We have no grounds for thinking that the futility of operating a defective search procedure does not apply as much to wild goose chases in philosophy, as it does to wild goose chases in other departments of human activity. We have known since Wittgenstein that ordinary language is far from being a magic, universal spotlight, capable of being turned freely, fluently and accurately onto every dimension of human thought. On the contrary, ordinary language is an intrinsically limited, rustic, frail, even disabled, message carrier. There are many human experiences which are extremely difficult to convey in ordinary language, and then only by good fortune to an intimate, sympathetic friend. There are others which, quite likely, are not conveyable at all.
Some philosophers seem to imagine that they can invent new words to put back the missing coverage.
But such words can only borrow their meaning from existing pieces of ordinary language. They can no more supplant ordinary language than packs made up of ordinary foods in a supermarket can supplant ordinary cuisine. Those who seek to plumb the secrets of 'being' and 'consciousness' by the introspective route seem to me to have failed to learn what Wittgenstein taught us. The heartland of meaningful speech is, of course, the honest expression in ordinary language of understandable emotion. It is centrally concerned with the presence and absence of goodness in others.