This connection then spreads out via the rest of the theorists language to descriptions of the ends and activities of the humans whose linguistic objects are in question. This is to say that such revision is required to apply this style of theory to natural language, since demonstratives are a universal feature of natural languages. We need a person, a time and a demonstrated book. There must be a demonstrated book. In a Tarski-style theory of truth, suitably revised to be serviceable for natural languages, linguistic objects, speakers, and times have truth applied to them, in such settings.
Truth is the notion that is applied.
A person, time and sentence. The linguistic objects that truth is applied to are not closed sentences, but sub sentential expressions. The linguist might then explain the truth of sentences as deriving from reference and expression, in virtue of the fact that reference is a way of putting things into discussion, and expression is a way of putting conditions into discussion, and a sentence is a way of creating the sort of discussion required for truth when it's not already underway. A welcome result.