The War on Terrorism in Central Asia and the Cause of Democratic Reform

Martha Brill Olcott is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article is a revised version of testimony she delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, on 27 June 2002.Since the attacks of 11 September and the emergence of a U.S. security partnership with several of the states of the Central Asian region, there has been much speculation about what this means for the prospects of democratic reform in all five of those countries. If the first ten months are any indication of future developments, the increased U.S. presence is unlikely to change the trajectories of political developments in the region.With the opening of U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and the granting of more limited U.S. landing rights in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, there is legitimate reason for concern that leaders in Washington and other Western capitals may be more reluctant to hold the states of the region to democratic norms, for fear of the political uncertainty it could cause. After all, as it is sometimes crudely put, better to deal with the devil you know than the one you don't.That argument, however, is very dangerous and lets the Central Asian leaders off the hook much too easily. In the case of Uzbekistan, closer cooperation with the United States is making the regime at least experiment with limited democratic reform. But in other parts of the region, the relatively hands-off U.S. policy, which offers criticism with little follow-through, is leading the "devils" we know to become more resistant to democratic reforms. This in turn seems likely to exacerbate the security risks that the states could pose to their neighbors in the future.The power void and collapse of civil society that made Afghanistan an attractive environment for the al-Qaeda network took years to develop and promoted instability in neighboring states. Cleaning out the remains of the terror network in Afghanistan gives the Central Asian states a chance for a brighter future but in itself does not eliminate or even substantially minimize the dangers from their own internally generated security risks. To minimize such risks, the United States should work harder to hold these states to democratic norms. That is the best way to advance U.S. national security interests, especially over the medium and long term, and it is the best way for the states to secure their long-term survival.In Washington, it is too commonly argued that the people of Central Asia should not be expected to develop democratic political systems, that they are unable to sustain democratic institutions because of their history, or that it is too soon in their history of statehood to expect them to develop democratic norms. Ten years may seem a short time in the life of a nation, but is shorter for the rulers than for those they rule. The latter need to retain the hope that things will improve, either in their lifetime or that of their children. Those born in the Soviet Union were raised on a diet of "deferred gratification" and are reluctant to be fed a new version of the old dietary staple by the communist-era bosses who run their now independent states. Those born after communism are likely to have even less patience.Although independence may indefinitely benefit the ruling classes, over time ordinary citizens are likely to see independence as something of a trick. For them, the only real difference in their lives is a change in psychological status and the ephemeral benefits that that provides. But the perceived psychological empowerment is diminishing with time. Those who live in a country must feel some sort of stake in its future or, failing that, must believe that it is realistic to hold out hope for themselves or their children.Developments in Central Asia are becoming increasingly reminiscent of the decolonization process that occurred in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where a number of states have spent the past forty years sliding backward from the levels of development that their populations enjoyed at the time of independence or immediately afterward. …