Although they are largely right on the latter point, technology has been an essential ingredient in most RMAs. Moreover, most who argue that an RMA is afoot or within reach today begin their case with reference to recent radical leaps in the power of computers and electronics, often claiming to be able to extrapolate those trencis to other areas of defense technology. This chapter also puts forth a broad verdict on the RMA hypothesis, accepting parts of it but disputing others, and arguing against the most sweeping policy pre- . . They consider security issues such as U.S. requirements for overseas military bases in the early twenty-first century and the future of multinational military operations. They also offer prescriptions for Pentagon budgeting.
Scientific progress is most rapid in the spheres of electronics and computers.
RMA proponents are right about the remarkable trends in these areas, even if they are often wrong to suggest that other areas of defense technology are advancing almost as fast. Someday those activities, and the technologies and new warfighting concepts they produce, may convincingly argue for a major overhaul of the U.S. military. We cannot yet know if that will be the case. But we can be confident that there is not a compelling case for immediate and wholesale transformation at the turn of the century.