The provider's behavior is uncertain. When the probability of a provider acting collusively is large, the equilibrium contract is independent of this probability and identical to the equilibrium collusion-proof contract when the provider is collusive with probability 1. 495. The consumer needs a major or a minor intervention, and incurs a cost for each visited expert. The expert may cheat by falsely recommending the major intervention. When consumers and experts are homogeneous, no cheating occurs in equilibrium.
Experts specialize in one intervention only if the visit cost is small.
Finally, when experts have different cheating costs, equilibrium cheating emerges despite free entry, endogenous prices and no capacity constraints. We first show, by example, that his result may not apply in general networks if disutility functions are allowed to differ. We investigate if this result applies to more general networks. We also show that user equilibrium is unique in a dynamic bottleneck model with a simple network. In the appendix, we also provide a proof of a slightly generalized version of Daganzo s theorem.