Question: On what date did Britain declare war on Germany following an "unsatisfactory reply" to the British ultimatum that Belgium must be kept neutral?
About the article "World War I", section "July Crisis".

Candidate passages:
The assassination led to a month of diplomatic manoeuvring between Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain which was called the July Crisis.
Believing correctly that Serbian officials (especially the officers of the Black Hand) were involved in the plot, and wanting to finally end Serbian interference in Bosnia, Austria-Hungary delivered to Serbia the July Ultimatum, a series of ten demands intentionally made unacceptable, intending to provoke a war with Serbia.
When Serbia agreed to only eight of the ten demands, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July 1914.
Strachan argues, "Whether an equivocal and early response by Serbia would have made any difference to Austria-Hungary's behaviour must be doubtful.
Franz Ferdinand was not the sort of personality who commanded popularity, and his demise did not cast the empire into deepest mourning".
The Russian Empire, unwilling to allow Austria-Hungary to eliminate its influence in the Balkans, and in support of its longtime Serb protégé, ordered a partial mobilisation one day later, 29 July.
Germany mobilised on 30 July, and Russia responded by declaring a full mobilisation that same day.
Germany imposed an ultimatum on Russia, through its ambassador in Berlin, to demobilise within 12 hours or face war.
Russia responded by offering to negotiate the terms of a demobilisation.
However, Germany refused to negotiate, declaring war against Russia on 1 August 1914.
Germany's war plan, the Schlieffen Plan, relied on a quick, massive invasion of France to eliminate the threat on the West, before turning east against Russia.
Simultaneously with its mobilisation against Russia, therefore, the German government issued demands that France remain neutral.
The French cabinet resisted military pressure to commence immediate mobilisation, and ordered its troops to withdraw from the border to avoid any incident.
Germany attacked Luxembourg on 2 August, and on 3 August declared war on France.
On 4 August, after Belgium refused to permit German troops to cross its borders into France, Germany declared war on Belgium as well.
Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, following an "unsatisfactory reply" to the British ultimatum that Belgium must be kept neutral.
  June 28, 1914: Serbian irredentists assassinate Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
June 28–29: Anti-Serb pogrom in Sarajevo  July 23: Austria-Hungary, following their own secret enquiry, sends an ultimatum to Serbia, containing several very severe demands.
In particular, they gave only forty-eight hours to comply.
Whilst both Great Britain and Russia sympathised with many of the demands, both agreed the timescale was far too short.
Both nevertheless advised Serbia to comply.
July 24: Germany officially declares support for Austria's position.
July 24: Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the British government, asks that Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, "who had no direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace simultaneously."
July 25: The Serbian government replies to Austria, and agrees to most of the demands.
However, certain demands brought into question her survival as an independent nation.
On these points they asked that the Hague Tribunal arbitrate.
July 25: Russia enters a period preparatory to war and mobilization begins on all frontiers.
Government decides on a partial mobilization in principle to begin on July 29.
July 25: Serbia mobilizes its army; responds to Austro-Hungarian démarche with less than full acceptance; Austria-Hungary breaks diplomatic relations with Serbia.
July 26: Serbia reservists accidentally violate Austro-Hungarian border at Temes-Kubin.
July 26: Russia having agreed to stand aside whilst others conferred, a meeting is organised to take place between ambassadors from Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France to discuss the crisis.
Germany declines the invitation.
July 27: Sir Edward Grey meets the German ambassador independently.
A telegram to Berlin after the meeting states, "Other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia ... as long as Germany would work to keep peace I would keep closely in touch."
July 28: Austria-Hungary, having failed to accept Serbia's response of the 25th, declares war on Serbia.
Mobilisation against Serbia begins.
July 29: Russian general mobilization is ordered, and then changed to partial mobilization.
July 29: Sir Edward Grey appeals to Germany to intervene to maintain peace.
July 29: The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, is informed by the German Chancellor that Germany is contemplating war with France, and furthermore, wishes to send its army through Belgium.
He tries to secure Britain's neutrality in such an action.
July 30: Russian general mobilization is reordered at 5:00 P.M.  July 31: Austrian general mobilization is ordered.
July 31: Germany enters a period preparatory to war.
July 31: Germany sends an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that they halt military preparations within twelve hours.
July 31: Both France and Germany are asked by Britain to declare their support for the ongoing neutrality of Belgium.
France agrees to this.
Germany does not respond.
July 31: Gemany asks France, whether it would stay neutral in case of a war Germany vs. Russia  August 1 (3 A.M.): King George V of Great Britain personally telegraphs Tsar Nicholas II of Russia.
August 1: French general mobilization is ordered.
August 1: German general mobilization is ordered.
August 1: Germany declares war against Russia.
August 1: The Tsar responds to the king's telegram, stating, "I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not the German ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war."
August 2: Germany and The Ottoman Empire sign a secret treaty.
entrenching the Ottoman-German Alliance  August 3: Germany, after France declines ("See Note") its demand to remain neutral, declares war on France.
Germany states to Belgium that she would "treat her as an enemy" if she did not allow free passage of German troops across her lands.
August 3: Britain, expecting German naval attack on the northern French coast, states that Britain would give "... all the protection in its powers."
August 4: Germany implements the Alfred von Schlieffen Plan (modified).
August 4 (midnight): Having failed to receive notice from Germany assuring the neutrality of Belgium, Britain declares war on Germany.
August 6: Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
August 23: Japan, honouring the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declares war on Germany.
August 25: Japan declares war on Austria-Hungary.
The chain of events.
"Note: French Prime Minister Rene Viviani merely replied to the German ultimatum that, "France will act in accordance with her interests.""
Had the French agreed to remain neutral, the German Ambassador was authorized to ask the French to temporarily surrender the Fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a guarantee of neutrality. 
Also on 1st August, Germany declared war on Russia.
When presenting his declaration of war, the German Ambassador accidentally gave the Russians both copies of the declaration of war, one which claimed that Russia refused to reply to Germany and the other that said Russia’s replies were unacceptable.
Grey warned Lichnowsky that if Germany invaded Belgium, Britain would go to war.
On August 2, Germany occupied Luxembourg as a preliminary step to the invasion of Belgium and implementation of the Schlieffen Plan.
On August 2nd, the British government promised that the Royal Navy would protect France’s coast from German attack.
The British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey gave Britain's firm assurance of protecting France with its navy to French Ambassador Paul Cambon.
Cambon's account stated: "I felt the battle was won.
Everything was settled.
In truth a great country does not wage war by halves.
Once it decided to fight the war at sea it would necessarily be led into fighting it on land as well."
Within the British Cabinet, the widespread feeling that Germany would soon violate Belgium’s neutrality and destroy France as a power led to the increasing acceptance that Britain would be forced to intervene.
A German ultimatum was delivered, this time to Belgium on August 2, requesting free passage for the German army on the way to France.
King Albert of Belgium refused the German request to violate his country’s neutrality.
On August 3, Germany declared war on France, and on Belgium on August 4.
This act violated Belgian neutrality, the status to which Germany, France, and Britain were all committed by treaty.
It was inconceivable that Great Britain would remain neutral if Germany declared war on France; German violation of Belgian neutrality provided the "casus belli".
Later on August 4, German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg told the Reichstag that the German invasions of Belgium and Luxembourg were in violation of international law, but he argued that Germany was "in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law."
At 7 PM that evening British Ambassador Sir Edward Goschen delivered Britain's ultimatum to German Secretary of State to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow, demanding a commitment by midnight that evening (within five hours) to go no further with Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality.
Jagow rejected the British ultimatum and Goschen demanded his passports and requested a private and personal meeting with Bethmann Hollweg; Bethmann invited Goschen to dine with him.
During their highly emotional conversation Bethmann Hollweg expressed astonishment that the British would go to war with Germany over the 1839 treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, referring to the treaty as a "scrap of paper" compared to the "fearful fact of Anglo-German war."
The unified opposition shown in Britain was in fact motivated by long-term strains of liberal and conservative thought, with the desire to protect small nations and the balance of power in Europe, respectively, a factor in coming to the government's decision.
Goschen's telegrams on August 4 to Grey never reached London.
Whether a state of war existed between Britain and Germany was therefore a confused matter until the expiry of the ultimatum at midnight, Berlin time.
Goschen's account of the "scrap of paper" conversation dated August 6 was later edited and published by the British Government and outraged public opinion in Britain and the United States.
The British government expected a limited conflict of rapid movement on the battlefield like the Franco-Prussian War, in which the UK would primarily use its great naval strength.
At the outbreak of the war, Wilhelm is reported to have said: "To think that George and Nicky should have played me false!
If my grandmother had been alive, she would never have allowed it."
On July 7, on his return to Vienna Count Hoyos reported to Austro-Hungarian Crown Council that Austria had Germany’s full support even if “measures against Serbia should bring about a big war”.
At the Crown Council, Berchtold strongly urged that a war against Serbia be begun as soon as possible.
At that meeting of the Crown Council, all involved were in full favour of war except Count Tisza.
Count Tisza warned that any attack on Serbia “would, as far as can humanly be foreseen, lead to an intervention by Russia and hence a world war”.
The rest of the participants debated about whether Austria should just launch an unprovoked attack or issue an ultimatum to Serbia with demands so stringent that it was bound to be rejected.
The Austrian Prime Minister Count Karl von Stürgkh warned Tisza that if Austria did not launch a war, its “policy of hesitation and weakness” would cause Germany to abandon Austria-Hungary as an ally.
All present except Tisza finally agreed that Austria-Hungary should present an ultimatum designed to be rejected.
Starting on July 7, the German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, Tschirschky, and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Berchtold held almost daily meetings about how to co-ordinate the diplomatic action to justify a war against Serbia.
On July 8, Tschirschky presented Berchtold with a message from Wilhelm who declared he “stated most emphatically that Berlin expected the Monarchy to act against Serbia, and that Germany would not understand it, if...the present opportunity were allowed to go by...without a blow struck”.
At the same meeting, Tschirschky told Berchtold, “if we [Austria-Hungary] compromised or bargained with Serbia, Germany would interpret this as a confession of weakness, which could not be without effect on our position in the Triple Alliance and on Germany’s future policy”.
On July 7, Bethmann Hollweg told his aide and close friend Kurt Riezler that “An action against Serbia can lead to a world war”.
Bethmann Hollweg felt such a “leap in the dark” was justified by the international situation.
Bethmann Hollweg told Riezler that Germany was “completely paralysed” and that “The future belongs to Russia which is growing and growing, and is becoming an ever increasing nightmare to us”.
Riezler went to write in his diary that Bethmann Hollweg painted a “devastating picture” with Russia building rail-roads in Congress Poland that allow Russia to mobilize faster once the Great Military Programme was finished in 1917, and that an Austro-Serbian war would probably cause a world war, “...which would lead to an overthrow of the existing order”, but since the “existing order was lifeless and void of ideas”, such a war could only be welcomed as a blessing to Germany.
Bethmann Hollweg's fears about Russia led him to credit Anglo-Russian naval talks in May 1914 as the beginning of an “encirclement” policy against Germany that could only be broken through war.
After Anglo-French naval talks had taken place, the Russians demanded the same courtesy be extended to them, which led to inconclusive Anglo-Russian naval talks.
On July 8th, Tisza told another meeting of the Crown Council that any attack on Serbia was bound to lead to “intervention by Russia and consequently world war”.
On the same day, Kurt Riezler’s diary has his friend Bethmann Hollweg saying: “If the war comes from the East, so that we are marching to Austria-Hungary’s aid instead of Austria-Hungary to ours, then we have a chance of winning it.
If war does not come, if the Czar does not want it or France dismayed, counsels peace, then we still have a chance of maneuvering the Entente apart over this action”.
On July 9th, Berchtold advised Franz Joseph I of Austria that he would present Belgrade with an ultimatum containing demands that were designed to be rejected, which would have ensured a war without the “odium of attacking Serbia without warning, put her in the wrong” and ensured that Britain and Romania would remain neutral.
On July 10th, Berchtold told Tschirschky he would present the Serbs with an ultimatum containing “unacceptable demands” as the best way of causing war, but “chief care” would be taken about how to present these “unacceptable demands”.
In response, Wilhelm wrote angrily on the margins of Tschirschky’s dispatch “They had time enough for that!”It took a week from July 7–14 for Tisza to be persuaded to support the war against Serbia.
On July 9, Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London was told by the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that he “...saw no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation”.
Despite Tisza's opposition, Berchtold had ordered his officials to start drafting an ultimatum to Serbia on July 10th.
The German Ambassador reported that “Count Berchtold appeared to hope that Serbia would not agree to the Austro-Hungarian demands, as a mere diplomatic victory would put the country here again in a stagnant mood”.
Count Hoyos told a German diplomat “that the demands were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them”.
On July 11, Tschirschky reported to the German Foreign Minister von Jagow that he “again took the occasion to discuss with Berchtold what action was to be taken against Serbia, chiefly in order to assure the minister once again, emphatically that speedy action was called for.” On the same day, the German Foreign Office wanted to know if they should send a telegram congratulating King Peter of Serbia on his birthday.
Wilhelm replied: “As Vienna has so far inaugurated no action of any sort against Belgrade, the omission of the customary telegram would be too noticeable and might be the cause of premature uneasiness...
It should be sent.” On July 12, Szögyény reported from Berlin that everyone in the German government wanted to see Austria-Hungary declare war on Serbia at once, and were tired of Austrian indecision about whether to choose war or peace.
He added that this: “"absolute" insistence on a war against Serbia was based on the two considerations already mentioned; firstly that Russia and France were ‘not yet ready’ and secondly that Britain will not at this juncture intervene in a war which breaks out over a Balkan state, even if this should lead to a conflict with Russia, possibly also France... Not only have Anglo-German relations so improved that Germany feels that she need no longer feel fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain, but above all, Britain at this moment is anything but anxious for war, and has no wish whatever to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Serbia, or in the last instance, Russia...
In general, then, it appears from all this that the political constellation is as favourable for us as it could possibly be.”.
On July 12, Berchtold had shown Tschirschky the contents of his ultimatum containing “unacceptable demands”, and promised to present it to the Serbs after the Franco-Russian summit between President Poincaré and Nicholas II was over.
Wilhelm wrote on the margins of Tschirschky’s dispatch “What a pity!” that the ultimatum would be presented so late in July.
By July 14, Tisza agreed to support war out of fears that a policy of peace would lead to Germany renouncing the Dual Alliance of 1879.
On that day, Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Austria-Hungary would present an ultimatum “which would almost certainly be rejected and should result in war”.
That same day, Jagow sent instructions to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, stating Germany had decided to do everything within its power to cause an Austro-Serbian war, but Germany must avoid the impression “that we were egging Austria on to war.
Jagow described a war against Serbia as Austria-Hungary's last chance at “political rehabilitation”.
He stated that under no circumstances did he want a peaceful solution, and though he did not want a preventive war, he would not “jib at the post” if such a war came because Germany was ready for it, and Russia “fundamentally was not”.
Russia and Germany being destined to fight each other, Jagow believed that now was the best time for the inevitable war, because: “in a few years Russia...will be ready.
Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers, and she will have her Baltic Fleet and her strategic railroads ready.
Our group meanwhile is getting weaker”.
Jagow's belief that the summer of 1914 was the best time for Germany to go to war was widely shared in the German government.
Many German officials believed that the “Teuton race” and “Slav race” were destined to fight each other in a terrible “race war” for the domination of Europe, and that now was the best time for such a war to come.
The Chief of the German General Staff, Moltke, told Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian Minister in Berlin, that “a moment so favourable from the military point of view might never occur again”.
Moltke argued that due to the alleged superiority of German weaponry and training, combined with the recent change in the French Army from a two-year to a three-year period of service, Germany could easily defeat both France and Russia in 1914.
On July 13, the Austrian investigators of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand reported to Count Berchtold that: “There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Serbian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparations, or the furnishing of weapons.
On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this altogether out of the question.” This report depressed Berchtold as it meant there was little evidence to support his pretext of Serbian government involvement in Franz Ferdinand’s assassination.
On July 14, the Austrians assured the Germans that the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia "is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is "practically excluded"".
That same day, Conrad told Berchtold that because of his desire to get the summer harvest in, the earliest that Austria could declare war was July 25th.
At the same time, the visit of the French President and Premier to St. Petersburg might that it was considered undesirable to present the ultimatum until the visit was over.
The ultimatum, officially called a demarche, would not be delivered until July 23rd with an expiry date of July 25th.
On July 16, Bethmann Hollweg told Count Roedern, the State Secretary for Alsace-Lorraine, that he couldn't care less about Serbia or alleged Serbian complicity in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.
All that mattered was that Austria attack Serbia that summer, to result in a win-win situation for Germany.
If Bethmann Hollweg's view was correct, an Austro-Serbian war would either cause a general war (which Bethmann Hollweg believed Germany would win) or cause the Triple Entente to break up.
That same day, the Russian Ambassador to Austria-Hungary reported to St. Petersburg that, “Information reaches me that the Austro-Hungarian government at the conclusion of the inquiry intends to make certain demands on Belgrade...
It would seem to me desirable that at the present moment, before a final decision on the matter, the Vienna Cabinet should be informed how Russia would react to the fact of Austria's presenting demands to Serbia such as would be unacceptable to the dignity of that state”.
The Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg falsely told the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov, that Austria was not planning on any measure that might cause a war in the Balkans, so no Russian complaints were made.
On July 17, Berchtold complained to Prince Stolberg of the German Embassy that though he thought his ultimatum would probably be rejected, he was still worried that it was possible for the Serbs to accept it, and wanted more time to re-phrase the document.
Stolberg reported back to Berlin that he had told Berchtold:“If Austria really wants to clear up her relationship with Serbia once and for all, which Tisza himself in his recent speech called ‘indispensable’, then it would pass comprehension why such demands were not being made as would make the breach unavoidable.
If the action simply peters out, once again, and ends with a so-called diplomatic success, the belief which is already widely held there that the Monarchy is no longer capable of vigorous action will be dangerously strengthened.
The consequences, internal and external, which would result from this, inside Austria and abroad, are obvious.” On July 18th, to reassure Stolberg, Count Hoyos promised him that the demands in the draft text of the ultimatum “were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them".
The same day, in response to rumours about an Austrian ultimatum, the Serbian Prime Minister Pašić stated that he would not accept any measures compromising on Serbian sovereignty.
On July 18, Hans Schoen, a Bavarian diplomat in Berlin, told the Bavarian Prime Minister Count Georg von Hertling that Austria was only making a pretence “of being peacefully inclined”.
Commenting on the draft text of the ultimatum shown to him by German diplomats, Schoen noted that: “It is perfectly plain that Serbia cannot accept any such demands, which are incompatible with her dignity as a sovereign state.
Thus the result would be war.”Zimmermann told Schoen that a powerful and successful move against Serbia would save Austria-Hungary from internal disintegration, and that was why Germany had given Austria “a blank power of full authority, even at the risk of a war with Russia”.
On July 19th, the Crown Council in Vienna finally decided upon the wording of the ultimatum to be presented to Serbia on July 23rd.
The extent of German influence on Austria-Hungary was evident when Jagow ordered Berchtold to hold back the delivery of the ultimatum by an hour to make sure that the French President and Premier were at sea after their summit in St. Petersburg.
The first draft of the ultimatum had been shown to the German Embassy in Vienna on July 12th, and the final text was provided in advance to the German Embassy on July 22nd.
Because of the Austrian delay in writing the ultimatum, the element of surprise that Germany had counted upon in the war against Serbia was lost.
Instead, the strategy of “localization” was adopted, which meant that when the Austro-Serbian war began, Germany would pressure other powers not to become involved even at the risk of war.
On July 19th, Jagow published a note in the semi-official North German Gazette warning other powers “that the settlement of differences which may arise between Austria-Hungary and Serbia should remain localized”.
Asked by Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador to Germany, how he knew about the contents of the Austrian ultimatum as he had revealed in the North German Gazette, Gottlieb von Jagow pretended to be ignorant of it.
Sir Horace Rumbold of the British Embassy in Berlin reported: “We do not know the facts.
The German government clearly do know.
They know what the Austrian government is going to demand...and I think we may say with some assurance that they had expressed approval of those demands and promised support should dangerous complications ensure...the German government did not believe that there is any danger of war.”Though Jagow’s pretence was not widely believed, it was still believed at this time that Germany was aiming for peace, and could restrain Austria.
General Moltke of the German General Staff again strongly approved of the idea of an Austrian attack on Serbia as the best way of bringing about the desired world war.
On July 20th, the German government informed the directors of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hamburg America Line shipping companies that Austria would soon present an ultimatum that might cause a general European war, and they should start withdrawing their ships from foreign waters back to the Reich at once.
That same day, the German Navy was ordered to start concentrating the High Seas Fleet, in case of a general war.
Riezler’s diary has Bethmann Hollweg saying to him on July 20th that Russia with its “growing demands and tremendous dynamic power would be impossible to repel in a few years, especially if the present European constellation continues to exist.” Riezler ended his diary with noting that Bethmann Hollweg was “determined and taciturn”, and quoted his former Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Waechter who “had always said we must fight”.
On July 21st, the German government told Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, and Bronewski, the Russian chargé d'affaires, that the German Reich had no knowledge of what Austrian policy was towards Serbia.
In private, Zimmermann wrote that the German government “entirely agreed that Austria must take advantage of the favourable moment, even at the risk of further complications”, but that he doubted “whether Vienna would nerve herself to act”.
Zimmermann ended his memo that “he gathered that Vienna, timid and undecided as it always was, was almost sorry” that Germany had given the “blank cheque” of July 5th, 1914 instead of advising restraint with Serbia.
Conrad himself was pressuring the Dual Monarchy for “haste” in starting a war, in order to prevent Serbia from “smelling a rat and herself volunteering compensation, perhaps under pressure from France and Russia”.
On July 22nd, Germany refused an Austrian request to have the German Minister in Belgrade present the ultimatum to Serbia because as Jagow had said, it would look too much “as though we were egging Austria on to make war”.
On July 23rd, the whole German military and political leadership ostentatiously went on vacation.
Count Schoen, the Bavarian chargé d'affaires in Berlin reported to Munich: “The administration will, immediately upon the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade, initiate diplomatic action with the Powers,in the interest of the localization of the war.
It will claim that that Austrian action has been just of much of a surprise to it as to the other Powers, pointing out the fact that the Emperor is on his northern journey, and that the Prussian Minister of War, as well as the Chief of the Grand General Staff are away on leave of absence.”However, on July 19th—four days before the ultimatum was presented—Jagow had asked all German Ambassadors the world over (except for Austria-Hungary) to state to their host governments that: “If the Austro-Hungarian government is not going to abdicate forever as a great power, she has no choice but to enforce acceptance by the Serbian government of her demands by strong pressure and, if necessary, by resort to military measures.”Subsequently, Jagow realized that his statement was incompatible with his claims of ignorance, thus leading to a hasty second dispatch claiming total ignorance of the Austrian ultimatum, but threatening “incalculable consequences” if any power tried to stop Austria-Hungary from attacking Serbia if the ultimatum were rejected.
When Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg reported that the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov warned him that Germany “must reckon with Europe” if she supported an Austrian attack against Serbia, Wilhelm wrote on the margin of Pourtalès’s dispatch “No!
Russia, yes!”In supporting an Austrian war with Serbia, Germany’s leaders knew the risks of a general war.
As the historian Fritz Fischer pointed out, this could be proven by Jagow’s request to know the full itinerary of Wilhelm’s North Sea cruise before the Austrian ultimatum was presented because: “Since we went to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia, we must not have the world alarmed by His Majesty’s returning prematurely; on the other hand, His Majesty must be within reach, in case unpredictable developments should force us to take important decisions, such as mobilization.
His Majesty might perhaps spend the last days of his cruise in the Baltic”.
On July 22nd, before the ultimatum was delivered, the Austrian government asked that the German government deliver the Austrian declaration of war when the ultimatum expired on July 25th.
Jagow refused stating that “Our standpoint has to be that the quarrel with Serbia is an Austro-Hungarian internal affair.” On the other hand, this refusal by Germany to present the ultimatum could be seen as Germany remaining as independent as it could with regards to encouraging a world war at this point.
On July 23, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, presented the ultimatum to the Serbian government.
At the same time, and having a strong expectation of Serbian rejection, the Austrian Army opened its war book, and began preparations for hostilities. 
On July 23, the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey made a mediation offer with a promise that his government would attempt to influence Russia to influence Serbia, and Germany to influence Austria-Hungary as the best way of stopping a general war.
Wilhelm wrote on the margins of Lichnowsky’s dispatch containing Grey’s offer that Britain’s “condescending orders” were to be totally rejected, and Austria-Hungary would not retract any of its “impossible demands” on Serbia.
He continued: “Am I to do that?
Wouldn’t think of it!
What does he mean by ‘impossible’?” Jagow ordered Lichnowsky to tell Grey of the supposed German ignorance of the Austrian ultimatum, and that Germany regarded Austro-Serbian relations as “...an internal affair of Austria-Hungary, in which we had no standing to intervene.” Jagow’s statement did much to discredit Germany in British eyes.
Lichnowsky reported to Berlin “If we do not join the mediation, all faith here in us and in our love of peace will be shattered.”At the same time, Grey met with opposition from the Russian Ambassador who warned that a conference with Germany, Italy, France, and Britain serving as the mediators between Austria and Russia would break apart the informal Triple Entente.
Sazonov accepted Grey’s proposal for a conference despite his reservations about the dangers of splitting the Triple Entente, Grey wrote to Sazonov that: “I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel.
If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.”Starting on the 23rd, all of Germany’s leaders returned secretly to Berlin to deal with the crisis they had in large part initiated.
A division emerged at various meetings of the "Reich"’s leadership between those led by the Chancellor who wanted to see what would happen following an Austrian attack on Serbia, and the military led by Moltke and Falkenhayn, who urged that Germany immediately follow up an Austrian attack on Serbia with a German attack on Russia.
Moltke repeatedly stated 1914 was the best time for starting a “preventive war” from the German point of view, or the Russian Great Military Programme would finish by 1917, making Germany unable to ever again risk a war.
Moltke added that Russian mobilization was regarded as an opportunity to be sought rather than as a sort of threat, as it would allow Germany to go to war while presenting it as forced on Germany.
The German military attaché in Russia reported that Russian preparations for mobilization were on a much smaller scale than was expected.
Though Moltke at first argued that Germany should wait for Russia to mobilize before beginning the “preventive war”, by the end of the week he urged that Germany should launch it anyway.
In Moltke’s view, in order to invade France successfully, Germany would need to seize the Belgian fortress of Liège by surprise.
The longer the diplomatic action continued, the less likely Moltke thought that Liège could be stormed by surprise, and if Liège was not taken, then the entire Schlieffen Plan would be unhinged.
On July 24, Zimmermann sent out a dispatch to all German ambassadors (except for Austria-Hungary) telling them to inform their host governments that Germany had no advance knowledge whatsoever of the ultimatum.
That same day, Grey, who was worried by the aggressive tone of the ultimatum (which he felt seemed designed to be rejected), warned Lichnowsky of the dangers of “European war "a quatre"” (involving Russia, Austria, France and Germany) if Austrian troops entered Serbia.
Grey suggested mediation between Italy, France, Germany, and Britain as the best way of stopping an Austro-Serbian war.
Jagow sabotaged Grey’s offer by waiting until after the ultimatum had expired before passing on the British offer.
Jagow pretended that “We exercised no influence of any kind with regard to the contents of the note Austrian ultimatum”, and that Germany “was unable to counsel Vienna to retract” because that would humiliate Austria too much.
The Russian Ambassador to the Court of St. James warned Prince Lichnowsky that “Only a government that wanted war could possibly write such a note Austrian ultimatum.” Upon reading an account of a meeting in which Count Berchtold informed the Russian Ambassador of his country’s peaceful intentions towards Russia, Wilhelm wrote on the margin “absolutely superfluous!” and called Berchtold an “Ass!”Also on the 24th, when Count Berchtold met with the Russian chargé d'affaires, this prompted furious complaints from Berlin who warned that Austria should not engage in any sort of talks with any of the other powers in case a compromise might be worked out.
That same day, Wilhelm wrote on the margin of a dispatch from Count Tschirschky, calling Austria-Hungary “weak” for not being aggressive enough in the Balkans, and writing that alteration in the power in the Balkans “has got to come.
Austria must become predominant in the Balkans as compared to the little ones, and at Russia’s expense.” Count Szögyény reported to Vienna that “here, it is generally taken for granted that if Serbia rejects our demands, "we shall at once reply by declaring war", and opening military operations.
We are advised...to confront the world with a "fait accompli" (emphasis in the original).” When the German ambassador in Belgrade reported how sad the Serbian people were with being faced with the choice of either war or national humiliation, Wilhelm wrote on the margins of the report: “Bravo!
One would not have believed it of the Viennese!...
How hollow the whole Serbian power is proving itself to be; thus, it is seen to be with all the Slav nations!
Just tread hard on the heels of that rabble!”On the 24th, the Serbian government, expecting an Austrian declaration of war on the 25th, mobilized while Austria broke diplomatic relations.
The British Ambassador to Austria-Hungary reported to London: “War is thought imminent.
Wildest enthusiasm prevails in Vienna.” Asquith wrote in a letter to Venetia Stanley that he was worried that:“Russia is trying to drag us in.
The news this morning is that Serbia had capitulated on the main points, but it is very doubtful if any reservations will be accepted by Austria, who is resolved upon a complete and final humiliation.
The curious thing is that on many, if not most of the points, Austria has a good and Serbia a very bad case.
But the Austrians are quite the stupidest people in Europe (as the Italians are the most perfidious), and there is a brutality about their mode of procedure, which will make most people think that is a case of a big Power wantonly bullying a little one.
Anyhow, it is the most dangerous situation of the last 40 years.” In order to stop a war, the Permanent Secretary of the British Foreign Office, Sir Arthur Nicolson, suggested again that a conference be held in London chaired by Britain, Germany, Italy and France to resolve the dispute between Austria and Serbia.
The 24th was the real beginning of the July Crisis.
Until that point, the vast majority of the people in the world were ignorant of the machinations of the leaders in Berlin and Vienna, and there was no sense of crisis.
A case in point was the British Cabinet, which had not discussed foreign affairs at all until the 24th of July.
On July 25, the Emperor Franz Joseph signed a mobilization order for 8 army corps to begin operations against Serbia on the 28th, and the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Giesl left Belgrade.
The Russian General Staff ordered the “Period Preparatory to War”, the first steps to mobilization if need occurred, while the caretaker government in Paris cancelled all leave for French troops as of the 26th, and ordered the majority of French troops in Morocco to begin returning to France.
On July 25, Grey suggested again that Germany inform Austria that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum was “satisfactory”.
Jagow passed on Grey’s offer to Vienna without comment, which in the parlance of diplomacy is an unofficial way of advising rejection.
At the same day, Jagow told the reporter Theodor Wolff that in his opinion “neither London, nor Paris, nor St. Petersburg wants a war”.
On the same day, Russia announced that it could not remain “uninterested” if Austria attacked Serbia.
Both the French and Russian ambassadors rejected four-power mediation, and instead proposed direct talks between Belgrade and Vienna.
Jagow accepted the Franco-Russian offer as it offered the best chance to sever Britain from France and Russia.
In his talks with Prince Lichnowsky, Grey drew a sharp distinction between an Austro-Serbian war, which did not concern Britain and an Austro-Russian war, which did.
Grey added that Britain was not working in concord with France and Russia, which heightened Jagow’s hopes of severing Britain from the Triple Entente.
On the same day, Jagow sent another message to Vienna to encourage the Austrians to hurry up with declaring war on Serbia.
On July 26, Count Berchtold rejected Grey’s mediation offer, and wrote that if a localization should not prove possible, then the Dual Monarchy was counting, “with gratitude”, on Germany's support “if a struggle against another adversary is forced on us”.
That same day, General von Moltke sent a message to Belgium demanding that German troops be allowed to pass through that kingdom “in the event of an imminent war against France and Russia”.
Bethmann Hollweg in a message to the German Ambassadors in London, Paris and St. Petersburg stated that the principal aim of German foreign policy now was to make it appear that Russia had forced Germany into a war, in order to keep Britain neutral and ensure that German public opinion would back the war effort.
Bethmann Hollweg advised Wilhelm to send Nicholas a telegram, which he assured the Emperor was for public relations purposes only.
As Bethmann Hollweg put it, “If war should come after all, such a telegram would make Russia’s guilt glaringly plain”.
Moltke visited the German Foreign Ministry to advise Jagow that Germany should start drafting an ultimatum to justify an invasion of Belgium.
Later, Moltke met with Bethmann Hollweg, and told his wife later that same day that he had informed the Chancellor he was “very dissatisfied” that Germany had not yet attacked Russia.
On July 26, in St. Petersburg, the German Ambassador von Pourtalès told Sazonov to reject Grey’s offer of a summit in London, stating that the proposed conference was “too unwieldy”, and if Russia were serious about saving the peace, they would negotiate directly with the Austrians.
Sazonov replied that he was willing to see Serbia accept almost all of the Austrian demands, and following von Pourtalès’s advice, rejected Grey’s conference proposal in favour of direct talks with the Austrians.
Von Pourtalès reported to Germany that Sazonov was being “more conciliatory”, seeking “to find a bridge...to satisfy... Austrian demands” and willing to do almost anything to save the peace.
At the same time, von Pourtalès warned that changes in the Balkan balance of power would be regarded as a highly unfriendly act by Russia.
The following Austro-Russian talks were sabotaged by Austria’s refusal to abandon any of the demands on Serbia As a preparatory move in case a war did break out, and Britain were to become involved, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, ordered the British fleet not to disperse as planned, arguing that news of the British move might serve as a deterrent to war, and thus help persuade Germany to put pressure on Austria to abandon some of the more outrageous demands in their ultimatum.
Grey stated that a compromise solution could be worked out if Germany and Britain were to work together.
His approach generated opposition from British officials, who felt the Germans were dealing with the crisis in bad faith.
Nicolson warned Grey that in his opinion “Berlin is playing with us”.
Grey for his part, rejected Nicolson's assessment, and believed that Germany was interested in stopping a general war.
Philippe Berthelot, the political director of the Quai d’Orsay told Wilhelm von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris that “to my simple mind Germany’s attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war”.
In Vienna, a dispute began between Conrad and Berchtold about when Austria should begin operations.
Their conversation ran as follows:Berchtold: “We should like to deliver the declaration of war on Serbia as soon as possible so as to put an end to diverse influences.
When do you want the declaration of war?Conrad: Only when we have progressed far enough for operations to begin immediately—on approximately August 12th.
Berchtold: “The diplomatic situation will not hold as long as that.”On July 27th, Grey sent another peace proposal through Prince Lichnowsky asking for Germany to use its influence on Austria-Hungary to save the peace.
Grey warned Lichnowsky that if Austria continued with its aggression against Serbia, and Germany with its policy of supporting Austria, then Britain would have no other choice but to side with France and Russia.
The French Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador in Paris, von Schoen, that France was anxious to find a peaceful solution, and was prepared to do his utmost with his influence in St. Petersburg if Germany should “counsel moderation in Vienna, since Serbia had fulfilled nearly every point”.
On the 27th, Wilhelm ended his cruise in the North Sea and returned to Germany.
Wilhelm landed at Cuxhaven (Kiel) departing on July 25 at 6PM over the objections of his chancellor.
The next afternoon, the order to disperse the British Fleet and dismiss British reservists was rescinded, putting the British Navy on a war footing.
Later, on July 27th, Austria-Hungary started to complete the preparations for war.
That same day, Jagow informed Szögyény that he was only pretending to take up the British offers of mediation in order to ensure British neutrality, but had no intention of stopping the war.
Szögyény reported “in order to avoid a misunderstanding” that Jagow had promised him that: “the German government assured Austria in the most binding fashion that it in no way identifies itself with the proposal mediation offer which may very shortly be brought to Your Excellency’s [ Berchtold ] notice by the German government: it is, on the contrary "decidedly" opposed to consideration of them, and is only passing them on out of deference to the British request” (emphasis in the original).
Jagow went on to state he was “absolutely against taking account of the British wish”, because “the German government point of view was that it was at the moment of the highest importance to prevent Britain from making common cause with Russia and France.
We must therefore avoid any action which might cut the line, which has so far worked so well, between Germany and Britain”.
Szögyény ended his telegram that “If Germany candidly told Sir E. Grey that it refused to communicate England’s peace plan, that objective British neutrality in the coming war might not be achieved.” Bethmann Hollweg, in a message to Prince Tschirschky, wrote on the 27th of July: “As we have already rejected one British proposal for a conference, it is not possible for us to refuse this suggestion also "a limine".
If we rejected every attempt at mediation, the whole world would hold us responsible for the conflagration and represent us as the real war-mongers.
That would also make our position impossible here in Germany, where we have got to appear as though the war had been forced on us.
Our position is the more difficult because Serbia seems to have given way very extensively.
We cannot therefore reject the role of mediator; we have to pass on the British proposal to Vienna for consideration, especially since London and Paris are continuously using their influence on St. Petersburg.” In passing on Grey’s message, Bethmann Hollweg deleted the last line which read: ”Also, the whole world here is convinced, and I hear from my colleagues that the key to the situation lies in Berlin, and that if Berlin seriously wants peace, it will prevent Vienna from following a foolhardy policy.” In his reply to London, Bethmann Hollweg pretended that: “We have immediately initiated mediation in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey.” Jagow sent Grey’s offer to Tschirschky, his ambassador in Vienna, but ordered him to not show it to any Austrian official in case they might accept it.
At the same time, Bethmann Hollweg sent a distorted account of Grey’s offer to Wilhelm.
In London, Grey told a meeting of the British Cabinet that they now had to decide whether to choose neutrality if war did come, or to enter the conflict.
While the Cabinet was still undecided about what course to choose, Churchill put the British fleet on alert.
His order read: "Secret.
European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente by no means impossible.
This is "not" the Warning Telegram, but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men of war... Measure is purely precautionary.” The Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Count Nikolaus Szécsen von Temerin, reported to Vienna: “The far-reaching compliance of Serbia, which was not regarded as possible here, has made a strong impression.
Our attitude gives rise to the opinion that we want war at any price.” A Russian diplomat in London criticized Grey for putting too much faith in Germany as a force for peace.
The British were warned that “War is inevitable and by the fault of England; that if England had at once declared her solidarity with Russia and France and her intention to fight if necessary, Germany and Austria would have hesitated.” In Berlin, Admiral von Müller wrote in his diary that “Germany should remain calm to allow Russia to put herself in the wrong, but then not to shrink from war if it were inevitable.” Bethmann Hollweg told Wilhelm that “In all events Russia must ruthlessly be put in the wrong.”On July 28th at 11.49 AM, Prince Lichnowsky sent the fourth British offer of mediation, this time from King George V as well as Grey.
Lichnowsky wrote that the King desired that “British-German joint participation, with the assistance of France and Italy, may be successful in mastering in the interest of peace the present extremely serious situation.” At 4.25 PM on July 28th, Lichnowsky reported to Berlin that “since appearance of Austrian demands nobody here believes in possibility of localizing conflict.” The Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Arthur Nicolson and the Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell saw Grey's conference offer as “the only possibility of avoiding a general war” and hoped "to get full satisfaction for Austria, as Serbia would be more apt to give in to the pressure of the Powers and to submit to their united will than to the threats of Austria”.
Tyrrell relayed Grey's view that if Serbia were invaded, “world war would be inevitable”.
Lichnowsky in his dispatch to Berlin offered "an urgent warning against believing any further in the possibility of localization the conflict”.
When Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, presented Grey’s conference proposal to Jagow, the Germans totally rejected the offer.
In a letter to Grey, Bethmann Hollweg stated that Germany “could not summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia”.
Austrian troops began to concentrate in Bosnia as a preparatory step towards invading Serbia.
Falkenhayn told the German government “It has now been decided to fight the matter through, regardless of the cost”, and advised Bethmann Hollweg to order a German attack on Russia and France at once.
Moltke supported Falkenhayn by submitting the assessment that 1914 was a “singularly favourable situation” for Germany to go to war as both Russia and France were not prepared whereas Germany was.
Once the Russian Great Military Programme would be completed by 1917, Moltke stated that Germany would never be able to entertain the prospect of a victorious war again, and so should destroy both France and Russia while it was still possible.
Moltke ended his assessment that “We shall never hit it again so well as we do now.” Jagow backed up Moltke by sending a message to Vienna telling the Austrians they must attack Serbia at once because otherwise the British peace plan might be accepted.
On the 28th, after reading the Serbian reply, Wilhelm first commented: “"But" that eliminates any reason for war”, or ""every cause" for war falls to the ground”.
Wilhelm noted that Serbia had made “a capitulation of the most humiliating kind", that “The few reservations which Serbia has made with respect to certain points can in my opinion surely be cleared up by negotiation,” and acting independently of Grey, made a similar “Stop in Belgrade” offer.
Wilhelm stated that because “The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion”, a temporary Austrian occupation of Belgrade was required until Serbia kept its word.
Wilhelm’s sudden change of mind about war enraged Bethmann Hollweg, the military and the diplomatic service who, acting in accord, proceeded to sabotage Wilhelm’s offer.
A German general wrote: “unfortunately...peaceful news.
The Kaiser wants peace...
He even wants to influence Austria and to stop continuing further.” Bethmann Hollweg sabotaged Wilhelm’s proposal by informing Prince Tschirschky: “You must most carefully avoid giving any impression that we want "to hold Austria back" We are concerned only to find a "modus" to enable the realisation of Austria-Hungary’s aim "without at the same time unleashing a world war", and "should this after all prove unavoidable, to improve as far as possible the conditions under which it is to be waged".” In passing on Wilhelm’s message, Bethmann Hollweg excluded the parts wherein the Emperor told the Austrians not to go to war.
Jagow told his diplomats to disregard Wilhelm’s peace offer, and continue to press for war.
General Falkenhayn told Wilhelm that he “no longer had control of the affair in his own hands”.
Falkenhayn went on to imply that the military would stage a coup d’etat, and depose Wilhelm in favour of the hawkish Crown Prince Wilhelm if he continued to work for peace.
Bethmann Hollweg’s two favourable conditions for war that he mentioned in his telegram to Vienna were that Russia be made to appear the aggressor forcing a reluctant Germany into war, and that Britain be kept neutral.
The necessity of making Russia appear the aggressor was the greater concern to Bethmann-Hollweg because the German Social Democratic Party had denounced Austria for declaring war on Serbia and ordered street demonstrations to protest Germany’s actions in supporting Austria.
However, Bethmann Hollweg put great faith in the private promises he received from SPD leaders that they would support the government if Germany was faced with a Russian attack.