The problem for the bidder in a Dutch auction is exactly the same as that facing a bidder in a sealed-bid auction. At some point in advance, the bidder must decide the maximum amount he will bid. He must decide when to stop the auction based upon his own valuation of the object and his prior beliefs about the valuations of other bidders. This auction type is strategically equivalent to first-price sealed auction because no relevant information is disclosed in the course of the auction, only at the end when it is too late. It is difficult to specify a single strategy because a profit-maximizing bid depends upon the actions of others.
Most bidders attempt to shade their bids to move closer to market consensus.
This also helps to avoid winner's curse. A participant who bids less is more likely to lose the auction and all that strategy accomplishes is to lower the chance of victory. Bidding high carries the risk of winner's curse. Neither affects the price paid if he wins. When each bidder adopts a strategy of bidding his true price, the outcome is that the item is awarded to the bidder with the highest valuation at a price equal to the second highest valuation.