Back pay runs from the beginning of the actionable discrimination until the date of the judgment, and equals the difference between what the victim earned and what the victim would have earned absent the discrimination. Other equitable relief could include, for example, a declaration that the employer discriminated, reinstatement of the plaintiff-employee, or an order forcing the employer to cease its discriminatory practices. But Congress subsequently enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made new remedies available to plaintiffs bringing employment discrimination cases. Together, compensatory and punitive damages are subject to a cap determined by the size of the defendant-employer. The cap, however, does not apply to any relief available under Title VII prior to the 1991 amendments.
Front pay is an award of lost wages from the date of judgment forward into the future.
One might argue that it should be, because just as compensatory damages repay plaintiffs for monetary losses resulting from discrimination, front pay can compensate plaintiffs for anticipated future monetary losses. A prior three-judge panel within the same circuit had held in Hudson v. Reno that front pay was subject to the 1991 Act's damages cap, and Pollard's panel did not have the authority to overrule that decision. Three other federal circuit courts have agreed with Pollard's position that front pay is not subject to the damages cap, and none have agreed with the Sixth Circuit. The 1991 Act explicitly excludes remedies that were traditionally available under Title VII from the damages cap. Moreover, front pay has, in other contexts, been analyzed as an equitable, rather than a legal remedy.