Maybe I need to say more. According to Hookway's reading of Quine, and I have no reason to disagree, if meaning holism and the indeterminacy of translation theses are correct, then there cannot be a science of cognitive psychology. There cannot be a science of the mind which admits into its theoretical framework the propositional attitudes. Actually, we can conclude only that such a science would have to be autonomous of physics, the domain of behavior and stimulus meanings. There is one more important premise, namely, physicalism.
Quine says that all explanation is physical explanation.
Therefore, since no science can be autonomous of physics, then there can be no science of cognitive psychology. Davidson's anomolous monism can now be seen as a denial of this final premise. By abandoning Quine's empiricist concern for nerve ending stimuli and still accepting meaning holism and the indeterminacy of translation, Davidson's materialism of mind is reduced to an ontological monism. The science of mind itself, that is, all the theories and constitutive concepts, can be autonomous of physics after all.