The Political Economy of Democracy Assistance in the Middle East: U.S. Aid for Democracy in Egypt and Morocco Since 1990

How effective is democracy assistance funding in promoting and developing democracy? A cross-national quantitative study commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2006 addressed this question in an attempt to measure the effects of U.S. foreign assistance on democracy building. The study’s conclusions broadly found that funding for democracy does have an impact on the level of democratisation in a recipient country. Regionally, the study found that obligations for democracy had the largest effects on democratisation in Asia and Africa and that in general, democracy assistance funding more “in ‘difficult contexts’ with the Middle East being the exception to this general pattern.” That the authors of the study provide no explanation for this exception raises several questions about the nature and execution of the programs in the region. Why have democracy assistance efforts been limited in the region? Do the construction of programs and the influence of local actors and organisations impact effectiveness? In what circumstances would U.S.-funded assistance programs have substantive impact in the region? Both states have been the focus of extensive scholarly inquiry over the last decade as the two have extended some measures of political and economic reform. That the results today bear no resemblance to democracy forces the question: How effective can democracy assistance be in an autocratic state? This paper addresses these questions through an examination of U.S. democracy assistance programs in Egypt and Morocco, two of the largest recipients of such funding in the region. By examining the evolution and execution of programs, this paper aims to advance explanations from a qualitative perspective as to why USAID’s efforts may have been limited through analysis drawn from archival research and informed by interviews with current and former USAID staff, contractors, activists and others involved with democracy aid in both states. As the principle actor involved in administering U.S. democracy assistance, I focus on the efforts of USAID in both states as well as the relationship between the Agency and recipients. Are programs designed and implemented with the collaboration of local aid administrators? What kind of feedback has taken place between the Agency and recipients over time? Have program evaluations taken place, and if so, have their results been used in the formulation of subsequent efforts? The few case studies on democracy assistance elsewhere offer little insight into this process leaving much to speculation and one to conclude that programs are executed blindly and funded more by outside directives than by the realities and results of past efforts. I also consider how regimes in both states have responded to democracy assistance efforts and their interaction with aid recipients and the United States over time. One of the inherent challenges of democracy aid concerns its promotion in authoritarian states, which would be fundamentally opposed to a project intended to reduce its power. In both states, for example, government ministries regulate aid and monitor recipients of democracy aid. How much control do such ministries exert, and if any parameters have been constructed over time, how have recipients responded? Finally, I consider how democracy assistance has been conceptualised by the United States in both states and the economic context in which such aid has been executed. The period in which Egypt and Morocco embarked on economic reform programs coincided with the introduction of U.S. democracy assistance programs. Conclusions drawn from studies on political liberalisation in authoritarian states suggest that such states are more inclined to extend some measure of liberalisation during periods of fiscal crisis. Consideration of this dynamic is absent from previous case studies of democracy assistance, and I ask whether the orientation of the United States’ democracy programs served to reinforce the status quo, or facilitate liberalisation of the political space in each state. By evaluating the composition and structure of such efforts in Egypt and Morocco, I hope to contribute some understanding of the dynamics involved as well as the parameters and possibilities for the effective implementation of democracy assistance programs in authoritarian states as well as in other contexts.