He too rejects the idea that science grows by accumulation of eternal truths. His main problem too is scientific revolution . This last Kuhnian thesis has been widely criticized and I shall not discuss it. My concern is rather that Kuhn, having recognized the failure both of justificationism and falsificationism in providing rational accounts of scientific growth, seems now to fall back on irrationalism. For Popper scientific change is rational or at least rationally reconstructible and falls in the realm of the logic of discovery .
Scientific change is a kind of religious change.
The clash between Popper and Kuhn is not about a mere technical point in epistemology. It concerns our central intellectual values, and has implications not only for theoretical physics but also for the underdeveloped social sciences and even for moral and political philosophy. In this paper I shall first show that in Popper's logic of scientific discovery two different positions are conflated. Sophisticated verses naive methodological falsification. Progress is measured by the degree to which a problemshift is progressive, by the degree to which the series of theories leads us to the discovery of novel facts.