The easiest and most common way to achieve higher results was certainly to diminish the goals as well as real production capacities. Employees were completely under the influence of enterprise executives. This means that the ruling, superior position of enterprise managers appeared to be a priori given obstacle for any sufficient corporate governance at the Russian formerly state enterprises. Hence, in all cases of the acquisition of the major part of enterprise stock by insiders, the full control over the enterprises certainly belongs to managers, and more concretely, to general directors. That explains a gap between the formal assignment of shares and the real control exercised by the shareholders.
Real control is in the hands of managers.
The aforementioned statements are hardly new to experts dealing with economies of the Soviet and post-Soviet type. They are articulated here, because sometimes analysts do not question the adequateness of the real process of control and governance to formal ownership structure. Russian privatized enterprises can be certainly classified according to the structure of shareholdings. Other insiders simply do not have enough access to working out, considering, formulating, approving and implementing decisions if this is not done through managers. Our explanation is that both types of companies are controlled by managers and, therefore, do not show many differences in performance.