Domestic political and bureaucratic interests may drive each to deploy more than the absolute minimum militarily necessary, but neither can afford to indulge in the foolishness that characterized the Cold War superpowers' nuclear extravagance as both engaged in a futile effort to discover ways to escape the logic of mutual deterrence. Analysts who worry about the stability of the nuclear balance in South Asia worry not just about an emerging arms race, but also about the likelihood that nuclear deployments increase the chance of war. But the standard is not that stringent. This excruciating uncertainty in the presence of nuclear weapons does not depend on sophisticated strategic reasoning, or empathy for the people in the territory controlled by the adversary's government. In both India and Pakistan at least, the governments have been restraining officials inclined to make reckless comments.
Nuclear weapons encourage prudence and circumspection.
The routine refrain about India and Pakistan having fought three wars since 1947 ought to be paired with the observation that none have been fought since the two sides became undeclared nuclear weapons states in the late 1980s. Some might suggest that both India and Pakistan could have continued to enjoy the benefits of deterrence without becoming declared nuclear states. We might prefer that they had remained opaque nuclear powers, and good arguments can be made that this would have been a sensible course to follow. Some who have reacted with alarm to the South Asian nuclear tests suggest that the problem is not really what India and Pakistan have done. After all, they have simply confirmed a capability that already existed.