Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force

With the passage of the Iraq War resolution in October 2002, Congress delegated immense authority to President George W. Bush, the likes of which had not been seen since 1964 when President Lyndon Johnson was granted wide discretion in Vietnam. The Iraq War resolution not only strengthened the president's hand by legitimizing a policy of preemptive action, but also seemingly undermined Congress's oversight role by not establishing any review procedures once conflict began and failing to set an expiration date for such executive powers. One notable scholar, James Lindsay, suggested as much regarding the war resolution: "Congress voluntarily removed itself from the debate over Iraq and went up into the cheap seats with the reporters and the pundits" (Fessenden and Cochran 2003, 677). Almost a year later, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), called for hearings regarding the administration's plan to hand over sovereignty to the new Iraqi government in June of 2004 (Anselmo 2004, 866). For his efforts, the chairman was widely rebuked by leaders from his own party out of concern for Bush's reelection, deliberately slighted by the administration who sent second-tier officials to testify, and with the exception of CNN, largely ignored by the national media (Rosenbaum 2004). Not long after, Congress was at it again--using hearings to question the administration about its $82 billion emergency supplemental request (FY 2005) for continued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although dispatching its first team in the form of Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense's exchange with the House Armed Services Committee, and later that day with the Senate Appropriations Committee, revealed a familiar pattern of disdain for Congress. With absolutely no trepidation of congressional authority, the secretary chose the questions he wished to answer, while ignoring others, and even broke for lunch during the hearings. And turning the tables, the secretary managed to use the hearings as an opportunity to chide Congress for the "casual regard" they employed in handling classified information (Milbank 2005). (1) Anecdotal evidence like this suggests that Congress's role is very limited or that it plays virtually no role in shaping the president's calculation to use force against another nation. However, the assertion that the congressional environment does not matter, or that Congress is relegated to the "cheap seats," belies the complexity of presidential decisions to use force. For example, even though President Bush argued that the use of force in Iraq was justified by previous UN resolutions, he nonetheless sought formal authorization (much like his immediate predecessors) from Congress. In addition, the congressional debates over Iraq likely had some effect on the Bush administration's subsequent decision to seek approval from the UN Security Council. Given Congress's clear constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs, presidents must certainly consider the preferences of those on Capitol Hill (Fisher 1995). So, arguing that decisions regarding the use of military force are ultimately owned by the president is far different than arguing Congress does not matter in the making of such decisions. We contend that Congress plays a vital role in U.S. foreign policy, even presidential decisions to employ military force. Its influence takes two distinct forms. First, Congress represents a bellwether for public opinion in the country. Strong opposition on Capitol Hill likely signals a more general aversion to presidential policies. (2) Second, congressional opposition or support signals the attractiveness of the legislative arena in affecting change in public policy. As presidents confront obstacles in the way of their legislative agenda, presidential attention and resources may increasingly focus on foreign policy where their unilateral tools can provide them with significant advantages (Moe and Howell 1999). …