For Berkeley brings forward against the present existence of external objects only the inconceivability of the relation of a Being to mind. This conception gives an instance of the difficulties which appear in regard to these questions, and which Berkeley wished to escape from in a quite original way. As to what Berkeley further states in respect of the empirical content, where the object of his investigation becomes entirely psychological, it relates in the main to finding out the difference between the sensations of sight and feeling, and to discovering which kind of sensations belong to the one and which to the other. The only point of interest is that these investigations have in their course chiefly lighted on space, and a dispute is carried on as to whether we obtain the conception of distance and so on, in short all the conceptions relating to space, through sight or feeling. And since here perception finds an objective thought, it really would be led on to thought or to the possession of a thought, but at the same time it cannot arrive at thought in its completion, since thought or the Notion are not in question, and it clearly cannot come to the consciousness of true reality.
Nothing is thought in the form of thought, but only as an external, as something foreign to thought.
Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. I. p. 264, seq. Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. I. p. 279 seq.