The stability is reasonably high, but the durability is uncertain. In this context, the Bush Administration will continue an engagement policy , however, with deterrence elements more salient. Many Japanese leaders and analysts take this renewed Bush posture as a fact of life, but are concerned because it may cause unexpected effects on Northeast Asian security, both positive and negative. Yet, it is very difficult to evaluate these effects at this point. Even after the North-South summit meeting in Pyongyang, June 2000, and the subsequent rapprochement, North Korea still keeps its military posture intact for invasion and aggression, with some temporary improvement of military readiness.
Japan has a strong and keen interest to secure a nuclear-free Unified Korea.
The emergence of a nuclear Korea would compel Japan to go nuclear, which involves a militarily more independent Japan and, most probably, abrogation or at least major modification of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Due to very strong aspirations toward national unification among Koreans, both South and North, many Japanese analysts see eventual unification and withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea unavoidable. Then the United States will have to lower the level of forward deployment in the region, and the US-Japan alliance will enhance its pivotal role. Depending upon the level of U.S. commitment, Japan may or may not need to possess more independent military capabilities within the alliance. The China factor is central to the post-unification balance of power.