In this case, it was well within the trial court's discretion to believe the testimony of Brown and Johnson in combination with the physical evidence, rather than the testimony of Boston and Tate. We will not disturb the trial court's determination that the State negated beyond a reasonable doubt the claim that defendants' use of force was justified because Brown was the initial aggressor. Defendants next contend their armed violence convictions, predicated upon aggravated battery, should be vacated because their sentences for that offense were unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentences they could have received for their convictions of aggravated battery with a firearm. The court held that in such an instance, the State's Attorney has no authority to even charge armed violence. 175 Ill. 2d at 423.
Armed violence is defined as the commission of any felony while armed with a dangerous weapon.
The commission of any felony with a category I weapon, such as a handgun, is a Class X offense with a penalty from 15 to 30 years. Robbery while armed with a handgun constitutes armed robbery, a Class X offense with a penalty of 6 to 30 years. The court found the two offenses substantially identical, but punishable by unconstitutionally disparate penalties. In this case, defendants contend that armed violence predicated upon aggravated battery has substantially identical elements as aggravated battery with a firearm. Aggravated battery is defined as intentionally or knowingly causing great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement while committing a battery.