Because of the proliferation dangers of civilian use of plutonium, the United States abandoned this aspect of its nuclear power program over a decade ago. But European plutonium programs have plowed ahead and are now dramatically increasing the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material in civilian commerce. As they do, the chances increase that some of it will escape from national and international controls and fall into the wrong hands. Therefore, protection and tracking of nuclear material will be only as strong as the weakest link. As a practical matter, the agreement delegates to the Europeans the power to determine whether any particular activity would or would not be consistent with basic U.S. non-proliferation standards.
Press accounts of the negotiations present a disturbing picture of U.S. efforts.
U.S. negotiators, eager to reach agreement, acceded to European demands that these rights be excluded from the agreement. This Committee should ask the Administration to explain the absence of the required consent rights in light of the earlier position taken by Secretary of State Christopher. But the question is not whether the proposed agreement is better than an old agreement which pre-dates the NNPA and which everyone agrees is defective. But such an assertion violates the intent of the NNPA to give Congress continuing effective oversight over nuclear trade. An agreement for cooperation establishes a framework under which nuclear trade may take place.