The U.S. District Court in Texas granted a take-nothing summary judgment against Fitzgerald, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit certified the question. The manufacturer argues that the Legislature intended to deny indemnification to sellers who are not in the chain of distribution from the manufacturer to the injured plaintiff. It contends that prior case law and legislative history demonstrate that the Legislature's purpose was to codify some aspects of our decisions and overrule others, resulting in indemnity only for those sellers in the chain of marketing or distribution of the defective product from the manufacturer to the injured plaintiff. Case law does not directly address indemnification for sellers outside the chain of distribution, and we find nothing in the legislative history to cast doubt on the otherwise plain words of the statute. When interpreting statutes we try to give effect to legislative intent.
Legislative intent remains the polestar of statutory construction.
Further, if a statute is unambiguous, rules of construction or other extrinsic aids cannot be used to create ambiguity. In such case it is vain to ask the courts to attempt to liberate an invisible spirit, supposed to live concealed within the body of the law. There are sound reasons we begin with the plain language of a statute before resorting to rules of construction. For one, it is a fair assumption that the Legislature tries to say what it means, and therefore the words it chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent. Also, ordinary citizens should be able to rely on the plain language of a statute to mean what it says.