But the arguments in the chapter on foundationalism seem aimed primarily at the notion of a basic belief that is essential to foundationalism. A basic belief is one that is justified without relying for its justification on other beliefs. But as Elgin points out, this means that basic beliefs must be logically independent of other beliefs, meaning that their content cannot be explained by appeal to other beliefs. This is because any logical connection between a basic belief and some other belief will ultimately make the justification of the basic belief dependent on that other belief. I seem to see red here now.
P is the sort of proposition that is often taken to be basic in the required sense.
I seem to see blue here now. The only way to avoid this dependency is to sever all the logical ties between basic beliefs and other propositions. But once those logical ties have been cut, it is difficult to see how a person could have basic beliefs, since their content would be cognitively inaccessible to the subject. But it was unclear what exactly the relationship between foundationalism and perfect proceduralism consists in. I can see how foundationalism is an example of perfect proceduralism.