The etymological sense of computing as a means of putting things in order is thus not far off. For obvious historical reasons, application of computing up to the 1980s was almost exclusively for numerical calculation in the sciences, and the expensive hardware was so often the focus for attention. Since then progressive sophistication in the interface between the hardware of logical operations and human intentions means that now, when we reflect on what we're doing with the machine as humanists, our focus can be much more easily on the root philosophical problem of what is by nature computable or can be stated in terms that are. But vocabulary lags behind and so interferes with thinking about and communicating what we do, as Searle complains of in Minds, Brains and Science . Thus this terminological note.
Contemporary evidence is mixed.
Computational infrequently refers to applications beyond the sciences. The story of humanities computing is further complicated by the connotations of unfamiliarity, foreignness and technical specialisation that cling to computing . These connotations not only repel the technophobe but also, more dangerously, attract the technophiliac, whose drive is toward exclusivity. So, when we use the term computing and even more computational for what we do, confusion is likely. The expectation that these terms refer to the unassimilated, obviously technical applications makes the term humanities computing seem old-fashioned, even quaint to some, as it appears to harken back to the days when the tools we actually use were new, raw, obviously computational .