Both countries have had terrible experience with plutonium processing and its attendant wastes. With the end of the Cold War, we have the opportunity to redirect resources from nuclear weapons programs into cleaning up the legacy of nuclear weapons development, and to other needed programs. However, we are deeply disturbed by the primary method by which this conversion is planned. A better method of disposition would be to immobilize the plutonium-that is, to mix it with ceramic or glass and to provide a radioactive barrier to further prevent theft and diversion. We are very concerned about the safety risks of using MOX fuel in existing reactors, almost none of which are designed to run on plutonium fuel.
Concerns are even greater in Russia.
Many of the Russian reactors slated for MOX use are old and will reach the end of their 30-year licensed lifetimes before the disposition program is complete. Furthermore, Russian regulatory agencies do not have sufficient resources or political standing to adequately ensure safety at a MOX fabrication facility and at reactors. Furthermore, we are dismayed that the people of both countries have been cut out of the process as decisions about plutonium disposition are made. The US has not ensured that Russian programs funded with American money follow environmental and public participation requirements. Within the US itself, the DOE has made a mockery of the public participation process by issuing a contract for production and irradiation of MOX fuel before issuing a final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision on the subject.