Presidential Rhetoric and the Economic Policy Image of the Parties

If we identified the single most ―presidential conception of the office, it would likely be a picture of the president speaking to the nation, urging action on an important policy or leading the public through a crisis. This picture of the public presidency pervades our conceptions of presidential leadership. Political pundits, the public and even political scientists adhere to a model of government in which the president plays the central role (Jones 2005). We take note of the fact that the president is the only elected official with a national constituency, study with great care the public image of the president, analyze the content and rhetoric of presidential speeches, and routinely measure the approval ratings of presidents. Presidents, too, devote much of their time and effort in their public relations, from routine photo-ops, national tours, careful cultivation of press relations, daily press briefings, and the like (Kumar 2007). These all seem to fall in place with Kernell’s theory of ―going public, namely that presidents go over the heads of their fellow politicians to solicit the support of Americans ultimately to enhance their chances of policy success in Washington. And yet, it appears that none of this does any good. Despite the appealing logic of ―going public as a governing strategy, recent evidence questions the actual attention presidents receive (Cohen 2004; Welch 2000, 2003) and, most importantly, the extent to which the strategy affects public opinion (Edwards 2003) and advantages presidents in any way (Canes-Wrone 2006). The strength of Edward’s conclusion – that presidential appeals fall ―on deaf ears – forces us to reexamine the conventional wisdom. Why would rational presidents persistently invest considerable resources of time and energy to engage in behavior that research shows has little or no apparent political benefit? One important factor missing from the going public literature is the political parties. Presidents are creatures of the two-party system, are elected by and receive their public support primarily from their party label, are most persuasive among their partisan followers – in Washington and the public – and they stand in the eyes of Americans as the leaders of the ―ideals and principles‖ of their parties. Their actions, I suggest, do not fall on deaf ears but on partisan ears, and are interpreted accordingly. I argue in this paper that Americans view the political sphere through a partisan lens and interpret the actions of the president in partisan terms. At times the stature of the president is above regular politics, especially in times of crisis, but presidents always hold a partisan label that follows their actions. Having the party label attached to their public actions, presidents are the voice – at least in the eyes of the public – of their parties and therefore, by going public, they change the way people view the parties they espouse. I test this proposition using survey data of the Gallup Most Important Problem question together with a content analysis of major presidential speeches from 1956 to 1999. Focusing on the economic agenda, I show that during this time frame, presidents managed the public agenda and were able to associate the agenda with their parties.