ZNet Curiously, there actually is one bit of evidence that supports the desired conclusion, but Newman and other advocates of the thesis do not make use of it. He allowed the sentence on withdrawal to remain only if attributed to McNamara and Taylor, without his acquiescence. In public too he was more hesitant about the withdrawal plan than the military command, as we have seen. One might argue, then, that JFK did not share the optimism of his advisers, and was therefore unwilling to commit himself to withdrawal. This treatment of the evidence illustrates Newman's technique precisely.
Evidence is nil, and counterevidence substantial, but irrelevant, thanks to the analytic technique.
36 Contrary to this remarkable reasoning, there is ample reason to be skeptical about these post-Tet reconstructions years after the alleged conversations. They are furthermore implausible and largely meaningless, hence discounted by historians generally. They do not begin to compare in significance with the extensive internal record and the public statements of the President, which conform to the internal record, a crucial fact missing from this study. In fact, they are far less significant than the pre-Tet memoirs and oral history, which Newman also ignores. The military were deceiving Kennedy's associates who were deceiving Kennedy, while he in turn was deceiving the public and his advisers, and many were deceiving themselves.