In order to avoid linguistic inconsistency, mind states are identified with brain states and causality statements about mind and body interactions are to be formed in terms of physiological concepts. My main concern with Hyland and Kirsch's approach is that it seems to generate contradictions. Furthermore, since these mind-body theories have been found incorrect, it follows that MC is consistent with false theories. If we accept this, then introspections can be attributed with the same properties as public observations, that is, data to be explained, data to test a theory, and data to be used for inducing theoretical concepts and generating hypotheses. Therefore, from these perspectives, there is no contradiction in attributing these different functions to introspection.
Any observation has to fulfill three criteria in order to be accepted scientifically.
In chapter 6, I discuss the question of whether introspections can fulfill these criteria, and come to the conclusion that there are a number of indirect methods for checking on the accuracy of introspective reports. These provide arguments against discounting introspections as properly belonging to the domain of sciences. In chapter 8, I propose that neobehaviorism and cognitive psychology view PB as a theoretical term, which in many cases is to be explained and is an explanatory concept. Hence, there is no problem with using a theoretical concept in order to explain a given phenomenon and at the same time to wonder how to understand it. This is a legitimate procedure in science.