The language of the Act shows that its reach was to be limited to conduct that defrauds or deceives consumers or others. The title of the Act is consistent with its content. Ill. Rev. Stat. Further indication that this is a statute directed against fraud and not one designed to be an additional antitrust enforcement mechanism is that every one of the specifically prohibited acts set out in the Act describes a situation where a buyer is being harmed by overreaching or fraudulent conduct. To construe the Consumer Fraud Act to give a cause of action for discriminatory pricing that the legislature refused to give under the Antitrust Act would be incongruous.
Legislation is designed to be consistent.
It would be inconsistent to provide that the very conduct which is not sufficient to state a cause of action under the Antitrust Act is sufficient to state a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. 133 Ill. 2d at 390-91. 133 Ill. 2d at 382. Thus, such allegations, pursuant to Laughlin, must be brought under the Antitrust Act and not the Consumer Fraud Act. Therefore, we find plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act.