Domain: Information
Question:
An organization is adopting NIST CSF 2.0 to strengthen cybersecurity risk management across three sub-environments: (1) a secure, regulated enclave with strong controls and dedicated monitoring, (2) a standard corporate environment with uneven implementations and limited "hard" technical control evidence, and (3) a guest/BYOD access layer where device assurance and software inventory are inconsistent but endpoints still authenticate to enterprise resources and access organizational data.
Security engineers are struggling to decide whether current implementations are "sufficient," and where to prioritize process and control improvements--especially around (a) sensitive data exposure pathways (including credential handling and out-of-bounds access), (b) monitoring/detection coverage beyond the regulated enclave (visibility gaps across endpoints, identity activity, and asset inventory), and (c) acquisition of unvetted software on end-user corporate devices.
After multiple competitors in the same industry suffered successful attacks, the executive team is demanding a defensible position on "how far" the organization must advance its security posture. Leadership asks:
"What level of advancement is sufficient right now, given an elevated threat landscape--and how do we defend that choice under CSF 2.0 when the framework doesn't prescribe a universal required maturity target?"

Expected points in a correct answer:
States NIST CSF 2.0 does not mandate specific desired maturity level
States NIST CSF 2.0 expects organizations to establish risk based current profile.
States NIST CSF 2.0 expects organizations to establish risk based target profile.
States that profiles (current and/or target) should be driven by business context
States that profiles (current and/or target) should be driven by threat landscape
States that profiles (current and/or target) should be driven by risk tolerance
States remaining at compliance-only posture insufficient
Identifies competitor breach as reasoning for advancement
Identifies repeatability as desired security outcome
Identifies adaptability as desired security outcome
Identifies need for documented security controls
Identifies the need for automation in detection
Identifies the need for logging in detection
Identifies detection as part of incident response workflow
Identifies analysis as part of incident response workflow
Identifies containment as part of incident response workflow
Identifies recovery as part of incident response workflow
Identifies behavioral analytics or anomaly-based detection as a desired advancement beyond signature-based detection
Identifies threat intelligence utilization as desired future state
Identifies alert automation as desired future state
Identifies attack surface monitoring as desired future state
Identifies purple teaming or adversary emulation exercises as desired future state
States NIST CSF 2.0 Function GV.RM as defensible security posture
States NIST CSF 2.0 Function DE.CM as defensible security posture
States NIST CSF 2.0 Function RS.AN as defensible security posture
States NIST CSF 2.0 Function PR.PT as defensible security posture
States the organization should target at minimum a defined, repeatable, and consistently implemented security program
States the organization should move toward an adaptive posture as resources allow
States that threat-informed defenses should account for real-world attacker behavior
States the organization should operate in a proactive, threat-informed, and continuously improving posture
Identifies reducing analyst fatigue as a benefit of automated alert triage
Identifies the need for enterprise-wide visibility and detection (not limited to the regulated enclave)