Given the tensions inflamed by the bid, and Woodside's role in mustering opposition to it on national-interest grounds, and the festering and escalating disagreements on Woodside's offshore exploration strategy, that, however, also looks unlikely. Now that has happened, presumably Shell will be interested to hear what they have to say. Whether it would be prepared to see its interest in Woodside reduced to that of an investor, as would probably occur if BHP's concept of backing BHP Petroleum into Woodside in exchange for sufficient shares to emerge with control, is another issue. It is also possible it could open negotiations with Woodside for a scaled-down version of the asset swap, one involving something less than outright control of Woodside. Suffice to say that the positions and future of Woodside and Shell's interest in the company are fluid and open.
Some fundamental change is likely.
Woodside shareholders, and the foreign arbitrageurs who built holdings in the company after Shell's bid was announced in particular, aren't going to be happy with Costello. The exposure of the arbitrageurs, who thought they had a one-way bet, explains some of the hysteria about the currency effects of a rejection. The rejection will be seen as a rejection of foreign investment, but Shell's status as a foreign company had little to do with Costello's decision other than that it was taken under the cover of the Foreign Takeovers Act. The real issue that Shell failed to overcome was its ownership of interests in a raft of competing LNG projects in the region, and its inability to resolve to the government's satisfaction the potential for conflict between its interests and the Australian national interest. That is more akin to a regional competition policy issue than one of foreign ownership.