Auctions, as mechanisms to perform distributed optimization with self-interested agents, can provide robust solutions. In this talk we will consider some of the computational challenges as auction protocols are integrated more deeply into core business processes, such as procurement and production scheduling.
Simple auctions can fail economically, while complex auctions can fail computationally.
In extending auctions to allow rich bidding languages, negotiation over attributes in addition to price, and advanced models of aggregation, it is important to pay careful attention to both economic and computational properties. We present iBundle, an iterative combinatorial auction which allows agents to bid with logical constraints across bundles of items, as an extended example. David Parkes is a PhD candidate in Computer and Information Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His research studies the design of iterative mechanisms to coordinate systems of self-interested and computationally limited agents, with applications to electronic commerce and distributed optimization. David has worked as a research intern at both Xerox PARC and the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, and is the current recipient of an IBM Fellowship award.