Civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium are produced and processed by the ton but canbe used by the pound to make atomicbombs. So, little losses mean a lot. The answer to this question must include a frank assessment of the degree to which counter-proliferation really can be relied upon to prevent use of bombs that have already spread, whether to terrorist organizations or to states. The answers to these questions are essential to the weighing of immediate political considerations against longer-term security threats. The track record clearly indicates that.
Nuclear proliferation is frankly boring, until it happens.
Both Iraq and North Korea have taught us that. In the case of Iraq, we did go to war to neutralize a military nuclear program provided mostly by our European allies with impeccable non-proliferation credentials, but Iraq's nuclear cadre and knowledge remain in place, absent only the fissile material needed to make nuclear weapons. So we see in both cases that these were close calls. We have a situation today involving India and Pakistan, a nuclear passion-play that is still being played out. Direct European assistance to these programs has been a principal factor in the problems that we face today in that troubled region.