Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. That was it exactly. The traditional conception of knowledge as justified, true belief applies to propositional knowledge as opposed to the kind of knowledge we have when we know how to ride a bike, or to knit, or to ski. Propositions are variously described as the contents of beliefs, as the statements that are expressed by sentences, and as the bearers of truth and falsity. She believes that Green Bay won the Super Bowl, that her dog has fleas, that the moon is made of green cheese.
Propositions can be either true or false.
This is what it means to say that propositions are the bearers of truth or falsity. Initially, it was thought that knowledge could be defined as justified, true belief. If this were true, then it would be impossible for there to be a case of justified, true belief that did not constitute knowledge. As a result of the Gettier problem, most traditional epistemologists claim only to have identified three necessary conditions for knowledge. Traditional epistemologists typically no longer claim to have provided a definition of knowledge, and the traditional formulation has been emended to the weaker claim that S's knowing that P implies that S believes that P, that p is true, and that S's belief that P is justified.