In this regard, I note that the Canadian government appears to have recognized the need to maintain the ability of carriers serving its trade to act concertedly. I think it's also important to keep the traditional underpinnings of antitrust immunity in mind. Since 1916, liner shipping has been given limited antitrust immunity to allow it the flexibility to address the serious price and service volatility that is endemic to the industry. The industry has had to contend with chronic overcapacity given the introduction of progressively larger ships, imbalances in trade flows, seasonal fluctuations in trade flows, and the influence of various non-commercial interests, such as national pride and national security. When faced with overcapacity, carriers tend to compete aggressively in order to fill their ships, as empty slots produce no revenue.
Carriers are thus prone to bidding rates down to levels close to or below their costs.
I would note, however, that the purpose of antitrust immunity is primarily to ensure an adequate and efficient supply of ocean transportation services in a manner that best fosters the flow of ocean commerce. This allows U.S. exports and U.S. trade to compete in the global marketplace and thus benefits U.S. businesses and consumers, too. Antitrust immunity also allows for a broad range of efficiency - enhancing arrangements as well. Carriers can easily band together into operational alliances which permit them to share larger, more efficient vessels, terminals and other assets, while preserving separate, competing commercial and marketing entities. These create operational efficiencies which lead to lower costs and improved service for customers.