Counsel for defendant did not present to the court any constitutional basis in support of his objection. The court ruled that because Ms. Hill had testified that the challenged words were spoken to her by defendant, the probative value in requiring defendant to speak those words outweighed any prejudicial effect. On 27 July 1993, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of common law robbery. Evidence was then presented at the habitual felon stage and defendant was convicted on 27 July 1993 of being an habitual felon. After being sentenced, defendant gave notice of appeal to our Court.
Defendant presents two arguments on appeal.
Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to speak the exact words the robber spoke in the courtroom in the presence of the jury for the witness to make a voice identification. Although defendant is raising the constitutional aspect of this issue for the first time on appeal, we choose to address it in our discretion. Although North Carolina has not directly addressed the issue of voice identification during trial, other states have done so. In these cases, compelling the defendant to speak during trial was done for the purpose of allowing a witness to identify the defendant's voice. So noting, we find, notwithstanding that Ms. Hill stated that she did not need to hear defendant speak in order to identify him, that the trial court correctly requested and required defendant to demonstrate his voice to Ms. Hill and to the jury for purposes of voice identification.