This paper describes a model of the collective alteration of strategic types and reports on the results of two simulations based on the model. In the model, we assume that autonomous robots pursue their own interests, calculate payoffs using recent information on the distribution of the population of choosing strategies, and decide their strategy based on these payoffs. Two simulations were conduced. One assumed global communication. The second assumed local communication.
Collective decision making with global communication is affected by communication delays.
That with local communication is affected by the way in which strategies are scattered within a group of robots. This paper proposes a computational model of the emergent collective behavior of multiple robots. For systems with multiple strategies, we can produce multi-stable systems provided payoff functions can group strategies by strategic types. Robots, with any initial distribution of strategies, can asymptotically converge to one equilibrium state. This paper focuses mainly on the dynamics by which all robots eventually change their strategic type whenever a small fraction of robots, called instigators, change their strategic type.