A point to keep in mind is that it is the same claim that can be made either as a report or as the conclusion of an inference. The content does not differ in the two cases. If it did, perception would be cognitively idle. Philosophers have worried over the ontological status of these unobservable, or merely theoretical objects. Insofar as they are cognitively accessible, they are so only to reason, not to the senses.
Instrumentalists even deny that there are any such objects.
Theoretical claims are just make-believe, not really about anything at all. Sellars understands theoretical claims as purely inferential claims, that is, claims one can only become entitled to as the conclusions of inferences. But to talk about how we can become entitled to a claim is one thing. To talk about what kind of thing the claim is about is another. There is no systematic difference between the kinds of things we reason about and the kinds of things we observe.