Bargaining theory helps explain the instability. Earlier in this chapter I explained that a game of redistribution under majority rule with symmetrical voters has an empty core. Similarly, a game of coalition government with symmetrical parties has an empty core. The trouble with this argument is that its logic applies to almost ANY situation of bargaining among multiple parties. But coalitions are not unstable in ALL multi-party situations.
Some countries enjoy highly stable coalition governments while others are less stable.
In trying to apply the analysis in straightforward ways like this, Cooter often oversimplifies issues that deserve closer scrutiny. Another accomplishment of the book is that it draws on a daunting interdisciplinary literature, making use of work in economics, law and, to a lesser extent, political science. In surveying such a large body of work, it is obviously impossible to include all relevant research. Nevertheless, even with this caveat in mind, important works that are central to the issues of concern to Cooter are conspicuously absent from the book. Similarly, in discussing electoral law, Cooter largely ignores a substantial political science literature.