Operations in Kashmir have, therefore, been of the nature of holding on to the territory with each side, albeit with local offensive of limited nature, such the Haji Pir Pass. Economically, Kashmir is a deficit area. So it can't be said that either strategically or economically, Pakistan's existence depends on Kashmir. There is a need to re-examine this assertion. It appears to have been accepted by Pakistan that Kashmir cannot be wrested by war.
Insurgency survives only if there is local dissatisfaction amounting to revolt.
The shenanigans of political parties, indifferent administration and communal propaganda from Pakistan, had estranged a fairly large number of the people in the urban areas in the valley. Based on the lessons of their first attempt in 1965, the present induction of militants from 1988 onwards was well planned. Restive youth from the valley, armed and trained by Pakistan in camps established by it across the border, were inducted for militancy in the hope of annexing the valley. Nine years down the road, it is becoming clear to Pakistan that it cannot get the valley by proxy war either. However, during the September 1997 visit of Nawaz Sharif to the UN, Clinton declined to interfere and advised him to pursue bilateral talks with India.