Thus the time-honoured model scientific method, Popperians often claim, is in ruins. They claim that induction is as mythical as raw hypothesis-free data and so there has to be better way of describing the epistemology of science. Briefly, the Popper answer is that science works deductively. The hypothesis holds up to the extent that it withstands attempts to falsify it. So scientific truth comprises propositions that have yet to be falsified despite our best efforts to do so.
Scientific knowledge is, ipso facto, provisional pending possible falsification.
It is a corollary of this view that some propositions, which by their very nature do not lend themselves to falsification tests, are, for that very reason, devoid of objective meaning - devoid of first order status in the real world. In passing, it cannot properly be argued that since many data are, demonstrably, hypothesis-laden therefore all data are so loaded. The fact is that we all actually use induction as though it were dependable while knowing all the time that ultimately it is not. One does not need epistemological sophistication to see this mismatch. When he set out on his famous voyage, Darwin appears to have had only two hypotheses in mind relating to the observations he set out to make.