The second is delay studying it or delay providing the uncomfortable information. Another is narrowly construe an issue so it cannot produce an answer that your superiors will find uncomfortable. Another is to select assumptions that lead to the desired conclusions. For example, you could study whether or not we will have adequate warning about indigenous ballistic missile development programs, even though there are no indigenous ballistic missile development programs on the face of the earth. In short, the effect of fudging is to work the intelligence process.
Leaders have to create an environment that is hospitable to the truth.
Whether it amounts to bad news or good news, not an environment that forces subordinates to trim, to hedge, to duck, and to fudge. A recent TD1 launch is an object lesson, but also a warning. Many were skeptical for technical reasons that it could even fly. And yet, North Korea demonstrated staging twice. The likelihood that the TD2 will be successfully test-flown has gone up considerably since that August 31 flight.