The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that until transfer from juvenile court jurisdiction is ordered, issues involving substantive rights of pre-transfer juveniles, such as the admissibility of statements, are controlled by the applicable provisions of the Family Code even when they are raised in a criminal forum. Therefore, articles 38.22 and 38.23 are not relevant in determining the admissibility of Mata's statement. No challenge to the statement's admissibility was made before the trial court based on sections 52.02 and 52.025 of the Family Code, and no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. The focus of Mata's brief and the argument at the suppression hearing was whether Mata was in custody at the time he made his statement. If Mata was not in custody, his statutory and constitutional rights were not violated, and the trial court properly admitted his statement into evidence.
Courts employ a two-step analysis to determine whether an individual is in custody.
First, all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation must be examined to determine whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. This initial determination focuses on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the individual being questioned. Second, a court considers whether, in light of the given circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Under Stansbury, however, the subjective intent of both the police and the defendant are irrelevant except to the extent that they may be manifested in the words or actions of the investigating officials. The custody determination is based entirely upon objective circumstances.