Further, a trial court is not required to present an instruction of the defendant's theory to the jury unless the defendant makes such a request. Because defendant did not request this instruction at trial and did not object to the trial court's instructions to the jury, we review this issue only to determine if manifest injustice resulted. There is no manifest injustice in this case. The trial court properly instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the crime of delivery of codeine. Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to a specific intent crime.
Defendant argues that delivery of a controlled substance is a specific intent crime.
The distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes is that specific intent crimes involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, while general intent crimes involve merely the intent to do the physical act. The cases are well settled that the act of transfer of the controlled substance is sufficient to sustain a finding of an actual delivery. Those cases do not require an intent involving a particular criminal intent beyond the act of delivering the controlled substance. Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated that knowledge is not required as an element in the statute. Finally, we note that this Court stated that there was no error in the trial court's refusal to give a specific intent instruction where the defendant was convicted of delivery of cocaine.