Even China's friend, Bill Clinton, sent two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese saber-rattling in 1996. Were Beijing to take some action to test Mr. Bush's resolve, an equally firm, or firmer, response should be expected. Keep in mind that the catalyst here would be a Chinese, not an American action. And, of course, Beijing must assume that President Bush would respond militarily, as I assume a President Gore or, for that matter, Clinton would have if an unprovoked Chinese attack had happened on his watch. A more likely Taiwan-related maneuver would be a renewed attempt to change the rules regarding Taipei's WTO accession.
Domestic considerations are likely to prevail.
Any heavy-handed attempt by Beijing to get President Bush to put the three no's in writing is sure to fail and will likely backfire. Efforts to codify the TSEA would set a counterproductive, confrontational tone and impede even routine efforts to address Taiwan's defense needs. The other two were no use of force and no change to Taiwan's status without the consent of the people of Taiwan. The latter two no's appear destined to play a central role in future U.S. policy toward cross-Strait developments. The Korean Peninsula is another area where Beijing may choose to be either cooperative or confrontational.