On the other hand, the executive heads of many UN agencies continue to be appointed as part of a political process, with suitability for a particular post being, in most cases, of secondary importance. Pleas for a more objective selection process have been largely ignored.29 Certain high-level posts within the UN system are considered to be reserved for certain countries or geographic regions. For example, the president of the World Bank is traditionally a U.S. citizen, and the managing director of the IMF is usually a Western European. It seems high time to initiate procedures to ensure that the best individual available will occupy a UN post, while at the same time the elementary principles of geographic distribution and cultural diversity are simultaneously maintained. If one looks at the total system for international cooperation, including the United Nations, its related bodies, specialized agencies, and the increasing numbers of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, there is one problem area that confronts all, namely how to secure sufficient financial resources to execute the tasks which governments transfer to the various organizations.
Assessed budgets meet only a modest part of total expenditures.
Yet, even for these assessed portions of expenditures there are the well-known and considerable backlogs, most notably the present situation of U.S. arrearages. Many agency and program heads spend a considerable part of their time traveling around the world to convince governments and other potential sources to increase their contributions. Many proposals have already been made, including a tax on airline tickets, international trade generally, or trade in arms. It can be noted that methods of consensus are increasingly replacing or at least complementing more automatic majority vote related procedures. The UN has become an experimental laboratory for new decision-making procedures.