Even if one tries to soften reductionism, Quine claims one will encounter the same problem. Thus Quine makes plain that if we allow for statements that are singularly verifiable, either by linguistic methods or by experience, we are opening the door for a statement to be verified only by linguistic methods. Such a statement would be analytic. Thus any kind of reductionist approach must include an unverifiable and invalid analyticity. We have found ourselves led, indeed, from the latter problem to the former through the verification theory of meaning.
Quine shows the inherent impossibility of the meaningful reduction of a statement.
Because reductionism rests on analyticity, which is circular, reductionism itself is invalidated. Even if one takes a linguistic approach again, reductionism still displays its inherent invalidity. As Quine points out, the truth of a statement seems to rely on both language and fact. From this we usually assume that the truth of a statement can be understood in these two ways. For the empiricist, the factual aspect must be put in verifiable terms.