Government Takings and Constitutional Guarantees: When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation

I. INTRODUCTION Perhaps the oldest case of a government's exercise of eminent domain is recorded in the Bible.1 King Ahab, ruler in Israel, saw and desired to possess Naboth's vineyard, a fertile plot of land located near Ahab's home.2 Ahab, not necessarily disposed to tyrannically expropriating his subjects' property, offered Naboth another vineyard or money for the property.3 Naboth refused, for which he was ultimately stoned to death.4 Ahab gained his desire and even apparently avoided paying compensation.5 Today, the effects of exercising the eminent domain right are much less severe for landowners than in Naboth's case. Federal and state governments in the United States may exercise the right only to take land for a "public use" and only if they also compensate the landowners for the value of the condemned6 property. CompensaIMAGE FORMULA213 tion-or "just compensation," as it appears in the United States Constitution7-requires that the landowner be put in the position he or she would have occupied had the government not taken the land.8 While this notion of just compensation has not always accompanied the eminent domain right,9 it is difficult to imagine a just scheme today that fails to compensate landowners for government takings.10 In any event, the Constitution requires it. Despite the need for providing just compensation, determining the proper amount in individual cases has presented a significant challenge to courts and legislatures. The challenge arises in part because land values change over time, and so, in order to make a present value determination, a court or a legislature must set a date on which to value the property. In a majority of states, this valuation date is set by statute. Unfortunately, these valuation date statutes can become controversial when a significant time period passes between the valuation date and the time the government actually takes the land if the land's value materially changes during that period. If the land value increases significantly, then paying the landowner the amount determined on the date of valuation is not adequate compensation, and the date of valuation statute fails to provide the constitutionally required just compensation. Notwithstanding the constitutional importance of this valuation problem, the principle of just compensation and its related valuation date issue have not been dominant themes in eminent domain jurisprudence. In fact, since the Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,ll the topic of regulatory takings-- takings effected by government regulation rather than through direct action against landowners-has commanded the majority of attenIMAGE FORMULA215 tion when courts and academics have examined eminent domain jurisprudence.12 This attention likely arises from the difficulties associated with determining when a government regulation is actually a taking of private property for public use-there is much room for debate. Nevertheless, within the realm of direct land condemnation, valuation date law has been more quietly developing, and the application of various valuation date statutes in recent years has imbued the topic with renewed vigor.13 This Comment outlines the parameters of the valuation date problem, which often pits statutory provisions against state and federal constitutional mandates. Part II provides insight into the valuation date problem by laying out historical eminent domain underpinnings and a just compensation framework. It also discusses each of the fifty states' varying statutory positions (or lack of positions) on dates of valuation.14 Part III examines the date of valuation problem, as well as the related takings date problem and summarizes several leading judicial responses to conflict between statutory dates of valuation and the constitutional just compensation requirement. …