In addition to Abkhazians, Russians, and Armenians. Subsequently, an estimated 50,000 Ossetians from South Ossetia were displaced from the war. Rather, their status was the result of political and economic insecurities aggravated by chauvinistic politicians on all sides, and fanned by Russia pursuing a traditional policy of divide et impera. Until the Abkhazian and Ossetian situation is settled, Georgia will not be able to invest time or money into the rebuilding of regional, political, and economic structures with its Caucasian neighbors. Current negotiations in Geneva regarding the return of refugees and the status of Abkhazia in Georgia suggests this will not be soon.
Georgian refugees are a potent political force for immoderate Georgian nationalists.
The wars and their consequences have not only prevented proper legislative business in parliament, but also delayed Georgia's economic and political reforms. Subsequently, the war in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia has complicated Georgian relations with North Caucasians-who aided the Abkhazians in large numbers. Shevardnadze's support of Russian action in Chechnya closed the opportunity for mending bridges with the North Caucasians, who along with Georgians. have confronted the brutal Russian military. Caucasia and the latter can destabilize Georgia with ease-in Abkhazia, Ossetia, or through economic pressure. Shevardnadze's government has recognized the inevitable.