As each combat unit deployed to bases in the Mideast, two representatives were sent to Central Command headquarters. There they worked alongside representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, as well as coalition partners. Unlike in Vietnam, planning for Desert Storm routinely included personnel from the units that would fly the missions. Senior political leadership left the details to the military professionals. In fact, when the overall air campaign was laid out in skeletal form, General Glosson sent it to each wing commander for his approval.
Nothing is sacrosanct.
We're just trying to do this the smartest way possible. While General Glosson and General Horner were pursuing this effort to plan from the bottom up, they felt little pressure from above. In Vietnam, field commanders were exasperated by the micro management to which they were subjected by higher headquarters and civilians at the Pentagon. In the early years of the war, targets were selected at the White House by President Johnson and a handful of his most trusted advisors. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara also took a personal interest in the smallest of details.