Perhaps the clearest exponent of this position is the comparatively recent Clifford whose use of moral vocabulary conveys well the overriding character of the reasons epistemology is meant to provide. The Enlightenment position was the hegemony of Evidentialism . Its rejection is quite compatible with holding a hegemony thesis for a fragment of epistemology, weaker than Evidentialism. This states that it is not warranted to have a belief according to which that belief is itself not warranted. As I understand it, postmodernism implies more than being postmodern in my sense.
Postmodernism is the rejection of the hegemony of even a fragment of epistemology.
That might seem agreeable to fideists. Postmodernism tends, however, to trivialise Fideism by obliterating any contrast between faith in divine revelation and trust in human capacities to discover the truth. Much contemporary epistemology of religion seeks to avoid the extremes both of the Enlightenment Evidentialism and of Fideism. It is thus postmodern without necessarily being postmodernist. Let us call the injunction to avoid these extremes the problematic of contemporary epistemology of religion.