The large number of decisions that we would have to overrule or reconsider, as well as the congressional reenactments discussed above, suggests that Justice Thomas' radical reinterpretation of the Voting Rights Act is barred by the well established principle that stare decisis has special force in the statutory arena. Section 5, he hints, might be interpreted differently. As noted above, in those amendments Congress clearly endorsed the application of the Voting Rights Act to vote dilution claims. Ante, at 1. There is no question that the Voting Rights Act has required the courts to resolve difficult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from an interpretation that Congress has thrice approved.
Statutes frequently require courts to make policy judgments.
The Sherman Act, for example, requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic organization. Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has required the courts to formulate a theory of equal opportunity. Our work would certainly be much easier if every case could be resolved by consulting a dictionary, but when Congress has legislated in general terms, judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid difficult questions. When a statute has been authoritatively, repeatedly, and consistently construed for more than a quarter century, and when Congress has reenacted and extended the statute several times with full awareness of that construction, judges have an especially clear obligation to obey settled law. It is therefore inappropriate for me to comment on the portions ofhis opinion that are best described as an argument that the statute be repealed or amended in important respects.