Question: Who was given the authority that the Russian Tsar stripped from Commander in chief M.I. Kutuzov?
About the article "Battle of Austerlitz", section "Allied plans and dispositions".

Candidate passages:
An Allied council met on 1 December to discuss proposals for the battle.
Most of the Allied strategists had two fundamental ideas in mind: making contact with the enemy and securing the southern flank that held the communication line to Vienna.
Although the Tsar and his immediate entourage pushed hard for a battle, Emperor Francis of Austria was more cautious and, as mentioned, he was seconded by Kutuzov, the Commander-in-chief of the Russians and the Allied troop.
The pressure to fight from the Russian nobles and the Austrian commanders, however, was too strong, and the Allies adopted the plan of the Austrian Chief of Staff, Franz von Weyrother.
This called for a main drive against the French right flank, which the Allies noticed was lightly guarded, and diversionary attacks against the French left.
The Allies deployed most of their troops into four columns that would attack the French right.
The Russian Imperial Guard was held in reserve while Russian troops under Bagration guarded the Allied right.
The Russian Tsar rudely stripped the authority of Commander-in-chief M. I. Kutuzov and gave it to Franz von Weyrother.
In the battle, Kutuzov could only command the IV Corps of the Allied army, although he was still the "de jure" commander because the Tsar was afraid to take over in case his favored plan failed.
Mikhail Kutuzov was born in Saint Petersburg on 16 September 1745.
His father, Lieutenant-General Illarion Matveevich Kutuzov, had served for thirty years with the Corps of Engineers, had seen action against the Turks and served under Peter the Great.
Mikhail Kutuzov’s mother was from the noble family of Beklemishev.
Between his father’s distinguished service and his mother’s high birth, Mikhail Kutuzov had contact with the imperial Romanov family from an early age.
In 1757, twelve-year-old Kutuzov went to a military engineering school as a cadet private.
(Since Peter the Great’s reforms of the military, all noblemen had to serve in the military starting as a private.
To become an officer, they had to work their way through the ranks.)
Kutuzov quickly became popular with his peers and teachers alike, proving himself to be highly intelligent, and showed bravery in his school’s numerous horse races.
Kutuzov became fluent in English, French, German, Polish, Swedish, and Turkish; his language skills served him well throughout his career.
In 1762, Kutuzov, now a captain under the command of Colonel Alexander Suvorov, traveled to the town of Astrakhan, a major city near the Volga Delta.
Kutuzov studied Suvorov’s style of command and learned how to be a good commander in battle.
Suvorov believed that an effective order should be simple, direct and concise, and that a commander should care deeply about the health and training of his soldiers.
Kutuzov also adopted Suvorov’s conviction that a commander should lead his troops from the front instead of the rear to provide an example of bravery for the troops to follow.
Suvorov also taught Kutuzov the importance of developing close relationships with those under his command.
Kutuzov’s followed this advice to the benefit of his career.
This advice contributed to Kutuzov’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief in 1812.
In late 1762, Kutuzov became the aide-de-camp to the Military-Governor of Revel, the Prince of Holstein-Beck, where he proved himself to be a capable politician.
In 1768, Kutuzov fought in Poland, after the Polish Szlachta—the Polish noble class—rebelled against Russia.
There he captured a number of strong defensive positions and thereby proved his skill on the battlefield.
In October 1768, the Ottoman Empire declared war on the Russian Empress Catherine the Great.
Two years later, Kutuzov, now a major, joined the soon-to-be-famous Count Petr Alexandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky’s army in the south to fight against the Turks.
Though Kutuzov served valiantly in this campaign, he did not receive any medals as another officer reported to Rumyantsev that Kutuzov mocked Rumyantsev behind his back.
Rumyantsev had Lieutenant-Colonel Kutuzov transferred into Prince Vasili Dolgorukov-Krymsky’s Russian Second Army fighting the Turks and the Tartars in Crimea.
During this campaign, Kutuzov learned how to use the deadly Cossack cavalry, another skill which would prove useful in the defense of Russia against Napoleon's invading armies in 1812.
In 1773, he was ordered to storm the well-defended town of Alushta on the southern coast of the Crimean peninsula.
After he realized the attack was faltering, he grabbed the fallen regimental standard and led the attack.
While charging forward, he was shot in the left temple — an almost certainly fatal wound at the time.
The bullet went right through his head and got out near the right eye.
However, Kutuzov slowly recovered, though frequently overcome by sharp pains and dizziness, and his right eye remained permanently twisted.
He left the army later that year due to his wound.
Kutuzov’s pain did not subside, and so he decided to travel to Western Europe for better medical care.
He arrived in Berlin in 1774 where he spent much time with King Frederick the Great of Prussia, who took great interest in Kutuzov.
They spent long periods of time discussing tactics, weaponry, and uniforms.
Kutuzov then traveled to Leyden, Holland and London, England for further treatment.
In London, Kutuzov studied the American general George Washington’s campaign against the British, concluding that it was not necessary to win battles in order to win a war.
Kutuzov returned to the Russian Army in 1776, where he again served under Suvorov in the Crimea for the next six years.
He learned that letting the common soldier use his natural intellect and initiative created a more effective army.
Suvorov also taught him how to use mobility in order to exploit the constantly changing situation on the battlefield.
By 1782, Kutuzov had been promoted to Brigadier General as Suvorov recognized Kutuzov’s potential as a shrewd and intelligent leader.
Indeed, Suvorov wrote that he would not even have to tell Kutuzov what needed to be done in order for him to carry out his objective.
In 1787, Kutuzov was again wounded in the right temple, in almost exactly the same place as before, and again doctors feared for his life.
However, Kutuzov recovered, though his right eye was even more twisted than before and he had even worse head pains.
In 1784 he became a major general, in 1787 governor-general of the Crimea; and under Suvorov, whose disciple he became, he won considerable distinction in the Russo-Turkish War (1787–1792), at the taking of Ochakov, Odessa, Bender and Ismail, and the battles of Rimnik and Mashin.
He was by that time (1791) a lieutenant-general and successively occupied the positions of ambassador at Istanbul, governor-general of Finland, commandant of the corps of cadets at Saint Petersburg, ambassador at Berlin, and governor-general of Saint Petersburg.
Kutuzov was a favorite of Tsar Paul I, and after that emperor's murder he was temporarily out of favor with the new Tsar Alexander I, though he remained loyal. 
An Allied council met on 1 December to discuss proposals for the battle.
Most of the Allied strategists had two fundamental ideas in mind: making contact with the enemy and securing the southern flank that led to Vienna.
Although the Tsar and his immediate entourage pushed hard for a battle, Emperor Francis of Austria was in a more cautious mood, and he was seconded by Kutuzov, the main Russian commander.
The pressure to fight from the Russian nobles and the Austrian commanders, however, was too strong, and the Allies adopted Austrian Chief of Staff Weyrother's plan.
This called for a main drive against the French right flank, which the Allies noticed was lightly guarded, and diversionary attacks against the French left.
The Allies deployed most of their troops into four columns that would attack the French right.
The Russian Imperial Guard was held in reserve while Russian troops under Bagration guarded the Allied right. 
In August 1805, Napoleon, Emperor of the French since December of the previous year, turned his army's sights from the English Channel to the Rhine in order to deal with the new Austrian and Russian threats.
On 25 September after great secrecy and feverish marching, 200,000 French troops began to cross the Rhine on a front of .
Mack had gathered the greater part of the Austrian army at the fortress of Ulm in Swabia (modern day southern Germany).
Napoleon swung his forces southward and performed a wheeling movement that put the French at the Austrian rear.
The Ulm Maneuver was well-executed and on 20 October Mack and 23,000 Austrian troops surrendered at Ulm, bringing the total number of Austrian prisoners in the campaign to 60,000.
Although the spectacular victory was soured by the defeat of the Franco-Spanish fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar the following day, French success on land continued as Vienna fell in November.
The French gained 100,000 muskets, 500 cannon, and the intact bridges across the Danube.
Meanwhile, delays in the arrival of Russian troops prevented them from saving the Austrian field armies, so the Russians withdrew to the northeast to await reinforcements and link up with surviving Austrian units.
Tsar Alexander I appointed general Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov to the commander-in-chief of the Russian and Austrian troops.
On 9 September 1805, Kutuzov arrived at the battlefield to gather information.
He quickly contacted Francis I of Austria and his courtiers to discuss planning and logistical matters.
Under pressure from Kutuzov, the Austrians agreed to supply munitions and weapons in a timely and sufficient manner.
Kutuzov also spotted shortcomings in the Austrian defense plan, which he called "very dogmatic".
He objected to Austrian annexation of the land recently under Napoleon's control, because this would make the local people distrust the allied force.
The Austrians rejected many of Kutuzov's proposals.
The French followed, but soon found themselves in an unenviable disposition: Prussian intentions were unknown and could be hostile, the Russian and Austrian armies now converged, and to add to Napoleon's challenges, the French lines of communication were extremely long and required strong garrisons to keep them open.
Napoleon realized that to capitalize on the success at Ulm, he had to force the Allies to battle and defeat them.
On the Russian side, Commander-in-chief Kutuzov also realized that; so instead of clinging to the "suicidal" Austrian defense plan, Kutuzov decided to retreat.
He ordered Pyotr Bagration to command 600 troops to contain the French at Vienna, and instructed the Allied Army to accept Murat's ceasefire proposal so that the allied army could have more time to retreat.
It turned out that the proposal was false and was used in order to launch a surprise attack on Vienna.
Bagration was able to hold off the French assault for a while by negotiating an armistice with Murat and providing Kutuzov more time to retreat by positioning himself with the Russian rearguard near Hollabrunn.
Murat didn't attack believing the entire Russian army stood before him.
Napoleon soon realized Murat's mistakes and ordered him to pursue quickly; at that time the allied army had already retreated to Olmutz.
According to Kutuzov's plan, the Allies would retreat further to the Carpathian region and "at Galicia, I will bury the French.
"Napoleon did not stay still.
The French Emperor decided to make a psychological trap in order to lure the Allies out.
Days before any fighting, Napoleon had given the impression to the Allies that his army was in a weak state and that he desired a negotiated peace.
About 53,000 French troops - including Soult, Lannes and Murat's forces - were assigned to take possession of Austerlitz and the Olmutz road, occupying the enemy's attention.
The Allied forces, numbering about 89,000, seemed to be far superior and would be tempted to attack an outnumbered French Army.
However, the Allies didn't know that the reinforcements of Bernadotte, Mortier and Davout had already been within the supported distance, and could be called in need by forced marches from Iglau and Vienna respectively, raising the French forces to 75,000 troops, and reducing their inferiority in number.
Napoleon's lure did not stop at that.
On 25 November, general Savary was sent to the Allied headquarters at Olmutz in order to secretly examine the Allied forces' situation and deliver Napoleon's message expressing his desire to avoid a battle.
As expected, that expression was seen as a sure sign of weakness.
When Francis I offered an armistice on the 27th, Napoleon expressed great enthusiasm in accepting it.
On the same day, Napoleon ordered Soult to abandon both Austerlitz and the Pratzen Heights and also create an image of chaos during the retreat; that would make the enemies occupy the Heights.
The next day (28 November), the French Emperor requested a personal interview with Alexander I and received a visit from the Tsar's most impetuous aide, Count Dolgorouki.
The meeting was another part of the trap, as Napoleon intentionally expressed anxiety and hesitation to his opponents.
Dolgorouki reported all of this to the Tsar as an additional indication of French weakness.
The plan was successful.
Many of the Allied officers, including the Tsar's aides and the Austrian Chief of Staff Franz von Weyrother, strongly supported the idea of attacking immediately and appeared to be swaying Tsar Alexander's opinion.
Kutuzov's idea was rejected, and the Allied forces soon fell into the trap that Napoleon had set. 
During Napoleon's Invasion of Russia in 1812 Barclay assumed the supreme command of the 1st Army of the West, the largest of the Russian armies facing Napoleon.
He proposed the now famous scorched earth strategy of drawing the enemy deep into one's own territory and retreated to the village of Tsaryovo-Zaimishche between Moscow and Smolensk.
Nevertheless, the Russians keenly opposed the appointment of a foreigner as commander-in-chief.
His rivals spread rumors of him being Napoleon's agent, and the populace condemned him as a coward.
Barclay was forced by his subordinates and the Tsar to engage Napoleon at Smolensk (17 – 18 August 1812).
Napoleon forced Barclay to retreat when he threatened Barclay's only escape route.
After losing the Holy City of Smolensk, the outcry of officers and civilians grew to a point where the Tsar could no longer ignore it.
He appointed Kutuzov, previously a general at the battle of Austerlitz, as the over-all commander of the Russian Forces.
Barclay remained General of the 1st Army of the West.
Barclay commanded the right flank at the Battle of Borodino (7 September 1812) with great valor and presence of mind and during the celebrated council at Fili advised Kutuzov to surrender unfortified Moscow to the enemy.
His illness made itself known at that time and he was forced to leave the army soon afterwards.
After Napoleon was driven from Russia, the eventual success of Barclay's tactics made him a romantic hero, misunderstood by his contemporaries and rejected by the court.
His popularity soared, and his honour was restored by the tsar.