copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-11-27): Beijing claims the Indian troops are occupying its soil, but both Bhutan and India maintain the area in question is Bhutanese territory. [...] The current standoff began on 16 June when a column of Chinese troops accompanied by construction vehicles and road-building equipment began moving south into what Bhutan considers its territory. [...] "This is in fact a provocative gesture which makes the defence of Doklam virtually the defence of India," Malik said. "I don’t expect a conflict, but I expect both sides to stay put as long as Chinese supply and logistical lines will allow."
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-07-16): The historically disputed territory in northern and western Bhutan is relatively small. However, the new Chinese claim in eastern Bhutan is said to be around 2,051 miles, or 11 percent of Bhutan’s total area (ORF, July 9). The disputed territory in western Bhutan consists of rich pasture land that has been the site of historic conflicts between Tibetan and Bhutanese herders (IDSA Comment, January 19, 2010) and could have potential for economic development. Nevertheless, it is primarily the immense strategic significance of the Doklam Plateau that is driving China’s territorial claims and aggressive infrastructure building in western Bhutan. The plateau is located on the southeast side of the trijunction area. Indian military experts say that under Bhutan’s control, Doklam gives India a "major terrain advantage" over China vis-à-vis the Chumbi Valley, allowing India the advantage of carrying out a strategic offensive or counteroffensive against China from Sikkim (News Laundry, July 8, 2017). Should Doklam be controlled by China, India would lose that advantage. Importantly, control over Doklam would also give China a foothold from where it could strike the Siliguri Corridor, a tenuous sliver of territory that connects India’s conflict-ridden northeastern states to the rest of the country.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-09-01): To start, it remains unclear that India "won." From India’s point of view, the status quo ante of June 2017 was restored, a victory. Yet from China’s perspective, Indian forces withdrew from Chinese territory (also claimed by Bhutan, but not by India). Moreover, on the ground at the site of the confrontation, Indian forces pulled back first. Meanwhile, Chinese forces remain in Doklam, even if Beijing chose not to press ahead with the road extension that sparked the standoff. [...] Take, for example, Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The Doklam "model" would suggest that if China sought to build a permanent presence on the reef, the United States could stop Chinese land reclamation by intervening on behalf of the Philippines to block Chinese dredgers. Yet unlike India’s open support of Bhutan’s claim to sovereignty over Doklam, the United States maintains a position of neutrality on the sovereignty of the contested land features in the South China Sea and around the world.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-09): In view of the many queries raised recently in the media regarding the Bhutan – China boundary in the Doklam area the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to convey the following: On 16th June 2017, the Chinese Army started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri. Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquility in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary. Bhutan has conveyed to the Chinese side, both on the ground and through the diplomatic channel, that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between our two countries. Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before 16 June 2017.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-04-28): All commentators note that China prefers a ‘package deal’ rather than a ‘sector-by-sector’ settlement. In the 1990s, China offered to exchange 495 square kilometers area with an area of 269 square kilometers in north-west Bhutan.23 However, the north western area (Doklam/Gipmochi/Gyemochen) is perceived to be strategically relevant for India, and this is the crux of the Doklam situation as it has unfolded in recent years. Menon and Kanisetti (2018, italics original) write, ‘Yet the Indo-Bhutan friendship cannot, indeed must not, be taken for granted … Bhutan’s own silence on China’s occupation of Doklam can be explained by the fact that it has perceived Doklam as not being of vital interest to itself…Bhutan appears to now be striking out and dealing with China on its own’. The trust deficit can be glaring on such occasions, when there are fuming reports in the Indian media about any possible overtures or contacts between Bhutan and China, which serve a useful purpose for domestic political mobilization in India and further entrench strategies concerning China (cf. Christensen, 1996).
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-09): For over a month, Indian and Chinese troops have been facing off on the Doklam Plateau, a disputed patch of land in the Himalayas near the junction of Bhutan, Tibet, and the Indian state of Sikkim. The impasse began with China’s decision to build a road on territory also claimed by Bhutan. The Chinese construction project, which was discovered in June, led to Bhutanese protests. These drew in India, which decided to increase the number of its troops in the area. New Delhi backs Bhutan’s claim and is called on to help address the country’s security concerns by the terms of a bilateral treaty renewed in 2007. [...] For the past few decades, Chinese officials have looked askance at India’s growing economic and military power. Although they are often dismissive of the prospects of India’s rise in Asia, China’s leadership recognizes that India is the only country on the continent with the material potential to stand up to Beijing’s quest for regional dominance. As India has sought to step out of the confines of its immediate neighborhood—by, for example, expanding its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, providing humanitarian assistance to afflicted states in the region, and carrying out counterpiracy operations around the Horn of Africa—China has worked to contain India within South Asia and to reduce its influence even there. The road-building project in Doklam is just the latest part of this plan.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-06-30): Recent Developments in Doklam Area [...] i.On 16 June, a PLA construction party entered the Doklam area and attempted to construct a road. It is our understanding that a Royal Bhutan Army patrol attempted to dissuade them from this unilateral activity. The Ambassador of the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) has publicly stated that it lodged a protest with the Chinese Government through their Embassy in New Delhi on 20 June. ii.Yesterday, the Foreign Ministry of Bhutan has also issued a statement underlining that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the 1988 and 1998 agreements between Bhutan and China and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between these two countries. They have urged a return to the status quo as before 16 June 2017.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-02-01): The 25th and latest round of talks between Thimphu and Beijing were held in October, four decades after negotiations to resolve the border dispute started. China claims 495 square kilometers (191 square miles) of territory in north-central Bhutan in the Jakarlung and Pasumlung valleys (Jakarlung is part of the Beyul) and 269 square kilometers (104 square miles) in the Doklam plateau in the west on Bhutan’s border with India. In 2020, China added Sakteng in the east to its list reportedly to seek advantage in negotiations. [...] The Chinese expanded in the Beyul to coerce Bhutan into ceding control of a more strategic area near India, the Doklam plateau, but it has since expanded in both regions and upped the ante without any repercussions or costs. [...] Nobody feels more pressure than Bhutan, but a denial in 2020 by the Bhutanese ambassador to India, Vetsop Namgyel, that "there is no Chinese village inside Bhutan" rang alarm bells in New Delhi and caused suspicion that Bhutan, India’s closest ally in South Asia, may have decided to hand over Doklam, or at least parts of it, to China.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-11-24): Maxar said the images show the newly constructed Pangda Village, on the Bhutanese side of the disputed border, as well as a supply depot in Chinese territory, near the point of a tense dispute between Indian and Chinese forces in 2017. [...] A thin strip of land bordering all three countries, the Doklam area is claimed by both China and Bhutan, but it is also strategically important to India, because of its proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, a vital artery between New Delhi and its north eastern states. [...] Just where the two countries draw their borders is highly disputed, however. The 2017 stand-off was sparked after Bhutan accused China of constructing a road inside its territory in "direct violation" of treaty obligations. China, which does not have formal diplomatic relations with Bhutan, denied the accusation, contending that the area is part of Chinese territory.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-17): Indian and Chinese forces have been locked in a standoff over the Doklam plateau, a territory disputed between China and Bhutan, since June. The disputed territory is located at the Doka La pass, a tri-junction where Bhutan borders the Indian state of Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. India, which enjoys a close relationship with Bhutan, is concerned about Chinese encroachment in Doklam because it would bring Chinese forces closer to its vulnerable "Chicken’s Neck" – the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India’s northeast to the rest of the country. In 2005, Bhutan considered yielding territory in the Doklam region to China in order to regain land in northern Bhutan – at least twice the size of the Doklam plateau. However, Bhutan acquiesced to India’s wishes to cancel the deal, demonstrating the power of the bilateral relationship between the two countries, which has been strengthened by years of close cooperation after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cracked down on dissent in Tibet in 1959. Despite China’s geopolitical and economic rise in recent decades, and their shared border, Bhutan remains guarded against its northern neighbor, forestalling the development of any diplomatic relationship. Such behavior is often questioned – after all, the argument goes that Bhutan would only have to give up a minuscule piece of land in order to normalize relations with a neighbor whose investment potential far exceeds that of India’s. Recently, some Bhutanese analysts have even suggested that Bhutan lacks a strong claim to the disputed portion of the Doklam region.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-07-03): "Doklam has been a part of China since ancient times. It does not belong to Bhutan, still less India," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang on Wednesday. "China’s construction of road in Doklam is an act of sovereignty on its own territory. It is completely justified and lawful, and others have no right to interfere." [...] The Doklam dispute is the latest in a long-running series of territorial flare-ups between India and China. In 1962, the two countries engaged in a bloody border war, and skirmishes have continued to break out sporadically in the decades since.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Bhutan (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2018-06-13): For 73 days last year, the world watched as Chinese and Indian forces faced off in a remote stretch of the Himalayas. The problem started in June when Chinese army engineers attempted to build a road through the Doklam plateau, claimed by both China and Bhutan. Following "coordination" with Bhutanese authorities, Indian soldiers based just across the border intervened and literally stopped the Chinese crews in their tracks. After weeks of negotiations, Delhi and Beijing agreed to withdraw their troops to their original positions; China "blinked" because it had to abandon the project. Since then, however, China has quietly deployed troops and built new infrastructure in the area, slowly but steadily gaining advantage in the contested region. As the first anniversary of the crisis approaches, neither India nor Bhutan have stepped in to block these activities. [...] For China, building roads through the rugged 14,000-foot Doklam plateau serves two major strategic purposes. First, a road network would support a more entrenched Chinese presence in the region. This would allow China to hand Bhutan a fait accompli in the territorial dispute, ending years of inconclusive border talks. Second, new infrastructure would allow Chinese troops to access a key ridge overlooking the Siliguri corridor. Also known as the "Chicken’s Neck," the corridor is a narrow stretch of land that connects India’s northeastern states with the rest of the country. Chinese forces could use their positions on higher ground to collect intelligence on Indian military positions and, in a conflict, even threaten Indian supply routes.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-08): The Demchok sector[a] is a disputed area named after the villages of Demchok in Ladakh and Demchok in Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is a part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both China and India claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.[b] [...] The talks were held in Beijing between Zhang Hanfu, China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China and T.N. Kaul, his Chargé d'Affaires and Chen Chai-Kang, a Director. They lasted from December 1953 till end of April 1954. [...] Kaul objected, Demchok was in India, he told Chen who answered that India's border was further on the West of the Indus. On Kaul's insistence Chen said "There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok". [...] In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22. [...] The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-08): Demchok (Tibetan: ཌེམ་ཆོག, Wylie: bde mchog, THL: dem chok, ZYPY: dêmqog),[1][a] was described by a British boundary commission in 1847 as a village lying on the border between the Kingdom of Ladakh and the Tibet. It was a "hamlet of half a dozen huts and tents", divided into two parts by a rivulet which formed the boundary between the two states.[5][6] The rivulet, a tributary of the Indus River variously called the Demchok River, Charding Nullah, or the Lhari stream, was set as the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet in the 1684 Treaty of Tingmosgang. By 1904–05, the Tibetan side of the hamlet was said to have had 8 to 9 huts of zamindars (landholders), while the Ladakhi side had two.[7] The area of the former Demchok now straddles the Line of Actual Control, the effective border of the People's Republic of China's Tibet Autonomous Region and the Republic of India's Ladakh Union Territory. [...] Chinese officials use the name "Demchok" only for the Tibetan side of the settlement and refer to the Ladakhi side as "Parigas" (also spelt "Barrigas").[12] [...] External links [edit]- Demchok Western Sector (Chinese claim), OpenStreetMap - Demchok Eastern Sector (Indian claim), OpenStreetMap
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-01-02): The differences in the western sector (Ladakh) are no longer confined to Trig Heights in the Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO) area and Demchok in the south as was the case in earlier decades. The Depsang Bulge, Galwan, Pangong Lake and Hot Springs are areas where China is seeking to press expedient claims. Since the Galwan incident, the two sides have disengaged at multiple friction points even as military and diplomatic talks continue to find a way out of the impasse at Depsang and Demchok. [...] The LAC between India and China, not being the result of bilateral negotiations, is frequently open to challenge by either side. There are areas along the LAC that have been patrolled by both sides in the past. The Chinese ingress in Sumdorong Chu valley in the Tawang sector in 1986-87 resulted in close confrontation that lasted eight years. It was only in 1995 that the two sides pulled back, with India relocating its Jaya and Negi posts on the south side of the Hathungla-Lungrola ridgeline. Nobody insinuated then that India was creating a buffer zone on its own territory, so why take that line now in regard to the disengagement already achieved in Ladakh? China encroached on Longju in Upper Subansiri way back in August 1959, yet the government of the day did nothing about it thereafter.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-07-31): NEW DELHI: Apart from fortifying its position along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh with the construction of a new village in the Demchok sector, China’s People’s Liberation Army has made a new bridge across Pangong Lake operational now. [...] It will be recalled that Depsang and Demchok are two points in Ladakh, where the standoff continues between the Indian Army and PLA. The Chinese PLA have pitched tents at Charding Nonong area in Demchuk to prevent access to Indian troops in the sector. India has increased its reinforcements on the LAC in Ladakh sector while the Chinese have been constructing villages at many places along the LAC to consolidate PLA’s presence after the tensions in June 2020. The villages also help in strengthening the border forces by filling in the gaps created by the outflow of residents and improve surveillance and patrols through the spread over network of herders along the LAC.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-06-04): Since the Corps commander level talks in 2020, the two sides have so far undertaken disengagement from five friction points — at Galwan after the violent clash in June 2020, the north and south banks of Pangong Tso in February 2021, at Patrolling Point (PP) 17 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area in August 2021, and PP15 in September 2022. On the Depsang Plains and Demchok, there are fundamental disagreements, as India maintains that they are the two additional friction points that still remain while China has refused to accept it, terming them as legacy issues predating the 2020 standoff. On several occasions, Army Chief Gen Manoj Pande has termed the situation along the LAC as "stable but unpredictable" while stating that five out of the seven friction points in Eastern Ladakh have been resolved and the focus is now on the remaining two points. [...] Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is another friction point. In Demchok while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala. The crucial Sub-Sector North (SSN) consists of the Depsang plains and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). Currently, the airfield at DBO is accessible by the 255 km-long Darbuk-Shyok-DBO (DSDBO) road. A plan for an alternate axis across Saser La which has an ancient trade route, is in the works.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-02): In April 2013 India claimed, referencing their own perception[54] of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) location, that Chinese troops had established a camp in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector, 10 km (6.2 mi) on their side of the Line of Actual Control. This figure was later revised to a 19 km (12 mi) claim. According to Indian media, the incursion included Chinese military helicopters entering Indian airspace to drop supplies to the troops. However, Chinese officials denied any trespassing having taken place.[55][56] Soldiers from both countries briefly set up camps on the ill-defined frontier facing each other, but the tension was defused when both sides pulled back soldiers in early May.[57] In September 2014, India and China had a standoff at the LAC, when Indian workers began constructing a canal in the border village of Demchok, Ladakh, and Chinese civilians protested with the army's support. It ended after about three weeks, when both sides agreed to withdraw troops.[58] The Indian army claimed that the Chinese military had set up a camp 3 km (1.9 mi) inside territory claimed by India.[59] According to scholar Harsh V. Pant, China gains territory with every incursion.[60]
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-08-19): NEW DELHI: The division commander of the Indian Army in Ladakh on Friday met his Chinese counterpart to take forward the talks on the disengagement of troops from the standoff areas of Depsang and Demchok. [...] The 3 Division of the Indian Army looks after the 832-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. There has been no movement forward on standoffs in Depsang and Demchok. The standoff persists at Depsang Y-Junction and Demchok even before the May 2020 standoff began. Sources said the Depsang standoff has resulted in obstruction of Indian troop movement to the traditional Patrolling Points (PP) PP 10, PP11, PP 11A, PP12, and PP13, covering 952 sq km. A few tents have been pitched by the Chinese on the Indian side in Demchok and have refused to pull back. The Chinese side dominates around 150 sq km in this area. The technical term for corps commander-level talks is senior highest military commander level (SHMCL); so far there have been 19 rounds of talks. Matters have earlier been resolved at the higher commander level (Major General) meetings.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of People's Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-04-25): This resulted in a military stand-off.</p>.<p>Though protracted negotiations led to the mutual withdrawal of troops by both the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA from some of the face-off points along the LAC, like Galwan Valley, the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso, Gogra Post and Hot Springs, the stand-off could not be resolved completely so far. The PLA troops deployed in Depsang, well inside the territory of India along the LAC with China, are still continuing to block the Indian Army’s access to Patrolling Points 10, 11, 12, 12A and 13. A face-off is also continuing in Demchok.</p>.<p>Beijing has of late been claiming that the mutual withdrawal of troops by the Chinese PLA and the Indian Army from Patrolling Point 15 (Gogra-Hotsprings area) in September 2022 marked the restoration of normalcy along the LAC in eastern Ladakh.</p>.<p>China’s claim appears to be an attempt to subtly build up pressure on India to accept the "new normal" in Depsang and Demchok areas. </p>