Red Tape and a Theory of Bureaucratic Rules

As every teacher of public administration knows, the term red tape refers to the cord that tied together government documents in the early centuries of British and American bureaucracy, and probably those of other former colonies as well. For the trivia minded, the tape was a loosely woven fabric (probably wool), brick red in color, and 7/16th of an inch wide when ironed flat. (As one of the field's antiquarians, I have a piece embedded in plastic.) More importantly, of course, the term red tape is the leading pejorative symbol of government bureaucracy in the English language. Most discussions of it consist of thoughtless denunciations of what are regarded as the inefficient and malevolent workings of government. Some scholars of public administration have taken the topic to the more serious level of showing how the deeper meanings of the term are capable of conveying the subjective nature and complex subtleties of largescale administration in a democratic polity. Some decades ago Herbert Kaufman published a small volume that did just that (1977). In this new book, Barry Bozeman has elevated the notion of red tape to a new height, that of a clearly defined and researchable phenomenon of public and private administration. The book begins as an easy read. In its first 72 pages it discusses the several ways in which the term is used, describes existing literature on the subject, notes how one person's red tape is another's due process, discusses concepts of formalism in organizations, reviews various theories on the pathologies of bureaucracy, and comments on ever-present efforts to reform public bureaucracy, including contemporary ones like the Government Performance and Results Act. In this first section of the book the author underscores the elusive nature of red tape and its implications; points out how different writers on bureaucracy take opposing views with respect to its overall degree of efficiency and competence; and demonstrates how empirical research is ambiguous on such questions as to whether the private sector performs better than government. While in retrospect one can see in this opening part of the book hints of what is to come, the book to this point appears as a useful review of existing knowledge on the subject but absent of any strikingly new ideas. The material is informative but not arresting. Ideas are conveniently illustrated by boxed case studies and research summaries. Still, sprightly language makes for a clear and even entertaining presentation. Some of the author's better lines: "But just as bureaucracy has tamed the world, the world now seeks to tame bureaucracy" (xi). "Bureaucracy is the cod liver oil of social institutions: It smells bad and leaves a nasty aftertaste, but sometimes it is just what you need" (1). "However, if red tape lacks the glitz of big time pathologies, it compensates with stubborn intractability" (64). But then, suddenly, in the middle of chapter 4, at an inauspicious and unannounced place at the bottom of page 72, and just following a lengthy case study on "Peppy Auto Supply," Bozeman begins his real enterprise. He launches what becomes the most important theoretical ideas on the subject the field has thus far received. A comprehensive, even elegant, theory on the subject is built. To call it a theory of red tape is, however, misleading, for Bozeman's ideas are really about rules. He constructs a theory of good and bad rules in bureaucracies and other organizations. Rules are obviously essential to bureaucratic organizations, creating the basis for stability, continuity, equity, and many other valued attributes. But rules can also be dysfunctional (i.e., fail to help or cause much mischief). These rules Bozeman calls red tape. One complication in this formulation is that particular rules may help some people but hurt others. Also they can achieve certain values and undermine others. They may also be reasonably useful but have high opportunity