In August 1997, defendant reentered the drug free zone and was arrested for second degree trespass. In the course of a bench trial, the state presented evidence that defendant had been excluded pursuant to the drug free zone ordinances and that he had reentered the drug free zone in violation of the exclusion order. The trial court denied defendant's motion and found defendant guilty of second degree trespass. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. As an initial matter, the state argues that defendant may not raise this issue by way of a motion for judgment of acquittal but must raise it by demurrer, because the state concludes that defendant is arguing that the indictment failed to allege an offense.
Defendant relies on a line of cases that concern the adequacy of various notices of suspension.
We conclude, for the reasons explained below, that those cases did not rest on federal due process but on statutory authority. The defendant argued that the underlying revocation was void, and the state contended that the validity of the underlying revocation was irrelevant. The court concluded, based on the wording of the statute pertaining to license revocation, that defendant was entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing before any revocation occurred. The court went on to note that the statutory provisions were designed to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a subsequent case the court went on to clarify that the Tooley analysis was statutory, not constitutional.