More practically, Japanese sometimes worry that American frustration with Japan's closed economic system and China's vibrant growth could prompt the U.S. to tilt toward China economically in U.S. policy. This pattern is said to resemble the Nixon-Kissinger frustration with Japan strategically and the American tilt toward China in the 1970s. At bottom, U.S. influence with Japan continues to depend heavily on Japan's ever closer economic interdependence with the U.S. market and Japan's continued dependence on the United States for security guarantees in an East Asian environment full of potential dangers to Japanese peace and prosperity. It needs the United States for balance against what otherwise could be a quasi-dependent economic relationship similar to those Japan maintains with South Korea and Taiwan. The latter two countries have been unable to press Japan to change economic policies contrary to their interests because enterprises in Taiwan and South Korea have become so heavily dependent on the technology, spare parts and other economic connections with Japan.
China is concerned with Japan's military power.
PRC planners are aware that Japanese power projection capabilities and potential are far ahead of China. Beijing does not want reduced American influence until it is more certain that China's military would be able to deal with possible contingencies. It is likely that China does not want U.S.-China friction to reach a point where Japan is forced to choose between the two. Under such circumstances, past practice and current realities seem to show that Japan would side with the United States against China. Assessing the new great power triangular relationship in Asia seems to show that the United States retains the most advantageous and influential position.