Here, because the statute does not require proof of the intent to cause a particular result or the intent that a specific consequence occur as a result of the performance of the prohibited act, but only requires proof that defendant intentionally discharged the firearm, the trial court correctly concluded that the crime of discharge of a firearm in an occupied structure is a general intent crime. Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel asserted a voluntary intoxication defense at trial despite the trial court's ruling that discharge of a firearm in an occupied structure was not a specific intent crime. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation prejudiced the defendant to the extent that it denied him a fair trial. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's assistance constituted sound trial strategy.
Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to a specific intent crime.
Before trial, the prosecutor requested that the trial court determine whether the offense of discharge of a firearm in an occupied structure required a specific or a general intent. Because it's not a specific intent crime, then the alcohol instruction as a defense will not be given. The prosecutor then requested that the court direct defense counsel not to argue an intoxication defense and that the court give CJI2d 6.1, which instructs the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charged crimes. I don't have a problem with you arguing it because that's all it is, is argument. I'm more concerned about what this jury is going to be instructed with.