Although society is much less willing to assume risks to life than risks of economic loss, this is less clear on an individual basis. Presumably they rationalised that there was no immediate threat to life but that there was a definite financial down side to disposing of their property under such circumstances. It matters who pays and who benefits. People are more trusting of study reports that reveal an unsafe condition than contrary reports, particularly those that attempt to show a large margin of safety. The public generally tolerate deficient situations resulting from the upgrading of codes or standards, but are relatively intolerant to deficiencies brought about by physical deterioration or changed conditions.
Regulators are averse to transferred risk.
For example diversion of debris flow potential from one area of a community to another area, even if it is better controlled by doing so. Regulators distinguish between artificial and natural warning as a means of mitigating risk to life. Regulators usually adopt a wait and see approach when a situation is perceived to become unsafe as a result of recent and still evolving advances in failure mechanics, lacking in case histories. They are obligated to ensure that new methods of analysing phenomena affecting safety are not promoted beyond their capacity for meaningful decision making. With the advent of risk based approaches, there has developed a trend for regulators to question not only unsafe proposals but also those that incorporate excessive protection against risk, because they reflect on other situations within their jurisdiction.