Question: When did the Soviets engage the 3rd Panzer Army with 700 tanks?
About the article "Operation Barbarossa", section "Phase 2: Battle for Smolensk (3 July – 5 August 1941)".

Candidate passages:
At the time of the counterattack, Manstein could count on the Fourth Panzer Army, composed of XLVIII Panzer Corps, the SS Panzer Corps and the First Panzer Army, with the XL and LVII Panzer Corps.
The XLVIII Panzer Corps was composed of the 6th, 11th and 17th Panzer Divisions, while the SS Panzer Corps was organized with the 1st SS, 2nd SS and 3rd SS Panzer Division.
In early February, the combined strength of the SS Panzer Corps was an estimated 20,000 soldiers.
The Fourth Panzer Army and the First Panzer Army were situated south of the Red Army's bulge into German lines, with the First Panzer Army to the east of the Fourth Panzer Army.
The SS Panzer Corps was deployed along the northern edge of the bulge, on the northern front of Army Group South.
The Germans were able to amass around 70,000 men against the 210,000 Red Army soldiers.
The German "Wehrmacht" was understrength, especially after continuous operations between June 1942 and February 1943, to the point where Hitler appointed a committee made up of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Martin Bormann and Hans Lammers, to recruit 800,000 new able-bodied men—half of whom would come from "nonessential industries".
However, the effects of this recruitment were not seen until around May 1943, when the German armed forces were at their highest strength since the beginning of the war, with 9.5 million personnel.
By the start of 1943 Germany's armored forces had sustained heavy casualties.
It was unusual for a Panzer Division to field more than 100 tanks, and most averaged only 70–80 serviceable tanks at any given time.
After the fighting around Kharkov, Heinz Guderian embarked on a program to bring Germany's mechanized forces up to strength.
Despite his efforts, a German panzer division could only count on an estimated 10,000–11,000 personnel, out of an authorized strength of 13,000–17,000.
Only by June did a panzer division begin to field between 100–130 tanks each.
SS divisions were normally in better shape, with an estimated 150 tanks, a battalion of self-propelled assault guns and enough half-tracks to motorize most of its infantry and reconnaissance soldiers—and these had an authorized strength of an estimated 19,000 personnel.
At this time, the bulk of Germany's armor was still composed of Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs, although the 2nd SS Panzer Division had been outfitted with a number of Tiger I tanks.
The Fourth Panzer Army was commanded by General Hermann Hoth, while the First Panzer Army fell under the leadership of General Eberhard von Mackensen.
The 6th, 11th and 17th Panzer Divisions were commanded by Generals Walther von Hünersdorff, Hermann Balck and Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, respectively.
The SS Panzer Corps was commanded by General Paul Hausser, who also had the 3rd SS Panzer (Totenkopf) Division under his command. 
Hausser had expected to continue his advance on Prokhorovka, and late on the evening of 11 July issued orders for a classic maneuver battle for the attack the next day.
The attack would begin north of the Psel river, with the 3rd SS Panzer Division driving northeast until reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road.
Once there, they were to strike southeast to attack the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka from the rear.
1st and 2nd SS Panzer divisions were to wait until "Totenkopf's" attack had destabilized the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka.
Once the Soviets at Prokhorovka were under attack from the rear, the "Leibstandarte" was to join the attack, advancing through the main Soviet defenses on the west slope before Prokhorovka.
To "Leibstandarte's" right, the 2nd SS was to advance eastward to the high ground south of Prokhorovka, then turn south to roll up the Soviet line and open a gap.
Unbeknownst to Hausser, Rotmistrov had moved his 5th Guards Tank Army up to an assembly area just below Prokhorovka, on the night of 11/12 July, in preparation for a massive attack the following day.
Throughout the night, German front line troops could hear the ominous sounds of Soviet tank engines to the east as the 18th and 29th Tank Corps moved into their assembly areas.
At 06:15, a Soviet artillery barrage began.
At 06:30, Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: "Steel, Steel, Steel!
", the order to commence the attack.
Down off the west slopes, before Prokhorovka, came the massed armour of five tank brigades from the two Soviet tank corps.
They had been ordered to approach at high speed.
Rotmistrov, fearing that German Tiger tanks comprised a large component of his opponents forces, had instructed his tankers to move forward at speed to close range quickly, firing on the move in an attempt to obtain a flank or rear firing position on the German tanks.
During this time period, firing on the move was highly inaccurate, particularly while moving at high speed.
Soviet intelligence estimates fixed the number of German Tiger tanks, in the Prokhorovka area, at approximately 100.
In actuality, the II SS Panzer Corps had only 15 Tiger tanks.
Ten of these tanks were north of the Psel River with the 3rd SS, the 1st SS had four operational Tiger tanks, and the 2nd SS had only one.
The 1st SS had just started to advance, when it was taken largely by surprise.
As the Soviet tank roared down the corridor, they carried the 9th Parachute Division into battle mounted on the tanks with the paratroopers holding onto rails.
At the base of Hill 252.2, was a Soviet dug anti-tank ditch.
With the firing of purple warning flares across the entire front, Rudolf von Ribbentrop (a company commander) stated he knew at once that a major attack was at hand.
He ordered his company's seven remaining Panzer IVs to start up and follow him, over a bridge that had been constructed over an anti-tank ditch, onto the lower slope of Hill 252.2.
On the crest of the hill, above him, was Joachim Peiper's 2nd SS Panzergrenadiers (supported by their halftracks) who were being overrun.
As Ribbentrop's tanks fanned out on the lower slope, he looked up to the crest of the hillside.
He recalled: "In front of me appeared fifteen, then twenty, then thirty, then forty tanks.
Finally there were too many of them to count.
The T-34s were rolling toward us at speed, and carrying mounted infantry."
The Soviet tanks charged down the west slope of the hill, firing as they moved.
Amid the swirls of dust, a highly confused tank battle began.
The Panzer IV, to Ribbentrop's right, was set ablaze.
The company was soon swamped by the large numbers of Soviet tanks advancing down the hill.
At the base of the hill, the advancing Soviet armour was held up by the anti-tank ditch.
Heavy firing commenced between the Soviet armour and tanks of the 1st SS based on the opposite side of the ditch.
Meanwhile, the Soviet tanks searched for a route across the ditch.
On the hilltop, with the passage of the first waves of Soviet tanks, Peiper's surviving panzergrenadiers emerged from trench lines to engage the Soviet paratroopers and attack Soviet tanks with magnetic shaped charges.
Twenty of the battalion's half-tracks were lost in the fighting, some destroyed when they attempted to ram the much heavier Soviet tanks in an effort to stop them from destroying the company.
To the north and east, the 3rd SS was engaged by the Soviet 33rd Guards Rifle Corps.
Tasked with destabilizing the Soviet defenses before Prokhorovka, the unit first had to beat off a number of attacks before they could go over onto the offensive.
Most of the division's tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as they advanced through mine fields against well hidden Soviet anti-tank guns.
Although the 3rd SS succeeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road, their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of its armour.
The majority of German tank losses suffered at Prokhorovka occurred here.
To the south, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps, of the 5th Guards Tank Army, had been thrown back by the 1st SS acting alone.
Meanwhile, the 2nd SS was holding a line to the south against the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
The Soviet attacks had been checked by the II SS Panzer Corps, without the Germans losing any ground.
By early afternoon, it was clear that Rotmistrov's attack had failed.
Luftwaffe air superiority, over the battlefield, also contributed to the Soviet losses, partly due to the "VVS" being directed against the units flanking II SS Panzer Corps.
Hs 129s and Ju 87s inflicted significant losses on the 5th Guards Tank Army.
Soviet tank losses were extremely heavy.
A report from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery " and commented that "due to continuous air attacks, they were unable to advance further and shifted to the defence".
By the end of the day, the Soviets had fallen back to their starting positions.
The battle has been described as a tactical defeat for the Red Army due to the heavy tank losses, but operationally the battle was a draw.
Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives.
Though the Soviet counterattack failed and they were thrown back onto the defensive, they did enough to stop a German breakthrough.
Tank losses during the battle has been a contentious subject.
Red Army tank losses have been given from 200 to 822, but records show about 300 complete losses and as many damaged.
The Soviets claimed enormous German losses, stating they had destroyed at least 400 tanks, including 100 Tiger tanks, and inflicting 3,500 deaths.
German records indicate that their losses were minute in comparison to the Soviet claims.
Three to five tanks were destroyed, and between 40 and 70 were damaged.
Manpower losses were in the region of 500 killed.
The 1st SS and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions reported 186 tanks, assault guns, and tank hunters serviceable on the eve of battle, and 190 available the evening after. 
Phase 2: Battle for Smolensk (3 July – 5 August 1941).
On 3 July, Hitler finally gave the go-ahead for the Panzers to resume their drive east after the infantry divisions had caught up.
However, a rainstorm typical of Russian summers slowed their progress and Russian defenses stiffened.
The delays gave the Soviets time to organize a massive counterattack against Army Group Center.
Its ultimate objective was Smolensk, which commanded the road to Moscow.
Facing the Germans was an old Soviet defensive line held by six armies.
On 6 July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd Panzer Army with 700 tanks.
The Germans defeated this counterattack with overwhelming air superiority.
The 2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Dnieper and closed on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd Panzer Army, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed on Smolensk from the north.
Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet armies.
On 18 July, the Panzer Groups came to within sixteen kilometres of closing the gap but the trap would not snap shut until 26 July.
When the Panzer Groups finally closed the gap, 300,000 Red Army soldiers were captured; but liquidating the pocket took another ten days in which time 100,000 Red Army soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans and Moscow.
Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength.
The German troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected strategic freedom of movement.
Operations were now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation.
Hitler had lost faith in encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers.
Hitler now believed he could defeat the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war.
That meant seizing the industrial center of Kharkov, the Donets Basin and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and the speedy capture of Leningrad, a major center of military production, in the north.
He also wanted to link up with the Finns to the north.
Fedor von Bock and almost all the German generals involved in Operation "Barbarossa", vehemently argued in favor of continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow.
Besides the psychological importance of capturing the enemy's capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production and the center of the Soviet communications and transportation system.
More importantly, intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red Army was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital.
But Hitler was adamant, and issued a direct order to Heinz Guderian, bypassing his commanding officer von Bock, to send Army Group Centre's tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.
On commencement of Operation Barbarossa, the group was a part of Army Group North, and consisted of the XLI Panzer and LVI Army (motorized) Corps which comprised three panzer and two motorized infantry divisions respectively, altogether equipped with 631 tanks.
Acting as the armored spearhead for Army Group North in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa, it crossed the Neman River, where the XLI Panzer Corps was counter-attacked by 300 Soviet Tanks near Raseiniai.
In a 4 day battle, the Germans encircled and destroyed the Soviet Armor.
The LVI Panzer Corps seized the Dvina bridges and began their advance towards Leningrad.
The Soviets formed a bitter defense around Leningrad and Hitler reinforced 4th Panzer Army with the 3rd Panzer Army and it crept up to 7 miles of the city.
However, Hitler re-called both Panzer Armies and transferred them to Army Group Center for an all-out offensive around Moscow.
The operation called for the 3rd and 4th Panzer Army to attack Moscow from the North.
The 4th Army would attack through the center and 2nd Panzer Army to attack from the south.
But due to the cold weather, deteriorating supply situation and bitter Soviet resistance, only the 4th Panzer Army made any headway against the Soviets and reached to about 15 miles of Moscow.
Exhausted, it was halted at the gates of Moscow and then pushed back 200 miles by the Soviet counteroffensive launched in December 1941. 
While the division was refitting, it was involved in minor skirmishes with partisans.
The reorganization was completed by late June, and the division was moved to Izyum where it, along with the "23.
Panzer-Division" was to form the reserve force for Manstein's Army Group during the approaching Operation "Citadel".
While the operation was in effect, several Soviet formations attacked towards Orel and Kharkov simultaneously.
The 5 SS ""Wiking"" was engaged against the forces near Kharkov, with the Estonians acquitting themselves well, destroying around 100 Red Army tanks over several days.
When "Citadel" was cancelled, the division was still involved in halting Soviet attacks.
Further to the south, on the Mius-Front, a major Red Army offensive, Operation "Rumyantsev", threatened to break the German lines.
5 SS ""Wiking"" was joined by the 3rd "SS "Totenkopf" Panzer Division" and the 2nd "SS Panzergrenadier Division "Das Reich"" and sent to the Mius-Bogodukhov sector to halt the Soviet attacks.
In subsequent fighting, the "SS" divisions defeated two Soviet tank armies (totaling over 1,000 tanks), destroying over 800 of them.
At no time did the "SS" divisions have any more than 50 panzers in working order.
Despite horrific losses, the Soviets were able to take Kharkov on 23 August and began advancing towards the Dnieper.
In October, the division was again pulled back out of the line, this time to be restructured as a panzer division, the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking"".