The State presented evidence upon which a jury could find defendant guilty of assaulting J.M. Defendant and Ms. Jacobs had exclusive custody of J.M. Defendant admitted to spanking him. The treating nurse opined that the bruising was at least a day old by the time she examined J.M. and was not wholly consistent with bruising caused by a fall or by hitting a chair. Finally, the photographs showing the bruising on J.M.'s lower back and upper buttocks corroborated the testimony supporting the State's case. We find that the evidence is more than sufficient to support defendant's conviction and does not preponderate heavily against the verdict. Therefore, the court properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal or a new trial.
Defendant also claims that the court erred in instructing the jury.
He argues that the court's instructions omitted the element of specific intent to harm necessary to distinguish lawful corporal punishment from assault. Corporal punishment is excessive when a parent acts cruelly or mercilessly and with a malicious intent or when it is designed to create a substantial risk of death, serious bodily injury, or extreme pain. Under the law, the parent has a right to inflict corporal punishment on a child subject to his disciplinary control provided the punishment is motivated by a corrective purpose and not by anger, that it is not inflicted upon frivolous pretenses, that it is not excessive or otherwise unreasonably inflicted, or that it is not cruel or merciless. Even if we assume that 1042 implicitly contains the defense of corporal punishment and requires an intent to harm, we find no error. The court's instruction conveyed to the jury the implicit intent to harm that separates lawful parental discipline from unlawful corporal punishment.