We assumed that only forty percent of total airlift capacity goes to support USAF's deployment and combat operations. Munitions for USAF fighter and fighter-bomber units must be airlifted to the theater until Day 10, by which time munitions from prepositioned stocks will be available. Of course, a host of support assets must be deployed if the shooters are to operate effectively. Assumptions used for weapon loads for MOEs 1 and 2 are shown in the chart on p. 39. Also shown is the assumed sortie effectiveness for MOE 3 and sortie rates for all aircraft types.
Vehicle kills per sortie are far less than the theoretical maximum for each type of aircraft.
We compared aircraft and munitions that will be available around 2000. Finally, before comparing the various elements in terms of our three MOEs, it was necessary to specify some rules to allocate the force among the three MOEs over time. To the extent possible, aircraft capable of effectively attacking moving vehicles would be pressed into that role until the invasion was halted. The exception to this rule is the F-117, which would continue attacking fixed targets. Having laid out these assumptions and constraints, we were ready to calculate the contributions of each type of aircraft to each of our three MOEs.