Question: How many casualties did the four carriers have?
About the article "Battle of Midway", section "Japanese casualties".

Candidate passages:
The British approach of armoured flight decks was an effective form of passive defence from bombs and kamikaze attacks that actually struck their carriers, but the American carriers primarily relied on fighters to prevent the carriers from being hit in the first place.
RN carriers such as "Ark Royal" or "Illustrious" had far heavier AA outfits than their USN counterparts, up to the introduction of the USN "Essex" class carriers.
"Ark Royal", in 1940, carried 16 x 4.5-inch guns, 32 x 40mm "Pom-pom" and 32 x 0.5 inch against 8 x 5", 16 x 28mm and 24 x .5" for "Enterprise", in 1940.
""In wartime, however, the US Navy found the armoured carriers fascinating.
After having examined HMS Formidable in 1940, the US naval attaché commented that, were he crossing the Pacific, he would prefer her to a Yorktown, the closest US equivalent, on the basis that she might carry fewer aircraft, but she would be much more likely to get there"."
Late in the war when the USN operated many carriers together and had improved radar, their fighter and AA defence was reasonably effective, yet both conventional and kamikaze attacks were still able to penetrate USN defences.
"Bunker Hill" and "Franklin" nearly succumbed in 1945.
The larger air groups (80–110 planes, vs. 52–81 for late war British ships) allowed for a more effective combat air patrol (CAP) without reducing strike capability, improving the protection of the whole battle group and lessening the workload of the carrier escorts.
Carrier fighters were able to shoot down far more kamikaze aircraft than any amount of deck armour would have protected against showing the value of absolute numbers, but in the early war period IJN aircraft had little difficulty in penetrating USN CAPs; near the end of the war, veteran American fighter pilots in superior F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighters were able to defeat the young, inexperienced and ill-trained kamikaze pilots with ease and run up huge kill scores but attackers were still able to get through.
(In addition to larger aircraft complements, the US Navy had larger fleets and more resources, so they could establish destroyer pickets and develop dedicated AAW ships such as the "Atlanta"-class antiaircraft cruisers which would have also drawn attention away from the carriers.)
On the surface, the record seems balanced.
British naval historian D.K.
Brown put the practical difference between American and British design philosophies in no uncertain terms: "More fighters would have been better protection than armour."
but that British designs were good for the circumstances in which they were meant to be used.
Yet, even the "Ark Royal", Britain's newest carrier prior to WW2, never operated close to her theoretical aircraft capacity.
Prior to the development of effective Radar and high speed monoplane fighters, a successful fighter defence was extremely unlikely for any navy thus calling into doubt D.K.
Brown's conclusions.
The benefits of flight deck armour were intended to counter these issues.
Fewer aircraft meant a lower priority to attack than the more heavily armed American carriers and the RN's operational doctrine dictated smaller airgroups, and the armoured hangar carriers had smaller Avgas and ammunition supplies to match.
However, RN carriers carried far more aircraft later in the war, making use of the deck park when they adopted USN style operational doctrine.
The 2nd generation RN armoured carriers, "Indomitable" and the "Implacable" class which had an additional half length lower hangar, were considerably less outmatched by their USN counterparts in the numbers of aircraft operated.
The RN operating in harsher weather protected their aircraft from the elements and did not use a permanent deck park in the earlier part of the war.
US carriers and their fighters shot down more than 1,900 suicide aircraft during "Operation Kikusui" (the last and largest Kamikaze attack in the Okinawa campaign), versus a mere 75 for the British, yet both forces suffered the same number of serious hits (four), on their carriers.
However the kamikazes made 173 strikes against other USN targets and the 4 USN carriers suffered a massive death toll, in contrast to the relatively light casualties on the RN carriers.
The kamikaze threat overall was serious, but allied defences neutralised it, and many kamikaze strikes missed the deck armour entirely, or bounced off the decks of both British or American carriers.
In some cases, kamikazes either struck glancing blows that did only superficial damage that was fixed within minutes or hours, or missed entirely, due to the poor training and poorer flight experience of their pilots.
The majority of kamikazes that did inflict harm caused no more damage than they would have against smaller ships.
After a successful kamikaze hit, the British were able to clear the flight deck and resume flight operations in just hours, while their American counterparts often could do the same, but not always; in some cases repairs took a few days or even months.
The USN liaison officer on commented: "When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at ].
When a kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case of "Sweepers, man your brooms.
"”American carriers of the "Essex" class suffered very high casualties from serious kamikaze hits, though they did survive.
USS "Franklin" was struck by two 250 kg(550 lbs) bombs, one semi-armour piercing (SAP) and one general purpose (GP), both of which penetrated into her hangar and set off ammunition, killing 724 personnel.
USS "Bunker Hill" was severely damaged by pair of kamikaze hits which killed 346 men.
Each of these USN carriers suffered more casualties than all the British RN armoured carriers combined, illustrating the life saving features of RN carrier design.
"Illustrious", which had the highest toll, suffered 126 fatal casualties and 84 wounded when hit by six 1100 lb bombs on 10 January 1941.
The USN studied the superior defensive qualities of Royal Navy armoured carriers and this analysis is partly revealed in the damage report following the attack on "Franklin" on 13 March 1945:The only Allied carrier lost to a deck hit was the American "Independence"-class light carrier, USS "Princeton" (CVL-23).
Indeed, many light and escort carriers were unarmoured, with no protection on the hangar or flight deck, and thus they fared poorly against deck hits. 
British casualties in the campaign were casualties were German casualties were unknown number of troops and carriers deserted on both sides. 
 Civilian casualties, may be far higher, casualties for the Dublin fighting are given as 250, but it is not clear how many of these were killed and how many wounded.  
Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy.
These were the battleships , , and the old battleship (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from "Arizona".
The majority of each battleship's crews survived; there were exceptions as heavy casualties resulted from "Arizona" magazine exploding and the "Oklahoma" capsizing.
Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships , and .
"California" and "West Virginia" had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, resulting in most of their crews being saved.
and suffered relatively light damage, as did , which was in drydock at the time.
Chester Nimitz said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941."
Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach to Pearl Harbor, he would have sortied to meet them.
With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (up to twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately restored to duty.
This was also the reaction of Joseph Rochefort, head of HYPO, when he remarked the attack was cheap at the price.
Many of the surviving battleships were extensively refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5"/51 caliber guns with more useful turreted dual-purpose 5"/38 caliber guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality.
Addition of modern radar to the salvaged vessels would give them a marked qualitative advantage over those of the IJN.
The repaired U.S. battleships primarily provided fire support for amphibious landings.
Their low speed was a liability to their deployment in the vast expanses of the Pacific, for instance they could not accompany the fleet carriers that had become the dominant combatants.
Six of the Standard Type vessels participated in the last battleship versus battleship engagement in naval history, the Battle of Surigao Strait, where none of them were hit.
During active duty, being well protected by escorts and air cover, none of the Pearl Harbor battleships suffered serious damage save for "Pennsylvania" which was permanently crippled by a torpedo in the closing stages of the war. 
The bombing of Darwin on 19 February 1942, was the heaviest single attack mounted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against mainland Australia.
On 19 February, four Japanese aircraft carriers (, , and ) launched a total of 188 aircraft from a position in the Timor Sea.
The four carriers were escorted by four cruisers and nine destroyers.
These 188 naval aircraft inflicted heavy damage on Darwin and sank nine ships.
A raid conducted by 54 land-based bombers later the same day resulted in further damage to the town and RAAF Base Darwin and the destruction of 20 Allied military aircraft.
Allied casualties were 251 killed and between 300 and 400 wounded, the majority of whom were non-Australian Allied sailors.
Only four Japanese aircraft were confirmed to have been destroyed by Darwin's defenders.
The bombing of Darwin was the first of many Japanese naval aviation attacks against targets in Australia.
The carriers , and —which escorted the invasion force dispatched against Port Moresby in May 1942—had the secondary role of attacking Allied bases in northern Queensland once Port Moresby was secured.
These attacks did not occur, however, as the landings at Port Moresby were cancelled when the Japanese carrier force was mauled in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Japanese aircraft made almost 100 raids, most of them small, against northern Australia during 1942 and 1943.
Land-based IJN aircraft took part in many of the 63 raids on Darwin which took place after the initial attack.
The town of Broome, Western Australia experienced a devastating attack by IJN fighter planes on 3 March 1942, in which at least 88 people were killed.
Long-range seaplanes operating from bases in the Solomon Islands made a number of small attacks on towns in Queensland.
Japanese naval aircraft operating from land bases also harassed coastal shipping in Australia's northern waters during 1942 and 1943.
On 15 December 1942, four sailors were killed when the merchant ship "Period" was attacked off Cape Wessel.
The small general purpose vessel was sunk by a Japanese floatplane near the Wessel Islands on 22 January 1943 with the loss of nine sailors and civilians.
Another civilian sailor was killed when the merchant ship "Islander" was attacked by a floatplane during May 1943.