Through his novels and historical study he began a relationship with the British Navy, lecturing at the War College. He melted history with maritime strategy, that of not seeking battle specifically, but seeking control of maritime communications. Corbett studied and believed in Clausewitz's theory of war, but saw it neglect maritime aspects of war. However, he felt that Clausewitz did not fully develop the theory of limited war, and the maritime implications. Corbett believed that sea power alone cannot win wars, but sea power can influence land operations in support of the Army.
Maritime operations are a subset of War, just as land operations are a subset.
Felt that control of sea lines of communication, in support of economic trade, to strangle the will of the people can have a decisive impact on the outcome of war. Corbett called maritime strategy war where the sea is a factor in relation to land forces. Protect seaborne commerce and trade. Protect sea lines of communication to enable freedom of movement for commerce and military action. Disperse cruisers to protect your own commerce and interdict enemy commerce while positioning the battlefleet to concentrate to defeat the enemy battlefleet when it appears.