Unfortunately, the subsequent chapters cannot keep pace with this promising beginning, as they lack its analytical clarity and chronological approach. Chapter three exemplifies this lack of structure, as it seems to focus mainly on the formal re-establishment of judicial independence under the Bavarian constitution of 1946. However, the chapter also provides interspersed references to the ineffectiveness of formal denazification. The countervailing pressures of denazifying the formally independent legal system and the severe shortage of untainted legal professionals are then more fully elaborated in chapter four. Yet previous references to denazification in the preceding chapter that had repeatedly claimed that denazification failed let the argument appear to be a historical and logical step backwards.
Analogous problems pervade all remaining chapters.
Rather than simply and progressively building on previous arguments, the author rehashes his reasoning and sacrifices analytical clarity to redundancy. Admittedly, the redundancy trap is easy to fall into when analyzing complex processes. The case studies of transitional justice, for example, practically beg a discussion of the difficulty of organically integrating natural law into a legal tradition to which it is foreign. Similarly, it is questionable how easily the distinction between overt and covert Nazism can be made retrospectively without a more in-depth analysis of the judges' reasoning and supporting archival material. Chapter six, Justice in the Flesh, suffers from analogous problems.