Common Sense Is Not Consensus: Professional Ethics as Marksman Ship

Tjeltveit's response to Hathaway's proposal to ground ethics on natural moral sense raises several significant issues and extends the discussion in important directions. Yet some of these issues arise from a misunderstanding of subtle but vital aspects of common sense ethics. Despite the cogent concerns raised by Tjeltveit, the central value of common sense ethics as a foundation for ethical practice remains. More importantly, no feasible alternative is readily apparent. The one promised by Tjeltveit either is unclear or does not fare as well as the common sense alternative suggested in Hathaway's proposal. Contrary to his claim that common sense ethics is unlikely to produce moral excellence, a grounding of ethical judgment in the moral sense provides concrete resources for superlative ethical judgment and inspiration. Treating moral judgment as, at least in part, a sense opens the door for a vision of moral discernment as marksmanship. The fundamental assumption that one is aiming at 'hitting' objective mor al truth motivates serious ethical concern. An emphasis on the natural moral sense in the context of moral realism also results in a commitment to precision under varied conditions of practice. Such a view does nor inadequately consider the role of sin. Rather it takes literally and seriously the deep meaning behind the most common biblical term for sin: hamartia. Tjeltveit (2001) has highlighted several important issues that are under-addressed in my common sense moral realist account of professional ethics and for which, he alleges, such an approach falls short (Hathaway, 2001). These concerns are varied: suggesting that commonsense moral realism fails to adequately appreciate the historical-conventional origins of moral judgments, the deep moral divides that can be seen in psychological controversies such as the debate over altruism versus egoism, the extent to which such an approach may preclude Christians from tapping the full resources of their particular ethical traditions, the impact of sin on the natural moral sense, and results in an ethical grounding for professional practice that is "too thin." Tjehveit asks important and relevant questions of my account and makes several assertions that I find little disagreement with. I have attempted to avoid making a straw man out of Tjelveit's concerns with my proposal in that recognize that he does not espouse a clear or pervasive form of postmodern relativism. To his credit, he also talks favorably about fallible moral realism, describes some things as 'real' and certainly expresses a healthy concern for giving uncompromising voice to a Christian ethical tradition. In all of these ways, he cannot be reduced to a simple relativist. Furthermore, I agree with his recognition of the importance of tradition and historical context in understanding moral views. But two broad problems exist with his criticisms. One involves a misunderstanding of the relationship of consensus and common sense; the second involves what appears to be postmodern, relativist leanings in his own perspective that lead him to a mistaken assessment of common sense moral realism on some key points. Though he may not intend to promote a postmodern or relativistic view, I think that some of his criticisms rely on postmodern and relativist outlooks for their force. Consider the following statements made by Tjeltveit: * "The socially constructed character of psychotherapy presents a serious problem for an approach that draws upon a 'natural' moral sense" (pg. 6). * "Therapy (and professional ethics) are based, not just on one's environment and natural sense; they are also traceable to ethical ideas and cultural practices that influence psychologists" (pg. 7). * "... applied psychology is in substantial measure, I think, a social construction, rather than being a natural human development" (pg. 8). Tjelveit's concerns about my proposal highlight genuine challenges to any attempt to provide a general grounding to professional ethics. …