But there is progress to fill the adjudicatory gap. The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda enjoy sweeping powers. The Yugoslav Tribunal has done a far better job that the Rwandan Tribunal, but its accomplishments are incomplete. They are incomplete in large part because of a third serious gap in the institutional tools available to make international law a reality. This third gap has to do with enforcement.
Courts do little good, domestically or internationally, if no one enforces their decisions.
The inability to enforce arrest warrants issued by the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Hague is a well known shortcoming of the Hague Tribunal apparatus. The problem here in its most basic terms is the absence of any sort of international police capability. We have, at the one end of the spectrum, conventional military force, but these forces are not trained to perform domestic law and order functions, and in Bosnia at least military leadership was completely unwilling to back up civilian decision makers or to assist in enforcing decisions of international courts. We all must work to develop useful concepts for an international police presence. There should be a standing staff, regular contingency and deployment plans, appropriate rules of engagement, and close integration with national and international judicial institutions.