So, as a first pass, the hypothesis here might be that what is actually going on in the heads of people when they perform certain visual tasks similar to those performed by the computer is very much like what is going on in the computer, which uses either array inputs or internally stored or generated arrays. And the interpretations are, as usual, user-relative rather than intrinsic to the representations. So explicit in the apple and explicit in what goes on in the head must be two different kinds of things. Whatever information is there, is there. What is not, is not.
Mental states have nothing to do with it.
Although it is a strain to do so, we should remind ourselves that, for all we know or can even imagine from what we know so far, that might have been how it turned out for ALL internal states and processes. And that's without making any commitment to the internal representations of objects, which may have been engendered by any or all of these transducer modalities. Besides, once it's inside, it's safer to speak of such information merely as internal and available, rather than continuing to wrap it in mentalistic interpretations that only serve to confuse if not prejudice us. Retinotopic organization of lateral eye input to Limulus brain. The induction and representation of categories.