2 France, the second naval power by a long chalk, posed no threat, its big naval program of 1858 having been rather too ambitious and its resources after 1870 being otherwise employed. Indeed, no other power, or likely combination of powers, possessed a navy that was a match, either quantitatively or qualitatively, for Britain's own navy. Nor did any other power develop a naval strategy that Britain needed to fear. It is impossible to do justice, in a short review, to the scope and depth of this book. Some caveats are none the less in order.
Administration occupies a considerable part of the text.
Nor does Beeler fully understand the complexities of the management structure that Childers replaced. His treatment of Childers's problematical management style is selective and misleading. The reader will not learn that the dockyards' failure to reach building targets was a factor of technological change and admiralty policy. Inconsistencies in the pattern of expenditure are carefully noted but not explained. An apparent enormous increase in the cost of ships, simply attributed to a mysterious bookkeeping change, actually reflected a crucially important accounting innovation.