The sale of liquid-fuel rocket motor technology by Moscow to India is a prominent example, but there have also been a host of less publicized transactions. In addition, the technical infrastructure of potential proliferants is maturing even as technology is becoming more accessible. Third, there is the possibility of dramatic and rapid change in U.S. political relations with states either possessing long-range missiles or capable of fielding such systems if they so choose. It is important to note that the character of U.S. relations with such countries may be subject to relatively rapid shifts during the 1990s or early in the next century. The potential for the rapid deterioration of political relations also entails the possible emergence of shorter-range missile threats from Latin American or Caribbean countries.
History demonstrates that rapid change in political relations does occur.
Historically, over a longer period of 10 to 20 years, this type of major reorientation of political relations is much more common. In a period of political uncertainty and instability, the prospect for political relations to deteriorate rapidly with states possessing long-range missiles, or capable of fielding such systems promptly, must be acknowledged. In summary, plausible routes to missile proliferation and additional missile threats could shape the situation during and after this decade. Either independently or in combination, these could lead to the emergence of additional missile threats to the United States. In these circumstances, the conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States for at least 15 years can be sustained only if these plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence.