The outcome of this massive economic gear-grinding exercise cannot be foreseen in detail. Estimates of overall PRC economic growth for 1998 have been revised downward, even as most Western observers assert that something on the order of 9 percent is needed simply to sop up the excess labor resources in the economy. Continuing pluralization of industrial ownership forms, likely to be further advanced by the upcoming National People's Congress, runs up against the ancient and endemic problem of the central government's struggle to command regional and local adherence to national laws and policies. Just one day before Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers arrived in Beijing to secure the central government's commitment to economic caution in the midst of the Asian crisis, the presumptive premier and top economic policy figure, Zhu Rongji, was in Guangzhou, berating South China's provincial and local officials for their failure to adhere to Beijing's instructions. In other words, China is in particular institutional and economic flux in 1998, as a combination of domestic and external forces impinge on the making of coherent policy commitments.
Many American businesses are intensely impatient over the nearly endless negotiations.
Others are determined to ensure that China's accession terms meet their concerns, and that their business sector not be sacrificed at the final negotiating table. But that vote certainly emphasized the reality that Congress will only implement controversial trade policy when the White House and pro-trade advocates have an overwhelming case. In fact, there has been significant cumulative progress in US-China WTO negotiations. Our Chinese friends have a point when they urge us to recognize more fully the major commitments that they have already made. Now, the emphasis increasingly is on what remains to be done, rather than on where to begin.