This has been evident in the utilization of Aegis cruisers equipped with SPY-1 radars as the heart of the Navy s Upper and Lower Tiers. Because naval assets could arrive first in a regional contingency, this concentration on active defense would seem prudent. However, Navy strike assets based primarily on unguided ordnance delivered by manned aircraft will not generate significant prelaunch attrition. This leaves active defenses vulnerable to saturation. Thus, the Navy has largely ceded the attack operations pillar to the Air Force and the Army.
Parochial interests color both approaches.
Generally speaking, the US Air Force views TMD as a natural extension of its air defense mission. Like aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles are flying objects that require intense air coordination. Like maneuver units on the ground, mobile missile launchers are one among many time-critical ground targets against which reconnaissance and attack resources must be allocated. This was the case during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Following the war, the Air Force has striven to enhance attack operations largely by upgrading manned aircraft and C4I functions.