Substantially Burdened, Substantially in Conflict, or Substantially Unneeded? A Discussion of Abdulhaseeb V. Calbone

I. Introduction The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone1 highlights the difficulty and conflicting rules courts face in determining when die government has placed a substantial burden on an inmate's religious rights. In Abdulhaseeb, the Tenth Circuit considered the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act2 ("RLUIPA"), which provides, inter alia, that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on die religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution."3 Aldiough the substantial burden requirement of RLUIPA is fundamental to the statute's application, the term is not defined within die statute, and circuit courts have differed in dieir interpretation of this requirement. To address this problem, die Tenth Circuit attempted to synthesize die various circuit rules by holding that a government substantially burdens an inmate's religious expression if it (1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.4 This Note argues that die Tendi Circuit's syntiiesized rule is problematic for two reasons. First, by combining die two prevalent but different tests used in the different circuits into one test, the rule undermines precedent and exacerbates the friction between die various circuit rules. Second, the tiiird part of this rule provides little guidance for application and opens the door for judges to base their decisions on their preferences instead of precedent. Part II of this Note discusses the facts and history of Abdulhaseeb. Part III discusses the context, political situation, and background leading up to the decision in Abdulhaseeb. Finally, Part IV discusses the problems inherent in the third part of the test postulated by the Tenth Circuit and the resulting need to eliminate that prong. II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY From June 4, 2001, to January 27, 2005, Madyun Abdulhaseeb was incarcerated at Great Plains Correction Facility ("GPCF").5 While a prisoner at GPCF, Abdulhaseeb requested that he be provided with a halal diet, but his requests were denied.6 After three years of incarceration, Abdulhaseeb submitted a formal grievance charging that GPCF forced him to accept gelatin and puddings on his meal trays in violation of his beliefs.7 Abdulhaseeb argued that, although GPCF indicated that the pudding and gelatin were halal and kosher, there was nothing on the packaging to substantiate that claim; thus, GPCF should have provided him with a satisfactory halal substitute.8 The administrator at GPCF denied Abdulhaseeb's grievance and indicated that no one was forcing Abdulhaseeb to have gelatin or pudding on his tray.9 The administrator also noted that there was no pork or pork byproduct in the gelatin or pudding; therefore, in his opinion, those products met Abdulhaseeb's religious standards.10 A month after GPCF denied his initial grievance, Abdulhaseeb filed another grievance with GPCF arguing that the prison should provide halal chickens for all the prisoners in celebration of the Islamic feast Eid-ul-Adha.11 Again, GPCF denied his request for accommodation.12 The GPCF administrator stated that "DOC policy allows you [Abdulhaseeb] to purchase a Hallal meal tiirough an approved vendor. The practice at GPCF, which includes die current year, is to provide a Hallal meal at the conclusion of Ramadan" but not for die Eid-ul-Adha feast.13 After receiving this denial, Abdulhaseeb unsuccessfully appealed to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("ODOC").14 Three months after his second grievance, GPCF transferred Abdulhaseeb to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary ("OSP"), a prison administered by ODOC. …