The Effects of Party and Agenda Control Assessing the Ideological Orientation of Legislation Directing Bureaucratic Behavior

AbstractAn expansive literature examines the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy, but scholars know very little about the ideological orientation of congressional influence over bureaucratic institutions. In this project, the authors formally examine the policy implications of various theoretical models of legislative voting. They then analyze House roll call voting behavior on legislation directing the Environmental Protection Agency. The authors find compelling support for a model in which the majority party controls the agenda and members vote according to their preferences. This finding suggests that congressional influence in the form of legislative directives will favor a moderate faction of the majority party.Keywordsbureaucratic control, legislative voting, congressional parties, agenda setting(ProQuest: ... denotes formula omitted.)Students of American politics have long been interested in studying the factors influencing bureaucratic institutions. After all, agencies play a vital role in the realization of public policy, and to some extent are controlled by outside entities. While a number of studies have identified sources of influence, few specify the ideological nature of this influence.1 This project seeks to offer some insight into this matter by examining roll call voting behavior on legislation instructing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).We suggest that much can be learned from examining the voting behavior of members of Congress within the framework of congressional decision-making models. In particular, we theoretically explore the policy implications of competing models of party- and preference-driven decision making. Each model, we demonstrate, offers distinct expectations for policy outcomes. We then turn to analyzing the roll call voting behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives on all measures instructing the EPA between the 101st and 110th Congresses (1989- 2008). We find compelling evidence to support a theoretical model of majority party agenda control, in which members vote according to their preferences. This suggests that EPA legislation favors a moderate faction of the majority party.This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical motivations for examining EPA legislation in the context of models of legislative decision making. We then identify and compare the locations of outcomes predicted by various theoretical models of voting behavior. Following this, we discuss the use of the EPA for this analysis. We proceed to analyze roll call data on measures instructing the EPA. Finally, we explore the implications of the findings and provide suggestions for further research.Ideological Orientation of Legislation Directing the BureaucracyA sizable literature explores the forces that influence bureaucratic institutions. While there is some debate surrounding the principal that agencies are most responsive to (Wood and Waterman 1991; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987), it is generally accepted that Congress plays a central role in shaping agencies and their performance 411101PRQ65310.1177/1065912911411101Meagh (Wood 1990). Furthermore, it appears that Congress is actively interested in influencing bureaucratic behavior (Aberbach 1990). Congress is capable of exerting influence in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, legislation. Legislation remains Congress's most powerful and commonly used means of explicitly affecting change in bureaucratic behavior (Wood and Waterman 1993; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994; Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner 2003). Whether for preemptive or reactionary purposes, a legislative strategy reflects Congress's desire to influence bureaucratic practices.2 Yet we know little about the ideological content of legislation instructing bureaucratic agencies.There is a vast and fruitful literature examining the influence Congress has on the bureaucracy. …