Judgments of the Workers' Compensation Court are not, and were not at that time, approved by the Division, and therefore, we conclude that the statute was not applicable to the facts in this case. Although, as will be later discussed, we may, in the absence of guidance from the Workers' Compensation Court's own rules, look to the Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance, we will not pick and choose those which we consider. In this case, any motion to set aside the judgment based on newly discovered evidence was untimely pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. Although we conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court had no specific statutory authority to set aside its judgment based on a petition filed 18 months after the judgment was entered, we agree that under some circumstances the court may have inherent equitable power to do so. However, even the court's equitable power is not without limitation and must be subject to predictable rules if the finality of judgments is to mean anything.
Extrinsic fraud affects the court itself.
We have held repeatedly that neither perjured testimony nor false or fraudulent allegations used in obtaining a judgment constitute extrinsic fraud. Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is fraud that represents an inherent risk to an adversarial proceeding. In this case, the findings of the Workers' Compensation Court established, at most, intrinsic fraud, and the Workers' Compensation Court may not set aside its own judgment based on a petition filed more than 60 days after it was entered for intrinsic fraud. For these reasons, we conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court lacked statutory authority and equitable authority to set aside its prior judgment two years after it was entered. However, contrary to the State Fund's argument, this does not mean that it or any other insurers are without remedies in cases involving fraud.