DOE officials note, for example, that under current budget planning their work in the ten nuclear cities, where the largest number of scientists work and the majority of nuclear material is stored, will take several more years to complete. And, while the ISTC and IPP have employed some 25,000 former weapons scientists and technicians on civilian projects, these jobs are temporary, not full-time. As many as 50,000 other scientists in the nuclear cities face imminent unemployment. Troops are leaving their posts to scavenge for food. Guards do not make their rounds for lack of warm clothing and boots.
Power outages make the electronic surveillance equipment installed by U.S. contractors useless.
There has also been a significant, documented increase in violent crime and theft among Russian troops. The political and financial crisis resulting from the August 1998 economic meltdown has only exacerbated these program shortfalls. Some congressional critics pointed to the GAO report as evidence that these programs are mismanaged and do not work. U.S. programs have been attempting to prevent this type of activity for several years now, but have not been given enough funding and sustained political attention to complete the job. The Chelyabinsk event should serve as a chilling reminder of the seriousness of the threat of loose nukes, loose material, and loose scientists.