The second complex is located on land zoned as C-1 in which apartments are not a permitted use. The Town granted a special use permit for the apartments only three months before it refused to consent to the vacation of the Helmicks' subdivision plat. These facts, the Helmicks assert, show that the Town's action was discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious. The Helmicks' pleadings, however, do not allege that either adjacent property was subject to an approved subdivision plat which had to be vacated before the respective apartment complexes could be constructed. The only allegation supporting the contention that the properties are similarly situated is that they are adjacent.
Adjacency alone is insufficient to establish a zoning discrimination claim.
The second category of alleged facts supporting a claim that the Town's action was unreasonable relates to the Town's motivation. In considering whether a legislative act is reasonable, however, generally the motives of the governing body in undertaking the act are immaterial. The allegations in the pleadings, taken as true, do not support claims that the action was arbitrary, capricious, unwarranted, or discriminatory and are insufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded the legislative action of the Town. Therefore, the trial court properly sustained the Town's demurrer to these claims. The Helmicks also assert that the trial court erred in holding that 3-13 of the Town's ordinance is constitutional.