On the other hand, vancomycin resistance, except for a few strains of enterococcus, is primarily a rare laboratory phenomenon. In addition, vancomycin is an expensive compound and it would be prohibitive to produce industrial quantities of resistant organisms. Thus vancomycin should be considered the gold standard of empirical therapy in a biowar environment. Similarly, developing and producing a strain resistant to both erythromycin and penicillin would more than double the cost and difficulty of producing the bugs unless fairly sophisticated molecular techniques were employed. If I were running things for the Iraqis, I'd be using a penicillin-resistant strain without any other modifications, since each piece of genetic baggage the organism has to carry will have unpredictable effects on virulence, and it's a very effective weapon already.
Early warning is possible to biological attacks.
Radar can detect aircraft flying suspicious attack patterns. There are descriptions in the literature of air-sampling arrangements which can be combined with microculture or immunoassays to provide rapid identification of an attacking organism. Anthrax vaccines are available and have been given to high-risk groups such as textile workers. Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1970. Provided for general information purposes only.