More fundamentally, they recommend that technical risk assessments be given priority in determining regulators' resource allocation. Over time, citizen complaints should fall if regulators establish strategic priorities and pursue them systematically while maintaining close contact with affected communities. Susmita Dasgupta, David Wheeler , November, 1996. An Econometric Analysis of the Levy System Hua Wang and David Wheeler Wang and Wheeler analyze China's experience with the water pollution levy, an emissions charge system that covers hundreds of thousands of factories. The levy experience has not been studied systematically, but anecdotal critiques have suggested that the system is arbitrarily administered and ineffective in controlling pollution.
Critics view the levy as a local financing mechanism, but ineffective as a regulatory instrument.
Enforcement is thought to vary widely, so that factories in different regions face different penalties for polluting. And it is widely believed that the levy provides little incentive to control pollution because official rates are below marginal abatement costs. However, the analysis of provincial water pollution control by Wang and Wheeler shows that China's pollution levy system has been working much better than is commonly believed. Wang and Wheeler test the conventional critique of the levy system using new province level data for 1987-93. Their results suggest that the water pollution levy system is neither arbitrary nor ineffective.