My opinion is very strongly in favor of openness and public discussion of computer security problems, right down to the details of how to break in to specific operating system releases. The background for my strong opinion is that I've been working with computer security, protection, and privacy since 1961. Fixing of the specific problem drops in priority, sometimes to the point that it doesn't get fixed at all, leaving the system vulnerable to attack for an extended time. Others with similar systems often don't learn about the problem, leaving their systems vulnerable. Others with dissimilar systems almost never hear about the problem and therefore don't realize that they should look for analogous problems in their systems.
People developing new systems design the same problem into their new system.
In practice, trying to hide security problems reduces security, certainly in the long run, usually in the medium run, and often even in the short run. When the proprietor of a site or an operating system vendor makes a potent case for not revealing a security weakness, my usual proposal in response is that any veiling of a weakness should have a time limit, after which it will be discussed publicly. Most important, it recognizes that the information will eventually circulate among system attackers, so it must be gotten to system designers, too. I am not convinced that you can publish overviews that do not provide any thoughtful person with enough insight to fairly easily complete the details of the attack. I believe that it is the initial identification of a flaw that is difficult, not the exploitation of it.