Of course, there have been a number of similar studies and recommendations from varying sources before and during this period, but these two are referenced to indicate 16 years of relative inattention and clear inaction. Later, under single management, tactical airlift has not fared much better due to similar competing priorities. Notwithstanding tactical airlift's near-orphan status, Army, Air Force, and joint doctrines fully expect the Air Force to provide the tactical airlift response necessary for maintaining the initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization on which AirLand Battle success depends. Nor will there be much argument or time for scholastic dissertations. His game plan calls for Air Force support, and I suspect he will get it.
War is still hell.
Those who still remember a land war in Europe can recall boring in on hundreds of strategic or tactical objectives, absorbing remarkable tosses, but pressing in all the same. The two situations are not as dissimilar as one might wish. In all major conflicts, losses are seriously measured against requirements and objectives. Under current doctrine, the LCC has every right to expect the Air Force to provide sufficient tactical airlift assets at the place and time of need and with the precise integrity and interval across or into an objective area that supports the intended ground tactical circumstances. In his provocative and imaginative book Red Storm Rising , Tom Clancy, knowingly or not, incorporated all four tenets in his exciting dramatization of the AirLand Battle and maneuver warfare.