But I know of no valid argument which establishes that we cannot have conjectural knowledge about ultimate reality. Whether they are real is a question of belief. No reality nor truth without belief. Afterwards one tends to forget, or even deny, that we have made them up. The reason for this relapse, as on other occasions in the history of conceptual thinking, is that the fictitious MIR is desired because it is erroneously believed to be an external, thus a mind-independent, source of security and stability of thought.
Static ontology is impossible but something like it is desired for stability.
I recommend to the reader the argument I develop in the book designed to show that because of the indispensable or vital epistemological and methodological roles that these theses play in natural science, we are entirely justified in holding them to be a part of scientific knowledge, even though they are about mind independent ultimate reality. There is much in NM's description that I agree with. This is perhaps not such much a contradiction as an omission, but it indicates in my opinion a conceptual error which undermines his foundation.