Host countries and allies often have only rudimentary consequence management capabilities, sometimes putting deployed U.S. forces at risk. In addition, war plans often rely on host nation workers who may be unwilling to remain on the job in the face of chemical or biological threats. Moreover, military medical capabilities are not configured to provide mass casualty treatment, such as acute respiratory care, for those exposed to biological or chemical agents. Finally, DOD cannot rely on an arbitrary, ad hoc process to ensure the proper allocation of limited consequence management capabilities among competing priorities. Deciding how to allocate resources among domestic terrorism, support for vital allies and coalition partners, and protection of U.S. forces involves difficult choices.
Domestic deployments are likely to diminish the ability to respond quickly to events overseas.
Overseas deployments of key military assets could diminish domestic readiness for a terrorist incident within the United States. No mechanism, short of the President, exists to evaluate competing demands and to arbitrate among priorities in the face of a multifaceted, multi-event crisis. Examine consequence management responses under more stressful scenarios, including multiple events in geographically dispersed areas against varied targets, or terrorist attacks in conjunction with a major theater war. Develop appropriate organizational structures that provide sufficient civilian and military oversight and provide a mechanism to deconflict competing demands for limited assets. These structures should focus on function, priority, and the availability of alternatives.