Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, we have obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council. Its provisions will significantly further our nuclear non-proliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen international security. I could, of course, cite additional endorsements by prominent officials, individuals, and organizations, as well as states allied to the United States. Sustained nuclear testing, with no less than six tests per year, is the only demonstrated way of maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent.
Nuclear testing is needed to meet new requirements.
The CTB will add to proliferation. I see no benefits to U.S. ratification of the CTB, and terrible costs. Obviously, the administration fundamentally disagrees with each of those four assessments. This confidence is based on understanding based on 50 years of experience and analysis of more than 1,000 nuclear tests, including the results of approximately 150 nuclear tests of modern weapons types in the past 20 years. In part, these were due to the more limited knowledge and computational capabilities of a decade, or more, ago.