Rather, Kings argues that he did not intend for Simpson himself to pay damages. Although such a limitation would seem to obviate any absolute or qualified immunity defense, we have two difficulties with this argument. First, it is contrary to the complaint, which states that King is suing Simpson in both his individual and his official capacities. King is of course entitled to withdraw his damages claim against Simpson in his individual capacity, but we see no indication that he formally has done so. It is well established, for example, that judicial actors enjoy absolute immunity.
Government officials performing prosecutorial acts also are absolutely immune from suit.
See id . In determining whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity, we must take a functional approach and look to the particular acts or responsibilities that the official performed. Thus, in Scotto , no absolute immunity attached to the actions of a parole officer who recommended that a warrant be issued for a parolee's arrest because the function was administrative rather than adjudicative or prosecutorial and was not integrally related to the judicial process. Our precedent therefore instructs us to examine the nature of the actions that the parole officer performed before deciding what immunity, if any, attaches to the actions. In this case, Judge Amon conducted no discernible factual inquiry into the nature of Simpson's responsibilities or alleged actions.