Watch this space for news of whether this submission has been successful, and for further information as it becomes available. This paper revisits the problem of relating dispositional properties to their alleged categorical grounds. I distinguish some related problems, such as the relation between noumenalism and the thesis that all our concepts are response-dependent. I further draw out some implication for 'metaphysical realism' and its Humean or Kantian competitors. Its central conviction was that experiment was authoritative because rational insight into the forms or essences of objects was impossible.
Experimental philosophy denies knowledge in order to make room for enquiry.
The nature of Hume's Academic stance becomes plain by attending to the structure of his argument in the first Enquiry, where the point and purpose of his philosophical stance is best discerned. To conclude what a person ought to do is to come to a hypothetical decision, to decide what to do if in that person's shoes. Yet from it follow various tenets both of Moorean non-naturalism and of naturalistic realism for the normative realm. In particular, it follows, there is a natural property that constitutes being what one ought to do. The word 'ought', in a sense, signifies that natural property.