This paper is not intended to evaluate the validity of this claim, but rather to note that it has political relevance. It is hardly accidental, as a favorite Soviet saying goes, that nuclear weapons have received close attention from the Russian government, and that they received more attention from the reformist government of Sergei Kiriyenko than they did from the previous government of Viktor Chernomyrdin. This means that relatively higher attention to nuclear weapons will continue under the conditions of the economic crisis because it provides for a near-optimal combination of political imperatives and economic costs. As a consequence, no amount of external pressure can force Russia to abandon strategic modernization. Reallocation of resources is highly unlikely.
Nuclear weapons possess an immediate deterrence value.
If these cases are taken as an example, one could imagine a variety of scenarios within Russia or in close proximity to its territory, but involving, nonetheless, its troops. These would include a deteriorating situation in the North Caucasus, the conflict in Abkhazia, separatist movements inside the country, nuclear cooperation with Iran, etc. While still foreign minister, Yevgeniy Primakov never tired of repeating that intentions are transitory, but power is enduring. And, after all, this is just a mirror image of the Western and East European concerns about the revival of Russian expansionism. In today's Russia, however, precious few view NATO as friendly in the long term.