Therefore, being in a certain phenomenal state and being in a certain intentional state are the same property. Experience thus provides a unique form of felt aboutness . So phenomenology and intentionality, feel and content, distribute convergently, when it comes to experience. Most internalists about experience seem to share the externalists distaste for the notion of internal intentionality, and hence typically resort to an alleged divergence of feel and content. Presence to the subject of the object of his experience seem not exhaustively explicable in terms of such natural relations. . .
Naturalistic theories fail to do justice to the uniqueness of conscious intentionality.
I suggest that this uniqueness McGinn refers to lies in the internality he mentions, and the latter comes down to this, that intentionality is an intrinsic feature of experience. There just isn't the sort of gap between vehicle and content we find in the intentionality of words, tacit beliefs, and the like. It is unclear how to construe this internality of experiential intentionality, but it seems a necessary condition that it exclude any individuation of experiences that would advert to extra-cranial factors. The puzzle about conscious experience is precisely that the external representational connections to the environment, although there, do not, and cannot, affect the identity conditions of experiences . The cases should not be overly fanciful, however, for then they will fail to threat a mitigated convergence thesis.