However, by distributing these logon attempts over different servers, each with is own copy of the password file, someone can get many more than five tries to guess the password. Navin indicated that the AIS authentication system could, instead, query CTS's server as a backend. So this may eliminate this problem. If a single password is used by an individual to gain access to everything, then a hacker who acquires someone's password has access to everything that person can do. This becomes more of a problem when many services, run by a variety of departments with different levels of security rigor, are authenticating using the same password-space.
Someone can choose the weakest server, hack into it, and sniff passwords.
By capturing a password there they can then gain access to the strongest server. Michael made the point that systems such as Kerberos, which can provide the convenience of single signon, go to great lengths to make every authentication path secure to avoid this problem. However, neither AIS's nor CTS's current authentication service can offer this level of security. Navin suggested that the AIS system can tell the application which type of authentication was provided so that the application can decide whether it is strong enough. However, the concern exists that if we do nothing, the outcome that will fill the vacuum could be even worse.