As such, it should be a full member of the WTO, as soon as it is able to commit itself to the obligations required of members of the organization. This would relieve U.S. negotiators of the inconsistent position they find themselves in of insisting that China commit itself to the obligations of the WTO, the first principle of which is non-discrimination, embodied in Article I of the GATT, while at the same time insisting that under current U.S. law, the United States could not commit itself to apply these same WTO obligations to China. By removing the MFN issue from the accession negotiations with China, the credibility of the United States is significantly enhanced and its bargaining position improved. Another important advantage of extending permanent MFN treatment is that it will end the annual Spring rite of the threat to deny such treatment to China. Some view this annual event as a charade, since the threat has, so far, always turned out to be empty.
Empty threats are poor policy tools.
But, we should not assume that the exercise is without cost. As such, it acts as an obstacle to U.S. exports. As a member of the WTO, China would be subject to the dispute settlement mechanism, which has proven to be a highly effective instrument for the enforcement of member-country obligations. In short, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the basic thrust of the bill is desirable and worthy of support. I would, however, call attention to several provisions which warrant particular consideration.