Document ID: SEC-2019-1200-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC
Posted Date: 2019-08-20T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 20, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43204-43207]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-17845]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-86679; File No. SR-MIAX-2019-36]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Miami International Securities 
Exchange, LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a 
Proposed Rule Change To Amend Exchange Rule 518, Complex Orders

August 14, 2019.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice 
is hereby given that on August 12, 2019, Miami International Securities 
Exchange, LLC (``MIAX Options'' or the ``Exchange'') filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') a proposed rule 
change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been 
prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to 
solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange is filing a proposal to amend Exchange Rule 518, 
Complex Orders, to amend subsection (d)(7) and to make a minor non-
substantive change to correct a typographical error in subsection 
(f)(1) of Interpretation and Policy .05.
    The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's 
website at http://www.miaxoptions.com/rule-filings/ at MIAX Options' 
principal office, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in 
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such 
statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend Exchange Rule 518, Complex Orders, 
to amend subsection (d)(7), Allocation at the Conclusion of a Complex 
Auction, to adopt a new parenthetical to existing rule text to state 
that orders and quotes executed in a Complex Auction \3\ will be 
allocated first in price priority based on their original limit price 
(or protected price, as described in Interpretation and Policy .05, if 
price protection is engaged).
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    \3\ See Exchange Rule 518(d).
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    Currently, subsection (d)(7) of the Rule provides that orders and 
quotes executed in a Complex Auction will be allocated first in price 
priority based on their original limit price, and thereafter as 
follows, and the Rule lists six different scenarios which influence 
allocation. The Exchange is proposing to adopt the parenthetical, ``or 
protected price if price protection, as described in Interpretation and 
Policy .05, is engaged'' after the term ``original limit price'' to 
improve the fairness and consistency of allocations among participants 
at the end of a Complex Auction.
    Under the proposal, allocations will continue to be calculated 
based on original limit price, with the exception that if price 
protection is engaged, allocation will then be based on the order's 
protected price as opposed to the order's original limit price. The 
following examples using the MPC Protection better illustrate this 
scenario.\4\
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    \4\ The Exchange notes that the System provides a number of 
price protections as described in Policy .05 of Interpretations and 
Policies to this Rule. Price protections include a Vertical Spread 
Variance price protection (.05(a)); a Calendar Spread Variance price 
protection (.05(b)); an Implied Away Best Bid or Offer (``ixABBO'') 
price protection. The ixABBO price protection feature is a price 
protection mechanism under which, when in operation as requested by 
the submitting Member, a buy order will not be executed at a price 
that is higher than each other single exchange's best displayed 
offer for the complex strategy, and under which a sell order will 
not be executed at a price that is lower than each other single 
exchange's best displayed bid for the complex strategy (.05(d)); and 
a Complex MIAX Options Price Collar (``MPC'') price protection 
(.05(f)).
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Example #1A

End of Complex Auction Allocation Using Current Allocation Methodology

icMBBO \5\/dcMBBO \6\ 1.75 x 2.00
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    \5\ Implied Complex MIAX Best Bid or offer (``icMBBO''). The 
icMBBO is a calculation that uses the best price from the Simple 
Order Book for each component of a complex strategy including 
displayed and non-displayed trading interest. For stock-option 
orders, the icMBBO for a complex strategy will be calculated using 
the best price (whether displayed or non-displayed) on the Simple 
Order Book in the individual option component(s), and the NBBO in 
the stock component. See Exchange Rule 518(a)(11).
    \6\ Displayed Complex MIAX Best Bid or Offer (``dcMBBO''). The 
dcMBBO is calculated using the best displayed price for each 
component of a complex strategy from the Simple Order Book. For 
stock-option orders, the dcMBBO for a complex strategy will be 
calculated using the Exchange's best displayed bid or offer in the 
individual option component(s) and the NBBO in the stock component. 
See Exchange Rule 518(a)(8).
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cNBBO \7\ 1.85 x 1.95
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    \7\ The Complex National Best Bid or Offer (``cNBBO'') is 
calculated using the NBBO for each component of a complex strategy 
to establish the best net bid and offer for a complex strategy. See 
Exchange Rule 100.
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MPC 0.05

    MPC Protection:

cNBB \8\-MPC (1.85-0.05 = 1.80)
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    \8\ NBB means the National Best Bid.
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cNBO \9\ + MPC (1.95 + 0.05 = 2.00)
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    \9\ NBO means the National Best Offer.
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Complex Order 1 (CO1) Buy 10 @ 2.00 (Auction on Arrival) \10\
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    \10\ A ``Complex Auction-on-Arrival'' or ``cAOA'' order is a 
complex order designated to be placed into a Complex Auction upon 
receipt or upon evaluation. Complex orders that are not designated 
as cAOA will, by default, not initiate a Complex Auction upon 
arrival, but except as described herein will be eligible to 
participate in a Complex Auction that is in progress when such 
complex order arrives or if placed on the Strategy Book may 
participate in or may initiate a Complex Auction, following 
evaluation conducted by the System. See Exchange Rule 518(b)(2)(i).

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    CO1 marked AOA initiates an auction upon receipt.

Market Maker (``MM'') \11\ Complex Order 2 (CO2) Sell 10 @ 1.80 (MPC 
= 1.80)

    \11\ The term ``Market Makers'' refers to ``Lead Market 
Makers'', ``Primary Lead Market Makers'' and ``Registered Market 
Makers'' collectively. See Exchange Rule 100.
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MM Complex AOC eQuote \12\ 3 (CO3) Sell 10 @ 1.00 (MPC = 1.80)
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    \12\ A ``Complex Auction-or-Cancel eQuote'' or ``cAOC eQuote,'' 
which is an eQuote submitted by a Market Maker that is used to 
provide liquidity during a specific Complex Auction with a time in 
force that corresponds with the duration of the Complex Auction. A 
cAOC eQuote with a size greater than the aggregate auctioned size 
(as defined in Rule 518(d)(4)) will be capped for allocation 
purposes at the aggregate auctioned size. See Exchange Rule 
518.02(c)(1).

[[Page 43205]]

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    Unrelated order CO2 and related response CO3 arrive during the 
auction and join the auction in progress. The Auction concludes with 
no further interest being received.
    Upon conclusion of the Auction CO2 and CO3 are subject to MPC 
Protection and cannot trade more than 0.05 lower than the Away Best 
Bid (1.85); meaning that these orders cannot trade lower than 1.80. 
With allocation based upon the original limit price CO3 trades 10 
with CO1 at 1.80 ahead of CO2 since CO3's original limit price 
(1.00) was more aggressive than the original limit price of CO2 
(1.80). CO2 does not trade and leaves a balance of 10 to sell at 
1.80.

cToM \13\ 1.75 x 1.80 (10)
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    \13\ cToM is the Exchange's Complex Top of Market data feed.

    Example 1B below illustrates the same scenario but with allocation 
as proposed by the new rule language.
Example #1B

End of Complex Auction Allocation Using Proposed Allocation Methodology 
(Price Protection Engaged)

icMBBO/dcMBBO 1.75 x 2.00
cNBBO 1.85 x 1.95
MPC 0.05

    MPC Protection:

cNBB-MPC (1.85-0.05 = 1.80)
cNBO + MPC (1.95 + 0.05 = 2.00)
Complex Order 1 (CO1) Buy 10 @ 2.00 (Auction on Arrival)

    CO1 marked AOA initiates an auction upon receipt.

MM Complex Order 2 (CO2) Sell 10 @ 1.80 (MPC = 1.80)
MM Complex AOC eQuote 3 (CO3) Sell 10 @ 1.00 (MPC = 1.80)

    Unrelated order CO2 and related response CO3 arrive during the 
auction and join the auction in progress. The Auction concludes with 
no further interest being received.
    Upon conclusion of the Auction CO2 and CO3 are subject to MPC 
Protection and cannot trade more than 0.05 lower than the Away Best 
Bid (1.85); meaning that these orders cannot trade lower than 1.80. 
With allocation priority based on the protected price CO3 trades a 
pro-rata share of 5 with CO1 at 1.80 based on its protected price. 
CO2 also trades a pro-rata share of 5 with CO1 at 1.80 based on its 
protected price. CO1 is filled, CO2 and CO3 each leave a balance of 
5, booked at their protected price of 1.80.

cToM 1.75 x 1.80 (10)

    The Exchange believes that using the protected price is more 
meaningful than using an order's original limit price in the context of 
determining trade allocation priority as orders cannot be executed at 
prices that would violate their protected price. Additionally, changing 
the allocation priority in this fashion would align allocations for 
orders with the same protected price, when price protection is engaged, 
with allocations for orders with the same original limit price, when 
price protection is not engaged, which can be seen in the examples 
below.
Example #2A

End of Complex Auction Allocation Using Current Allocation Methodology

icMBBO/dcMBBO 1.75 x 2.00
cNBBO 1.85 x 1.95
MPC 0.05

    MPC Protection:

cNBB-MPC (1.85-0.05 = 1.80)
cNBO + MPC (1.95 + 0.05 = 2.00)
Complex Order 1 (CO1) Buy 10 @ 2.00 (Auction on Arrival)

    CO1 marked AOA initiates an auction upon receipt.

Market Maker (``MM'') Complex Order 2 (CO2) Sell 10 @ 1.90 (MPC = 
1.80)

MM Complex AOC eQuote 3 (CO3) Sell 10 @ 1.90 (MPC = 1.80)

    Unrelated order CO2 and related response CO3 arrive during the 
auction and joins the auction in progress. The Auction concludes 
with no further interest being received.
    Upon conclusion of the Auction CO2 and CO3 when subject to MPC 
Protection cannot trade more than 0.05 lower than the Away Best Bid 
(1.85); meaning that these orders cannot trade lower than 1.80. 
However since the limit price of CO2 and CO3 is not through the MPC 
Protected Price, price protection is not engaged and the trade is 
based on the best limit price among CO2 and CO3. With allocation 
based upon the original limit price; CO3 trades a pro-rata share of 
5 with CO1 at 1.90 based on its original price. CO2 also trades a 
pro-rata share of 5 with CO1 at 1.90 based on its original price. 
CO1 is filled, CO2 and CO3 each leave a balance of 5, booked at 
their limit price.

    Example 2B below illustrates the same scenario but with allocation 
as proposed by the new rule language.
Example #2B

End of Complex Auction Allocation Using Proposed Allocation Methodology 
(Price Protection Not Engaged)

icMBBO/dcMBBO 1.75 x 2.00
cNBBO 1.85 x 1.95
MPC 0.05
MPC Protection = cNBB-MPC (1.85-0.05 = 1.80)
Complex Order 1 (CO1) Buy 10 @ 2.00 (Auction on Arrival)

    CO1 marked AOA initiates an auction upon receipt.

Market Maker (``MM'') Complex Order 2 (CO2) Sell 10 @ 1.90 (MPC = 
1.80)

MM Complex AOC eQuote 3 (CO3) Sell 10 @ 1.90 (MPC = 1.80)

    Unrelated order CO2 and related response CO3 arrive during the 
auction and joins the auction in progress. The Auction concludes 
with no further interest being received.
    Upon conclusion of the Auction CO2 and CO3 when subject to MPC 
Protection cannot trade more than 0.05 lower than the Away Best Bid 
(1.85); meaning that these orders cannot trade lower than 1.80. 
However since the limit price of CO2 and CO3 is not through the MPC 
Protected Price, price protection is not engaged and the trade is 
based on the best limit price among CO2 and CO3. With allocation 
based upon the original limit price; CO3 trades a pro-rata share of 
5 with CO1 at 1.90 based on its original price. CO2 also trades a 
pro-rata share of 5 with CO1 at 1.90 based on its original price. 
CO1 is filled, CO2 and CO3 each leave a balance of 5, booked at 
their limit price.

    There is no difference in the allocation results under the proposed 
allocation algorithm or the current allocation algorithm for orders 
with identical original limit prices when price protection is not 
engaged. Additionally, as demonstrated in Example 3A and 3B below, 
there is no difference in the allocation results under the proposed 
allocation algorithm or the current allocation algorithm for orders 
with differing original limit prices when price protection is not 
engaged.
Example #3A

End of Complex Auction Allocation Using Current Allocation Methodology

icMBBO/dcMBBO 1.75 x 2.00
cNBBO 1.85 x 1.95
MPC 0.05

    MPC Protection:

cNBB-MPC (1.85-0.05 = 1.80)
cNBO + MPC (1.95 + 0.05 = 2.00)
Complex Order 1 (CO1) Buy 10 @ 2.00 (Auction on Arrival)

    CO1 marked AOA initiates an auction upon receipt.

Market Maker (``MM'') Complex Order 2 (CO2) Sell 10 @ 1.95 (MPC = 
1.80)
MM Complex AOC eQuote 3 (CO3) Sell 10 @ 1.85 (MPC = 1.80)

    Unrelated order CO2 and related response CO3 arrive during the 
auction and join the auction in progress. The Auction concludes with 
no further interest being received.
    Upon conclusion of the Auction CO2 and CO3 when subject to MPC 
Protection cannot trade more than 0.05 lower than the Away Best Bid 
(1.85); meaning that these orders cannot trade lower than 1.80. 
However since the limit price of CO2 and CO3 is not through the MPC 
Protected Price, price protection is not engaged. With allocation 
based upon the original limit price; CO3 trades 10 with CO1 at 1.90 
ahead of CO2 since its original limit price (1.85) was more 
aggressive than the original limit price of CO2 (1.95). CO2 does not 
trade and leaves a balance of 10 to sell at 1.95.
Example #3B

End of Complex Auction Allocation Using Proposed Allocation Methodology 
(Price Protection Not Engaged)

icMBBO/dcMBBO 1.75 x 2.00
cNBBO 1.85 x 1.95
MPC 0.05

[[Page 43206]]

MPC Protection = cNBB-MPC (1.85-0.05 = 1.80)
Complex Order 1 (CO1) Buy 10 @ 2.00 (Auction on Arrival)

    CO1 marked AOA initiates an auction upon receipt.

Market Maker (``MM'') Complex Order 2 (CO2) Sell 10 @ 1.95 (MPC = 
1.80)
MM Complex AOC eQuote 3 (CO3) Sell 10 @ 1.85 (MPC = 1.80)

    Unrelated order CO2 and related response CO3 arrive during the 
auction and joins the auction in progress. The Auction concludes 
with no further interest being received.
    Upon conclusion of the Auction CO2 and CO3 when subject to MPC 
Protection cannot trade more than 0.05 lower than the Away Best Bid; 
meaning that these orders cannot trade lower than 1.80. However 
since the limit price of CO2 and CO3 is not through the MPC 
Protected Price, price protection is not engaged. Allocation remains 
based upon original limit price as price protection is not engaged. 
CO3 trades 10 with CO1 at 1.90 ahead of CO2 since its original limit 
price (1.85) was more aggressive than the original limit price of 
CO2 (1.95). CO2 does not trade and leaves a balance of 10 to sell at 
1.95.

    As illustrated by the examples above, there is no difference in 
allocations under the proposal when orders have the same, or different, 
original limit prices when price protection is not engaged (Examples 2 
and 3 respectively). Under the current rule there is a difference in 
allocation when orders have the same protected price but different 
original limit prices, as illustrated in Example 1. Under the 
Exchange's proposal, using the order's protected price, when price 
protection is engaged, to determine allocation, will provide the same 
allocation result as when orders have the same original limit price, 
but when price protection is not engaged (as demonstrated in Example 
2). The Exchange believes that allocating interest at the conclusion of 
a Complex Auction based upon an order's protected price, when price 
protection is engaged, as opposed to its original limit price, provides 
a consistent allocation methodology when orders have the same price 
(either original limit price when price protection is not engaged, or 
protected price when price protection is engaged).
    Additionally, the Exchange proposes to amend section (f) of 
Interpretation and Policy .05 to add an opening quotation to the term 
eQuotes in subsection (1), which states, [a]ll complex orders on the 
Exchange, together with cAOC eQuotes and cIOC eQuotes \14\ (as defined 
in Interpretations and Policies: 02.(c)(1) and (2) of this Rule) 
(collectively, ``eQuotes''), are subject to the MPC Price Protection 
feature. This is non-substantive change to make a typographical 
correction to the rule text.
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    \14\ A ``Complex Immediate-or-Cancel eQuote'' or ``cIOC 
eQuote,'' which is a complex eQuote with a time-in-force of IOC that 
may be matched with another complex quote or complex order for an 
execution to occur in whole or in part upon receipt into the System. 
cIOC eQuotes will not: (i) Be executed against individual orders and 
quotes resting on the Simple Order Book; (ii) be eligible to 
initiate a Complex Auction or join a Complex Auction in progress; 
(iii) rest on the Strategy Book; or (iv) be displayed. Any portion 
of a cIOC eQuote that is not executed will be immediately cancelled. 
See Exchange Rule 518.02(c)(2).
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2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that its proposed rule change is consistent 
with Section 6(b) of the Act \15\ in general, and furthers the 
objectives of Section 6(b)(5) of the Act \16\ in particular, in that it 
is designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, 
to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster 
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in facilitating 
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the 
mechanisms of a free and open market and a national market system and, 
in general, to protect investors and the public interest.
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    \15\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \16\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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    The Exchange believes that determining priority for allocating 
interest at the conclusion of a Complex Auction based on an order's 
protected price, when price protection is engaged, removes impediments 
to and perfects the mechanisms of a free and open market and a national 
market system and, in general, protects investors and the public 
interest by providing a consistent allocation methodology. Basing trade 
allocation priority on an order's protected price provides for a more 
equitable allocation of interest at the conclusion of a Complex Auction 
versus using an order's original limit price to determine allocation 
priority. An order's original limit price is not relevant for 
determining allocation as the order cannot trade through its protected 
price. Therefore, the Exchange believes that when price protection is 
engaged, using the protected price as the basis for allocation priority 
at the conclusion of a Complex Auction is more appropriate.
    As demonstrated in Example 1A, under the current rule an order with 
a limit price that is through its protected price supersedes an order 
with a limit price equal to its protected price. In Example 1A, the 
trade price is equal to the protected price, however the order with a 
more aggressive original limit price receives the first allocation. In 
Example 1A, the order's $1.00 original limit price to sell is illusory 
in the sense that the order can never be executed below its protected 
price of $1.80 due to price protection being engaged. With two orders 
that can be executed at $1.80 the Exchange believes that basing 
allocation on the protected price promotes just and equitable 
principles of trade, as both orders receive an allocation. This aligns 
to the allocation that results when two orders can be executed at their 
original limit price without price protection being engaged, and 
provides consistency in the allocation process used on the Exchange, 
and prevents unfair allocations from occurring, which promotes just and 
equitable principles of trade.
    The Exchange believes its proposal to make a non-substantive change 
to correct a typographical error protects investors and the public 
interest by providing accuracy in the Exchange's rules. Clarity and 
precision in the Exchange's rules helps avoid the potential for 
confusion which benefits investors and the public.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
    The Exchange's proposal will not impose any burden on inter-market 
competition as the proposal will only affect trade allocations 
performed at the conclusion of a Complex Auction on the Exchange, when 
price protection is engaged.
    The Exchange does not believe the proposed rule change will impose 
any burden on intra-market competition as the rules of the Exchange are 
applicable to all Members \17\ equally, and will equally impact those 
Members who participate in Complex Auctions.
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    \17\ The term ``Member'' means an individual or organization 
approved to exercise the trading rights associated with a Trading 
Permit. Members are deemed ``members'' under the Exchange Act. See 
Exchange Rule 100.
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C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Because the foregoing proposed rule change does not: (i) 
Significantly affect

[[Page 43207]]

the protection of investors or the public interest; (ii) impose any 
significant burden on competition; and (iii) become operative for 30 
days from the date on which it was filed, or such shorter time as the 
Commission may designate, it has become effective pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \18\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(6) thereunder.\19\
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    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \19\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). In addition, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) 
requires a self-regulatory organization to give the Commission 
written notice of its intent to file the proposed rule change, along 
with a brief description and text of the proposed rule change, at 
least five business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed 
rule change, or such shorter time as designated by the Commission. 
The Exchange has satisfied this requirement.
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    A proposed rule change filed pursuant to Rule 19b-4(f)(6) under the 
Act \20\ normally does not become operative for 30 days after the date 
of its filing. However, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) \21\ permits the 
Commission to designate a shorter time if such action is consistent 
with the protection of investors and the public interest. The Exchange 
has requested that the Commission waive the 30-day operative delay so 
that the proposed rule change may become operative upon filing. As 
discussed above, the Exchange believes that using an order's protected 
price when price protection is engaged, rather than an order's original 
limit price, is appropriate for determining allocation priority at the 
conclusion of a Complex Auction because an order cannot be executed at 
a price that would violate its protected price. Thus, an order's 
original limit price is not relevant for determining allocation 
priority when price protection is engaged, and the Exchange believes 
that using an order's protected price to determine auction allocations 
when price protection is engaged will prevent unfair Complex Auction 
allocations. The Commission believes that determining Complex Auction 
allocations based on an order's protected price when price protection 
is engaged, rather than on the order's original limit price, is 
appropriate because an order will never execute at a price that 
violates its protected price. The Commission believes that using an 
order's protected price when price protection is engaged will help to 
assure that orders are allocated fairly at the conclusion of a Complex 
Auction. Therefore, the Commission believes that waiver of the 30-day 
operative delay is consistent with the protection of investors and the 
public interest. Accordingly, the Commission hereby waives the 
operative delay and designates the proposed rule change operative upon 
filing.\22\
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    \20\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6).
    \21\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6)(iii).
    \22\ For purposes only of waiving the 30-day operative delay, 
the Commission also has considered the proposed rule's impact on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 
78c(f).
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission 
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to 
determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or 
disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-MIAX-2019-36 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-MIAX-2019-36. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments 
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are 
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying 
information from comment submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-MIAX-2019-36, and should be submitted on 
or before September 10, 2019.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\23\
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    \23\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-17845 Filed 8-19-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P