We first address the question of whether the appropriate sanction is suspension or disbarment. The essential difference between suspension and disbarment is that although both sanctions involve the withdrawal of the privilege of practicing law, an attorney who is suspended may resume practice at the end of the period of suspension upon demonstration of his fitness to practice, whereas an attorney who is disbarred may not apply for readmission to the bar for a period of five years, and in disbarment, there is no basis for an expectation by the disbarred attorney of the right to resume practice at some future point in time. The power of a court to disbar an attorney should be exercised with great caution, but there should be no hesitation in exercising it when it clearly appears that it is demanded for the protection of the public. We have no difficulty in agreeing with the board that the present case requires disbarment. When an attorney attempts to bribe a witness or a court official for the purpose of affecting the outcome of a judicial proceeding, he has stricken at the heart of the judicial system itself.
Fair adjudication is predicated upon the ability of courts to arrive at the truth.
It is further predicated upon the confidence that courts will make their decisions based on that truth. If instead, courts are foreclosed from arriving at the truth because attorneys subvert the truth determining process, then justice cannot be administered. Instead, the truth determining process becomes a contest between bidders for corrupt testimony. That Renfroe could attempt to corrupt the system which sustained him and then argue that he should not be disbarred strains credulity. The remaining question is whether his disbarment should be retroactive or prospective, and if retroactive, to what date.