The Russian-German war is still largely ignored, hardly understood, and even with the mass of records now available, is continually misinterpreted. And the West still gives only grudging recognition to Russia's wartime contribution despite the loss of some 30 million Soviet citizens. The new books that inundate the markets are misleading or incomplete.
Many scholars still view the war and Germany's defeat in terms of isolated components.
They ignore the relationship between military, political, economic, bureaucratic, cultural and social factors. Virtually no comprehensive account exists to show how all these elements impacted detrimentally on German military operations in Russia between June 22 and the end of September 1941. Germany's defeat has not been examined in terms of its national character or suicidal predisposition. With no natural frontiers of its own, the German Army prepared for and carried out aggressive war by rationalizing its defensive nature. And despite claims after World War II of being apolitical, the Army General Staff in particular held de facto political power from 1871 and moved the new nation inexorably toward self-destruction.