E. Misognynist pornography therefore causes harm to women, and so may be justifiably censored, MacKinnon argues. Consider, for example, a documentary about a rape. Since unlike the Roth or Miller standards, there is no reference to the work as a whole appealing to a prurient interest, or not having redeeming aeshetic value, etc. For example, Picasso did some sexually explicit engravings late in his life that might be so characterized. Censoring pornography is not good for women because it is as likely to be turned against them as for them.
Women have more to fear than to gain from censorship generally.
For example, Andrea Dworkin's own book is evidently currently subject to censorship in Canada. The case for regarding censorship of misogynist pornography as a restriction of discriminatory action rather than speech is weak, since we lack good empirical evidence that pornography does condition male sexual response to images of violence and therefore provokes violence against women. And again, the precedent of considering misogynist pornography to be action rather than speech, and therefore not protected by the first amendment is also dangerous to the interests of women as to any group that can advance its interests only through political speech and action. Once the door is open to considering forms of expression to be action rather than speech, this is likely to be used against groups who will be most at risk if it is possible to restrict unpopular political discourse as not really speech. Two Countries, Two Laws.