In 1992-93 Russia had used shutdown threats for political pressure. Russian relations with China have been similarly driven by economic issues and opportunities. More generally, Russian and Chinese economic interests in better relations have so far been a boon for Asian stability, including an agreement signed in April 1997 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgystan to reduce the number of military forces along their borders. The influence of economic priorities has not been limited to foreign policies, but affects traditional security interests and priorities as well. In arms control, crucial obstacles to Russian cooperation are not hostile intentions, but financial constraints.
Arms control turns out to be very expensive.
The Russian Duma, hardly known for its deference to international law and opinion, has declared that it cannot ratify the convention because of the expense of the commitment which Russia cannot meet. The Duma sent a letter to the members of the CWC explaining the reason in distinctly non-defiant tones, and even asked that Russia not be excluded from CWC agencies. This angle on Russian security cooperation makes clear why programs such as Cooperative Threat Reduction have more impact that the numbers involved might otherwise indicate. Russia simply does not have the resources to build and deploy 700 missiles, and this dilemma is made particularly acute in the context of US plans to build a missile defense system. Economic considerations and constraints play an even starker role in Russia's basic national defense.