Almost surely not. Western critics of Yeltsin, Gaidar, and Chubais usually accuse them of trying to do too much too fast. Reforms would have been moe popular, and politics less divisive, if social payments received a higher priority. In addition, it is hard to see Chinese development as an overwhelming success. Political liberalization has not yet begun.
Police states are nasty places to live.
China has grown very rapidly in percentage terms, but from a very, very low initial base. Deng Xiaoping has been a good emperor, interested in economic liberalization and growth and able to override the forces that have traditionally made China's bureaucrats the enemies of economic growth. At some point China's political organization will either collapse into civil war on its own, or once again become a binding contraint on economic growth. I think that when either of these possibilities comes to pass, it will be much harder to criticize Yegor Gaidar's attempt to do as much as possible as quickly as possible in order to push reform past the point of no return. This book presents and spirited and persuasive defense of Russia's approach to privatization and economic reform.