MIGRATION, WAR, AND THE MAKING OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEBANESE SHIʿI COMMUNITY IN SENEGAL

The July 2006 Lebanon war was an important turning point for West African Lebanese. For the first time since their formation as a community, the Lebanese in Senegal organized a demonstration in Dakar displaying solidarity with Lebanon.1 This protest illuminates the dynamics between global forces and local responses. Hizbullah’s effectiveness in winning the international public opinion of both Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims in the war against Israel led to a surge in Lebanese diaspora identification, even among communities who had not been similarly affected by previous Lebanese wars. By analyzing the role of a Lebanese shaykh in bringing religious rituals and a Lebanese national identity to the community in Senegal, this article explores how members of the community maintain political ties to Lebanon even when they have never visited the “homeland” and sheds new light on the relationship among religion, migration, and (trans)nationalism. On 20 July 2006, eight days after the start of the Lebanon war, 3,000 Lebanese demonstrated in the area between Senegal’s national television station and Dakar’s Grand Mosque.2 A token representation of those from outside the Lebanese community joined in the demonstration, including Karim Wade, the president’s son; Mustafa Niass, the former prime minister and leader of the opposition; and other Senegalese politicians, professors, religious leaders, and members of nongovernmental organizations. Those in attendance waved Lebanese and Hizbullah flags as well as signs in French, English, and Arabic supporting Lebanon and protesting the Israeli attacks. Lebanese community leaders in Dakar, who had formed the committee Solidarite Liban 2006, gave public speeches denouncing the war and comparing it to the Nazi destruction of the French village Oradoursur-Glane in Normandy on 10 June 1944. They also cited as an example of their “hope and courage” the eventual victory of Nelson Mandela’s struggles against apartheid in South Africa.3 Such comparisons place the Lebanese struggle alongside other well-known cases of tragedy and human-rights violations while providing examples familiar to a French-educated African audience. The demonstration was followed by a march, led by Shaykh ʿAbdul Munʿam al-Zayn. Senegal’s Lebanese Shiʿi leader was born in 1945 in the south of Lebanon and was trained by Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khuʾi, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and other prominent Shiʿi scholars in a ḥawza (religious seminary) in Najaf, Iraq. He currently serves as wakīl (representative) for Ayatollah ʿAli al-Sistani. Sent to Dakar in 1969 by Musa al-Sadr, the legendary leader of Lebanon’s Shiʿa and founder of the political party Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya), Shaykh al-Zayn was fundamental in bringing Lebanese Shiʿa in Senegal “back to Islam” as well as (spiritually if not physically) back to Lebanon. Clerics, through their Islamic institutions, are particularly important in organizing minority or immigrant communities whose members live in close proximity to one another and who face challenges and discrimination from the dominant society. Shaykhs in the diaspora serve not only as religious models for the community to emulate but also as representatives of the country of origin. How do religious leaders link their congregations to their country of origin and Islam to nationalism? Protesters marched with Shaykh al-Zayn past the Senegalese presidential palace and the U.S. embassy. They ended at the Lebanese Islamic Institute, where there was a well-attended service that included the Syrian and Iranian ambassadors and other dignitaries. Although it is not unusual for heads of state to attend religious ceremonies, it was a clear political statement for two countries with their own goals in Lebanon to be present at such a public event showing solidarity with the Lebanese people.4 I was told that the shaykh spoke more about politics at this occasion than usual and that he was full of praise for sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, whereas previously he had always been careful not to demonstrate any attachments to Lebanese political parties.5 What is even more remarkable is that many of the protesters who had been living in West Africa for two, three, or even four generations, and had never before marched in the streets of Dakar for a political agenda, had also never visited Lebanon. Although there were many demonstrations against Israel’s actions in 2006, with the largest protests taking place in cities in North America, Europe, and the Middle East, I argue that something different was manifesting among Lebanese in Senegal. Taking a public stance against the war broke with the community’s previously cautious public profile as a minority not fully accepted in Senegal and can be analyzed as a culmination of their emerging Lebanese identity. National identity in the diaspora is not only linked to home country solidarity. During the protest, Lebanese also carried the Senegalese flag and signs saying “Merci Senegal,” thanking Senegal for its hospitality for over a century. They hung a banner with the image of the Lebanese national cedar tree on a car rapide, one of Dakar’s primary vehicles for public transportation, characteristically blue and yellow, proclaiming in bold, black letters on the front of the large Renault van “Al-ḥamdu lillāh” (praise God). The car rapide is a symbol of Senegal, reproduced in children’s toys and tourist souvenirs. Times of tension in Lebanon underscore for the Lebanese community the insecurity of their situation elsewhere, and they use these periods of political instability in their “homeland” to reaffirm commitment to their “host countries” and express gratitude for having been given the opportunity, now long ago, to settle in West Africa.6 Stressing loyalty to Senegal as well as to Lebanon was therefore necessary, and speakers exclaimed: “Long live Senegal! Long live Lebanon! Long live Senegalese–Lebanese solidarity!” This article will explore how Lebanese national identity exhibited by those in the diaspora can sometimes be a response to their exclusion from national belonging in their country of residence. Religious rituals are one way of reinforcing belonging to the homeland while unintentionally representing the host society as not home.7 Louer has reasoned that “any inquiry about the transnational practices of [Shiʿi Islamic] movements implies an examination of their relation to religious authority.”8 Through focusing on the work of Shaykh al-Zayn in Senegal, this article thus contributes to a newly emerging scholarship on transnational Shiʿi linkages.9 While much of this literature focuses on relationships between Iran and the Levant, I will concentrate on ties between Lebanese in West Africa and Lebanon. Through presenting a detailed ethnography of the transformation of Lebanese Shiʿi identity in Senegal from the French colonial period to the present day, I insist on the importance of the African example in adding another dimension to our understanding of the relationship between religion and nationalism in the Middle East. Area studies scholars often examine events in the region at the exclusion of related processes taking place in the diaspora. This article highlights the place of the Lebanese diaspora in Senegal within transnational (Shiʿi) Islam, where I define transnational Islam as being anchored within two or more nation–states. I focus my investigation of Lebanese diaspora Shiʿi Islam around the question Peter Mandaville has asked: “What happens to Islam when it travels, migrates or becomes otherwise ‘transplanted?’”10 I understand traveling Islam not only to be the movement of Muslims across borders but also the global circulation of religious knowledge through books or cassettes and the transmission of new ideas about Islam over the radio, television, or Internet. Furthermore, I am using a broader conception of religion than one focused solely on the sacred, religious rituals, individual piety, or religious authorities and institutions. I concentrate my analysis on interactions of all of these components of religion, suggesting a new way to think about the globalization of religion through a more in-depth understanding of migration and politics. I first examine different theoretical understandings of nationalism and then provide a brief history of Lebanese immigration to Senegal. In highlighting the importance of Islamic institutions and authority in the diaspora, the remainder of the article evaluates Shaykh al-Zayn’s success in heightening religious and national awareness among the Lebanese community. I explore his efforts to institute formal religious education through a Friday sermon, encourage public expressions of piety, and introduce new religious rituals in commemorations of ʿAshuraʾ and Ramadan. Finally, I describe other ties Lebanese in Senegal have with Lebanon. This enables me to emphasize the links between religious and political transnationalisms and how Lebanese Shiʿa have an understanding of the relationship between Shiʿi Islam and Lebanese nationalism that is different from that of Shiʿa in Lebanon.