As long as our goal is to understand the behavior, or perhaps replicate it on a computer or other people, the symbolic descriptions are more appropriate than neural. However, there are also processes whose foundations are clearly subsymbolic. Processing appears effortless and intuitive. These properties are very difficult to capture in the symbolic framework. It seems that a complete account of linguistic performance will have to include subsymbolic mechanisms.
Script processing is a case in point.
Any co-occurrence of events forms a basis for a script. Some of them are reinforced more than others and become stronger, other accidental associations die away. Dror and Young claim, however, that any idea that comes from the symbolic approach, such as scripts or lexicon, even when implemented in terms of subsymbolic processes, limits the exploration of the new foundation of cognitive science on neural networks. I would like to argue that although this may be philosophically true, in the practice of cognitive science using results of the symbolic approach to guide subsymbolic research is an effective way to make progress. Completely abandoning our old ideas about how cognition is put together and rebuilding everything on connectionist foundations is a mighty task.