Hence predation by sham litigation has been shown to succeed. By pricing its browser at zero, thus requiring Netscape to do the same, Microsoft cut off Netscape's revenues and forced it to match Microsoft's fixed costs of research and development. Netscape's browser could not survive in that environment. There being no omniscient courts, much judicial opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, it is impossible to measure directly the harm to consumers from continued monopoly vs. consumer benefits from low prices during the period of predation. In price-fixing cases, courts do not measure consumer harm.
Harm is presumed from the suppression of competition.
The party in the best position to judge the costs and benefits of predation is the predator, not a robed magistrate. The parallel between predatory conduct and price fixing is exact. In both cases, the law must accept the judgment of the wrongdoer as to the rationality of its behavior. The evidence does not suggest, moreover, that Microsoft followed a strategy of charging less than the full monopoly price. When it sought exclusive arrangements with distributors, the company had to offer discounts or other concessions.