Thus, to avoid the contradiction, Schlesinger need only relativize statements about the actuality of worlds to the moments at which they are actual. The problem this poses for Schlesinger's attempted transientist solution to McTaggart's paradox is as follows. Schlesinger wants to avoid the contradiction which McTaggart derives by relativizing statements about the present to worlds in which they are true. E is present' is true in W n . E is present' is true when W n is actual.
E is present' is true at m n .
The rationale is that the moment m n extends through each of the worlds in Schlesinger's model. E is present' is true when W n is actual and W n is actual when m n is present. E is past when m n is past and E is present when m n is present and E is future when m n is future. Consequently, paradox can be avoided by indirectly relativizing statements about the present to the moments in the B-series at which they are true. Thus, Schlesinger's model doesn't actually succeed in providing a transientist solution to McTaggart's paradox.