Clearly, the United States has not become a purely conservative or reactionary power along the lines of Prince Metternich's Austria. There is still something of the old liberal spark in American foreign policy and at least a misty vision of a preferred future world. But at the same time, the conservative tendencies in our statecraft are undeniable, and all too often we seek to thwart change rather than encourage and manage it. Whether one supports or opposes the conservatism that accompanies global responsibility and world leadership, the obstacles posed to the generation of a national strategy remain. It is there, where the need for integration and the impact of cultural and organizational factors is the greatest, that creativity, consistency and vision are in the shortest supply.
Military strategy suffers somewhat less.
Because the military is, to some extent, isolated from the rest of society, a distinct military subculture, which includes patterns of analysis, understanding and problem solving, exists. As a general rule, the military subculture is less hostile to strategic thinking than the wider American culture. But while the military subculture softens the impact of cultural, organizational and historical factors, it cannot totally deflect them. After all, military strategy must be accepted by the wider political leadership and, on a personal level, no officer is totally divorced from the nonmilitary dimension of American culture. Thus, the military strategist must understand the impact that both his immediate environment and the wider social context have on strategic planning.