Naturally, there are criticisms that can be made about the experiments, but it seems to be the experiments with the most depressing implications that are the most robust and replicable. Certain values can act as psychological causes of a action without being justifications of that action. This means that we can and should treat people whose inferences and behaviour seem illogical with a large measure of charitability. It does not, however, mean that we must give up evaluative concepts of rationality, or distinctions between good and bad reasoning. Much of my thesis consists of attempts to show that this concept, given a precise decision-theoretic definition, matches up with our intuitions of what distinguishes scientific or strongly rational thinking from other kinds of thinking.
Normality is a balanced mixture of all four.
There will always be plenty of others who, for a price, are delighted to sell others their thoughts to think. You can't get rid of stupidity any more than you can run from your own legs. It's wrong to make fun of other people's beliefs, unless those beliefs are stupid. Whether one is better than the other is a matter of taste. If no thought thy mind doth visit, make thy speech not too explicit.