Moreover, although the Ad Hoc Group s mandate required Article X provisions to be included in the protocol, meeting that requirement did not necessitate bringing together both compliance and assistance measures in a single package or that their implementation be combined under a single rubric. It probably would have been better to find a creative solution for separating the two sets of measures because the benefits of cooperation extend well beyond the field of weapons. Some people are likely to criticize details of the procedures for conducting investigations, such as the very complex decision-making process for either blocking or initiating a facility investigation. Most problematic in this regard is the requirement that a majority of members of the implementing agency s executive body vote in favor of a requested facility investigation before it can proceed. It should be the other way around the investigation should proceed unless a significant vote is taken to block it.
Timelines are another questionable detail.
Allowing 108 hours for investigators to arrive at the perimeter of a facility is excessive when, in the view of some experts, a site can be cleaned up in 48 hours. Although these and other measures detailing how investigations would be conducted are questionable, the ability to get investigators to the scene of activity of concern is probably the most valuable element of the draft protocol. In that, these measures are similar to the challenge inspection provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the four years that the CWC has been in force however, a challenge inspection has never been requested, despite publicly voiced concerns about the noncompliance of some states-parties. The answer is that transparency leads to enhanced confidence.