The sceptical attitude has tended to increase with the growth of multiculturalism both nationally and internationally. These challenges were propounded in terms of noncognitivism earlier in the century, implying that morality is without a rational foundation and is basically grounded in emotions or existential decisions. These will be the main questions of the second part of our conference. Metaethical theories of moral realism assume it does. On this assumption normative ethics can be understood as a strong cognitivism.
Normative cognition can be a matter of true, justified belief, and hence of knowledge.
In recent years there have been various attempts to work out this possibility in terms of justification from normative premises which are recognised as binding, and hence as pragmatically valid. There are various theories about the sources of this bindingness. Some assume it is based on reflective endorsement of certain kinds, others that it is based on recognised opinions or certain kinds of consensus. On these assumptions normative ethics need not by understood as a kind of noncognitivism, even if basic normative premises are not ascribed truth-value. Instead there will be a weak cognitivism based on cogent justifications.