By making the avoidance of error our sole or primary epistemic objective, it overlooked the importance we attach to sensitivity, relevance, informativeness, and cognitive efficacy. We regularly risk error to achieve such ends. An acceptable epistemology should explain how, when, and why it is reasonable to do so. So I am uncertain how these sorts of flaws in foundationalism imply that the whole project of perfect procedural epistemology is untenable. Proceduralism conceives inquiry as a game, epistemology as the description of the rules of that game.
Games have several attributes that are important for our purposes.
First, they are rule governed. Second, the rules define the goal of the game, the criteria by which the goal is to be judged to have been reached, and the acceptable means by which to achieve it. Third, the rules of the game cannot be criticized, so long as the rules are such that it is possible for someone to win. It is not as if those who invented Chess could have gotten the rules wrong somehow, or that there are better rules that Chess might have followed. To say that Chess should have been different is only to say that one wishes to play some game besides Chess.