It existed briefly in the heat of the Persian Gulf War when American leadership made clear the dangers of opposing the United States in a crisis. But the coalition long ago ceased to exist as a functioning instrument of power. That is not the fault of the new administration. Eight years of fecklessness by the Clinton White House doomed to failure the already difficult task of holding together the European, Arab, Asian and American governments that contributed in some form to the unfinished defeat of Saddam Hussein 10 years ago this month. But if Powell and President George W. Bush adopt the myth that negotiating fixes in the coalition is their most urgent and important task in charting a new Iraq policy, they will become prisoners of an illusion.
Legends have their place in foreign policy.
But legends must be based in reality. NATO stood the test of time and adversity in large part because its members had shared values, shared institutions and the shared threat of Soviet attack. The Gulf coalition lacks those three standards of cohesion, and much more besides. Even the democracies that turned from selling Saddam nuclear reactors, grain, and chemical weapons material in the 1980s to fight him in 1990-91 disagree today over the utility of fashioning an effective program to drive him from power. We want sanctions ended, not reinvigorated.