Here, as discussed above, the delay was extenuated by defendant's conduct. He wilfully failed to attend the original trial date and, after causing the initial delay of the trial and while aware of the charges against him, he remained silent for eight years. In contrast to the circumstances in Rohlfing , this case was set for trial and, unlike in Rohlfing , defendant did not give the police a phone number where he could be reached. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the delay was so manifestly excessive and unreasonable as to shock the conscience. Therefore, we examine whether defendant established actual prejudice.
Defendant has the burden to show some actual prejudice.
Defendant did not present any evidence that actual prejudice resulted from the delay. He was not in custody as a result of this case during the relevant period, and perceived no humiliation, indignity, or anxiety by reason of its existence. The trial court's finding is supported by the record. We conclude, as a matter of law, that defendant's right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, was not violated. As noted above, defendant also argues that his right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution was violated.