For example, Kaplan contrasts the impact of organized crime on the political and economic development of Bulgaria with that on other Soviet-bloc states. Nor are there the colorful ethnic ingredients here that distinguish criminal circles in the Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Chechnya, with their family mafias and highwaymen. The comparison between time's legacy in the southern Balkans and in the Caucasus is also indicative of Kaplan's theoretical inconsistencies. Some modern events appear inextricably rooted in the hoary past of tribal identities and imperial politics while others are not. One is never sure when or why Kaplan believes history is relevant.
Factual errors are also a distraction for the informed reader.
By simplifying his description of Turkish politics to highlight the tension between a religious minority and a Western-oriented military, Kaplan offers a caricature in place of analysis. Similarly, the author misuses words and language in places in an attempt to enhance the authenticity of the observations about the enduring nature of historic patterns. The word Kaplan is searching for is millet, meaning a religious community or a group defined by religion and language. More importantly, the origin and scope of the Ottoman government's famed millet system for self-governance of minority religious communities within the empire are themselves matters of scholarly debate among historians. Bad history written into an easily accessible book read by many senior Washington policy makers contributed to false perceptions about America's ability to influence events in the Balkans.