Repeated interaction produced simple dynamics that converged to the equilibrium selected by the historical accident of the initial median. Since all baseline experiments exhibit coordination failure, they provide a striking example of how strategic uncertainty can lead to coordination failure. Treatment Omega reduced the strategic uncertainty confronting subjects by eliminating considerations of security. Payoff-dominance accurately predicts the modal response to period game . Treatment Phi reduced the strategic uncertainty confronting subjects by eliminating considerations of payoff-dominance.
Security accurately predicts the modal response to period game .
As with the baseline treatment, the historical accident of the initial median selected the equilibrium outcome implemented in all three Omega treatments and all three Phi treatments. Continuation treatments found little evidence for the salience of weak precedent. Instead, experience in related games increased the salience of payoff-dominance. However, like the initial treatment, the historical accident of the period eleven median determines which equilibrium point obtains in the continuation treatment. Hence, all treatments provide evidence that the initial median in a treatment provides a salient precedent in average opinion games.