In addition, the equipment must be assessed according to international standards to ensure a high degree of confidence in its nuclear detection capability. Before elaborating these policy prescriptions, I will examine the changes Russia has undergone since 1991 as well as the continuities with the past, since both have important ramifications for the Second Line of Defense's attempt to prevent smuggling of nuclear material and weapons across Russia's borders. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has dramatically increased the probability of nuclear smuggling occurring in Russia. Private garden plots are so vital to Russia's food supply that even though they occupy 2.6 percent of cultivated land, they produce half of the nation's food. Russia's GNP is not much higher than the Netherlands, a nation with one-tenth the population.
Malnutrition is widespread and the incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases is increasing.
In August the government devalued the ruble and defaulted on much of its debt, precipitating the dissolution of the government for the second time in six months. The state is currently run either according to the whim of its President, or is not run because of his frequent maladies. The concentration of power in one individual hinders the emergence of a democratic and stable Russia, which requires the development of modern governing and policymaking institutions. Economic, political and social instability has led to a spiritual crisis in Russia. In this climate, it would not be surprising for someone to attempt to steal and sell nuclear material or weapons for profit.