Thus there is no prospect of future interaction to induce trusting behavior. So, we study the trust building process where there is little scope for social relations and networks. Standard game theory is used as a null hypothesis, which assumes all players are opportunistic and untrustworthy and thus players should have zero trust for others. Conversely, several social theories predict mutual trust can exist even among strangers. We test whether generalized morality is sufficient to induce trust, examine how social uncertainty affects trustworthiness, and study the evolution of trust among different sub-populations.
Results show subjects exhibit some degree of trusting behavior.
However, a majority of them are not trustworthy and claim the entire social gain. Players are more reluctant to trust in later stages than in earlier ones and are more trustworthy if more certain of the intention of the trustee. Finally, we find the sub-population who invests in initiating the trust building process modifies its trusting behavior based on the relative fitness of trust.