The IETF received a fair bit of free advice, not all of which reflected an accurate knowledge of the relevant laws or the technical considerations. The IETF considered a number of legal theories and national laws. CC Docket No. This was helpful in understanding that particular law, which is complex, but also led the discussion to ignore the range of laws. Two examples suffice to demonstrate the range of laws concerning legal intercept.
Most countries practice wiretap under some circumstances to gather evidence of criminal behavior.
In Sweden, it is illegal to attribute a statement to a person in electronic mail, or to refer to him by name, without his consent, and in general wiretap is strongly supported in the law of the European Community. In the People s Republic of China, on the other hand, there is little or no inhibition on government surveillance of its citizens or its visitors. If the IETF were to establish protocol procedures for the systematic interception of communications regardless of whether done for valid law enforcement objectives or more sinister policing of free thought it would have to do so in a way that met the specific requirements of law in every country the Internet is deployed in. This is obviously a complex and exacting requirement. The IETF has considered wiretap questions before, notably when it considered a procedure known as Key Escrow or Key Recovery.