With the international experiences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in mind, Beijing has sought to reverse the relative regional autonomy from the central government that developed in the 1990s and end the existence of local power bases. In 1998 the Peoples Liberation Army was ordered to divest itself of its considerable and highly regionalised business activities. In the same year the government of Guangdong was almost totally purged and replaced with figures selected by Beijing. One aspect of the current corruption purge, as in the case of the Falun Gong crackdown, is the central government's assertion of control over the provinces and state apparatus and the elimination of any potential rival. The purpose of the crackdown on corruption, however, goes beyond an attempt to forestall social discontent and to maintain a strong central government.
Economic factors are also in play.
One of most significant social changes in China is that, two decades after the first free market reforms, a definable class of capitalists has emerged that is no longer dependent upon bureaucratic position for its accumulation of wealth. It now holds ownership of considerable productive and financial capital in the form of property, shares and private businesses. Weighed against the local networks of politically-sponsored smugglers, black marketers and extortionists, are the interests of China's major domestic companies. Eight of them rank in the Fortune magazine 500 largest corporations in the world and Chinese oil and steel companies are preparing to list on Wall Street. Oil provides one example of the conflict of interests.