Hence, if one entity almost entirely fails to possess the capacity to think linguistically, this is such a drastic deficiency in a central human faculty that one should hesitate to hold that we have here a person at all. The point is similar if what is lacking is the entire faculty of spatial reasoning. This is to deal with the point, which obviously concerns Puccetti, that these are not any old parts of persons that we are dealing with. The situation is not exactly parallel to persons, because attributing multiple personalities does not immediately issue in the conclusion of multiple persons. This also indicates that our opening question might have different answers for different concepts.
Consciousness looks to be a lot less divisible than personhood.
We suggest that this may be one of the main motivations behind Puccetti's views. Even so, part-consciousnesses are not such an absurd notion. There is an obvious sense in which even something as narrow as visual consciousness has parts, namely, the parts of the visual field. There is another obvious sense in which one's consciousness of, for example, an opera, can have parts which are auditory, parts which are visual, and parts which are linguistic. The point is supported by another consideration, that insofar as consciousness involves propositional attitudes specifically, and beliefs and knowledge, then truncating some of these substantially and systematically ought to leave at best a part-consciousness.