Checking the Boss: Executive-Legislative Relations in Novgorod and Pskov, 1992-2005

Why do similar sub-national polities exhibit drastically different levels of parliamentary strength? Novgorod and Pskov oblast are small, adjacent provinces in the northwestern part of the Russian Federation, nearly indistinguishable on the variables the literature identifies as predictors of democratization – economic development, ethnic makeup, cultural legacies, and levels of resource endowment. The provinces are also similar in population size, composition of the economy between industry and agriculture, status vis-a-vis the federal budget (both are recipient regions, heavily dependent on subsidies by the federal government), World War II history (both occupied and nearly completely leveled) and even medieval period history (ancient city-states).Yet, during the first decade of their existence following the collapse of communism, the newly created legislative bodies in the two provinces could not have behaved more differently. The Novgorod Oblast Duma (Council) was from the first day of its creation a classic rubberstamp body, a mere appendage to the gubernatorial administration. Typically, deputies voted on resolutions after less than five minutes of deliberation and passed them unanimously. Agendas consisting of over thirty items were rushed through two-hour sessions while budget bills, the most important piece of legislation in a given year, passed smoothly with only occasional cosmetic revisions. The body can hardly be taken seriously as a parliament. In contrast, the Pskov Zakonodatel’noe Sobranie (Legislative Assembly) consistently displayed a degree of autonomy and strength vis-a-vis gubernatorial administrations that often came close to the intended checks-and-balances arrangement. Particularly during the first ZS (94 -98), lawmakers successfully completed veto overrides, questioned and criticized senior administration officials on spending, rejected or significantly amended budget bills, and rebuffed attempts on the part of the executive to expand formal powers or centralize tax revenue flows within the region. The outcome of three different gubernatorial election campaigns was influenced by decisions made on the assembly floor.In addition to executive-legislative relations, the divergence in outcomes between the two regions extends to political contestation. In Novgorod, governor Prussak reigned virtually unchallenged from early 1992, when he was appointed by President Yeltsin, to 2007, in the meantime cruising to victory in three gubernatorial elections with impressive levels of support. For example, in September of 1999 he collected a staggering 92% of the vote (Table 1). If Novgorod had been a sovereign state instead of a federal subject, by 2007 it would have been a consolidated dictatorship (or perhaps a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime).Pskov, on the other hand, is a relative outlier within the federation in terms of political contestation. On two separate occasions gubernatorial heads rolled – an anomaly from the gradual drift toward authoritarianism across the federation. The second time occurred in early 2005 when an incumbent officially supported by the pro-presidential United Russia party was defeated in a rare loss for the Kremlin.How can we account for this dramatic divergence of regime trajectories in spite of the remarkable similarity of starting conditions? Following a brief literature review that situates the study within existing work, I address the question through careful process tracing of the early institutional formation period in the two regions. The analytic focus falls on a seemingly minor rule in regional charters regarding eligibility for assembly deputies that, I argue, had profound implications for parliamentary autonomy. Then, I examine the link between autonomy and contestation by reviewing the role that the two legislatures played in resisting or assisting the governor’s electoral grip on the region.