Iraqi military shortcomings were well highlighted in this conflict, and many were repeated in the early stages of the war with Iran. Though various efforts have been made to quantify outcome, these have not been particularly successful and encourage emphasis upon process at the expense of analysis. The most common flaw in assessments is to view insurgency in static perspective. Societal causes are a necessary but not sufficient factor in upheaval. Once the insurgency becomes a going concern, organizational dynamics become important.
Similar factors obtain on the counterinsurgent side.
In the end, both compete for domination of human terrain. This article presents a regional overview of US-Latin American security relations, focusing on those countries where US national security interests are most likely to be endangered over the next two decades. The author examines the current US strategy of 'shaping' the Latin security environment, with a view to assessing the strength and weaknesses of this approach. The article presents some policy recommendations, including the recommendation that the US do more to redress the historical imbalance in Latin American civil-military relations by strengthening civilian institutions. In 1945, the Dutch government was not in a position to re-impose its control upon its colonies in the East Indies after the surrender of Japan.