See footnote 9 In finding that the circuit court had the authority to grant the plaintiff's petition to reinstate alimony, we do not rule on the merits of her petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the circuit court, and remand this case to the circuit court for consideration of the plaintiff's petition to reinstate. Weaver, C.J., and Brickley, Cavanagh, Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurred. MSA 25.106 authorizes the circuit court to entertain the plaintiff's petition to reinstate alimony. However, I write separately to express my concern about one aspect of this Court's decision.
Parties are generally free to contract for a wide range of alimony contingencies.
However, the same conditions imposed by a trial court should be more closely scrutinized on appeal. In this case, the trial court apparently imposed the noncohabitation condition on its own initiative. That imposition, as well as the trial court's later decision to terminate alimony without the benefit of a hearing on the merits, raise significant due process and equal protection issues. In addition, a discussion of the trial court's sua sponte action would provide guidance to future courts. Thus, I would grant leave to consider the appropriateness of the trial court's unsolicited imposition of a noncohabitation requirement as a condition to the receipt of alimony.