Nor do we agree the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining plaintiffs' objection to defendants' query to Stephen on cross-examination as to why John Mann wanted to execute a written lease. This question's only purpose was to delve into the grantor's intent which the trial court, in its sound discretion, deemed irrelevant in the absence of any ambiguity within the lease and deed two. Defendants next contend the trial court erred when it found the realty remained subject to the leasehold agreement. Defendants maintain that as remaindermen they are bound to a non-freehold estate which will last for a term longer than John Mann' s life. Defendants further contend that since they were not a party to the lease at its execution and because they have succeeded to title in the realty, the leasehold has been transformed into a tenancy at will.
Defendants therefore conclude the lease is terminable upon their election.
Upon a close analysis of the documents, the times they were recorded and the resulting legal positions of the parties, we disagree. Before the lease was executed and recorded, John Mann owned the realty in fee. Thus, the effect of the lease was to carve out a term for years leaving John Mann, as lessor, with a reversion in fee simple. Seven minutes later, John Mann transferred his reversion in fee simple to the defendants, reserving a life estate in himself. Thus, John Mann kept a life estate in his reversionary interest in fee simple to the realty, subject to the leasehold's term for 15 years.