Essentialism has the PNC falling out of that view. To be an essential property, requires that it, and not its opposite, be a property to be what it is. Furthermore, since Aristotle s theory of definition depends on essences, they to must denied, or given a different theoretical justification then intrinsic essences. This almost seems like too much to give up. If we have been dialectically pushed, from the first refutation, to reject that words have a definite meaning, then the jump to denying that there are not definite definitions should be quite a small leap.
Definite definitions appear to be our identification of the definite meaning of a term.
Once we lose definite meaning, then there is not a meaning out there to identify with our definition. We can further deny that there are metaphysical essences as they are the metaphysical basis of definitions and definite senses. If we are willing to reject real definitions and definite senses, then it is not clear why we need to postulate that there are metaphysical essences. It seems clear that if metaphysical essences do not exist, then we lose the metaphysical basis and justification for real definitions and definite senses. However, it may be possible to believe that they exist, but there is an epistemological barrier such that we lose any access to real definitions and definite senses.