"What Did You Mean by That?": The Functions of Perceptions in Interpersonal Argument

the arguments they "normally" have with each other. Thus, the recreated arguments seem to be representative of the argumentative patterns of these friends. And, given the findings reported here, perceptual analysis is one dimension that warrants consideration even if it requires an experimental setting to retrieve the perceptions. Investigating the interactants' perceptions helps researchers consider and address questions aimed at explaining how arguments progress and why they are handled in a given way. Perceptual analysis encourages researchers to focus on issues that cannot be addressed if one considers only what is said. A fruitful area Perhaps even O'Keefe (1977) could not have predicted the volume of scholarly debate and research that would accrue from his articulation of two senses of argument. O'Keefe noted that one sense of argument (|argument.sub.1~) involved "making an argument" while another distinct concept of argument involved the process of having an argument (|argument.sub.2~). Several researchers have suggested that the proper focus of argumentation theory and research should be |argument.sub.1~ and therefore study the logical structure (formal and informal) of reason-giving discourse (Burleson, 1979; 1980; 1981; Kneupper, 1978; 1979; Rowland & Barge, 1991). Other researchers suggest that the proper focus for argumentation theory and research should be on having arguments (|arguments.sub.2~) (Willard, 1978; 1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1981). Finally, a third group of scholars are interested in studying the interaction of |argument.sub.1~ and |argument.sub.2~ in everyday social settings (Trapp, 1983; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1990; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs & Jackson 1981; 1982; 1983; Jackson, Jacobs, Burrell, & Allen, 1986). This latter group of scholars seeks to use the |argument.sub.1~/|argument.sub.2~ distinction to better understand and explain the nature of interpersonal argument. However, this research fails to investigate a central element of everyday argument--the perceptions of the participants. The purpose of this study is to use the |argument.sub.1~/|argument.sub.2~ distinction to understand how arguments are maintained and evolve. Both the arguments made in the dispute as well as the perceptions of the interactants in the dispute were coded and analyzed in order to understand how disputes were organized and maintained in friendship dyads. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTIONS Existing studies of the relationship between |argument.sub.1~ and |argument.sub.2~ have, thus far, failed to account for an important element of |argument.sub.2~, the perceptions of the individuals who are having an argument. The lack of consideration for interpersonal perception seriously limits the findings of previous research in interpersonal argumentation. While the work of Trapp (1983; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1990) and Jackson and Jacobs (1980; 1981; 1982; 1983; 1986) is vital, it fails to investigate the perceptions of the participants in argument. These studies involve systematic coding of interaction by outside observers using predetermined categories. Trapp (1986), for example, asked students to read transcripts and identify which interactions they believed were arguments. The actual participants in the interaction were not known to the coders and the arguers' views of the interaction were not considered in defining which interactions were, indeed, arguments. Similarly, Jackson and Jacobs (1980; 1981; 1982; 1983) have tended to rely on their own interpretations of argument or have likewise asked students to read transcripts and code them according to whether or not the students thought an argument was taking place (Jackson, Jacobs, Burrell, & Allen, 1986). In short, whether or not the interaction is an argument has been determined by individuals who knew nothing about the situations or the actors except what the transcripts revealed. Other researchers have challenged the prevailing reliance on coding schemes, arguing that they imply the existence of a "behavioral reality" and suggesting that such behaviors may be subject to alternative interpretations (Golding, 1978; Knudson, Sommers & Golding, 1980; Margolin, 1990). …