The Hierarchy of Consumer Participation and Patterns of Economic, Social, and Political Participation1

This article examines relationships between the hierarchy of consumer participation and propensities for general political and community participation. The results of an empirical study reveal how patterns of participation, knowledge seeking, and decision making are interrelated and deeply rooted in the sociopolitical culture. Cluster analysis reveals that economic, social, and political bias are cumulative in individuals, creating differential patterns in the American political culture resulting in a comparative advantage for some and a structural disadvantage for others. The findings have important implications for understanding behavior in democratic polities, market economic systems, political, economic, and social participation, citizen/consumer education and protection, and policymaking. The dynamics of citizen and consumer participation are of interest to several disciplines, each of which takes a particular disciplinary perspective on what may be similar or related phenomena. For example, a fundamental principle of a competitive market economic model is that consumers need to have full and complete information about products and their options and that they use such information to make wise decisions about purchases. Failing this, the market is skewed, consumers make inefficient choices, and supply-demand cycles are distorted (Samuelson 1948, Stonier and Hague 1961, Friedman 1983). Hyman's (1990) Hierarchy of Consumer Participation is a multilevel model based on degrees of proficiency in consumer knowledge and decision making. Hyman's model is based on an empirical study of telecommunications decision making, and by inference, consumer decision making in general. Best (1981) describes a model of the consumer problem-solving process which describes successive, more intensive involvement in p roblem solving and complaining. This, too, appears hierarchical in that fewer consumers choose to take action at successive stages. Hyman, Shingler, and Miller (1992) refine the model and use it to test the tip-of-the-iceberg theory that complaints are not usually unique occurrences but are reflective of systemic patterns. In the political arena, a democratic government depends on citizens to be informed about public policy issues and to use that information when voting for leaders, influencing public officials, discussing issues with others, petitioning government for redress of grievances, supporting community organizations, and engaging in other forms of political participation. Milbrath's (1965) Hierarchy of Political Participation parallels the Hyman model in that it identifies different levels of involvement in political behavior and the consequences thereof. In the societal arena, Smith and Macaulay (1980) posit a model of social participation that also identifies different levels and suggests that an egalitarian society seeks to provide opportunities for all to participate irrespective of class, status, or power. Similarly, Olson (1971) presents a theory of the relationship between market economic forces and political and social interests. He suggests that groups form on the basis of economic, social organizational, an d political bases and pursue their own interests to the detriment of others. The unorganized forgotten groups, similar to what will be called non-decision makers below, are left to suffer in silence (Olson 1971, 165). The literature on economic, political, and social participation, thus, appears to produce complimentary findings, but the relationships across fields are rarely examined empirically. A wide body of literature finds that economic, social, and political participation in American society are not distributed evenly throughout the population. Citizens with higher levels of income, education, and age are more likely to participate in social and political affairs and to occupy leadership positions in community power structures (Verba and Nie 1972; Smith and Macaulay 1980; Waste 1986; Schumaker 1993; Keating 1993; Shively 1994). …