Products of the will: Robertson's Children of Choice.

Perhaps no author in the field of bioethics has written more widely or influentially on assisted reproduction than John Robertson, and his Children of Choice(1) might almost be described as a Summa. Although he sometimes claims to be discussing reproductive freedom as a moral and legal matter, I find very little that qualifies as moral argument. Nevertheless, Robertson's argument deserves our attention precisely because it accurately represents a widely shared and influential viewpoint in our society. I will explore the structure of Robertson's approach and reflect upon some of the deeper issues that he acknowledges, but (with a rapidity that often astonishes) passes by.IRobertson addresses a number of different issues -- abortion, forced contraception, in vitro fertilization and collaborative reproduction, the status of the human embryo, quality control of offspring, restrictions on pregnant women to prevent harm to children, and nonreproductive uses of our reproductive powers (e.g., producing embryos for research, conceiving a child to serve as an organ donor) -- but throughout his discussion the fundamental structure of argument remains essentially the same. He begins with the claim that (given the legal status of abortion in our society) there is a right not to reproduce. He then argues that it should follow that there is also a right to reproduce if one wishes. Although this would be, in the first instance, a right to reproduce coitally, Robertson argues that it must logically be extended to include noncoital reproduction as well as the power to control characteristics of the offspring one produces.This right to reproduce is basic but not absolute. Hence, it could be limited if the state had compelling interests that required such limitation. For Robertson, however, the only sort of interest that might warrant limiting the right of reproductive liberty would be clear evidence that harm would result from its exercise. Most of the objections to one or another manner of exercising the right seem to him to express "symbolic" concerns rather than identify actual harms. Those concerns, he suggests, are matters about which citizens in a pluralistic society may reasonably differ and, therefore, offer no substantial ground for limiting the right of reproductive liberty. Even though relatively few limitations upon the exercise of this right are, in his view, justified, Robertson does describe it as a negative rather than a positive right. The state is not obligated to make possible our exercise of the right; it simply cannot stop us from exercising the right if we wish. With that bare bones outline of the argument before us, we need to consider at least three of its important features: the meaning and scope of reproductive liberty, the importance of the liberty, and its character as a negative rather than a positive right.The Meaning and Scope of Reproductive LibertyRobertson's goal is "to show the importance of procreative liberty."(2) Although Robertson often uses this language, I will generally refer to "reproductive liberty" because, as will become evident, I do not think he discusses a phenomenon that can accurately be termed "procreation." The first task, however, is to clarify the nature of the liberty.Robertson's initial and simplest description of reproductive liberty is that it is "the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring."(3) Elsewhere, he speaks of a "decision to have or not have children,"(4) and of "an individual or couple's choice to use technology to achieve reproductive goals."(5) A slightly broader formulation describes this liberty as "the freedom to have and rear offspring."(6)Robertson clearly describes reproductive liberty as "first and foremost an individual interest."(7) That he often refers to the right of "couples" to exercise their reproductive liberty does not, I think, indicate anything other than a deferential nod toward bourgeois morality. …