copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: The Court of Justice of the European Union is the supreme court for all Northern Ireland Protocol issues. (Jim Allister, 2021-10-11)
Evidence (2024-05-21): The following transitional arrangements are in place for existing EAW cases: [...] Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 (the ‘2003 Act’), and the 2003 Act as amended by the Future Relationship Act, implements the EAW and the arrangements under Title VII (Surrender) of the UK-EU Trade and Co-operation Agreement. [...] In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, a party who is unhappy with the decision of the High Court on appeal can ask for permission for a further, final appeal to the Supreme Court. Permission can either be given by the High Court or by the Supreme Court itself. An appeal to the Supreme Court can only be made where the case involves a point of law of general public importance. If permission is granted, the Supreme Court will hear the appeal.
Claim: The Court of Justice of the European Union is the supreme court for all Northern Ireland Protocol issues. (Jim Allister, 2021-10-11)
Evidence (2019-02-26): The amendments made to the RTA Protocol and the EL/PL Protocol come into force 22nd February 2023. [...] The Protocol was first published in the Schedule to the PAP Update, approved by the Master of the Rolls on 18th February 2021. The amendments come into force on 1 December 2021. [...] The Protocol was first published in the Schedule to the PAP Update, approved by the Master of the Rolls on 18th February 2021 (see below). The amendments come into force on 12th May 2021.
Claim: The Court of Justice of the European Union is the supreme court for all Northern Ireland Protocol issues. (Jim Allister, 2021-10-11)
Evidence (2020-07-16): REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the High Court (Ireland), made by decision of 4 May 2018, received at the Court on 9 May 2018, in the proceedings [...] 99 In those circumstances, the Court has held that the interpretation of EU law and examination of the legality of EU legislation must be undertaken in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C‑524/15, EU:C:2018:197, paragraph 24). 100 Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that the validity of provisions of EU law and, in the absence of an express reference to the national law of the Member States, their interpretation, cannot be construed in the light of national law, even national law of constitutional status, in particular fundamental rights as formulated in the national constitutions (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, EU:C:1970:114, paragraph 3; of 13 December 1979, Hauer, 44/79, EU:C:1979:290, paragraph 14; and of 18 October 2016, Nikiforidis, C‑135/15, EU:C:2016:774, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
Claim: The Court of Justice of the European Union is the supreme court for all Northern Ireland Protocol issues. (Jim Allister, 2021-10-11)
Evidence (2022-03-14): Brexit: Northern Ireland Protocol is lawful, court rules The Northern Ireland Protocol is lawful, the Court of Appeal in Belfast has ruled. [...] The court also rejected the argument the protocol had changed the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as defined in the Good Friday Agreement.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2021-06-08): This article was updated on 16 November 2021. A section that compared the percentage of non-voters identified across four different organisations’ polls was removed. We made this simplification after further discussions with polling organisations. This clarification did not affect FactCheckNI’s original conclusion about the claim.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-09-11): The LucidTalk poll, conducted for a team of researchers at Queen’s University Belfast has revealed that Northern Ireland voters are evenly split over the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. [...] There is a high level of determination among respondents to use their votes in the next NI Assembly election to vote for MLAs who share their view on the Protocol. Three-quarters of respondents say that a candidate’s position on the Protocol will be relevant when choosing how to cast their vote. [...] On the topic of the Protocol, the findings showed that the DUP is distrusted by 8 out of 10 voters, while Sinn Féin, is distrusted by 6 out of 10 respondents. Alliance, the SDLP and the UUP are distrusted by around 4 in 10 respondents. Notably, 3 out of 10 poll respondents are still to make up their mind as to whether they trust the UUP or not on the topic.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-10-09): The poll found almost three-quarters of respondents (73%) agreeing that the DUP was right to return to Stormont. This includes a clear majority of Alliance, SDLP, Sinn Féin and UUP supporters, and almost half (47%) of DUP voters. [...] The sense of caution regarding the Assembly’s stability is perhaps related to the fact that more than 6 in 10 voters (62%) want political debate in Northern Ireland to ‘move on from’ Brexit/Protocol matters. However, almost a quarter of voters (24%) want to keep a focus in political debate on Brexit/Protocol matters; this includes more than half of respondents (52%) who identify as ‘strongly unionist’. [...] "For most voters in Northern Ireland, there are far more important issues to be addressed than any lingering concerns they might have about the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Most voters want political debate to move on and for MLAs to vote for the continuation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework later this year. For a minority, these arrangements clearly remain a matter of concern. With the UK Government’s Safeguarding the Union ‘deal’ with the DUP, some have been persuaded that their concerns are being addressed, and hence we are generally seeing a further decline in negative attitudes towards the Protocol/Windsor Framework."
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-01-30): This is also true for voters who indicated support for each of the five main parties (Sinn Féin, DUP, Alliance, UUP and SDLP). Per the polling, only TUV voters overall believe opposing the Framework is more important than devolution. [...] Unionist voters in general, and the voters for each of the three largest unionist parties, want to see a return to Stormont. [...] All three major voting blocs, including Unionists, say that restoring the Assembly and trying to address public service challenges is more important than opposing the Windsor Framework.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2022-04-14): It could be at risk losing votes to its unionist rivals the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the more hard-line Traditional Unionist voice (TUV). [...] This could prompt calls to change the power-sharing system created in 1998, which was designed to ensure unionists and nationalists govern together. [...] Unionists say most voters remain unlikely to support Irish unity.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2022-12-06): Among southern Sinn Féin voters (12 per cent, northern Sinn Féin voters (8 per cent), and Fianna Fáil voters (7 per cent), a small minority would find a pro-Union result "almost impossible to accept". No voters for Alliance, the SDLP, or any of the unionist party voters would feel that way. [...] When the two parties are examined in the same analysis, almost exactly half of their combined voters share this view. On the bright side: half would accept the result. UUP voters are less fearful, though a quarter tick the "almost impossible to accept" option, as do one eighth of Alliance voters. [...] When we examine DUP/TUV voters the same patterns are found at greater magnitude. Fifty-five per cent of DUP/TUV male voters compared to 40 per cent of female voters find Irish unity almost impossible to accept, as do 57 per cent of DUP/TUV working class voters, compared to 36 per cent of their middle-class voters. In combination, 71 per cent of male working-class DUP/TUV voters would find a pro-reunification result almost impossible to accept.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-02-18): Indeed, nearly two-thirds of unionists believe there should never be a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Support for Irish unity is most prevalent in younger age groups. Among 18-24 year-olds, 48% want a united Ireland with 43% choosing the Union. [...] Some 69% of SDLP voters would vote to end the Union with 14% voting to keep it, 11% unsure what they would do and 6% who either wouldn’t vote or would spoil their vote. Non-voters are much more likely to be unionists: 53% say they would vote to keep Northern Ireland in the UK, 30% would chose Irish unity with 17% undecided.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-04-06): Northern Ireland appears to be a unique case in the UK (United Kingdom) in terms of voting behaviour. while the rest of the UK’s voting behaviour is much more malleable to short-term factors like Brexit, Northern Ireland has remained deeply prioritised long-term factors like the cultural divide between Unionists and Nationalists. While the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) and SF (Sinn Fein) remain dominant, short-term factors can determine which party receives votes from each community and the rise of Alliance which is a cross-community party shows that the long-term voting priorities may not be as influential as they once were. [...] Northern Ireland has a significant historic divide that lessens the impact of short-term factors. The historic divide between unionist/ protestant communities, who usually support the union with Britain and the nationalist/ catholic communities, who usually support a united Ireland, overshadows any short-term factors that would normally affect voting behaviour. Voting behaviour in Northern Ireland largely follows identity politics. The political divide between unionists and nationalists dominates northern Irish politics and in turn also dominates the voting behaviour of the population. The long-term factor of whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or unify with Ireland is a crucial part of most of the parties in Northern Ireland. A unionist community will always vote for a unionist party even if their economic interests lie with a nationalist party and vice versa with a nationalist community and a unionist party. The strong identity of the two communities does not allow voters to be malleable when short-term factors arise.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2020-10-16): More than three quarters of the half a million people who do not vote in elections in Northern Ireland support the Union, a major academic survey has found. [...] In a report setting out the findings, the lead author of the research project, Professor Jon Tonge from the University of Liverpool, said: "In terms of a border poll, election results may be a less accurate a guide to the desire for reunification especially when it is considered that 76.9% of non-voters who stated a preference are pro-Union. [...] As well as non-voters, a critical group in deciding the outcome of any border poll will be Alliance voters. The survey found that 58.8% of Alliance voters support the Union and 25.6% want Irish unity.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2022-12-06): Almost a fifth of voters in Northern Ireland, including nearly a third of voters from a Protestant background, say they would find a vote in favour of a united Ireland "almost impossible to accept", according to an Ipsos opinion poll. [...] In Northern Ireland, just under half (47 per cent) of all voters said they would "happily accept" a vote in favour of unity. A further 26 per cent said that they "would not be happy but could live it", but 18 per cent of all voters — which includes 32 per cent of voters from a Protestant background, and 14 per cent of voters from a non-Catholic and non-Protestant background — said they would find this result "almost impossible to accept". Acceptance of a pro-union result was much higher. Almost three-quarters of voters (73 per cent) in the North said they would "happily accept" this outcome, with 19 per cent reluctantly accepting it and just 2 per cent who said they would find it "almost impossible to accept".
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2023-12-02): In 2023, 30 per cent in the North said they would vote in favour of unification (compared to 27 per cent in 2022) and 51 per cent to stay in the UK (compared to 50 per cent last year), with the remainder saying they either "don’t know" or would not vote. Three-fifths of Northern Catholics say they would vote for Irish unity, while four-fifths of Protestants say they would vote to stay in the UK. There is a much larger proportion of pro-UK Catholics (one in five) than pro-unification Protestants (four per cent). [...] In the South, 64 per cent said they would vote for unification compared to 16 per cent who said they would vote for Northern Ireland to stay in the UK, while 13 per cent said they did not know how they would vote and 7 per cent said they would not vote.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2022-12-03): Northern Ireland would vote decisively against a united Ireland if there was a Border poll, according to an Ipsos opinion poll for a new research project into North-South relations and political views on the future of the island. [...] Half of all respondents (50 per cent) in Northern Ireland said they would vote against Irish unity, which included 21 per cent of those from a Catholic background. Just over a quarter (26 per cent) in the North said they would vote for unity, while 19 per cent said they didn’t know how they would vote and 5 per cent said they would not vote.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-04-08): As figure 1 illustrates, the question of Northern Ireland’s constitutional future continues to be consequential in shaping voting behaviour (Murphy 2022). Yet, it also shows how the middle ground, largely represented by the Alliance Party, is gaining momentum. At the 2022 Assembly election, the pro-European Union (EU), neither nationalist nor unionist Alliance Party won the biggest gain in vote share, from 9.1% in 2017 to 13.5% in 2022 (O Dochartaigh, 2022; ARK, 2023). This was enough to make the party Northern Ireland’s third largest, ahead of the historically dominant Ulster Unionist Party (O Dochartaigh, 2022). Three events or changes can be interpreted as altering voting behaviour in Northern Ireland away from the dominance of orange and green politics, to a landscape where the middle or third way is growing. These are the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and changing identity cleavages.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2022-05-03): A unionist party has always been returned as the largest party at Stormont, giving some reassurance to people who strongly see themselves as British and want remain part of the UK. [...] The problem for the DUP is that they are also losing voters in the other direction too. Many people are increasingly fed up with so-called Green and Orange politics - green for those who want Irish unification, orange which has become shorthand for unionism, referring to the unionist organisation the Orange Order. Moderate unionists in particular are voting in larger numbers for centre-ground parties who do not align themselves with either. The cross-community Alliance party has seen a sharp rise in its vote share in recent elections, and could become the third biggest party in the assembly ahead of the other two traditional parties, the Ulster Unionist Party and the nationalist SDLP.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2019-11-22): General Election: The Northern Ireland non-voters who could transform electoral landscape [...] Thousands of non-voters in Northern Ireland and those not registered to vote could potentially transform the political landscape of Northern Ireland, if they took part in elections. New analysis has revealed the extent of non-voters across Northern Ireland - with all but one of the 18 constituencies having more people registered to vote that don’t take part than the number of people that elect the winning politician.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2022-04-05): This claim is accurate with consideration. The claim that three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union is based on evidence from a research survey commissioned on behalf of the University of Liverpool. It found that 76.9% of respondents who did not vote in the 2019 General election and who stated a constitutional preference chose "to remain part of the UK". [...] During an episode of BBC Northern Ireland’s Spotlight programme, Professor Peter Shirlow claimed (at 24:55): "Three-quarters of people who don’t vote in Northern Ireland are pro-Union." This claim was made in the context of a discussion on the new leaders of two Unionist parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party. [...] The figure relevant to this claim is found in a table in the survey report: "To Remain in UK or to reunify with Ireland by Voters and Non-Voters who state a preference". The table states that almost a third (31.1%) of all respondents who are non-voters gave a preference to one of the two constitutional choices. Of these non-voters in the survey, 76.9% chose the response, "To remain part of the UK".
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-07-06): Politics in Northern Ireland has always been framed upon unionist versus nationalist divisions. Power-sharing between unionists and nationalists is mandatory in the devolved Executive and Assembly. Yet, according to the 2019 ESRC Northern Ireland election study, 40% of Northern Ireland's electors say they are neither unionist nor nationalist, compared to only 27% identifying as unionist and 25% as nationalist. [...] By analysing the demography and views of non-voters, voters and party members who eschew unionism and nationalism, we will achieve a far better understanding of Northern Ireland's understudied third tradition, numerically its largest but the least researched. We will analyse several different types of elector rejecting unionism and nationalism: [...] c) non-unionist and non-nationalist electors are the 'swing' voters who need to be won by unionists or nationalists in any future border poll on Northern Ireland's constitutional future, permitted under the Good Friday Agreement.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2024-07-08): Unionism as an ideology is broken, fracturing itself to pieces on an ever-shrinking board. The 2021 census illustrated a sharp decline in British identity in Northern Ireland, and survey results consistently indicate that a growing number of people – particularly those aged 18 to 24 – feel no affinity towards unionism. With a decreasing voter base, it is difficult to imagine three parties representing three wings of unionism surviving the next decade and, as this political ideology slips further towards oblivion, so too will support for staying in the United Kingdom. Though the causes of unionism’s decline are multifaceted, this has undeniably been hastened by Brexit. The DUP’s folly in supporting the UK’s departure from the European Union, and the subsequent propping up of Theresa May’s Conservative government, galvanised pro-European and nationalist voters in Northern Ireland while simultaneously causing an irreparable rift within the unionist cause.
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2019-10-24): Further results reveal possible consequences to the union. In 2017, the research team was among the first to show that a majority of Leavers in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland regarded the unravelling of the Northern Ireland peace process and a second Scottish independence referendum with a Yes vote as a ‘price worth paying’ for Brexit. [...] - Remain voters are particularly likely to believe that Brexit will lead to the breakup of the UK (around three quarters in Scotland, England and Wales believe this) but similar proportions of Leave voters believe staying in the EU will undermine faith in the union. [...] "Individuals might profess an attachment to the union, but Brexit has revealed most in Britain to be ambivalent unionists who now see it as expendable to get their own way on Brexit. Because this holds for both Leave and Remain voters, it confirms just how much the Brexit debate has polarised the electorates in Britain. These findings show that polarisation is reshaping how we argue with one another, and what we argue about, but could reshape the union as well."
Claim: Three-quarters of non-voters in Northern Ireland are pro-Union. (Peter SHIRLOW, 2021-06-08)
Evidence (2018-02-21): Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU by a margin of 56% to 44%. John Garry (Queen’s University Belfast) explains that there is a strong division behind this outcome, different ethno-national groups voted very differently in the referendum. Yet, he observes, that with regard to the Brexit process there is a strong consensus on the need to avoid a hard north/south border. Voting was very strongly linked to the underlying divide in Northern Ireland between Catholic nationalists (who tend to identify as Irish and favour a united Ireland) and Protestant unionists (who tend to identify as British and favour maintaining Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom). [...] Leave voters in Northern Ireland tended to be those ‘left behind’ by globalisation (working class, less skilled and educated voters with socially conservative views) while the ‘winners’ of the globalisation process (young, educated, skilled multi-culturalists) tended to be pro- Remain.
Claim: UK passports are produced by non-UK companies. (Richard Moore, 2020-10-20)
Evidence (2020-10-20): The new (blue) UK passport is produced by Thales Group (headquartered in France). However, passports will be personalised with the holder’s details in the UK.
Claim: UK passports are produced by non-UK companies. (Richard Moore, 2020-10-20)
Evidence (2020-02-25): Brexit: Why your next UK passport will be blue - Published - comments [...] Following Brexit, UK passports are changing from a burgundy booklet to a blue one. [...] Now the UK passport will be blue with gold writing and won't have "European Union" written on it as the UK has now officially left the EU.
Claim: UK passports are produced by non-UK companies. (Richard Moore, 2020-10-20)
Evidence (2018-03-22): The new UK passport to be issued after Brexit will be made in France, the current British manufacturer has said. [...] Gemalto, which has its headquarters in Paris and has a factory in Fareham, said it was aware of the reports regarding the contract to produce the new UK passport. [...] A spokeswoman for the Home Office said: "The chosen company demonstrated that they will be best able to meet the needs of our passport service with a high quality and secure product at the best value for money for our customers and the taxpayer."