It is true that the KLA, insofar as its disparate nature allowed it to formulate a strategy, did want an intervention. Those who first decided to take on the Serbian security forces in Kosovo did so here and there across the territory, without much coordination. To suggest they systematically embroiled the Nato countries is to assign to them a capacity for planning, and for manipulating the outside world, they surely did not possess. The mania for revelation is one of the problems that make a proper understanding of these events more difficult. Simply because effort has been put into preparing new narratives of the war, and because there may have been access to new documents or interviews with actors who had not spoken before, the distorting idea grows up that there must be revelation.
New material can be interesting and relevant without being revolutionary.
Even if it does prompt some necessary revision, it almost never adds up to a plot. The Kosovo war has in fact been unusual in that post-war information has not added a great deal to the understanding of the conflict. There are some important gaps to be filled, particularly on Serbian motivation and Russian policy, and the story of how the war was ended diplomatically is not absolutely clear. But we already knew that the Nato countries banked on Milosevic backing down, either at the Rambouillet conference or after a few days bombing, and that when he intensified his attacks in Kosovo, and added mass expulsions, they were mightily surprised. We already knew that the air war then lurched from strategy to strategy, from ineffective attempts to stop Serbian operations in Kosovo to attacks on key targets in Belgrade and finally to attacks on the country's economic infrastructure.