Below each abstract there are links for downloading and ordering. If the download link is in grey, the paper is not available for downloading at this time. This paper examines regional population distribution when there is an interregional transfer policy without commitment. We introduce explicitly the following time structure of actions.
Individuals make decisions on locational choices freely ex ante, but are immobile ex post.
The interregional transfer policies by regional governments and the central govenment are implemented after individuals' migration decisions. We obtain the following results. When we extend the basic model by taking account of capital, congestion, and spillovers in the provision of a public good, it is shown that whether or not central government intervention enhances the efficiency of the population distribution depends upon several economic factors. This fact makes valuation of banking activity straightforward. A model of a profit-maximizing bank is set out and the role of homogeneity in the production functions turns out to be crucial in defining inputs and output.