Consider also the situation where a computer has been seized and copied but the defence require access to it for their own purposes. If the defence access is not supervised by someone at least as knowledgeable there is the possibility that information could be changed or erased. This would again leave the courts unable to determine which is the true evidence. When the copies are completed the owner is invited to choose one of them to be sealed in his presence. This sealed copy is signed by the owner and is then kept secure by the police.
Forensic examination is conducted on the other copy and the computer is returned to the owner.
In the event of a challenge to the integrity of the working copy, the court can order the seal to be broken on the secure copy and this can be verified - if necessary by an independent expert. The security of this process would be helped if some system of internal verification were implemented within the copying procedure such that any subsequent alterations might be located and identified. While this represents a relatively simple solution to a difficult problem, it should not be applied too liberally since it leaves the possibility that criminally significant material might be left in the hands of the computer owner. Where there is doubt, it would be better to temporarily seize and seal the computer until the presence or absence of criminally significant material could be positively established. This article may not be reproduced without prior permission of the publisher.