Less coercive schemes have also been tried. Crop-substitution and alternative development programs, for example, seek to encourage peasants to join the legal market in agriculture or other sectors. U.S. aid finances infrastructure projects, such as roads and bridges, and subsidizes the cultivation of legal agricultural goods, such as coffee and corn. Here too, serious obstacles and unintended consequences undermine the best laid plans of Washington and the governments of drug-source countries. Coca plants, for example, grow in areas and under conditions that are thoroughly inhospitable to legal crops, making a switch to legal alternatives unrealistic.
Farmers can also earn far higher returns from illicit plants than from the alternatives.
For that reason, even when they enter crop-substitution programs, peasants often continue to grow drug plants in other areas. Ironically, the U.S. government in such cases subsidizes the production of illegal drugs. It is not clear why Washington thinks that a crop reduction program raises the income of Midwest wheat farmers but lowers the income of Andean coca farmers. The drug industry also benefits from improved infrastructure. Finally, even if alternative development programs were able to raise the prices of legal crops so that they exceeded or were at least competitive with the price paid for illegal crops, that situation could not last.