I came across a passage about judgment that draws a distinction between justice and judgment. The basic idea, one that still confounds me, is that judgment is not the conclusion of postponement. The act of postponing makes judgment possible. Judgment is too organizing, segmenting, discriminating, postponing, and destructive. What disturbed us was that in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving ourselves of any means of distinguishing between existing beings, between modes of existence, as if everything were now of equal value.
Judgment prevents the emergence of any new mode of existence.
For the latter creates itself through its own forces, that is, through the forces it is able to harness, and is valid in and of itself inasmuch as it brings the new combination into existence. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only by defying judgment. It is not a question of judging other existing beings, but of sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is, whether they bring forces to us, or whether they return us to the miseries of war, to the poverty of the dream, to the rigors of organization. Then again, justice seems to open the door to a doctrine of judgment. My comment, in sum, is that the door can always be opened again, shut, unhinged, or painted.