First, I present an account of what that problem is, how it can be motivated independently of the difference between classical and quantum mechanics, and what the basic logical options are in responding to it. Second, I show that the difference between classical and quantum mechanics that Stapp focuses on does not distinguish between the various logical options in responding to the problem, and thus that it does not in itself provide any solution to it. Third, I argue that any solution that is open to the quantum theorist is equally open to the classical theorist. But the problem I will present has been a central problem in the tradition in the philosophy of mind, and is one of the central problems about the relation of mental to non-mental properties and phenomena, and it is the one in particular with which Stapp is concerned. The problem is generated by a set of propositions all of which can be given strong motivations, and yet which are jointly inconsistent.
Some objects have mental properties.
Mental properties are not conceptually or definitionally reducible to non-mental properties. Every feature of every object is deducible from a complete description of it in terms of its fundamental constituents and their properties and relations. The problem can be motivated independently of concern for the differences between classical and quantum mechanics. The second is that at some time in the past no objects had mental properties. These are all powerful motivations.