As Anand and Peter suggest, there might have been no such relationship between the principles of justice and a fair distribution of public heath. The principles might not have addressed the key social determinants of health at all, or might have resulted in greater health inequality. The second argument involves an extension of Rawls's theory that does make the reduction of health inequalities a direct requirement of justice. Because justice requires such a reasonable array, we must ensure a proper distribution of the social determinants of health, once we discover what they are. In particular, it may seem redundant to emphasize the importance of fair income distribution for public health.
Opportunity does it all.
We do not intend to propose two theories of justice bearing on health but only one, the extended theory that addresses health through its affects on opportunity. At the same time, we observe that the other principles of justice support a similar conclusion. So the theory produces a convergence, not tension or redundancy. In his early work, Sen argued that Rawls's emphasis on liberties, opportunity, and economic resources obscured the problems produced by disease and disability. So Sen urged that our views about justice should focus directly on our real capabilities for doing things, and not simply on our liberties, opportunities, and economic resources.