Defendant does not satisfy either prong of Strickland. The government had to show that Balogun occupied a managerial position in the charged criminal enterprise, and the government's evidence at trial easily met this burden. Balogun provided a heroin source in Thailand, sent money abroad to pay for the heroin, picked the routes that couriers used to come to the United States, greeted couriers upon their return, and sold the heroin for profit. Given this evidence, it is hard to understand how the defendant's trial counsel could have argued that Balogun was a passive investor. We therefore find that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated.
Defendant also argues that the district court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts.
In particular, defendant objects to the introduction of the testimony of Adekunle Lawal, Balogun's cousin and a cooperating witness. At trial, Lawal testified that Balogun introduced him to heroin trafficking and explained how the conspirators came to be involved with each other. Defendant argues that the court wrongly permitted Lawal to testify to events that occured between 1988 and 1990 and to state that Balogun stored heroin during this time in an apartment that Balogun permitted Lawal to use. Defendant argues that Lawal's testimony was prejudicial because Lawal was a blood relative and because the prior act of hiring an alimentary smuggler may have evoked antipathy from the jury. Defendant has, however, made no argument that even suggests that Lawal's testimony was more prejudicial than probative.