Question: What effect did the oil crisis of 1973 have on Japan?
About the article "Japan", section "Environment".

Candidate passages:
Since the 1973 oil crisis, energy conservation has been an issue in Japan.
All oil based fuel is imported, so indigenous sustainable energy is being developed.
The Energy Conservation Center promotes energy efficiency in every aspect of Japan.
Public entities are implementing the efficient use of energy for industries and research. 
The 1973 oil crisis started in October 1973, when the members of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or the OAPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus Egypt, Syria and Tunisia) proclaimed an oil embargo.
By the end of the embargo in March 1974, the price of oil had risen from US$3 per barrel to nearly $12.
In the Yom Kippur War of that year, Egypt and Syria, with the support of other Arab nations, launched a military campaign against Israel on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar in order to regain Arab territories lost to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War.
The United States chose to re-supply Israel with arms and in response, OAPEC decided to retaliate, announcing an oil embargo against Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
With the Arab nations' actions seen as initiating the oil embargo and the long-term possibility of high oil prices, disrupted supply, and recession, a strong rift was created within NATO.
Additionally, some European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Arab oil producers had also linked the end of the embargo with successful U.S. efforts to create peace in the Middle East, which complicated the situation.
To address these developments, the Nixon Administration began parallel negotiations with both Arab oil producers to end the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange an Israeli pull back from the Sinai and the Golan Heights .
By January 18, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had negotiated an Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the Sinai.
The promise of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria was sufficient to convince Arab oil producers to lift the embargo in March 1974.
Independently, the OAPEC members agreed to use their leverage over the world price-setting mechanism for oil to stabilize their real incomes by raising world oil prices after the recent failure of negotiations with the major Western oil companies.
The embargo coincided with global increase in petroleum consumption by the industrialized countries targeted by OAPEC, and particularly a sharp increase in oil imports by the world's largest oil consumer, the US.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the targeted countries initiated a wide variety of new, and mostly permanent, policies to contain their further dependency.
The 1973 "oil price shock", along with the 1973–1974 stock market crash, have been regarded as the first event since the Great Depression to have a persistent economic effect.
They were blamed for dramatic price inflation in the period following the crisis, although a minority questions that causal relationship.
The success of the embargo demonstrated the financial clout and international power of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil exporter and a politically and religiously conservative kingdom.
In the Arab world, progressive Arab nationalism was swept aside by an Islamic revival.
Throughout the Muslim world, in the coming years, the greatly increased wealth and international prestige of Saudi Arabia would help the puritanical, conservative "Wahhabi" interpretation of Islam it favored ("petro-Islam") "attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."
Economic and political instability can lead to an energy crisis.
Notable oil crises are the 1973 oil crisis and the 1979 oil crisis.
The advent of peak oil, the point in time when the maximum rate of global petroleum extraction is reached, will likely precipitate another energy crisis. 
The effects of the embargo were immediate.
OPEC forced the oil companies to increase payments drastically.
The price of oil quadrupled by 1974 to nearly US$12 per barrel (75 US$/m3).
This increase in the price of oil had a dramatic effect on oil exporting nations, for the countries of the Middle East who had long been dominated by the industrial powers were seen to have acquired control of a vital commodity.
The traditional flow of capital reversed as the oil exporting nations accumulated vast wealth.
Some of the income was dispensed in the form of aid to other underdeveloped nations whose economies had been caught between higher prices of oil and lower prices for their own export commodities and raw materials amid shrinking Western demand for their goods.
Much was absorbed in massive arms purchases that exacerbated political tensions, particularly in the Middle East.
This control of a vital commodity became known as the "oil weapon", which came in the form of an embargo and cutbacks in oil production from the Arab states to select industrial governments of the world to pressure Israel during the fourth Arab-Israeli War in October 1973.
These target industrial governments included the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands.
In retrospect, the purpose of the embargo, as perceived by these target governments, was to sway their foreign policies concerning Israel towards a more pro-Arab position by threatening to cut off exports of Arab oil, and that in altering their policies the Arab states would respond by again allowing their purchase of more oil.
The Arab states selected their target governments to emplace their embargo, mostly affecting the European Common Market countries and Japan with an eventual 25% oil cut in production.
However, in all five cases there did not appear to be a dramatic change in policy making as envisioned by the Arab states.
In the case of the United States, scholars argue that there already existed a negotiated settlement based on equality between both parties prior to 1973.
Second, Soviet involvement in the Middle East as a threat to becoming another superpower confrontation was of more concern to the United States than the oil weapon.
A third reason, the interest groups and other government agencies that were more concerned with the implications of the oil weapon held little influential power concerning foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of Kissinger's total dominance over this process.
Also within the United States concerning the economic impact at the macro level, direct correlations have been drawn between the rise in oil prices and economic recessions.
"Oil price shocks", referring to disruptions in the production and distribution of oil, that result in the increase of oil prices "have been held responsible for recessions, periods of excessive inflation, reduced productivity, and lower economic growth"The effect of the Arab embargo had a negative influence on the U.S economy through causing immediate demands to address the threats to U.S. energy security.
On an international level, the price increases of petroleum disrupted market systems in changing competitive positions.
At the macro level, economic problems consisted of both inflationary and deflationary impacts of domestic economies.
The Arab embargo left many U.S. companies searching for new ways to develop expensive oil, even in the elements of rugged terrain such as in hostile arctic environments.
The problem that many of these companies faced is that finding oil and developing new oil fields usually require a time lag of 5 to 10 years between the planning process and significant oil production.OPEC-member states in the developing world withheld the prospect of nationalization of the companies' holdings in their countries.
Most notably, the Saudis acquired operating control of Aramco, fully nationalizing it in 1980 under the leadership of Ahmed Zaki Yamani.
As other OPEC nations followed suit, the cartel's income soared.
Saudi Arabia, awash with profits, undertook a series of ambitious five-year development plans, of which the most ambitious, begun in 1980, called for the expenditure of $250 billion.
Other cartel members also undertook major economic development programs.
Meanwhile, the shock produced chaos in the West.
In the United States, the retail price of a gallon of gasoline (petrol) rose from a national average of 38.5 cents in May 1973 to 55.1 cents in June 1974.
State governments requested citizens not put up Christmas lights, with Oregon banning Christmas as well as commercial lighting altogether.
Politicians called for a national gas rationing program.
Nixon requested gasoline stations to voluntarily not sell gasoline on Saturday nights or Sundays; 90% of owners complied, which resulted in lines on weekdays.
The embargo was not uniform across Europe.
Of the nine members of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Netherlands faced a complete embargo, the United Kingdom and France received almost uninterrupted supplies (having refused to allow America to use their airfields and embargoed arms and supplies to both the Arabs and the Israelis), whilst the other six faced only partial cutbacks.
The UK had traditionally been an ally of Israel, and Harold Wilson's government had supported the Israelis during the Six Day War, but his successor, Ted Heath, had reversed this policy in 1970, calling for Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders.
The members of the EEC had been unable to achieve a common policy during the first month of the Yom Kippur War.
The Community finally issued a statement on November 6, after the embargo and price rises had begun; widely seen as pro-Arab, this statement supported the Franco-British line on the war, and OPEC duly lifted its embargo from all members of the EEC.
The price rises had a much greater impact in Europe than the embargo, particularly in the UK (where they combined with strikes by coal miners and railroad workers to cause an energy crisis over the winter of 1973–74, a major factor in the change of government).
The UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Norway banned flying, driving and boating on Sundays.
Sweden rationed gasoline and heating oil.
The Netherlands imposed prison sentences for those who used more than their given ration of electricity.
Ted Heath asked the British to heat only one room in their houses over the winter.
A few months later, the crisis eased.
The embargo was lifted in March 1974 after negotiations at the Washington Oil Summit, but the effects of the energy crisis lingered on throughout the 1970s.
The price of energy continued increasing in the following year, amid the weakening competitive position of the dollar in world markets. 
The 1973 oil crisis is a direct consequence of US production peak in late 1970 beginning 1971 (and shortages especially for heating oil started from there).
The "embargo" as described below is the "practical name" given to the crisis, allowing the US to "lie to itself" or hide its production peak towards its citizens.
For the main Arab producers, the "embargo" allowed to show to "the Arab street" that they were doing something for the Palestinians.
In real market terms (number of barrels) the embargo was almost a non event, and only from a few countries, towards a few countries, see for instance "The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource" by Leonardo Maugeri page 113It should also be noted that the "Embargo" was never effective from Saudi Arabia towards the US, as reported by James Akins in interview at 24:10 in the documentary "la face cachée du pétrole part 2".
James Akins, who audited US capacity for Nixon after US peak, was US ambassador in Saudi Arabia at that time.
In October 1973, the members of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or the OAPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus Egypt and Syria) proclaimed an oil embargo "in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military" during the Yom Kippur war; it lasted until March 1974.
OAPEC declared it would limit or stop oil shipments to the United States and other countries if they supported Israel in the conflict.
With the US actions seen as initiating the oil embargo, the long-term possibility of embargo-related high oil prices, disrupted supply and recession, created a strong rift within NATO; both European countries and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the US Middle East policy.
Arab oil producers had also linked the end of the embargo with successful US efforts to create peace in the Middle East, which complicated the situation.
To address these developments, the Nixon Administration began parallel negotiations with both Arab oil producers to end the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange an Israeli pull back from the Sinai and the Golan Heights after the fighting stopped.
By January 18, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had negotiated an Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the Sinai.
The promise of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria was sufficient to convince Arab oil producers to lift the embargo in March 1974.
By May, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights.
Independently, the OPEC members agreed to use their leverage over the world price-setting mechanism for oil to stabilize their real incomes by raising world oil prices.
This action followed several years of steep income declines after the recent failure of negotiations with the major Western oil companies earlier in the month.
For the most part, industrialized economies relied on crude oil, and OPEC was their major supplier.
Because of the dramatic inflation experienced during this period, a popular economic theory has been that these price increases were to blame, as being suppressive of economic activity.
However, the causality stated by this theory is often questioned.
The targeted countries responded with a wide variety of new, and mostly permanent, initiatives to contain their further dependency.
The 1973 "oil price shock", along with the 1973–1974 stock market crash, have been regarded as the first event since the Great Depression to have a persistent economic effect.