The casual assumption that the general superiority of U.S. military power inevitably translates into quick victory in any specific circumstance is obviously wrong and the point has been finally driven home. We would be very surprised if the Clinton Administration attempted another humanitarian intervention after Kosovo. Indeed, one of the lessons learned by all future administrations is that interventions should never be casually undertaken until, and unless, the military is given time to plan and implement the intervention, as Bush permitted in Desert Storm. Moreover, since the implementation of an intervention in Eurasia is always costly and time-consuming, what appeared to be a good idea at first glance, might well turn out to be a very bad idea in the long run. Merely wanting to do something does not mean that something can be done.
Moral obligations are easy to assume.
They are sometimes impossible to carry out. This is a hard lesson to learn. Put differently, talk is cheap. War is hard. We expect two parallel processes to emerge after Kosovo.