Interest Group Lobbying and U.S. House Decentralization: Linking Informational Focus to Committee Hearing Appearances

Using extensive interview and committee testimony data across two contrasting sets of interests (environmental and labor), this article examines the effects of changing House institutional structure on legislative lobbying. Specifically, I argue that the institutional context of the postreform House has altered the role of lobbyists as information providers by expanding the scope of the conflict to different committees, forcing groups to lobby a wider variety of legislative actors. Relying upon a distinction between `technical' and `political' information, I contend that the effect of decentralizing reforms is strengthened or attenuated by the informational focus of the interest group. Using longitudinal committee testimony data (1959-92) for ten groups, I show that the mid-1970s House reforms had differential effects on environmental groups and labor unions-in part, depending on group informational focus. The results have implications for studies of lobbying tactics, theories of information provision, and models of legislative institutional structure. Various scholars have recently identified important links between changing institutional arrangements and the strategic context of political decision-making (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 1994). In addition, much research on interest groups focuses explicitly on the informational nature of lobbying (Austen-- Smith and Riker 1987 and 1990; Hansen 1991; Leyden 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Wright 1996). By focusing on interest groups as legislative information providers, this study examines the effect of a changing U.S. House institutional structure on the lobbying context for interest group representatives. In particular, since institutional changes leading to the post-reform House have altered the legislative context by expanding the scope of the conflict to different committees, interest groups are forced to lobby more legislative actors with a wider variety of preferences. I hypothesize that the impact of reforms on group lobbying depends upon group informational focus-specifically on a `technical' or `political' information classification defined in the article. While the 1970s reforms led to heightened legislative activity for all interests, the effect of group informational specialization means that some groups experienced more significant changes than others. This article provides a variety of qualitative and quantitative evidence to test these hypothesized effects of House reforms on interest group activity. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE HOUSE House Decentralization and the Levels and Focus of Lobbying In many ways, the 1970s was a pivotal decade for the national legislative process in the United States as the House of Representatives underwent significant changes. Formally decision making in the House became more decentralized and fragmented. The number of subcommittees increased, overlapping committee jurisdictions were institutionalized, and multiple referral was instituted. Committee chair power was substantially reduced as subcommittees were given more rights. Informally, as junior legislators received more formal resources and power, norms of committee deference, seniority and apprenticeship were damaged (Smith and Deering 1990). This transformation of the institutional setting was the culmination of other changes in the electoral arena that had been occurring since the 1950s. Scholars identified the rise of the "personal vote" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; also Mayhew 1974; Mann 1978; Alford and Brady 1989, 1993). Changes in split-ticket voting rates, the introduction of party primaries, and campaign finance law changes produced an overall rise in independence among members of Congress. These institutional and electoral context changes made the 1970s a watershed period for the legislative process. From the heightened power of first-term legislators to the fragmented nature of the process, things would be more complicated for anyone trying to "work the Hill" (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Cigler and Loomis 1991). …