Holding elections in two years' time will not alter these facts. For example, many argue that the elections in Mostar, postponed from May 31 to June 30, will provide a forecast for the success of the September elections, but few will know that the outcome was decided in March when Bosnian Croats prevented the creation of a mixed central district and secured the division of the city into six ethnically pure electoral districts, three in which only Croats will vote, three in which only Muslims will vote, and prohibition of the right of any Serb to vote. Finally, the structure of tasks and deadlines in the Dayton accord is such that little more of significance from the international community can take place until the elections are held. Foreign private investment cannot begin to flow. Authoritative decisions on infrastructural reconstruction and development for all of Bosnia cannot be taken.
Citizens have no way to hold their leaders accountable for peace-time tasks.
NATO cannot decide how and where to redeploy a follow-on force. Implementation of all tasks of the Dayton accord will continue to be driven by the electoral ambitions of local and national politicians. The best way to reduce the power of radical nationalists is to force them to begin to deal with the problems of their own communities rather than to blame outsiders or leaders of other communities. There is a very real risk that no government will be formed after the elections, or that it will be so deadlocked and unstable that conflicts intensify and no capital flows in. One need only look at the fact that the three-person presidency nominates the prime minister to wonder about the outcome.