In the case before us, the legislature has provided clear definitions of both dependent and independent districts. A district that includes more than one county is an independent special district. Nevertheless, the District argues that the Town of Longboat Key represents a special situation not contemplated by the legislature because, although the District overlaps two counties, it is contained within a single municipality and therefore meets the definitions of both an independent and a dependent special district. The District thus attempts to characterize its argument in terms of ambiguity. However, there is a difference between ambiguity and unexpressed intention.
Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language.
The fact that the statute first defines a dependent special district and then exempts multi-county districts from that definition does not render the statute unclear or susceptible to different meanings. It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole. Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. Accordingly, both definitions in section 189.403 must be considered as a whole, and in their entirety, in order to effectuate the legislative intent. Such a reading harmonizes both definitions.