Question: Did the war against Japan hurt the Republicans?
About the article "Cold War", section "Chinese Civil War and SEATO".

Candidate passages:
The Democrats included a strong element that came of age in opposition to the Vietnam War, and remained hostile toward American military interventions.
On August 1, 1990, Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait.
President Bush formed an international coalition and secured UN approval to expel Iraq.
Congress on January 12, 1991 authorized by a narrow margin the use of military force against Iraq, with Republicans in favor and Democrats opposed.
The vote in the House was 250–183, and in the Senate 52-47.
In the Senate 42 Republicans and 10 Democrats voted yes to war, while 45 Democrats and two Republicans voted no.
In the House 164 Republicans and 86 Democrats voted yes, and 179 Democrats, three Republicans and one Independent voted no.
The war, a military operation known as "Desert Storm," was short and successful, but Hussein was allowed to remain in power.
The Arab countries (and Japan) repaid all the American military costs. 
The term originated in the run-up to the War of 1812 with the "War Hawks", who consisted of Democratic-Republicans and mostly were from southern and western states (the American West then consisted of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, as well as territories in the Old Northwest that did not yet have votes in Congress) and the older block of the Congress, encompassing most Republicans.
They advocated war against Britain to protect American shipping from Royal Navy interference, which the War Hawks believed hurt the American economy and injured American prestige.
War Hawks from western and landlocked states also believed that the British were instigating American Indians on the frontier to attack American settlements; the War Hawks therefore urged an invasion of British Canada to punish Britain and end the threat.
Prominent Virginia Congressman John Randolph of Roanoke, a staunch opponent of entry into the war, created the term "War Hawk".
Therefore, no 'official' roster of War Hawks existed: historian Donald Hickey notes, "Scholars differ over who (if anyone) ought to be classified as a War Hawk."
One scholar believes the term "no longer seems appropriate."
Most historians use it to distinguish from the Twelfth Congress about a dozen members whom Speaker of the House Henry Clay of Kentucky led; John C. Calhoun of South Carolina was another notable War Hawk.
Both men became and for decades remained important in American politics.
Among the other men who are traditionally called War Hawks are Richard Mentor Johnson of Kentucky, William Lowndes of South Carolina, Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and William W. Bibb of Georgia.
The older members of the Party, led by United States President James Madison and Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, unsuccessfully tried to defeat the War Hawks movement; they felt that the United States was unprepared for war. 
From 1947 to 1949, when the Republicans controlled the Senate, Taft was his party's leading voice in domestic policy.
He was reluctant to support farm subsidies, a position that hurt the GOP in rural areas (especially in the Midwest) in the 1948 elections.
Taft engineered the passage of the 1949 National Housing Act, which funded slum clearance and the construction of 810,000 units of low-income housing over a period of six years.
It was one of the few Fair Deal proposals of President Truman he liked.
In terms of foreign policy, he was non-interventionist and did not see Stalin's Soviet Union as a major threat.
However he did call David Lilienthal "soft on the subject of Communism".
The true danger, he believed, was big government and runaway spending.
He supported the Truman Doctrine, reluctantly approved the Marshall Plan, and opposed NATO as unnecessary and provocative to the Soviets.
He took the lead among Republicans in condemning President Harry S Truman's handling of the Korean War and questioning the constitutionality of the war itself, saying: "My conclusion, therefore, is that in the case of Korea, where a war was already under way, we had no right to send troops to a nation, with whom we had no treaty, to defend it against attack by another nation, no matter how unprincipled that aggression might be, unless the whole matter was submitted to Congress and a declaration of war or some other direct authority obtained.
"In the wake of the Independence of the State of Israel, Senator Taft was a supporter of the new state, and called to lift the arms embargo to the Middle East, and for the shipment of military aid for the new country. 
War in Sight crisis of 1875.
Between 1873 and 1877, according to Stone (1994), Germany repeatedly acted the bully against France by manipulating the internal affairs of France's neighbors to hurt it.
Nismarck put heavy pressure on Belgium, Spain, and Italy hoping to obtain the election of liberal, anticlerical governments.
His plan was to promote republicanism in France by isolating the clerical-monarchist regime of President MacMahon.
He hoped that ringing France with liberal states would help the French republicans defeat MacMahon and his reactionary supporters.
The bullying almost got out of hand with a brief and war scare in mid-1875.
It was sparked by an editorial entitled "Krieg-in-Sicht" ("War in Sight") in a Berlin newspaper close to the government, the "Post."
It indicated that highly influential Germans were alarmed by France's rapid recovery from defeat in 1875 and its announcement of an increase in the size of its army.
They talked of launching a preventive war against France to hold it down.
Bismarck denied knowing about the article ahead of time, but he certainly knew about the talk of preventive war.
The editorial produced a war scare.
Britain and Russia made it clear they would not tolerate a preventive war against France.
Bismarck did not want any war, either, and the crisis blew over.
It was one of the rare instances when his opponents outmaneuvered and embarrassed Bismarck, but he learned an important lesson.
It forced him to take into account the fear and alarm that his bullying and Germany's fast-growing power was causing among its neighbors.
The crisis reinforced Bismarck's determination that Germany had to work in proactive fashion to preserve the peace in Europe, rather than passively let events take their own course and react to them. 
Within each house of Congress Northern Democrats gave the Civil Rights Act of 1964 more support than did Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats more support than Southern Republicans.
Amongst members of the U.S. House of Representatives who represented congressional districts in the South, more Democrats (seven out of 94 or roughly seven percent) than Republicans (none out of 10) voted for the Act.
Of Northern Democrats in the House, 145 (out of 154 or 94 percent) voted for the Act compared with 138 (out of 162 or 85 percent) Northern Republicans.
All (100 percent) of the 10 Southern Republicans in the U.S. Senate voted against the Act as did most (20 or 95 percent of 21) Southern Democrats.
This pattern of greater support for civil rights coming from Democrats than from Republicans also shows among Northerners: 98 percent (45 out of 46) of Northern Democrats but only 84 percent (27 out of 32) of Republicans supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964.