“International Orphans” — The Chinese in Thailand During World War II

Historians of Southeast Asia are quite familiar with the flexible "bamboo" diplomacy which permitted Thai politicians to avert national disaster during World War II, but have paid less attention to the equally pragmatic wartime survival strategy pursued by the leaders of Thailand's Chinese community. This study examines Japanese efforts to win the cooperation of this intrinsically hostile, but economically vital, segment of Thailand's population, the impact of the Japanese presence on the troubled relationship between the Chinese and the Thai authorities, and the ability of certain Chinese capitalists to turn adversity to advantage.(1) The "International Orphans" While the intrusion of Japanese troops into Thailand on 8 December 1941 shocked the entire nation, Bangkok had enjoyed friendly relations with Tokyo prior to the war and Premier Phibun Songkhram and his ministers hoped for sympathetic treatment from the invaders. In contrast, because the Chinese in Thailand had actively supported a series of anti-Japanese boycotts in response to Japan's aggressive actions in China, the immigrant community's leaders could anticipate nothing but repression from the Japanese army. Their situation seemed all the more perilous because they could expect little protection from the Thai authorities. When the boycott movement had turned violent after the outbreak of full-scale war between China and Japan in 1937, the Thai government, eager for smooth relations with the Japanese, had suppressed it. Moreover, the military-dominated Phibun government, which had come to power at the end of 1938, initiated a nationalistic program designed to weaken Chinese links with their homeland and encourage assimilation. Phibun's regime closed all Chinese schools and all but one Chinese-language newspaper, arrested and deported a number of politically active Chinese, and implemented various measures aimed at weakening the dominant role of non-citizen Chinese in the nation's economy. Also, from May 1941 the government had begun issuing a series of decrees barring non-citizens from militarily sensitive areas of the country.(2) The Chinese in Thailand had nowhere to turn for assistance in seeking relief from the Thai government's measures. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's(3) Chinese Nationalist government did not have formal diplomatic relations with Thailand because Bangkok had refused such connections. This stance reflected longstanding Thai concern that Chinese diplomats inevitably would interfere in domestic politics by attempting to protect and promote the interests of the resident Chinese nationals. Moreover, given the weak and war-beleaguered state of Chiang's government, Bangkok found it easy to ignore any complaints or entreaties emanating from that quarter. The Japanese, of course, were pleased by the Thai crackdown. The rival British, who were seeking to shore up their increasingly weak regional position by appeasing Phibun, raised no objections. Thus the Chinese in Thailand became, as a Japanese intelligence report would later describe them, "international orphans"(4) who had to fend for themselves. Under these circumstances the community's leaders, the successful businessmen who headed the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the associations representing various South Chinese linguistic groups, saw no alternative but to bow to the pressures applied by the Thai government. Overt anti-Japanese campaigns ended, although the Chinese quietly continued to raise relief funds and recruit young volunteers to help Nationalist China in its struggle for survival.(5) Well aware of this, Japanese diplomats in Thailand searched for means to induce the Chinese to switch their loyalties from the Nationalist government in Chungking to the Tokyo-sponsored Wang Ching-wei regime in occupied Nanking. In light of the aggressive Japanese actions in China this was an uphill effort at best, and matters were not helped by the fact that credible pro-Nanking agents were hard to find. …