The Brazilian State in the New Democracy

This paper analyzes the contradictory impact of democratization on the Brazilian state. The return of democracy initially reinforced the efforts of clientelist politicians and "special interest" groups to win influence inside the state. Yet the resulting corrosion of state autonomy and capacity exacerbated Brazil's severe economic problems, which discredited established elites. In this crisis situation, democratic elections produced a renovation in political leadership and allowed determined reformers-first Fernando Collor, then Fernando Henrique Cardoso--to win office and try to rebuild the state, for instance through tax reform. Under democracy, the initial deterioration of state capacity thus triggered efforts to jump-start economic development and strengthen the state. How does a country's transition to democracy affect its state? This question is of great importance, 1 given the crucial role that the state has played in the economic, social, and political development of most countries affected by the "third wave" of democratization. Yet this topic has received insufficient scholarly attention. In fact, definitional assumptions may make this question appear as 2 a non-issue: Because the state is regarded as more permanent than a political regime, which can change with disturbing frequency, democratic transitions are often assumed to leave the state unchanged. Latin America's "politicized states" (Chalmers 1977; Power 1991), however, lack institutional stability. Given the fluidity of state structures in the region, democratization may have a profound effect upon the state: It may help institutionalize the state and turn it more autonomous from established social forces, or by contrast, it may further corrode the internal unity and undermine the strength of the state. Since the state has assumed an enormously wide range of responsibilities in Brazil, this country constitutes an especially good case for analysis. At the outset, a clarification of key concepts is in order. Following Weber (1976: 29), I define the state as the territorially based institution that "successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion for the execution of its orders". The core of the state--and the focus of the following analysis--is the complex bureaucratic apparatus dedicated to administration, coercion, and fiscal extraction. To the extent that the state "formulate[s] and pursue[s] goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society" (Skocpol 1985: 9), state autonomy prevails. State capacity, in turn, denotes the state's ability to attain these goals and implement its decisions; the more institutionalized state structures are, the more the state can sustain this ability. Finally, state strength is the combination of state autonomy and state capacity. Due to the dearth of scholarly attention, theoretical guidance on the impact of democratization on the state is scarce. The sporadic hints in the literature cluster around two divergent conjectures. Some authors expect a democratic transition to turn the state into a more autonomous and powerful Leviathan, whereas others foresee a Gulliver tied down by an ever denser web of particularistic links to narrow social groupings. Rival Conjectures The first set of arguments claims that democratization gives the state a higher level of institutionalization, making its organizational apparatus more cohesive and turning it more autonomous from powerful social classes and groups. Democracy enhances the transparency of decision-making and thus allows the public to hold the state more accountable. Intensified control by civil society induces state officials to assume a more unified posture and refrain from constant squabbling and bureaucratic infighting (Hintze 1981: 142-56). Increased accountability also eliminates the shady influences that private groupings commonly exert on the state under authoritarian rule. Since democratization opens up channels of interest representation for mass actors, who were tightly 3 controlled by the military regime, it also turns political participation more widespread and less skewed in social terms. The affirmation of political equality permits the "popular sectors" to de-monopolize privileged groups' privileged access to the state. As a result, the state acquires greater autonomy from dominant groups and classes. This reduction of outside influences makes it possible to enhance the 5 internal unity of the state. Democratization may also strengthen the state by turning politicians away from clientelism. Where electoral politics continued under authoritarian rule, as in Brazil, politicians were excluded from important policy decisions and remained confined to winning support by advancing particularistic demands for special favors to the state bureaucracy. With democratization, politicians regain the power to make central policy decisions. They may therefore come to care more about programmatic issues than about special favors. This turn away from clientelism allows state agencies to fulfill their administrative tasks without the constant interference of scores of patronage-hungry politicians. Since under authoritarian rule these politicians also sought to have their own cronies appointed to public posts in order to control the distribution of state resources, the turn away from clientelism allows the public bureaucracy to institute more merit-based recruitment and promotion systems, which improve the competence of state officials and enhance the cohesion of the state apparatus. In addition, politicians who were excluded from power under the military regime and who therefore did not use patronage may win office in the new democracy. Used to gaining support through programmatic appeals, they refrain from resorting to clientelist tactics (Shefter 1994: 27-34). Thus, the turnover stimulated by democratization further diminishes the role of patronage in politics. Finally, in federal systems, democratization increases the autonomy of local and regional governments. This allows the federal government to delegate many routine tasks--such as the administration of primary education and basic health care--and concentrate on fundamental policy decisions (Dominguez and Giraldo 1996: 27). Relieved of unimportant responsibilities, the central state can devote all its attention and resources to the crucial issues. This functional specialization further strengthens the state. In all these ways, democratization can enhance the autonomy and capacity of the state. By contrast, other authors expect democratization to corrode the state's cohesion and autonomy by allowing interest organizations and clientelist politicians to enhance their influence and capture public agencies. In this view, the extension of rights of democratic participation favors privileged social groups, who take better advantage of the new opportunities and further increase their influence in and on the state. In fact, to the extent that "popular sectors" gain influence, state cohesion diminishes even more. Instead of balancing elite influence and thus giving the state greater