And following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979, the Carter Doctrine announced that the Persian Gulf was a vital American interest, one the U.S. would defend with whatever means necessary, including possibly the use of nuclear weapons. This self-described foreign policy doctrine is more ambitious than any of its predecessors, committing American power not only to defend vital national interests in a specific region but to protect human rights wherever and whenever they are violated. Its very sweeping nature, however, raises questions about its practicality and longevity, and also about its sincerity. Indeed, Clinton's own Secretary of State has her doubts. I would caution against any such sweeping conclusions.
Every circumstance is unique.
Albright's caution must be taken very seriously, especially by those on Clinton's staff he has asked to examine the lessons of the Kosovo war for any insight on whether, how, and when America might intervene in the future. For if we take the Kosovo war as a guide to the what we can expect in the future, it becomes clear that intervention of this kind in the future will be few and far between. First of all, while Clinton prides himself in having acted earlier than in Bosnia, this was still a full year after the killing in Kosovo started. Even then, Clinton did so reluctantly and for reasons that had little to do with the humanitarian tragedy that was unfolding. The public justification for war was Kosovo's geographic location, a powder keg amidst the unstable Balkans that threatened not only neighbors but key allies like Greece and Turkey.