Rather in death the other is there like a thing, that is to say, something present to hand a corpse. The deceased is not the same as a dead thing. The deceased leaves behind those who care for him or her, and is therefore as object of concern, in the way a mere dead thing is not. The relation to the deceased is not the relation to a thing, but is still a relation to a person, to another, about whom we care in a way that we are never do about things. Rather than death being experienced through the death of others, Heidegger argues, it can only be experience through my own being.
Death is that which is most individuating.
I cannot experience the death of the other as a possibility of their being. I can only experience as something that lies outside of them, like the million of deaths that I see on the television at night each one that is much the same as the other this factory of death that is the Twentieth century. I cannot live their deaths from the inside, but only from the outside. However, to think that death in only this uniform death, which can be spoken about as something that is the same for every Dasein , and as though Dasein s death is the same as the flower head that is lopped off with a stick, is precisely to be ignorant about the being of Dasein . Dasein is not something ready to hand or present to hand, and thus death is not a something that merely happens to Dasein and changes it from being a live thing to a dead thing, in the same way that a piece of wax goes from being soft to head, as though death were only the change in the property of a thing.