The principal conclusion I offered was that any future Indonesian President will need the support of the military, now the TNI, to both govern the nation and maintain internal stability and peace. This conclusion remains unchanged by events over the past eighteen months or so. Despite the popular attitudes to the TNI being at an all time low within the Indonesian community, the TNI retains significant influence at all levels of government and quasi-government administration, and appears well placed to continue to do so in the near to medium term. The TNI regards itself as being integral to, and the catalyst for, the foundation of modern Indonesia. The eleven principles of this doctrine remain the basis of teaching in Indonesian military education institutions at all levels.
Military tradition is almost by definition, hard to change, and Indonesia is no exception.
To change the traditions and the status of the TNI, particularly from without, will be a difficult and lengthy task. I t seems to me that unless one wants Indonesia to slide into domestic chaos and probable anarchy, the changes to the constitutional functions of the TNI, and within the TNI culture itself, must be planned carefully and implemented gradually. The TNI civilian politicians are seen as being susceptible to pressure from overseas governments and international NGOs. Changes hinted at already by Wahid and others are set to cause significant dissent within the TNI ranks as members see reductions in traditional influence, power, and status. Wahid's February round of retirements, promotions, and re-assignments for detractors and supporters within the TNI will, in the short term at least, likely blunt any TNI opposition to reform.