Neither the public at large nor the mass media have much interest in or knowledge of the policies involved. In order to protect their favored relationship with the government, client groups must find strategically placed patrons in the government or the legislature. Often clients can exert influence in the cumbersome process by which the Presidential Administration makes policy decisions. The Duma's agriculture committee, for example, is a strong advocate of financial support for Russian agriculture. Because of the importance of a client having a sponsor, corruption tends to be far more widespread in client politics than in majoritarian politics.
Implementation is likely, since it invloes a group accepting a benefit.
Entrepreneurial politics promise benefits for society as a whole or some large part of it, and a substantial cost on a some small identifiable part of it. However, compliance imposes a high cost on Russian firms whose livelihood depends on sales to clients in Iraq, China, or Iran. If the beneficiaries are the public at large and the public has little incentive to press for what it thinks are its interests, then one would expect that organized opponents of a policy would usually win. Moreover, since the Russian political system provides ample opportunity to block policies that threaten organized interests, it is remarkable that these policies are passed at all. The natural gas monopoly Gazprom, for example, has successfully lobbied in the Duma against bills it opposes.