We try to compensate for this through the use of information systems. It follows that, therefore, costs for economic transactions are reduced. The actual limits of appropriate dynamic technical arrangements are no longer generated by the cost for such arrangements, but by the quality of the electronically available information. The practicality of virtual organizations depends on the willingness to provide information and also on the readiness to use available information. Opportunistic human behavior, in the sense of pursuing self-interests at another person's expense, causes risks.
Asymmetric information can cause a risk of delegation.
Likewise, the more complex and strategically important a performance, the higher the interest for contractual guarantees. Contracts are traditionally used to provide for performance guarantees. Virtual organizations, however, mostly renounce performance guarantees in order to ensure their dynamic features. Blind trust, on the other hand, is definitely not recommended either. Only the long-range stability of the rules of the game assures the necessary flexibility of organizations.