The failure of a government to stop acts of hatred before they occur can hardly be viewed as persecution. I do not believe the asylum laws are designed to grant refugee status under these circumstances. Therefore, the IJ denied petitioner's requests for asylum and withholding of deportation, but granted him voluntary departure on or before April 1, 1995. The BIA reviewed the record de novo, concluded that the IJ correctly analyzed the case, and adopted the IJ's decision as its own. We review the IJ's determination of refugee status under a substantial evidence standard, which is extremely deferential.
Petitioner bears a very heavy burden.
To obtain a reversal, he must establish that the evidence not only supports a conclusion that he suffered persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution, but compels it. As with many asylum cases, this one hinges on the question whether the mistreatment petitioner suffered in Ukraine arose to the level of persecution. Mere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations, of the sort which abounds in numerous countries and inflicts misery upon millions of innocent people daily around the world, generally is not sufficient to permit the Attorney General to grant asylum . . . . The IJ found that the discrimination and harassment petitioner suffered did not arise to the level of persecution. We conclude that the IJ's finding that petitioner did not suffer persecution in Ukraine is supported by substantial evidence.