Rohrer's attempt to show the way in this regard relies on a certain ambiguity. An important step away from Bloom is the declaration that no philosophical truths are being assumed, no foundational metaphysics. A kind of open-ended, liberal facilitation of student reflection on such matters has its appeal, though against the backdrop of diagnosed ills, the position can be challenged from politically diverse angles for the way it reaffirms an unhappy status quo. Bloomians would see the swamp of relativism merely deepened, while, for example, Freire worries that teachers who renounce their standing in authority in favor of a posture of facilitating are tacitly authoritarian, since they endorse the primacy of the system that maintains them in their privileged position. What is at stake, on the strong view, is authentic being itself.
Teachers thus play an emancipatory role.
Membership in the friends of Bloom is also, in principle, open to all. The central ambiguity of Rohrer's paper seems to me to reflect the understandable goal of avoiding this problematic comparison, by way of the weaker position, while buttressing philosophy's place at the center of educational practice by way of the stronger one. What we make of the ambiguity depends, I think, on the way the problem is understood. If, as Rohrer suggests, following Bloom, philosophy is the tonic for education's ills, we would need to press for a clearer prescription, some further theoretical resolution. But perhaps the paper serves another, philosophically more modest role.