Much progress has been made in recent years, but clearly much work still lies ahead to provide the desired degree of precision. The Paper goes on to explore the scope of the mechanisms incorporated in IEAs for resolving disputes, an important feature given the possibility of disagreements over the substantive obligations of the environmental agreements. More than one-third of existing IEAs contain dispute settlement provisions. Such mechanisms are, appropriately, becoming a normal part of IEAs. Yet the analysis in this Paper suggests that the dispute settlementprovisions in IEAs remain very underdeveloped compared to the counterpart provisions found in trade agreements.
Special attention is given to sanctions as a central part of an effective dispute settlement system.
The Paper identifies several preconditions that should be met when developing a credible sanctions mechanism, the most critical of which are the avoidance of unilateralism and the importance of attracting the broadest possible international support. In fact, the menu of possible sanctions is quite extensive. To the extent that trade sanctions are envisaged, it does not appear appropriate for Canada to exchange the reasonably well developed and effective dispute settlement mechanisms found in modern trade agreements for the lesser discipline of their environmental counterparts until such time as the latter become more sophisticated and effective. Thus, the Paper concludes that, if the provisions of a specific IEA are to over-ride those of the GATT and other trade agreements, Canada should seek the emergence of an international consensus based on several criteria. Most critically, such an IEA must feature a well-constructed dispute settlement mechanism.