Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries

This article presents and establishes the significance of the Nuclear Arsenal Games, which investigates behaviour within dyads experiencing a crisis. It assumes that nuclear and quasi-nuclear states act according to the size and potential of their own nuclear force structure and that of their opponent. This article argues that the size and potential damage an arsenal poses determines actor preferences within a crisis situation. The specific objective here is to propose a nuclear index for use in empirical studies and offer an example of one game-theoretic approach of crisis interaction that indicates whether preferences and predicted behaviour adhere to the assumptions of Classical (or Rational) Deterrence Theory. Resume. Cet article explique et d6montre la port6e des ?jeux de l'arsenal nucl6aire> qui examinent le comportement des 1tats durant une crise. Ces jeux stipulent que, dans une telle situation, les Etats qui posshdent ou qui sont sur le point de possfder une force nucl6aire agissent en fonction de la taille et du potentiel de leur propre arsenal nuclfaire et de celui de leurs adversaires. Cet article soutient que les prrf6rences des acteurs, lors d'une crise, sont d6terminfes par l'importance du dommage potentiel que peut causer un arsenal nucl6aire. De manibre plus sp6cifique, il propose un index des forces nucl6aires utiles pour les 6tudes empiriques et pr6sente une approche des intdractions en situation de crise de la thdorie des jeux qui permet de v6rifier si les pr6f6rences et les comportements prrvisibles des acteurs confirment les hypotheses de la thdorie classique (ou rationnelle) de la dissuasion. Mini-arsenal presents more specifically a minimal nuclear capability and its relation to crisis behaviour. This is perhaps the most complex, and therefore difficult, level to describe. First, a mini-arsenal state is capable of acquiring, at best, two or three, crude Hiroshima or Nagasaki-style warheads. Fat Man, the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, was about 20 kilotons, the more powerful of the two used by the United States in 1945. This pales in comparison to thermonuclear weapons, that are measured in megatons. India, Israel and Pakistan, which can project significant nuclear threats, are beyond this category since the arsenals they are believed to possess contain qualitatively and quantitatively much more destructive power. Second, the most critical distinction of the mini-arsenal is that, while potential damage may be extreme, destruction of state or society is not assured. A strike from a mini-arsenal state may be survivable-militarily, politically and socially. This perception, which may be held both by the mini-arsenal state leadership and its potential enemies, is expected to result in preferences and behaviour that do not match actions of states with more deadly arsenals. Leadership that is more willing to risk domestic populations may consciously choose to escalate wars to nuclear levels if the state and its government may survive. Of the four levels of nuclear capability, mini-arsenal dyads promise to be the most unstable during crises as the deadliest of cost-benefit analyses are expected to take place. The NAG assumes that capability is related to, yet distinct, from choice. Canada and Sweden, for instance, have the capability of nuclear proliferation with relatively few physical impediments. Resources, in This content downloaded from 207.46.13.20 on Wed, 28 Dec 2016 18:06:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 726 CAROLYN C. JAMES