This distinction is significant because Wilson had both a statutory and contractual duty to provide the State with an accurate statement of his criminal history. All disputed issues as to criminal history shall be decided at the sentencing hearing. He did not. Even so, my plea of guilty to this charge is binding on me. I cannot change my mind if additional criminal history is discovered even though the standard sentencing range and the prosecuting attorney's recommendation increase . . . .
Plea agreements are contracts.
Words in a contract should be given their ordinary meaning. The court will not give effect to interpretations that would render contract obligations illusory. Wilson's interpretation would render meaningless the distinctions between various offenses under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and their accompanying penalties. Under these circumstances, Wilson assumed the risk that his actual criminal history would be discovered before sentencing. This is not to suggest that Wilson should have known of the different legal effects between possession and delivery convictions on his sentence.