Plus, it is well established practice in law that this benefactor need not be his natural parents. Indeed, classical liberalism would have no qualms with anyone entering on a child's behalf in order to save or protect him. Logistically, guardianship may be purely contractual, where one auctions off the flow of utility for years of having a kid to the highest bidder. So then, the transactions costs are shifted to the guardian who becomes the unborn child's vicar, and his transactions costs of negotiating a settlement are far lower than the unborn child's would be. This outcome is not surprising.
Markets automatically tend toward such cost-minimizing solutions.
Thus, there is little reason to doubt that some agreement would be reached in the market to deal with unwanted pregnancies without resorting to public policy-especially given the evidence of a extensive network of people who dedicate their time to helping the unborn and the present high demand for adoption services. Adoption services compete with abortion services. Abortion markets are largely artificial and inefficient, not to mention morally vile. On the other hand, there are many Coasean solutions to be found in the adoption market. Conformably, both Chicago and Virginia public choice theory would suggest that any intervention which precludes Coasean solutions would tend to make the abortion situation worse in terms of social efficiency.