An analytic truth is true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. The notion of definition has deep connections to that of synonymy. Quine sketches out a theory of definition, where he lists three different ways in which a term can be defined. Simplification, explication and postulation can all be affected by experience. Our synthetic truths are also a posteriori, and we seem to have lost the beautiful distinction with which we began.
All truths are subject to revision upon experience.
Analytic truths, if a priori, should not be subject to this sort of revision. As I said before, Quine was wrong. He seems to insist that the Verificationist must cling to the identity of analytic and a priori truth. I take geometrical truths to be an example of a fairly unimpeachable analytic truth. This follows directly from the combination of the definition of a triangle and geometrical laws.