In this paper I am interested in exploring, from a feminist perspective, some ethical dimensions of university teaching. Tracing the origins of this feeling reveals some moral quandaries in the situation of university instructors, especially feminist instructors. I suggest some possible causes for feeling fraudulent, attempt to assess its significance, and then sketch some ways of revisioning, if not resolving, the moral quandaries that the feeling of fraudulence reveals. Yet, Tocqueville, who could properly be called the first philosopher of modern democracy, not only discusses at length the mode and content of democratic education, but also emphasizes throughout Democracy in America that such an education is indispensable to democracy. Nevertheless, there is disagreement over how moral education is to be accomplished.
Teaching ethics continues to be a controversial issue in education.
Kant's moral rule, always treat other people as ends in themselves and never as a means to your end, asserts that all people are inherently worthy of respect because they are moral agents free to act on rational principle. Establishing morality by habit, as in Aristotle's rule of moderation, is appropriate for younger children, but Kant's secular, rational ethic provides a way to educate older children so they will make good choices as free and equal citizens in a global, democratic society. This essay confronts some of the conceptual difficulties involved in thinking about the place of technology in social change. It argues that the seemingly intractable nature of the arguments around that problem stems from treating technology and society as distinct entities. Hence the use of stories, not as mere illustrations, but as definitional.