It is from this order that Ms. Lipscomb now appeals. Appellant argues that the lower court committed reversible error by denying appellant's motion in limine and by making improper comments to the jury regarding the credibility of a witness. We agree with appellant that the errors made below entitle her to a new trial. We grant trial court judges wide latitude in conducting the business of their courts. However, when we find that the lower court has abused its discretion, we will not hesitate to right the wrong that has been committed.
Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
With the foregoing in mind, we examine the actions of the judge in the case before us. Appellant argues that any such testimony would amount to improper parol evidence because she and the Commission had entered into an employment contract. While we do not disagree with the basis of appellant's contract theory, we need not travel that far along appellant's line of reasoning to reach our conclusion that the trial judge erred when he denied the motion in limine. Whether or not such testimony would constitute improper parol evidence, it was offered so that the jury could construe an ambiguous term in the Commission's wage and hour policy, namely, to whom, exactly, the Commission must grant longevity pay. We ruled recently that any ambiguity in such matters will be decided against the employer, because the employer has great latitude in dictating the terms of employment.