Mayer also refers us to language in Bednarz suggesting that expert testimony will not assist the trier of fact when the incident of domestic abuse is an isolated one. We see nothing in this language to prevent us from affirming the trial court's decision. Not only is the statement dicta and the issue explicitly left unresolved, the statement does not even address the point Schnorr was called to raise. Schnorr's testimony was the opposite of the situation described in the Bednarz dicta-that parties to a relationship may say things about the other party in the heat of a domestic quarrel which are initially true, only to recant. At trial, Mayer's sole objection to Schnorr's testimony was that it was not relevant.
Evidence is relevant if it makes a fact that is of consequence more or less probable.
Accordingly, Schnorr's testimony was relevant because it made more probable the existence of the fact that Kathryn's recantation was not trustworthy due to psychological factors. The trial court did not err by overruling this objection. For the sake of clarity, we note that although relevant, Schnorr's testimony could only be admitted if she was properly qualified as an expert and if the evidence would assist the trier of fact. Mayer did not, however, object on these grounds, nor did he attempt to voir dire Schnorr to determine whether a single assault was sufficient to allow her to conclude that common characteristics existing for the entire class of domestic abuse victims applied to Kathryn's behavior. Because Mayer raised no alternative basis for objection, we do not determine whether an alternate basis existed for the exclusion of this evidence.