Balance where it really counts

A balanced approach that considers human strengths and weaknesses will lead to a more flattering set of empirical findings, but will distract researchers from focusing on the mental processes that produce such findings and will diminish the practical implications of their work. Psychologists ought to be doing research that is theoretically informative and practically relevant, exactly as they are doing. If ideas come in and out of fashion, then those presented by Krueger & Funder (KF Griffin et al. 2001; Kahneman & Tversky 1996). We will not repeat that history by pointing out recurring misconceptions, but will focus instead on KF “disgust” can be reframed as “elevation” (Haidt 2003); and “stereotyping” as efficient “categorization.” Even the widely influential research program on heuristics and biases pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky assumed that the heuristics people used to guide everyday judgments were generally beneficial – an assumption polemically confirmed by Gigerenzer and colleagues in their research on “fast and frugal” heuristics. In other words, the same mental processes can lead to mental outcomes that are sometimes “ludicrous” (Tversky & Kahneman 1971, p. 109), and at other times can be the very things that “make us smart” (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). A focus on judgmental outcomes may create a rush to reframe previous research on human shortcomings as human strengths, or, worse, to “rediscover” mental processes that usually produce accurate judgments but occasionally lead to bias and error. Such a focus may lead some to believe that new insights have been gleaned when they have not, but this new gloss is unlikely to advance psychologists’ understanding of the human condition. Pursuing mental problems. Even a discipline balanced between mental processes and mental outcomes will gain more from an unbalanced focus on human shortcomings than on human strengths. KF Rozin & Royzman 2001; Taylor 1991). Failing hurts more than succeeding feels good. A few moments of self-reflection will make clear that a single colleague’s slight, lover’s insult, or negotiator’s misstep can ruin a day, a relationship, or a reconciliation. It is harder to think of analogous compliments, sweet nothings, or creative compromises. Mental shortcomings, in this regard, seem somewhat analogous to physical pain; they serve as a clear signal that something is wrong or needs to be fixed. It is therefore no more erroneous for psychologists to focus on alleviating the mental shortcomings of their participants than for physicians to focus on alleviating the pain of their patients. Just as we would encourage our colleagues and students to attend to their broken leg rather than their unbroken arm, so too will we continue to encourage them to work in areas where their work can best improve the human condition. Concluding thoughts. Waves of research come and go, and we doubt this clarion call for research on judgmental accuracy will create any more whiplash among researchers than any of its predecessors. K&F may be correct to hearken a regime change, but we hope the change will be to develop broader theoretical models, rather than simply add a new set of human strengths to the existing list of human shortcomings. Psychologists don’t so much need redirection to the study of human strengths as they need to focus on the mental processes underlying mental outcomes, maintaining balance where it really counts. Commentary/Krueger & Funder: Problem-seeking approach to social behavior and cognition BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:3 333