Cuba excepted, guerrillas are most effective in support of regulars when victory is certain or probable. The former made national integration impractical, two economies inevitable and military logistics impossible. The latter gave legitimacy to Bengali aspirations. Geographical contiguity and minority demands rarely spawn successful liberation movements irrespective of the breadth and depth of popular support and participation. This happens because the centre's staying power exceeds the insurgents.
Fatigue eventually overwhelms the rebels.
The long-running but unsuccessful insurgencies in Baluchistan, Chechnya, CHT, Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram, Sri Lanka and Tibet validate this point. One man's FF is another's terrorist. But whether this would have spilled over into a successful national liberation movement is an interesting question. The interplay of accommodation, reform, threats and use of force probably would have kept the pot boiling without engendering a fatal explosion beyond the point of no return. These two factors make up the third reason for our successful liberation.