The defendant and state each requested the general charge, and the court gave the charge on behalf of the state. There was no direct, positive testimony of the main fact necessary to a conviction, and, while there was no conflict in the evidence, the conclusion of guilt was not the only one warranted to be drawn from the undisputed testimony. This is a criminal statute, and must be strictly construed. Even though possession of the pistol may be said to be sufficient to constitute the offense of carrying, yet the possession must necessarily be of such a character as to carry with it the intent to bear arms, the evil at which the statute is directed, and a violation of which it seeks to punish. The evidence in this case, while possibly sufficient to warrant the jury in drawing the necessary inferences of guilt from the facts proven, is not in itself sufficient to prove the main fact essential to a conviction without the necessity of drawing such inferences from circumstances attending the proven facts, and the right to draw these inferences when different conclusions may be reached is the province, not of the court, but of the jury.
Inferential facts are to be drawn by the jury from proven attendant facts.
And if the tendencies of the evidence go to support the charge, or afford inferences to that end, the question, unless so palpably inconclusive as to fail to make out a prima facie case, is not for the court, but is properly submitted to the jury. The court is not authorized to draw inferences. The jury is the only proper tribunal to draw inferences from the proof. W. U. Tel. The general affirmative charge should never be given against a defendant when it takes from the jury the right to weigh the testimony and especially when there are inferences that may be drawn from the evidence that do not necessarily establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.