While D.L.W. objected to a portion of the victim information on the basis that it is hearsay, his contention on appeal is not based upon any hearsay nature of the information, but only as to its nature as victim impact information. D.L.W. specifically urges that the admission of the victim impact testimony was in error because it constituted details of a prior offense. In the first place, the offense for which D.L.W. was adjudicated delinquent and has received a determinate sentence is not a prior conviction for the purpose of the release-transfer hearing contemplated by 54.11. We hold the trial court did not err in hearing evidence of the details of the offense for which D.L.W. was adjudged delinquent. We find all of these cases distinguishable because they involve the introduction of details of prior criminal convictions into evidence at the punishment phase of a criminal trial.
None deals with a release-transfer hearing in a juvenile proceeding.
As we have noted, in this case the details did not relate to a prior conviction but to the offense for which D.L.W. had been adjudicated delinquent in this very proceeding. We overrule points of error numbers one and three. D.L.W. insists in point of error number two that the trial court abused its discretion by transferring him to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, against the weight of the evidence. We interpret this as an argument that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding. D.L.W. argues that, given the entire record, the evidence is clearly factually insufficient to justify discretionary transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.