In an action commenced before the effective date of this Act, a trial, new trial, or retrial that is in progress on the effective date is governed by the law applicable to the trial, new trial, or retrial immediately before the effective date, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose. Concerning Keco's contract claim, the court held that Baker Hughes had not established that information it obtained from Keco was not a trade secret, so that its third motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Baker Hughes argues that the court of appeals' application of section 16.010 violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution, and that Keco's trade secrets claim is barred by limitations. Baker Hughes also argues that it was entitled to summary judgment on Keco's contract claim. We address each argument in turn.
Statutes of limitations are procedural.
The rule is well settled that procedural statutes may apply to suits pending at the time they became effective, but even a procedural statute cannot be given application to a suit pending at the time it becomes effective if to do so would destroy or impair rights which had become vested before the act became effective. In this connection it is the settled law that, after a cause has become barred by the statute of limitation, the defendant has a vested right to rely on such statute as a defense. To permit barred claims to be revived years later would undermine society's interest in repose, which is one of the principal justifications for statutes of limitations. Thus, we have written that a statute extending the limitations period of a claim already barred by limitations violates the Texas Constitution's prohibition against retroactive laws, which is article I, section 16. But whether a party has a vested right to a limitations defense does not depend on whether the law was settled when suit was filed.