The rocket turned out to be a U.S. scientific probe intended to explore the upper atmosphere, to improve human knowledge of the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed Russian authorities of the planned launch weeks before, but the message had not made its way through the Russian bureaucracy to those who needed to know. The system worked that night in early 1995 and catastrophe was averted. On seven occasions during the fall of 1996 operations at several nuclear weapons centers were severely disrupted when thieves tried to steal critical communications cables to retrieve the valuable copper they contained. The CIA also warned that the normal chain of command has broken down in some parts of the Russian military.
Some stations are in Latvia, others in the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.
Disputes over funding and personnel have put the operational integrity of these systems in doubt. The weakest link in the nuclear-weapons control system may be the humans involved. Here, we know more about the Americans than we do about the Russians. The military is deeply concerned about the psychological stability of these people, and has developed a Personnel Reliability Program to select them. Individuals are decertified if they are found guilty of negligence, serious civil infractions, repeated alcohol or drug abuse, or other aberrant behavior that might lead to unreliable performance.