As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. Then tenacity and courage of French soldiers in World War I lead everyone from Winston Churchill to the German high command vastly to overestimate the French army's fighting abilities. Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian army of 1973 based on Egypt's hapless performance in the 1967 war.
Culture is difficult to pin down.
It is not synonymous with an individual's race nor ethnic identity. The role of culture These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. Even the much-lauded Egyptian crossing of the Suez in 1973 at its core entailed a masterful deception plan.