Other countries tend to place a higher value on commercial interaction than the United States and are less willing to forfeit it voluntarily. In addition, the notion that economic interaction is desirable because it promotes more open political and economic systems is an argument that normally has more resonance in other capitals. Such thinking makes achieving what is desirable, namely multilateral support for sanctions, less feasible than the United States tends to want. And even in the case of Iraq, generous compensation for affected states, including Egypt and Turkey, was a prerequisite for these government's and others sustaining support for sanctions. This approach has had some deterrent effect on the willingness of certain individuals and firms to enter into proscribed business activities, but at a significant political price.
Unilateral sanctions can be expensive for American business.
Sanctions, do, however, affect the economy by reducing revenues of U.S. companies and individuals. Moreover, even this cost is difficult to measure because it needs to reflect not simply lost sales but also forfeited opportunities stemming from governments and overseas companies electing not to do business with the United States for fear that sanctions might be introduced and thereby interrupt the supply of spare parts or otherwise complicate or prohibit normal commercial relations. Multilateral support for economic sanctions should normally constitute a prerequisite for the introduction of economic sanctions by the United States. Such support need not be simultaneous, but it should be all but certain and likely to follow with little delay. Unilateral sanctions should be avoided except in those circumstances that the United States is in a unique situation to derive leverage based on the economic relationship with the target.