To avoid that differences in intuitive interpretations muddle the discussion of deontic logic, we shall undertake a logical analysis that makes the various specific interpretations explicit parts of our analysis of the deontic concepts. Expressed in another way, each of the above interpretations may amount to a different notion of obligation. Once you have more than one possible notion, the need arises for a systematic analysis making explicit the various differences in the notions, and making explicit how the different notions are related. The result of this analysis is a set of distinct but logically related notions of obligation and permission. Each notion will be represented as a modal logical operator.
Strong obligation implies general obligation.
Hence, general obligation implies an obligation for some specific individual, and an obligation for some specific individual implies an unspecific obligation. A weak obligation is implied by an unspecific obligation. We hold that special obligations are more likely to conflict than general or strong obligations. The result is situations where the fulfillment of one special obligation makes the fulfillment of another special obligation impossible. We also discuss whether a similar analysis is possible for the notion of directed permission.