The policy included medical payments and uninsured motorist coverage. Ms. Arnold filed an answer denying liability and asserting as an affirmative defense that the action was time barred by the statute of limitations. Ms. Arnold also filed a motion to dismiss that invoked the same affirmative defense. In a brief filed in response to the motion to dismiss, Shelter argued that its cause of action against Ms. Arnold had not accrued until it paid Ms. Day s medical expenses, and attached copies of the drafts it paid to Ms. Day as exhibits. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the three- year statute of limitations had run.
Shelter asserts both procedural error and errors in the application of substantive law.
We will address each in turn. First, Shelter asserts that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. Shelter contends that, consequently, the motion to dismiss should be treated as one for summary judgment, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 56, and that this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the one against whom summary judgment was granted. See, e.g., Pastchol v.