Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be said for an irrealist, noneliminativist, naturalistic approach to intentionality that I call preservative irrealism. Reply to F. Egan's commentary on 'Naturalism and Intentionality'. Nonreductive Materialism , in R. Warner and T. Szubka, eds. To appear in Polish translation in Znack.
Nonreductive materialism makes three main claims.
First, the mental and the neurobiological explanatory framworks are compatible, rather than excluding each other. I briefly summarize my own proposed explication of these three claims. We offer three replies. First, FP is clearly committed only to a weak form of modularity that connectionism accommodates easily. Second, even if FP were committed to other forms of modularity not manifested in human cognition, this would not mean that FP is so radically false that there are no beliefs and desires.