Absent sufficient information, the plea would be unknowing and, consequently, involuntary. We agree that for purposes of determining whether defense counsel was effective a defendant need only be made aware of the direct consequences of a guilty plea. A defendant's ignorance of a plea's collateral consequences does not render the plea involuntary. Counsel's failure to properly advise of the plea's collateral consequences does not bear on whether defendant properly understood his decision to plead guilty to the charges in question. Although we acknowledge that deportation is a severe collateral consequence, we cannot conclude that it warrants treatment as a direct consequence of a plea.
Deportation is only one possible collateral consequence of a guilty plea.
Allowing defendants to withdraw their pleas once they discover that their conviction subjects them to deportation would open the door for defendants to withdraw their pleas for other collateral reasons. Failure to inform the defendant of the following consequences of his guilty plea has been held not to render the plea invalid. We discern no principled distinction between the immigration consequences of a plea and these other collateral consequences. We have found no authority that holds collateral consequences should be considered in allowing a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after having been sentenced. Such a holding would seriously jeopardize the finality of plea-based convictions.