copenlu/druid huggingface dataset:
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2022-08-12): In general, classified documents must be handled in a way that protects the integrity and confidentiality of the information they contain. This includes securing documents in a safe or other authorized storage container when the documents are not being used by staff. If staff needs to move them from one place to another, they must follow security protocols to do so. Though classified information can be taken off the premises in the course of official duties, taking classified documents home is prohibited by executive order. [...] Mishandling classified information, especially if it is accidental, is usually handled as an administrative matter. However, more serious violations can incur criminal charges and penalties. Federal law (18 U.S. Code § 1924) states that anyone who "knowingly removes such documents or materials without authority and with the intent to retain such documents or materials at an unauthorized location shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both."
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-08-27): A sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF /skɪf/), in United States military, national security/national defense and intelligence parlance, is an enclosed area within a building that is used to process sensitive compartmented information (SCI) types of classified information. [...] - ^ "Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities" (PDF). DNI.gov. September 28, 2017. Archived (PDF) from the original on July 20, 2023. Retrieved October 23, 2019. [...] - "Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities", DCID 6/9 Text; effective November 18, 2002 til May 26, 2010. Retrieved 2010-07-19. (expired, only in use as grandfathering old facilities without updating)
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-08-20): TS (Top Secret) material must be stored in a SCIF office which stands for (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility). Only personnel with a TS clearance can enter the SCIF. When not in use, the room is locked. Presidents often have a temporary SCIF on their property or vacation homes. Presidents and VPs travel with a large communications team so they are always in constant contact with the Situation Room including when abroad. [...] A frequent classification is NOFORN, meaning the document cannot be shared with any foreign government or individual. In most cases this does not apply to the Five Eyes group: the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the US. NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, and others get considerable access as well. [...] "All classified documents are subject to periodic review for declassification."
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-02-09): In a Feb. 8 press conference responding to Special Counsel Robert Hur’s classified documents report, President Joe Biden made misleading and inaccurate statements about the documents — including how documents were stored in lockable cabinets in his home and who the material was shared with — points the report contradicts. [...] The report said investigators found classified documents from 2009 stored in a "badly damaged box surrounded by household detritus," such as a collapsed dog crate, a broken map and potting soil in the garage of Biden’s Wilmington, Delaware, home. The documents, which were related to U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan, had classification markings "up to the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information level," one of the highest levels of classification. [...] U.S. Attorney’s Office, Special counsel report in Biden classified documents case, Feb. 8, 2024
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2023-01-31): When I served in the military just before the close of the Cold War, my job was primarily in a "SCIF" – a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. This is a space designed to keep classified information out of the hands of people who wish to do the United States harm. It is literally a vault that is secured and monitored for who and what comes in, and perhaps even more importantly, who and what comes out. This level of compartmented information is even withheld from those with the highest levels of clearance without a "need to know." [...] Interestingly, one can often read information in the press or in "Open Source" material that is actually classified at some of our government’s highest levels. Those of us who were trained and therefore trusted knew to never speak of this information in unsecured places, even if it was publicly available. It was classified for a reason. [...] I share this because we all have been exposed to the recent news cycle where we have discovered that presidents and vice presidents of more than one administration are in possession of classified information found in their personal residences and in other unsecured spaces.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2023-01-24): Referring to Biden’s handling of materials with classified markings, Fitzpatrick cited his experience as an FBI special agent and a federal prosecutor, and said: "Classified documents can never be taken out of a SCIF, ever." [...] Moss said classified documents, no matter their level, "cannot simply be removed and taken outside of any secured space without complying with security protocols." However, he called Fitzpatrick’s characterization of the process an "oversimplification." [...] This is exaggerated. SCIFs must be used when documents with the highest-level classifications have to be reviewed. But even the most highly classified documents can be taken out of a SCIF, as long as specific precautions are taken that ensure similar levels of security.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-01-09): The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and selected agencies have taken some steps to address physical access barriers to sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIF), such as adding automatic door openers. However, additional barriers remain, including: [...] Physical Barriers to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) at Selected Facilities That GAO Visited [...] SCIFs are the only facilities authorized for storing, using, discussing, and processing highly classified information. The Director of National Intelligence, whose organization sets policy for the design, construction, and management of SCIFs, stated that she expects agency leaders to remove barriers to equal opportunities for their workforces, including for people with disabilities.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2008-08-04): Email questions and comments to dcsa.cdsetraining@mail.mil.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2023-05-17): SCIFs, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, and SAPFs, Special Access Program Facilities, are two types of secure facilities whose names are sometimes used interchangeably. However, they have one major difference: While both are U.S. government-accredited facilities designed to store, discuss or process classified or sensitive information, and both are built according to the same technical specifications, the difference is found in who utilizes these facilities. [...] The difference between SCIFs and SAPFs is often confused because both facilities adhere to the special construction requirements set forth by the ICD 705 Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, otherwise known as the Tech Spec. But it wasn’t always this way. In 2004, the Department of Defense began using its own standards, processes and ways of protecting national security with the use of a document titled the JAFAN 6/9. And prior to 2010, when the Intelligence Community Directive number 705 (ICD 705) policy debuted, each agency inside the Intelligence Community had their own standards when it came to classified information. This was problematic because if a company received a contract to build a SCIF for the NSA and then later wanted to use that same space for a contract with the CIA, they couldn’t utilize the same facility without a major renovation because these agencies had different standards and specifications for safeguarding their information.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2022-08-12): What are classified documents? [...] A subset of Top Secret documents known as SCI, or sensitive compartmented information, is reserved for certain information derived from intelligence sources. Access to an SCI document can be even further restricted to a smaller group of people with specific security clearances. [...] Then, there may be extra security protocols involved in viewing Top Secret information. Some documents must be viewed in what’s known as a SCIF, or a sensitive compartmented information facility.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-10-06): SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) Use Policy 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to establish policies for accessing, safeguarding, and storing classified information and material, including documents printed and stored within a U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)-controlled SCIF. [...] Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) - All information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) - An accredited area, room, group of rooms, or installation where sensitive compartmented information may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically processed, where procedural and physical measures prevent the free access of persons unless they have been formally briefed for the particular sensitive compartmented information authorized for use or storage within the sensitive compartmented information facility.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2022-08-22): Federal officials do not secure TS/SCI information in this way. First, TS/SCI documents are so sensitive that only officials meeting a very high need-to-know bar are allowed to read them. TS/SCI-cleared officials must also follow standard procedures to conduct their TS/SCI "read." They must do so only in a government-approved sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), which is specially constructed and hardened to prevent unauthorized entry and electronic eavesdropping. For certain highly sensitive information, readers must sign their names on the document they read. They may discuss the TS/SCI content while in the SCIF but not when outside a SCIF. They read the TS/SCI documents in the presence of an intelligence officer, who later collects all TS/SCI documents, returns them to a TS/SCI-designated safe located within a SCIF, and logs in their return. No one may take a TS/SCI document out of the SCIF to their office or their home, even if there is a strong padlock on their office or personal safe. When an official leaves government service, they are "read out" of the TS/SCI program and cut off from further access to TS/SCI material. If an official loses a TS/SCI document, they can lose their TS/SCI clearance—or go to prison if they do something more damaging. These safeguards exist because the sensitivity of TS/SCI information is so grave.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2022-10-06): A range of protections is in place to guard against the disclosure of classified information. Only those government employees and contractors with the requisite security clearance may have access to classified documents, and even then, only if they have a "need to know." Some documents that are classified as Top Secret/Secure Compartmented Information might be accessible only to a handful of executive branch officials. Classified documents also must be transmitted through, and stored on, secure systems or facilities. Officials who mishandle classified documents or disclose them without authorization are subject to administrative or even criminal penalties. [...] Moreover, it is important to understand the nature of the president’s constitutional authority in this context. Under Article II, the president is responsible for making judgments about national security harm. If a president determines that protections for classified information can be removed without harming national security or that the public interest in disclosure outweighs any such harm, he has exercised that judgment. If, on the other hand, a president alters a document’s classification status for some other reason — for instance, it would be more convenient for him to work at home than in a secure facility, or he simply failed to apply the required protections — such an action is arguably an abdication of his Article II responsibility rather than an exercise of it.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-05-13): SUBJ/MARINE CORPS TEMPORARY SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY ACCREDITATION AND DE-ACCREDITATION PROCESS// [...] 3.b.2.c. The removal of all classified AIS material must be coordinated with the AIS ATO issuing authorities to obtain any additional couriering or removal requirements. All classified AIS material shall be stored in an appropriate classified facility at all times. [...] 3.c.8. The close-out security inspection checklist shall be sent to the Parent SSO and the appropriate T-SCIF Delegated Accrediting Authority for validating the sanitization of all classified information or AIS was removed from the physical structure.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2007-08-10): Classified information may be compartmented within a classification level. Thus, TS/SCI is information classified at the Top Secret (TS) level that is subject to the enhanced controls applicable to Sensitive Compartmented Information. For instance, TS material must either be "under the personal control of an authorized or appropriately cleared person" or "guarded or stored in a locked security container," typically a General Services Administration-approved safe. See DOJ Security Program Operation Manual at 6-202. However, SCI material must be stored in a SCIF irrespective of its classification level. According to Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 6/9 (Nov. 18, 2002), a SCIF is a specially constructed room or other structure "intended to prevent as well as detect visual, acoustical, technical, and physical access by unauthorized persons." [...] The procedures established in the Manual, and reinforced in security briefings, provide that classified material must be either "under the personal control of an authorized or appropriately cleared person" or "guarded or stored in a locked security container," typically a General Services Administration-approved safe. However, regarding the handling of TS/SCI material, the Manual provides that "SCI information may only be... stored within a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)." Further, "SCI material must not be sent to a building that does not have a SCIF or to someone who does not have access to a SCIF." As discussed above, the Manual’s requirement that SCI material be stored in a SCIF was covered in the SCI briefing Gonzales received the day he became the Attorney General.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2023-07-03): SECURITY POLICY FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) WITHIN DEPARTMENT [...] 12 FAM 715 Sensitive compartmented information facility (scif) [...] g. Prior to granting access to non-SCI indoctrinated personnel, there should be an announcement or notification to all SCIF occupants that there will be "uncleared personnel" entering the facility. All classified material, operations and discussions must cease until the uncleared personnel have departed. This includes covering or securing all classified material, turning off all classified systems, and ceasing all classified conversations. Uncleared personnel entering the SCIF must be continuously escorted (close proximity, never left unattended in the facility). An SCI indoctrinated person from the bureau or post familiar with the security procedures of that SCIF must escort the uncleared person at all times to prevent a compromise. All visitors must be under the continuous escort ratio of one SCI indoctrinated person to two uncleared persons.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2023-04-26): With a few exceptions, highly classified materials — including top secret documents and information gleaned from intelligence sources — are never supposed to leave a SCIF. [...] The rules for handling classified information are different for sitting presidents. They’re free to review top secret materials outside of a SCIF, but even then, they usually do so in the presence of a senior official such as the national security adviser, who is responsible for retrieving the documents and securing them afterward. [...] McCord transported sensitive materials home in a special locked bag. At home, she had a government-installed safe behind a deadbolt. But still, she could only take certain classified documents home — nothing past the secret level — and had to complete some tasks in the more protected SCIF at the Justice Department’s headquarters.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-06-19): 5. Classified material must be kept in secure facilities as set forth above and must never be taken out of such facilities unless the material is being returned to the filing party or originating agency, sent to the BIA, or archived. See also infra Section VIII, Transmittal of Classified Information. Classified material must be reviewed in an area that affords sufficient protection against unauthorized disclosure of the information—i.e., an area to which access can be limited and where processing can be accomplished without being observed or monitored by persons not authorized to access the classified information. See infra Section VI, Security Procedures. 6. Classified material must never be taken to a person’s home under any circumstances. This is true even if a person has a security clearance or has been approved for telework or work from an alternative worksite. If any part of a ROP is classified, the entire ROP must be reviewed and maintained at the court or other designated secure facility at all times.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-05-29): Starting in 2019, hearing aids began incorporating "hands-free calling," a two-way audio Bluetooth technology. The new technology, however, presented an increased security threat to NSA — the potential for the transmission of classified conversations outside of a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2023-04-24): They are designed with one purpose: to protect sensitive security or military information. Classified documents and conversations are kept in. Unauthorized personnel are kept out. Period. [...] Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities embody the term "serviceable." They are built for the singular purpose of hosting sensitive discussions and reviewing secure documents – and that’s precisely the role they serve. [...] - They must be accredited. Before a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility can be used to safeguard sensitive material, it must be formally approved by a regulating agency, and said to meet all physical, technical, and operational criteria.
Claim: “Classified documents can never be taken out of a (sensitive compartmented information facility), ever.” (Brian Fitzpatrick, 2023-01-22)
Evidence (2024-02-09): Biden sought to contrast his handling of classified material with that of former President Donald Trump, who faces felony charges for willfully retaining classified documents. (Hur agreed that there were major distinctions between the two cases.) But while Biden correctly noted that the documents were in a private home that is very different from the Mar-a-Lago social club where Trump lives, Biden embellished his argument with a false claim. [...] Facts First: Biden’s claim that none of the classified material found in his possession was highly classified is false, according to details provided by the special counsel. Hur reported the discovery of documents in Biden’s possession that had markings identifying them as "Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information," a very high level of classification – plus handwritten notebooks from Biden’s time as vice president that weren’t marked as classified but that "contain information that remains classified up to the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information level." [...] For example, Hur wrote, the open box in Biden’s garage contained an Afghanistan-related memo from the National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama in 2009 marked "TOP SECRET/SCI" (Sensitive Compartmented Information). Hur wrote that experts in the intelligence community said the document contains "highly sensitive information about the military programs of the United States and a foreign government. The unauthorized disclosure of this information, both today and in 2017 when Mr. Biden was no longer vice president, reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."
Claim: The United States had 589 coal-fired plants 10 years ago, and “we're down to 504. … We are the only nation that has reduced our reliance (on) coal energy." (Joe Manchin, 2021-12-16)
Evidence (2021-12-16): Manchin is broadly right to note that the U.S. has decreased its reliance on coal for generating electricity over the past decade, although he incorrectly labeled the units of measurement that went along with his figures. He also has a point that the U.S. has led the world in the number of retirements of coal-fired assets. However, other countries have also made significant cuts in coal-fired power over the same period.