Anderson's suit alleged violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, as well as conspiracy to violate those rights. Anderson claimed damages in the amount he would have received from the City of Minneapolis for the anticipated thinspreading contract. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of defendants. Anderson appeals, arguing that violation of his equal protection and due process rights by the Douglas County and Nagle subjects Nagle to liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Anderson also argues that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy.
Defendants cross-appeal the district court's denial of their request for fees.
Anderson relies upon the fact that before 1991 thinspreading was considered a permitted use under the Douglas County Zoning Ordinance and did not require any specific approval by local zoning authorities. Anderson failed to establish that similarly situated persons did not have to obtain conditional use permits. Indeed, the only evidence he presented tends to prove that other parties submitting thinspreading applications in 1991 were also required to obtain conditional use permits. As for the pre-1991 applicants, a city or county is entitled to change its interpretation of an ordinance as long as there is a rational basis for the change. We cannot say that Nagle's decision to regulate thinspreading more closely was without a rational basis.