In Argentina, for instance, competition among the some 200 families engaged in fishing for the domestic market was leading to lower prices. Some smaller Japanese fisheries have improved their management in a similar manner. Conflicts with foreign fleets, however, especially those with large factory ships, unfortunately can overshadow such efforts. Thus far, this seems not to have occurred. When such concentrations appear likely, governments could make use of antitrust powers, impose taxes and user fees on windfall profits, and also decide who gets retired user rights.
Government can employ some fairly simple measures to prevent concentration.
For instance, a one percent limit on quota transfers, combined with other limitations, has kept the rights to the northern Pacific halibut fishery well-distributed. While the role of governments would in time be substantially reduced in rights-based fisheries, the transition to a new system requires significant government involvement. Reducing the size of management areas and bringing groups of fishermen into management decisions would be helpful. Research into economic and biological alternatives for a fishery, as well as negotiating the redistribution of wealth and overlapping international interests, are other forms of government help. Government subsidies will be required, but for disinvestment this time, not for the shipbuilding booms that have contributed to fleet overcapacity.