We need not decide whether Mrs. Trepanier's agency fits within this exception, however, for an individual in a comatose state is generally not considered to be permanently incapacitated under general agency principles. This rule is predicated on the view that comatose individuals are only temporarily incapacitated, as they may recover, and acts by individuals temporarily incapacitated are at most voidable. With respect to such voidable contracts, the power to affirm or disaffirm rests solely with the principal or an authorized representative, which can include the estate of the principal. The contract here was not voided by Mr. Trepanier, and there is no claim or evidence that he would have done so prior to his death. We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Mrs. Trepanier's agency terminated when Mr. Trepanier lapsed into a coma, and in entering summary judgment on this basis.
Additional issues remain to be decided, however.
As noted, the trial court assumed, without deciding, that Bankers Life had made a valid offer, that Mrs. Trepanier was authorized to accept the offer, and that mailing the letter on April 12 was sufficient, without more, to constitute a valid acceptance. Because the trial court never reached these issues, or the issue of bad faith, all of which were raised in the cross-motion for summary judgment, we remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.