We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the information was sufficient to apprise Schopper that a hearing before the court was to be held. Schopper argues that because the notice was received and a weekend intervened, the statutory provision that weekends are not included in the calculation of time is applicable and that the notice was received less than five days in advance. Schopper's notice argument must fail for several reasons. First, the court and not a party scheduled the motion to dismiss. The trial court has the inherent power to control its calendar and scheduling.
Trial courts have discretion to shorten the five-day notice requirement for motions.
We, therefore, conclude that the statutory provisions for notice time required for motions do not limit the trial court's ability to schedule a motion so long as each party has a fair opportunity to prepare and be heard. Second, even if the statutory notice requirements applied to a court scheduling a motion hearing, Schopper received adequate notice. The record discloses that the court sent Schopper a notice of hearing on July 11 and on the same day notice of the motion to dismiss of the Outagamie corporation counsel was mailed to Schopper. The notices sent on July 11 scheduling a hearing on July 25 gave Schopper more than the statutory required five-day notice. Even if we were to disregard the July 11 notice of the corporation counsel, the July 19 notice would be sufficient.