He claims, plausibly enough, that consciousness depends upon our bodily nature and that the self is not a disembodied Cartesian ego. But the key question here, especially f or someone with Rossman's phenomenological method, is how this can possibly be so. I found no attempt to pose or to answer these central questions. Rossman does attempt to justify one important claim that is essential to his method. Rossman's argument for the phenomenal character of beliefs boils down to this.
Beliefs are essentially tied to action-they contribute to the production of behavior.
This argument presupposes that only what is felt can contribute to action. In my view, a much better strategy would be to abandon direct phenomenology and argue that only states like beliefs can account for the sorts of bodily movements that constitute human actions. As far as morality and the meaning of life are concerned, Rossman claims that they are to be found in the recognition that we are not separate from the world or from other persons. Once we recognize this and integrate it into our immediate experience of things, we will have the sorts of motives that are constitutive of right action. This proves too little and too much.