Document ID: PHMSA-2008-0211-0041
Agency: phmsa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals
Posted Date: 2009-08-17T04:00Z

[Federal Register: August 17, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 157)]
[Notices]               
[Page 41495-41520]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr17au09-138]                         

[[Page 41495]]

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Part II

Department of Transportation

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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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Information Collection; Notice

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2008-0211]

 
Information Collection

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

ACTION: Request for public comments and OMB approval of existing 
information collection.

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SUMMARY: On September 4, 2008, as required by the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) published a notice in the Federal Register of its intent to 
revise the agency's standardized forms for reporting pipeline incidents 
and accidents. PHMSA later extended the time for responding to that 
notice until December 12, 2008, and received timely comments from 
several pipeline operators, five trade associations representing 
pipeline operators, the association representing State pipeline safety 
regulators, two State pipeline regulatory agencies, and one public 
interest group. PHMSA is publishing this notice to respond to comments, 
provide the public with an additional 30 days to comment on the 
proposed revisions to the incident and accident report forms, including 
the form instructions, and announce that the revised Information 
Collections will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) for approval.

DATES: Comments on this notice must be received by September 16, 2009 
to be assured of consideration.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roger Little by telephone at 202-366-
4569, by fax at 202-366-4566, by e-mail at Roger.Little@dot.gov, or by 
mail at U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., PHP-10, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number 
PHMSA-2008-0211 by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 1-202-395-6566
     Mail: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 726 Jackson Place, NW., 
Washington, DC 20503, ATTN: Desk Officer for Department of 
Transportation (DOT).
     E-mail: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), Office of Management and Budget, at the following address: 
oira_submissions@omb.eop.gov.
    Requests for a copy of the information collection should be 
directed to Roger Little by telephone at 202-366-4569, by fax at 202-
366-4566, by e-mail at Roger.Little@dot.gov, or by mail at U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., PHP-10, Washington, DC 
20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal 
Regulations requires PHMSA to provide interested members of the public 
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information 
collection and recordkeeping requests. This notice identifies revised 
information collection requests that PHMSA will be submitting to OMB 
for approval. These information collections are contained in the 
pipeline safety regulations, 49 CFR parts 190-199. PHMSA has revised 
burden estimates, where appropriate, to reflect current reporting 
levels or adjustments based on changes in proposed or final rules 
published since the information collections were last approved. The 
following information is provided for each information collection: (1) 
Title of the information collection; (2) OMB control number; (3) type 
of request; (4) abstract of the information collection activity; (5) 
description of affected public; (6) estimate of total annual reporting 
and recordkeeping burden; and (7) frequency of collection. PHMSA will 
request a three-year term of approval for each information collection 
activity. The comments are summarized and addressed below as specified 
in the following outline:

I. Background
II. Summary of Comments
    A. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.1, Gas Distribution Systems 
(Impacted Information Collection: OMB Control No. 2137-0522)
    B. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.2, Gas Transmission and 
Gathering Systems (Impacted Information Collection: OMB Control No. 
2137-0522)
    C. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7000-1, Accident Report--
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems (Impacted Information Collection: 
OMB Control No. 2137-0047)
III. Proposed Information Collection Revisions and Request for 
Comments

I. Background

    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
requires that an operator of a covered pipeline facility file a written 
report within 30 days of certain adverse events, defined by regulation 
as either an accident or incident, 49 CFR 191.1-191.27, 195.48-195.63 
(2008).\1\ PHMSA further requires that those reports be submitted to 
the agency on one of three standardized forms, PHMSA Form F 7100.1, 
Incident Report--Gas Distribution Pipelines, PHMSA Form F 7100.2, 
Incident Report--Gas Transmission and Gathering Systems, and PHMSA Form 
F 7000-1--Accident Report for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems. PHMSA 
uses the information collected from these forms (1) to identify trends 
in the occurrence of safety-related problems, (2) to appropriately 
target its performance of risk-based inspections, and (3) to assess the 
overall efficacy of its regulatory program.
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    \1\ Reportable events are referred to as ``incidents'' for gas 
pipelines, 49 CFR Sec.  191.3, and ``accidents'' for hazardous 
liquid pipelines, 49 CFR 195.50. An operator may also be required to 
file a supplemental report in certain circumstances.
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    PHMSA published a Federal Register notice on September 4, 2008 (73 
FR 51697) inviting public comment on a proposal to revise PHMSA Forms F 
7100.1, F 7100.2, and F 7000-1. PHMSA stated that the proposed 
revisions were needed ``to make the information collected more useful 
to'' all those concerned with pipeline safety and to provide 
additional, and in some instances more detailed, data for use in the 
development and enforcement of its risk-based regulatory regime. PHMSA 
published a subsequent Federal Register notice on October 30, 2008 (73 
FR 64661) to extend the comment period to December 12, 2008.

II. Summary of Comments

    During the three-month response period, the following groups 
provided PHMSA with comments on the proposal outlined in the September 
2008 Federal Register notice:

    --Five industry trade associations--American Gas Association (AGA), 
American Public Gas Association (APGA), American Petroleum Institute 
(API), American Oil Pipelines Association (AOPL), and Interstate 
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA).

--The National Association of State Pipeline Safety Representatives 
(NAPSR) and two State pipeline regulatory agencies--Iowa Utilities 
Board (IUB) and Missouri Public Service Commission (MOPSC).
--Nine pipeline operators--Southern California Gas Company and San 
Diego Gas & Electric (SoCal/SDG&E), MidAmerican Energy Company 
(MidAmerican), Northern Illinois Gas Company d/b/a Nicor Gas Company 
(Nicor), Atmos Energy Corporation

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(Atmos), Southwest Gas Corporation (Southwest), El Paso Pipeline Group 
(EPPG), Columbia Gas Transmission (CGT), Panhandle Energy (Panhandle), 
and Paiute Pipeline (Paiute).
--The Pipeline Safety Trust--A summary of those comments and PHMSA's 
responses is provided below for each of the three proposed incident 
report forms and related instructions.

A. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.1--Gas Distribution Systems 
(Impacted Information Collection: OMB 2137-0522)

General Comments
    Increase in requested information: AGA and APGA noted that the 
proposed changes would increase the length of the form from 3 to 10 
pages. AGA and APGA cautioned that while such an increase was not 
objectionable per se, PHMSA should ensure the relevance of any 
additional information being collected.
    PHMSA response: The increase in the total number of pages in the 
revised PHSMA Form F 7100.1 does not accurately reflect the information 
collection burden that will be placed on operators. Most of the 
additional pages are dedicated to Part F, Cause Information. Part F is 
subdivided into 8 separate categories, and an operator is only required 
to complete the section that relates to the primary cause of the 
incident. In other words, an operator will only need to answer the 
questions presented on pages 6 and 7 if corrosion caused the incident, 
on page 7 if natural force damage caused the incident and, on page 8 
and 9 if excavation damage caused the incident. Similarly, depending on 
the location of the incident, only the Onshore or Offshore selection 
will need to be completed.
    Moreover, the vast majority of operators elect to use PHMSA's 
online incident reporting form, a tool that utilizes smart navigation 
and formatting to filter out irrelevant sections, thereby decreasing 
the actual numbers of pages that must be viewed by an operator. Thus, 
it is misleading to suggest that the increase in the total number of 
pages used in the revised form is indicative of an unduly burdensome 
information collection.
    Nevertheless, PHMSA acknowledges that the revised form will collect 
new, and in some instances more detailed, information. However, PHMSA 
has determined that the collection of such information is justified by 
the agency's need to identify trends in safety-related problems, to 
appropriately target its performance of risk-based inspections, and to 
assess the overall efficacy of its pipeline-safety regime.
    Rely more on narrative: APGA noted that prior studies show that 
narrative descriptions are a better source of data on the cause of 
reported incidents and suggested that PHMSA should provide more 
guidance with respect to the information sought in that portion of the 
revised form, rather than increasing the number of questions in others 
areas.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees with APGA's comment regarding the 
successful use of narrative descriptions in identifying the cause of 
reported incidents in prior studies. However, those studies required 
the investment of substantial time and effort into data extraction, and 
the lack of uniformity in the information collected meant that 
inferences often had to be drawn to reach a final conclusion. PHMSA has 
carefully examined this issue and determined that its incident 
reporting data collection needs are ill suited to such an approach, 
i.e., that the information submitted by operators must be presented in 
a standardized format that can be easily received, stored, and 
analyzed. The revised form is consistent with that approach.
    Report vs. investigation: Many industry stakeholders argued that 
the revised form seeks to collect more information than is necessary 
for an adequate incident report. Some even suggested that the new form 
cannot be completed without conducting a root cause investigation for 
each incident.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that the proposed revisions are 
designed to collect new, and in some instances more detailed, data on 
incidents, but firmly rejects the suggestion that a root cause 
investigation must be conducted to complete the form. To the contrary, 
PHMSA is confident that a prudent operator can complete the form in a 
reasonable amount of time based on the information available at or near 
the time of the incident. PHMSA also does not agree that the additional 
effort that may be needed in some cases to complete the revised form is 
unjustified. While the number of incidents that occur annually has 
declined in recent years, PHMSA remains committed to reducing the 
occurrence and mitigating the consequences of these adverse events, and 
more detailed data is required to support these analyses.
    Changes needed in criteria for reporting: A number of commenters 
suggested that the criteria for a reportable incident should be 
changed, focusing in particular on the $50,000 threshold for property 
damage and noting that the combined effects of inflation, escalating 
property values, and increases in the price of gas require that more 
and more incidents be reported.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that the number of reportable 
incidents will increase with any rise in the cost of gas and property 
values. However, an incident is defined by regulation, and a rulemaking 
must be initiated to change that definition. That type of regulatory 
change is beyond the scope of this information collection request.
    Time to file: MidAmerica suggested that additional data and 
investigation will be required to complete the revised form; therefore, 
the deadline for its submission to PHMSA should be extended from 30 to 
60 days after an incident.
    PHMSA response: The 30-day deadline for filing an incident report 
is set by regulation and can only be changed in a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, an action that is beyond the scope of this information 
collection request. Nonetheless, PHMSA acknowledges that certain 
information may not be known by an operator within 30 days of an 
incident, and that is why the regulation allows operators to include 
additional information in supplemental reports filed after the initial 
report is submitted.
    Relationship to pending rulemakings: Several pipeline operators 
noted that PHMSA is developing new rules on distribution integrity and 
control room management and that the revised form requests information 
on these issues. These operators therefore argued that the proposed 
revision of the incident reporting form should be deferred until those 
two rulemakings are completed.
    PHMSA response: Congress has mandated PHMSA to use its broad 
authority to collect information on pipeline facilities, 49 U.S.C. 
60117(b)(1)-(2), to obtain specific data from owners and operators on 
the role of controller fatigue in incidents and accidents. Pipeline 
Inspection, Protection and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 2006, Public Law 
109-468, section 20, 120 Stat. 3498 (Dec. 29, 2006). However, rather 
than addressing that mandate in isolation, PHMSA is coordinating its 
collection of that information with its pending rulemakings on 
distribution integrity and control room management. Distribution lines 
are a key part of the nation's pipeline network, and Congress has 
determined that additional information on the contribution of 
controller fatigue to the occurrence of incidents and accidents is 
vital to PHMSA's safety mission. These authorities provide ample 
support for collecting all of the information sought

[[Page 41498]]

in the proposed revision to the incident reporting form without further 
delay.
Part A, Key Report Information
    Question 1 and 2,\2\ Operator identification: IUB suggested that a 
mailing address is still needed for any official correspondence that 
may be needed in response to an incident. IUB also noted that while 
PHMSA may have access to an address through its Operator Identification 
(OPID) system, others seeking to contact the company may not have 
access to such information.
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    \2\ Question numbers used in this notice refer to the numbers on 
the draft forms about which comments were submitted.
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    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested change.
    Question 4, location of incident: NAPSR suggested that question 4 
concerning location of an incident be modified to provide separate 
lines for entering City and County/Parish and to require that location 
be reported by GPS coordinates, including identification of the 
relevant ``projection'' to better define the latitude and longitude 
information. IUB also noted that distribution lines may be in 
unincorporated/undeveloped areas where a street address is not useful 
to define location and that some other means of describing the location 
is needed.
    PHMSA response: Latitude and longitude were included in this form 
when it was last revised. This information was not included in the 
draft revised form, but has been restored. Industry comments on the 
previous revision expressed concern over requirements to specify a 
projection, stating that this information would not be available to 
many distribution pipeline operators and may be confusing. PHMSA 
elected at that time to omit a requirement that operators specify the 
projection used. Since PHMSA did not propose such a change in the 
September 4, 2008, notice, the requirement to report latitude and 
longitude is being retained as in the previous form, without a need to 
report projection. PHMSA has made the editorial change suggested by 
NAPSR to separate City and County/Parish.
    Question 7, commodity released: A number of commenters noted that 
the term ``spilled'' is inappropriate for natural gas and suggested 
that it be replaced with ``released.'' NAPSR noted that natural gas and 
propane are the only commodities currently transported by gas 
distribution pipelines and suggested that other commodities listed be 
deleted. APGA and MidAmerican also noted that the gas distribution 
pipeline industry does not use the terms ``sour'' or ``wet'' to 
characterize gas carried and suggested that these terms be deleted or 
defined in the instructions.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested changes.
    Question 8, type of system: MidAmerican suggested that the need to 
distinguish between privately- and municipally-owned systems should be 
eliminated, since the same regulations are applicable to both.
    PHMSA response: Part 192 safety regulations apply to both types of 
systems. Many outside factors affect private and municipal systems 
differently, however, and could result in different incident trends. 
This data is needed to be able to determine if incident trends are 
different for privately- and municipally-owned systems.
    Questions 9 and 10, amount released: Several pipeline operators 
objected to the need to report separately the volume of commodity 
released intentionally and unintentionally. They noted that it would be 
difficult, at best, to prepare these estimates. Atmos also noted that 
the form should reflect that these quantities are only estimates.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has revised the form to ask only 
for an estimate of total commodity released.
    Questions 11 and 12, number of fatalities and injuries: A number of 
pipeline operators suggested that PHMSA delete the category of 
``Workers working on the Public Easement or near pipeline facility but 
not associated with this operator or this pipeline facility.'' They 
consider the category confusing and note that the category of ``general 
public'' would already account for non-operator personnel. Southwest 
also suggested that the category of ``emergency responders'' should be 
limited to non-operator personnel, since operator employees and 
contractors are addressed in other categories.
    PHMSA response: Utility easements are used for purposes other than 
gas distribution pipelines. Thus, there may be workers associated with 
other utilities (e.g., electric, cable television, sewer/water) 
performing work on the easement. This category of ``public'' is more 
likely to be involved in an incident, since they are more likely to be 
engaged in work that might disturb pipelines in an easement than are 
other members of the public. PHMSA considers it important to collect 
this data to be able to determine if common location of utilities is a 
factor contributing to incident frequency. Similar situations exist for 
other pipeline types with other pipelines/utilities installed in common 
rights-of-way, and PHMSA also collects this data for those pipelines. 
Therefore, PHMSA has retained this category. PHMSA agrees with 
Southwest that the emergency responder category was intended to apply 
to responders not employed by the pipeline operator and has modified 
the form to so indicate.
    Question 15, number evacuated: MidAmerican suggested revising this 
question to seek the estimated number of general public evacuated, if 
known. They noted that non-operator emergency responders often suggest 
evacuation and persons self-evacuate and it may not be possible to know 
how many persons evacuated.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that this data will be an estimate 
and may be subject to some uncertainty, but does not consider that 
changes to the form are needed. PHMSA expects operators to exercise 
reasonable diligence in estimating the number of people evacuated.
    Question 16, elapsed time: NAPSR suggested that this question be 
revised to collect a time sequence of key events such as when the 
operator was notified, when operator personnel arrived on site, and 
when the area was made safe. Other commenters noted that the form and 
instructions were not consistent for this question.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that a time sequence would provide 
more useful information and eliminate the need for an operator to make 
the calculation implicit in the original question--time between 
becoming aware of the incident and making the area safe. PHMSA has 
revised this question to a time sequence. PHMSA has implemented this 
change for the other incident report forms as well.
Part B, Additional Location Information
    Question 17, location of system involved: MidAmerican commented 
that the location of the system is of little importance and suggested 
that most of this question be deleted. Southwest commented that the 
location information sought in this question duplicates information to 
be collected later in the form (section F3, Excavation Damage) and 
therefore suggested that this question be deleted to avoid duplication. 
Southwest also questioned the meaning of ``bridge crossing,'' asking 
whether that term applied to waterway crossings or to all bridges. They 
noted that a bridge can cross a road, meaning that two of the available 
options could be selected. NAPSR suggested changing ``right-of-way'' to 
``easement,'' as that term is more appropriate for use in

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distribution pipelines. Southwest also noted that the terms have 
different legal connotations.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA considers this data important to identify 
national trends. Excavation activities can be expected to occur more 
frequently in areas with utility easements, but more data is need to 
confirm that hypothesis. Similarly, utilities and their contractors 
should be more knowledgeable about one-call procedures and the need to 
avoid damage to underground utilities. Data is also needed to confirm 
that hypothesis and the need for additional regulatory action, if 
appropriate.
    Data on bridge and other types of crossings is needed to determine 
if such locations are more likely to experience an incident and, if so, 
the steps that can be taken to mitigate the consequences thereof. In 
addition, whether a bridge crosses a roadway or a waterway is not as 
important as the fact that the pipeline must be integrated with or 
attached to the bridge structure. PHMSA will clarify in the 
instructions that only one option should be selected.
    With regard to duplication, section F3 only applies if the cause of 
an incident is excavation damage. However, question 17 applies to all 
incident types. Therefore, the information sought is not unnecessarily 
duplicative.
    PHMSA agrees that ``easement'' is a more appropriate term for 
distribution pipelines and has used that term.
    Question 18, area of failure: Nicor and Atmos objected to the use 
of the undefined term ``failure'' and commented that an incident may 
result from circumstances outside the control of a pipeline operator, 
e.g., impact by a non-operator vehicle and not from a ``failure'' of 
the pipeline. In commenting on the gas transmission form, INGAA also 
noted that incidents can result from inappropriate but intentional 
releases of gas in which a failure does not occur. IUB noted that the 
options available on the form were not adequate to address many 
situations. For example, IUB observed that most underground pipelines 
are simply buried under soil, but that this is not one of the options 
for selection. Instead, it would need to be reported as ``other'' and 
described. IUB considered it inappropriate that reporting of the most 
common situation should be relegated to ``other.'' APGA also noted the 
need for an ``under soil'' selection. IUB also noted that the options 
do not address underground valve vaults and questioned the 
characterization of ``in an open ditch'' as an above-ground failure.
    PHMSA response: The comments questioning the use of the term 
``failure'' relate principally to the issue of liability. PHMSA 
recognizes in that regard that incidents may be caused by circumstances 
outside the control of a pipeline operator, and that the operator may 
not be culpable for their occurrence. However, a failure usually still 
occurs, i.e., pipe or some appurtenance that is supposed to contain 
transported gas fails to do so and gas is released. It is important to 
collect data on where these failures occur in order to be able to 
identify trends that may indicate a need for additional action, e.g., 
additional regulations or increased coordination with the other 
agencies with jurisdiction over the activities that can affect 
pipelines. Nevertheless, PHMSA recognizes that incidents can result 
from non-failure releases and has revised the form to avoid the use of 
the term ``failure,'' instead referring to ``area of incident.'' PHMSA 
will clarify in the instructions that this is to describe the point at 
which gas was released from the pipeline facility vs. where 
consequences were realized (e.g., neighboring building in which 
released gas collected resulting in ignition).
    PHMSA agrees with IUB that the options provided on the form did not 
adequately describe many typical installations, including ``under 
soil.'' PHMSA has revised the form to include those installations 
identified by IUB.
Part C, Additional Facility Information
    Question 20, information collected when mains or services are 
involved: NAPSR suggested that examples be added for pipe specification 
(e.g., API-5L, ASTM D2513). Several pipeline operators also suggested 
that the meaning of ``pipe specification'' was not clear. IUB commented 
that the original specification may not be known and that ``unknown'' 
should therefore be an option. Southwest suggested that the listed 
coating types be reviewed as they present some likelihood of overlap 
and confusion. Some pipeline operators also suggested that ``unknown'' 
needed to be an option for pipe coating; they also noted that this 
information was only important for incidents resulting from external 
corrosion. Some operators suggested that depth of cover is not a 
parameter of importance, or that it is important only on initial 
installation. MidAmerican suggested that none of the information sought 
in this question has much value for distribution pipelines. Several 
commenters also pointed out that numbering within this question was 
incorrect.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has adopted NAPSR's suggestion and added 
examples of pipe specification. PHMSA believes this obviates the need 
for a definition of the term. PHMSA has also added an option for 
``unknown'' for all of the information, except nominal pipe size.
    However, PHMSA rejects the notion that depth of cover is not 
important. It is true that requirements for depth of cover apply at 
installation. Nevertheless, inadequate depth of cover could be a factor 
in why incidents occur. The data that will be collected through this 
question will enable analyses to determine whether changes in depth of 
cover requirements or other mitigative actions may be needed. 
Similarly, PHMSA considers that the other data sought in this question 
is necessary to evaluate possible trends in incidents. PHMSA does not 
consider that collecting this information will impose unreasonable 
burdens, particularly since an option has been provided to indicate 
``unknown'' if the information is not readily discernible.
    PHMSA has corrected the numbering.
    Question 21, type of release: APGA suggested that overpressure is 
more appropriately classified as the cause of a failure and should 
therefore be removed as a type of failure.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the change.
    Question 22, material involved: NAPSR suggested adding Cellulose 
Acetate Butyrate (CAB) as a type of plastic pipe. APGA suggested that 
more instruction was needed to assure appropriate reporting of 
polyethylene (PE) and cross-linked PE or, alternatively, that the 
standard number for the pipe should be reported. Atmos noted that 
specified minimum yield stress (SMYS) is not an important parameter for 
distribution piping and suggested that it be deleted. Several 
commenters noted that standard dimension ratio (SDR) is not applicable 
to all plastic pipe and suggested that an option to report wall 
thickness be provided. For PE pipe, Atmos noted that ``grade'' is not 
an appropriate concept and Southwest suggested replacing this sub-
question with reporting of the Pipe Material Designation Code. Several 
commenters identified the need to allow ``unknown'' and ``other'' as 
options for the information sought in this question.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested changes. 
The form has been modified to add the designator PEX for cross-linked 
polyethylene, which is commonly known by that acronym.
    Question 23, year of installation: IUB suggested that the form 
allow for ``unknown,'' as operators may not always know the year in 
which some components of a pipeline were installed.

[[Page 41500]]

    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the change.
Part D, Additional Consequence Information
    Question 24, cost data: MOPSC, Nicor, and Atmos noted that the cost 
of repair and the cost of emergency response are not required to be 
considered by 49 CFR 191.3 in determining whether an incident has 
occurred. They therefore suggested that it is not appropriate to 
collect this data. Most commenters suggested that cost of emergency 
response be limited to response costs incurred by the pipeline 
operator. Costs of outside response agencies are difficult to obtain 
and are often not directly comparable between jurisdictions. 
MidAmerican and Southwest questioned the need to estimate separately 
the cost of gas released intentionally and unintentionally. Several 
commenters also requested that the form explicitly recognize that the 
reported costs are expected to be estimates. Southwest asked for 
guidance concerning what estimated costs are sufficient to submit a 
``final'' report, noting that some repair and restoration costs (e.g., 
repaving) can be incurred over a significant period of time. 
MidAmerican suggested that the requirement to report emergency response 
costs could lead to a need for an administrative procedure to capture 
costs in real time that could delay emergency response.
    PHMSA response: The revision of this form does not change the 
criteria of an incident as defined in 49 CFR 191.3. Nevertheless, costs 
are incurred for repairs and for emergency response when most incidents 
occur. Consideration of these costs helps identify the relative 
significance of an incident, and PHMSA thus considers it appropriate to 
collect this data. PHMSA agrees that it would be an unreasonable burden 
to require operators to estimate the costs incurred by outside 
emergency response agencies and has limited this factor to costs 
incurred by the operator for emergency response. PHMSA has eliminated 
the need to estimate costs separately for intentionally and 
unintentionally released gas, consistent with the changes discussed 
above for questions 9 and 10. PHMSA has modified the form to note 
explicitly that the reported costs are expected to be estimates.
    With respect to the question asked by Southwest, PHMSA does not 
consider it practical to provide definitive guidance for when cost 
estimates can be considered final. This will vary depending on each 
particular situation, and inherently requires a judgment on the part of 
the operator. PHMSA expects that all significant costs associated with 
an incident will be estimated as part of the initial or a supplemental 
incident report, regardless of whether those costs are incurred soon 
after an incident or at some later time. Operator judgments in this 
regard will be reviewed as part of the regulator's investigation of an 
incident, and additional supplemental incident reports may be requested 
if the regulator concludes that significant costs have not been 
included in reported estimates.
    With respect to the potential for delaying emergency response, 
PHMSA considers that this claim is exaggerated. This form does not 
require that precise costs be reported. Real-time collection of cost 
data is neither needed nor required. Operators will be able to estimate 
costs for emergency response after an event and without affecting 
response during an incident.
    Question 25, customers out of service: SoCal/SDG&E, Nicor, and 
MidAmerican questioned the need to report this information. They 
suggested that the number of customers affected by an incident is not 
related to safety and that the need to report could create a 
disincentive to shut off services that might be contrary to safety. 
Nicor noted that outside emergency responders often turn off service to 
customers regardless of the seriousness of an incident. Southwest 
suggested that this question be re-phrased to seek total number of 
``customer accounts'' out of service. They note that in the case of 
master meter accounts, a pipeline operator may not know the number of 
customers beyond the master meter.
    PHMSA response: While subject to some degree of uncertainty, PHMSA 
has determined that the number of customers placed out of service as a 
result of an incident is a reasonable and readily available measure 
that helps to quantify the relative significance of an incident. PHMSA 
has therefore retained the requirement to report this information. 
PHMSA has not changed the terminology as suggested by Southwest. PHMSA 
is concerned that the number of ``accounts'' could lead to other 
confusion. PHMSA agrees that what is to be reported is the number of 
customers served by the pipeline operator, and that in the case of a 
master meter this would be one; PHMSA does not expect operators to 
estimate how many additional customers are beyond a master meter that 
the operator serves.
Part E, Additional Operating Information
    Question 26, estimated pressure: In addition to asking for the 
estimated pressure at the point and time of the incident, IUB suggested 
asking for the normal operating pressure as distribution systems often 
operate below their maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) and 
this information could be relevant to safety considerations.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has added this question.
    Question 28, MAOP: MidAmerican commented that this question should 
be deleted as this parameter is inspected by State utility boards and 
need not be reported here. Southwest recommended that 49 CFR 192.621 be 
referenced as another section under which a distribution pipeline MAOP 
may be established.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA understands that the established MAOP is 
subject to review by State pipeline safety regulators, but considers 
the information to be relevant to evaluating an incident or to 
subsequent analysis of incident trends. PHMSA has made the addition 
suggested by Southwest.
    Question 29, how detected: MidAmerican suggested that this question 
be deleted since an operator may not be aware of how an incident was 
detected. It may have been reported to the operator by emergency 
response personnel or others who may not have that information.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has revised this question to ask how the 
incident was initially identified by the operator. Notification by 
emergency responders is one of the options provided for selection. 
Operators need not report how those reporting an incident became aware 
of it, only how the operator became aware.
    Questions 30 and 31, controller involvement: AGA and Southwest 
suggested that these questions be deleted until the definition of 
controller was further clarified in the pending rulemaking on control 
room management. Several other commenters suggested that controller 
actions were not relevant for distribution pipelines and that the 
questions should therefore be deleted. AGA suggested adding an option 
for ``NA'' for cases where a controller had no involvement and another 
option to indicate that the extent of controller involvement was still 
under investigation.
    PHMSA response: As previously noted, Congress ordered PHMSA to 
collect information on the role of controller fatigue in incidents and 
accidents, and the agency is coordinating the execution of that mandate 
with its pending rulemaking on control room management. Nevertheless, 
PHMSA has responded to

[[Page 41501]]

the comments received from the various stakeholders by significantly 
reducing the amount of information sought in this section of the form, 
much of which PHMSA will obtain through the use of alternative means, 
including accident investigations. Having taken these steps, PHMSA is 
confident that it has resolved any past concerns over the information 
sought in this section. PHMSA has also added options in the controller 
involvement section for ``NA'' and result pending further investigation 
as suggested.
    Questions 32 and 33, drug and alcohol testing: AGA and APGA 
suggested that the number of operator employees and contractors be 
reported separately rather than together. AGA further suggested that 
the form make clear that the only contractors to be reported are those 
engaged by the pipeline operator. Southwest noted that the form 
implicitly assumes that a drug or alcohol test was required as a result 
of the incident and suggested that the form be revised to first report 
whether such a test was required.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested changes. 
These questions have been modified to ask first if a post-incident drug 
or alcohol test was required and then separately to report the number 
of operator employees and operator-employed contractors who failed such 
tests.
    Question 34, operator qualification: AGA commented that whether an 
incident involved a task covered under operator qualification 
requirements (i.e., a ``covered task'') is a judgment that would be 
part of an incident investigation rather than a report. Nicor suggested 
adding ``NA'' as an option since they did not believe there was a way 
to indicate that a covered task was not involved.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that identifying whether a covered 
task was involved might be part of an incident investigation and not 
immediately obvious upon occurrence. That does not mean, however, that 
it is inappropriate to report the information. There are other 
questions posed on this form that will require some investigation to 
answer. Collection of this data, including whether a covered task was 
involved and if employees were qualified, is important to analyzing 
trends to determine if regulations may be inefficient in preventing 
incidents. PHMSA notes that Nicor's suggested change is not needed. The 
form asks if actions that led to an incident were a covered task. If 
they were not, i.e., if no covered task was involved, then an operator 
simply reports ``no.'' PHMSA has moved these questions to Part F, Cause 
F7--Incorrect Operations, so they only need to be answered for 
incidents where personnel errors are the principal cause.
Part F, Cause Information
    Cause categories: Southwest suggested that this form should be 
consistent with causes being considered for distribution integrity 
management under a rulemaking docket that is still open.
    PHMSA response: Based in part on the contribution and views of 
industry stakeholders, including Southwest, the proposed rule on 
distribution integrity management only incorporates the broad cause 
categories that are listed in the revised incident reporting form, and 
those categories are unchanged from the previous version of the form. 
Thus, the cause categories are consistent with those used in the 
pending rule on distribution integrity management and the prior 
versions of this form and are well-known throughout the pipeline safety 
community. Moreover, the additional information requested in the 
revised form, including the sub-categories not explicitly included in 
the proposed integrity management rule, are important for analyzing 
incident trends. Lastly, PHMSA will address cause categories for the 
distribution integrity management and the annual report form for 
distribution systems in a subsequent Federal Register notice and 
coordinated with the pending distribution integrity management 
rulemaking. While we do not anticipate any changes to cause categories 
on incident forms as a result of the pending rulemaking, PHMSA will 
review the cause categories on the distribution annual report in the 
course of that rulemaking and align the cause categories with those 
implemented for incident forms through this Federal Register notice.
Part F, F1--Corrosion Failure
    Internal corrosion: The draft form posed a number of questions for 
incidents caused by external corrosion, but none for those related to 
internal corrosion. NAPSR suggested information that should be sought 
for internal-corrosion incidents. This included whether corrosion 
inhibitors were used, whether the interior was coated or lined with 
protective coating, whether corrosion coupons were used for monitoring, 
and an indication of whether the location of the incident was one at 
which internal corrosion might have been anticipated (e.g., low point, 
drop out). MOPSC also suggested collecting data about the nature of the 
location where the failure occurred. Southwest suggested asking if 
liquids were found in the system.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has added the questions NAPSR and 
Southwest suggested.
    Cathodic protection: MidAmerican suggested that the question 
relating to when cathodic protection (CP) was started should be made 
optional, because this information might not be available for older 
systems. They also suggested that the information might be of limited 
use, because it will not be clear whether protection was adequate.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has added an option for ``unknown'' to 
address those situations where operators might not know when protection 
was started for older systems. PHMSA understands that the adequacy of 
CP could still be questionable, but whether or not CP was provided is 
an objective data element that is relevant for incident trend analyses. 
In fact, a report that an external-corrosion incident occurred in a 
system that was protected by CP from installation could well indicate 
potential adequacy issues for the CP.
Part F, F2--Natural Force Damage
    Temperature: NAPSR suggested creating a separate sub-category for 
natural or forest fires and eliminating the sub-question regarding 
these under the temperature sub-cause. Southwest commented favorably on 
treatment of forest fires under ``temperature'' but asked if it would 
apply to fires caused by arson.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that treating forest fires as a sub-
category of temperature was inadequate. PHMSA has modified the form to 
treat incidents caused by outside fires in two places. One is under 
natural force damage--lightning, as a sub-category indicating a 
secondary impact such as resulting from nearby fires. The other is 
under outside force damage (F4) for nearby industrial, man-made, or 
other non-natural fire/explosion as the primary cause of the failure. 
Man-made fires, even if forest fires, would be reported under F4.
Part F, F3--Excavation Damage
    Several commenters suggested changes to the additional information 
sought for incidents caused by excavation damage. Among them:
     Deleting unknown/other as a choice for location, since 
operators should know the location.
     Requiring detailed information concerning the one-call 
notification.
     Clarifying the information required for utilities in 
common trenches.
     Clarifying that the name of excavator is a company name 
vs. an

[[Page 41502]]

individual or deleting the requirement to report the name.
     Rearranging the form.
     Adding additional types of markings.
     Requiring additional information about the interaction 
between the pipeline operator and those making one-call requests.
     Eliminating the questions concerning whether the excavator 
incurred downtime and whether the excavation had been ongoing for more 
than one month.
     Deferring to the Common Ground Alliance's Damage 
Information Reporting Tool (DIRT).
     Deleting information about circumstances over which the 
operator had no control.
     Deleting the question about whether notification of 
excavation had been received, because excavators are required to 
notify.
     Deleting the type of excavator and work performed.
     Deleting the type of locator.
     Requiring only mandatory DIRT fields or requiring 
reporting via DIRT rather than duplicating their reporting 
requirements.
    PHMSA response: The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is the recognized 
authority for preventing excavation damage of underground utilities. 
The CGA has determined the information necessary to evaluate excavation 
damage trends via its DIRT system. PHMSA has adopted in this form the 
fields defined within the DIRT system as mandatory. Collecting 
information on excavation damage consistent with DIRT will allow for 
thorough analyses to identify trends related to excavation damage. It 
will also allow comparative analyses to consider information reported 
to DIRT by other underground utility operators, thereby expanding the 
database and potentially affording additional insights.
Part F, F4--Other Outside Force Damage
    Fire-caused: AGA recommended deleting the sub-category related to 
events caused by nearby fires. They contend that these events are 
outside of PHMSA jurisdiction, and that their inclusion in DOT 
statistics will distort the safety record. In support of their 
argument, they note that the DOT incident database records 17 such 
events in 2007 despite hundreds of thousands of fires reported by other 
Federal agencies. Nicor also suggested that this category be deleted as 
such events should only be reported if additional damage due to the gas 
release exceeds reporting criteria. Southwest questioned if this 
category is appropriate for reporting incidents initiated by fires 
caused by arson.
    PHMSA response: Fires whose causes are unrelated to gas 
distribution systems can cause situations that are reported as gas 
distribution incidents. AGA's citation to the 2007 DOT data proves that 
point. A 2003 analysis of incident data sponsored by PHMSA found that a 
small, but significant, percentage of reported incidents were such 
fire-first events. It is important to be able to identify these events 
when analyzing incident experience, in part to be able to separate them 
out as incidents that were not under the control of pipeline operators. 
In fact, many incidents are caused by circumstances not under the 
control of a pipeline operator and thus outside of PHMSA jurisdiction 
(e.g., excavation damage). Nevertheless, it is important to be able to 
characterize correctly the causes of incidents in order to draw 
appropriate lessons from analyses of incident data. PHMSA agrees that 
fire-first incidents need not be reported unless reporting criteria in 
49 CFR 191.3 are met, but that does not eliminate the need to capture 
appropriately the data for circumstances in which a report is required. 
PHMSA has retained this category. As described above, this category 
would be appropriate for reporting incidents from arson-related fires.
    Damage by vehicles: AGA and Nicor recommended eliminating the sub-
category for damage by vehicles not engaged in excavation. They note 
that vehicle accidents happen, that operators would not be culpable, 
and that collection of this data is thus unnecessary. Nicor and 
Southwest further noted that there are parameters relevant to a 
complete understanding of vehicle-impact events that will be unknown to 
pipeline operators.
    PHMSA response: Culpability is not the issue. As with fire-first 
events, analysis of distribution pipeline incident data has shown that 
incidents caused by vehicle impacts are a small, but significant, 
percentage of all incidents. Again, PHMSA is not attempting to regulate 
the operation of vehicles near pipelines. It is necessary to a complete 
understanding of the incident experience to be able to identify 
incidents caused by vehicle impacts. Asking whether a vehicle barrier 
was in place does not pre-suppose that the absence of such a barrier 
was a contributing cause to an incident. The presence or absence of 
such barriers is a factor that can be within the control of a pipeline 
operator and which could be important to understanding the importance 
of such protection. It is therefore appropriate to identify whether 
such barriers were present.
Part F, F5--Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure
    General: MidAmerican commented that this section adds little value 
for distribution pipelines and should be deleted. Southwest suggested 
that this section is disorganized and that it should be restructured to 
ask first questions related to both metal and plastic pipe and then 
those specific to a type of material.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA continues to consider this section important. 
The greater use of plastic pipe in distribution pipelines may make 
welds of relatively less significance, but other joints are potentially 
susceptible to failure. In particular, failure of mechanical/
compression couplings has been the cause of a number of serious 
incidents on distribution pipelines. PHMSA has made some editorial 
changes to this section in response to other comments, but has not 
reorganized it. The first portion of this section relates to the 
portion of the pipeline involved--body of pipe or type of joint. Some 
of the joint types are applicable to metal and some to plastic, but the 
reporting operator only needs to select the single appropriate entry. 
The latter portion poses questions that are applicable to all pipe 
types. PHMSA considers this organization appropriate.
    Compression couplings: NAPSR recommended that compression couplings 
be identified as a separate sub-cause. Failure of compression couplings 
has been the cause of a number of serious gas distribution pipeline 
incidents.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the recommended change.
    Additional information required: NAPSR suggested including 
``previous damage'' as one of the potential causes of failure. AGA 
suggested deleting ``design defect'' since they believe that it is 
unclear.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees with NAPSR and has made the 
recommended change. PHMSA did not make the change AGA suggested. PHMSA 
considers that design defects are a condition that could influence 
joint failures. PHMSA will add additional clarification in the 
instructions.
    Plastic joints: AGA and Southwest suggested that ``butt, 
electrofusion'' duplicates ``socket, electrofusion'' and that one of 
them should be deleted.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees. The electrofusion process may be 
the same. The presence of a pre-formed socket potentially affects the 
fit-up process and can affect the integrity of

[[Page 41503]]

the joint. PHMSA considers it worthwhile to collect data at a level of 
detail that would reflect these differences.
    Pipe seam: Southwest questioned why the type of pipe seam was no 
longer of interest for seam failures.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that this information is potentially 
important and has revised the form to restore the specification of seam 
type from the present form.
    Pressure tests: NAPSR and Southwest recommended that the question 
of whether a hydrostatic test has been conducted since installation be 
deleted. They noted that hydrostatic tests are generally not performed 
for distribution pipelines. Southwest also noted that it may be 
difficult to determine the actual test pressure.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA acknowledges that pressure tests are 
conducted rarely, if ever, for many distribution pipelines subsequent 
to initial construction, and that air or natural gas is often used as 
the test medium rather than water. PHMSA has revised this question to 
refer to pressure tests vs. hydrostatic tests. The fact that pressure 
tests may be rare for some distribution pipelines is not particularly 
relevant. Operators who have not conducted pressure tests since 
installation would simply check ``no'' for this question. PHMSA 
considers that whether a pipeline that has failed (i.e., suffered an 
incident) had been tested is an important piece of information. PHMSA 
recognizes that a precise determination of test pressure may be 
difficult, but notes that an estimate of the test pressure should be 
easier to obtain and will be sufficient. PHMSA will clarify the 
instructions to discuss the expected degree of precision.
Part F, F6--Equipment Failure
    Non-threaded failures: NAPSR suggested deletion of the 
clarification ``NOT pump seals'' since pumps are not used in 
distribution pipeline systems.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has made the suggested change.
    Malfunction of control/relief equipment: IUB noted that the reason 
for a failure is an important piece of information not collected.
    PHMSA response: A description of the failure/incident can always be 
included in Part G. PHMSA saw no reason why this particular incident 
cause should be separately identified as requiring additional 
explanation.
    Non-threaded connection failure: IUB noted that O-rings and gaskets 
are seals and questioned why operators were asked to specify either of 
these or ``seal or packing.''
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that O-rings and gaskets are, 
technically, types of seals. They are, however, in common use and 
generally referred to as O-rings and gaskets rather than as seals. 
PHMSA has modified this question for clarity to make the choices O-
rings, gaskets, and ``other'' seals or packing.
Part F, F-7, Incorrect Operation
    General: APGA noted that the instructions for this section do not 
address all of the sub-causes. They also questioned the value of sub-
categorizing these incidents.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will revise the instructions. PHMSA cannot 
know at this time the value of collecting information at the sub-
category level, because the data has not previously been collected. 
PHMSA considers it worthwhile to collect this data to determine if 
there are sub-categories of incorrect operation that may require 
additional regulatory attention. Operators completing reports will only 
be required to check the box for the appropriate type of mal-operation, 
so PHMSA concludes that the additional burden required to collect this 
information will be minimal.
    Valve left or placed in wrong position: NAPSR suggested deleting 
reference to caverns since cavern storage is not a part of distribution 
pipelines. Nicor suggested that the term ``storage'' be defined
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has deleted all reference to storage. The 
question had asked whether incorrect valve operation resulted in 
overpressurization of storage. PHMSA has revised this question to ask 
simply whether overpressurization, of any pipeline portion/component, 
resulted.
Part F, F8--Other Cause
    Still under investigation: For incidents still under investigation, 
the form noted that a supplemental incident report was required. NAPSR 
suggested modifying the form to require that this report be submitted 
within one year.
    PHMSA response: The regulation requires supplemental reports, as 
deemed necessary, when additional relevant information is obtained. The 
regulation does not, however, specify a maximum time frame in which 
such reports must be submitted. PHMSA cannot use this change in the 
incident report form to impose such a requirement. PHMSA will modify 
the instructions to state its preference that supplemental reports 
addressing additional investigation be submitted within one year of the 
submission of the initial incident/accident report.
Instructions for Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.1--Gas Distribution 
Systems
    In response to many of the comments received, PHMSA has revised the 
instructions to reflect changes made in the form and for editorial 
purposes. PHMSA also received the following specific comments on the 
instructions:
    Duplication of the form: Many commenters noted that a large portion 
of the proposed instructions was duplicative of the information already 
provided on the incident reporting form and that such information could 
be deleted. These commenters also suggested that the instructions 
should only provide additional guidance, where needed, and that 
eliminating unnecessary or duplicative information would significantly 
shorten the instructions and make them more useful.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has deleted unnecessary 
duplication.
    Reporting to State regulators: NAPSR and State regulators suggested 
that the instructions include a reminder to operators of their 
obligations to comply with any applicable State reporting requirements.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has added such a reminder.
    Time to report: NAPSR noted that the indication that incidents are 
to be reported to the National Response Center by telephone within 24 
hours was a deviation from past practice. The regulation, 49 CFR 191.5, 
requires that telephonic reports be made ``at the earliest practicable 
moment.'' NAPSR notes a long-standing interpretation that such reports 
should be made in 2 hours and questions the change to 24 hours.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that this was an unintended change and 
has revised the instructions to reflect the long-standing 2-hour 
interpretation.
    Cost guidance: NAPSR and MOPSC suggested that additional guidance 
be provided for estimating costs associated with an accident. 
Specifically, they suggested including guidance published in advisory 
bulletin ADB-94-01.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has included the guidance from the advisory 
bulletin.
    Incidents significant in operator's judgment: An incident is 
defined as an event that meets certain threshold criteria or is 
otherwise ``significant, in the judgment of the operator.'' 49 CFR 
191.3. Southwest requested that the form include guidance on PHMSA's 
policy toward reporting the latter category of incidents, i.e., those 
based solely on the operator's judgment.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA does not believe that the provision of any

[[Page 41504]]

additional guidance on this issue is appropriate or required at this 
time. However, PHMSA reminds operators that Form F 7100.1 must be 
completed and submitted regardless of whether an incident is based on 
the specific threshold criteria or an operator's judgment.
    Classification of fatalities: Southwest suggested that the guidance 
on reporting an injury that ultimately results in fatality raises 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) concerns.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees. The identified guidance simply 
states that injuries that result in a fatality within 30 days of an 
incident should be reported as fatalities and that injuries that result 
in a fatality beyond that time should be reported as injuries. This is 
consistent with DOT's general guidelines and does not involve 
information protected by HIPAA.
Comments on Burden Estimate, Form 7100.1, Incident Report--Gas 
Distribution System
    Investigation Burden estimate: NAPSR and State regulators commented 
that the burden estimate did not account for the burden on State 
regulatory agencies to investigate incidents.
    PHMSA response: The burden associated with investigations is not 
related to the information that is collected via this form and has been 
appropriately excluded.
    Burden estimate: SoCal/SDG&E, Nicor, and MidAmerican commented that 
the burden for completing the form (estimated at 7 hours) was 
significantly underestimated. MidAmerican contended that the total time 
required to complete the form could be 20 to 40 hours or longer for 
complicated events. SoCal/SDG&E suggested that the burden could be 
reduced by redefining the thresholds for reporting incidents.
    PHMSA response: The operators provided little information in 
support of their contention. Nicor and SoCal/SDG&E simply stated that 
the burden was greater than estimated by PHMSA. MidAmerican provided 
estimates of hours that would be required to complete some sections of 
the form, but without substantiation. PHMSA agrees that complicated 
events may take longer, but notes that the shorter time that will be 
required for more ``simple'' events will balance this out. PHMSA 
believes that MidAmerican's estimates are excessive. Even if completion 
of the form would require more than the seven hours estimated, the 
total burden of this information collection is still minimal. Operators 
need only complete the form if they have an incident. There are 
approximately 150 incidents annually on gas distribution systems, and 
it is rare for an individual operator to experience more than one. 
PHMSA considers that the value of this information for future analysis 
of incident trends and the factors that influence the occurrence of 
incidents justifies the information collection burden. The threshold 
for reporting incidents is defined in the regulations and no change to 
those regulations has been proposed. Changing the threshold is beyond 
the scope of this information collection request.

B. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.2, Gas Transmission and Gathering 
Systems

General Comments (Impacted Information Collection: OMB 2137-0522)
    Definition of incident: INGAA suggested that any information 
collection should be limited to only those events that meet the 
reporting thresholds for unintentional releases of gas, a limitation 
not included in the definition of incident in 49 CFR 191.3, but one 
that is included in the definition of incident in ASME/ANSI B31.8S 
(referenced in 49 CFR 192.945). Panhandle also suggested that a 
modification of the definition of incident, particularly given the 
recent change in the price of natural gas, should precede any change to 
the accompanying reporting form.
    PHMSA response: The definition of an incident is established by 
regulation and can only be changed in a notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
an action that is beyond the scope of this information collection 
request.
    Report vs. investigation: INGAA and certain pipeline operators 
argued that PHMSA's proposed changes to the reporting form go beyond 
what is necessary to report an incident and are tantamount to requiring 
a root cause investigation. INGAA suggested that this would likely mean 
that most of the incident reports submitted in 30 days would be 
incomplete. INGAA further suggested that the additional data items 
included in the new form actually undermine the original purpose of 
incident reporting. INGAA suggested that a rulemaking should be 
initiated if PHMSA wants to make changes of this magnitude.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that the revised form is designed to 
collect new, and in some cases more detailed, data on incidents. 
However, PHMSA has determined that this information is needed to 
identify trends in the occurrence of safety-related problems, to 
appropriately target its performance of risk-based inspections, and to 
assess the overall efficacy of its pipeline-safety regime. Furthermore, 
PHMSA does not agree that a root cause investigation must be conducted 
to complete the revised form. On the contrary, PHMSA is confident that 
a prudent operator can complete the form in a reasonable amount of time 
based on the information available at or near the time of the incident. 
While the number of incidents that occur annually has declined in 
recent years, PHMSA remains committed to reducing the occurrence and 
mitigating the consequences of these adverse events, and more detailed 
data is required to support these analyses.
    Relationship to pending rulemaking: INGAA and AGA argued that the 
data sought on potential controller involvement exceeds current 
regulatory requirements. INGAA and AGA also noted that a rulemaking on 
control room management is pending and suggested that any changes to 
the incident reporting forms be deferred until that proceeding is 
completed. Nicor, Paiute/Southwest, and SoCal/SDG&E also supported 
removing these questions pending completion of the control room 
management rulemaking.
    PHMSA response: Congress has mandated that PHMSA use its broad 
authority to collect information on pipeline facilities, 49 U.S.C. 
60117(b)(1)-(2), to obtain specific data from owners and operators on 
the role of controller fatigue in incidents and accidents. Pipeline 
Inspection, Protection and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 2006, Public Law 
109-468, section 20, 120 Stat. 3498 (Dec. 29, 2006). However, rather 
than addressing that mandate in isolation, PHMSA is coordinating its 
collection of that information with its pending rulemaking on control 
room management. Transmission lines are a key part of the nation's 
pipeline network, and Congress has determined that additional 
information on the contribution of controller fatigue to the occurrence 
of incidents and accidents is vital to PHMSA's safety mission. These 
authorities provide ample support for collecting all of the information 
sought in the proposed revision to the incident reporting form without 
further delay.
    Time to implement: INGAA estimated that it could take up to 6 
months to fully integrate the new incident reporting form and suggested 
that a stay of enforcement be granted with respect to any reporting 
problems that arise during this time. SoCal/SDG&E suggested that 
operators be allowed a period of three months after publication to 
begin using the new form. Paiute/Southwest

[[Page 41505]]

suggested that the substantial changes made in the incident reporting 
form justify PHMSA's sponsoring of a workshop to allow operators and 
other affected parties to discuss the underlying issues.
    PHSMA response: PHMSA does not agree that the proposed incident 
reporting form is significantly more complicated than its current 
counterpart. To the contrary, PHMSA has structured the new form to make 
it much easier to complete than the current form in most instances. 
Similarly, PHMSA has determined that most of the information requested 
should be readily available within the 30-day reporting period, and 
that any new data can as in the past be submitted in a Supplemental 
Report. Nevertheless, PHMSA will host a Web Live Meeting or similar 
forum when the new form is issued to explain its contents and 
demonstrate its proper use. PHMSA will also consider posting these 
broadcasts on its Web site for later reference.
Part A, Key Report Information
    Question 1 and 2, Operator identification: IUB suggested that a 
mailing address is still needed for any official correspondence that 
may be needed in response to an incident. In particular, IUB noted that 
while PHMSA may have access to an address through its OPID system, 
others seeking to contact the company may not have access to that 
information.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has made the suggested change.
    Question 4, location of incident: NAPSR suggested adding ``GPS 
Coordinates'' and ``Projection'' to provide clarity and better define 
the latitude/longitude data.
    PHMSA response: Appropriate guidance will be included in the 
instructions. The current state of GPS location technology is such that 
these sorts of descriptors are no longer necessary.
    Question 6, time and date of telephonic report: INGAA and Panhandle 
suggested deleting this element since it could conflict with 
information recorded by the National Response Center (NRC). They 
suggested that the NRC could provide this information if needed.
    PHMSA response: This information is important to demonstrate that 
the NRC was notified as required. This information is also important in 
PHMSA's evaluation of the timeliness of an operator's NRC reporting and 
subsequent follow-up. It adds minimal burden and will assure that the 
information is captured in the same database as other information 
related to the incident. PHMSA has retained this element.
    Question 7, commodity released: Several commenters noted that 
``spilled'' is an inappropriate term for gas and should be replaced 
with ``released.'' INGAA and Panhandle also suggested that the terms 
``wet'' and ``sour'' should be defined and that the term ``synthetic 
gas'' is not clear. INGAA also commented that releases of propane would 
be hard to detect and that this commodity is generally not transported 
via transmission pipelines. Panhandle questioned why propane, which 
they contend is a hazardous liquid, is on the list. NAPSR suggested 
collecting the following data for sour gas: H2S---- grains/
100cf or ---- ppm and replacing ``[Neither]'' with ``[Other/Specify:--
--].'' They suggested that operators completing reports could specify 
could specify [Dry], P/L quality gas. NAPSR also noted that a number of 
the releases in question 31 could involve significant quantities of 
liquids and asked whether the volume of these liquids should be 
reported.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has changed ``spilled'' to ``released,'' and 
eliminated the questions pertaining to whether the gas released is 
``wet'' or ``sour'' due to the limited usefulness of that information 
in ensuring public safety. Synthetic gas and propane gas have been 
retained. Though rare, these are transported commodities which could be 
involved in a reportable release. A question requiring the operator to 
report the amount of liquid that accompanies a gas release has been 
added.
    Questions 9 and 10, volume released: NAPSR suggested that the 
acronym MCF be spelled out to avoid confusion. They noted that this 
typically refers to thousands of cubic feet, but that M is also used in 
engineering applications to denote millions. INGAA suggested revising 
the language of these questions to replace gas released unintentionally 
with gas released during the incident and gas released intentionally 
with gas released during mitigation and repair. MidAmerican, Paiute/
Southwest and SoCal/SDG&E noted that it can be difficult to estimate 
the amount of gas released and to differentiate between what is 
intentionally and unintentionally released. They suggested simply 
reporting the estimated total volume released. Atmos agreed that the 
form should indicate that the amounts reported are expected to be 
estimates. Panhandle questioned the need to report any quantity of gas 
released unless it is associated with a criterion defining a reportable 
incident.
    PHMSA response: ``MCF'' has been spelled out to eliminate 
confusion, and the questions have been revised to clarify the 
unintentional vs. intentional amounts of any gas released. PHMSA 
recognizes that it may be difficult to estimate released volumes in 
some situations. PHMSA only expects that a reasonable estimate be made 
based on the facts of the incident known by the operator, and will 
explain this in the instructions.
    Questions 11 and 12, number of fatalities and injuries: Several 
commenters questioned the need for some of the information sought in 
these questions. For example, INGAA and Nicor suggested omitting the 
numbers of emergency responders and non-operator personnel working on 
the right-of-way, characterizing that information as without value and 
ambiguous. Paiute/Southwest also suggested that the category of 
``emergency responders'' be limited to non-operator personnel as 
operator employees and contractors are addressed in other categories. 
Paiute/Southwest also noted that pipelines may be located in areas 
other than a right-of-way. Finally, Panhandle questioned the need for 
any of the detailed information sought, suggesting instead that all 
that is needed is a yes/no answer as to whether fatalities or injuries 
occurred and, if so, a number.
    PHMSA response: Because utility rights-of-way are used for purposes 
other than gas pipelines, employees or persons associated with other 
utilities (e.g., electric, other pipelines) may be performing work on 
the right-of-way at or near the time of an incident. PHMSA considers it 
important to collect data on this category of the ``public'' to 
determine if common location of utilities is a factor that contributes 
to incident frequency. Similar situations exist for other pipeline 
types with other pipelines/utilities installed in common rights-of-way/
easements, and PHMSA also collects this data for those pipelines. For 
these reasons, PHMSA has retained this category. PHMSA agrees with 
Paiute/Southwest that the emergency responder category was intended to 
apply to responders not employed by the pipeline operator and has 
modified the form accordingly.
    Question 13, was pipeline shut down: NAPSR suggested that 
information on the exact date and duration of pipeline shutdown be 
collected, noting that this may occur on the date of or subsequent to 
the incident depending on the circumstances presented. INGAA suggested 
that this question be either deleted or limited to situations where a 
shutdown or reduction in the capacity of a pipeline occurred for an 
extended

[[Page 41506]]

period. They contended that wide variations in the nature and duration 
of shutdowns would make this data of limited use and noted that details 
necessary to understand these variations were not being collected. 
Paiute/Southwest suggested that it allow for reporting of shutdowns 
affecting just the portion of the system in which the incident 
occurred. MidAmerican suggested that the duration of a shutdown is not 
relevant, as pipelines can remain shutdown for a variety of reasons 
that may not be related to the incident. Panhandle questioned the 
relevance of this information and suggested that the question be 
deleted.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that there can be wide variations 
in the nature, cause, and extent of shutdowns. However, PHMSA has 
concluded that the information is needed to enable the agency to better 
determine the full extent of the impact on the overall reliability of 
the nation's pipeline infrastructure caused by the incident. For 
example, shutdowns and failures can adversely affect the broader public 
through the loss of heat during cold periods, and the impact on at-risk 
communities, including homes, hospitals, nursing homes, can be 
particularly severe. Nonetheless, in response to the comments received 
on the notice, PHMSA has modified this question to collect information 
specific to shutdowns on the time of the shutdown, the time the 
incident was identified, the time that operator resources arrived on 
site, and the time the facility was restarted, from which meaningful 
durations and intervals can then be calculated.
    Questions 14 and 15, did commodity ignite/explode: INGAA noted that 
the term explosion is highly subjective and suggested these two 
questions be consolidated into a single question on whether the 
released commodity ignited. Panhandle agreed, noting that while an 
ignition might sound like an explosion a true explosion cannot occur 
unless gas is contained.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has used the terms ``fire'' and ``explosion'' 
in the past without controversy and does not believe that the few 
isolated situations where the difference between a fire and an 
explosion might be relevant warrants the changes INGAA and Panhandle 
suggested.
    Question 16, number evacuated: MidAmerican recommended that the 
heading be changed to ``Estimated Number of General Public Evacuated if 
Known.'' They suggested that the number of evacuees is likely to be 
unknown, because emergency services call for evacuation in an informal 
manner and people self-evacuate. Panhandle also stated that this number 
would be difficult to estimate for the same reasons.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA recognizes that this data will be an estimate 
and may be subject to some uncertainty, but does not consider that 
changes to the form are needed. PHMSA expects operators to exercise 
reasonable diligence in estimating the number of people evacuated. The 
instructions will so state.
    Question 17, elapsed time: NAPSR suggested that this question be 
revised to request a time sequence, similar to the changes they 
suggested for Form F 7100.1, Gas Distribution Systems. Several pipeline 
operators noted an inconsistency between the form and the instructions 
for this question. Paiute/Southwest questioned the use to which this 
data will be put, contending that the implied development of a national 
response time for an incident would be inappropriate due to differences 
in the circumstances of different pipeline operators in widely varying 
geographic locations. Panhandle questioned the value of this question, 
commenting that there are incidents in which operating personnel would 
not go to the site.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has modified this question to provide for a 
time sequence, similar to the change made to the gas distribution 
system incident report form. PHMSA has addressed the inconsistency with 
the instructions. PHMSA considers that it is very unlikely that a 
reportable incident (i.e., an event involving a fatality, serious 
injury, or $50,000 in property damage) will occur without some 
representative of the operator being dispatched to the site. The time 
sequence asks when ``operator resources'' arrived, which would account 
for situations in which the personnel dispatched are contractors rather 
than operator personnel. PHMSA has no intention to develop a national 
response time limit.
Part B, Additional Location Information
    Questions 20 and 21, address: NAPSR suggested separate lines be 
provided for City and County/Parish. NAPSR also suggested adding other 
options to identify locations between station numbers and to provide a 
segment ID and the name of the pipeline. IUB commented that the form 
should retain the option to provide location by section, township, and 
range, as this is still the best way to identify a location in rural 
areas. MidAmerican suggested deleting questions 21-23, based on the 
assumption that operators would provide geographic coordinates. INGAA 
suggested that question 20 should allow for, but not require, a ``zip 
plus 4'' zip code. Panhandle noted it is sometimes difficult to obtain 
zip codes for sites in rural areas.
    PHMSA response: The form has been modified to separate City from 
County/Parish, to add space for a Pipeline Name and Segment ID and to 
allow for, but not require, a ``zip plus 4'' zip code. PHMSA considers 
the available options to identify location to be sufficient.
    Question 22, operator designated location: INGAA noted that 
transmission pipelines associated with distribution systems are 
unlikely to be designated by milepost/valve station or survey station 
number. INGAA and Paiute/Southwest contended that the latitude/
longitude information provided in question 4 should be sufficient and 
suggested deleting question 22.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA must be able to identify the precise location 
of an incident for either contemporary or future purposes. The 
milepost/valve station/survey station information provides a designator 
that allows later determination of the precise location of the incident 
on operator drawings and records, while the latitude/longitude 
information allows for the incident's precise location on-site or 
geographically, both of which are essential for further investigation 
and analysis.
    Question 23, Federal lands: NAPSR suggested a breakdown by type of 
Federal land, e.g., Military, Tribal Reservation, BLM, Forest Service, 
Park Service.
    PHMSA response: The statutory basis for issuing pipeline rights-of-
way on Federal lands is 30 U.S.C. 185, and the purpose of this question 
is to identify incidents that occur on lands subject to that code 
section. Section 185 does not require a breakdown by type, as suggested 
by NAPSR. PHMSA does not see the utility in requiring this additional 
level of detail, nor does it envision any risk evaluations where this 
information might prove valuable.
    Question 24, location of incident: NAPSR suggested requiring a 
name/identification for lakes, rivers, streams, or creek crossings, 
noting that this information can be useful and is usually readily 
obtainable. Nicor and Columbia suggested that ``high consequence area'' 
be used instead of ``covered segment'' as the term is more readily 
recognized. They further commented that the method by which a high 
consequence area (HCA) was determined and whether it is based on an 
identified site are not relevant and both elements should be deleted. 
INGAA and Panhandle noted that the method of

[[Page 41507]]

determining an HCA may vary over time and that this data will thus be 
of limited use for trending. INGAA and Panhandle also suggested that 
class location be part of a separate question and questioned the value 
of additional data elements added to this question. They recommended 
that this item be limited to determining whether the incident happened 
in an HCA and its class location.
    PHMSA response: The name of the water body being crossed has been 
added. And the term ``high consequence area'' has replaced ``covered 
segment'' to reflect the term already defined in regulation and to 
reduce the potential for confusion. Identification of the method by 
which an HCA is determined is essential to PHMSA's ability to assess 
and validate the basic approaches operators use to determine this 
critical, safety-related calculation. Identification of Class 
Location--another primary safety indicator--has been segregated out and 
rewritten as its own question as suggested.
    Question 25, approximate water depth: INGAA and Panhandle noted 
that this question will be confusing for incidents that occur offshore 
in piping on platforms, i.e., not below the surface. INGAA suggested 
first asking if the incident occurred on a platform and only asking 
water depth for those offshore incidents that did not.
    PHMSA response: The instructions will make clear that this is 
intended to be the water depth at the location of the incident, even if 
the incident occurs on a platform, and not the depth of the incident 
below the water.
    Question 26, origin in State waters: For offshore incidents in 
State waters, NAPSR suggested requiring specification of the State, the 
Area, and the Block/Track as this is useful identifying information. 
Paiute/Southwest requested clarification as to the term ``origin of the 
accident'' and whether ``in State waters'' refers only to commercially 
navigable waterways.
    PHMSA response: For offshore incidents in State waters, the form 
has been modified to obtain Area and Block/Track information to more 
accurately locate the incident. Commercially navigable waterways may or 
may not exist offshore. For an incident to be considered both 
``offshore'' and ``in State waters,'' the incident would by definition 
not be in inland waters. This ``offshore'' determination would be made 
without regard for whether the waters were commercially navigable or 
not.
    Question 27, area of failure: Nicor and Atmos objected to the use 
of the undefined term ``failure'' in this question and commented that 
an incident may result from circumstances outside the control of a 
pipeline operator, e.g., impact by a non-operator vehicle and not from 
a ``failure'' of the pipeline. Nicor also noted that options for 
normally buried pipe and aboveground appurtenances need to be provided. 
IUB also noted that the options available on the form were not adequate 
to address many situations. For example, IUB noted that most 
underground pipelines are simply buried under soil, but that this is 
not one of the options for selection. Instead, it would need to be 
reported as ``other'' and described. IUB considered it inappropriate 
that reporting of the most common situation should be relegated to 
``other.'' For transmission pipelines, IUB noted that the likelihood of 
pipelines being buried under a building is so remote that this option 
should be deleted. INGAA and Panhandle recommended adding depth of 
cover for underground facilities, information that is currently 
collected and has proven valuable. Paiute/Southwest requested 
clarification of the term ``open ditch.''
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has replaced the word ``failure'' with 
``incident'' to the extent practicable. Nonetheless, there are still 
some situations where the use of ``failure'' in its common definition 
is necessary and would not be confusing. The selections for Underground 
and Aboveground locations have been refined and expanded upon, each 
retaining an ``Other'' category to capture situations not expressly 
identified in the selections offered. Under soil has been included. For 
Underground facilities, depth-of-cover has been added as suggested.
Part C, Additional Facility Information
    Question 28, pipeline function: MidAmerican commented that the term 
``Transmission Line of Distribution System'' needs to be defined.
    PHMSA response: This is intended to refer to a pipeline classified 
as transmission (usually due to operating stress levels) but operated 
as part of a distribution pipeline system. This will be defined in the 
accompanying instructions.
    Question 30, part of system involved: INGAA and Panhandle commented 
that the data required for this question would be of little or no value 
and suggested that the choices be limited to below ground storage 
including piping, above ground storage vessels and piping, pipelines, 
compressors, and metering/regulation, and that all the offshore data 
elements should be deleted. Nicor also questioned the value of the 
offshore elements for incident trending and analysis.
    PHMSA response: The categories have been adjusted to reflect these 
comments, with the exception of the elimination of the offshore 
elements. Offshore pipelines and facilities represent a very distinct 
and different set of conditions and risk factors--and available 
preventive and mitigative measures--than onshore pipelines and 
facilities, so we have retained offshore elements to capture them 
separately. We have deleted the collection of detailed offshore data 
elements relating to valving and isolation.
    Question 31, item involved: INGAA and Panhandle questioned the 
value of many of these data elements for incident analysis, noting that 
the list of potential pipe coatings and equipment types is not complete 
and that a complete list could be very long. INGAA and Panhandle also 
suggested many of the seldom-involved elements be deleted. MidAmerican 
also commented that providing the amount of data required would be 
burdensome and questioned its value. For example, MidAmerican noted 
that pipe seam type would be of little interest for an incident 
resulting from excavation damage and that coating type is relevant only 
if the incident is caused by corrosion. Panhandle commented that this 
section is unclear if an incident involves other than pipe or a valve, 
and noted that compressor is addressed here and in Part F6. Panhandle 
also suggested that operators be required to only provide the 
information that is relevant, suggesting, for example, that wall 
thickness and SMYS of the pipe are not important if the incident 
involves a valve. NAPSR recommended adding joint as an element and 
requiring that the joint type be specified. Commenters noted that some 
of the information may not be known for older pipelines and that the 
form should accommodate this by allowing a response of ``unknown.'' 
Atmos questioned whether extruded polyethylene is a coating type. 
SoCal/SDG&E suggested that pipe specification should be better defined. 
Nicor suggested changing ``failure'' to ``incident.''
    PHMSA response: Choices have been expanded and modified based on 
comments received, with an ``Other'' category as an option for those 
situations not identified by the other choices. PHMSA considers the 
item involved in an incident to be a basic piece of data that should be 
captured for all incidents. Additional data is only being collected as 
it pertains to the individual item selected as being involved in the 
incident. In particular,

[[Page 41508]]

with pipe being such a critical component that represents a vast 
majority of any pipeline asset, PHMSA believes that basic information 
pertaining to the pipe will be valuable for a number of analyses and 
also to better understand the basic characteristics of any pipeline 
system. We have changed ``failure'' to ``incident'' wherever 
practicable throughout the form.
    Question 33, material involved: IUB suggested that the type of 
plastic be requested when an incident involves plastic pipe as well as 
additional information to specify the particular plastic. INGAA and 
Panhandle suggested that the response options be limited to steel, 
plastic, and other. They contended that additional information is not 
needed for plastic pipe, since plastic pipe is seldom used in 
transmission pipelines.
    PHMSA response: The choices have been limited to steel, plastic, 
and other. PHMSA agrees that plastic pipe is not prevalent enough in 
transmission or gathering service to warrant capturing the type of 
plastic used.
    Question 34, type of failure: INGAA and Panhandle noted that the 
proposed form no longer asks for information concerning puncture size 
and also omits other questions from the current form. They believe that 
this information has proven useful and should be retained. INGAA and 
Panhandle noted that overpressure is a potential cause, but not a type 
of failure. Nicor and Columbia suggested that there are other types of 
mechanical damage of potential interest besides punctures. IUB 
suggested value in requesting the type of joint failure for cases of 
failure of plastic pipe joints.
    PHMSA response: Puncture and Rupture size information has been 
restored. We have removed overpressure as a ``Type'' of incident, and 
Connection Failure and have included it as a sub-category to 
accommodate threaded connections or other types of joints.
Part D, Additional Consequence Information
    Question 35, potential impact radius (PIR): INGAA, Panhandle, and 
Columbia suggested deleting this question, noting that it is only 
relevant for an HCA and then only if method 2 was used to identify 
HCAs. Paiute/Southwest noted that PIRs are not calculated if method 1 
is used. Some commenters also contended that the need for this 
information as part of an incident report is not obvious. INGAA and 
Panhandle also suggested that the related requirement to describe the 
incident footprint in the narrative be deleted, in part because the 
footprint will reflect subsequent material fires and will not be 
directly proportional to the size of a pipeline leak or rupture. 
Several commenters noted that PIR should be spelled out as potential 
impact radius (as opposed to a circle) and that the dimensions in which 
the size is to be reported (feet) should be included.
    PHMSA response: We have modified the form so that the PIR is only 
required to be reported when it was calculated by the operator. The 
descriptive information pertaining to an incident footprint has been 
omitted; however, if and when an incident has occurred in an HCA, it is 
very important for PHMSA--as well as the operator--to understand if 
there were any impacts beyond the calculated PIR, and to what extent 
these impacts existed. If impacts of incidents are often found to 
extend beyond the calculated PIR, it could indicate a need for PHMSA to 
revise the PIR definition. As a result, several specific questions 
asking about these impacts now replace the more general descriptive 
information about the incident's footprint.
    Question 36, cost data: INGAA noted that the difficulties in 
estimating the amount of gas released intentionally and unintentionally 
(see question 9 and 10 above) also apply here. They further suggested 
that the cost of the commodity be deleted, since it appears that the 
reporting basis will now be volume released. They suggested that cost 
of repair should be limited to repair of the pipeline facility and 
should not include costs to repair property of others. INGAA also noted 
that the cost of emergency response by others may be impossible to 
know. Columbia also noted that the information desired for cost of 
emergency response requires clarification. NAPSR suggested that 
emergency response costs be limited to those borne by the operator. 
Nicor and Atmos suggested that this element be deleted, along with cost 
of repair, since those costs are not required to be considered by 49 
CFR 191.3 in determining whether an incident has occurred. Several 
commenters also requested that the form explicitly recognize that the 
reported costs are expected to be estimates. Paiute/Southwest asked for 
guidance concerning what estimated costs are sufficient to submit a 
``final'' report, noting that some repair and restoration costs (e.g., 
repaving) can be incurred over a significant period of time. NAPSR 
suggested consideration be given to adding ``customers out of service'' 
as done on the distribution pipeline form.
    PHMSA response: The revision to this form does not change the 
criteria that define an incident under 49 CFR 191.3. Nevertheless, 
costs are incurred for repairs and for emergency response when most 
incidents occur, and consideration of these costs helps identify the 
relative significance of an incident. Thus, PHMSA considers it 
appropriate to collect this data. PHMSA agrees that it would be an 
unreasonable burden to require operators to estimate the costs incurred 
by outside emergency response agencies and has limited this factor to 
costs incurred by the operator to cover their emergency response 
activities. PHMSA has modified the form to note explicitly that the 
reported costs are expected to be estimates, including the cost of gas 
lost both unintentionally and intentionally as these are key components 
in evaluating the overall impacts of incidents. PHMSA considers that 
attempting to determine the ``customers out of service'' for gas 
transmission and gathering incidents would in most cases be too far 
removed from the incident involved and too difficult to obtain with any 
degree of certainty.
    With respect to the question asked by Paiute/Southwest, PHMSA does 
not consider it practical to provide definitive guidance for when cost 
estimates are to be considered final. That determination will vary 
depending on the facts and circumstances of each particular incident 
and inherently requires an exercise of judgment by the operator. PHMSA 
expects that all significant costs associated with an incident will be 
estimated as part of the initial or a supplemental incident report, 
regardless of whether those costs are incurred soon after an incident 
or at some later time. An operator's judgment in this regard will be 
reviewed as part of the regulator's investigation of an incident, and 
additional supplemental incident reports may be requested if PHMSA (or 
its State partner agency) concludes that significant costs have not 
been included in reported estimates. It is important that PHMSA account 
for and understand the true and total costs of incidents which occur, 
not just to allow for a reasonable accounting to the public and other 
stakeholders, but also to improve the accuracy of any future cost-
benefit analyses that PHMSA performs.
Part E, Additional Operating Information
    Question 37, special regulatory circumstances: INGAA and Panhandle 
suggested that this question be deleted as an operator must typically 
report incidents in other reports required by the regulatory documents 
listed. Columbia and Nicor suggested that there

[[Page 41509]]

needed to be an option for ``none'' or ``NA.''
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has deleted this question.
    Question 39, MAOP: The question asks under which regulatory 
requirement the MAOP was determined. IUB suggested that it should also 
ask what the MAOP is. INGAA noted that this should be the MAOP at the 
point of the incident. MidAmerican recommended that the proposed 
paragraph asking how the MAOP was determined be deleted as irrelevant, 
since an MAOP determined under any of the cited regulations is 
acceptable and the method by which an MAOP has been determined will 
have no relevance to the occurrence of an incident. Panhandle noted 
that a change to this question may be needed to accommodate an MAOP of 
80 percent SMYS.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has retained this set of questions from the 
existing reporting form. PHMSA agrees with Panhandle that SMYS 
information is increasingly important considering the agency's recent 
rulemakings allowing operators to increase SMYS up to 80 percent. We 
retained this set of questions from the existing report form, but 
updated the selections for SMYS determination to reflect recent 
rulemakings.
    Question 40, overpressurization: INGAA and Panhandle suggested that 
this question requires clarification as to whether pressures exceeding 
MAOP or MAOP plus some allowable margin (e.g., 10 percent) were 
experienced. IUB suggested that a positive answer should require that 
the operator also report normal operating pressure, MAOP, and pressure 
experienced to provide the context for an overpressure event.
    PHMSA response: This question has been modified to clearly indicate 
which pressure range was exceeded when an overpressure occurred. PHMSA 
has not modified the form to collect normal operating pressure. MAOP is 
already collected, and operation at any pressure below MAOP is 
acceptable. PHMSA thus concluded that normal operating pressure (which 
may be below MAOP) is not needed.
    Question 41, SCADA: INGAA recommended that this question be deleted 
as irrelevant. They note that the existence of a SCADA system does not 
indicate any relevant information about whether the system recorded/
transmitted information concerning the incident site. Panhandle also 
noted that a SCADA system may be in place for nearby compressors, for 
example, but provide no information relevant to the incident. They 
asked how an operator would complete this section in such a case. 
Columbia also supported INGAA's comment, noting that a SCADA system may 
monitor areas not associated with the incident. NAPSR recommended an 
additional question asking if the SCADA system was operating, since it 
is possible that a SCADA system may exist but not be in use.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA considers it appropriate to collect this 
information. PHMSA has explicitly included a question asking whether 
SCADA-based information assisted in detection of the incident. This 
will allow operators to identify situations in which the presence of 
the SCADA system was not relevant to the incident.
    Question 42, how detected: INGAA and Panhandle recommended that 
this question be deleted. They questioned its relevance, noted that it 
uses terms not previously defined, and pointed out that SCADA systems 
do not detect incidents. Columbia and IUB also noted that the terms 
local controller and remote controller have not been defined. 
MidAmerican also supported deletion, commenting that how an incident 
was detected is immaterial.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA does not agree that this information is 
immaterial. PHMSA has revised this question to ask how the incident was 
identified for the operator, which will accommodate those situations in 
which the incident was reported by others rather than being detected by 
the operator. PHMSA will describe what is meant by remote controller 
and local operating personnel in the instructions.
    Question 43, leak duration: INGAA, Panhandle, and Nicor recommended 
revising this to ``release'' vs. ``leak,'' since the latter term 
presumes a leak existed and may be confusing. Paiute/Southwest 
questioned how the duration of a leak would be determined. Columbia 
agreed that ``release'' would be a better term, but also suggested that 
``time to make safe'' would be a better question. IUB questioned how a 
``Static Shut-in Test or Other Pressure or Leak Test'' would detect a 
leak and noted that Air and Ground Patrols are unlikely to identify 
leaks.
    PHMSA response: We have deleted this question.
    Questions 44-58, controller involvement: INGAA recommended deleting 
most of these questions as described above under General Comments. 
Columbia, Atmos, and IUB suggested that there should be no need to 
provide this information if controllers were not involved with the 
event. (Columbia also noted its belief that controller involvement is 
not a major factor in gas transmission pipeline incidents). Panhandle 
suggested this information need not be reported in any case, and could 
be requested by PHMSA if needed. Some pipeline operators and IUB noted 
that question 44 provides no means of reporting that controllers were 
not involved, only that an operator had not determined that they were 
involved by the date of the report. NAPSR noted that multiple responses 
may be needed if more than one controller is involved and that the form 
does not accommodate this need. NAPSR also suggested clarifying 
editorial changes. IUB noted that the first question should be whether 
the pipeline has controllers, since many do not. Panhandle noted that 
there is no requirement in Part 192 for a SCADA system and suggested 
that questions concerning SCADA use are trying to apply a requirement 
not presently in the regulations.
    PHMSA response: Consistent with a recommendation made by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Congress ordered PHMSA to 
obtain specific data from owners and operators on the role of 
controller fatigue in incidents reporting forms. Pipeline Inspection, 
Protection and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 2006, Public Law 109-468, 
section 20, 120 Stat. 3498 (Dec. 29, 2006). Nonetheless, PHMSA has 
reduced the amount of information required by these questions to allow 
for reporting that the facility was not monitored by controllers or 
that the operator determined that a review of controller actions was 
not needed. The revised form also allows for reporting review results 
that determined there were no control room/controller issues. PHMSA 
considers that this is the minimum information for it to satisfy the 
statutory requirement. PHMSA agrees that SCADA systems are not 
required, but notes that many pipelines incorporate such systems. 
Questions concerning SCADA do not imply a requirement to add SCADA 
systems and PHMSA currently has no intention of establishing such a 
requirement.
Part F, Cause Information
    General: INGAA recommended reorganizing this section into ten cause 
categories to be consistent with ASME/ANSI B31.8S and the reporting 
required for integrity management.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has chosen to retain its traditional high-
level Cause categories to accommodate, to the extent possible, 
historical trending to include data from incidents already reported. 
PHMSA has made minor editorial changes to the Causes described on the 
form to address an NTSB recommendation that PHMSA align their Cause 
categories between the two

[[Page 41510]]

transmission pipeline types--Gas Transmission/Gathering and Hazardous 
Liquid. In addition to aligning these Cause and sub-cause categories, 
PHMSA has added several new sub-categories to reduce the number of 
``Other'' incidents currently being reported by the regulated community 
across all pipeline types. Additionally, PHMSA has reorganized one 
Cause category significantly to better segregate sub-categories of 
Causes associated with construction-, fabrication-, installation-, and 
original manufacturing-related incidents, while adding a new sub-
category for Environmental Cracking-related causes such as Stress 
Corrosion Cracking, Sulfide Stress Cracking, and Hydrogen Stress 
Cracking.
    PHMSA appreciates the importance of the gas industry's ability to 
cross reference the threat categories outlined in B31.8S with incident 
Causes captured by PHMSA, and PHMSA has crafted their Cause categories 
and sub-categories such that PHMSA's incidents can be cleanly mapped to 
the specific threat categories listed in B31.8S. In addition, by 
accommodating this cross-mapping of threats and Incident Causes, 
PHMSA's pending changes to Gas Integrity Management reporting will 
likewise support future analyses of the B31.8S threat categories 
against PHMSA incident Causes and Integrity Management reports. With 
the addition of the new sub-cause categories on PHMSA's form, INGAA and 
ASME may want to consider revisions to B31.8S to fully account for all 
of the incident causes that will now be captured in PHMSA's data.
Part F, F1--Corrosion
    General: INGAA and Columbia suggested that most of the detailed 
questions were confusing and would be better addressed through a 
narrative, if needed at all. They did not consider that this 
information is valuable for analysis or trending.
    PHMSA response: The information being requested is basic 
information pertaining to incidents caused by corrosion, all of which 
should be clearly understood and readily obtainable. As corrosion 
continues to be a leading cause of incidents, the collection of this 
basic information is essential to PHMSA's efforts at further 
prevention. Information collected by narrative is much more difficult 
to use for subsequent analyses.
    External corrosion: INGAA and Panhandle suggested that the phrase 
``or in contact with the ground'' was confusing and irrelevant. They 
suggested the question be changed to, ``Was the failed item buried?'' 
Columbia and Panhandle noted that cathodic protection (CP) surveys 
other than close interval surveys (CIS) are not defined and recommended 
that reference to them be deleted. Panhandle noted that the year in 
which CP was initiated may be unknown, particularly for older 
pipelines. Panhandle also noted that ``selective seam'' is not a type 
of corrosion.
    PHMSA response: We have eliminated the phrase ``or in contact with 
the ground''. We have clarified the questions pertaining to the types 
of cathodic protection surveys being conducted. Selective seam 
corrosion can be considered a ``type'' of corrosion in the sense that 
it manifests itself in a fairly distinct fashion, similar to other 
choices under this question.
    Internal corrosion: INGAA and Panhandle noted that the questions 
relate to operator practices rather than the cause of the incident. 
They suggested these questions be replaced with the results of a visual 
inspection, the type of corrosion, and whether the commodity was 
``corrosive gas.'' Paiute/Southwest suggested that some questions could 
be relocated to a ``general'' section, eliminating some duplication 
within the form. Paiute/Southwest also suggested that information on 
the assessment history be collected. NAPSR suggested adding questions 
to determine whether corrosion coupons were used and the location of 
the corrosion failure. MidAmerican stated that it was unclear what was 
meant by ``cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely 
utilized.''
    PHMSA response: Questions relating to visual inspection, type of 
corrosion, and other contributory factors (like location of corrosion) 
have been added. A question was also added pertaining to whether 
corrosion coupons were used. Questions pertaining to operator practices 
have been retained because PHMSA believes it is important to have a 
general understanding of the basic preventive measures which were in 
place prior to the incident occurring.
Part F, F2--Natural Force Damage
    High winds: INGAA and Panhandle suggested limiting this question to 
damage directly caused by high winds rather than including secondary 
damage such as barges that may have been moved by high winds to impact 
the pipeline. They contended this latter type of incident should be 
considered mechanical damage. INGAA and Panhandle also suggested 
eliminating the question as to whether the high winds were associated 
with a severe weather event (e.g., hurricane, tornado) as it is too 
subjective. NAPSR suggested creating a separate sub-category for 
natural or forest fires and eliminating the sub-question regarding 
these under the temperature sub-cause.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has modified the question to capture only 
incidents directly associated with High Winds, placing secondary damage 
such as may be caused by drifting barges under ``Other Outside Force 
Damage'' as suggested. Questions associated with Forest Fires are now 
segregated so that those associated with Lightning are associated with 
Natural Force Damage and those which are man-made are associated with 
``Other Outside Force Damage''. PHMSA has retained the question 
concerning severe weather events. This question simply asks if the high 
winds were associated with such an event. If so, operators are asked to 
identify the type of event (hurricane, tropical storm, tornado, or 
other). Damage occurring during Hurricane Katrina was extensive. It has 
been necessary to exclude from analyses reported property damage from 
incidents that occurred in 2005 so that the outlier magnitude of these 
damages did not skew the analytical results. In doing so, however, some 
non-Katrina damages have also been excluded, because PHMSA had no means 
of identifying which damages were from Katrina-related causes. The 
Katrina experience demonstrates that it can be necessary to treat 
severe event-related damages separately, and PHMSA considers it 
appropriate to collect this data.
    Temperature: Paiute commented favorably on treatment of forest 
fires under ``temperature'' but asked if it would apply to fires caused 
by arson.
    PHMSA response: Man-made fires, even if forest fires, would be 
reported under F4, Other Outside Force Damage--Nearby Industrial, Man-
made, or other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident. Arson which 
actually takes place on the site of a pipeline facility would also fall 
under F4, but would be considered ``Intentional Damage''. Naturally-
occurring forest fires caused (most probably) by lightning would be 
captured under F2, Natural Force Damage.
Part F, F3--Excavation Damage
    Excavation damage: Several commenters suggested changes to the 
additional information sought for incidents caused by excavation 
damage. INGAA suggested that most of the questions be deleted, because 
they are more appropriate for research than for incident reporting. 
Among the suggested changes were:

[[Page 41511]]

     Deleting unknown/other as a choice for location, since 
operators should know the location.
     Deleting the damage location entirely.
     Increasing the number of potential locations to include 
rights of way on public lands.
     Deleting the question as to whether the pipeline operator 
belonged to a one-call system.
     Deleting information as to whether one-call was notified.
     Requiring detailed information concerning the one-call 
notification.
     Requiring additional information about the interaction 
between the pipeline operator and those making one-call requests.
     Clarifying the information required for utilities in 
common trenches.
     Clarifying that the name of excavator is a company name 
vs. an individual or deleting the requirement to report the name.
     Deleting the requirement to provide the name of the 
excavator.
     Rearranging the form.
     Deleting the question as to whether permanent pipeline 
markings were visible.
     Eliminating the questions concerning whether the excavator 
incurred downtime and whether the excavation had been ongoing for more 
than one month.
     Deferring to the Common Ground Alliance's Damage 
Information Reporting Tool (DIRT).
     Deleting information about circumstances over which the 
operator had no control.
     Deleting the question about whether notification of 
excavation had been received, because excavators are required to 
notify.
     Deleting the type of excavator and work performed.
     Deleting the type of locator.
     Deleting the owner of an easement.
     Deleting whether a pipeline was located in a common trench 
with other facilities.
     Requiring only mandatory DIRT fields or requiring 
reporting via DIRT rather than duplicating their reporting 
requirements.
     Allowing space to enter a description where the answer is 
``other''.
     Eliminating perceived duplication.
     Adding additional questions concerning vehicular damage 
events.
    PHMSA response: The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is the recognized 
authority for preventing excavation damage of underground utilities. 
The CGA has determined the information necessary to evaluate excavation 
damage trends via its DIRT system. PHMSA has adopted in this form the 
fields defined within the DIRT system as mandatory. Collecting 
information on excavation damage consistent with DIRT will allow for 
thorough analyses to identify trends related to excavation damage. It 
will also allow comparative analyses to consider information reported 
to DIRT by other underground utility operators, thereby expanding the 
database and potentially affording additional insights.
Part F, F4--Other Outside Force Damage
    Fishing: INGAA and Panhandle recommended deleting the check box for 
fishing or other marine activity not related to excavation, contending 
that it is adequately addressed as damage by a vehicle.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA wishes to maintain this basic distinction 
between land-based and maritime causes to evaluate the need, if any, 
for additional regulations or advisories and to coordinate regulatory 
or advisory activities with the other Federal agencies with 
jurisdiction over pipeline facilities located in navigable waters, such 
as the U.S. Coast Guard.
    Previous damage: INGAA and Panhandle suggested that the question 
concerning failure due to prior damage be revised to refer to prior 
``mechanical'' damage. Paiute/Southwest suggested that this question 
seems to presume that the portion of the pipeline involved was covered 
by integrity management requirements (presumably because assessment/
examination would be required for such portions).
    PHMSA response: We have revised the item to include ``mechanical'' 
damage. As far as the presumption of coverage under an IMP, operators 
are not precluded from taking basic preventive measures such as those 
shown anywhere on their pipeline systems. PHMSA is interested in any 
such preventive measures which may have been undertaken preceding an 
incident.
    Additional questions: INGAA commented that the additional data 
related to hydrostatic tests, direct assessment, and non-destructive 
evaluation are not justified by the small number of incidents from this 
cause and should be deleted. Columbia agreed that many questions appear 
to seek general data, appropriate for an investigation but which is not 
related to a specific incident.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees and has retained the questions 
pertaining to the data identified by the commenters, i.e., the use of 
prior hydrotesting, direct assessment, or non-destructive evaluations, 
as such information is important to furthering the agency's general 
understanding of the efficacy of these basic preventive measures.
    Electrical arcing: NAPSR suggested adding electrical arcing from 
adjacent facility.
    PHMSA response: We have added this under ``Other Outside Force 
Damage''.
    Fire-first events: Nicor suggested that this category be deleted as 
such events should only be reported if additional damage due to the gas 
release exceeds reporting criteria. Paiute/Southwest questioned if this 
category is appropriate for reporting incidents initiated by fires 
caused by arson.
    PHMSA response: Changes to this form do not modify the reporting 
criteria in 49 CFR 191.15, and PHMSA agrees that no incident report 
need be filed unless those criteria are met. Experience has 
demonstrated, however, that pre-existing fires have caused damage to 
pipeline systems that subsequently resulted in damages exceeding the 
reporting criteria. Two categories of Fire-related causes have been 
retained--one for man-made fires under ``Other Outside Force Damage'' 
and one for lightning-caused fires under ``Natural Forces''. Both of 
these causes have occurred in the past.
    Damage by vehicles: Paiute/Southwest suggested that the question 
implies a need for vehicle barriers. Paiute/Southwest further noted 
that there are parameters relevant to a complete understanding of 
vehicle-impact events that will be unknown to pipeline operators.
    PHMSA response: As with fire-first events, analysis of pipeline 
incident data has shown that incidents caused by vehicle impacts are a 
small but significant percentage of all incidents. Again, PHMSA is not 
attempting to regulate the operation of vehicles near pipelines, nor is 
it implying that a vehicle barrier was needed. Therefore, we have 
removed the questions pertaining to impact barriers.
    Prior examinations: Panhandle concluded that the information 
requested concerning prior assessments or non-destructive examinations 
was not needed. They noted that there are very few incidents in this 
category and that the data will thus be of limited, if any, use. They 
contended that PHMSA can collect the information as part of an 
investigation.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees and has retained the questions 
pertaining to the data identified by the commenters, i.e., the use of 
prior hydrotesting, direct assessment, or non-destructive evaluations, 
as such

[[Page 41512]]

information is important to furthering the agency's general 
understanding of the efficacy of these basic preventive measures.
Part F, F5--Material and/or Weld Failure
    Assessment history: Paiute/Southwest reiterated its concern (see F4 
above) that this section presumes the involved pipeline segment was 
covered by integrity management requirements.
    PHMSA response: There is no such presumption. This section asks 
whether certain assessments or examinations were performed. Integrity 
management requirements are one reason why they may have been 
performed, but some pipeline operators also conduct such evaluations as 
a prudent preventive measure on their own volition even if not 
explicitly required by the regulations, and whether the pipeline is in 
an HCA or not. Understanding whether failures occur despite 
examinations intended to identify incipient failures can be important 
to future evaluations of the effectiveness of such measures and whether 
additional assessment or inspection requirements are needed.
    Reporting basis: INGAA and Panhandle suggested deleting the first 
question, which asks the basis on which the subsequent information was 
developed. They noted that this information is not needed for trending 
and that subsequent completion of metallurgical examinations or 
investigations could lead to a need to file a supplemental report to 
change the response to this question even though the relevant 
information does not change.
    PHMSA response: Though not needed for trending, it is important 
information that supports the merits of the reported findings, and it 
is important for PHMSA to understand the veracity of the reported data, 
especially in these cases where a highly technical mechanism may be 
involved.
    Environmental cracking: INGAA and Panhandle suggested that 
questions related to environmental cracking, fatigue and stress should 
be moved to another section, because they do not relate to material 
failures.
    PHMSA response: These new cause sub-categories align more closely 
with this primary incident cause than any of the others, and because 
PHMSA did not wish to create a new primary category, they were placed 
here, but in such a way that they may be segregated for separate 
analyses.
    Additional questions: INGAA reiterated its objection (see F4 above) 
to including additional questions concerning hydrostatic testing and 
assessment methods. Columbia again supported those objections.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA disagrees and has retained the questions 
pertaining to prior hydrotesting testing. This information is important 
to the agency's general understanding of the efficacy of these basic 
preventive efforts.
    Supplemental report required: For incidents still under 
investigation, the form noted that a supplemental incident report was 
required. NAPSR suggested modifying the form to require that this 
report be submitted within one year.
    PHMSA response: The regulation requires supplemental reports, as 
deemed necessary, when additional relevant information is obtained. The 
regulation does not, however, specify a maximum time frame in which 
such reports must be submitted. PHMSA cannot use this change in the 
incident report form to impose such a requirement. PHMSA will modify 
the instructions to state its preference that supplemental reports 
addressing additional investigation be submitted within one year of 
filing the initial incident report.
    Prior examinations: Panhandle again commented that the information 
requested concerning prior assessments or non-destructive examinations 
was not needed. They noted that this was the third time this 
information was requested, and that the question concerning hydrostatic 
tests discounts the importance of the original hydrostatic test.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has already responded to this thread of 
comments on the importance of obtaining information on prior tests, 
such as hydrotesting or direct assessment conducted on the failed 
pipeline segment prior to incident occurrence.
Part F, F6--Equipment
    General: IUB suggested that the form require that a description of 
the failure be included in the narrative provided in Part G.
    PHMSA response: A description of the failure mechanism, secondary 
and contributory causes, and any other factors deemed important to 
understanding the incident can always be included in Part G. PHMSA saw 
no reason why this particular incident cause should be separately 
identified as requiring additional explanation.
    Malfunction of control/relief equipment: INGAA and Panhandle 
suggested that the form allow for multiple selections and that separate 
selections be allowed for regulators and control valves. Similarly, 
Columbia noted that block and check valves serve different functions 
and should not be grouped together.
    PHMSA response: These changes were accepted and incorporated.
    Compressors: INGAA and Panhandle commented that the question should 
be limited to compressors, which are part of the pipeline system, and 
should not include their drivers, which are not. Columbia suggested 
that additional data elements could be appropriate for compressors 
including, for example, emergency shutdown systems, relief valve and/or 
valve failure, pressure vessel failure, or pipe failure.
    PHMSA response: We have eliminated motor-driver as a sub-cause, and 
adopted the additional sub-causes suggested by Columbia.
    Connection failures: INGAA and Panhandle suggested that these be 
moved to another failure cause.
    PHMSA response: The connections envisioned here would fall under 
``Equipment'' as the primary incident cause.
Part F, F7--Incorrect Operation
    General: INGAA and Panhandle commented that the elements in this 
section address what happened but do not cover causes, as is done on 
the current form. INGAA also noted that this section inappropriately 
implies that storage is separate from gas transmission and asks 
questions concerning overpressure that are duplicated elsewhere. INGAA 
suggested replacing the questions in this section with others largely 
drawn from the current form. Columbia and Nicor suggested that the term 
``storage'' should be defined as it could be interpreted differently by 
different users. Panhandle suggested that storage be eliminated 
completely as it is a part of transmission and need not be called out 
separately.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA believes the new sub-causes listed are more 
proximate to the incident occurrence than those included in the current 
form. The choices from the current form, however, have been added back 
in to address the concern that these important root causes were no 
longer being captured. In addition, PHMSA has added sub-causes to 
identify the factors involved in overpressurization of storage, a 
special case of overpressure that warrants the capture of this 
additional level of detail.
Part F, F8--Other Cause
    Still under investigation: For incidents still under investigation, 
the form noted that a supplemental incident report was required. NAPSR 
suggested

[[Page 41513]]

modifying the form to require that this report be submitted within one 
year.
    PHMSA response: The regulation requires supplemental reports, as 
deemed necessary, when additional relevant information is obtained. The 
regulation does not, however, specify a maximum time frame in which 
such reports must be submitted. PHMSA cannot use this change in the 
incident report form to impose such a requirement. PHMSA will modify 
the instructions to state its preference that supplemental reports 
addressing additional investigation be submitted within one year of 
filing the initial incident report.
Instructions for Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7100.2--Gas Transmission 
and Gathering Systems
    PHMSA has revised the instructions to reflect changes made in the 
form and for editorial purposes based on the comments submitted. PHMSA 
also received the following specific comments on the instructions:
    Duplication of the form: Many commenters noted that a large portion 
of the proposed instructions was duplicative of the information already 
provided on the incident reporting form and that such information could 
be deleted. These commenters also suggested that the instructions 
should only provide additional guidance, where needed, and that 
eliminating unnecessary or duplicative information would significantly 
shorten the instructions and make them more useful.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has deleted unnecessary 
duplication.
    Reasonable effort: SoCal/SDG&E suggested that the instructions 
should specify that a reasonable effort should be expended to generate 
required estimates and that supplemental reports are only needed if 
reported estimates change significantly or if new information results 
in a change in reportable status of an incident.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA generally agrees and has included appropriate 
guidance in the instructions.
    Cost data: NAPSR suggested that additional guidance be provided for 
estimating costs associated with an accident, including the guidance 
published in advisory bulletin ADB-94-01. SoCal/SDG&E asked that the 
instructions specifically recognize that broad costs estimates are 
acceptable when specific costs cannot be readily determined.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has incorporated guidance from the 
advisory bulletin.
    Contributing causes: IUB noted that section F instructs the 
operator to complete only one cause section, but that some incidents 
could have multiple contributing causes. IUB suggested that this 
situation be addressed in the instructions.
    PHSMA response: Part F is intended to capture the principal cause 
of an incident and, as indicated in the instructions, operators can 
provide additional information in the narrative if they determine that 
contributing secondary causes were important. For these reasons, PHMSA 
does not believe any additional guidance is needed on this issue at 
this time.
Comments on Burden Estimate, Form F 7100.2, Incident Report--Gas 
Transmission and Gathering System
    Burden Hour Estimate: SoCal/SDG&E, Paiute/Southwest, and Panhandle 
commented that the burden for completing the form (estimated at 7 
hours) was significantly underestimated. Paiute/Southwest estimated 
that the burden may be between 12 and 30 hours. Panhandle estimated 52 
hours. SoCal/SDG&E suggested that the burden could be reduced by 
redefining the thresholds for reporting incidents.
    PHMSA response: Even if completion of the form would require more 
than the seven hours estimated, the total burden of this information 
collection is still minimal. Operators need only complete the form if 
they have an incident. There are approximately 75 incidents annually on 
gas transmission and gathering systems. PHMSA considers that the value 
of this information for future analysis of incident trends and the 
factors that influence the occurrence of incidents justifies the 
information collection burden. The threshold for reporting incidents is 
defined in the regulations and no change to those regulations has been 
proposed. Changing the threshold is beyond the scope of this 
information collection request.
    Incidents significant in operator's judgment: Section 191.3 defines 
an incident as an event that meets specified threshold criteria or ``is 
significant, in the judgment of the operator'' even though it did not 
meet those criteria. Paiute/Southwest requested that the form include 
guidance on PHMSA's policy and expectations for such reports and how 
they are to be submitted.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA does not consider it appropriate to provide 
additional guidance for this requirement. Such guidance would likely 
become an additional de facto criterion and incidents of significance 
that do not conform to the guidance would likely not be reported. PHMSA 
does not want to imply that operators should not report any incident 
that they regard as significant, i.e., that they conclude is of 
sufficient importance that the regulator should be notified. Such 
incidents are to be reported using Form F 7100.1 in the same manner as 
any other incident.

C. Incident Report Form PHMSA F 7000--1, Accident Report--Hazardous 
Liquid Pipeline Systems (Impacted Information Collection: OMB 2137-
0047)

General Comments
    Substitute form: API stated that the hazardous liquid pipeline 
industry would prefer that PHMSA adopt the form used for its Pipeline 
Performance Tracking System (PPTS). API noted that use of the same form 
would reduce the administrative burden on reporting utilities and that 
the industry has refined the PPTS form, over time, based on lessons 
learned from the data.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA appreciates the value of API's PPTS and has 
sought to adopt its concepts, breakdowns, and terminology to the extent 
practicable. However, PHMSA cannot simply adopt the PPTS form for use 
by hazardous liquid pipeline operators. Indeed, doing so would 
frustrate PHMSA's objective of creating and maintaining consistency 
between and among the three types of accident and incident reporting 
forms.
    Excessive change: API contended that the proposed ``revisions'' on 
control rooms and fatigue are so substantive in nature that they in 
effect create a new regulatory requirement for industry, that such 
action can only be done through the rulemaking process, and thus the 
proposal is inappropriate and beyond the scope of an ICR. For example, 
API contended that a fatigue investigation is required by the form for 
every accident, something that is not required by regulations at this 
time. As such, API stated those requirements do not meet the criterion 
of necessity for an ICR and are in violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act requirement for notice and comment.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has the authority to request that the owners 
and operators of covered pipeline facilities submit information as 
needed to ensure compliance with the nation's pipeline safety laws. 49 
U.S.C. 60117(b)(1)-(2). Indeed, hazardous liquid pipelines are a 
critical part of the nation's pipeline network and information on the 
accidents that affect those lines is vital to ensuring public safety. 
Congress has

[[Page 41514]]

also directed PHMSA to amend its accident and incident reporting forms 
to require that operators provide data related to controller fatigue, 
Pipeline Inspection, Protection and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 2006, 
Public Law 109-468, section 20, 120 Stat. 3498 (Dec. 29, 2006), and the 
agency is coordinating its efforts to execute that mandate with its 
pending rulemaking on control room management. These authorities 
provide ample support for all of the information sought in the proposed 
revision to the accident reporting form without notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or further delay.
    Nevertheless, PHMSA has significantly reduced the level of detail 
required to complete the form, particularly in the area of controller 
fatigue, and positive answers to the remaining questions will provide 
information indicating that further investigation of potential fatigue 
issues may be warranted.
    Unnecessary information: API is concerned about the addition of 
data elements that will not add value to analysis of accident trends. 
For example, they noted that reporting the method by which MOP was 
determined is likely to require additional research (and associated 
burden) while it will not provide a commensurate benefit.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has eliminated the proposed 
element for reporting the method by which MOP was determined.
    Short form: API noted that elimination of the short form 
(previously used for small releases) resulted in a significant increase 
in burden for reporting accidents involving minimal impact on the 
environment. They noted that many questions on the replacement form 
would not be relevant for a small release and that requiring completion 
of that form for all releases thus is a significant and unjustified 
increase in reporting burden. API submitted a revised version of the 
short form as part of their comments. API also noted that information 
on PHMSA's Web site concerning accident experience focuses on larger 
releases. API questioned whether PHMSA will use the data collected for 
smaller releases, for which the short form was previously used, to 
improve its safety programs.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will retain the short form for the same types 
of smaller releases as was done in the past.
    Unknown cause: The Pipeline Safety Trust noted its conclusion that 
too many accidents have been attributed to an ``unknown'' cause. For 
that reason, the Trust recommended that PHMSA require that any report 
with the cause listed as ``unknown'' remain open and be updated every 
60 days until a cause is determined or PHMSA concludes that all 
information has been provided and there is no way to determine a cause.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has concluded that many incidents were 
previously reported as ``unknown'' or ``other'' because the apparent 
causes did not fit cause categories on the incident report form. PHMSA 
expanded the number of sub-cause categories in its previous revision 
and has seen a decrease in the number of unknown/other reports. PHMSA 
has added additional sub-cause categories in this revision to attempt 
to further reduce the number of such reports. PHMSA will monitor 
incidents reported as ``unknown'' and will investigate as appropriate.
    Reporting threshold: The Pipeline Safety Trust noted that Alaska's 
criteria for reporting hazardous liquid releases are more conservative 
than those used by PHMSA.
    PHMSA response: The criteria defining an incident are established 
in regulation and a rule change would be needed to change them. Such an 
action is beyond the scope of this request.
Part A, Key Report Information
    Question 2, name of operator: API suggested that the on-line 
reporting system automatically complete this field based on the entered 
operator ID, noting that this would reduce potential errors.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and will implement this enhancement.
    Question 4, location: NAPSR suggested that location be reported by 
GPS coordinates, including identification of the relevant 
``projection'' to better define the latitude and longitude information.
    PHMSA response: Latitude and longitude were included by PHMSA in 
the last revision of this form. We did not include this information in 
the pending proposed revised form, but will restore the information to 
the final form. Industry comments on the previous revision expressed 
concern over requirements to specify a projection, stating that this 
information would not be available to many distribution pipeline 
operators and may be confusing. PHMSA elected at that time to omit a 
requirement that operators specify the projection used. Since PHMSA did 
not propose such a change in the September 4, 2009, notice, the 
requirement to report latitude and longitude is being retained as in 
the previous form, without a need to report projection.
    Question 7, commodity spilled: API noted that the revised form adds 
a question concerning sulfur content of crude oil without any 
explanation as to why this information is needed. API contended that 
this information is not important to understanding an accident and that 
there may be proprietary or other reasons not to reveal this data. API 
suggested that this question be deleted unless it can be demonstrated 
that the information will contribute to understanding accidents or 
their consequences. API further suggested that the listed commodities 
for refined products and highly volatile liquids be grouped in a more 
logical fashion. NAPSR suggested that the definitions for sweet and 
sour crude be moved to the instructions, and also noted that the 
definitions leave it unclear how crude oil with between 0.5 and 2.5 
percent sulfur is to be reported. The Pipeline Safety Trust also noted 
the gap between the concentrations designated sweet and sour.
    PHMSA response: We have eliminated the ``sweet'' and ``sour'' 
subcategories under ``Crude'' because this information is of limited 
utility in ensuring public safety. This obviates the need to address 
the gap in options for percent sulfur. We have adjusted the commodity 
list and groupings as API suggested.
    Question 7, biofuels: API commented that PHMSA has proposed 
collecting information concerning spills of biofuels (i.e., ethanol and 
biodiesel) but that the form does not provide for identification of 
these commodities. In fact, they noted that the form refers to 49 CFR 
195.50 as the regulatory basis for required reporting and that this 
section does not refer to biofuels.
    PHMSA response: Section 195.50 requires reporting of accidents 
involving ``a release of * * * hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide'' 
meeting certain criteria. Hazardous liquid is defined in 49 CFR 195.3 
to include all petroleum products. PHMSA's policy for regulating 
transport of biofuels by pipeline was described in a policy statement 
published August 10, 2007 (72 FR 45002). As described more fully in 
that statement, any blend of biofuels with petroleum products is 
considered subject to the existing regulations in Part 195, including 
Sec.  195.50, under the definition in Sec.  195.3. The policy statement 
also notes that the statutory definition of hazardous liquids includes 
petroleum or petroleum products and ``a substance the Secretary of 
Transportation decides may pose an unreasonable risk to life or 
property.'' The policy statement goes on to explain why the Secretary 
has determined that ethanol is a substance that may pose an 
unreasonable risk to life or property. Thus, accidents involving 
release of

[[Page 41515]]

ethanol or ethanol blends must be reported under 49 CFR 195.50. The 
policy statement does not explicitly address unblended biodiesel. 
Reporting of accidents involving pure biodiesel transported by 
pipelines would not be required under current pipeline safety 
regulations, although operators could report such releases voluntarily. 
PHMSA has revised the form to include biofuels and biofuels blends.
    Question 8, unit of measure: API commented that use of two units of 
measure (barrels and gallons) has caused confusion. API suggested that 
data be reported only in barrels. API further suggested that if PHMSA 
continues to request gallons for spills of less than one barrel, that 
the on-line data entry should include a validation check that will 
prevent the use of gallons for spills of more than 41 gallons. API 
suggested that, in either event, data entry must allow the use of two 
decimal places.
    PHMSA response: We have modified the form to accept only barrels as 
the unit of measure, and to allow for the use of two decimal places.
    Questions 9 and 10, volume spilled and recovered: API commented 
that it is important that these questions indicate that the reported 
volumes are expected to be estimates.
    PHMSA response: We have added the word ``estimated'' to each item 
on the form, and the instructions will also reflect this expectation.
    Question 13: NAPSR suggested that this question be modified to 
collect the date and time of any shutdown. The Pipeline Safety Trust 
also suggested that an option be provided to indicate that the pipeline 
is still shut down, since a shutdown may extend beyond the time at 
which the written report must be filed.
    PHMSA response: We have incorporated both of these suggestions.
    Question 17, response time: API objected to the proposed 
restructuring of this sentence (to Elapsed Time from Operator's 
Awareness of Accident to Arrival of Operator Personnel on Site). They 
commented that ``awareness'' is too vague. They noted that response 
personnel may be a contracted oil spill response organization, as 
allowed by 49 CFR 194.115. They also noted that mitigating actions can 
begin before response personnel arrive on site, such as via SCADA 
commands. NAPSR suggested that this question be revised to collect a 
time sequence of key events such as when the operator was notified, 
when operator personnel arrived on site, and when the area was made 
safe. Other commenters noted that the form and instructions were not 
consistent for this question.
    PHSMA response: We have revised this question to request a time 
sequence as NAPSR suggested. We have made a similar change to the other 
incident/accident report forms. We have also revised the time line 
elements to clarify our intent.
Part B, Additional Location Information
    Question 21, nearest address: API noted that determining a valid 
address can be difficult for rural locations. They further noted that 
the latitude and longitude information reported in question 4 will 
adequately describe the location of an accident and suggested that 
question 21.a be deleted.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has deleted the nearest address 
information from the form.
    Question 22, location: NAPSR suggested adding elements for 
locations between station designations, segment ID, and pipeline name.
    PHMSA response: Segment ID and Pipeline name have been added. PHMSA 
considers that ``between stations'' information is not needed because 
the Milepost, Valve, or Station number is already requested.
    Question 23, Federal lands: The Pipeline Safety Trust questioned 
why lands in National Parks are excluded from categorization as Federal 
lands.
    PHMSA response: This question identifies accidents that occur on 
pipeline rights-of-way on Federal lands authorized pursuant to 30 
U.S.C. 185, and National Parks are specifically excluded from that 
statute.
    Question 24, location: API suggested that this question refer to 
the location of the accident as opposed to the location of a failure. 
API also suggested that some of this information be relocated. In 
particular, they suggested that information concerning whether the 
incident occurred in a pipeline segment that had been identified as 
able to affect a high consequence area be moved to Part D, where 
consequences are addressed. They also suggested that questions 
concerning crossings (i.e., bridge, rail, and road) be presented in a 
separate question uniquely devoted to crossings. Finally, they would 
have clarified that reported water depth for accidents that occur in a 
body of water is expected to be approximate, since depth can vary over 
time. NAPSR suggested capturing the name of any body of water. The 
Pipeline Safety Trust suggested that an additional option was needed 
for water bodies to reflect those that are intermittent/ephemeral.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has adopted all of these recommendations with 
the exception of the last one. PHMSA concludes that recognized bodies 
of water will include these types of intermittent/ephemeral water 
flows, at least those of significance to pipeline safety.
    Question 26, origin in State waters: NAPSR suggested that area, 
block/track number, and nearest county be required for incidents 
originating in State waters.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has incorporated these suggestions.
    Question 27, area of failure: API again requested that the form 
refer to accident as opposed to failure. They also suggested a 
restructuring of the data elements to separate onshore from offshore 
and reduce the need to report as ``other.'' NAPSR suggested adding a 
space for operators to describe the water, building, or space. The 
Pipeline Safety Trust questioned the element for above ground but under 
pavement.
    PHMSA response: We have incorporated these suggestions.
Part C, Additional Facility Information
    Question 28, pipeline function: API noted that ``gathering'' and 
``transmission'' are pipeline types and that the presence in this 
question of choices for tanks and facility piping could be confusing. 
They suggested that these additional elements be moved. They also noted 
that only gathering is defined in Part 195 and they suggested that the 
choices here should thus be ``gathering'' and ``trunkline/
transmission.''
    PHMSA response: We have incorporated these suggestions.
    Question 30, distance between valves: API requested that elements 
30 (d) and (e) be removed. They noted that the distance between valves 
cannot be used to infer adequate protection without knowledge of a 
number of other pipeline factors, and that this issue had been 
previously addressed through rulemaking. They are concerned that 
reporting of this data will create a temptation to make meaningless 
comparisons and conclusions.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees with API that the information in parts 
(d) and (e) of this question would not be useful without the knowledge 
of a number of other factors and has removed these elements.
    Question 31, item involved: API suggested addition of items and 
modification of others to make data entry easier and reduce reporting 
as ``other.''
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has made the suggested changes.
    Question 34, type of failure: API expressed concern that reference 
to the type of ``separation'' could create

[[Page 41516]]

confusion as it implies failure of a seam. They suggested that this 
question, instead, refer to the orientation of a failure as generally 
longitudinal or circumferential.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has made the suggested changes.
Part D, Additional Consequence Information
    Environmental impacts: API commented that PHMSA had not included 
the information that was in section F.2 of the previous form on 
environmental impacts. Instead, API contended that PHMSA was collecting 
environmental impact data only for those accidents for which the 
release affects a high consequence area. API strongly encouraged PHMSA 
to continue to collect environmental impact data on all accidents.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and restored these elements.
    Question 35, high consequence areas: NAPSR suggested combining all 
of the elements for spilled commodity affecting HCAs into one question 
and including commodity recovered. NAPSR also suggested adding a 
question on whether animals or other species were affected. API 
recommended that questions pertaining to the amount of commodity 
released and recovered in an HCA be deleted. They expressed concern 
that this reporting could create confusion and result in multiple 
counting of released volume.
    PHMSA response: Questions pertaining to affected animals or other 
species were added. The questions pertaining to volume spilled and 
recovered have been eliminated.
    Question 36, costs: API suggested that this question acknowledge 
that the reported amounts are expected to be estimates. API also 
suggested restoring the word ``reimbursed'' and adding the word 
``paid'' to the category on public or private property damages and 
adding an element for ``other'' costs. NAPSR suggested capturing costs 
separately for facilities directly and indirectly affected. NAPSR also 
suggested additional elements to capture costs related to business 
interruption (e.g., lost sales, tariffs, line down time). The Pipeline 
Safety Trust suggested that PHMSA needs to specify the price to be used 
to estimate the cost of lost commodity.
    PHMSA response: API's suggestions have been incorporated. PHMSA 
believes that trying to segregate direct effects vs. indirect effects 
would introduce a significant element of complexity and confusion, and 
would not add any analytical value to the data. Also, business 
interruption impacts involve proprietary information which could not be 
revealed. The price of the commodity to be used in these estimates is 
highly variable and location-dependent, so it would not be feasible for 
PHMSA to try to specify the values to be used in all situations.
Part E, Additional Operating Information
    Question 37, special regulatory treatment: API requested that this 
question be deleted. They questioned whether the fact that a pipeline 
was operating under any of the listed regulatory authorizations/
restrictions at the time of an accident adds any useful information for 
accident analysis and trending.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has deleted this question.
    Question 39, MOP: API questioned the usefulness of this information 
to accident analysis and suggested that the method used to determine 
MOP only be asked for accidents resulting from overpressurization.
    PHMSA response: We reconsidered the need for this information. 
Experience has shown that an error in calculating MOP is rarely, if 
ever, relevant in determining the cause of an accident. It has also 
shown that such information can be more efficiently and effectively 
gathered during the course of an accident investigation. For these 
reasons, PHMSA has eliminated this question.
    Question 40, overpressurization: The Pipeline Safety Trust 
suggested that additional information is needed concerning 
overpressurizations that may have been experienced in the year 
preceding the accident and that PHMSA should ask explicitly if the 
operator believes that overpressurization played a factor in 
contributing to the accident.
    PHMSA response: Part E includes questions that ask the estimated 
pressure at the point of the incident, the MAOP, and the range of 
potential overpressure. In addition, operators would report 
overpressurization as the cause of an incident in Part F. PHMSA 
considers this sufficient information concerning potential overpressure 
events. This report is intended to collect information concerning an 
incident, and it would be inappropriate to include questions that 
address past operations (e.g., overpressure experiences in the 
preceding year). Historical operating experience that might indicate a 
systemic problem related to an incident would be appropriate for 
examination during a post-incident investigation, but such 
investigations are not the subject of this form.
    Question 42, initial detection: API noted that the definition of 
controller in the pending proposed rule was too expansive and suggested 
that reporting here be limited to controllers as defined in API-RP-
1168. They also suggested additional changes to prevent confusion 
within the industry.
    PHMSA response: The definition of controller in the rulemaking 
identified by API is not at issue in this information collection 
request. However, PHMSA has made the additional changes API suggested.
    Questions 44-57, fatigue: API objected to inclusion of these 
questions, noting that a rulemaking addressing this subject is still in 
progress. API suggested revisions and deletions to individual questions 
in the event PHMSA did not agree to delete them all. The suggested 
changes would eliminate questions that API considers subjective (e.g., 
whether a supervisor thought a controller was fatigued) and would 
reorganize questions to what API perceives as a more logical 
relationship. The Pipeline Safety Trust noted that question 44 does not 
seem to allow for the option of a determination that a controller did 
not cause or contribute to the accident.
    PHMSA response: Consistent with a recommendation made by NTSB, 
Congress ordered PHMSA to obtain specific data from owners and 
operators on the role of controller fatigue in incidents reporting 
forms. Pipeline Inspection, Protection and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 
2006, Public Law 109-468, Sec.  20, 120 Stat. 3498 (December 29, 2006). 
Nonetheless, PHMSA has reduced the amount of information required by 
these questions. The revisions allow for reporting that the facility 
was not monitored by controllers or that the operator determined that a 
review of controller actions was not needed. The revised form also 
allows for reporting review results that determined there were no 
control room/controller issues. PHMSA considers that this is the 
minimum information for it to satisfy the statutory requirement.
    Question 58, drug and alcohol testing: API requested that this 
question be deleted. They contended that it provides no useful 
information for accident analysis and is related only to compliance. 
The Pipeline Safety Trust suggested that this question be expanded to 
include other covered employees. The Trust also suggested that 
operators be required to state their basis for concluding that drug and 
alcohol testing was not necessary, if that is the case, and to report 
information concerning the tests and results if tests were 
administered.

[[Page 41517]]

    PHMSA response: Whether any operator or contractor employees were 
tested under DOT's post-accident requirements--and if so, how many 
failed--would be pertinent for any accident report. This determination 
provides information related to potential contributing causes. The form 
has been modified to require that the number of persons who failed a 
post-accident test, and the number that did not fail, be reported. 
PHMSA does not consider it appropriate to require operators to state a 
basis for not testing. That basis would be subject to PHMSA's review 
under our accident investigation process.
    Integrity management and testing: NAPSR suggested that a new 
section be added to the end of part E to collect information concerning 
integrity management assessments and testing that is now addressed in 
several other portions of the form.
    PHMSA response: Questions concerning pipeline assessment occur in 
multiple sections of Part F. Operators only complete one section of 
Part F, depending on the cause of the accident. Accordingly, the 
assessment questions do not result in duplication of effort. In fact, 
operators need not provide assessment information for causes for which 
assessment is not relevant. PHMSA considers it appropriate to ask these 
questions as part of the information related to causes for which 
assessment may be relevant. PHMSA has thus not collected these 
questions into a new section.
Part F, Cause Information
Part F, F1--Corrosion
    Type of corrosion: API noted that more than one issue may be 
causing corrosion and suggested that the form allow for selection of 
multiple elements to accommodate this possibility. For internal 
corrosion, NAPSR suggested a question be added asking whether coupons 
were used.
    PHMSA response: We have incorporated the suggested changes.
    Cathodic protection surveys: API suggested that reference to close 
interval survey (CIS) or other cathodic protection surveys should be 
revised to refer to cathodic protection surveys of any type, thereby 
reducing the apparent importance placed on CIS.
    PHMSA response: We have expanded and clarified the questions.
    Non-destructive examinations (NDE) and assessments: API noted that 
the most recent NDE for many pipelines would have been done at the time 
of construction and that these records may be difficult to access. 
Accordingly, requesting information about these exams could pose 
significant burdens. API suggested that this data element be limited to 
examinations conducted since the integrity management regulations 
became effective at the end of 2001. According to API, this would 
reduce the burden to retrieve this information and would make it more 
useful, since reported information would reflect examination of the 
pipe in service instead of at initial construction. API also requested 
that the distinction between high resolution and standard resolution 
magnetic flux leakage (MFL) tools be clarified or the need to report 
each separately be eliminated. This comment was also made for other 
sections of part F.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees that recent NDE experience is of 
interest and that the effort to retrieve construction data is not 
necessary. We have modified the form to request NDE-related information 
only if an operator has performed an examination since 2001. PHMSA has 
also eliminated the need to differentiate between standard- and high-
resolution MFL tools.
Part F, F2--Natural Forces
    Thermal stress: API suggested that guidance is needed concerning 
the meaning and use of this term.
    PHMSA response: We will revise the instructions to include guidance 
in this area.
    High winds: API recommended that the instructions emphasize that 
damage from ``wind- or weather-induced contact by debris or boats, 
barges, anchors, drilling rigs, or other objects'' should be reported 
in this category rather than similar categories in F3 or F4.
    PHMSA response: A similar question was included on the draft Gas 
Transmission/Gathering form. Comments submitted concerning that form 
suggested that secondary impacts (i.e., impact from boats, barges, etc. 
that might be moved by high winds) be reported as ``Other Outside Force 
Damage.'' PHMSA desires to maintain consistency among the forms as to 
how accident data is collected, as this will facilitate future 
analysis. PHMSA has modified this question to capture only incidents 
directly associated with High Winds, placing secondary damage such as 
may be caused by drifting barges under ``Other Outside Force Damage'' 
as INGAA suggested. PHMSA will ensure that guidance for reporting 
secondary impacts is included in the instructions.
    Natural fire: API suggested eliminating reference to natural fires 
under temperature. They noted that a natural fire (e.g., forest fire) 
would likely be caused by lightning, which is a separate element in 
this part, and that its treatment under temperature is confusing. NAPSR 
suggested making forest fires a separate sub-cause.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has revised the form to collect 
information concerning accidents caused by fires initiated by lightning 
damage. Accidents resulting from man-made fires would be reported under 
F4, other outside force damage.
Part F, F3--Excavation Damage
    Location: NAPSR suggested deleting ``unknown'' under damage 
location, since operators should know where the damage occurred.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA generally includes ``unknown'' or ``other'' 
in data elements where operators select among available options. PHMSA 
agrees that operators should most likely be able to select an element 
from the list provided here, but has continued to provide an ``unknown/
other'' option for any situations in which the choices provided are not 
sufficient.
    Damage Information Reporting Tool (DIRT): API noted that the 
proposed form adopted many of the data elements used by the Common 
Ground Alliance in its DIRT system, in lieu of the information 
previously required for excavation damage incidents. API recommended 
that this change not be made. API reported its own experience with DIRT 
for consideration by PHMSA in case PHMSA did not agree to return to the 
excavation damage information previously required. API noted that it 
has modified its PPTS system to collect the data used in the DIRT 
system and that it then uploads that data directly to DIRT for all 
events reported to PPTS. API noted that requiring this information to 
be submitted to PHMSA would represent unnecessary duplication unless 
PHMSA also agrees to provide this information to DIRT, in which case 
API would cease collecting this data for PPTS. API recommended that 
PHMSA collect only that data identified in DIRT as mandatory. NAPSR 
suggested additional data elements for inclusion.
    PHMSA response: The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is the recognized 
authority for preventing excavation damage of underground utilities. 
The CGA has determined the information necessary to evaluate excavation 
damage trends via its DIRT system. PHMSA has adopted in this form the 
fields defined within the DIRT system as mandatory. Collecting 
information on excavation damage consistent with DIRT will allow for 
thorough analyses to identify trends related to excavation damage. It 
will

[[Page 41518]]

also allow comparative analyses to consider information reported to 
DIRT by other underground utility operators, thereby expanding the 
database and potentially affording additional insights.
Part F, F4--Other Outside Force Damage
    Vehicular damage: API suggested that the element concerning damage 
by a vehicle or other equipment be modified to include damage by the 
operator or its contractor. NAPSR suggested adding sub-elements to 
identify if barriers were in place, the distance between the roadway 
and the facility, and the location of damaged facilities.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA modified this question to collect information 
as to whether the vehicle was operated by operator or operator 
contractor personnel. PHMSA did not include questions concerning 
vehicle barriers. Experience shows that unique circumstances are often 
involved in vehicle-damage accidents, making it difficult to develop a 
uniform set of questions that would collect the appropriate information 
in all cases. The presence and location of vehicle barriers is more 
appropriately addressed as part of an accident investigation.
    Assessment: API questioned the value of collecting data on when 
inspection tools were run, noting that damage could have occurred 
subsequent to an inspection. API suggested that this element be 
replaced with a question asking whether the operator has reason to 
believe that its most recent internal inspection was completed prior to 
the damage being sustained.
    PHMSA response: We have added the question API suggested. PHMSA 
also has retained the questions concerning when tools were run. PHMSA 
recognizes that damage could have occurred subsequent to the last tool 
run, but it is also possible that damage went unrecognized as a result 
of the type of tool used or for other reasons. PHMSA considers it 
important to collect information which can be used to help identify 
whether assessment requirements are being effective in preventing 
accidents from latent outside force damage.
    Prior damage: API noted that the instructions should explicitly 
state that this section is to be completed for accidents resulting from 
prior excavation damage. They further suggested that a question be 
added as to whether the prior damage resulted from excavation. API 
again suggested that the questions related to assessments be limited to 
assessments/inspections conducted since the effective date of integrity 
management regulations.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA added the word ``mechanical'' to damage, 
which is more accurate than stating ``excavation'' damage. PHMSA also 
added a question as to whether the prior damage resulted from 
excavation. PHMSA did not limit the questions to those assessments 
conducted since the effective date of the integrity management 
regulations because these sorts of preventive assessments may well have 
taken place prior to and without regard to whether they were required 
by regulations.
Part F, F5--Material and/or Weld Failure
    Title: API noted that this redesigned section caused considerable 
confusion among its members. They suggested that the section be 
retitled ``material failure of pipe or weld'' which they believe will 
resolve the confusion.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has made the suggested change.
    Multiple causes: API suggested that the section on cause should 
include more options and should allow for multiple to be selected 
(i.e., check all that apply).
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has revised the form to indicate 
that multiple choices can be made.
    Failure drivers: API noted that the distinction between 
construction and original defect is not clear. They also noted that 
fatigue or vibration would be a factor that would drive a construction-
related or other incipient defect to failure, rather than being a cause 
unto itself. API suggested a restructuring to reflect this 
relationship.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has revised the form to indicate that sub-
causes are construction-related or original manufacturing defects. 
PHMSA has also reorganized the form to collect information on the 
subsequent mechanism that likely drove one of these defects to failure.
Part F, F6--Equipment Failure
    Failure methods: API indicated that the hazardous liquid pipeline 
industry is working hard to understand equipment failure problems. They 
suggested that additional data in this section would be useful, and 
provided an expanded list of failure methods to be included.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has revised the form to incorporate API's 
suggestions.
    Pump failure: API noted that a motor failure cannot, alone, cause a 
release from a pump. API suggested that the sub-questions for this 
element be limited to body failure, crack in body, and appurtenance 
failure.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and has modified the sub-questions 
accordingly.
Part F, F7--Incorrect Operation
    Revisions: API suggested a different set of questions for this 
section, to better understand the causes of incorrect operation.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has incorporated the API-suggested questions.
Instructions for Form 7000-1, Accident Report--Hazardous Liquid 
Pipeline Systems
    Inadequate instructions: API commented that the proposed 
instructions were inadequate, consisting for the most part of 
information duplicated from the form. API concluded that the extensive 
changes to the form, plus its applicability to operators of low-stress 
and rural gathering pipelines not previously subject to the regulations 
makes it imperative that good and thorough instructions be provided. 
API prepared and submitted a proposed draft set of instructions as part 
of their comments.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will revise the instructions to provide more 
guidance and to minimize repetition of information from the form.
    Zero as a placeholder: The draft form instructed operators to enter 
unknown for text fields and ``0'' for numeric fields where information 
is unavailable. API suggested that numeric fields for which information 
is not available should be left blank. They noted that zero can be 
interpreted as actual data and that this will distort subsequent 
analyses.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA agrees and will revise the instructions to so 
indicate.
    Required fields: API noted that there is no indication on the draft 
form as to which fields are required. They also commented that the on-
line data entry option does not indicate which fields are required 
until after data entry has been completed.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has held several discussions with Trade 
Association teams on general form design. Feedback from various 
stakeholders will be taken into account for both hard copy and 
electronic form design, including consideration of which fields are 
required for both instances.
    Volume recovered: API requested that the instructions include 
guidance for estimating the amount of a spill that is recovered.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will include such guidance in instructions.

[[Page 41519]]

    Guidance on costs: API requested that the instructions include 
explicit guidance for how costs related to an accident are to be 
estimated. The proposed instructions API submitted included such 
guidance.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will include such guidance in instructions.
    Conflicts with regulations: The Pipeline Safety Trust suggested 
that there were conflicts between the instructions and the regulations 
concerning the definition of highly volatile liquids and treatment of 
natural gas liquids.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA will address conflicts between the 
instructions and the regulations concerning the definition of highly 
volatile liquids and treatment of natural gas liquids in revisions to 
instructions that will be posted in the docket at time of publication 
of this r notice.
    Fatality: The Pipeline Safety Trust objected to the instructions 
that a fatality occurring more than 30 days after an accident as a 
result of an injury incurred from the accident should be reported as an 
injury. They contended that all fatalities resulting from an accident 
should be reported as a fatality.
    PHMSA response: This distinction is standard DOT practice. PHMSA 
acknowledges the logic behind attributing any resulting fatality to an 
accident, but there are practical difficulties in doing so. Accidents 
may result in injuries that subsequently contribute to death, sometimes 
long after the injury occurs. PHMSA cannot require pipeline operators 
to maintain contact with injury victims so that they will be aware of 
subsequent deaths and can modify incident reports accordingly. Thus, it 
is necessary to have some practical time limit in which operators would 
be expected to have this information and in which it is relatively 
clear that the accident is the proximate cause of death. PHMSA has no 
reason to deviate from DOT standard practice in establishing this 
limit.
Comments on Burden Estimate, Form 7000-1, Accident Report--Hazardous 
Liquid Pipeline Systems
    Basis for estimates: API noted that PHMSA's basis for the number of 
forms to be completed each year is based on the historical record of 
number of accidents reported. API considered this inaccurate, since a 
recent change to the regulations has made the regulations applicable to 
additional pipeline mileage (low-pressure pipeline and rural gathering 
lines between 6 and 8 inches in diameter). API also noted that the 
burden estimate included the short form, which was eliminated in this 
ICR. API reported its conclusion that the estimate of seven hours to 
complete the form is significantly low.
    PHMSA response: PHMSA has restored a short form to be used for 
small releases. PHMSA acknowledges that more accident reports may be 
filed in the future as a result of additional pipeline mileage made 
subject to Part 195. At the same time, other regulatory (and voluntary) 
initiatives have been put in place that are intended to significantly 
reduce the number of accidents that occur. If those initiatives are 
successful, then use of the historic record could actually overestimate 
the number of reports that will be submitted in the future. It is not 
possible to know which outcome will occur, and PHMSA considers that use 
of the historical record is most appropriate.

III. Proposed Information Collection Revisions and Request for Comments

    The forms to be revised are pipeline accident and incident 
reporting forms authorized by Information Collections OMB 2137-0522, 
Incident and Annual Reports for Gas Pipeline Operators and OMB 2137-
0047, Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline: Recordkeeping 
and Accident Reporting. The revised burdens hours associated with these 
information collections are specified as follows:
    Title of Information Collection: Transportation of Hazardous 
Liquids by Pipeline: Recordkeeping and Accident Reporting.
    OMB Control Number: 2137-0047.
    Type of Request: Revision of currently approved information 
collection.
    Abstract: Currently Information Collection 2137-0047 entitled 
``Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline: Recordkeeping and 
Accident Reporting'' has an approved burden hour estimate of 51,011 
hours and 200 respondents. This information collection consists of a 
broad scope data collection relative to hazardous liquid pipeline 
operators. This notice will affect only a portion of this information 
collection for accident reports. PHMSA estimates that the currently 
approved 200 respondents for this information collection should be 
revised to 300 respondents. This 100 respondent increase reflects the 
number of smaller entities that were previously unaccounted for due to 
the fact that they did not have to pay user fees and were not inspected 
by PHMSA. Therefore, this group became recognized after we began 
collecting annual reports in 2004. PHMSA estimates that 150 accident 
reports are submitted each year. This estimate is based on accident 
reporting data that PHMSA has collected over the past decade (1999--
2008). Currently, PHMSA estimates that each form takes an estimated 6 
hours to complete. This sets burden hours relative to completion of the 
accident form at 1,200 hrs. (200 responses * 6 hours/response). PHMSA 
estimates that the form changes relative to this notice will result in 
a 2 hour increase in the amount of time necessary to complete an 
accident report. However, since we estimate that 150 accident reports 
are submitted each year versus 200 accident reports this 2 hour 
increase in time will result in no change to the total annual burden 
hours (200 * 6 = 150 * 8). The amendments specified above will result 
in the following:
    Affected Public: Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline 
Operators.

Recordkeeping

    Estimated Number of Respondents: 300.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 51,011 hours (no increase).
    Frequency of collection: On occasion.
    Title of Information Collection: Incident and Annual Reports for 
Gas Pipeline Operators.
    OMB Control Number: 2137-0522.
    Type of Request: Revision of currently approved information 
collection.
    Abstract: Currently Information Collection 2137-0522 entitled 
``Incident and Annual Reports for Gas Pipeline Operators'' has an 
approved burden hour estimate of 36,105 hours and 2,100 respondents. 
This information collection consists of incident and annual reporting 
for gas pipeline operators. PHMSA's approved 2137-0522 information 
collection estimates that 10 percent (210) of the respondent community 
(distribution and transmission operators) will submit an incident 
report. Upon review of recent annual and incident report data, PHMSA 
estimates the respondent community at 2,212 respondents (950 
Transmission Operators and 1,262 Distribution Operators). Also, PHMSA 
has reviewed the past 10 years of incident data (1999--2008) and is 
revising the estimated 210 incident reports/year to an estimated 300 
incident reports/year. PHMSA estimates that the current form will takes 
6 hours to complete. This sets the current burden hours relative to 
completion of the incident form at 1,260 hrs. (210 responses * 6 hours/
response). PHMSA estimates that the form changes relative to this 
notice will result in a 2 hour increase in the amount of time necessary 
to complete an incident report. This adjustment, along with the other 
amendments specified above, will increase the estimated burden hours

[[Page 41520]]

relative to incident forms from 1,260 hours to 2,400 hours (300 
responses * 8 hours/response). This will increase the total estimated 
burden hours from 36,105 hours to 37,245 hours. The result of this 
revision is specified as follows:
    Affected Public: Gas Pipeline Operators.

Recordkeeping

    Estimated Number of Respondents: 2,212.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 37,245 hours (1,140 hour 
increase).
    Frequency of collection: On occasion.
    Comments are invited on:
    (a) The need for the proposed collection of information for the 
proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether 
the information will have practical utility;
    (b) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the 
proposed collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected; and
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on 
those who are to respond, including the use of appropriate automated, 
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques.

    Issued in Washington, DC on August 10, 2009.
Jeffrey D. Wiese,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. E9-19499 Filed 8-14-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-60-P