Safety at the Racetrack: Results of Restrictor Plates in Superspeedway Competition

1. IntroductionIn May of 1987, driver Bobby Allison's car became airborne after blowing a tire in the front stretch of the Talladega Superspeedway in Alabama. The car destroyed 100 feet of safety fencing and nearly entered the densely packed grandstands at 210 miles per hour. As it was, debris from the airborne car caused severe injuries, including the loss of an eye by a spectator. Allison was not seriously injured, but the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) saw the horrific possibilities and implemented a plan to slow down cars at its two fastest speedways: Talladega and the Daytona track in Florida (Duskey 2001).NASCAR's solution was to mandate the use of restrictor plates at these tracks. This device limits the flow of air to the car's engine, thereby reducing the horsepower and, consequently, the speed the engine can generate. Since their introduction, restrictor plates have succeeded in reducing not only speeds reached during races, but also qualifying speeds. Prior to the implementation of the plates at Daytona and Talladega, qualifying speeds consistently exceeded 200 miles per hour (mph), reaching a high of 212.809 mph during the qualifying session in which Allison's infamous takeoff occurred. Since then, qualifying speeds have never reached 200 mph and have actually declined so that in 2000 and 2001, qualifying speeds averaged just under 187 mph. Despite achieving the objective of slowing down the cars, the use of restrictor plates has been controversial among drivers, many believing that their personal safety has been compromised. The refrain from many NASCAR drivers is that during a restrictor-plate race, "the big one" is inevitable, and hopefully no one will be seriously injured. Veteran Sterling Marlin voiced a common concern among NASCAR drivers after a last-lap crash at the Talladega race in October 2001 eliminated 16 of 43 cars: "They [restrictor plates] caused this and they'll continue to cause things like this until they [NASCAR officials] get them off the cars. It's not safe and they better do something" (Associated Press 2001).This article investigates the empirical determinants of safety at NASCAR races, paying particular attention to the effects of restrictor plates. No one debates that spectator safety is now greater; however, if, as the drivers assert, their well-being is diminished, then NASCAR finds itself in the unenviable situation of placing its product in jeopardy for the safety of its fan base. What we seek to determine is whether, in fact, restrictor-plate racing is more hazardous than non-plate racing. We establish a model that evaluates not only the relationship between restrictor plates and driver injuries, but also between the plates and accidents on the track. It may be the case that what drivers are actually observing is more cars wrecking on the track and not necessarily an increased threat to their personal safety. If this is the case, then NASCAR may have happened upon a process for increasing fan interest in these races. When more cars wreck, viewership increases, while the drivers themselves are not harmed. NASCAR veteran driver Bobby Labonte sarcastically summed this up, saying, "The grandstands are full and everybody is OK, so I guess it's OK" (Associated Press 2001).As we proceed with our analysis, section 2 examines the highway safety literature and makes a connection with our NASCAR data. Section 3 details the data, and section 4 sets up the model describing the number of wrecked cars. Section 5 expands the model to evaluate driver injuries. Finally, we summarize our findings in section 6.2. Does Speed Kill or Does Variance Kill?Research into NASCAR safety can be seen as an extension of highway safety studies, although in a highly controlled or even artificial setting. NASCAR races provide experiments in risk and safety in addition to entertainment. The data are cleaner than highway data, however, due to a number of differences. …