And the ontological argument, if it works, yields a necessary being too. And therefore, says Abraham, if the ontological argument doesn't work, the cosmological argument cannot either. But this is a combination of two non sequitors. First, the fact that one proof of a thing doesn't work does not mean that other proofs do not. This is equally true of logically necessary propositions as of contingent things.
Gale presents a different attempt at proof of the link.
Gale is correct, in some sense, that the necessary object of the cosmological argument, containing its own reason for existence as it does, must have some ontological argument available. But the mere fact that the particular ontological arguments humans have presented might fail does not mean that all such must fail. One must show that ontological arguments must fail in principle for this to be so. And this is what Kant attempts to do. But Kant's arguments for an in-principle rejection of any ontological argument are highly questionable, and depend on the details of his specious divisions of analytic and synthetic propositions.