The I in its empirical manifestation is embodied in space and time, and by means of the will it chooses an object from among the infinitude of possible objects in the empirical world and brings it to cognition. Thus all cognition presupposes the concept of a goal which the I freely sets for itself. Setting a goal for oneself is a form of activity. The ability to set a goal for oneself presupposes cognition for its possibility. But cognition, like all forms of activity, requires a goal.
Activity requires cognition which requires activity.
Hence the circle of consciousness. He argues that there must a non-deliberative willing which provides its own object and is prior to all empirical willing and cognition. Fichte is not clear about this. At this point Fichte's audience might plausibly interpret his remarks about the pure will as a demand that we rationally engage the world, in both a theoretical and a practical fashion. Our empirical willing and cognition would thus be seen as the sensible manifestation of our freedom, for rational engagement with the world is the object which the I imposes on itself.