In the midst of a roles and missions reevaluation and increasingly tight budgets, the armed services have embraced a loosely defined concept of presence with a certain rhetorical flourish. Unfortunately, military presence can easily masquerade as the objective and the argument over which particular service or mix of forces can best attain the desired presence can dominate the debate and exclude other considerations. Presence and influence are related, but they are not synonymous. Presence, the mere fact or condition of being present, is much easier to achieve. In all these cases, presence is designed to shrink the time and distance equation so a potential military response will seem more immediate and visible.
Influence is also a much more elusive objective than presence.
The answer to that question is not as simple as the slogan makers seem to make it. For example, great claims are made about the Navy's ability to operate in the world's coastal or littoral areas and thus, so the argument goes, making it the most visible and flexible service to support forward presence. What these proponents do not acknowledge is that littoral presence may or may not provide an avenue for achieving influence. In effect, a naval presence adds only the possibility for influence. Because influence, particularly when it involves actual combat or immediate threat of combat, is the product of both capabilities and the perceived will or intention to use those capabilities, the political will of the US to put its military forces in harm's way becomes immediately important.