Abundant property theories say there are at least as many properties as there are ways to group the individuals. I explain the appeal of the consideration in pragmatic terms, and reject it as invalid. The inclination to think this premise rationally acceptable is due to the tendency to conflate epistemic possibility assessments with metaphysical possibility assessments. It is argued that Kripke's de re modality, defined in terms of what is true in some possible world, no possible world and all possible worlds, is an unsatisfactory amalgam of the two. A formal description of a process is given.
Process is defined as a sequence of changes of states in a system of states.
I consider here the systems whose possible states are completely described by a list of characterizing values of the states. I then define the simple and complex states of a system, and simple and complex processes. A logical reconstruction of different kinds of counterfactual sentences by the modal sentences of LPR is given.