When established before disputes erupt, certain international institutions shape the way leaders define and explain foreign disputes for domestic audiences. These initial domestic frames can decisively influence later international outcomes. For example, some crises between great powers erupt out of issues on which the great powers have already established an unenforced prior consultation obligation. No issue covered by such an agreement has yet escalated to great power war. Focused comparison, process tracing and historical interpretation demonstrate a domestic process wherein these consultation rules help leaders postpone positioning themselves relative to domestic rivals.
Leaders can then pursue the nuanced diplomacy needed for a peaceful resolution.
This dynamic helps explain the outcomes in an otherwise puzzling pair of great power crises. By showing that international institutions can have domestic framing effects even with weak rules, strong countries and dangerous disputes, the study broadens our understanding of the possible effects of institutions throughout world politics. A complete draft of his dissertation is available. Rasmussen has received several research fellowships and assistantships, presented conference papers at APSA and ISA and has authored and co-authored chapters in an edited volume. Rasmussen teaches most subfields of International Relations, with emphases in Theory and Security.