To gain this good, it is necessary to cloak judicial officers with immunity from civil liability for their acts, so long as these acts are within the jurisdiction of the officer. Other officials who are performing acts associated with the judicial process may be protected as well. Judicial immunity depends upon the performance of a judicial function. When such judicial functions are performed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity. Judicial immunity is granted or withheld on the basis of the nature of the function being performed, and not on the basis of the office.
Judicial immunity extends to prosecutors for acts performed in initiating prosecutions.
That principle was originally approved in Watts , where the plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action, alleging that the prosecutor had caused him to be arrested under the Prohibition laws knowing that the plaintiff had not, in fact, violated the law. On rehearing, however, the court reversed itself and concluded that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for malicious prosecution. We and the Supreme Court have consistently reiterated that principle. That argument misconstrues Utley 's jurisdictional principle. In Utley , the defendant city recorder issued a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest without a sworn complaint having ever been filed.