Justification having as tied to the normative questions must take care of cognitive plausibility in belief formation. Otavio Bueno A Plea for a Modal Realist Epistemology David Lewis's genuine modal realism postulates the existence of concrete possible worlds that are spatio-temporally discontinuous with the concrete world we inhabit. In this paper we examine Lewis's attempts to provide an epistemology of modality and we argue that he fails to provide an account that properly weds his metaphysics with an epistemology that explains the knowledge of modality that both he and his critics grant. We argue that neither the appeals to acceptable paraphrases of ordinary modal discourse nor parallels with platonistic theories of mathematics suffice. We conclude that no proper epistemology for modal realism has been provided and that one is needed.
Most philosophers assume that truth has a single underlying nature if any nature at all.
While seemingly sensible, this assumption generates what I call the scope problem for traditional theories of truth. Following the lead of Crispin Wright, I suggest a form of alethic pluralism, the idea that truth has a different underlying nature in different contexts. The view I roughly sketch can be seen as a type of functionalism about truth, since it holds that truth is a multiply realizable property of propositions. I argue that the functionalist theory not only evades the scope problem, it avoids the various pitfalls facing other forms of alethic pluralism.