Like many German conservatives Heidegger saw Marx as just an extreme case of what was wrong with modernism. I am in favor of treating ecology as the appropriate general worldview, the successor to metaphysics, although I am against importing into natural science models from economics, and calling the result ecology. I mainly agree with Heidegger, but I think he exaggerates the historical significance of philosophy in comparison with other things that also shape history, such as markets. This was probably mainly true of empiricism and positivism, but it was not really true of positivism in its physicalist interpretation, and it is not true of realist philosophies of science such as those of Putnam and Harre. Since Heidegger wrote there has been a movement away from operationalism.
Foundations are arches, and arches are firsts, prealables.
It changes nothing for the social functioning of foundations in the history of philosophy that Heidegger treats his firsts as openings of spaces of possibilities. Ethics has always been the central task of philosophy, hence what philosophy needs to become is in line with a legitimate way of seeing what it always has been. For every attempt to gain insight into the supposed task of thinking finds itself moved to review the whole history of philosophy. My historical review of the history of philosophy interprets philosophy as being and as always having been cultural action. I don't have the original German at hand and would like to look at it.