Both permits were subsequently renewed. Count I sought a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to reissue the outdoor-advertising permits on the basis that the Department should be estopped from revoking the permits by the conduct of its representatives. Count II sought an injunction to prohibit defendants from removing and confiscating the billboard that plaintiff had already constructed on the property. Plaintiff asserted that it was entitled to a writ of mandamus and an injunction estopping defendants from revoking the permit, because it was defendant's affirmative action that induced plaintiff to act and because plaintiff would suffer a substantial loss without the requested relief. Accordingly, the trial court found that defendants should be estopped by their own actions from revoking the permits.
Defendants now appeal.
The issue we are asked to address is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff and in denying summary judgment for defendants. Defendants assert that contrary to the trial court's determination, defendants should not be estopped from revoking the permits, because estoppel does not apply against the State unless there has been some positive act by State officials that induced the party asserting estoppel to act and the party would suffer a substantial loss without the relief requested. Plaintiff responds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in its favor because the facts establish the necessary elements for estoppel. We agree with plaintiff. In Illinois, as a general rule, summary judgment is to be encouraged as an aid to the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit.