The good news is that apparent defects in laws and constitutions can often be patched up or rectified by the mechanisms of governance. The bad news is that what appear to be good laws and constitutions may be ineffectual. One of the lessons of transaction-cost economics is to be permissive toward private ordering. Being respectful of private ordering has ramifications both for the economic theory of contracting and for antitrust. In the absence of preexisting market power, exchange agreements should be regarded as mechanisms for giving and receiving credible commitments.
Similar considerations apply to property.
The question is how this provision, which is not self-enforcing, is to be implemented. Investors who realize that they are disadvantaged in relation to other, more favored members of society can and will adapt in a variety of ways. Thus more durable assets will be supplanted by less durable ones. Nonmobile assets will be supplanted by more mobile ones. Conspicuous assets will give way to those that can be sequestered.