Although Ayn Rand would adamantly oppose Plato on the question of censorship, her esthetic preferences are not unlike his. Like Plato, she believed that art should present heroes one could admire, rather than pity. Like him, she wanted art to be exemplary and uplifting, not revolting and subversive. On the face of it, Ayn Rand's views seem to have more in common with the Platonic rejection of tragedy than with the Aristotelian defense. Yet, before we draw our final conclusions about her actual alliances, we need to look yet a little closer at her position.
Historical context is important here.
As in the case of Nietzsche, Ayn Rand's opposition to pity is related to its central role in altruistic systems of morality, where it is held up as an unconditional virtue, embracing innocent and guilty alike. Such altruistic pity, in Ayn Rand's view, was evil because it is antithetical to justice. And here, Aristotle would no doubt have agreed. For pity, conceived of in this unconditional way, was something he would have rejected, seeing it as excessive, as too undiscriminating. The pity he approved of was of a morally qualified kind, being restricted to clear cases of human misfortune resulting from conditions beyond the sufferer's control and responsibility.