The Hubble Servicing Mission Controversy: Is the Risk of a Manned Mission Reasonable?

The National Academy of Sciences Committee recommended that NASA abandon a robotic mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope and fly a manned mission to repair it instead. Is their assessment to recommend a manned mission sound? Does it meet the criteria of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board? I. OVERVIEW In January of 2004, Scan O'Keefe, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"), announced a decision to cancel the manned servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope (SM-4).1 He believed that compliance with the safety recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board issued months earlier could not be achieved in time to fly a manned shuttle mission to replace the Hubble's batteries and gyroscopes before their anticipated failure. A public outcry immediately followed. The NASA Administrator was vilified and accused of "killing" the inanimate Hubble Space Telescope. The media, politicians, scientists, and public alike were infuriated as they had become hooked on the remarkable and unique images produced by the telescope during its storied history over the preceding thirteen years. The rationale for NASA's decision to cancel the mission was largely ignored and became engulfed by the hue and cry as the outrage persisted. The outspoken critics were shrill in arguing that the decision on the telescope, a national treasure, was too important to be left to the Administrator at NASA. They even went so far as to conclude that the Administrator's decision to cancel the manned servicing mission demonstrated his unwillingness to take risks.2 In an effort to quell the rage, NASA responded by proposing to repair the Hubble by employing a "robotic" servicing mission. It undertook full-bore an effort to assess the prospects, scope, cost, and timing of such an undertaking. However, the measure was seen by some as unrealistic and pressure mounted for an independent opinion. NASA finally acquiesced to requests from Congress and elsewhere for an outside study and invited the National Academy of Sciences to review and recommend one of the two options to "save" the Hubble: a manned Shuttle mission or a robotic one. In the late spring of 2004, the National Academy of Sciences appointed the Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope3 (the "National Academy of Sciences Committee," or "NASC"). It issued a final report on December 8, 2004, in which it unanimously concluded that: . . . NASA should commit to a servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope that accomplishes the objectives of the originally planned SM-4(4) mission. The committee recommends that NASA pursue a [manned] shutde servicing mission to ... [the Hubble Space Telescope] that would accomplish the above stated goal. Strong consideration should be given to flying this mission as early as possible after return to flight. A robotic mission approach should be pursued solely to de-orbit Hubble after the period of extended science operations enabled by a shuttle astronaut servicing mission, thus allowing time for the appropriate development of the necessary robotic technology.5 As the former General Counsel for NASA who counseled the agency during the Columbia disaster and the subsequent investigation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and who participated in the decision to cancel the servicing mission, I am distressed by the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences Committee. This is not because of disagreement, but because the recommendations appear to be based on an optimistic view of the risks attendant to a Hubble SM-4 mission and because they fail to adequately address the whole risk spectrum of such a mission. Having lived through the tragedy of Columbia, there was the danger that NASA would become risk averse. The Columbia experience did not, however, have this effect. Instead, NASA and its Administrator merely became more risk conscious. …