There is nothing to prevent certain banks from continuing to use their correspondents' accounts. It is an innovative arrangement, intended to smooth the future transition of the relevant EU Member States to the Monetary Union. This arrangement, which is subject to an agreement with the central banks concerned, should be seen as a very specific exception to the general rule approved by the central banks of the Group of Ten countries, that no central bank shall grant credit in a currency other than its own. In these areas, I feel very confident that we are well prepared for the start of Monetary Union. But I should like to underline that the credibility of the single monetary policy also depends very heavily on another building block, namely the extent to which governments are prepared to pursue stability-oriented policies of fiscal discipline and to undertake essential structural reforms.
Fiscal policy affects credibility in two ways.
The first has to do with how well national fiscal policies cope with differences in the business cycle and in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms of the participating Member States. Under a single monetary policy, national fiscal policies need to be far more active and flexible than is necessary at present to deal successfully with country-specific growth and inflation differences. Both the room for manoeuvre needed at the national level and the Stability and Growth Pact explicitly demand that national public budgets are balanced and sound. The second aspect of fiscal policy is the overall degree of fiscal policy discipline in the euro area. The maintenance of price stability and subdued inflation expectations in a low interest rate environment will be more easily achieved if fiscal policy is disciplined in the euro area as a whole.