Wading Through the "Morass": The Eleventh Circuit Recognizes a Right to Candidacy in Randall v. Scott

Introduction"Precedent in the area of constitutional protection for candidacy can best be described as a legal morass," opined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in its 2010 decision, Randall v. Scott.1 Randall tackles a question that has split the circuits: does the First Amendment protect a public employee who is fired for announcing his candidacy for elective office?2 Charting new ground, the Eleventh Circuit held that the First Amendment affords protection to an individual based on the mere fact of that individual's political candidacy.3Part I of this Comment summarizes the Eleventh Circuit's Randall decision.4 Part II examines the limited Supreme Court precedent on First Amendment protections for political candidacy and surveys the contradictory approaches that other circuits have taken in addressing the issue.5 Part III then evaluates the Eleventh Circuit's novel approach, concluding that the Randall method, although well intentioned, is tenuously grounded in Supreme Court precedent.6I. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision in Randall v. ScottIn 2007, Earl Randall was the chief of staff to Jewel Scott, the District Attorney of Clayton County, Georgia.7 In late September, Randall declared his intent to run for chairman of the Clayton County Board of Commissioners.8 Within days, Jewel Scott informed Randall that her husband, Lee Scott, intended to run for chairman as well and that he was angered by Randall's candidacy, believing that it would split voters who wanted to vote against the incumbent candidate.9 In the months that followed, Lee Scott allegedly pressured his wife to fire Randall unless he backed out of the race.10 Jewel Scott told Randall that he was "making life difficult" for her and warned him that if he stayed in the race he might lose his job.11 In December, five days after receiving an invitation to a fundraiser for Randall's campaign, Jewel Scott fired him.12Randall brought an action in Georgia state court asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jewel Scott in her individual and official capacities.13 Scott removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Randall's complaint failed to state a First Amendment violation and, alternatively, that she was immune from suit.14 The district court granted Scott's motion to dismiss.15 The court reasoned that, under a heightened pleading standard applicable to § 1983 claims, "the mere fact that Randall decided to run for political office and held an event in connection with his candidacy is not enough to trigger First Amendment protection." 16 Randall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.17On June 30, 2010, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Randall v. Scott.18 The panel held that the district court erred in applying a heightened pleading standard to Randall's § 1983 complaint and remanded the case.19 Because the lower court "[made] explicit" that Scott's motion to dismiss would have been granted under any pleading standard, the panel then addressed the First Amendment question as well.20The panel concluded that, contrary to the district court's analysis, the "mere fact" of Randall's political candidacy did trigger sufficient First Amendment protection to overcome Scott's motion to dismiss.21 Although there was no U.S. Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent squarely analogous to Randall's situation, the court stated that "every case addressing the issue has found at least some constitutional protection" for candidacy.22 At the Supreme Court level, several cases had addressed restrictions on ballot access (such as large filing fees) and explained that "[f]ar from recognizing candidacy as a fundamental right, we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny."23 Nevertheless, the Randall court opined, these cases still suggested that "political candidacy is entitled to at least a modicum of constitutional protection. …