That is entirely appropriate, as the old adage that arms control works best when it is needed least continues to hold true. That the leaders of Great Britain, France, and Germany support ratification is less important than what is going on inside the heads of the leaders of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Some of the countries with active nuclear weapons programs clearly fall into that category. On that count, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty falls dangerously short. In order to fully comprehend the complexity of the verification issue, it is important to understand the distinction between monitoring and verifying.
Monitoring is a technical issue.
Verification, however, is a political process. What are we to make of a verification regime that is far from prepared to handle the challenges it will confront. For example, we are potentially years from an agreement among signatories on what technologies will be employed for monitoring purposes. Furthermore, we are being asked to accept arguments on verification by an Administration that swept under the rug one of the most egregious cases of proliferation this decade, the November 1992 Chinese transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and that continues to cling tenaciously to the ABM Treaty despite the scale of global change that has occurred over the last 10 years. In determining whether to support this treaty at this time, it is essential that we examine the continued importance of nuclear weapons to our national security.