While these are, of course, familiar points, discussing them as part of the dispute about the nature of freedom provides a tight link between philosophical and economic arguments that are often treated separately. Sometimes Kelley talks as if there is a direct path from the concept of positive freedom to the welfare state, but that's not necessarily so. Without economic determinism and faith in state action, the concept of positive freedom, while confused, need not have politically pernicious consequences. Kelley then turns to justifications of the welfare state by appeals to benevolence and charity. He argues that charity, benevolence, and compassion cannot be primary virtues in the realm of material well-being because they depend upon the creation of wealth.
Creation comes before distribution, achievement before aid.
Because charity as a value is fundamentally different from welfare as a right. In one sense this is obvious, since the latter prevents the donor from choosing his recipients, the amount of aid, and the conditions under which aid should be given. Kelley, though, has a more important point in mind. When charity is compulsory, persons are no longer treated as ends in themselves. Instead, recipients own a piece of the donor.