For example, both coherence and correspondence, even if taken together, are clearly only part of the story. Further, our theories are in many ways tentative. In fact, to the extent that a theory of truth is timid in not reaching out substantially toward R, it is partial although possibly less tentative, while to the extent that the theory boldly reaches toward R, it is tentative although possibly less partial. In summary, then, inadequacies there clearly are, in our theories of truth. For it adds to a theory to be clearer about its limitations, and it helps us to move on to further improvements if we are clearer about the ways in which the theory is only partial and tentative.
Classical logic is a good case in point.
Some insight into what is going on here may be gotten by recalling the Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games for elementary equivalence. So the current plethora of nonclassical logics is generally a healthy phenomenon, attempting to broadly reach out toward R with a wide variety of systems of logic, giving us an ever-growing mass of evidence about that beast we wish to understand. But, as with theories of truth, it is well to remember that each has its inadequacies, that each is both partial and tentative so long as our ignorance of R remains great. Explorationism Let us refer to the maintenance of the thesis briefly discussed in Section 1 as Explorationism . Explorationism embraces broad investigation of a wide variety of theories of truth and systems of logic, each attempting to penetrate certain clearly delineated aspects of the target beast R while being vigilant to openly declare known ways in which the theory or system is partial and tentative.