The present issue of The Monist will deal with these and related questions on the topic of responsibility. The distance between one person and another can be assessed in a variety of ways. Persons can be physically, or geographically, distant. But they can also be affectively distant, for example when they are related to each other by no special ties of family or friendship or community. Intuitively, we have stronger moral obligations to those who are physically or affectively near than to those who are physically or affectively remote.
Distance seems to set moral boundaries, and distant strangers seem to be of minimal moral concern.
Contributions are invited which seek answers to questions such as these in ways which will throw light on the concepts of moral distance and moral boundaries. Works of art are cognitive devices aimed at the production of rich cognitive effects. Thus it can be argued, in the light of what is known about human cognition, that aesthetic experience is a by-product of the exercise of more fundamental cognitive faculties such as perception and imagination. Works of art, on this view, are never grasped directly. Theories of art should thus address questions about the interplay of the cognitive faculties.