We submit that the majority should have, in balancing the equities, also considered the fact that Bowers waited until a few days after its decision issued before he made the information public. Majority Order at 3 n.1. Not only was Bowers able to argue that point, but he also was able to argue that Shahar could not function as a trustworthy member of his staff because she likely had a conflict of interest with respect to Georgia's sodomy laws. Considering that Bowers admits that, perhaps at the very time he fired Shahar, he also was breaking Georgia's adultery and fornication laws, his justification is entitled to no weight. At the very least, Bowers' justification evinces discrimination against Shahar solely on the basis of her status as a homosexual, since Bowers did not make the same assumption about conflict of interest with respect to himself or other lawyers in his department.
Judicial notice is obviously appropriate.
It was published nationwide by newspapers, radio, television, and magazines of national circulation. Surely this court can know the content of a statement that is relevant, accurate because made by Mr. Bowers himself, and known to millions. We dissent from the court's denial of Ms. Shahar's petition for rehearing.