Israeli security in exchange for a political process was the quid pro quo that seemed to emerge from the logic of Oslo. It was a very difficult proposition to maintain and became vulnerable to change, to domestic politics, and now to an absence of trust. That trade-off, although logical, needs to be revitalized in two fundamental respects. Number one, security is not traded for a political process. If the Palestinians perceive the proposition in this manner, it will fail.
Security becomes an admission ticket into a relationship with an adversary.
You discharge your security obligations so that you can negotiate peacefully with your neighbor. Unfortunately, security cooperation has fallen victim to those who argue it should be used as a card to be played when the negotiations are going well and to be held when the negotiations are going badly. That suggestion is not sustainable. It is impossible for anybody to control suicide terrorism or to hermetically seal Israel from suicide terror. Security must be pursued bilaterally between the Israelis and Palestinians and unilaterally by the Palestinians, who must take certain steps to preempt, counter, and ultimately delegitimize those elements in their own society who still politically espouse violence as a way to pressure and manipulate negotiations.