To determine how we proceed, I think it is worth taking a look around the region to consider what's worked. While the Administration likes to claim credit for Peru's success, the truth is they succeeded alone. The U.S. suspended all assistance in 1991 and 1992. Nonetheless, President Fujimori launched an aggressive, broad scale assault on both the traffickers and the guerrillas protecting their trade. I doubt anyone would be calling Peru a success today if traffickers were in jail, but the Sendero Luminoso had stepped in to take their place.
Critics argue that Peru's success came at a very high human rights price.
As a result, many now argue that we must carefully concentrate only on the Colombian drug war and avoid any involvement or support of efforts which target the paramilitaries or guerrillas. Hence, we must not step up military training, support or the presence of U.S. troops. I am already hearing soothing Administration reassurances that Plan Colombia is a counter-narcotics effort, and we need not worry about the quagmire of a counterinsurgency or military campaign. What is the Administration really promising in Plan Colombia. For several years, we have provided substantial support to the Colombian Narcotics Police in their attack on coca crops and cartels.