Disclosure of the budget request would provide foreign governments with the United States' own overall assessment of its intelligence weaknesses and priorities and assist them in redirecting their own resources to frustrate the United States' intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to our national security. Because I must deny foreign governments information that would assist them in assessing the strength of the United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined that disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for my determination without disclosing classified information. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declaration. Second, disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to assist foreign governments in correlating specific spending figures with particular intelligence programs.
Foreign governments are keenly interested in the United States' intelligence collection priorities.
Nowhere are those priorities better reflected than in the level of spending on particular intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning the amount and objects of intelligence spending by other foreign governments. The CIA's own intelligence analysts conduct just such analyses of intelligence spending by foreign governments. Budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired information, assist experienced intelligence analysts in reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of all sorts of foreign intelligence activities, including covert operations, scientific and technical research and development, and analytic capabilities. I expect foreign intelligence services to do no less if armed with the same information.