Document ID: FAA-1999-6717-0060
Agency: faa
Document Type: Notice
Title: U.S. DOT/FAA -  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) - Original
Posted Date: 2003-11-10T05:00Z

[4910-13]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, 135

[Docket No. FAA-2002-6717; Notice No. 03-11]

RIN 2120-AI03

Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes

AGENCY:	Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION:	Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY:  The FAA proposes to issue regulations governing the design,
maintenance, and operation of airplanes and engines for flights that go
beyond certain distances from an adequate airport.  This proposal would
extend some requirements that previously applied only to two-engine
airplanes to airplanes with more than two-engines.  The proposed rule
implements existing policy, industry best practices and recommendations,
and international standards to ensure that long-range flights will
operate safely.

DATES: Send your comments on or before January 13, 2004.

ADDRESSES:  You may submit comments to DOT DMS Docket Number 

FAA-2002-6717 by any of the following methods:

Web Site:   HYPERLINK "http://dms.dot.gov"  http://dms.dot.gov  . Follow
the instructions for submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket
site.

Fax: 1-202-493-2251.

Mail:  Docket Management Facility; US Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC
20590-001.

Hand Delivery : Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 am and 5 pm, Monday
through Friday, except Federal Holidays.

Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to   HYPERLINK
"http://www.regulations.gov"  http://www.regulations.gov . Follow the
online instructions for submitting comments.

Instructions:  All submissions must include the agency name and docket
number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. 
For detailed instructions on submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process, see the Public Participation
heading of the Supplementary Information section of this document.  Note
that all comments received will be posted without change to   HYPERLINK
"http://dms.dot.gov"  http://dms.dot.gov  . including any personal
information provided.  Please see the Privacy Act heading under
Regulatory Notices.

Docket:  For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to   HYPERLINK "http://dms.dot.gov" 
http://dms.dot.gov  at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
am and 5 pm, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  Eric vanOpstal, Flight Standards
Service, Air Transportation Division, AFS-200, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3774; facsimile (202) 267-5229.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited.  The FAA invites interested persons to participate in
this proposed rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views.
 We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental,
energy, or federalism impact that might result from adopting the
proposals in this document.  The most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended
change, and include supporting data.  We ask that you send us two copies
of written comments.

We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a report
summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking.  The docket is available for public
inspection before and after the comment closing date.  If you wish to
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.  You may also review the docket using the
Internet at the web address in the ADDRESSES section.

Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we receive
on or before the closing date for comments.  We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or
delay.  We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.

If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard
on which the docket number appears.  We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it to you.

Regulatory Notices

Privacy Act:  Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit  
HYPERLINK "http://dms.dot.gov"  http://dms.dot.gov .

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the
following steps:

(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) web page
(http://dms.dot.gov/search).

(2) On the search page type in the last five digits of the Docket number
shown at the beginning of this notice.  Click on "search."

(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information for
the Docket you selected, click on the document number of the item you
wish to view.

You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through FAA's web
page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal
Register's web page at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue
SW., Washington, DC  20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.  Make sure to
identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number of this
rulemaking.

Background

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has long-standing regulations
that restrict the operations of two-engine air carrier airplanes
operated under part 121, Title 14 of the code of federal regulations (14
CFR).  Under current regulations these airplanes may not be operated on
routes that lie more than sixty minutes from an airport unless
authorized by the Administrator.  The premise for these restrictions was
that two-engine airplanes were less safe than three and four engine
airplanes particularly over very long distances.

History of ETOPS

In the 1980s, a new generation of very reliable, two engine airplanes
came into service and changed the underlying premise that restricted the
operations of these airplanes.  The airline industry sought to take
advantage of the improvements in reliability, range, and payload
capabilities that these new airplanes offered.  Beginning in 1985, the
FAA allowed air carriers to operate certain twin-engine airplanes on
routes that included points more than sixty-minutes from an adequate
airport under a formal program known as Extended Range Operation with
Two Engine Airplanes (“ETOPS”).  The regulatory basis of ETOPS was
the deviation authority contained in 14 CFR section 121.161.  With the
cooperation of the airlines, manufacturers, and other interested groups,
the FAA carefully controlled and monitored this new type of flight
operation.

Historical documents

Advisory Circulars 120-42 and 120-42A

In support of ETOPS, the FAA issued two Advisory Circulars (AC) 120-42
and 120-42A in 1985 and 1988 respectively.  These two AC documents have
been the basis for type design and operational practices for ETOPS to
date.  Initially, the FAA set a maximum approval of 120 minutes from an
airport for ETOPS.  During the nascent stage of ETOPS, air carriers
gained significant service experience; the safety and efficiency of
ETOPS became apparent.  In 1988, the FAA increased that approval to 180
minutes based on demonstrated safety record of these operations.

Deviation authority from section 121.161 prior to ETOPS

Since the 1970s, the FAA has authorized two-engine operations on routes
up to 75 minutes away from an airport exclusively in the Caribbean. 
These were not considered ETOPS flights.  These flights were approved by
the FAA as deviations under section 121.161, but were authorized before
a formal ETOPS program was developed.  These deviations were approved
after a safety evaluation of the areas of operation, the airplanes, and
the operators conducting them.

207 minute ETOPS

In March 1999, the Air Transport Association (ATA) asked the FAA to
extend the 180-minute ETOPS authorization an additional fifteen percent
to 207-minutes.  The FAA published the ATA letter and asked for comments
(64 FR 22667, April 27, 1999).  Several commenters suggested that the
FAA should formalize ETOPS in the regulations rather than continuing to
rely on the deviation authority in section 121.161 and advisory
materials.  In January 2000, the FAA approved 207 minute ETOPS and
stated its intent to task an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) Working Group to study the issues and to recommend regulations
for ETOPS (65 FR 3522, January 21, 2000).  In this same notice, the FAA
solicited comments from the public on its decision to approve 207 minute
ETOPS.

Polar operations letter

The increasing use of Polar flights, while creating economic benefits,
has brought new challenges to extended operations such as climactic
extremes.  Due to these new challenges and to the increasing similarity
among all long-range operations, experience began to show that ETOPS
requirements and processes are generally applicable to all long-range
operations including those by three and four engine airplanes and would
improve their safety.

Harmonization with international standards

Related international activity

Two related activities should be noted.  First, the Joint Aviation
Authorities (JAA) of European nations has chartered a working group that
is also developing standards and guidance material for extended
operations.  In ongoing efforts of both the FAA and JAA to coordinate
regulatory requirements, one of the ARAC ETOPS Working Group tasks was
to “harmonize …standardized requirements across national boundaries
and regulatory bodies.”  Toward that end, there are representatives
who are members of both the ARAC ETOPS Working Group and the JAA Working
Group.  Also, the two groups met together twice in Europe to facilitate
joint action and harmonization.  Second, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Air Navigation Commission (ANC) Operations
Panel has decided to develop standards and recommended practices (SARPS)
for extended range operations.  In May of 2001, the ARAC ETOPS Working
Group held one of its meetings in Montreal, Quebec, Canada (ICAO’s
headquarters city) for the purpose of briefing members of the ANC and
ICAO Air Navigation Bureau staff.

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Task Statement

The FAA established the ARAC ETOPS Working Group through a notice in the
Federal Register at 65 FR 37447, dated June 14, 2000.  It was given the
following tasks:

1.  Review the existing policy and requirements found in Advisory
Circular (AC) 120-42A, applicable ETOPS special conditions, and policy
memorandums and notices, for certification and operational regulations
and guidance material for ETOPS approvals up to 180 minutes.

2.  Develop comprehensive ETOPS airworthiness standards for 14 CFR parts
25, 33, 121, and 135, as appropriate, to codify the existing policies
and practices.

3.  Develop ETOPS requirements for operations in excess of 180 minutes
up to whatever extent that may be justified.  Develop those requirements
such that incremental approvals up to a maximum may be approved.

4.  Develop standardized requirements for extended range operations for
all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, including all
turbojet and turbopropeller commercial twin-engine airplanes (business
jets), excluding reciprocating engine powered commercial airplanes. 
This effort should establish criteria for diversion times up to 180
minutes that is consistent with existing ETOPS policy and procedures. 
It should also develop criteria for diversion times beyond 180 minutes
that is consistent with the ETOPS criteria developed by the Working
Group.

5.  Develop additional guidance and/or advisory material as the ARAC
finds appropriate.

6.  Harmonize such standardized requirements across national boundaries
and regulatory bodies.

7.  Any proposal to increase the safety requirements for existing ETOPS
approvals up to 207 minutes must contain data defining the unsafe
conditions that would warrant the safety requirements.

8.  The Working Group will provide briefings to the Transport Airplane
and Engine Issues group.

9.  The recommendations should consider the comments received as a
result of the April 27, 1999 and January 21, 2000 Federal Register
notices.

10. Within one year of publication of the ARAC task in the Federal
Register, submit recommendations to the FAA in the form of a proposed
rule.

Formation and membership of the ETOPS Working Group

Formation

Following the formal tasking notice in the Federal Register, the ARAC
organized an ETOPS Working Group.

Membership

The ETOPS Working Group consisted of over 50 representatives of U.S. and
foreign airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, pilots’ unions,
industry groups, air disaster support groups, and representatives from
the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the FAA.

In accordance with the task statement and the Working Group’s work
plan approved by the ARAC Air Carrier Operations Issues Group on August
15, 2000, the Working Group reviewed existing ETOPS documents and
developed a risk assessment method for ETOPS and other long-range
flights.  The risk assessment method is comprised of three parts:  a
loss of thrust model; a system safety analysis using the FAR/JAR 25.1309
process; and an operational assessment assuring that pertinent
operational considerations are taken into account.

On the basis of the risk model and their review of long-range
operations, the Working Group used the following general concepts as the
basis for proposed regulations and advisory material.

Special considerations must be given for extended range flights to
prevent the need for a diversion and to protect the airplane and
passengers during the diversion when it cannot be prevented;

Airplanes must be designed and built for the intended mission 

Airplanes must be designed, manufactured, and maintained at a level that
ensures the original reliability throughout the life of the airplane.

When engine reliability reaches a certain level, as measured by the In
Flight Shut Down (IFSD) rate (IFSD=0.01/1,000 hours), the risk of
independent failures leading to loss of all thrust is not significant
enough to require limiting the allowed time from an airport and other
limiting factors come into play.

For part 121 air carrier operations, ETOPS should be defined as flights
more than 60 minutes from an adequate airport for two-engine airplanes
and more than 180 minutes from an adequate airport for air carrier
airplanes with more than two engines.  For part 135 operations ETOPS
should be defined as flights more than 180 minutes from an adequate
airport.

Because of extreme climactic conditions certain ETOPS requirements
should be applied to Polar operations even if those operations would not
otherwise be considered ETOPS

Part 135 operations have unique considerations

Improvements in airplane engine and system reliability have reached a
point that they may no longer be the constraining factor on the
long-range flight operations.  The Working Group found, however, and the
FAA agrees, that it would be prudent for two-engine airplanes to remain
within 180 minutes of an adequate airport whenever possible.  There is a
positive correlation between risk and diversion length.  Thus the FAA
believes that diversion lengths should be kept to a minimum.

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Concept General Observations

As already noted, the working group acknowledged that the reliability of
aircraft engines and systems has improved to the point that it may not
be limiting to the operation.  The Working Group recommended that
two-engine airplanes should be approved in many cases for 180-minutes
ETOPS and ETOPS beyond 180 minutes may be appropriate in some
situations.  The Working Group recommended that airplanes with more than
two engines should be approved for ETOPS beyond 180-minutes in many
cases.  Even though engine reliability has significantly improved,
diversions are sometimes necessary for reasons that are unrelated to the
number of engines on an aircraft and their reliability, such as
passenger illness or other occurrences.

Regarding extended range operations by jet-powered airplanes under part
135, FAA policy for many years has permitted such flights up to 180
minutes from an airport, without additional ETOPS-like requirements. 
Operational experience has validated that policy, and the Working Group
proposal continues existing policy and provides for flights with longer
diversion times with appropriate additional requirements.

Regarding extended range operations by air carrier airplanes with more
than two engines, those flights have been conducted without any
ETOPS-like requirements since the air carrier jet era began.  The
Working Group’s proposals would ensure the continued safety of those
flights by adding requirements in areas that are not dependent upon the
number of engines on the airplane, such as cargo fire protection
duration.

The ETOPS Working Group has proposed regulations and guidance material
in three specific areas:  Type Design (Parts 25 and 33); Part 121
Operations; and Part 135 Operations.

General Discussion of the Proposal

FAA approach to the ARAC recommendations

In developing this proposal the FAA has accepted ARAC recommendations
without change where possible.  The FAA made changes for clarity, to
correct for incomplete ARAC recommendations, to ensure that requirements
are legally sufficient, and to make improvements in style of
presentation.  The FAA provides explanation in this notice for any
substantial differences with the ARAC recommendation.

General issues

Terminology - Extended Operations (ETOPS)

This proposal has two primary objectives: (1) To create new regulations
and amend existing regulations for the design, maintenance, and
operation of aircraft used in ETOPS; thus far ETOPS has been allowed by
the FAA’s discretionary authority and supported by an Advisory
Circular and; (2) To apply the lessons learned from ETOPS to all
airplanes that are operated in Extended Operations (ETOPS) regardless of
the number of engines.  The acronym ETOPS would apply to all airplanes
in Extended Operations and not just twin-engine airplanes.  These rules
would apply equally to airplanes operating over oceanic areas or routes
entirely over land.

Risk model

Item 3 of the ARAC tasking was to “develop ETOPS requirements for
operations in excess of 180 minutes up to whatever extent that may be
justified.”  At the early ARAC ETOPS Working Group meetings, the FAA
presented a new risk model for assessing risk on an ETOPS flight.  The
new approach for assessing the overall risk of critical thrust loss on
an ETOPS flight considers such factors as the length of the flight and
engine reliability in addition to the more traditional maximum diversion
time.

The ARAC ETOPS Working Group adopted the FAA’s proposed risk model and
further developed it to apply it to three and four engine airplanes.  It
did this by including the corresponding engine failure rate that would
be required to achieve an equivalent risk of critical thrust loss due to
independent failures on three and four engine airplanes.  We will now
summarize the risk model used in the development of this proposed rule.

The basic premise that the FAA used in developing its risk model is that
ETOPS service experience is excellent and that any changes to allow
further expansion of ETOPS need to preserve this record.  With this
premise in mind, the basic objective is to define a risk model that
would allow an expansion of two engine airplane operations to use the
same routes as three and four engine airplanes with no substantial
change in the overall risk.

Currently, we manage dual engine shut down risk on two engine airplanes
by limiting the maximum allowable diversion distance and requiring a low
engine in-flight shutdown rate.  This is a one-dimensional risk model in
that with a constant in-flight shutdown rate, the existing ETOPS
requirements and policy consider only the maximum distance that an
operator may plan a route from an enroute diversion airport.  It assumes
that there is a constant risk during the course of a flight with no
consideration of how the actual diversion times vary along the track as
different alternate airports come into and out of range of the airplane.
 This approach also does not consider the increase in overall risk that
is created by increasing an airplane’s range, and thus time aloft, by
adding fuel.  Further, this model provides no means to assess the effect
on overall risk with changes with engine failure rates.  Actual ETOPS
involve continuously changing distances to alternates.  Current ETOPS
limits on maximum diversion time don’t represent real world risk
because diversions can occur anywhere along the track, not just at the
maximum point.  The new ETOPS risk model adopted for the development of
this new proposed rule is based on the introduction of a “two
dimensional” model to replace the “one dimensional” maximum
diversion time/distance model currently in use.

The new ETOPS Exposure Index is a simplified form of several risk
equations that have been developed over the past forty years.  All share
similar characteristics.  The ARAC ETOPS Working Group compared several
different mathematical representations for allowable risk versus engine
failure rate.  Each showed that an engine failure rate on the order of
0.01 per 1,000 engine flight hours was adequate to allow diversion times
for two engine airplanes that for all practical purposes could be
considered as unrestricted.

The new risk model consists of a comparative risk index based on a
combination of range, average diversion distance, and engine failure
rate.  Independent cause dual engine shut down risk is driven by the
footprint area of the route multiplied by the engine failure rate (E)
squared.  The footprint area is defined as the route length (L)
multiplied by the average diversion distance (D).  Note that the engine
shut down rate is squared to account for loss of first engine and then
loss of second engine.  Therefore, we define “ETOPS Exposure Index”
(EEI) as a function of:

Footprint Area (Route Length x Average Diversion Distance) (L x D) and

E2 (Engine Failure Rate Squared)

				EEI=LxDxE2

The ETOPS Exposure Index can be used as an evaluation tool to assess
risk of ETOPS operations due to independent engine failure causes.
Assuming the following values for each of the terms of the equation:

Route Length = 5500 nautical miles,

Average Diversion Distance for 180 minute ETOPS = 800 nautical miles,
and 

Engine failure rate at the current required level = 0.02 shutdowns/1,000
engine-hours or 50,000 hours time between shutdowns.

The EEI would then be:

			EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760

With the ETOPS Exposure Index fixed at this level, longer flights and
greater maximum diversion distances can be offset by decreased engine
failure rate.  In other words, as E becomes smaller, L and/or D can
increase appropriately. An engine failure rate of one-half the current
requirement (E = 0.01/1,000 engine-hours) would allow a four times
increase in “footprint” area.

EEI =    L   x   D  x   E2

EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760

equals

EEI = 5500 x 3200 x 0.012 = 1760

equals

EEI = 11,000 x 1600 x 0.012 = 1760

In other words, with an engine failure rate that is one-half the current
requirement for 180 minute ETOPS we could allow four times the average
diversion distance or a combination of increased route length and
average diversion distance with no change in the current ETOPS risk.

For a two engine airplane, engine failure rate has the biggest impact on
ETOPS risk because the factor is squared.  A reduction in the engine
failure rate has a large impact on the size of an allowable footprint
area for the same risk.  Using the ETOPS Exposure Index concept with a
reduction in the engine failure rate standard allows the development of
ETOPS rules for two engine airplanes that minimize restrictions on
airline operations while maintaining the current excellent ETOPS safety
record.

Current in-service engines are capable of achieving better than 100,000
hours time between shutdowns (.01/1,000 engine-hours), or double the
current ETOPS reliability standard.  This represents two in-flight
shutdowns in the entire life of a typical transport airplane.  It is not
reasonable to expect that two in-flight shutdowns due to independent
causes in the entire life of a typical transport airplane would occur on
the same flight.

With an IFSD rate of 0.01/1,000 hours, the probability of complete loss
of thrust due to independent failures will be sufficiently low so that
the main focus of long-range operational safety can be on reducing the
possibility of other risk factors.

We emphasize that this risk model represents a good tool for evaluating
the risk of critical thrust loss due to “independent” failure
causes.  The biggest threat to long-range operational safety continues
to be the loss of thrust from multiple engines resulting from: 

Common Cause Multiple Failures

Cascading Multiple Failures

Fuel Exhaustion

These threats are common to all long-range operations, regardless of the
number of engines on the airplane. 

Examples of common cause multiple failure events:

Eastern Airlines L1011 nearly lost all engines after improper
installation of engine magnetic chip detectors.

B-747 volcanic ash cloud encounter during volcanic eruption in Alaska -
All engines severely damaged by ash.

Example of potential cascading failure:

Worn-out second engine fails after application of higher power following
failure of first engine

Examples of Fuel Exhaustion events:

Air Canada 767 - No power landing into Gimli, Canada

Air Transat A330 - No power landing in the Azores

Sources of Common Cause and Cascading Failures:

Common Design Faults

Hardware

Software

Environmental Exposures

Weather

Volcanic Ash Clouds

Bird Strikes

High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

Lightning

Simultaneous Maintenance on More than One Engine

Contaminated Fuel

Sources of Fuel Exhaustion:

Operational Errors

Fuel System Mismanagement

Fuel Loading Errors

Misleading Fuel Quantity Indications

Misleading Fuel Loading Procedures particularly during a non-normal
(MEL) dispatch

Constant awareness of potential sources of common cause failures,
cascading failures, and fuel exhaustion is the key to continued
long-range operational safety.  This awareness, growing from operating
experience, is the basis for continued ETOPS safety.  ETOPS safety
enhancements focus on defining methods to prevent potential threats
caused by known sources.

Examples of Common Cause/Cascading Failure Prevention Strategies:

1. No single person performing simultaneous engine maintenance or
servicing

2. Conservative fuel loading requirements

3. Intense rain/hail ingestion engine design requirements

4. Constant adherence to established ETOPS procedures without exception

5. Robust engine condition monitoring program

The FAA incorporated prevention strategies for these types of failures
into airworthiness requirements and ETOPS policy as we learned of them. 
This proposal would codify those prevention strategies for known sources
of common cause, cascading and fuel exhaustion failures that have not
been incorporated into the regulations.

The ARAC ETOPS Working Group also looked at how the new risk model could
be applied to airplanes with more than two engines.  For these types of
airplanes, the working group had to decide what a critical loss of
thrust was in order to determine the impact that engine failure rate
would have on overall risk.  For a two-engine airplane, the risk model
assumes that a loss of both engines is a critical thrust loss.  This is
because there is a general expectation that the result of such an
occurrence would be a catastrophic loss of the airplane; though there
are examples of safe landings following the loss of both engines.  The
working group applied a similar approach to define a critical thrust
loss for airplanes with more than two engines.

The operating rules contained in 14 CFR Part 121 have minimum
performance requirements with two engines inoperative for airplanes that
have more than two engines.  Using this as a guide, the working group
assumed that critical thrust loss for both three and four engine
airplanes would be three engines.  If three engines fail on either kind
of airplane, there is a general expectation that the result would be a
catastrophic loss of the airplane.  In other words, the risk model
assumes the fourth engine on a four-engine airplane provides no
additional safety benefit compared to the loss of all engines on a
three-engine airplane.  As is the case for two-engine airplanes, there
are examples where a flight crew was able to safely land a four-engine
airplane following the loss of three of the engines.  However, the ETOPS
risk model makes the conservative assumption that this would result in
loss of the airplane.

This assumption for three and four engine airplanes changes the risk
model equations so that for these types of airplanes, the probability of
the loss of three engines would be much more remote than the loss of
both engines on a two engine airplane.  Under this assumption there is a
higher probability of losing three engines on a four-engine airplane
than on a three-engine airplane.  The following example illustrates the
concept.  A three-engine and a four-engine airplane are in-flight.  Both
airplanes suffer the loss of two-engines due to independent causes but
can reach a diversion airport.  However the loss of an additional engine
for either airplane at this point would be catastrophic for the
airplane.  The three-engine airplane has a single engine that could
possibly fail while the four-engine airplane has two engines that could
possibly fail.  In this unlikely situation, the four-engine airplane is
at greater risk because the probability of experiencing an engine
failure event increases with the number of engines.  Assuming that the
engine failure rate is the same for each type of airplane, a four-engine
airplane would have twice the probability of losing one of the two
remaining engines than the three-engine airplane would have of losing
the one remaining engine.

Using the available risk model equations with these considerations, the
ARAC ETOPS Working Group determined that the in-flight shutdown rate for
a three engine airplane would be approximately 0.2 shutdowns per 1,000
engine-hours to have an equivalent risk of critical thrust loss compared
to at two engine airplane with an in-flight shutdown rate of 0.01 per
1,000 engine-hours.  On a four-engine airplane, the equivalent in-flight
shutdown rate would be 0.1 per 1,000 engine-hours.

Because these rates are so high compared to the failure rates currently
achieved by today’s turbine engines, the FAA does not consider it
necessary to specify in-flight shutdown rates for three and four engine
airplanes other than as part of an operator’s propulsion system
monitoring program.  Under these programs, the operator must notify the
FAA and take corrective action if these rates are exceeded.

In-flight Shutdown (IFSD) rate

Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.  A
propulsion system monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary.  The certificate holder would
have to ensure that its ETOPS airplanes have In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD)
rates commensurate with the world fleet’s operation for that airplane
type.  Propulsion system monitoring at the operator level has been
accomplished via the guidance of AC 120-42A which defined specific IFSD
rates for ETOPS.

Propulsion system problems and IFSD may be caused by type design
deficiencies, ineffective maintenance or operational procedures.  It is
very important to identify the root cause of events so that appropriate
corrective action may be determined.  The diverse causes of propulsion
system problems require different solutions.  For example, type design
problems may affect the world fleet of aircraft.  If an individual
certificate holder experiences a problem caused by a type design issue,
it may not be appropriate for the FAA to reduce or withdraw the
particular operator’s ETOPS authority.  However, maintenance or
operational problems may be wholly, or partially, the responsibility of
the certificate holder.  If a certificate holder has an unacceptable
IFSD rate risk attributed to maintenance or operational practices, then
action carefully tailored to that certificate holder may be required.

The FAA does not use IFSD rate as the sole means to determine a
certificate holder’s ETOPS authority.  The FAA considers the 12-month
rolling average standard that occurs for a mature fleet after the
commencement of ETOPS.  A high IFSD rate could be due to the limited
number of engine operating hours used as the denominator for the rate
calculation or a small fleet.  The effect may be an IFSD rate jump well
above the standard rate due to a single IFSD event.  The underlying
causes for such a jump in the rate will have to be considered by the
Administrator.  Conversely, there may be occasions when a single ETOPS
event may warrant corrective action even though the overall IFSD rate is
not exceeded.  In such a case, the cause would be certificate holder
specific and may require changes to their operational, dispatch or
maintenance procedures.

Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document

The use of a CMP document has been in the ETOPS criteria from AC 120-42,
and later 120-42A, from the very first ETOPS airplane approvals.  The
CMP document defines airplane and propulsion system design
configurations, maintenance procedures, and operational procedures
required to comply with the ETOPS requirements that are not already a
part of the original type design approved by the original issuance of
the airplane and engine type certificates.

The CMP document is comprised of service bulletins, service letters,
maintenance manual references, and other pertinent documents which
define the alterations, maintenance or operational requirements and
limitations that the FAA requires to make an airplane type design
suitable for ETOPS.  The CMP is an amendment to the airplane type design
defined in 14 CFR 21.31.  The initial CMP approval, as a change to the
type design, is analogous to other type design approvals for specific
operations such as Category III autoland approval for autopilot systems
that could involve design changes to a previously certified system.

After ETOPS approval, the CMP may be modified by any airworthiness
directives (ADs) issued in accordance with part 39 that supersede
existing CMP requirements.  CMP document requirements will not increase
except by AD.

Misconceptions about the criteria for revising CMP documents generated
some of the biggest discussions in the ARAC ETOPS Working Group
meetings.  The FAA approved airplanes for ETOPS under the original AC
120-42 between 1985 and 1989 without a defined propulsion system
reliability standard.  The approach used in AC 120-42 to assess the
suitability of an airplane-engine combination for ETOPS was to use a
“fix all problems” approach.  This process involved identifying the
causes of propulsion system problems in service on the candidate
airplane and including identified corrective actions into an approved
CMP document as a condition for ETOPS approval.  This was an ongoing
process and the FAA conducted regular reviews to determine additional
corrective actions as new problems occurred in service.  As a result,
the FAA routinely required the airplane manufacturer to revise the CMP
documents during this period.

The “fix all problems” approach to airplane propulsion system
assessment was carried over into the revised AC 120-42A at the end of
1988, and continues on in this notice in proposed part 25 Appendix L
paragraph II(a)(ii).  However, revision A of the AC added a propulsion
system reliability standard as a provision for ETOPS type design
approval that did not exist in the original AC.  With an established
propulsion system reliability standard, the FAA now had a gauge to
monitor the safety of the approved ETOPS fleet without a need to
continually update the CMP as new problems occurred.  Also, several
ETOPS operators began objecting to the FAA requiring them to continually
upgrade existing ETOPS approved airplanes without any input to the
changes being required.

The FAA recognized that our previous practice of requiring upgrades to
already approved airplanes without prior public review created an undue
burden on operators.  As a result, the FAA changed its approval process
for revisions to CMP documents.  The FAA documented this change in an
internal memorandum signed by the managers of the Transport Airplane
Directorate, and the Engine and Propeller Directorate on April 3, 1990. 
In that memo, the directorate managers noted that the AC gave them the
responsibility for the continuing airworthiness of the type design CMP
standard and that the CMP should not be changed unless the reliability
of the airplane-engine combination is not achieving or maintaining the
reliability objective, or some other unsafe condition arises.  As with
any type design, the FAA permits manufacturers and operators to
incorporate minor changes and routine enhancements by service bulletins
or production design changes.  However, the FAA will not mandate such
enhancements in a revision to the CMP standard.  The memo concludes by
stating that the Transport Airplane and the Engine and Propeller
Directorates plan to use the AD process to control the continuing
airworthiness type design requirements of the ETOPS CMP standard.

As a result of the joint memo, the FAA established strict guidelines for
CMP revisions to ensure that the requirements of the basic CMP standard
originally approved for an airplane-engine combination are not increased
without going through the AD process.

The FAA approves revisions to an airplane’s CMP document for the
following reasons:

1. When incorporating the CMP standard for a newly approved
airplane-engine combination into an existing CMP document.

2. When correcting errors in previous revisions.

3. When ADs are issued that supersede existing CMP requirements.

4. When approving optional alternatives to existing requirements.

5. When mandating changes to the CMP by an AD.

The FAA aircraft certification offices have used these guidelines since
issuance of the joint memo to approve CMP revisions.  Because operators
had already complied with several revisions to previously approved CMP
documents in force at the time the FAA issued the new CMP guidelines,
the FAA worked with the airlines and the manufacturers to establish
“baseline” CMP requirements for each ETOPS approved airplane-engine
combination.  The affected operators agreed to ensure that all of the
requirements of these baseline CMPs are incorporated into their ETOPS
fleets.  Thereafter, the new CMP revision guidelines would be the
standard way of making subsequent revisions.

Summary of the proposed changes

The following chart summarizes which operations would be affected by the
proposed rule changes:

	Current requirements	Proposed Rule

	Up to 60 minutes	Beyond 60 minutes	Up to 60 minutes	Beyond 60 min up to
180 minutes	Beyond 180 minutes

Part 121 two engine	Section 121.161 applies	Advisory material and policy
letters	No change	Would apply (Would codify previous practice)	Would
apply

Part 121 more than two engine	No current regulation	No current
regulation	No change	No change	Would apply

Part 135	No current regulation	No current regulation	No change	No change
Would apply

	The chart below summarizes ETOPS regulations before and after the
proposed changes.

	Under current advisory circulars and policy	Under the proposed
regulation

Proposed ETOPS requirement	Twins	More than two engines	Part 135
operations	Twins	More than two engines	Part 135 operations

Applicability	More than 60 minutes from an adequate airport	Does not
apply to turbine engine airplanes.	Does not apply	More than 60 minutes
from an adequate airport	More than 180 minutes from an adequate airport
More than 180 minutes from an adequate airport

Terminology	ETOPS (Extended Operations for Two Engine Airplanes)	ETOPS
does not currently apply to turbine engine airplanes with more than two
engines	ETOPS does not currently apply to part 135 operations	ETOPS
(Extended Operations)	ETOPS (Extended Operations)	ETOPS (Extended
Operations)

Maximum permissible distance from an adequate airport	207 minutes	Not
regulated	180 minutes	240 minutes with certificate holder approval,

beyond 240 minutes with route specific approval	To maximum system
limitation	240 minutes

Cargo fire suppression	Diversion limit plus 15 minutes	Not required	Not
required	Diversion limit plus 15 minutes.	Diversion limit plus 15
minutes (6 year compliance period)	Not required

Rescue and fire fighting service capability	ICAO category 4 	Not
required	Not required	ICAO category 4 up to 180 min, ICAO category 7
beyond 180 min	ICAO category 7	Not required

Passenger recovery plan	Required for polar operations	Required for polar
operations	Required for polar operations	Required	Required	Required

Engine reliability standards	IFSD rates:

0.02/1000 hrs for 180 min,

0.19/1000 hrs for 207 min	None	None	IFSD rates:

0.05/1000 hrs for 120 min,

0.02/1000 hrs for 180 min,

0.01/1000 hrs for > 180 min	IFSD rates:

0.2/1000 hrs for 3 engine airplanes,

0.1/1000 hrs for 4 engine airplanes	Not specified

Areas of designated ETOPS applicability	Polar	Polar	Polar	Applies
Applies	Applies

Time-limited systems	Per type design approval limit for the airplane (up
to 207 min).	No requirement	No requirement	Specified in part 25,
Appendix L	Specified in part 25, Appendix L	Specified in part 25,
Appendix L

Dispatch weather requirements for alternate	Applies	No requirement	No
requirement	Applies	Applies	Applies

ETOPS maintenance program	Required	No requirement	No requirement
Required	Required	Required

Communication capabilities	SATCOM required for 207 min ETOPS	No
requirement	No requirement	Additional com required. SATCOM beyond 180
min..	Additional com required. SATCOM beyond 180 min..	Additional com
required. SATCOM beyond 180 min..

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposal

We begin the discussion by clarifying the term “ETOPS”.  Since its
inception eighteen years ago, the term “ETOPS” has described
extended-range operations of two-engine air carrier airplanes under a
deviation from 14 CFR 121.161.  The term has gained broad acceptance
among operators and regulators throughout much of the world.

This proposal would create regulatory requirements for extended
operations for all air carrier airplanes.  As described previously, the
thresholds for applicability would vary by the number of engines and
type of operation.  In its deliberations, the Working Group stated that
it struggled with the question of whether to use a new term to describe
the operations of airplanes beyond 180 minutes from an adequate airport.
 Early on, the Working Group considered and agreed to the term
“LROPS” which stands for Long Range Operations to describe flights
beyond the 180-minute threshold.  However, as their efforts progressed
the Working Group found that the use of two terms (ETOPS and LROPS) for
two-engine airplanes flying beyond 60 minutes and 180 minutes from an
airport quickly became awkward and cumbersome.  Further, the Working
Group members representing the maintenance community expressed great
concern that the introduction of the LROPS term would needlessly create
confusion among the maintenance community and would also require
painstaking and potentially expensive revisions to numerous maintenance
manuals and programs.  In order to avoid any potential confusion, the
Working Group recommended the use of the term ETOPS for all air carrier
extended range operations irrespective of the number of engines.

The FAA strongly agrees with this recommendation.  The FAA also believes
that the addition of a new term could needlessly create confusion. 
Further it would potentially dilute the intent of this proposal, which
is to codify existing ETOPS standards and procedures and to extend those
concepts to airplanes with more than two-engines.  The FAA believes that
the introduction of a new term could be misinterpreted as creating a new
operational concept as opposed to the extension of an existing one.

The proposed amendments to the Type Design Rules 14 CFR parts 25 and 33
and supporting advisory material are a consolidation of requirements
taken from AC 120-42A, the 777 Special Conditions, and JAA Information
Leaflet (IL) 20.  The materials contained in the proposed Airplane Type
Design Rule (Part 25) and AC are a compilation of the existing
AC120-42A, 777 Special Condition, and JAA IL20.

The following discussion takes each of the Rule sections and attempts to
capture all of the comments and discussion from the ARAC activities.

Part 1

Section by section discussion of the proposed changes to part 1

Section 1.1 - General Definitions

The proposed definitions were adopted directly from the ARAC
recommendation.  This proposal would establish three different
definitions of ETOPS in three significant ways.  In each case, the
acronym would stand for “extended operations” for all airplanes
regardless of the number of engines.  The definition would vary in part
121, however, depending on whether the airplane involved has two engines
or more than two engines.  This proposal also would introduce ETOPS into
part 135 for the first time, where ETOPS would have a third definition. 
The FAA believes the remainder of the proposed definitions for section
1.1 are self-explanatory.

Part 21

The amendments to part 21 would create reporting requirements for the
holders of type certificate for two-engine ETOPS airplanes and ETOPS
eligible engines.  This would require type certificate holders to
closely monitor the performance of their products to ensure their
continuing reliability.  These amendments would also ensure that the FAA
is kept apprised of any existing or potential problems in a timely
manner.

Section by section discussion of the proposed changes to part 21

Proposed New Section 21.4 - ETOPS Reporting Requirements.

This proposal would add a new regulation consisting of two parts, Early
ETOPS Problem Reporting & Tracking for all ETOPS airplanes, and ETOPS
Operational Service Reliability Reporting for two-engine airplanes.

Explanation.

1. Reporting for all ETOPS airplanes.  The proposed rule is a
codification of what the FAA considers to be one of the essential and
objective elements of the early ETOPS Special Conditions (SC) for the
B777 aircraft; specifically as they pertain to problem tracking and
reporting.  The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendation and proposes it as a
new section 21.4.  Section 21.4 would require the type certificate
holder to establish an early ETOPS problem reporting system.  The
proposed system would contain a means for the prompt identification of
those problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations in order
that they may be resolved in a timely manner.  The system would also
contain the process for the timely notification to the responsible FAA
office of all relevant problems encountered, and identification of
corrective actions deemed necessary and provide for appropriate FAA
review of all planned corrective actions.  The system would be in place
for the first 250,000 engine-hours of fleet operating experience after
the airplane enters service.

For two-engine ETOPS airplanes the system would remain in effect beyond
250,000 engine-hours of fleet operating experience until the fleet has
demonstrated a specified and stable IFSD rate consistent with the
approved diversion time of the aircraft.  For the service period, this
system would define the sources and content of in-service data that will
be made available to the type certificate holder in support of the
problem tracking system.  The content of the data provided would include
the data necessary to evaluate the specific cause of all service events
reportable under section 21.3(c) of part 21, in addition to any other
failure or malfunction that could affect the safety of ETOPS operation. 
Ten event occurrences, specifically defined with respect to reliable,
safe ETOPS operation that would require reporting are defined in the
proposal.

2. Reporting for two engine ETOPS airplanes. Paragraph (b)(1) of the
proposed section 21.4 would require engine and airplane manufacturers to
report periodically on the reliability of their two-engine airplane
fleets.  Reporting would include: IFSD events, IFSD rates, and ETOPS
fleet statistics.  This reporting may be combined with the reporting
required by section 21.3.  The proposed rule also would require the
identification of cause and appropriate corrective action to assure
reliable, safe ETOPS operations.

The periodic reporting of the reliability required of the manufacturers
of engines and airplanes approved for ETOPS service would begin at the
introduction of the product into service and continue throughout its
product life.  The interval of the reporting would be more frequent
early in its product cycle and generally longer later in its product
service life, especially after the product has achieved maturity with
regard to engine reliability.  Reliability would be indicated by a
stable engine shutdown event rate at or below the target values.

Generally, early product service life reporting on a quarterly basis is
adequate, especially considering the fact that the manufacturers report
engine failure events as they occur under the requirements of section
21.3.  Event rates may fluctuate considerably early in the product’s
service life cycle because, although the fleet is growing in numbers of
engine-airplane combinations in service, the accumulation of engine
flight hours is generally slow.  Typically, event rates are not very
stable when the fleet cumulative time is less than 1 or 2 million engine
flight hours.  Therefore the focus should be on event occurrences, not
failure rates, with a small fleet typical of early service time.

After maturity (a stable engine shutdown event rate at or below the
target values) with a large fleet, reporting intervals continue on a
quarterly basis.  Regardless of fleet size, fleet age, and state of
maturity, engine failures are reported under the requirements of section
21.3.

3. Paragraph (b)(2) of the proposed Section 21.4 identifies world fleet
IFSD rate/reliability requirements.  The standards in section
21.4(b)(2)(i) are the IFSD rates compatible with the current FAA ETOPS
AC and Policy for operation up to 180 minutes (including North Pacific
operation).  The standard in section 21.4(b)(2)(ii) is an IFSD rate
compatible with operation beyond 180 minutes to 240 minutes and beyond,
as contained in the proposed Operational rule and guidance material.

As discussed in this proposed NPRM, an IFSD rate of 0.01/1,000 Engine
Flight Hours (EFH) is consistent with an extremely improbable risk of a
dual in-flight power loss from independent causes for a two-engine
airplane, even assuming a decision of practically unlimited duration. 
The rates given are not operator specific, but rather apply across the
fleet of a given airplane-engine combination.

The FAA expects implementation of corrective action will maintain an
acceptable in-flight shutdown rate below the required levels.  This is
borne out by the current ETOPS fleet in-flight shutdown rates, which
have achieved and consistently maintained rates at or below 0.01 per
1,000 engine-hours.  If the normal airworthiness monitoring process is
not sufficient by itself to maintain an acceptable propulsion system
reliability for a particular airplane-engine combination, then the FAA
may require additional corrective actions, or reduce or withdraw the
ETOPS diversion authority as described in section 21.4(c), if the risk
of dual power loss is unacceptably high.  Before such action is taken,
however, the certificate holder and the FAA will assess the fleet-wide
risk based upon the risk model developed for ETOPS presented in this
preamble.

Part 25

Section by section discussion of the proposed changes to part 25

Proposed Change to Paragraph 25.857(c)(2) - Cargo fire suppression.

The proposed change to section 25.857(c)(2) would require that the
applicant furnish the certified time capability of a Class C cargo fire
suppression system in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) in accordance
with section 25.1581(a)(2).  The time capability of a system is the
maximum length of time a system can suppress a fire.

Explanation.

The proposed new section 121.633 and part 135, Appendix H, paragraph E
would specify that the time that an operator needs to fly to a planned
ETOPS alternate may not exceed the maximum time capability specified in
the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane’s most time limited
system.  This change to section 25.857(c)(2) and a similar requirement
in the new Appendix L, section I, paragraph (e)(4) will ensure that the
Airplane Flight Manual provides the information that the operators will
need regarding the fire suppression system to comply with the operating
requirements.  The justification for these changes is further discussed
in the explanations for those proposed operating rules.

Proposed New Section 25.1535 - ETOPS Approval.

A proposed new section 25.1535 would prescribe the requirements for
obtaining ETOPS type design approval.

Explanation.

This new rule in the body of part 25 is effectively a pointer to a new
Appendix L, which sets out additional design, analysis and test
requirements for ETOPS type design approval.  This rule also requires
that in showing compliance with part 25 rules the applicant must
consider the maximum length ETOPS mission.  The applicant must also
consider the effects of airplane system failure on crew workload and
passenger physiological needs during a diversion of the maximum time
considered.  The system safety assessment required by section 25.1309 is
an example of a rule where the ETOPS mission profile would be considered
in an analysis to determine compliance.  The ETOPS mission profile
(including the maximum diversion time) could also affect the compliance
analysis for section 25.1011(b) concerning oil endurance, and section
25.571 governing structural fatigue and damage tolerance.

This proposed rule is crucial to ensure that throughout the airplane
design, the ETOPS mission profile is properly considered, and the
standard of compliance is high because of it.  The “ETOPS Scenario”
diagram and the ETOPS significant systems definition that would be
provided in the associated advisory circular for this rule are good
tools that system designers can use to assess all conditions although
they are not regulatory.  There are also additional requirements in
Appendix L to provide focus on those airplane systems that have,
historically, been important to ETOPS operations such as electrical
power, APU, and fuel systems.  The emphasis on these specific airplane
systems does not mean that these are the only airplane systems that are
important to ETOPS.  The section 25.1535 and Appendix L requirements
along with the advisory circular guidance for ETOPS significant systems
and the ETOPS mission profile provide the basis for assessing other
airplane systems for ETOPS approval.

Proposed new part 25 Appendix L – Extended Operations.

A proposed new appendix L to part 25 defines additional airworthiness
requirements for ETOPS approval.

Explanation.

Appendix L would codify the airworthiness standards unique to ETOPS from
Advisory Circular 120-42A, the Boeing 777 ETOPS special conditions, and
the 207-minute ETOPS Policy Letter EPL 20-01.  The requirements of
Appendix L would go beyond simply considering the ETOPS mission in
applying the basic part 25 requirements.

Since we would not require an applicant to comply with these ETOPS
requirements in order to receive a basic part 25 type certificate, we
decided that a separate appendix to part 25 would be the best location
for these additional requirements for ETOPS.

Appendix L Format.

Appendix L is organized into three sections.  Section I sets out design
requirements that all airplanes must comply with for ETOPS approval. 
Section II prescribes specific requirements for two engine airplanes. 
Section III prescribes specific requirements for airplanes with more
than two engines.

The proposed numbering system and organization of Appendix L is a
significant departure from the ARAC recommendation.  As an aid to
readers familiar with the original ARAC proposal, Tables 1 and 2
cross-reference the original Appendix L paragraph numbers recommended by
ARAC to the reorganized appendix proposed in this notice.

	Table 1

	Cross-Reference of ARAC Proposed and New Appendix L Paragraph Numbers

Original ARAC Proposal	New

L25.1

Appendix L	Applicability

L25.2	(a)	Section I	(a)

	(a)(i)	Section I	(a)(1)

	(a)(i)(1)	Section I	(a)(1)(i)

	(a)(i)(2)	Section I	(a)(1)(ii)

	(a)(ii)	Section I	(a)(2)

	(a)(ii)(1)	Section I	(a)(2)(i)

	(a)(ii)(2)	Section I	(a)(2)(ii)

	(a)(ii)(3)	Section I	(a)(2)(iii)

	(a)(iii)	Section I	(a)(3)

	(b)	Section I	(b)

	(b)(i)	Section I	(b)(1)

	(b)(i)(1)	Section I	(b)(1)(i)

	(b)(ii)	Section I	(b)(1)

	(b)(iii)	Section I	(b)(1)(ii)

	(b)(iv)	Section I	(b)(2)

	(b)(iv)(1)	Section I	(b)(2)(i)

	(b)(iv)(2)	Section I	(b)(2)(ii)

L25.3	(i)	Section II	(b)(1)

	(ii)	Section II	(b)(2)(ii)

	(iii)	Section I	(c)

L25.4

Section II, Section III

(a)	Section II, Section III	(a)

	(a)(i)	Section II, Section III	(a)(1)

	(a)(ii)	Section II, Section III	(a)(1)

	(a)(iii)	Section II 	(a)(2), (a)(3)

Section III	(a)(2)

	(a)(iv)	Section II	(a)(4)

	(a)(iv)(a)	Section II	(a)(4)(i)

	(a)(iv)(b)	Section II	(a)(4)(ii)

	(a)(iv)(c)	Section II	(a)(4)(iii)

	(a)(v)	Section II 	(a)(3)

Section III	(a)(2)

	(a)(vi)	Section II	(a)(5)

Section III	(a)(3)

	(a)(vii)	Section I	(d)

	(b)	Omit

(b)(i)	Section II	(b)(9)

Section III	(b)(6)

	(b)(i)(1)	Section II	(b)(4)

	(b)(i)(1)(a)	Section II	(b)(4)(i)

	(b)(i)(1)(b)	Section II	(b)(4)(ii)

	(b)(i)(2)	Section II	(b)(6)

	(b)(i)(2)	Section III	(b)(3)

	(b)(i)(3)	Section II	(b)(7)

	(b)(i)(3)	Section III	(b)(4)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)(i)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)(1)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)(1)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)(2)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)(2)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)(3)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)(3)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)(4)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)(4)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)(v)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)(5)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)(5)

	(b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)	Section II	(b)(7)(i)(6)

Section III	(b)(4)(i)(6)

	(b)(i)(3)(b)	Section II	(b)(7)(ii)

Section III	(b)(4)(ii)

	(b)(i)(3)(c)	Section II	(b)(7)(iii)

Section III	(b)(4)(iii)

	(b)(i)(3)(d)	Section II	(b)(7)(iv)

Section III	(b)(4)(iv)

	(b)(i)(3)(e)	Section II	(b)(7)(v)

Section III	(b)(4)(v)

	(b)(ii)	Section II	(b)(8)

Section III	(b)(5)

	(b)(ii)(a)	Section II	(b)(8)(i)

Section III	(b)(5)(i)

	(b)(ii)(b)	Section II	(b)(8)(ii)

Section III	(b)(5)(ii)

	(b)(ii)(c)	Section II	(b)(8)(iii)

Section III	(b)(5)(iii)

	(b)(ii)(d)	Section II	(b)(8)(iv)

Section III	(b)(5)(iv)

	(b)(iii)	Section II	(b)(3)

Section III	(b)(1)

	(c)	Section II, Section III	(c)

	(c)(i)	Section II, Section III	(c)(1)

	(c)(ii)	Section II, Section III	(c)(2)

L25.5

Section I	(e)(4)

	Table 2

	Cross-Reference of New and ARAC Proposed Appendix L Paragraph Numbers

New	Original ARAC Proposal

Appendix L	Applicability	L25.1

	Section I

L25.2

(a)	L25.2	(a)

	(a)(1)	L25.2	(a)(i)

	(a)(1)(i)	L25.2	(a)(i)(1)

	(a)(1)(ii)	L25.2	(a)(i)(2)

	(a)(1)(iii)	New

(a)(2)	L25.2	(a)(ii)

	(a)(2)(i)	L25.2	(a)(ii)1

	(a)(2)(ii)	L25.2	(a)(ii)(2)

	(a)(2)(iii)	L25.2	(a)(ii)(3)

	(a)(3)	L25.2	(a)(iii)

	(b)	L25.2	(b)

	(b)(1)	L25.2	(b)(i), (b)(ii)

	(b)(1)(i)	L25.2	(b)(i)(1)

	(b)(1)(ii)	L25.2	(b)(iii)

	(b)(2)	L25.2	(b)(iv)

	(b)(2)(i)	L25.2	(b)(iv)(1)

	(b)(2)(ii)	L25.2	(b)(iv)(2)

	(b)(3)	New

(c)	L25.3	(iii)

	(d)	L25.4	(a)(vii)

	(e)	New

(e)(1)	New

(e)(2)	New

(e)(3)	New

(e)(4)	L25.5

(e)(5)	New

	Section II

L25.4

(a)	L25.4	(a)

	(a)(1)	L25.4	(a)(i), (a)(ii)

	(a)(2)	L25.4	(a)(iii)

	(a)(3)	L25.4	(a)(iii), (a)(v)

	(a)(4)	L25.4	(a)(iv)

	(a)(4)(i)	L25.4	(a)(iv)(a)

	(a)(4)(ii)	L25.4	(a)(iv)(b)

	(a)(4)(iii)	L25.4	(a)(iv)(c)

	(a)(5)	L25.4	(a)(vi)

	(b)(1)	L25.3	(i)

	(b)(2)(i)	New

(b)(2)(ii)	L25.3	(ii)

	(b)(3)	L25.4	(b)(iii)

	(b)(4)	L25.4	(b)(i)(1)

	(b)(4)(i)	L25.4	(b)(i)(1)(a)

	(b)(4)(ii)	L25.4	(b)(i)(1)(b)

	(b)(5)	New

(b)(6)	L25.4	(b)(i)(2)

	(b)(7)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)

	(b)(7)(i)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)

	(b)(7)(i)(1)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(i)

	(b)(7)(i)(2)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)

	(b)(7)(i)(3)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)

	(b)(7)(i)(4)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)

	(b)(7)(i)(5)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(v)

	(b)(7)(i)(6)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)

	(b)(7)(ii)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(b)

	(b)(7)(iii)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(c)

	(b)(7)(iv)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(d)

	(b)(7)(v)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(e)

	(b)(8)	L25.4	(b)(ii)

	(b)(8)(i)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(a)

	(b)(8)(ii)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(b)

	(b)(8)(iii)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(c)

	(b)(8)(iv)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(d)

	(b)(9)	L25.4	(b)(i)

	(c)	L25.4	(c)

	(c)(1)	L25.4	(c)(i)

	(c)(2)	L25.4	(c)(ii)

Section III

L25.4

(a)	L25.4	(a)

	(a)(1)	L25.4	(a)(i), (a)(ii)

	(a)(2)	L25.4	(a)(iii), (a)(v)

	(a)(3)	L25.4	(a)(vi)

	(b)(1)	L25.4	(b)(iii)

	(b)(2)	New

(b)(3)	L25.4	(b)(i)(2)

	(b)(4)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)

	(b)(4)(i)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)

	(b)(4)(i)(1)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(i)

	(b)(4)(i)(2)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)

	(b)(4)(i)(3)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)

	(b)(4)(i)(4)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)

	(b)(4)(i)(5)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(v)

	(b)(4)(i)(6)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)

	(b)(4)(ii)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(b)

	(b)(4)(iii)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(c)

	(b)(4)(iv)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(d)

	(b)(4)(v)	L25.4	(b)(i)(3)(e)

	(b)(5)	L25.4	(b)(ii)

	(b)(5)(i)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(a)

	(b)(5)(ii)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(b)

	(b)(5)(iii)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(c)

	(b)(5)(iv)	L25.4	(b)(ii)(d)

	(b)(6)	L25.4	(b)(i)

	(c)	L25.4	(c)

	(c)(1)	L25.4	(c)(i)

	(c)(2)	L25.4	(c)(ii)

We discuss each paragraph of the proposed new Appendix L below.

Section I - Design Requirements.

I(a)  Airplane Systems.

I(a)(1)  Operation in icing conditions.

I(a)(1)(i).

ETOPS airplanes would have to comply with the requirements of section
25.1419 for operation in icing conditions.

Explanation.

Section 25.1419 sets out the requirements for certifying a transport
category airplane for flight into icing conditions.  This requirement is
optional in that an applicant may choose to not apply for approval in
icing conditions.  However, from a practical standpoint no one would
request certification of an airplane that did not meet this requirement.
 This proposed new regulation makes this approval mandatory for ETOPS
approval.

I(a)(1)(ii).

The airframe and propulsion system ice protection would have to be
capable of continued safe flight and landing at engine-inoperative and
decompression altitudes in icing conditions.  Following the loss of an
engine at cruising altitude, an airplane will drift down to a lower
(engine-inoperative) altitude.  A decompression altitude is an altitude
to which an airplane must descend following the loss of cabin pressure. 
Decompression altitudes are 10,000 feet MSL and below.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify AC 120-42A, paragraph 8(b)(11) for airframe
ice protection.  The applicant would have to demonstrate that the
airplane is capable of continued safe flight and landing at the
decompression altitudes.  This rule would require the applicant to
demonstrate to the FAA that the anti-icing systems on the airplane will
assure the airplane’s capability to continue to operate during a
worst-case diversion.  The ARAC Working Group recommended a standard
that would require the capability to safely divert if anti-icing cannot
be shown available for all scenarios.  This recommended standard tacitly
assumes that airplane ice protection is not necessarily required during
an ETOPS diversion.  We disagree with this recommendation.  Paragraph
8(b)(11) of AC 120-42A says that the airframe and propulsion ice
protection should be shown to provide adequate capability for the
intended operation.  The AC says that this should account for prolonged
exposure to lower altitudes associated with the engine-out diversion,
cruise, holding, approach and landing.  We do not interpret this
paragraph as allowing circumstances where anti-icing would not normally
be available during an ETOPS diversion.  An applicant would have to
address any failure conditions where the ice-protection systems would
not be available during an ETOPS diversion as part of the safety
analysis required by section 25.1309.

The preamble justification provided in the ARAC proposal stated that
this rule “will also require the applicant to demonstrate that the
non-heated (or “non-deiced”) areas of the airplane will not pick up
a load of ice that would make the airplane uncontrollable or create too
much drag to complete the diversion.”  This statement is consistent
with how the FAA has applied the criteria of AC 120-42A paragraph
8.(b)(11) for all airplanes certified using that policy.  However, the
ARAC recommendation did not include this specific provision.  We have
added this requirement into the proposed rule as a new paragraph
I(a)(1)(iii).  It is consistent with ARAC’s recommendation and
consistent with what has been standard ETOPS type certification practice
to consider the accumulation of ice on the non-heated or non-deiced
areas of the airplane.

The associated advisory material for this proposed requirement will
describe the conditions and assumptions that an applicant may use in
simulating a diversion icing environment for showing compliance with the
proposed rule.  The advisory material will also provide guidance for
developing analyses or testing that would justify not having to assume
that the entire diversion would be in icing conditions.

I(a)(2) Electrical Power Supply.

I(a)(2)(i) and (ii).

These paragraphs would establish reliability requirements for the
electrical power supply system on an ETOPS flight.

Explanation.

Paragraphs I(a)(2)(i) and (ii) are basically a restatement of section
25.1309 for the electrical power supply system in consideration of the
ETOPS mission.  We agree with the ARAC’s apparent intent that these
paragraphs, in conjunction with the new sections 25.1535(a) and (b),
codify paragraphs 8(b)(1), 8(b)(6), 8(b)(7) and 8(c)(4) of AC 120-42A
for the electrically powered ETOPS significant systems.  These
paragraphs establish the overall system safety objectives for these
systems in extended operations.

The proposed rule is not as explicit as AC 120-42A in stating the types
of functions that an applicant would need to consider in applying the
safety objectives of section 25.1309 for an ETOPS mission.  The general
philosophy of the proposed rule is to let the existing policy associated
with section 25.1309 compliance determine the design analysis for ETOPS.
 This philosophy is consistent with paragraph (c)(1) of the Boeing Model
777 ETOPS special conditions, which requires the applicant to comply
with part 25 with regards to the ETOPS mission.  Although we discuss
this regulatory philosophy here in reference to the specific electrical
power supply system requirements, it also applies to other ETOPS
significant systems that are not specifically addressed in the proposed
rule.

The FAA’s intent for paragraphs I(a)(2)(i) and (ii) is to assure that
the applicant properly focuses on electrical power redundancy and
reliability when considering ETOPS mission scenarios  in showing
compliance with section 25.1309.  On a two-engine airplane, the
potential lack of redundancy available for electrical power generation
makes this requirement especially important.  However, the new emphasis
is in paragraph (ii).  It will be up to the applicant to demonstrate
which functions would reduce the capability of the airplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions.  It is
not realistic, for instance, for an applicant to state that operating
for an extended period of time on suction feed would not reduce the
capability of the airplane to cope with adverse operating conditions
(for example, negative g or turbulence).  Additionally, the applicant
would have to determine what navigation and communication systems must
be powered by emergency generation sources during a worst case ETOPS
diversion.

I(a)(2)(iii).

This paragraph would require at least three independent electrical
generation sources for airplanes being certified for greater than 180
minutes.

Explanation.

Paragraph I(a)(2)(iii) would codify the three generator requirement of
paragraph 8.(b)(8) in AC 120-42A.  However, the ARAC recommendation only
applies this requirement to airplanes being certified for greater than
180-minute ETOPS.  The AC specifies three generators for any ETOPS
approval.  This specific requirement created much discussion within the
ARAC ETOPS Working Group.  Paragraph I(a)(2)(iii) as proposed in this
notice represents the compromise position that allowed working group
consensus.  The following paragraphs are the ARAC’s recommended
justification for this requirement.  The FAA is publishing them without
comment.

This topic is inextricably linked to the discussion about MMELs.  The
MMEL or Master Minimum Equipment List allows an airplane operator to fly
without equipment not on this fully functioning.  There is concern that
without a specific number of generators required in the rule, the MMEL
could strip away some of the redundancy required for long-range flight. 
The arguments against a prescriptive number are generally as follows:

(1) Defining a number of generators would not assure proper system
reliability (for example, is it better to have three generators with a
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 20,000 hours each, or four
generators with an MTBF of 3,000 each?)

(2) Defining a number of generators would either artificially constrain
or give a “pass” to future airplane designs.  For instance, if a new
airplane had a system architectural need for 8 generating systems,
requiring three in the ETOPS rule would not assure an adequately safe
design.

(3) Trying to address the formation of the MMEL in Part 25 is
impractical and inconsistent with agreed- to policies for MMEL
development.

“Nonetheless, it was agreed that there should be a tie-in between the
analysis performed for Part 25 ETOPS approval and the analysis the
Flight Operations Evaluation Review Board (FOEB), who develop the MMEL,
used in determining dispatch criteria.  This is almost always the case
in today’s process, but formalizing the process would be a positive
step.

“Therefore, an additional paragraph has been added to the ETOPS
regulation to require a minimum number of electrical generators.  This
requirement codifies the existing AC 120-42A electrical generator
redundancy criteria.  The intent of this requirement is to ensure future
airplanes to be certified for ETOPS have an electrical generation system
architecture equivalent to the 737, 757, 767, 777 and A310, 320, A330
era airplanes.  Future airplane electrical system architectures may be
significantly different from today’s airplanes, but the architecture
must be equivalent from the perspective of robustness to independent
failure scenarios.”

I(a)(3) Time limited systems.

This paragraph would require that the applicant state the capability of
most time limiting ETOPS significant system in the airplane flight
manual.

Explanation.

As stated previously for the revised paragraph 25.857(c)(2), this
requirement would provide the information that the operators would need
to comply with the applicable operating requirements.  Advisory Circular
120-42A has two main categories of ETOPS approval (120 minutes and 180
minutes) based on demonstrated propulsion system reliability.  The ETOPS
approval, as stated in the airplane flight manual in currently approved
ETOPS airplanes, identifies the maximum approved diversion time based as
one of these two times.  In order to qualify for the ETOPS type design
approval, the applicant must design the airplane time-limited systems to
support this maximum approved diversion time with an additional 15
minutes capability to allow for airplane holding, approach and landing.

In the context of proposed paragraph I(a)(3), we do not consider the
propulsion system as a time-limited ETOPS significant system.  Proposed
Appendix L, section II(a), codifies the service experience method for
ETOPS approval from AC 120-42A.  Paragraph II(a)(4) of this section
defines the required world fleet in-flight shutdown rate with each level
of ETOPS operational approval.  In this particular case, the level of
ETOPS approval refers to the operational approval authority defined in
the operating rules, not the time-limited system capability required in
paragraph I(a)(3).

I(b) Propulsion system.

I(b)(1) Fuel System Design.

This paragraph would require design features to ensure that fuel
necessary to complete an ETOPS mission will be available at the flow and
pressure required for the engine, during a diversion for the longest
time being approved for the airplane.  The proposed rule includes a
requirement for alerts to the crew when the fuel available to the
engines falls below the level required to complete the mission which can
occur because of fuel mismanagement, abnormal transfer between tanks,
and fuel loss.

Explanation.

Fuel system design and the ability of the crew to properly deal with
fuel system malfunctions are arguably the most important issues facing
the designer of ETOPS airplanes.  The proposed rule (with corresponding
AC guidance) addresses the need for:

(1) Positive fuel pressure at the engine fuel pump (no suction feed);

(2) Fuel availability following system failures (no hidden/trapped fuel,
functional crossfeed valves, etc.); and

(3) Flight deck alerts when fuel available to the engines falls below
the level required to complete the mission.

The proposed requirements would codify the intent of paragraph
8.(b)(2)(iii) of AC 120-42A, paragraph (c)(3)(i)(C) of the Boeing 777
ETOPS special conditions, and items 7 and 8 of the type design
provisions of the 207 minute ETOPS Policy Letter EPL 20-1.

There has been some discussion regarding newer generation airplanes
(B777) and their system architecture being the standard by which
operations beyond 180 minutes will be judged.  Currently, all transport
category aircraft are required to perform suction feed testing as part
of basic Part 25 certification, which requires the applicant to simulate
an all Alternating Current (AC) power loss at the highest altitude the
airplane is used in service (“service ceiling”).  The testing is
performed to demonstrate that in the event of an all AC power loss,
there is still ability (at some safe altitude) to re-start the engines
after flameout on suction feed and generate thrust to a safe landing. 
This demonstration does not, however, provide any assurance that the
engines can operate on suction feed for the long duration diversion
times envisioned for ETOPS.  The engines are certified with a minimum
engine fuel pump inlet pressure limit of typically one-half pound per
square inch (0.5 psi) above the ambient air pressure, or the fuel vapor
pressure, whichever is higher.  Section 25.955 requires that the
airplane fuel system deliver fuel to the engine at this minimum pressure
for the maximum fuel flow required by the engine. Without the fuel boost
pressure, airplanes cannot comply with § 25.955.  The fuel system
design requirements proposed in this notice are intended to ensure that
continued operation on suction feed is not a practical possibility on
ETOPS airplanes.  Paragraph I(b)(1) would be applicable to all ETOPS
airplanes irrespective of the number of engines.

Loss of normal electrical power to the boost pumps is the primary cause
of the loss of fuel system boost pressure.  A specific fuel feed
capability requirement has been added for twin-engine ETOPS operations
beyond 180 minutes that is intended to address the concerns about loss
of fuel boost pressure raised in the development of the 207 minute ETOPS
policy.  The 207-minute policy included a provision to also address fuel
cross-feed capability following the failure of normal electrical power. 
Proposed paragraph I(b)(1)(i) would require that the applicant design
the airplane fuel system with a fuel boost pump in each main tank and
the capability to operate at least one crossfeed valve by a back-up
electrical generation source other than the primary engine driven or APU
driven generators.  There is an exception in the proposed rule for fuel
system designs for situations when electrical power does not provide
required fuel boost pressure or crossfeed valve actuation.  Although
this is a specific design requirement applicable to two engine airplanes
for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the overall design objective underlying
paragraph I(b)(1) is applicable to all ETOPS airplanes.  The applicant
may use the same design features required by paragraph I(b)(1)(i) as
part of their compliance with paragraph I(b)(1) for airplanes not
specifically covered by this subparagraph.

The other possible source of the loss of fuel boost pressure is
mechanical failure of fuel system components.  These include pump
failures or performance degradation, valve failures, and plumbing
failures causing internal or external fuel leaks that result in
significant fuel pressure loss. Possible design alternatives to address
mechanical failures as a source of loss of fuel system boost pressure
are:

1. Redundancy (additional boost pumps, cross-feed valves, etc.)

2. Improved component reliability (including any instructions for
continued airworthiness necessary to maintain that level of reliability)

3. Enlarged main fuel tank capacity (to minimize the effect of loss of
boost pressure in other fuel tanks)

4. A time-limited engine fuel inlet pressure limit at which the engine
can demonstrate acceptable operation and integrity for the longest
diversion time for which the airplane manufacturer is requesting
approval.

Each of these design alternatives has advantages and disadvantages that
the manufacturer would need to consider in designing an airplane to
comply with the proposed rule.

We intend that the proposed paragraph I(b)(1) would preclude all causes
of loss of system boost pressure in extended operations.  This is
consistent with the overall safety objectives established by the part 25
airworthiness standards for potentially catastrophic failure conditions.

Proposed paragraph I(b)(1)(ii) would require flight deck alerts when the
fuel available to the engines falls below that required to complete the
mission.  The FAA’s intent is that the required flight deck alerts
would give flight crews clear warning of impending fuel exhaustion with
enough time to safely land the airplane before the condition becomes
critical.  As a minimum, the manufacturer would have to design the
flight deck alerts to address the types of failures or human errors that
have resulted in airline fuel exhaustion events in service.

Examples of fuel exhaustion events include an Air Canada Boeing 767 that
landed on an abandoned runway after both engines flamed out from fuel
exhaustion.  In this case, the normal low fuel alerts did not function
because of a fuel quantity indication system failure.  The fuel
exhaustion was caused by the crew not receiving a low fuel alert, in
combination with an unapproved airplane dispatch and a fueling error. 
An Air Tran Airbus A330 landed in the Azores following flameout of both
engines caused by fuel exhaustion due to an unrecognized engine fuel
leak.  The AC provides guidance on critical fuel system alerts derived
from these types of fuel loss events that have occurred in the current
generation of aircraft.

I(b)(2) APU design.

If operation of an auxiliary power unit (APU) were needed to comply with
the ETOPS requirements, the applicant would have to demonstrate that the
APU has adequate reliability for that operation.  Also, if in-flight
start and run capability is necessary, the APU in-flight operating
envelope would have to extend to the maximum operating altitude of the
airplane or 45,000 feet, whichever is lower

Explanation.

The electrical system reliability standard contained in AC 120-42A
envisions three independent alternating current (AC) electrical
generators.  Besides the two engine driven generators, an auxiliary
power unit (APU) could drive a third generator to meet this standard. 
Auxiliary power units are separately controlled small engines that are
installed on an aircraft to power services when the main aircraft
engines are not running.  Airlines normally use an airplane APU at the
gate to provide electrical power for onboard lighting and an air source
for the air conditioning system between flights.  Besides this normal
function, the FAA may allow an airline to use an APU powered electrical
generator during a revenue flight when a main engine generator is not
working.

The electrical system reliability requirements proposed in this notice
do not specifically require three independent generators except for
airplanes being certified for ETOPS diversion times greater than 180
minutes.  Current two engine aircraft that the FAA has approved for
ETOPS would only be able to comply with the proposed requirement for
electrical system reliability by having three independent generators. 
Other required aircraft system functions also may be powered by an APU. 
Proposed paragraph I(b)(2) of the rule would require that if the
applicant is going to rely on the APU for compliance with the ETOPS
requirements:

(1) The APU has to have adequate reliability; and

(2) If it must be started and run in-flight, the APU must demonstrate
that it has the capability to start and perform its intended function up
to the maximum operating altitude of the airplane, or 45,000 feet,
whichever is lower

The major reason for wanting high altitude APU in-flight start
capability is to avoid having flight level changes that would cause the
flight to have to cross through established flight track systems just to
start the APU.  Also, once the flight leaves the established track
system it can be very difficult, or impossible to re-enter the track
system, reducing the pilot’s flexibility to fly the optimum flight
plan.  Having an in-flight start capability up to 45,000 feet mitigates
these concerns.

“Adequate” reliability consumed much of the Working Group’s
discussion time during development of the rule.  This term can only be
placed in context by understanding the overall electrical and pneumatic
system architecture of the airplane.  For instance, if an applicant has
installed generators with inadequate reliability, their mean time
between failure (MTBF) may require an extremely reliable APU generator
in order to comply with the electrical system reliability objectives of
§ 25.1309.  This would drive the applicant into a significant APU
reliability demonstration program.  The reverse could also be true.  An
electrical system may have generators with an excellent MTBF of 100,000
hours with additional non-APU back-up sources.  In this case, the
“required” reliability of the APU would be less than for current
airplane electrical systems with APU driven generators.  However, the
applicant would have to present a convincing system level reliability
analysis backed by validated component reliability data before the FAA
would accept an assumption of lower APU reliability from that required
for today’s airplanes.

An APU has traditionally been used only to “back-up” the electrical
system, and the proposed new regulatory and advisory material focuses on
this function.  No current aircraft utilizes an APU to provide
“back-up” pneumatic system capability to meet ETOPS significant
system reliability standards.  However, the associated advisory circular
addresses the possible operational need for APU pneumatics on the ground
to power the cabin air conditioning system following an airplane
diversion.  If the APU is necessary as a bleed source to comply with
section 25.1309 or the new section 25.1535, the applicant would have to
define the operating envelope of where it can perform this intended
function.  The FAA requires this for any APU required function under the
existing airworthiness standards of part 25.  Currently most APUs can
only provide both bleed air and electrical power at lower cruise
altitudes, and cannot provide enough bleed air to power an air
conditioning pack at the airplane service ceiling.  The applicant would
have to fully account for the use of a “limited” ETOPS APU operating
envelope in substantiating compliance with section 25.1309 or section
25.1535.  In accounting for a limited APU operating envelope, the
applicant would have to address the operational implications, including
air traffic control, of having to descend to a lower altitude in order
to use the required APU function.

ARAC recommended the following language for paragraph I(b)(2).  “If
operation of the APU installation is required to comply with this
appendix, the applicant must…”  Except for the electrical system,
which has specific requirements in proposed Appendix L, all other
potential airplane system functions that could be powered by an APU are
addressed by the overall ETOPS requirement contained in section
25.1535(a).  Examples include the cabin pressurization and hydraulic
systems, which may be powered by an APU.  The ARAC recommended proposed
rule and preamble states the intent that this requirement should not be
limited to just electrical system reliability.  We have corrected this
oversight by replacing “this appendix” with section 25.1535 in
proposed paragraph I(b)(2).

I(b)(3) Engine oil tank design.

The engine oil filler cap design would have to comply with a proposed
change to section 33.71(c)(4), which will require oil tank cap designs
that prevent hazardous oil loss in the event of an oil tank cap
installation error.

Explanation.

See the proposed change to section 33.71(c)(4) for an explanation of the
reasons for this change.  We added paragraph I(b)(3) to Appendix L to
ensure that engines installed on ETOPS airplanes comply with the part 33
requirement.

I(c) Engine condition monitoring.

The applicant would have to define and validate, as required, an engine
condition monitoring process in accordance with part 33, Appendix A,
paragraph A33.4.

Explanation.

This requirement would codify paragraph a(5) of Appendix A of AC 120-42A
and paragraph (b)(2) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.

With the propulsion system reliabilities existing on today’s long
range airplanes, the FAA is very concerned that the biggest threat to
ETOPS safety is the risk associated with common cause, cascading
failures and fuel exhaustion.  Several of the proposed requirements in
this notice would address these threats.  The engine condition
monitoring process requirement specifically addresses the potential of
additional engine failure or failures resulting from the increased
thrust or service demands on the remaining engine or engines.

Operators would be required, in the proposed changes to parts 121 and
135, to have an engine condition monitoring program as part of their
ETOPS maintenance program.  Paragraph I(c) of Appendix L and paragraph
A33.4 in part 33 would require the airplane and engine manufacturer to
provide the instructions necessary for an operator to develop this
program.

Since the potential for a catastrophic loss of thrust is greater on a
two engine airplane than on airplanes with more than two engines, this
proposed rule would require that the applicant validate the engine
condition monitoring process for use on two engine airplanes before
ETOPS approval.  For airplanes with more than two engines, the applicant
would need only to define the process.

I(d) Configuration, maintenance and procedures.

The applicant would have to identify configuration, maintenance, or
operational standards necessary to maintain appropriate reliability or
to obtain required capability for ETOPS in a Configuration, Maintenance,
and Procedures (CMP) document.

Explanation.

Paragraph I(d) of the proposed rule would codify material AC 120-42A. 
All existing policy on revising CMP documents would remain in force
under the new rule.  This is discussed more fully previously under
general issues in the general discussion of the proposal.

I(e) Airplane flight manual.

This paragraph would specify certain information that the airplane
flight manual (AFM) must contain for ETOPS approval.

Explanation.

This proposed requirement would codify paragraph 8(f)(1) of AC 120-42A. 
ARAC did not include this paragraph in their proposed rule draft. 
However, there are provisions within the AC paragraph that the FAA has
required in all ETOPS type design approvals issued since 1985.  The
ETOPS approval statement contained in AC subparagraph 8(f)(1)(vi) is
particularly important as applicants have based their airplane flight
manual ETOPS approval statements on this wording.  We are proposing to
add the relevant provisions from AC paragraph 8(f)(1) into this notice
in order to maintain continuity with the historical AFM ETOPS
requirements.

The two provisions from AC 120-42A that we are not proposing to
incorporate directly into proposed paragraph I(e) are subparagraphs
8(f)(1)(iii) and (v).  Subparagraph 8(f)(1)(iii) addresses inclusion of
the performance data used to comply with the engine-inoperative
diversion criteria of the flight dispatch considerations in the
operational approval section of the advisory circular.  Contrary to this
advisory circular provision, the FAA has not required that the
performance data be included in the approved parts of the AFM and have
not included this provision in the proposed rule.  Subparagraph
8(f)(1)(v) asks for a description or reference to a document containing
the approved airplane configuration CMP standard.  The CMP document
identification has traditionally been included in the ETOPS approval
statement defined in subparagraph 8(f)(1)(vi) for ETOPS airplanes
approved under the existing policy.  Therefore, we have combined
subparagraphs 8(f)(1)(v) and 8(f)(1)(vi) from the AC into the new
proposed paragraph I(e)(5).

We are also proposing to add the original AFM requirement from the ARAC
proposal into paragraph I(e)(4).  This proposed requirement is not in AC
120-42A.  This proposed paragraph would require the applicant to define
the maximum ETOPS diversion time capability required by paragraph
I(a)(3) into the airplane flight manual in accordance with §
25.1581(a)(2),”Furnishing Information.”  This proposed requirement
provides a cross-reference to proposed paragraph I(a)(3), which would
require that the ETOPS capability defined by most limiting ETOPS
significant system capability be stated in the airplane flight manual.

Section II – Two Engine Airplanes.

In addition to the requirements of section I, an applicant for a two
engine airplane would have to also show compliance with one of three
proposed requirements of section II.

II(a) Service experience method.

The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane and engine
combination for which approval is sought has the required airplane and
propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS mission with the
maximum diversion for which approval is sought, and has achieved
required airframe and propulsion system reliability based upon fleet
in-service experience.

Explanation.

Proposed sub-section II(a) would codify part of the existing approval
process based on service experience, as contained in AC 120-42A for two
engine airplanes.  This includes the most significant aspect of this
process, the propulsion system assessment contained in Appendix 1 of the
advisory circular.  The AC process is predicated on having a sufficient
amount of service experience to give the FAA enough data to assess the
overall suitability of a two-engine airplane for ETOPS approval.

The AC type design assessment criteria are divided into two parts.  The
first part defines specific system design capability and safety
objectives in order to provide a minimum design standard for airplanes
operating in ETOPS.  This part of the AC criteria is addressed in
proposed section 25.1535(a) and (b), and section I of proposed part 25
appendix L.

The second part of the AC process is a review of in-service problems and
identification of appropriate corrective actions to prevent problems
that could have an adverse effect on ETOPS safety.  Part of this review
is to establish that the airplane and propulsion systems have an
appropriate level of reliability to meet the safety objectives defined
in the AC.  Appendix 1 of the AC defines an amount of service experience
that would normally be required in order to give a sufficient database
to evaluate propulsion system reliability.  We are proposing to address
this second part of the AC type design assessment process in sub-section
II(b) of this notice.

II(a)(1) Required service experience.

This paragraph would require that an applicant who desires to obtain
ETOPS type design approval using service experience conduct a
reliability review after accumulating 250,000 worldwide fleet engine
hours on the airplane and engine combination for which approval is being
sought.  The number of hours could be reduced if adequate compensating
factors are identified which give a reasonable equivalent database.  A
significant portion of the 250,000 engine hours would have to be
obtained on the candidate airplane.

Explanation.

Proposed paragraph II(a)(1) would codify the service experience
eligibility criteria from paragraph a(1) of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A.

II(a)(2) Propulsion system assessment.

Paragraph II(a)(2)(i) would require an applicant to conduct a propulsion
system assessment based on data collected from the entire fleet of the
specific airplane and engine combination for which approval is sought. 
Paragraph II(a)(2)(ii) would require an applicant to identify corrective
actions to prevent future occurrences of engine in-flight shutdowns or
loss of thrust control.

Explanation.

Paragraph II(a)(2)(i) would codify the reliability data base criteria
from paragraph b. of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A.  ARAC did not include the
reliability data base criteria in their proposed rule draft, but did
have it in their associated draft advisory material.  In paragraph
10(a)(iii) of the draft part 25 advisory circular, ARAC stated “A
propulsion system assessment must be based on the following data,
collected from the entire fleet of the specific airplane/engine
combination type for which approval is sought...”.  Since ARAC clearly
stated its intent that an applicant “must” conduct a propulsion
system assessment on the specific list that follows, and based on the
clear reference to the existing policy from Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A, we
have incorporated this section from the ARAC draft advisory circular
into proposed paragraph II(a)(2)(i) of this notice.

Paragraph II(a)(2)(ii) would codify the intent of the propulsion system
assessment criteria from paragraph 3 of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A.  This
is the so-called “fix-all-problems” requirement that has been the
practice for all ETOPS type design approvals that the FAA has given
using the service experience approval process defined in AC 120-42A.

The corrective actions that the applicant identifies in compliance with
proposed paragraph II(a)(2) would be included in the approved
configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document as a condition
of the ETOPS approval.

II(a)(3) Airplane systems assessment.

The applicant would have to show compliance with section 25.1535(a)
using available in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant
systems.  The applicant would have to identify corrective actions to
prevent future occurrences of ETOPS significant system failures
occurring in service.

Explanation.

The first part of this paragraph would codify the intent of paragraph
8(c)(1) of AC 120-42A for those ETOPS significant airplane systems
addressed in proposed §25.1535(a).  This AC paragraph states that the
analysis and demonstration of airframe and propulsion system failure
effects and reliability provided by the applicant should be based on
in-service experience and the longest diversion time for the airplane.

The second part of proposed paragraph II(a)(3) is an extension of the
“fix-all-problems” approach used in the propulsion system assessment
that we are proposing in paragraph II(a)(2).  For all airplanes approved
using the policy contained in AC 120-42A, the FAA has required an
applicant to define effective corrective actions for all in-service
problems known to result in, or potentially result in, airplane
diversions.  The FAA has required this in order to enter ETOPS service
with the highest quality airplane.  An applicant rarely considers known
system failure conditions to be acceptable occurrences in service that
they account for in their system failure analyses submitted for
compliance with section 25.1309.  Therefore, this fix all problems
approach is appropriate in reassessing compliance with the applicable
airworthiness requirements of proposed section 25.1535(a).

The corrective actions that the applicant identifies in compliance with
proposed paragraph II(a)(3) would be included in the approved
configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document as a condition
of the ETOPS approval.

II(a)(4) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) rates.

This proposed paragraph defines propulsion system reliability standards
for three levels of ETOPS type design approval.

(i) For operations up to 120 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.05 or
less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with a CMP intended to bring the rate
down to 0.02.

(ii) For operations up to 180 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.02 or
less per 1,000 engine hours with an existing 120 minute CMP standard, or
new or additional CMP requirements that have been demonstrated to
achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.

(iii) For operations greater than 180 minutes: a rate of approximately
0.01 or less per 1,000 engine hours with an existing 120 minute or 180
minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have
been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.

Explanation.

This proposed paragraph would codify the propulsion system reliability
standards from Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A.  In addition, we are proposing
to add the reliability standard of 0.01 per 1,000 engine hours for ETOPS
greater than 180 minutes that ARAC proposed in their recommended draft
ETOPS rule.

The original ARAC recommendation refers to “target threshold” or
“target” rate.  These terms do not adequately define what would
constitute an acceptable or unacceptable in-flight shutdown rate for
showing compliance with this proposed requirement.  The FAA has similar
concerns about the term “approximately” as used in this proposal,
but this term is in the existing AC 120-42A policy and has been applied
successfully since issuance of the AC.  Therefore, the FAA has
tentatively chosen to retain the term “approximately” as used in the
existing AC policy in this proposed rule.

We have added the qualifier “or less” to the proposed in-flight
shutdown rate requirement.  Without this term, the rule could be
interpreted to mean that the in-flight shutdown rate “must” be the
approximate value specified.  We clearly do not intend that an applicant
with an in-flight shutdown rate well below the requirement would not be
in compliance with the rule.  We have added this additional qualifier in
order to clarify this intent.

The original ARAC recommendation for operations up to 120 minutes was
written in the following manner: “with a required list of corrective
actions that would result in continuing improvement toward an IFSD rate
of 0.02 per 1000 fleet engine-hours.”  We have added “in the CMP
document” in order to clarify where the list of corrective actions
must be contained.

For the proposed requirements for both operations up to 180 minutes and
operations greater than 180 minutes we have added a provision that
considers the effect that existing or new CMP standards have on
compliance with the required in-flight shutdown rate.  In the past, we
granted ETOPS approvals using a 180-minute CMP standard developed from
the 120 minute ETOPS CMP documents.  This has occurred when the
applicant has substantiated, through service experience, additional
requirements that would achieve the desired in-flight shutdown rate for
those airplanes incorporating the additional requirements.  The added
provision proposed in this notice is a statement of existing practice
for granting 180-minute ETOPS approval where the 120-minute standard had
to be modified.  This notice proposes to codify this existing practice
into the rule as noted above.

II(a)(5) Airplane flight test requirements.

This paragraph would require a flight test to validate the adequacy of
the airplane’s flying qualities, performance, and the flight crew’s
ability to deal with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system
failure conditions expected to occur in service.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify the intent of paragraph 8(d)(3) of AC
120-42A.  The original ARAC proposed paragraph stated that the proposed
flight test would validate “non-normal worst case probable system
failure conditions.”  This proposed wording would not adequately
reflect how the FAA has applied the AC paragraph being codified.  	The
term “probable” as used in the original ARAC proposal would have a
specific meaning within the type certification community.  As defined by
Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A, probable failures are those anticipated to
occur one or more times during the entire operational life of each
airplane.  Probable failures would most likely only include significant
single failures, or more frequent double failures.  However, we have
required applicants for ETOPS type design approval under AC paragraph
8(d)(3) to demonstrate multiple failure conditions that are much less
frequent in service, such as

(i) the loss of all normal electrical power;

(ii) flight controls powered by an emergency backup hydraulic source;
and

(iii) loss of normal flight instruments.

These types of failure conditions would be expected to occur during the
life of a fleet of airplanes, but not necessarily on each airplane.  We
believe that ARAC may have intended to include these failure conditions
by using the qualifying term “worst case” in their proposal,
however, we are not confident that it would be interpreted correctly
with the wording as ARAC proposed.  We have deleted the word
“probable” and replaced it with system failure conditions
“expected to occur in service” in the proposed rule.  This
clarification more accurately reflects how the FAA has applied the
paragraph 8(d)(3) of AC 120-42A.

II(b) Early ETOPS method.

This part of section II defines requirements that an applicant would
have to comply with to certify an airplane for ETOPS without first
accumulating the service experience that would be required in section
II(a).

Explanation.

This section would codify the early ETOPS process defined in the Boeing
Model 777 ETOPS special conditions 25-ANM-84 for two engine airplanes. 
These special conditions defined requirements that allowed the FAA to
approve the Boeing Model 777 airplane for ETOPS without the service
experience normally expected under the policy in AC 120-42A.  The intent
of this proposed sub-section of Appendix L is to define requirements
that would allow the FAA to grant ETOPS approval concurrent with the
original type certification of an airplane.

II(b)(1) Relevant experience assessment.

The applicant would have to identify specific corrective actions taken
on the airplane design to address relevant design, manufacturing,
operational and maintenance problems experienced on previously certified
part 25 airplanes manufactured by the applicant.  Specific corrective
actions would not be required if the nature of the problem is such that
it would not have a significant impact on the safety or reliability of
the system.  The proposed rule would require that this assessment
include the relevant experience of supplier provided ETOPS Group 1
significant systems and similar or identical equipment utilized on
aircraft built by other manufacturers.

Explanation.

This proposed rule would codify paragraph (c)(2) of the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions 25-ANM-84.  The term “relevant experience”
as used in the proposed rule means the design, manufacturing,
operational or maintenance problems that have, or could have, resulted
in the types of occurrences that would be included in propulsion system
and airplane system assessments conducted in accordance with a service
experience based ETOPS approval process proposed in section II(a).

The intent of this proposed requirement is to take advantage of service
experience on other airplane types built by the applicant as much as is
practical.  This relevant experience assessment is in lieu of service
experience on the actual airplane to be approved and is a major
compensating factor for that direct service experience.

One of the five key elements of the early ETOPS process on the Boeing
Model 777 was the “relevant experience assessment,” or “lessons
learned.”  Simply stated, the intent is for the applicant to review
the failures on previous airplane/engine combinations, and assure that
the causes of those failures are mitigated.  While simple in concept,
the execution of this assessment is significant in scope.  One of the
most significant aspects of this proposed rule is that an applicant with
no previous transport category manufacturing experience would not be
eligible to receive early ETOPS approval.  The FAA considers the
relevant experience assessment as elemental to the early ETOPS process. 
Without the ability to perform this assessment including lessons learned
on manufacturing and engineering processes, the FAA could not
confidently grant an early ETOPS approval.

Beyond a certain level of commonality, past experience may not be
relevant to a new design.  This is particularly true where a specific
design feature that contributed to problems in previous airplanes is not
a part of the new airplane design. However, the demonstration of the
applicability of past experience to the new design is inherent in the
relevant experience assessment.

This proposed rule would require that the applicant identify corrective
actions taken to preclude similar problems from occurring on the new
airplane.  Removal from the design of a system, sub-system, or component
that has had problems in the past may be an acceptable corrective
action, as long as it precludes similar problems from occurring.

Where new technology is introduced, the lessons learned assessment
becomes impractical, as there is no previous experience with this
technology.  While this is true, there may still be applicable relevant
experience.  For example, an applicant's previous experience with new
technology introductions may lead to changes in manufacturing and
quality control processes.  Further, lessons learned of general
applicability can be introduced into the new technology design, such as
a general design practice to prevent cross-connector installation.

II(b)(2) Propulsion system design.

II(b)(2)(i) Engine ETOPS eligibility.

This paragraph would require that the engines to be installed on the
airplane be approved for ETOPS eligibility in accordance with proposed
new section 33.200.

Explanation.

Proposed new section33.200 would require that an engine intended for a
two engine ETOPS airplane that does not have the service experience
required by part 25, section II(a), would have to comply with certain
requirements.  The ARAC proposed rule draft did not specifically state
that the engines installed in an early ETOPS airplane must be certified
in accordance with section 33.200.  We have corrected that oversight in
this notice.

We intend that section II(b) of this notice apply to all new airplanes
and engines.  We have considered the possibility that an applicant may
install an already certified engine with existing service experience
onto a new airplane.  In this case, the combined service experience and
early ETOPS approval method of proposed section II(c) would provide a
way of certifying this type of mixed configuration.

II(b)(2)(ii) Design to preclude in-flight shutdowns.

The applicant would have to design the propulsion system to preclude
failures and malfunctions that could result in an engine in-flight
shutdown.  In addition, the applicant would have to substantiate
compliance with this requirement by analysis, test, in-service
experience on other airplanes, or other means that the propulsion system
will minimize failures and malfunctions with the objective of achieving
the following in-flight shutdown rates:

(i) 0.02 or less per 1,000 engine fleet hours for 180 minute ETOPS or
less

(ii) 0.01 or less per 1,000 engine fleet hours for ETOPS beyond 180
minutes

Explanation.

ARAC provided the following justification for this proposed rule.
“This rule section requires that the propulsion system be designed to
preclude failures and malfunctions that could result in an engine
in-flight shutdown.  Propulsion systems on previous airplanes were
designed and certified to be "fail-safe," in compliance with section
25.901 of part 25; in other words, any single failure, or probable
combination of failures, would not jeopardize continued safe flight and
landing of the airplane.  Because safe flight following an engine
shutdown is required by part 25, preventing engine in-flight shutdowns
has not been a major design objective on some previous airplane designs.
 The additional design requirement in this section to preclude failures
and malfunctions that could result in an engine in-flight shutdown has
an enormous effect on propulsion system reliability in that normal
design decisions must now consider whether a failure or malfunction
might result in an engine in-flight shutdown.  The method of compliance
to this section may vary from applicant to applicant, but the intent
remains -- all design features of the propulsion system must preclude
shutdowns or power losses.  This intent is also captured in the proposed
part 33 rule.”

We agree with the justification that ARAC provided.  The “design to
preclude failures and malfunctions that could result in an engine
in-flight shutdown” is one of the most important features of the early
ETOPS special conditions that we required for the Boeing Model 777
airplane.  The FAA had a similar justification for this requirement in
the preamble to those special conditions.  However, the proposed rule
that ARAC recommended did not clearly state this intent.  We have
modified the original ARAC proposal to clarify this stated ARAC intent
and bring the proposed rule in line with the existing Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions.

ARAC did not provide a specific justification for the proposed in-flight
shutdown rate analysis requirement.  Boeing has submitted such an
analysis under compliance with paragraph (c)(5) of the ETOPS special
conditions for the Model 777 airplane.  Paragraph (c)(5) of those
special conditions requires the applicant to define specific new
analyses that will be used to assure engine and airplane system design
integrity.  The addition of a predicted in-flight shutdown rate analysis
into this proposed rule would codify this method of compliance with the
Boeing ETOPS special conditions.

Since in-service experience does not exist on a new airplane, we have
also changed the ARAC proposed rule language for the in-flight shutdown
rate analysis to clarify that the in-service experience to be considered
in this analysis would be from other airplanes. Applicable service
experience would include the same basic engine design or other
propulsion system components on other airplanes manufactured by the
applicant, or by other manufacturers if the applicant has access to that
data and can substantiate its applicability to the new airplane design.

II(b)(3) Maintenance and operational procedures.

The applicant would have to validate all ETOPS significant systems
maintenance and operational procedures. Any problems found would have to
be tracked and resolved through the problem tracking system and
resolution system proposed in paragraph (II)(b)(8).

Explanation.

This proposed rule would codify the intent of paragraph (d)(2) of the
Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.  The special conditions
paragraph requires the applicant to have a program to systematically
detect and correct problems occurring as a result of improper execution
of maintenance and flight operations.  Boeing has complied with this
requirement by validating maintenance and operational procedures
important to the safety of ETOPS operations.  This proposed rule would
codify this method of compliance.

Human error continues to be a major cause of engine in-flight shutdowns
and forced airplane diversions.  The proposed maintenance validation
requirement, combined with the proposed requirement to operate and
maintain the test airplane during the airplane demonstrate test in
paragraph II(b)(7) using the recommended operations and maintenance
manual procedures, are part of the FAA’s overall regulatory objective
to minimize human errors in the ETOPS rule.  The FAA intends that the
proposed ETOPS type design requirements would result in an airplane
entering service with validated maintenance and operational procedures
that minimize the possibility of human error in ETOPS operations.

II(b)(4) Propulsion system validation test.

This paragraph would require the applicant for an early ETOPS airplane
to comply with the 3,000-cycle engine test in the proposed new
§33.200(c) with the installed engine configuration.  The test engine
would have to be configured with a complete airplane nacelle package,
including engine-mounted equipment except for any configuration
differences necessary to accommodate test stand interfaces with the
engine nacelle package.  At the conclusion of the test, the test
hardware would have to be:

(i) visually inspected in according to the applicant’s on-wing
inspection recommendations and limits; and

(ii) completely disassembled and inspected in accordance with the
service limits submitted in compliance with §25.1529.

Explanation.

Proposed paragraph II(b)(4) would codify paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(6) of
the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions for the airplane
propulsion system installation.  These special conditions paragraphs
require vibration testing and a 3,000-cycle engine demonstration test on
the installed engine configuration.  The proposed §33.200(c) would
combine these two special conditions test requirements into one test
based on how Boeing complied with these paragraphs for the Model 777
airplane.

The original ARAC recommended rule draft proposed the following wording
for the first sentence of this paragraph: “The propulsion system for
which approval is being sought…” The FAA defines the airplane
propulsion system based on the definition of the powerplant installation
contained in § 25.901(a), which states:

“For the purpose of this part, the airplane powerplant installation
includes each component that—

(1) Is necessary for propulsion;

(2) Affects the control of the major propulsive units; or

(3) Affects the safety of the major propulsive units between normal
inspections or overhauls.”

The components and systems covered by the overall definition of
“propulsion system” include the fuel system and the engine and fuel
system flight deck controls.  We do not intend that the proposed
propulsion system validation test in paragraph II(b)(4) would include
any propulsion system components outside of the airplane nacelle
package.  We have made two changes to the original ARAC wording in order
to clarify the intended test configuration.  We have replaced
“propulsion system” with “installed engine configuration” in the
first sentence.  We have changed the second sentence to clarify that the
test engine must be configured with a complete airplane nacelle package,
including engine-mounted equipment except for any configuration
differences necessary to accommodate test stand interfaces with the
engine nacelle package.  These proposed changes are consistent with a
recent revision of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.

The Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions did not originally require
a post-test teardown inspection.  However, all three-engine companies,
in cooperation with Boeing, conducted post-test teardown inspections on
the original baseline engines installed on the Model 777 series
airplanes based on their own experience of what would constitute an
adequate evaluation.

The FAA reviewed the data from the 3,000-cycle tests for the three
original engine types installed on the Model 777 and found that most of
the early in-service 777 engine failure modes could have been discovered
with additional inspection and analysis of the 3,000-cycle test engine
and propulsion system hardware.  Part conditions noted in the teardown
inspection reports for the three baseline 777 engine types did later
occur in service, and they resulted in engine in-flight shutdowns or
airplane diversions.  

In order to provide a consistent standard for a post-test evaluation of
the 3,000-cycle test hardware, the FAA is proposing an enhanced
3,000-cycle test requirement in proposed paragraph II(b)(4) of Appendix
L and § 33.200(c).  The standard would require a complete teardown
inspection of the engine and airplane nacelle test hardware after
completion of the test.  The FAA intends that the enhanced teardown
inspection requirement for the 3,000-cycle test hardware would catch
potential sources of engine in-flight shutdowns or diversions.

An enhanced post-test teardown inspection requirement is part of a
revision to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions that the FAA
developed for the Model 777-300ER program.  The ARAC ETOPS Working Group
had knowledge of our intent to revise the Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions in this manner as they developed their recommendations.

Even though paragraphs II(b)(4) and § 33.200(c) address the same
proposed post-test teardown inspection requirement, the wording for the
requirement in paragraph II(b)(4) is different from that in §
33.200(c).  The FAA considers that the intent of the proposed post-test
teardown and inspection requirement in parts 25 and 33 to be identical. 
However, the specific language used in each part is tailored to the
unique aspects of the engine and airplane type certification processes
used to show compliance with this requirement.

See the discussion for the proposed new § 33.200(c) for a complete
explanation of the proposed 3,000-cycle engine test requirement.

Proposed paragraph II(b)(4) is largely a “pointer” to the proposed
requirements to perform an engine cyclic endurance test in part 33.  The
purpose of this paragraph in the rule is to assure that the entire
installed engine configuration (engine accessories, nacelle, thrust
reverser, etc.) is installed on the test vehicle during the part 33
testing.  Since the proposed part 33 requirement only covers the engine
type design, this proposed rule is necessary.

II(b)(5) New technology demonstration testing.

The applicant would have to conduct testing to demonstrate the
suitability of any technology new to the applicant.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify paragraph (e)(4) of the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions.  The ARAC left this requirement from the
special conditions out of its recommended rule proposal, even though the
associated part 25 draft advisory circular provided with their
recommendation refers to this as a requirement.  We propose to add the
new technology demonstration testing requirement to the notice for
completeness.

II(b)(6) APU Validation Test.

This paragraph would require an applicant to complete a test consisting
of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles on an auxiliary power
unit that the applicant uses to comply with the electrical power supply
system requirements of paragraph I(a)(2) of this proposed appendix.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify paragraph (e)(5) of the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions.

As we stated in the section on APU design for proposed paragraph
I(b)(2), current twin engine airplanes approved for ETOPS only comply
with the proposed requirement for electrical system reliability
contained in this notice by having three independent electrical
generators.  On these airplanes, the third independent electrical
generator is normally powered by an auxiliary power unit.  To assure
that an APU would have the proper reliability at entry into service, the
proposed rule would require the applicant to conduct an APU endurance
test in a similar manner to that proposed in paragraph II(b)(4) for the
main engines.  The phrase “equivalent airplane operational cycles”
requires the applicant to test the APU in an environment that the APU
would be operating in an airline ETOPS operation. In most cases this
would include starting and operating the APU in extremely cold
temperatures representative of high altitude operation or ground
operations in extremely cold climates. This would also include operation
in high temperature environments, and with simulated pneumatic and
electrical loads.  Further amplification of the interpretation of
“equivalent airplane operational cycles” is found in the draft part
25 advisory circular.

II(b)(7) Airplane demonstration Test.

This paragraph would require the applicant to conduct an airplane flight
test to demonstrate that the airplane, its components and equipment are
capable of and function properly during ETOPS and ETOPS diversions. This
flight test may be coordinated with, but would not be in place of the
function and reliability flight testing required for compliance with §
21.35(b)(2).

The proposed requirement includes several conditions that the applicant
would have to comply with in conducting this test.  Among these are 

(1) The flight test program would have to include:

(i) flights simulating actual ETOPS operation;

(ii) demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversions;

(iii) maximum time engine inoperative diversions;

(iv) non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplanes capability to
safely; conduct an ETOPS diversion,

(v) diversions into representative operational diversionary airports;
and

(vi) repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.

(2) The flight testing would have to validate the adequacy of the
airplane’s flying qualities, performance and the flight crew’s
ability to deal with adverse operating conditions.

(3) The engine-inoperative diversions would have to be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant’s flight test
program.

(4) The test airplane would have to be operated and maintained using the
recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures during the
test.

(5) At the completion of the test, the ETOPS Group 1 significant systems
would have to undergo an airplane visual inspection and the engines
would have to also undergo an internal gas path inspection.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify the airplane demonstration test requirement
of paragraph (e)(7) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions. 
The original version of the special conditions effective July 1, 1994
required the applicant to fly one complete airplane for at least 1,000
flight-cycles simulating an actual airline operation.

The FAA developed the 1,000-cycle airplane demonstration test
requirement with the intent of exposing the candidate airplane to the
conditions where the greatest numbers of in-flight shutdowns occur. 
Most in-flight shutdowns occur during takeoff and climb.  Failures that
tend to occur only during certain portions of a flight are known as
“cyclic” failures.  An example of a cyclic failure would be a tire
failure where exposure to the high tire speeds that could lead to a tire
failure would only occur during takeoff or landing.  These are in
contrast to failures that are more likely to occur as components age,
which are known as “hourly” failures.  An example of an hourly
failure is an electric cooling fan failure where the fan runs
continuously to cool electronic components.

The failure modes associated with takeoff- and climb-related in-flight
shutdowns tend to be cyclic in nature for a couple of reasons.  In cases
where the loads and stresses on engine or airplane hardware increase as
engine power or thrust increases, the takeoff portion of the flight is
most critical.  Failure modes that occur due to improper maintenance or
engine servicing, for instance loss of engine oil due to improper
assembly of an oil tube connection, also tend to occur early in the
flight.  A larger number of airplane flights increases the exposure to
these types of failures.  Therefore, the FAA considered a cyclic type of
test to be the most appropriate airplane validation test for the
original 777 ETOPS special conditions.

Although the fewest in-flight shutdowns occur during cruise, this is the
phase of flight that is most important to an ETOPS operation. 
Traditionally, the FAA and industry have avoided trying to differentiate
between those in-flight shutdowns that may occur during cruise from
those that would only occur in a non-ETOPS environment.  The main reason
for this approach in existing ETOPS policy is that by correcting all
causes of in-flight shutdowns, we gain confidence in the overall
integrity of the propulsion system design.  Since an enhanced
3,000-cycle engine demonstration test proposed for paragraph II(b)(4) of
Appendix L and §33.200(c) would provide adequate cyclic exposure, the
FAA has concluded that the airplane validation program should emphasize
exposure to the cruise phase of flight.

During the three 1,000-cycle tests conducted for the original 777 engine
installation certification programs, only 91 of the total 1,000 cycles
were of durations of two hours or more.  Since we intend for the
airplane demonstration test to simulate an actual airline operation,
this would better be accomplished through longer duration flight cycles.
 Long duration flight exposure provides additional confidence that the
design accounts for cruise-related failure modes that cannot be
evaluated in a cyclic test environment.  Such failure modes could
include freezing of entrapped water condensation or binding of
propulsion system components, neither of which would likely occur in a
sea level test facility.

Based on these considerations, the FAA has determined that the airplane
demonstration test requirement should be refocused on those conditions
that are most prevalent in an ETOPS operating environment.  Those
conditions include long flights to a variety of airports with broad
variations of airport elevation, temperature, and humidity.  It is also
important that these flights expose the airplane to several enroute
climbs, such as may occur with a fully loaded 777-300ER on a long-range
flight, and a number of engine-inoperative diversions.  As such, the FAA
proposes that the specific test conditions described in the
sub-paragraphs to proposed paragraph II(b)(7) more clearly state the
objectives of the test program.  Those objectives include demonstrations
that the aircraft, its components, and equipment are capable of and
function properly during long-range operations and airplane diversions,
including engine-inoperative diversions.

This change in focus constitutes a significant departure from the
original purpose of the 1,000-cycle airplane demonstration test
requirement discussed in the preamble to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS
special conditions.  However, the proposed changes to the 3,000 cycle
test requirement and the airplane demonstration test that we propose for
this rule would provide an overall better evaluation of a new airplane
design for ETOPS approval.

The original ARAC proposal recommended the following wording for
paragraph II(b)(7)(i)(4): “Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the
airplane’s capability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst
case probable system failure conditions.”  This is similar language
for a flight test demonstration of non-normal operating conditions to
Section III – Airplanes with more than two engines that proposed for
paragraph II(a)(5).  For similar reasons to those in the explanation for
paragraph II(a)(5), we have deleted the word “probable” in proposed
paragraph II(b)(7)(i)(4) and replaced it with system failure conditions
“expected to occur in service” in the proposed rule.

Human error continues to be a major cause of engine in-flight shutdowns
and forced airplane diversions.  The proposed requirement in paragraph
II(b)(7)(iv) to operate and maintain the test airplane using the
recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures, combined with
the proposed maintenance validation requirement in paragraph II(b)(3),
are part of the FAA’s overall regulatory objective to minimize human
errors in the ETOPS rule.  The FAA intends that the proposed ETOPS type
design requirements would result in an airplane entering service with
validated maintenance and operational procedures that minimize the
possibility of human error in ETOPS operations.

During the certification of the B777 for early ETOPS, the special
conditions required that the airplane demonstration test be conducted
using the airline maintenance and operations manuals.  The purpose of
this requirement was three-fold:  1) to assure that the airplane test
was as close to an airline simulation as possible, 2) to assure that the
maintenance and operations products were mature at entry into service,
and 3) to assure that no maintenance or operations procedures would
erroneously contribute to system failures.

In developing their draft rule, the ARAC ETOPS Working Group fully
concurred with the proposed requirement to assure maintenance and
operational product maturity at entry into service.  However, the
working group also recognized that validation of these products could be
accomplished in different fashions.  Nonetheless, ARAC noted that the
proposed associated advisory circular (AC) recommends that the
maintenance manual should be used for all testing necessary for ETOPS
validation (component, engine and airplane).  Tasks such as LRU
replacement, testing following removal/replacement of parts, etc., must
be validated per the requirements of the rule.  The proposed AC does
provide amplification, however, on what maintenance manual sections
should be validated, namely only those sections pertinent to Groups 1
and 2 ETOPS significant systems.  For instance, while validation of a
landing gear maintenance task may be prudent for product readiness, the
landing gear is not considered ETOPS critical, and therefore validation
of related maintenance procedures would not be required.

As we said in the discussion for the proposed 3,000 cycle test
requirement in paragraph II(b)(4), the FAA has concluded from a review
of in-service experience of the Model 777 series airplanes that the
3,000-cycle engine and propulsion system test in proposed paragraph
II(b)(4) of Appendix L and § 33.200(c) provides an adequate opportunity
to discover cyclic-related failure modes associated with the design,
provided that the engine and airplane manufacturers conduct an adequate
post-test evaluation.  For similar reasons, proposed subparagraph
II(b)(7)(v) would require a post-test external and internal visual
inspection of the airplane demonstration test engines and propulsion
system hardware.  The applicant would have to identify, track and
resolve any abnormal conditions found during these inspections in
accordance with the provisions of the proposed problem tracking and
resolution system requirement of paragraph II(b)(8).

The proposed paragraph II(b)(7)(v) would require the manufacturer to
visually inspect the airplane ETOPS significant systems per the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of section 25.1529 following
the airplane demonstration test.  The stated objective for this
inspection in the proposed rule is to identify any abnormal conditions
that could result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.  We have
proposed this paragraph as ARAC recommended.  However, many of the
airplane ETOPS significant systems have components that are not amenable
to visual inspection.  An example is an electronic controller for
airplane electrical load management.  We request comments on this
specific aspect of the proposed rule.  If a visual inspection alone is
not a sufficient post-test inspection requirement, what additional
post-test inspections or tests should be incorporated into the final
rule?  If certain ETOPS significant systems should not be covered by
this post-test inspection requirement, then what should be the criteria
in the final rule for their exclusion?  We invite commenters to respond
to other commenters’ suggestions because the FAA may select one or
more commenter recommended approaches for the final rule.

The FAA proposed a change to the airplane demonstration flight test
requirement in a revision to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions for the Model 777-300ER type certification program.  The ARAC
ETOPS Working Group had knowledge of our intent to revise the Model 777
ETOPS special conditions in this manner as they developed their
recommendations.  We have provided a more detailed justification of the
airplane demonstration test requirement changes proposed in this notice
in the preamble for that special conditions revision.

II(b)(8) Problem tracking and resolution system.

This paragraph would require the applicant to establish a problem
tracking and resolution system to address problems, as identified in
proposed 21.4(a)(5), encountered on ETOPS significant systems during
airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations.

Explanation.  This paragraph would codify the problem tracking system
requirements of paragraph (f) from the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions.

The special conditions problem tracking system requirement is divided
into two parts:  the problem tracking/reporting required during type
certification testing, and that required during the “early ETOPS”
period of the first 250,000 hours of operation after the airplane enters
service.  The proposed paragraph II(b)(8) addresses the first part of
the special conditions requirement.  The second part is captured in the
proposed new §21.4(a).

The original ARAC recommendation would have required the problem
tracking and resolution system to address “relevant” problems
encountered.  The term “relevant” is subjective and may result in
inconsistent application of the proposed rule.  Furthermore, we have
identified the types of problems that must be reported in the post type
certification period in proposed new § 21.4(a)(5).  In order to assure
consistency with the companion post type certification problem reporting
requirement contained in proposed § 21.4(a), we have replaced the term
“relevant” with the phrase “as identified in § 21.4(a)(5)”.

In evaluating the importance of this proposed rule, the FAA has reviewed
the experience on the first early ETOPS airplane.  The FAA approved the
Model 777-200 powered by Pratt & Whitney PW4077 engines for ETOPS on May
30, 1995 and the airplane entered airline service in June 1995.  By all
accounts, it was a very successful new model introduction.  This was
followed by the FAA ETOPS approval of the Model 777-200 powered by
General Electric GE90-77B and Rolls-Royce RB211-Trent 877-17 engines in
October 1996.  Based on data supplied by Boeing, the in-flight shutdown
(IFSD) rate for all three-engine types was zero for at least the first
year in service.  The Pratt & Whitney PW4000 reached a peak 12-month
rolling average IFSD rate of 0.018/1,000 hours in October 1996.  The
General Electric GE90 reached a peak of 0.021 for one month in July 1998
and the Rolls-Royce Trent reached a peak of 0.016 in December 1997.

Although the in-flight shutdown rates stayed within the allowable
0.02/1,000 hour standard for 180 minute ETOPS, Boeing and the engine
manufacturers reported to the FAA new design problems that they
discovered on each engine type after ETOPS approval.  The FAA was
concerned that the design problems being discovered may have been an
indication of a failure of the early ETOPS process to identify these
failure modes before they occurred in service.  Some failure modes had
the potential of resulting in in-flight shutdowns had they occurred
under different circumstances or they had not been detected during
maintenance for unassociated reasons.  Had every one of these events
resulted in an engine in-flight shutdown, the resulting IFSD rates for
each engine type would have been significantly higher.  However, Boeing,
the engine manufacturers, the FAA, the airlines, and other regulatory
authorities worked together to prevent in-flight occurrences of these
failure types.

The FAA did not expect that the early ETOPS process would eliminate ALL
failures.  That is why the FAA required a problem tracking system in the
Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.  The actual in-flight shutdown rates
prove that Boeing and the engine manufacturers successfully managed
these early in-service problems to maintain the safety of B777 ETOPS
operations worldwide.  A robust problem tracking, reporting, and
resolution process was key to the continued safe operation of the Boeing
Model 777 and will be an essential component of future early ETOPS
programs.  The proposed problem reporting and resolution requirements in
paragraph II(b)(8) and new §21.4(a) are important to the continued
success of airplanes approved for ETOPS using the early ETOPS process
proposed in this notice.

II(b)(9) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.

The applicant would have to show that the type and frequency of failures
that occur during the airplane flight test program and the airplane
demonstration test proposed by paragraph II(b)(7), are consistent with
the type and frequency of failures or malfunctions that would be
expected to occur on currently certified ETOPS airplanes.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify paragraph (h)(1) of the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions.  This proposed paragraph is the so-called
“type and frequency” requirement that is the final indicator of
ETOPS suitability in the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.

The FAA’s intent for the type and frequency requirement is that it
would provide an objective standard that we could use to assess an
airplane’s suitability for ETOPS.  Significant propulsion system
failures occurring during type certification testing, including the
additional ETOPS testing that would be required in section II of
proposed Appendix L, are an indicator that an airplane may not yet be
ready to enter ETOPS service.  Our intent is that the proposed type and
frequency requirement would identify when an airplane is not suitable
based on available test data.

We did not intend that the proposed type and frequency requirement would
provide a meaningful measurement of reliability.  It is not possible to
measure system reliability with any degree of statistical confidence
with the limited amount of test experience obtained during a reasonable
type certification program.

A lack of significant failures during type certification testing does
not assure an ETOPS-suitable design at entry into service.  It is for
this reason that the proposed problem tracking system requirement
exists.  As we said in the explanation for proposed paragraph II(b)(8),
the FAA concludes from the Boeing Model 777 experience that a
manufacturer can successfully manage early in-service problems to
maintain the safety of worldwide ETOPS operations during the initial
introductory service period with the data provided by the enhanced
problem tracking system that would be required by proposed in paragraph
II(b)(8).

The combination of these two proposed requirements form the key supports
of the early ETOPS safety standard for two-engine airplanes proposed in
this notice.  The proposed type and frequency requirement gives the
basis for denying ETOPS approval for airplanes with known significant
design problems.  The proposed problem tracking and resolution system
gives the FAA confidence that we have the means to safely manage a fleet
of airplanes and engines that do not experience significant problems
until after ETOPS approval.

The original ARAC proposed wording for paragraph II(b)(9) referred to
failures that occur during the “airplane and engine validation
programs.”  This wording is inconsistent with the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions, which refers to failures that occur during
“the airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration
test.”  Nowhere does the proposed rule use the term “validation
program.”   We think that the special conditions wording more
accurately describes what testing is covered by this proposed
requirement and have changed the proposal accordingly.

The ARAC draft had an additional qualifying phrase on the airplane
models that the candidate airplane’s failures and malfunctions would
be compared to.  In addition to “presently certified ETOPS
airplanes,” the ARAC draft added the phrase “or any non-ETOPS
derivative models of those aircraft or engines.”  This added phrase is
not in the existing Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.  We are
proposing that the proposed type and frequency requirement for two
engine airplanes include a comparison with an existing fleet of ETOPS
approved airplanes that are currently operating at a stable level of
reliability in ETOPS service.  It would not be appropriate to make this
comparison with a non-ETOPS approved fleet.  The FAA does not require
the operators of non-ETOPS fleets to maintain a level of reliability
consistent with the ETOPS standard for two-engine airplanes.

We speculate that the ARAC may have intended that the added phrase “or
any non-ETOPS derivative models of those aircraft or engines” would
address a manufacturer that initially would have no previously approved
ETOPS airplanes in service from which to base a type and frequency
comparison.  The proposed rule would not specifically require that the
comparison be with currently certified ETOPS airplanes by that
manufacturer.  If an applicant does not currently have an existing ETOPS
approved airplane in service from which to base a type and frequency
comparison, the proposed rule would allow the manufacturer to use
available data for ETOPS approved airplanes of other manufacturers.  It
is not necessary that the applicant use a single existing airplane model
in the comparison that would be required by proposed paragraph II(b)(9).
 We have not included this phrase in proposed paragraph II(b)(9).

In finding compliance with the proposed type and frequency requirement,
we would be looking at the significance of the problems that occur
during the type certification testing and whether or not they would
require a design change prior to type certification of the airplane. 
Manufacturers continually make improvements to enhance their designs
based on in-service experience.  These design improvements may eliminate
nuisance problems that are not, in themselves, safety related.  In
addition, certain failures that occur in service are expected during the
life of the product at a known low rate of occurrence and are not
indicative of a significant design shortcoming.  We could find
compliance with the proposed reliability demonstration acceptance
criteria even though we might expect that these types of failures or
problems occurring during airplane flight testing could also occur on a
mature ETOPS fleet.

In contrast, the types of failures or problems that would give the FAA
concern about compliance with the proposed reliability demonstration
acceptance criteria would fall into two categories:

(1) A major failure that would require a significant redesign before the
airplane could receive a basic part 25 type certificate.  In other
words, a problem that makes the airplane unsafe without a significant
redesign and testing.

(2) Random ETOPS significant failures occurring during the test program
at a frequency greater than would be expected on a mature ETOPS fleet. 
ETOPS significant failures would be those that result in the events
listed in proposed § 21.4(a)(5).

II(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.

This proposed paragraph would allow an applicant to combine certain
elements of the early ETOPS process proposed in section II(b) with a
reduced amount of service experience from what would be required by
paragraph II(a)(1) to obtain ETOPS approval.

Explanation.

The early ETOPS process proposed in section II(b) of Appendix L would
define requirements for obtaining ETOPS type design approval without the
service experience that would be required by section II(a).  Proposed
sub-section II(c) would define requirements for obtaining ETOPS approval
with a combination of service experience and elements of the early ETOPS
process.

The FAA has accepted, in principle, the concept of trading a limited
amount of service experience for the airplane demonstration test
requirements contained in the 777 early ETOPS special conditions.  The
FAA did this based on a concept already contained in Advisory Circular
120-42A, which allows a reduction in the normal amount of service
experience if “adequate compensating factors exist which give a
reasonable equivalent database.”  The FAA considers that elements of
the early ETOPS process may be used to provide “adequate compensating
factors.”  Since the 777 early ETOPS process provides a method for
obtaining ETOPS approval without any service experience, a minimum
amount of actual service experience would provide an adequate evaluation
of if the applicant complies with the other elements of the early ETOPS
process.

Proposed section II(c) would codify this concept into the ETOPS rule. 
The proposed rule would allow two methods of reduced service experience
in place of the complete early ETOPS process contained in section II(b).
 Paragraph II(c)(1) would specifically require only 15,000 engine hours
of service experience if the applicant complies with the following
elements of sections II(a) and (b):

(a)(5)  Airplane flight test requirements

(b)(1)  Relevant experience assessment,

(b)(2)  Propulsion system design,

(b)(3)  Maintenance and operational procedures,

(b)(4)  Propulsion system validation test,

(b)(5)  New technology demonstration testing

(b)(6)  APU validation test, 

(b)(8)  Problem tracking and resolution system, and

(b)(9)  Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria

In addition to the airplane flight test requirement from the service
experience method, paragraph II(a)(5), these are all of the elements of
the early ETOPS process except for the airplane demonstration test in
proposed paragraph II(b)(7).  We have added three paragraphs to the
original ARAC proposal.  The first is the airplane flight test
requirement from the service experience method, paragraph II(a)(5). 
Without some required airplane flight-testing, the ARAC proposal would
not result in an equivalent demonstration of a capability to safely
operate in an ETOPS environment.  Paragraph II(a)(5) would require an
applicant for ETOPS approval based on service experience to conduct a
flight test to validate the adequacy of the airplane’s flying
qualities, performance and the flight crew’s ability to deal with
engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system failure conditions
expected to occur in service.  The FAA considers that an applicant who
does not complete the airplane demonstration flight test requirement in
accordance with proposed paragraph II(b)(7) as part of a combined ETOPS
approval method must as a minimum complete the flight testing that would
be required if the applicant were using service experience only.

The second is proposed paragraph (b)(5), new technology testing.  We
have added the new technology testing requirement here and in section
III because we could find no valid reason to exclude it when every other
requirement of proposed early ETOPS section is included except for the
airplane demonstration test requirement.  Since ARAC overlooked the new
technology testing requirement in their original proposal as discussed
above for proposed paragraph II(b)(5), we assume that it would have been
included in proposed paragraph II(c)(a) had they not overlooked it.

The third paragraph we have added is the reliability demonstration
acceptance criteria in proposed paragraph II(b)(9).  In section II(a)
for a service experience based approval, in-flight shutdown rate
provides the FAA with a reliability objective to assess a design’s
suitability.  In the early ETOPS method proposed in section II(b), the
reliability demonstration acceptance criteria provides a way to compare
the airplane flight test history to existing ETOPS approved airplanes as
a way to assess design suitability.  Without some defined criteria for
assessing the suitability of a design for ETOPS approval, we would have
no way of determining if a candidate airplane were acceptable when an
applicant chooses to use the combined approach.  Therefore, we have
added the reliability demonstration acceptance criteria requirement to
proposed paragraph II(c)(1).  Since we consider this to be a significant
departure from ARAC’s original recommendation and ARAC did not clearly
state their intent for this section, we request specific comments on
this particular proposal.

The second method for reduced service experience proposed in paragraph
II(c)(2) would allow some level of service experience other than 15,000
engine hours, provided the applicant defines compensating factors that
provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided using any of the
other methods.  This method would allow an applicant some latitude to
create an ETOPS approval program tailored to the unique aspects of the
airplane model.

Section III – Airplanes with more than two engines.

In addition to the requirements of section I, an applicant for an
airplane with more than two engines would have to show compliance with
the proposed requirements of section III.

Explanation.

This section of Appendix L would define those specific requirements that
would be applicable to airplanes with more than two engines.  In order
to achieve an equivalent risk of a critical loss of thrust during an
ETOPS flight due to independent failure causes, the in-flight shutdown
rate for twins needs to be ten times lower than four engine airplanes
and 20 times lower than three engine airplanes to achieve an equivalent
level of safety for ETOPS.  For maximum diversion times greater than 180
minutes, the proposed standard for two engine airplanes is 0.01
shutdowns per 1,000 engine-hours.  The associated in-flight shutdown
rate to achieve the same level of safety would be 0.2 for three engine
airplanes and 0.1 for four engine airplanes.  These levels of
reliability are inherent in current generation turbine engines without
the need for specific propulsion system requirements beyond those now in
parts 33 and 25.   The FAA is concerned that we may inadvertently
encourage a lower standard than is already normally achieved by
specifying these high in-flight shutdown rates in the proposed rule for
three and four engine airplanes.  Therefore, we have not included any of
the proposed propulsion system requirements that would be applicable to
two engine airplanes into proposed Appendix L, section III.

What remains for section III are the proposed airplane level system
requirements from section II including a flight test demonstration of
airplane and propulsion system capability during a maximum ETOPS
diversion.  Since we are equally concerned about human error caused
critical multiple failures for airplanes with more than two engines as
we are for twins, we are also proposing a maintenance and operational
procedure validation requirement in section III.  Except as noted, the
explanation for each of the proposed paragraphs in section III is the
same as for section II.

III(a) Service experience method.

The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane and engine
combination for which approval is sought has the required airplane and
propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS mission and
maximum diversion and has achieved required airplane system reliability
based upon fleet in-service experience.

Explanation.

This proposed requirement is the same as in section II with the
exception that “propulsion system” has been removed from the last
phrase of the proposed requirement.  Otherwise, the explanation is the
same as for paragraph II(a).

III(a)(1) Required service experience.

This paragraph would require that an applicant who desires to obtain
ETOPS type design approval using service experience conduct a
reliability review after accumulating 250,000 worldwide fleet engine
hours on the airplane and engine combination for which approval is being
sought.  The number of hours would be allowed to be reduced if adequate
compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable equivalent
database.  A significant portion of the 250,000 engine hours would have
to be obtained on the candidate airplane.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(a)(1).

III(a)(2) Airplane systems assessment.

The applicant would have to show compliance with section 25.1535(a)
using available in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant
systems.  The applicant would have to identify corrective actions for
all causes or potential causes of ETOPS significant system failures
occurring in service that are shown to be effective in preventing future
occurrences.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(a)(3).

III(a)(3) Airplane flight test requirements.

This paragraph would require a flight test to validate the adequacy of
the airplane’s flying qualities, performance and the flight crew’s
ability to deal with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system
failure conditions expected to occur in service.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(a)(5).

III(b) Early ETOPS method.

This part of section II defines requirements that an applicant would
have to comply with to certify an airplane for ETOPS without first
accumulating the service experience that would be required in section
III(a).

Explanation.

Proposed section III(b) is the same as proposed section II(b) except
that the relevant experience assessment and propulsion system design
requirements have been removed from the proposed section III
requirements.  Otherwise, the explanation is the same as for paragraph
II(b).

III(b)(1) Maintenance and operational procedures.

Under this proposed requirement, the applicant would have to validate
maintenance and operational procedures for ETOPS Significant Systems. 
The applicant would have to track and resolve any problems discovered
during the validation process using the proposed Problem Tracking and
Resolution System as described by paragraph (b)(5).  

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(3).

III(b)(2) New technology demonstration testing.

The applicant would have to validate all ETOPS significant systems
maintenance and operational procedures. Any problems found would have to
be tracked and resolved through the problem tracking system and
resolution system proposed in paragraph III(b)(5).

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(5).

III(b)(3) APU validation test.

This paragraph would require an applicant to complete a test consisting
of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles on an auxiliary power
unit that the applicant uses to comply with the electrical power supply
system requirements of paragraph I(a)(2) of this proposed appendix.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(6).

III(b)(4) Airplane demonstration test.

This paragraph would require the applicant to conduct an airplane flight
test to demonstrate that the airplane, its components and equipment are
capable of and function properly during ETOPS and ETOPS diversions. This
flight test may be coordinated with, but would not be in place of the
function and reliability flight testing required for compliance with §
21.35(b)(2). 

The proposed requirement includes several conditions that the applicant
would have to comply with in conducting this test.  Among these are 

(1) The flight test program would have to include:

(i) flights simulating actual ETOPS operation;

(ii) demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversions;

(iii) maximum time engine inoperative diversions;

(iv) non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplanes capability to
safely conduct and ETOPS diversion;

(v) diversions into representative operational diversionary airports;
and

(vi) repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.

(2) The flight testing would have to validate the adequacy of the
airplane’s flying qualities, performance and the flight crew’s
ability to deal with adverse operating conditions.

(3) The engine-inoperative diversions would have to be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant’s flight test
program.

(4) The test airplane would have to be operated and maintained using the
recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures during the
test.

(5) At the completion of the test, the ETOPS Group 1 significant systems
would have to undergo an airplane visual inspection and the engines
would have to also undergo an internal gas path inspection.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(7).

III(b)(5) Problem tracking and resolution system.

This paragraph would require the applicant to establish a problem
tracking and resolution system to address problems, as identified in
proposed section 21.4(a)(5), encountered on ETOPS significant systems
during airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(8).

III(b)(6) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.  The applicant
would have to show that the type and frequency of failures that occur
during the airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration
test proposed by paragraph III(b)(4), are consistent with the type and
frequency of failures or malfunctions that would be expected to occur on
presently certified ETOPS airplanes, or any non-ETOPS derivative models
of those aircraft or engines.

Explanation.

As discussed above for proposed paragraph II(b)(9), the original ARAC
draft did not differentiate between two engine airplanes from airplanes
with more than two engines in the applicability of the type and
frequency requirement.  The ARAC proposal for this paragraph included
the added phrase “or any non-ETOPS derivative models of those
airplanes or engines” for those airplanes and engines that could be
included in this comparison of reliability.  As we discussed above for
proposed paragraph II(b)(9), we have deleted this phrase from the
proposed rule for two engine airplanes because an applicant would not
necessarily have to do the comparison to previously approved airplanes
manufactured by that applicant.  We are now proposing to separately
state the requirements for airplanes with more than two engines in
proposed section III of Appendix L.We have retained this provision in
the proposed requirement for airplanes with more than two engines in
paragraph III(b)(6) since previous ETOPS experience may not exist on
airplanes with more than two engines at the time this proposed rule
becomes effective.

III(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.

Explanation.

With the exception of any specific propulsion system requirements that
are being applied to airplanes with more than two engines as discussed
above, the explanation for proposed section III(c) is the same as for
proposed section II(c).

Part 33

Global issues for part 33

The overall philosophy behind ETOPS type design approval is to build
upon the improved reliability observed in today’s engines, resulting
in an even higher level of reliability for future engine products. 
However, the FAA recognizes that even with the advances in design and
manufacturing technology, loss of thrust control (LOTC), in-flight
shutdown (IFSD), or other power loss events will continue to occur. 
Therefore the overall intent of these ETOPS type design requirements are
to minimize the likelihood of an engine power loss during ETOPS
operations.

Specifically, the part 33 ETOPS related amendments require the engine
manufacturers to use their best design and manufacturing practices,
skills and lessons learned in designing and manufacturing the new
product.  The intent is to eliminate from the design all known ETOPS
relevant failures, malfunctions, or design related maintenance errors
experienced in their other relevant FAA certified engine models.  These
failures include but are not limited to loss of thrust control,
in-flight shutdown, or other power loss events.

It is important to note that complying with the part 33 ETOPS
requirements for certification makes the product “eligible” for
ETOPS operation only, and in no way implies an approval separate from
the aircraft or operator.  Therefore, compliance with these requirements
does not constitute an operational or aircraft level approval for ETOPS
operations.

Discussion of general issues in part 33

ETOPS Engine Testing

A 3,000-cycle test would be required for ETOPS engine eligibility.  This
test simulates 3,000 flights from engine startup to engine shutdown.  A
3,000-cycle test was first required for the early ETOPS approval of
two-engine aircraft under an FAA Early ETOPS Special Condition. 
However, prior to and subsequent to that Special Condition, other
aircraft types with new engines, and others with derivative engine
types, have successfully demonstrated the requisite level of reliability
in service for ETOPS using normal certification procedures.  However,
the FAA considers that new two-engine airplane-engine combinations
intended for immediate ETOPS operations should be required to undergo a
cyclic endurance ground test to give confidence that the requisite level
of reliability for such operations will be achieved at entry into
service.

The technical basis for applying this test to two-engine airplanes
rather than all airplanes, is that the allowable IFSD rate needed to
maintain safe flight throughout the diversion and landing is an order of
magnitude greater for a three or four engine aircraft as compared to a
two-engine aircraft (assuming equivalent risk and flight duration). This
also assumes that the aircraft can maintain safe flight throughout the
diversion and land with one engine inoperative.

The FAA has concluded from a review of in-service experience that the
3,000-cycle engine and propulsion system test provides an adequate
opportunity to discover cyclic-related failure modes associated with the
design.  However this is predicated upon an adequate post-test
evaluation to identify conditions that could result in an in-flight
shutdown, power loss, or inability to control engine thrust.  An FAA
review of the data from the 3,000-cycle tests for three new engine types
has shown that most of the early in-service engine failure modes could
have been discovered using a more thorough teardown inspection and
analysis of a 3,000-cycle test engine and propulsion system hardware. 
This would include evaluating hardware condition against the required
lessons learned analysis, and also to evaluate abnormal or other wear or
distress conditions not currently addressed in the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness (ICA).

In light of the FAA experience certifying and monitoring the Boeing 777,
and in order to provide a consistent standard for post-test evaluation,
the FAA proposes to require a complete teardown inspection of the engine
hardware after completion of the test.  The inspection would include an
analysis of any abnormal conditions found.  The analysis would consider
the possible consequences of similar occurrences in service to determine
if they might become sources of engine in-flight shutdowns, power loss,
or inability to control engine thrust.  The intent of this requirement
is to identify potential sources of engine in-flight shutdowns or
diversions and prevent these from occurring in the future.

The basic premise behind the engine demonstration tests required by this
proposal is that the tests will provide a useful validation of the
inherent level of reliability that was the product of an enhanced design
and test process.  The FAA’s expectation for these tests is that
significant failures will not occur.  The probability of significant
failures occurring on a single engine test program is so low that if any
do occur, it would be indicative of a design that is not suitable for
ETOPS approval.  This expectation is addressed in the “type and
frequency” requirement of the rule.

FAA general changes to the ARAC proposal for part 33

The ARAC ETOPS recommendations for part 33 engine rulemaking addresses
the Tasking Statement objectives for part 33 and incorporates the
fundamental elements to achieve the Tasking Statement’s stated
objective.  The FAA has concluded that the fundamental elements of the
ARAC Recommendations, along with the identified changes, supports
achieving the target level of safety and reliability necessary for safe
ETOPS operations for engines installed in two-engine aircraft at
entry-into-service.

However the FAA has identified a number of areas where the level of
detail in the ARAC rule recommendation is not adequate to fully address
a fundamental element, or has details that the FAA believes are
inappropriate or lacking in adequate detail.  Also, for the purpose of
clarity, completeness, and terminology usage, and to follow required
rule format, the ARAC rule recommendation has been reorganized within
part 33.

FAA changes from the ARAC Part 33 Rule Recommendations

1. Format and Organization

The Rule has been reformatted and reorganized to include all early ETOPS
design, lessons learned, and test requirements under one specific rule. 
The rule number is 33.200, which resides in new part 33 subpart G,
Special Requirements.  The ARAC recommendations divided the ETOPS
requirements between existing § 33.90 Initial Maintenance Inspection
(IMI) and a specific ETOPS rule.  Section 33.90 retains the provision to
utilize the ETOPS testing for compliance purposes.  The reorganization
is generally as follows:

ARAC Recommendation Paragraph Number	New Paragraph Number

33.90(a)	Same

33.90(b)	Same

33.90(b)(1)	33.200(c)(1)

33.90(b)(2)	33.200(c)(2)

33.90(b)(3)	33.200(f)

33.100(a)(1)	33.200(a) 

33.100(a)(2)	33.200(b)

33.100(b)	33.200(c)/(d)/(e)

	2. Revision of the 10 year limit on service data to be reviewed for the
Lessons Learned analysis from section 33.200(b)

The ARAC proposal for section 33.200(b) limited the assessment of past
design problems that have resulted in loss of thrust control, in-flight
shutdown, or other power loss to “the applicant’s other relevant
type design approvals provided within the past ten years.”  

“Ten years” as used in the rule, is considered to be the time frame
relevant to design/manufacture evolving technology for which the
applicant must show that problems especially relevant to ETOPS have been
addressed in the design for which early ETOPS eligibility is sought. 
For example, an early 1980’s certified engine with a relatively lower
level of reliability, would not be appropriate to use the applicant’s
experience base of lessons learned for compliance with section 33.200(b)
for an engine certified in year 2000; a much better experience base
would be engines certified from 1990, which as an industry group have
very good reliability.  The intent is to continuously build upon the
improved reliability seen in today’s engines into even higher levels
of reliability.”

The corresponding part 25 requirement proposed by ARAC does not contain
such a time limit on the relevant experience assessment, nor does the
Boeing 777 ETOPS Special Condition, which is the basis for this proposed
requirement.  The relevant experience assessment that Boeing submitted
for compliance with the Special Condition’s requirement consisted of
data from a ten year time period immediately prior to the B777 design
development.  The FAA approved this ten-year period at the time because
it included three previous major airplane certification programs (Models
757, 767, and 737-300).  For the current Model 777-300ER type
certification program, the assessment was updated to include the
additional relevant experience that has occurred since the original
database was developed.  Coincidentally, this covers a ten-year time
period.  However, the FAA cannot draw a conclusion from this experience
that a ten-year period will always provide adequate data for all
manufacturers that may apply for an early ETOPS approval.  Therefore,
the FAA has included a provision that the 10-year limit applies if
adequate data exists to do the assessment.  If the FAA determines that
the applicant’s other relevant type design approvals provided within
the past ten years do not constitute an adequate database, the FAA will
determine the extent of additional data required to be included in the
relevant experience assessment based on the following factors:

a. The manufacturer’s level of experience in certifying engines
installed on Transport Category airplanes,

b. Recent experience certifying new engines,

c. Completeness of the manufacturer’s design practices/manuals used in
the development of new engines, and

d. Any other factors that the manufacturer may want to present to the
FAA for consideration.

3. Insertion of the word "independently" in the test section of section
33.200(c)(2)

The ARAC Recommendation 3,000 cycle test requires all rotors to be
unbalanced to 90% of a limit value, however the actual rule text is not
specific as to whether each rotor is to be unbalanced independently. 
The FAA has verified that it was the ARAC’s intent that each rotor
must be unbalanced independently relative to its individual rotor limit.
 So the word "independently" is inserted to clarify that each individual
rotor must be unbalanced to the specified 90% limit value.

4. Addition of inspection criteria for post 3,000 test [See
33.200(e)(3)(i)(C)]

The ARAC Recommendations specify hardware layout inspections in
accordance with the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) and
the Lessons Learned analysis.  The FAA proposes to add a third
inspection criteria as follows: "Inspect in a manner to identify wear or
distress conditions which could result in IFSD, LOTC or other power
loss, and which are not specifically identified by 33.200(b) or
addressed within the current ICA."  It should be noted that the ARAC
Recommendation’s AC material discusses such an inspection method and
that the recent FAA B777 Special Condition for ETOPS also included a
similar inspection requirement.

5. Clarification of an incomplete statement relating to post-test
hardware condition [See § 33.200(e)(3)(ii)]

The ARAC Recommendation contains a requirement that post-test hardware
condition be such that no distress is observed that could result in a
power loss.  However many engine parts if distressed and operated long
enough will fail and potentially cause a power loss.  As written,
distress in many parts could be predicted to result in power loss over
an inappropriately long period of operation.  Therefore the FAA proposes
to define the period of operation to make this judgment as follows;
"...within a period of operation before the component, assembly or
system would likely have been inspected or functionally tested for
integrity while in service”.

6. Revision of interim inspection to be used for § 33.90 compliance

The ARAC Recommendations propose to use the 3,000-cycle test for §
33.90 compliance by means of an interim on-wing inspection method.  The
FAA concurs with the basic on-wing inspection approach.  However, the
ARAC Recommendations only specify a visual inspection for § 33.90
compliance purposes.  This Recommendation does not meet the most basic
existing Method of Compliance (MoC) for a § 33.90 inspection.  The FAA
proposes to revise the "visual only" inspection to be an inspection
acceptable to the Administrator, and specify an acceptable MoC within
the AC.  Currently for an on-wing type inspection for § 33.90
compliance, the FAA would accept an inspection that does all of the
following:

(1) Full borescope inspection of accessible gas path stages or areas of
the fan, compressor, combustor, and turbine modules, to the serviceable
limits of the ICA.

(2) For Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) equipped
engines, observe and interrogate the FADEC system for fault messages and
status messages, both current or previously recorded, to the serviceable
limits of the ICA.

(3) Inspect all oil system chip detectors and filters for contamination.

(4) Inspect all fuel system filters for contamination.

(5) Test a sample of main engine oil for contaminants that might
indicate impending internal failure.

(6) Conduct a complete visual inspection of the inlet, exhaust, and
externals, to the serviceable limits of the ICA.

(7) Conduct a power calibration to show that the engine can produce
power or thrust within established limits, and is free of surge or stall
when operated in accordance with the Operating Instructions.

General pass/fail criteria for the above items is serviceable in
accordance with the ICA, unless otherwise approved by the Administrator.

The above method of compliance has been established for conventionally
designed engines, and is discussed further in the companion AC.  Other
inspections or checks, or deletion of non-applicable items may be
necessary for new or unconventional designs.

7. Addition of Oil Tank Design Requirement

The FAA is proposing to revise the current requirements of §
33.71(c)(4), which addresses oil tank caps.  The proposed revision would
incorporate a new ETOPS eligibility design requirement for oil tanks
intended to prevent hazardous oil loss in the event of an oil tank cap
installation error.  The FAA is aware of a number of single and dual
engine oil loss events due to oil tank cap installation errors, and is
concerned that these types of problems will continue to occur,
potentially resulting in an unsafe condition during extended operations.
 The FAA believes it prudent to address this situation by requiring oil
tanks to be designed to accommodate cap installation errors without
hazardous oil loss.  The proposed rule would not allow compliance by
maintenance procedures; the necessary physical features or
characteristics must be part of the oil tank design. The rule is
intended to protect against hazardous oil loss when oil tank cap
installation errors occur.

8. Engine Endurance Test with Vibration

The ARAC Recommendations include a 3,000-cycle endurance test with main
rotor unbalance.  The Recommendations specify the minimum unbalance as
being an “average value” of the peak vibration level observed during
required vibration surveys.  In section 33.200(c)(2)(iv), the term
“average value” is being replaced by the term “equivalent value”
to better address the concept of cumulative damage.  For example,
utilizing an average value could result in less cumulative damage due to
vibration then if the 90% requirement was precisely maintained over the
test duration.  By computing and working to an equivalent value of rotor
unbalance, cumulative damage will always be equal to or greater then a
test conducted with a steady value of 90% unbalance.  The equivalent
value is a Miner’s rule summation calculation, and is further
described in the companion AC.

Section by section discussion of the proposal

Proposed New Appendix A, Paragraph A33.3(c), Extended Operations (ETOPS)
Requirements.

A proposed new Appendix A Paragraph A33.3(c) would define new engine
condition monitoring requirements necessary for obtaining ETOPS type
design eligibility approval.

Explanation.

This section requires inclusion of a power assurance check methodology
into the ICA for all engine models requiring ETOPS eligibility.  A
special requirement exists for engines to be installed in twin-engine
aircraft applications, that being the power assurance method must be
validated by test or experience.

Proposed Revision to Section 33.71(c)(4) – Oil Tanks

A proposed revision to section 33.71(c)(4) would define new oil tank
design requirements necessary for obtaining ETOPS type design
eligibility approval.

Explanation.

See the explanation in paragraph 7 of this section, above.

Proposed Revision to Section 33.90 – Initial maintenance inspection
(IMI).

A proposed revision of section 33.90 would define requirements for
utilizing ETOPS type design eligibility test data obtained during
section 33.200 testing for section 33.90 compliance purposes.

Explanation.

The fundamental requirements of section 33.90 are unchanged; except for
the inclusion of a provision to allow utilization of data obtained under
section 33.200 testing to show compliance to section 33.90 IMI.

Proposed New Section 33.200 – Early Extended Operations (ETOPS)
Eligibility and Test Requirements.

A proposed new section 33.200 would define overall requirements for
obtaining ETOPS type design eligibility approval.

Explanation.

Compliance with this section results in an engine model that is eligible
for two-engine ETOPS operation before the service experience required
under 14 CFR part 25, Appendix L, Section II, paragraph (a) is achieved.
The individual subparagraphs are discussed below:

Sections 33.200(a) and 33.200(b)

These sections require an applicant to establish a design quality
process acceptable to the Administrator that will ensure that the type
design minimizes the possibility of power loss failure events.

These rule sections require the applicant to use its best design
practices, including all its corporate knowledge, skills and lessons
learned in the design and manufacture of the engine.  The intent is to
eliminate from the design all known failures, malfunctions or design
related maintenance errors experienced in other relevant FAA certified
engines, and that are especially relevant to ETOPS.  Such events include
loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other power loss events.

Compliance may be shown by evidence acceptable to the Administrator that
the applicant’s design quality assurance process has demonstrated the
capability to eliminate causes of engine failures, malfunctions, and
design related maintenance problems known to have occurred within the
applicant's commercial engine experience base.  The applicant should
also show that the design quality process would preclude the recurrence
of that cause in the new design.  Also, the design quality process and
design features must address all applicable failures, malfunctions, and
maintenance problems that could affect ETOPS even if they occurred on
taxi, if such an event could have occurred in-flight.

The FAA will determine the extent of data required to be included in the
relevant experience assessment based on the following factors:

(1) The manufacturer’s level of experience in certifying engines
installed on Transport Category airplanes;

(2) Recent experience certifying new engines;

(3) Completeness of the manufacturer’s design practices and manuals
used in the development of new engines; and

(4) Any other factors that the manufacturer may want to present to the
FAA for consideration.

If adequate data exists the time period of consideration will be the
prior 10 years of applicant experience.

Section 33.200(c)

The intent of this testing is to simulate in-service operation; and to
simulate the extent of time that the engine will operate at maximum
continuous power for the longest diversion time in an ETOPS scenario,
and at a level of engine vibration that exceeds expected service
operation.  The test is not intended to duplicate or repeat or replace
the endurance test required by section 33.87.

Explanation.

This 3,000-cycle test requirement simulates the typical field service
operation expected to be encountered in the first 250,000 fleet hours
(typically two years of service) and the extent of time that an engine
will operate in the event of a diversion at maximum continuous power for
the longest diversion time expected.  In addition, the test is required
to be conducted at a level of vibration for the complete test that
exceeds expected service exposure.  The new test is an important part of
the early ETOPS eligibility determination for both the engine and
propulsion system of the airplane.  No other type of engine vibration
testing can simulate the vibration induced by imbalance of its rotors
running through the speed and power ranges experienced in service.  The
test is required to simulate 3,000 cycles of service operation
(typically two years) in a short time span.  This test is similar to
that conducted for the original certification of the three engine types
used on the B777 under the Special Conditions.  Those tests were also a
combination of engine cyclic endurance with high cycle fatigue (HCF)
vibration induced by way of imbalancing the main rotors of the engine.

Section 33.200(d)

The purpose of this test is to establish thrust characteristics, and
ensure that the engine can deliver rated takeoff power or thrust within
approved limits prior to the start of the test.

	Section 33.200(e)

This section establishes what the required inspections are and what the
pass/fail criteria is for section 33.200 compliance.  Further detail on
a MoC for this section can be found in the companion advisory circular.

Section 33.200(f)

This section establishes the requirements for utilizing paragraph
33.200(c) 3,000-cycle test data to show compliance to section 33.90
Initial Maintenance Inspection.  The companion AC provides details of an
acceptable MoC.

Part 121

Global issues for part 121

FAA general changes to the ARAC proposal for part 121

(1) Section 121.368 has become 121.374

The ARAC proposed rule number had to be changed due to other FAA rule
writing projects.  The content and concepts from the proposal were
retained wherever possible within the new rule.  Specific format changes
and the differences between this proposed rule and the ARAC proposal are
discussed in each section below.

Section by section discussion of the proposed changes to part 121

Proposed New Section 121.7 Definitions and designations.

The FAA proposes to add a new section in part 121 for definitions
applicable to ETOPS.

Explanation.

Many of the terms used in the proposed regulatory and guidance material
for ETOPS under this part are unique to these operations.  Requirements
and concepts for ETOPS require precise definition to assure common
understanding and compliance.  Definitions are added for:

Adequate Airport

ETOPS Alternate

ETOPS Area of Operation

ETOPS Dual Maintenance

ETOPS Entry Point

ETOPS Maintenance Significant System

ETOPS Qualified Personnel

Maximum Diversion Time

One Engine Inoperative Cruise Speed (Approved)

The following areas are designated as ETOPS areas by the Administrator
in which the planning, operational, and equipage requirements for ETOPS
apply.  The areas are defined as:

NOPAC

North Pacific

Polar Areas

North Pole

South Pole

Proposed New Section 121.97 (b)(1)(ii) Airports: Required data

The FAA proposes to clarify the “public protection” requirement of
section 121.97 to include consideration of facilities available for
public safety, protection, and welfare during regular and irregular
operations (including diversions to the airport).

Explanation.

Airlines must consider passenger facilities when selecting an ETOPS
Alternate and in diversion planning.  The facilities at an airport or in
the immediate area must be sufficient to protect the passengers and crew
from the elements and to see to their welfare during the time required
to transport them onward.

By definition, ETOPS operations are those with long segments over water
or remote areas. Some of these remote areas are affected by severe
weather conditions such as, but not limited to, extreme cold or high
winds and cold temperatures.  Some of the airports that are well
positioned for use as enroute alternates are in remote areas.  These
airports may have only limited or seasonal facilities that could be used
to shelter passengers and crew after an unscheduled landing.  As ETOPS
operations have expanded in scope and extended in length, operations
over more remote areas with more extreme weather possibilities have
become routine.  Northern Canada and the Russian Far East are typical
examples.  Facilities at some of the airports in those areas have not
been maintained because of political, economic and military changes.  It
cannot be assumed that the passengers and crew of an aircraft will be
safe simply because a safe landing can be made at an airport. 
Therefore, certificate holders are obligated to be aware of the
available facilities and satisfy them that there will be adequate
facilities to protect the passengers and crew should it be necessary to
make an unscheduled landing for any reason.

These are new requirements.  The FAA is proposing to add these
additional requirements to this regulation because it has learned that
not all certificate holders have planned for these contingencies in the
past, apparently because the current wording of the regulation did not
require them to do so.  The FAA believes regulations are needed to
prudently insure carriers recognize “the duty of an air carrier to
provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public
interest…” 49 U.S.C. sec. 44701 (d)(1)(A). The ARAC recommendation
included arguments that since ETOPS flights are generally international
flights, treaties limit damages for negligence that passengers on
international flights may recover from airlines.  The ARAC further
stated that absent the compelling motivation of unlimited liability for
proven damages available to domestic passengers, carrier motivation to
avoid findings of negligence may also be lessened somewhat.

Others have pointed out that in the Polar Policy letter the FAA has
already included instructions and requirements detailing the treatment
of passengers in case of diversions or accidents and the facilities to
be made available for them.  Further, the addition of passenger related
contingencies are based on rules, regulations and International
Treaties, which have been and are in the process of being enacted for
the protection of passengers well being such as: “Aviation Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 1996”, the DOT/NTSB Task Force Report on
Assistance to Families of Aviation Disasters of 1997, Public Law 105-148
of 1997 (105th Congress), ICAO Circular 285-AN166 (33rd Assembly, 2001),
European Union Regulation (EG) 2027/97, the “Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air” of
1999 and others.  Providing for the safety, security, comfort and well
being of all of the occupants of an airplane has become especially
important on long range flights because of increasing medical
consequences.  It was also pointed out that ignoring those requirements
expose the carriers to increasing liability claims and to loss of
business because of passengers’ discomfort.

Proposed New Sections 121.99(c) and (d) Communications Facilities

The FAA proposes to add sections 121.99(c) and 121.99(d).  Section
121.99(c) would create a baseline ETOPS equipage requirement for flag
operations.  Section 121.99(d) would create an additional equipage
requirement for operations beyond 180-minutes.  

Explanation.

Under this proposal a certificate holder would have to provide for voice
communication between the crew and air traffic services and the crew and
the certificate holder wherever and whenever it is available.  In areas
where voice communication is not possible, the certificate holder would
have to provide a non-voice communication system, such as High Frequency
(HF) data link, to ensure communication capability.

Paragraph 121.99(d) would apply on to ETOPS flights planned on greater
than 180-minutes and would require the installation of an additional
communication system.    This communication system would have to be
capable of providing immediate satellite based voice communication of
land-line telephone-fidelity between the flight crew and air traffic
services and between the flight crew and the company.  The term
“immediate” in the context of this section would mean the time
period required to connect an ordinary land-line telephone call.  The
modifiers “land-line telephone-fidelity” are included as performance
standards to describe the faithful reproduction of sound.  The FAA is
essentially describing Satellite Communication (SATCOM).  At this time,
only SATCOM provides this capability and compliance with this proposed
rule.  The FAA acknowledges that technological innovation may create
alternatives to SATCOM or render the system obsolete.  Certificate
holders would be required to equip airplanes used in ETOPS beyond 180
minutes with SATCOM or other system that offers equivalent or enhanced
capability.  The FAA notes that the ARAC consolidated these requirements
in a single paragraph (c) in their recommendation.  The FAA elected to
reformat for clarity.

Both paragraphs (c) and (d) would require the certificate holder to
consider “potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to
ETOPS alternates” when assessing the availability of voice
communication facilities.  The ARAC recommended that the FAA amend
paragraph 121.99(a) to include the above-quoted language.  The FAA has
elected not to amend paragraph 121.99(a).  Paragraph 121.99(a) is the
baseline requirement for all domestic and flag certificate holders
operating under part 121.  The FAA believes the equipage and
communication performance requirements for ETOPS should be separate and
distinct from the baseline communication requirement for part 121. 
Further, the FAA has proposed amending paragraph 121.99(a) in the Area
Navigation (RNAV) proposed rulemaking.  See 67 FR 77326 (December 17,
2002).

The origin of paragraph 121.99(d) is the 207-minute policy letter, which
conditioned extension of section 121.161 deviation authority upon the
installation SATCOM for operation on those routes.  See 65 FR 3520
(January 21, 2000).  The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that
flight crews have the best communication capability in the event of an
extended diversion.  During a diversion, crew workload increases
considerably.  The use of an unwieldy communication system during a
diversion would needlessly distract the crew from more important cockpit
duties.  SATCOM is not available in all regions of the world.  In those
regions, flight crews must have another means to communicate with the
certificate holder and air traffic services.

Proposed New Section 121.106 Required rescue fire fighting capability
at ETOPS alternate airports

The FAA proposes to add new section 121.106, requiring a rescue fire
fighting capability at an airport designated as an ETOPS alternate.

Explanation.

Currently, part 139 does not require any aircraft rescue fire fighting
(RFF) capability at airports designated as Takeoff and Destination
alternates.  Alternate airports are referred to in part 139 but not
defined.  The common perception of an alternate airport is that it is an
airport that is used infrequently, when diversions occur.  The original
use of the definition was limited to the destination or takeoff
airports.  There was no specific mention of the en route alternate until
Advisory Circular 120-42, Extended Range Operation With Two Engine
Airplanes (ETOPS), was issued in 1985.  The airport regulations
specified in part 139 were first published in 1972 prior to the
inception of ETOPS.  For these reasons, and as outlined further, we
propose new section 121.106 to include the requirement for RFF at an en
route alternate airport.

Normally a flight diverts to its destination alternate airport because
of poor weather at the destination airport or the aircraft having a low
fuel state.  In contrast, a diversion to an ETOPS en route alternate is
likely attributable to an engine or system failure or medical emergency.
 Throughout the ETOPS flight the designation of the en route alternate
may be revised, with consideration of the designated en route alternate
airport maintaining an adequate level of weather and runway conditions
to safely land the airplane.  At the most critical point of an ETOPS en
route diversion there is no other choice as to the diversion airport. 
It remains necessary to ensure that all the facilities and services are
adequate to ensure that a safe landing can be made at the diversion
airport in the event that it is necessary to divert.  Thus, some have
argued that there is an increased importance of a rescue fire fighting
service at airports designated as an ETOPS en route alternate.  Further,
they have argued that establishing such a requirement in the Federal
Aviation Regulations is consistent with ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Attachment
E, wherein an “adequate alternate aerodrome” is defined.  The
definition includes a list of various facilities and services, including
‘rescue and fire fighting’, as being necessary.  (An attachment to
ICAO Annex is intended as a guide or supplementary material to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices and as such, is not a requirement.)

The fact that en route diversions have occurred in the past and will
continue to occur necessitates evaluation of the facts surrounding those
events and the needs they identify. ETOPS operators in the United States
(as well as Europe) operating across the North Atlantic have encountered
difficulties in being able to designate certain Canadian airports as
ETOPS en route alternates due to the reduction of RFF service capability
(Canadian airport privatization) and numerous military base closures.

History has shown that in-flight diversions occur for a variety of
reasons, other than In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD) of two engine aircraft. 
Any aircraft conducting extended range operations could experience a
critical emergency requiring diversion to an en route alternate airport.
 Thus, it is proposed by some that a regulation be established to
require an en route alternate for all extended range flight operations
(aircraft with 2, 3, and 4 engines) because, in such an event requiring
a diversion, a simple emergency evacuation in a hostile environment (for
example, due to cold temperatures) could be deadly, or in a similar way,
a mechanical event requiring a need to land could result in an
unanticipated accident, such as a runway overrun and thus become
catastrophic. It is further argued by some that these considerations
have led to the conclusion that some level of accident mitigation
systems should be required for airports designated as en route alternate
airports.  This accident mitigation protection is provided for at
airports designated as origin and destination airports in the
regulations of part 121, and the appropriate levels of protection are
specified in the airport certification regulations designated as part
139.

Part 139 specifies the level of aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF)
as a function of aircraft size.  This level of protection is deemed the
‘Index’ and specifies the amount of agent for fire extinguishment
and the number of vehicles to deliver the agent proportionate to the
size of the largest airplane using the airport.  In the international
Standards of ICAO, the length and width of the aircraft fuselage
determines the “RFF Category”.  An allowance for reducing the
index/category is provided in the event that the aircraft only uses the
airport infrequently i.e., less than 700 movements in the busiest
consecutive three months with the airplane in the highest category. This
is termed a remission factor. Even though frequency of operations may
allow a reduction of service levels by 1 Category, this reduction will
no longer be allowed after January 2005 under the ICAO Standards.  ICAO
RFF category range from 1 to 10.  As an example, the ICAO category of
RFF 4, which is nearly equivalent to Index A in part 139, provides at
least 1 firefighter and 1 vehicle with the ability for immediate fire
suppression or ground assistance to occupants.

Contradicting the arguments of those who support RFF at enroute
alternates, some have stated that based on the last sixteen years of
ETOPS operations with well over 2.5 million ETOPS flights around the
world, there is no record of a single incident where a twin on an ETOPS
phase of flight with a mechanical event diverted to an ETOPS alternate
and the landing resulted in an unanticipated accident, such as a runway
overrun and thus became catastrophic, and required the RFF services.  It
was further argued that the probability of an ETOPS flight diverting on
the ETOPS portion of the flight, landing at an ETOPS alternate,
resulting in an accident or a catastrophic situation is very remote, and
need not be considered.  However, some have pointed out that the fact
that an event has not happened does not mean it will never happen, and
industry needs to be proactive and provide a level of safety as a
margin, should the situation arise.

Some have pointed out that requiring high levels of RFF protection for
the enroute alternate airports would either severely limit the selection
of diversion airports necessitating longer divert times, or demand the
communities supporting these enroute alternate airports increase their
level of emergency service beyond that currently available.  However, it
can be argued that for airplanes on long diversions a pad may need to be
built in so that a minimum level of RFF capability is assured at the
time of landing.

Even though currently not required by part 139, the FAA considers it
very desirable to have some minimum level of RFF protection at the ETOPS
alternates.  Taking into account the various opinions expressed in the
ARAC recommendations, the FAA proposes to establish a minimum RFF of 4
for ETOPS operations below 180 minutes, and a minimum RFF of 7 for
diversion times greater than 180 minutes.  This reflects the RFF
requirements stated in FAA Order 8400.10, Flight Standards Handbook
Bulletins for Air Transportation, HBAT 99-15 titled Level of Rescue and
Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) for ETOPS En Route Alternates, and the
207-Minute ETOPS Policy.

Similar to the allowance contained in HBAT 99-15, the proposed
regulation allows for an off airport response time of thirty minutes,
however, the required equipment must be available on-scene for the
arrival of the diverting airplane and should remain for as long as their
services are needed.  In contrast to a destination or departure airport,
the diversion airport has time to muster community emergency service
assets to provide the necessary emergency response following
notification of the aircraft diversion.  This provision for the use of
off-airport emergency services necessitates that a robust communications
link must be established in order to provide sufficient time to muster
the necessary RFF personnel and equipment.  Further, local community
emergency services support of required RFF response in providing
equipment and personnel is considered prudent.

In all cases the certificate holder must ensure that the flight crews
are provided current information (in plain language) concerning the RFF
capability for those airports designated as alternate airports

Proposed New Section 121.122 Communication  Facilities

The FAA proposes to add a communication facilities requirement for
supplemental operators.  This section would mirror section 121.99, which
applies to flag and domestic operators.

Explanation.

The FAA believes it is necessary to create comparable communication
requirement for supplemental operators to ensure consistency among part
121 operations.  To this end, the FAA proposes communication
requirements similar to those in section 121.99.  For example, paragraph
121.122(a) is based on the existing paragraph 121.99(a), which is the
basic communication requirement for domestic and flag operators. 
Similarly paragraphs 121.122(b) and (c) are based on the proposed
sections 121.99(c) and (d) respectively which would establish
communication requirements for ETOPS.  See discussion above for
121.99(c) and (d) for the rationale of ETOPS communication requirements.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.135(b)(10) Contents

Add a new 14 CFR 121.135(b)(10) to require performance data to support
ETOPS.

Explanation.

The FAA proposes to insert a new requirement for performance data in the
manual required by this section to support ETOPS as paragraph (b)(10),
and to renumber existing paragraphs 121.135(b)(10) through (24) to new
paragraphs 121.135(b)(11) through (25).  Since ETOPS are conducted under
a special authorization, there is an additional performance data
requirement to support these operations.  The flight crew and
dispatchers should have available the engine inoperative and cabin
depressurization cruise data used by the certificate holder to plan
flights and operate under ETOPS.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.135(b)(26) Contents (new)

Add paragraph 121.135(b)(26) to require a passenger recovery plan for
flag and supplemental operations in the certificate holder’s manual.

Explanation.

The FAA proposes to add paragraph 121.135(b)(24) to require a passenger
recovery plan for flag and supplemental operations in the certificate
holder’s manual.  The FAA introduced the requirement for an airline to
develop and maintain a passenger recovery plan for flights authorized in
the North Pole area of operation by policy letter in March 2001.

It is incumbent that a carrier account for contingencies when diversions
occur to airports not normally served by the carrier.  When a diversion
occurs in an area where the carrier has a substantial operational
infrastructure, (that is, a carrier serves many destinations in Europe
but is forced by operational circumstances to divert to an airport not
served by the carrier but within the region) that diversion plan becomes
a simple matter of describing how the carrier’s assets within the
region can supply immediate logistical support to the diversion
aircraft.  This can be called a regional passenger recovery plan
applicable to a stated geographical area.

However, a carrier with an extensive route system extending over remote
areas has a responsibility to devise a plan of substance to recover the
passengers, crew, and aircraft in the event of a diversion within a
remote area.  The plan should be of sufficient detail to demonstrate
that the recovery operation can be readily affected, and the basic needs
of the diverted customers and crew can be provided for in the interim.

The certificate holder must demonstrate that a regional plan is robust
enough to handle diversion scenarios within that region by showing the
effectiveness and adequacy of communications; coordination; facilities;
accuracy of NOTAM and weather information; and operability of support
ground equipment.  The recovery plan should also address the care and
safety of passengers and crew at the diversion airport, and include the
plan of operation to extract the passengers and crew from that airport. 
The certificate holder must maintain the accuracy and completeness of
its recovery plan as part of its annual audit.

Proposed change to Section 121.161 Airplane limitations: Type of route.

The FAA proposes to revise section 121.161(a) to create ETOPS route
authority within the regulations and to move away from ETOPS conducted
under the Administrator’s deviation authority.

Explanation.

As discussed earlier in this proposal, deviation from section 121.161(a)
has been the regulatory basis of ETOPS since its inception.  The FAA
issued AC 120-42 and AC 120-42A to provide guidance for carriers seeking
to conduct ETOPS.  However as ETOPS evolved from an exceptional kind of
operation to a prevalent kind of operation, the need for amending
paragraph 121.161(a) has become became apparent.  The proposed paragraph
121.161(a) would describe when and where the requirements of ETOPS would
apply and furthermore would contain a pointer to the new Appendix O. 
Appendix O would contain the approval requirements for the different
ETOPS time thresholds and ETOPS areas of applicability.  ETOPS would no
longer be conducted under the Administrator’s deviation authority
under this proposal but would have a distinct regulatory basis.

The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph 121.161(d) that would limit
operations of reciprocating engine powered airplanes to routes no more
than 60 minutes away from an adequate airport at single-engine
inoperative speed in still air and standard conditions.  This new
section would have language allowing the Administrator to grant
deviations.  The FAA believes that, although not possible at present,
reciprocating engines may someday achieve the reliability necessary for
operations beyond 60 minutes.

Proposed New Section 121.374 ETOPS Maintenance Requirements

(1) Format changes

ARAC Proposal	NPRM Draft

121.368 ETOPS Maintenance	121.374 ETOPS Maintenance Elements

(a) CMP	(a) CMP

(b) Initial maintenance and training procedures	(b) CAMP

	(g) Maintenance training

(c)(1) CMP requirements	Deleted

(c)(2) Pre-departure service check	(b)(1) Pre-departure service check

(c) (3) Verification procedures	(b)(3) Verification program

(c) (4) Preclude dual maintenance	(b)(2)(i) Preclude dual maintenance

(c) (5) Procedures if dual maintenance. 	(b)(2)(ii) Procedures if dual
maintenance cannot be 

cannot be avoided	avoided

(c) (6) APU in-flight start program	(f) APU in-flight start program

(d) Centralized maintenance control	(b)(5) Centralized maintenance
control 

(e) Changes to maintenance and training procedures	(h) Procedural
changes

(f) ETOPS task identification	(b)(4) ETOPS task identification

(g) ETOPS document	(b)(6) ETOPS document

(h) ETOPS parts control	(b)(7) ETOPS parts control

(i) ETOPS reliability program	(b)(8) ETOPS reliability program

None	(b)(8)(i) Reporting requirements

(j) Investigate each IFSD	(b)(8)(ii) Investigation requirements

(j) Also contained IFSD rates	(c) Propulsion system monitoring

(k) Engine condition monitoring	(d) Engine condition monitoring

(l) Oil consumption program	(e) Oil consumption monitoring

(m) APU in-flight start program	(f) APU in-flight start program

Explanation.

A crucial element of ETOPS is a robust maintenance program that
complements the standard airplane-engine maintenance program.  ETOPS
maintenance practices are designed to preclude and protect diversions
through closely controlled procedures such as engine condition
monitoring, oil consumption monitoring, the aggressive resolution of
reliability issues, and procedures to reduce the risks of human error
during maintenance of airplane systems and engines.  For the past 18
years, AC 120-42 and AC 120-42A have provided guidance describing the
specialized maintenance requirements necessary for ETOPS.  The FAA
proposes to codify the guidance from the AC.  These requirements would
apply to all airplanes used in ETOPS regardless of the number of the
engines installed.

This proposal would require operators to develop an ETOPS maintenance
program that addresses or incorporates the following elements:

(a) Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) compliance.

Each certificate holder would have to establish a system to ensure
compliance with the CMP.  The importance of the CMP is discussed more
fully above in the General Discussion of the Proposal.

(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP)

A CAMP is a comprehensive oversight program to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of an airplane.  A CAMP includes but is not limited to
maintenance tasks, inspection tasks, auditing requirements, and data
analysis.  CAMP is required by part 121 Subpart L.  The proposed
regulation would expand the scope of the CAMP for ETOPS operators to
encompass issues unique to ETOPS.  The following are considered basic
additional elements of a CAMP for an ETOPS operator:

(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check

The pre-departure service check is designed to ensure that ETOPS
significant systems will perform their intended function throughout the
flight.  An ETOPS pre-departure service check would have to verify the
status of ETOPS significant systems. Some certificate holders conducting
ETOPS flights have elected to add other items to their check as a result
of operational experience and knowledge gained from their reliability
programs.  Regardless of any additional items an operator may add to a
check, the focal point of this check must be inspection, servicing, and
maintenance of ETOPS significant systems.

(2) Dual maintenance

Dual maintenance is a concept relating to repetition of maintenance
errors on redundant systems.  There have been instances of a single
mechanic repeating a maintenance error on multiple systems.  An example
of dual maintenance error is failing to install o-rings on engine oil or
fuel components on multiple engines.  Establishing procedures to avoid
dual maintenance can minimize the probability of such errors.  The use
of two or more mechanics reduces the risk of this type of error. 
Routine tasks on multiple similar elements, such as oil and fuel filter
changes, should never be scheduled and assigned on the same maintenance
visit.

However, the FAA is aware that under some limited circumstances, dual
maintenance may be unavoidable.  For instance, a pilot’s report of a
discrepancy on an ETOPS significant system may require maintenance on
one engine at the same time as a scheduled maintenance event for the
other engine.  In such cases, the certificate holder must establish and
follow procedures to mitigate the risk of a common cause human error.

(3) Verification program

The verification program ensures the effectiveness of ETOPS maintenance
actions.  Verification programs are designed to identify any potential
problems and may consist of ground tests, flight tests, use of built in
test equipment (BITE), and other tests as appropriate.  Verification
action must be accomplished following corrective action to an ETOPS
significant system, primary system failure, IFSD or in response to
significant adverse trends. The certificate holder must establish
procedures to clearly indicate who is going to initiate the action and
what verification action is necessary.  A verification flight may be
performed in combination with an ETOPS revenue flight, provided the
verification phase is documented as satisfactorily completed upon
reaching the ETOPS entry point.

(4) Task identification

ETOPS maintenance programs include numerous tasks that are critical to
ETOPS.  Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to
identify specific tasks that must be accomplished by ETOPS qualified
personnel.  These ETOPS-specific tasks are performed during all phases
of maintenance.  On the other hand, some tasks in an ETOPS maintenance
program are identical to tasks on a non-ETOPS airplane.  The FAA
realizes that tasks, such as checking seat belts prior to a flight, do
not involve ETOPS significant systems and may be performed by non-ETOPS
qualified personnel.  ETOPS specific tasks would either be identified on
the certificate holder’s routine work forms and related instructions
or parceled together and identified as an “ETOPS package.”

(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures

The certificate holder would have to develop and clearly define in their
program ETOPS related procedures, duties, and responsibilities, such as
the involvement of centralized maintenance control.  The function of
centralized maintenance control is to be a focal point for operational
aspects of ETOPS maintenance and to ensure that ETOPS aircraft are
airworthy.  Procedures and centralized control processes would be
established which would preclude an airplane being dispatched for ETOPS
flights after a propulsion system shut-down, significant primary
airframe system failure, or significant adverse trends in system
performance without appropriate corrective action having been taken.
Confirmation of corrective maintenance would require appropriate
verification action prior to an ETOPS flight.  Depending on the size and
scope of the ETOPS operation, the maintenance control entity could be an
entire department or one ETOPS-qualified individual for a small
operation.  “Centralized maintenance control” is also referred to as
“technical services center”, “maintenance operations control
(MOC)”, and “maintenance coordination center” among other terms
within industry.

(6) ETOPS program document

The certificate holder would have to develop a document that identifies
all ETOPS requirements, including supportive programs, procedures,
duties, and responsibilities.  The ETOPS program document would be for
use by personnel involved in ETOPS and would be readily accessible to
those personnel.  This document need not be inclusive but should at
least reference the maintenance program and other requirements, and
clearly indicate where they are located in the certificate holder’s
document system.  The ETOPS program document would have to be submitted
to the CHDO for approval at least 60 days before beginning ETOPS flights
and be subject to revision control.

(7) ETOPS parts control

Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to develop a
parts control program that ensures the proper parts and configurations
are maintained for ETOPS airplanes.  The program would have to include
procedures to verify that the parts installed on ETOPS airplanes during
parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used
after repair or overhaul, maintains the necessary ETOPS configuration. 
In many cases, certificate holders utilize the Illustrated Parts Catalog
(IPC) as the ETOPS parts controlling document.  However, other methods
may be used provided that the configuration standard of the airplane and
engine is maintained.

(8) Reliability program

The certificate holder would have to develop an ETOPS Reliability
Program or the certificate holder’s existing Reliability Program would
have to be supplemented.  This program should be designed to identify
and prevent ETOPS related problems.  The program would be event-oriented
and incorporate reporting procedures for critical events detrimental to
ETOPS flights.  For those certificate holders that do not have a FAA
approved reliability program, their Continuing Analysis and Surveillance
(CAS) would have to be enhanced to achieve ETOPS reliability goals. 
Reliability data would have to be readily available for use by the
certificate holder and the FAA to ensure that an acceptable level of
reliability is achieved and maintained.  

The reporting requirements differ from the ARAC recommendation.  The
ARAC proposal indicated that the reporting requirements for ETOPS would
be satisfied through reporting required by sections 121.363, 121.703,
121.704 and 121.705.  Due to other FAA rulemaking activity to amend
sections 121.703 and 121.704, the reporting requirements of 121.703 and
121.704 would not apply in the manner as understood by the Working
Group.  In order to adjust for these changes, the FAA proposes to codify
the existing list of reportable events from Advisory Circular 120-42A.

(1) The following are in addition to the reporting requirements in
section 121.703 and would include:

(a) In-flight shutdowns.

(b) Diversions or turnback.

(c) Uncommanded power changes or surges.

(d) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.

(e) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.

(f) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.

(2) Certificate holders would also be required to furnish the following
information:

(a) Airplane identification (type and N-number).

(b) Engine identification (make and serial number).

(c) Total time, cycles and time since last shop visit.

(d) For systems, time since overhaul or last inspection of the
discrepant unit.

(e) Phase of flight.

(f) Corrective action.

This proposed regulation would require certificate holders to conduct an
investigation into the cause of the occurrence of any event listed above
in addition to any event described in section 121.703.  The certificate
holder would have to submit findings and description of corrective
action taken to the CHDO.  The FAA expects certificate holders to
investigate events above in conjunction with manufacturers.  The report
must be submitted in the manner prescribed by section 121.703(e).

(c) Propulsion System Monitoring 

Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.  A
propulsion system-monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary.  Propulsion system problems and
IFSD may be caused by type design deficiencies, ineffective maintenance,
or operational procedures.  It is very important to identify the root
cause of events so that corrective action may be determined.  The
diverse causes of propulsion system problems require different
solutions.  For example, type design problems may affect an entire fleet
of aircraft.  If an individual certificate holder experiences a problem
caused by a type design issue, it may not be appropriate for the FAA to
withdraw ETOPS authority.  Fundamental design problems that require an
effective hardware (or software) final fix will normally be corrected by
an FAA Airworthiness Directive.  Inspections may be satisfactory as an
interim solution but long-term design solutions are required for
terminating action.  However, maintenance or operational problems may be
wholly, or partially, the responsibility of the certificate holder.  In
these cases, the cause would be specific to that certificate holder and
may require changes to their operational, dispatch or maintenance
procedures.  Propulsion system monitoring should be used to ensure that
airplane and engine reliability stay within approximate IFSD rates as
described in the proposed regulation.  

(d) Engine condition monitoring

The certificate holder would have to monitor the condition of engines on
ETOPS airplanes.  The monitoring program would describe the engine
performance parameters to be tracked, method of data collection,
analysis, and corrective action processes.  It would detect
deterioration in engine performance by tracking parameters such as rotor
speeds, exhaust gas temperatures, and fuel flow and to allow for
corrective action before safe operation is affected.  The program should
reflect the manufacturer’s instructions and industry practices. 
Engine limit margins must be maintained so that prolonged engine
inoperative diversions may be conducted without exceeding approved
engine limits at all approved power levels and expected environmental
conditions.  Engine margins are maintained through this program to
account for the effects of additional engine loading demands such as
electrical and pneumatic systems that may be required during a
diversion.  If oil analysis such as Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program
(SOAP) would be relevant, it should be included.

(e) Oil consumption monitoring

The certificate holder would have to establish an engine oil consumption
monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to complete any
ETOPS flight.  The certificate holder’s consumption limit would not be
allowed to exceed the manufacturer’s recommendations, and would have
to be sensitive to oil consumption trends.  The program would have to
track the amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS station with
reference to the running average consumption.   The monitoring must be
continuous up to and including the oil added at the ETOPS departure
station.  For example, after servicing, the oil consumption may be
calculated by maintenance personnel as part of the pre-departure check
or may be automatically calculated by the certificate holder’s
computer software program.  The amount of oil added could also be
reported to centralized maintenance control for calculation prior to the
ETOPS flight. If an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) is required for ETOPS,
then its oil consumption for the 

APU must be included in the program.

(f) APU in-flight start program

If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the certificate
holder would be required to establish an in flight start and run
monitoring program.  The primary function of an APU is to provide backup
electrical power in the event of a main system failure such as engine
in-flight shut down or generator loss.  This program would have to
ensure that the APU in-flight start capability would continue at a level
of performance and reliability established by the manufacturer or the
FAA.  The program would have to be acceptable to the Administrator and
include periodic sampling of each ETOPS airplane’s APU in-flight
starting capabilities.  Certificate holders with existing approved
programs may continue under that authority under this proposal. 
Sampling intervals may be adjusted according to system performance and
fleet maturity.  The Advisory Circular accompanying this proposal
contains guidance for APU reliability and performance assessment.

(g) Maintenance training

The certificate holder would have to develop additional ETOPS specific
training that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is required for
all personnel involved in ETOPS.  This training would be in addition to
the certificate holder’s accepted maintenance training program to
qualify individuals for specific airplane and engines.  This program may
be incorporated into the accepted maintenance training curricula.  The
certificate holder would have to review the entire maintenance-training
program with the CHDO to ensure that it adequately supports ETOPS
training requirements.  The goal of this program is to ensure that all
personnel involved in ETOPS are provided the necessary training so that
the ETOPS maintenance requirements are properly accomplished.

The program must establish a system to qualify ETOPS maintenance
personnel.  ETOPS qualified maintenance personnel are those who have
successfully completed the certificate holder’s ETOPS training program
and who have satisfactorily performed extended range tasks under the
direct supervision of an FAA certificated maintenance person who has had
previous experience with maintaining the particular make and model
aircraft being utilized under the certificate holder’s maintenance
program.  For new aircraft introduction, the previous experience for
training can be obtained from the manufacturers training program.

(h) Procedural changes

Following approval of the maintenance and training procedures
established to qualify for ETOPS; substantial changes to those
procedures must be submitted to the Certificate Holding District Office
(CHDO) and approved before they may be adopted.  The determination of
what constitutes substantial changes should be negotiated between the
certificate holder and the CHDO.  This is to allow some flexibility
depending on the certificate holder’s ETOPS experience and performance
history.  The CHDO may require submission of all changes for a new ETOPS
operator or for an operator experiencing difficulties. However, as
experience is gained the CHDO may reevaluate what changes it needs to
approve.

Continuing Surveillance

As with all other operations, the CHDO may also monitor all aspects of
the ETOPS operations it has authorized, to ensure that the levels of
reliability achieved in ETOPS operations remain at acceptable levels,
and that the operation continues to be conducted safely.  In the event
that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if
significant adverse trends exists, or if critical deficiencies are
detected in the type design or in the conduct of ETOPS operations, the
CHDO may initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions,
and ensure the operator adopts corrective actions in order to resolve
the problems in a timely manner.  The CHDO should alert the appropriate
FAA Aircraft Certification Office and Aircraft Evaluation Group when
problems associated with airplane design or operations are identified.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.415(a)(4) Crewmember and dispatcher training
requirements.

The FAA proposes to add a new requirement to train crewmembers and
dispatchers in their roles and responsibilities in the certificate
holder’s passenger recovery plan to the certificate holder’s
approved training program.

Explanation.

Crewmember and dispatcher involvement in seeing to the welfare of
passengers following a diversion often is an important factor in the
success of post diversion passenger handling.  With ETOPS and the
possibility of diversion to a remote foreign airport with reduced
services and facilities available for passenger welfare, it is
increasingly important that the certificate holder have a passenger
recovery plan and that crew members and dispatchers understand their
role in that plan. Current regulations do not require training for
crewmembers or dispatchers in their role in a certificate holder’s
passenger recovery plan.  The role of the crewmembers and dispatchers
must be defined and the training program tailored around those defined
roles.

Proposed Change to Paragraph 121.565(a) Engine inoperative: Landing;
reporting   REF R121_565aEngineInoperativeLanding \p \h  \* MERGEFORMAT 
below 

Explanation.

The FAA proposes a minor revision to paragraph 121.565(a) to delete the
reference to stopping the rotation of an engine, which applies only to
propeller driven airplanes.  This is to be replaced with terminology
…“ whenever an engine is shut down…” that applies to all
reciprocating engines and turbine powered engines.

Proposed New Section 121.624 Dispatch Requirements for an ETOPS
Alternate Airport

The FAA proposes to add a regulation, which specifies the dispatch
requirements for an ETOPS alternate, and the requirements for a valid
ETOPS alternate after takeoff.

Explanation.

Most airplanes operate in an environment where there is usually a choice
of diversion airports available within a close proximity to the route of
flight.  The available airports usually have significant infrastructure
and facilities for routine handling of aircraft, crews, and passengers. 
An airplane conducting ETOPS may have only one alternate within a range
dictated by the endurance of a particular airframe system (for example,
cargo fire suppressant) and therefore the approved maximum diversion
time for that route.  Additionally, the alternates maybe isolated and
less completely equipped to deal with passenger aircraft.  Therefore, it
is important that any airport designated as an ETOPS alternate has the
capabilities, services and facilities to safely support the airplane and
its passengers and crew during the diversion.  Section 121.624

A regulatory requirement for an ETOPS alternate meets a prudent planning
requirement for an en route diversion alternative for all long-range
aircraft in the event an engine failure, an airplane system failure or a
serious passenger problem.  A new regulation is required to specify the
dispatch and en route requirements for ETOPS alternates.  In addition,
past experience in ETOPS operations of twin-engine aircraft with en
route diversions for reasons other than engine failure justify the
imposition of a requirement to designate en route alternate for all
long-range operations with airplanes with two or more engines.  The
additional operational challenges of these routes are equally demanding
of all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, and include such
issues as extremes in terrain and meteorology, as well as limited
navigation and communications infrastructure.

At dispatch, an enroute alternate must meet the alternate weather
requirements specified in the certificate holder’s operations
specifications.  Due to the natural variability of weather conditions
with time, as well as the need to determine the suitability of a
particular enroute alternate prior to departure, such requirements are
higher than the weather minimums required to initiate an instrument
approach.  This is necessary to assure that the instrument approach can
be conducted safely if the flight must divert to an alternate airport. 
The visual reference necessary to safely complete an approach and
landing is determined, among other things, by the accuracy with which
the airplane can be controlled along the approach path by reference to
instruments and the accuracy of the ground-based instrument aids, as
well as the tasks the pilot is required to accomplish to maneuver the
airplane so as to complete the landing.  For these reasons the weather
minima for non-precision approaches are generally higher than for
precision approaches.

The weather conditions at the time of arrival should provide a high
assurance that adequate visual references are available upon arrival at
decision height (DH) or minimum descent altitude (MDA), and the surface
wind conditions and corresponding runway surface conditions must be
within acceptable limits to permit the approach and landing to be safely
completed with an engine and/or systems inoperative.

The proposed section (d) would require operators to designate only those
airports as ETOPS alternates that adequately protect the passengers and
crew from the elements and see to their welfare.

Proposed Change to Section 121.625 Alternate airport weather minimums

Explanation.

The purpose of the proposed amendment to section 121.625 is to clarify
the intent of this regulation as being applicable to destination and
takeoff alternates only and not to ETOPS alternates requirements. ETOPS
alternate requirements are the subject of proposed new regulation,
section 121.624 ETOPS Alternates.

Proposed Change to Section 121.631 Original dispatch or flight release,
redispatch or amendment of dispatch or flight release 

The FAA proposes to modify section 121.631 to specify weather
requirements for ETOPS alternates while a flight is en route and the
availability of the option to amend the dispatch or flight release to
add another ETOPS alternate if a required ETOPS alternate becomes
unavailable.

Explanation.

The FAA proposes to modify section 121.631 to address weather
conditions required at designated ETOPS alternates while a flight is en
route.  This regulation is consistent with the standards and practices
of AC 120-42A, the advisory circular that provided guidance for ETOPS
since 1985.

The proposed regulation also specifies the action required of the pilot
in command and, in the case of flag operations, the dispatcher, in the
event a required, designated alternate becomes unavailable and no other
qualifying airport is available.  In that event, the flight may not
continue as an ETOPS flight unless another track that qualifies is
available.  The FAA recognizes that this may sometimes cause disruptions
in scheduled operations and anticipates that carriers will adjust the
enroute alternate weather minimums upward on routes on which this
becomes more than a very infrequent problem.

Proposed New Section 121.633 Planned ETOPS diversion time limitations

The FAA proposes to add new regulation section 121.633 to require that
planned ETOPS diversion times not exceed the time limit specified in the
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) for the airplanes most time-limited system
minus 15 minutes.  For airplanes with more than two engines and type
certificated before the effective date of this regulation, the effective
date for compliance with paragraph 121.633(b) is proposed to be not
later than six years following the date on which this rule becomes
effective.

Explanation.

Section 121.633 has been developed to codify the two-engine airplane
operating practices with regard to diversion time and time critical
systems and to expand those regulations to include airplanes with more
than two engines in long-range operations.

The premise of ETOPS has been to preclude a diversion and, if it were to
occur, to have programs in place that protect the diversion.  Under this
concept, propulsion systems are designed and tested to assure an
acceptable level of in-flight shutdown; other airplane systems are
designed and tested to ensure their reliability.  However, despite the
best design/testing, and maintenance practices, situations have occurred
which required an airplane to divert.  In-service data has also shown
that all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, divert from
time to time for various causes.  Airplanes with more than two engines
currently are operated in areas where there are a limited number of
enroute airports, where the support infrastructure is marginal or with
challenging weather conditions.  All such operations should adopt the
same ‘preclude and protect’ concept.

Under the ‘preclude and protect’ concept, various failure scenarios
need to be considered.  For example, during the design of the airplane,
time limited systems such as cargo compartment fire
suppression/containment capability are considered.  The fuel planning
process accounts for the possibility of decompression and/or the failure
of an engine with considerations for icing.

If airplanes with more than two engines plan to operate in areas where
en route airports are farther than 180 minutes or in north polar areas
where weather conditions can be challenging at certain times of the
year, these operations should be required to meet the standards to
ensure that all efforts are made to preclude a diversion and, if a
diversion were to occur, procedures are in place to protect that
diversion.  This would include systems capability to protect the
aircraft and its occupants during the entire length of the diversion. 
As such, for ETOPS operations less than 180 minutes the one engine
inoperative cruise speed maximum diversion time to any ETOPS alternate
may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
for the airplane’s most time-limited system, minus 15 minutes.  The 15
minutes allows time for approach and landing.  The cruise speed is
calculated as if in still air under standard temperature conditions.

In ETOPS operations wind becomes an increasingly significant factor with
increasing diversion times and should be considered in ETOPS operations
beyond 180 minutes to assure that AFM system time limits are not
exceeded.  For example, while diverting with an engine inoperative, it
is essential to ensure that there is sufficient amount of oil in the
tank for continuous operation of the remaining engines at Maximum
Continuous Thrust for the actual duration of divert.  As a result, for
ETOPS operations with approved diversion times greater than 180 minutes
the one engine inoperative cruise speed (approved) maximum diversion
time is calculated by taking into account forecast wind and temperature.
 The maximum diversion time may not exceed the time specified in the
airplane flight manual for the airplane’s most time-limited system,
minus 15 minutes for approach and landing.

However, there are some other time limited systems, like cargo fire
suppression, which may not have as much relevance to the one engine
inoperative diversion time.  The FAA believes that the likelihood of an
engine failure at the critical point followed by cargo fire to be
extremely remote.  Thus ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo fire suppression
requirement would be based on covering the diversion distance authorized
(maximum diversion time authorized at the approved one engine
inoperative speed) at the all engine operating speed.  It has already
been stated that for ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes wind becomes an
increasingly significant factor with increasing diversion times and
should be considered.  Therefore this proposed rule requires that for
ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo fire suppression time required be based
on the airplane operating at all engine operating speed with actual
wind.  For ETOPS at or below 180 min, there is precedent in AC 120-42,
for cargo fire suppression for the maximum diversion time based on one
engine inoperative speed.  This proposal would codify that practice. 
The cargo fire suppression time in all cases shall also include 15
minutes allowance for holding, approach and landing.

During development of their recommendation the ARAC ETOPS Working Group
had much discussion regarding aircraft utilized in long haul operations.
 Some three and four-engine airplanes routinely operate on routes with
diversion times that exceed aircraft system capabilities such as cargo
fire suppression.  The FAA believes equivalent cargo fire suppression
capabilities should exist among the entire fleet of airplanes conducting
ETOPS.  The proposed regulation would require the modification of those
airplanes.  The FAA recognizes that a transition period to gain full
compliance with the proposed rule is necessary for the industry.  The
FAA finds that these modifications can be accomplished within the
scheduled maintenance D check cycle (6 years) based on ARAC
recommendations.  This proposal would grant the operator sufficient time
to adequately plan for and incorporate necessary modifications in the
6-year time frame proposed.  

The FAA recognizes this proposal would allow three and four engine
airplanes to continue to operate on routes with diversion times up to
and including 180 minutes without having to update time-limited system
capabilities.  The FAA seeks comment on how it should address this
discrepancy in the future.

Proposed New  Section 121.646 Fuel supply required following
depressurization

We propose to add a new rule, section 121.646, to specify the fuel
supply required following depressurization.  Current regulations contain
no requirement for a fuel supply sufficient to reach an en route
diversion airport.

Explanation.

ICAO Annex 6, Part I, section 4.3.6.4(d) requires consideration of
additional fuel in the event of loss of pressurization.  Fuel
consumption increases considerably at the lower altitudes flown
following a loss of pressurization.  Although section 121.329 requires
descent following cabin depressurization “to an altitude that will
allow successful termination of the flight,” there is no explicit
requirement in part 121 for a fuel supply in the event of cabin
depressurization to assure a safe landing.  It should be noted that an
interpretation can be made that fuel to provide for cabin pressurization
is required because of the requirement of section 121.329.

Both AC 120-42 and 120-42A considered the fuel supply required at the
most critical point in the ETOPS area of operation in the event of the
cabin depressurization, and also considered the possibility of a
simultaneous failure of an engine.  As the probability of
depressurization is comparable between two, three, and four-engine
airplanes , the proposed section 121.646 would retain the AC conditions
for fuel supply to an ETOPS alternate in the event of cabin
depressurization for all ETOPS operations.

For airplanes with more than two engines the section 121.329 implied
fuel supply requirement becomes a proposed regulatory requirement. 
Paragraph 121.646(a) applies to operations more than 90 minutes (with
all engines operating at cruising power) and less than 180 minutes (at
the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed) from an adequate
airport, while the requirements in paragraph 121.646(b) apply for
operations greater than 180 minutes (at the approved one engine
inoperative cruise speed) from an adequate airport.

	Further, the AC required consideration of fuel for icing at the cabin
depressurization cruise altitude and consideration of errors in wind
forecasting.  Studies done by the Atmospheric Environment Service of
Canada with the assistance of airplane manufacturers under the second
Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP II) confirm that the probability
of a continuous or repetitive significant icing encounter is very small
on a long flight segment.  The airspeeds associated with cruise at cabin
depressurization altitude are not conducive to ice build-up.  Moreover,
pilots can avoid icing with minor changes in altitude or by changing the
cruise speed, either of which can have a large effect on ice accretion. 
Based on the CASP II study, considering the probability of encountering
depressurization at the critical point and icing on the same flight, an
argument was made that fuel for icing in addition to fuel for
depressurization is not deemed necessary.  However, as a conservative
measure, paragraph 121.646(b)(C)(iv) requires fuel to compensate for the
greater of the effect of airframe icing (including the fuel used by
engine and wing anti-ice during this period) during 10 percent of the
time for which icing is forecast, or a combination of fuel for engine
anti-ice, and for some models of airplanes based on their
characteristics and the manufacturer’s recommended procedures fuel for
wing anti-ice for the time during which icing is forecast.

Based on the weather forecasting techniques of the early 1980s, the AC
required a five percent fuel pad to account for wind forecast errors. 
However, winds aloft forecasting has improved dramatically in the last
twenty years as a result of the following:

·	The sophistication of wind forecast models have experienced a quantum
improvement.  These models provide forecasts based on a wider range of
inputs and more accurate extrapolation throughout the altitude profile.

·	Wind forecasting responsibilities have been assigned to computers
with vastly increased capacity, capability, and speed.

·	The flow of input data has significantly increased; largely as a
result of systems that automatically downlink weather information at
much more frequent intervals.  Additionally, weather is measured on a
worldwide grid of collection points.  This grid has nearly four times
the collection points compared to the grid used previously.

·	Information gleaned from satellite downlinks and satellite depictions
of air mass movement are added to the data stream, not only to fine tune
forecasting at frequently flown altitudes, but also to provide more
accurate forecasts at lower altitudes (10,000 to 15,000 feet) where the
decompression profiles are flown.

This information is collected, analyzed, and distributed worldwide by
the World Area Forecast System (WAFS).  This centralized distribution of
weather information provides for a consistent level of accuracy that can
eliminate the assignment of arbitrary penalties, provided that
individual airlines subscribe to the service and make use of this level
of information.

Therefore, given the documented improvements in forecasting accuracy
when using WAFS, a more accurate means of determining the fuel used
during a decompression profile involves adding a pad to the actual
forecast winds in making the fuel calculation rather than adding an
arbitrary fuel penalty.  The addition of a five- percent wind error pad
provides an accurate case-by-case adjustment as compared with a five-
percent fuel penalty, while preserving the necessary level of safety. 
However, if a certificate holder elects not to use such accurate winds
in the computation of decompression fuel, then the proposed rule will
require the operator to continue applying the five percent fuel pad to
account for wind forecast errors.

Section 121.646 requires accounting for any airplane performance
degradation on the fuel requirement.  In addition, if APU is a required
power source, then its fuel consumption also must be accounted for.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.687(a)(6) Dispatch release: Flag and
domestic operations

We propose to add new paragraph 121.687(a)(6), which would add the ETOPS
approval basis to the content of the dispatch release under which the
flight is being dispatched.

Explanation.

The proposal assures that the pilot in command of an ETOPS flight is
notified as to the time basis, (for example, 120 minute or 180 minute
ETOPS) including the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) limitations, under
which the flight is dispatched.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.689(a)(8) Flight release form: Supplemental
operations

The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph 121.689(a)(8) to add the ETOPS
time basis to the content of the flight release of each ETOPS flight.

Explanation.

The proposal assures that the pilot in command of an ETOPS flight is
aware of the limitations (for example, 120 minute or 180 minute ETOPS)
including the minimum Equipment List (MEL) limitations, under which the
flight is released.

Proposed New 14 CFR 121 Appendix O Requirements for ETOPS Approvals

Appendix O to Part 121 would establish the operational requirements and
limitations for the various ETOPS diversion time thresholds and areas of
ETOPS applicability.  In very general terms, Appendix O would codify
existing approvals and operational practices that have been developed
since 1985 and it would also establish requirements for ETOPS flights
that certificate holders may elect to operate in the future.  These
latter ETOPS flights would have diversion time bases exceeding 180
minutes and are not authorized at this time.  The FAA points out again
that 207-minute ETOPS flights are an extension of the 180-minute
authority and not an independent diversion time authority.

A. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with 2 engines

(a) 75 Minutes ETOPS

The proposed 75-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification of
the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A.  This deviation authority
has traditionally been used for operations in the Caribbean, Western
Atlantic, and less frequently, in the North Atlantic areas of operation.

(b) 90-minute ETOPS (Micronesia).

This ARAC recommendation for a new diversion authorization is to
establish a 90-minute ETOPS authority for exclusive use on Micronesia
routes.  This geographical area has been served with ETOPS approved
airplanes with operational authority to dispatch at 120-minutes.  The
only difference between the proposed 90-minute level in comparison to
120-minute ETOPS is to require the ETOPS pre-departure check on the
outbound segment only.  The nature of flights to serve this area
involves destinations to islands at frequencies such that it becomes
unreasonable for the operator to have an ETOPS certified mechanic
stationed at the arrival location.  An alternative means is for the
operator to carry on board each flight a certified ETOPS mechanic that
would conduct the ETOPS pre-departure check prior to the return to the
return flight.  This option is an inefficient use of a certified
mechanic.  The Micronesia route structure is such that it lies beyond a
75-minute authority (which would allow for the operation to be conducted
without requiring the ETOPS pre-departure check for the return flight),
but short of requiring the full 120-minute diversion.  The Micronesia
area in terms of weather and airport availability is similar to the area
associated with ETOPS conducted in the Caribbean area.

The FAA proposes to allow for a 90-minute ETOPS diversion authority for
use in Micronesia routes provided that the airplane is type design
approved, and configured to the CMP standards for 120-minutes.  The
operations are to be conducted to 120-minute ETOPS standards and
requirements and MEL requirements, with the exception that the ETOPS
pre-departure check will not be required for the return leg of the round
trip flight.

(c) 120 minutes.

The FAA proposed 120-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A.  The airplane and
engine combination would have to be ETOPS type design approved for a
minimum of 120-minutes and configured to the standards specified in the
CMP document.  All flight operations dispatched or released to
120-minute ETOPS standards would have to comply with MEL requirements
specified for the operation.

(d) 138 Minutes.

The FAA proposed 138-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that is specified in the 138-minute ETOPS policy letter.
 No changes to the present existing requirements are proposed. 
Operators may request 138-minute ETOPS operational approval on an
airplane engine combination that has an ETOPS type design approval of
120-minutes provided that the airplane engine combination has been
assessed by the FAA for the extended diversion length.  In such cases
the dispatch authority may only be exercised on a flight-by-flight
exception basis.  The operator will be required to amend and use a MEL
that has been amended to include those items that are specified for
operations beyond 120-minutes.  Operators approved to conduct 138-minute
ETOPS with an airplane and engine combination that has 180-minute ETOPS
type design approval may to so without any restriction to frequency of
use.  The operator must dispatch or release such flights in accordance
with the MEL provisions for ETOPS beyond 120 minutes.

(e) 180 Minutes.

The FAA proposed 180-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A.  The airplane and
engine combination would have to be ETOPS type design approved for a
minimum of 180-minutes and configured to the standards specified in the
CMP document for 180-minutes.  All flight operations dispatched or
released to 180-minute ETOPS standards would have to comply with MEL
requirements specified for the operation.

(f) Greater than 180 minutes

The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendations to include the increased ETOPS
diversion authorizations beyond 180-minutes.  ETOPS beyond 180 minutes
has been in use on a limited, flight by flight exception basis, since
March 2000 with the issuance of the 207-minute ETOPS policy.  The
industry has demonstrated its capability to maintain the necessary
engine and systems reliability for such operations using the B-777
airplane.  Certain geographical areas of the world have few adequate
airports along flight routing, and are separated by a distance that is
farther than what could be flown within 180-minutes.  Other geographical
areas have severe weather patterns and weather systems that at times
would not allow for the designation and use of area airports as ETOPS
alternates.  In these cases the air carrier would benefit with better
dispatch reliability and added safety of the flight with the ability to
flight plan with diversion times that exceed 180-minutes to avoid
exposure to such conditions.  

The authority for this increased diversion distance flight planning is
dependent on the demonstrated capability of the operator’s ETOPS
program, and the use of an airplane and engine combination that is
approved for such operations.  The FAA therefore proposes that
eligibility of an air carrier to conduct ETOPS beyond 180 minutes will
be dependant on the air carrier already having ETOPS approval to conduct
180-minute ETOPS with the requested airplane and engine combination.  It
will therefore not be possible for the air carrier to bypass the
180-minute ETOPS approval process before making application for ETOPS
approvals beyond 180-minutes.

Air carriers that are authorized to conduct ETOPS beyond 180-minutes
will be required to consider all available airports that are within
180-minutes of the routing being planned for use as ETOPS alternates. 
This is to minimize the dispatch diversion time to 180-minutes when
possible, and thereby minimizes the risk of the extended exposure when
possible.  The proposed rule in Appendix O requires that:

“In conducting all such operations, operators shall make every attempt
to minimize diversion time along the preferred track and plan ETOPS at
maximum diversion distances of 180 minutes or less.  If conditions
prevent the use of adequate airports within 180 minutes as ETOPS
alternates, the route may be flown beyond 180 minutes subject to the
requirements provided for the specific area of operations.”  

In March 2000 the FAA implemented the 207-minute ETOPS policy that
required certain airplane system capabilities and that specific
equipment be operable at time of dispatch or flight release for a
207-minute planned route.  This included enhanced communication
capability with the use of SATCOM, or with the use of SATCOM data link. 
It also required that the flight crew before entering the extended range
entry point receive company communication to update the flight plan
information based on a review of the airplane status and systems
capability, as well as an update on all available alternates along the
flight route.  For airplane capabilities, single engine autoland is
required to be operative at dispatch for a 207-minute ETOPS flight.  The
policy letter also specified additional system and equipment operability
that cannot be deferred for such operations through the use of a minimum
equipment list (MEL).  This includes the fuel quantity indicating system
(FQIS), the auxiliary power unit (APU) to its full electrical and
pneumatic designed capability, and the autothrottle system.

The ETOPS ARAC recommended that the additional requirements that were
introduced by the FAA for 207-minute ETOPS continue as requirements for
all ETOPS diversion authorizations greater than 180-minutes.  The FAA
accepts the recommendation.

(1) North Pacific

ETOPS authority for the North Pacific area of operation is a
codification of the FAA 207-minute ETOPS policy letter.  This authority
allows on a flight by flight exception basis flight planning to an ETOPS
alternate up to 207-minutes, when an ETOPS alternate within 180-minutes
is not available.  As with the previous 207-minute ETOPS policy, this
exception is limited to circumstances such as political or military
concern, volcanic activity, airport weather below dispatch requirements,
temporary airport conditions and other weather related events.  The
airplane and engine combination must as a minimum be ETOPS type design
approved for 180-minutes and configured to the standards specified in
the CMP document for 180-minutes.  All flight operations dispatched or
released to 207-minute ETOPS standards have to comply with an approved
MEL required for 180-minutes that includes the additional items
specified in this part for operations beyond 180-minutes.  In all cases,
the time required to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS alternate or
alternates, at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, in
still air and standard day temperature, may not exceed the time
specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane’s most time
limited system time minus 15 minutes.  This means that the most time
limiting system on the airplane used for a 207-minute ETOPS flight
cannot be less than 222-minutes.

(2) Polar Area (North Pole) and North of NOPAC

This authorization for use in the North Pole allows for a diversion
authority of 240-minutes on a flight-by-flight exception basis.  This
dispatch authority may be used when the area experiences temporary
extreme weather conditions that cause airport closures, extreme cold
temperatures, or weather below dispatch minimums.  Consideration for
other weather related conditions and events such as volcanic activity
that are particular to this area of the world may be given.

The operator will be required to establish criteria to be used when
flight planning in order to determine if the use of a 240-minute
authority is appropriate in order to designate an ETOPS alternate. 
These criteria and procedures developed must be accepted by the FAA and
published in the certificate holder’s manual for the use of
dispatchers and pilots.

For such operations, the airframe and engine combination must be type
design approved for a minimum of 240 minute ETOPS and configured to the
standards as specified in the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures
(CMP) Standard for such operations.  For such operations, the
requirements in paragraph C, Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS
beyond 180 minutes North of the NOPAC area, of this appendix apply.

(3) 240 minutes Area of Operations

There are several geographical areas that have few airports available
for use as an ETOPS alternate, and those airports are situated at a
distance beyond what could be flown in 180-minutes.  These areas include
the Pacific oceanic areas between the US west coast and Australia, New
Zealand and Polynesia; the south Atlantic oceanic areas; the Indian
Oceanic areas; and the oceanic areas between Australia and South
America.  The FAA proposes that a diversion authority of up to
240-minutes be established for use in these geographical areas. 
Operators that apply for this authority must have as a prerequisite
180-minute ETOPS authority and experience with the requested airframe
and engine combination.

When planning flight routes in these areas, the operator will be
required to designate the nearest available ETOPS alternate along the
planned flight route, and always within a maximum of 240-minutes. 
Whenever possible along the planned route, designated ETOPS alternates
should be within 180-minutes.  In all cases for ETOPS beyond 180
minutes, the time required to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS
alternate(s), at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed,
correcting for wind and temperature, may not exceed the time specified
in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplanes most time limited system
time (except for cargo fire suppression), minus 15 minutes.  The flight
routing must also be within the time required to fly the distance to the
planned ETOPS alternate or alternates, at the all engines operating
cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, that is specified in
the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane’s cargo fire suppression
system time minus, 15 minutes.

For such operations, the airframe/engine combination must be type design
approved for a minimum of 240 minute ETOPS and configured to the
standards as specified in the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures
(CMP) Standard for such operations.

(4) Beyond 240 minutes Area of Operations

The FAA proposes a new ETOPS diversion limit that is beyond 240-minutes.
 This authority would be available only to those operators that have
considerable experience with ETOPS, including operations with routes
requiring 240-minutes ETOPS.  At a minimum, the operator would have to
have 24 consecutive months of ETOPS experience with operations 180
minutes and greater, of which at least 12 consecutive months were at
240-minute ETOPS on the airframe and engine combination for which the
authority is requested.

There are only a few routes that would require a diversion time greater
than 240-minutes from an ETOPS alternate.  The geographical areas with
routes that would be best flown with such an authority are the Pacific
oceanic areas between the US west coast and Australia, New Zealand and
Polynesia; the south Atlantic oceanic areas; the Indian Oceanic areas;
the oceanic areas between Australia and South America, and South Pole
area.  The FAA proposes that for such routes, the authority to dispatch
or release a flight that would be more than 240-minutes from an ETOPS
alternate would be granted only for specific city pairs served.  In
planning the route, the operator would be required to always designate
the nearest available ETOPS alternate(s).  In all cases for ETOPS flight
segments that are beyond 180 minutes, the time required to fly the
distance to the planned ETOPS alternate(s), at the approved one engine
inoperative cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not
exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the
airplanes most time limited system time (except for cargo fire
suppression), minus 15 minutes.  The flight routing must also be within
the time required to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS alternate or
alternates, at the all engines operating cruise speed, correcting for
wind and temperature, that is specified in the Airplane Flight Manual
for the airplane’s cargo fire suppression system time minus, 15
minutes.

For such operations, the airframe and engine combination would have to
be type design approved for the maximum authorized ETOPS diversion time.
 All requirements specified in the Configuration Maintenance and
Procedures (CMP) Standard for beyond 240 minute ETOPS would be
applicable to such operations.

B. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with more than 2 engines

The flight planning for long-range flights traversing remote areas with
few airports available for a non-scheduled landing should not be
different because of the number of engines installed.  Flights in all
engine configurations have experienced conditions requiring landings
short of the planned destination.  The conditions included onboard
technical failures, adverse atmospheric flight conditions, and
increasingly, passengers that develop life threatening medical
conditions that require prompt medical care.  The preclude and protect
philosophy that has been a foundation for two-engine airplane ETOPS has
similar application and benefit to flight operations that are conducted
with 3 and 4-engine airplanes.

The FAA proposes that ETOPS practices apply to flights conducted with 3
and 4-engine airplanes on routes where the flight will be more than
180-minutes from an adequate airport.  Operations in any area up to a
maximum diversion time up to 240-minutes (based on the one-engine
inoperative speed flown in still air) may be conducted on a routine
basis.  For all such operations, the nearest available ETOPS alternate
within 240 minutes diversion time must be specified.  If an ETOPS
alternate is not available within 240 minutes, the operator may conduct
the flight by designating the nearest ETOPS alternate on the planned
route that is within the airplanes most time limited system capability
as specified by § 121.633 of this chapter.

On all such operations, MEL limitations for ETOPS apply and in addition,
the Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) and the communication
requirements specified in § 121.99 and § 121.122 as appropriate must
be operational.  The airframe/engine combination must be type design
approved for the maximum authorized ETOPS diversion time.

C. Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS beyond 180 minutes North of
the NOPAC area

The ARAC ETOPS recommendation includes the adoption of the FAA Polar
Policy that was issued March 2001.  Because of extreme cold weather
during the winter months and the limited availability of supporting
services and facilities, it is proposed that the Polar, the area north
of N 78o 00’, be designated as an area of ETOPS applicability.  Except
for intrastate operations within the State of Alaska, ETOPS requirements
would apply regardless of the number of engines or an airplane’s
proximity to an airport.  Support of a necessary diversion and
subsequent recovery in such areas would require the following items to
be addressed by the operator:

(1) Designation and requirements for airports that may be used for
enroute diversions

(2) Recovery plan for passengers at diversion alternates

(3) Fuel freeze strategy and monitoring requirements for Polar
operations

(4) Communication capability for Polar operations

(5) MEL considerations for Polar operations

(6) Training issues for Polar operations

(7) Crew considerations during solar flare activity

(8) Special equipment for Polar operations such as cold weather
anti-exposure suits.

In order to receive authorization to conduct polar operations, the
operator would be required to conduct an FAA observed validation of its
polar program.  As part of the validation, the operator would be
required to exercise its reaction and recovery plan that would be
implemented in the event of a diversion to a designated polar area
alternate airport.

Part 135

Global issues for part 135

Discussion of general issues in part 135

(1) Defining a safe operation for ETOPS

The intent of the proposed amendments to part 135 is to establish ETOPS
safety standards for commuter and on-demand operators that are adapted
for the unique nature of those operations.  Regardless of whether a
commercial flight is operated under part 121 or part 135, the same
safety considerations of ETOPS apply.  The FAA believes that these
proposals would preclude and protect any diversions.

The applicability of ETOPS requirements would differ from part 121 to
part 135.  Part 135 casts a wider net than part 121.  Part 135 operators
range from one or two person companies operating a single Cessna 172 to
larger companies that operate fleets of turbojets.  As a practical
matter, these amendments would not affect the vast majority of part 135
operators.  Unlike a typical part 121 operator, a part 135 on-demand
operators may fly on a given route only once or twice in a year.  This
proposal takes into account these differences.

Under this proposal, ETOPS requirement under part 135 would apply to:
(1) flights that operate on routes containing a point greater than 180
minutes from an adequate airport based on a single-engine inoperative
speed in still air and standard conditions; (2) and flights that operate
in designated geographical areas.  In contrast to part 121, there would
be no distinction between airplanes with two engines and those with more
than two engines.

Recent Changes to Part 135

In 1998, the FAA added part 119 to 14 CFR.  This amendment modified the
types of operations permitted in accordance with part 135.  Among the
changes was an allowance for infrequent scheduled operations with
airplanes with 9 or fewer seats and a maximum payload capacity of 7,500
pounds.  These airplanes often do not have the range capability to
operate on routes to which ETOPS requirements would apply to this
proposal.  This proposal would not allow the use of many of these
aircraft in ETOPS even if they are modified with additional fuel tanks
that would give them additional range.  The reason is that range
capability is necessary but not sufficient for ETOPS.  There are other
airplane system capabilities and redundancies that are required for safe
ETOPS flights.  These issues are discussed in further detail in the
following section.

ICAO Standards

This proposal would make part 135 regulations more consistent with
paragraph 4.7.1 of Annex 6 of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs).   That paragraph states: “Unless the operation has been
specifically approved by the State of the Operators, an aeroplane with
two turbine power-units shall not, except as provided in 4.7.4, be
operated on a route where the flight time at single engine cruise speed
to an adequate en-route alternate aerodrome exceeds a threshold time
established for such operations by that State.”  This SARP does not
specify a time threshold for two-engine ETOPS but clearly assumes the
existence of one.  The SARP was written to give signatory States the
flexibility to determine appropriate time thresholds.

Safety Study

In 2000, Robert Breiling of the National Business Aviation Association
(NBAA) conducted a study of airplane accidents between 1964 and 1999. 
This study may be purchased directly from NBAA, 1200 18th Street, N.W.;
Washington, D.C. 20036-2506.  This study revealed that there was not a
single accident with a two-engine airplane in long-range operations. 
Historically the vast majority of airplanes operated in accordance with
part 135 have not had the range capability for routes that would require
ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, thus the FAA never found sufficient safety
justification for proposing rules.

In 1996, manufacturers began delivering airplanes to part 135 operators
that had vastly improved range capability.  These new-generation
two-engine airplanes have ranges up to 6,500 nautical miles and are
capable of operating on routes that would require diversion times in
excess of 180 minutes.  Thus the FAA believes that regulations are
necessary to assure the safe operation of such flights if an operator
elects to conduct them.

Existing FAA Policy.

In 1996, the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) proposed a
regulation that would have limited commercial operations of small
airplanes to less than 120 minutes from an aerodrome, unless
specifically approved by the State authority.  In our response, we
expressed our view that 180-minutes would be the U.S. threshold for
these type of operations.  The FAA disagreed with the JAA 120-minute
threshold because it would have shut down a number of part 135 operators
that have been conducting these operations safely for many years.  By
policy the FAA has not authorized operations beyond 180 minutes for part
135 operators.

(2) Specific Differences between part 121 ETOPS

As noted earlier the ETOPS requirements for part 135 would differ from
those of part 121 due to the differing nature of those operations.  For
instance, the presence of adequate crash, fire and rescue equipment is
an important consideration for part 121 operations, which may operate
many times per year to a single location with a relatively large number
of passengers.  Although adequate RFF service is desirable for any
long-range operations, it is not feasible to require the presence of
crash, fire and rescue equipment at an airport before authorizing an
on-demand operation that may operate only once a year with very few
passengers. Therefore, no such requirement exists in part 135.

Another difference is that part 135 would not identify specific IFSD
rates for authorization.  IFSD rates have less predictive value in small
fleets of airplanes with lower annual cycles that are prevalent among
part 135 operators.

(3) Nomenclature

The issue of nomenclature was controversial among ARAC participants from
the part 135 community.  The consensus decision was the use of the term
ETOPS in lieu of alternatives including Commercial On-Demand Operations
(CODEOPS).  The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendation and proposes to use
the acronym ETOPS defined as Extended Operations for part 135
operations.

(4) Airplane and engine ETOPS Type design and transition period

Type-Design.

No specific type design approval has ever been required by part 25 or
part 33 before an airplane can be flown over long-ranges in accordance
with part 135.  The proposed ETOPS rule was drafted to allow
currently-certified airplanes to operate in accordance with ETOPS
procedures without requiring a new type design approval.  However, when
an operator first applies to the FAA for approval to use a certain
airplane in ETOPS (beyond 180 minutes from an airport), the operator
must demonstrate that the airplane meets certain system and equipment
requirements specified the proposed Appendix H and the guidance
contained in the ETOPS Advisory Circular.  

The proposed changes to airplane and engine certification rules in this
NPRM will apply to any new airplane certified under part 25, regardless
of whether the airplane is to be operated in accordance with part 135 or
part 121.  As newly designed airplanes are granted type-design approvals
incorporating the requirements for ETOPS contained in part 25 or part
33, the flight manual will specify each time-limited system, and the
maximum time that system can safely operate.

Transition.

The proposed rule allows a transition period of eight years from the
date the revised part 25 and part 33 are published during which
certificate holders may continue to add airplanes of current designs to
their part 135 fleets.  After that date, the proposed rule requires that
airplanes added to a certificate holder’s fleet be type-certificated
in accordance with the new ETOPS design requirements.  This method of
transition recognizes the excellent safety record of current airplane
designs, and avoids penalizing certificate holders who may have made
significant capital investments in airplanes.  The length of this
transition period was set at eight years because it is typical of the
time required for a new, long-range turbine-powered airplane to go from
initial design to the time it is commonly available to the majority of
certificate holders.  However, this transition period applies only to
type design.  The transition period will allow manufacturers to produce
newly compliant aircraft and for those aircraft to become readily
available in the aircraft marketplace.  The operational practices
required in part 135 Subpart H would become effective immediately. 
These standards for operation, maintenance and dispatching of ETOPS
would contribute to the continued safe operation of part 135 long-range
aircraft operations.

(5) Approved one-engine inoperative speed

When scheduled air carriers apply for route authority over a route
requiring ETOPS, FAA approves a one-engine inoperative speed for a
specific route flown by that operator in a specific airplane model. 
This speed is then used to determine fuel reserves and maximum diversion
distances for all subsequent flights.  Unlike scheduled air carriers, an
on-demand operator may only operate once over any given route-of-flight,
and they must be able to do so with relatively short notice. 
Flexibility is required for ETOPS conducted in accordance with part 135.
 It is therefore not feasible to require pre-approval of a single
one-engine inoperative speed for certificate holders operating ETOPS on
each route in accordance with part 135.  Instead, when a certificate
holder applies for ETOPS approval, the operator will suggest a range of
speeds within the certified limits for a specific model of airplane. 
The FAA will approve this range of speeds for that operator.  When
planning for a specific flight, the certificate holder will select a
single speed within this range and ensure that this selected speed is
used to determine both fuel reserves and maximum diversion distances.

(6) Polar operations

The increasing use of Polar flights, while creating economic benefits,
has brought new challenges to the extended operations.  Due to these
pressures and to the increasing commonality of all long-range
operations, the data began to show that ETOPS requirements and processes
are generally applicable to all long-range operations including those by
three and four engine airplanes and would improve the safety and
viability of all long range operations.  The FAA polar policy issued
March 2001 provides the requirements for approval to conduct these
operations.  Given the nature of part 135 on-demand operations, it is
conceivable that flights in the designated polar area may occur.  Polar
operations require the designation of airports that may be used in the
event a diversion is necessary, and it requires that the operator have a
passenger recovery plan.  The recovery plan should address the care and
safety of passengers and crew at the diversion airport, and include the
plan of operation to extract the passengers and crew from that airport. 
The certificate holder would have to maintain the accuracy and
completeness of its recovery plan.  As the rule would apply to those
part 135 on-demand operations that can be conducted less than 180
minutes from an airport as well as those operations conducted as ETOPS,
the FAA proposes section 135.98 to be a separate requirement from ETOPS
requirements.  The proposed section 135.98 for polar operations excludes
intrastate operations within the State of Alaska.

FAA general changes to the ARAC proposal for part 135

The following table cross-references the ARAC proposed rules with what
the FAA has proposed in this NPRM.  The ARAC proposal included several
requirements that were in their Advisory Circular, but were not included
in their proposed rules.  The FAA has therefore included these ARAC
Advisory Circular requirements into this NPRM in order to codify the
ARAC proposal.

ARAC Proposal	NPRM 

135 Appendix H  ETOPS	135 Appendix H  ETOPS

Paragraph H Maintenance Program Requirements	Paragraph Maintenance.
Program Requirements

None	H(a) Configuration, Maintenance & Procedures (CMP)

H(a) CAMP	H(b) CAMP

None	H(b)(1) ETOPS Pre-departure service check

H(2)(a) procedures to preclude dual maintenance	H(b)(2) procedures to
preclude dual maintenance

H(2)(b)  verification procedures	H(b)(3) verification program

None	H(b)(4) task identification

None	H(b)(5) centralized maintenance control procedures

None	H(b)(6) ETOPS program document

None	H(b)(7) ETOPS parts control

None	H(b)(8) Enhanced CAS

H(3) reporting requirements	H(b)(8)(a) reporting requirements

H(4) periodic report of engine hours & cycles	None

H(5) corrective action	H(b)(8)(b) corrective action

None	H(c) propulsion system monitoring

None	H(d) engine condition monitoring

None	H(e) oil consumption monitoring

H(2)(c) APU in-flight start program	H(f) APU in-flight start program

None	H(g) maintenance training

None	H(h) procedural changes

Section by section discussion of the proposed changes to part 135

Proposed New Section 135.98 Polar Operations

The FAA proposes a new rule for the conduct of flights in the North Pole
area as defined as the region north of N 78o 00’.

Explanation.

Operations in this defined area, with the exception of intrastate
operations within the State of Alaska, would require specific approval. 
Operators applying for polar authority would be required to address
specific areas identified in proposed paragraphs 135.98(1) through (8). 
All certificate holders conducting polar operations would have to
develop a plan for recovering passengers at designated diversion
airports.  The recovery plan should address the care and safety of
passengers and crew at the diversion airport.

Proposed Change to Section 135.345 Pilots: Initial, transition, and
upgrade ground training 

The FAA proposes to amend section 135.345 by adding subject material to
be included in the pilot training requirement.

Explanation.

The additional training includes ETOPS for those operators that will
have ETOPS authority.  It would also add the requirement for training on
the operator’s passenger recovery plan that would apply for those
operators conducting ETOPS, and those operators conducting non-ETOPS
polar flights.  The recovery plan should address the care and safety of
passengers and crew at the diversion airport, and include the plan of
operation to extract the passengers and crew from that airport.  It is
therefore important that crew members are adequately trained so that
they understand their role in the certificate holder’s passenger
recovery plan.

Proposed New Section 135.364 Multi-Engine airplane Limitations: Maximum
Distance from an airport

The FAA proposes to add a new rule, section 135.364, which establishes
the maximum distance that a multi-engine airplane may be operated from
an airport that meets the requirements of part 135.

Explanation.

The rule would allow flight operations beyond 180-minutes when approved
by the FAA, and conducted to the ETOPS requirements specified in part
135, Appendix H.

Proposed Change to Section 135.411 Applicability

The proposal would add paragraph (d) to require ETOPS operators to
maintain the aircraft under a maintenance program in accordance with
paragraph (a)(2) and the additional requirements of Appendix H of this
part.

Explanation.

The ARAC proposed that part 135 operators could maintain their airplanes
under paragraph 135.411(a)(1) for 9 or less passenger seats with an
approved aircraft inspection program under section 135.419 or under
paragraph 135.411(a)(2) for ten or more passenger seats.  This proposal
differs from ARAC’s proposal in that it would require all part 135
operators to maintain their aircraft in accordance with paragraph
135.411(a)(2).  The FAA does not feel that an inspection program
approved under section 135.419 will support the ETOPS requirement.  A
CAMP approved under paragraph 135.411(a)(2) sets the same foundation to
support ETOPS operations as part 121.

The ARAC recommended periodic reporting of airplane and engine operating
hours and cycles.  The FAA did not include this recommendation because
the information is currently available and reported to the FAA by the
engine manufacturers.

Proposed New Part 135 Appendix H:

Appendix H to part 135 would establish the certification, airplane,
operation and maintenance requirements for ETOPS operations.

A. Definitions:

The FAA proposes to use the following definitions applicable to ETOPS . 
Many of the terms used in the proposed regulatory and guidance material
for ETOPS under this part are unique to these operations.  Requirements
and concepts for ETOPS require precise definition to assure common
understanding and compliance.

1. ETOPS: Extended Operations.

2. ETOPS Dual Maintenance.

B. Certificate Holder Experience Prior to Conducting ETOPS

Safety is enhanced when, prior to conducting ETOPS, a certificate holder
gains operational experience in the type of airplane capable of ETOPS,
and with the operational environment typically encountered on longer
range flights (up to 180 minutes) in areas where airports available for
an enroute diversion are limited.  Typically, this involves prior
operational experience on overwater flights to international areas of
operation in accordance with part 135.

Operators requesting authority to operate ETOPS would have to show
operating experience on international routes with a transport category
turbine powered airplane.  For this particular case, experience with
international operations does not include operations from the 48
contiguous States to Canada and Mexico.  This experience can only be
obtained on extended flight operations that involve oceanic crossings.

A minimum 12 months operating experience is required.  The proposal
allows for up to 6 months credit toward the 12-month requirement for
those operators that were certificated under part 135 or part121 prior
to the effective date of this rule.  Additionally, for operators with
previous ETOPS experience with other airplane types may have that
experience credited in whole, or in part to the 12 month experience
requirement.

C. Airplane Requirements

The proposed regulation would require that airplanes operated in ETOPS
be certificated to the new section 25.1535 standards.  In order to allow
for a smooth industry transition to this requirement for a period of 8
years following the effective date of the new part 25 regulation with
airplanes certificated to the present part 25 standards could be used in
ETOPS if they have specific electrical and fuel system capabilities. 
Such an airplane would have to be found acceptable to the FAA after
consultation with the type certificate holder.  The determination that
an airplane is acceptable for ETOPS is a simply a verification that the
airplane electrical and fuel systems are capable of supporting the
intended operation.  This provision would apply to airplanes added to
the operator operations specifications on or before the date that is 8
years after the new part 25 is in effect.  Airplanes added to the
operating certificate after the 8-year period would have to be
certificated to the new part 25 standards.

D. Certificate holder requirements

The ARAC recommended that part 135 flights conducted under ETOPS
authority be limited to a maximum diversion time of 240 minutes from an
enroute alternate airport, at a speed selected by the certificate holder
from a range of speeds approved by the FAA that is within the
certificated operating limits of the airplane, with one engine
inoperative (under standard conditions in still air).  This was deemed
to be sufficient for the routes that could be expected for an on-demand
type operation.  Having an upper limit would enable an operator to
maintain an operational readiness and the required reliability
especially when these types of operations may occur infrequently.  The
FAA accepts the recommendation and reflects it in the proposed rule.

The proposed rule would require the certificate holder to have the means
and the procedure to allow flight crews to have in-flight access to
current weather and operational information on all enroute alternate,
destination and destination alternate airports proposed for each ETOPS
flight.  By validated ETOPS practices, flights can be launched on the
basis of weather forecasts that are revised and updated while the flight
is enroute.  It is essential that the flight crew be informed and aware
of changing weather as well as airport status.

E. Operational Requirements

The proposed rule would require that the flight crew only plan and
conduct ETOPS on instrument flight rules.  The FAA believes that ETOPS
cannot be conducted safely under visual flight rules.  The flight crew
may not proceed beyond the ETOPS entry point unless the weather and
operating conditions at the required enroute alternate airports are
reviewed and expected to be at or above the operating minimums specified
in the operations specifications during the period in which that airport
may be expected to be used based on expected estimated times of arrival
at that airport.  The planned route of flight may be amended while en
route to allow use of additional enroute alternate airports provided
weather is forecast to be at or above operating minima and the airport
is within the maximum ETOPS diversion time.

In ETOPS operations wind becomes an increasingly significant factor with
increasing diversion times and should be considered in ETOPS operations
beyond 180 minutes to assure that Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) system
time limits are not exceeded.  For example, while diverting with an
engine inoperative, it is essential to ensure that there is sufficient
amount of oil in the tank for continuous operation of the remaining
engines at Maximum Continuous Thrust for the actual duration of divert. 
As a result, for ETOPS operations with approved diversion times greater
than 180 minutes the one engine inoperative cruise speed (approved)
maximum diversion time, taking forecast wind and temperature into
account, to each ETOPS alternate may not exceed the time specified in
the airplane flight manual for the airplane’s most time-limited system
minus 15 minutes (for approach and landing).  However, there are some
other time limited systems like cargo fire suppression, where the use of
cargo fire suppression may not have as much relevance to the one engine
inoperative diversion time.  Data was presented that showed the
likelihood of an engine failure at the critical point followed by cargo
fire is extremely remote.  Hence for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo
fire suppression requirement would be based on covering the diversion
distance authorized (maximum diversion time authorized at the approved
one engine inoperative speed) at the all engine operating speed. 
Therefore this proposed rule requires that for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes
with airplanes equipped with a Class C cargo fire suppression system,
the cargo fire suppression time required be based on the airplane
operating at all engine operating speed with actual wind.

The certificate holder may continue ETOPS with airplanes that lack the
airplane flight manual information regarding time-limited systems (e.g.
cargo fire suppression) for a period not to exceed 8 years from the
effective date of this rule.  See the discussion in the airplane
requirements above.

F. Communications Requirements

The proposal would establish the minimum standard for communication for
ETOPS.  Two independent transmitters and two independent receivers,
appropriate to the planned route, would be required for ETOPS flights. 
At least one of each would have to be capable of voice communication. 
If operating in areas where voice communication is not possible or of
poor quality, alternate systems (data link, SATCOM, etc.) may be used.

G. Fuel Planning Requirements

An airplane should not be released for an ETOPS flight unless it carries
sufficient fuel and oil to meet the requirements of section 135.223, and
any additional fuel that may be determined in accordance with the
critical fuel reserves of this section.  In establishing the critical
fuel reserves, the operator would determine the fuel necessary to fly to
the most critical point and execute a diversion to an ETOPS alternate
under the conditions outlined in paragraph 1(b) of this section for the
critical fuel scenario.  The computed critical fuel reserve would be
compared to the normal section 135.223 fuel requirements for the flight.
 If it is determined by this comparison that the fuel to complete the
critical fuel scenario exceeds the fuel that would be on board at the
most critical point, as determined by section 135.223 requirements,
additional fuel should be included to the extent necessary to safely
complete the critical fuel scenario.

To determine the critical fuel reserves necessary, the operator would
plan on that which is operationally the most critical considering both
time and the airplane configuration, such as one engine inoperative or
all engines running.  For those airplanes that are not certificated to
operate above Flight Level (FL) 450, the flight would also be planned
for failure of the pressurization system to an altitude of 10,000 feet
or at an altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of
section 135.157.  (ICAO Annex 6, Part I, section 4.3.6.4(d) for fuel
planning requires consideration of additional fuel in the event of loss
of pressurization).

The critical fuel scenario would require an immediate descent to the
determined altitude and continued cruise at the planned one-engine
inoperative speed to the enroute alternate and upon reaching the
alternate airport, a descent to 1,500 feet, hold for 15 minutes, and
then conduct an instrument approach and land.

A pad for wind speed error would be required.  Based on the weather
forecasting techniques of the early 1980s, ETOPS critical fuel planning
required a five percent fuel pad to account for wind forecast errors. 
However, winds aloft forecasting has improved dramatically in the last
twenty years as a result of sophisticated wind modeling with super
computers, and weather information that is automatically down linked at
much more frequent intervals.  There are many more collection points, as
well as satellite depictions of air mass movement.  This information is
collected, analyzed, and distributed worldwide by the World Area
Forecast System (WAFS).  This centralized distribution of weather
information provides for a consistent level of accuracy that can
eliminate the assignment of arbitrary penalties, provided that
individual airlines subscribe to the service and make use of this level
of information.  Therefore, given the documented improvements in
forecasting accuracy when using WAFS, a more accurate means of
determining the fuel used during a decompression profile involves adding
a pad to the actual forecast winds in making the fuel calculation rather
than adding an arbitrary fuel penalty.  The addition of a five- percent
wind error pad provides an accurate case-by-case adjustment as compared
with a five- percent fuel penalty, while preserving the necessary level
of safety.  However, if a certificate holder elects not to use such
accurate winds in the computation of decompression fuel, then the
proposed rule will require the operator to continue applying the five
percent fuel pad to account for wind forecast errors.

Consideration of fuel for icing at the cabin depressurization cruise
altitude is also required.  Studies done by the Atmospheric Environment
Service of Canada with the assistance of airplane manufacturers under
the second Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP II) confirm that the
probability of a continuous or repetitive significant icing encounter is
very small on a long flight segment.  The airspeeds associated with
cruise at cabin depressurization altitude are not conducive to ice
build-up.  Moreover, pilots can avoid icing with minor changes in
altitude or by changing the cruise speed, either of which can have a
large effect on ice accretion.  Based on the CASP II study, considering
the probability of encountering depressurization at the critical point
and icing on the same flight, an argument was made that fuel for icing
in addition to fuel for depressurization is not necessary.  However, as
a conservative measure, this section requires fuel to compensate for the
greater of the effect of airframe icing (including the fuel used by
engine and wing anti-ice during this period) during 10 percent of the
time for which icing is forecast, or a combination of fuel for engine
anti-ice, and for some models of airplanes based on their
characteristics and the manufacturer’s recommended procedures fuel for
wing anti-ice for the time during which icing is forecast.

The proposal also requires that the fuel supply be increased by 5
percent to account for deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance
unless the certificate holder has a program established to monitor
airplane in-service deterioration of cruise fuel burn performance and
includes in fuel supply calculations fuel sufficient to compensate for
any such deterioration.

Finally, if the APU is a power source required by this appendix, then
its fuel consumption must be accounted for.

H. Maintenance Program Requirements

(a) Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP).

This type design document establishes the baseline configuration
standard for each specific airplane and engine combination used in
ETOPS.  The importance of the CMP is discussed more fully above in the
discussion of part 25 amendments of this proposal.

(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP)

A CAMP is a comprehensive oversight program to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of an airplane.  A CAMP includes but is not limited to
maintenance tasks, inspection tasks, auditing requirements, and data
analysis.  CAMP is required by section 135.411(a)(2).  The proposed
regulation would expand the scope of CAMP for ETOPS operators to
encompass issues unique to ETOPS.  The following are considered basic
additional elements of a CAMP for an ETOPS operator.

(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check

The pre-departure service check is designed to ensure that ETOPS
significant systems will perform their intended function throughout the
flight.  An ETOPS pre-departure service check would have to verify the
status of ETOPS significant systems. Some certificate holders conducting
ETOPS flights have elected to add other items to their check as a result
of operational experience and knowledge gained through reliability data.
 Regardless of any additional items an operator may add to a check, the
focal point of this check must be inspection, servicing, and maintenance
of ETOPS significant systems.

(2) Dual maintenance

There have been instances of a single mechanic repeating a maintenance
error on multiple systems.  An example of dual maintenance is failing to
install o-rings on engine oil or fuel components on multiple engines. 
Establishing procedures to avoid dual maintenance can minimize the
probability of such errors.  The use of two or more mechanics reduces
the risk of this type of error.  Routine tasks on multiple similar
elements, such as oil and fuel filter changes, should never be assigned
on the same maintenance visit.

However, the FAA is aware that under some limited circumstances, dual
maintenance may be unavoidable.  For instance, a pilot’s report of a
discrepancy on an ETOPS significant system may require maintenance on
one engine at the same time as a scheduled maintenance event for the
other engine.  In such cases, the certificate holder must establish and
follow procedures to mitigate the risk of a common cause human error
jeopardizing the ETOPS flight.

(3) Verification program

The verification program ensures the effectiveness of ETOPS maintenance
actions.  Verification programs are designed to identify any potential
problems and may consist of ground tests, flight tests, use of built in
test equipment (BITE), and other tests as appropriate.  Verification
action must be accomplished following corrective action to an ETOPS
significant system, primary system failure, IFSD or in response to
significant adverse trends.  The certificate holder must establish
procedures to clearly indicate who is going to initiate the action, what
verification action is necessary.  A verification flight may be
performed in combination with an ETOPS revenue flight, provided the
verification phase is documented as satisfactorily completed upon
reaching the ETOPS entry point.

(4) Task identification

ETOPS maintenance programs include numerous tasks.  Under this proposal,
the certificate holder would have to identify specific tasks that must
be accomplished by ETOPS qualified personnel.  These ETOPS-specific
tasks are performed during all phases of maintenance.  On the other
hand, some tasks in an ETOPS maintenance program are identical to tasks
on a non-ETOPS airplane.  The FAA realizes that tasks, such as checking
seat belts prior to a flight, do not involve ETOPS significant systems
and may be performed by non-ETOPS qualified personnel.  ETOPS specific
tasks would either be identified on the certificate holder’s routine
work forms and related instructions or parceled together and identified
as an “ETOPS package.”

(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures

The certificate holder would have to develop and clearly define in their
program ETOPS related procedures, duties, and responsibilities, such as
involvement of centralized maintenance control.  The function of
centralized maintenance control is to be a focal point for operational
aspects of ETOPS maintenance and to ensure that ETOPS aircraft are
airworthy.  Procedures and centralized control processes would be
established which would preclude an airplane being dispatched for ETOPS
flights after a propulsion system shut-down, significant primary
airframe system failure, or significant adverse trends in system
performance without appropriate corrective action having been taken.
Confirmation of corrective maintenance would require appropriate
verification action prior to dispatch on an ETOPS flight.  Depending on
the size and scope of the ETOPS operation, the maintenance control
entity could be an entire department or one ETOPS-qualified individual
for a small operation.  “Centralized maintenance control” is also
referred to as “technical services center”, “maintenance
operations control (MOC)”, and “maintenance coordination center”
among other terms within industry.

(6) ETOPS program document

The certificate holder would have to develop a document that identifies
all ETOPS requirements, including supportive programs, procedures,
duties, and responsibilities for use.  The ETOPS program document would
be for use by personnel involved in ETOPS and would be readily
accessible to those personnel.  This document need not be inclusive but
should at least reference the maintenance program and other
requirements, and clearly indicate where they are located in the
certificate holder’s document system.  The ETOPS program document
would have to be submitted to the CHDO for approval at least 60 days
before beginning ETOPS flights and be subject to revision control.

(7) ETOPS parts control

Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to develop a
parts control program that ensures the proper parts and configurations
are maintained for ETOPS airplanes.  The program should include
procedures to verify that the parts installed on ETOPS airplanes during
parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used
after repair or overhaul, maintains the necessary ETOPS configuration. 
In many cases, certificate holders utilize the Illustrated Parts Catalog
(IPC) as the ETOPS parts controlling document.  However, other methods
may be used provided that the configuration standard of the airplane and
engine is maintained.

(8) Enhanced Continuing Analysis and Surveillance (CAS)

The certificate holder would have to enhance their existing CAS in order
to achieve ETOPS reliability goals.  This program should be designed to
identify and prevent ETOPS related problems.  The program would be
event-oriented and incorporate reporting procedures for critical events
detrimental to ETOPS flights.  Reliability data would have to be readily
available for use by the certificate holder and the FAA to ensure that
an acceptable level of reliability is achieved and maintained.

In addition to the reporting requirements in section 135.415, the
following items would have to be reported within 72 hours to the CHDO.

(a) In-flight shutdowns.

(b) Diversions or turnback.

(c) Uncommanded power changes or surges.

(d) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.

(e) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.

(f) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.

(2) Certificate holders would also be required to furnish the following
information:

(a) Airplane identification (type and N-number)

(b) Engine identification )make and serial number)

(c) Total time, cycles and time since last shop visit.

(d) For systems, time since overhaul or last inspection of the
discrepant unit.

(e) Phase of flight.

(f) Corrective action

This proposed regulation would require certificate holders to conduct an
investigation into the cause of the occurrence of any event listed above
in addition to any event described in section 135.415.  The certificate
holder would have to submit findings and description of corrective
action taken to the CHDO.  The FAA expects certificate holders to
investigate events above in conjunction with manufacturers.  The report
must be submitted in the manner prescribed by section 135.415(e).

(c) Propulsion System Monitoring

Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.  A
propulsion system-monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary.  Propulsion system problems and
IFSD may be caused by type design deficiencies, ineffective maintenance,
or operational procedures.  It is very important to identify the root
cause of events so that corrective action may be determined.

The diverse causes of propulsion system problems require different
solutions.  For example, type design problems may affect an entire fleet
of aircraft.  If an individual certificate holder experiences a problem
caused by a type design issue, it may not be appropriate for the FAA to
withdraw ETOPS authority.  The FAA will normally address by an
Airworthiness Directive fundamental design problems that require an
effective hardware (or software) final fix.  Inspections may be
satisfactory as an interim solution but long-term design solutions are
required for terminating action.  However, maintenance or operational
problems may be wholly, or partially, the responsibility of the
certificate holder.  In these cases, the cause would be specific to that
certificate holder and may require changes to their operational,
dispatch or maintenance procedures.

(d) Engine condition monitoring

The certificate holder would have to monitor the condition of engines on
ETOPS airplanes.  The monitoring program would describe the engine
performance parameters to be tracked, method of data collection, and
corrective action processes.  It would detect deterioration in engine
performance by tracking parameters such as rotor speeds, exhaust gas
temperatures, and fuel flow and allow for corrective action before safe
operation is affected.  The program should reflect the manufacturer’s
instructions and industry practices.  Engine limit margins must be
maintained so that prolonged engine inoperative diversions may be
conducted without exceeding approved engine limits at all approved power
levels and expected environmental conditions.  Engine margins are
maintained through this program to account for the effects of additional
engine loading demands such as electrical and pneumatic systems that may
be required during a diversion.  If oil analysis such as Spectrographic
Oil Analysis Program (SOAP) is meaningful, it should be included.

(e) Oil consumption monitoring

The certificate holder would have to establish an engine oil
consumption-monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to
complete any ETOPS flight.  The certificate holder’s consumption limit
would not be allowed to exceed the manufacturer’s recommendations, and
would have to be sensitive to oil consumption trends.  The program would
have to track the amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS station
with reference to the running average consumption.  The monitoring must
be continuous up to and including the oil added at the ETOPS departure
station.  For example, after servicing, the oil consumption may be
calculated by maintenance personnel as part of the pre-departure check
or may be automatically calculated by a computer program.  The amount of
oil added could also be reported to centralized maintenance control for
calculation prior to the ETOPS flight.  If an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
is required for ETOPS, then its oil consumption must be included in the
program.

(f) APU in-flight start program

If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the certificate
holder would be required to establish an in flight start and run
monitoring program.  The primary function of an APU is to provide backup
electrical power in the event of a main system failure such as engine
in-flight shut down or generator loss.  This program would have to
ensure that the APU in-flight start capability will continue at a level
of performance and reliability established by the manufacturer or the
FAA.  The program would have to be acceptable to the Administrator and
include periodic sampling of each ETOPS airplane’s APU in-flight
starting capabilities.  Certificate holders with existing approved
programs may continue under that authority under this proposal. 
Sampling intervals may be adjusted according to system performance and
fleet maturity.  The Advisory Circular accompanying this proposal
contains guidance for APU reliability and performance assessment.

(g) Maintenance training

The certificate holder would have to develop additional ETOPS specific
training that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is required for
all personnel involved in ETOPS.  This training would be in addition to
the certificate holder’s accepted maintenance training program to
qualify individuals for specific airplanes and engines.  This program
may be incorporated into the accepted maintenance training curricula. 
The certificate holder would have to review the entire
maintenance-training program with the CHDO to ensure that it adequately
supports ETOPS training requirements.  The goal of this program is to
ensure that all personnel involved in ETOPS are provided the necessary
training so that the ETOPS maintenance requirements are properly
accomplished.

The program must establish a system to qualify ETOPS maintenance
personnel.  ETOPS qualified maintenance personnel are those who have
successfully completed the certificate holder’s ETOPS training program
and who have satisfactorily performed extended range tasks under the
direct supervision of an FAA certificated maintenance person who has had
previous experience with maintaining the particular make and model
aircraft being utilized under the certificate holder’s maintenance
program. For new aircraft introduction, the previous experience for
training can be obtained from the manufacturers training program.

(h) Procedural changes

Following approval of the maintenance and training procedures
established to qualify for ETOPS; substantial changes to those
procedures must be submitted to the CHDO and approved before they may be
adopted.  The determination of what constitutes substantial changes
should be negotiated between the certificate holder and the CHDO.  This
is to allow some flexibility depending on the certificate holder’s
ETOPS experience and performance history.  The CHDO may require
submission of all changes for a new ETOPS operator or for an operator
experiencing difficulties.  However, as experienced is gained the CHDO
may reevaluate what substantial changes it needs to approve.

Reporting

The FAA proposes to require certificate holders to report the operating
hours and cycles for each airplane and engine authorized for use in
ETOPS on a quarterly basis to the CHDO and the respective manufacturers.
 These reports would allow the FAA and manufacturers to ensure safe
operations and to anticipate potential problems.  

Continuing Surveillance

As with all other operations, the CHDO may also monitor all aspects of
the ETOPS operations it has authorized, to ensure that the levels of
reliability achieved in ETOPS operations remain at acceptable levels,
and that the operation continues to be conducted safely. In the event
that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if
significant adverse trends exists, or if critical deficiencies are
detected in the type design or in the conduct of ETOPS operations, the
CHDO may initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions,
and ensure the operator adopts corrective actions in order to resolve
the problems in a timely manner.  The CHDO should alert the appropriate
FAA Aircraft Certification Office and Aircraft Evaluation Group when
problems associated with airplane design or operations are identified.

International Compatibility

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable.  The FAA has determined that there are no
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) that correspond to
these proposed regulations.  ICAO SARPS are currently being developed
for ETOPS and we expect that this proposed rule and rules currently
being developed in Europe would affect the ICAO SARPS.  We expect that
there will be some differences between the rule developed in the United
States and the rules developed in Europe.

Economic Summary

Proposed changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses.  First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency must
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.  Second, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities.  Third, the
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. sections 2531-2533) prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.  In developing U.S. standards, this Trade
Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.  Fourth, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-4) requires
agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and
other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million
or more annually (adjusted for inflation.).

In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this proposed rule: 
(1) would have benefits that justify its costs, would be a
“significant regulatory action” as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866, and would be “significant” as defined in
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (2) would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities;
(3) would not constitute a barrier to international trade; and (4) would
not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments,
or on the private sector.  The FAA has placed these analyses in the
docket and summarized them as follows.

Cost Savings

The ability to fly the most direct route between two points results in
time and fuel savings and thus reduces operating costs.  The mileage
savings for a two-engine ETOPS flight can be very significant.  For
example, a two-engine operator approved for 180 minutes flying the Great
Circle Route, the shortest distance between two points on the earth,
between Milan, Italy and Barbados would save over 1,300 nautical miles
compared to a routing staying within 60 minutes of an adequate airport.

Part 121 operators of two-engine airplanes will elect to incur the costs
associated with the higher ETOPS requirements based on their judgment of
whether cost savings would exceed the cost of compliance.  A new
2-engine ETOPS operator operating a single daily roundtrip is estimated
to save 38 minutes per round trip.  This timesaving is based on the
reported timesaving of a current twin-engine Part 121 ETOPS operator
operating a route beyond 180-minutes.  The operator reported that
operating beyond 180-minutes saved 27 minutes on a westbound
trans-Pacific flight and 11 minutes on the return leg.  The annual hours
saved would total approximately 231 hours based on a single daily
roundtrip.  The total annual savings based on hourly operating costs of
$4,500 would be $1,040,000; the ten-year savings would be $10.4 million
or $7.3 million, discounted.  The costs of the proposed rule to this
operator are estimated in the Cost section at $106,500 or $75,900,
discounted.  This operator would have net cost savings of $10.3 million
or $7.2 million, discounted over a 10-year period.

Part 121 operators of three or four-engine airplanes would be required
to make a similar judgment if they elect to fly beyond 180-minutes
ETOPS.  However, the net cost savings would take longer to achieve than
if the rule had not been proposed since there are proposed costs that
are not currently required for three or four-engine airplanes to fly
beyond 180-minutes.  A part 121 operator of a three or four-engine fleet
serving a single route beyond 180-minutes assuming the same time savings
of 38 minutes per round trip and a single daily roundtrip would have
total annual savings of $1,965,000 based on an hourly operating costs of
$8,500.  The ten-year savings would be $19.7 million or $13.8 million,
discounted.  The costs of the proposed rule to this operator are
estimated in the Cost section at $3.7 million or $2.8 million,
discounted.  This operator would have net cost savings of $16 million or
$11 million, discounted over a 10-year period.

Part 135 operators currently are not permitted to operate beyond
180-minutes from an airport meeting minimum requirements but the
proposed rule would allow these operators to do so.  Those that elect to
incur the costs associated with the proposed rule would experience cost
savings attributable to the proposed rule.  The timesaving varies by
route, airplane speed, and prevailing winds.  A part 135 operator with
less fuel capacity would be able to avoid a fuel stop in each direction,
which would result in significant timesaving.  The FAA estimates that a
part 135 operator would save 2 hours of flying time per round trip by
operating beyond 180-minutes.  A part 135 operator with a fleet of four
airplanes, with each airplane operating 12 roundtrips beyond 180-minutes
ETOPS per year would save 96 hours annually or 960 hours over a 10-year
period.  The cost savings associated with the timesaving would total
$9.6 million or $6.7 million, discounted.  The costs of the proposed
rule to this operator are estimated in the Cost section at $1.1 million
or $777,000, discounted.  This operator would experience net cost
savings of $8.5 million or $6.0 million, discounted over a 10-year
period based on an airplane operating cost of $10,000 per hour.

The net cost savings to individual operators are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1-Net Ten-Year Cost Savings to Individual New ETOPS Operators 

	New 2-Engine Operator	3 or 4-Engine Operator	Part 135 Operator

Total Cost savings 	$10,395,000	$19,650,000	$9,600,000

Total Cost 	$     106,500	$  3,676,100	$1,030,400

Net Cost Savings	$10,288,500	$15,973,900	$8,569,600

	Present Cost savings	$7,300,400	$13,800,200	$6,742,100

Present Cost 	$     75,900	$  2,789,200	$   741,100

Net Present Cost Savings	$7,224,500	$11,011,000	$6,001,000

An applicant seeking certification of a new type engine (as opposed to
an applicant seeking a type certificate through an amendment of an
existing type certificate or through supplemental type certificate
procedures) for ETOPS eligibility would realize cost savings under
proposed 33.200(f).  Proposed 33.200(f) would allow the applicant to
interrupt the 3000 cycle engine test required by 33.200(c) to show
compliance with the existing initial maintenance inspection (IMI) test
and inspection required by sections 33.90(a-b).  The applicant would
then resume the ETOPS test to complete the requirements of section
33.200.  Thus the applicant for a new type design engine would only have
to provide one engine to complete the existing IMI test and inspection
and the 3,000-cycle test of the proposed section 33.200(f) rather than 2
engines.  The 3,000-cycle test is estimated in the Cost section to cost
$6.5 million or $6.1 million, discounted.  The FAA requests comments and
data addressing this issue.

Manufacturers of business airplanes do not have direct offsetting cost
savings.  These manufacturers would only voluntarily incur these costs
after making a business decision that they could recoup their costs by
the sale of airplanes capable of operating beyond 180-minutes ETOPS. 
The substantial net cost savings that could be achieved by a part 135
operator operating beyond 180-minutes ETOPS would aid the market demand
for such airplanes by business airplane operators.

The total cost savings to operators are estimated at $1.09 billion over
a ten-year period or $762.3 million, discounted as shown in Table 2. 
These savings are based on the following assumptions:

There are currently 3 2-engine operators flying beyond 180 minutes on an
exception basis.  It is assumed they will routinely fly 231 hours each
beyond 180 minutes.

There are currently 7 “low cost” passenger carriers (AirTran,
America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and Spirit as defined
by the Aviation Daily).  It is assumed each would operate 4 ETOPS
airplanes on a single route.

There are currently 13 U.S. operators of 3-or 4-engine aircraft and it
is assumed each would operate 1 route beyond 180 minutes.

There are 81 Part 135 operators that both meet the proposed aircraft and
maintenance requirements and each would save 96 hours annually.

Table 2 Ten-Year Cost Savings to Operators

Cost-savings to:	 	Cost Savings	Present Value

3 Existing 2-engine Operators

$31,185,000	$21,901,225

7 New 2-engine Operators

$72,054,500 	$50,596,140 

13 3-or 4-engine Operators

$207,660,700 	$143,142,935 

81 Part 135 Operators

$777,600,000 	$546,108,480 

Total Cost Savings	 	$1,089,210,700	$762,255,500 

The net cost-savings to the industry are reduced by the costs incurred
by the operators and manufacturers. These costs are addressed in the
Cost section.  These costs are estimated to be less than the estimated
savings and the net cost-savings to the industry are estimated at $823.9
million or $530.2 million, discounted as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Ten-Year Net Cost-Savings or Costs to Industry

Category 	 	Cost Savings or	Present Value

 

Cost	 

Existing 2-engine Operators

$20,449,500 	$14,341,826 

7 New 2-engine Operators

$72,019,500 	$50,571,560 

13 3-or4-engine Operators

$159,866,200 	$106,879,435 

81 Part 135 Operators

$694,137,600 	$486,079,380 

Reporting and Certification Costs for

	3 models of 3 or 4 engine airplanes

($11,875,500)	($9,797,100)

5 Business Aircraft Manufacturers

($36,065,000)	($33,720,900)

Part 25 costs

 

	5 Business Aircraft Manufacturers

	Part 33 Costs

($50,625,000)	($47,337,500)

Current Part 135 Operators 

	Aircraft Replacement Costs

($24,000,000)	($22,440,000)

 

	 

Total Net Cost Savings	 	$823,907,300 	$530,234,875 

In addition to cost savings to operators there are other benefits of the
proposed rule.

Benefits

Accidents due to diversions are non-existent for twin-engine aircraft
operating under parts 121 or 135 and for more than two engine aircraft
operating under part 121.  The FAA believes the proposed weather
provisions of the rule would reduce the probability of an accident
occurring and the provision requiring rescue fire fighting services at
ETOPS alternate airports would minimize the impact if an accident were
to occur.  In addition, the FAA believes the proposed requirements to
require certificate holders to develop and implement passenger recovery
plans for ETOPS alternate airports would better protect passengers and
crew if a diversion is made for any reason.

Benefits cannot be assigned to specific provisions of the proposed rule;
rather, it is assumed that the proposed revisions would work together to
prevent diversions and to reduce the impact of any diversions that do
occur.  Aviation routes not supported within 180-minute diversion
authority tend to be routes over remote areas of the world that are
uniquely challenging.  The additional operational challenges of these
routes are equally demanding of all airplanes, regardless of the number
of engines, and require all operators to equip their aircraft and train
their personnel to prevent diversions and to minimize the impact of
diversions that do occur.  All operators must support any diversion that
occurs and the subsequent recovery by providing the added planning,
training and expertise demanded by the event.  The FAA believes the
requirements of the proposed rule provide the support and procedures
necessary to minimize the stress on the airplane, crew, and passengers
inherent in a diversion experience.

The FAA believes that the proposed ETOPS requirements would increase the
system reliability of an operator that decides to conduct ETOPS
operations and thus costly diversions could be reduced.  One study that
only addressed the cost of an “irregular” operation, unrelated to an
ETOPS-type diversion, estimated the cost of a single diversion of a
wide-body international flight with passengers having an overnight stay
at another airport at between $89,400 and $181,800.  The estimate is
based on 200 passengers and 400 passengers and includes allowance for
hotel, meals and telephone, aircraft operating costs, lost opportunity
cost, and revenue lost from the diverted flight to passengers switching
to another carrier.  Omitting the opportunity cost would reduce these
estimates by $10,000 resulting in a minimum cost of approximately
$79,000.  The cost of a diversion to a remote site would incur
significant costs since recovery times as long as 48 hours are
anticipated and per passenger costs may exceed the estimate included in
the study.  A worst-case scenario presented by Airbus in a CD labeled
LROPS involves an engine loss and diversion to an airport in Siberia. 
Airbus estimated the recovery costs could be as high as $1 million
including passenger accommodations, chartering an airplane to ferry the
passengers to their destination, chartering an airplane to ferry a
replacement engine, ferrying the repaired airplane to its station, and
loss of airplane use.  The FAA requests comments on the number of
diversions that might be avoided on flights beyond 180-minutes as a
result of the proposed rule and seeks diversion cost data.

Costs

Compliance with the proposed rule is voluntary for all operators,
airframe-engine manufacturers.  Since the decision is voluntary, the FAA
has estimated the cost to current ETOPS operators for the cost of
provisions not incurred by current practices and has estimated the cost
savings and costs to individual operators, and airframe and engine
manufacturers.   The FAA has also estimated the total cost to industry
based on a set of assumptions as to the number of operators and airplane
manufacturers that would voluntarily participate.

The FAA estimates that the cost of the rule to a new entrant part 121
operator of a twin-engine airplane would be approximately $106,500 over
10 years more than the operator would incur under the existing deviation
policy and procedures.  This reflects the cost of preparing and
maintaining passenger recovery plans and maintenance investigation and
resolution costs for a four-airplane ETOPS operation.

A part 121 operator of a three or four-engine fleet serving a single
route beyond 180-minutes would incur costs of approximately $3.7 million
over 10 years.  It is assumed that the route would require a
four-airplane fleet with 60 crewmembers, supported by 2 dispatchers and
20 mechanics.

A part 135 operator seeking authorization to conduct ETOPS operations
beyond 180-minutes would incur costs of approximately $1.0 million over
10 years.  This estimate is based on a fleet of 4 airplanes flown by a
crew of 16 pilots and maintained by 2 certified mechanics, and each
aircraft conducts a monthly ETOPS operation.  The fleet excludes
aircraft with a Class C cargo compartment.  Aircraft with Class C cargo
compartments would add $1.5 million to the cost.  All aircraft are
capable of operating between the West Coast-Hawaii.  Currently 6
operators that are authorized to fly between the West Coast and Hawaii
only operate airplanes that would not be acceptable to the FAA under the
proposed rule.  These operators would have to upgrade to an acceptable
aircraft at an estimated cost of $4 million per aircraft to continue
these flights.

A business aircraft manufacturer would incur reporting and investigation
costs that would be required by the proposed provisions of part 21
estimated at $3.2 million over 10 years.  This expenditure would by
incurred to fund 2 full-time staff for reporting purposes and a
full-time staff member to conduct investigations of incidents.  The
manufacturer would also incur airplane ETOPS certification costs of $7.2
million.  This would consist of design costs of $6 million, and
assessment and validation costs of $1.2 million.  Engine certification
costs that would be required to make an engine ETOPS eligible would cost
$10.1 million.  This would consist of design costs $3.2 million, testing
costs of $6.5 million and establishing engine-monitoring procedures at a
cost of $400,000.  The total cost to a business aircraft manufacturer
for reporting and investigation, and airframe and engine certification
would be $20.6 million.

The manufacturer of an existing three or four-engine airplane would
incur additional reporting costs under part 21 of $1.9 million to
include operators that choose to fly beyond 180-minutes, supplemental
certification costs of $1.9 million to allow operators of existing three
or four-engine airplanes to increase the capacity of the cargo fire
suppression system required for beyond 180-minute ETOPS and other
required costs of $200,000 for a total cost of $4 million.

The quantified costs to all the individual entities affected by the
proposed rule are summarized in Table 4.  The FAA requests comments and
data addressing these estimates.

Table 4- Estimated Ten Year Quantified Costs of Proposed Rule to
Individual Entities

Cost Area	Total Cost	Present Value

Cost to a New Part 121 Twin-Engine ETOPS Operator	 $     106,500	$    
75,900

Cost to a 3 or 4-Engine Operator	$ 3,676,500	$2,789,500

Cost to a Part 135 Operator	$ 1,030,400	$   741,100

Costs to a Business Aircraft Manufacturer for Reporting and
Investigation, and Certification of Airframe and ETOPS-Eligible Engine 
$ 20,560,000	$18,474,500

Reporting and Certification Costs to Manufacturer of 3-4engine airplane
$3,958,500	$3,265,700

In addition, the total cost of the provisions of the proposed rule for
existing two-engine ETOPS operators over a ten-year period beyond those
incurred to comply with the existing policy and guidance is estimated at
$10.7 million or $7.6 million, discounted.

The total costs to the industry are estimated at $265.3 million over a
ten-year period or $217.7 million, discounted as shown in Table 5. 
These costs are based on the following assumptions:

Costs to existing 2-engine operators as shown in the Regulatory
Evaluation

Costs for a single operator, as shown in the Regulatory Evaluation, are
multiplied by the number in the first column for each row to obtain the
Total Cost and Present Value columns.

There are currently 7 “low cost” passenger carriers (AirTran,
America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and Spirit as defined
by the Aviation Daily).  It is assumed each would operate 4 ETOPS
airplanes on a single route.

There are currently 13 U.S. operators of 3-or 4-engine aircraft and it
is assumed each would operate 1 route beyond 180 minutes.

There are 81 Part 135 operators that both meet the proposed aircraft and
maintenance requirements.

There are 3 “makes” of 3- or 4-engine airplanes (B-747, DC-10,
MD-11)

There are 5 “major” business airplane manufacturers serving this
market segment.  (Boeing, Cessna, Gulfstream, Raytheon, and Sabreliner)

There are 6 current Part 135 operators using airplanes that could not be
upgraded to meet the specifications of the proposed rule.  It would cost
each operator approximately $4 million to replace a single airplane to
meet the specifications

Table 5 Estimated Ten-Year Costs to Industry

Costs Incurred by:	 	Total Cost	Present Value

Existing 2-engine Operators

$10,735,500	7,559,400

7 New 2-engine Operators

$745,500 	$531,300 

13 3-or4-engine Operators

$47,794,500 	$36,263,500 

81 Part 135 Operators

$83,462,400 	$60,029,100 

Reporting and Certification Costs for

	 

3 makes of 3 or 4 engine airplanes

$11,875,500 	$9,797,100 

5 Business Aircraft Manufacturers

$36,065,000 	$33,720,900 

Part 25 costs

	 

5 Business Aircraft Manufacturers

	 

Part 33 Costs

$50,625,000 	$47,337,500 

Current Part 135 Operators 

	 

Aircraft Replacement Costs

$24,000,000 	$22,440,000 

 

	 

Total Costs	 	$265,303,400	$217,678,800

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes “as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, to
fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.”  To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the
rationale for their actions.  The RFA covers a wide-range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions.

Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or final
rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.  If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.

However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is not
expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of
the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required.  The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.

This proposed rule would affect airframe and engine manufacturers and
part 121 and part 135 operators engaged in ETOPS operations.  All United
States manufacturers of transport category airplanes exceed the Small
Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,500 employees for
aircraft manufacturers.  Those U.S. manufacturers include: Boeing,
Cessna, Gulfstream, Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and
Sabreliner.  All United States manufacturers of ETOPS-capable engines
exceed the Small Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,000
employees for aircraft engine manufacturers.  Those U.S. manufacturers
include: General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls Royce.  All United
States operators of transport category airplanes that are currently
authorized to conduct 180-minute ETOPS operations exceed the Small
Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,500 employees for
scheduled and non-scheduled air transportation firms.  Those U.S,
operators include: American, American Trans Air, Continental, Delta,
United, US Airways, and UPS.  There are a number of small non-scheduled
part 121 operators that operate 3 or 4 engine aircraft that have the
capability to operate ETOPS flights beyond 180 minutes.  Those operators
include: Atlas, Evergreen, Gemini, Kalitta, Southern Air, Polar, and
World.  There are a number of small non-scheduled part 135 operators
that operate 2 engine aircraft that have the capability to operate ETOPS
flights beyond 180 minutes.  These non-scheduled part 121 and part 135
operators are not required to conduct beyond 180-minute ETOPS
operations.  Those who voluntarily decide to equip their aircraft and
conduct the required training and planning under this proposed rule will
have made their own business decisions that the costs associated with
this NPRM are less than the cost savings of operating beyond 180-minute
ETOPS flights.  The FAA therefore certifies that the proposed rule would
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
operators.  The FAA seeks public comments regarding this finding and
requests that all comments be accompanied with detailed supporting data.

International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. 
Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered
unnecessary obstacles.  The statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
for U.S. standards.

In accordance with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the potential
effect of this proposed rule and determined that it would impose
requirements on airframe and engine manufacturers that both domestic and
foreign firms would have to comply with.  U.S. operators of 3 and 4
engine aircraft that seek authority to operate beyond 180-minutes ETOPS
flight would have to comply with the same proposed equipment and
training provisions regardless of the country of origin of the aircraft
or engine manufacturer.  Also the FAA does not believe that U.S.
operators of 3 and 4-engine airplane would be placed at a competitive
disadvantage to foreign operators of 3 and 4-engine airplane as a result
of this proposed rule.  The FAA seeks public comments regarding this
finding and requests that all comments be accompanied with detailed
supporting data.

The FAA concludes that these proposed requirements would have a neutral
impact on foreign trade and, therefore, create no obstacles to the
foreign commerce of the United States.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among
other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates
on State, local, and tribal governments.  Title II of the Act requires
each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may
result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in
the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be
a “significant regulatory action.”

This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate.  The requirements of
Title II do not apply.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This proposal contains new information collection requirements.  As
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)), the FAA will submit the information
requirements associated with this proposal to the Office of Management
and Budget for its review.  A summary of those requirements follows.

Title: Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes

Summary: The regulations currently prohibit operators of two engine
airplanes from flying more than one hour from an adequate airport.  The
NPRM would codify current practices that permit certificated air
carriers to obtain approval under the Administrator’s deviation
authority to operate two-engine airplanes further than one hour from an
adequate airport.  It would also add regulations for ETOPS for all
carriers regardless of the number of engines.  ETOPS is voluntary for
operators and manufacturers.

Use of the information:  This rule is necessary to support the following
elements of the FAA’s strategic plan:

Global leadership- The worldwide aviation industry is interested in
extended operations.  Civil aviation authorities of other countries and
international aviation organizations are carefully watching the FAA’s
efforts to develop rules to govern extended operations.  This proposed
rule will enhance worldwide air travel safety and efficiency.

System efficiency- Allowing extended operations allows operators to take
more direct routes to long-range destinations and improves overall
system efficiency.

Safety- The proposed rule addresses the safety aspects of extended
operations.

Respondents:  The likely respondents to this proposed information
requirement are airplane manufacturers and air carriers who wish to
operate on routes that go more than one hour from an adequate airport.

Frequency:  Initial authorization and additional annual requirements.

Annual Burden Estimate:

This collection of information includes four areas:

1. Operators who elect to use the ETOPS alternative would have to
prepare a passenger recovery plan applicable to each ETOPS alternate
airport listed in the carrier’s operations specifications.  The FAA
estimates that the initial preparation of such plans would require 100
staff hours, and to keep the plans up-to-date and viable would expend an
additional 50 hours annually.

2. Operators are required under 121.703 to file mechanical reliability
reports concerning the failure, malfunction, or defect for 17 areas. 
This proposal, however, would require that operators investigate certain
failures and submit findings and corrective actions acceptable to the
FAA.  The FAA believes that there is a 5% probability of such a failure
that would require additional reporting, and that such action could be
resolved in two staff days.

3. Section 121.374 would require each certificate holder operating
beyond the 180-minutes to have an ETOPS maintenance program in addition
to the program currently required by 121.367.  The program consists of
18 areas, including manual preparation, establishing procedures, and
conducting training.  The FAA estimates that it would take 3 months to
develop.  

4. Section 121.374 would require the certificate holder to develop and
write procedures for a pre-departure check.  The FAA estimates that it
would take 6 weeks to develop this check.  In addition, the carrier must
develop and write procedures for identifying ETOPS specific procedures,
which is estimated to take 8 hours.  Carriers must also supplement their
existing reliability program; estimated time to complete is 100 hours.

Each of these four areas is covered under three types of operators: 
2-engine, 3-4 engine, and business jets.  In addition, there are
reporting requirements for parts 21, and 25 certification requirements. 
The burden is estimated based on the assumption that there will be 7 new
2-engine ETOPS Part 121 operators, 13 Part 121 3-or 4-engine operators
and 81 business jet operators.  Since many aspects of the proposed rule
are voluntary the actual burden may vary significantly.  The hours and
costs per hour break down as follows:

Two-engine operators:

Passenger recovery plans – For current operators using ETOPS, estimate
19 plans x 100 hours x $75 = $142,500 for the initial plan.  Thereafter,
operators would spend 40 hours annually reviewing and validating the
plan for a total 10-year cost of  $655,000.

Initial development = 100 hrs x 19 plans = 1900 hours

Initial cost = $142,500

Recurring hours = 40 hrs x 19 plans x 9 years = 6840 hours

Recurring cost = $513,000

Total Hours = 8,740

Total Cost = $655,500

For estimated 7 new ETOPS operators:

Initial development = 100 hrs x 7 plans = 700 hours

Initial cost = $52,500

Recurring hours = 40 hrs x 7 plans x 9 years = 2520 hours

Recurring cost = $189,000

Total Hours = 3220

Total Cost = $241,500

Reporting failures and findings:

For existing operators:

Initial =16 hrs x 1,400 incidents= 22,400 hours x $45 = $1,008,000

Total over 10 years = 224,000 hours x $45 = $10,080,000

For estimated 7 new operators:

Initial = 16 hours x 7 operators x 10 incidents per = 1,120 hours x $45
= $50,400

Total over 10 years = 11,200 hours = $504,000

3- or 4-engine airplanes:

Passenger recovery plans

For estimated 13 new ETOPS operators

Initial development = 100 hrs x 13 plans = 1,300 hours

Initial cost = 1,300 hours x $75 = $97,500

Recurring hours = 40 hrs x 13 plans x 9 years = 4680 hours

Recurring cost = $351,000

Total Hours = 5,980

Total Cost = $448,500

ETOPS Maintenance Program:

For estimated 13 new ETOPS operators

Program document: 

One time cost of 520 hours x 13 = 6760 hours x $85 = $574,600

Pre-departure check program:

240 hours x 13 = 3,120 hours x $85= $265,200

ETOPS specific procedures:

8 hours x 13 = 104 hours x $85 = $8,840

Reliability program:

200 hours x 13 = 2600 hours x $85 = $221,000

Pre-departure service check:

2 hours x 3 planes x 360 days x 13 = 28080 hours x $45 = $1,263,600 

Total Hours = 280,800

Total Cost = $12,636,000

Reporting failures and findings

16 hours x 10 incidents x 13 = 2080 hours x $45 = $93,600 

Total Hours = 20,800

Total Cost = $936,000

Training

Initial Training

44 hours x 20 mechanics x 13 = 11440 hours x $45 = $514,800 

16 hours x 20 pilots x 13 = 4160 hours x $173 = $719,680

4 hours x 40 flight attendants x 13 = 2080 hours x $52 = $108,160

12 hours x 8 dispatchers x 13 = 1248 hours x $38 = $47,424

Total Hours = 18,928

Total Cost = $1,390,064

Recurrent Training

1 hour x 20 mechanics x 13 x 9 = 2340 hours x $45 = $105,300 

1 hour x 20 pilots x 13 x 9 = 2340 hours x $173 = $404,820

1 hour x 40 flight attendants x 13 x 9= 4680 hours x $52 = $243,360

1 hour x 8 dispatchers x 13 x 9 = 936 hours x $38 = $35,568

Total Hours = 10,296

Total Cost = $789,048

Ten Year Training

Total Hours = 29,224

Total Cost = $2,179,112

Business Jets

For estimated 81 new ETOPS operators 

Maintenance program:

50 hours x 81 = 4050 hours x $100 = $405,000

Pre-departure service check:

1 hour x 24 inspections x 81 = 1944 hours x $45 = $87,480 

Total Hours = 19,440

Total Cost =$874,800

Continuing Analysis Surveillance Program (CASS)

100 hours x 81 = 8100 hours x $45 = $364,500

Monitoring programs.

1 mechanic x 81 x 2080 hours = 168480 x $45 = $7,581,600 

Total Hours = 1,684,800

Total Cost = $75,816,000

Training:

Initial Training 

4 hours x 2 mechanics x 81 = 648 hours x $45 = $29,160 

Recurrent Training

1 hour x 2 mechanics x 81 x 9 = 1458 hours x $45 = $65,610

Total Hours = 2,106

Total Cost = $94,770

Quarterly reporting:  

	8 hours x 81 = 648 hours x $45 = $29,160

8 hours x 81 x 10 = 6480 hours x $45 = $291,600

For operations north of latitude N78:

Recovery plan:

Initial development t= 40 hrs x 81 plans = 3240 hours

Initial cost = 3240 hours x $75 = $243,000

Recurring hours = 10 hrs x 81 plans x 9 years = 7290 hours

Recurring cost = 7290 x $75 = $546,750

Total Hours = 10,530

Total Cost = $789,750

Training:

Initial Training 

16 hours x 16 pilots x 81 = 20736 hours x $173 = $3,587,328

Recurring Training

1 hour x 16 pilots x 81 x 9 = 11664 hours x $173 = $2,017,872

Total Hours = 32,400

Total Cost = $5,605,200

Part 21

Expanded ETOPS reporting:

Two engineer aides x 2080 = 4,160 hours x $45 = $187,200

Total Hours = 41,600

Total Cost = $1,872,000

New ETOPS reporting:

For estimated 5 new ETOPS manufacturers

Two engineer aides x 2080 = 4,160 hours x 5 = 20800 hours x $45 =
$936,000

Total Hours = 208,000

Total Cost = $9,360,000

Investigation of shutdown causes:

2,000 hours x 5 = 10,000 hours x $67.50 = $675,000

Total Hours = 100,000

Total Cost = $6,750,000

Part 25

One time certification for fire suppression:

25,000 hours (for 3 type certificates) x $75 = $1,875,000 million

	In summary, the FAA estimates that the one-time and first year burden
of the paperwork requirements for ETOPS operators and manufacturers
would be approximately 357,000 hours and cost $21.2 million,
undiscounted.  The ten-year burden is estimated at 2.7 million hours and
the undiscounted cost is estimated $132.8 million as shown in the
attached table.

In addition, there are other certification costs that are difficult to
sort by information requirements.  Some of these other costs are
manufacturing costs with additional reporting requirements.

The FAA is soliciting comments to—

(1) evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is necessary
for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have practical utility;

(2) evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden;

(3) enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be
collected; and

(4) minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.

Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the information
collection requirement by [Insert date 60 days after publication in the
Federal Register], and should direct them to the address listed in the
addresses section of this document.

According to the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is
not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control number.  The OMB control number
for this information collection will be published in the Federal
Register, after the Office of Management and Budget approves it.

	Summary of Initial and Total Paperwork Hours and Costs

Category	Initial	Initial Cost	Ten Year	Ten Year 

	Hours

Hours	Costs

2-engine

Recovery Plans

	Existing	1900	$142,500 	8,740	$655,500 

New	700	$52,500 	       3,320 	$241,500 

Reporting

Existing	22400	$1,008,000 	224,000	$10,080,000 

New	1120	$50,400 	11200	$504,000 

More than 2-engine

Recovery Plans

1300	$97,500 	5,980	$448,500 

ETOPS Program document

	6760	$574,600 	6760	$574,600 

Pre-departure Program

	3120	$265,200 	3120	$265,200 

ETOPS SpecificProcedures

	104	$8,840 	104	$8,840 

Reliability Program

	2600	$221,000 	2600	$221,000 

Pre-departure Service Check

	28080	$1,263,600 	280,800	$12,636,000 

Reporting Failures

2080	$93,600 	20,800	$936,000 

Training

	18928	$1,390,064 	29,224	$2,179,112 

Business Jets

	ETOPS Maintenance Program

	4050	$405,000 	4050	$405,000 

Pre-departure Service Check

	1944	$87,480 	19,440	$874,800 

CASS

	8100	$364,500 	8100	$364,500 

Monitoring Programs

	168480	$7,581,600 	1,684,800	$75,816,000 

Training

	648	$29,160 	2,106	$94,770 

Quarterly Reporting

	648	$29,160 	6,480	$291,600 

Polar Recovery Plan

	3240	$243,000 	10,530	$789,750 

Polar Training

20736	$3,587,328 	32,400	$5,605,200 

Part 21

ETOPS Reporting

Expanded	4160	$187,200 	41,600	$1,872,000 

New	20800	$936,000 	208,000	$9,360,000 

Shutdown Investigations

	10,000	$675,000 	100,000	$6,750,000 

Part 25

Certification

25000	$1,875,000 	25000	$1,875,000 

TOTAL	356898	$21,168,232 	2,739,154	$132,848,872 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism.  We determined that this
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and therefore would not have federalism implications.

Plain Language

Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) requires each agency
to write regulations that are simple and easy to understand.  We invite
your comments on how to make these proposed regulations easier to
understand, including answers to questions such as the following:

Are the requirements in the proposed regulations clearly stated?

 Do the proposed regulations contain unnecessary technical language or
jargon that interferes with their clarity?

Would the regulations be easier to understand if they were divided into
more (but shorter) sections?

Is the description in the preamble helpful in understanding the proposed
regulations?

Please send your comments to the address specified in the ADDRESSES
section.

Environmental Analysis

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically excluded
from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental impact statement.  In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D,
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this proposed rulemaking action qualifies
for a categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the notice has been assessed in accordance with the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1.  We have determined that the
notice is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the
EPCA.

Executive Order 13211 - Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

Executive Order 13211 requires agencies to submit a Statement of Energy
Effects to the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget, for matters identified
as significant energy actions.  A significant energy action is an action
that (1) is significant under Executive Order 12866 and is likely to
have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy or (2) is designated by the administrator of the Administrator of
OIRA as a significant energy action.  This proposed rule would save fuel
for operators who obtain authorization for ETOPS routes and would
therefore have a significant positive effect on energy use.  We are not
required to submit a Statement of Energy Effects for this proposed rule
because we do not expect this rule to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of energy and the Administrator of
OIRA has not identified it as a significant energy action.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 1

Air transportation.

14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 33

Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 121

Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, Charter
flights, Drug  abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Safety, Transportation.

14 CFR Part 135

Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, Drug abuse,
Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 

The Proposed Amendment

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend part 14 CFR parts 1, 25, 33, 121, and
135 as follows:

PART 1 – DEFINITIONS

1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

2. Amend § 1.1 by adding the definitions of “Early ETOPS”, “ETOPS
Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures Standard (CMP)”. “ETOPS
Significant Systems”, “Extended Operations (ETOPS)”, “Group 1
Systems”, “Group 2 Systems”, and “In-flight shutdown (IFSD)”,
to read as follows:

§ 1.1 General Definitions.

*  *  *  *  *  

Early ETOPS means obtaining ETOPS type design certification without
first gaining service experience on the airplane/engine combination to
be certified.

*     *     *     *     *

ETOPS Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures Standard (CMP) means
specific airframe and engine configuration minimum requirements,
including any special inspection, hardware life limits, Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL) constraints and maintenance practices found
necessary by the FAA to establish the suitability of that airframe and
engine combination for ETOPS.

*     *     *     *    *

ETOPS Significant Systems means the airplane propulsion system and any
other airplane systems whose failure could adversely affect the safety
of an ETOPS flight, or whose functioning is important to continued safe
flight and landing during an airplane diversion.  Each ETOPS significant
system is either a Group 1 or Group 2 system based on the relationship
to the number of engines, or to continued safe engine operation.

Extended Operations (ETOPS) means an airplane flight operation in which
a portion of the flight is operated beyond a predetermined time
threshold, as identified in parts 121 and 135 of this title, from an
adequate airport based on an approved one engine inoperative cruise
speed under standard conditions in still air.

*     *     *     *     *

ETOPS Group 1 Systems:  Group 1 Systems include any systems that relate
to the number of engines on the airplane and are important to the safe
operation of the airplane on an ETOPS flight.  The following provides
additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 1 Significant
System: 

(1) A system for which the fail-safe redundancy characteristics are
directly linked to the number of engines (for example, hydraulic system,
pneumatic system, electrical system).

(2) A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines to
the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or uncommanded
loss of thrust (for example, fuel system, thrust reverser or engine
control or indicating system, and engine fire detection systems).

(3) A system which contributes significantly to the safety of an engine
inoperative ETOPS diversion and is intended to provide additional
redundancy to accommodate the system(s) lost by the inoperative engine. 
These include back-up systems such as an emergency generator or APU.

(4) Any system essential to prolonged operation at engine inoperative
altitudes including anti-icing systems for a twin-engine airplane if
single engine performance results in the airplane operating in the icing
envelope.

ETOPS Group 2 Systems: Group 2 Systems are systems that do not relate to
the number of engines on the airplane, but are important to the safe
operation of the airplane on an ETOPS flight.  The following provides
additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 2 Significant
System:

(1) A system the failure of which would reduce the capability of the
airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with an ETOPS diversion, 
(for example, long-range navigation or communication, equipment cooling,
or systems important to safe operation on a ETOPS diversion after a
decompression.)

(2) Time-limited systems including cargo fire suppression and oxygen if
the duration of ETOPS dependent on the availability of such systems.

(3) Systems whose failure would result in excessive crew workload or
have operational implications or significant detrimental impact on
flight crew or passengers physiological well being for an ETOPS
diversion (for example flight control forces that would be exhausting
for a maximum ETOPS diversion, system failures that would require
continuous fuel balancing to ensure proper Center of Gravity (CG), or a
cabin environmental control failure that could cause extreme heat or
cold that it could incapacitate the crew or cause physical harm to the
passengers).

(4) Any other system specifically installed to enhance the safety of
long-range operations including an ETOPS diversion regardless of the
applicability of paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this definition (for
example SATCOM, GPS).

*     *     *     *     *

In-flight shutdown (IFSD) means when an engine ceases to function in
flight and is shutdown, whether self-induced, crew initiated or caused
by some other external influence.  (The FAA considers IFSD for all
causes, for example. flameout, internal failure, crew initiated shutoff,
foreign object ingestion, icing, inability to obtain and/or control
desired thrust.)

PART 21 – CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS

3. The authority citation for part 21 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701-44701,
44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.

4. Add § 21.4 to read as follows:

§ 21.4  ETOPS reporting requirements.

(a) Early ETOPS problem reporting, tracking, and resolution. (1) The
holder of a type certificate of an airplane that has been approved for
ETOPS without service experience in accordance with section II,
paragraph (a), or section III, paragraph (a), of Appendix L of 14 CFR
part 25 must establish a system for reporting, tracking, and promptly
resolving problems encountered with ETOPS Significant Systems.

(2) The system must contain a means for the prompt identification of
problems with ETOPS Significant Systems, for the reporting of such
problems to the responsible FAA certification office, and for proffering
solutions to and obtaining FAA approval for the resolution of the
problems.  The implementation of the problem resolution can be
accomplished by way of an FAA approved change(s) in the type design, the
manufacturing process, or an operating or maintenance procedures.

(3) The reporting system must be in place for the first 250,000 fleet
engine hours. For a two-engine ETOPS airplane, the reporting requirement
remains in place until the fleet has demonstrated a stable in-flight
shutdown rate in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section for
the maximum diversion time for which the airplane has been certified.

(4) If the airplane or engine type certificated is a derivative of a
previously certificated airplane or engine, the type certificate holder
may, with prior authorization from the Administrator, report only on
systems that have changed from the original type certificate.

(5) For the early ETOPS service period, an applicant must define the
sources and content of in-service data that will be made available to
them in support of their problem reporting and tracking system.  The
content of this data must be adequate to evaluate the specific cause of
all service incidents reportable under § 21.3(c) of part 21, in
addition to any occurrences that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations and must be reported, including:

(i) In-flight shutdown events, and for twin-engine ETOPS airplanes,
in-flight shutdown rates;

(ii) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power;

(iii) Precautionary thrust reductions (except for normal troubleshooting
as allowed in the aircraft manual);

(iv) Degraded propulsion in-flight start capability;

(v) Inadvertent fuel loss or fuel unavailability, or uncorrectable fuel
imbalance in flight;

(vi) Technical air turn backs or diversions associated with an ETOPS
Group 1 Significant System;

(vii) Inability of an ETOPS Group 1 Significant System, designed to
provide backup capability after failure of a primary system, to provide
the required backup capability in-flight;

(viii) A complete loss of any electrical power generating system or
hydraulic power system during an operation of the aircraft;

(ix) Any event that would jeopardize the safe flight and landing of the
airplane on an ETOPS flight;

(x) Unscheduled engine removals for conditions that could result in one
of the reportable items listed above.

(b) ETOPS operational service reliability reporting for two-engine
airplanes.

(1) Two engine reliability reporting. Type Certificate Holder of engines
and airplanes used in ETOPS service must report monthly on the
reliability of their two-engine airplane fleets in service.  The
Administrator may approve reporting on a quarterly basis if the airplane
and engine demonstrate sustained IFSD rates below those identified in
(b)(2). This reporting may be combined with the reporting requirements
of § 21.3.  Causes of propulsion system in-flight shutdown must be
investigated by the manufacturer(s), and where appropriate for the
safety and airworthiness of ETOPS operations, FAA approved corrective
action must be implemented. Reporting must include:

(i) Propulsion system in-flight shutdown events (excluding normal
training events)

(ii) In-flight shutdown rates for all causes (excluding normal training
events).

(iii) ETOPS fleet utilization, including a list of operators, their
ETOPS diversion time authority, flight hours, and cycles.

(2) ETOPS World Fleet In-flight Shutdown Rate Requirements.  Type
Certificate Holders of engines and airplanes approved for ETOPS service
must monitor and report the worldwide fleet in-flight shutdown rates by
airplane-engine type combinations to ensure appropriate rates are
maintained.  ETOPS 12 month rolling average in-flight shutdown rates
must be maintained at the following levels:

(i) A threshold rate of 0.05 per 1,000 fleet engine hours for two-engine
airplanes in ETOPS for initial approval up to 120 minutes, with
continuing improvement toward a rate of 0.02 per 1,000 fleet engine
hours;

(ii) A rate of 0.02 per 1,000 fleet engine hours for two-engine
airplanes in ETOPS up to 180 minutes, and as provided for flight by
flight exception based operations up to 207 minutes maximum diversion
time in the North Pacific area of operation as defined in 14 CFR Part
121;

(iii) A rate of 0.01 per 1,000 fleet engine hours for twin-engine
airplanes in ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, except as provided for flight by
flight exception based operations up to 207 minutes maximum diversion
time in the North Pacific area of operation as defined in 14 CFR Part
121.

PART 25 -- AIRPLANE TYPE DESIGN

5.  The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.

6. Amend § 25.857 by revising paragraph (c)(2) to read as follows:

§ 25.857 Cargo compartment classification.

*     *     *     *     *

(c) *     *     *

(2) There is an approved built-in fire extinguishing or suppression
system controllable from the cockpit.  For ETOPS approval, the certified
time capability of the system must be provided as required by §
25.1581(a)(2).

*     *     *     *     *

7. Add § 25.1535 to read as follows:

§ 25.1535 ETOPS approval.

Each applicant seeking type design certification for ETOPS must:

(a) Comply with the requirements of this part considering the maximum
mission time and the longest diversion time for which approval is being
sought.

(b) Consider crew workload and operational implications and the flight
crew’s and passengers’ physiological needs of continued operation
with failure effects for the longest diversion time for which approval
is being sought, and

(c) Comply with the requirements of Appendix L of this part.

8. Add Appendix L to read as follows:

APPENDIX L TO PART 25 -- Extended Operations (ETOPS)

This appendix defines additional airworthiness requirements for the
approval of an airplane-engine combination for Extended Operations
(ETOPS) in accordance with §25.1535.  Two engine airplanes must comply
with Sections I and II of this appendix.  Airplanes with more than two
engines must comply with Sections I and III of this appendix.

Section I - Design requirements

(a) Airplane Systems. (1) Operation in icing conditions. (i) The
airplane must be certificated for operation in icing conditions in
accordance with § 25.1419.

(ii) The airframe and propulsion system ice protection must be capable
of continued safe flight and landing at engine inoperative and
decompression altitudes in icing conditions.

(iii) The applicant must show that the unprotected areas of the airplane
will not collect a load of ice that would make the airplane
uncontrollable or create too much drag to safely complete a diversion in
icing conditions.

(2) Electrical power supply.  The electrical power supply system must be
designed so that -  

(i) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the airplane on an ETOPS flight is
extremely improbable, and 

(ii) The occurrence of any other failure conditions which would reduce
the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with
adverse operating conditions on an ETOPS flight is improbable.

(iii) For airplanes to be certificated for usage on routes further than
180 minutes from a suitable airport, the airplane must be equipped with
at least three independent electrical generation sources.

(3) Time limited systems.  For each ETOPS Significant System that is
time limited, the system capability must be defined.  The most limiting
ETOPS Significant System capability must be stated in the Airplane
Flight Manual per the requirements of paragraph (e)(4) of Section I of
this appendix.

(b) Propulsion systems. (1) Fuel system design.  Fuel necessary to
complete an ETOPS mission, including a diversion for the longest time
for which approval is being sought, must be available to the operating
engine or engines at the pressure and flow required by § 25.955 under
any airplane failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. 
Examples of the types of failures to be considered include crossfeed
valve failures, automatic fuel management system failures, and normal
electrical power generation failures.

(i) For two engine airplanes to be certificated for usage on routes
further than 180 minutes from a suitable airport, one fuel boost pump in
each main tank and actuation capability of at least one crossfeed valve
must be able to be powered by a back-up electrical generation source
other than the primary engine driven or APU driven generators, unless
the required fuel boost pressure or crossfeed valve actuation is not
provided by electrical power.

(ii) Alerts must be displayed to the flight crew when the quantity of
fuel available to the engines falls below that level required to
complete the mission.  These alerts must include provisions for abnormal
fuel management or transfer between tanks, and possible loss of fuel.

(2) APU design.  If operation of the APU installation is required to
comply with this appendix, the applicant must substantiate that:

(i) The APU has adequate reliability for that operation, and;

(ii) If in-flight start and run capability is necessary, the APU
in-flight operating envelope shall extend to the maximum operating
altitude of the airplane, but need not exceed 45,000 feet.

(3) Engine oil tank design.  The engine oil tank filler cap must comply
with section 33.71(c)(4).

(c) Engine condition monitoring.  Procedures for an engine condition
monitoring process must be defined and validated in accordance with Part
33 Appendix A, paragraph 33.3(c).

(d) Configuration, maintenance and procedures.  If the airplane,
propulsion, and ETOPS Significant System assessments identify
configuration, maintenance or operational standards necessary to
maintain appropriate reliability for ETOPS, the applicant must identify
the appropriate standards in a Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures
(CMP) document.

(e) Airplane flight manual.  The airplane flight manual must contain the
following information.

(1) Special limitations, including any limitations associated with
operation of the airplane up to the maximum diversion time being
approved.

(2) Required markings or placards.

(3) The airborne equipment, installation, and flight crew procedures
required for extended operations.

(4) The maximum diversion time capability of the airplane for ETOPS
required by paragraph (a)(3) of this appendix in accordance with §
25.1581(a)(2), “Furnishing information.”

(5) The following statement:  “The type design reliability and
performance of this airframe-engine combination has been evaluated in
accordance with § 25.1535 and found suitable for (state maximum
diversion time) extended operations (ETOPS) with the incorporation of
the approved airplane configuration CMP standard contained in (state
description or reference to a document containing the approved CMP
standard).  This finding does not constitute approval to conduct
ETOPS.”

Section II – Two engine airplanes

An applicant for a two engine airplane must use one of the methods
described in paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of Section II of this appendix
to certify the airplane for Extended Operations.

(a) Service experience method. The applicant must demonstrate that the
airplane and engine combination for which approval is sought has the
required airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an
ETOPS mission and maximum diversion and has achieved required airframe
and propulsion system reliability based upon fleet in-service
experience.

(1) Required service experience.  After accumulating 250,000 worldwide
fleet engine hours on the airplane and engine combination for which
approval is sought, a reliability review must be performed.  The number
of hours may be reduced if adequate compensating factors are identified
which give a reasonable equivalent database.  Where experience on
another airplane is applicable, a significant portion of the 250,000
hours must be obtained on the candidate airplane.

(2) Propulsion system assessment. (i) The applicant must conduct a
propulsion system assessment based on the following data, collected from
the entire fleet of the specific airplane and engine combination for
which approval is sought:

(A) A list of all engine shutdown events both ground and in-flight for
all causes (excluding normal training events) including flameouts.  The
list should provide identification (engine and airplane model and serial
number), engine configuration and modification history, engine position,
circumstances leading up to the event, phase of flight or ground
operation, weather/environmental conditions, and reason for shutdown. 
In addition, similar information should be provided for all occurrences
where control of desired thrust level was not attained.

(B) Unscheduled engine removal rate (accumulated 6- and 12-month rolling
averages), removal summary, time history of removal rate and primary
causes for unscheduled removal.

(C) Dispatch delays, cancellations, aborted takeoffs (includes those
induced by maintenance or crew error) and en-route diversions chargeable
to the propulsion system.

(D) Total engine hours and cycles and engine hour population (age
distribution).

(E) Mean time between failure of propulsion system components that
affect reliability.

(F) IFSD rate based upon a 6- and 12-month rolling average.

(ii) All causes or potential causes of engine in-flight shutdowns or
loss of thrust control occurring in service must have corrective actions
that are shown to be effective in preventing future occurrences.

(3) Airplane systems assessment.  Airplane systems must comply with the
requirements of § 25.1535(a) using available in-service reliability
data for ETOPS significant systems.  All causes or potential causes of
ETOPS significant system failures occurring in service must have
corrective actions that are shown to be effective in preventing future
occurrences.

(4) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) rates.  The demonstrated airplane and
engine combination world fleet propulsion system 12 month rolling
average IFSD rate must be commensurate with the level of ETOPS approval
being sought.

(i) For operations up to 120 minutes:  A rate of approximately 0.05 or
less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with a required list of corrective
actions in the CMP document that would result in continuing improvement
toward an IFSD rate of 0.02 per 1,000 fleet engine hours.

(ii) For operations up to 180 minutes:  A rate of approximately 0.02 or
less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with an existing 120 minute CMP
standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have been
demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.

(iii) For operations beyond 180 minutes:  A rate of approximately 0.01
or less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with an existing 120 minute or 180
minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have
been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.

(5) Airplane flight test requirements.  A flight test must be conducted
to validate the adequacy of the airplane’s flying qualities,
performance and the flight crew’s ability to deal with engine
inoperative and non-normal worst case system failure conditions expected
to occur in service.

(b) Early ETOPS method.  

1) Relevant experience assessment.  The applicant must identify specific
corrective actions taken on the airplane design to address relevant
design, manufacturing, operational and maintenance problems experienced
on previously certified Part 25 airplanes manufactured by the applicant.
 Specific corrective actions are not required if the nature of the
problem is such that the problem would not significantly impact the
safety or reliability of the system.  Relevant problems are those
problems on ETOPS Group 1 Significant Systems that have or could have
resulted in in-flight shutdowns or diversions.  To experience of
supplier-provided ETOPS Group 1 Significant Systems and similar or
identical equipment utilized on aircraft built by other manufacturers
must be included.

(2) Propulsion system design. (i)Engine ETOPS eligibility.  The engine
must be approved for ETOPS eligibility in accordance with § 33.200.

(ii) Design to preclude in-flight shutdowns.  The applicant must design
the propulsion system to preclude failures or malfunctions that could
result in an engine in-flight shutdown.  The applicant must substantiate
compliance with this requirement by analysis, test, in-service
experience on other airplanes, or other means.  The analysis must show
that the propulsion system design will minimize failures and
malfunctions with the objective of achieving the following in-flight
shutdown rates:  0.02 per 1,000 engine fleet hours for ETOPS (180
minutes or less) 0.01 per 1,000 engine fleet hours for ETOPS (beyond 180
minutes).

(3) Maintenance and operational procedures.  The applicant must validate
all ETOPS significant systems maintenance and operational procedures. 
Any problems found as a result of the validation must be tracked and
resolved through the Problem Tracking and Resolution System required by
Section II, paragraph (b)(8) of this appendix.

(4) Propulsion system validation test.  The installed engine
configuration for which approval is being sought must comply with
§33.200(c).  The test engine must be configured with a complete
airplane nacelle package, including engine-mounted equipment except for
any configuration differences necessary to accommodate test stand
interfaces with the engine nacelle package.  At the conclusion of the
test, the propulsion system must be:

(i) Visually inspected according to the applicant’s on-wing inspection
recommendations and limits.

(ii) Completely disassembled and the propulsion system hardware must be
inspected in accordance with the service limits submitted in compliance
with § 25.1529.  Any potential sources of in-flight shutdown, loss of
thrust control, or other power loss encountered during this inspection
must be tracked and resolved in accordance with Section II, paragraph
(b)(8) of this appendix.

(5) New technology demonstration testing.  Testing must be conducted to
substantiate the suitability of any technology new to the applicant,
including substantially new manufacturing techniques.

(6) APU validation test.  If utilizing an APU in order to meet the
requirements of paragraph(a)(2) of section I of this appendix, one APU
of the type to be certificated with the airplane must complete a test
consisting of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles.  Following
completion of the demonstration test, the APU must be disassembled and
inspected.  Any potential sources of in-flight start problems or run
problems or both must be identified, tracked and resolved in accordance
with Section II, paragraph (b)(8) of this appendix.

(7) Airplane demonstration test.  For each airplane and engine
combination to be certificated one or more airplanes must conduct
flight-testing that demonstrates that the aircraft, its components and
equipment are capable of and function properly during ETOPS and ETOPS
diversions.  This flight-testing may be coordinated with, but is not in
place of flight-testing required for compliance to § 21.35(b)(2).

(i) The flight test program must include:

(A) Flights simulating actual ETOPS operation including normal cruise
altitude, step climbs, and APU operations if paragraph (b)(2) of section
I of this appendix applies.

(B) Demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversion time for which eligibility is sought.

(C) Engine inoperative maximum time diversions to demonstrate the
airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS
diversion, including a repeat of a maximum continuous thrust (MCT)
diversion on the same engine.

(D) Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplane’s capability to
safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst-case system failure
conditions expected to occur in service.

(E) Diversions into representative operational diversionary airports.

(F) Repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.

(ii) The flight testing must validate the adequacy of the airplane’s
flying qualities, performance and flight crew’s ability to deal with
the conditions of paragraphs (b)(7)(i)(C), (b)(7)(i)(D), and
(b)(7)(i)(E) of Section II of this appendix.

(iii) The engine-inoperative diversions must be evenly distributed among
the number of engines in the applicant’s flight test program except as
required by paragraph (b)(7)(i)(C) of Section II of this appendix.

(iv) The test airplane or airplanes must be operated and maintained
using the recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures
during the airplane demonstration test.

(v) At the completion of the airplane or airplanes demonstration
testing, the ETOPS significant systems must undergo an airplane visual
inspection per the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of
§25.1529.  The engines must also undergo a gas path inspection.  These
inspections are intended to identify any abnormal conditions that could
result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.  Any abnormal conditions
must be identified, tracked and resolved in accordance with paragraph
(b)(8) of Section II of this appendix.

(8) Problem tracking and resolution system.  A problem tracking and
resolution system must be established to address problems, as identified
in § 21.4(a)(5), encountered on the ETOPS significant systems during
airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations.  If the airplane or engine type certificated is a derivative
of a previously certificated airplane or engine, the criteria of §
21.4(a)(4) may apply.

(i) The system must contain a means for prompt identification of
problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations.

(ii) The system must contain the process for the timely notification to
the responsible FAA office of all relevant problems encountered, and
corrective actions deemed necessary, in a manner that allows for
appropriate FAA review of all planned corrective actions.

(iii) The system must be in effect during the phases of airplane and
engine development that will be used to assess early ETOPS eligibility.

(iv) Upon Type Certification, the certificate holder must comply with
problem tracking and resolution system requirements of § 21.4.

(9) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.  For airplane,
propulsion and ETOPS significant systems, the type and frequency of
failures that occur during the airplane flight test program and the
airplane demonstration test required by paragraph (b)(7) of Section II
of this appendix must be consistent with the type and frequency of
failures or malfunctions that would be expected to occur on presently
certified ETOPS airplanes.

(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.

(1) The in-service experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1) may be
reduced to 15,000 engine hours provided compliance to paragraphs (a)(5),
(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(8), and (b)(9) of
Section II of this appendix have been met.

(2) Additionally, as allowed by § 21.21(b)(1), the in-service
experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of Section II of this
appendix may be reduced to some level other than 15,000 engine hours
provided compensating factors that provide an equivalent level of safety
are provided.

Section III – Airplanes with more than two engines

An applicant for an airplane with more than two engines must use one of
the methods described in the following paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of
Section III of this appendix to certify the airplane for Extended
Operations.

(a) Service experience method.  The applicant must demonstrate that the
airplane and engine combination for which approval is sought has the
required airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an
ETOPS mission and maximum diversion and has achieved required airplane
system reliability based upon fleet in-service experience.

(1) Required service experience.  After accumulating 250,000 worldwide
fleet engine hours on the airplane and engine combination for which
approval is sought, the applicant must perform a reliability review. 
The number of hours may be reduced if adequate compensating factors are
identified which give a reasonable equivalent database.  Where
experience on another airplane is applicable, a significant portion of
the 250,000 hours must be obtained on the candidate airplane.

(2) Airplane systems assessment.  Airplane systems must comply with the
requirements of §25.1535(a) using available in-service reliability data
for ETOPS significant systems. All causes or potential causes of ETOPS
significant system failures occurring in service must have corrective
actions that are shown to be effective in preventing future occurrences.

(3) Airplane flight test requirements.  The applicant must conduct a
flight test to validate the adequacy of the airplane’s flying
qualities, performance and the flight crew’s ability to deal with
engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system failure conditions
expected to occur in service.

(b) Early ETOPS method.

(1) Maintenance and operational procedures.  The applicant must validate
all ETOPS Significant Systems maintenance and operational procedures. 
The applicant must track and resolve any problems found as a result of
the validation through the Problem Tracking and Resolution System
required by paragraph (b)(5) of Section III of this appendix.

(2) New technology demonstration testing.  The applicant must conduct
testing to substantiate the suitability of any technology new to the
applicant, including substantially new manufacturing techniques.

(3) APU validation test.  If utilizing an APU in order to meet the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of section I of this appendix, one APU
of the type to certificated with the airplane must complete a test
consisting of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles.  Following
completion of the demonstration test, the APU must be disassembled and
inspected.  Any potential sources of in-flight start problems or run
problems or both must be identified, tracked and resolved in accordance
with paragraph (b)(5) of Section III of this appendix.

(4) Airplane demonstration test.  For each airplane and engine
combination to be certificated, the applicant must conduct
flight-testing with one or more airplanes to demonstrate that the
aircraft, its components and equipment are capable of and function
properly during ETOPS and ETOPS diversions.  This flight-testing may be
coordinated with, but is not in place of flight-testing required for
compliance to § 21.35(b)(2).

(i) The flight test program must include:

(A) Flights simulating actual ETOPS operation including normal cruise
altitude, step climbs, and APU operations if compliance to paragraph I
(b)(2)of this appendix is necessary.

(B) Demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversion time for which eligibility is sought.

(C) Engine inoperative maximum time diversions to demonstrate the
airplane and propulsion system’s capability to safely conduct an ETOPS
diversion, including a repeat of a maximum continuous thrust (MCT)
diversion on the same engine.

(D) Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplane’s capability to
safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst case system failure
conditions expected to occur in service.

(E) Diversions into representative operational diversionary airports.

(F) Repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.

(ii) The flight testing must validate the adequacy of the airplane’s
flying qualities, performance and flight crew’s ability to deal with
the conditions of paragraphs (b)(4)(i)(C), (b)(4)(i)(D), and
(b)(4)(i)(E) of Section III of this appendix.

(iii) The engine-inoperative diversions must be evenly distributed among
the number of engines in the applicant’s flight test program except as
required by paragraph (b)(4)(i)(C) of Section III of this appendix.

(iv) The test airplane or airplanes must be operated and maintained
using the recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures
during the airplane demonstration test.

(v) At the completion of the airplane or airplanes demonstration
testing, the ETOPS Significant Systems must undergo an airplane visual
inspection per the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of §
25.1529.  The engines must also undergo a gas path inspection.  These
inspections are intended to identify any abnormal conditions that could
result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.  The applicant must
identify, track and resolve any abnormal conditions in accordance with
paragraph (b)(5) of Section III of this appendix.

(5) Problem tracking and resolution system.  The applicant must
establish a problem tracking and resolution system to address problems,
as identified in § 21.4(a)(5), encountered on the ETOPS Significant
Systems during airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety
of ETOPS operations.  If the airplane or engine type certificated is a
derivative of a previously certificated airplane or engine the criteria
of § 21.4(a)(4) may apply.

(i) The system must contain a means for prompt identification of
problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations.

(ii) The system must contain the process for the timely notification to
the responsible FAA office of all relevant problems encountered, and
corrective actions deemed necessary, in a manner that allows for
appropriate FAA review of all planned corrective actions.

(iii) The system must be in effect during the phases of airplane and
engine development that will be used to assess early ETOPS eligibility.

(iv) Upon type certification, the problem tracking and resolution system
will revert to the requirements of § 21.4.

(6) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.  For ETOPS
significant systems, the type and frequency of failures that occur
during the airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration
test required by paragraph (b)(4) of this section must be consistent
with the type and frequency of failures or malfunctions that would be
expected to occur on presently certified ETOPS airplanes, or any
non-ETOPS derivative models of those aircraft or engines.

(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.

(1) The in-service experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of
Section III of this appendix may be reduced to 15,000 engine hours
provided compliance to paragraphs (a)(3), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3),
(b)(5), and (b)(6) of Section III of this appendix have been met.

(2) Additionally, as allowed by § 21.21(b)(1), the in-service
experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of Section III of this
appendix may be reduced to some level other than 15,000 engine hours
provided compensating factors that provide an equivalent level of safety
are provided.

PART 33 -- ENGINE CERTIFICATION

9. The authority citation for part 33 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702- 44704.

10.  Amend § 33.71 by revising paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:

§ 33.71 Lubrication system.

*     *     *     *     *

(c) *   *   * 

(4) Each oil tank cap must provide an oil-tight seal.  For applicants
seeking type design eligibility for engines to be installed in an
Extended Operations (ETOPS) airplane in accordance with § 25.1535, the
oil tank must be designed to prevent a hazardous quantity of oil loss
due to oil tank cap installation errors.

*     *     *     *     *

11. Revise § 33.90 to read as follows:

§ 33.90 Initial maintenance inspection test.

Each engine, except engines being type certificated through amendment of
an existing type certificate or through supplemental type certification
procedures, must complete one of the following tests on an engine that
substantially conforms to the final type design to establish when the
initial maintenance inspection is required:

(a) An approved engine test that simulates the conditions in which the
engine is expected to operate in service, including typical start-stop
cycles.

(b) An approved engine test in accordance with §§ 33.200(c) and
33.200(f) of this part.

12. Add subpart G of part 33 to read as follows:

SUBPART G – SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: TURBINE AIRCRAFT ENGINES

  HYPERLINK  \l "P33_200EquivalentVibrationLevel"  § 33.200 Early
extended operations (ETOPS) eligibility and test requirements 

Each applicant seeking engine type design eligibility for an engine to
be installed in a twin-engine ETOPS airplane that does not have the
service experience required by 14 CFR part 25, Appendix L, section II,
paragraph (a) must comply with the following:

(a) The engine must be designed using a design quality process
acceptable to the Administrator, which assures that design features of
the engine minimize the occurrence of failures, malfunctions, or
maintenance errors that could result in loss of thrust control,
in-flight shutdown, or other power loss.

(b) The design features of the engine must address problems that have
been shown to result in loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or
other power loss, when compared to the applicant’s other relevant type
design approvals received within the past ten years, providing that
adequate service data is available within that ten year period. 
Applicants without applicable engine service experience may show
equivalent experience and equivalent knowledge of problem mitigating
design practices to that gained from actual service experience in a
manner acceptable to the Administrator.

(c) The following test must be conducted on an engine that substantially
conforms to the type design and in accordance with an approved test plan
that consists of:

(1) Simulated ETOPS Mission Cyclic Endurance. The test must include a
minimum of 3,000 representative service start-stop mission cycles
(take-off, climb, cruise, descent, approach, landing and thrust
reverse), plus three simulated diversion cycles at maximum continuous
thrust for the maximum diversion time for which ETOPS eligibility is
sought.  The diversions are to be approximately evenly distributed over
the cyclic duration of the test, with the last diversion to be conducted
within 100 cycles of the completion of the test.

(2) Unbalance and Vibration Endurance.  (i) The simulated ETOPS mission
cyclic endurance test required by § 33.200(c)(1) must be performed with
the high speed and low speed main engine rotors independently unbalanced
to obtain a minimum of 90 percent of the recommended field service
maintenance vibration levels. In addition to the specified unbalance for
the low and high-speed rotors, for engines with three main engine
rotors, the intermediate speed rotor must also be independently
unbalanced to obtain a minimum of 90 percent of the recommended
production acceptance vibration level.  The vibration level must be
defined as the peak level seen during a slow acceleration and
deceleration of the engine across the operating speed range.

(ii) Each 60 rpm incremental step of the typical high-speed rotor
start-stop mission cycle speed range (take-off, climb, cruise, descent,
approach, landing and thrust reverse) must be subjected to a minimum of
three million vibration cycles during the cyclic endurance test.  The
test may be conducted using any rotor speed step increment up to 200 rpm
provided that the typical service start-stop cycle speed range is
covered. For a 200 rpm step the corresponding vibration cycle count is
to be ten million cycles.

(iii) Each 60 rpm incremental step of the high-speed rotor approved
operational speed range between minimum flight idle and cruise power,
and not covered by § 33.200(c)(2)(ii), must be subjected to a minimum
of 300,000 vibration cycles during the cyclic endurance test.  The test
may be conducted using any rotor speed step increment up to 200 rpm
provided that the applicable speed range is covered.  For a 200 rpm
step the corresponding vibration cycle count is to be 1 million cycles.

(iv) Vibration surveys will be conducted at periodic intervals
throughout the cyclic endurance test.  The equivalent value of the peak
vibration level observed during the surveys must meet the minimum
vibration requirement of § 33.200(c)(2)(i).

(v) An alternate vibration test that provides an equivalent
demonstration of the unbalance and vibration endurance test specified in
paragraphs §§ 33.200(c)(2)(i) through 33.200(c)(2)(iv) may be approved
by the Administrator.

(d) Prior to the testing required by § 33.200(c), the test engine must
be subjected to a calibration run to document power and thrust
characteristics.

(e) At the conclusion of the testing required by § 33.200(c), the test
engine must:

(1) Be subjected to a calibration test at sea-level conditions; and any
change in thrust characteristics must be within certified limits.

(2) Be visually inspected in accordance with the on-wing inspection
recommendations and limits contained in the Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness submitted in support of § 33.4.

(3) Be completely disassembled and:

(i) The engine hardware must be inspected:

(A) In accordance with the applicable inspection recommendations and
limits contained in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
submitted in support of § 33.4;

(B) With consideration of the causes of loss of thrust control,
in-flight shutdown or other power losses identified by § 33.200(b); and

(C) In a manner to identify wear or distress conditions which could
result in loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other power
loss, and which are not specifically identified by § 33.200(b) or
addressed within the current Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.

(ii) The engine hardware must not show distress to the extent that could
result in loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other power
loss within a period of operation before the component, assembly or
system would likely have been inspected or functionally tested for
integrity while in service.  Such hardware distress must have corrective
action implemented by way of design changes, maintenance instructions or
operational procedures before ETOPS eligibility is granted.

(iii) The type and frequency of hardware distress that occurs during the
engine test must be consistent with the type and frequency of hardware
distress that would be expected to occur on ETOPS eligible engines, or
any non-ETOPS derivative engines of this type.  Additional analysis
and/or tests may be required to satisfy this requirement.

(f) The 3,000 cycle simulated ETOPS mission cyclic endurance test
required by § 33.200(c) may be used to show compliance with §§ 33.90
and 33.90(b).  After completing the full number of test cycles required
for an initial maintenance inspection test conducted in accordance with
§ 33.90(a), the 3,000 cycle simulated ETOPS mission cyclic endurance
test may be interrupted so that the engine may be inspected by an
on-wing or other method and criteria acceptable to the Administrator.
Following the § 33.90(b) inspection, the ETOPS test must be resumed to
complete the requirements of § 33.200.

13. Add paragraph A33.3(c) to Appendix A to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 33 – Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

*   *   *   *   *

A33.3 Content

*   *   *   *   *

 (c) Extended Operations (ETOPS) Requirements.  For engines to be
installed in ETOPS airplanes, procedures for engine condition monitoring
must be included within the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 
The engine condition monitoring procedures must be able to determine
prior to flight, whether an engine is capable of providing, within
certified engine operating limits, the maximum power or thrust, bleed
air and power extraction required for the desired engine inoperative
diversion.  For engines to be installed on twin-engine ETOPS airplanes,
the engine condition monitoring procedures must be validated before
ETOPS eligibility is granted.

PART 121 -- AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS

14. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.

15. Add § 121.7 to read as follows:

§ 121.7 Definitions and designations.

The following definitions apply to those sections of part 121 that apply
to ETOPS:

Adequate Airport means an airport that:

(1) The Administrator determines satisfies safety requirements of part
139, subpart D, excluding aircraft rescue and fire fighting service, or

(2) Meets the landing performance requirements of § 121.197, or

(3) Is a military airport that is active and operational, and meets the
landing performance requirements of § 121.197.

ETOPS alternate means an adequate airport listed in the certificate
holder’s operations specifications that meets the requirements of 
§121.624 and the Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) requirements of
§121.106 designated in a dispatch/flight release.  This definition
applies to flight planning and does not in any way limit the discretion
of the pilot in command during flight.

ETOPS area of operation means (1) ETOPS area of operation means for
turbine engine powered airplanes with two engines, an area beyond 60
minutes from an adequate airport, or with more than two engines, an area
beyond 180 minutes from an adequate airport, and within the authorized
ETOPS maximum diversion time approved for the operation being conducted
or an area designated by the Administrator as an area of ETOPS
applicability.  An ETOPS area of operation is calculated at a one-engine
inoperative cruise speed (approved) under standard conditions in still
air.

(2) The Administrator designates the following areas as ETOPS areas in
which the planning, operational, and equipage requirements for ETOPS
apply:

(i) NOPAC: The North Pacific Air Traffic Service routes and adjacent
airspace between Anchorage and Tokyo Flight Information Region.

(ii) North Pacific: The Pacific Ocean areas north of 40oN latitudes
including NOPAC ATS routes, and published PACOTS (Pacific organized
track system) tracks between Japan and North America.

(iii) Polar areas - North Pole: The entire area north of 78º N
latitude.

(iv)  Polar areas -South Pole: The entire area south of 60º S latitude.

ETOPS dual maintenance means maintenance actions performed on the same
element of identical, but separate ETOPS maintenance significant
systems, during the same routine or non-routine visit.  This is to
recognize and preclude common cause human failure modes without proper
verification process or operation test prior to ETOPS.

(1) For turbine engine powered airplanes with two engines - A
maintenance action performed on the same element of identical but
separate ETOPS significant systems during the same routine or
non-routine visit.

(2) For turbine engine powered airplanes with more than two engines - A
maintenance action performed on the same element of identical but
separate ETOPS significant systems on 2 engines of a 3 engine aircraft,
or more than 1 engine per side of a 4 engine aircraft during the same
routine or non-routine visit.

ETOPS entry point means, for turbine engine powered airplanes, the first
point on the route of an authorized flight which is more than 60 minutes
from an adequate airport for airplanes with two engines, or 180 minutes
from an adequate airport for airplanes with more than two engines, or a
point designated as an entry point in an area designated by the
Administrator as an area of ETOPS applicability.  The ETOPS entry point
is calculated at a one-engine inoperative cruise speed (approved) under
standard conditions in still air.

ETOPS maintenance significant system means:

(1) A system for which the redundancy characteristics are directly
linked to the number of engines; or

(2) A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines to
the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or uncommanded
loss of thrust; or

(3) A system that contributes significantly to the safety of a
diversion.

ETOPS qualified personnel means maintenance personnel that have
completed the certificate holder’s ETOPS training program.

Maximum diversion time means for the purposes of ETOPS in part 121 the
diversion time, under standard conditions in still air at the One Engine
Inoperative Cruise Speed (Approved).

One engine inoperative cruise speed  means, for the purposes of those
sections of part 121 applicable to ETOPS, a speed within the certified
operating limits of the airplane, selected by the certificate holder and
approved by the FAA, that is used for calculating fuel reserve
requirements and the still air distance associated with the maximum
approved one engine inoperative diversion distance for the flight.

16. Amend § 121.97 by revising paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to read as follows:

§ 121. 97 Airports: Required data.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(1) * * *

(ii) Public protection including the availability of facilities at each
airport or in the immediate area sufficient to protect the passengers
and crew from the elements and to see to their welfare.

*     *     *     *     *

17. Amend § 121.99 by adding paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:

§ 121.99 Communications facilities.

*     *     *     *     *

(c) For ETOPS where voice communication facilities are available, voice
communications must be provided.  The certificate holder must consider
potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to ETOPS
alternates in determining whether voice communication facilities are
available.  Where voice communication facilities are not available or is
of poor quality, and voice communication is not possible, communications
using alternative systems must be substituted.

(d) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes the certificate holder must have an
additional communication system that is capable of providing immediate
satellite based voice communications of landline telephone-fidelity. 
The system must provide communication capability between the flight crew
and air traffic services and the flight crew and the certificate holder.
 The certificate holder must consider potential routes and altitudes
necessary for diversion to ETOPS alternates in determining whether
immediate, satellite based voice communications are available.  Where
immediate, satellite based voice communications are not available, or
are of poor quality, communications using alternative systems must be
substituted.

18. Add § 121.106 to read as follows:

§ 121.106 ETOPS alternate: Rescue fire fighting service (RFFS).

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the following
rescue fire fighting service must be available at each airport
designated as an ETOPS alternate listed in a dispatch or flight release.

(1) For ETOPS up to 180-minute diversion length, the designated ETOPS
alternates must have rescue fire fighting capability equivalent to that
specified by ICAO Category 4.

(2) For Two-Engine 207-Minute operations the designated ETOPS Alternates
must have rescue fire fighting capability equivalent to that specified
by ICAO Category 4.  In addition, at least one adequate airport within
the 207-minute diversion time must have rescue fire fighting capability
equivalent to that specified by ICAO Category 7.

(3) For all other ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes, the designated
ETOPS alternates must have rescue fire fighting capability equivalent to
that specified by ICAO Category 7.

(b) If the equipment and personnel required in paragraph (a) are not
immediately available at the airport, the airport may still be listed on
the dispatch or flight release if the required RFFS capability can be
augmented from the local fire fighting assets.  Such equipment and
personnel must be available on arrival of the diverting airplane and
must remain as long as the diverting airplane requires the services.  A
30-minute response time for augmentation by the local fire department is
adequate if the initial notification to respond can be initiated while
the diverting airplane is enroute.

19. Add § 121.122 to read as follows:

§ 121.122 Communications facilities.

(a) Each certificate holder conducting supplemental operations must show
that a two-way radio communication system or other means of
communication approved by the Administrator is available at points that
will ensure reliable and rapid communications, under normal operating
conditions over the entire route, (either direct or via approved
point-to-point circuits) between each airplane and the certificate
holder, and between each airplane and the appropriate air traffic
services, except as specified in § 121.351(c).

(b) For ETOPS where voice communication facilities are available, voice
communications must be provided.  The certificate holder must consider
potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to ETOPS
alternates in determining whether voice communication facilities are
available.  Where voice communication facilities are not available or is
of poor quality, and voice communication is not possible, communications
using alternative systems must be substituted.

(c) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes the certificate holder must have an
additional communication system that is capable of providing immediate
satellite based voice communications of landline telephone-fidelity. 
The system must provide communication capability between the flight crew
and air traffic services and the flight crew and the certificate holder.
 The certificate holder must consider potential routes and altitudes
necessary for diversion to ETOPS alternates in determining whether
immediate, satellite based voice communications are available.  Where
immediate, satellite based voice communications are not available, or
are of poor quality, communications using alternative systems must be
substituted.

20. Amend § 121.135(b) by;

Redesignating paragraphs (b)(10) through (b)(22) as paragraphs (b)(11)
through (b)(23); 

Redesignating paragraphs (b)(23) and (b)(24) as paragraphs (b)(25) and
(b)(26); and 

Adding paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(24) as follows:

§ 121.135 Contents.

*     *     *     *     *

(b)  *     *     *

(10) For ETOPS, airplane performance data to support all phases of these
operations.

*   *  *  *  *

(24) For flag and supplemental operations, a passenger recovery plan
applicable to each approved en route alternate airport listed in the air
carrier’s operations specifications.

*     *     *     *     *

21. Amend § 121.161 by revising paragraph (a) and adding paragraph (d)
to read as follows:

§ 121.161 Airplane limitations: Type of route.

(a) No certificate holder may operate a turbine engine powered airplane
over a route that contains a point farther than 60 minutes flying time
from an adequate airport for airplanes with two engines, or 180 minutes
flying time from an adequate airport for airplanes with more than two
engines (in still air at normal cruising speed with one engine
inoperative) or within an area designated by the Administrator as an
Area of ETOPS Applicability unless approved by the Administrator in
accordance with Appendix O of this part.  The polar areas are designated
as areas of ETOPS applicability.  ETOPS must be authorized in the
certificate holder’s operations specifications.

*     *     *     *     *

(d) Unless authorized by the Administrator, based on the character of
the terrain, the kind of operation or the performance of the airplane to
be used, no certificate holder may operate a reciprocating engine
powered airplane over a route that contains a point farther than 60
minutes flying time (in still air at normal cruising speed with one
engine inoperative) from an adequate airport.

22. Add § 121.374 to read as follows:

§ 121.374 ETOPS maintenance elements.

Each certificate holder authorized to conduct ETOPS under Appendix O
must have a maintenance program that includes the following:

(a) Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) compliance. A
system to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements set forth in
the Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) for each airframe
and engine combination, or the Type Design document for each airframe
and engine combination.  Any CMP changes necessary for continued safe
ETOPS flights will be mandated through the Airworthiness Directive
procedures pursuant to part 39 of this chapter. 

(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP). Develop and
follow a continuous airworthiness maintenance program based on the
manufacturers maintenance program or one currently approved for the
operator and supplemented for ETOPS for each airframe and engine
combination.  The program must include the following:

(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check. A check that must be accomplished
immediately prior to an ETOPS flight and certified complete by an ETOPS
qualified maintenance person.

(2) Dual maintenance. (i) Procedures to preclude ETOPS dual maintenance.

(ii) Procedures to use if ETOPS dual maintenance cannot be avoided.

(3) Verification program. Procedures for corrective action to an ETOPS
maintenance significant system.

(4) Task identification. Identify ETOPS specific procedures or tasks
that must be accomplished or verified by ETOPS qualified personnel.

(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures. Establish and document
procedures for centralized Maintenance Control related to ETOPS.

(6) ETOPS program document. Develop a document for use by personnel
involved in ETOPS. All ETOPS requirements, including supportive
programs, procedures, duties and responsibilities, must be identified in
this document and submitted for approval to the CHDO.  This document is
not required to be inclusive but must at least reference the maintenance
programs and clearly define where they are located in the certificate
holder’s document system.  Changes to the ETOPS document must be
submitted to the CHDO and approved before such changes may be adopted.

(7) ETOPS parts control. Develop an ETOPS parts control program to
ensure the proper identification of parts to maintain the ETOPS
configuration.

(8) Reliability program. Develop an ETOPS reliability program, or
supplement the existing reliability program.  The program must be
event-oriented and incorporate reporting procedures for significant
events detrimental to ETOPS flights. 

(i) In addition to the reporting requirements in § 121.703, the
following items must be reported within 72 hours to the CHDO:

(A) In-flight shutdowns.

(B) Diversions or turnback.

(C) Uncommanded power changes or surges.

(D) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.

(E) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.

(F) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.

(ii) The certificate holder must conduct an investigation into the cause
of the occurrence of any event listed in § 121.703 and paragraph
(b)(8)(i) of this section in conjunction with manufacturers and submit
findings and description of corrective action to the CHDO.  The report
must be submitted in the manner prescribed by § 121.703(e).  The
corrective action must be acceptable to the CHDO.

(c) Propulsion system monitoring. (1) If the IFSD rate computed on a
12-month rolling average exceeds the following values, the certificate
holder, in conjunction with the CHDO, must investigate common cause
effects or systemic errors.  

(i) Two engine airplanes:

(A) 0.05/1,000 engine hours for ETOPS up to and including 120 minutes;

(B) 0.03/1,000 engine hours for ETOPS beyond 120 minutes up to and
including 180 minutes, and 207 minutes in North Pacific; and

(C) 0.02/1,000 engine hours for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, except for 207
minutes in North Pacific.

(ii) For airplanes with more than two engines:

(A) 0.2/1,000 engine hours for 3-engine ETOPS; and

(B) 0.1/1,000 engine hours for 4-engine ETOPS.

(2) The report of investigation and, if necessary, corrective action
taken, must be submitted within 30 days through the CHDO to the Director
of the Flight Standards Service for approval.

(d) Engine condition monitoring. The certificate holder must establish
and conduct an Engine Condition Monitoring program to detect
deterioration, at an early stage, and to allow for corrective action
before safe operation is affected.

(1) This program must describe the parameters to be monitored, method of
data collection, analysis, and corrective action process.

(2) The program must ensure that engine limit margins are maintained so
that a prolonged engine inoperative diversion may be conducted without
exceeding approved engine limits (for example, rotor speeds, exhaust gas
temperatures) at all approved power levels and expected environmental
conditions.

(e) Oil consumption monitoring. The certificate holder must establish
and conduct an engine oil consumption monitoring program to ensure that
there is enough oil to complete any ETOPS flight.  The operator’s
consumption limit must not exceed the manufacturer’s recommendations. 
The program must consider the amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS
stations with reference to the running average consumption.  The
monitoring must be continuous up to and including oil added at the ETOPS
departure station.  The APU must be included if an APU is required for
ETOPS.

.

(f) APU in-flight start program. If APU in-flight start capability is
required for ETOPS, the certificate holder must have a cold soak
in-flight APU start and run reliability program acceptable to the
Administrator.

(g) Maintenance training. The certificate holder must review the
airplane and engine combination maintenance training program with the
CHDO to ensure that it adequately supports ETOPS training requirements. 
The certificate holder must develop additional ETOPS specific training
that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is required for all
personnel involved in ETOPS.  This training is in addition to the
operator’s accepted maintenance training program to qualify
individuals for specific airplanes and engines. 

(h) Procedural changes. Any substantial changes to the maintenance or
training procedures established to qualify for ETOPS must be submitted
to the CHDO and approved before they may be adopted.

23. Amend § 121.415 by adding paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:

§ 121.415 Crewmember and dispatcher training requirements.

(a) *     *     *

 (4) Training for crewmembers and dispatchers in their roles and
responsibilities in the certificate holder’s passenger recovery plan.

*     *     *     *     *

24. Amend § 121.565 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:

§ 121.565 Engine inoperative: Landing; reporting.  REF
P121_565aEngineInoperative \h  \* MERGEFORMAT  

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an
engine of an airplane fails or whenever an engine is shutdown to prevent
possible damage, the pilot in command shall land the airplane at the
nearest suitable airport in point of time at which a safe landing can be
made.

*     *     *     *     *

25. Add § 121.624 to read as follows:

§ 121.624 ETOPS alternates.

(a) No person may dispatch an airplane for ETOPS unless the ETOPS
Alternates listed in the dispatch or flight release are located such
that the airplane remains within the authorized ETOPS maximum diversion
time under which the flight is to be dispatched. The certificate holder
must consider all adequate airports within the diversion limits of the
operation that meet the standards of this part.  Each required ETOPS
Alternate must be listed in the dispatch or flight release.

(b) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate in the dispatch
or flight release unless the appropriate weather reports or forecasts or
any combination thereof indicating that weather conditions are at or
above ETOPS Alternate minima specified in the certificate holder’s
operations specifications and with field condition reports indicating
that a safe landing can be accomplished at the time of the intended
operation (from the earliest to the latest time of landing at that
airport).  Once a flight is enroute, the ETOPS Alternates must meet the
requirements of § 121.631(c).

(c) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate in the dispatch
or flight release unless that airport meets the requirements of this
part. 

(d) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate in the dispatch
or flight release unless that airport meets the public protection
requirements of § 121.97(b)(1)(ii).

26. Revise § 121.625 to read as follows:

§ 121.625 Alternate airport weather minimums.

Except as required by § 121.624, no person may list an airport as an
alternate in the dispatch or flight release unless the appropriate
weather reports or forecasts or any combination thereof indicate that
the weather conditions will be at or above the alternate weather
minimums specified in the certificate holder's operations specifications
for that airport when the flight arrives.

27. Amend § 121.631 by redesignating paragraphs (c) and (d) as
paragraphs (e) and (f), respectively, and adding new paragraphs (c) and
(d) to read as follows:

§ 121.631 Original dispatch or flight release, redispatch or amendment
of dispatch or flight release.

*     *     *     *     *

(c) For ETOPS, in addition to paragraph (b) of this section, no person
may allow a flight to continue beyond the ETOPS Entry Point unless the
weather conditions at required ETOPS Alternates specified in the
dispatch or flight release are reviewed and forecast to be at or above
the operating minimums specified in the operations specifications for
that airport during the period in which that airport may be expected to
be used (from the earliest to the latest time of landing at that
airport).  Such a review must include all ETOPS Alternates within the
dispatch diversion time of the planned routing and advice to the flight
crew of any changes that have occurred since dispatch.  However, the
dispatch or flight release may be amended en route to add any ETOPS
Alternate with weather above operating minima and that is within the
maximum ETOPS diversion time that could be authorized for that flight.

(d) The pilot in command for supplemental operators, or a dispatcher for
flag operators must, prior to the ETOPS Entry Point, use company
communications to update any revised flight plan if required as a result
of re-evaluation of aircraft system capabilities.

28.  Add § 121.633 to read as follows:

§ 121.633 ETOPS: Time limited system planning.

(a) For ETOPS up to and including 180 minutes, the time required to fly
the distance to the planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, in still air and standard
day temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane
Flight Manual for the airplanes most time limited system time minus 15
minutes.

(b) Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, for
ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the time required to fly the distance to the
planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the all engines operating
cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not exceed the
time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane’s cargo
fire suppression system time minus 15 minutes.

(c) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section, for
ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the time required to fly the distance to the
planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the approved one engine
inoperative cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not
exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the
airplanes most time limited system time (except for cargo fire
suppression) minus 15 minutes.

(d) Three and four-engine turbine powered airplanes not meeting the
requirements of paragraph (b) of this section as of the effective date
of this regulation may continue ETOPS operations for a period not to
exceed 6 years from the effective date of this regulation. 

29. Add § 121.646 to read as follows:

§ 121.646 En route fuel supply: flag and supplemental operations.

(a) No person may dispatch or release for flight or takeoff a turbine
engine powered airplane with more than two engines more than 90 minutes
(with all engines operating at cruising power) and less than 180 minutes
(at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed) from an adequate
airport unless, considering wind and other weather conditions (including
icing), it has enough fuel, assuming a rapid decompression at the most
critical point followed by descent to a safe altitude in compliance with
the oxygen supply requirements of § 121.333, to fly to an adequate
airport and conduct a normal approach and landing with enough fuel
remaining to hold for 15 minutes at 1500 feet above field elevation.

(b) No person may dispatch or release for flight or takeoff a turbine
powered airplane in ETOPS unless, considering wind and other weather
conditions expected, it has enough fuel to satisfy the following
requirements (b)(1) through (b)(4) of this section:

(1) Greater of:

(i) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate assuming a rapid
decompression at the most critical point followed by descent to a safe
altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of §
121.333, or 

(ii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate at the approved one
engine inoperative cruise speed assuming a rapid decompression and a
simultaneous engine failure at the most critical point followed by
descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply
requirements of § 121.333, or

(iii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate at the approved one
engine inoperative cruise speed assuming an engine failure at the most
critical point followed by descent to the one engine inoperative cruise
altitude.

(2) Upon reaching the alternate hold at 1500 feet above field elevation
for 15 minutes and then conduct an instrument approach and land.

(3) Add a 5% wind speed factor (i.e., an increment to headwind or a
decrement to tailwind) on the actual forecast wind used to calculate
fuel in paragraph (b)(1)(i) above to account for any potential errors in
wind forecasting.  If a certificate holder is not using the actual
forecast wind based on wind model acceptable to the FAA, allow 5% of the
fuel required for paragraph (b)(1)(i) above, as reserve fuel to allow
for errors in wind data.

(4) Compensate in paragraph (b)(1)(i) above for the greater of:

(A) The effect of airframe icing during 10 percent of the time during
which icing is forecast (including the fuel used by engine and wing
anti-ice during this period), or

(B) Fuel for engine anti-ice, and if appropriate wing anti-ice for the
entire time during which icing is forecast.

(C) Unless the certificate holder has a program established to monitor
airplane in-service deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance and
includes in fuel supply calculations fuel sufficient to compensate for
any such deterioration, increase the fuel supply by 5% to account for
deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance.

(D) If an APU is a required power source, then its fuel consumption must
be accounted for during the appropriate phases of flight.

30. Amend § 121.687 by adding paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:

§ 121.687 Dispatch release: Flag and domestic operations.

(a) *     *     *

(6) For each flight dispatched as an ETOPS flight, the ETOPS time basis
(if any) under which the flight is dispatched.

*     *     *     *     *

31. Amend § 121.689 by adding paragraph (a)(8) to read as follows:

§ 121.689 Flight release form: Supplemental operations.

(a) *     *     *

 (8) For each flight released as an ETOPS flight, the ETOPS time basis
(if any) under which the flight is released.

*     *     *     *     *

32. Add appendix O to read as follows:

Appendix O to Part 121 -- Requirements for ETOPS

The Administrator may approve ETOPS for various areas of operation in
accordance with the requirements and limitations specified in this
appendix.

A. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with Two engines

(a) 75 Minutes ETOPS

(1) Caribbean / Western Atlantic Area. Approvals may be granted to
conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 75 minutes on Western
Atlantic/Caribbean area routes.  The airframe and engine combination
shall be reviewed by the Administrator to ensure the absence of factors
that could prevent safe operations.  The airframe and engine combination
need not be approved for ETOPS; however, it must have sufficient
favorable experience to demonstrate a level of reliability appropriate
for 75-minute ETOPS.  These operations must comply with the requirements
of section 121.633.  The certificate holder must employ an FAA approved
maintenance program that specifically addresses factors significant to
75-minute ETOPS operations except that a service check before departure
of the return flight may not be required.

(2) Other Areas. Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS operations
with maximum diversion times up to 75 minutes on other than Western
Atlantic / Caribbean area routes.  The airframe and engine combination
shall be reviewed by the Administrator to ensure the absence of factors
that could prevent safe operations.  The airframe and engine combination
need not be approved for ETOPS; however it must have sufficient
favorable experience to demonstrate a level of reliability appropriate
for 75-minute ETOPS.  These operations must comply with the requirements
of section 121.633.  The certificate holder must employ an FAA approved
operations and maintenance program that specifically addresses factors
significant to 75-minute ETOPS operations.

(b) 90-minutes ETOPS (Micronesia). Approvals may be granted to conduct
ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 90 minutes on Micronesian area
routes.  For such operations the airframe and engine combination must be
type design approved for a minimum of 120 minute ETOPS.  The certificate
holder must employ an FAA approved operations and maintenance program
that specifically addresses factors significant to 120 minute ETOPS,
except that a service check before departure of the return flight may
not be required.  Minimum equipment list requirements for 120 minute
extended range (“ER”) operations apply to such operations.

(c) 120 minutes. Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS with maximum
diversion times up to 120 minutes.  For such operations the
airframe/engine combination must be type design approved for a minimum
of 120 minute ETOPS.  The certificate holder must employ an FAA approved
operations and maintenance program that specifically addresses factors
significant to 120 minute ETOPS.  Minimum equipment list requirements
for 120 minute extended range (“ER”) operations apply to such
operations. 

(d) 138 Minutes. 138-minute ETOPS must be operated under one of the
following:

(1) Extension of 120-minute ETOPS authority. Approvals may be granted to
conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 138 minutes.  This
authority is deemed to be an extension of already existing 120-minute
ETOPS authority, and may only be exercised on a flight-by-flight
exception basis.  For such operations the airframe-engine combination
must be type design approved for a minimum of 120 minute ETOPS.  In
addition, airplane time-limited system capability may not be less than
the authorized 138-minute diversion time in still air conditions at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed plus a 15-minute allowance
for holding, approach and landing.  The certificate holder must employ
an FAA approved operations and maintenance program that specifically
addresses factors significant to 138-minute ETOPS.  Operators with
120-minute ETOPS authority but no 180-minute authority may apply to
AFS-200 through their certificate holding district office (CHDO) for a
modified MEL which satisfies the MMEL policy for system / component
relief in ETOPS beyond 120 minutes.  The certificate holder shall submit
for FAA approval a summary of revisions to training curricula for
maintenance, dispatch and flight crew personnel which identifies
differences between 138-minute ETOPS diversion authority and its
previously approved 120-minute ETOPS diversion authority.

(2) Use of existing 180-minute ETOPS approval. Approvals may be granted
to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 138 minutes to
certificate holders with existing 180 minute ETOPS approval.  This
authority may be exercised on an unlimited basis.  For such operations
the airframe/engine combination must be type design approved for a
minimum of 180-minute ETOPS.  The certificate holder must employ an FAA
approved operations and maintenance program that specifically addresses
factors significant to 138-minute ETOPS.  Approved minimum equipment
list provisions for “beyond 120 minutes ETOPS” apply to these
operations.  The certificate holder shall submit for FAA approval a
summary of revisions to training curricula for maintenance, dispatch and
flight crew personnel which identifies differences between 138-minute
ETOPS diversion authority and its previously approved 180-minute ETOPS
diversion authority.

(e) 180 minutes. Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS with maximum
diversion times up to 180 minutes.  For such operations the airframe and
engine combination must be type design approved for a minimum of
180-minute ETOPS.  The certificate holder must employ an FAA approved
operations and maintenance program that specifically addresses factors
significant to 180-minute ETOPS operations.  Minimum equipment list
provisions for “beyond 120 minutes ETOPS” apply to these operations.

(f) Greater than 180 minutes.

Approvals may be granted to certificate holders with previous ETOPS
experience to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times exceeding 180
minutes as specified in paragraphs (g) through (j) of this appendix. 
Approvals may be granted only to certificate holders with existing 180
minutes ETOPS approval on the airframe/engine combination listed in
their application.  In conducting all such operations, operators must
make every attempt to minimize diversion time along the preferred track
and plan ETOPS at maximum diversion distances of 180 minutes or less. 
If conditions prevent the use of adequate airports within 180 minutes as
ETOPS Alternates, the route may be flown beyond 180 minutes authority
subject to the requirements provided for the specific area of
operations.  In addition to the MEL limitations for 180 minute ETOPS,
the following systems must be operational for dispatch:

(1) Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS),

(2) APU (including electrical and pneumatic supply to its designed
capability),

(3) auto throttle system,

(4) the communication system required by section 121.99(d) or
121.122(c), as applicable, and

(5) one engine inoperative auto land capability, if flight planning is
predicated on its use.

Operators must inform the flight crew any time an aircraft is proposed
for dispatch under this authority and make available the dispatch
considerations requiring such operations.

(g) North Pacific

On flight by flight exception basis, tracked by the certificate holder,
when an ETOPS Alternate is not available within 180 minutes in the North
Pacific area of operation, the nearest available ETOPS Alternate must be
specified within 207 minutes maximum diversion time.  In conducting such
operations the operator must give Air Traffic Services preferred track,
if available, the first consideration.  Application of this exception
must be limited to circumstances such as political or military concern,
volcanic activity, airport weather below dispatch requirements,
temporary airport conditions and other weather related events.  For such
operations, the airframe and engine combination must be type design
approved for a minimum of 180-minute ETOPS.  The time required to fly
the distance to the planned ETOPS Alternate or alternates, at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, in still air and standard
day temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane
Flight Manual for the airplane’s most time limited system time minus
15 minutes.

(h) Polar Area (North Pole) and North of NOPAC

On a flight by flight exception basis, tracked by the certificate
holder, when an ETOPS alternate is not available within 180 minutes in
the Polar Area (North Pole) or north of the North Pacific Area of
Operations, the nearest available ETOPS Alternate must be specified
within 240 minutes maximum diversion time.  Application of this
exception shall be limited to circumstances related to the weather
extremes particular to this area of the world such as volcanic activity,
extreme cold weather at en route airports, airport weather below
dispatch requirements, temporary airport conditions and other weather
related events.  The criteria used by the certificate holder to make
determinations that extreme weather precludes the use of an airport must
be established by the certificate holder and accepted by the FAA and
published in the certificate holder’s manual for the use of
dispatchers and pilots.  For such operations, the airframe/engine
combination must be type design approved for a minimum of 240-minute
ETOPS as specified in the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures (CMP)
Standard for such operations.  For such operations, the requirements in
paragraph C, Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS beyond 180
minutes North of the NOPAC area, of this appendix apply.

(i) 240 minutes Area of Operations

Approvals may be granted to certificate holders with previous ETOPS
experience and existing 180-minute ETOPS approval for the airframe
engine combination listed in their application to conduct ETOPS with
maximum diversion times up to 240 minutes on routes in the Pacific
oceanic areas between the US west coast and Australia, New Zealand and
Polynesia; south Atlantic oceanic areas; Indian Oceanic areas; oceanic
areas between Australia and South America.  The operator must designate
the nearest available ETOPS Alternate or Alternates along the planned
route of flight.  For such operations, the airframe and engine
combination must be type design approved for a minimum of 240 minute
ETOPS.  All requirements specified in the Configuration Maintenance and
Procedures (CMP) Standard for 240 minute ETOPS are applicable to such
operations.

(j) Beyond 240 minutes Area of Operations

Approvals may be granted, to certificate holders who have been operating
in accordance with 180 minute or greater ETOPS for 24 consecutive
months, of which at least 12 consecutive months shall be at 240 minute
ETOPS on the airframe/engine combination for which the authority is
requested, to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times beyond 240
minutes between city pairs on routes in the Pacific oceanic areas
between the US west coast and Australia, New Zealand and Polynesia;
south Atlantic oceanic areas; Indian Oceanic areas; oceanic areas
between Australia and South America, and South Pole area.  The operator
must designate the nearest available ETOPS alternate(s) along the
planned route of flight.  For such operations, the airframe and engine
combination must be type design approved for at least the maximum
authorized ETOPS diversion time necessary for that operation.  All
requirements specified in the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures
(CMP) Standard for beyond 240 minute ETOPS are applicable to such
operations.

B. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with more than two engines

Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS on a routine basis with
maximum diversion times up to 240 minutes in any area of operations. 
For all such operations, the nearest available ETOPS Alternate within
240 minutes diversion time (in still air at one engine inoperative
speed) must be specified.  If an ETOPS Alternate is not available within
240 minutes, the nearest alternate ETOPS alternate must be specified. In
either case the operator must designate the nearest available ETOPS
Alternate(s) along the planned route of flight. On all such operations,
MEL limitations for ETOPS apply and in addition, the Fuel Quantity
Indicating System (FQIS) and the communications requirements of §
121.99(d) or § 121.122(c) must be operational.  For company
communications on such operations, operators must use the system
required by § 121.99(d).  For such operations, the airframe and engine
combination must be type design approved for the maximum authorized
ETOPS diversion time.

C. Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS beyond 180 minutes North of
the NOPAC area 

Approvals may be granted to conduct any operations within these areas. 
To obtain such approvals, in addition to the requirements in paragraphs
(A) and (B) of this appendix, the operator must consider airport
requirements for ETOPS Alternates, airline recovery plan for passengers
at diversion alternates, fuel freeze strategy and monitoring,
communication capability, Minimum Equipment List considerations, airline
training issues specific to polar operations, long range crew
requirements, dispatch and crew considerations during solar flare
activity, special equipment requirements, and validation requirements
for area approval in a manner acceptable to the Administrator.

Part 135 -- OPERATING REQUIREMENTS; COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATION AND
RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT                          
                                                                        
       

33. The authority citation for part 135 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 44113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709,
44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722.

34.  Add § 135.98 to read as follows:

§ 135.98 Polar operations.

Except for intrastate operations within the State of Alaska, no person
may operate an aircraft in the region north of N 78o 00’, designated
as Polar, unless authorized by the Administrator and unless the
certificate holder’s operation specifications address the following
items:

(a) Designation and requirements for airports that may be used for
enroute diversions.

(b) Recovery plan for passengers at diversion alternates.

(c) Fuel freeze strategy and monitoring requirements for Polar
operations.

(d) Communication capability for Polar operations.

(e) MEL considerations for Polar operations.

(f) Training issues for Polar operations.

(g) Crew considerations during solar flare activity.

(h) Special equipment for Polar operations.

35. Amend § 135.345 by removing the word “and” from the end of
(a)(7), redesignating paragraph (a)(8) as (a)(10), and by adding new
paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) to read as follows:

§ 135.345 Pilots: Initial, transition, and upgrade ground training.

*     *     *     *     *

(a) *     *     *

(8) ETOPS, if applicable;

(9) Passenger Recovery for ETOPS, if applicable; and

*     *     *     *     *

36. Add § 135.364 to read as follows:

§ 135.364 Multi-engine airplane limitations: Maximum distance from an
airport.

Unless approved by the Administrator in accordance with Appendix H of
this part (Extended Operations (ETOPS)), no certificate holder may
operate an airplane outside the continental U.S. unless the planned
route for that airplane remains within 180 minutes flying time (in still
air at normal cruise speed with one engine inoperative) from an airport
meeting the requirements of §§135.385, 135.387, 135.393 or 135.395, as
applicable, and §§ 135.219 or 135.221 as applicable.

37. Amend § 135.411 by adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:

§ 135.411 Applicability.

*     *     *     *     *

(d) A certificate holder performing Extended Operations must comply with
 paragraph (a)(2) of this section  and the additional requirements of
Appendix H of this part. 

38. Add appendix H to read as follows:

APPENDIX H TO PART 135 --EXTENDED OPERATIONS (ETOPS)

The Administrator may approve ETOPS for various areas of operation in
accordance with the requirements and limitations specified in this
appendix 

(A) Definitions:

(1) ETOPS: Extended operations.

ETOPS is an operation authorized under part 135 for flights beyond 180
minutes flying time (in still air at normal cruise speed with one engine
inoperative) from an airport meeting the requirements of §§ 135.385,
135.387, 135.393 or 135.395, as applicable, and §§ 135.219 or 135.221
as applicable.  However, ETOPS flights must be planned so as to remain
within 240 minutes flying time (in still air with one engine
inoperative) from an airport meeting the requirements of §§ 135.385,
135.387, 135.393 or 135.395, as applicable, and §§ 135.219 or 135.221
as applicable.

(2) ETOPS dual maintenance.

Maintenance actions performed on the same element of identical, but
separate ETOPS maintenance significant systems, during the same routine
or non-routine visit. This is to recognize and preclude common cause
human failure modes without proper verification process or operation
test prior to ETOPS.

(B) Certificate Holder Experience Prior to Conducting ETOPS

(1) Prior to applying for authorization to conduct ETOPS, the
certificate holder must have at least 12 months operating experience
with a type of transport category turbine-engine powered airplane
conducting international operations (excluding Canada and Mexico).  For
the purpose of this subparagraph, operations to or from the State of
Hawaii may be considered as experience in international operations.

(2) Certificate holders granted authority to operate under part 135 or
part 121 before [insert date final rule is effective] may credit up to 6
months of domestic operating experience (including Canada and Mexico) in
a transport category turbojet airplane as part of the required 12 months
of international experience.

(3) A certificate holder’s previous ETOPS experience with other
aircraft types may be considered by the Administrator as meeting the
requirements of paragraph (B)(1) in whole or in part.

(C) Airplane Requirements.

(1) No person may conduct ETOPS in a multi-engine airplane that was
added to the certificate holder’s U.S. operations specifications after
[insert date that is eight years after the effective date of this final
rule] unless the airplane is certificated to § 25.1535.

(2) No person may conduct ETOPS in a multi-engine airplane that was
added to the certificate holder’s U.S. operations specifications on or
before [insert date that is eight years after the effective date of this
final rule] unless the airplane has the following systems capability
acceptable to the Administrator:

		(a)  Electrical System.  Three or more independent electrical power
sources must be available, each of which must be capable of providing
power for all of the equipment required by this part for the duration of
any diversion.

(b) Fuel System.  The fuel supply system must be able to provide
sufficient fuel for the duration of any diversion following any single
failure of fuel system components.

D. Certificate holder requirements.

(1)  No certificate holder may operate an airplane in accordance with
ETOPS unless the planned route for that airplane remains within 240
minutes flying time (in still air and one engine inoperative) from an
airport meeting the requirements of §135.385, §135.387, §135.393 or
§ 135.395, as applicable, and §135.219 or § 135.221 as applicable. 

(2)  In addition to the requirements of §135.83, §135.225 and
§135.229 the certificate holder will ensure flight crews have in-flight
access to current weather and operational information on all enroute
alternate, destination and destination alternate airports proposed for
each ETOPS flight.

(E) Operational Requirements.

(1)  No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue beyond the ETOPS
entry point unless the weather and operating conditions at the required
enroute alternate airports are reviewed and expected to be at or above
the operating minimums specified in the operations specifications during
the period in which that airport may be expected to be used based on
expected estimated times of arrival at that airport.  The planned route
of flight may be amended while en route to allow use of additional
enroute alternate airports provided weather is forecast to be at or
above operating minima and the airport is within the maximum ETOPS
diversion time.

(2) Pilots shall plan and conduct ETOPS under instrument flight rules.

(3) Time Limited Systems.

(a) For ETOPS, the time required to fly the distance to the planned
ETOPS alternate or alternates, at the all engines operating cruise
speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not exceed the time
specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane’s cargo fire
suppression system time (if installed), minus 15 minutes.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a) above, the time required to fly
the distance to the planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, correcting for wind and
temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight
Manual for the airplanes most time limited system time (except for cargo
fire suppression) minus 15 minutes.

(c) Certificate holders operating turbine-engine powered airplanes that,
on the effective date of this regulation, lack the airplane flight
manual information required by paragraphs a and b above, may continue
ETOPS operations for a period not to exceed the date that occurs eight
years following the effective date of this rule.

(F) Communications Requirements.

(1) No person may conduct an ETOPS flight unless the following
communications equipment, appropriate to the route to be flown, is
installed and operational:

(a) Two independent communication transmitters (at least one must allow
voice communication).

(b) Two independent communication receivers (at least one must allow
voice communication).

(c) Two headsets, or one headset and one speaker.

(2) In areas where voice communication facilities are not available, or
voice communication is not possible or is of poor quality,
communications using alternative systems may be substituted.

(G) Fuel Planning Requirements.

1. No person may take off a flight for operations in ETOPS unless the
fuel carried on board is the greater of:

a. Fuel required under §135.223, or

b. Considering forecast wind and other weather conditions, the airplane
carries sufficient fuel to complete the flight under the following
conditions:

(i) Greater of:

(a) Fuel sufficient to fly to a ETOPS enroute alternate airport assuming
a rapid decompression at the most critical point followed by descent to
a safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of
§135.157; or

(b) Fuel sufficient to fly to a ETOPS enroute alternate airport at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed assuming a rapid
decompression and a simultaneous engine failure at the most critical
point followed by descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the
oxygen supply requirements of §135.157; or

(c) Fuel sufficient to fly to a ETOPS enroute alternate airport at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed assuming an engine failure
at the most critical point followed by descent to the one engine
inoperative cruise altitude.

(ii) Upon reaching the enroute alternate airport, hold at 1500 ft above
field elevation for 15 minutes and then conduct an instrument approach
and land.

(iii) Add a 5% wind speed factor (i.e., an increment to headwind or a
decrement to tailwind) on the actual forecast wind used to calculate
fuel in paragragh b.(i) of this appendix to account for any potential
errors in wind forecasting.  If a certificate holder is not using the
actual forecast wind based on wind model acceptable to the FAA, allow 5%
of the fuel required for a above, as reserve fuel to allow for errors in
wind data.

(iv) Compensate in paragraph b.(i) above for the greater of:

(A) The effect of airframe icing during 10 percent of the time during
which icing is forecast, or

(B) Fuel for engine anti-ice, and if appropriate wing anti-ice for the
time during which icing is forecast,

2. Unless the certificate holder has a program established to monitor
airplane in-service deterioration of cruise fuel burn performance and
includes in fuel supply calculations fuel sufficient to compensate for
any such deterioration, increase the fuel supply by 5 percent to account
for deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance.

3. If the APU is a power source required by this appendix, then its fuel
consumption must be accounted for.

H. Maintenance Program Requirements.

Each certificate holder authorized to conduct ETOPS under section
135.364 must have a maintenance program that includes the following:

(a) Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) compliance.

A system to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements set forth in
the Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) for each airframe
and engine combination, or the Type Design document for each airframe
and engine combination.

(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP).

Develop and follow a continuous airworthiness maintenance program based
on the manufacturers maintenance program or one currently approved for
the operator and supplemented for ETOPS for each airframe and engine
combination.  The program must include the following:

(1). ETOPS pre-departure service check. A check that must be
accomplished immediately prior to an ETOPS flight and certified complete
by an ETOPS qualified maintenance person

(2) Dual maintenance.

(a) Procedures to preclude ETOPS dual maintenance. 

(b) Procedures to use if ETOPS dual maintenance cannot be avoided.

(3) Verification program. Procedures for corrective action to an ETOPS
maintenance significant system.

(4) Task identification.  Identify ETOPS specific procedures or tasks
that must be accomplished or verified by ETOPS qualified personnel.

(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures. Establish and document
procedures for centralized Maintenance Control related to ETOPS.

(6) ETOPS program document.  Develop a document for use by personnel
involved in ETOPS. All ETOPS requirements, including supportive
programs, procedures, duties and responsibilities, must be identified in
this document and submitted for approval to the CHDO.  This document is
not required to be inclusive but must at least reference the maintenance
programs and clearly define where they are located in the certificate
holder’s document system.  Changes to the ETOPS document must be
submitted to the CHDO and approved before such changes may be adopted.

(7) ETOPS parts control.  Develop an ETOPS parts control program to
ensure the proper identification of parts to maintain the ETOPS
configuration.

(8) Enhanced Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) program.
 The certificate holder must include the ETOPS program elements in the
certificate holder’s CASS program.  The program must incorporate
reporting procedures for significant events detrimental to ETOPS
flights.

(a) In addition to the reporting requirements in § 135.415and
§135.417, the following items must be reported within 72 hours to the
CHDO.

(1) In-flight shutdowns.

(2) Uncommanded power changes or surges.

(3) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.

(4) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.

(5) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.

(b) The certificate holder must conduct an investigation into the cause
of the occurrence of any event listed in § 135.415, §135.417, or
paragraph (8)(a) above in conjunction with manufacturers and submit
findings and corrective action to the CHDO.  The report must be
submitted in the manner prescribed by section 135.415(e).  If the CHDO
determines that additional corrective action is necessary, the
certificate holder must implement the corrective action.

(c) Propulsion system monitoring.

The certificate holder, in conjunction with the CHDO, must

(1) establish criteria as to what action is to be taken when adverse
trends in propulsion system conditions are detected and 

(2) investigate common cause effects or systemic errors and submit the
findings to the CHDO within 30 days.

(d) Engine condition monitoring.

The certificate holder must establish an Engine Condition Monitoring
program to detect deterioration at an early stage to allow for
corrective action before safe operation is affected.

(1) This program must describe the parameters to be monitored, method of
data collection and corrective action process.

(2) The program must ensure that engine limit margins are maintained so
that a prolonged engine inoperative diversion may be conducted without
exceeding approved engine limits (for example, rotor speeds, exhaust gas
temperatures) at all approved power levels and expected environmental
conditions.

(e) Oil consumption monitoring.

The certificate holder must establish an engine oil consumption
monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to complete any
ETOPS flight.  The operator’s consumption limit must not exceed the
manufacturer’s recommendations.  The program must consider the amount
of oil added at the departing ETOPS stations with reference to the
running average consumption.  The monitoring must be continuous up to
and including oil added at the ETOPS departure station.  The APU must be
included if an APU is required for ETOPS.

(f) APU in-flight start program.

If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the certificate
holder must have a cold soak in-flight APU start and run reliability
program acceptable to the Administrator.

(g) Maintenance training.

The certificate holder must review the airplane and engine combination
maintenance training program with the CHDO to ensure that it adequately
supports ETOPS training requirements.  The certificate holder must
develop additional ETOPS specific training that focuses on the special
nature of ETOPS and is required for all personnel involved in ETOPS. 
This training is in addition to the operator’s accepted maintenance
training program to qualify individuals for specific airplanes and
engines.

(h) Procedural changes.

Any substantial changes to the maintenance or training procedures
established to qualify for ETOPS must be submitted to the CHDO and
approved before they may be adopted.

(i) Reporting.

For each airplane authorized to conduct ETOPS, the certificate holder
shall report on a quarterly basis operating hours and cycles for each
engine and airframe to the CHDO and to the airplane and engine
manufacturer.

Issued in Washington, DC, on November 7, 2003.						.

James Ballough

Director, Flight Standards Service

 “Improving Airline Profitability Through Better Estimated Times of
Arrival and Terminal Area Flight Information: a Benefit Analysis of
PASSUR” Darryl Jenkins and Bill Cotton.   Available at
www.passur.com/report

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