Rohlfing , however, is distinguishable. There, we concluded that, because the defendant was not aware of the indictment and because the evidence showed that, during the eight-year delay in prosecution, the defendant or a family member was available at the phone number that the defendant had given the police in his initial contact with them, the defendant could not be deemed to have consented to the delay. In contrast, here, defendant was aware of the charge against him and of the date set for trial. Despite that knowledge, he did not appear nor did he provide the police with information regarding his whereabouts. We hold that defendant's actions constituted consent to the delay and that, accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of ORS 137.747.
Defendant also raises both Oregon and United States constitutional arguments.
The threshold inquiry focuses on the length of the delay. If the delay is substantially greater than the average time to bring an accused to trial, it triggers a full analysis of all three factors. We first look at the length of the delay. If the time taken to bring an accused to trial is substantially greater than the average, inquiry into the two remaining factors is triggered. The state concedes that the eight-year delay between citation and reactivation of defendant's case requires inquiry into the reasons for the delay and any resulting prejudice to defendant.