It was the appellant's submission that s.315-2 of the Municipal Code did not prohibit the impugned activity, namely, the selling of tickets to an event on a Toronto sidewalk. The appellant also submitted that Sparrow J. did not properly direct herself on the issues, as she misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the Municipal Code. Despite any other Act, the council of the Corporation may pass by-laws regulating or prohibiting activities carried out on public highways over which the Corporation has jurisdiction. The definition of vending in s.315-1 of the Municipal Code is broader than the authorizing statute. The authorizing statute makes no reference to tickets whatsoever.
Municipalities are entirely the creatures of provincial statutes.
Accordingly, they can exercise only those powers which are explicitly conferred upon them by a provincial statute. To the extent that the language in the Municipal Code makes it an offence to sell or display articles of sale such as tickets, other than from a portable display unit, it is ultra vires the City and of no force and effect. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of Sparrow J. is set aside, and in its place an order shall go quashing the conviction against the appellant entered by His Worship T. Walton.