These constraints are not only normative, but also cognitive and situational. Dilemmas generated by cognitive and situational constraints are genuine. This is because the constraints that generate them are constitutive of the agent's capacity, and not just a sign of the agent's defective rationality. Second, I show that there are different kinds of normative indeterminacy, not all of which are worrisome. Dilemmas may occur because of an indeterminate theory of deliberation.
Deliberation is a complex activity.
The criteria of justification are normative criteria for judging morally and offer grounds for decision-making. Dilemmas do not prove that the justification is insufficient, since the moral demands the agent recognizes as binding are well grounded. Rather, dilemmas show that the decision-making procedure is indeterminate, and thus it prescribes no determinate action. My third and final contention is that normative determinacy is not a requirement of adequacy for ethical theory. To claim otherwise is to neglect the agent's integrity for the sake of completeness.