Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Norgren, we conclude that the trial judge erred in granting Friend's Bar's motion for summary judgment. Stearns County and Sheriff Kostreba argue that the district court erred in failing to grant their motions for summary judgment based on either official or discretionary immunity. They contend that Kostreba's decision to park ahead of the Norgren vehicles was an exercise of discretion, not merely a ministerial task, and was thus protected by official immunity. They claim further that because Sheriff Kostreba did not violate any policy in deciding how to park his car, he cannot be held to have been negligent in rendering assistance to Norgren. In the alternative, Stearns County and Sheriff Kostreba argue that an officer's decision to assist stranded motorists is a valuable public service and thus must be protected by discretionary immunity.
Public officials have the burden of proving that their actions are entitled to immunity.
However, the fact that some judgment is exercised will not necessarily shield an officer's conduct under the doctrine of official immunity. Furthermore, an officer's action can be considered willful or malicious when that officer intentionally commits an act which the officer has reason to believe is wrong at the time he or she acts. This determination hinges on whether the individual intentionally commits an act that the individual has reason to believe is prohibited. Moreover, resolution of this issue presents a fact question for the jury. As an exception to the general rule of governmental liability, discretionary immunity must be narrowly construed.