The power of the European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter

he European Parliament under the current cooperation procedure has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission of the European Communities, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify, since only qualified majority is required for acceptance, whereas full unanimity for modification. The importance of this power, which I call the power of the conditional agenda setter, has not been recognized in previous scholarly work. For structural reasons explained in the text, this power is likely to increase in the future. I conclude by arguing that the conditional delegation of power to international actors (the European Parliament, Commission, and the Court of Justice) is a frequent phenomenon in European institutions. This delegation presents three important advantages: it makes possible the selection of one among many possible equilibria, it accelerates European integration, and it diffuses responsibility for politically unpopular measures. T he European Parliament (EP) is widely considered a weak parliament (Dehouse 1989; Edward 1987; Fitzmaurice 1988; Lenaerts 1991; Lodge 1989; Wessels 1991). Moreover, discussions are frequently advanced about the "democratic deficit" of European institutions, which, among other things implies a weakness of the EP (Bogdanor 1989; Bowler and Farrell 1993; Thomas 1988; Williams 1991). Yet in 1989, the EP, when confronted with the common position of the Council of Ministers specifying low standards on exhaust emissions for small cars, raised the standards and was able to impose its decision on both the Commission of the European Communities and a "reluctant majority" in the Council of Ministers (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 170). According to the cooperation procedure established by the Single European Act treaty, the Council of Ministers can modify the position of the Parliament by a unanimous vote, but in this case the Council could not agree on any alternative. The legislation in question is far from trivial, since it affects around 60% of all passenger cars in the European Community (Kim 1992). Moreover, the differences in positions between the EP and the Council were significant: compared to the Council's position, the legislation adopted raised the price of small cars by more than five hundred dollars apiece and significantly improved the environment. I shall explain this surprising power of the EP. I argue that under the current cooperation procedure, the EP has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify (only qualified majority being required for acceptance but unanimity, for modification). I call this the power of the conditional agenda setter and study its properties. My answer generates a second question: If the EP is able to influence the legislative process so significantly, why does it not do so all the time? Alternatively, if the conditional agenda-setting power is significant, the EP should have been recognized in the literature as a strong parliament. To address these issues, I shall specify the conditions under which the EP can make use of its agenda-setting power. The European Community fascinates observers and scholars because it is a unique object of study. Accordingly, a series of neologisms have been invented to describe it. It is "neither a state nor an international organization" (Sbragia 1992, 257); "less than a Federation, more than a Regime" (W. Wallace