copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-30): People's Republic of China's position [edit]The Depsang Plains are located on the border of the Indian union territory of Ladakh and the disputed zone of Aksai Chin. The Chinese Army controls most of the plains,[4] while India controls the western portion of the plains.[5] The dispute remains unresolved.[6] Arunachal Pradesh is a state of India created on 20 January 1972, located in the far northeast. It borders the states of Assam and Nagaland to the south, and shares international borders with Burma in the east, Bhutan in the west, and China in the north. The majority of the territory is claimed by China, by whom it is called South Tibet. The northern border of Arunachal Pradesh reflects the McMahon Line, a line demarcated by the 1914 Simla Convention between the United Kingdom and the Tibetan government. The Simla Convention was never accepted by the Chinese government, and it was also considered invalid by Tibetans due to unmet conditions specified in the treaty.[7] The boundary was not broadly enforced by the Indian government until 1950. Currently, this territory is administered by India.[8][9]
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-03-08): On the China-India border in early May, China asserted itself in the long-standing dispute with a rare mobilization of troops in the western sector of the dispute, which is also called Ladakh. In three locations, China moved forces up to what it views as the "line of actual control" (LAC)—but across what India views as the LAC. The scope, scale, and posture of Chinese actions on the border are perhaps unprecedented (Fravel 2020c). Unlike previous incidents on the border in 2013 at Depsang or 2014 at Chumar, China is now putting pressure on the LAC in the western sector, simultaneously, in multiple areas across a large front. [...] Landry PF. Decentralized authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party’s control of local elites in the post-Mao era. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2008. [...] Shirk SL. China: fragile superpower. New York: Oxford University Press; 2007.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-10-29): The border law also mentions that "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China are sacred and inviolable". This is of concern to New Delhi as Chinese maps show parts of Ladakh, the Barahoti Plains in the state of Uttarakhand, and the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. This has raised speculation that any Indian territory that China occupies either militarily or through settling civilians within these areas will automatically be considered sovereign Chinese territory. In other words, the border law could legitimise China’s military incursions along the LAC and empower it to continue building villages in disputed areas to support its territorial claims. Indian observes have also pointed out that this provision will make it harder to resolve the ongoing standoff in eastern Ladakh as China is likely to refuse to withdraw any further and remain encamped in its current positions.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-08-31): At half past three in the morning on September 10, 2014, Indian forces found that Chinese troops had deployed heavy machinery to construct a temporary road inside Indian territory. Over the next twenty-four hours, Indian troops kept a watch on the 300 PLA soldiers, who after the initial road cutting activity, were camped in the area. Chumar, the last village in Ladakh, bordering Himachal Pradesh, has been a bone of contention, with China claiming it to be its own territory. At a height of around 15,000 feet, generally known as 30R, Chumar offers a vantage point at the apex of a ridge that gives the Indian troops a clear view of Chinese movements. The Chinese side wanted India to vacate the height, alter the frontier, and claim the area known as Tible-Mane. A journalist reported that some sources in the Indian army were puzzled by China opening up a "front" in Chumar for two reasons. First, Chumar had been undisputed till about 2013. Second, and more importantly, the frontier along Tible-Mane is recognized as the International Boundary and not as the LAC.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-12-08): The end of the Cold War and reforms in both countries saw India and China enter into agreements to stabilize the status quo on the border and, with it, the Indian-Chinese relationship. But beginning in the second decade of this century, the People’s Liberation Army began to make increasingly assertive moves. In 2013, for example, PLA troops crossed the Line of Actual Control in Depsang and set up tents before agreeing to withdraw after two and a half weeks. The next year, in Chumar, Indian soldiers blocked Chinese construction workers from building a road into territory controlled by India. In 2017, Beijing again attempted to construct a road and occupy foreign territory, this time in Bhutan’s Doklam plateau, before India intervened. (India has security commitments to Bhutan.) After a 72-day standoff, both sides withdrew from the face-off point, but China has since occupied large parts of the plateau. And then on June 15, 2020, Chinese and Indian forces clashed in the disputed Galwan River valley, resulting in the deaths of at least 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese ones. It was the first lethal conflict between the two nations in 45 years.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-12-15): Since 2013, there have been a series of incidents between the border patrols of the two sides, escalating in scope and scale. Former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon, who had steered the BPTA in 1993, wrote in 2021 that the "face-offs and intrusions along the border, which were handled quietly and managed smoothly before 2012, are now more frequent, publicized by both sides and led in 2020 to the first death of troops since 1975."23 The vastly superior Chinese infrastructure in the border region has enabled the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to deploy better anti-access/area denial capabilities, thereby obstructing Indian patrol parties from going to areas that they have patrolled in the past. This includes the Depsang, Demchok, Chumar, and Galwan areas in eastern Ladakh.24 This escalation in Chinese patrolling behavior along the LAC has been accompanied by stone pelting and attacks with nail-studded wooden clubs. The PLA’s behavior has progressively weakened the framework of peace and tranquility built by the two sides since 1993. [...] 6 There is a substantial difference between the respective claims of India and China and the areas under their actual control in both Ladakh (Western sector) and Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern sector) as well as smaller but still significant differences in the Middle sector. More in Menon, "Pacifying the Border."
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-06-19): The 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident is a good example of such an infrastructure arms race. During that incident, China set up camps in the region, leading to India retaliating with its own encampment. The 20-day standoff ended with the Chinese dismantling bunkers near Depsang, the Indians dismantling bunkers in Chumar, and both sides withdrawing. [...] They are also retaliations against the creation of the Ladakh Union Territory in August 2019, which included "the Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India boundary into its administrative jurisdiction" in India’s reissued map. [...] The bad news is that the process will be long, destabilizing, and could include more casualties. Neither side will easily abandon their tactical objectives. In that sense, the current standoff is unlikely to see a quick resolution. The 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident saw a 20-day standoff before the Indians agreed to dismantle bunkers in the Chumar sector and the Chinese withdrew. The 2017 Doklam standoff lasted for much longer — 72 days — and ended with the withdrawal of troops by both sides. If these precedents serve as indicators, China and India will eventually negotiate disengagement and mutual withdrawal. However, it is even more likely that both sides will sneak to return in the next year to encroach in what they both believe to be their rightful territory. The heart of the matter is that India believes the construction it is conducting is on its undisputed territory. But since there is no boundary, the Chinese see the Indian construction as changing the status quo. These two perspectives will be hard to reconcile.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-10-25): Beginning with the Nathu La and Cho La skirmishes of 1967 in the eastern sector, tensions have risen steadily across the area, with new incidents taking place in this sector in 1975, 1986–87 and 2017. Moving to the western sector, tensions grew with the Daulat Beg Oldie and Chumar stand-offs in 2013, followed by other stand-offs in 2014 and 2015. Most recently, the Naku La incident in 2020 in the eastern sector and the eastern Ladakh stand-off between 2020 and 2022 in the western sector complete this picture of periodical military clashes between the sides. [...] Chinese efforts to legitimise its claims over this area have further heightened tensions. For instance, in October 2021, amidst the eastern Ladakh stand-off, China’s top legislature adopted a new law on the protection and exploitation of the country’s land border areas, which came into effect from 1 January 2022. The law stipulates that that China will take all necessary measures to "safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines territorial sovereignty and land boundaries".[8] It is important to note here that China has settled its land borders with 12 neighbours, while only India and Bhutan remain unresolved. It is thereby apparent that this law has direct bearing on the India–China boundary dispute.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-06-25): A three-week standoff between Indian and Chinese troops near each other and the Line of Actual Control between Jammu and Kashmir's Ladakh region and Aksai Chin (Aksai Chin is a disputed border area between China and India. It is administered by China as part of Hotan County, which lies in the southwestern part of Hotan Prefecture of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, but is also claimed by India as a part of the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1962, China and India fought a brief war in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, but in 1993 and 1996, the two countries signed agreements to respect the Line of Actual Control.) was defused on 5 May 2013. The Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops in exchange for an Indian agreement to demolish several "live-in bunkers" 250 km to the south in the disputed Chumar sector. The agreement led to another duration of relative peace until on 16 June 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment under the Belt and Road initiative began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India's ally Bhutan. On June 18, 2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two bulldozers, entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road assuming that the 2007 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty was a enough of a reason for preventive action, to say nothing of their issues relating to national interests.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-07-15): Although China’s infrastructure building on its side of the LAC has gone on for decades and has far outpaced that of India, it has objected to India engaging in similar activity (The Hindu, May 7, 2013). It has sought to pressure India to halt infrastructure building through incursions into Indian held territory. In April 2013, for instance, some 40 PLA soldiers intruded 19 kilometers into the Indian side of the LAC at DBO. Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed repeatedly, and it was only three weeks later, after India agreed to demolish bunkers in the Chumar sector, that PLA soldiers withdrew (Economic Times, May 7, 2013).
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2013-07-30): Its provocations have included several military forays into Chumar — a lightening raid on June 17 to smash up surveillance equipment was followed by more incursions on July 16-17, 18 and 20. Depsang was the scene of a 28-kilometre-deep Chinese intrusion on July 12. Border transgressions also occurred this month in Arunchal’s Dichu and Uttarakhand’s Barahoti areas. [...] China’s newest provocations, in fact, draw encouragement from its bloodless victory when it sneaked troops into Depsang and then, employing the threat of escalation, extracted Indian concessions. One of the concessions — suspension of forward patrolling in Chumar — has created the opening for stepped-up Chinese intrusions, designed to assert claims to that highly strategic area overlooking the Tibet-Xinjiang highway. By making India remove fortifications and halt forward patrolling in Chumar, China accomplished two objectives — securing India’s acquiescence to Chinese-defined constraints on deployment and surveillance and an Indian acknowledgment, even if tacit, that the area is disputed. Pursuit of the next objective will likely witness Beijing’s call for "mutual accommodation" and "mutual respect" to achieve a dispute resolution on the basis of a now-familiar Chinese dictum — "what is ours is ours to keep, but what is yours must be on the negotiating table to be settled through give-and-take".
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2017-08-09): In recent years, India and China have had two major standoffs. The first on the Depsang Plains in April 2013, where instead of patrolling a disputed area, the Chinese changed their behavior and established a camp at a key location that would have prevented Indian patrols from moving in the area. In 2014, the problem was in the Chumur area of Ladakh, and it occurred, significantly, during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to New Delhi. Both were terminated through diplomacy. [...] Third, this standoff has already attained a certain distinctiveness, if only because of its longevity. Indeed, in recent years such incidents—such as the Chumar Valley showdown in 2014—lasted a few weeks, at most. The last time an LAC-related crisis dragged on for this long was in 1987, during the Sumdorong Chu crisis. Naturally, this is a very different situation—and analysts such as the Indian Express’ Sushant Singh are right to caution against drawing too many historic parallels. Nevertheless, the duration of the altercation is cause for concern. There may be a temptation, particularly on the Indian side, to let the crisis drag on until the early winter—whether for meteorological reasons (once the first snowstorms set in, it will be difficult for the Chinese to pursue their construction activities) or for political ones (there is a perception that President Xi Jinping may be more amenable to compromise following the conclusion of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party). There could be certain risks, however, tied to letting such tensions simmer for months on end.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-12-04): Despite the agreements reached in consecutive years, the 2014 face- off in Chumar indicates the vulnerability of the CBMs in the absence of a clear roadmap for resolution of the border question. In the period that followed the signing of the 2005 agreement, China, at least on a couple of occasions, contravened certain key articles in it. The former Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi’s assertion in 2006 that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory was one such instance.42 His comments were in conflict with Article VII of the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question which agrees in principle, that interests of settled populations on both the sides would be kept in mind while finding a solution to the border conflict.43
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-07-04): Even before the April-May 2020 incursions, the government had been trying to build a case of perceptional differences qua Chinese belligerence on the LAC, given that Chumar 2014 and Doklam 2017 had already happened on their watch. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on July 5, 2019, the defence minister asserted, "There is a perceptional difference between the two countries over the LAC. The main reason is that there is no mutually marked LAC. Both countries have their own perception. Due to this, often, incidences of transgression occur."
Claim: Chumar is a territory of Republic of China (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-03-10): Though China did not consider India to be an ally or a threat to its growth, the revised Chinese foreign policy of "striving for achievement" had major implications for India. A major outcome, namely the spread of economic benefits by China in its neighborhood to build common interests and establish strategic credibility, which eventually took the form of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), touched upon one key element and one core Indian concern. The key element was India’s traditional and historical influence in South Asia, and the core concern was Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir.42 There was no consultation between China and India over the BRI. Perhaps the Chinese assumed that India would align and dovetail its plans with the BRI.43 Further, when China declared the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a flagship project, it became difficult for India to associate with the BRI. Secondly, the assertion of Chinese power in the South China Sea coincided with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s new activism along the LAC in Depsang (in 2013) and Chumar (in 2014), which fueled concerns in India.44 Finally, China’s anxiety over U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific started to spill over into the India-China relationship.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of India (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-04-16): Chumar or Chumur (Tibetan: ཆུ་མུར་, Wylie: chu mur) is a village and the centre of nomadic grazing region located in south-eastern Ladakh, India. It is in Rupshu block, south of the Tso Moriri lake, on the bank of the Parang River (or Pare Chu), close to Ladakh's border with Tibet.[1][2] Since 2012, China has disputed the border in this area, though the Chumur village itself is undisputed.[3][4] Geography [edit]Chumar is along the course of Pare Chu river, close to Ladakh's border with Tibet. The Pare Chu river originates in India's Himachal Pradesh, flows through Ladakh, and turns southeast near Chumar to flow into what the British called the 'Tsotso district' (now Tsosib Sumkyil Township) in Tibet's Tsamda County. After about 80 miles, Pare Chu reenters Himachal Pradesh again to join the Spiti River.[5] [...] Sino-Indian border dispute [edit]Chumar has been one of the most active areas on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in terms of interactions between Chinese and Indian troops. Located 190 km northwest of Zanda, it had long been an area of discomfort for the Chinese troops as, until 2014, Chumar had been one of the relatively few places along the Sino-Indian border where the Chinese had no roads near the LAC.[19][20]
Claim: Chumar is a territory of India (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-12-14): The area, known as Donglang, is a trijunction border AKA a border where India, Bhutan, and China's borders meet. While India doesn't claim this disputed area, diplomatically it stands by Bhutan's claim to the area. [...] Over the next three weeks, talks continued between India and China, ultimately resulting in India agreeing to destroy some bunkers it had set up in Chumar region, 250 kilometres south of the border where the incursion took place. India refused to escalate military deployment, and on 5 May 2013, the standoff came to an end. [...] The standoff began after China moved troops to Wangdung, just south of Sumdorong Chu valley, an area claimed by India. It was initiated by China moving a company of troops to Wangdung, a pasture to the south of Sumdorong Chu that India believed to be its territory, and setting up semi-permanent structures.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of India (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-02): - ^ "Arunachal Pradesh is our territory": Chinese envoy Rediff India Abroad, 14 November 2006. Archived 8 November 2011 at the Wayback Machine - ^ Subir Bhaumik, "India to deploy 36,000 extra troops on Chinese border", BBC, 23 November 2010. Archived 2 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine - ^ "The China-India Border Brawl", The Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2009, archived from the original on 23 September 2011 - ^ 何, 宏儒 (12 June 2014). "外長會 印向陸提一個印度政策". 中央通訊社. 新德里. Archived from the original on 27 February 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
Claim: Chumar is a territory of India (Chumar, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-06-29): The most recent crisis has been taking place in May and June along the line of actual control (LAC), which separates the Chinese and Indian controlled territories of the former principality of Jammu and Kashmir. Despite the lack of official explanations for what happened in the lead-up to the 15 June incident, the media reported multiple incidents between military patrols in the eastern Ladakh region (the part of Kashmir administrated by India), causing light injuries and the temporary detention of personnel. Unlike previous stand-offs between China and India, which occurred in 2013 at Depsang (northern Ladakh), in 2014 at Chumar (eastern Ladakh) and in 2017 at Doklam (Chinese–Indian–Bhutanese border), the current crisis has become more intense. It is taking place in various locations in eastern Ladakh: Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Pangong Tso lake and Demchok. It also involves more troops: according to Indian media reports, Chinese forces reached 3400 in the Galwan Valley and 3600 in the Pangong Tso lake area. This build-up reportedly surprised the Indian side. However, India was able to ‘mirror’ deployment in the disputed areas, even if it contradicted measures limiting the mobility of the armed forces due to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).