That which had not been achieved through Milosevic's action, or inaction, would have to be conceded by those coming after him. That means securing as much American presence and influence in this part of the Balkans as possible. This does not necessarily entail the creation of democratic institution as such. Whether it is elections, the media, or the functioning of elected bodies, the will of the people in the Bosnian Serb Republic is irrelevant. What matters is the will of the authorities in Washington.
Legal forms have special importance in various peace agreements that constitute the pax Americana.
Countless revisions of the Dayton Agreement are a clear sign, as are the many creative legal interpretations by the international High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that this does not sound too abstract, let me quote one statement by Christopher Hill, the American diplomat who was the author of several versions of the proposed peace agreement on Kosovo. In the fall of 1998, Hill stated that the U.S. plan for Kosovo must be worded so as to provide different interpretations of the same provisions by the opposing sides, without undermining the agreement in the process. Milosevic's foreign policy had always oscillated between excessive uncooperativeness and excessive cooperativeness, and always at the wrong moment. Some authorities in Montenegro and in the Republic of Srpska, and some opponents of Milosevic among the opposition in Serbia, have also behaved very cooperatively.