Budget allocations described in dollar amounts provide an understandable metric of commitment even though the level of risk reduction they purchase is unknown. Likewise, performing three tests on wake turbulence rather than two seems like greater commitment to aviation safety, four tests rather than three even more so, etc. At some point, however, someone in an organization must decide when enough money has been spent on wake-turbulence testing. Someone has to balance the seriousness of wake turbulence against other risks such as the age of airframes, the combustibility of fabrics and other materials used within the cabin, and procedures for deicing aircraft during winter storms. These decisions and the controversies that erupt over them are about acceptable costs, not acceptable risks.
Risk is determined to a very real yet unknown extent when decisions about costs are made.
They may have little control over some components of overhead such as the costs of group health insurance and of hiring procedures that conform with affirmative-action laws. Not every member of the building department is an inspector or a blueprint checker, for example. Building departments also assign people to answer the telephones and take messages, supervise other employees, represent the department in budget meetings and engage in a variety of activities that support seismic safety but do not directly involve plan checking or field inspection. Regardless, the qualifications of the building department head are in some way connected to the level of seismic safety in a city, and the salary of the department head is in some way connected to those qualifications, hence to safety as well. The same is true for building inspectors and plan checkers.