A review of the lower court record indicates that although the issue of voluntary intoxication was discussed in connection with the giving of an instruction on insanity or diminished capacity, defendant did not request an instruction on voluntary intoxication or object to the instructions that were given. Further, a trial court is not required to present an instruction of the defendant's theory to the jury unless the defendant makes such a request. Because defendant did not request this instruction at trial and did not object to the trial court's instructions to the jury, we review this issue only to determine if manifest injustice resulted. There is no manifest injustice in this case. The trial court properly instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the crime of delivery of codeine.
Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to a specific intent crime.
Defendant argues that delivery of a controlled substance is a specific intent crime. The distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes is that specific intent crimes involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, while general intent crimes involve merely the intent to do the physical act. The cases are well settled that the act of transfer of the controlled substance is sufficient to sustain a finding of an actual delivery. Those cases do not require an intent involving a particular criminal intent beyond the act of delivering the controlled substance. Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated that knowledge is not required as an element in the statute.