First Things First: Balancing Scientific and Ethical Values in Environmental Science

T he U.S. Office of Technology Assessment has warned that up to ninety percent of all cancers are "environmentally induced and theoretically preventable" (see Lashof et al. 1981:3, 6ff.) A recent committee of the U.S. National Research Council opined that, after the year 2000, cancers would exceed strokes, heart attacks, and other ailments and thus become the leading cause of death of Americans (National Research Council 1996:335). Whether in the form of carcinogenesis, global warming, endocrine disruption, or species losses, environmentally induced catastrophes loom large and demand society's ethical, as well as its scientific, attention. Because so many environmental threats are laced with both mathematical and empirical uncertainties, a crucial question facing environmental scientists is the nature of their ethical responsibilities to the public. Their duties are heightened because of both their role in helping to address environmental risks and the public consequences of their decisions. In their Forum essay (pp. 277-86) sketching the outlines of a possible balance between scientific and ethical values in environmental science, Harman, Harrington, and Cerveny go a long way toward a reasonable balance. They correctly note (1) that the most controversial environmentalscience issues are those involving both scientific uncertainty and public risk. They realize (2) that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to model intransitive aspects of threats such as global climate change (p. 279). Also, to their credit, Harman et al. recognize (3) that there are many crucial differences between scientific and ethical rationalities as alternative ways of addressing scientific uncertainty. Instead of ethical rationality alone (as defended by Shrader-Frechette and McCoy [1993]), however, Harman et al. propose incorporating "symbolic utility," as explicated by Nozick (1993). In doing so, they hope to capture the symbolic meaning of ethical principles. They argue that taking account of "symbolic utility" would provide a powerful motivator for ethical actions because it would recognize and shape the prevailing social context at a given time (p. 283). Are Harman et al. (p. 283) correct in their fundamental point that " 'ethical rationality' provides useful ethical guidance . . . but Nozick's ideas give us a stronger justification to reflect on our public actions, if only for their initially unintended [but symbolic] message"? In other words, are they right in their argument that Nozick's "symbolic utility" (which takes account of the symbolic or unintended messages behind our actions) provides more justification (than ethical rationality does) for reflecting on our public actions? To answer this question, it is important to know precisely what "ethical rationality" entails. Note that ethical rationality is grounded in a prima facie default rule, that is, a rule that holds in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. This default rule places the burden of proof on risk imposers. It requires that scientists and decisionmakers-facing situations of catastrophic risks and mathematical or scientific uncertainty-minimize false negatives (type-II errors) rather than false positives (type-I errors), when they cannot do both (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993:170-97). In other words, ethical rationality requires (1) that, in such situations, scientists and decisionmakers ought to use the prima facie default rule to minimize false assertions of no harm rather than false assertions of harm, when one cannot do both. In such situations, minimizing false negatives, rather than false positives, results in placing the burden of proof on polluters and developers, rather than on potential victims of public risk. In general, ethical rationality also requires (2) that scientists and policymakers, together with the public, consider the moral goodness or desirability of alternative