Question: How many drones were used by the UAV fleet of Iraq?
About the article "2003 invasion of Iraq", section "Iraqi drones".

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In October 2002, a few days before the US Senate vote on the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, about 75 senators were told in closed session that the Iraqi government had the means of delivering biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones that could be launched from ships off the US' Atlantic coast to attack US eastern seaboard cities.
Colin Powell suggested in his presentation to the United Nations that UAVs were transported out of Iraq and could be launched against the United States.
In fact, Iraq had no offensive UAV fleet or any capability of putting UAVs on ships.
Iraq's UAV fleet consisted of less than a handful of outdated Czech training drones.
At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the intelligence community whether the CIA's conclusions about Iraq's UAV fleet were accurate.
The US Air Force agency denied outright that Iraq possessed any offensive UAV capability.
  In 1981, the Israeli IAI Scout drone, is operated in combat missions by the South African Defence Force against Angola during Operation Protea.
In 1982, UAVs operated by the Israeli Air Force are instrumental during Operation Mole Cricket 19, where both IAI Scout and Tadiran Mastiff are used to identity SAM sites, while Samson decoy UAVs are used to activate and confuse Syrian radar.
During the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Army forces surrendered to the UAVs of the USS "Wisconsin".
In October 2002, a few days before the U.S. Senate vote on the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Saddam Hussein had the means of delivering biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction by UAVs that could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to attack U.S. eastern seaboard cities.
Colin Powell suggested in his presentation to the United Nations that they had been transported out of Iraq and could be launched against the U.S.
It was later revealed that Iraq's UAV fleet consisted of only a few outdated Czech training drones.
At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the intelligence community as to whether CIA's conclusions about Iraqi UAVs were accurate.
The U.S. Air Force, the agency most familiar with UAVs, denied outright that Iraq possessed any offensive UAV capability.
The first US targeted UAV killing outside the conventional battlefield took place on November 3, 2002, in the Marib district of Yemen.
Six alleged terrorists were killed in their SUV by a UAV-fired missile.
The command centre was in Tampa, Florida, USA.
In December 2002, the first ever dogfight involving a UAV occurred when an Iraqi MiG-25 and a U.S. RQ-1 Predator fired missiles at each other.
The MiG's missile destroyed the Predator.
The U.S. deployed UAVs in Yemen to search for and kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American and Yemen imam, firing at and failing to kill him at least once before he was killed in a UAV-launched missile attack in Yemen on 30 September 2011.
The targeted killing of an American citizen was unprecedented.
However, nearly nine years earlier in 2002, U.S. citizen Kemal Darwish was one of six men killed by the first UAV strike outside a war zone, in Yemen.
In December 2011, Iran captured a United States' RQ-170 unmanned aerial vehicle that flew over Iran and rejected President Barack Obama's request to return it to the US.
Iranian officials claim to have recovered data from the U.S. surveillance aircraft.
However, it is not clear how Iran brought it down.
There have also been claims that Iran spoofed the GPS signal used by the UAV and hijacked it into landing on an Iranian runway.
In December 2013, The U.S. Navy has successfully launched an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) from a submerged submarine, the first step to “providing mission intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to the U.S. Navy’s submarine force.”  
October 3, 2002 US Evangelical Christian leaders led by Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention send a letter to President Bush outlining the theological justification for a pre-emptive attack on Iraq.
October 10, 2002  The United States Congress passes the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq.
Canada announces that it not will be part of any military coalition sanctioned by the United Nations to invade Iraq.
A few days before the U.S. Senate vote on the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, about 75 senators are told in closed session that Saddam Hussein has the means of delivering biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones that could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to attack U.S. eastern seaboard cities.
Colin Powell suggested in his presentation to the United Nations that UAVs were transported out of Iraq and could be launched against the U.S.
In fact, Iraq had no fleet of UAVs nor any capability of putting UAVs on ships.
Iraq's UAV fleet consisted of less than a handful of outdated Czech training drones.
At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the intelligence community as to whether CIA had conclusions about Iraqi UAVs were accurate.
The U.S. Air Force agency most familiar with UAVs denied outright that Iraq possessed any offensive UAV capability.  
The IAPF's key members have accumulated significant amounts of time in modern wartime theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and have been exposed to evolving tactics and technology.
Mander and Dean, having seen UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones) technology deployed in Iraq, were convinced of its place in conservation.
Whilst initial enquiries were made into attaining UAVs as early as 2009, the IAPF UAV program did not commence officially until 2012.
Mander has remarked of the UAV program: "Having real-time intelligence greatly increases operational capabilities when reacting to poachers."
"A UAV can cover in a few hours what a ground team will cover in a week."
"Conservationists must now be given the capacity to embrace the same technology that is made available to the military.
"In mid-2012, international media became aware of the IAPF's use of non-weaponized unmanned drones for conservation.
Mander, along with IAPF's Technical Development Director Simon Beart (a former Royal Navy helicopter technician), started to regularly portray to the world the use of UAVs in conservation, and their thoughts on their future use.
Mander is quoted as asking, "Why could I have a UAV watching over me in Iraq, but these elephants here cannot have the same privilege?
"Seeing articles appear in the media and hearing the call to arms, a number of Australians and South Africans came forward.
A late-2012 Sydney UAV conference cemented a team of world-class standards.
The IAPF is moving towards the next phase of UAV operations, which consists of purchasing drones that are affordable, durable, and easy to operate from long range.
Despite these plans, the IAPF is aware that many are pinning their hopes on the use of the unmanned drones as a "silver bullet" solution.
Mander maintains a healthy degree of caution: "Drones are not the answer, they are a tool in the box.
It is how we utilise these tools that will allow us to change the way we do things."
An entire department within the IAPF has been developed to test and write the manuals for ground operations, utilising UAV technology.
In addition to UAVs, the IAPF constantly explores new ways to modernise tactics and operations for anti-poaching. 
Iran has produced several domestically developed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which can be used for reconnaissance and combat operations.
Iran have also captured US drones.