After World War II, general requirements for military weapons were generated by perceived needs. Sammet and Green claim that the leading edge of technology became the driver for the development of new weapon systems rather than the basic need itself, which had the effect of driving development and procurement costs upward. In 1961, Secretary of State Robert McNamara proposed guidelines for improving program planning, source selection, contracting, and cost-plus incentive contracts. In 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci provided 31 recommendations to streamline the acquisition process, which included such objectives as improving long-range planning, achieving economic rates of production, providing realistic cost and budget models, and establishing a strong industrial base necessary for a strong defense. Sammet and Green describe many problems of the modern procurement system, borrowing heavily from anecdotes experienced during their military careers.
Additional problems lie in the difficulty of invoking competition during follow-on procurements.
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Robert Costello helped set the stage for the advent of Concurrent Engineering in aerospace and defense. We must be constantly sensitive to the fact that it is the taxpayer's dollar that is being spent. Even more important, the nation's security is at stake. Sammet and Green spend much of the book discussing problems in the manufacturing of weapon systems. More effective procurement processes can improve quality at the source and time-phased purchasing and receiving, thus lowering overall costs.