Document ID: FAA-2008-1292-0030
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Flightcrew Alerting
Posted Date: 2010-11-02T04:00Z

[Federal Register: November 2, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 211)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 67201-67210]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr02no10-1]                         

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[[Page 67201]]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No.: FAA-2008-1292; Amendment No. 25-131]
RIN 2120-AJ35

 
Flightcrew Alerting

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is amending the airworthiness standards for transport 
category airplanes concerning flightcrew alerting. These standards 
update definitions, prioritization, color requirements, and performance 
for flightcrew alerting to reflect changes in technology and 
functionality. This amendment adds additional alerting functions, and 
consolidates and standardizes definitions and regulations for 
flightcrew warning, caution, and advisory alerting systems. This action 
will result in harmonized standards between the FAA and the European 
Aviation Safety Agency.

DATES: This amendment becomes effective January 3, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this rule, contact Loran Haworth, FAA, Airplane and Flightcrew 
Interface Branch (ANM-111), Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone (425) 227-1133; facsimile 425-227-1232; e-mail 
Loran.Haworth@faa.gov.
    For legal questions concerning this rule, contact Doug Anderson, 
FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel (ANM-7), 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 
Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2166; facsimile 425-
227-1007; e-mail Douglas.Anderson@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 describes 
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation 
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting 
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations and minimum standards in the interest of safety for the 
design and performance of aircraft that the Administrator finds 
necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the 
scope of that authority. It prescribes new safety standards for the 
design and operation of transport category airplanes.

Background

    Section 25.1322 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), 
became effective February 1, 1977,\1\ and has never been amended. Since 
it was issued there have been many advances in the design and 
technology of flight deck alerting devices. The new technologies 
associated with integrated visual, aural, and tactile flightcrew alerts 
and alert messaging are more effective in alerting the flightcrew and 
aiding them in decision making than the discrete colored lights for 
warning, caution, and advisory alerts prescribed in Sec.  25.1322. The 
word ``alert'' in the above context is a generic term used to describe 
a flight deck indication meant to attract the attention of the 
flightcrew and identify a non-normal operational or airplane system 
condition. Warnings, cautions, and advisories are considered to be 
categories of alerts.
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    \1\ Published in the Federal Register (41 FR 55467) on December 
20, 1976; Amendment No. 25-38.
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    Because Sec.  25.1322 is outdated and lacks content commensurate 
with state-of-the-art flight deck display technology, applicants have 
to perform additional work when showing compliance to that regulation. 
This results in additional work for the FAA, which has to generate 
issue papers and special conditions when applicants want to install 
advanced flight deck designs and current display technologies that are 
not addressed in Sec.  25.1322.

Summary of the NPRM

    The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), Notice No. 09-05, 
published in the Federal Register on July 9, 2009 (74 FR 32810), is the 
basis for this final rule. The public comment period closed on 
September 8, 2009. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend the 
airworthiness standards for flightcrew alerting in transport category 
airplanes. The proposed standards addressed regulations regarding 
definitions, prioritization, color requirements, and performance for 
flightcrew alerting. In the NPRM, the FAA also proposed to update the 
current standards to reflect the current technology and functionality 
for flightcrew alerting.

Summary of the Final Rule

    The FAA is adopting this final rule to update the flightcrew 
alerting standards so they are relevant to the current technology. This 
includes adding additional alerting functions, and consolidating and 
standardizing definitions and regulations for flightcrew warning, 
caution, and advisory alerting systems. Adopting this rule also 
harmonizes flightcrew alerting standards between the FAA and the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). This rule will apply to 
applications for type certificates submitted after the effective date 
of the rule. This rule may also apply to applications for type design 
changes, including amended Type Certificates and Supplemental Type 
Certificates, submitted after the effective date of the rule, in 
accordance with Sec.  21.101.
    This final rule adopts the proposed rule with wording changes to 
improve clarity. Also, the order of certain paragraphs has been changed 
to improve the coherence of the rule.

Summary of Comments

    The FAA received comments from 18 commenters, including civil 
aviation authorities, manufacturers, aviation associations, and the 
National Transportation Safety Board. All of the commenters generally 
supported the proposed changes to Sec.  25.1322. Only the substantive 
comments are discussed below.

[[Page 67202]]

Discussion of the Final Rule

    The FAA received comments on the following general areas of the 
proposal:

     Reserving and limiting the use of alerting colors red, 
amber, or yellow on the flight deck.
     Restricting the use of yellow to caution alerts only.
     Restricting the use of certain colors for advisory alerts.
     Weather displays and terrain awareness and warning system 
(TAWS) displays.
     Requiring cues from two different senses for warning and 
caution alerts.
     Identifying an alert and determining corrective action.
     Minimizing and preventing the effects of false and 
nuisance alerts.
     Suppressing the attention-getting component of an alert 
caused by failure of the alerting function.
     Requiring that an alert presentation be removed once the 
condition no longer exists.
     Presenting alerts on multi-color displays.
     Presenting alerts on monochromatic displays.
     Prioritizing alerts within a given category.
     Applying the changed product rule.
     Economic impact.
    Below is a more detailed discussion of the rule, as it relates to 
the comments the FAA received to the NPRM.\2\
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    \2\ The full text of each commenter's submission is available in 
the public docket.
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Reserving and Limiting the Use of Red, Amber, or Yellow on the Flight 
Deck

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that visual alert indications shown 
on multi-color displays conform to the following color convention 
(proposed Sec.  25.1322(d)):
    (1) Red for warning alert indications;
    (2) Amber or yellow for caution alert indications;
    (3) Any color except red, amber, yellow, or green for advisory 
alert indications.

The FAA also proposed that the use of red, amber, and yellow be 
reserved for alerting functions and that the use of these colors for 
functions other than flightcrew alerting must be limited and not 
adversely affect flightcrew alerting (proposed Sec.  25.1322(f)).
    After review, commenters' greatest concern with the proposed rule 
was the restriction imposed on color usage in the flight deck. However, 
following comments and internal FAA review, the final rule text now 
combines two sentences into one, to further clarify the intent to limit 
the use of certain colors. The final rule text for Sec.  25.1322(f) 
states: ``Use of the colors red, amber, and yellow on the flight deck 
for functions other than flightcrew alerting must be limited and must 
not adversely affect flightcrew alerting.'' The final rule text is 
harmonized with EASA. Airbus commented that the FAA's proposal to limit 
the use of red to only warning alerts is too restrictive. Airbus stated 
that some system failures may require immediate response during certain 
operations but not in others, and that the color coding must always 
consider the worst case scenario. Airbus proposed that paragraph Sec.  
25.1322(f) be revised to add: ``However, deviations are acceptable for: 
(i) The use of red for failure flags on primary flight display and 
navigation display that may require immediate crew awareness and 
response;''
    The FAA has changed the final rule text; however, these changes do 
not align with Airbus' proposal. The purpose of this final rule is to 
update the current standards to provide an increased level of safety. 
The FAA notes the trend in flightcrew alerting is toward reducing 
nuisance alerts by using smarter alerting, where the alerting system 
has built-in logic and knows when to display the alerts. The rule will 
require that alerting functions be designed to minimize the effects of 
false and nuisance alerts and prevent the presentation of these alerts 
when they are inappropriate. Red flags are one way to present visual 
warning information. However, alert indications that are similar in 
presentation but have two different meanings can be confusing to the 
flightcrew. Airbus' suggested text sets up a situation where certain 
red flags require immediate flightcrew response, while other red flags 
do not. This creates an opportunity for pilot error in determining the 
significance of the flag (since it has more than one meaning) and will 
slow the flightcrew's response to the flagged alert. Such a result is 
against the purpose of the rule. Additional guidance on flags is found 
in advisory circular (AC) 25.1322-1.
    Airbus also commented that red, amber, and yellow are used for 
graphical depictions of weather phenomena and terrain elevation. The 
limitation in the last sentence of proposed paragraph Sec.  25.1322(f) 
may be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as not allowing the use of red, 
amber, or yellow for weather displays and TAWS. Airbus proposed that 
paragraph Sec.  25.1322(f) be revised to add:

    However, deviations are acceptable for: (ii) The use of red and 
amber for weather display, terrain hazard [TAWS] and TCAS [traffic 
collision avoidance system] sector, provided widely spread standards 
are used.

    The FAA acknowledges that red, amber, and yellow have been used for 
weather radar, TAWS, and TCAS displays. However, the FAA does not agree 
that the suggestion to limit the use of these colors for alerts can be 
broadly interpreted as not allowing the use of red, amber, or yellow 
for weather radar, wind shear, TAWS, and TCAS. The FAA has guidance 
regarding colors that can be used on these specific displays in ACs and 
technical standard orders (TSO).\3\ For example, AC 20-149 states that 
for flight information service-broadcast weather, red ``should be 
associated with a need for immediate flightcrew awareness and/or 
conditions that represent serious near-term or serious potential 
threats to safety.'' Amber should be for flightcrew awareness of 
conditions that represent moderate near-term or moderate potential 
threats to safety. Also, AC 25-23 includes guidance stating that TAWS 
should be compliant with the requirements of Sec.  25.1322 and use the 
color scheme specified in Sec.  25.1322. The FAA guidance that 
recommends the use of red, amber, or yellow for indications other than 
alerts should be construed as FAA agreement that use of these colors 
comply with the published guidance of Sec.  25.1322. Using these colors 
for indications other than alerts is acceptable if the use is limited 
and does not adversely affect flightcrew alerting. Paragraph (f) is 
intended to limit the use of these colors outside of flightcrew 
alerting features and functions in order to standardize their use 
within the flight deck, to protect their meaning, and to avoid diluting 
their attention-getting characteristics. However, it is not our intent 
to entirely prohibit their use for any other functions. If proposed for 
any

[[Page 67203]]

functions other than flightcrew alerting, an applicant would have to 
show an operational need to use these colors for other purposes. For 
example, using these colors for marketing or other non-safety related 
functions is typically not appropriate. Even if an applicant can show 
there is an operational need, using these colors for non-flightcrew 
alerting purposes would not be permitted if flightcrew alerting is 
adversely affected.
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    \3\ AC 20-149, Safety and Interoperability Requirements for 
Initial Domestic Flight Information Service-Broadcast, 8/31/2005. AC 
25-23, Airworthiness Criteria for the Installation Approval of a 
Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) for Part 25 Airplanes, 
5/22/2000. AC 25-11A, Electronic Flight Deck Displays, 06/21/2007. 
AC 25-12, Airworthiness Criteria for the Approval of Airborne 
Windshear Warning Systems in Transport Category Airplanes, 11/2/87. 
AC 20-131A, Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance Systems Aircraft Flight Information Services-Broadcast 
(FIS-B) Data Link Systems and (TCAS II) and Mode S Transponders, 03/
29/1993. AC 20-149, Safety and Interoperability Requirements for 
Initial Domestic Flight Information Service-Broadcast, 08/31/2005. 
TSO-C117, Airborne Windshear Warning and Escape Guidance Systems for 
Transport Airplanes, 01/10/1990. TSO-C147, Traffic Advisory System 
(TAS) Airborne Equipment, 4/16/1998. TSO-C151b, Terrain Awareness 
and Avoidance System, 12/17/2002. TSO-C157, Aircraft Flight 
Information Services-Broadcast (FIS-B) Data Link Systems and 
Equipment, 9/20/2004.
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    Consistent use and standardization for red, amber, and yellow is 
required to retain the effectiveness of flightcrew alerts. The 
flightcrew should not become desensitized to the meaning and importance 
of color coding for alerts. This rule will limit the frequency and use 
of red, amber, and yellow to flightcrew alerting-related functions in 
the flight deck. This limitation is also necessary to avoid 
desensitizing pilots to the urgency that should be associated with the 
meaning of these colors, which could increase the flightcrew's 
processing time, add to their workload, and increase the potential for 
flightcrew confusion or errors. Any proposed uses of these colors for 
non-alerting features or functions must show that they do not have any 
of these adverse effects.
    Weather radar and TAWS displays are examples of displays that 
comply with this regulation. There is a demonstrated operational need 
for these systems to impart safety-related information--for example, 
when the nearby terrain presents a threat because it is near and at or 
above the airplane's flight trajectory--using these colors in a limited 
way. Additionally, the FAA has found that these displays do not 
adversely affect flightcrew alerting.
    For future certification projects that require demonstrated 
compliance to this regulation, existing and previously-approved uses of 
these colors for features and functions other than flightcrew alerting 
will be evaluated under the criteria described above.
    Boeing suggested adding ``advisory'' as an alert for functions 
other than flightcrew alerting that must not adversely affect 
flightcrew alerting. Boeing stated that the color for advisory alerts 
must be reserved for the same reason the colors for warning and caution 
alerts are being protected.
    The FAA agrees that the final rule could include additional 
limitations regarding the use of certain colors in the flight deck. 
However, reserving the color used for advisory alerts was not included 
in the proposed rule because advisory alerts would further restrict 
available colors for other uses, the number of colors that can be 
distinguished under all foreseeable conditions is already a limited 
set, and advisory alerts do not require immediate awareness.
    The guidance in AC 25-11A recommends as a best practice to use six 
colors or less in a typical deck to display all of the information 
necessary to safely operate the airplane. Since Boeing currently uses 
amber for both caution and advisory alerts, it has already limited the 
colors it uses for flightcrew alerting to two: Red for warning alerts, 
and amber for caution and advisory alerts. This allows Boeing to use 
four additional colors for flight deck displays. However, an unequal 
burden would be placed on those original equipment manufacturers that 
followed the FAA guidance in AC 25-11 \4\ and used a color other than 
amber for advisory alerts. Those original equipment manufacturers would 
only have three additional colors to use throughout the flight deck 
because three colors are already reserved for flightcrew alerting: Red 
for warning, amber or yellow for caution, and whatever color they chose 
for advisory alerts. Although colors used for advisory alerts are not 
restricted in this rule, these alerts must still be colored so as to 
perform their intended function. The FAA will include guidance language 
in AC 25.1322-1 regarding restrictions on the colors that should be 
used for advisory alerts.
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    \4\ AC 25-11, Transport Category Airplanes Electronic Display 
Systems, 16 July 1987.
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    Boeing also commented that limiting the use of color for functions 
other than flightcrew alerting is beyond the scope of the proposed 
rule, and can even conflict with other rules, advisory material, and 
industry standards for the use of color. As an example, Boeing cited 
Sec.  25.1549, Powerplant and auxiliary power unit instruments, which 
prescribes color requirements for the use of red and yellow on engine 
instruments.
    The FAA has determined that limiting the use of red, amber, and 
yellow on the flight deck for functions other than alerting is within 
the scope of this rule. The FAA's intent is to limit the wide-spread 
use of red, amber, and yellow in the flight deck so when a pilot sees 
one of these colors the pilot can quickly identify that indication as 
an alert. Similar wording was recommended in the ARAC final report. As 
explained above, the proposed rule stated that the use of red, amber, 
or yellow for functions other than flightcrew alerting must be limited 
and must not ``adversely affect'' flightcrew alerting. Section 
25.1322(f) of the final rule has been revised to emphasize that use of 
the colors red, amber, and yellow on the flight deck for functions 
other than flightcrew alerting must be limited and must not adversely 
affect flightcrew alerting.
    Regarding Boeing's comment that limiting the use of color for 
functions other than flightcrew alerting might conflict with other 
rules, specifically Sec.  25.1549 on engine instruments, neither 
proposed nor final Sec.  25.1322 would prohibit compliance with the 
color requirements of Sec.  25.1549. The required use of red and yellow 
in that section is consistent with the warning and caution criteria of 
this rule.

Requiring That Yellow Only Be Used for Caution Alerts

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(d)(2) would have required that amber or 
yellow be used for caution alerts. Airbus stated that this proposed 
requirement was too restrictive. The color yellow is extensively used 
in all Airbus flight decks, but not for alerting purposes. Yellow is 
used to distinguish between displays that indicate systems and 
operations are normal and displays that indicate there is a problem.
    One reason the FAA proposed to limit the use of yellow was that 
amber and yellow are visually similar--research studies, discussed in 
the original version of AC 25-11, indicate high color confusion between 
yellow and amber. Further, yellow is already used to indicate 
cautionary ranges on some electronic and mechanical displays. The ARAC 
final report also made the same recommendation to limit the use of 
yellow. In addition, the original version of AC 25-11 included a 
statement that ``the extensive use of the color yellow for other than 
caution/abnormal information is discouraged.'' The guidance in AC 25-
11A states: ``Use of the color yellow for functions other than 
flightcrew alerting should be limited and should not adversely affect 
flightcrew alerting.'' Therefore, Airbus may continue to use yellow to 
indicate normal operation and airplane system conditions, but only if 
use of this color is limited and Airbus can demonstrate that there is 
no adverse effect on flightcrew alerting. The intent of the proposed 
rule is retained in this final rule but the text has been revised for 
clarity.

Restricting the Use of Certain Colors for Advisory Alerts

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(d)(3) would have prohibited the use of red, 
amber, yellow, or green for advisory alerts. Boeing and Airbus objected 
to the inclusion of amber and yellow in this proposed restriction and 
provided the following reasons:

[[Page 67204]]

    (1) There are no known incidents or accidents that can be 
attributed to the inability of the flightcrew to distinguish between 
caution and advisory alerts.
    (2) There are a limited number of display colors available for use 
on flight deck displays.
    (3) The use of certain colors for advisory level alerts is already 
widespread in the aviation industry.
    (4) If an advisory alert is presented in any color other than amber 
or yellow the flightcrew would not perceive the alert as non-normal.
    Boeing suggested that, instead of prohibiting the use of certain 
colors, there should be a requirement that the alert categories be 
readily distinguishable from each other. Boeing and Airbus both agreed 
that red should not be used for advisory alerts.
    The FAA concurs with the reasons provided by the commenters and has 
removed the restriction. The final rule allows the use of amber or 
yellow for advisory alerts, as was allowed in the ARAC final report. 
However, in AC 25.1322, the FAA will recommend that a separate and 
distinct color be used when possible. The AC will also recommend that, 
if color is not used to distinguish between caution and advisory 
alerts, any alternate coding technique must meet the general 
requirements of Sec.  25.1322(a)(2) so the flightcrew can readily and 
easily detect the difference between caution and advisory alerts.

Using Green for Advisory Alerts

    The FAA received several comments regarding the use of the color 
green. Cessna recommended that green be used for advisory alerts and 
that green should be mentioned in the final rule. Embraer asked that 
the requirements clearly address the use of the color green. Airbus 
stated that prohibiting green for advisory alerts is too restrictive. 
The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) wanted to retain 
the use of green to indicate that systems are safely operating. GAMA 
requested that the proposed rule be changed to specify that green must 
be used to identify a safe operation and that in some instances yellow 
may also be used for non-cautionary alerts.
    The FAA finds the suggestion to use green for normal operation and 
system conditions to be outside the scope of this final rule. Alerts 
are associated with non-normal operation or system conditions, not 
normal conditions. The FAA's original intent in the proposed 
requirements for Sec.  25.1322 was to address only non-normal operation 
or system conditions. The final rule text has been revised for clarity 
and Sec.  25.1322(a)(1)(i) now states that flightcrew alerts must 
``[i]dentify non-normal operation or airplane system conditions * * 
*.''
    Further, the FAA already provides a recommendation for using green 
to indicate that systems are normal in AC 25-11A, Table 11 (recommended 
colors).

Limiting the Colors That Can Be Used for Weather Displays and TAWS 
Displays

    Airbus and a private citizen commented that the color ``green'' 
should be allowed for weather displays, TAWS, and TCAS. Airbus proposed 
that red, amber, yellow, and green should be allowed for weather 
displays and TAWS displays with no restrictions or limitations. Airbus 
also commented that magenta is used in the weather radar system to 
provide ``turbulence ahead'' alerts and in TAWS for advisory alerts. 
The private citizen stated that the definition within the color radar 
guidance calls the various colors ``warnings,'' including the use of 
green for a ``minimum warning.''
    As previously mentioned, Table 11 in AC 25-11A lists recommended 
colors for certain functions. Table 12 in AC 25-11A provides specific 
colors for certain display features. The color magenta is typically 
used for an instrument landing system deviation pointer, and for a 
selected heading and active route/flight plan. Green is typically used 
to indicate engaged modes and normal conditions, current data, and 
values. As adopted, Sec.  25.1322(e) requires that red be used for 
warning alerts, yellow or amber for caution alerts, and any other color 
except red and green for advisory alerts.
    This final rule will not allow the use of magenta for a warning or 
caution category alert. However, magenta can be used on weather 
displays for awareness of turbulence and heavy rain. Green can also be 
used on a weather display and typically indicates areas of light 
rainfall. The FAA could not find any references to using green for 
``minimum warning.'' Section 25.1322 does not allow use of the color 
green for a non-normal alert Use of the colors green and magenta for 
awareness on a weather display is acceptable if it is within the 
manufacturer's color philosophy to use these colors for that purpose.
    A consistent and standardized color usage is desirable to ensure 
the pilot understands the urgency of an alert based on its color. The 
manufacturer and the FAA should evaluate inconsistencies in color usage 
to ensure that these do not lead to confusion or errors, and do not 
adversely impact the intended function of the system(s) involved. Color 
usage should adhere to the color coding guidance in AC 25-11A.
    The FAA has tasked ARAC with updating the guidance in AC 25-11A for 
weather displays in transport category airplanes. To meet this goal, 
ARAC has re-convened the ASHWG, which is working with industry and 
professional organizations.\5\ For weather displays, TAWS, TCAS, or any 
other piece of flight deck equipment, other regulations (for example, 
Sec.  25.1309(c)) determine whether any particular flight deck 
indication serves the function of an alert (for example, whether it 
identifies ``non-normal'' operation). If a flight deck indication is 
determined to be an alert, this indication must then comply with the 
requirement of Sec.  25.1322.
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    \5\ One organization is SAE Technical Committee G-10, Aerospace 
Behavioral Engineering Technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    WSI Corporation, a company that provides a subscription service for 
aviation weather information, commented that the proposed rule would 
not standardize color usage for the presentation of datalink radar, 
warm fronts, and low pressure systems. WSI stated that the proposed 
rule language would slow the adoption of proven technology or create 
non-standard presentations of weather phenomena, because designers 
would each have their own interpretation of what is meant by a display 
that does ``not adversely affect flightcrew alerting.''
    The FAA understands this commenter's concern regarding non-standard 
presentations on weather displays. The FAA did not intend to use Sec.  
25.1322 to standardize color usage for datalink radar, warm fronts, or 
low pressure system displays. The FAA does intend to include guidance 
on how to comply with the requirement that using red, amber, and yellow 
on the flight deck for functions other than flightcrew alerting must be 
limited and must not adversely affect flightcrew alerting. If an 
applicant chooses to use alerting colors for non-alerting functions, 
that applicant is responsible for showing that the use of these colors 
is limited, meets an operational need, and does not cause an adverse 
effect on flightcrew alerting. The determination of what is considered 
adverse depends not only on the actual display but also on how the 
display is integrated on the flight deck. The adverse effect associated 
with using alerting colors for non-alerting functions is that the 
flightcrew may spend extra time to determine whether a flightcrew alert 
actually occurred and, if so, its meaning. In general, use of alerting

[[Page 67205]]

colors for non-alerting purposes would be considered adverse effects 
when such use: (1) Interferes with the flightcrew's ability to identify 
non-normal operation or airplane system conditions, (2) slows the 
flightcrew's awareness of and response to an alert, (3) slows the 
flightcrew's ability to determine the appropriate actions, and (4) 
interferes with the flightcrew's ability to readily and easily detect 
and understand the alert under all foreseeable operation conditions. 
Since several factors determine whether using alerting colors for non-
alerting purposes will have an adverse effect, evaluations during 
simulations or flight tests will usually be required. Alerting 
components found on weather displays must follow the requirements in 
this final rule. As previously mentioned, ARAC is currently tasked with 
developing recommendations for a revision to AC 25-11A that will 
address guidance for weather displays in transport category airplanes.

Requiring Cues From Two Different Senses for Warning and Caution Alerts

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(a)(1) would have required attention-getting 
cues through at least two different senses. Cessna agreed that warning 
alerts should have two sensory cues. However, it did not agree that all 
caution alerts must require two sensory alerts. Cessna also stated that 
the priority of the alert should determine if two sensory alerts are 
necessary (for example, safety of flight issue).
    The FAA's reason for the two sensory alerts requirement is that 
both warning and caution alerts require immediate flightcrew awareness, 
and adding the requirement for getting attention through a second sense 
helps to ensure flightcrew awareness. The two sensory alerts 
requirement is supported by ARAC recommendation and by the NTSB's 
comments to the NPRM. The final rule retains this safety requirement.

Identifying Alerts and Determining Corrective Action

    The Air Line Pilots Association, International, and Boeing 
commented that the term ``[d]etermine corrective action'' in proposed 
Sec.  25.1322(a)(2) could be interpreted three different ways. It could 
be a requirement (1) to provide specific instructions on the alerting 
display; (2) that the alert determine the correct action, or (3) that 
the flightcrew determine the correct action or respond to an alert 
condition. These commenters stated that the alert should ``help'' the 
flightcrew determine the correct action.
    Although the FAA believes that the proposed language in Sec.  
25.1322(a) implies flightcrew decision-making rather than a reduction 
in pilot decision-making or authority, we have clarified and 
reorganized Sec.  25.1322(a) in the final rule. Section 25.1322(a)(1) 
requires that flightcrew alerts provide the flightcrew with the 
information needed to (1) identify non-normal operation or airplane 
system conditions, and (2) determine the appropriate actions, if any. 
The FAA did not incorporate the commenters' suggestions to include the 
words ``help'' or ``allow'' in the final rule because those words would 
weaken the requirement that the system needs to provide sufficient 
information for the flightcrew to make an informed decision. Also, the 
FAA and industry acknowledge that, in some situations, time-critical 
alerts must be direct.

Deleting the Words ``Less Urgent'' in the Definition of Caution Alert

    The text for Sec.  25.1322(b)(2) proposed that alerts conform to a 
prioritization hierarchy that included a caution alert for conditions 
that require immediate flightcrew awareness and less urgent flightcrew 
response. A private citizen, Boeing, and EASA recommended removing the 
words ``less urgent,'' or as an alternative define what this term 
means.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters' suggestions and Sec.  
25.1322(b)(2) has revised the caution alert to require immediate 
flightcrew awareness and subsequent flightcrew response.

Minimizing and Preventing the Effects of False and Nuisance Alerts

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(c) required the presentation of alerts be 
designed to minimize nuisance effects and, specifically, (1) permit 
each occurrence of attention-getting cues to be acknowledged and 
suppressed, (2) prevent the presentation of an inappropriate or 
unnecessary alert, (3) remove the alert when the condition no longer 
exists, and (4) provide a means to suppress an attention-getting 
component of an alert caused by a failure of the alerting system that 
interferes with the flightcrew's ability to safely operate the 
airplane.
    EASA and Cessna expressed concern that inappropriate or unnecessary 
alerts could not be fully prevented and that the requirement to 
``prevent'' might be too stringent. GAMA was concerned that the term 
``minimize'' would set a continually moving regulatory target and 
requested that the FAA clarify the intent of this requirement.
    In response to EASA and Cessna, the FAA's intent was to emphasize 
that features to prevent inappropriate or unnecessary alerts should be 
a part of the design process for how to present alerts. In response to 
GAMA, the FAA will include methods of compliance for ``minimizing'' 
nuisance effects in AC 25.1322-1. GAMA is correct in assuming that, as 
future methods and technologies become more capable of minimizing the 
effects of false and nuisance alerts, the FAA will expect industry to 
use best practices to minimize these effects.
    In the final rule, the FAA moved the requirements of proposed Sec.  
25.1322(c) to a new paragraph Sec.  25.1322(d) and added the words 
``the effects of false and'' to the introductory sentence. That 
introductory sentence now states ``[t]he alert function must be 
designed to minimize the effects of false and nuisance alerts. In 
particular, it must be designed to: (1) Prevent the presentation of an 
alert that is inappropriate or unnecessary.'' This rule text was 
harmonized with EASA.

Suppressing the Attention-Getting Component of an Alert Caused by 
Failure of the Alerting Function

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(c)(4) requires the flightcrew alerting 
system provide a means to suppress an attention-getting component of an 
alert caused by a failure of the alerting system that interferes with 
the flightcrew's ability to safely operate the airplane. Airbus and 
Embraer asked what part of the alert would be suppressed, the 
attention-getting component or the alert itself? Embraer also asked:

     How does the FAA propose to alert the crew of failure of 
the alerting system itself?
     Does this refer to global suppression or suppression of a 
single event?

    The scenario that the FAA envisioned when proposing this 
requirement is when an alert's attention-getting component (for 
example, continuous aural alerts or continuous flashing lights) 
interferes with the flightcrew's ability to safely operate the 
airplane. Manufacturers must provide a means, through their design, to 
suppress the attention-getting component(s). This rule did not envision 
a complete failure of the alerting system, just the interference of 
attention-getting components due to the failure of an alerting 
function. If a more-thorough alerting system failure triggers the need 
to inform the flightcrew, the equipment manufacturers are responsible 
for determining how the flightcrew will be alerted.

[[Page 67206]]

    Where failure of the alerting function interferes with the 
flightcrew's ability to safely operate the airplane, the proposed rule 
did not specify global suppression or suppression of a single event 
because such suppression (global or single event) would depend on the 
particular system design and trigger for the false alert. The intent of 
the rule is to suppress only the attention-getting component that may 
cause pilot distraction. The final rule was not changed in response to 
this comment.

Removing the Presentation of an Alert When the Condition No Longer 
Exists

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(c)(3) would require that an alert be removed 
when the condition that initiated the alert no longer exists. Airbus 
commented that this proposed requirement should be flexible enough to 
allow some tolerances or exceptions, notably when data or parameters 
required to determine the condition are not available. Airbus also 
proposed that paragraph Sec.  25.1322(c)(3) be modified to require 
confirmation that the condition no longer exists, except if justified.
    The FAA has determined that the alerting function that created the 
alert should be intelligent enough to remove the alert when the 
condition no longer exists and there is no longer any need for pilot 
awareness or action. If for any reason, including loss of data, the 
systems on the airplane are unable to determine that the condition 
associated with the alert no longer exists, but the alert persists, the 
pilot should usually assume that the condition still exists. We believe 
an alert that is no longer relevant would add clutter to the display 
and could confuse and distract the flightcrew from attending to other 
alerts. The commenter did not provide and we are not aware of any 
situation that would justify retaining an alert when the condition no 
longer exists. The proposal is adopted without change.

Presenting Alerts on Multi-Color Displays

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(d) would require visual alert indications 
that are shown on multi-color displays to conform to the following 
color convention:
    (1) Red for warning alert indications.
    (2) Amber or yellow for caution alert indications.
    (3) Any color except red, amber, yellow, or green for advisory 
alert indications.
    EASA commented that using color for alert should be standard; and 
the term ``alert'' is already defined as an indication and the words 
``that are shown on multi-color displays'' should be removed. In 
addition, EASA commented that using color for alerts should be the 
standard. Boeing commented that the ARAC recommendation purposefully 
refrained from specific technological implementations such as lights, 
color displays, monochromatic displays, head-up displays (HUDs), and 
tactile and aural devices. The ARAC recommendation was based on 
functions, not specific technology. Proposed Sec.  25.1322(d) deviated 
from the ARAC recommendations in a way that would have unintended 
effects contrary to the overall objective of an improved minimum safety 
standard. For example: Master warning and caution lights are not on a 
multi-color display and yet the color requirements must still apply.
    Language from the ARAC final report is shown below:
    ``(d) Alerts must conform to the following color convention for 
visual alert indications:
    (1) Red for warning alert indications.
    (2) Amber/yellow for caution alert indications.
    (3) Any color except red or green for advisory alert indications.''
    The FAA and EASA agree with the commenter that this proposal would 
not allow for alerts on monochromatic HUDs, even though certain time-
critical alerts on HUDs are in use today. However, the FAA believes 
there is a safety benefit for appropriately-designed alerts appearing 
on HUDs, and modified ARAC recommendation to allow for alerts appearing 
on HUDs and monochromatic displays. Although the FAA and EASA reached 
agreement on harmonized language for multi-color capable and 
monochromatic displays for visual alerts, the FAA now recognizes that 
this agreed-to language does not fully address alerting functions such 
as master caution and master warning lights, which are also considered 
monochromatic displays since they are capable of providing only a 
single alerting color.
    In response to these comments, the FAA revised paragraph Sec.  
25.1322(e) in this final rule to emphasize the use of color for alerts 
and to also address single-color displays that provide alerting colors 
(for example, master warning and master caution alerts). The revised 
rule text also renders the regulation less technology-specific.

Presenting Alerts on Monochromatic Displays

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(e) required visual alert indications shown 
on monochromatic displays use display coding techniques such that the 
flightcrew can clearly distinguish between warning, caution, and 
advisory alert categories.
    EASA stated that the use of color for alerts should be the 
standard, and other techniques should be considered only in cases where 
color is not possible (for example, monochromatic displays and HUDs).
    The FAA agrees with EASA; however, if color use is not possible to 
indicate, separate, and standardize between alert categories, other 
coding techniques must be used that are as effective as the color 
standard. The FAA does not want to prescribe coding techniques (other 
than color) that may be used by applicants to distinguish the alert 
categories. However, the coding must meet all of the applicable 
requirements in this final rule to ensure the alerts are readily and 
easily detectable and intelligible by the flightcrew, including 
conditions which present multiple alerts (Sec.  25.1322 (a)(2)).
    Boeing stated that if alerts were made visually distinctive by 
category on a head-down display (HDD), and were duplicated on a 
monochromatic display, then the duplicate alert on the monochromatic 
display does not need to be distinguishable by category. For example, 
if the presentation of an alert on HDDs was distinctive so as to easily 
identify its category of alert, then the duplicate alert on 
monochromatic HUDs does not need to be visually distinctive. Other 
alert information presented simultaneously, such as aural alerts, 
presence of master lights, and visual information on HDDs, provides 
sufficient cues to the flightcrew to determine the correct response and 
urgency of response.
    The FAA disagrees with Boeing's comment ``that alerts need not be 
visually distinctive so the alert category can be easily determined'' 
on the HUD. It is a key requirement of the visual alert indication to 
distinguish its category, regardless of whether the presentation is 
head-up or head-down. The safety objective for visual alert indications 
is that they clearly signify the urgency of the alert and the need for 
immediate intervention, if applicable. A visual alert indication that 
does not distinguish the alert category (for example, warning, caution, 
or advisory) would fail to properly convey its urgency. The FAA does 
not expect a pilot using the HUD to also scan the head-down primary 
flight display, so the pilot may miss what is only on the head-down 
display. If the visual indication of the head-down primary flight 
display distinguishes the alert category, but the indication on the HUD 
does not, it fails to meet the safety objective for this rule.

[[Page 67207]]

    The FAA revised Sec.  25.1322(e)(2) in the final rule to clearly 
state that visual alert indications must conform to the prescribed 
color convention unless it is not possible to comply with the 
convention. The additional language was needed to address the situation 
where a monochromatic display is capable of providing only a single 
alerting color, such as red for a master warning, or yellow or amber 
for a master caution light. Adding this language also makes the 
regulation less technology-specific, as recommended by ARAC and 
commenters.

Prioritizing Alerts Within a Given Category

    Proposed Sec.  25.1322(b) would have required that alerts conform 
to a prioritization hierarchy based on category, but it did not require 
alerts to be prioritized within a given category. EASA commented that 
this additional prioritization should be required. EASA also suggested 
that the information in proposed Sec.  25.1322(b) be reorganized and 
moved to a new Sec.  25.1322(c)(1).
    The FAA agrees with both suggestions. For alerts to perform their 
intended function as required by Sec.  25.1301,\6\ they must be 
prioritized when more than one alert is displayed at the same time. The 
FAA has revised new Sec.  25.1322(c)(1) to require that alerts be 
prioritized with a given category. A typical example of prioritizing 
alerts within categories is the time-critical warning alert which, to 
meet its intended function, must have higher priority on a display than 
a general warning alert. This change to the final rule strengthens the 
case for prioritizing alerts within categories that was part of the 
original ARAC recommendations. Guidance for this additional 
prioritization is available in AC 25.1322-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 14 CFR 25.1301, Function and Installation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Economic Impact

    GAMA and a private citizen commented on the Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis. They suggested that the rule would affect other organizations 
in addition to the five transport category airplane manufacturers 
discussed in the Analysis. They commented that the proposed rule 
contained new regulations which would apply to organizations that 
design and certify equipment installations in the flight deck under 
supplemental type certificate (STC) approvals and design components for 
installation in the flight deck under the FAA's technical standard 
order (TSO) program. Additionally, the regulations would affect 
modification shops that use the field approval process for installing 
equipment in the flight deck. Both GAMA and a private citizen 
recommended that the FAA address these affected organizations with 
respect to cost, benefit, and small business impact.
    GAMA also commented that neither the proposed regulation, nor the 
associated guidance material, discussed issues related to the Changed 
Product Rule (14 CFR 21.101) and how modifications to the flight deck 
which affect or contain alerting functions should be addressed. GAMA 
was particularly concerned about the effect of changing an existing 
alerting scheme as a result of a minor change in the flight deck.
    The FAA disagrees. This rule applies only to type certificate 
applications for transport category airplanes submitted after the 
rule's effective date and to certain amended type certificate (TC) and 
supplemental TC (STC) applications submitted after that date.
    Modification shops are not permitted to obtain field approvals for 
significant product-level changes, so we do not anticipate any direct 
impact of this rule on that type of business. A minor change to the 
flight deck would not be considered a significant product-level change, 
so updating the existing alerting scheme would not be required for 
minor changes.
    There may be some future applications for STC approval of 
significant product-level design changes that would affect flightcrew 
alerting. The FAA expects that the requirements of Sec.  21.101 will 
determine which future design changes would need to have the 
certification bases updated to include the requirements in this final 
rule. The FAA addressed these additional costs of updating a 
certification basis in the economic evaluation for Sec.  21.101.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 14 CFR 21.101, Designation of applicable regulations 
(commonly known as the Changed Product Rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    GAMA commented that this rule may generate an unfunded mandate. The 
FAA calculated the cost of this rule and it does not create an unfunded 
mandate.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    GAMA commented that this rule would directly impact the cost of 
installing flight decks in existing airplanes which operate in support 
of commerce and the public benefit in Alaska. The FAA has determined 
that this rule will not affect any existing airplanes.

Harmonizing Rule Text Between the FAA and EASA

    Boeing and Airbus expressed concern because the proposed rule 
deviated in some areas from the ARAC recommendations and there might be 
conflicts between the FAA and EASA regulations. The FAA and EASA have 
harmonized on the rule text. The principles behind the ARAC 
recommendations were closely followed.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. We have determined that there 
is no current or new requirement for information collection associated 
with this amendment.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these regulations.

Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, 
International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires 
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small 
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. 
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate

[[Page 67208]]

likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of 
the economic impacts of this final rule. We suggest readers seeking 
greater detail read the full regulatory evaluation, a copy of which we 
have placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this final 
rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is not an 
economically ``significant regulatory action: as defined in section 
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is ``significant'' as defined in 
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; 
(5) will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States; and (6) will not impose an unfunded mandate on 
State, local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector, by 
exceeding the threshold identified above. These analyses are summarized 
below.

Total Benefits and Costs of This Rule

    The estimated cost of this final rule over the 20-year analysis 
period is $7.7 million ($4.1 million present value). The estimated 
potential benefits of this final rule over the 20-year analysis period, 
consists of preventing at least 10 serious injuries worth $8.3 million 
($4.4 million present value).

Persons Potentially Affected by This Rule

     Manufacturers of future part 25 airplanes.
     Manufacturers of future instrument panel avionics for 
future part 25 airplanes.

Assumptions

    Discount rates--7%.
    Analysis period--2010 through 2029 (twenty years).

Changes From the NPRM to the Final Rule

    There were no substantive changes made to the Regulatory 
Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, or Unfunded Mandates 
Assessment as a result of comments received on the NPRM.

Benefits of This Rule

    For future part 25 airplanes, we estimated that the rule changes 
would avoid about 10 serious injuries over a 20-year period. The 
resulting benefits include averted fatalities and injuries, loss of 
airplanes, investigation cost, and collateral damages. The total 
benefits are about $4.4 million in present value terms.

Costs of This Rule

    There are no additional manufacturing or operating costs associated 
with this rule; however, there are additional design and certification 
costs to future part 25 airplane manufacturers. The average cost 
estimate per new airplane certification is $0.7 million. The estimated 
number of new certifications annually is 0.55. When the average cost 
estimate per new airplane certification ($0.7 million) is multiplied by 
the estimated annual number of new certifications (0.55), the estimated 
annuals costs are $385,000. When summed over the 20-year analysis 
period the total cost of this rule is about $4.1 million in present 
value terms.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) 
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall 
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale 
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions 
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required 
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given 
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities, 
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small 
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the 
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    Section 603 of the Act requires agencies to prepare and make 
available for public comment a final regulatory flexibility analysis 
(FRFA) describing the impact of final rules on small entities. Section 
603(b) of the Act specifies the content of a FRFA. Each FRFA must 
contain:
     A description of the reasons why action by the agency is 
being considered;
     A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis 
for, the final rule;
     A description and an estimate of the number of small 
entities to which the rule will apply;
     A description of the projected reporting, record keeping 
and other compliance requirements of the final rule, including an 
estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the 
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for 
preparation of the report or record;
     An identification, to the extent practicable, of all 
relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
the final rule.
     Each final regulatory flexibility analysis shall also 
contain a description of any significant alternatives to the final rule 
which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which 
minimizes any significant economic impact of the final rule or small 
entities.
    GAMA and a private citizen commented on the initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis. The FAA's responses to these comments were 
responded to earlier in the ``Summary of Comments'' section of this 
preamble. The FAA believes this final rule will not have a significant 
impact on a substantial number of small entities because all United 
States transport-aircraft category manufacturers exceed the Small 
Business Administration small-entity criteria of 1,500 employees. In 
addition, the alerting system design firms contacted by the FAA for 
preparation of the initial regulatory evaluation did not consider that 
they would incur any additional costs as a result of the proposed rule.
    Therefore, as the FAA Administrator, I certify that this rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

International Trade Impact Analysis

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related 
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of 
standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign 
commerce of the United States, so long as the standard has a

[[Page 67209]]

legitimate domestic objective, such as the protection of safety, and 
does not operate in a manner that excludes imports that meet this 
objective. The FAA notes the purpose is to ensure the safety of the 
American public, and has assessed the effects of this rule to ensure it 
does not exclude imports that meet this objective. As a result this 
rule is not considered as creating an unnecessary obstacle to foreign 
commerce.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one 
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by 
the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant 
regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value 
of $143.1 million in lieu of $100 million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements 
of Title II do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and, therefore, does not have federalism implications.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner 
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to 
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, 
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, we 
requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply 
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska. We received one comment 
from GAMA stating that this rule will directly impact the cost of 
installing flight decks in existing airplanes which operate in support 
of commerce and the public benefit in Alaska. We have determined that 
this rule will not affect any existing airplanes and, based on the 
administrative record of this rulemaking, there is no need to make any 
regulatory distinctions applicable to intrastate aviation in Alaska.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical 
exclusion identified in paragraph 312(f) and involves no extraordinary 
circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not 
a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order because it is 
not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy of rulemaking documents using the 
Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://
www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this 
rulemaking.
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit 
http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question 
regarding this document, you may contact your local FAA official, or 
the person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at 
the beginning of the preamble. You can find out more about SBREFA on 
the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/
sbre_act/.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration 
amends Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 25--TITLE AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY 
AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.

0
2. Revise Sec.  25.1322 to read as follows:

Sec.  25.1322  Flightcrew alerting.

    (a) Flightcrew alerts must:
    (1) Provide the flightcrew with the information needed to:
    (i) Identify non-normal operation or airplane system conditions, 
and
    (ii) Determine the appropriate actions, if any.
    (2) Be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the 
flightcrew under all foreseeable operating conditions, including 
conditions where multiple alerts are provided.
    (3) Be removed when the alerting condition no longer exists.
    (b) Alerts must conform to the following prioritization hierarchy 
based on the urgency of flightcrew awareness and response.
    (1) Warning: For conditions that require immediate flightcrew 
awareness and immediate flightcrew response.
    (2) Caution: For conditions that require immediate flightcrew 
awareness and subsequent flightcrew response.
    (3) Advisory: For conditions that require flightcrew awareness and 
may require subsequent flightcrew response.
    (c) Warning and caution alerts must:
    (1) Be prioritized within each category, when necessary.
    (2) Provide timely attention-getting cues through at least two 
different senses by a combination of aural, visual, or tactile 
indications.

[[Page 67210]]

    (3) Permit each occurrence of the attention-getting cues required 
by paragraph (c)(2) of this section to be acknowledged and suppressed, 
unless they are required to be continuous.
    (d) The alert function must be designed to minimize the effects of 
false and nuisance alerts. In particular, it must be designed to:
    (1) Prevent the presentation of an alert that is inappropriate or 
unnecessary.
    (2) Provide a means to suppress an attention-getting component of 
an alert caused by a failure of the alerting function that interferes 
with the flightcrew's ability to safely operate the airplane. This 
means must not be readily available to the flightcrew so that it could 
be operated inadvertently or by habitual reflexive action. When an 
alert is suppressed, there must be a clear and unmistakable 
annunciation to the flightcrew that the alert has been suppressed.
    (e) Visual alert indications must:
    (1) Conform to the following color convention:
    (i) Red for warning alert indications.
    (ii) Amber or yellow for caution alert indications.
    (iii) Any color except red or green for advisory alert indications.
    (2) Use visual coding techniques, together with other alerting 
function elements on the flight deck, to distinguish between warning, 
caution, and advisory alert indications, if they are presented on 
monochromatic displays that are not capable of conforming to the color 
convention in paragraph (e)(1) of this section.
    (f) Use of the colors red, amber, and yellow on the flight deck for 
functions other than flightcrew alerting must be limited and must not 
adversely affect flightcrew alerting.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on October 20, 2010.
J. Randolph Babbitt,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-27629 Filed 11-1-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P