Although discourse about justice is often influenced by models of law, the ethics of justice is a subject in itself. Enjoyment of an experience, having access to many opportunities, getting protection from or exposure to a risk, and so on may be relevant. The 'others' relevant to justice may be those living in a person's community, those in other communities, or even those dead, those yet to live, or perhaps possible persons who will never live. Here intuitions and arguments seem better grounded. Distributive justice concerns the ethical appropriateness of which recipients get which benefits and burdens.
Retributive justice concerns the ethical appropriateness of punishment for wrongdoing.
Corrective justice concerns the ethical appropriateness of compensating with some good because of a loss or appropriating some good because of a gain. A few in philosophy have doubted the rational basis or the desirability of any justice orientation. Indeed, political and economic power are goods, and to worry about the justice of who has them is familiar, especially for those philosophers who have taken egalitarianism to be basic to justice. There is indeed a presumption in favour of treating persons equally in distributive matters, unless some relevant difference can be specified to distinguish persons treated unequally. To treat persons unequally with respect to distribution of important benefits and burdens, in the absence of a justification, is a paradigm of injustice.