A traffic judge, therefore, is not exercising judicial power under section 479.500. They base their assertions on the premise that the legislature unconstitutionally delegated the task of judicial review to traffic court commissioners. As discussed above, traffic court commissioners do not exercise judicial review when they hear cases in the first instance. Mo. Const. art. Appellants' assertion is without merit.
Traffic judges serve at the pleasure of, and act under the direct review of, circuit court judges.
As section 479.500 is construed and implemented in the twenty-first judicial circuit, a circuit judge enters judgment on the commissioner's findings. Section 302.535 specifically provides that any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the department of revenue to revoke or suspend a driver's license may file a petition for a trial de novo in the circuit court. Having determined that sections 479.500 and 302.535 are valid as implemented, this Court turns to the question of whether Ressel and Dabin were afforded due process under sections 479.500 and 302.535 as they were applied in these cases. Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Due process applies to the suspension or revocation of a driver's license by the state.