I think it is on the basis of the counter intuitive conclusions, and the philosophical predicament that doubt raises, that Wittgenstein is prompted to raise the question of the meaning of doubt altogether. Wittgenstein does not think that an analysis of the term or proposition will reveal its essential meaning. In contrast, the meaning is only available and present in the larger context of usage. Th e contexts, or environments of use, are, for Wittgenstein, essentially practical. That is to say, meaning does not rest upon the analysis of a supposedly independent linguistic proposition, but is embedded and founded upon styles of practical action in the world.
Meaning is situated.
What Wittgenstein calls the simple, or primitive game is characterized by the absence of doubt in the philosophical sense. Traditionally, most philosophers have thought so, and have rarely missed the opportunity to contrast philosophical knowledge against the beliefs and uncritical assumptions held by the average person. It is c ertainly logical permissible to say that the game can begin with doubt. For we can imagine situations in which doubt is found at the beginning of the simple game, rather than not included at all. When descriptions are given it is seen that the philosophic notion of doubt, along with the games described, become unrecognizable.