The Information Quality Act: The Little Statute That Could (Or Couldn't?) Applying the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 to the Federal Communications Commission

I. INTRODUCTION II. THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT A. Risk Analysis Under the Safe Drinking Water Act B. Office of Management and Budget's Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 C. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996: A Review of Criticisms III. HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION UNDER THE FCC GUIDELINES A. The FCC Has Neither Adopted Nor Adapted the Safe Drinking Water Act Standard B. The FCC Engages in Analysis of Risks to Human Health, Safety, and the Environment; Therefore, the FCC Should Adopt or Adapt the Safe Drinking Water Act Standard of C. Regulation of Environmental Risk." FCC Environmental Regulations D. Regulation of Risks to Public Health & Safety: Radio frequency Exposure Regulations IV. SOCIAL RISK ANALYSIS UNDER THE OMB GUIDELINES: APPLICATION OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1996 TO SOCIAL SCIENCE A. Regulatory Authority B. Social Science as Risk Analysis Under the OMB Guidelines 1. Psychological Harms to Human Health and Safety 2. Physical Harms to Human Health and Safety V. SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1996: THE RISK OF RISK ANALYSIS UNDER THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT A. Incorporation of the SDWAA by the FCC is Consistent with the Information Quality Act B. The Safe Drinking Water Act--Good Government Under the Data Quality Act C. To Adapt or Adopt?: That is the Question D. Adaptation of the Safe Drinking Water Act: Something to Consider VII. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION This is the era of regulation by information. (1) More than at any other time in American history, (2) U.S. lawmakers rely upon information in the formation of state policy. With this in mind, Congress has passed several laws designed to ensure the quality of government-disseminated information. (3) However, Congress had no such design when it passed the Information Quality Act ("IQA")--also referred to as the Data Quality Act. (4) Slipped into the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (5) as an appropriations rider, the IQA was subject to no legislative hearings, no committee review, and no congressional debate. (6) At first blush, the IQA appears to be benign--a good government statute. (7) Despite its seemingly good intentions, (8) the IQA has been met with fierce public resistance. (9) Written by industry lobbyist Jim Tozzi' who now heads the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness ("CRE"), the IQA comes at the heels of several unsuccessful attempts by Tozzi to get Congress to raise the evidentiary requirement of regulation. (10) Not discouraged, Tozzi worked with Jo Ann Emerson (R-Mo.) (11) who snuck the IQA--two sentences long--into the 712-page Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001. (12) Despite its size, the IQA "packs quite a wallop." (13) The IQA's mandate is four pronged: (1) Public Law 106-554 [section] 515(a) entrusts the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") with providing "policy and procedural" guidance to federal agencies to ensure the "quality, objectivity, utility and integrity" ("quality") of federally disseminated information; (2) [section] 515(b)(2)(A) compels each individual agency to formulate their own guidelines in an effort to achieve the same objective; (3) [section] 515(b)(2)(B) requires each agency, in formulating those guidelines, to establish an appeals process whereby third parties may challenge the quality of disseminated information; and (4) [section] 515(b)(2)(C) demands that each agency periodically update the OMB as to the number of complaints received and the agency's response--quite the feat for the two-sentence long appropriations rider. What the IQA does not do, however, has fueled the debate between public interest groups and the private sector. …