In addition to early warning indicators based on crop production, it was clear by December 1996 that people in certain parts of the Sahelian region were experiencing severe difficulties caused by several consecutive poor harvests. By February 1997, most donor representatives appeared to agree on the seriousness of the situation, but they failed to act. Contributing to their hesitancy was a lack of coordination within the donor community, due in part to disagreement over who should take the lead. The vastness of such countries as Mauritania, Chad, and Niger, combined with the decline in funding for data collection, is an obstacle to the collection of sufficient information. Tensions between host governments and donors and between national governments and the different regions of their countries can also complicate response activities.
Donors are reluctant to provide support for governments that they regard as illegitimate.
Host country governments at times pursue political objectives that conflict with the humanitarian objectives of food assistance programs. Understandably, many donors prefer to focus on long-term solutions to food insecurity. They may view emergency programs, which are inherently inefficient, as disruptive to the development process. Drought response methods have changed since the last major instance of widespread drought in the Sahel. In the past, lead donors had large stocks of commodities available, as a byproduct of commodity support and assistance programs.