Instead, Gillespie is only interested in showing that Craig himself adheres to the A-Theory of time. That is, from an ontological perspective, the series of past events does not consist of a narrowly actual and coexistent membership, and therefore cannot draw upon those principles governing such a series. At most, the series of past events constitutes only a broadly actual series . Craig will not accept the first option, so he must be opting for the second. But if this is so, then this clearly places him at odds with the A-theory of time.
Past events can be infinite.
Some reasons suggest that it is not. When Dr. Craig speaks of the impossibility of an actual infinite being instantiated in the real world he means to suggest that there can be no actual infinite sets that bear any ontological status beyond nominalist or conceptualist restraints. So one way of unraveling the controversy is as easy as understanding the difference between past events and the past itself . The reasoning behind this occurs from the simple fact of temporal accumulation. This would mean that my having eaten breakfast yesterday does not accumulate in a way that the breakfast contributes to the present.