THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

MICHAEL J. MEESE (*) 1. INTRODUCTION The creation of the all-volunteer force (AVF) was one of the most difficult peacetime changes that the American military has ever conducted, and its successful implementation has been essential to American military success. At the time of its implementation, most senior military leaders, including the chief of staff of the army, General William Westmoreland, privately opposed the elimination of the draft, especially considering public hostility toward the army, declining budgets, reduced personnel, and the ongoing war in and withdrawal from Vietnam. (1) However, the powerful economic analysis and political persuasiveness of the Gates Commission's (1970) unanimous report prepared the nation for the end of conscription. Several authors (most recently Warner and Asch [2001]) have examined the economics and politics surrounding the AVF, especially the prescience of the Gates Commission as they estimated the impact of ending conscription. The Gates Commission's report necessarily had to make predictions about the impact of simultaneously changing several independent variables affecting military personnel planning. The AVF not only changed the source of enlisted soldiers but affected compensation, contract lengths, advertising, morale, soldier duties, training, officer procurement, and many other variables. Understandably, the Gates Commission and others examining the impact of an AVF made their estimates without knowing precisely how the military would adapt to all of these changes. This article examines the changes made by the U.S. Army's officer corps and within the officer corps, which has provided the leadership of the AVF since its implementation. Although the end of conscription is primarily thought of as affecting enlisted soldiers, it coincided with fundamental changes in the way that the officer corps led the army. This article discusses five fundamental ways that the army has adapted since the end of conscription: * The consideration of standards for the AVF * The increased emphasis on soldiers' pay, education, and training * The emphasis on families and quality of life * The increased diversity in the officer corps leadership * The increasingly distinctive approach of the officer corps Taken together, these changes not only reinforce the soundness of the decision to end conscription but also illustrate the importance of continuing to ensure that the army, especially the officer corps, is effectively managed to ensure its continued contribution to national defense. II. STANDARDS FOR THE AVF One of the most important questions facing the AVE was how to retain quality soldiers without conscription. Indeed one of the objections that the Gates Commission (1970, p. 18) explicitly addressed was: "Objection 8: A voluntary force will be less effective because not enough highly qualified youths will be likely to enlist and pursue military careers." With increased pay, significant advertising, and full national support, the initial implementation of the AVE was successful. The secretary of the army, Howard H. Callaway, proclaimed: "The volunteer Army is a success. Yesterday (30 June 1974) the volunteer Army proved that it was a success by ending the fiscal year in excess of its authorized strength of 781,600. This was achieved through a record of enlistments of over 199,000 volunteers and the unusually high reenlistment of nearly 58,000 men and women. That's what I call a successful volunteer Army and I am proud to be a part of it." (quoted in Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel [2000, p. 51]). Almost imm ediately, public and budgetary support for the army waned. By 1976, the Vietnam-era GI Bill ended, recruiting budgets were reduced, and the economy was improving. Pay increases did not keep up with inflation, so that by 1980 army salaries had lost 25% of their purchasing power compared with 1974. …