Consequently, even supporting the Iraqi opposition can only be seen, ultimately, as an adjunct to containment and not an alternative to it. During the years it would require to recruit, train and equip an Iraqi opposition capable of effective operations inside Iraq the United States will still have to keep Saddam weak and isolated through continued containment. Morever, we must recognize that even after a viable opposition is up and running, the probability that Saddam will actually fall as a result of such an effort is low. Thus, the United States will still have to ensure an effective containment regime to guard against the very real risk, indeed the likelihood, that even a well-supported opposition will fail to remove him from power. Nevertheless, while it is clear that the United States will have to rely on some form of containment for the forseeable future, it is equally clear that we cannot continue with business as usual.
Containment is under attack from a variety of directions.
What s more, these attacks are doing real damage. Over the last three years, the United States has been forced to give ground on a number of issues in the face of such pressure. The United States supported Resolutions 986, and 1153 simply because we recognized that it was impossible to do otherwise. Although, one must give credit to the Administration for the ingenious approach embodied in the resolutions which make concessions on Iraqi exports while retaining control over Iraqi imports, we must still recognize that both resolutions entailed sacrificing part of the sanctions regime in the face of pressure from the international community. Similarly, our limited response to Saddam s attack on Irbil in 1996 and our willingness to accept Kofi Annan s compromise deal with Saddam in 1998 both speak to the great difficulty we now have finding states willing to support us on those occasions when it is necessary to use force to prevent or punish Iraqi defiance.