If we have the degree of access that would provide such information, such access probably would have been used to uncover or disrupt the terrorist group in question much earlier, long before it got to the point of implementing a specific operation. Indeed, one of the greatest contributions that intelligence can make to civil aviation or to any other potential terrorist target is to facilitate such early pre-emption or disruption of a terrorist group. It is at that stage, perhaps well before particular targets are selected, that the broadest potential benefit from counterterrorist activities can be realized. Of course, if our successes in early-stage disruption were comprehensive enough, this too might obviate expensive security countermeasures. But we are nowhere near that goal.
Terrorists are still very much in business and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
There is greater emphasis by terrorists on inflicting heavy casualties. And the terrorist threat in the 1990s also emanates from sources that are more numerous, and more varied, than was true of most past eras. So there is still plenty of work for intelligence to do. Chiefly in the following four ways, which are in increasing order of specificity. Gauging the terrorist threat to aviation .