Abstract Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic policies can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. We first derive a model that delivers such a result.
Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the government to collect tax revenue.
For all countries for which we can obtain relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model s prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency. En Bai is Assistant Professor of Economics, School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong. Shang-Jin Wei is a Faculty Associate at The Center for International Development at Harvard University, Associate Professor of Public Policy, at the Kennedy School of Government, a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Advisor, The World Bank. Back to CID Working Papers page Direct site comments or questions to CID's Webmaster .