Section 2 explains the formal model of the stage game. The learning dynamics of the repeated game are explained in Section 3, while simulation results are presented in Section 4. A brief conclusion and some tentative extensions are offered in Section 5. 2. The setting is defined as a lattice of i columns and j rows. There is an implicit assumption that the speaker wants the audience to respond with an ovation, but we do not employ an explicit utility function to represent this desire.
Agents also care about conforming, since acting the same as others provides sycophantic pleasure.
In each period, if the utility to standing exceeds the utility to sitting, then the agent will stand. The decay parameter ensures that all audience members will eventually sit. To capture some type of evolutionary dynamics, the stage game was repeated with both performer and population subject to inter-period alteration. The performer's and the population's learning dynamics are defined by distinct updating procedures. Concentrating on the former, the performer's learning mechanism is a function of a first difference in ovation levels, measured as the maximum number of agents standing at any one time step within a stage game.