The second one is a simulated ecological evolution , in which at the beginning there is a fixed population including the same quantity of each strategy. A round-robin tournament is made and then the population of bad strategies is decreased whereas good strategies obtain new elements. This is this way that nasty strategies, those who take the initiative of the first defection, have been discovered to be not very stable, because they are invaded by kind ones. It begins to cooperate, and then play what its opponent played in the last move. It cooperates until the opponent has defected, after that move it always defects.
First move is considered to be equality.
It cooperates if and only if both players opted for the same choice in the previous move. Cooperates except if opponent has defected at least one time in the two previous move. First move is considered to be equality. Y. Leborgne , undergraduate student, is involved in some mathematicals research on a variation of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we have set up. Here are an extensive list of the papers written, and published by members of the team.