The Texas Supreme Court in the Blum decision did not refer to the second requirement set out by the United States Supreme Court in Weinstein. Because Blum was the only complaining party, the court's language suggested a recognition that the complained-of conduct could occur again with respect to other individuals who had signed the petition but who were not parties to the suit. The court stated that the usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, not simply at the date the action was initiated. However, the Court goes on to say that when a pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestational period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. Thus, an appellate process would be effectively denied.
Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness.
This doctrine might well be applied to the present case. Another exception to the mootness doctrine has been addressed in Texas. This exception allows appellate review of a question of considerable public importance if that question is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public, but for some reason evades appellate review. We believe that the present case falls within both of these categories. It is possible that future parties could find themselves in the same position as the DPS and LaFleur due to the expiration of a license prior to the completion of an appeal.