The case for deploying theater missile defenses with capabilities beyond those of the improved PAC-3 Patriot remains unclear. There is little prospect within the foreseeable future that the United States or its allies will be threatened by Third World ballistic missiles that cannot be addressed by Patriot. And counterforce strikes against missile launchers may be a more cost-effective response to the missile threat. If a decision to deploy is not made at that time, development and testing of the system will continue, so that it is always deployable within a three-year window. Intercepting tactical, theater and strategic ballistic missiles faces a variety of challenges to system effectiveness.
More advanced systems remain untested, and testing experience to date has produced mixed results.
An NMD systems could be readily defeated by simple offensive countermeasures, and thus cannot provide effective and reliable protection. Moreover, there is no missile threat that requires or justifies such deploying an NMD system, and such a deployment is likely to provoke other countries to actions that lessen US security. The Clinton Administration has successfully engaged the Russians in negotiations aimed at loosening or eliminating many of these Treaty restrictions. The Clinton Administration has created an anomalous situation in which that which will be permitted under the revised ABM Treaty vasty exceeds what appears possible or desireable in the foreseeable future. The parties to the ABM Treaty should reverse course, and focus on more restrictive limitations distinguishing between permitted and prohibited systems.