I believe that amendment reflected the sentiment that it is appropriate to place reasonable time restrictions on post-conviction claims. That thinking also applies here. This gives the court the ability to deny the post-conviction request if it determines that DNA testing would not be material to the finding of guilt. Obviously, there is no need to burden the system with mandatory post-conviction DNA testing in cases where the results of a DNA test could have no bearing on the finding of guilt. I have seen proposed statutes that mandate post-conviction DNA testing in cases upon a showing merely that an exculpatory DNA test would be relevant.
Relevant evidence covers a very broad spectrum much broader than relevant and material evidence.
For example, it would certainly be relevant evidence to show that a federal inmate convicted of extortion did not lick a postage stamp on an envelope that contained an extortionate demand, but it would certainly not be material if the other evidence in the case included wiretap recordings of the inmate s extortionate demands. There is no basis in law or logic for abandoning the concept of materiality in the limited context of post-conviction requests for DNA testing. DNA testing is certainly powerful, but there is no reason to mandate such testing in cases where it has no potential to prove innocence. In this regard, it should be noted that the proposed statutes that mandate DNA testing without a finding that it would be material also draw no distinction between trial and guilty plea cases. The combination of those elements would allow an inmate who has confessed and pleaded guilty to force the system to conduct DNA testing, even when the results of such testing would not prove his innocence, but would instead produce evidence that would merely be relevant to his claim.