In this view, dissociations between explicit and implicit memory are produced by destruction either of the CAS itself, or of the connections between CAS and other modules supporting other cognitive functions. My own view is that consciousness has to do with particular mental contents, not particular mental modules. In particular, consciousness occurs when we bind mental representation of some experience, thought, or action to a mental representation of the self as the agent or patient of some event, or the stimulus or experiencer of some state. On these terms the personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate datum in psychology. But even this would not be a memory.
Memory requires more than the mere dating of a fact in the past.
It must be dated in my past. In other words, I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have that 'warmth and intimacy' which were so often spoken of in the chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences 'appropriated' by the thinker as his own. If James, Janet, and Claparede are to be believed, a mental representation becomes part of conscious mental life when it is integrated with a mental representation of self. When this integration does not occur, or is disrupted, the representation is inaccessible to introspection, though it may still influence ongoing experience, thought, and action.