Myin takes issue with the conception of psychological explanation and propositional attitude ascription that I deploy in developing my account of nonconceptual self-consciousness. He objects to the idea that psychological explanation requires an appeal to internal content-bearing states, whether those states are conceptual or nonconceptual. One can accept this view of content without denying that there are content-bearing internal states. It is important to keep questions about the nature of content distinct from questions about the nature of the vehicle of that content. My own view is that the content of a propositional attitude cannot be simply identified with a fact or state of affairs.
Content is essentially aspectual.
To each of these ways of apprehending a fact there corresponds a different content. At the level of nonconceptual content, aspectuality is captured using Peacocke's notion of protopropositional content. At the level of conceptual content we need to deploy the well-known distinction between sense and reference. It is worth at this point commenting on Myin's proposal that the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual does not need to be captured at the level of content. Although Myin has interesting things to say about the differences between perception and belief in section 5, this proposal is misguided because the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content does not map clearly onto the distinction between perception and belief.