Misak s alternative, pragmatism, begins with the fact that no one actually believes that moral judgments have no connection with truth, or the world. Pragmatism is an epistemic rather than metaphysical, deflationist account of truth, linking it strongly to inquiry. The correspondence theorist can claim that the best possible account may yet be false, as it may not map onto the mind-independent world. For the pragmatist, such a claim is empty, particularly since what constitutes correspondence is as yet a mysterious and difficult connection. Pragmatism, then, promises to afford insights that do not jar with practical understanding, without presupposing the queer relations, entities or faculties that inevitably fall out of a theory that tries to squeeze moral judgment into the limited empiricist model.
Pragmatism then leaves room for moral knowledge having objectivity.
The reality of moral discourse speaks against its being arbitrary or purely subjective. The fact people argue, reason, debate, learn, and seem to feel they can generally improve their views seems to speak against relativism. The idea of improvement certainly appears to presuppose an end, and the end most reasonably supposed is that of truth. Of course, Mackie s response is to frankly insist that such discussion, such thinking, is mistaken. But, as we have seen, his Argument from Queerness does not seem to give a satisfactory account to justify his claim.