A plaintiff is required to strictly comply with the requirements of section 41 even when the CTA has full knowledge or notice of the injury. Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint, arguing that he provided complete and correct information and that all necessary elements were contained on the face of his notice. He argues that the clinic practice group, that he named as his attending physician and that provided his treatment, is the attending physician under the eyes of the law, citing to agency principles in other areas of the law, including medical malpractice actions, licensing procedures, and billing procedures. Additionally, plaintiff contends that the practice of medicine has changed since the enactment of section 41 which is something the legislature could not have foreseen. Plaintiff also argues that the CTA could easily have obtained his medical records from the clinic if it wanted to do so.
Defendant contends that the correct standard of review of the trial court's ruling is de novo .
Substantively, defendant maintains that a practice group is not a substitute for naming an attending physician and the agency theory of respondent superior is irrelevant in determining the propriety of plaintiff's notice under section 41. Defendant also contends that the CTA has no duty to obtain plaintiff's records and, therefore, plaintiff's argument that it could have done so is irrelevant. We first observe that, contrary to plaintiff's contention, our standard of review upon a trial court's granting of a motion to dismiss is de novo . Several courts have addressed the attending physician element of section 41. In Yokley , although the more prominent issue was the fact that the plaintiff provided a nonexistent location as the accident location, the plaintiff also listed a medical center and its address as the attending physician.