Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the vehicle insurance policy the rental company had on the truck should provide indemnification to plaintiff for the amount it paid to Mroue for the damage to the real property. We remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Where the meaning of statutory language is ambiguous, judicial construction is necessary.
Words are to be accorded their ordinary and generally accepted meaning.
In interpreting a particular phrase in a statute, the courts must construe the phrase in a way that does not conflict with, or deny effect to, other portions of the statute. An interpretation of a word in the no-fault act must be made in the context of the entire act, after due consideration of other sections of the act, so as to produce a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Turner, supra at 28-29. We find no contextual evidence in the no-fault act that the Legislature intended the household exclusion to broadly apply to a person named in any property protection insurance policy. Nor do we find any indication in case law that has addressed the household exclusion that would indicate that the Legislature intended a universal reference to any named insured in any policy.