The expansion of NATO, he argued, will not convince Russia to oppose cooperation with the West. The Russians have moved beyond this issue. Gompert did admit, though, that a second round of NATO expansion, particularly if it includes the Baltic states, might indeed lead to a more severe Russian reaction. The uncertain future of expansion makes cost estimates difficult. Government and private estimates vary widely, depending on changing assumptions about what items to include, burden-sharing among the U.S., other existing NATO powers, and the new members, and the potential inclusion of additional countries beyond the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
Proponents stress that costs to the U.S. in the first round are marginal.
Most of the necessary costs of weapons modernization, developing interoperability in command, control and communications, and even teaching English will be borne by the new members themselves. Rey and Gompert also asserted that the costs to the new members would be relatively small, less than 10 percent of the current Polish military budget, according to Rey. Cost implications for the U.S., according to Rathjens, are unknown, given the apparent unwillingness of other NATO allies to increase their own expenditures, and the difficulties the new members may face in light of their still struggling economies. Rathjens stressed even more the opportunity cost of NATO expansion. Linda Bentley is a research intern at the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, where Robert Leavitt is Associate Director.