A better short-term policy for both sides would be to minimize immediate damage to arms control. From this perspective, the Clinton administration's approach makes sense. In effect, the president is trying to obtain Russian agreement to very limited amendments necessary to launch construction of a national missile defense site in Alaska in early 2001. In this way, he can give the go-ahead for the defense while also giving the next president an opportunity to return to the status quo if in the future it turns out that the system does not work or is unnecessary. He can decide, for example, that U.S. moving earth in Alaska does not violate the ABM Treaty in and of itself.
Patience can yield benefits for each side without tangible losses.
For Russia, it does not make much sense to wreck useful arms control agreements in response to a system that will not exist for a long time, will hardly affect its retaliatory capability for many years, and might fail altogether. In a few years Russia might be able to fashion a better deal or, if necessary, field a precisely targeted response to whatever defense will emerge. The threats that stimulated the proposed defense in the first place will multiply on a scale that no national missile defense will be able to withstand. The price of hasty decisions might be too high. In the future the United States still might deploy a defense system and Russia might respond in some fashion.