Amendments are the pork barrel mechanism that allows deputies to produce and reproduce their electoral capital. In Brazil, deputies' electoral capital is distributed spatially according to different patterns. Ames makes his analysis largely dependent of this typology since he contends that the electoral efficacy of municipal budgetary amendments depends of its visibility and such visibility increases where deputy dominance is guaranteed. Indeed, less visibility increases electoral costs. From his spatial analysis, Ames derives an implicit typology of candidates that he uses to advance the explanation that emerges of his model.
Deputies defend their redutos with amendments.
The offensive moves are captured by inter and intraparty fragmentation. Ames finds that they are also powerful predictors of municipal amendments. Having ranked low in 1986 was a strong predictor as well. Those in danger had to work hard to not fall under others' attacks. It is probable that Ames be right where he seems right because of wrong reasons and be wrong because of good reasons.