Voters can verify that their ballots were received at the remote ballot boxes by visiting a Web service with voter lists. Verifiability can considerably reduce the probability of undetected fraud. If only a small fraction of voters do verify that their cast ballots were received for tallying, voters in the entire county will benefit because this process reduces the probability of undetected fraud from ballots being lost . This test provided an opportunity for voters and the public in general to see for themselves that Safevote's technology provides fail-safe privacy, verifiable security and election integrity and is, at the same time, far easier to use than anything else on the market, Gerck said. Considering the machines at the voting office are connected via an effectively unknown and changing IP address, and then in turn making connections to six other machines in unknown locations, again with unpublished IP addresses they re going to be rather difficult to get at.
Voters deserve no less.
Safevote intends to repeat the attack test in the near future and is collecting suggestions for test conditions and the release of secret information in order to make it somewhat easier for attackers. Of course, in a real election Safevote would not release any information that could facilitate any type of attack on the network or on election data. In a real election Safevote would also not reveal even partially which range of IP numbers is being used, and other configuration data such as random seeds. This is not a gentleman s game and law is too sluggish in moving against automated fraud and con games, concluded Gerck. That is why we need to keep every advantage, so that attacks can be forestalled as much as possible and do not cost us time and resources in defending against them.