Like argues the trial court erred in finding no issue of material fact existed. These allegations, Like suggests, present material factual issues that remain undecided and are reasons for reversing and remanding this matter for further proceedings. Pierce concedes Like was a business invitee and, therefore, he owed a duty to use ordinary care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition. Nonetheless, he argues Like still must show Pierce was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of her damages. See AMI Civil 3rd, 203.
Pierce claims the evidence presented by Like proves neither negligence nor proximate cause.
She recalled the gravel walkway contained big, gray granite. From this description, Like simply falls short of showing that either the stairs or the gravel created a dangerous condition causing her fall and injuries. The Carton court held that, although the duties of occupiers of land to business invitees usually ends when the danger is either known or obvious to the invitees, the obvious danger rule does not bar recovery when the invitee is forced, as a practical matter, to encounter a known or obvious risk to his job. For instance, nothing Like presented showed the gravel was inherently dangerous or contained some type of substance making the walkway unreasonably unsafe or dangerous. Because Like's pleadings and proof fail to show a genuine issue of material fact establishing her injuries were caused by Pierce's negligence, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Pierce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.