Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Comparative Advantage in Trade Relationships: An Interactive Game

[Author Affiliation]Eric P Chiang, Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University, 777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA; chiang@fau.edu[Acknowledgment]This paper has benefited from excellent comments from Janice Hauge, an anonymous referee, and the editor, Laura Razzolini. I also thank my current and former students who participated in the many trials of this game.1. IntroductionThe concept of comparative advantage, that individuals or countries can gain from specializing in the activity in which their opportunity cost is lower, is a fundamental tool taught in economics. And although comparative advantage is used most extensively in classes relating to international trade, it is a concept introduced in virtually all principles of economics textbooks, and hence, presumably most principles classes. Yet, on first introduction of comparative advantage, the concept is often not fully grasped by the typical student. One reason for this is that the definition of comparative advantage itself does not lend to easy application in the real world. Telling students to specialize in activities with lower opportunity cost is often a foreign concept without proceeding further into the ideas of gains from specialization and terms of trade. In this paper, I present the layout of an interactive classroom game that highlights each of the essential elements of comparative advantage in a way that students can better grasp the underlying intuition and importance of this concept.Classroom experiments emphasizing comparative advantage are not uncommon. Various authors have developed innovative classroom experiments to help students understand the notion of comparative advantage and the value of specialization and trade. For example, Stodder (1994) pairs students to represent either the United States or Mexico to show that gains from trade can exist despite one country having an absolute advantage in the production of all goods. In Haupert's (1996) experiment, students possessing one of four production functions attempt to achieve their respective consumption goals by interacting with other students. More recent papers have incorporated utility functions into their games. For example, Bergstrom and Miller (2000) developed a game that uses a simple utility function defined by the minimum quantity of two goods produced, whereas Anderson et al. (2005) introduced a Cobb-Douglas utility function to more realistically incorporate the role of preferences in trade. Last, a web-based game entitled the Ricardian Explorer offers an alternative approach to the traditional classroom game that is useful in classes where computers are readily available (Isgut, Ravishanker, and Rosenblat 2005).In the game presented in this paper, I emphasize the role of asymmetric information and negotiation in trade relationships. Unlike prior games, there are no predetermined trade partners; instead, each student represents a distinct firm that can benefit from trade with nearly all other firms. The contribution of the game is that the extent of the gains from specialization depends on estimating the privately known production functions of other firms and negotiating the terms of trade on the basis of available information.The procedure of the game is simple: Students representing firms with an endowed production function openly negotiate to form partnerships to increase their own profit. This game has wide application: it can be effective in a class with as few as four students and in a class with over 100 students, it can be played by principles of economics students as well as graduate students, and it can be played and discussed within a 50-minute class period.2. Essential Elements of Comparative AdvantageThe elements of comparative advantage can be described by the following: (i) individuals can have a comparative advantage in an activity (and benefit from specialization) despite not having an absolute advantage in that activity, (ii) the gains from specialization are greatest when individuals have the most heterogeneous skill sets, and (iii) the extent of each individual's share of the gains from specialization is often left to negotiation, with asymmetric information playing an influential role. …