After briefing and argument by counsel, the trial court denied Coleman's motion, reaffirming its holding that Hogan's second strike of Thomas was based on a racially neutral reason. We awarded Coleman an appeal to determine whether the trial court properly allowed Hogan to exercise a second peremptory strike against Thomas. Hogan does not challenge the trial court's ruling that his initial peremptory strikes on the basis of gender violated the Equal Protection Clause. The issue before us is whether the remedy chosen by the trial court, allowing Hogan the opportunity to strike a reseated juror a second time, is consistent with the principles of Batson and its progeny, namely, whether this remedy provides sufficient assurance that an individual will not be prevented from serving as a juror for unconstitutional reasons. The positions of the parties on this issue are clear.
Hogan asserts that, following the reseating of the jurors, the process begins anew.
Here, Hogan asserts, the trial court found that Hogan's reasons were not pretextual, and, Hogan argues, the trial court's determination on this factual issue should be given great deference and overturned only if the trial court abused its discretion or committed manifest error. Coleman argues that in cases such as this, where the reason for the initial strike was constitutionally infirm, any subsequent reason given for the strike, even if neutral on its face, cannot be separated from the original offensive basis for the strike. Some states have required that the venire be discharged and a new panel chosen. Other jurisdictions have required that an improperly stricken juror be reinstated on the panel. A third and largest group has allowed the trial court to exercise its discretion in selecting the appropriate remedy.