In the long term, export controls cannot prevent, but can only make it more difficult and lengthy, to produce nuclear weapons. The importance of controls is real and tangible, but should not be exaggerated. The relatively minor role played by imports from the United States in Iraq's nuclear program indicates that stringent U.S. export controls, combined with unique U.S. intelligence resources, make procurement from the United States relatively unattractive to a proliferant state. In light of this, let me discuss the prospects for strengthening existing technology transfer and arms control agreements or negotiating new agreements to contain proliferation . Dual use items are items which have legitimate commercial and industrial uses but which can also contribute significantly to a nuclear weapons program if misused.
Examples are computers, oscilloscopes, machine tools, and zirconium.
There is an international regime, based on IAEA safeguards, to control fissile material that could be used to make nuclear weapons. Obviously, this regime could be strengthened as we have found out in the Iraq case. Nevertheless, we have a international foundation to build upon. However, there is no effective international regime to control the equipment and technology which is necessary to convert fissile material into nuclear weapons. They believed that, if all fissile material was subjected to international safeguards, there would be no need to explicitly prohibit weaponization activities.