City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: An Unprecedented Use of 'Primary' Purpose Leaves Wide Open the Door for 'Secondary' Problems

Six times between August and November of 1998, the Indianapolis Police Department set up checkpoints or drug interdiction roadblocks for the sole purpose of catching drug offenders and “[interrupting] the flow of illegal narcotics throughout Indianapolis.” Approximately thirty officers were located at each checkpoint, along with patrol cars that contained mobile data terminals. During each stop, which exceeded no more than five minutes, a predetermined number of drivers were asked to present their driver's licenses and vehicle registration, while an officer peered into the car. At some point during the stop, the police led a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of the car, and upon an “alert” or indication from the trained dog, probable cause was established. This program led to the stopping of 1,161 vehicles, which resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests, “meaning that five percent of the total number of stops resulted in successful drug ‘hits,’ and 49 arrests for conduct unrelated to drugs, such as driving with an expired driver's license, for an overall hit rate of 9 percent.” The fundamental principle of the Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable; however the Supreme Court has recognized limited circumstances where the usual requirement of reasonable suspicion and probable cause have been waived. To determine whether individualized suspicion is required, the Court balances “the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue.” Suspicionless searches have been upheld where the program was designed to serve special needs, administrative purposes, a fixed border patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens or check driver sobriety, and the Court even suggested that a similar checkpoint whose purpose was to verify drivers' licenses and vehicle registration might also be permissible. Yet the Court has made it clear that it had never upheld, nor even indicated that it might uphold, a checkpoint whose “primary purpose” was to detect general criminal wrongdoing. While the Court pointed out another well-established principle--that vehicle stops on the highway constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment--the thrust of its opinion centered around the primary purpose of checkpoint programs. Rejecting the State's assertion that precedent precluded an inquiry into the purpose of a checkpoint program where a legitimate interest is pursued, the Court stated that such cases reinforce the principle that “programmatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of the Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.” In response to the State's argument that its program ought to be justified by its lawful secondary purposes of keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying drivers' licenses and registrations, the Court noted that the importance of examining the primary purpose was to prevent the police from establishing checkpoints for nearly any purpose “so long as they also included a license or sobriety check.” The Court concluded that its holding did not affect valid border searches or those searches conducted at airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety was heightened. In addition, the ability of police officers to respond to information properly acquired during a checkpoint stop, justified by a lawful primary purpose, was not debilitated. Finally, the purpose inquiry was to be conducted only at the programmatic level and was not an invitation to “probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene.” Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint was concededly one of general crime control, it violated the Fourth Amendment, and the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed. This Note will analyze the current state of the law surrounding vehicle roadblocks and checkpoints due to the recent Supreme Court case, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. Part I will provide a summary of the relevant principles behind the Fourth Amendment where the courts have upheld seizures at roadblock checkpoints without a warrant or probable cause. Part II will provide a brief discussion of the circuit split regarding the legality of vehicle roadblocks and Brown v. Texas, which set forth the three-prong test governing the reasonableness of seizures. Part III will critically evaluate City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the recent Supreme Court decision discussing vehicle roadblocks and checkpoints, and suggest its departure from Brown v. Texas and unprecedented use of a “primary” purpose. Finally, Part IV will conclude with the overall significance and future impact this case will have on the current state of law.