Bureaucrats are shifted from post to post much more frequently than efficient job performance would justify. No one knows whose interests are being served or why a particular posting has been made, meaning that civil servants do not influence decisions about postings in an organized manner. Since a successful post holder is one who acquires funds to move to a more lucrative post, the individual must specialize in the private distribution of goods and services to maximize kickbacks and bribes. Thus, bureaucrats become specialists at mismanagement, working at cross- purposes with the laws and institutions they oversee. The mobility of bureaucrats is a bad practice only when it is conducted without any reference to serving the needs of constituents.
Transfers are a poor surrogate for performance ratings and accountability for outputs.
Panels made up of representatives of citizen and government interests would correct the arbitrary character of the present system. When the charge is to eliminate corrupt officials, remedies other than sending the problem to another locale are likely to be more effective. The solution to capricious transfers is neither difficult to conceive nor implement. The attractiveness of the ad hoc criteria governing transfers can be easily curtailed, but, like many perverse practices, they are maintained. The bureaucracy is reacting to what the system rewards.