India's reluctance to declare a unilateral moratorium on fissile material production could be the consequence of two concerns. First, India may have an insufficient stock of fissile material to meet the requirements of a minimum deterrent. Hence, it may want to make good that deficit before negotiations on a global fissban treaty are completed. Alternatively, Indian negotiators might simply be using the issue of fissile material production as a bargaining chip in their negotiations with the United States. One way out of the impasse for India would be to draw a line between the civilian and military components of its nuclear programme.
Civilian reactors are unsuitable for fissile material production.
Further, if fissile material stocks sufficient to meet the requirements of a minimum deterrent have been accumulated, then India should seriously consider bringing its research reactors and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities under international safeguards. The quid pro quo, of course, would be to seek a lifting of the NSG embargo on the sales of civilian nuclear technologies to India. An Indo-US nuclear deal is thus certainly feasible. Nonetheless, it requires political will, imagination, and creative policy making. The United States must recognise that a nonproliferation regime that does not guarantee states' fundamental security interests is unsustainable.