Under the proposed terms of the performance bond, violation of any of the conditions will result in the bond's revocation. Under a conventional bond agreement, returning an offender to jail who has failed to appear in court preserves the bondsman's profit. He has discharged his duties, and everyone, with the exception of the defendant, is happy. Under ALEC's proposal, however, the bondsman will lose money regardless of whether he returns the offender to jail. Under these circumstances there is little incentive for the bondsman to supervise that offender in any real sense of the word.
Supervision involves more than just monitoring behavior.
It consists of intervention and counseling, along with repeated attempts to enforce conditions where there is non-compliance. There is an obvious conflict of interest if the bondsman loses money when an offender has to be taken back into custody and the bondsman provides the supervision that uncovers violations resulting in rearrest. It seems logical that this arrangement would be a disincentive for the bondsman to provide meaningful supervision. The highly constrictive nature of the performance bond as outlined by ALEC is attractive to both legislators and the public. The consequences for both family members and bondsmen, should the offender violate the conditions, seem to offer great incentive for everyone involved to keep the offender on the path to rehabilitation.