But it is Iran, with a population both larger and better educated than Egypt's, that has the greatest chance to remake the region. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran's population has doubled, and population growth has outpaced economic growth by 1.4 percent a year since 1985. In the course of this economic decline, Iran's revolution has moved from fiery Jacobinism to ossified Bolshevism. The only remaining question is whether this is an early Brezhnev phase or a late Chernenko one. Iranian newspapers protest government corruption.
Mosques are empty and Western culture ubiquitous.
A stranger from another era deposited suddenly in Egypt, then in Iran, might think it was the latter, not the former, where the U.S. enjoyed a large diplomatic presence and good relations. Ironically, the Iranian regime's very internal weakness may postpone its demise. Because Iranians can increasingly say and do what they want, few feel an immediate need to replace the government. But when the counterrevolution does come it could further weaken the Iranian state, leading to upheavals in Iran's ethnic border areas among Kurds, Azeri Turks and Turkomans. This would dramatically shift the regional power balance just as calcified Arab regimes and their corrupt elites, from Morocco to the Gulf, come under greater popular pressure than ever.