Since the appellants failed to issue an appropriate summons, the chancellor was correct in denying their motion to strike and their motion for a default judgment. We do not reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. In this case, there was ample evidence to support the chancellor's findings. Conflicting accounts were given of the 1989 meeting between Thompson and Blankenship. The chancellor chose to believe Blankenship.
Deference is given to the superior position of the chancellor to judge the credibility of witnesses.
Those documents indicated that Potlatch made its decision to begin leasing hunting rights in 1992 and, even then, cautioned interested parties that it was not making a promise or commitment regarding the leases. Additionally, the letter sent to Potlatch by Thompson in early 1990 indicates an awareness on Thompson's part that a leasing program was, at that time, a mere possibility. The appellants make two final arguments on appeal, but we cannot address those arguments because they were not ruled upon by the chancellor. No findings were made regarding the appellants' claim that a contract was formed through their detrimental reliance on Blankenship's alleged promises, nor were any findings made concerning their prescriptive easement claim. Issues that are raised during the course of trial proceedings must be brought to the attention of the chancellor for a ruling before they are reviewable on appeal.