The most obvious such force is political. The lack of success in stabilization in 1992 and 1993 contributed to the political reversals of the reformers in the December 1993 parliamentary elections and therefore to much higher risks of hyperinflation in 1994. Tax collections continue to shrink in 1994, both because of tax evasion and because of increased resistance, formal and informal, to tax payments by the regions. The sharp decline in state spending in recent years has weakened the state in several ways. Public support and legitimacy have been undermined.
Criminality appears to be on the increase.
And the region's fear of retribution from central authorities for tax withholding also has probably been undermined. Another area of a self-reinforcing trend toward higher inflation is the flight from the ruble. Velocity has been rising steadily. With the continuing shrinkage of the inflation tax base, Russia requires a rising level of inflation just to collect the same underlying level of real inflation taxation. So far, Russia has avoided a complete collapse of central authority, but it is difficult to judge how weakened the central state really is at this point.