The Setting A canonical problem studied by game theorists is that of a strategic form game played repeatedly between randomly matched players. The random matching in a large population provides a rationale for the assumption that players play myopically when considering the effect that their current actions may have on the future play of opponents. The criterion generally used in forecasting or learning theory is the quality of predictions that are made. In contrast, game theory more appropriately considers the utility that is derived from the learning rule. An example of this type of dynamic is fictitious play.
Ficitious play plays a best-response to the historical frequency of opponents' play.
On a logarithmic time scale, in the long-run this is essentially the same thing as continuous adjustment in the direction of increasing utility. As this is a talk for non-game theorists, I'll focus the remainder of the presentation on games that have proven of great importance to game theorists, games that raise some of the questions that we hope that learning theory might help us resolve. In fact in experimental settings, up and right is frequently observed. This vast multiplicity of equilibria with infinite horizon is of great concern to game theorists. A simpler setting in which to study the problem of multiple equilibria is the coordination game below.