Covenant refused his request, maintaining that the agreement provided for severance pay only if Reuter was terminated before becoming vested under Covenant's pension plan. The trial court concluded that the Reuter-Covenant agreement was ambiguous on the subject of Reuter's entitlement to severance pay. Then, viewing Covenant's motion to dismiss and Reuter's motion for summary judgment as reciprocal motions, the trial court concluded that because Reuter had worked for Covenant for more than five years, he had become vested in Covenant's pension plan and therefore was not entitled to severance pay. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to Covenant. Reuter first argues that the trial court erred in viewing the motions as reciprocal ones seeking summary judgment and, therefore, in viewing his motion as a tacit stipulation to the factual basis on which the court could make its determination.
Covenant is incorrect.
Thus, Reuter's argument that the trial court erred in viewing the parties' motions as reciprocal ones for summary judgment is academic. After all, Reuter's primary point is that he and Covenant differ on the meaning of their agreement regarding severance pay and that his interpretation of their agreement should prevail. The trial court, however, reading the sentences together, concluded that the agreement was ambiguous. Whether contractual language is ambiguous presents an issue of law subject to de novo review. Here, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the agreement was ambiguous.