The trial judge did not specifically state in his order that he had considered Mark's inheritance when making the property division. The order simply delineated what property would go to which spouse. Although the trial judge did not indicate the grounds upon which he based the Drummonds' divorce, the record contains evidence suggesting that Rhonda's conduct was a major factor contributing to the breakdown of the marriage. Even where the parties are divorced on the grounds of incompatibility, the conduct of the parties and fault with regard to the breakdown of the marriage are factors for the trial court to consider in fashioning its property division. Finally, we note that the trial judge, who heard oral testimony from the parties and from other witnesses, was best able to determine the credibility to be afforded that testimony.
Appellate courts can only review the record.
Consequently, the trial court must be left with some discretion to determine which witnesses it deems more credible than others. Once the trial court makes that determination, it is not for the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not plainly or palpably abuse its discretion in dividing the parties' property as it did. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as that judgment reversed the property-division and alimony portions of the trial court's judgment, and we remand the case with instructions for the Court of Civil Appeals to reinstate those portions of that trial judgment. Hooper, C.J., and Maddox, Cook, Brown, Johnstone, and England, JJ., concur.