One cannot agree. However, he seems to begs the question in suggesting that units and connections are the very things that units and connections model. There also appear to be some problems with the use of sources in support of his position. He stresses the fact that scientists often idealise the entities they study when incorporating them into theories. He does, however, seem altogether too cavalier in his use of this observation.
Idealisation can be a very tricky game.
I myself would not go nearly this far. Consider that if it turned out that we had been entirely wrong about the brain, and found that beliefs and desires were instantiated instead in, say, the liver, folk psychology would need to change little in order to accommodate this discovery. In the absence of such an account, it is only plausible as long as it holds out the promise that its theoretical entities will ultimately be cashed out somehow in terms of brain activity. This is just question- begging. Most certainly not, connectionists leap to tell us.