Because of this, China's nuclear forces represent less of a threat to the United States than did Soviet nuclear forces. The United States nuclear forces consist of 11,000 ICBMs, while Chinese nuclear forces include only 20 missiles capable of hitting the United States. While China could rapidly expand its nuclear force, it has not shown an inclination to do so. In fact, China's ability to quickly design and deploy complex weapons systems is questionable. For example, China has not yet deployed the DF-31 ballistic missile, which has been in development for 15 years and still has only one ballistic missile nuclear submarine after launching its first in 1986.
Nuclear weapons improve China's national prestige and influence by exhibiting super- power status.
Possession of nuclear weapons are also seen as a deterrent to what China sees as U.S. hegemonistic aggression. Also, China's limited resources will be focused on deterring U.S. involvement in a conflict with Taiwan, rather than preparing for a nuclear war with the United States. China's espionage must also be viewed in the broader context of its arms control and nonproliferation policies. While China has been seen as a proliferator of missile technology, in recent years China has come to realize that arms control can also enhance its national security and has consequently increased its membership in nonproliferation and arms control regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Based on this broader context, China's theft of US nuclear secrets must be viewed with concern, but should not be the defining issue in US-Sino relations.