Firstly, his account of the soul, as being capable originally only of simple reactions to impressions and as being then virtually swallowed up by, or dissolved into the stream of subsequent presentations or ideas, is metaphysically erroneous, and in educational practice exceedingly dangerous if carried to its logical conclusions. For it implies an entirely mechanical view of the mind, as rigidly determinist as that of the English Associationists, with which indeed, notwithstanding Herbart's spiritualism, it has sundry points of similarity. It leaves no place for free-will, nor, if logically pressed, for individual responsibility. The soul seems to be conceived merely as the arena for chance experiences coming from without. Our whole mental life is solely the resultant of the collision or coalescence of the presentations flowing in upon us.
Every volition is the inexorable product of the circle of thought.
Again, the ethical aim of Herbartianism is after all the Ego. Further, knowledge and intellectual culture, however varied or refined, are not virtue. Herbart has here fallen into the old Socratic error. Asceticism, so obnoxious to the Herbartian, is therefore not unintelligent. Many-sided interest, too, though ethically helpful is not virtue.