Ironically, this strength of the book is also one of its weaknesses. In maintaining accessibility, Cooter sometimes oversimplifies and suppresses more subtle aspects of the analysis. On occasion, this leads him to overstate the power of particular explanations or insights. Although it may appear unfair to pick on a particular section in a 400-page book, an example that is typical is useful to illustrate what I mean. After discussing the generic emptiness of the core under majority rule in multiple dimensions, Cooter applies the same logic to coalition government.
Bargaining theory helps explain the instability.
Earlier in this chapter I explained that a game of redistribution under majority rule with symmetrical voters has an empty core. Similarly, a game of coalition government with symmetrical parties has an empty core. The trouble with this argument is that its logic applies to almost ANY situation of bargaining among multiple parties. But coalitions are not unstable in ALL multi-party situations. Some countries enjoy highly stable coalition governments while others are less stable.