However, in the present paper we join McGrew and McGrew in concentrating on whether foundationalism can overcome the objection that because relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, the regress argument for foundationalism fails, together with the received foundationalist circularity arguments against many of foundationalism's opponents. The regress argument is a deductive argument for, in the first place, the conclusion that at some point inferential justification or reason-giving must end, on pain of either vicious regress or vicious circularity. Indeed, many anti-foundationalists themselves use this much of the argument to reach the same conclusion.
Every justified belief is justified by inferring it from some justified belief or beliefs.
No belief justifies itself. If a belief x justifies a belief y , and y justifies z , then x justifies z . There is no infinite sequence of beliefs each of which is justified by inferring it from its predecessor. Each of these assumptions seems plausible in itself, yet jointly they entail a contradiction. Without the transitivity there is no absurdity.