It is just these forms of income that teams need not divide among the other teams under the revenue-sharing agreement. Thus the Maryland agreement represents a direct payment to the new Baltimore team, and to the Baltimore team alone. Is is far less obvious that the state makes out well at all. Economist Robert Baade has studied 48 American cities economies between 1958 and 1987. This is because much of the amount spent on a professional franchise is in fact merely a diversion of leisure dollars from other activities.
People essentially allocate a given percentage of their budgets and time to entertainment.
Thus, what is spent on football is not spent on bowling, theater, movies, tractor pulls, etc. It must be especially galling for Maryland s bowling alleys, theaters and so on to be compelled to pay corporate taxes in effect to subsidize enterprises competing with them for Marylanders leisure time. This multiplier effect is often cited by stadium promoters in Maryland as a prime reason for expending public funds to attract a football franchise. However, not only is the multiplier effect generally absent in cities that have constructed stadiums, in many cases stadium construction is associated with negative growth. Of Baade s 36 stadium cities, no fewer than 19 witnessed below average per-capita income growth relative to national, comparative trend lines.