Russia's relations with North Korea have thus entered a new stage. As usual, the bottom line of the relationship will be determined by Russia's intention to help North Korea survive, to keep it from drifting into a desperate isolation that might prompt the impossible regime to do something stupid and dangerous. Therefore Russia will strive to engage North Korea in dialogue and to maintain reasonable economic exchange with the country. Well aware of the fact that North Korea is absolutely closed to any attempt to pressure it into reforms, Russia will not back schemes based on this idealistic premise. Likewise, Russia will not expect North Korea to improve its human rights record, nor try to link such an improvement to any aid or cooperation projects.
Human rights are nonexistent in North Korea, and that is the end of it.
Hopefully in this eventuality the Russian government would recognize the illusory nature of this temptation, at about the same time as Perry discovers that there is no such thing as containment as far as policy towards North Korea is concerned. Quite simply, a piecemeal containment would have no effect whatsoever, while a full-scale containment would lead to war with a country that is somewhat less sensible than, say, Yugoslavia. However, extreme cases apart, Russia's policy toward North Korea, at least for the time, being will not differ much from the policies pursued by other major countries. It will be marked by habitual frustration both with North Korea's stubbornness and the scarcity of available means to influence it. Admittedly, few people in Russia will be happy or proud at having to maintain contacts with North Korea.