At the level of primary process such a difference may be private in principle, being at an unconscious level. And even when it is a matter of secondary process the indeterminancies are only detectable as the impulses which give rise to them. Which is to say that even here references to real or potential, not ideal, speakers have to be invoked, and with them their intentionalities, to get a description of the further examples off the ground. What has happened, not unpredictably, here is that Smith and Wilson conflated signification with intension, an easy mistake to make since they have much in common. In System and Structure , Wilden mounts a withering attack on those disciplines, his own systems theory not excluded, which attempt, as context-free semantics does, to study concepts as if they obeyed rules not dissimilar to grammatical ones in linguistic discourse, from syntax to semantics to pragmatics.
All open systems are goal seeking and adaptive.
More controversially, it might be said that such an utterance cannot ever be rendered salva veritate as if it had never been part of an utterance, as linguists pretend to cast around for specimen sentences that will lend themselves for treatment as pure signification. Austin's 'locutionary meaning' and Chomsky's 'strict meaning' are the results of reifying with indispensable and central notions that which gives a sentence a subject and a compatible predicate. They may be useful in teaching people how to use particular linguistic constructs, but they have outlived that usefulness when removed from that context. Of course, in fact they never are completely removed from context, since linguistics has illocutions and perlocutions of its own. Frequently also, denotation is mistaken for naming or designation, and this gives rise to the illusion of invisibility before the 'objective' signified, cherished by those of a 'common sense' persuasion to see nouns as essentially names for things or at least names for classes.