Travel abroad where foreign intelligence operatives can gain access to you on their home turf. Work in a position or geographic location in the U.S. where it is easy for foreign nationals to gain access to you. Ethnic, racial, or religious background that may attract the attention of a foreign intelligence operative. It is important to note that all the above factors that increase the chances of a person selected for initial targeting and assessment are circumstances over which the individual has little or no control. Therefore, the fact that a person is targeted and assessed should never, by itself, be interpreted as casting doubt on the integrity or loyalty of that person.
Most foreign contacts are perfectly legitimate and well-meaning.
Your ability to recognize the few who are not will help you avoid problems. It will also help your security office help others avoid problems. Your assistance in identifying foreign intelligence collectors who may be cultivating you for ulterior purposes will make it possible to warn others and neutralize the foreign intelligence activity. During the Cold War, most Americans who betrayed their country by spying for foreign intelligence services were not targeted, assessed and recruited on the initiative of the foreign service. The strong preponderance of volunteers over recruits may have been due, in part, to the Cold War barriers that limited opportunities for Communist intelligence officers to take the initiative in contacting, assessing and cultivating American targets.