Efforts to control such information are more likely to be frustrated from within than from without. Even with compression and selective intelligent updating, the bandwidth required to send the same information over the air to a location behind the lines does not exist in the electromagnetic spectrum. As a perhaps apocryphal illustration, although Winston Churchill was said to know through Britain's Enigma system of codebreaking that the Germans would bomb Coventry, he decided to abjure countermeasures that might reveal that the British had broken the German codes. Consider the close alignment between what was formerly named the Joint Electronic Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas, and now the C2 Warfare Center and the co-located USAF Information Warfare Command. Encryption techniques can mask blank time patterns.
False emitters can generate false conversations from random locations.
In a trivial comparison, an F-18, with its pilot, FLIR sensors, and attached weapons, can link all three with wires or in the pilot's mind and is therefore far more resistant to jamming. The formula works differently on PKE, because the challenge to the code breaker is to factor a product of two prime numbers rather than guess a correct key. Aideed's ingenious use of tom-toms, satellite terminals, and radio transmissions that bounced off city walls and so were difficult to geolocate has been cited as an indication that he understood other aspects of information warfare. The unexpectedly successful are also unlikely to be forced into subsequent decisions. See defense intelligence-based warfare for mention of deception at the tactical level.