In both situations, the court is disposing of the accused after having found he engaged in delinquent conduct. Second, nothing in the statute purports to differentiate between an initial disposition and a modification thereof. So, to the extent that appellant complains of the court's alleged failure to make the sanction level assignment called for in the Guidelines, the allegation falls within the scope of section 59.014, irrespective of whether the sanction is levied via an initial disposition or modification of a disposition. This is allegedly so, due to his age and because other alternatives were potentially available. We overrule this point as well.
Trial courts have broad discretionary power in determining the suitable disposition of a child.
Thus, we can reject its decision only if it failed to comply with controlling rules and guidelines. Statute permits a trial court to modify a prior disposition and commit a juvenile to the TYC if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. So too did it direct him to commit no offenses against the laws of Texas as a condition of remaining on probation. Despite this admonishment, appellant subsequently burglarized a home and an automobile. These criminal actions amounted to a violation of not only the conditions of his probation, but also the February 1998 decree.