The stated end use for the part was a west European country. The request was handwritten on business letterhead most likely produced on a home computer. The U.S. defense contractor became suspicious when a similar request for the same aircraft part arrived from a different U.S. company in Florida. In the second request, no end user was listed but the part number, quantity, and item number were exactly the same. The two U.S. companies submitting the RFQs were likely front companies either operated by or operating on behalf of the southwest Asian country.
Some front companies can be more blatant and obvious.
A company, located in Florida, sent a letter and a few weeks later telephoned a U.S. defense contractor to establish a business arrangement for the sale of a classified airborne infrared countermeasures system. The U.S. defense contractor could not obtain an export license for this country and so declined to pursue the business arrangement. The company soliciting the business arrangement subsequently approached the U.S. defense contractor about exporting the countermeasures system through a foreign office or subsidiary in a country where an export license could be approved. The best security countermeasure is to know your customer. Many U.S. defense contractors conduct business with the same companies on a daily basis.