Question: What did Britain use its economic power to expand?
About the article "Napoleonic Wars", section "Financing the war".

Candidate passages:
Industrialisation progressed dynamically in Germany and German manufacturers began to capture domestic markets from British imports, and also to compete with British industry abroad, particularly in the U.S.
The German textiles and metal industries had by 1870 surpassed those of Britain in organisation and technical efficiency and superseded British manufacturers in the domestic market.
Germany became the dominant economic power on the continent and was the second largest exporting nation after Britain.
Technological progress during German industrialisation occurred in four waves: the railway wave (1877–86), the dye wave (1887–96), the chemical wave (1897–1902), and the wave of electrical engineering (1903–18).
Since Germany industrialised later than Britain, it was able to model its factories after those of Britain, thus making more efficient use of its capital and avoiding legacy methods in its leap to the envelope of technology.
Germany invested more heavily than the British in research, especially in chemistry, motors and electricity.
Germany's dominance in physics and chemistry was such that one-third of all Nobel Prizes went to German inventors and researchers.
The German cartel system (known as "Konzerne"), being significantly concentrated, was able to make more efficient use of capital.
Germany was not weighted down with an expensive worldwide empire that needed defense.
Following Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, it absorbed parts of what had been France's industrial base.
By 1900, the German chemical industry dominated the world market for synthetic dyes.
The three major firms BASF, Bayer and Hoechst produced several hundred different dyes, along with the five smaller firms.
In 1913, these eight firms produced almost 90% of the world supply of dyestuffs and sold about 80% of their production abroad.
The three major firms had also integrated upstream into the production of essential raw materials and they began to expand into other areas of chemistry such as pharmaceuticals, photographic film, agricultural chemicals and electrochemicals.
Top-level decision-making was in the hands of professional salaried managers; leading Chandler to call the German dye companies "the world's first truly managerial industrial enterprises".
There were many spinoffs from research—such as the pharmaceutical industry, which emerged from chemical research.
By the start of World War I (1914–1918), German industry switched to war production.
The heaviest demands were on coal and steel for artillery and shell production, and on chemicals for the synthesis of materials that were subject to import restrictions and for chemical weapons and war supplies. 
Friedman predicts a second cold war between the United States and Russia in the 2010s.
He assesses that Russia will make attempts to expand its sphere of influence into Central and Eastern Europe during this period, and will attempt to build up its military capabilities to the point where it can pose a regional challenge to the United States.
Friedman asserts that around 2015, the United States will become a close ally to some Central and Eastern European countries, who will be dedicated to resisting Russian geopolitical threats during this period.
Friedman speculates in the book that the United States will probably become a close ally of Central European countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, who may form a Polish-led military alliance during this period, which Friedman refers to as the "Polish Bloc."
According to Friedman's prediction, in the early 2020s, Russia will collapse, fragment, and disintegrate from the economic and political pressure of the Second Cold War.
Around this time, the early 2020s, China will politically and culturally fragment as well, according to Friedman's prediction.
Friedman asserts that the rapid economic development of China since 1980 will cause internal pressures and inequalities in Chinese society that will result in regional fragmentation of the country, primarily due to economic reasons.
Friedman asserts that China will remain formally united, but the central government of China will gradually lose much of its real power.
According to Friedman, the collapse of central authority in Russia and fragmentation in China will leave the region in general chaos, allowing the secession and annexation of numerous regions.
He predicts that Chechnya and other Muslim regions, as well as the Pacific Far East will secede from Russia, Finland will annex Karelia, Romania will annex Moldova, Tibet will gain independence with assistance from India, Taiwan will extend its influence into China, while the Japanese create regional spheres of influence in China.
Friedman predicts that in the 2020s and 2030s, three main powers will emerge in Eurasia.
Friedman asserts that Turkey will expand its sphere of influence and become a major power, much as it was during the time of the Ottoman Empire.
Turkey will expand its sphere of influence into the Arab world, which will have increasingly fragmented by then, and north into Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Friedman believes that Israel will remain a powerful nation and outside the Turkish sphere of influence, but will be forced to come to an accommodation with Turkey.
Friedman predicts that Japan will expand its economic influence to regions of coastal China, the Russian Far East, and many Pacific Islands, and will build military strength during this period.
Finally, Friedman assesses that Poland will continue to lead its military alliance, the "Polish Bloc."
He believes that the "Polish Bloc," possessing substantial military strength, will expand its economic influence into what was formerly European Russia, and that it will compete with Turkey for influence in the important economic region of the Volga River Valley.
Friedman believes that the United States will be allied with all three powers initially, but will gradually become an adversary of both the new Turkish and Japanese empires, who will grow in power in the 2020s and 2030s, and begin to threaten American interests.
Friedman states that Japan and Turkey will probably form an alliance near the end of this period, in an effort to counter the overwhelming global power of the United States.
Friedman also speculates that Germany and Mexico may possibly join this anti-United States coalition; however, he thinks it generally unlikely.
Friedman states that in this conflict, the United States will be allied with the "Polish Bloc," and probably with China, India, a united Korea, and the United Kingdom.
Friedman also predicts that decades of low birthrates in developed countries, especially in Europe, will result in dramatic cultural, social, and political shifts through the first half of the 21st century.
Friedman predicts economic and social strain in these countries, caused by an increasingly smaller working age demographic and a rapidly aging population.
As a result, in the decades of the 2020s and 2030s, Western nations will gradually begin competing for immigrants.
Friedman asserts that the United States will depart from its policy of discouraging Mexican immigration, and will begin trying to entice foreigners - especially Mexicans - to emigrate to the United States.
Friedman predicts that a third world war will take place in the middle of the 21st century, close to the year 2050.
He asserts that the United States will be allied with the "Polish Bloc," Britain, India, and China in this conflict, and will face a coalition of the Turkish and Japanese empires.
He asserts that the war will probably be started by a coordinated Turkish-Japanese sneak attack against the United States and its allies.
In the specific scenario discussed in the book, Friedman hypothesizes the attack will place on November 24, 2050, at 5:00 p.m.
He foresees a form of limited war, very different in its conduct than a total war, such as World War II of the 20th century.
Friedman asserts that the primary weapons of the war will be long-range hypersonic aircraft and infantrymen with highly sophisticated, powered body-armor.
Friedman predicts control of space will be crucial over the course of the conflict.
Friedman states in the book that Germany and France may enter into the conflict during its later stages, probably on the side of the Turkish and Japanese empires.
Nonetheless, he assesses that the United States and its allies will win, that the war will last two to three years, and that it will cost somewhere around 50,000 lives.
Friedman predicts that after the war, the United States will enjoy a prosperous decade in the 2060s due to its overwhelming political and military power at the time, and that new technologies developed during the war will foster dramatic economic growth, especially in the United States.
According to Friedman, North America will remain the center of gravity for the global economic and political system for at least several hundred years after the outcome of World War III.
However, he also states that this does not guarantee that the United States will always dominate North America.
Friedman predicts that in the decades following the war, starting in the 2070s, tensions between Mexico and the United States will rise.
By this time, after decades of massive immigration, many parts of the United States, especially the South West, will become predominantly ethnically, culturally, and socially Mexican.
Friedman claims that, during this period, many ethnic Mexicans living in the United States, especially those living in the Mexican Cession, may not assimilate into American culture, but still consider themselves citizens of Mexico, and remain loyal to Mexico, rather than to the United States.
During this period, Mexico will experience substantial economic and population growth, Friedman asserts.
He assesses that by the end of the 21st century, Mexico will be in a position to militarily and geopolitically challenge the United States for dominance of North America, and that political, cultural, and military tensions will rise.
Friedman predicts an extended crisis between the two countries that the United States will be unable to resolve through the use of military force, and that the demographic changes that have taken place in the Southwestern United States will be irreversible.
He also asserts that most countries of the world will wish to see Mexico defeat the United States, but that no nation will want to become involved in a matter so fundamental to the United States.
His final prediction is that the conflict will likely continue into the 22nd Century.
Friedman also makes many cultural and technological predictions for the 21st century. 
Critical to British success in confronting Napoleon was its superior economic situation.
It was able to mobilize the nation’s industrial and financial resources and apply them to defeating France.
With a population of 16 million Britain was barely half the size of France with 30 million.
In terms of soldiers the French numerical advantage was offset by British subsidies that paid for a large proportion of the Austrian and Russian soldiers, peaking at about 450,000 in 1813.
Most important, the British national output remained strong.
Textiles and iron grew sharply.
Iron production expanded as demand for cannon and munitions was insatiable.
Agricultural prices soared--it was a golden age for agriculture even as food shortages appeared here and there.
There were riots in Cornwall, Devon, and Somerset during the food shortages of 1800-01.
Mobs forced merchants to hand over their stocks, as the food was distributed to the hungry by popular committees.
Wells concludes that the disturbances indicate deep social grievances that extended far beyond the immediate food shortages.
Overall, however, crop production grew 50% between 1795 and 1815.
The system of smuggling finished products into the continent undermined French efforts to ruin the British economy by cutting off markets.
The well-organized business sector channeled products into what the military needed.
Not only did British cloth provide for British uniforms, it clothed the allies as well and indeed the French soldiers too.
Britain used its economic power to expand the Royal Navy, doubling the number of frigates and increasing the number of large ships of the line by 50%, while increasing the roster of sailors from 15,000 to 133,000 in eight years after the war began in 1793.
France, meanwhile, saw its navy shrink by more than half.
The British budget in 1814 reached £66 million, including £10 million for the Navy, £40 million for the Army, £10 million for the Allies, and £38 million as interest on the national debt.
The national debt soared to £679 million, more than double the GDP.
It was willingly supported by hundreds of thousands of investors and tax payers, despite the higher taxes on land and a new income tax..
The whole cost of the war came to £831 million.
By contrast the French financial system was inadequate and Napoleon’s forces had to rely in part on requisitions from conquered lands.  
A key element in British success was its ability to mobilize the nation's industrial and financial resources and apply them to defeating France.
With a population of 16 million Britain was barely half the size of France with 30 million.
In terms of soldiers the French advantage was offset by British subsidies that paid for a large proportion of the Austrian and Russian soldiers, peaking at about 450,000 men in 1813.
By the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1803, Britain paid a subsidy of ₤1.5 million pounds for every 100,000 Russian soldiers in the field.
Most important, the British national output remained strong and the well-organized business sector channeled products into what the military needed.
Britain used its economic power to expand the Royal Navy, doubling the number of frigates and increasing the number of large ships of the line by 50%, while increasing the roster of sailors from 15,000 to 133,000 in eight years after the war began in 1793.
France, meanwhile, saw its navy shrink by more than half.
The system of smuggling finished products into the continent undermined French efforts to ruin the British economy by cutting off markets.
Subsidies to Russia and Austria kept them in the war.
The British budget in 1814 reached £66,000,000, including £10 million for the Royal Navy, £40 million for the army, £10 million for the allies, and £38 million as interest on the national debt.
The national debt soared to £679 million, more than double the GDP.
It was willingly supported by hundreds of thousands of investors and tax payers, despite the higher taxes on land and a new income tax.
The whole cost of the war came to £831 million.
By contrast the French financial system was inadequate and Napoleon's forces had to rely in part on requisitions from conquered lands.
Pitt was an expert in finance and served as Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Critical to his success in confronting Napoleon was using Britain's superior economic resources.
He was able to mobilize the nation's industrial and financial resources and apply them to defeating France.
With a population of 16 million Britain was barely half the size of France with 30 million.
In terms of soldiers the French numerical advantage was offset by British subsidies that paid for a large proportion of the Austrian and Russian soldiers, peaking at about 450,000 in 1813.
Most important, the British national output remained strong and the well-organized business sector channeled products into what the military needed.
Britain used its economic power to expand the Royal Navy, doubling the number of frigates and increasing the number of large ships of the line by 50%, while increasing the roster of sailors from 15,000 to 133,000 in eight years after the war began in 1793.
France, meanwhile, saw its navy shrink by more than half.
The system of smuggling finished products into the continent undermined French efforts to ruin the British economy by cutting off markets.
By 1814, the budget that Pitt in his last years had largely shaped, had expanded to £66 million, including £10 million for the Navy, £40 million for the Army, £10 million for the Allies, and £38 million as interest on the national debt.
The national debt soared to £679 million, more than double the GDP.
It was willingly supported by hundreds of thousands of investors and tax payers, despite the higher taxes on land and a new income tax.
The whole cost of the war came to £831 million.
By contrast the French financial system was inadequate and Napoleon's forces had to rely in part on requisitions from conquered lands.