After the war, the Russian generals convinced both themselves and the politicians that the reasons for the defeat were irresolution in the government, and broad popular hostility to the conflict. Accordingly, they concluded that before relaunching the war, they needed to gain unanimous support among the political elites and to gag the mouths of critics. In the resumption of armed operations, the lessons of NATO's Kosova campaign have been reinterpreted in Russian fashion. The population has been swamped with propaganda. Opponents of the war have been either denied access to the mass media or intimidated into silence.
Surveys indicate that support in Russia for the conflict is by no means as universal as is claimed.
Nevertheless, the psychological substrate is one of profound public apathy. Among Russians, the image of the Chechen fighter, courageously battling the despised Yeltsin regime, has faded. Contrary to the claims of war propagandists, this is not so much because people have learned something they did not know earlier, as because the past three years really have brought changes in Chechnya. With the republic effectively independent, prominent Chechen field commanders have turned into corrupt criminal bosses, closely linked to the worst elements of the Russian elite. For big-time Russian criminals, the existence of Chechnya as a territory within Russia's nominal boundaries, but outside the control of the Russian state, has created phenomenal opportunities.