The district court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether LePage was a trespasser because there was evidence that LePage did not know that he should not be on the off-ramp. Intent to trespass, however, is not necessary for a trespass. In fact, however, Sell cited a provision in the Restatement that requires for trespass an intent to enter. Although we conclude that the state was entitled to summary judgment based on the fact that LePage was a trespasser, we briefly address the district court's conclusion that the state is entitled to vicarious official immunity. Since 1976, the state is generally liable for its negligent acts, although limited exceptions exist.
Official immunity is one exception to liability.
Official immunity is intended to protect government officials from a threat of personal liability, which might deter the exercise of discretion and independent action and, consequently, impair effective performance of their duties. Official immunity applies to individual governmental actors. LePage argues that the state is not entitled to vicarious official immunity because no individual defendant was named or identified in this lawsuit. We previously rejected a claim by a respondent who argued that the county was not entitled to vicarious official immunity because the respondent had sued the county, not its employees. Id. S.L.D., however, is distinguishable.