The stunning success of Army aviation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is cited by Allard. Helicopters of the 1st Armored Division's 4th Brigade combined the critical advantages of speed and mobility in mountainous terrain. The use of video gun camera tape from Apache attack helicopters played an important role. Innovations by the helicopter crews led to a new method of digitizing imagery that provided valuable intelligence. As unclassified imagery, the photographs occasionally could be handed over to the former warring factions, he observes.
Information is the only component of warfare whose cost has gone down and whose utility has gone up.
The Bosnia-Herzegovina experience underlines the need to substitute commercial telecommunications, automation and services for outmoded military equipment and support structures. In contrast, the largest single command and control problem handicapping coordination in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Dayton Accords, which did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military, political and humanitarian aspects of the mission. Information technology is uniquely affected by people, training and procedures, and the time people take to perform them. However, a combination of these factors in combat or operational settings constantly and curiously is underestimated, according to Allard's assessment. These tasks are daunting.