The PLRA was designed to reduce judicial involvement in prison administration. To that end, it entitled defendants in prison condition lawsuits to immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. Accordingly, defendants moved to terminate the consent decree. They also invoked the Act's automatic stay provision, which provided that any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be stayed beginning 30 days after the motion to terminate is filed. That ruling is currently on appeal in Hadix v. Johnson , No.
Defendants now appeal.
We review such a question of law under a de novo standard of review. First, the court found that the Act required courts to reopen a final judgment in violation of the rule that Congress may not interfere with judgments of Article III courts. Second, it opined that the provisions mandate the result in a particular case. We consider these issues in turn. A. Reopening of a Final Judgment Defendants contend that the district court erred in ruling that the PLRA termination provisions impermissibly reopen a final judgment.