Economic stabilization measures have been adopted in all of these countries, but none has yet achieved significant structural adjustment. The domestic factor most strongly correlated with categorization of early adjustor as opposed to recalcitrant state is the relative share of resources controlled by the state prior to the commencement of reform. Those states that control relatively high proportions of total societal resources appear to remain reluctant to undertake reforms that would cause a rapid reduction in levels of state appropriation. External sponsorship of reform may have been somewhat greater for early adjustors than for recalcitrant states. In Chapter Five the economic and political strategies of the recalcitrant states will be described, with special attention being paid to the obstacles to reform.
Outsiders consist of Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan.
In the concluding chapter the interrelationship of political and economic factors at the three levels of analysis will serve as the basis for evaluating prospects for transitions to some form of capitalism, including an Islamist variant. At the level of global-regional interactions, an attempt will be made to evaluate the costs and benefits to the MENA region of political and economic interventions into the region by external actors. That cost-benefit analysis, in combination with assessments of national political economies, will in turn provide the basis from which the likelihood of adoption of alternative development strategies will be evaluated. For the purposes of this volume the MENA region will be defined as all Arab states as well as Iran, Israel and Turkey. It should be noted, however, that Israel will be excluded from generalizations about the region, unless otherwise specified, as will be noted in the preface.