There is an asymmetry of resources, knowledge, and customer information that favors the incumbent in negotiations. New entrants underscored the fact that delay in resolution of the disputes on interconnection issues favored the incumbent and expressed the wish that regulatory regimes function as fair judges in the market place. The regulatory regime should provide to new entrants equal opportunities compared to the incumbent operator for public hearings, consultations, and any publicly-funded training or seminars. Specific information on interconnect agreements between the incumbent and the members of the Telecommunications Operators of the Philippines, all new entrants in the market, were offered. Also, further experiences from India, Canada, the United States, and Japan were offered.
Negotiations can then proceed, with different approaches for regulatory oversight.
Effective dispute resolution mechanisms should create incentives to successfully conclude negotiations. Details of the Hong Kong, China, regime were offered. The purpose of setting a pricing methodology in an interconnection regime is to create a backdrop for negotiations that offers greater predictability, consistency, and minimizes subsequent regulatory costs. Three types of market entry include full facilities-based competition, resale of retail services, and use of unbundled elements. The advantages of a forward-looking cost model were described, including its objective of simulating charges that would be made in a competitive environment, the incentives it can create for investment by new entrants and for innovation by the incumbent.