Projections range from small numbers to many millions. Despite strong criticisms of ministers and civil servants for failing to keep the public fully informed as to possible risks, the report commends the government for taking significant measures to protect human health when the likelihood of transmission to humans was considered remote. Allegations of a cover up cannot be substantiated, but the report says it was not surprising that the public felt it had been deceived. But the report concludes that there is no foundation in the allegation that the ministry put the interests of farmers before consumers.
Scientists generally come out of the report well.
By the time BSE was identified in 1986, as many as 50,000 cattle were likely to have been infected. At the heart of the BSE story lie questions of how to handle hazard - a known hazard to cattle and an unknown hazard to humans. The government took measures to address both hazards. They were sensible measures, but they were not always timely nor adequately implemented and enforced. The lack of rigour by officials in implementing policy decisions was partly because of the belief of many before 1996 that BSE was not a potential threat to human life.