How Do Welfare Sanctions Work

Under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, families are subject to greater work requirements, and the severity of sanction for noncompliance has increased. Using Wisconsin longitudinal administrative data, the authors performed event history analysis to examine the dynamic patterns of sanctioning and the patterns of benefits following a sanction. They found that very high rates of sanctioning (especially partial sanctions) and multiple sanctions were fairly common but sanction spells were quite short. The most common transition from a sanction was back to full benefit receipt. The authors also examined the factors associated with being sanctioned and the severity of sanctions by comparing a traditional model with an event history model. They found that it is important to estimate a model that takes into account the period of risk. Results confirm that those who may be least able to succeed in the labor market are most likely to be sanctioned. KEY WORDS: event history analysis; poverty; TANF; welfare programs; welfare sanctions ********** The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) ended the federal guarantee of cash assistance for single-parent families with children and replaced the entitlement program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. Work requirements were a key component of the legislation, and sanctions for noncompliance were an important part of the policy design. Under TANF, sanctions have taken on much greater significance, both because fewer families are exempt from work requirements and because the new policy of full family sanctions means that failure to comply with those requirements can result in the loss of the family's entire cash grant (Pavetti & Bloom, 2001; Pavetti, Derr, & Hesketh, 2003), as well as the loss of food stamps and Medicaid (Cherlin et al., 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO], 2000). The number of people no longer receiving benefits because they have been sanctioned has increased concern about how often sanctions are used, who is at risk of being sanctioned, and the effects of sanctions on welfare recipients. A number of studies have examined the characteristics of sanctioned families, the reasons these families did not meet their participation requirements, and the later consequences to them. Most of these studies did not focus on sanctions but looked more generally at families who had left welfare ("leavers"; see Colville, Moore, Smith, & Smucker, 1997; Westra & Routley, 2000) or were conducted under the old AFDC system (Colville et al.; Fraker, Nixon, Losby, Prindle, & Else, 1997; Kornfeld et al., 1999; GAO, 1997). There is less known about the use of sanctions under TANF. Most of the early studies of sanctions were exploratory and descriptive, assessing the characteristics and describing the experiences of sanctioned recipients or sanctioned leavers. Furthermore, much sanction research has measured a sanction as a simple dichotomous variable (sanction, nonsanction) at a particular time. Relatively few studies have examined the severity of sanctions or the timing and duration of sanctions. We used Wisconsin longitudinal administrative data in our study. These data include detailed information on the timing and severity of sanctions, enabling us to examine the dynamic patterns of sanctioning, factors associated with being sanctioned, and the relationship between sanctioning and subsequent outcomes. POLICY CONTEXT States have broad authority and flexibility regarding the design and use of sanctions. The triggers for sanctions and amount of reduction in the grant vary from state to state. There are various types of sanctions tied to work requirements, child support enforcement, and, for teenagers receiving welfare, the requirements to attend school and live with parents. …