Blackness-In-Itself and Blackness-For-Itself: Frantz Fanon’s Program for Racial Change

INTRODUCTION Is another world possible? When viewed through the context of race, Jean-Paul Sartre (1946, 1956, 1963a, 1964, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1988, and 1989) and Frantz Fanon (1967) agree on the possibility of another, more egalitarian world. They also agree on the means by which this world needs will be achieved--temporal re-articulation. Both identify the unity of the temporal ecstasies--past, present, and future--as the key to revolutionary racial change (Sartre 1988; Fanon 1967). However, they seem to disagree on what will be the end result of this revolutionary process, and their seeming disagreement on how to approach this problem reveals key underlying dynamics in their work. In Fanon's BlackSkin, White Masks (1967)--his major theoretical conceptualization of blackness--the emancipatory struggle that subordinated racialized beings undertake is implicitly framed in terms of an in-itself and a for-itself. Rather than having G.W.F Hegel's (1975) "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself," or Karl Marx's (1978a and 1978b) "class-in-itself" and "class-for-itself," with Fanon's (1967) program for black liberation we find race-in-itself and race-for-itself. The former reflects situations and conditions where forces external to the individual determine the parameters of the individual's racial being. The latter represents situations wherein a racialized being articulates his or her own racial existence. By examining Sartre's theories, racial and otherwise (1946, 1956, 1963a, 1964, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1988, and 1989), and juxtaposing them with Fanon's (1967) theoretical formulation of blackness we can illuminate new possibilities for investigating the phenomenon of race. Sartre (1988) sees the efforts of blackness to emancipate itself as a subordinated inevitability where blackness sacrifices itself for a greater good. Fanon (1967) takes exception with this, establishing the individuality and primacy of black agency, establishing blackness-for-itself. THE IN-ITSELF AND THE FOR-ITSELF Fanon's (1967) implicit formulation of the tension between race-in-itself and race-for-itself has its roots in the work of Hegel (1975 and 1977). Hegel's (1975) formulation of thought-in-itself and thought-for-itself distinction has had an indelible effect on modern social theory, influencing Karl Marx (1978), Martin Heidegger (1962), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1956), all of whom have employed some version of the distinction in their works--works which have strongly influenced Fanon's (1967), either directly or indirectly. By examining the ways in which the distinction is employed in these works we can improve upon our current conceptions of race-in-itself and race-for-itself. Most relevant to sociology may be Marx's (1978a and 1978b) formulation of the distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself. The former represents the immediate oppressive results of capitalism. However, Marx (1978a) finds within this condition the seeds of class revolution. As oppressive as capitalism and its resultant factories are, they create conditions that foster class-consciousness. Two inter-related dynamics are at play. The first is the creation of situations which support the development of class-consciousness in the proletariat. Via the factory, workers realize that they constitute a class. Second, the actual physical structure of the factory, such as its packed environment, produces a space where the proletariat can realize the nature of modern class dynamics, a situation which creates an environment where workers can unite to form a revolutionary force. When these are actuated the proletarians enact class-for-itself. Like Sartre's (1956) explicit formulation of being-in-itself and being-for-itself (which will be addressed later), and Fanon's (1967) implicit formulation of race-in-itself and race-for-itself, Marx's (1978a, 1978b) take on the in-itself and for-itself owes a debt to Hegel (1975). Examining Hegel's Logic (1975) we can gain an understanding of his conceptualization of thought-in-itself and thought-for-itself. …