I have followed Chinese behavior in this area very closely for a number of years, and it is entirely plausible to me that there are activities that go on that are not approved and are not even known about by the central government. A case in point was the sale several years ago of ring magnets, relatively unsophisticated pieces of equipment, to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. The more we looked at this, the more it became very believable that the Chinese entity involved was operating on its own without government oversight. These were general-purpose goods, but they nonetheless contributed to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. This is one reason why we have called for the strengthening of China's nuclear related export controls, because we wanted to remedy this kind of problem and to ensure that the governmental authorities have oversight over all exports that could contribute to proliferation.
China has a great stake in stability in the Middle East.
China has become a net importer of oil. So it should not want to see instability in the Gulf region. We have had concerns with the Chinese over the sale of conventional anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. We feel that this anti-ship cruise missile capability could contribute to an Iranian capability to destabilize the region, the ability to threaten shipping in the Gulf. So we have made this a high priority and we've recently seen signs that the Chinese understand our concerns and hopefully will be responsive to them.