In addition to the suspect nuclear site, North Korea's three-stage missile capability potentially could land payloads on the United States. On the contrary, it must remain central to our approach. Let me just briefly review the elements of our strategy against proliferation. It helps our nonproliferation strategy when we can remind Russia or China of their legally-binding obligations under the NPT, the CWC, or the BWC not to assist other countries acquire those weapons. Again, it doesn't solve all the problems in a single stroke, but it gives us another tool to stroke with.
Sanctions have a key role.
Nobody likes them much, but the conventional wisdom that they never work is wrong. Sanctions also warn others that proliferation entails costs. Of course a sanction becomes a positive inducement when you remove it. Activating the 1985 peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with China was done in the context of significant Chinese actions to phase-out even peaceful nuclear contacts with Iran. Of course our most controversial positive inducements are light water-reactors and interim heavy fuel oil deliveries, linked to North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework.