Aside from statutoHly defined components of sulking, a generally recognized notion of 'sUlking' is evolv-ing. Not only do antistalking statutes indicate recognition of stalking, public and judidal perceptions indicate that stalking is a discretely identifiable behavior. Although this public perception of stalking does not obviate the need for concise definitions in antistalking statutes, it does provide guidance as to the types of activity society is trying to limit through these statutes. Nevertheless, the sus-pected stalker's actions cause fear in his victim. As long as a stalking defendant knows or should know that his actions cause fear, the alleged stalker can be prosecuted for stalking.
Protection orders can serve as notice to a defer.
Since stalking statutes criminalize what otherwise would be legitimate behavior based upon the fact that the behavior induces fear, the level of fear induced in a stalking victim is a crucial element of the stalkingoffense. Acts that induce annoyance or emotional distress would be punishable under statutes such as harassment or trespassing, which do not rise to the felony level and carry less severe penalties. In some instances, a defendant may be aware, through a past relationship with the victim, of an unusual phobia of the victim's and use this knowledge to cause fear in the victim. In order for such a defendant to be charged under provisions similar to those in the model code, the victim actually must fear bodily injury or death as a result of the defendant's behavior and a jury must determine that the victim's fear was reasonable under the circumstances.