In our models, coupling between local populations occurs directly through ecological interactions such as competition. This can lead to very interesting pattern formation even if the local dynamics are very simple. Evolution of cooperation Spatial structure can also have a strong effect on evolutionary outcomes, as we have shown by considering spatially extended evolutionary games . In particular, we have shown that spatial structure greatly facilitates the evolution and maintenance of cooperation. Based on the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, we have developed new, simple, but more realistic models for the evolution of cooperation by introducing the notion of investment, which is an act that brings a cost to the individual performing it, but a benefit to other individuals.
Investments can vary continuously.
This leads to a simple generalization of the Prisoner's Dilemma that turns out to very helpful for understanding the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behavior . We are currently developing this theory further, and it seems possible to test our models with empirical research, e.g. using experimental evolution in microorganism. An alternative approach would be to use the Internet for setting up a game for human players to test whether investments evolve to positive values in spatially structured populations, but not in populations in which interactions are random. In sum, my main current interests are in combining ecological and genetic modeling in order to obtain theories of sympatric speciation, in the theory of the evolution of cooperation, and in the dynamics of spatially structured populations. The challenge for the future is to extend the existing theory, and to use experimental ecology and evolution to test the theoretical predictions.