Both cases focused on the question of whether the transportation use had ended. Opay held that it had and Shea held merely that there was no evidence that the transportation purpose had ended. Because the respective drivers died while still in the vehicles, those cases, in addition to lacking precedential effect, are distinguishable from this case as to the situs of the deaths. The former case, decided prior to the Vodinelich and Klug decisions, rests solely on a general causation determination. The post-Klug requirement, however, is that there be a causal connection between the injury and a transportation use of the vehicle.
Strand is distinguishable because it did involve a transportation use of the vehicle.
Strand parked his car overnight in his garage and it leaked gasoline. He was about to leave for work in his car when his housemate activated the garage door opener and fumes from the spilled gasoline were ignited by a gas water heater in the garage. Preparing immediately to drive his car, Strand was engaged in a transportation use and was covered under the no-fault act. Once the decedents had parked their car and gone to bed for the night, they had ceased to use the car for transportation purposes. Although there was an unbroken causal link between the vehicle and the deaths, the vehicle was not being used for transportation purposes at the time of the deaths.