Firms that have generated profits thanks to closed markets or other regulations that impede potential competitors have a vested interest in preserving their profits by supporting the status quo. Therefore, they will lobby the government to preserve the status quo and can be counted on to oppose reform. This pattern is evident in both developing and transitional economies. This is why as reforms unfold, policymakers and entrepreneurs should encourage the formation of voluntary business groups as alternatives to state-sponsored, corporatist chambers. In transitional economies such as those in Central and Eastern Europe, state-linked chambers may also oppose reform.
Privatization is a useful example.
Typically, state-owned firms slated for privatization mobilize their resources to fight it. In many cases, it is not only workers who are worried about losing their jobs, but managers as well. Many of the formerly socialist countries, such as Poland, are contemplating the adoption of the public-law chamber model. The adoption of the public-law model in these societies involves the risk of slowing reform by creating business associations that oppose it. This opposition stems from the links of the member firms of national chambers to the state, a legacy of central planning, which is corporatist in nature.