Good bidding is often the result of correct predictions about the behavior of others and sometimes that means guessing the extent of someone else's information correctly. Bidders, of course, tend to worry more about their bids than their strategy. From a Seller's Perspective In any auction a seller can influence results by revealing information about the object. In general, the more information a bidder has, the more the price-dampening effect of winner's curse is lessened. It is also a good idea because if a seller seems reluctant to disclose something, a buyer always assumes the hidden information must be unfavorable.
Revealing information removes uncertainty.
Theoretical literature demonstrates that, under assumption of private value, all four basic auction types can be shown to yield the same expected price and revenue to the seller when bidders are risk neutral and symmetric. This implies that auction choice is not crucial because each format yields on average the same payoff. The rankings illustrate advantages of increased information. In comparison, bidders, recognizing winner's curse, bidding in first-price auctions bid less aggressively and shade their bids. The reason that a bidder behaves the same in both kinds of auction is that he makes the same decision and this decision is based upon the same information.