Accordingly, we address the petitioner's argument that her injury did not arise out of her employment. Because the petitioner does not challenge the board's finding that medical causation exists, we review only its finding of legal causation. Dustin does not stand for the principle that injuries must arise out of a work condition that is unique to the claimant's job. In that case, an employee fainted, fell to the floor, and received a blow to the head which caused death. See id .
Obviously floors are a normal and customary incident in both industry and the home.
The Compensation Act has not contravened the law of gravity, and discomfort in a greater or less degree is inevitably the companion of a fall. We did not, as the petitioner claims, find the injury not compensable because the fall did not result from a condition peculiar to the job. Indeed, it is not a requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that the injury be peculiar to the claimant's job. See R. Galway, New Hampshire Workers' Compensation Manual 2.04, at 2-8. Finally, the petitioner argues that stress injuries arising from good faith criticism of an employee's job performance should be excluded from the province of the Workers' Compensation Law as a matter of public policy.