His satellite phones are often carried in a third convoy. Many of those who survived the first purge were Afghans, former comrades from his days with the mujahideen. But recently most of them were fired too and Bin Laden now relies on a select group of mainly Arab fighters to protect him. And his eldest son, Mohammed, who is believed to be around 16. Experts believe that in the absence of the means to genuinely control a vast web of inter-linked terrorist cells, Bin Laden's strategy may be to create the leadership and motivation that might galvanise individual, independent units into action.
More publicity means more recruits.
The major input that Bin Laden may make to Kashmir militancy is through funding fundamentalist groups operating in Pakistan, which in turn patronise militant outfits in the Valley. The role of Pakistan in all this is unclear. There is a strong body of Bin Laden supporters among the army and the intelligence services and also, obviously, among the increasingly powerful clergy. However, there are also many moderate politicians who realise that Pakistan cannot jeopardise its relationship with the US, and the continuing drip-feed of IMF and World Bank loans, by overtly obstructing their efforts to capture the man. Caught in the middle, as ever, is Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who is trying to tread a careful path among domestic opinion, political lobbies and the demands of the West.