And indeed Turkey opted in the aftermath of World War II to join the Western family of nations, i.e., democracies, hence the capitalist camp. The policy-makers did not comply. Secondly, US military aid did indeed create an aura of dependence whereby Turkey's freedom of maneuver was severely limited. Thirdly, as the book asserts, Richard Perle in 1978 and Gen. Alexander Haig in 1983 stated that the Turkish Armed Forces were not equipped to handle anything but a defensive war, and a short one at that. Perhaps the most relevant question the book asks is why the TAF was in the shape it was after 45 years of military aid.
All relationships are fragile and perhaps international relations are more so.
However, blaming outsiders and their so-called native collaborators for all the ills of the country appears like Third World sentimentalism to which Turkey should not subscribe. Lastly, it is difficult to assess to whom this book would appeal. It definitely does not appeal to patriots who believe, not in a socialist revolution, but, where necessary, in the role of a social state.