Unofficial estimates for 1995 and projections for 1996 and 1997 point to even larger deficits. The re cord of the past tells us that persistent and growing balance of payments deficits are a harbinger of future trouble. This might not be the case if there were large-scale foreign private investment. It may be a matter of pride, or that some of the decision-makers may find the current situation to their liking. These international institutions usually prescribe privatization, something resisted by highly-placed public officials who find it is easier to corrupt the public sector.
Privatization usually means large-scale dismissals and a host of other problems.
In short there are no real prospects of basic economic reforms. In the absence of basic economic reforms, the Syrian economy wil l continue to be dependent on exogenous factors, as it has since the 1960s most importantly oil. The possibility of foreign aid, as in the past, is a second important factor. A third factor is Syria's effective control of Lebanon. Syria sent its army to Lebanon one year after the eruption of the civil war in 1975.