The New Orleans-Katrina Case for New Federal Policies and Programs for High-Risk Areas

Abstract This paper reviews the federal government's programs and policies and how these policies encourage urban growth in areas having relatively high risk potential for recurring natural disasters. While Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and local authorities respond to emergency situations during crisis events, this paper explores the concept that such disasters, and additional emerging loss of life and property, could be avoided through changes in current federal government programs and policies. A cycle of federal programs which perpetuates urbanization of high-risk areas (hurricane, flood, and earthquake areas) is offered as well as insight on residential value trends of previously flooded areas highlighting that building or rebuilding in areas which place the public or public tax payer funds at greater financial risks does not exceed the long-term benefits. Hurricane Katrina has unfortunately offered a perfect and timely opportunity to seriously reconsider if the federal government's current and past policies actually conflict with the concept of protecting the health, welfare, and safety of the public and property at large by encouraging urban development and redevelopment in known high-risk areas through federal programs. There are two ways the federal government can ''control'' urban growth in high-risk areas: 1. In coordination with state and local governments to impose or encourage local zoning restrictions (police power). Nelson (2000) highlights two forms of market interventions: a. ''Planning mandates, with or without oversight. Planning mandates with oversight involve state or regional agencies' certification that locally prepared plans are consistent with statewide or regional goals and objectives, including assuring that the development capacity of local plans does not exceed market needs. Planning mandates without oversight are those that state laws may require of all communities statewide, or in specific regions, but for which there is little or no state-level oversight. b. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) processes, with or without oversight. States that have a needs-assessment component in EIA processes are more deliberate in judging whether a particular proposal meets market needs, or is speculative in nature. States with EIA processes but without needs-assessment components require only limited assessment of a proposed development's impact on the air, water and land.'' Nelson (2000) also suggests that the evidence that mandated planning per se is not effective in reducing the risks associated with natural hazards where there is no oversight function at a higher level of government, such as a state agency. 2. Federal financing and related programs. Federal financing should not be available for developers or property owners in high-risk areas. Aalberts (2005) highlights that the ''National Flood Insurance program offers to buy, move, or elevate homes if the owners have filed flood claims repeatedly. If the owners refuse they will not qualify for future disaster aid and would eventually have to pay the full rate for flood coverage.'' While private enterprise and land owners should have the right to build or rebuild in high-risk areas, which would otherwise most likely not be achieved by private investors, this paper concludes that it is not in the best interest of the public's safety or of federal tax dollars to encourage development or redevelopment in high-risk disaster areas of the United States. Disasters and Recovery Plans The U.S. has sustained various types of catastrophes throughout the years impacting both lives and property on various scales. From a hurricane intensity perspective, at least seventy-five hurricanes of Katrina's land-fall strength (Category 3) impacted the U.S. mainland from 1851 to 2005 (Townsend, 2006). This represents an average of one storm of the same strength (3 or above) every two and a half year. …