The appellants contend that the appellee received the warranty after she had exchanged the note and mortgage for the deed, and that therefore no consideration was given by appellee in return for the warranty. The appellee, on the other hand, testified that she received the Home Owners Policy from the builder's representative when the closing papers were signed, and this testimony is buttressed by the fact that the deed, note, mortgage and policy all bore the same date, September 8, 1960. It is apparent, in his finding that the warranty was breached, that the trial judge found there to have been consideration for it. This was a proper inference from the evidence that the warranty was given contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, note and mortgage, these instruments all being part of a single inseparable transaction. We have next to deal with the main thrust of appellant's argument, which is that they were immunized from the appellee's defense because the Mason Mortgage Company, from whom they derived title, was a holder in due course against whom failure of consideration was not a good defense.
Appellants contend that according to Fla.
674.60, F.S.A, they, as parties deriving title from a holder in due course, have all the rights of such former holder in respect to prior parties. We agree with this statement of the law, as well as the proposition that a holder in due course is immune from the defense of failure of consideration. But to be accorded the status of a holder, and entitled to the presumption of being a holder in due course as provided by Fla. Stat., Secs . 674.33 and 674.01, F.S.A. Paper payable to order, as was the note here, is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder, plus delivery.