They will eventually go along with an American definition of the central problem in the Middle East as a mysterious Palestinian refusal to accept a very fair bargain. And the world in general will understand that the US has little interest in an International Criminal Court and in more than minimal environmental agreements, and that it cannot, for very good reasons, join in any ban on land mines. The first Republican error here is the old one of believing that what America does abroad, particularly what it does militarily, is done for all and should be appreciated by all. Any idea that American military spending is, in the first place, to do with American national interests, with American fantasies of encirclement and attack and with the political competition between the parties to appear most ready to meet these alleged threats puts burden-sharing in a different light. American arms have indeed been vital to the world in the past and could be vital in the future, but that is far from the whole story of American military power.
Leadership involves convincing and enthusing others.
When others go along in spite of being unconvinced it is either because they have been coerced or because, over a long period of decision-making they have seen enough success to swallow their doubts in a particular instance. This is why the Republicans invoke Bush senior and Reagan. There is a lot of room for argument about any simple cause and effect relationship between Reagan's policies and Soviet reform and then disintegration. But even setting that aside, the continuity to which Republicans appeal is fractured, not least by the foreign policy mistakes of the Clinton years, mistakes to which partisan Republicans in the House and Senate contributed so much. The Clinton administration's worst failure, in the Middle East, owes little to Republican sabotage.