The same interdependence which has bred the possibilities which have allowed the Court to emerge, may also provide its very undoing in specific cases. The interlocking nature of specific interests at the international level complicate enforcement. Like it or not, the same kinds of calculations over tradeoffs among competing interests which bedevil human rights advocates with respect to US policy toward Beijing will inform the decision process of State Parties. Moreover, with the Court you have the prospect of a very few appointed officials who presumably will have the authority to bind the elected officials in all States Party to a particular course of action. Many of the most important Bosnian Serbs remain free, almost certainly because NATO commanders and their political superiors fear their arrest could start the fighting again.
Advocates have operated on a simple, perpetrators ought to be punished model.
Simple slogans for the simple minded or for aspiring demagogues which mask complex questions of process. It is quite another to apply this piece of pious supposition to the real world. I m not sure what fantasy land Professor Scharf inhabits. The Statute potentially give the Court the power to intervene, adjudicate, and enforce based upon its own determination of appropriate force used either in revolution or to suppress one. Third, peace and justice are not necessarily correlative principles.