copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-09-12): The Irish government and Northern Irish nationalists (favouring a united Ireland) supported the protocol, whereas Unionists (favouring the existing United Kingdom) opposed it. By early 2019, the Westminster Parliament had voted three times against ratifying the Withdrawal Agreement and thus also rejected the backstop. [...] Sinn Féin, the SDLP, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and the Green Party in Northern Ireland all support the backstop.[53] [...] On 15 January 2019, the UK parliament rejected a government motion to approve its draft withdrawal agreement. In late January 2019 many Brexit-supporting Conservative and DUP MPs continued to oppose a backstop without a specified end-date, concerned that it could tie the UK to many EU rules indefinitely.[60] In subsequent votes, most of the Conservative rebels voted for the Withdrawal Agreement and backstop, though the DUP continued to oppose it and thus contributed to its continuing defeat. This opposition was in spite of a LucidTalk opinion poll (released 6 December 2018) indicating that 65% of Northern Ireland voters were in favour of a Brexit that kept Northern Ireland in the EU single market and customs union.[57] On 28 January 2019, May expressed opposition to the backstop that she and the EU had agreed, and urged Tory MPs to vote in favour of a backbench amendment replacing the backstop with unspecified "alternative arrangements".[61][62]
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2019-01-29): Being Irish, I have family and friends on both sides of the border (protestant and catholic). Unlike "the troubles" of the past, nationalists and unionist alike are united in their opposition to a hard border. They accept that the backstop is the only workable way of achieving that and have overwhelmingly endorsed it. [...] The backstop is designed to safeguard the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), a legally binding international peace treaty voted for by people across the Island of Ireland in a referendum, 20 years ago. The details of the GFA were meticulously circulated to every household beforehand so that people knew what they were voting for. [...] Recent polls indicate that 60 per cent of people in Northern Ireland would prefer to be part of a united Ireland than a disunited little Britain. Ironically, by riding roughshod over the democratic rights of the people in the province, the DUP/Tory coalition of chaos, has done more to make the case for a united Ireland than Sinn Fein ever could.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-10-09): Northern Ireland and the backstop: Why 'alternative arrangements' aren't an alternative [...] Ultimately, however, the consent of the people most directly affected by arrangements for the border will be necessary for any technical solution to succeed. Any system-based approach requires the majority of traders to play ball, register, and comply with it, whatever schemes are created to manage trade across the border. This is not to say that consent could never be obtained, just that it is not there yet. Furthermore, there is little sign of the necessary groundwork being done. Northern Irish people and business groups at present appear to be a secondary consideration to what is predominantly an intra-party Westminster debate. Whereas the backstop, or a close, highly integrated economic relationship between the EU and UK, removes the need for physical infrastructure or associated checks by ensuring no new regulatory or customs border is created, technical solutions are premised on the acceptance of a new border, combined with efforts to ensure it is as unintrusive as possible. Any solution that assumes that a border community that is predominantly Irish nationalist, and against leaving the EU, will readily accept the existence of a new customs and regulatory divide faces an uphill struggle.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2022-12-23): The backstop proved one of the most contentious issues in parliamentary debates on the draft Withdrawal Agreement. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) opposed it because it would have introduced differences in regulation between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, which it saw as a threat to Northern Ireland’s place in the Union. A majority of people in Northern Ireland supported the backstop, however, as it gave them privileged access to both the UK and EU markets. In January 2019, the UK government published proposals on how the UK, including the Northern Ireland executive, could influence both the decision to use the backstop and its governance if it came into effect, as well as a commitment that the rest of the UK would unilaterally align with the single market regulations being applied in Northern Ireland. Other Brexiteers are opposed to the backstop because it would mean the UK remaining in a customs territory with the EU, removing the UK’s ability to vary its tariffs, a key component of trade deals.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-01-01): Limit the backstop to Northern Ireland alone was Dkr4188 now Dkr1999 for your first year, equivalent to Dkr166.58 per month. Make up your own mind. Build robust opinions with the FT’s trusted journalism. Take this offer before 24 October.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2022-03-02): Jenkins linked to an article (£) in the Sunday Times to underpin his statistics. The Sunday Times article was based on LucidTalk’s Tracker poll from August 2019, and stated "[A]lmost three out of five voters in Northern Ireland are in favour of a "border in the Irish Sea." It also noted that "one in six unionists support the Northern Ireland-only backstop." In both cases there is a slight rounding up of the numbers. To be precise, 58.4% of the overall population and 15% of unionists favour a NI specific backstop. Nonetheless, the Sunday Times figures are close to the mark. [...] Another explanation for the 40% figure could be that Jenkins may have heard the previously fact-checked analysis that "60% of Unionist people are opposed to the Backstop on economic grounds", and extrapolated that 40% of unionists must therefore support it.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-01-15): - A majority of total MLAs and a majority of both nationalist and unionists in attendance, vote in favour; or - 60% of MLAs, including 40% of unionists and nationalists in attendance, vote in favour. [...] The EU and Ireland also feel that, if the decision was in the hands of Northern Ireland alone and not the UK Parliament, the risk of a vote against the arrangements is reduced. There is a wide-spread opposition to no-deal in Northern Ireland. In August, over half of MLAs signed a letter 25 Devenport M, MLA appeal over backstop in letter to Tusk, BBC News, 22 August 2019, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-49435880 to the EU Council President expressing their support for Theresa May’s backstop. [...] The consent mechanism has received a mixed reaction from political parties in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland’s largest Unionist Party the DUP have argued that the mechanism violates the principle of consent in the Good Friday Agreement, as the vote could be passed by a simple majority, without the support of both communities. Several Unionist parties and UK politicians have launched a legal challenge to the consent mechanism regulations and the protocol itself on this basis. 26 McBride S, Unionist leaders unite to go to court over Irish Sea border, arguing it breaches the 1800 Act of Union and 1998 Belfast Agreement, News letter, 21 February 2021, www.newsletter.co.uk/news/politics/unionist-leaders-unite-to-go-to-court-over-irish-sea-border-arguing-it-breaches-the-1800-act-of-union-and-1998-bel…
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2022-02-08): Viewed from this perspective, the Northern Ireland Protocol is deeply problematic because it seeks to undermine what was secured through the Good Friday Agreement, by enabling the Republic of Ireland, and the wider EU, to effectively lay claim to, and thereby negate, part of the UK single market for goods, with the effect that the UK single market for goods no longer exists. It has now been replaced by a Great Britain single market for goods and an all-Ireland single market for goods, as part of the wider EU single market. In a context where one of the primary roles of a sovereign state is to uphold and regulate the market, it is not possible to affirm the territorial integrity of the state with its own laws apart from its territorial market and its laws. [...] ‘If the rest of the union has been prepared to allow this arrangement, notwithstanding its implications for those in Northern Ireland who are committed to the United Kingdom, is the United Kingdom the kind of community I want to be part of?’
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2013-01-01): The ESM common backstop will be used only as a last resort, in the situation that the SRF is depleted, and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is not able to raise sufficient contributions or borrow funds from other sources at acceptable rates.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-09-12): - four respondents supported the proposals;
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-09-20): Local and geographic effects [edit]The potential impact on the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has been a contentious issue. Since 2005, the border had been essentially invisible.[271] After Brexit, it became the only UK–EU land border[272] (not counting the land borders that EU states Spain and Cyprus have with British Overseas Territories). All involved parties agreed a hard border should be avoided,[273] because it might compromise the Good Friday Agreement that ended the Northern Ireland conflict.[274][275][276] To forestall this, the EU proposed a "backstop agreement" that would keep the UK in the Customs Union and keep Northern Ireland in some aspects of the Single Market until a lasting solution was found.[277] The UK Parliament rejected this proposal. After further negotiations in autumn of 2019, an alternative model, the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol was agreed between the UK and the EU. Under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is formally outside the EU single market, but EU free movement of goods rules and EU Customs Union rules still apply; this ensures there are no customs checks or controls between Northern Ireland and the rest of the island.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2023-10-10): Backstops are more likely to prove effective if central banks provide more transparency about when liquidity will be available in advance.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2023-02-23): The backstop provider and backstop recipient must comply with all other applicable laws, rules, and regulations of the Commission and any self-regulatory organization of which they are members.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-10-07): Although Northern Ireland is currently suffering the full impact of Brexit as part of the United Kingdom, 55.8% of the population of Northern Ireland voted in favour of remaining in the European Union. The principle of the consent of the people of Northern Ireland to the choice of their constitutional future is considered to be one of the essential foundations of the Good Friday Agreement[15]. [...] After numerous obstacles and surprising turns of events, it was decided, as a provisional solution of last resort (backstop) in a first agreement, that the United Kingdom as a whole, and not just the province of Northern Ireland as had initially been envisaged, would remain in a customs union with the European Union and that Northern Ireland would remain in partial alignment with the Single Market. But this first agreement met with hostility from the most ardent Brexiters of the British Conservative Party allied with the Unionists of the DUP, who found the option unacceptable and undemocratic and feared that it would imprison the United Kingdom indefinitely in the European Customs Union. Despite three attempts, Theresa May failed to win parliamentary support and was forced to resign in July 2019. [...] [18] The Unionists felt betrayed by Boris Johnson in December 2019 when he decreed that there would be a frontstop in the Irish Sea after promising never to inflict differential treatment on the province. Some may have regretted having torpedoed the Agreement reached by Theresa May, which was much more favourable to them.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2024-09-19): The new Withdrawal Agreement replaced the controversial Irish backstop provision with a protocol. According to the revised deal, the entire U.K. left the EU customs union upon Brexit, but Northern Ireland continued following EU regulations and value-added tax (VAT) laws for goods, while the U.K. government collected the VAT on behalf of the EU. [...] The backstop emerged as the main reason for the Brexit impasse. It was a guarantee that there was no "hard border" between Northern Ireland and Ireland. It was an insurance policy that kept Britain in the EU customs union with Northern Ireland following EU single-market rules. The backstop, which was meant to be temporary and was superseded by a subsequent agreement, could only be removed if both Britain and the EU gave their consent.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2020-02-03): Overall the backstop has essentially been replaced by a full stop whereby Northern Ireland remains aligned to the EU from the end of the transition period for at least four years. A change can only happen if it is voted on by the Stormont assembly (more of that later). As Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s chief negotiator in the Good Friday agreement, tweeted: "The funny side of the No 10 claim they have got rid of the backstop is that they have in fact transformed it from a fallback into the definitive future arrangement for NI with the province remaining in the single market and customs union". [...] The majority in the protocol for cross-community support is defined as a "weighted majority of 60% of the members of the legislative assembly present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations".
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2020-05-29): - 6 in 10 respondents (60%) agree that the Windsor Framework is the best available compromise for addressing the concerns of people in Northern Ireland with the original Protocol. One third (33%) disagree. [...] More than two thirds of respondents (70%) agree that ‘particular arrangements’ for Northern Ireland are needed to manage the effects of Brexit. This is the same as in October 2022 and February 2023, but slightly lower than in June 2023 (73%). The proportion of all respondents being strongly of this view (48%) is just below the highest figure recorded (50%) in June 2023 and June 2022. [...] The fifth section of the poll focused on specific aspects of the Windsor Framework and its implications and asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with certain specific statements (See Figure 7). A first question asked whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework, although it remains contested, is realistically the best available compromise for addressing the concerns of people in Northern Ireland on the implementation of the original Protocol. A majority (60%) agree; a third (33%) disagree. The overwhelming majority (≥85%+) of nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters agree; ‘slightly unionist’ voters are split between agree and disagree; and ‘slightly unionist’ voters overwhelming disagree.
Claim: 60% of people in Northern Ireland are against the backstop. (Jim Shannon, 2019-02-12)
Evidence (2019-10-21): But it adds to the checks between the rest of the UK - which will not necessarily be sticking to EU single market rules - and Northern Ireland. [...] If the Northern Ireland Assembly votes against the new arrangements, they would stop applying two years later, during which time the "joint committee" would make recommendations to the UK and EU on what to do about this. [...] The deal defines cross-community support as more than 50% of unionist and nationalist Assembly members voting in favour, or at least 40% of members from each designation if in total at least 60% of members have voted in favour.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2016-05-30): Most recent data show a third (33.5%) of school leavers continue studies outside Northern Ireland. While public investment policy in further education is a significant factor, others must be considered, such as the desire and ability to take up opportunities elsewhere. Thus it is misleading to say that 38% have to leave; some leave because they wish to.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2018-12-18): The analysis of student flows between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in higher education has just been published jointly by the Republic's Department of Education and Skills (DES) and Northern Ireland's Department for the Economy (DfE). It shows that the number of students from the Republic of Ireland studying at higher education institutions in Northern Ireland fell from 3,520 in 2011/12 to 2,195 in 2015/16 - a 38% decrease. [...] However, with around 235,000 higher education enrolments in the Republic in 2017/18, Northern Irish students make up just over half a per cent of the student body.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2021-01-28): The rest of the 16 to 18 leavers fall into the ‘all other’ category. These are students who took qualifications at level 1 or entry level, or qualifications that had no assigned level. These include lower level vocational qualifications and essential and functional skills qualifications. [...] Students with recorded learning difficulties or disabilities (LLDD) were 9 percentage points more likely to stay in education after 16 to 18 study compared to all other college students (44% compared to 35%). They were, however, more likely to continue in further education rather than in higher education compared to the rest of the cohort. They were also less likely to take up apprenticeships or go into employment. [...] This is likely because more independent school leavers defer their entry into higher education or move abroad after 16 to 18 study.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2022-03-23): Enrolments at UK Higher Education Institutions: Northern Ireland Analysis 2020/21 This statistical bulletin provides information on the number of NI students enrolled at UK Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and the number of students enrolled at NI HEIs. The key points are: [...] This statistical bulletin provides information on Higher Education qualifications gained by students at NI HEIs and by NI domiciled students at UK HEIs. The key points are:
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2022-09-30): The number of Northern Irish undergraduate students dropping out of university rose by almost 60% in the 2021-22 academic year. [...] Some 894 Northern Ireland students withdrew from university in 2019-20. The SLC data is for students whose home address is in Northern Ireland so they could have dropped out of their course at any university in the UK, not just those in Northern Ireland.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2021-09-07): Almost 38% of 18-year-olds have so far decided to go to university, the highest ever proportion. Although entry numbers for those aged 19 and over are slightly down on last year.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2024-02-14): This puts the application rate for UK 18-year-olds at 41.3%, down from 41.5% in 2023, but up from 38.2% in 2019.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2016-05-30): 'More than a third of students leave Northern Ireland at 18; we cannot afford to lose such talent - but they'll only return if there are opportunities' [...] Northern Ireland, as a result of that, lost 2,250 student places - that's over 10% of the total undergraduate student places. Some 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at the age of 18, that's a really serious situation for any society because, in particular, your most talented people are leaving. You do want people to leave and come back - people only come back to where opportunities sit.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2022-02-27): On 11 March 2018, Brian Smyth claimed that "…a third of young people from Northern Ireland who go to university travel outside NI, mainly to the North West of England and Scotland, and only a third of those who graduate return back home." [...] The latest figures from the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education surveyshow that, in 2015-16, 33.1% (815/2,465) of full-time Northern Ireland domiciled leavers from Great Britain returned to Northern Ireland to work six months after graduating. [...] We found that Brian Smyth’s claim that "…a third of young people from Northern Ireland who go to university travel outside Northern Ireland, mainly to the North West of England and Scotland, and only a third of those who graduate return back home" was generally factually accurate. The Department of Economy statistics suggest that the figure for those leaving Northern Ireland for Great Britain institutions is closer to 26.9%; it is closer to a third for those enrolled full-time. After graduation, the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education survey indicates that 33.1% of Northern Irish students returned home to work.
Claim: 38% of students have to leave Northern Ireland at age 18 for higher education. (Patrick Johnston, 2016-05-30)
Evidence (2024-01-01): Should I stay or should I go? Reasons for leaving Northern Ireland for study or work [...] 1. Students clearly said that poor community relations in Northern Ireland were a reason to leave and not return. People who had chosen to live and work outside Northern Ireland after graduation agreed that this was a strong motivation to remain away. [...] 3. Students said that a broader range of higher education courses, greater availability of places and a higher quality student experience elsewhere encouraged them to leave Northern Ireland.