The second is that the violence must end before the parties can agree on the confidence-building measures that will follow, including a settlement freeze. The first could allow both sides some leeway to negotiate, but the second would doom the diplomatic efforts before they commence. Unlike conventional wisdom in Washington, the Mitchell report does not conclude that the Palestinian Authority started the violence deliberately or that it is singularly responsible for its continuation. While it chides both Israel and the Palestinian Authority for not doing enough to end the violence, it recognizes that both sides have significant forces at home with whom to contend. He has no chance.
Realism begins with an honest assessment of the situation on the ground.
To have a shot at getting back to the table, the Israelis will need an end to Palestinian violence, especially suicide bombings, and the Palestinians will need a settlement freeze. Mr. Arafat is considerably weaker today than he was only a few months ago, and his public is more defiant. At Camp David, one of the mistakes made by the United States and Israel in July was to assume that Mr. Arafat had few redlines imposed by his public on issues like Jerusalem and that it was only a matter of persuading Mr. Arafat personally to accept a deal. This turned out to be a costly assumption when the Jerusalem issue triggered a collapse of the negotiations. Going into the modest efforts that the administration is now undertaking with an assumption that violence can be brought under control without an effective settlement freeze would be a costly miscalculation.