We obtain such a theory by applying the principle 'act always so as to maximize value' to evaluator relativism, where the value of certain states of affairs is taken to be relative to the evaluator's position. The resulting theory is one according to which agents ought always to bring about what is, from their own individual position, the best available state of affairs.
Ethical egoism is a paradigm example of such a theory.
It gives me the aim of maximizing my welfare, but you the aim of maximizing your welfare. But an agent-relative teleological theory needn't be egoistic. We can apply the principle 'act always so as to maximize value' to a version of evaluator relativism that relativizes the value of states of affairs to certain objective positions which an evaluator can occupy, e.g., that of agent, patient, or bystander. Furthermore, agent-relative teleology can accommodate other features of commonsense morality, i.e., options and special obligations , provided we accept evaluator relativism. Or so I argue.