We find that the trial court erred in a number of respects regarding the calculation of Alton's income. As owner of the property he should not be required, in effect, to pay to live there. Imputing rental income raises difficult valuation problems. It is not called for in Rule 90.3 nor is it suggested by the committee commentary to the rule. B., there is no similar suggestion with respect to straight-line depreciation of business equipment.
Depreciation is a means of reflecting on an annual basis the costs of capital equipment.
Such costs are real and should not be disregarded unless it appears that equipment was acquired in order to avoid or reduce the obligor's child support obligation. Property Division Alton alleged errors with respect to the trial court's division of the parties' property. His first contention is that the date for valuation of marital assets should not have been the date on which the parties ceased to function as a single economic unit, but, rather, the date of the divorce decree. Because the four-plex was worth more in April 1986, the date the court determined the economic entity to have been severed, than in December 1988, the date of the divorce, Alton had to cash Lee Ann out at a higher value. We have not previously expressed a general preference between date of separation and date of trial for valuation of property.