On the Problem of Clarifying Commitment Theory

O ne of the ways in which sociology advances is through the development of an hypothesis and the testing of it empirically. The result of such empirical testing may be an acceptance, a rejection, or a casting of doubt on the hypothesis. Once an hypothesis has been tested empirically, other theorists or empiricists (or both) may feel compelled to respond to the results of the empirical test. Such is an "ideal type" of sociological research and, happily, is one which is being followed in the case of Howard Becker's (1960) theory of commitment. In brief, Becker contends that the greater the number of investments (side-bets), the greater the commitment. In a recent study by the authors (Ritzer and Trice, 1969a) this theory of commitment was tested on a sample of personnel managers. The results indicated that there was little or no support in that study for the side-bet theory of commitment (Ritzer and Trice, 1969b). Stebbins in his critique of our study has attempted to point out an area of conceptual confusion in our study as well as in the theorv of commitment. Despite the limitations in Stebbins' critique, this process of theory development, empirical test, and rejoinder has promise of greatly advancing the theory of commitment. As Stebbins makes clear, commitment has, in his opinion, two dimensions: value commitment and continuance commitment. Value commitment consists of a series of "subjectively defined rewards" or "absence of certain costs or penalties" which tell us what attracts an individual to a given position. Continuance commitment, on the other hand, arises not from the presence of rewards, "but from the presence or imminence of subjectively defined penalties associated with the attempt or desire to leave a specific position." Further, these penalties may also be "the absence of rewards obtainable only, or most efficiently, in the incumbent identity." Stebbins feels that Becker's side-bet theory is concerned with continuance commitment, but we in an "innocent and facile" error misunderstood this and tested, instead, the value commitment of personnel managers. This is Stebbins' major critique of our study and we should like to respond to it. As outlined in our study we asked our respondents whether they would leave their organization (or occupation) for a variety of reasons. From the answers to these questions we constructed a commitment to organization score which could range from 5 (low commitment to organization) to 25 (high organizational commitment). Since, in constructing this score, we asked the respondents if they would leave their organizations for more pay, freedom, status, responsibility, or opportunity, Stebbins concludes that since these are "rewards" we are really measuring value commitment. In fact, we are not dealing with either value or continuance commitment, but with the end result of both. The commitment scores computed tell us how committed the personnel manager is to his organization, not how he became committed. He may be committed because of rewards or because of presence or imminence of penalties, but whatever the reason, he is committed to some degree to his organization and it is merely this degree of commitment which we are measuring in our dependent variable. Stebbins is clearly talking about the process of becoming committed, while we are focusing on the result of this process. That Stebbins is thinking about the process is implicit in his definition of the two dimensions in which he talks of "a frame of mind that arises from . . ." and "a psychological state that arises not from . . ." Although Stebbins makes an interesting, and