Representation, Responsive and Indicative

Let us assume that one party, A, represents another, B, if and only if A, with B’s authorization, purports to speak or act for B. B may authorize A directly, or may authorize the rules under which A is selected to speak or act, and in either event the authorization may consist in a positive endorsement or in a failure to exercise a capacity to disendorse. Building on this assumption about the nature of representation, let us assume in addition that there is some dimension in which the representing party is supposed to be faithful to the represented party so that, depending on the degree of fidelity displayed, the representer may perform better or worse in the representational role: the degree of fidelity provides a criterion for judging the quality of the representation. These assumptions about the nature and quality of representation put important restrictions on the topic to be addressed here. Thus they mean that A may be statistically – or, more generally, descriptively1 – representative of B without being a representer in our sense. And they mean that A may be an advocate for B without being a representer in that sense.2 But they still leave a large number of issues open. The relationship envisaged may vary in three more or less familiar ways. • It may be a relationship between one representer and one representee, or it may assume the form of one-many, many-many or, at the limit, many-one representation. The onemany representation is exemplified by the relationship of a member of parliament to a constituency; many-many by the relationship between congress and the people as a whole.3 • The dimension in which the representer is supposed to be faithful to the representee may be more or less constraining. The representer may just be expected to speak or act on the basis of her own best judgment; or, going to the other extreme, to act according to the preferences or judgments of the representee; or, in between, to act according to the representee’s interests or values. The less constrained representer will count as a trustee, the more constrained as a delegate.4 • However fully authorized, the relationship may or may not give the representee a certain control over how faithful the representer is. Where there is representee-control, the factors that support it may include: a power of selection, a power of deselection, constraints on the process of representative action, constraints on the domain of representative action, and exposure to scrutiny and contestation. In this essay, I want to introduce another respect in which the relationship of representation may vary. Representation may be responsive in character, as I put it, or rather, it may be indicative. This distinction has been unduly neglected, because theorists have focused mainly on the responsive variety of representation, and this essay is designed to help correct the balance.5 The discussion is in three sections. In the first, I present the distinction in an abstract form. Then in the second, I describe some ways in which indicative representation has been recognized, side by side with responsive representation, in the tradition of political thought. And, finally, in the third section, I ask after the lessons that the recognition of indicative representation has for democratic politics today.