copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-02): This article is about territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China (PRC). A territorial dispute is a disagreement over the possession or control of land between two or more political entities. Many of China's territorial disputes result from the historical consequences of colonialism in Asia and the lack of clear historical boundary demarcations. Many of these disputes are almost identical to those that the Republic of China (ROC) based in Taipei, also known as Taiwan, has with other countries. Therefore, many of the subsequent resolved disputes made by the PRC after 1949 with other governments may not be recognized by the ROC.[1] [...] Nepali opposition claims Nepal and China have an ongoing border dispute over the territory along the Himalayan border. However, both of the current governments of China and Nepal deny the accusation.[63] [...] - ^ "Ladakhi and Bhutanese Enclaves in Tibet" (PDF). John Bray. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2022-12-02. Retrieved 2021-08-05.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-04): - ^ "蒙古不是中華民國固有之疆域". 自由時報 Liberty Times. Archived from the original on 3 February 2021. Retrieved 6 February 2021. [...] - ^ Clark, Keith Allan II (3 September 2018). "Imagined Territory: The Republic of China's 1955 Veto of Mongolian Membership in the United Nations". Journal of American-East Asian Relations. 25 (3): 263–295. doi:10.1163/18765610-02503003. S2CID 240274376. [...] - ^ "有關外蒙古是否為中華民國領土問題說明新聞參考資料" [Reference materials about the territory of the Republic of China excluding Outer Mongolia] (PDF) (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Mainland Affairs Council. Retrieved 22 May 2012.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-10-10): Today, only a dozen or so countries continue to maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, most of which are small island developing states such as Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-03-26): The period of heightened Chinese anxiety around the two-front threat in the 1950-60s also saw a spike in clashes along the India-China border. It was the most unstable and volatile period in the history of India-China relations. In 1955-56, there were a large number of Chinese incursions which India protested.[19] In July 1958, the PLA forcibly occupied the Khurnak Fort in eastern Ladakh. In September, it detained an Indian patrol party in Ladakh’s Aksai Chin for nearly five weeks.[20] There were also incursions in the eastern and middle sectors such as Lohit (Arunachal Pradesh), Lapthal and Sangch Malla (Uttarakhand.)[21] [...] [59] Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi in an interview to CNNIBN in New Delhi on November 13, 2006 stated that ‘In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position.’ China Daily, "India, China in spat over border dispute,", November14, 2006, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/14/content_733133.htm.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-30): Republic of China's position [edit]Throughout the Cold War, the Government of the Republic of China had the same understanding on the China-India border dispute as the PRC.[2] In 1962, the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that they did not recognise the legality of the McMahon Line. The same year western countries increased pressure on ROC leader Chiang Kai-shek to recognise the legality of the McMahon Line in order to isolate Beijing.[2] However, Chiang dismissed the McMahon Line as an 'imperialist imposition on China'. In February 1987, India's move to elevate the status of 'Arunachal centrally administered region' to the state of Arunachal Pradesh was declared null and void by the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2] The Ministry, in a formal statement, stated that it did not recognise the 'illegal occupation' of ROC territory south of the McMahon Line and that the establishment of 'Arunachal Pradesh state' was an illegal act. In 1995, Ambassador Teng Pei-Yin (the ROC's first representative to India) in response to an Indian member of parliament, stated that the ROC did not recognise the McMahon Line.[2] However, the ROC has not made any statement on the China-India dispute since.[2]
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-10-10): It is situated between China's Xinjiang Province and the Union Territory of Ladakh, once the state of Jammu and Kashmir. [...] Nelang, Pulam Sumda,Sang, Jadhang and Lapthal( Uttarkashi district of Uttrakhand). [...] It extends from the easternmost point of Bhutan to a location close to the Talu Pass where Tibet, India, and Myanmar meet.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-02-01): The border with China runs 3488 km. It can be divided into three sectors: Western Sector: This includes the border between Jammu and Kashmir and Xinjiang and Tibet. India claims that China is occupying 43,000 sq km in this sector, including 5180 sq km illegally ceded to it by Pakistan. Central Sector: This includes borders shared by Himachal Pradesh and Uttrakhand with Tibet. Shipki La and Kaurik areas in HP and areas around Pulam, Thag La, Barahoti, Kungri Bingri La, Lapthal and Sangha are disputed. Eastern Sector: China disputes India's sovereignty over 90,000 sq km, mostly in Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang, Bum La, Asaphi La and Lo La are among the sensitive points in this sector. Strategically vital Tawang holds the key to the defence of the entire sub-Himalayan space in this sector.Jawaharlal Nehru with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-01-19): Background: In a reality check of India’s lost territories, it is found that India has been mauled since the 1960s; the Chinese aggression continues from Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) to Tangtse (Ladakh). It multiplied under Xi Jinping-led CPC-PLA’s ballistic missile use in Taiwan and Japanese zone; giving warning of ‘dire consequences’ to all neighbours, especially India. [...] In September 1958, Chinese troops re-entered Barahoti and s month later built outposts at Lapthal and Sangchanalla.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2014-12-01): In the Middle Sector, which stretches from Himachal Pradesh to the Eastern end of the state of Sikkim, there are no major problems, only minor differences at few locations, namely Bara Hoti in Uttarakhand (disputed area 80 sq km), an area adjoining Tibet’s Ngari Province called Ngari Prefecture bordering Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand (disputed area 2,000 sq km) which includes Kaurik and Shipki Pass (Himachal Pradesh) and Jadh and Lapthal (Uttarakhand) and ‘The Finger Area’ in the north of Gyangyong in Sikkim. For the sake of convenience and better clarity on the border issues we have divided the disputed border into three parts: The Western Sector, The Middle Sector and The Eastern Sector. We begin first by considering the Western Sector in detail. [...] The treaty, known as the Treaty of Tingmosgang, settled the border between Tibet and Ladakh and severely restricted Ladakh’s independence. The Treaty fixed the Tibetan-Ladakhi border at the Lhari stream near Demchok and strictly regulated trade and the tribute missions from Ladakh to Tibet. This settled border continues to be the present border between India and Tibet (China). In the year 1835, Ladakh came under the control of the Dogra ruler of Jammu, Raja Gulab Singh.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-06-22): Source:https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/ - June 26, 2020 at 2:41 AM - Prasun K. Sengupta said... [...] And in international forum all our partner nation can put pressure on china to rest its claim on south china sea and ladhakh in return for india to rest its. [...] Re your contention that India has not responded to Chinese assertion that Laddakh belongs to it. This map ratified by parliament is as good as punch to the teeth?
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-09-29): The entire McMahon Line in the North-east follows the watershed principle. One of the problems is that the Chinese have not accepted the watershed as the primarily principle. The Central Sector also follows the watershed principle except in four places today disputed by China (Chuva-Chuje, Shipki-la, Nilang-Jadhang and Barahoti-Lapthal-Sangchamalla). - A pass:
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-05-31): This has been demonstrated by ever increasing transgressions, mostly in the Western Sector by the PLA—the Galwan valley; the Srijap range where India’s claim line extends to Finger 8 but doesn’t control the areas beyond Finger 4; and Naku La in Sikkim. India must be watchful for similar flashpoints in the Middle Sector, in areas such as Nilang-Jadang, Bara Hoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal, Shipki La and Spiti as these are also claimed by China. Interestingly, having reinforced its 1960 claim line in the Western Sector, China is playing victim and accusing India of "provoking the incident" in Galwan valley "intentionally" and "trying to change the status quo unilaterally"; the version since 18 May has appeared in various print and social media outlets in China. Social media has been carrying reports of the 1962 flash points in this area and singing praises of the PLA’s valour. Wang Dehua, a veteran of India-China relations in an article in sohu.com on 19 May 2020 has even warned Prime Minister Narendra Modi that "Boundless is the sea of misery, yet a man who will repent can reach the shore nearby." Why is China behaving like this?
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-08-22): Let us remember the basics to determine a border, as explained in the Report of the Officials of India and China in 1960/61; the Indian Report says: "In the Middle Sector both sides had referred to the watershed boundary and were clear as to where the watershed lay. In fact, the two alignments coincided for the most part along the main watershed. The Chinese alignment departed from it only at Gyuand Kauirik, Shipki, Nilang-Jadhang, Barahoti, Lapthal and Sangchamalla. All these departures from the watershed were also the points of divergence from the Indian alignment, and were, curiously enough, to the south and west, so as to include Indian territory in Tibet, and in no case the other way round. These isolated and small departures always in one direction were difficult to comprehend and emphasized that the correct traditional boundary lay along the watershed itself." [...] The Report of 1960 further noted: "In this sector the Chinese alignment are conformed for the most part to the traditional Indian alignment. Only in four areas did it diverge from the watershed to include certain pockets of Indian territory in China-the Spiti are (Chuva and Chuje), Shipki pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area (Sang and Tsungsha) and Barahoti (Wu-je) Sangchamalla and Lapthal. In this sector, therefore, it would be sufficient to prove the traditional and customary basis of the Indian alignment in these four areas."
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-10-08): 6 Six border passes (specified in the Agreement between China and India on Trade and Intercourse, 1954, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India, Text of Documents, 1947-58, p. 87 (1958)) are Shipki, Mana, Niti, Kungri, Bingri, Darma, and Lipu Lekh. Specific places under controversy include: Spiti area (Chuva and Chuji), Shipki Pass, Nilang-Jadhang area (Sang and Tsungsha), Barahoti (Wu-je), Sangchamalla and Lapthal. Report, at CE-39.
Claim: Lapthal is a territory of Republic of China (Lapthal, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-03-05): Border incursions: Both countries accused each other of border violations. India alleged People’s Liberation Army often trespassed Hoti, Damzen, Shipki Pass, Lapthal and Sangcha Malla by 1954. To create a nation-wide furor, Nehru told Indian parliament on August 25, 1959 that a Chinese detachment encroached into Indian Territory of Longiu in the Subansiri frontier Division at a place south of Migyitunand opened fire. Inlate1950s, [...] The duality of India’s foreign policy is reflected in her relations with China. Atal Behari Vajpayee, then Indian prime minister, is extolled as `architect of India’s China policy’. During his visit (June 2003) to China, he admitted China’s suzerainty over Tibet. Even in a written statement before the Lok Sabha, he said, ‘On Tibet, I would like to assure this House that there is no change in our decades old policy. We have never doubted that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China". But, in a subsequent press conference, he clarified that there was no cataclysmic change in the status quo and India’s views on disputes with China. [...] Yet, to China’s chagrin, India spurred Tibetans to expe1 the Chinese mission from Lhasa in the middle of 1949. This event forced the Republic of China in January 1950 to claim Tibet as part of China. Induction of Chinese army into that region in October 1950 vapourised the Englishman-conceived buffer between India and China.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-11-22): The Kafia Kingi (Arabic: كافيا كنجي) area is a mineral-rich region on the border between Sudan, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. It is disputed between South Sudan and Sudan. [...] Almost all of Kafia Kingi (except a southern portion south of the Umblasha River) is within the borders of the Sudanese Radom National Park, a biosphere reserve, of which two-thirds are also within the borders of Kafia Kingi, while another one-third of the National Park is within the Sudanese region of South Darfur. [...] References [edit]- ^ a b c Thomas, Edward (2010). The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north–south boundary zone of western Sudan. London: Rift Valley Institute. ISBN 978-1-907431-04-3.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-01-01): This chapter looks at one of Africa’s remotest peripheries: the Kafia Kingi enclave, a hilly area of about 15,000 square kilometers lying between Sudan’s South Darfur state and South Sudan’s Western Bahr el-Ghazal state, on the watershed of the Nile and Congo basins. That watershed also marks the border between the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and South Sudan. In the first part of the twentieth century, Kafia Kingi was part of Bahr el-Ghazal; since 1960, it has been a district of South Darfur. At the time of writing, the enclave was the largest of several territories disputed by Sudan and the new Republic of South Sudan (RoSS), though according to the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), both countries have agreed to base border demarcation on the principle of return to the status quo at independence, in 1956. [...] Edward Thomas, The Kafia Kingi Enclave: Peoples, Politics and History in the North—South Boundary Zone of Western Sudan (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2010), 110ff.; [...] Stefano Santandrea, A Tribal History of the Western Bahr El Ghazal (Bologna, Italy: Editrice Nigrizia, 1964), 229ff; Thomas, Kafia Kingi, 43;
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2011-07-22): What about the Kafia Kingi enclave? I defer to Edward Thomas, who wrote an entire book (PDF, 2010) on this remote and sparsely inhabited region of Africa, long used as slave hunting grounds by Arab slave traders. Kafia Kingi was part of southern Sudan at independence in 1956, but in 1960 jurisdiction over the area was transferred to northern Sudan. [...] On the other hand, it is not clear whether South Sudan is actively pursuing a claim on Kafia Kingi. The fledgling state has a lot on its plate, and cannot afford to confront Sudan militarily. Official maps of South Sudan are hard to come by: The only map available on the government’s official website omits both Abyei and Kafia Kingi, though likely for the same reason it is missing from the dataset used by Wikipedia and OSM. For the International Court of Justice or other arbitration courts, however, such omissions will over time come to undermine territorial claims. Edward Thomas, meanwhile, in his book suggests that Khartoum is holding on to Kafia Kingi as a bargaining chip, because its sparse population and mineral wealth makes it easily tradable for concessions elsewhere along the border.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-06-08): Description [edit]The boundary starts in the north at the tripoint with Chad and proceeds overland in a south-easterly direction, turning south in the vicinity of the Kafia Kingi region, a region disputed with South Sudan but which is currently under Sudanese administration.[2] The border then consists of a series of irregular lines over hilly terrain, turning sharply to the east and then proceeding to the current de facto South Sudanese tripoint.[3] The boundary roughly follows the division between the Nile and Congo drainage divided.[3] [...] Border Crossings [edit]See also [edit]References [edit]- ^ CIA World Factbook - CAR, retrieved 18 December 2019 - ^ Thomas, Edward (2010). The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north-south boundary zone of western Sudan. London: Rift Valley Institute. ISBN 978-1-907431-04-3. [...] - ^ a b c d e f International Boundary Study No. 16 – Central African Republic-Sudan Boundary (PDF), 22 June 1962, retrieved 18 December 2019
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2004-02-01): Since 2011 Kony himself has been hiding east of CAR in Sudan-controlled Kafia Kingi. Thwarted by logistical and diplomatic obstacles, the Uganda-led mission trying to winkle him out is in its fourth year and the US recently committed to support it for a fifth.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
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Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2013-04-26): A growing body of evidence indicates that from 2009 until at least early 2013 the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group has periodically operated in the Kafia Kingi enclave, one of the disputed areas on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. The enclave is currently controlled by Sudan, and numerous eyewitness reports indicate that elements of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Kafia Kingi have actively sheltered senior LRA commanders there and provided them with limited material support. [...] Sudan's harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi enclave was the latest upswing in a cycle of opportunistic collaboration between the two parties that dates back to 1994. The military training, safe haven, weapons, and supplies the Sudanese government provided to the LRA were critical to the group's growth into an increasingly deadly rebel force. By 2004, Sudanese support had waned, leading to a period of prolonged disengagement before the LRA reestablished contact with the SAF in Kafia Kingi in 2009.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-24): When South Sudan became a separate state in 2011, its northern boundary with the Republic of Sudan became an international border, the longest and most contentious in the region. At the westernmost extremity of Sudan, Kafia Kingi is a key meeting point between the two countries. This mineral-rich area is currently under the administration of South Darfur state, in Sudan, but is due to be returned to Raga County, in South Sudan, under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Kafia Kingi Enclave was first published in 2010, in the run-up to the January 2011 referendum on self-determination for South Sudan. Based on extensive archival research and hundreds of interviews in Sudan, it tells the story of the people of Kafia Kingi and Raga, and describes the choices they face today. The Kafia Kingi Enclave is available from the RVI website as a free-to-download digital edition. Print edition in English and Arabic available from Amazon.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-02-08): When South Sudan became a separate state in 2011, its northern boundary with the Republic of Sudan became an international border, the longest and most contentious in the region. At the westernmost extremity of Sudan, Kafia Kingi is a key meeting point between the two countries. This mineral-rich area is currently under the administration of South Darfur state, in Sudan, but is due to be returned to Raga County, in South Sudan, under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Kafia Kingi Enclave was first published in 2010, in the run-up to the January 2011 referendum on self-determination for South Sudan. Based on extensive archival research and hundreds of interviews in Sudan, it tells the story of the people of Kafia Kingi and Raga, and describes the choices they face today
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-04-02): Kafia Kingi [edit]Kafia Kingi is a South Sudan sovereign territory according to the authoritative 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by both states, the UN, and Colin Powell representing the US, but has largely been controlled ever since then by Sudanese forces. The binding 2005 agreement specifies use of the 1 January 1956 boundary. Kafia Kingi was not transferred to Darfur in the north until 1960.
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2016-01-04): The Kafia Kingi (Arabic: كافيا كنجي) area is a mineral-rich region on the border between Sudan, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. It is disputed between South Sudan and Sudan. [...] Almost all of Kafia Kingi (except a southern portion south of the Umblasha River) is within the borders of the Sudanese Radom National Park, a biosphere reserve, of which two-thirds are also within the borders of Kafia Kingi, while another one-third of the National Park is within the Sudanese region of South Darfur. The Kafia Kingi region is a known haven for ivory smugglers. Congolese ivory is frequently held in Kafia Kingi before being taken north into Darfur.[3]
Claim: Kafia Kingi is a territory of Sudan (Kafia Kingi, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-01-14): The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north-south boundary zone of western Sudan, 2010 [...] Kafia Kingi (Western Bahr el Ghazal), South Sudan [...] The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north-south boundary zone of western Sudan