Long before the Challenger accident, however, it was becoming obvious that even the modified goal of two flights a month was overambitious. In establishing the schedule, NASA had not provided adequate resources for its attainment. As a result, the capabilities of the system were strained by the modest nine-mission rate of 1985, and the evidence suggests that NASA would not have been able to accomplish the 14 flights scheduled for 1986. These are the major conclusions of a Commission examination of the pressures and problems attendant upon the accelerated launch schedule. The result would have been an unacceptable compression of the time available for the crews to accomplish their required training.
Spare parts are in critically short supply.
The Shuttle program made a conscious decision to postpone spare parts procurements in favor of budget items of perceived higher priority. Lack of spare parts would likely have limited flight operations in 1986. Stated manifesting policies are not enforced. Payload specialists frequently were added to a flight well after announced deadlines. Late changes to a mission adversely affect the training and development of procedures for subsequent missions.