We will discuss each of these arguments in turn. Defendant argues that our first decision in this case is palpably erroneous and subject to our reconsideration in that this case involves a contract of insurance for which contract law applies, not the tort-based proximate cause analysis we adopted from the Carlson decision. We find that our decision in the first appeal is not palpably erroneous, and therefore, the ruling of that decision is the law of this case. 164 Ill. App. Defendant argues that by applying tort principles to the construction of this contract of insurance, we failed to give the plain words of the policy their normal and everyday meaning, i.e., we used construction aids outside the policy, which is not allowed unless the terms of the policy are ambiguous.
Defendant is wrong.
Use of a proximate cause analysis as set forth in numerous, relevant cases, including Carlson, is proper because the language of the policy drafted by defendant, and used in many other standard accidental death and dismemberment insurance policies, calls for such an analysis. 76 Ill. App. The policy must be construed in the light of the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary man when making an ordinary contract. 299 Ill. App. The above-quoted passage has not been explicitly or implicitly overruled by any case from any court, including the first district.