The burden to justify the extent of the restrictions nonetheless remains with the would- be regulator. Here, we conclude the state has carried its burden of showing the restrictions to be narrowly tailored. Instead, the record evidences a careful effort on the part of the City to draw a balance between the commercial speech rights of the proprietors and the problems the Ordinance addresses. The failure of these more limited attempts at redress demonstrates that the legislative measures enacted by the city are not so unduly burdensome as to offend Central Hudson. And, as the district court noted, the city stopped short of enacting an outright ban on OPC activity throughout the city.
Appellants also contend that the Ordinance is invalid under Fla.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that the Ordinance does not violate the Florida statute. The district court read the statute as not applicable here, because the Ordinance requires registration of barkers based on the location of their canvassing activity. This conclusion was confirmed by the fact that no permit or registration is required for barking activities other than in the locations specified in the Ordinance. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded the statute does not prohibit enforcement of the Ordinance.