More crucial is the discrimination in terms of promotion against most officers who do not belong to the inner tribal circles of the president. Paradoxically, the Americans virtually wiped out the very units that had triggered the uprising against Saddam, whereas they left the elite units in the middle sector of the country almost intact. In 1998, however, Washington may be envisaging a qualitative approach. If, seven years ago, Iraq's military defeat was supposed to end up by spontaneously toppling the regime, this time Washington is pursing a logic which will allow it to inflict a political defeat on the regime. And, as the Republican Guard is its main shield, it could well be the major target of the attack, along with the intelligence and security services.
Civil insurrection is the second aspect of the situation.
Informed sources believe that any bombing campaign will result in a glaring political vacuum. In the north of the country, the Kurds already control Kurdistan, but they remain deeply split, despite courtesy letters recently exchanged by Messrs Barzani and Talibani and the meeting of their respective political bureaux. Clearly, unlike in 1991, they no longer have a fighting agenda. Unlike their previous tactic of seizing Kirkuk and advancing to Baghdad, the only meaningful move the Kurds could make is to take Mosul. There are rumours of a possible understanding with the military commanders in the north, with a view to forming a provisional administration.