Second, there are social costs when sentences that have been imposed after the revocation of probation go unexecuted during the pendency of an appeal that is based on complaints about the conditions. Third, it is a natural expectation that a party with a bona fide complaint about a harmful error would raise the complaint as soon as the error was committed. Finally, injustice may result if a trial court makes decisions about sentencing with the reasonable understanding that a party has no objection to the decision, but the party is thereafter able to void some aspects of the punishment decision. If the appellant thought these conditions were unauthorized, he should have objected in the trial court. I also want to record my disagreement with the Court's continuing to describe probation as contractual, like a grant of clemency.
Executive clemency is contractual because it requires acceptance by the convicted person.
It is the very ability of the trial court to put a defendant through such a continuum that would make the defendant refuse to enter the contract, and inspire the court to impose probation. I concur in the judgment of the Court. Delivered December 1, 1999. See 953 S.W.2d at 753. The generally acknowledged policies of requiring specific objections are two-fold.