That agreement effectively waived the plaintiffs' ability to later attack the legal sufficiency of the court's order on appeal. Moreover, without a transcript of the hearing, we are unable to determine whether the trial court, when making its ruling, relied on any additional legal grounds other than the agreement of the parties. The plaintiffs next argue that Superior Court Rule 57 renders the agreement made by counsel during the December 16th hearing invalid as a matter of law. We have recognized, however, that a trial court may deviate from the strict language of Rule 57 when neither party objects to the proceeding. Furthermore, there are strong policy reasons for affirming the trial court's order.
Attorneys are officers of the court, cf .
This is not a case of novices lost in a forest of legal technicalities . . . . It is common knowledge that the scrupulousness with which arrangements of this sort are kept in this state is of inestimable value in the administration of justice. To require strict adherence to Rule 57 in this case would undermine the ability of trial judges to resolve disputes based on agreements made by counsel during court proceedings. The plaintiffs contend that the superior court erred in both granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying their motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs assert that the superior court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgement because its order contains findings of fact that were unsupported by the record and because its legal rulings were incorrect.