Document ID: SEC-2020-1810-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: The Depository Trust Co.
Posted Date: 2020-11-12T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 219 (Thursday, November 12, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71973-71977]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25006]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-90368; File No. SR-DTC-2020-801]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Depository Trust Company; 
Notice of No Objection To Advance Notice To Amend Rule 4

November 6, 2020.
    On September 9, 2020, The Depository Trust Company (``DTC'') filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') advance 
notice SR-DTC-2020-801 (``Advance Notice'') pursuant to Section 
806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, entitled Payment, Clearing and Settlement 
Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing Supervision Act'') \1\ and Rule 
19b-4(n)(1)(i) \2\ under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'') \3\ to amend Rule 4 of the Rules, By-Laws and 
Organization Certificate of DTC (the ``Rules''). The Advance Notice was 
published for comment in the Federal Register on October 20, 2020,\4\ 
and the Commission has not received comments regarding the changes 
proposed in the Advance Notice. This publication serves as notice of no 
objection to the Advance Notice.
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    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
    \4\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90169 (October 14, 
2020), 85 FR 66666 (October 20, 2020) (SR-DTC-2020-801) (``Notice of 
Filing'').
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I. The Advance Notice

A. Background

    DTC is the central securities depository (``CSD'') for 
substantially all corporate and municipal debt and equity securities 
available for trading in the United States.\5\ As a covered clearing 
agency that provides CSD services,\6\ DTC provides a central

[[Page 71974]]

location in which securities may be immobilized, and interests in those 
securities are reflected in accounts maintained for its Participants, 
which are financial institutions such as brokers or banks.\7\ DTC does 
not provide central counterparty services and therefore does not become 
party to its Participants' transactions or guarantee settlement on 
behalf of its Participants.\8\
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    \5\ Each capitalized term not otherwise defined herein has its 
respective meaning as set forth in DTC's rules, including, but not 
limited to, the Rules, By-Laws and Organization Certificate of DTC 
(the ``Rules'') and the DTC Settlement Service Guide (the 
``Settlement Guide''), available at http://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.aspx. The Settlement Guide is a Procedure of DTC 
filed with the Commission that, among other things, operationalizes 
and supplements the DTC Rules that relate to settlement.
    \6\ A covered clearing agency is defined as a registered 
clearing agency that provides the services of a central counterparty 
(``CCP'') or CSD. See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(5). CSD services means 
services of a clearing agency that is a securities depository as 
described in Section 3(a)(23)(A) of the Exchange Act. See 17 CFR 
240.17Ad-22(a)(3). Specifically, the definition of a clearing agency 
includes, in part, ``any person, such as a securities depository 
that (i) acts as a custodian of securities in connection with a 
system for the central handling of securities whereby all securities 
of a particular class or series of any issuer deposited within the 
system are treated as fungible and may be transferred, loaned, or 
pledged by bookkeeping entry without physical delivery of securities 
certificates, or (ii) otherwise permits or facilitates the 
settlement of securities transactions or the hypothecation or 
lending of securities without physical delivery of securities 
certificates.'' 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(23)(A).
    \7\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20221 
(September 23, 1983), 48 FR 45167, 45168 (October 3, 1983) (File No. 
600-1) (``A securities depository is a ``custodial'' clearing agency 
that operates a centralized system for the handling of securities 
certificates. Depositories accept deposits of securities from 
broker-dealers, banks, and other financial institutions; credit 
those securities to the depositing participants (sic) accounts; and, 
pursuant to participant's (sic) instructions, effect book-entry 
movements of securities. The physical securities deposited with a 
depository are held in a fungible bulk; each participant or pledgee 
having an interest in securities of a given issue credited to its 
account has a pro rata interest in the physical securities of the 
issue held in custody by the securities depository in its nominee 
name. Depositories collect and pay dividends and interest to 
participants for securities held on deposit. Depositories also 
provide facilities for payment by participants to other participants 
in connection with book-entry deliveries of securities. . . .'').
    \8\ A clearing agency that provides central counterparty 
services interposes itself between the counterparties to securities 
transactions, acting functionally as the buyer to every seller and 
the seller to every buyer. 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(2).
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    DTC provides settlement services for virtually all broker-to-broker 
equity and listed corporate and municipal debt securities transactions 
in the U.S., as well as institutional trades, money market instruments 
and other financial obligations. For end-of-day net funds settlement, 
the DTC settlement system records money debits and credits to 
Participant settlement accounts throughout a Business Day.\9\ At the 
end of a Business Day, a Participant's settlement account will have a 
net debit (i.e., the sum of all money charges to a Participant's 
account exceeds the sum of all money credits), net credit (i.e., the 
sum of all money credits to a Participant's account exceeds the sum of 
all money charges), or zero balance. This final balance will determine 
whether the Participant has an obligation to pay or to be paid as part 
of the process of DTC completing settlement on that Business Day. A 
Participant that fails to pay its net debit balance and therefore 
defaults on its settlement obligations on a Business Day will not have 
paid for the securities processed for delivery versus payment, and the 
securities will not be credited to its account.
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    \9\ Credits to a Participant settlement account arise from 
deliveries versus payment, receipt of payment orders, principal and 
interest distributions in respect of securities held, intraday 
settlement progress payments and any other items or transactions 
that give rise to a credit. Debits to a Participant settlement 
account are primarily due to receives versus payment, as well as 
other types of charges to the account permitted under the Rules. See 
Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 85 FR at 66667.
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    DTC represents that there may be circumstances in which the amount 
of settlement payments received or available to DTC on a Business Day 
is not sufficient to pay all Participants with an end-of-day net credit 
balance on that Business Day (a ``settlement gap'').\10\ A settlement 
gap could occur on a Business Day as a result of a Participant Default, 
where a Participant fails to pay its settlement obligation (a ``default 
gap''). A settlement gap could also occur on a Business Day as a result 
of causes other than a Participant Default (a ``non-default gap''). 
Examples of a non-default gap could include a scenario in which the 
funds required to complete settlement are not available to DTC due to 
an operational or data issue arising at DTC or at a Participant or 
Settling Bank, a cyber incident, or other business disruption.\11\ 
According to DTC, its failure to complete settlement on a given 
Business day could cause significant market-wide effects.\12\
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    \10\ See id.
    \11\ DTC is subject to a number of regulatory requirements 
related to its operational and cyber risks, including Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(17) and Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity. DTC's 
overall approach to operational risk is summarized in its Disclosure 
Framework, available at https://www.dtcc.com/legal/policy-and-compliance. Among other things, DTC manages its operational risk 
pursuant to the Clearing Agency Operational Risk Management 
Framework, which the Commission approved in a separate rule filing. 
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81745 (September 28, 2017), 
82 FR 46332 (October 4, 2017) (SR-DTC-2017-014).
    \12\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 85 FR at 66667 (citing, 
e.g., Rule 9(B), supra note 5, which states: ``Each Participant and 
the Corporation shall settle the balance of the Settlement Account 
of the Participant on a daily basis in accordance with these Rules 
and the Procedures. Except as provided in the Procedures, the 
Corporation shall not be obligated to make any settlement payments 
to any Participants until the Corporation has received all of the 
settlement payments that Settling Banks and Participants are 
required to make to the Corporation.'').
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B. The Participants Fund and Rule 4

    The Participants Fund is prefunded and represents the aggregate of 
the deposits that each DTC Participant is required to make under DTC's 
Rules.\13\ The Rules provide for a minimum deposit to the Participants 
Fund, and Participants with higher levels of activity that impose 
greater liquidity risk to the DTC settlement system have proportionally 
larger required deposits.\14\ DTC has stated that the Participants Fund 
is a mutualized pre-funded liquidity and loss resource, and that DTC 
does not have an obligation to repay the Participants Fund and the 
application of the Participants Fund does not convert to a loss.\15\ 
Once DTC applies the Participants Fund, the Participants are required, 
upon the demand of DTC, to replenish their shares of the Participants 
Fund to satisfy their minimum deposits.\16\ DTC further represents that 
the principal purpose of the Participants Fund is to be one of the 
foundational liquidity resources available to DTC to fund a shortfall 
in order to complete settlement on a Business Day.\17\
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    \13\ See Rule 4 (Participants Fund and Participants Investment), 
supra note 5.
    \14\ See id.
    \15\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83950 (August 27, 
2018), 83 FR 44393 (August 30, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-804).
    \16\ See Section 4 of Rule 4 (Participants Fund and Participants 
Investment), supra note 5.
    \17\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 85 FR at 66668 (citing 
DTC's Settlement Guide which provides that the Participants Fund 
creates liquidity and collateral resources to support the business 
of DTC and to cover losses and liabilities incident to that 
business).
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    Currently, Section 4 of Rule 4 provides that, if there is a 
Defaulting Participant and the amount charged to the Actual 
Participants Fund Deposit of the Defaulting Participant pursuant to 
Section 3 of Rule 4 \18\ is not sufficient to complete settlement, DTC 
may apply the Actual Participants Fund Deposits of Participants other 
than the Defaulting Participant (each, a ``non-defaulting 
Participant''), and apply such other liquidity resources as may be 
available to DTC, including, but not limited to, the End-of-Day Credit 
Facility.\19\ DTC recognizes that currently, certain provisions of Rule 
4 might be construed to narrow the scope of use of the Participants 
Fund (and any other liquidity resources) for settlement to a

[[Page 71975]]

default gap only.\20\ In order to ensure that DTC may use the 
Participants Fund and other liquidity resources to fund a settlement 
gap regardless of its cause, DTC has proposed revising Rule 4, as 
discussed below.
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    \18\ Section 3 of Rule 4 provides that if a Participant is 
obligated to DTC pursuant to the Rules and the Procedures and fails 
to satisfy any such obligation, DTC shall, to the extent necessary 
to eliminate such obligation, apply some or all of the Actual 
Participants Fund Deposit of such Participant to such obligation to 
satisfy the Participant Default. See Section 3 of Rule 4, supra note 
5.
    \19\ Section 2 of Rule 4 provides that ``End-of-Day Credit 
Facility'' is any credit facility maintained by DTC for the purpose 
of funding the end-of-day settlement of transactions processed 
through the facilities of DTC. See Section 2 of Rule 4, supra note 
5. Also see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80605 (May 5, 2017), 
82 FR 21850 (May 10, 2017) (SR-DTC-2017-802; NSCC-2017-802) 
(renewing the committed revolving credit facility of DTC and 
National Securities Clearing Corporation).
    \20\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 85 FR at 66668.
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C. Description of Proposed Changes

    DTC states that Section 4 of Rule 4 does not address the use of the 
Participants Fund to complete settlement when there is a non-default 
gap and could be construed as limiting the pro rata application of the 
Participants Fund to fund a settlement gap to default scenarios.\21\ 
DTC further represents that, on each Business Day, settlement occurs 
during a tight timeframe, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve's 
National Settlement Service and Fedwire.\22\ If there is a delay with 
the receipt or disbursement of funds for settlement, DTC would need to 
address those problems quickly in order to complete settlement on that 
Business Day.\23\
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    \21\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 85 FR at 66669.
    \22\ See id.; see also, Settlement Guide at 19-20, supra note 5.
    \23\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 4, 85 FR at 66669.
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    In the Advance Notice, DTC describes the proposed changes to 
address this situation and expressly ensure that the Participants Fund 
could be used to complete settlement in the event of a non-default gap. 
First, DTC proposes to amend Section 4 of Rule 4 to state that (i) the 
Participants Fund, (ii) the existing retained earnings or undivided 
profits of DTC, and (iii) any other liquidity resources as may be 
available (including, but not limited to, the End-of-Day Credit 
Facility), would be available to DTC as liquidity resources to fund 
settlement on a Business Day, regardless of whether the settlement gap 
is a default gap or a non-default gap. The proposal would state that 
DTC may apply its available resources to fund settlement, in such order 
and in such amounts as it determines, in its sole discretion. Second, 
DTC proposes to provide that a determination to apply the Participants 
Fund shall be made by either the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Risk 
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, a member of any management committee, 
Treasurer or any Managing Director as may be designated by the Chief 
Risk Officer from time to time. The proposal also states that the Board 
of Directors (or an authorized Committee thereof) shall be promptly 
informed of the determination.\24\ Third, DTC proposes to make certain 
clarifying and conforming changes, including to clarify that a 
Participant's pro rata share of an application of the Participants Fund 
would be the same whether there is a default gap or a non-default gap, 
and to make minor changes for conformity and readability.
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    \24\ The requirement that DTC would also promptly notify the 
Commission in the event that the Participants Fund were used to 
complete settlement would remain unchanged.
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II. Discussion and Recommendation

    Although the Clearing Supervision Act does not specify a standard 
of review for an advance notice, the stated purpose of the Clearing 
Supervision Act is instructive: To mitigate systemic risk in the 
financial system and promote financial stability by, among other 
things, promoting uniform risk management standards for systemically 
important financial market utilities (``SIFMUs'') and strengthening the 
liquidity of SIFMUs.\25\
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    \25\ See 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).
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    Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act authorizes the 
Commission to prescribe regulations containing risk management 
standards for the payment, clearing, and settlement activities of 
designated clearing entities engaged in designated activities for which 
the Commission is the supervisory agency.\26\ Section 805(b) of the 
Clearing Supervision Act provides the following objectives and 
principles for the Commission's risk management standards prescribed 
under Section 805(a): \27\
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    \26\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
    \27\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
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     To promote robust risk management;
     To promote safety and soundness;
     To reduce systemic risks; and
     To support the stability of the broader financial system.
    Section 805(c) provides, in addition, that the Commission's risk 
management standards may address such areas as risk management and 
default policies and procedures, among others areas.\28\
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    \28\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(c).
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    The Commission has adopted risk management standards under Section 
805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act and Section 17A of the 
Exchange Act (the ``Clearing Agency Rules'').\29\ The Clearing Agency 
Rules require, among other things, each covered clearing agency to 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures that are reasonably designed to meet certain minimum 
requirements for its operations and risk management practices on an 
ongoing basis.\30\ As such, it is appropriate for the Commission to 
review advance notices against the Clearing Agency Rules and the 
objectives and principles of these risk management standards as 
described in Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act. As 
discussed below, the Commission believes the proposal in the Advance 
Notice is consistent with the objectives and principles described in 
Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act,\31\ and in the Clearing 
Agency Rules, in particular Rule 17Ad-22(e)(1), (e)(2)(i) and (v), and 
(e)(7).\32\
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    \29\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2, 2012) (S7-08-11). 
See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (September 28, 
2016), 81 FR 70786 (October 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) (Standards for 
Covered Clearing Agencies). DTC is a ``covered clearing agency,'' as 
defined in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5). See supra note 6.
    \30\ Id.
    \31\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
    \32\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(1) and (e)(2)(i).
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A. Consistency With Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act

    The Commission believes that the Advance Notice is consistent with 
the stated objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing 
Supervision Act,\33\ because the changes proposed in the Advance Notice 
are consistent with promoting robust risk management, promoting safety 
and soundness, reducing systemic risks, and supporting the broader 
financial system.
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    \33\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
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    First, the Commission believes that the proposal is consistent with 
promoting robust risk management. DTC proposes to amend Section 4 of 
Rule 4 to provide expressly for the pro rata application of the 
Participants Fund, retained earnings, and any other liquidity 
resources, including DTC's credit facility, to any settlement gap, 
including a non-default gap. As noted above, settlement occurs during a 
tight timeframe on each Business Day. If there is a delay with the 
receipt or disbursement of funds for settlement, it would need to be 
addressed quickly in order to complete settlement on that Business Day. 
The proposal would clarify which resources DTC can access and use in 
the most time-efficient and effective manner to ensure settlement.\34\

[[Page 71976]]

Moreover, the proposal would specify the particular DTC personnel whose 
approval could authorize the use of the Participants Fund to finance a 
settlement gap. The Commission believes that the proposal is designed 
to allow DTC to take timely and effective action to fund a settlement 
gap, regardless of whether it is a default or non-default gap, and 
therefore complete settlement, by identifying and applying appropriate 
liquidity resources, which is consistent with the promotion of robust 
risk management.
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    \34\ The Commission further believes that use of the 
Participants Fund may be the most efficient method of completing 
settlement at the end of a Business Day on a tight timeframe, as it 
generally consists of cash which, pursuant to DTC's Investment 
Policy, must be held in demand deposit, savings or checking bank 
accounts that provide same day access to funds. See Exchange Act 
Release No. 88513 (March 30, 2020), 85 FR 19047, 19048 (April 3, 
2020). The Commission observes that, as a general matter, it likely 
could take more time to access retained earnings or draw down on the 
credit facility.
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    Second, the Commission believes that the proposal is consistent 
with the promotion of safety and soundness of DTC and, by extension, 
the broader financial system. As stated above, the proposal would 
expressly provide that DTC may use the Participants Fund and other 
specified resources as a liquidity resources in the event of a 
settlement gap. With this proposal, DTC would expressly state how it 
would manage the potential liquidity risk that may arise from both the 
default of a Participant as well as a non-default event, including 
operational issues at DTC, a Participant, or a Settling Bank. With the 
proposal, DTC would be better positioned to timely complete settlement 
if a default or non-default gap arises. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes that the proposal is consistent with the promotion of safety 
and soundness.
    Finally, the Commission believes that the proposal is consistent 
with reducing systemic risks and supporting the stability of the 
broader financial system. With clear authority to use the Participants 
Fund and other resources to address both a default and non-default 
settlement gap, DTC should be better positioned to access sufficient 
liquidity, and thus be better able to manage its liquidity risks in the 
event of a settlement gap. DTC is a SIFMU and serves as the only 
central securities depository in the United States, settling virtually 
all broker-to-broker equity and listed corporate and municipal debt 
securities transactions in the United States, as well as institutional 
trades, money market instruments and other financial obligations. This 
access to liquidity during a stress event would help mitigate any risk 
to settlement finality due to DTC having insufficient funds to meet 
payment obligations to its Participants. As such, access to this 
liquidity would help to strengthen the liquidity of DTC and mitigate 
potential risks to settlement finality, thereby reducing systemic risks 
and supporting the stability of the broader financial system.
    For the reasons stated above, the Commission believes the changes 
proposed in the Advance Notice are consistent with Section 805(b) of 
the Clearing Supervision Act.\35\
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    \35\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
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B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(1)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(1) under the Act requires that DTC establish, 
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to provide for a well-founded, clear, transparent, 
and enforceable legal basis for each aspect of its activities in all 
relevant jurisdictions.\36\
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    \36\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(1).
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    As discussed above, current Section 4 of Rule 4 does not address 
the use of the Participants Fund or other liquidity resources to 
complete settlement when there is a non-default gap, and DTC is 
concerned that it could be construed as limiting the pro rata 
application of the Participants Fund to fund a settlement gap to 
default scenarios. The proposal would amend Rule 4 to expressly state 
that the Participants Fund, DTC's retained earnings, and other 
liquidity resources may be used by DTC to fund a settlement gap to 
complete settlement on a Business Day, whether the settlement gap is 
the result of a Participant Default or otherwise. In addition, the 
proposal makes clarifying and conforming changes and provides 
governance regarding the application of the Participants Fund.
    The Commission believes that the above changes are designed to 
ensure greater certainty in the Rules regarding what resources would be 
available to DTC to complete settlement in the event of a settlement 
gap. The proposal would provide a clear, transparent and enforceable 
legal basis for DTC to apply the Participants Fund, retained earnings, 
or other liquidity resources to any settlement gap. It would also 
clarify that a Participant's pro rata share of an application of the 
Participants Fund would be the same whether there is a default gap or a 
non-default gap, and expressly state that DTC may apply its available 
resources to fund settlement, in such order and in such amounts as it 
determines, in its sole discretion.
    Therefore, the Commission believes the proposal is designed to help 
ensure that DTC's Rules remain well-founded, transparent, and legally 
enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions, consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(1) under the Act.\37\
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    \37\ Id.
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C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2)(i) and (v)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) under the Act requires, in part, that DTC 
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to provide for governance arrangements 
that (i) are clear and transparent, and (v) specify clear and direct 
lines of responsibility.\38\
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    \38\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2)(i) and (v).
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    As discussed above, the proposal would provide that a determination 
to apply the Participants Fund shall be made by either the Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Risk Officer, Chief Financial Officer, a 
member of any management committee, Treasurer or any Managing Director 
as may be designated by the Chief Risk Officer from time to time. The 
proposal would also provide that the Board of Directors (or an 
authorized Committee thereof) shall be promptly informed of the 
determination. With this proposal, the Rules would expressly define who 
would be responsible for making the determination to apply the 
Participants Fund to a settlement gap and would require that the Board 
of Directors (or its authorized Committee) would be informed of such 
determination promptly.
    Therefore, the Commission believes the proposal is designed to 
provide for governance arrangements regarding the use of the 
Participants Fund to complete settlement that are clear and transparent 
and specify clear and direct lines of responsibility, consistent with 
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2)(i) and (v) under the Act.\39\
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    \39\ Id.
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D. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i) under the Act requires, in part, that a 
covered clearing agency, like DTC, establish, implement, maintain and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
effectively measure, monitor, and manage the liquidity risk that arises 
in or is borne by the covered clearing agency, including measuring, 
monitoring, and managing its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing 
and timely basis, and its use of intraday liquidity, by maintaining 
sufficient liquid resources to effect same-day settlement of payment 
obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of 
foreseeable stress scenarios.\40\
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    \40\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7)(i).
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    As described above, the proposal would clarify that the 
Participants Fund and other resources may be applied by

[[Page 71977]]

DTC to fund settlement in the event of a default or non-default gap. 
The proposed change is designed to help ensure that DTC is able to 
manage its settlement and funding flows on a timely basis and effect 
same day settlement of payment obligations in certain foreseeable 
stress scenarios.
    Therefore, the Commission believes that the proposal is reasonably 
designed to help DTC effectively manage liquidity risk in a timely 
manner to complete settlement, and accordingly is consistent with Rule 
17Ad-22(e)(7)(i).\41\
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    \41\ Id.
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III. Conclusion

    It is therefore noticed, pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(I) of the 
Clearing Supervision Act, that the Commission does not object to 
Advance Notice (SR-DTC-2020-801) and that DTC is authorized to 
implement the proposed change as of the date of this notice or the date 
of an order by the Commission approving proposed rule change SR-DTC-
2020-011, whichever is later.

    By the Commission.
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-25006 Filed 11-10-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P