A second approach is to structure the written rules so that they encourage cooperation. In so doing, the proponents have substantially ameliorated this formidable restraining force. A third approach is to remove the incentives of hourly billing. When we bill by the hour, the more we do, the more money we make - assuming someone can and will pay the bill. Clients have attempted to reduce these incentives by controlling billing practices.
Many institutional clients pay pitiful hourly rates, prompting lawyers to exaggerate their time.
If instead such clients required their lawyers to enter into cost-effective relationship agreements whenever possible, they could realize huge cost savings. In addition, such clients might eschew the adversarial relationships they are developing with their lawyers in favor of relationship agreements that encourage cooperation between them. Finally, conscious judicial efforts to support relationship agreements will discourage client belligerence. For example, if early in the case, lawyers reach cooperative relationship agreements, then judges should allow those lawyers to control the case. Since most lawyers dislike being controlled, this policy would encourage self-regulation.