Neither the declassification measures nor the classification upgrades recommended by the Fundamental Classification Policy Review have been fully implemented by the Department of Energy. Both aspects of the Higher Fences Initiative deserve continued consideration. Since the need for increased protection may seem obvious at the moment, I would like to stress the equal importance of relaxing protection in areas of lower sensitivity, i.e. declassification. There is a tendency among some to believe that greater secrecy translates directly into greater security, and that declassification means increased vulnerability. This is not so.
Declassification is an indispensable component of a rational information security program.
Removing information that is obsolete or no longer sensitive from security controls through declassification keeps security focused where it is most needed. It also preserves the credibility of classification, which can otherwise become simply a bureaucratic habit, instead of a vital instrument of national security. Any information security reform program that does not provide for appropriate declassification is incomplete. The Department of Energy should make every reasonable effort to ensure the protection of sensitive nuclear weapons information. But no more than a reasonable effort.