Later, he goes on to offer a more physicalistic image, suggesting that vinnana is more akin to the electricity that drives a computer, the rest of the skandhas suggesting, I assume, the hardware and software. Whatever else it may entail, the concept of anatta clearly excludes any sense of a self or soul as an enduring entity that could serve as a criterion of personal identity over the course of a distinct lifetime or through rebirth. The more physicalistic analogy with a computer's electricity also seems to ignore the clearly cognitive and mentalistic associations that go along with vinnana and suggest the usual translation. The issue is an important one, because much of what Keown has to say regarding the application of Buddhism to bioethical issues hinges on his understanding of the traditional Buddhist reverence for life. That reverence, according to Keown, consists in a particular account of the course of a human life from conception to death as a spiritual progression toward nirvana.
Human life stands at the apex or end of the cycle of rebirth, representing the chance for release.
It is the crowning achievement of the entire life process as Buddhism conceives it. In support, Keown refers to traditional Buddhist theories of the gandhabba or intermediate being existing between birth and death, which is attracted to a material form, thus initiating the life process all over again. So for Buddhism, the most important stage of the nirvanic process, a human life, begins with the investment of material form by the spiritual essence of a being's ontological individuality, its identity, through samsara, strongly suggesting a process of ensoulment. Furthermore, the karmic stage represented by a human life retains value even in periods of intolerable suffering and pain. For Keown, this explains why Buddhism, though concerned to root out suffering, is not overly concerned to relieve it, or to relieve it by any means necessary.