This revolutionary publishing model depends on mutual trust between user and publisher . I would like to use Radden's interesting exploration of the historical roots of a split between affect and thought as an occasion for reflecting on the distinction itself and some of the philosophical reasons for its appeal. There is a range of presuppositions in philosophical theories about knowledge, judgment, moral judgment and the like that have disposed us, at least in the West, to accept a split between emotion or affect and reason or thought. 1 Feelings might provide content or data for reasoning but do not themselves judge. In his thought Kant, who had such a strong influence on the development of Kraepelin's theory, reflects several of these assumptions.
Emotions are part of the sensible world and subject to the strict law of causality.
The only exception to the deterministic view of emotion is the moral feeling of respect for the moral law. If feeling also tends to be viewed as noncognitive, then it has no value for knowledge. Given these assumptions, actions and judgments that are based on, motivated by, or formed with reference to feeling are viewed as suspect with regard to their objectivity. The split between reason and emotion has had interesting consequences in the assessment of behaviors that are thought of as gendered. Thus a woman is caught in a doublebind.