In this case, there were no actual costs from delay. The district court issued the temporary injunction on June 16 and decided the underlying issue and lifted the injunction just four weeks later, on July 12. Construction of the school building went ahead during that four-week period because the mechanical work covered by the Manning contract was not yet required. The only costs arising from the injunction were the attorney fees expended opposing it. Manning and the School District are entitled to no more attorney fees for litigating the merits of the underlying action, which is independent of the injunction delay issue, than a party to any other civil action would be.
Respondents point to no statutory or contractual authority for imposing attorney fees in the action.
It is well established that, in general, there must be either statutory or contractual authority before attorney fees will be awarded. No fees or expenses incurred in connection with the substantive claim or the two prior appeals are recoverable from the injunction bond. Because there is no clear delineation of what portion of the total attorney fees went toward opposing the motion for a temporary injunction, we remand for the district court to determine and order payment of the amount of fees and expenses reasonably and necessarily spent defending against the temporary injunction. Reversed and remanded.