Lebanon, on the other hand, offers an example of where a bitter communal conflict can be put behind us. The implications of anarchy are more benign than structural realists claim. The search for security leads to a focus on the motivations of other states. Structural realists argue that these motivations are difficult to observe and hence states remain suspicious and fearful of each other. Democracies find this especially easy because their policy making processes are so open.
All states can also send costly signals that reveal their motivations and avoid misunderstanding.
Residual uncertainty about future motivations, while a possible cause of concern, is in reality rarely great enough to produce conflict. During peacetime, contrary to the predictions of balance of power theory, states have often allied with countries posing a grave threat to them in the international system. One central effect of this 'tethering' dynamic is that the very issues that bring states together in an alliance may be the same ones that inhibit the member states' ability to coordinate their goals and policy, i.e., the cohesion of these alliances is low. The alliances lack cohesion not merely as a consequence of the absence of a uniform external threat, but because there is a high level of threat internal to the alliance. This proposition is examined in the context of several case studies drawn from late 19th century European history.