Thus, it is incumbent to show how it is possible for mathematicians to get it right most of the time. Under the suggested realism, this requires epistemic access to an acausal, eternal, and detached mathematical realm. This is the most serious problem for realism. We must either solve the problems with realism, give up the continuity between mathematical and everyday discourse, or give up the prevailing semantical accounts of ordinary and scientific language. Most contemporary work in philosophy of mathematics begins here.
Realists grab one horn of the trilemma, antirealists grab one of the others.
The straightforward, but daunting strategy for realists is to develop an epistemology for mathematics while maintaining the ontological and semantic commitments. Clearly, we do have scientific and ordinary knowledge, even if we do not know how it works. The strategy is to link mathematical knowledge to scientific knowledge. The ploy would not solve the epistemic problems with mathematics, of course, but it would suggest that the problems are no more troublesome than those of scientific or ordinary discourse. The modest strategy conforms nicely to the seamless interplay between mathematical and ordinary or scientific discourse.