Of particular concern, are the intrusive on-site inspections of American businesses mandated by the Convention. In a review of the first six-months of the CWC, the Center for Security Policy observed on 1 November that such espionage was a serious problem for the American economy even before it was subjected to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Dr. Merrifield warned that the U.S. chemical industry is a primary focus for foreign industrial espionage. He also advised Senators that access provided to foreign nationals under the CWC would permit a trained engineer or chemist to identify, and therefore to steal, a company's trade secrets, sometimes without having actually to enter a production or research facility. In the course of the CWC debate, the CMA incessantly made representations to the effect that the CWC's intrusive verification provisions would pose no threat to the U.S. chemical manufacturing business.
Economic espionage is a direct threat to the economic security of the United States.
Specifically, the CMA analysis cites evidence of the ease with which foreign operatives can obtain coveted Confidential Business Information if given even limited access to American competitors' facilities. Still, by putting adhesive tape on their shoes, the scientists were able to collect slivers of metal alloys being used for new U.S. fighter planes. The job of Director of Verification has gone to Major General Jean-Louis Roland who previously served as the chief of the Arms Control Division of France's Defense Staff. And the Director of the OPCW's Inspectorate is a former senior official in Japan's Self-Defense Force, Ichiro Akiyama. The French and Japanese intelligence organizations are among the world's most aggressive in pursuing competitive advantages for their companies through official conduct of industrial espionage.