We reverse and remand. Plaintiffs make two contentions on appeal. We agree with the trial court and the State that the Declaratory Judgments Act provided a procedural vehicle and remedy that was not previously available to litigants in general, but the Act did not extend the jurisdiction of the courts over subject matter or parties. See Gifford Memorial Hosp. Thus, if the municipalities do not have capacity to sue, as the trial court decided, the Declaratory Judgments Act does not provide it.
Plaintiffs also challenge the trial court's conclusion that they lack capacity to sue the State.
Incapacity to sue exists where there is some legal disability, such as infancy or lunacy, or a want of title in the plaintiff to the character in which he sues. It is not true that municipalities always lack capacity to sue the State. Plaintiffs argue that their claims are within an exception to the general rule barring local government challenges to state legislation. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs under the general rule, without consideration of whether compliance with the statute at issue would in fact require the municipalities to violate constitutional provisions. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.