Because there is no record of how long the jury deliberated after being given the hammer instruction, we cannot say that the jury was coerced into finding Copple guilty, or that the trial court clearly abused its discretion or prejudiced Copple by giving the hammer instruction, or by giving it when it did. Copple's first point is denied. Copple objected to Kirsten's testimony regarding what her mother told her about the time they arrived home on the basis that it was hearsay. The prosecutor claimed that the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the time they arrived home, but simply whether the mother made such a statement to Kirsten. The trial court overruled Copple's objection and allowed Kirsten to answer.
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude testimony.
Courts generally exclude hearsay because of the inherent lack of trustworthiness that accompanies such testimony. Even if hearsay evidence is erroneously admitted, then reversal of the case will only be required if the appellant shows that he suffered undue prejudice as a result of the error. We have not discerned from Copple's arguments any undue prejudice suffered by him as a result of the admission of Kirsten's testimony. The hearsay declarations of a victim's state of mind are particularly relevant where the defendant has put the victim's mental state at issue by claiming accident, self-defense or suicide. At issue here is the statement of a declarant who is neither the witness nor the victim.