If the PRC had unrestricted access to a U.S. communications satellite for at least two hours, the PRC military could gain valuable information that is not otherwise available in the public domain. The PRC could accomplish even exploitation that penetrated the interior of the satellite, given two hours of time, without leaving any traces. With this kind of exploitation, the PRC could gain new information about major satellite subsystems, as well as the design and manufacture of each subsystem. While unmonitored PRC access to a U.S. satellite for more than five or six hours would produce diminishing returns, there is almost nothing about a U.S. satellite that the PRC could not learn from unrestricted access for 24 hours. Among the reasons the PRC would be interested in exploiting the technology in U.S. communications satellites is to determine the satellite manufacturer s techniques for passive thermal control.
Thermal control is critical to satellite life.
Obtaining part numbers could allow the PRC to try to acquire U.S. technology directly from the manufacturer that would improve the performance and provide for longer on-orbit life for PRC satellites. Launch-related equipment, documents, and personnel accompany the satellite to the PRC military facility for the launch campaign. Technical interchange meetings between U.S. and PRC experts also occur. All of these materials and exchanges relating to controlled technology or information are required to be monitored by the Defense Department. Unauthorized PRC access to controlled equipment or materials, including blueprints or testing equipment, could benefit the PRC s own military space launch activities.