After the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, appellant was convicted of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact. As such, we will defer to a trial court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Although appellant does not dispute the lawfulness of the initial stop, he asserts that he did not voluntarily consent to the search because he merely acquiesced to a search already in progress. Whether a consent to a search is voluntary is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.
Consent is voluntary where given without coercion or submission to an assertion of police authority.
The trial court found that appellant voluntarily consented to the search, and the record permits that finding. Appellant primarily relies on Dezso . In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search of his wallet where the officer officially and persistently questioned the defendant while the defendant was seated in the officer's vehicle, the officer moved toward the defendant while questioning him, there was no indication that the defendant knew he could refuse the officer's request, and the defendant's answers to the officer's requests seemingly did not indicate a willingness to allow a search. Furthermore, Dezso is distinguishable because it represents the special scrutiny given to the concept of consent to search in the context of routine traffic stops. The search of appellant occurred in circumstances that do not involve the risks observed in traffic stops, where citizens are stopped for slight cause, sometimes pretextual, and where police may impermissibly target members of groups.