The weakness of the coalition in responding to Saddam's actions inside his country should not be interpreted as its demise. A good deal of consensus continues to exist, enough so that keeping the sanctions in place and preventing Iraq from again becoming a strategic threat to its neighbors should be possible. Reinvigorating the coalition should be the first priority. This means repairing the U.S.-Turkish relationship and consulting closely with Turkey about how best to deal with future crises in northern Iraq. It must thus become a foreign policy priority to continue Operation Provide Comfort , both to avoid suggesting to Saddam that he enjoys a free hand in the north and so that the U.S. and Turkish governments are prepared for a new crisis that would require U.S. use of Turkish bases.
Turkey ought to be willing to sign on to such a course.
We similarly need to make sure a consensus exists that Saddam will not be able to mass forces against any of his neighbors as he did in July 1990 and again in October 1994. U.S. policy should ensure that Saddam does not re-emerge as a strategic threat. This policy also has the potential to create a context in which the Iraqi people move against Saddam. Toward that end, the United States must do a much better job of articulating just how Iraq would benefit under a different leadership, one that would demonstrate its intention to act responsibly. This approach also has the potential to be more effective than renewed covert policy in which the Kurds are used as the foundation of an anti-Saddam effort.