Let us now apply the observations we have made about identity and difference and agreement and opposition to Kant's deeply held belief that to represent objects, we require sensible intuitions as well as concepts. Kant's treatment of this requirement is at least as peculiar as his treatment of identity. He mounts an argument that we need concepts, of course, indeed very specific concepts, and he mounts an argument that we need the forms of intuition, that is, space and time. Kant does argue the point in other works, the discussion of incongruent counterparts being one example. But the closest we find to an argument in the Analytic prior to the Appendix are two obscure anticipations of the Appendix in the sections immediately preceding it.
Most commentators focus on the drops of water argument.
As an argument for the necessity of a sensible component in empirical representation, many have thought that it is decisive. In fact, it is not. All it claims is that spatial location plays a role in some judgments of identity. But spatial location is purely formal, something derived from the forms of intuition. If so, the drops of water example is no argument that we need the particular, contingent contents of sensible intuition.