Evidence of post-offence conduct is susceptible to jury error because the jury may fail to take into account alternative explanations for the accused s behaviour, and because the jury might fail to consider whether a feeling of guilt relates to some culpable act other than the crime in issue. Therefore, Arcangioli held that a jury should not be allowed to consider post-offence conduct when the accused h as admitted culpability for another offence and the evidence cannot logically support an inference of guilt with respect to one crime rather than the other. In White and Cote, the Appellants argued that Arcangioli governed and that the jury ought to have been told that the post-offence conduct had no probative value on consciousness of guilt regarding Chiu s murder because those acts were equally explained by reference to the parole violations and bank robberies. Post-offence conduct, while inadmissible for the purpose of linking the conduct to the offence being tried rather than some other admitted offence, may still be admissible for other purposes like connecting the accused to the scene of the crime or to a piece of evidence, or to undermine the accused s credibility generally. The jury will generally be given the task of deciding whether the post-offence conduct is related to the crime before the court or to some other culpable act.
Weight is also for the jury.
In White and Cote, identity was the main issue in dispute, not their degrees of guilt. The criminal standard of proof is not applicable to post-offence conduct. The criminal standard of proof applies only to the jury s final determination of guilt or innocence and is not to be applied to individual items or categories of evidence. No persuasive reasons exist for creating an exception to this general rule for evidence of post-offence conduct. Post-offence conduct, like any evidence, takes on its full significance and probative value only in the context of the other evidence in the case.