It also shows, however, that the air war against Germany was, on the whole, unsuccessful. Each B-17 carried a crew of 10, so on some raids literally hundreds of highly and expensively trained men were killed or captured in one night. In all likelihood those men and materials would have done more good elsewhere, including tactical air support and anti-submarine flying. Whether these German efforts were militarily necessary is not clear, but they happened, and so it may be that, as with the ghastly battle of the Somme in 1916, the strategic bombing of Germany in 1942-45 cost the enemy more than it cost us. Criticisms of the senior officers responsible for both as stupid, callous butchers are way off the mark unless they can deal with this consideration.
Tactical madness can make good strategic sense.
In Kosovo there are no other arenas, so it won't work if history is any guide. I'd be happy to lend these books to Art Eggleton. John Robson is Senior Writer and Deputy Editorial Pages Editor.