Rather, it is a neutral law that may have a disparate impact on persons based on the timing of their sentences. Therefore, to present a cognizable equal protection claim, the defendant must show that the statute was enacted for a discriminatory purpose. 152 Ill. 2d at 429. Here, defendant has presented no evidence, nor even alleged, that the legislature enacted the merger provision of the Code because it would discriminate against offenders whose misdemeanor and felony sentences were not merged. We therefore reject defendant's equal protection claim.
Defendant also claims that the merger provision violates due process.
According to defendant, rather than furthering these goals, the merger provision actually hinders the statutory goals by ignoring the rehabilitative potential of offenders. Defendant contends that those subjected to simultaneous sentencing for felonies and misdemeanors will face the harsher penalty of having to serve more actual time in prison. Defendant further contends that this will lead to the neglect of an offender's rehabilitative potential as a sentencing objective because the operation of the merger provision will lead to a longer term of imprisonment without regard to whether one offender deserves such a longer period of incarceration. We reject defendant's argument. The test for a due process claim is whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate State goal.