You'll also find an article on firewalls that deals with how to keep computer crime from happening in the first place. While those two initiates combined are more than a token effort, they fall far short of being a final solution. For openers, agency and activity commanders can start being vocal, very very vocal about the incidents that have happened within their commands. The unwritten policy now is to sterilize any findings on computer crime incidents until the facts have been homogenized into Pablum. That's precisely the wrong approach.
Nothing makes things more real and therefore more important than names, places, dates, etc.
Activities who have been cracked need to talk about how and why it happened and what they've done to make sure it never happens again. Lessons learned is an old Navy tradition that should be dusted off and used to its best advantage. I see too much of what I call token education. Round everyone up and show them an excruciatingly bad movie on cloak and dagger espionage. However, some of us have found the old-movie method fairly effective.