All this has relevant implications for the European integration process. Different processes have led us to increasingly share interests across European countries. One could argue that the process of market integration ensuing the Rome Treaty of 1956 is itself to be blamed for this, but it is also the case that this was perceived to be the reaction to previous developments which took place much earlier. Be this how it may, we have reached a point at which we share many interests, just as we already share a good deal of common action norms, as the thick repertoires of Community law prove. Although it was stated at the beginning, it is probably worth repeating now that this does not mean that the European Union is a perfectly legitimate polity and that we should bow to any argument for deeper integration.
European institutions are still inadequate in what concerns the other three dimensions of democracy.
Political participation is weak, the acquis communitaire needs to be expanded in order to give a more balanced protection to basic fundamental rights, and access to Courts is imbalanced in favour of certain sectoral interests. In both cases, we will end up with a serious democratic deficit, due to the mismatch between the level at which decisions should be adopted and the one at which they are actually adopted. Consequently, we will probably end up with far from efficient arrangements. This site is part of the Academy of European Law online , a joint partnership of the Harvard Jean Monnet Chair and of the Academy of European Law at the European University Institute .