Document ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2005-0538-0115
Agency: epa
Document Type: Supporting & Related Material
Title: 
Posted Date: 2006-08-21T04:00Z

1
1
U.
S.
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY
2
*
*
*

3
PUBLIC
HEARING
4
*
*
*

5
NOTICE
OF
PROPOSED
RULEMAKING:

6
THE
2007
CRITICAL
USE
7
EXEMPTION
FROM
THE
PHASEOUT
OF
METHYL
BROMIDE
8
DOCKET
NO.:
2005­
0538
9
10
11
EPA
East
Builging
12
1201
Constitution
Ave.,
NW
13
Room
1153
14
Washington,
DC
15
Friday,
July
21,
2006
16
11:
10
a.
m.

17
18
19
The
meeting
was
held
on
Friday,
July
21,

20
2006,
at
1201
Constitution
Ave.,
NW,
commencing
at
21
11:
10
a.
m.,
Marta
E.
Montoro,
presiding.

22
2
1
P
R
O
C
E
E
D
I
N
G
S
2
(
11:
10
a.
m.)

3
MS.
MONTORO:
Good
morning.
Thank
you
to
4
all
of
you
for
coming
today.
This
is
the
hearing
on
5
the
methyl
bromide
critical
use
exemption
Proposed
6
Rule.

7
I
think
we
can
go
ahead
and
start.

8
Certainly,
if
other
people
come,
they
can
sign
in
and
9
volunteer
to
speak,
as
well.

10
My
name
is
Marta
Montoro.
I
know
that
11
most
of
you
know
me.
I'm
filling
in
for
Jodaya
12
Finman,
who
was
originally
the
point
of
contact.
She
13
couldn't
be
here
today.
As
most
of
you
know,
she
got
14
her
clearance
to
go
work
at
the
State
Department,
and
15
she
is
winding
things
down
back
at
the
office.

16
I
work
on
the
Methyl
Bromide
Team
with
her
17
in
the
Office
of
Atmospheric
Programs
at
EPA.
Our
18
Office
is
responsible
for
the
phaseout
of
ozone­

19
depleting
substances.

20
I
do
want
to
say
thank
you
to
all
of
you
21
for
attending
on
such
short
notice,
and
make
just
a
22
few
general
remarks.
3
1
Specifically,
the
Proposed
Rule
that
is
2
the
subject
of
today's
hearing,
is
the
2007
Critical
3
Use
Exemption
Allocation
Pool,
which
was
published
in
4
the
Federal
Register
on
July
6,
2006,
Docket
Number
5
2005­
0538.

6
The
Proposed
Rule,
as
you
know,
would
7
allocate
6,237,890
kilograms
of
methyl
bromide
for
8
2007,
and
that
amounts
to
24.4
percent
of
baseline.

9
Again,
as
you
probably
know,
the
purpose
10
of
this
hearing
is
to
allow
interested
parties
to
11
comment
on
the
Proposed
Rule.
This
would
be
12
providing
verbal
comments
to
EPA,
and
we
would
13
consider
these
verbal
comments
in
the
same
way
we
14
consider
written
comments
that
are
provided
us
during
15
the
comment
period.

16
In
just
a
couple
of
weeks,
we
should
have
17
the
transcript
available
on
the
Methyl
Bromide
18
website
and
on
the
Ozone
Depletion
website,
as
well,

19
and
I
can
give
you
those,
those
URLs,
so
you
can
20
check
for
that
transcript.

21
The
purpose
of
this
hearing
is
really
not
22
to
answer
individual
questions,
but,
again,
for
4
1
interested
parties
to
provide
comments
on
the
2
proposal.

3
And
as
we
assemble
the
Final
Rule,
we'll
4
be
considering
the
verbal
comments
we
receive
today,

5
in
the
same
manner
that
we
consider
the
written
6
comments
that
we
receive
during
the
comment
period.

7
If
you
are
attending
today
and
are
8
submitting
oral
comments
and
also
wish
to
provide
9
written
comments
as
a
followup,
that's
fine,
too.

10
And
I
want
to
remind
you
all
that
the
11
deadline
for
submitting
comments
is
now
August
21st.

12
As
you
know,
the
deadline
was
initially
August
6,
but
13
because
there
was
this
hearing
requested
and
we
want
14
people
to
comment
on
the
hearing,
as
well,
that
15
deadline
is
now
moved
to
August
21st
as
the
deadline.

16
Okay,
so
I
hope
all
of
you
who
are
17
interested
in
speaking,
checked
the
speaker
box
in
18
the
sign­
in
sheet,
or,
if
not,
you
can
let
me
know,

19
personally,
as
well.
So
far,
we
have
one
individual
20
who
is
going
to
speak
today,
and
that's
Peter
Joyce
21
of
Value
Recovery.

22
Right
now,
I'm
going
to
let
him
take
the
5
1
floor.
Again,
if
any
of
you
are
interested
in
2
speaking,
I'll
open
up
the
floor
for
further
3
comments,
afterward.

4
Peter?

5
MR.
JOYCE:
Good
morning.
My
name
is
6
Peter
J.
Joyce,
and
I
am
President
of
Value
Recovery,

7
Incorporated,
a
small
technology­
based
research
8
company
located
in
Southern
New
Jersey.

9
We
have
a
3,000
square
foot
laboratory
for
10
technology
development,
and
have
two
patents.
Our
11
Company
invents
and
develops
technology
for
customers
12
in
search
of
novel
chemical
separations.

13
We
have
technology
for
removing
alkyl
14
halides
from
air,
water,
and
solid
streams.
Of
15
particular
interest
is
our
technology
for
removing
16
and
simultaneously
destroying
one
very
important
akly
17
halide,
methyl
bromide,
from
ventilation
streams
and
18
fumigations
of
soil,
pre­
plant,
post­
harvest,
and
19
QPS.

20
The
technology
has
been
described
at
21
several
international
NBAO
meetings,
and,
the
most
22
detailed
description
to
date,
is
published
in
the
E
6
1
Docket
at
OPP­
2005­
0123­
205.1.

2
My
comments
this
morning
are
in
response
3
to
the
Notice
of
July
6,
published
in
the
Federal
4
Register.
I
will
specifically
address
the
request
on
5
page
38,336,
third
column,
in
which
the
Agency
states
6
"
In
addition,
the
Agency
welcomes
comments
on
the
7
implementation
of
emission
minimization
and
whether
8
and
how
further
emission
minimization
could
be
9
achieved.

10
We
feel
that
the
potential
for
emissions
11
reduction
of
methyl
bromide
is
very
great,
and
could
12
have
a
significant
impact
on
the
Agency's
and
13
Montreal
Protocol's
stated
goals
of
protecting
the
14
ozone
layer.

15
In
our
experience,
we've
run
up
against
16
many
barriers
in
our
desire
to
commercialize
this
17
technology.
These
barriers
are
neither
technical,

18
nor
economic.
They
are
barriers
of
power,
politics,

19
common
sense,
leadership,
and
will.

20
And
since
you've
given
me
the
opportunity
21
to
shed
light
on
how
further
emission
minimization
22
techniques
could
be
achieved
and
how
they
are
blocked
7
1
by
these
barriers,
I've
come
here
voluntarily
here
2
today
in
response
to
your
request.

3
For
us,
emission
minimization
means
the
4
use
of
emissions
controls
that
result
in
elimination
5
of
at
least
70
percent
and
up
to
99
percent
of
the
6
methyl
bromide
used
in
a
fumigation.

7
The
first
barrier
to
adoption
of
emissions
8
controls
is
that
no
­­
and
the
major
one
­­
is
that
9
no
commercial
incentives
to
industry
have
been
10
offered
by
either
the
Montreal
Protocol,
or
the
EPA,

11
to
use
emissions
control
technology
for
either
pre­

12
plant,
post­
harvest,
or
QPS.

13
There
are
incentives
with
regard
to
soil,

14
and
those
are
in
the
requirement
to
obtain
CUEs.
This
15
is
a
matter
of
public
record,
and
it's
been
told
to
16
us
numerous
times.
In
one
instance,
a
green
17
California
grower
told
me
point
blank,
that
even
18
though
he
would
love
to
try
our
technology
for
ozone
19
layer
protection,
to
do
so
would
put
him
at
a
cost
20
disadvantage
to
his
competitor,
who
was
under
no
21
obligation
to
use
emission
controls.

22
Commercial
incentives
could
be
in
the
form
8
1
of
a
CUE
credit
on
a
per­
pound
or
fraction­
of­
a­
pound
2
basis.
Thus,
if
an
entity
could
verify
that
it
had
3
used
methyl
bromide,
but
had
not
admitted
it
into
the
4
atmosphere
through
third­
party
verification,
then
5
that
use
should
not
be
deducted
from
his
CUE.

6
Room
for
this
approach
is
stated
in
both
7
the
Clean
Air
Act
and
in
the
Montreal
Protocol.
In
8
relating
to
the
regulation
of
methyl
bromide
under
9
the
Montreal
Protocol,
Section
6
of
the
1997
Clean
10
Air
Act,
Definition
11,
states:
"
Produce,
produced,

11
and
production,
the
terms,
'
produce,'
'
produced,'
and
12
'
production,'
refer
to
the
manufacture
of
a
substance
13
from
any
raw
material
or
feedstock
chemical,
but
such
14
items
do
not
include
(
a)
the
manufacture
of
a
15
substance
that
is
used
and
entirely
consumed,
except
16
for
trace
quantities
in
the
manufacture
of
other
17
chemicals,
or,
(
b)
the
reuse
or
recycling
of
a
18
substance.

19
Clearly,
the
authors
of
the
Clean
Air
Act,

20
intended
that
methyl
bromide
that
did
not
reach
the
21
atmosphere,
should
be
exempt
from
the
definition
of
22
"
production,"
due
to
the
inclusion
of
the
exemption
9
1
terms,
"
reuse
or
recycling."

2
If,
to
Definition
B,
we
could
add,
quote,

3
"
chemically
destroyed
in
situ,"
then
a
massive
4
incentive
to
use
emission
controls
would
result.
The
5
fact
that
this
modification
has
not
been
implemented,

6
is
a
barrier
characterized
by
a
lack
of
leadership.

7
The
amount
of
methyl
bromide
removed
by
8
emission
controls,
can
be
easily
measured
and
9
verified
through
third
parties.
If
this
information
10
had
value
in
terms
of
non­
CUE
allowances
for
the
use
11
of
methyl
bromide,
companies
would
want
to
collect
12
it,
collect
this
information,
and
report
on
it.

13
Second
barrier:
The
Montreal
Protocol,

14
through
Decision
17/
9,
and
CRP­
10,
at
the
25th
OEG
15
meeting
in
June
of
2005,
asked
for
examples
of
16
commercialization
of
emissions
control
data.

17
It
took
nine
months
for
a
one­
page
form
to
18
report
data
on
emissions
control
technology
to
become
19
available.
The
form
never
appeared
on
the
Ozone
20
Secretary's
website,
even
though
the
Director
stated
21
it
would
be.

22
It
became
available
to
us
from
a
10
1
consultant
to
the
EPA.
The
form
is
technically
2
inconsistent,
contradictory,
and
poorly
documented.

3
It
confuses
concentration
and
mass
in
the
4
way
that
it
accounts
for
the
methyl
bromide
5
controlled.

6
Finally,
the
form
shows
a
lack
of
7
fundamental
understanding
of
basic
chemical
8
principles.
Despite
making
the
requested
data
9
submission,
we
have
not
heard
one
word
from
the
10
Montreal
Protocol,
or
from
Dr.
Jonathan
Banks,
the
11
designee
to
oversee
receipt
of
this
information.

12
This
year,
emissions
control
was
not
even
13
on
the
Montreal
Protocol
OEWG
agenda.
In
addition,

14
we
were
also
denied
the
opportunity
to
present
our
15
data,
an
approach
to
the
Montreal
Protocol,
through
16
the
use
of
a
side
session
that
was
supposed
to
be
17
open
to
all
stakeholders.

18
We
can
only
conclude
that
the
Montreal
19
Protocol
does
not
believe
that
emissions
control
20
technology
companies
are
stakeholders
in
the
goal
of
21
reducing
ozone
depletion.

22
The
Montreal
Protocol
may
also
be
in
11
1
violation
of
Article
IX,
Paragraph
1(
a)
in
denying
2
our
request.

3
We
suggest
strongly
that
the
EPA
make
a
4
point
to
the
Protocol
to
provide
expectations
for
5
experimentation
and
support
for
emissions
control
6
technologies
and
then
foster
an
environment
for
the
7
exchange
of
information.

8
This
is
a
barrier
of
political
power
to
9
reach
those
entities
and
countries
who
might
want
to
10
be
on
the
cutting
edge
of
introducing
new
technology.

11
This
is
further
reinforced,
because
we
12
were
also
denied
the
opportunity
to
attend
an
13
international
meeting
on
ozone
depletion
in
Lisbon,

14
Portugal,
in
2004.
We
were
told,
quote,
"
We
cannot
15
allow
you
to
attend."

16
The
third
barrier,
an
argument
that
17
rejects
the
advocacy
of
emissions
controls,
the
third
18
barrier
is
an
argument
that
rejects
the
advocacy
of
19
emissions
controls,
in
that
it
would
lessen
the
20
incentive
to
develop
alternatives.
This
means
that
21
if
users
had
a
choice
between
adopting
alternatives
22
or
using
emissions
controls
and
chose
emissions
12
1
controls,
then
the
desired
solution
to
the
methyl
2
bromide
problem,
switching
to
alternatives,
would
be
3
severely
hurt,
because
users
would
not
have
to
give
4
up
methyl
bromide.

5
The
three
points
can
be
made
to
counter
6
this
argument:
The
first
is,
so
what?
From
a
short­

7
term
perspective,
if
the
alternatives
developers
have
8
less
of
an
incentive
to
develop
alternatives,
because
9
less
methyl
bromide
is
being
emitted
into
the
10
atmosphere,
then
isn't
this
what
is
supposed
to
11
happen?

12
The
fundamental
basis
for
the
development
13
of
alternatives,
is
that
they
protect
the
atmosphere.

14
If
there
is
protection
for
the
atmosphere
by
an
15
alternative
solution
like
emissions
controls,
then
16
why
is
this
a
concern?

17
The
objective
is
to
keep
methyl
bromide
18
out
of
the
atmosphere
and
the
one­
way
mentality
of
19
using
only
alternatives,
should
not
be
allowed
to
20
keep
emissions
controls
from
emerging.

21
The
second
counter
to
this
argument
is
22
from
a
long­
term
perspective.
The
alternatives
13
1
manufacturers
have
been
on
notice
since
at
least
2
1992,
when
it
was
obvious
that
a
ban
on
methyl
3
bromide
would
be
forthcoming.

4
They
have
had
an
open
playing
field
and
5
have
been
protected
from
emissions
advocacy
for
14
6
years.
If
they
can't
get
these
problems
solved
by
7
now,
then
how
much
longer
should
they
be
given?

8
Another
14
years?

9
Is
there
a
contractual
obligation
on
the
10
part
of
the
EPA
to
give
alternative
suppliers
a
11
regulatory
advantage
at
the
expense
of
potential
12
adoption
of
emissions
control
technology?

13
The
advocacy
by
the
Agency
of
14
alternatives,
is
well
documented
and
understood.
The
15
political
support
has
been
broad
and
deep,
and
there
16
is
no
reason
for
this
support
to
wane.

17
However,
support
for
alternatives
should
18
not
be
cast
as
a
corresponding
competition
with
the
19
same
space
by
emissions
controls.
This
defies
common
20
sense.

21
Finally,
the
argument
is
made
that
the
use
22
of
­­
the
counter
arguments:
Finally,
the
argument
14
1
is
made
that
the
use
of
emissions
controls
for
methyl
2
bromide
will
mean
that
to
adopt
emissions
control
3
methods
­­
that
users
who
will
adopt
emissions
4
control
methods,
and
be
even
more
reluctant
to
give
5
up
methyl
bromide,
quote,
"
when
it
becomes
phased
6
out,"
unquote.

7
The
overwhelming
evidence
from
the
CUE
8
submissions
in
the
exempt
areas
of
QPS
and
crisis
9
uses,
is
that
it
will
never
­­
or,
should
I
say,
not
10
in
our
lifetimes,
be
completely
phased
out.

11
Fourteen
years
have
gone
by
since
the
12
Protocol
was
signed,
and,
this
year,
the
use
level
13
for
2007,
is
down
to
29
percent
of
the
1991
baseline.

14
At
that
rate,
and
without
a
major
technical
15
breakthrough
or
policy
change,
it
will
take
another
16
14
years
and
another
$
165
million
in
research
17
spending,
to
get,
potentially,
down
to
eight
percent
18
of
the
baseline.

19
The
law
of
diminishing
returns
is
setting
20
in,
and
policy
should
change
to
reflect
reality.

21
The
fear
that
emissions
control
will
hurt
22
the
development
of
alternatives,
and,
in
turn,
hurt
15
1
the
goals
of
ozone
depletion,
are
barriers
that
show
2
a
lack
of
common
sense
and
leadership.

3
Fourth,
a
review
of
the
2007
approved
CUE
4
nominations,
shows
that
the
allowed­
use
level
in
the
5
U.
S.
is
29
percent
of
the
1991
baseline.
A
further
6
review
of
those
nominations
show
that
applicants
have
7
requested
58
percent
of
the
baseline.

8
If
one
assumes
that
at
least
five
to
ten
9
percent
more
would
use
methyl
bromide,
but
did
not
10
bother
to
go
through
the
cumbersome
application
11
process,
potentially
because
of
the
stigma
associated
12
with
asking
for
more
methyl
bromide,
then
a
13
reasonable
estimate
for
the
need
for
methyl
bromide,

14
is
65
to
70
percent
of
the
1991
baseline.

15
In
other
words,
after
four
years
and
over
16
$
165
million
in
research
funding,
the
desire
for
17
methyl
bromide
in
the
U.
S.
has
only
decreased
by
30
18
to
35
percent
and
maybe
even
less.

19
Its
use
level
is
much
less,
due
to
an
20
imposed
Government
fiat,
and
not
due
to
voluntary
21
substitutions.
Methyl
bromide
is
not
going
away
22
anytime
soon,
and
policies
that
its
use
will
go
to
16
1
zero,
absolute
zero,
serve
no
public
purpose.

2
Often
Value
Recovery
has
asked,
why
aren't
3
the
methyl
bromide
suppliers
interested
in
emissions
4
control
technology?
After
all,
the
introduction
of
5
emissions
controls
would
allow
the
suppliers
to
sell
6
more
and
thus
make
much
more
money,
which
is
the
7
ultimate
objective
of
any
corporation.

8
However,
a
closer
look
at
the
methyl
9
supply
dynamic,
explains
why
selling
less
methyl
10
bromide,
actually
makes
more
money
for
the
producers.

11
Since
the
Government
has
specified
which
12
methyl
bromide
suppliers
can
sell
in
the
U.
S.,
and
13
the
proportions
they
can
sell,
then
most
of
the
14
competitive
incentive
to
compete
on
prices,
is
15
removed.

16
Also,
since
only
four
companies
are
17
allowed
to
sell
in
the
U.
S.,
they
need
not
fear
any
18
new
competition.
The
Government­
mandated
cartel
of
19
methyl
bromide
has
come
into
existence.

20
Since
the
demand
far
outstrips
the
supply,

21
the
methyl
bromide
prices
rise,
instead
of
fall,
as
22
time
goes
by.
Methyl
bromide
suppliers
keep
raising
17
1
their
prices
to
cover
both
their
fixed
and
operating
2
costs,
and
to
keep
their
cashflow
constant,
or,
in
3
one
case,
have
actually
increase
cashflows.

4
Thus,
higher
prices
allow
some
5
alternatives
into
the
market,
and
lets
the
Agency
and
6
the
Protocol
claim
that
alternatives
are
replacing
7
methyl
bromide.

8
Thus,
by
carefully
planning
how
much
9
global
supply
decrease
will
appease
the
Protocol,

10
and,
simultaneously
keep
cashflows
constant
or
11
rising,
by
rising
prices,
then
the
suppliers
are
in
12
the
best
of
both
worlds.

13
The
cry
from
the
industry
for
relief
on
14
spiraling
prices,
is
clear,
and
has
shown
up
15
extremely
recently
in
OAR
2005­
0538­
106,
which
was
16
submitted
to
this
E­
Docket
on
July
18
by
Plum
Creek.

17
In
business
valuations,
one
takes
the
18
future
cashflow
of
a
company
and
discounts
for
the
19
risk
of
the
business.
Regarding
methyl
bromide
20
supply,
there
is
no
risk,
thus,
the
valuations
are
21
very
high.

22
Since
the
value
generated
in
any
business
18
1
is
a
tug­
of­
war
between
the
shareholders
and
the
2
consumer,
excluding,
of
course,
management's
3
salaries,
then
the
loser
in
this
equation
is
the
4
consumer.

5
Supplier
business
valuations
keep
going
6
up,
while
production
decreases.
Thus,
we
believe
7
this
is
the
reason
that
supplies
have
not
erased
8
emissions
control
technology,
because,
in
the
9
regulated
environment,
it
is
not
in
their
interest
to
10
do
so,
because
they
will
make
less
money,
and
they
11
are
merely
following
the
directives
of
the
12
shareholders
to
maximize
the
returns
of
whom
they
are
13
responsible
to.

14
The
make
less
money
because
the
higher
15
costs
of
emissions
control,
would
go
to
someone
else
16
and
not
to
them.

17
We
advocate
opening
up
competition
for
18
methyl
bromide
supply
and
providing
incentives
for
19
new
suppliers
to
add
value
to
their
product
through
20
emissions
control.

21
To
allow
for
the
continued
extraction
of
22
value
from
the
consumer
in
terms
of
higher
prices,
19
1
along
with
lessened
ozone
depletion,
is
a
barrier
of
2
political
leadership.

3
Number
5:
In
this
testimony,
I
have
4
repeatedly
advocated
that
EPA
support
commercial
5
incentives
for
the
implementation
of
methyl
bromide
6
controls
as
a
fundamental
method
for
supporting
their
7
adoption.

8
Our
recommendation
for
those
incentives,

9
are
summarized
as
follows:
The
Clean
Air
Act
and
the
10
Montreal
Protocol
have
allowances
in
their
11
definitions
for
production
of
methyl
bromide,
to
12
exempt
methyl
bromide
that
has
been
chemically
13
destroyed,
post­
fumigation,
from
the
CUE
allocation,

14
as
I
mentioned
earlier.

15
In
other
words,
if
one
can
prove
that
a
16
pound
of
methyl
bromide
used
in
a
fumigation,
did
not
17
enter
the
atmosphere,
then
this
pound
would
not
count
18
against
the
CUE.
In
simple
terms,
doesn't
this
make
19
sense?

20
After
all,
if
protection
of
the
ozone
21
layer
is
the
ultimate
objective
of
the
Clean
Air
Act
22
and
the
Montreal
Protocol,
and
it
is
proven
that,
in
20
1
spite
of
the
use
of
methyl
bromide,
the
ozone
layer
2
was,
indeed,
protected
from
it,
then
why
should
it
be
3
rationed?

4
Both
the
Protocol
and
the
EPA,
need
to
5
revisit
the
regulation
of
methyl
bromide
based
on
6
use.
As
in
most
regulatory
systems,
it
may
be
easier
7
to
manage
for
the
Agency,
but
much
more
painful
for
8
the
industry
and
consumers.

9
And,
is
managing
use
really
easy?
Based
10
on
the
continued
drumbeat
of
requests
for
CUEs,
I
11
don't
believe
that
industry
would
reject
a
system
12
where
they
report
on
methyl
bromide
use,
destroyed
13
after
use,
and
also
emitted,
provided
access
to
14
increased
sources
of
methyl
bromide
was
available.

15
Another
commercial
incentive
would
be
for
16
the
EPA
to
publish
methyl
bromide
emissions
from
17
users
on
an
annual
basis.
For
some
reason,
the
18
vented
amount
of
methyl
bromide
by
users,
does
not
19
show
up
in
the
TRI
database
for
hazard
emissions.

20
I
do
not
know
the
reason.
It
does
for
21
some
industries,
but
not
for
all.
I
do
not
know
the
22
reason
that
this
information
is
kept
secret,
and
21
1
wonder
if
it
is
even
legal
to
do
so.

2
The
public's
right
to
know
is
a
well­

3
established
legal
principle.
Publishing
fumigation
4
data
by
user,
would
provide
ample
incentive
for
those
5
companies
or
industry
groups
wishing
to
gain
a
6
marketing
edge,
based
on
using
stated
green
7
technologies.

8
In
addition,
publishing
emissions
data
9
might
be
an
incentive
for
companies
who
use
methyl
10
bromide,
to
actually
adopt
alternatives,
as
well.

11
Another
incentive
that
we
recommend,
is
12
that
the
EPA
publish
a
drop­
dead
date,
five
or
some
13
other
years
into
the
future,
where
a
minimum
of
50
14
percent
of
methyl
bromide
use
must
be
contained
in
15
some
kind
of
emissions­
control
use,
or
use
of
methyl
16
bromide
would
be
prohibited.
In
ten
years
or
some
17
other
date,
a
95­
percent
emissions
control
would
be
18
required.

19
In
the
'
70s
and
'
80s,
the
EPA
went
to
20
great
lengths
to
ensure
that
sulfur
dioxide,
nitrous
21
oxide,
mercury,
and
a
plethora
of
hazardous
air
22
pollutants,
were
not
allowed
into
the
atmosphere,
22
1
period.

2
For
some
reason,
all
of
that
experience
3
and
policy
does
not
seem
to
apply
to
methyl
bromide
4
emissions,
and
there
is
no
reason
not
to
do
this.

5
I
do
not
know
where
the
chemical
6
industry's
Responsible
Care
Initiative
comes
into
7
play
on
this
issue,
other
than
to
say
it
is
absent.

8
This
also
could
serve
as
an
incentive
for
9
alternatives.

10
Another
incentive
we'd
recommend,
is
that
11
the
Agency
seriously
consider
allowing
new
methyl
12
bromide
competition
into
the
United
States,
that
13
would
be
linked
to
controlling
emissions.

14
Maybe
the
mere
threat
of
competition
would
15
convince
the
suppliers
to
support
emissions
control.

16
Other
points
about
our
experience
and
17
observations
that
may
shed
light
on
enhancing
the
use
18
of
methyl
bromide
emissions
controls,
are
as
follows:

19
First,
the
original
concept
of
replacing
methyl
20
bromide
with
alternatives,
followed
the
model
used
to
21
replace
CFCs
as
refrigerants,
and
is
not
supported
22
when
one
does
a
first­
principles
analysis
and
detects
23
1
a
technical
flaw
in
the
approach
of
using
a
methyl
2
bromide
substitution
in
line
with
a
CFC
substitution.

3
The
flaw
is
also
evident
in
the
need
for
4
continued
use
of
methyl
bromide
via
CUEs,
since
a
5
drop­
in
replacement
is
not
available.

6
If
one
looks
at
the
requirements
to
7
replace
CFCs
­­
and
it
could
be
argued
that
this
was
8
a
much
easier
problem
to
solve
than
the
one
for
9
replacing
methyl
bromide
­­
first,
the
process
of
10
replacing
CFCs,
required
substitutes
that
could
11
substitute
for
the
physical
attributes
of
CFCs,
such
12
as
diffusivity,
volatility,
and
density
relative
to
13
air,
as
well
as
other
physical
attributes.

14
And
replacing
methyl
bromide,
besides
15
replacing
the
physical
attributes,
one
also
has
to
16
find
a
substitute
for
its
reactivity,
since
the
17
reactivity
of
a
fumigant
is
probably
its
most
18
critical
attribute.

19
Thus,
finding
a
substitute
for
methyl
20
bromide
requires
simultaneously
matching
physical
and
21
reactive
properties,
as
opposed
to
replacing
only
22
physical
attributes,
as
in
the
case
of
CFCs.
24
1
This
is
not
a
trivial
technical
task.
In
2
looking
closer
at
CFCs,
one
notices
that
they
all
3
have
at
least
two
carbon
atoms
and
sometimes
three,

4
while
methyl
bromide
has
only
one.

5
Thus,
the
degree
of
freedom
available
for
6
the
replacement
of
CFCs,
were
much
greater,
due
to
7
CFCs
being
more
complex
molecules
than
methyl
8
bromide,
and
thus
the
probability
of
replacement
9
success,
much
greater.

10
This
is
borne
out
in
the
numerous
CUE
11
applications
where
there
is
overwhelming
agreement
12
across
industries
and
applications,
that
a
direct
13
substitute
for
all
of
the
remaining
methyl
bromide
14
CUEs,
will
be
impossible
to
achieve.

15
This
is
further
supported
by
the
agreement
16
to
allow
an
outright
ban
exemption
for
quarantine
and
17
preshipment
applications,
where
the
thought
of
a
18
drop­
in
replacement
for
methyl
bromide
is
sometimes
19
met
with
ridicule.

20
Second
point:
We
have
done
two
21
commercial­
scale
demonstrations
of
approximately
22
3,000
cubic
feet
of
fumigation
volume,
at
Royal
25
1
Fumigation
at
the
Port
of
Wilmington,
Delaware,
on
2
imported
grapes
and
at
Insects
Limited
in
Westville,

3
Indiana,
on
exports.

4
Both
demonstrations
worked,
in
that
we
5
were
able
to
show
through
a
mass
balance,
an
in
situ,

6
instantaneous
destruction
of
87
and
91
percent
7
destruction
of
methyl
bromide
from
vent
streams.

8
Both
were
in
real­
world
conditions,
and
9
the
latter
was
done
at
15
degrees
Fahrenheit.

10
In
both
demonstrations,
we
were
able
to
11
verify
mass
balance
of
chemically­
destroyed
methyl
12
bromide.
We
have
a
design
and
significant
market
13
interest
for
100,000
and
one
million
cubic
foot
14
systems,
amenable
to
large­
scale
import
fumigations
15
and
structural
fumigations,
respectively.

16
The
design
of
these
larger
systems
17
overcome
an
inherent
limitation
we
have
on
the
size
18
of
the
scrubbers,
by
applying
carbon
absorption
as
an
19
intermediate
step
to
separate
out
most
of
the
air
and
20
simultaneously
decouple
our
operation
from
the
time
21
pressure
of
their
respective
operations.

22
The
waste
from
our
process
is
non
26
1
hazardous
and
benign,
and
waste
treatment
costs
are
2
very
low.

3
Third
point:
Recently,
our
second
methyl
4
bromide
patent
was
published.
In
it,
we
show
the
5
solubilizing
agent
for
enhancing
methyl
bromide
6
reactions,
is
polyethylene
glycol,
a
food
additive.

7
Thus,
our
chemical
system
for
destroying
methyl
8
bromide,
consists
of
ammonium
thiosulfate,

9
polyethylene
glycol,
and
water.

10
Ammonium
thiosulfate
can
be
purchased
in
11
bulk
for
18
cents
a
pound,
and
30
cents
worth
of
12
ammonium
thiosulfate
is
enough
to
chemically
destroy
13
a
pound
of
methyl
bromide.
Our
system
will
work
14
without
the
polyethylene
glycol,
even
though
a
lower
15
conversion
will
result.

16
Thus,
we
claim
that
chemical
scrubbing,
as
17
practiced
by
our
Company,
is
uncomplicated,

18
verifiable,
cheap,
easy
to
operate,
and
works
on
a
19
broad
range
of
environments,
and
yet
it
still
isn't
20
supported.

21
Lastly,
often
we
hear
the
reviewers
need
22
more
data.
Data
can
be
a
substitute
for
real
27
1
knowledge,
when
the
operating
principles
are
not
2
understood,
or
a
model
not
available.

3
However,
based
our
published
commercial
4
trials,
patent
applications,
and
presentations
at
5
national
meetings,
we
have
contributed
to
well
6
established
mathematical
process
model
that
is
in
7
plain
sight,
is
derivable
from
first
principles
of
8
kinetics,
thermodynamics,
transfer
phenomena,
mass
9
and
energy
balances.

10
Only
the
truly
incompetent
reviewers
need
11
more
data.
In
our
view,
then
need
for
more
data
is
a
12
smoke
screen
for
delays,
the
desire
to
grow
a
13
regulatory
or
political
bureaucracy,
and
job
14
justification.

15
The
inability
of
the
Montreal
Protocol
to
16
absorb
and
respond
to
our
information,
is
without
17
justification.

18
In
summary,
I
have
presented
you
with
our
19
experiences
and
frustrations
in
trying
to
provide
20
emissions
control
technology
to
those
interested
in
21
protecting
the
ozone
layer
from
methyl
bromide
22
emissions.
28
1
The
overall
issue
in
this
regard
is
that
2
there
are
no
commercial
incentives
whatsoever
for
3
someone
to
install
very
high
levels
of
emissions
4
control
technology.

5
Right
now,
only
local
environmental
6
regulations
related
to
harmful
pesticide
exposure
or
7
a
sense
of
civic
pride,
are
the
only
reasons
someone
8
would
install
this
technology.

9
It
is
mind­
boggling
that
a
technology
can
10
be
allowed
to
sit
on
the
shelf,
while
unnecessary
11
suffering
is
endured
by
both
consumers
and
growers.

12
To
not
show
interest,
such
as
the
recent
e­
mail
I
13
received,
where
a
high­
ranking
member
of
the
EPA
14
could
not
make
it
to
a
commercial
demonstration
15
because
travel
to
Indiana,
quote,
"
was
not
in
the
16
budget,"
unquote,
and
to
not
provide
incentives
for
17
this
or
other
technologies
to
protect
the
ozone
18
layer,
is
unconscionable.

19
There
either
is
or
isn't
a
problem
with
20
methyl
bromide
in
the
ozone
layer.
If
there
isn't,

21
then
let's
turn
out
the
lights
and
forget
this
14­

22
year
sojourn
has
ever
happened.
29
1
If
there
is
a
problem,
then
solve
it,
or
2
let
those
of
us
who
have
the
answer,
have
a
level
3
playing
field
to
solve
it.

4
Thirty­
five
years
ago,
this
country
5
launched
a
determined
program
to
put
a
man
on
the
6
moon
in
seven
years,
and
did
it.
The
lunar
module
7
had
less
electrical
sophistication
than
today's
cell
8
phones.

9
Certainly,
the
same
country
can
take
one
10
of
the
most
reactive
and
potentially
harmful
11
industrial
molecules,
keep
it
contained,
and
force
it
12
into
a
well
known
destructive
chemical
reaction
in
13
water,
and
do
it
safely
and
economically.

14
It
should
not
be
up
to
a
small
15
entrepreneurial
company
with
extremely
limited
16
resources,
to
have
to
lead
this
effort.
When
this
17
technology
emerged
over
three
years
ago
on
May
28th,

18
2003,
it
should
have
been
embraced.

19
Due
to
intense
public
pressure,
the
20
chemical
and
process
industries
came
to
terms
with
21
the
air
emissions
over
30
years
ago.
It
is
time
for
22
the
agriculture
industry
to
mature
and
take
care
of
30
1
their
air
emissions,
as
well.

2
Thank
you
very
much
for
the
invitation
to
3
share
with
you,
my
views
on
this
subject.

4
MS.
MONTORO:
Thank
you
very
much,
Mr.

5
Joyce,
for
your
comments.
Is
there
anybody
else
6
today
who
may
not
have
signed
up
to
speak,
but
who
7
would
like
to
provide
additional
comments
on
the
8
Notice
of
Proposed
Rulemaking?

9
(
No
response.)

10
MS.
MONTORO:
Nobody
else?
Okay,
then,

11
thank
you
all
very
much
for
coming.
Again,
I
do
12
appreciate
your
attendance
today,
and
we
will
be
13
posting
the
transcript
of
this
hearing
on
14
epa.
gov\
ozone
and
ozone\
mbr,
in
about
two
weeks.
You
15
can
also
call
me,
if
you
have
any
questions
about
the
16
transcript.

17
Thank
you
very
much
for
your
attendance
18
today.

19
(
Whereupon,
at
1:
35
a.
m.,
the
hearing
was
20
concluded.)

21
22