For example, one could call a friend in a spirit of good fun, intending to play a joke on the friend. This lewd language, in fact, could be part and parcel of the joke. The specific intent to annoy or offend while telling a joke would bring the telephone call under the statute. The potential overbreadth of the statute is not, of course, limited to the scenarios posed above. However, the First Amendment does not prohibit the kind of essentially harmless communications described above.
First Amendment is made of sterner stuff.
We thus reverse Whatcott's conviction. Because of our disposition, we do not reach Whatcott's arguments that insufficient evidence supported his conviction and that the statute is also unconstitutionally vague. Because we cannot impose a limiting construction in this case, Whatcott has standing to challenge the statute both on its face and as applied to him. The information charging Whatcott did not indicate under which subsection Whatcott was charged. Similarly, the jury was instructed to evaluate whether Whatcott's conduct satisfied any of the subsections, without specifying a particular one.