Practically speaking, self-regulation of DOE cannot be as stable as external regulation, and change has been difficult to avoid. Elections can change the Department radically and, as experience has shown, have changed the Department radically, particularly its programs and priorities for environment, safety, and health. Some regulators, such as NRC, are headed by commissioners with staggered terms and political diversity to insulate them from change. DOE can increase stability by converting many of its safety standards to rules, but rules alone cannot provide the necessary stability. Because of the importance of stability, we devote a chapter of this report to the subject of transition between the current regulatory regime at DOE and the one we are recommending.
External regulation makes both the regulator and the regulated accountable.
The regulated, of course, must satisfy the external regulator. That necessity by itself will help induce clearer lines of accountability in the regulated party. Moreover, external regulation can make it clearer just who is the regulator. Without clarity on that point, there can be little accountability for safety. The regulator itself must adhere to government-wide processes for establishing standards, submit to Congressional oversight of its policies, and submit to judicial review of its standards and actions.