Rethinking Prisoner Litigation: Shifting from Qualified Immunity to a Good Faith Defense in 1983 Prisoner Lawsuits

INTRODUCTION The vindication of constitutional and federal statutory rights is a significant source of litigation in federal courts. Section 1983 of Title 42 (1) of the United States Code provides an avenue of redress for citizens whose constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated under color of state law. (2) Section 1983 has been used to enforce such rights, especially by plaintiffs who otherwise might not have the ability to seek effective redress. (3) Prisoners constitute one such class of plaintiffs, (4) as most of their interactions with prison officials involve action under color of state law. (5) The current state of prisoner [section] 1983 litigation is marked by inconsistency. A prisoner whose constitutional or statutory rights have been violated by prison officials faces significant challenges to even have her grievances heard in court as new laws require that a prisoner exhaust all administrative procedures before filing her suit. (6) Assuming the prisoner meets the requirements, her suit will progress differently depending upon whom she sues. If the defendant is a state prison official, he may be allowed to assert qualified immunity, thus diminishing the prisoner's chance of successfully achieving redress. (7) If the defendant is a privately employed guard, however, he is not allowed to assert qualified immunity, but may be able to assert some form of good faith defense. (8) Under this current regime, both prisoners and prison guards are treated unjustly. Adding to the mix is the argument that the federal courts have been inundated with mostly frivolous prisoner lawsuits. While some allege the use of excessive force by guards, others allege the denial of their constitutional right to a certain kind of peanut butter. (9) Given the characterization of the frivolous nature of the latter and the perception that the majority of prisoner suits fit that mold, (10) prisoner suits have become a convenient target for those seeking to limit access to the federal courts under [section] 1983. When the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995 (11) was passed in 1996, (12) the prevailing thought was that prisoner litigation would be curtailed significantly. (13) Congress passed the Act in response to the increasing number of prisoner lawsuits being filed and their perceived collective frivolity. (14) An initial examination of the Act's effects seemed to indicate that it had been successful in decreasing the number of prisoner suits. (15) However, it is unclear whether this represents only a decrease in the amount of frivolous prisoner suits, or whether the decrease has also managed to keep legitimate claims out of federal court. (16) Although [section] 1983 prisoner litigation currently suffers from several deficiencies that threaten to undermine the just result [section] 1983 seeks, this Note does not advocate for a complete overhaul of the system. Rather, it hopes to resolve one of the most glaring flaws in the current system--the varying defenses afforded to private and public prison guards. This Note proposes that courts abandon the doctrine of qualified immunity and replace it with a good faith defense in the prisoner litigation context. Such a shift would make it easier for prisoners with meritorious claims to have their cases heard. Further, it would introduce a measure of consistency and fairness with respect to prison guard defendants in [section] 1983 lawsuits. This may be palatable to those afraid of federal court inundation as the flooded courtroom concern--a concern that helped justify the use of qualified immunity-has been somewhat alleviated by the PLRA. Moreover, such a shift would further the important principles underlying [section] 1983 by removing the obstacles facing prisoners who allege violations of their constitutional or federal statutory rights. In Part I, this Note discusses the history and purposes of [section] 1983 litigation and the immunities and defenses available to defendants. …