Thus, I know I am seeing, and I know I am seeing a table. Even when one is seeing things one is seeing things. This consists in bracketing out not, like the first, what is dubitable and therefore not really part of the experience and the object as experienced, but what is not essential to an experience being perceptual experience or to an object being a table. Two very interesting examples of the applications of all this are Sartre s early texts, The Psychology of the Imagination, and Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. The move to embodied perceiving consciousness, though in one way an extension of Husserl s phenomenology, seems to involve some perhaps radical changes.
Perception is meaningful.
Any attempt to add to perception something that would give it meaning begs the question. But against this background of the already meaningful and presupposed by it is the awareness that what we are aware of goes beyond what we are aware of. This is not the claim that as a matter of fact there is more to the world than what we perceive, but rather that the experience of perception is an experience of what transcends it. Husserl s attempt to bracket out what is dubitable thus perhaps goes against what perception tells us. Husserl s consciousnesss, after the reduction, may have lost the transcendent, what makes consciousness consciousness of something other than itself.