Even if the Duma acts to increase the defense budget, it does not mean an immediate infusion of money into weapons programs. Second, only 40 to 60 percent of what was allocated in the budget was actually paid in 1997 and 1998. Unless Russia reverses its policy of maintaining at least the semblance of strategic nuclear parity with the United States, even these additional funds will be no more than a drop in the bucket. According to a Duma source, by 2001, the service life of all of Russia's long-range nuclear cruise missiles will have expired. By 2003, Russia may have as few as 1,000 operational strategic nuclear warheads.
Most Russian politicians see nuclear parity as an issue that goes well beyond nuclear strategy.
From a Russian perspective, Moscow must continue to rely on it as one of the only available trappings of great power status. While the emotional desire to stay at the highest level of nuclear readiness is understandable, Russia's specific actions must be commensurate with available funding and consistent with overall national security imperatives. Under a pessimistic but more realistic scenario of continued economic turmoil and slow recovery, the total would be well under 500. The rate of attrition in Russia's strategic weapons is running far ahead of any future-oriented arms control plans. The basic issue would be to determine how many nukes are enough, and to concentrate on maintaining that number.