To be accommodated by the representational theory of mind, experiences must have their representational character essentially. It seems that this phenomenal character is what the distinctive experientiality of experience, if you will, is all about. To overturn this consideration, I offer an argument to the effect that, as far as experience is concerned, being in a phenomenal state and being in an intentional state is, appearances to the contrary, one and the same thing. We have no idea how to make sense of such a possibility. Therefore, being in a certain phenomenal state and being in a certain intentional state are the same property.
Experience thus provides a unique form of felt aboutness .
So phenomenology and intentionality, feel and content, distribute convergently, when it comes to experience. Most internalists about experience seem to share the externalists distaste for the notion of internal intentionality, and hence typically resort to an alleged divergence of feel and content. Presence to the subject of the object of his experience seem not exhaustively explicable in terms of such natural relations. . . Naturalistic theories fail to do justice to the uniqueness of conscious intentionality. I suggest that this uniqueness McGinn refers to lies in the internality he mentions, and the latter comes down to this, that intentionality is an intrinsic feature of experience.