And this view seems consonant with what Aristotle teaches, that memory is not in the intellectual but in the sensitive part of the soul. So it seems that the preservation of intellectual impressions does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. But on careful consideration this theory will be found ultimately to differ little or nothing from the theory of Plato. Now it makes no matter for the acquirement of knowledge whether our knowledge is caused by one separate substance or by several. It is not therefore likely that any regarding of bodily phantasms should dispose our soul to receive the influence of an intelligence subsisting apart.
Intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory.
If therefore in sensory knowledge there is some power of preserving apprehensions, much more will this be the case in intellectual knowledge. The arguments to the contrary are easily solved. This however does not bar the potential intellect's preservation of intellectual impressions, which are abstracted from all particular conditions.