The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War world has been one from strategic urgency to strategic uncertainty. The author's critical analysis leads him to propose significant and controversial changes in planning standards, force structure, and defense spending. I have chosen to elaborate on this topic. Specifically, I believe that the age of large-scale conventional interstate warfare opened by the French Revolution is drawing to a close, and with it the relevance of Clausewitz's postulation of total war among states.
Most future conflict is likely to erupt across ethnic and cultural rather than state boundaries.
It is further likely to be predominantly unconventional in character and waged on a far lesser scale than the major interstate wars of the past 2 centuries. The Department of Defense, however, continues to prepare precisely for big conventional wars, and not for just one at a time but rather for two. The risk is that of carrying too much Clausewitzian baggage into a neo-Jominian world. This page last updated by Rita Rummel on 2 Jul 98.