We assess ways in which computing systems may support Separation of Duty. We discuss the mechanisms we are implementing to support Separation of Duty and roles in Adage, a general-purpose authorization language and toolkit. On SDSI's Linked Local Name Spaces Martin Abadi Rivest and Lampson have recently introduced SDSI, a Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure. One of the important innovations of SDSI is the use of linked local name spaces. This paper suggests a logical explanation of SDSI's local name spaces, as a complement to the operational explanation given in the SDSI definition.
Many security protocols have the aim of authenticating one agent to another.
We formalize each definition using the process algebra CSP, use this formalism to study their relative strengths, and show how the model checker FDR can be used to test whether a system running the protocol meets such a specification. We discuss various aspects of secure distributed computation and look at weakening both the goals of such computation and the assumed capabilities of adversaries. We present a new protocol for a conditional form of probabilistic coordination and present a model of secure distributed computation in which friendly and hostile nodes are represented in competing interwoven networks of nodes. It is suggested that reasoning about goals, risks, tradeoffs, etc. for this model be done in a game-theoretic framework. In recent years, a method for analyzing security protocols using the process algebra CSP and its model checker FDR has been developed.