Pakistan's choices are particularly difficult. Its minimal arsenal may encourage conventional preemption by the enemy. Eric Arnett has pointed out that the Indian Air Force could potentially disable most of Pakistan's nuclear delivery capability with a conventional attack. This threat will increase as India inducts more and better aircraft with high precision munitions and deploys more Prithvis. In fact, Pakistan's aircraft-borne deterrence already stands considerably eroded.
Decapitation is a valid fear in the case of Pakistan's deterrent.
Consider further the implications of the widening conventional imbalance in the military capabilities of the two South Asian nuclear weapon powers. Conversely, Pakistan will find it increasingly difficult to give up the deterrence available in retaining the right of first use. This is where deterrence begins to hover dangerously close to war fighting as otherwise it loses credibility. This stark reality has some very important implications for the command and control system. It has to reflect the intent and resolve to use nuclear weapons.