Distributional Implications of the Extended Economic Zone: Some Policy and Research Issues in the Fishery: Discussion

We heartily applaud Bromley's paper. As expected, it is provocative. We agree with his premise that "there are important insights to be gained by a more careful specification of the traditional steady-state/yield-effort models and by viewing the economics of extended jurisdiction in a welfare theoretic framework." However, we are concerned with two particular aspects of the paper. Bromley seems to go beyond the identification of distributional consequences of fishery policy and suggests certain fishery policies because of their distributional consequences. Economists generally employ theoretical constructs in order to predict the consequences (distributional or otherwise) of alternative policies. Theoretical constructs do not prescribe policy "for the greatest possible benefit of all of us." Economists must therefore doff their economists' hats when they enter the policy-making arena. Bromley does not tell us when he is wearing his economist's hat and when he is wearing his manager's hat (nor do Crutchfield or Bell, as quoted in Bromley's paper). We would prefer a clearer distinction between Bromley's use of welfare theory to provide policy prescriptions (normative) and Bromley's use of welfare theory in predicting consequences of policy decisions (positive). Our second concern relates to the role of distribution in welfare theory. Bromley argues that efficiency (or maximum net economic rent) is only one socially relevant variable. We agree. He then introduces distributional considerations. Does this imply that distribution is another socially relevant variable, or is distribution another dimension of efficiency? If distribution is another socially relevant variable, are there not many more that deserve consideration? The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 contains an extensive list of socially relevant variables. Our own experience suggests that fishery participants would rank efficiency fairly low on an extensive list of socially relevant variables. If distribution is another dimension of efficiency (as implied in Bromley's discussion of "access"), what of the distributional dimensions of the other socially relevant variables? We suspect that the current controversy over allocation of fish (or fishing rights) is more closely related to who gets fish, flexibility, etc., than to who gets what share of the maximum net economic rent. In substituting the net economic rent criterion for the maximum sustainable yield criterion, economists have exposed themselves to the same criticisms leveled at proponents of the maximum sustainable yield criterion. Our model is still single valued and incomplete. Fortunately, the new management regime created by the Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976 provides for public hearings where potential gainers and losers cannot only identify socially relevant variables but can express priorities for distribution. Bromley emphasizes that fishing families are "not mere pounds of fertilizer, acre-feet of water, or tons of bauxite." We find it unfortunate that he dismisses, by implication, the rewards accruing to owners of fertilizer, water, and bauxite, who may also have families. The international model presented by Bromley appears to have a variety of interesting applications. For example, it might be used to predict the reaction of Japan (i.e., country B) to the current management policies under the U.S. (country A) Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. In contrast to BromRichard S. Johnston and Frederick J. Smith are with the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University.