If I stab a man, the moral character of the act does not belong to the dagger, nor to the hand which held it, nor to the muscles of the arm, nor to the volition which impelled the arm, but to the intention. There is no virtue in the perception of truth. Devils, and wicked, as well as good men, perceive truth, and doubtless think correctly on many subjects, and their reason affirms moral truths, but there is no virtue in this. It also asserts that moral character cannot belong to volitions as distinguished from choices, for choice or intuition necessitates volition for the time being. But it does assert that moral character belongs to the ultimate intention of the mind.
Intention is the choice of an end.
I will illustrate the difference between ultimate and proximate intention. Suppose a young man laboring, and you inquire what he is laboring for. He says, to get money. This is one end. He says, to buy books.