This Court is not bound by the doctrine of law of the case made on pretrial motions. In light of all of the evidence, as well as the 1917 Agreement, Bethany Church failed to prove it has a legally cognizable interest and failed to sustain its burden of proving its alleged third party beneficiary status. Here, the Attorney General may intervene, which it has declined to do, to enforce the terms of 1917 Agreement. Because the decision on the earlier dismissal motion had no collateral estoppel or res judicata effect, this Court admitted extrinsic evidence on whether or not Bethany Church was an intended third party beneficiary. As in any contract dispute, the parties' intent must be interpreted based upon the language of the agreement.
Extrinsic evidence is only relevant where an ambiguity is found.
The 1917 Agreement is silent about Bethany Church, except the recital paragraph which refers to Bethany Church as a tenant at will. The language of the 1917 Agreement not only distinguishes Bethany Chapel from Bethany Church and refers to Bethany Church as a tenant at will, it contains no language which affords Bethany Church the right of occupancy or any other interest in the Property. No extrinsic historical records of its relationship with Madison or Collegiate can create a right which does not otherwise exist. The sense of the Agreement is that it expressly provides for the preservation of the buildings for the purpose of carrying out the religious and charitable work and for the support of those who were named intended beneficiaries, but not for Bethany Church. In fact, while the Agreement provides that funds from the sale or condemnation of the site are to be applied to the construction of a new building, it makes no provision for Bethany Church in such event.