Hajime!—The Causes and Prospects of the New Start in Russian-Japanese Relations

The "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations has proved a disappointing failure. The policy, to which Moscow and Washington agreed in the beginning of 2009, promised to "chart a fresh start in relations between our two countries."1 It fared well for the first couple of years, leading to an improved bilateral atmosphere and, most significantly, to the signing of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement in April 2010. From 2011, however, the policy began to lose its effect, unable to overcome fundamental differences between the countries on human rights and geopolitical issues (above all the wars in Libya and Syria). In August 2013 the reset could be declared well and truly over when President Barack Obama canceled a planned meeting with his Russian counterpart following Moscow's decision to grant temporary asylum to Edward Snowden. The rise and fall of the U.S. reset has attracted intense scholarly attention.2 Much less noted, however, is that during precisely this same period, Russia's relations with Japan were undergoing a fresh start of their own. This second reset is in many ways comparable to the first, although the sequence of cooperation and conflict was reversed.Having been characterized during the preceding years by bilateral tensions and ill-tempered exchanges, beginning in 2011 Japanese-Russian relations suddenly became considerably more positive. Not only did the rhetoric become significantly warmer, but the sides also succeeded in delivering a series of concrete achievements. This diplomatic transformation is a major development, not just for the countries themselves but also for the broader region. It is the purpose of this article to systematically address the causes of this fresh start and, in so doing, to assess the prospects of it becoming a long-term trend. With this goal in mind, the article is divided into five sections:* pp. 84-87 provide an overview of recent developments in JapaneseRussian relations.* pp. 87-92 assess the influence of individual actors, especially that of the countries' current leaders, Vladimir Putin and Shinzo Abe.* pp. 92-100 turn to structural considerations, focusing first on economic factors and giving attention to growing commercial incentives for closer ties, particularly in the energy sector.* pp. 100-106 examine the geopolitical angle and whether security considerations may also be encouraging reconciliation.* pp. 107-10 draw conclusions about the Russian-Japanese relationship's longer-term prospects from the preceding discussion of the causes of the countries' rapprochement.RUSSIA-JAPAN RAPPROCHEMENTIn 2009-11, at the time when the U.S.-Russian reset appeared most promising, Russian-Japanese relations were mired in a state of semi-crisis.3 To begin with, in 2009 there was a considerable hardening in Tokyo's rhetoric regarding the countries' territorial dispute. In particular, when addressing a parliamentary committee in May, Prime Minister Taro Aso publicly condemned Russia for "illegally occupying" Japan's Northern Territories.4 These widely reported comments prompted immediate criticism from Moscow, yet this did nothing to soften Tokyo's harder line, which continued after the change in government in September of the same year.5 These brusque exchanges led to a souring of the diplomatic atmosphere, but this was nothing compared to the angry confrontations of the following autumn when President Dmitry Medvedev visited Kunashir (called Kunashiri in Japanese), the second-largest of the disputed islands. This was the first such visit by a Russian or Soviet head of state and it provoked a forceful reaction from Tokyo. The Japanese foreign minister summoned the Russian ambassador to issue an official protest, reinforcing the message by temporarily withdrawing Tokyo's own representative from Moscow. Relations then deteriorated further during the next year when Prime Minister Naoto Kan, speaking on February 7-Japan's Northern Territories Day-denounced the Russian leader's visit as an "inexcusable outrage. …