Other secessionist impulses, while less potent, have surfaced repeatedly throughout the country's troubled history. Not only does this strategy undermine Washington's long-standing effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it creates undesirable risks for the United States. Such ominous developments should have caused U.S. policy- makers to reassess the wisdom of investing so much diplomatic, political, and military capital in an unpredictable and unstable ally. For a brief period during the early years of the Carter administration there was some evidence of a reevaluation, but any inclination to deemphasize the Pakistan connection vanished when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. During the intervening years, Pakistan has resumed its traditional role as America's principal political and military outpost in South Asia.
Evidence suggests, however, that it is a risky and unwise commitment.
Washington views Pakistan both as a bulwark in its own right against Soviet expansion and as an important component of American policy toward Afghanistan. The last point was underscored in April 1986 when massive anti- government crowds greeted the return from exile of Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the country's last elected prime minister and heir to his political machine. Pakistan seems destined for yet an- other period of acrimonious confrontation and domestic turmoil. By placing so much reliance on a weak and unstable ally, the United States risks the collapse of its entire South Asian pol- icy. To view this entire document please click here .