Nor are objects properties. Wittgenstein recognizes a distinction between formal and material properties. On-ness is a formal property. Since material properties are manifested only in states of affairs, and states of affairs are produced by a configuration of objects, material properties are not simple and thus are not objects. Wittgenstein does not attempt to explain how material properties are produced by objects.
Properties are the features according to which things in the world can be sorted and classified.
It is not possible to understand redness before finding examples. What is common among particulars, and contrasted with other particulars which lack such features, enables us to formulate ideas about properties. It is essential to properties that they have multiple occurrences, but particulars, by definition, are singular, unrepeated occurrences. According to Wittgenstein, since properties are principles of classification, a property is more complex than a particular instantiation of a property through a state of affairs. Not only are properties not objects, Wittgenstein attempts to purge objects of properties altogether.