The trial court concluded that the legislative intent of the statutory language in question was to protect mentally incapable individuals because of their inherent inability to consent to sexual relations and found that without an understanding of the moral quality of the act, a person cannot intelligently and truly consent to such an act. We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court. Defendant's position is also inconsistent with a logical interpretation of the statute. In essence, it would limit the statute's protections to those individuals who are so divorced from reality that they are not even aware of what is happening to them physically. Thus, to construe the statutory language in the manner advocated by defendant would strip the statute of the protection that the legislature intended for those individuals, like the victim, who know what is happening to them but are incapable of protesting or protecting themselves due to a severely diminished intellectual capacity.
Cognitive understanding is involved.
In a case such as the one before us, it includes being substantially able to understand what she was doing. An understanding of coitus encompasses more than a knowledge of its physiological nature. An appreciation of how it will be regarded in the framework of the societal environment and taboos to which a person will be exposed may be far more important. In that sense, the moral quality of the act is not to be ignored. This is to be distinguished, however, from the participating woman's personal sense of morality.