We therefore infer that it is permissible for a court to specifically enforce a reasonable agreement. Having found that a covenant not to compete may be extended where circumstances warrant, we now examine whether the trial court properly granted injunctive relief in the present case. Other considerations surrounding the issuance of a preliminary injunction are whether it will preserve the status quo so that a final hearing can be held without either party having been injured and whether it will grant one of the parties final relief prior to a hearing on the merits. The trial court's decision must not be arbitrary and must be based on the facts of the particular case. Comm'r of Ins , supra at 77.
Defendants challenge two of the trial court's findings on the four factors.
First, defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits. However, the parties have been before the trial court for several years, and the trial court has presided over both an evidentiary hearing and a bench trial on issues related to these facts. In view of the trial court's familiarity with this case, and absent any compelling contradictory evidence, we believe that the trial court's finding that plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits is entitled to substantial deference. Defendants also challenge the trial court's finding that plaintiffs would have suffered irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction were not granted. The trial court based its findings on the fact that the parties had bargained for the period of noncompetition, and defendant Borzym breached that agreement.