China already has been sanctioned twice for these activities. Additional sanctions now are unlikely to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals. Internal Chinese debates on issues such as MTCR membership and the test ban treaty ratification are at a crucial stage. China likely would respond to sanctions by limiting future cooperation on these issues and might even backtrack on its existing commitments. Moreover, the Senate rejection of the CTBT is causing even U.S. friends and allies to question U.S. commitment to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements.
China is likely to conclude that the U.S. only supports arms control when it is convenient.
Sanctions would deal another blow to strained relations only beginning to improve after the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade. Our conversations with Chinese foreign ministry officials and army officers indicate that many Chinese view the months leading up to Taiwan's March presidential elections as a dangerous time. This adds up to an overwhelming case for waiving sanctions on the grounds of U.S. national security interests. The Clinton administration should admit that China transferred the missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s, but it should decline to impose sanctions because they would not advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives. We do not mean to suggest that the issue of nonproliferation is unimportant.