Readers interested in how agents for Brazil, the European Union, Japan, or Mexico behave in economic bargaining and in how to influence them, will find interesting material here. Much of our concrete knowledge about monetary and trade negotiations comes from case studies that have not been conducted primarily to develop negotiation theory. This book s cases are selected for theoretical purposes, its main method is comparative, and its main points are relevant beyond the events studied. This volume illustrates a promising method for additional comparative studies on other countries, issues, and times. Theoretically, this book departs from the most popular meaning of bargaining, as only a devious, manipulative, manipulative business.
Many commentators impose the metaphor of warfare or an athletic contest to interpret examples.
Journalists try to evaluate outcomes by asking which side won. Even some specialists define the parties as opponents, loading conclusions into the language itself. On the other hand, some negotiation and cooperation studies concentrate on behavior and arrangements that might help everyone win, but neglect distributive behavior. Many actual agreements are not win-win, despite soothing rhetoric at the end. Some mean gain for one party and a loss for the other, relative to the prior status quo.