Finally, reaching the poorest segments of the poor may be the more costly, further reducing the government's incentives for targeting the ultra-poor. Both the timing and pace of economic reform affects the probability that resources will be redirected to the very poor. That probability is higher when reform is implemented immediately after an election when political opposition is weakest and when the reform is fast and dramatic, undermining the power of established interest groups. Authoritarian regimes have to rely on the rulers' own preferences and not on public opinion pressure to support programs for marginal groups. Institutional political autonomy and effectiveness and targeting of social assistance programs.
Autonomy can increase speed, effectiveness, evaluation, etc.
But, also increases the risks of sudden reduction in budgets which are controlled by government. It also affects the level of political support available for programs for the poor. However, foreign financing of safety nets without a political commitment from the government cannot sustain the programs, which will fail. Decentralization of government structures can help improve local targeting of the poor, but only if it prevents the strengthening of clientelist systems supported by local elites.