These considerations are the basis for Davidson's contention that the preponderance of our beliefs must be true. The upshot is this. Just the opposite. Davidson spells out the epistemological consequence of the generically pragmatist view of mind. If words and thoughts are, in the most basic cases, necessarily about the sorts of objects and events that cause them, there is no room for Cartesian doubts about the independent existence of such objects and events.
Doubts there can be, of course.
But there need be nothing we are indubitably right about for it to be certain that we are mostly right about the nature of the world. This doubt is the function of an optional view of our minds, the generically Cartesian one. It doesn't take Reformed epistemology to remove that doubt. It just takes a reminder of how we deploy psychological terms every day of our lives. Plantinga's defeater for evolutionary naturalism does not apply to those who hold a generically pragmatist view of mind.