In 1931, the German mathematician Kurt Godel proved that formal mathematical systems cannot be both complete and consistent. In recent years, scholars addressing law's indeterminacy have begun to discuss the applicability of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems, attempting to prove for law what Godel proved for mathematics. In this Essay, Professor Dow challenges the utility of mathematical analysis in legal discourse. Focusing on a recent article by Mark R. Brown and Andrew C. Greenberg, Professor Dow shows that legal and mathematical reasoning are fundamentally dissimilar, and argues that law should scavenge only for things that law is like. Moreover, Professor Dow explains, attempting to prove law's indeterminacy through formal devices shows a basic misunderstanding of the source of law's inability to mechanically resolve disputes.
Law comprises distinctive sets of norms, entirely discrete normative regimes.
The real task of legal theory, Professor Dow concludes, is to determine how we should choose among these competing regimes. Currently, at least four states ban write-in voting completely, and many states place various restrictions on such voting. The Court found that the state interest in regulating elections outweighed the voters' interest in write-in votes. This Note argues that bans on write-in voting violate the First Amendment right to free political speech. The Note examines the relationship between the First Amendment and the right to vote, considering the Fourth and Ninth Circuit applications of First Amendment doctrine to write-in voting.