Adhere Resolutely to a Mistake: The Florida Taxpayer Standing Cases

Since at least 1856 and well into the modern era a taxpayer in Florida had standing to sue to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of state or local government funds on the theory that such expenditure would result in the injury of increasing his taxes. The unlawful expenditure could take many forms and the factual basis of the cases are quite varied. The rule existed along side an equitable principle that for someone to sue to enjoin a public nuisance that person had to show a special injury different from the public generally. In 1917, the Florida Supreme Court decided the Rickman case that should have had no effect on the rule. The Court held that if the illegality did not threaten an increase in the plaintiff's taxes then, like the public nuisance equitable principle, the plaintiff would have to show some injury unique to him. On its face, this seems to be unremarkable. And for a while it was. Then, in 1941, the supreme court applied what had by then become known as the Rickman rule to a case where something akin to public nuisance, not taxpayer standing, was the issue. In doing so, Rickman was interpreted to require unique injury. The ruling is consistent with the public nuisance rule but the use of Rickman was the beginning of the downfall of taxpayer standing in Florida. In 1972, the Supreme Court seemed to assume that Rickman required a taxpayer plaintiff to show more than the threat of increased taxes in the form of an injury unique to him. Of course, Rickman had required this "special injury" but if, and only if, the taxpayer plaintiff could not demonstrate the threat of increased taxes. Acting on this assumption, the Court, borrowing from the United States Supreme Court's Flast decision created an exception to the supposed inability of a taxpayer to sue without showing an injury unique to him, the "special injury." The exception was that even without showing a "special injury," a taxpayer could sue to enjoin an allegedly unconstitutional exercise of the Legislature's appropriation power, the so-called Horne exception to the now new and mistaken view of taxpayer standing. In the early 1980's, three judge panels of three different Florida District Courts of Appeal considered the issue of taxpayer standing. Seven of the nine judges involved aligned themselves with the original understanding of taxpayer standing in Florida. One of those cases went to the Florida Supreme Court. At that point, it made it clear that, in the view of the supreme court majority, the rule that a taxpayer plaintiff would have to show an injury unique to him, not just a threatened increase in his taxes along with all other taxpayers was not only the rule but had been so since the 1941 case referred to earlier. The dissent was persuasive but changed nothing. In the 1990's, a Florida District Court of Appeal, while holding consistent with the Florida Supreme Court's taxpayer standing rule tried to convince the Court that it had misinterpreted the Rickman rule and should reconsider the issue. This invitation was flatly refused based primarily on its 1941 decision which, as explained earlier, did not even involve taxpayer standing. As the article's conclusion points out, this leaves the protection of taxpayers to public watchdogs such as the attorney general.