I offer them to whomever is interested in such contemplation, and welcome any comments. As I described in my post on Selective DoS Attacks, the current remailer system has a number of problem spots which need to be addressed in any long term development plans. It is now commonplace for web browsers to use SSL technology to securely connect to web servers for processing orders, exchanging credit card information, etc. This provides the ability to encrypt and verify the data exchange, and to authenticate the server. Yet current remailers accept and send data only by email.
Email is also more vulnerable to mail bombing and flooding.
Remailers connecting to other remailers would authenticate one another, and would transfer data securely. The above would prevent loss, snooping, and corruption of data between users and remailers and between remailers. Much like the Hushmail system, mail destined to non-nym users or to newsgroups would be posted as required. Remailers could distribute public encryption and signing key pairs, with regular expiration dates. These would be used to encrypt chained messages.