In Pierce Concrete , this Court observed that the individual defendant, to the extent he was involved, was acting in his capacity as president and agent of the corporation. His authority as agent of the corporation extended only to matters within the ordinary scope of the corporation's business. As discussed above, the suspended corporation had no statutory right to conduct as part of its ordinary business . . . In addition, the parties do not dispute that SMPC's corporate charter had been suspended during the time it allegedly entered into the agreement to provide painting services to Cunnane. Therefore, SMPC concludes, the circumstance of revenue suspension would not operate to preclude its suit against Cunnane.
Mica is distinguishable.
In the instant case, however, SMPC sought to enforce contract rights allegedly acquired during a period of suspension. SMPC vigorously points to the reinstatement of its articles during the pendency of this action. Rather we conclude the statute and case law direct our focus to the circumstance that SMPC's suit against Cunnane was instituted to enforce a contract allegedly entered into while SMPC's articles of incorporation were suspended. As SMPC's articles of incorporation were dissolved 9 March 1993, there remains no legal basis upon which to validate the alleged 22 May 1997 contract with Cunnane occurring during the period of SMPC's suspension and dissolution so as to permit suit upon the alleged contract. SMPC's reliance upon the Business Corporation Act is unavailing.