Contrast Inverted Mary , who has green experiences where Mary has red experiences. Her new knowledge differs from Mary's. She learns that tomatoes look G to her, that red things look G to her, and so on. If experience isn't conceptually supervenient on the functional, phenomenal belief isn't, either. But R and G differ from these, and they differ in their notional content.
Experience plays a role in constituting our phenomenal concepts and phenomenal beliefs.
A direct phenomenal concept need not accompany every experience, but they are common when one attends to one's experiences. A direct phenomenal belief arises when one forms a direct phenomenal concept based on a certain experience, and predicates that concept of the experience in question. In a direct phenomenal belief, R is predicated of E, which has Q, so the belief is true. The role of the experience in constituting both concept and object ensures this. Most phenomenal beliefs are still corrigible, as most phenomenal beliefs are not direct phenomenal beliefs.