He blamed the Navy for authorizing the addition of vessels unfit for combat operations to the stock of fighting ships. Kolton alleged that problems with nuclear-powered submarines are the result of monopolistic attitudes in industry and science and the total power of admirals, and that the buoyant escape chamber aboard the Komsomolets that failed to work was never tested at its maximum depth. According to Kolton, in 1988 top naval commanders knew about the chamber's structural faults because they had been detected in other subs. The Komsomolets disaster also reflects general difficulties brought on by the stagnation and disintegration of the Soviet system itself. Technical requirements, proper equipment testing, and coordination of rescue efforts do not function effectively.
Human error is yet another important cause of accidents.
For instance, in a 1988 accident aboard the nuclear submarine Rossiya , Chief Physicist Kushelev issued an erroneous command to open a valve, which almost led to reactor meltdown. It was discovered that Kushelev had been kept on watch duty for five days without relief. The sinking of the Komsomolets has been followed by a number of other serious accidents involving nuclear-powered submarines. As for the Komsomolets , it is not known at this time whether the submarine will be raised as planned in the summer of 1992, or which office within the former Soviet government has assumed responsibility for the operation. The salvage operation may well have lost its priority as the Russian government wrestles with basic issues of economic reform, ownership of military forces, and political legitimacy.