This situation automatically creates the preconditions for lobbying of departmental interests. At the same time, the personnel in the administration do not have sufficient qualifications nor authority to constructively influence military policy. In the end, the concentration of authority in the hands of the Councils' staff would provide synchronized reforms of other security structures. In any case, getting a balance of interests seems to be much more achievable at this level of the state's military hierarchy. Such a method, however, does not exclude a further merger of the Ministry of Defense and Presidential Councils in a uniform body, responsible both for development and realization of military policy.
Any reform is a controversial process.
If military reform in Russia is implemented, it should inevitably solve a number of sharp contradictions in civil-military relations. Today, the military has fallen in social status from its formerly privileged position. Yet, in a democratic society they should effectively compete for budget resources, learn to cooperate with civilians competently and constructively, and assert and coordinate their basic requirements. If such a scenario were to transpire, civilians and military in Russia should pass through a difficult period to one characterized by more consent and interaction.