For example, these voters may adopt a don't waste my vote strategy in which they vote for their sincerely preferred alternative only if that alternative is likely to be one of the top contenders. A variation on this is the vote against last choice strategy in which voters vote for whichever alternative has the best chance of beating their least favorite alternative. Those who wish to show that the winner is not strongly supported or express sympathy for a candidate who is unlikely to win may adopt an underdog strategy in which they vote for the alternative mostly likely to come in last place. Thus, in order to behave rationally, a voter must have a set of preferences, a set of beliefs, and a strategy consistent with his or her preferences and beliefs. In this chapter we develop an automated strategy formulator that produces strategies which optimally represent the rational voter in a DSV election.
Section introduces a formal method for determining a voter's rationally optimal strategy.
Section discusses methods for determining and quantifying beliefs about the preferences of other voters and introduces a novel method that scales better than those found in the literature. Section examines the specification of strategies for voters who are indifferent between the alternatives. These elements are tied together and a decision-theoretic strategy formulator is presented in Section .