This means not only countries such as China and Russia, but also Cuba and Iran, which have both signed. In other words, forget about the trade embargoes and forget about foreign policy. The treaty would require the U.S. to facilitate the modernization of the chemical-weapons industry in a host of countries that just might use them. The second problem is verification. No one, not even its most ardent supporters in the Administration, is naive enough to claim that the treaty is verifiable.
Chemical weapons are easy to make and easy to hide.
The sarin that was used in the attack in the Tokyo subway last year was concocted in an 812 room. Instituting snap inspections of companies that make or use chemicals isn't going to stop a future Aum Shinri Kyo. In addition, the inspection and reporting procedures required under the treaty would be a huge burden on American business, which of course would become even more nervous about industrial espionage. The small number of chemical companies that make the lethal stuff would of course be covered, too, and much has been made of the treaty's endorsement by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, which represents just 190 member companies and had a hand in formulating the treaty's verification procedures. The industry is already very heavily regulated, and the treaty's inspection and reporting requirements wouldn't be much of an additional burden.