Document ID: PHMSA-2016-0014-0004
Agency: phmsa
Document Type: Notice
Title: Hazardous Materials: ICAO Lithium Ion Battery Prohibition Safety Advisory
Posted Date: 2016-04-07T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 67 (Thursday, April 7, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20443-20444]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07936]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0014; Notice No. 2016-05]

Hazardous Materials: ICAO Lithium Ion Battery Prohibition Safety 
Advisory Notice

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
DOT.

ACTION: Safety advisory notice.

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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this safety advisory notice to inform persons 
engaged in the transport of lithium batteries in commerce of recent 
actions taken by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
to enhance the safe transport of lithium batteries by air.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kevin A. Leary, Standards and 
Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, telephone: (202) 366-8553.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This safety advisory notice is to inform 
persons engaged in the transport of lithium batteries in commerce of 
recent actions taken by the ICAO to enhance the safe transport of 
lithium batteries by air. According to the International Coordinating 
Council of Aerospace Industries Association (ICCAIA), Boeing, and other 
aircraft manufacturers, the fire suppression capabilities of an 
aircraft may be exceeded in a situation where heat and flames generated 
from thermal runaway in a single package of lithium ion batteries 
spreads to adjacent packages, potentially leading to a catastrophic 
loss of the aircraft because of a fire that cannot be contained or 
suppressed.\1\
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    \1\ http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/DGPWG15/DGPWG.15.WP.004.5.en.pdf.
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    Testing by the Federal Aviation Administration's William J. Hughes 
Technical Center (FAA Tech Center) supports the ICCAIA's and aircraft 
manufacturers' assessments.\2\ A fundamental concern highlighted by the 
FAA Tech Center's research is that the cargo compartment fire 
protection standards are not designed to address the unique hazards 
associated with the transport of lithium batteries. Safety concerns 
include:
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    \2\ http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov.
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     The potential for propagation of thermal runaway between 
cells or batteries in a package and between adjacent packages of 
batteries;
     The potential for uncontrolled lithium battery fires to 
overwhelm the capability of existing aircraft cargo fire protection 
systems, leading to a catastrophic failure of the airframe; and
     The potential for venting of combustible gases from 
lithium ion cells in thermal runaway, which could collect in an 
enclosed environment and cause an explosion even in the presence of a 
suppression agent.
    Specifically, test data from the FAA Tech Center demonstrates that: 
(1) The ignition of the unburned flammable gases associated with a 
lithium cell or battery fire could lead to a catastrophic explosion; 
(2) the current design of the Halon 1301 fire suppression system in a 
Class C cargo compartment in passenger airplanes is incapable of 
preventing such an explosion; and (3) the ignition of a mixture of 
flammable gases could produce an over pressure, which would dislodge 
pressure relief panels, allow leakage of Halon from the associated 
cargo compartment, and compromise the ability of fire suppression 
systems to function as intended. As a result, smoke and fire can spread 
to adjacent compartments and potentially compromise the entire 
aircraft.
    Based on this information and in conjunction with recommendations 
developed at the ICAO Multidisciplinary Lithium Battery Transport 
Coordination Meeting(s), the ICAO amended the 2015-2016 edition of the 
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air 
(ICAO TI) concerning the transport of lithium ion cells and batteries. 
These amendments, effective April 1, 2016, include:
     A prohibition on the transport of lithium ion cells and 
batteries as cargo aboard passenger carrying aircraft (this prohibition 
applies to lithium cells and batteries (UN3480) not contained in or 
packed with equipment when transported as cargo and does not include 
batteries contained in personal electronic devices carried by 
passengers or crew);
     A requirement for lithium ion cells and batteries to be 
shipped at a state of charge of no more than 30 percent of their rated 
capacity on cargo aircraft (forbidden on passenger); and
     A limit on the number of packages of both lithium ion and 
lithium metal batteries that may be offered for transportation on cargo 
aircraft under current provisions for small cells and batteries to not 
more than one package per consignment or overpack.
    Representatives from the FAA and PHMSA participate in meetings of 
the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel--the

[[Page 20444]]

international body responsible for the ICAO TI. In consultation with 
the FAA and other relevant government agencies, PHMSA works to 
periodically harmonize the provisions of the domestic hazardous 
materials regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) with international 
regulatory approaches, including the ICAO TI. In coordination with the 
FAA, PHMSA is considering additional actions, including appropriate 
amendments to the HMR to address these enhanced safety measures adopted 
by ICAO.
    For additional information see:
     FAA SAFO 16001 \3\ issued on January 19, 2016.
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    \3\ https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2016/SAFO16001.pdf.
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     Addendum No. 3 \4\ to the Technical Instructions (2015/
2016 Edition) issued on January 15, 2016.
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    \4\ http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/AddendumCorrigendum%20to%20the%20Technical%20Instructions/Doc%209284-2015-2016.ADD-3.pdf.
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     Addendum No. 4 \5\ to the Technical Instructions (2015/
2016 Edition) issued on February 23, 2016.
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    \5\ http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/AddendumCorrigendum%20to%20the%20Technical%20Instructions/Doc%209284-2015-2016.ADD-4.en.pdf.

    Issued in Washington, DC on April 1, 2016.
William S. Schoonover,
Deputy Associate Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016-07936 Filed 4-6-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P