The book provides a comprehensive assessment of the pre-Gulf War Iraqi nuclear weapon programme. The final outcome of this process will depend on North Korea allowing the IAEA to investigate thoroughly its historical plutonium production programme and determine if the country has hidden a stock of weapon-grade plutonium. The international community needs to maintain strong support for the United Nations and IAEA Action Team inspections in Iraq. The IAEA requires strong support in its efforts to determine North Korea's past nuclear activities within the context of the Agreed Framework India, Pakistan and Israel need to be brought into the negotiation of an agreement to cut-off the production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear explosives. These stocks continue to grow at the rate of about 70 tonnes p.a.
Separated plutonium is far more accessible for nuclear weapon use.
This surplus is expected to grow to about 250 tonnes over the next decade. Surpluses are growing at these unprecedented rates because plutonium separation in reprocessing plants is not being matched by plutonium disposition through recycling as fuel in civil power reactors. France, the UK and Russia hold the largest inventories of civil plutonium, but an increasing amount of this material will be owned by NNWS in Europe and by Japan. The transition away from reprocessing is hindered by binding contracts with reprocessors and the uncertainty faced by utilities in pursuing long-term spent fuel storage policies. There is an urgent need for a profound reassessment of civil reprocessing and plutonium management policy in Europe and Asia.