In response, Aetna removed the action to federal district court, where both Aetna and Wright moved for summary judgment. Wright argued that Aetna was bound by the reimbursement agreement since Aetna drafted the agreement and since the SPD reimbursement provision specifically contemplated such an agreement. According to Wright, the reimbursement agreement required her to reimburse Aetna only from those settlement proceeds attributable to medical expenses. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Aetna. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards used by the district court.
Summary judgment is warranted where there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Essentially, Aetna argues that the SPD reimbursement provision's express requirement that Wright sign a reimbursement agreement is of no import. The only language in the SPD reimbursement provision that matters, Aetna argues, is the language that suggests a general obligation to reimburse Aetna from third party damages attributable to medical as well as nonmedical expenses. We refuse to accept an argument that asks us to ignore explicit language in a SPD and accordingly reject Aetna's argument that the reimbursement agreement is of no import. Rather, we look to the reimbursement agreement to interpret Wright's reimbursement obligation. In Alday, we similarly held that a booklet summarizing benefits, letters to employees, and seminar documents could not modify an unambiguous plan document.