Collective Security and UN Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible

I. THE UN's ORIGINAL MISSION Article 1(1) of the UN Charter states the primary purpose of the international organization thus: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Such an ambitious commitment to a new international order raised not only high hopes but also crucial questions regarding its implementation. Who is to determine whether there has been a breach of "international peace and security"? What "collective measures" are to be taken in the event of such a breach, and by whom? These crucial questions were not overlooked by the nations as they negotiated the post-war order and, in the words of the Charter's preamble, set about preparing the contours of a new institutional process by which "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." After forty million deaths caused by the just-ended conflict,1 states well understood the necessity for collective security and sought to invent a process-replete with parliamentary, executive and judicial institutions2-which, if utilized properly, would ensure against the recurrence of such global catastrophes by timely decisions and effective means. The Charter does establish norms, procedures and a process for implementing collective security. Article 39 authorizes the security Council to make the crucial threshold determination as to the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to decide which of the measures enumerated in Articles 41 and 42 to invoke in dealing with the problem. These measures are not trivial and range from diplomatic and economic sanctions3 to "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."4 In Article 43, the ratifying parties even agreed to establish and "contribute to" an armed force "available to the security Council, on its call. . . for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."5 How well did this plan succeed? The answer to that question appropriately serves as surrogate for another: how necessary is it, sixty years after it was instituted, to reform the UN system? The question is not easily answered in abstract theoretical terms. Some parts of the answer are clear. The promised stand-by force was never created-no states having carried out their obligation to negotiate the necessary agreement with the security Council.6 Peacekeeping-type operations in Namibia,7 Cambodia,8 Mozambique,9 Haiti,10 Liberia,11 Sierra Leone,12 the Ivory Coast13 and, so far, Kosovo14 may be accounted qualified successes. Somalia,15 Rwanda16 and Bosnia17 stand out as failures. Other evidence of success and failure is more ambiguous. Ultimately, how one assesses the first sixty years of UN collective security will depend not only on one's appraisal of what has happened, but also on what has not happened. Yes, there have been notable instances of aggression which the collective security system has failed to anticipate and suppress.18 Much more difficult to weigh against the ample instances of non-compliance are the many instances in which the system worked to avert, or end a conflict.19 Even more difficult to measure is the phenomenon of "the dog that did not bark": instances when states may have been tempted to resort to unlawful force but did not do so, choosing instead to resolve a dispute by peaceful means in deference to the rules and the perceived cost of violating them.20 Then, too, performance must always be balanced against expectations, realistic or optimistic, which are necessarily subjective. On balance, given the failure to establish a standing force and the problems created by the Cold War, the first half-century of the collective security system's operation may have been like Dr. Johnson's doe walking on his hind legs, remarkable less for having performed badly than for having performed at all. …