There is also evidence that there are multiple internal representations, which are not mutually consistent. For example, in the phenomena of blindsight, cortically blind patients can discriminate different visual stimuli, but report seeing nothing. This inconsistency would not be a feature of a single central model of visual space. These experiments and many others like it, such as the work by Gazzaniga and LeDoux on split brain patients or Rensink, O'Regan, and Clark on changes in visual scenes, convincingly demonstrate that humans do not construct a full, monolithic model of the environment. Instead humans tend to only represent what is immediately relevant from the environment, and those representations do not have full access to one another.
Humans have no monolithic control.
While there are undoubtedly control structures, this model of a single, unitary control system is not supported by evidence from cognitive science. One example comes from studies of split brain patients by Gazzaniga and LeDoux. In one example, a snow scene was presented to the right hemisphere and the leg of a chicken to the left. The separate halves of the subject independently acted appropriately, but one side falsely explained the choice of the other. This suggests that there are multiple independent control systems, rather than a single monolithic one.