Even if one puts the impact of the US sanctions policy in the best light, however, it would be hard to call the results to date successful . For example, sanctions contributed to the release of the US hostages in Iran in 1981, but had little impact on the eventual removal of Noreiga from Panama. Despite our low threshold for success, we found that successful cases have become increasingly rare as globalization has made it easier for target countries to tap international trade and capital markets and find alternative suppliers of goods and capital. In the 1990s, sanctions have contributed to the achievement of US foreign policy goals in less than 20 percent of the cases. In light of this experience, the United States should use sanctions with care.
Sanctions are blunt policy tools that are easily circumvented.
Contrary to popular belief, there is no such thing as smart sanctions that maximize benefits with minimal costs. The smart sanctioner will realize these limitations, and tailor measures to better match the costs of these policies with their anticipated results. The third edition of this two-volume study, including cases initiated in the 1990s and analysis of the use of sanctions in the post Cold War period, should be available in early 1998. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Economic Sanctions Reconsidered , pp. See Gary C. Hufbauer et.