The German victory over France in May 1940 resulted largely from changes in the cultural patterns of the German army that were made in the early 1920s by the chief of staff, General Hans von Seeckt. The hallmarks of the new German army were its emphasis on systematic, thorough analysis, willingness to grapple with what was really happening on the battlefield, and a rigorous selection process that emphasized the professionally relevant intellectual attainments of officers as well as their performance in leadership positions. The Reichswehr's willingness to study the operational and tactical lessons of the last war stands in sharp contrast with the British army's reluctance during the same period to draw lessons from the experiences of the Western Front. Historians have often suggested that military organizations study the last war and that is why they do badly in the next. In fact, few military organizations study the past with any degree of rigor, although the success of those that do so has demonstrated its vital importance.
Some military cultures reject the past as having no relevance to the future of war.
Air forces have been particularly attracted to the belief that the study of even recent military experience is of limited use in preparing for the glorious, technology-driven future. Such cultures have great difficulty in innovating in useful ways during peacetime and a particularly hard time in adapting to the real conditions of war. The Eighth Air Force's failure to push for the development of long-range escort fighters, despite heavy losses to its bombers on deep penetration raids during the summer and fall of 1943, indicates the potentially baneful influence of military culture. For the most part, U.S. military cultures were in fact flexible and open to innovation during the interwar period, and emphasized intellectual preparation for future war. Professional military education, in particular, received not only high-level attention but respect.