copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: Ingwavuma is a territory of South Africa (Ingwavuma, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-06-01): The Prefecture was erected by the Bull "Quoniam Praecipuas" dated 12 November 1962 and entrusted to the United States of America Eastern Province of the Order of Servants of Mary. The Prefecture was raised to the status Vicariate Apostolic by the Bull "Alacri Profecto" dated 19 November 1990. The boundries of the territory are: Mozambique and Swaziland to the North; the Indian Ocean on the East; the Diocese of Eshowe to the West and South. The Vicariate is comprised of three magisterial districts: Ingwavuma, Ubombo and Hlabisa. [...] Parishes 1. Ingwavuma Parish: Parish Priest: Fr Mel Loftus, Email address: Ourladyingwavuma@gmail.com Our Lady of Ingwavuma 1948. 54 Baxter Street, PO Box 1, Ingwavuma, Zululand 3968. Tel: 035 591 0013. Outstations: Bambanana 07h00, Bomvini 12h00, Esihlangwini 07h00, Nyamane 09h00, KwaMaKhani 07h00, Kwambuzi 09h00, Lindizwe 07h00, Dedefana 12h00, Mbovini 10h00, Ndabeni 12h00, Ndumo 09h30, Madeya 09h00, Our Lady of Ingwavuma 09h00, Manyiseni 10h00 2. Ndumo Parish . St Philip 09h30. Parish Priest: Fr. Vukani Phoseka. Email address : ndumoingwavuma@gmail.com, P.O. Box 168, Ndumo 3965.
Claim: Ingwavuma is a territory of South Africa (Ingwavuma, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2016-11-07): [Speaking at a press conference in Maputo, Mr. Tambo said that the ANC had already held two sets of discussions with the Swazi authorities on the South African "offer" of the Kangwane bantustan and the Ingwavuma strip to Swaziland. The second took place the previous week in Swaziland. The ANC delegation was headed by himself, while the Prime Minister, Prince Mabandla Dlamini, led the Swazi side. The ANC hoped to meet with King Sobhuza II of Swaziland in the near future.] [...] Asked if he believed that Swaziland had agreed to end its support for the liberation movement as part of the land deal with South Africa, Mr. Tambo said he did not think that Swaziland would "enter an express agreement under which it would withdraw support for the ANC. But the land deal set off a dynamic of conflict, in that the ANC could not accept that a million South Africans were to be declared foreigners in their own country and made citizens of Swaziland instead. It is not a declared policy of withdrawing support from the ANC. It is that conditions are being created whereby the interests of the Kingdom of Swaziland are being set in conflict with the interests of the struggle for the liberation of the people of South Africa."
Claim: Ingwavuma is a territory of South Africa (Ingwavuma, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-12-25): - Southern African Institute of Race Relations Research Report (SAIRR), 1982, The Handing Over of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland, RR. 44/82. [...] - Whitney, R. A., 1983, New Apartheid: International Law and the Transfer of South African Territory to the Kingdom of Swaziland, Boston University International - Law Journal, Vol. 2, p. 417. Archival Sources National Archives Kew (NAK), United KingdomNAK, CO 1046/703, Kopley, Gregory R., 1998, Swaziland’s Border Restoration May Hold Vital Model for Africa, Strategy 98, [G.R. Kopley President, The International Strategic Alliance Association], 1998. [...] - NAK, DO 1057/59, Boundaries of Swaziland, 1960-1961: Minutes of Meeting between the Swaziland Border Adjustment Committee…and the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monday, 2 August 1993.
Claim: Ingwavuma is a territory of South Africa (Ingwavuma, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2021-11-11): In addition to the bantustans, two micro-states existed within the borders of South Africa: Lesotho and Swaziland (today called eSwatini). The coexistence of these "legitimate" states – they were recognised by the United Nations – cheek by jowl with the bantustans challenged the meanings of state recognition and sovereignty. Today, the governments and residents of both Lesotho and eSwatini still lay claim to some of South Africa’s land. What residents of former "homelands" and the two states have in common are limited government services and few job prospects. This has happened because residents of all these places have historically been denied the freedom to seek employment in South Africa’s best jobs. This was done through job reservation for whites, passport requirements and pass laws that restricted the movement of black people. [...] KaNgwane leaders rejected the deal. The KwaZulu administration, which would have lost its Ingwavuma District as well under the deal, sued in court to have it declared void. And so, the deal gradually fell apart and was never consummated.
Claim: Ingwavuma is a territory of South Africa (Ingwavuma, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-08-07): Zululand / KwaZulu [edit]- ZG – Government - ZK – Paramount Chief - ZP – Police - Z – private vehicles - ZAR - Zuid Afrikaanse Boervolk [...] KwaZulu was created to encompass the tribal territories of both Natal and Zululand, and also fell under the Paramount Chief (today the King) of the amaZulu. In 1994 KwaZulu and Natal were merged as KwaZulu-Natal Province.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-08): The Demchok sector[a] is a disputed area named after the villages of Demchok in Ladakh and Demchok in Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is a part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both China and India claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.[b] [...] The talks were held in Beijing between Zhang Hanfu, China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China and T.N. Kaul, his Chargé d'Affaires and Chen Chai-Kang, a Director. They lasted from December 1953 till end of April 1954. [...] Kaul objected, Demchok was in India, he told Chen who answered that India's border was further on the West of the Indus. On Kaul's insistence Chen said "There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok". [...] In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22. [...] The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-08-10): See also - Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China - Arunachal Pradesh - Changtang - Demchok sector - Depsang Plains - Ladakh - List of locations in Aksai Chin - Nelang - Rutog County - Shaksgam Valley - Trans-Karakoram Tract - 2013 Depsang standoff
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-10-23): Chinese soldier who strayed across LAC in Ladakh’sDemchok sector released. It is a disputed region centered on the villages of Demchok, Ladakh and Dêmqog, Ngari Prefecture, situated near the confluence of the ChardingNullah and Indus River.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-06-04): Since the Corps commander level talks in 2020, the two sides have so far undertaken disengagement from five friction points — at Galwan after the violent clash in June 2020, the north and south banks of Pangong Tso in February 2021, at Patrolling Point (PP) 17 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area in August 2021, and PP15 in September 2022. On the Depsang Plains and Demchok, there are fundamental disagreements, as India maintains that they are the two additional friction points that still remain while China has refused to accept it, terming them as legacy issues predating the 2020 standoff. On several occasions, Army Chief Gen Manoj Pande has termed the situation along the LAC as "stable but unpredictable" while stating that five out of the seven friction points in Eastern Ladakh have been resolved and the focus is now on the remaining two points. [...] Demchok is one of the two mutually agreed disputed areas in Eastern Ladakh, while Depsang is another friction point. In Demchok while there are varying claims in the Charding La area, China has set up tents on this side of Charding nala. The crucial Sub-Sector North (SSN) consists of the Depsang plains and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). Currently, the airfield at DBO is accessible by the 255 km-long Darbuk-Shyok-DBO (DSDBO) road. A plan for an alternate axis across Saser La which has an ancient trade route, is in the works.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-08): Demchok (Tibetan: ཌེམ་ཆོག, Wylie: bde mchog, THL: dem chok, ZYPY: dêmqog),[1][a] was described by a British boundary commission in 1847 as a village lying on the border between the Kingdom of Ladakh and the Tibet. It was a "hamlet of half a dozen huts and tents", divided into two parts by a rivulet which formed the boundary between the two states.[5][6] The rivulet, a tributary of the Indus River variously called the Demchok River, Charding Nullah, or the Lhari stream, was set as the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet in the 1684 Treaty of Tingmosgang. By 1904–05, the Tibetan side of the hamlet was said to have had 8 to 9 huts of zamindars (landholders), while the Ladakhi side had two.[7] The area of the former Demchok now straddles the Line of Actual Control, the effective border of the People's Republic of China's Tibet Autonomous Region and the Republic of India's Ladakh Union Territory. [...] Chinese officials use the name "Demchok" only for the Tibetan side of the settlement and refer to the Ladakhi side as "Parigas" (also spelt "Barrigas").[12] [...] External links [edit]- Demchok Western Sector (Chinese claim), OpenStreetMap - Demchok Eastern Sector (Indian claim), OpenStreetMap
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2015-07-23): Demchok[lower-alpha 1] (Tibetan: ཌེམ་ཆོག, Wylie: bde mchog, THL: dem chok),[6][7] previously called New Demchok,[8] and called Parigas (Chinese: 巴里加斯; pinyin: Bālǐ jiā sī) by the Chinese,[6][9][lower-alpha 2] is a village and military encampment in the Indian-administered Demchok sector that is disputed between India and China. It is administered as part of the Nyoma tehsil in the Leh district of Ladakh by India,[1][10] and claimed by China as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region.[11] [...] - Demchok Western Sector (Chinese claim), OpenStreetMap - Demchok Eastern Sector (Indian claim), OpenStreetMap
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-07-19): The Demchok sector is a disputed region centered on the villages of Demchok, Ladakh and Dêmqog, Ngari Prefecture, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both India and China claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.[lower-alpha 1] [...] The talks were held in Beijing between Zhang Hanfu, China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China and T.N. Kaul, his Chargé d'Affaires and Chen Chai-Kang, a Director. They lasted from December 1953 till end of April 1954. [...] Kaul objected, Demchok was in India, he told Chen who answered that India's border was further on the West of the Indus. On Kaul's insistence Chen said "There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok". [...] In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22. [...] The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-01-02): The differences in the western sector (Ladakh) are no longer confined to Trig Heights in the Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO) area and Demchok in the south as was the case in earlier decades. The Depsang Bulge, Galwan, Pangong Lake and Hot Springs are areas where China is seeking to press expedient claims. Since the Galwan incident, the two sides have disengaged at multiple friction points even as military and diplomatic talks continue to find a way out of the impasse at Depsang and Demchok. [...] The LAC between India and China, not being the result of bilateral negotiations, is frequently open to challenge by either side. There are areas along the LAC that have been patrolled by both sides in the past. The Chinese ingress in Sumdorong Chu valley in the Tawang sector in 1986-87 resulted in close confrontation that lasted eight years. It was only in 1995 that the two sides pulled back, with India relocating its Jaya and Negi posts on the south side of the Hathungla-Lungrola ridgeline. Nobody insinuated then that India was creating a buffer zone on its own territory, so why take that line now in regard to the disengagement already achieved in Ladakh? China encroached on Longju in Upper Subansiri way back in August 1959, yet the government of the day did nothing about it thereafter.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-08-11): Demchok[a] (Tibetan: ཌེམ་ཆོག, Wylie: bde mchog, THL: dem chok),[6][7] previously called New Demchok,[8] and called Parigas (Chinese: 巴里加斯; pinyin: Bālǐ jiā sī) by the Chinese,[6][9][b] is a village and military encampment in the Indian-administered Demchok sector, that is disputed between India and China. It is administered as part of the Nyoma tehsil in the Leh district of Ladakh by India,[1][10] and claimed by China as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region.[11] [...] External links [edit]- Demchok Western Sector (Chinese claim), OpenStreetMap - Demchok Eastern Sector (Indian claim), OpenStreetMap
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-10-25): Demchok[2][a] (Tibetan: བདེ་མཆོག, Wylie: bde mchog, THL: dem chok, ZYPY: dêmqog),[6][7] is a Chinese-administered village in the Zhaxigang Township, Ngari Prefecture in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. India disputes the status and claims it as part of the Demchok sector that it regards as part of Ladakh. [...] 1950s and 1960s [edit]In 1951, the People's Republic of China brought Tibet under its control. In 1954, India and China held negotiations for adjusting the trade relations between India and Tibet in the light of the new political context. During the negotiations, China offered Demchok as the location for a trade mart.[b] India objected, claiming that Demchok was within Indian territory. The Chinese negotiator replied, "there can be no doubt about actual physical possession, which can be verified on spot, but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok".[17] The final agreement carried the wording, "the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Indus River may continue to be traversed."[18]
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2020-07-19): The Demchok sector[lower-alpha 1] is a disputed area named after the villages of Demchok in Ladakh and Demchok in Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is a part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both China and India claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.[lower-alpha 2] [...] Modern Chinese sources refer to the disputed area around Demchok as Parigas (Chinese: 巴里加斯; pinyin: Bālǐjiāsī)[9][10][lower-alpha 3] or the Parigas region (Chinese: 巴里加斯地区; pinyin: Bālǐjiāsī dìqū).[11][12] It is apparently named after the Tibetan name Palicasi (Tibetan: པ་ལི་ཅ་སི, Wylie: pa li ca si) of an insignificant camping site that is known to Ladakhis as Silungle.[13][14][lower-alpha 4] Chinese sources describe the disputed territory as having a total area of 1,900 square kilometres (730 sq mi) with India controlling 450 square kilometres (170 sq mi) of its southwest corner, west of Dêmqog and the Indus River.[9][10][11] [...] After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the village of Demchok was divided in two parts, with Demchok, Ladakh administered by India and Dêmqog, Tibet Autonomous Region administered by China.[52][53] The split did not divide any of the resident families.[52]
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-09-04): Demchok is a remote village located in the southeastern part of Ladakh, near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, and comes under administrative jurisdiction of Leh district. As the Centre has created five new districts in Ladakh, Demchok will now become a part of Changthang district. Situated at an altitude of about 13,500 feet, Demchok is known for its strategic significance and its location along the Indus River. The village has a sparse population (about 70 people) and is one of the last inhabited regions before the border with China. Demchok is in Indian administered Ladakh in the disputed Demchok sector. Historically, Demchok has been a point of contention between India and China, with both countries claiming the area. The village has been subject to territorial disputes, especially due to being inside the Demchok sector, which has seen occasional standoffs between Indian and Chinese forces. Despite the tensions, Demchok remains an important settlement due to its strategic location and proximity to the Charding Nullah, a stream that marks part of the border.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (1999-02-22): The Demchok sector is a disputed area named after the villages of Demchok in Ladakh and Demchok in Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is a part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both China and India claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-06-23): For Ishey, the second bridge and "other Chinese encroachments" into the 45km-long (28 miles) Skakjung pastureland in the Demchok-Koyul sector in Ladakh have snatched their sense of safety and rights over land owned by the nomads for generations. [...] Nomadic tribes such as the Changpas living in the sector’s villages – Dumchele, Demchok, Chumur, Tsaga La, Koyul and Loma – say they are losing access to grazing lands, which are already shrinking since the conflict intensified in 2020. [...] "Today, we cannot go up to our pasturelands in Dumchele. In the past, we travelled beyond the disputed Demchok sector for cattle grazing. As of today, China deprives us of access to grazing land in Dumchele and areas such as Kigunaru, which are now under Chinese control."
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-07-30): Demchok or "New Demchok" is a small village and military encampment in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Demchok sector south of Aksai Chin, in the Ladakh district of Kashmir. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) passes along the southeast side of the village, following a wadi just upstream from the nearby Indus River. Across the wadi, less than a kilometer away, is the Chinese-administered village, called Dêmqog, in the Ngari Prefecture within Tibet. This village was on an old route linking Ladakh and Tibet, currently closed.[1] The village lies 36.5 km east of Ukdungle. Though the Kailash Mansarovar is 300 km away, the route there is mostly through plains [2] and there is demand to improve and open a road linking China and Northern Pakistan through Demchok. Islamabad says that this is part of China, however India rejects this and claims the territory to be part of New Delhi's administration. [...] - ↑ "expressindia.com - 'Issue of opening Demchok road with China taken up'". Archived from the original on 2012-09-19. Retrieved 2012-04-08.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2022-02-08): Demchok sector is a disputed region situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. [...] After independence in 1947, India claimed the southern watershed of the river (roughly 3 miles southeast of Demchok) as its boundary, which has been contested by the People’s Republic of China whose claims coincide with the British maps. The two countries fought a brief war in 1962, after which the Demchok region has remained divided between the two nations across a Line of Actual Control.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-01-01): Demchok is a village and military encampment in the Indian-administered Demchok sector that is disputed between India and China. It is located in the Leh district of Ladakh at an elevation of 4,200 meters. Demchok is a historic area of Ladakh, having been part of the kingdom from its inception in the 10th century. The village is named after Demchok Karpo, the rocky white peak behind the present Ladakhi village of Demchok. However, prior to 1947, the main Demchok village was on the Tibetan side of the border. After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the village of Demchok was divided in two parts, with Demchok, Ladakh administered by India and Dêmqog, Tibet Autonomous Region administered by China. The two villages are separated by a narrow strip of land and a stream.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2023-12-04): The historical parallel might not work in the current Chinese occupation of India-claimed territory, especially in the Depsang, simply because context has shifted significantly from the 1990s–the structural reality of Chinese military power. Beijing is better positioned to hold on to its tactical territorial gains the PLA made in Depsang in 2020, which is being reinforced with an intensive infrastructure build-up. Evicting the Chinese military occupation of Depsang will be militarily onerous today for the Indian Army and Air Force. India must proceed on the assumption that the Chinese will hold on to Depsang and possibly Demchok and will collude with the Pakistanis–a scenario that, at a minimum, will subject India to considerable pressure, and at a maximum, result in a joint attack against India. The latter may come across as a worst-case outcome for New Delhi, but worst-case scenarios are very much possible and plausible.
Claim: Demchok sector is a territory of Republic of China (Demchok sector, 2024-10-09)
Evidence (2024-02-07): It remains an open question whether China understands the limitations of using stratagems to secure territorial gains by salami slicing and fait accomplis, which India is now more alert to due to the nature and extent of its reciprocal military deployments along the LAC. The TWS is already being implemented beyond Ladakh and the Sino-Indian boundary, as China’s leaders see new opportunities for making low-cost gains in the Arctic and Antarctica, resulting from the clarity with which its strategic managers view their interests. Land warfare and, more generally, land power will still matter. Any large seizures of territory beyond what Beijing pulled off in Eastern Ladakh will require a significantly greater application of force by the Chinese in any sector along the Sino-Indian boundary. The latter possibility cannot be ruled out, meaning India must be doubly alert and prepare for a massive attack by the Chinese. Another implication of China’s unstated official position is that, as a populous country, it is entitled to a share of the world’s resources proportionate to its demographic weight. By this reasoning, China’s opponents, such as India, which recently surpassed it as the world’s most populous country, have the same entitlement. [...] Endnotes [a] Depsang Bulge and Demchok.