A second RCT and a nuclear materials technician were replacing the glove, which had a hole in the armpit, while the first RCT and two other employees observed the operation. During the glove change-out, a radioactive release triggered a continuous air monitor, and all personnel immediately evacuated the area. Nasal smears indicated that the observing RCT received a low-level uptake. The facility manager closed off the work area. Health Physics personnel surveyed the surrounding area and found no evidence that the contamination had spread.
Airborne contamination can transcend work zone boundaries leading to unexpected uptakes.
Investigators learned that, prior to the operation, Health Physics personnel established a hot job exclusion area and erected a plastic post and rope barrier with radiological zone signs 10 feet from the location of the glove-change operation. The RCT observing the operation stood 5 feet beyond the barrier, along with two other employees. Only the RCT and the nuclear materials technician who were performing the change-out wore respirators. Site procedures require that only workers within the hot job exclusion area must wear respirators. Following the event it was determined that other continuous air monitors in the vicinity of the hot job area displayed elevated readings.