The party reformers and opposition negotiators became we, whereas the nomenklatura and more extreme elements of the opposition became they. Leadership on both sides proved to be another vital element. Polish party leaders went so far as to threaten to resign to get their party to accept Solidarity, while in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, party reform elements proved amenable to changes their predecessors would have rejected out of hand. The articles in this collection, which discuss these and other matters have been particularly well chosen. Unlike most multi-authored books, this one meshes well.
All authors discuss much the same issues, albeit in different ways, making comparisons easy.
It was a particularly good idea to include the contrasting case of the Tiananmen Square tragedy to emphasize how unusual the East European roundtable discussions were. Ruling parties that had always claimed their exclusive right to power voluntarily stepped aside. It is true that they greatly miscalculated their strength and made decisions that later turned out poorly for them. In Hungary, Bulgaria, and later Poland, for instance, the belief of the communists that they could continue to manipulate public life through a strong president proved erroneous. Within months, rapidly developing events brought opposition figures to office.