Lawder offered evidence that he ceased all work and, thus, understood from the letter that no legal action would be taken against him. Thus, we find that Lawder presented substantial evidence from which a jury could infer that the city and Brewer intentionally made a misstatement that Lawder relied on to his detriment. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict and did not err by charging the jury on fraud. Such a claim is unquestionably one of promissory fraud. See Cabnetware, Inc. v.
Promissory fraud is an intentional species of fraud, requiring proof of an intent to deceive.
Based on the above, we hold that the trial court erroneously submitted Lawder's fraud claims to the jury. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded. Maddox, Almon, See, and Lyons, JJ., concur. Hooper, C. J., concurs in the result. Kennedy, J., dissents.