Effective establishment of public security requires a long-term commitment on the part of the international community. The issues of local consent and overall impartiality are pivotal for success. An exit strategy may involve basic institutional and attitudinal reform, not only of the police but also of the judicial and penal systems and political institutions. Such profound reform can conflict with the indigenous culture and entrenched local interests, provoking a reaction against the intervention forceCmaking the situation more costly and risky. Piecing together the remnants of a state challenges the collective financial and human resources, and the political will available to the international community.
Caution is needed in how far a mission intrudes into essentially indigenous responsibilities.
Demands for Civ-Pol contingents are burgeoning while UN funding has declined. Moreover, the size of the Secretariat staff dedicated to Civ-Pol is minuscule, numbering about 6 officials compared to some 200 dedicated to military support functions. This adversely affects planning and support for police functions. The UN is forced to recruit from member states on an ad hoc basis for each mission. Many recruits lack rudimentary policing skills, do not speak the official language of the mission nor understand local political and cultural conditions.