Drawing from the previous discussion, a comprehensive answer clearly should include both supply and demand perspectives. These will be addressed in turn. As we have seen, the United States has on two occasions convinced Beijing to amend its practices by concentrating on a specific issue, and using incentives and disincentives that seemed well-tailored to draw the desired reaction. In any political system, as a rule, the more disparate the nature of topics under debate, the more difficult it is to build an effective coalition to deal with them. At the same time, those parties most concerned with the likelihood of future tensions with the PRC over its weapons export policies, should maintain an open dialogue with their Chinese counterparts.
Outlooks do vary widely, and it is necessary to exchange views to help avoid unanticipated crises.
International arms control regimes, however, may offer a more promising avenue than do bilateral or narrowly-based approaches. As a caveat, it should be added that one UN initiative that appears to offer little of practical value in actually controlling weapons transfers, the international arms registry, may have a salutary effect on Beijing. The secrecy and official lack of candor that enshrouds all aspects of the PRC's weapons exports activities has not been conducive to meaningful arms control dialogue with other states, or, for that matter, within the Chinese bureaucracy itself. First, as a regional power, China does not share the expansive concerns of a superpower, such as the United States, for the maintenance of the international security order. Consequently, it has few incentives to display moderation, outside of Asia, in its transfer of military hardware.