I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves to examine the component parts of the English constitution, we shall find them to be the base remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with some new republican materials. The remains of monarchical tyranny in the person of the king. The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers. The new republican materials, in the persons of the commons, on whose virtue depends the freedom of England. T o say that the constitution of England is a union of three powers reciprocally checking each other, is farcical, either the words have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.
T o say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things.
That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after, or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural disease of monarchy. That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or more worthy of confidence than the crown. T he prejudice of Englishmen, in favor of their own government by king, lords, and commons, arises as much or more from national pride than reason. Individuals are undoubtedly safer in England than in some other countries, but the will of the king is as much the law of the land in Britain as in France, with this difference, that instead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the people under the most formidable shape of an act of parliament. For the fate of Charles the First, hath only made kings more subtle not- more just.