Nothing renders the crime of high treason more arbitrary than declaring people guilty of it for indiscreet speeches. Wherever this law is established, there is an end not only of liberty, but even of its very shadow.
Words carried into action assume the nature of that action.
Thus a man who goes into a public market-place to incite the subject to revolt incurs the guilt of high treason, because the words are joined to the action, and partake of its nature. It is not the words that are punished, but an action in which words are employed. Therefore, leaving things as they are, you are to inform us accordingly, that we may be able to judge of words by persons, and that we may duly consider whether we ought to punish or overlook them. In writings there is something more permanent than in words, but when they are in no way preparative to high treason they cannot amount to that charge. And yet Augustus and Tiberius subjected satirical writers to the same punishment as for having violated the law of majesty.