copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-11-01): A Bhutanese delegation led by Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji held the 25th round of boundary talks with Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong on October 23-24. [...] China's construction activity has essentially changed the reality of the ground, allowing it to hold talks with Bhutan from a position of strength. In 2017, the Chinese and Indian army were locked in a face-off in the Doklam region, traditionally a Bhutanese territory. China has established permanent military structures in Doklam and has called the region its territory while demanding that Bhutan include it in talks to swap other territory. [...] "The Bhutan Prime Minister's statement on the border issue in July indicated that Bhutan will give China some or most of the western border areas that China is demanding—and in several cases has already occupied. But the PM said it will not give up Doklam unless India agrees," Robert Barnett, a professorial research associate at SOAS, University of London, wrote on X, formerly Twitter.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-02): The Philippines’ moves gravely infringe upon China’s sovereignty and violate international law and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). China asks the Philippines to immediately withdraw the vessel illegally anchored in the lagoon, and stop infringement activities and provocations at once. China will continue to take resolute measures in accordance with law to safeguard our territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and uphold the sanctity and effectiveness of the DOC. Meanwhile, we are ready to maintain dialogue and communication with the Philippines through diplomatic channels to properly address relevant issues and put the maritime situation under control. [...] Mao Ning: I noted the media reports. China and the ROK are close neighbors and each other’s important cooperation partners. Advancing the sound and steady growth of China-ROK relations serves the common interests of the two countries. High-level exchanges play an important role in growing relations between countries. They require sound preparation, a favorable atmosphere, and sufficient potential deliverables. On future high-level exchanges between the two sides, I have nothing specific to share.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-07-18): Beijing takes this to mean that the convention remained in force under India as the successor state to British India and denoted the triboundary point, even if Bhutan was not a party to the convention. Beijing also justifies its claim to the Doklam region more broadly by evoking the "indisputable fact" that "Doklam has always been part of China’s territory and under its effective jurisdiction" — language that may sound familiar to readers who track Chinese claims in the South China Sea, for instance. To explain its claim, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released its own map of the area, shown below. The blue arrow shows the location of the Indian Army crossing and the mountain shown at the trijunction point is Mount Gipmochi. (Neither the Indian nor Bhutanese governments have released authoritative maps highlighting their interpretation of the triboundary point.)
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-07-08): Chumbi Valley has been in the news for a couple of weeks owing to reports about the Chinese intrusion into the Doklam (Donglang according to China) Plateau. There has been some confusion created about the place of intrusion with names like "trijunction", "Doka La", "Sikkim Border", "Donglang", "Mount Gipmochi (Gyemo Chen)" and "Doklam" used by the angry People’s Republic of China (PRC) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) spokespersons, and our media. [...] Doklam Plateau is an 80-89 square km plateau with average altitude of 4,000-4,500 meters, located in Western Bhutan. It is a salient of Bhutanese territory that juts north into the Chumbi Valley with India (Sikkim) to the north-west, west and south-west and Tibet to the north, east and south-east. The trijunction of India, Bhutan and Tibet is on the north-western edge of the Doklam Plateau where the Batang La post of India is located and north-west of which along the crest line are the Indian defences of Sikkim. [...] China decided to embarrass India in the Doklam area by trying to alter the status quo. It aimed at driving a wedge between India and Bhutan and thus chose to show its presence in Bhutanese territory, to which India also is very sensitive. China’s strategy is to make India lose face by forcing it to withdraw and thus wean Bhutan to its own sphere of influence. Anything short of mutual withdrawal will leave China in de facto control of the Doklam Plateau outflanking and compromising the Indian defences in Sikkim.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2018-05-15): Relations hit a low when Indian military forces prevented a Chinese military crew from constructing a metal road on the Doklam plateau, in Bhutanese territory but claimed by China. This unilateral Chinese action went against an understanding between China and Bhutan that the status quo on their border would not be violated by either side pending resolution of their boundary issue. The Doklam standoff lasted from 16 June to 28 August 2017 during which Chinese rhetoric was vitriolic with the threat of war. Meetings at the leadership level defused the crisis. In a brief meeting on the G20 sidelines in July, Modi and Xi agreed that talks would be held at the official level to resolve the standoff. Limited disengagement of the two sides’ forces followed, enabling Modi to travel to Xiamen for the BRICS summit with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in September. One may surmise that the prospect of the BRICS unraveling as a result of India-China tensions may have encouraged China to seek a limited tactical compromise. However, the willingness of the two leaders to convene their rather unusual and unprecedented "informal" summit at Wuhan, April 27 and 28, suggests that Doklam may have triggered a rethink on India-China relations going beyond tactical compulsions. [...] This give and take, though limited in scope, represents a significant turnaround in India-China relations from the dark days of the Doklam standoff.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-11-21): While situating the ongoing border standoff within the overarching framework of Chinese foreign policy and global strategy, this paper makes two key arguments. First, the ongoing border crisis in Ladakh is likely the outcome of an intensifying conflict between China’s Major Power Diplomacy (of wooing India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making New Delhi a key partner in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its Neighborhood Strategy (that of securing a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region) vis-à-vis India. Second, the standoff lays bare China’s policy dilemma over India — on the one hand, Beijing wants to effectively check a rising India by asserting its strength and psychological advantage over New Delhi. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the impact of the current crisis on the realization of its various regional and global objectives in the Indian Ocean Region that necessitates cordial ties with India.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-09): On June 16, China started building a road in the Doklam area in the Himalayas in territory claimed by China and Bhutan, near the border with India. Two days later, on Bhutan’s behalf, Indian troops crossed a settled boundary to stop China’s construction. Around 300 troops from India and China have been facing off since, in one of the most serious border standoffs between the two Asian powers in decades. China has demanded that Indian troops withdraw first, while India has called for simultaneous withdrawal. With their armies facing off, each country has unleashed diverging narratives about what is going on in Doklam. [...] The first question is why China decided to extend a longstanding road through the Doklam plateau in mid-June, towards the important Jampheri ridge. This is both a legal and political question. China claims the area under an 1890 Anglo-Chinese treaty that defines the tri-junction point of India, China, and Bhutan. India accepts the treaty, but interprets it differently. Both sides have a reasonable case, but India also points out that China agreed in 2012 to finalize the tri-junction through consultation—rather than unilateral action.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-07-16): [6] While the Bhutanese government maintained that the road [lay] inside Bhutanese territory and "is a direct violation of the [1988 and 1998] agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary" between the two countries (Bhutan MFA, August 6, 2017), the PRC insisted that "Doklam has been a part of China since ancient times" and "is an indisputable fact supported by historical and jurisprudential evidence, and the ground situation." China’s construction of [a] road in Doklam is an act of sovereignty on its own territory, it said (PRC MFA, June 28, 2016).
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-07-18): Since 1996, China has offered an exchange of territory with Bhutan, seeking to relinquish its claim to disputed regions in the north in exchange for Bhutan ceding more strategically important territory in the west. For Beijing, Doklam remains the goal: It sits at a junction that connects Tibet, Bhutan, and India, and it would provide the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with a tactical advantage. To make this a more attractive proposition, China noted that the territory in the north was far larger than the territory it sought. Although the initial offer nearly worked, the 1996 talks ultimately broke down. [...] Similarly, the Chumbi Valley to the north of Doklam—often described as a Chinese dagger into Indian territory—represents a weakness for China, which sees the ancient gateway to Tibet as vulnerable to a pincer movement, in which Indian troops could strike from both sides of the valley at once—from Bhutan and India. By extending its claim by 89 square kilometers south of the intersection with Bhutan and India, China hopes to gain a vantage point that could serve both offensive and defensive purposes in a potential conflict with India.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-03): I 1. The Dong Lang area (Doklam) is located in Yadong county of the Tibet autonomous region of China. It borders India’s Sikkim state on the west and the Kingdom of Bhutan on the south. In 1890, China and the UK signed the Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet which delimited the boundary between the Tibet region of China and Sikkim. According to the Convention, the Dong Lang area, which is located on the Chinese side of the boundary, is indisputably Chinese territory. For long, China’s border troops have been patrolling the area and Chinese herdsmen grazing livestock there. At present, the boundary between the Dong Lang area and Sikkim is a part of the China-India boundary in the Sikkim Sector. [...] 8. The China-India boundary in the Sikkim Sector has already been delimited, and the Dong Lang area is Chinese territory. China’s road building on its own territory is aimed at improving local transportation, which is completely lawful and legitimate. China did not cross the boundary in its road building, and it notified India in advance in full reflection of China’ s goodwill. The Indian border troops have flagrantly crossed the mutually-recognized boundary to intrude into the Chinese territory and violated China’ s territorial sovereignty. This is indeed a real attempt to change the status quo of the boundary, and it has gravely undermined peace and tranquility of the China-India border area.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-03-14): China shares land borders with 15 countries and sea borders with eight, and is involved in many disputes. Land disputes include the ones with Bhutan (Doklam plateau), India (Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin) and Nepal (near Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts). Maritime disputes in the South China Sea involve Vietnam (Paracel Islands, also known as Xisha Islands [西沙群島]), the Philippines (Scarborough Shoal, or Huangyan Island [黃岩島]), and parts of Spratly Islands [Nansha Islands, 南沙群島]), Malaysia (parts of Spratly Islands), Brunei (parts of Spratly Islands) and Taiwan. Last year, Beijing published a map claiming most of these territories as part of the People’s Republic of China. [...] In 2017, the Doklam plateau dispute erupted between India and China in the tri-junction area claimed by Bhutan, India and China. A platoon of Chinese border guards demolished Royal Bhutan Army bunkers. Subsequently, a Chinese road construction crew arrived, accompanied by more Chinese soldiers. India, Bhutan’s de facto security guarantor under the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, sent troops to obstruct the Chinese construction. After intermittent skirmishes, both sides agreed to withdraw forces. [...] If Beijing successfully acquires Doklam without firing a shot, this could become its new expansion strategy. It would also undermine India’s role as the de facto security guarantor for Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, as well as for the exiled Tibetan community.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-09-08): Moreover, a Chinese military presence at Doklam—particularly one with transportation infrastructure capable of supporting deeper incursions—would threaten a 17-mile-wide strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor linking seven Northeastern Indian states to the rest of the country. The corridor is often referred to as India's "Chicken Neck"—and New Delhi had no intention of letting Beijing gain control of it. The 2007 treaty with Bhutan ominously notes (PDF) that "neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other." Even if Bhutan were willing to let China take control of Doklam, India would likely have been unwilling (and, by treaty, unrequired) to stand aside. [...] Beijing has objected vociferously to each of these steps, with the Foreign Ministry noting in April, "China will firmly take necessary measures to defend its territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests." China intends to select the Dalai Lama's successor—as it did in 1995 for Tibetan Buddhism's second-ranking cleric, the Panchen Lama. China's claim to the areas held by India (and Bhutan) flows from its claim to Tibet. If Tibet is an integral part of China, then all territories ever controlled (or claimed) by Tibet are also integral parts of China. A high-profile scare on the Doklam Plateau—inhabited only by seasonal Tibetan and Bhutanese yak-herders—may have been intended to send India an implicit message: namely, not to repeat its decision to shelter the Dalai Lama in 1959, a key cause of China's 1962 invasion.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-08): Doklam (Tibetan: འབྲོག་ལམ, Wylie: ‘brog lam, THL: drok lam),[1][a] called Donglang (Chinese: 洞朗) by China,[5][6] is an area in Chumbi Valley with a high plateau and a valley, lying between China's Yadong County to the north, Bhutan's Ha District to the east and India's Sikkim state to the west. Since the 1960s, China and Bhutan have disputed sovereignty over the Doklam area. The dispute has not been resolved despite several rounds of border negotiations between Bhutan and China.[3][7] The area is of strategic importance to all three countries.[3][8][9] [...] Anglo-Chinese Treaty [edit]China claims the Doklam area as Chinese territory based on the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1890, negotiated between the British Empire in India and the Chinese resident in Tibet.[86][87] Its purpose was to delineate the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, and Bhutan was mentioned only in the offing. Article I of the treaty states: [...] On 29 June 2017, Bhutan protested the Chinese construction of a road in the disputed territory.[96] The Bhutanese border was put on high alert and border security was tightened as a result of the growing tensions.[97] On the same day, China released a map depicting Doklam as part of China, claiming, via the map, that all territory up to Gipmochi belonged to China by the 1890 Anglo-Chinese treaty.[98]
Claim: Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-02): 2017 Doklam military standoff [edit]In June, a military standoff occurred between India and China in the disputed territory of Doklam, near the Doka La pass. On 16 June 2017, the Chinese brought heavy road building equipment to the Doklam region and began constructing a road in the disputed area.[64] Previously, China had built a dirt road terminating at Doka La where Indian troops were stationed.[64] They would conduct foot patrol from this point up till the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) post at Jampheri Ridge.[64] The dispute that ensued post 16 June stemmed from the fact that the Chinese had begun building a road below Doka La, in what India and Bhutan claim to be disputed territory.[64] This resulted in Indian intervention of China's road construction on 18 June, two days after construction began. Bhutan claims that the Chinese have violated the written agreements between the two countries that were drawn up in 1988 and 1998 after extensive rounds of talks.[65] The agreements drawn state that status quo must be maintained in the Doklam area as of before March 1959.[65] It is these agreements that China has violated by constructing a road below Doka La.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-09-07): Moreover, a Chinese military presence at Doklam—particularly one with transportation infrastructure capable of supporting deeper incursions—would threaten a 17-mile-wide strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor linking seven Northeastern Indian states to the rest of the country. The corridor is often referred to as India’s "Chicken Neck"—and New Delhi had no intention of letting Beijing gain control of it. The 2007 treaty with Bhutan ominously notes that "neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other." Even if Bhutan were willing to let China take control of Doklam, India would likely have been unwilling (and, by treaty, unrequired) to stand aside. [...] Beijing has objected vociferously to each of these steps, with the Foreign Ministry noting in April, "China will firmly take necessary measures to defend its territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests." China intends to select the Dalai Lama’s successor—as it did in 1995 for Tibetan Buddhism’s second-ranking cleric, the Panchen Lama. China’s claim to the areas held by India (and Bhutan) flows from its claim to Tibet. If Tibet is an integral part of China, then all territories ever controlled (or claimed) by Tibet are also integral parts of China. A high-profile scare on the Doklam Plateau—inhabited only by seasonal Tibetan and Bhutanese yak-herders—may have been intended to send India an implicit message: namely, not to repeat its decision to shelter the Dalai Lama 1959, a key cause of China’s 1962 invasion.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-08): China on Tuesday did not seem to rule out taking military action as a possibility to end the standoff between its and Indian troops at the Doklam plateau as, it said, the situation there had acquired a "dangerous" dimension. It feels a mutual pullout of forces from the area, as proposed by India, is not an option. [...] Ms. Wang said that in the mid-nineties, Bhutan agreed that Donglang, the Chinese name for Doklam, belonged to China. After 24 rounds of boundary talks, Beijing and Thimphu had worked out a "basic consensus" on the situation and alignment of the boundary, she observed. [...] However, Bhutan’s ambassador to India, Vetsop Namgyel, is on record stating that, "Doklam is a disputed territory and Bhutan has a written agreement with China that pending the final resolution of the boundary issue, peace and tranquility should be maintained in the area."
Claim: Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-09-08): Moreover, a Chinese military presence at Doklam—particularly one with transportation infrastructure capable of supporting deeper incursions—would threaten a 17-mile-wide strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor linking seven Northeastern Indian states to the rest of the country. The corridor is often referred to as India's "Chicken Neck"—and New Delhi had no intention of letting Beijing gain control of it. The 2007 treaty with Bhutan ominously notes (PDF) that "neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other." Even if Bhutan were willing to let China take control of Doklam, India would likely have been unwilling (and, by treaty, unrequired) to stand aside. [...] Beijing has objected vociferously to each of these steps, with the Foreign Ministry noting in April, "China will firmly take necessary measures to defend its territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests." China intends to select the Dalai Lama's successor—as it did in 1995 for Tibetan Buddhism's second-ranking cleric, the Panchen Lama. China's claim to the areas held by India (and Bhutan) flows from its claim to Tibet. If Tibet is an integral part of China, then all territories ever controlled (or claimed) by Tibet are also integral parts of China. A high-profile scare on the Doklam Plateau—inhabited only by seasonal Tibetan and Bhutanese yak-herders—may have been intended to send India an implicit message: namely, not to repeat its decision to shelter the Dalai Lama in 1959, a key cause of China's 1962 invasion.
Claim: Doklam is a territory of People's Republic of China (Doklam, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-29): India said the two sides had reached a "disengagement understanding," which led to the "expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face-off site" in Dolam, part of Doklam region that is disputed between Bhutan and China. (See part one of this series for a primer on the political geography of the region.) MEA released a follow-up statement noting that the "border personnel of India and China at the face-off site" were withdrawing. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, confirmed in a press conference that the standoff had ended, with India withdrawing "all its border personnel and equipment that were illegally on the Chinese territory to the Indian side." Hua added that "Chinese border troops continue with their patrols in the Dong Lang area," using the Chinese name for the Doklam region. [...] While China may have conceded to a return to the status quo — an outcome rendered palatable with face-saving claims of India withdrawing first — the Doklam region won’t be off the table for future attempts at prodding India and Bhutan.