Counterfactuals and the Study of the American Presidency

There is little reason to suspect that [Andrew] Jackson or any of the other candidates contending in 1824 would have done much better. As none had a convincing case for breaking openly with the old order, none had the capacity to untangle the conundrum [John Quincy] Adams wrestled with. --Stephen Skowronek (1993, 127) [Faced with deciding whether to seek apolitical or military solution in Vietnam, Lyndon] Johnson opted for military power, first ordering the bombing of North Vietnam and then committing a mounting U.S. ground force to combat in Vietnam. Would a President [Hubert H.] Humphrey have taken a different course of action than Johnson? ... It is probable that he would have.... These examples remind us, it [the U.S. government] is one in which the matter of who occupies the nation's highest office can have profound repercussions. --Fred I. Greenstein (2000, 2) These epigraphs provide examples of the use of counterfactual thought experiments in the study of the American presidency. Though these thought experiments are never fully developed by their respective authors, both perform the valuable function of highlighting the (un)importance of the individual who is president. Indeed, for Skowronek (1993), the individual who occupies the presidency is not as important as the context in which that individual assumes office. On the other hand, for Greenstein (2000), it is the individual who makes the difference. There is nothing new about counterfactual inference in social science. Max Weber (1949) long ago argued vehemently for the need to employ counterfactuals to solidify causal explanations. Furthermore, a burgeoning number of political scientists have written extensively on the use of counterfactuals (Elster 1978, 1983; Fearon 1991, 1996; Tetlock 1998, 1999a, 1999b, forthcoming; Lebow 2000b). Tetlock and Belkin (1996a) have also recently produced an anthology dealing with counterfactual analysis in world politics. Tetlock, Lebow, and Parker (forthcoming) have produced a similar volume, employing counterfactuals to examine the role of various causal factors in the making of the Western world. What is new, or rather, what I will argue should be new, is their use in the literature on the presidency to test theories. Despite their apparent usage in the presidency literature, relatively little has been discussed of the use of counterfactuals. Consider the following passage from Richard Neustadt's (1990) classic text on the presidency: Bargaining advantages convey no guarantees. Influence remains a two-way street. In the fortunate instance of the Marshall Plan, what Truman needed was actually in the hands of men who were prepared to "trade" with him. He personally could deliver what they wanted in return. [Secretary of State George C.] Marshall, [Senator Arthur H.] Vandenberg, [Secretary of Commerce Averell] Harriman, et al., possessed the prestige, energy, associations, staffs essential to the legislative effort. Truman himself had a sufficient hold on presidential messages and speeches, on budget policy, on high-level appointments, and on his own time and temper to carry through all aspects of his necessary part. But it takes two to make a bargain. It takes those who have prestige to lend it on whatever terms. Suppose that Marshall had declined the secretaryship of state in January 1947; Truman might not have found a substitute so well equipped to furnish what he needed in the months ahead. Or suppose that Vandenberg had fallen victim to a cancer two years before he actually did; Senator [Alexander] Wiley of Wisconsin would not have seemed to [Senator Robert A.] Taft a man with whom the world need be divided. Or suppose that the secretary of the treasury had been possessed of stature, force, and charm commensurate with that of his successor in Eisenhower's time, the redoubtable George M. …