Nearly five years have passed since the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan attempted a series of biological and chemical attacks. While the chance of such attacks may be lower than bombs and guns, the risks of being unprepared should a biological agent attack occur in the future impels responsible governments and laboratories to continue to assess the threat and means for countering it.
Biological terrorism poses unique challenges in defense, public health, and law enforcement.
While biological weapons require a reasonable level of sophistication to manufacture and deploy, they are generally more accessible to a terrorist group than nuclear materials and technology. Production activities can be readily concealed and the basic equipment, such as fermenters, concentrators, dryers, and milling equipment, is readily available. If these agents were dispersed optimally, they could inflict casualties comparable to nuclear bombs. Biological agents are also easy to conceal and smuggle across borders, a particular concern for the United States, with its borders north and south open to friendly neighbors. One only needs look at the ease with which drug smugglers operate across our borders and coasts to imagine the danger this could pose.