Thereafter, petitioner proceeded on count II of her petition. In this second count, petitioner requested indemnification for the fair market value of the property pursuant to section 21-305 of the Property Tax Code. Petitioner and her mother, Mary Britts, appeared as witnesses. She testified that she did not have the money with which to do so and that she did not attempt to obtain funds from any other source in order to make reimbursement. The trial court found that petitioner was not barred or otherwise precluded from bringing an action to recover her property as is required for indemnification by section 21-305 of the Property Tax Code.
Petitioner now appeals.
It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that the court's prime consideration in construing a statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. The trial court should look to the language of the statute as the best indication of the legislature's intent, giving the terms of the statute their ordinary meaning. We do not agree with petitioner's conclusion. In the instant case, it is not an unsuccessful 2-1401 action that has prevented petitioner from being indemnified. Petitioner brought a successful action in that the trial court granted her motion to vacate on the condition that she first fulfill the statutory requirements of reimbursement under section 22-80.