Question: What caused a hostile Islamist response to develop internally?
About the article "Saudi Arabia", section "Foreign relations".

Candidate passages:
This book has been studied by leading members of the British Government, who have adopted a number of his suggestions.
It was positively received by journals like "The Times Literary Supplement" and "Literary Review" from terrorism experts Walter Laqueur and Michael Burleigh.
While Steven Poole in the Guardian called it "remarkably trite" and asked "what universe is Gove living in?"
Damian Thompson in "The Daily Telegraph" wrote that Gove's analysis is rooted in an "essentially Manichean" world view, which over simplifies the complexities of Islamist terrorism.
Although, according to Thompson, "Celcius 7/7" provides a useful analysis of Western 'appeasers' of militant Islam, by and large comparing the war on terror to a war against a totalitarian ideology is "misleading, and even dangerous."
Since publishing, Gove has been accused of harbouring a hostile attitude towards Islam and Muslims.
The author William Dalrymple has attacked the book as a "confused epic of simplistic incomprehension" and pointed out that contrary to claims on the book's jacket that Gove was an authority on Islamist terror, he had in fact never lived or travelled in any Islamic country, knew little about Islamic history or theology, and showed no sign of having met or talked to any Muslims.
Gove was vigorously defended by authors Melanie Phillips and Stephen Pollard, who rejected Dalrymple's analysis, and Gove himself has replied in "The Times". 
The 2006 Islamist demonstration outside the Embassy of Denmark in London took place on 3 February 2006, in response to controversy surrounding the publication of editorial cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper "Jyllands-Posten" on 30 September 2005.
The extremist UK-based Islamist groups al Ghurabaa and The Saviour Sect staged a controversial protest march from London Central Mosque near Marylebone Station to the Danish Embassy near Knightsbridge tube station. 
According to psychologists, rage is a behavior that every person exhibits in some form.
Rage is often used to denote hostile/affective/reactive aggression (as distinct from predatory/instrumental/proactive aggression, which by contrast is motivated by a desire to obtain some goal by use of aggression).
It denotes aggression where there is anger present, that is motivated by causing some harm to others, and that is characterized by impulsive thinking and a lack of planning.
Some psychologists, however, such as Bushman and Anderson, argue that the hostile/predatory dichotomy that is commonly employed in psychology fails to define rage fully, since it is possible for anger to motivate aggression, provoking vengeful behavior, without incorporating the impulsive thinking that is characteristic of rage.
They point to individuals or groups such as Seung-Hui Cho in the Virginia Tech massacre or Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold of the Columbine High School massacre, all of whom clearly experienced intense anger and hate, but whose planning (sometimes over periods of years), forethought, and lack of impulsive behavior is readily observable.
Rage stems from anger, in that, in certain cases where there is anger present, the ultimate push will create an outrageous occurrence.
Many of the effects that stem from anger and how a person reaches the point of expressing rage is a fine line associated with these behavioral tendencies.
Much of the behavior experienced from anger has been studied extensively, but most do not know what causes the next step, rage, or why some people go the extra emotional mile.
Rage is considered to be an emergency reaction, in which we as humans are pre-wired to possess.
Rage tends to be expressed when a person faces a threat to their pride, position, status or dignity.
Expression of rage can be very intense, often distinguished by distorted facial expressions and by threat (or execution) of physical attack.
Rage is associated with individuals who experience psycho-pathological issues.
This can lead to physical violence resulting in serious injury or death.
Self-esteem is another factor of one feeling rage; evidence has shown that individuals that suffer from low self-esteem may compensate by inflicting physical harm onto others.
Some psychologists have seen rage as being internally focused, constituting an attack on one’s self rather than on others.
They believe this leads to rage being more intense, less focused and longer lasting.
They also believe this 'self-inflicted' rage is a narcissistic response to one's past injuries.
Rage, under this set of theories, is caused from built up anger from past traumas.
Rage can also be released in the wake of a traumatic event.
In people who witness the killing of a loved one, many will often enter or "go into a rage", attempting to kill the perpetrator.
This can sometimes be the most violent and reluctant type of rage and will usually end only after the killer or they themselves have been killed. 
 In "The Independent", Ziauddin Sardar, complains of what he sees as Husain's "reductive extremist" activity, first embracing "the extremist cleric Omar Bakri Muhammad, and ... the atrocious Hizb ut-Tahir", and then going in the opposite direction blaming multiculturalism "for the radicalisation of Muslim youth".
He goes on to dismiss Husain's book, saying ""The Islamist" seems to have been drafted by a Whitehall mandarin as a PR job for the Blair government."
Writing in "The Guardian", Madeleine Bunting, argues that "Husain's book will be used in many debates—the future of multiculturalism, whether infringements of civil liberties are necessary to combat terrorism, what parts of Islamist histories from Asia and the Middle East a British Muslim community needs to jettison.
One suspects the naivety which took him into Hizb-ut Tahrir has blinded him as to how his story will be used to buttress positions hostile to many things he holds dear—his own faith and racial tolerance, for example.
A glance at the blog response to a Husain piece in the "Telegraph" reveals how rightwing racism and anti-Islamic sentiment are feasting on his testimony."
A commentary page piece in "The Guardian" by Riazat Butt accused Husain of having been a peripheral character whose association with Islamic groups in Britain occurred over a decade ago.
"He is happy to reinforce stereotypes and justifies this by saying he knows what inspires terrorists—the likely inference being that his book is an educational tool.
But Husain was not a terrorist and his account is dated and misleading.
The groups he mentions, and their "modus operandi", are more fluid and sophisticated now.
Husain provides no new answers and no fresh information.
The activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir and their ilk have been well documented already.
I have to ask why, when his experiences are firmly based in the 1990s, this book is being published now and is being greeted with an adulation that is both embarrassing and unwarranted."
On the Arab Spring, he has said:The Arab world is no longer across the oceans.
It is also on our streets here.
Millions of American citizens are of Arab descent.
Millions more are here as workers and students.
What happens over there matters here.
Can America make these people proud and empower them against Muslim extremists by changing the American story and making us all safer?
Yes, it can.
It must.
Husain advocates American soft power and leadership in modelling democracy.
Countering the US response to the Egyptian military's raiding of NGO offices in 2012, he said:The U.S. government should ask its military allies to return to their barracks and cease killing protesters—and that it should tie these demands to U.S. aid.
...
The Arab revolutionaries did not look to China or Russia for a model of government.
They looked to four-year presidential terms, inspired directly by American democracy.
Islamist leaders such as Tunisia's Mohamed Ghannouchi condemn French secularism but highlight American accommodation of religion as a model of a secular state that is less hostile to religion.
However, Husain argued against U.S. military intervention in Syria, stating:What happens in Syria does not stay in Syria.
... U.S. military intervention in Syria would likely see traditional state actors backing rival groups (Sunnis and Muslim Brotherhood by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, for example, Shia and Alawites by Iran, Druze and Christians by France, a former colonial master, or even indirectly Israel).
Worse, there is a real possibility of the emergence of an al-Qaeda-inspired organization inside Syria to fight "Western imperialism," much like al-Qaeda or the "Sunni insurgency" in Iraq.