We should make it clear to Russia that our NMD development program is not a reaction to the traditional competition between our two countries. Indeed, the NMD system we envision would be designed to protect against limited missile attack, not the strategic conflicts our bilateral agreements were designed to prevent. S. 257 is a reaction to new threats we could not have predicted even 10 years ago. As such, we must find new ways of interpreting or dealing with agreements that were designed for a very different strategic world order. We face a real and growing threat that cannot be countered by our conventional forces and which will not be deterred by the threat of retaliation.
Deterrence requires rationality.
By definition, accidental, unauthorized, or rogue acts are not the acts of a rational person and cannot be reliably deterred. Thus, they must be endured or defended against. Its very existence has already acted as a catalyst in moving forward the debate about the threat and the funding needed to develop a limited NMD system. I realize that S.257 will not help defend against some threats, such as clandestine delivery, but it will begin to defend against a limited ballistic missile attack from rogue states and organizations, a defense our nation requires sooner rather than later. I agree with the goals of S.257, and I will vote for it.