U.S. and Russian lab scientists are trying to develop alternative measurement approaches that could avoid disclosing classified Russian information. As a practical matter, this work must be conducted at national nuclear labs, and the U.S. has used unclassified visits to Department of Energy labs to launch the effort. The Russians have reciprocated. Denial of access to Department of Energy labs would make further work impossible. The labs are the world s leading institutions in this area, and the fact that training is provided in U.S. labs gives the United States added confidence in the quality of IAEA inspector training, as well as the opportunity to mold the professional attitudes of the foreign specialists involved.
All training is conducted at the unclassified level.
To ensure broad international political support for the Agency s inspections, the IAEA inspectorate must include nationals from a wide range of IAEA member states. Although the U.S. labs have excluded nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea from their training activities, nationals from other countries on the Energy Department sensitive countries list have received training to prepare them for their work as IAEA inspectors. Curtailing training for nationals from all sensitive counties on the Department s sensitive country list would lead the IAEA to declare the United States ineligible for the training mission, resulting in a highly damaging loss of influence in this crucial area. Unclassified exchanges at the DOE labs and demonstrations of key verification technologies there are an essential tool for building support for both treaties among countries of proliferation concern, especially, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. Science is the key that unlocks many of our national challenges.