The purpose of statutes that allow the transfer of fees is to curb abuses by both parties. If the present act, the Disclosure Act, is interpreted to allow the award of attorney fees only to prevailing buyers, it will afford no limitation on buyers who file meritless claims. A review of other Illinois statutes that provide for a grant of attorney fees to a prevailing party shows that when the legislature intends that certain parties can or cannot receive attorney fees, it has been specific. The Disclosure Act does not limit the award of attorney fees to a specific party, thus allowing the award of attorney fees to any prevailing party. We conclude that either plaintiffs or defendants, in appropriate circumstances, may recover fees under the Act.
Plaintiffs next argue that the grant of attorney fees to defendants was an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiffs contend the defendants should not have been awarded attorney fees because the trial court did not find plaintiffs' lawsuit was frivolous, as required by Haskell. Since our decision in Haskell, other courts have agreed that bad faith by the plaintiff is an important, and possibly controlling, factor to be considered by a trial court in deciding whether to award attorney fees under the Consumer Fraud Act. See Graunke v. 247 Ill. App. 267 Ill. App.