It's a long shot that even this relatively modest objective can be attained, and the obvious downside risk is that, as in Bosnia, the U.N. presence will prove too small to accomplish much in the way of facilitating a peace, but too big to escape the blame when, say, civilians are massacred in the vicinity of blue helmets. The United Nations then would be attacked as ineffectual, when the fair question would be whether the major powers inside the U.N. sought credit for an operation that they were reluctant to support in a meaningful way. The Congo plan is being discussed at a time when other major U.N.-led peacekeeping operations are, to differing degrees, faltering. In Sierra Leone, a horrifically violent rebel organization refuses to disarm, with little effective response from the Western governments that brokered a share of power for it. In Kosovo, the planned U.N. police force is woefully undermanned, and much violence between Serbs and Albanians goes unchecked.
Congo is too important to ignore.
But the United States and its partners would make a more credible case for pursuing peace there if they were fulfilling the commitments they already have made elsewhere.