Hence, the contention fails. We also reject the District Attorney s argument that, under the facts before it, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that there was an appearance of impropriety. Indeed, had the court failed to disqualify the District Attorney s Office on these facts, defendant would have solid ground for an appeal on the issue. In the cross-appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it declined to dismiss the charges against him for violation of the speedy trial statute. We agree that defendant s statutory speedy trial rights were violated.
Defendant argues that the speedy trial period had run because there was no interlocutory appeal.
We agree with defendant. An appeal is taken in good faith when the assertion that such an appeal is authorized has arguable merit, is not taken for the purpose of delay, and the issues raised have a substantial effect on the prosecution s case . An appeal necessarily disrupts the course of proceeding to a final resolution when, absent a stay of the proceedings, there can be no effective remedy . While an order disqualifying the District Attorney s office may create some delay attributable to the defendant, it has no substantial effect on the prosecution s case for purposes of determining whether appeal of that order is an interlocutory appeal. When a competent special prosecutor has been appointed, the case can proceed, and the District Attorney s interest in ensuring that justice is done has been met.