Even if we assume, as claimant argues, that Hoffman unlawfully stopped claimant, the money was seized following a series of searches. The relevant inquiry, then, is not whether the stop was valid, but rather, whether those searches were constitutionally valid. We conclude that they were. Article I, section 9, prohibits unreasonable searches. Generally, in order for a search to be reasonable, the police must have a search warrant or the search must come within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Consent is a recognized exception to that requirement.
To establish the existence of that exception, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a person with authority over the property voluntarily consented to the search. In this case, the trial court concluded that claimant's consent to the searches was voluntarily given. Even applying the more strict standard governing consent obtained after illegal police conduct, we agree with the trial court's conclusion. The trial court found that, after telling the men that they were free to leave, Hoffman asked claimant if he would mind answering a few questions. There is an implicit finding that claimant agreed to do so.