For the U.S. and Russia, the simple proposition is that in order to reduce to a minimum the number of nuclear weapons held by the other party, it is well worth reducing to the same level ourselves. Present weapons deployments in Europe could be maintained without change as negotiations proceed, thus removing this issue as a source of concern with regard to NATO nuclear expansion. These are the places where effort and attention need to be focussed and sustained. The Nunn-Lugar initiative has been of tremendous value to U.S. security, and should be sustained and augmented. Many challenging tasks and prerequisite steps for the nations involved are embedded in the proposals I suggest.
None appear to be unmanageable.
All will need to be carefully evaluated and subjected to bilateral and multilateral consideration and consultation. If we are to be serious and responsible about reducing the nuclear danger to U.S. security, attention and effort should now be concentrated on these practical issues. When and if the practical issues such as those are ultimately successfully resolved, and only then, we will have created an option, suitable for consideration and decision at that time, of going for total elimination. Such denial also involves efforts to forestall the movement of trained weapons scientists and technicians to the countries of potential proliferants. Dissuasion of such potential proliferants from pursuing a nuclear weapons course.