This is the kernel of Cox's arguments along his article. Evidence from US and Japan shows that the partisan model outperforms the floor model explaining legislative outcomes. When considering how bills are protected from amendments on the floor, Cox mentions different mechanism such as the package vote in France or the guillotine in UK, and its analogous in Latin American States, that allow governments to protect proposed legislation. Allowing agenda setters manipulating who can monitor votes and providing them with the wherewithal to make side payments are effects of procedural rules with consequences on legislators' voting behavior. Examples of the first mechanism are omnibus bills, restrictive procedures, and the vote of confidence.
Restrictive procedures immunize bills against attempts to remove unpopular contents.
The vote of confidence triggers the party or coalition's cohesion linking the bill to the survival of the government. The side payments effects are to clinch deals or clear legislative hurdles. However, their importance varies with the degree the electoral system fosters personal votes. Incidentally, Cox considers some implications of the influence of party on roll-call voting and shows that the direction in which the current evidence seems to go is to confirm the influence of the party. To consider how rules affect policy choices, Cox distinguishes three stages and takes into account the model that seems to explain what happens in each of them.