I, therefore, cannot be said to be straight-shaped simpliciter. Rather, it is that the first has wrongly done away with shapes as intrinsic properties that can be had simpliciter . These things are not ordinary continuants, but are rather the temporal parts of continuants. But it is here that his opponents have seen a weakness. When such a stalemate is reached, it is the end of the role of argumentation, but not the end of the role of reason.
Good judgment is called for.
In light of the existence of the stage view, however, stalemate in the debate over temporary intrinsics has not yet been reached. The rejoinder to Lewis only applies to the worm view, not to the stage view. According to the stage view, I myself have the property being straight , for I am a stage, not a space-time worm. The version of four-dimensionalism that emerges the strongest from the problem of temporary intrinsics, then, is not the worm view but rather the stage view, for unlike the worm view, the stage view allows both that temporary intrinsics are instantiated simpliciter, and that they are instantiated by ordinary continuants such as persons and candles. That is, I have the temporal property futurely being bent , by future of having a temporal counterpart tomorrow that is bent.