The United States' foreign policy in the Northeast Asian region, Cato analyst Bandow argues, is fossilized in 1953 terms. The maintenance of troops in the region suggests that policy makers in Washington remain oblivious to changes that have occurred on the peninsula since the end of the Cold War. First, as long as the United States retains its position in the region the South Korean government will have no incentive to extend its military responsibilities. Also, the cost involved with the United States stationing troops on the Korean peninsula is a heavy drain on the American economy.
Military retrenchment is to be replaced with diplomatic reconciliation.
The new role of the United States in the region would first be to continue to work towards improving relations with North Korea. Secondly, the United States would act as a broker between communist Pyongyang and its capitalist neighbors including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The author does recognize that the consequences of United States retrenchment from Northeast Asia would result in military buildup, including nuclear weaponry, on the part of not only North and South Korea, but Japan and China as well. Bandow could have explored deeper the spillover effect that such a buildup would have not only in Northeast Asian, but in Southeast Asia as well. The economic effects of war between North and South Korea, or for that matter any states of the region, would extend globally to gravely effect the concerns and interests of all nations, including those of the United States, to a much greater extent than Hyundai automobiles.