The reluctance to use force progressively erodes our credibility. Each time we fail to fulfil our threats, we are forced to make a more formidable threat in the next round and a larger mobilization of effort. At the end of this vicious circle we will be left with the choice of abdication or a massive assault that, if Saddam is skillful, may then appear unprovoked. The argument that unless we march on Baghdad we will be unable decisively to weaken Saddam is poor testimony to the strategic foresight, political will and military capacity of a superpower. To argue that we are unable to destroy Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbours and to prevent significant deployments constituting such a threat is an alibi for abdication.
Potential friends lose heart at the decline of American credibility.
Those on the sidelines see no reason for restraint. This is a tougher job than Afghanistan. Saddam's next provocation must be viewed not from the point of view of the particular offence but of advancing our broader strategy. On the whole, I consider this a better option than relying largely on the internal resistance. If we are serious about backing the Iraqi resistance, we should set about equipping and training it and organizing its command structure, and be prepared to protect it with our own forces.