Thus annexing any part of the Golan is no guarantee of security rather the opposite, as it would prevent reaching a stable and binding agreement with Syria. The security of northern Israel also cannot be guaranteed by a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. While Hizballah s resistance to Israel s occupation of Lebanese land has served Syria in its negotiating strategies, it is not certain that Hizballah will view itself as subject to any Syrian-Israeli agreements in the future. Recently, the Palestinian refugee presence has been pointed out by Lebanon and Syria as a source of instability and a threat to regional security. It is predicted that Syria will try to use both to strengthen its hand in negotiations, although both are expected to declare a separate will of their own and might not be amenable to the cards in a game strategy.
All players are quite conscious of the element of time as a decisive factor in negotiations.
Barak is coming to the end of his honeymoon or grace period with the Israeli public. The polls show decreasing support for the necessary territorial withdrawal, and the promise of a referendum is beginning to show signs of a boomerang effect. Even the peace camp that was largely responsible for his election victory is beginning to express its disappointment and disenchantment in a more public and vocal manner. Barak s policy of playing off the Palestinian and Syrian track against each other is also backfiring, particularly in view of its devastating effect on Palestinian domestic realities and on the atmosphere of confidence or trust that became its first victim. Palestinian volatility may destroy any chances of peace on all fronts and lay to rest all of Barak s best laid plans for manipulating Palestinian weakness or dictating an Israeli version of final status.