Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and Constitutional Change. By Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Lori A. Ringhand. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 296 pp. $32.99 paperback.

Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and Constitutional Change. By Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Lori A. Ringhand. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 296 pp. $32.99 paperback.This book does exactly what a scholarly manuscript ought to do: It offers a novel theoretical interpretation of a long-known phenomenon, makes arguments backed up with empirical evidence and accompanied by real-life examples, and makes one think. While it remains debatable whether theirs is the "right" view of the phenomenon under study, it is absolutely the case that it ought to be taken seriously and widely discussed and debated. Indeed, I urge everyone with an interest in confirmation hearings and in the interplay between Congress, the Supreme Court, and the public, to engage with their analysis and discuss its implications. After summarizing their argument, I will do so here, in hopes of beginning the conversation.In their book, Collins and Ringhand analyze Supreme Court confirmation hearings, attributing to them more meaning than has been so attributed to date. The conventional wisdom is basically that Senators are grandstanding and playing to their constituents as they ask long-winded statement/questions while the nominees themselves decline to answer the most basic of questions concerning their views on relevant issues. We already know, from other scholarly research, that the latter is not true; Justice-Nominees do indeed answer most of the questions posed to them. In addition, although, Collins and Ringhand ascribe much more meaning to the questioning arguing that these hearings constitute "a democratic forum for the discussion and ratification of constitutional change" (p. 10). They make the case for their much-more-charitable interpretation of these events by showing that Senators ask questions about issues that are important to the public, and that the conversations they have with nominees are grounded in Supreme Court precedent. This translates, they argue, into evidence that, through the process, the Senate informs the public of Supreme Court precedent, takes a position informed by public opinion on the constitutional interpretation choices made in those precedents, and communicates to Supreme Court nominees the expectation that they will abide by those preferred, public-opinion-ratified constitutional understandings. They test these claims via two empirical chapters and several qualitative analyses, finding support for their view.Their characterization of the hearings as a democratic forum for constitutional discussion is intriguing. Indeed, many legal scholars argue that judges ought not be exclusively charged with interpreting the constitution, so a construal of the confirmation hearings that considers a "people's constitution," as many scholars call it, is attractive. Is it possible that these hearings are the official way in which "the people" contribute to a constitutional conversation? Perhaps, although I have a few doubts making me resist Collins and Ringhand's notion.Most importantly, I continue to struggle with considering the questions asked by Senators to constitute a constitutional conversation, expecting instead that they are either a way for Senators to wax eloquent on issues important to their voters, or a way for Senators to predict how the nominee will vote. The findings reported in the book remain consistent with both notions: Senators ask about policies, not about theories of constitutional interpretation; and the largest impact on questioning is the amount of legislation in a particular issue area and not the most important issue or the amount of Supreme Court precedent in an issue area (although they each matter as well). …