Given how little we appear to know about the operational concepts that guide biological weapons programs, some caution should be exercised in making assessments regarding the intended objectives of a proliferator. Because we believe that few, if indeed any, of the proliferators have used their biological weapons, there is no real world data on which to judge capabilities. Aerosol dissemination of biological agents requires exquisite skill, because of the many factors, many of them poorly understood, that can affect delivery of the agent. Experience tells us that not all countries are likely to be equally adept at mastering the such techniques, even if one assumes that all understand the problem equally well. As a result, there are likely to be vast differences in the capabilities of the different proliferant countries.
Trends There are some interesting trends in biological weapons proliferation that deserve mention.
First, and perhaps foremost, there is no evidence to suggest any growth in the number of countries with biological weapons programs. Significantly, the ten countries most commonly mentioned today as biological weapons proliferators are the same ones discussed nearly a decade ago. It appears that we are faced with a hard core group of BW proliferators. If this is indeed correct, it clearly has significant implications for the policy community in addressing the BW proliferation problem. In many ways it is not a global problem, but one isolated to a set group of countries, and we may need policy responses that are tailored to the individual countries of concern and not primarily global responses.