Where access is sought in cases of routine crime to confidential or other sensitive material, Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires the investigating authority to positively show that other methods have failed or are bound to fail. For the Bill to apply a less stringent test where the individual faces an interference with fundamental rights on the basis of suspicion of serious wrongdoing turns proportionality on its head. Authorisation procedures Retention of executive rather than prior judicial authorisation of interception is fundamentally objectionable. That the executive should secretly authorise itself to commit clandestine interferences with important rights is neither acceptable nor necessary. The Government has failed to advance any satisfactory case for failure to adopt a judicial procedure.
Judicial involvement maintains public confidence in the investigatory framework.
It would eliminate the risk of a d bacle such as the Matrix Churchill affair. We consider it essential that in all cases covered by clause 5, authority to intercept should be sought from a High Court or equivalent judge. Disclosure to target The individual's right to complain of an infringement of rights is reduced to a matter of chance - for example, the individual might become aware of interception only after a security service leak. Clause 18 currently prevents that. Clause 16 accentuates the problem.