Stephen Bronars Stephen Bronars' research combines economic theory with empirical methods to analyze substantive problems. He has written papers on such diverse topics as unemployment and unemployment insurance, labor market discrimination, migration and immigration, labor unions, Congressional voting behavior, and the socioeconomic consequences of unwed childbearing. These studies have shown that union organizing activity has a particularly adverse impact on the profitability of labor intensive firms, and that union organizing drives also reduce the expected profits of rival firms in the industry through threat and spillover effects. His other investigations have also revealed how firms attempt to limit unions' appropriation of rents by committing future revenues to creditors.
Firms reduce workers' incentives to bargain collectively by relying more heavily on debt finance.
The threat of bankruptcy and higher debt to equity ratios limit union organizing activity and wage demands. Although unions reduce firms' profits and encourage greater use of debt, Professor Bronars' empirical research has found little evidence that firms alter their investment, employment, or output decisions in response to increased threats of unionization. Thus, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that unions are relatively efficient in transferring wealth from shareholders to workers. He is currently analyzing the incentive effects of the welfare system. He finds that more generous welfare benefits significantly delay the marital decisions of unwed mothers.