Moore s response as to why this cannot work is to say that such things, particularly money, obviously cannot be a part of our mental sensation of pleasure. It is nonsensical to say that the actual coins that are money are a part of my feeling of pleasure. This is clearly a result of the naturalistic fallacy, as the means are often taken to be a part of the definition of the ends when the naturalistic fallacy is present. Moore s final argument against Mill s claim that things such as money and virtue are a part of happiness is as follows. Some things, such as money and virtue, are desired as a part of happiness.
Money is a purely physical thing.
Happiness is a purely mental thing. If 2 and 3, money cannot be a part of happiness. Money cannot be a part of happiness. Although Moore s above argument appears valid, there is a possible error. Moore fails to consider that perhaps money is not something physical, but rather something mental that is only represented by physical coins.