Second, the risk models, because they rely on broad age categories, do not adequately account for the vulnerabilities of infants and young children, who a recent National Academy of Science report found are especially sensitive to pesticide-related health risks. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the risk models use of extraordinarily precise figures lend the practice of risk-assessment an air of scientific certainty that the theories do not warrant. In fact, scientists do not fully understand cancer s causal mechanisms, and their techniques for estimating carcinogenicity are very crude, with different assumptions and models yielding vastly different results. Perhaps the most disturbing element of the Clinton proposal is the way in which it undercuts the core Delaney Clause principles of erring on the side of safety in the face of scientific uncertainty and of preventing, rather than just regulating , carcinogenic exposures. Whether these twin principles of precaution and prevention will be preserved or eroded has far-reaching implications.
Cancer now strikes one in three people in the United States and kills one in four.
Proponents of the Delaney Clause take a much more thoughtful and practical view, however. They argue that the rapidly rising incidence of cancer is precisely the reason that all unnecessary and preventable exposures should be eliminated. This argument is all the more forceful when it is combined with recognition of the uncertainties surrounding cancer causation, the synergistic effects of exposure to multiple carcinogens and the environmental effects of extensive pesticide use. In a society where fascination with technological innovation often crowds out sober realities about safety, environmental and social effects of new technologies and products, the role of prevention and precautionary principles is critical. Where these principles are embedded in law, they must be protected and preserved, not sacrificed for reasons of political expediency.