The court found that because the Clearwater ordinance applied to virtually any form of graphic communication that was publicly displayed, it plainly reached noncommercial expression. Here, as in Dimmitt, the sign ordinance reaches not only expressive conduct, such as flying an American flag, but also pure expression, such as the display of a flag containing a written message. Thus, the sign ordinance must be justified under one of the tests applicable to expression. Because the sign ordinance does not apply to residential property, we turn to the question of whether it regulates noncommercial or commercial expression. Under that test, the government must show that it has a substantial interest, the regulation directly advances that interest, and the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
Commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction.
It is expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker. It cannot be said that every flag flown by a commercial entity necessarily proposes a commercial transaction or is related solely to its economic interests. Thus, the sign ordinance must be deemed to reach noncommercial expression. As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based. By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content-neutral.