The DOD has been unable to procure advanced weapon systems that can lower the cost and increase the performance of the armed forces. The need to swiftly introduce new weapons systems is paramount. The transformation of U.S. military power to take full advantage of commercially created information technology may require undertaking a near-term investment to acquire modem capabilities derived from U.S. scientific and industrial preeminence, rather than simply upgrading existing systems. The present weapons system acquisition process was designed for a different environment than the one that exists today. It is ill suited to meet the demands posed by an expansion of unconventional and asymmetrical threats in an era of rapid technological advances and pervasive proliferation.
Some efforts take far longer.
Such processes are not responsive to urgent new challenges that involve considerable uncertainties. They are not capable of harnessing the remarkable genius and productivity of the modern, information-based commercial and industrial sectors that have done so much to revolutionize the U.S. civilian economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the time from initial concept to actual deployment was significantly shorter than it is today. In short, the pace of development has become slower while the pace of technological change has become far more rapid. These two opposite trends conspire to create a situation where it is difficult for the acquisition process to produce anything other than capabilities that are already a generation behind when deployed.