For example, we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired. We believe it is more likely that the Chinese used U.S. design information to inform their own program than to replicate U.S. weapon designs. China s technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media enclosures, declassified U.S. weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative contribution of each cannot be determined. Regardless of the source of the weapons information, it has made an important contribution to the Chinese objective to maintain a second strike capability and provided useful information for future designs.
Significant deficiencies remain in the Chinese weapons program.
The Chinese almost certainly are using aggressive collection efforts to address deficiencies as well as to obtain manufacturing and production capabilities from both nuclear and nonnuclear sources. To date, the aggressive Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear weapons deployment. U.S. information acquired by the Chinese could help them develop a MIRV for a future mobile missile. We do not know if U.S. classified nuclear information acquired by the Chinese has been passed to other countries. Having obtained more modern U.S. nuclear technology, the Chinese might be less concerned about haring their older technology.