First, Eakin never relinquished his authority to prosecute this case. Second, Wagner was under the District Attorney's direction and supervision as Eakin made all important strategic and tactical decisions concerning the prosecution. . . . . Trial Court slip. The Majority tacitly concedes that there was no violation of the Act here. 1420 and concludes that the District Attorney had no authority to appoint Wagner as a Special Assistant District Attorney.
Majority slip op.
None of those sections, however, expressly or impliedly limits the authority granted in Section 1420. Therefore, I believe the Majority has erred by disregarding the letter of Section 1420 under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. The proper focus of the inquiry should be on the plain language of Section 1420, which is the only section the District Attorney has invoked. The district attorney may appoint such number of assistants, learned in the law, to assist him in the discharge of his duties, as is fixed by the salary board of the county. The salary board shall fix the salary of such assistants.