The data sets used for computational testing in this survey paper can be found here . A proposal by Robert Weber and myself to the FCC on the design of a combinatorial auction can be found here . To find out more click here after May 30th, 2000. Learning in Games I'm often asked what learning in games is all about. The question took on a special urgency when I was asked it by a press officer of the AAAS in preparation for their annual meeting in February 2000.
Real markets seem distantly removed from the markets of the neo-classical textbook.
In the text book, market particpants are blessed with unlimited computational ability and can divine the future. In reality market participants are boundedly rational and make guesses about the future based on the past. In this talk I will describe models of such markets that show that outcome is not chaos as intuition suggests. On the flip side one can ask how well agents in real markets do in forecasting future events that affect their livliehood. Here the results are mixed, some prefessions do better than others.