The effort to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty failed not because of isolationist opposition but because prominent internationalists, including six former secretaries of defense, argued that it hurt U.S. interests. At the same time, many congressional foreign policy debates carry a decidedly internationalist cast. However unwise it might be to expand NATO, to impose sanctions on countries that violate religious rights, to terminate aid to countries that acquire nuclear weapons, to recognize Tibet as a sovereign country, to encourage Taiwanese independence, and to punish countries that trade with Cuba and Iran, these are not proposals aimed at disengaging the United States from world affairs. The crux of the many conflicts today between the White House and Capitol Hill, then, is not whether the United States should be involved abroad but rather how and to what end. The truth is that 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, elite opinion on foreign policy remains fractured.
Disagreement persists on both policy diagnosis and prescription.
Much like friends who agree to dine out but can t agree on a restaurant, foreign policy elites agree that the United States should do something, just not what. Congress naturally reflects this dissensus, which makes it difficult for the institution to function. Divided by chamber, party, ideology, region, committee, and generation, Congress lists toward paralysis whenever a modicum of agreement and a sense of proportion are absent. The public s apathy about foreign policy only encourages this. When members gain more freedom to debate, they are more receptive to narrow interests and face less pressure to compromise.