I propose that it is precisely agents' bounded rationality that prevents them from successfully performing this alignment. I have developed a computational simulation model in which buyers and suppliers interact with each other. Buyers' choices between market and hierarchy are implemented as the result of a process in which each buyer is matched to a supplier or to himself, respectively. This matching is repeated in each of a sequence of timesteps. The outcome of the matching is determined by the agents' preferences for each other, which they are allowed to adapt to their experiences from each timestep to the next.
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In our approach, however, we maintain that real economic agents can't optimize because of bounds on their rationality, but have to settle for satisficing solutions, which they learn by adaptively searching through the space of organizational forms. Torsten Eymann 's European ACE-page . The proceedings for the 1999 CMOT workshop. The ModelAge project looks at Organizational Models and Intelligent Agency .