The drafting of efficient rules, however, is predicated upon the adoption of a sufficiently sound theoretical basis regulating the means of acquiring property. The lack of such theoretical basis results in a weakness of the control apparatus, which in turn undermines the privatization effort. The success of any property law reform initiatives, however, is dependent upon the effectiveness of the legal process used to enforce them. As property law deals with problems of both public and private law, it is important to address the proper balance between them in reforming property laws in former Socialist countries. Comparative law and economics shows that systems of law in transition would mostly benefit from entrusting such choices to a unitary system of courts similar to the common-law model.
Legal tradition is a major source of high transaction costs.
The Roman law conception of property rights, in particular, introduces very high costs in the area of property law. Property law reform in former Socialist countries provides a clear opportunity to do away with such inefficient principles of civil law and replace them with more efficient rules offered by common-law systems. These efforts would make a real contribution to the development of European private law. This Note suggests that the dramatic reform of American fair lending law now contemplated by Congress would replicate the ineffective British model for preventing loan discrimination. The Note begins with an examination of the problem of lending discrimination in the United States, and surveys legislation adopted in the last thirty years which addresses the problem.