One can demonstrate the development of structures, and this is one kind of development. One can also describe biological development, which is a different kind. It turns out then that HM's assertion that structure spontaneously arises from non-structure is logically equivalent to Kant's assertion of conceptual categories that exist prior to experience. The only difference is that Kant had twelve pre-existent structures of experience, whereas HM suggests that if he had only one, he could bootstrap the rest. The bootstrapping occurs in the act of asserting the created structures as real or true.
Assertion is essential for reality-belief, using the created structures.
Personally, I find nothing wrong with asserting some kind of structure prior to experience. I don't like Kant's elaborate schema of pre-existent categories, but I think that some very simple structural principle of consciousness could serve the purpose. Lacking any such principle, the 0-D approach is inert. Like its astronomical namesake, it can be known only at its transition horizon, and only by inference from the perturbations It causes on the experience around it. This is a matter of definition.