Indeed, some would argue that psychoanalysis, not physics or physiology, is the paradigm science. Other versions of this dichotomy lie between scientistic ego psychology and humanistic traditions such as the Middle or Independent Group of the British Psychoanalytical Society, embracing the theories of, for example, Winnicott and Rycroft. There are also strict and reductionist Darwinians, for example the militant reductionism of Frances Crick or the positivistic and decontextualised thinking of Ernst Mayr and Michael Ghiselen. There is an existentialist version of Darwinism in the writing of Jacques Monod. There are also scientistic Darwinians of the right such as Michael Ruse and humanistic ones of the left, among whom I would count myself and Jim Moore, while seeing the work of John Greene and John Durant as centrist.
Controversies rage on the locus of the foundations of the human sciences.
The concept of 'human' is fragility itself - forever in danger of being reduced to the biological or, latterly, to the linguistic. To argue for the primacy of the personal, the evaluative and the humanistic and to assert that these categories are epistemologically prior to body or mind, that is, to biology or psyche, has until recently been seen as naive. A related way of putting this point is to say that a human science is a contradiction in terms. In so far as it is human in the humanistic sense, it is derivative of historical, social and biographical modes of discourse. In attempting to do so, I would ask what is the meaning of history, by which I mean historicalness or historicity.