But the policy may do little good if Iran becomes a conduit for gas supplies to Turkey and Europe, instead. Ankara's reasons for backing Baku-Ceyhan are to minimize additional tanker traffic on the Bosporus and, incidentally, to profit from pipeline transit fees. But its concern about gas supplies may be even more critical, making it willing to deal with Iran. Turkey's demand for gas has been growing by about 10 percent a year during the 1990s. Unless it gets additional gas, the country could soon suffer electricity shortages and brownouts.
Turkey can live without the profits from Caspian oil.
But without gas, its economy could grind to a halt. Ankara's increasing willingness to deal with Iran for gas supplies appears to be influenced by several factors. First, the threat of future shortages has become more pressing with the passage of time, while political squabbles over the Caspian have created more problems than solutions for Turkey's energy security. Turkey also appears to be less concerned with pursuing its 23-year contract to buy gas from Iran, now that the former Islamicist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan has been ousted from power. But since Erbakan was banned from politics in June 1997, the government now seems to see little reason to worry about the implications of an Iranian business deal.