Stated alternatively, with a particular set of facts, what precedents are regarded as analogous is influenced by the principles to which the reasoner adheres. The focus when constructing legal analogies, from the generalization said to govern the analogy, to the characteristics used to demonstrate that the generalization applies, to the particular facts of cases which demonstrate the presence of those characteristics, are all dependent on the principles to which the reasoner adheres. If different principles are adhered to then a different generalization may be regarded as relevant, different characteristics may be regarded as relevant to establishing that generalization and different facts might be sought to demonstrate the presence of those characteristics. However, principles do not exist pre-packaged to be applied in the determination of problems. Legal analogizing plays an important role in determining the scope of principles themselves.
Principles are empty without testing by reference to concrete examples.
The application of principles is itself a refinement of those principles. It is argued that the principles which underlie analogies, and which can be referred to as supporting the analogy in its reconstruction, are the result of the interaction of and compromise between other principles. Thus, while principles influence the creation of analogies, they do so by weighing for one result or another and are themselves refined in the process. Any comprehensive attempt to simulate legal analogizing must simulate the role of legal principles in legal analogizing. Numerous systems have been constructed that simulate aspects of legal analogizing.