The district court found otherwise in part because he believed that Pries should not be allowed to have things both ways. After conceding in her deposition that she did not fasten her seat belt, the judge believed, Pries should not be allowed to take it back. We have held that a con- flict between a party's deposition and a later affidavit does not create a material dispute requiring a trial. A party may not wriggle out of a concession after its legal consequence becomes clear. But that is not what occurred here.
New knowledge is a good reason for new views.
Anyway, the principal evidence that Pries wore her seat belt is physical, and the striations in the webbing need not explain why they contradicted the driver's remarks. Although Pries' principal theory was that she was belted at the time of the accident and slipped out when the seat belt apparatus allowed undue slack, she presents several other issues. Because these may come up again, we dis- cuss them briefly. An alternate theory of how Pries got out of her seat belt is that the latch opened during the accident. See also Bammerlin v.