The mother contends that the court erred when it applied a preponderance of the evidence standard in determining that the Department may cease reunification and rehabilitation efforts, that due process requires the application of a clear and convincing standard of proof, and that the Department failed to meet that standard. Because we conclude that the court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in its determination, we affirm the judgment.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
If the court determines that a child is in circumstances of jeopardy, the court may issue an order providing protection to that child. If the child is removed from the home, the statute places on the Department a responsibility to aid in reunification of the child's family and in the family's rehabilitation. In certain circumstances, however, the obligation imposed on the Department to aid in the reunification and rehabilitation of the family need not be undertaken, or if undertaken, may be ended. If the mother's contention is correct, the legislature would have intended for two separate burdens of proof to apply in a single hearing for a final protection order. The statute clearly states that a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate before a protection order is issued.