We study a bargaining situation involving two-issues. One of these has a surplus size which is public information, the other has a surplus size which is private information to one of the bargaining parties. Bargaining is by alternating offers under common time-discounting. The bargaining agenda is determined endogenously via the offers that players make.
Players are free to offer on any number of outstanding issues.
Offers must, however, be accepted or rejected in their entirety, that is, if an offer on both issues is received then either both prices or neither price must be accepted and it is not possible to accept only one of the prices. We study this game under two alternative rules for implementing agreements. In the alternative setting implementation is joint, so that even if an offer on one issue is accepted consumption of this surplus must nevertheless wait until the second issue is also settled. In contrast to some writings in the negotiation practitioner literature, such initial agenda offers always involve concessions, that is, much smaller allocations to the informed player than in a bargain without agenda offers. We also show that it is the implementation rule which determines which issue leads in the agenda.