Two game models are developed to examine the strategic details of dispute initiation. Empirically, the dissertation examines dispute-initiation behavior between the United States and the Soviet Union. Changes in Soviet capabilities are found to increase the likelihood of dispute initiation in both directions while changes in American capabilities have no significant effect on dispute initiation in either direction. This conforms to the power-transition idea that perceptions of the challenger's power are more important than perceptions of the hegemon's power. I also find that the diplomatic influence of the rival increases the likelihood of a superpower initiating a dispute against that rival.
Diplomatic influence is an empirical measure of dissatisfaction within the dyad.
As such, the findings conform to the power-transition notion that the dissatisfied side is more likely to be the initiator. Awards, Honors, Accomplishments Defended dissertation without revisions, April 2000. Awarded Graduate School Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Michigan State University, Fall 1999. Inducted into Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi , Spring 1998. Pass with distinction on Comprehensive Exam in Positive Political Theory, Michigan State University, 1996.