The experiment reported below varies the sex ratio. All male, all female, and mixed cohorts are used. The PDF file size is 449k. Conclusion Initially subjects distinguish between at least two classes of games. Players are reluctant to conform to the Utilitarian convention when doing so gives them a small share and, given their role, requires them to use their least secure action.
Conventions based on the strategic details of the game do sometimes emerge.
In 5 of 26 cohorts the same convention emerged for all of the similar games within the 70 periods of the evolutionary game. Given convergence in both types of games, the Utilitarian convention emerged 4 times as often as the Rawlsian convention. We never observed the most interesting case, which would have been a Rawlsian convention in games in which risk dominance selects the Rawlsian equilibrium and the Utilitarian convention in games in which risk dominance selects the Utilitarian equilibrium, that is, a convention based on the deductive principle of risk dominance. There is no evidence of economically significant gender differences in bargaining behavior. The difference in mean earnings between all male and all female cohorts was 3 cents and the difference in standard deviation was 2 cents.