Though the institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its role was no more than incidental to economic life. Besides driving some utility companies into bankruptcy, it now appears that the United States will be lucky if the nuclear industry eventually produces as much energy as it has consumed. Most economists simply KNOW that the market can be used to solve many or most of our environmental problems. This assumption has been shown to be false. The combined economic and political cycle can now be summarized.
Specific industries emerge and grow, creating new environmental problems.
Problems are quietly solved by concerned parties and a few affected politicians. When publicity brings environmental problems to broad public attention, new interests favoring regulation organize and win legislative and legal victories against industry interests. When the issues recede from public attention and concern, the newly organized environmental interest groups remain, but vested industry interests are able to recover, and regulatory stalemate results. The regulatory war continues, battles are won and lost, but the rate of real regulatory change slows dramatically. Evidence for this process is provided by the U.S. political history regarding air pollution, water pollution, and pesticide regulation as well as management of the national forests.