Agents in a miraculous world could do no evil because God would be actively involved in thwarting their attempts to harm each other. Because a morally significant option is not available to such agents, they do not fit Reichenbach's definition of significant freedom. Thus, a world in which God had prevented physical evil would be one without freedom, since evil actions could not be performed. Because it would make freedom impossible, such a world could not have been created by God. Reichenbach's attempt to float the claim that evil choices are not possible because evil effects are prevented by miraculous intervention arises from his understanding of the nature of moral evil.
Moral evil is basically natural evil that is caused by free choice.
Thus, presumably, if God eliminates the natural evil effect, then God prevents the evil choice. Aquinas and the Nature of Natural Evil Reichenbach's defense of God's goodness in the light of natural evils pays the price of sacrificing his omnipotence. Aquinas' approach is different. He is willing to allow God the possibility of having created the world in much different way. As a general criticism, the kind of evils which Reichenbach's theodicy does explain seem only to be natural disasters, i.e. occasional occurrences of nature wherein various lines of causality incidentally coincide.