For Dworkin, the practice of moral judgment has no explanation. It has no need of justification. There is no issue about whether moral judgments are more like beliefs or desires. And the normative aspiration of moral judgment needs neither explanation nor justification. This is obscurantism.
Moral judgments are like miracles only worse.
But there is another tendency in Dworkin. Dworkin says that religious or astrological judgments are like scientific judgments in that they are subject to tests of reliability, and in this there is a contrast with moral judgments. We might note that Sturgeon and Co. will deny this and Dworkin presents no argument against them, but let us put that to one side. The point is that Dworkin clearly holds a substantial metaphysical position, although he thinks he doesn't. And in this he keeps company with all those who affect to eschew metaphysics.