It is now more than two years after the initial sale, the validity of that sale has been fully litigated in two courts, yet if we dismiss the appeal it could be years before the property can be finally distributed. The uncertainty over title has already created another round of litigation over responsibility for past-due rents. The uncertainty can impose other costs as well. Purchasers are likely to demand a steep discount in return for investing in the property. And disqualifying Pierson may deprive the estate of its highest bidder.
Similar problems surround the other three leases and the personal property.
We thus conclude that the approach endorsed in Gillespie requires us to hear this appeal. Because we have jurisdiction under the Gillespie doctrine, we need not decide whether other exceptions to the finality requirement are applicable. We also do not decide how often the costs of litigation in two courts below, whether the second court be a district court or a BAP, will justify invocation of the Gillespie doctrine. We note, however, that the courts designated as intermediate appellate courts in bankruptcy proceedings have a jurisdiction over interlocutory decisions denied the courts of appeals. Thus there is nothing in the structure of the Bankruptcy Reform Act that requires all decisions appealable to the district courts or BAPs to be automatically appealable to the courts of appeals.