Domain: Information
Question:
A healthcare software company operating in a highly regulated environment is reassessing its security approach after an audit exposed systemic weaknesses, including unclear ownership of security responsibilities and inconsistent validation of critical systems. The organization develops rapidly, values autonomy across engineering and operations teams, and is attempting to modernize its cloud environment using Microsoft-aligned architectural guidance while assuming zero trust across identities, infrastructure, and applications.
Rather than creating a centralized security function that operates separately from delivery teams, leadership is exploring how security responsibilities can be embedded into existing roles and workflows without slowing development or turning security into a compliance-only exercise. At the same time, executives want stronger assurance that risks related to sensitive healthcare data, supply chains, and platform dependencies are continuously understood and addressed.
Using the Microsoft Cybersecurity Reference Architecture as a framing model, how should this organization structure responsibility, leadership involvement, and validation practices so that security becomes part of normal operations across teams rather than an isolated function? What practical advantages does this approach create for resilience, incident response, and compliance in a healthcare-focused software organization?

Expected points in a correct answer:
States that under MCRA, security responsibilities should be embedded within existing engineering and operations roles rather than isolated in a separate isolated function
States that isolating security as a standalone function creates organizational weaknesses such as ambiguity in ownership, detachment from delivery, or friction in development cycles
States that security should become part of 'how work gets done' (e.g., embedded in CI/CD pipelines, infrastructure templates) rather than a separate approval process.
States that under MCRA, responsibilities are assigned to the executive security leadership, the engineering and operations team, and the platform engineering teams
states that the engineering and operations teams has any of these responsibility; secure design, coding practices, configuration of services, or remediation of vulnerabilities
States that leadership has the responsibility of oversight over risk governance
States that validation of critical systems (or configurations) should occur continuously rather than periodically
mentions examples of mechanisms (such as just-in-time access, automated provisioning, attribute-based access, role-based access) that validate system integrity during development or operations
mentions that continuous validation (e.g., validation of configuration) increases assurance for sensitive healthcare data
References Zero Trust principles applied to identity management (e.g., identity-centric controls, identity and access governance)
References Zero Trust principles applied to infrastructure (e.g., secure infrastructure templates, configuration and drift validation)
References Zero Trust principles applied to applications (e.g., CI/CD pipeline security, secure coding practices)
mentions that embedded security responsibilities reinforce zero trust principles
States that trust should not be implicitly granted based on role
States that trust should not be implicitly granted based on team
States that trust should not be implicitly granted based on environment
Rejects treating security primarily as a compliance-driven exercise or only during audit, but as an integral part of the organization workflow
States that leadership should focus on reviewing posture trends, policy exceptions, and high-risk findings rather than reviewing every operational change.
States that executive engagement in risk oversight provides assurance without introducing friction into development cycles.
States that under MCRA Ref Architecture, leadership avoids being a bottleneck for routine delivery decision via focusing on trends instead of micromanagement
Mentions that continuous monitoring or validation of supply chain and platform dependencies contributes to organizational resilience.
mentions that embedded security improves organizational resilience by limiting lateral movement and blast radius
mentions that the MCRA-aligned model improves incident response effectiveness via one of these techniques; incident ownership, automated validation, identity-centric controls
Frames the approach using Microsoft-aligned architectural guidance rather than ad hoc security practices.
States that the platform engineering team is responsible for embedding policy into CI/CD pipelines, providing secure infrastructure templates, and/or automating identity provisioning
States that executive security leadership is responsible for defining enterprise security strategy, Zero Trust governance, risk appetite, and/or healthcare regulatory interpretation
States that least privilege should be maintained continuously rather than periodically reviewed
Mentions that automated deprovisioning should be tied to identity lifecycle events
States that MCRA-driven automated validation ensures continuous compliance readiness with clear audit trails
Mentions that leadership should use continuous telemetry dashboards and/or measurable compliance metrics tied to automated controls for risk visibility