C2W and IBW are linked in that EW techniques can be used against both command and intelligence systems. Third, most of what U.S. forces can usefully do in information warfare will be defensive , rather than offensive . Following Sun Tzu, the side that understands its enemy better is better prepared for conflict. Understanding the enemy's culture and the ways in which its society uses information remain important. At the core physical level, architecture incorporates sensors and emitters and their power, acuity, availability, and reliability.
Architecture speaks to the way bits are transformed into information.
The commander in another may insist on a large group of analysts who look examine raw data, the relative influence of each analyst varying with the commander's estimate of their ability and with the correlation between the analysis and reality. Clearly, each commander has a different decisionmaking style, and a campaign of C2 warfare would have very different effects on each command apparatus. Information warfare waged without regard for the architecture of decisionmaking is no better than a shot in the dark. By 17 January allied forces had a fairly good feel for the way Iraq used information. Architectural issues pervade civilian systems under attack from tomorrow's hackers.