However, by and large states have not taken an active role in enforcing rights. The sheriff is available to seize counterfeit goods when they are identified, but few law enforcement agencies have a mandate or a plan for intercepting and suppressing counterfeit or infringing goods. Even in developed countries, enforcement is left up to private parties. The degree of enforcement in any system is therefore related to the incentive that a rights holder has to enforce its rights, the cost of that enforcement, and the benefits of enforcement. In all countries, many violations of intellectual property rights go unaddressed because rights holders do not find it worthwhile to bear the cost of detection and prosecution.
Compliance is enhanced when private parties internalize the values that underlie the norms.
These three factors suggest an uneasy relationship between international law and national responsibility, one that is driven by the difference between compliance by nations and compliance by private parties. To recognize the interrelationship between state and private responsibility for intellectual property compliance, we envision that two analytical perspectives will be helpful. The first analytical perspective is cost-benefit analysis. Under this view, a country will adjust its regime when the perceived costs of doing so are less then the perceived benefits. This perspective seeks to identify the various costs and benefits that a country will face when deciding its policy toward intellectual property.