Document ID: NHTSA-2010-0162-0002
Agency: nhtsa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rear View Mirrors: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-in Reporting Requirements
Posted Date: 2010-12-07T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 234 (Tuesday, December 7, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 76186-76250]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-30353]

[[Page 76185]]

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Part IV

Department of Transportation

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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

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49 CFR Parts 571 and 585

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors; Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 7, 2010 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 76186]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 571 and 585

[Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162]
RIN 2127-AK43

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors; Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 
directs NHTSA to issue a final rule amending the agency's Federal motor 
vehicle safety standard on rearview mirrors to improve the ability of a 
driver to detect pedestrians in the area immediately behind his or her 
vehicle and thereby minimize the likelihood of a vehicle's striking a 
pedestrian while its driver is backing the vehicle. Pursuant to this 
mandate, NHTSA is proposing to expand the required field of view for 
all passenger cars, trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles, buses, and 
low-speed vehicles rated at 10,000 pounds or less, gross vehicle 
weight. Specifically, NHTSA is proposing to specify an area immediately 
behind each vehicle that the driver must be able to see when the 
vehicle's transmission is in reverse. It appears that, in the near 
term, the only technology available with the ability to comply with 
this proposal would be a rear visibility system that includes a rear-
mounted video camera and an in-vehicle visual display. Adoption of this 
proposal would significantly reduce fatalities and injuries caused by 
backover crashes involving children, persons with disabilities, the 
elderly, and other pedestrians.
    In light of the difficulty of effectively addressing of the 
backover safety problem through technologies other than camera systems 
and given the differences in the effectiveness and cost of the 
available technologies, we developed several alternatives that, 
compared to the proposal, offer less, but at least in one case still 
substantial, benefits and do so at reduced cost. We seek comment on 
those alternatives and on other possible ways to achieve the statutory 
objective and meet the statutory requirements at lower cost.

DATES: You should submit your comments early enough to ensure that the 
docket receives them not later than February 7, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to the docket number identified in 
the heading of this document by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public 
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this 
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change 
to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information 
provided. Please see the ``Privacy Act'' heading below.
    Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all 
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit http://DocketInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the street 
address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the 
dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact 
Mr. Markus Price, Office of Vehicle Rulemaking, Telephone: (202) 666-
0098. Facsimile: (202) 666-7002. For legal issues, you may contact Mr. 
Steve Wood, Office of Chief Counsel, Telephone (202) 366-2992. 
Facsimile: (202) 366-3820. You may send mail to these officials at: The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Attention: NVS-010, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
    A. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007
    B. Applicability
    C. Backover Crash Safety Problem
    i. Definitions and Summary
    ii. Backover Crash Risk by Crash and Vehicle Type
    iii. Backover Crash Risk by Victim Age
    iv. Special Crash Investigation of Backover Crashes
    v. Analysis of Backover Crash Risk by Pedestrian Location Using 
Monte Carlo Simulation
    D. Comparative Regulatory Requirements
    i. Current FMVSS No. 111
    ii. Relevant European Regulations (Also United Kingdom and 
Australia)
    iii. Relevant Regulations in Japan and Korea
    iv. State Regulations
III. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    A. Technologies To Mitigate Backover Crashes
    i. Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors
    ii. Rearview Video Systems
    iii. Sensor-Based Rear Object Detection Systems
    iv. Multi-Technology (Sensor + Video Camera) Systems
    v. Other Technologies
    B. Approaches for Improving Vehicles' Rear Visibility
    C. Rear Visibility Measurement
    D. Possible Countermeasure Performance Specifications
    E. Summary of Comments Received
    i. Measurement of Rear Blind Zone Area and Its Use as a Basis 
for Determination of Countermeasure Need
    ii. Application of Countermeasures Among Vehicle Types
    iii. Use and Efficacy of Rear-Mounted Mirror Systems, and Convex 
Driver's-Side Mirrors
    iv. Use of Monte Carlo Simulation of Backover Crash Risk for 
Development of a Required Countermeasure Coverage Area
    v. Use and Efficacy of Sensor-Based Systems
    vi. Use and Efficacy of Rearview Video Systems
    vii. Characteristics of Rearview Video Systems
    viii. Development of a Performance-Based or Technology-Neutral 
Standard
    ix. Other Issues
    x. Suggested Alternative Proposals
    xi. Costs and Benefits
    F. Questions Posed and Summary Response
    i. Technologies for Improving Rear Visibility
    ii. Drivers' Use and Associated Effectiveness of Available 
Technologies To Mitigate Backover Crashes
    iii. Approaches for Improving Vehicles' Rear Visibility
    iv. Options for Measuring a Vehicle's Rear Visibility
    v. Options for Assessing the Performance of Rear Visibility 
Countermeasures
    vi. Options for Characterizing Rear Visibility Countermeasures
IV. Analysis of ANPRM Comments and NHTSA's Tentative Conclusions

[[Page 76187]]

    A. Application of Rear Visibility Systems Across the Light 
Vehicle Fleet
    B. Limitation of Countermeasure Application to Certain Vehicle 
Types
    C. Using Blind Zone Area as a Basis for Countermeasure 
Requirement
    D. Use of Convex Driver's-Side Mirrors
    E. Advanced Systems and Combination Sensor/Rearview Video 
Systems
    F. Rear Field of View
    G. Rear Visibility System Characteristics
    i. Rearview Image Response Time
    ii. Rearview Image Linger Time
    iii. Rear Visibility System Visual Display Brightness
    iv. Rear Visibility System Malfunction Indicator
    H. Rear Visibility System Compliance Test
    i. Compliance Test Ambient Light Level
    ii. Compliance Test Object
V. NHTSA Research Subsequent to the ANPRM
    A. Rearview Video Systems With In-Mirror Visual Displays
    B. Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors
    C. Rear Sensor Systems
    D. Ability of Rear Sensor Systems To Detect Small Child 
Pedestrians
VI. Countermeasure Effectiveness Estimation Based on NHTSA Research 
Data
    A. Situation Avoidability
    B. System Performance
    C. Driver Performance
    D. Determining Overall Effectiveness
VII. Proposal To Mandate Improved Rear Visibility
    A. Proposed Specifications
    i. Improved Rear Field of View
    ii. Visual Display Requirements
    a. Rearview Image Size
    b. Image Response Time
    c. Image Linger Time
    d. Visual Display Luminance
    e. Other Aspects of Visual Display
    iii. Requirements for External System Components
    B. Proposed Compliance Tests
    i. Ambient Lighting Conditions
    ii. Rear Visibility Test Object
    iii. Rear Visibility Compliance Test Procedures
    a. Rear Field of View Test Procedure
    b. Rearview Image Size Test Procedure
    C. Proposed Effective Date and Phase-In Schedule
    D. Potential Alternatives
    E. Summary of Estimated Effectiveness, Costs and Benefits of 
Available Technologies
    F. Comparison of Regulatory Alternatives
    i. System Effectiveness
    ii. Costs
    iii. Benefits
    iv. Net Benefits
    v. Cost Effectiveness
VIII. Public Participation
IX. Regulatory Analyses
    A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and 
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
    D. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
    E. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children From 
Environmental Health and Safety Risks)
    F. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    H. National Environmental Policy Act
    I. Paperwork Reduction Act
    J. Plain Language
    K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
X. Proposed Regulatory Text

I. Executive Summary

    In this notice, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) is proposing to expand the current rear visibility requirements 
of all passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, 
and low-speed vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 
10,000 pounds (lb) or less by specifying an area behind the vehicle 
that a driver must be able to see when the vehicle is in reverse gear. 
This rulemaking action is being undertaken in response to the Cameron 
Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 \1\ (the ``K.T. 
Safety Act,'' or the ``Act''), which required that NHTSA undertake 
rulemaking to expand the required field of view to enable the driver of 
a motor vehicle to detect areas behind the vehicle to reduce death and 
injury resulting from backing incidents known as backover crashes. A 
backover crash is a specifically-defined type of incident in which a 
non-occupant of a vehicle (most commonly, a pedestrian, but it could 
also be a cyclist) is struck by a vehicle moving in reverse.
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    \1\ Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, 
(Pub. L. 110-189, 122 Stat. 639-642), Sec.  4 (2007).
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    Our assessment of available safety data indicates that on average 
there are 292 fatalities and 18,000 injuries (3,000 of which we judge 
to be incapacitating \2\) resulting from backover crashes every year. 
Of those, 228 fatalities and 17,000 injuries were attributed to 
backover incidents involving light vehicles (passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles) 
with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
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    \2\ The Manual on Classification of Motor Vehicle Traffic 
Accidents (ANSI D16.1) defines ``incapacitating injury'' as ``any 
injury, other than a fatal injury, which prevents the injured person 
from walking, driving or normally continuing the activities the 
person was capable of performing before the injury occurred'' 
(Section 2.3.4).
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    In analyzing the data, we made several tentative findings. First, 
many of these incidents occur off public roadways, in areas such as 
driveways and parking lots and involve parents (or caregivers) 
accidentally backing over children. Second, children under five years 
of age represent approximately 44 percent of the fatalities, which we 
believe to be a uniquely high percentage for a particular crash mode. 
Third and finally, when pickups and multipurpose passenger vehicles 
strike a pedestrian in a backover crash, the incident is four times 
more likely to result in a fatality than if the striking vehicle were a 
passenger car.
    NHTSA believes that there are several potential reasons for these 
tentative findings, including, but not limited to, the attributes of 
the vehicle, vehicle exposure to pedestrians, and the driver's 
situational awareness while driving backward. However, due to 
difficulties in isolating each of those effects individually, we cannot 
at this time determine their relative contribution to the occurrence of 
these backover crashes.
    In consideration of the areas that a driver cannot see either 
directly or using existing mirrors, the agency has tentatively 
concluded that providing the driver with additional visual information 
about what is directly behind the driver's vehicle is the only 
effective near-term solution at this time to reduce the number of 
fatalities and injuries associated with backover crashes.
    Before reaching this tentative conclusion, NHTSA published an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) and considered the public 
comments received in response to that notice.\3\ The ANPRM reiterated 
some previous tentative findings on backover crash statistics; outlined 
current technologies that may have the ability to improve rear 
visibility including: improved direct vision (i.e., looking directly 
out the vehicle's rear window), indirect vision via rear-mounted convex 
mirrors or rearview video systems, and rear object detection sensors; 
\4\ and presented research findings on the effectiveness of those 
technologies.
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    \3\ 74 FR 9478, March 4, 2009.
    \4\ While object detection sensors do not technically improve 
visibility in terms of providing a visual image comparable to what a 
driver could see with his or her own eyes, the Act indicated that 
sensors should be examined as a candidate technology for improving 
rear visibility. Such sensors could be used in combination of some 
type of visual display to show the location of detected objects.
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    The ANPRM set forth three approaches to defining the potential 
scope of applicability of the proposed requirements for improving 
rearward visibility.\5\ The approaches included requiring improvements 
on a) all light vehicles, b) those light vehicles that are trucks, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, or vans, or c) those light vehicles 
whose rear blind zone area (i.e., the area behind a vehicle in which 
obstacles are not visible to a driver)

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exceeds a specified size. We also presented ideas on how and on what 
basis to define the areas behind a vehicle that should be visible to a 
driver and general performance characteristics for mirrors, sensors, 
and rearview video systems. Finally, the ANPRM sought responses to 43 
specific questions covering all of the above mentioned areas.
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    \5\ 74 FR 9504.
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    Thirty-seven entities commented in response to the ANPRM, including 
industry associations, automotive and equipment manufacturers, safety 
advocacy organizations, and 14 individuals. Generally, the comments can 
be grouped into four main areas according to the organization of ANPRM 
sections. The areas are: approaches for improving vehicles' rear 
visibility, effectiveness of the technologies, cost of the 
technologies, and performance requirements suitable for each type 
technology.
    With regard to the issue of which vehicles most warrant improved 
rear visibility, vehicle manufacturers generally wanted to focus any 
expansion of rear visibility on the particular types of vehicles (i.e., 
trucks, vans, and multipurpose passenger vehicles within the specified 
weight limits) that they believed posed the highest risk of backover 
crash fatalities and injuries. Vehicle safety organizations and 
equipment manufacturers generally suggested that all vehicles need to 
have expanded rear fields of view.
    With regard to the issue of what technology would be effective at 
expanding the rear field of view for a driver, commenters discussed 
additional mirrors, sensors, and rearview video combined with sensors. 
Some commenters provided input regarding test procedure development and 
rear visibility countermeasure characteristics, such as visual display 
size and brightness, and graphic overlays superimposed on a video 
image. Some also discussed whether it is appropriate to allow a small 
gap in coverage immediately behind the rear bumper.
    Finally, with regard to the issue of costs, commenters generally 
agreed with the cost estimates provided by the agency. However, some 
did suggest that our estimates of the cost of individual technologies 
seemed high and that there would be larger cost reductions over time 
than the agency had indicated.
    To assess the feasibility and benefits of covering different areas 
behind the vehicle, NHTSA considered the comments received, the 
available safety data, our review of special investigations of backover 
crashes, and computer simulation. For example, we examined the typical 
distances that backover-crash-involved vehicles traveled from the 
location at which they began moving rearward to the location at which 
they struck a pedestrian. We tentatively concluded that an area with a 
width of 10 feet (5 feet to either side of a rearward extension of the 
vehicle's centerline) and a length of 20 feet extending backward from a 
transverse vertical plane tangent to the rearmost point on the rear 
bumper encompasses the highest risk area for children and other 
pedestrians to be struck. Therefore, we are proposing that test objects 
of a particular size within that area must be visible to drivers when 
they are driving backward.
    To develop estimates of the benefits from adopting such a 
requirement, NHTSA used a methodology that reviewed backover crash case 
reports to infer whether the crash could be avoided with the aid of 
some technology, evaluated the performance of various countermeasures 
in detecting an object behind the vehicle, and tested whether the 
driver used the countermeasure and avoided the crash. Our evaluation of 
currently available technologies (mirrors, sensors, and rearview video 
systems) that may allow a driver to determine if there was a pedestrian 
in a 10 feet by 20 feet zone behind a vehicle indicates that rearview 
video systems are the most effective technology available today.
    However, we note that technology is rapidly evolving, and thus, we 
are not proposing to require that a specific technology be used to 
provide a driver with an image of the area behind the vehicle. 
Consistent with statutory requirements and Executive Order 12866, we 
are not prescribing requirements that would expressly require the use 
of a specific technology and are attempting to promote compliance 
flexibility through proposing more performance oriented requirements. 
We have tentatively concluded that, in order to maintain the level of 
effectiveness that we have seen in our testing of existing rearview 
video systems, we should propose a minimum set of such requirements. 
Accordingly, this proposal sets forth requirements for the performance 
of the visual display, the rearview image, and durability requirements 
for any exterior components. Under this proposal, manufacturers would 
have flexibility to meet the requirements as they see fit (perhaps 
through the development of new or less expensive technology). Since we 
believe that manufacturers, in the near term, would likely use current 
production rearview video systems to achieve the required level of 
improved rear visibility and that most, if not all, systems in 
production today already meet this minimum set of requirements, we do 
not believe that the adoption of these requirements would increase the 
cost of this technology. However, we seek comment later in this 
preamble on including in the final rule requirements relating to 
additional matters such as image quality and display location.
    Section 2(c) of the K.T. Safety Act requires that the requirement 
for improved rear visibility be phased in and that the phase-in process 
be completed within ``48 months'' of the publication of the final rule. 
Because we anticipate publishing a final rule by the statutory deadline 
of February 28, 2011, the rule must require full compliance not later 
than February 28, 2015. We note, however, that model years begin on 
September 1 and end on August 31 for safety standard compliance 
purposes and that February 28 falls in the middle of the model year 
that begins September 1, 2014. The agency believes that vehicle 
manufacturers would need, as a practical matter, to begin full 
compliance at the beginning of that model year, i.e., on September 1, 
2014. They could not wait until the middle of the model year to reach 
100% compliance. Accordingly, NHTSA is proposing the following phase-in 
schedule:
     0% of the vehicles manufactured before September 1, 2012;
     10% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2012, and before September 1, 2013;
     40% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2013, and before September 1, 2014; and
     100% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2014.
    The agency recognizes that taking the dates on which model years 
begin and end for safety purposes effectively reduces the overall 
phase-in duration by 6 months (from 48 months to 42 months).
    We invite comment on how to provide as much leadtime as possible 
within the limits of the statute. Specifically, should the agency 
change the structure of the phase-in schedule to allow for more 
flexibility and ease of implementation? We note that the statute 
explicitly requires an expanded field of view for all light vehicles 
and that there are substantial differences in the effectiveness of 
available technologies. Accordingly, the agency is proposing 
performance requirements that would trigger the installation of 
expensive technologies such as video camera systems for these vehicles. 
In view of the need to expand the field of

[[Page 76189]]

view for all vehicles and the statutory requirements set forth by 
Congress regarding timing and manner of implementation of the proposed 
requirements, however, the agency is limited in its ability to reduce 
the cost of this rulemaking through adjusting the application of the 
proposed rule or the specific deadline for implementation.
    In evaluating the benefits and costs of this rulemaking proposal, 
the agency has spent considerable effort trying to determine the scope 
of the safety problem and the overall effectiveness of these systems in 
reducing crashes, injuries and fatalities associated with backing 
crashes. We have also estimated the net property damage effects to 
consumers from using any technology to avoid backing into fixed 
objects, along with the additional cost incurred when a vehicle is 
struck in the rear and the technology is damaged or destroyed.
    The most effective technology option that the agency has evaluated 
is the rearview video system. Using the effectiveness estimates that we 
have generated and assuming that all vehicles would be equipped with 
this technology, we believe the annual fatalities that are occurring in 
backing crashes can be reduced by 95 to 112. Similarly, injuries would 
be reduced by 7,072 to 8,374.
    However, rearview video is also the most expensive single 
technology. When installed in a vehicle without any existing visual 
display screen, rearview video systems are currently estimated to cost 
consumers between $159 and $203 per vehicle, depending on the location 
of the display and the angular width of the lens. For a vehicle that 
already has a suitable visual display, such as one found in route 
navigation systems, the incremental cost of such a system is estimated 
to be $58-$88, depending on the angular width of the lens. (We note 
that the cost may well decrease over time, as discussed below.)
    Based on the composition and size of the expected vehicle fleet, 
the total incremental cost, compared to the MY 2010 fleet, to equip a 
16.6 million new vehicle fleet with rearview video systems is estimated 
to be $1.9 billion to $2.7 billion annually. These costs are admittedly 
substantial. Nonetheless, the following considerations (discussed 
briefly here and at great length below in section VII.D. of this 
preamble) lead us to conclude tentatively that our proposal to 
implement the statutory mandate is reasonable and necessary, and that 
the benefits justify the costs. We request comment on this conclusion 
and on the various considerations that support it.
    Those considerations include the following--
    [dec221] 100 of the 228 annual victims of backover crashes are very 
young children with nearly their entire lives ahead of them. There are 
strong reasons, grounded in this consideration and in considerations of 
equity, to prevent these deaths.
    [dec221] While this rulemaking would have great cost, it would also 
have substantial benefits, reducing annual fatalities in backover 
crashes by 95 to 112 fatalities, and annual injuries by 7,072 to 8,374 
injuries. (We attempt to quantify these benefits below.)
    [dec221] Some of the benefits of the proposed rule are hard to 
quantify, but are nonetheless real and significant. One such benefit is 
that of not being the direct cause of the death or injury of a person 
and particularly a small child at one's place of residence. In some of 
these cases, parents are responsible for the deaths of their own 
children; avoiding that horrible outcome is a significant benefit. 
Another hard-to-quantify benefit is the increased ease and convenience 
of driving, and especially parking, that extend beyond the prevention 
of crashes. While these benefits cannot be monetized at this time, they 
could be considerable.
    [dec221] There is evidence that many people value the lives of 
children more than the lives of adults.\6\ In any event, there is 
special social solicitude for protection of children. This solicitude 
is based in part on a recognized general need to protect children given 
their greater vulnerability to injury and inability to protect 
themselves.
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    \6\ J.K. Hammitt and K. Haninger, ``Valuing Fatal Risks to 
Children and Adults: Effects of Disease, Latency, and Risk 
Aversion,'' Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 40(1): 57-83, 2010. This 
stated preference study finds that the willingness to pay to prevent 
fatality risks to one's child is uniformly larger than that to 
reduce risk to another adult or to oneself. Estimated values per 
statistical life are $6-10 million for adults and $12-15 million for 
children. We emphasize that the literature is in a state of 
development.
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    [dec221] Given the very young age of most of the children fatally-
injured in backover crashes, attempting to provide them with training 
or with an audible warning would not enable them to protect themselves.
    [dec221] Given the impossibility of reducing backover crashes 
through changing the behavior of very young children and given 
Congress' mandate, it is reasonable and necessary to rely on technology 
to address backover crashes.
    [dec221] Based on its extensive testing, the agency tentatively 
concluded that a camera-based system is the only effective type of 
technology currently available.
    [dec221] Requiring additional rearview mirrors or changes to 
existing review mirrors cannot significantly increase the view to the 
rear of a vehicle except by means that reduce and distort the reflected 
image of people or objects behind a vehicle.
    [dec221] The agency's testing indicated that currently available 
sensors often failed to detect a human being, particularly a small 
moving child, in tests in which the vehicle was not actually moving. In 
tests in which the vehicle was moving, and when the sensors did detect 
a manikin representing a child, the resulting warning did not induce 
drivers to pause more than briefly in backing.
    [dec221] In contrast, in the agency's tests of video camera-based 
systems, drivers not only saw a child-sized obstacle, but also stopped 
and remained stopped.
    [dec221] Consequently, the agency has tentatively concluded that 
the requirements must have the effect of ensuring that some type of 
image is provided to the driver.
    [dec221] The agency's estimates of current costs for video camera-
based systems may be too high.
    [dec221] The agency has a contract in place for conducting tear 
down studies that could produce somewhat lower cost estimates.
    [dec221] In time, types of technology other than a video camera-
based system may be able to provide a sufficiently clear visual image 
of the area behind the vehicle at lower cost. We believe that it is 
reasonable to project that the costs of the requirements proposed here 
may well decline significantly over time. While extrapolations are 
uncertain, technology has been advancing rapidly in this domain, and 
future costs may well be lower than currently expected.
    [dec221] In light of statutory requirements, the agency is limited 
in its ability to reduce the cost of this rulemaking through adjusting 
either the requirements or application of the proposed rule or the 
schedule for its implementation.
    [dec221] Congress has mandated the issuance of a final rule instead 
of allowing the agency to retain discretion to decide whether to issue 
a final rule based on its consideration of all the relevant factors and 
information.
    [dec221] Less expensive countermeasures, i.e., mirrors and sensors, 
have thus far shown very limited effectiveness and thus would not 
satisfy Congress's mandate for improving safety.
     [squf] As the most cost-effective alternative, a requirement for a 
system that provides an image of the area behind the vehicle would be 
consistent with the policy preference underlying the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act.

[[Page 76190]]

    [dec221] Were the agency able to provide more than the amount of 
lead time permitted by the statutory mandate, the additional leadtime 
might be sufficient to allow the development of cheaper cameras.
    As noted, the agency requests comments on all of the foregoing 
points. And in view of the cost of our proposed option, the agency is 
seeking comment and suggestions on any alternative options that would 
lower costs, maintain all or most of the benefits of the proposal, and 
lower net costs or the cost per equivalent life saved. We carefully 
explored our ability under the Act to vary the population of vehicles 
subject to the proposal, vary the performance requirements, and extend 
the leadtime to implement the proposal and thereby develop alternative 
options that offer benefits similar to those of our proposal, but at 
reduced cost. Although our ability to make any of those types of 
adjustments appears constrained as a legal or practical matter, and 
although none of the alternative options that the agency has been able 
to identify would accomplish all three of those goals, we are seeking 
comment on them and on any others that commenters may suggest.
    We seek comment especially on the alternative option under which 
passenger cars would be required to be equipped with either a rearview 
visibility (e.g., camera) system or with a system that includes sensors 
that monitor a specified area behind the vehicle and an audible warning 
that sounds when the presence of an object is sensed. Under this 
option, other vehicles rated at 10,000 pounds or less, gross vehicle 
weight, would be required to be equipped with a visibility system.
    This alternative would have substantially lower, but still 
significant, safety benefits, substantially lower installation costs, 
lower net costs, and higher cost per equivalent life saved. Cars not 
equipped under this option with a rearview visibility system would be 
required to provide an audible warning inside the vehicle of not less 
than 85 dBa between 500-3000 Hz when a test object is placed in one of 
the locations specified for test objects in the requirements for 
rearview image performance and the vehicle transmission is shifted into 
reverse gear. Given that current sensors have a shorter range than 
rearview visibility systems, the test objects might need to be placed 
somewhat closer to the vehicle than they are when used to test the 
performance of rearview visibility systems. Alternatively, the test 
objects could be placed in the same locations as for rearward 
visibility systems, thus requiring sensors to have stronger signals. A 
disadvantage of doing that would be the risk of increased ``false'' 
activations. This requirement to sense the presence of a test object 
would be required to be met for each of the test object locations. The 
other requirements would be similar to those for the proposed rearview 
systems.

II. Background

A. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007

    Subsection (2)(b) of the K.T. Safety Act directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to initiate rulemaking by February 28, 2009 to amend 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 111, Rearview 
Mirrors, to expand the required field of view to enable the driver of a 
motor vehicle to detect areas behind the motor vehicle to reduce death 
and injury resulting from backing incidents.\7\ The Secretary is 
required to publish a final rule within 36 months of the passage of the 
K.T. Safety Act (i.e., by February 28, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ As noted above, the agency first public step toward meeting 
this requirement was the issuance of an ANPRM. It was posted on the 
NHTSA Web site on February 27, 2009, and published in the Federal 
Register on March 3, 2009. 74 FR 9478.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that subsection (2)(b) requires the amendment of a Federal 
motor vehicle safety standard, this rulemaking is subject to both the 
requirements of subsection (b) and the requirements for such standards 
in the Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 30111.
    Subsection (2)(b) contains the following requirements. Not later 
than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary shall initiate a rulemaking to revise Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard 111 (FMVSS 111) to expand the required field of view to 
enable the driver of a motor vehicle to detect areas behind the motor 
vehicle to reduce death and injury resulting from backing incidents, 
particularly incidents involving small children and disabled persons. 
The Secretary may prescribe different requirements for different types 
of motor vehicles to expand the required field of view to enable the 
driver of a motor vehicle to detect areas behind the motor vehicle to 
reduce death and injury resulting from backing incidents, particularly 
incidents involving small children and disabled persons. Such standard 
may be met by the provision of additional mirrors, sensors, cameras, or 
other technology to expand the driver's field of view.
    Subsection (2)(e) of the K.T. Safety Act broadly defines the term 
``motor vehicle,'' as used in subsection (2)(b), as follows: As used in 
this Act and for purposes of the motor vehicle safety standards 
described in subsections (a) and (b), the term `motor vehicle' has the 
meaning given such term in section 30102(a)(6) of title 49, United 
States Code, except that such term shall not include--a motorcycle or 
trailer; or any motor vehicle that is rated at more than 10,000 pounds 
gross vehicular weight.
    Section 30102(a)(6) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act defines ``motor vehicle'' even more broadly as a vehicle 
driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use 
on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle 
operated only on a rail line.
    The K.T. Safety Act also specifies the rule must be phased-in and 
that it must be fully implemented within four years after the 
publication date of the final rule. The statutory language, contained 
in subsection (c) of the K.T. Safety Act, sets out these requirements 
for the phase-in period: The safety standards prescribed pursuant to 
subsections (a) and (b) shall establish a phase-in period for 
compliance, as determined by the Secretary, and require full compliance 
with the safety standards not later than 48 months after the date on 
which the final rule is issued.
    In establishing the phase-in period of the rearward visibility 
safety standards required under subsection (b), the Secretary shall 
consider whether to require the phase-in according to different types 
of motor vehicles based on data demonstrating the frequency by which 
various types of motor vehicles have been involved in backing incidents 
resulting in injury or death. If the Secretary determines that any type 
of motor vehicle should be given priority, the Secretary shall issue 
regulations that specify which type or types of motor vehicles shall be 
phased-in first; and the percentages by which such motor vehicles shall 
be phased-in.
    Congress emphasized the protection of small children and disabled 
persons, and added that the revised standard may be met by the 
``provision of additional mirrors, sensors, cameras, or other 
technology to expand the driver's field of view.'' While NHTSA does not 
interpret the Congressional language to require that all of these 
technologies eventually be integrated into the final requirement, we 
have closely examined the merits of each of them, and present our 
analysis of their ability to address the backover safety problem.
    We note that the inclusion of sensors as a ``technology to expand 
the driver's field of view'' suggests that the passage ``expand the 
required field of view''

[[Page 76191]]

should not be read in the literal way as meaning the driver must be 
able to see more of the area behind the vehicle. A literal reading 
would make the reference to sensors superfluous, violating a basic 
canon of statutory interpretation. Instead, it seems that language 
should be read as meaning the driver must be able to monitor, visually 
or otherwise, an expanded area.
    Finally, section 4 of the K.T. Safety Act provides that if the 
Secretary determines that the deadlines applicable under the Act cannot 
be met, the Secretary shall establish new deadlines, and notify the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate of 
the new deadlines describing the reasons the deadlines specified under 
the K.T. Safety Act could not be met.
    The relevant provisions in the Vehicle Safety Act are those in 
section 30111 of title 49 of the United States Code. Section 3011 
states that the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor 
vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be practicable, meet the 
need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms. When 
prescribing a motor vehicle safety standard under this chapter, the 
Secretary shall consider relevant available motor vehicle safety 
information; consult with the agency established under the Act of 
August 20, 1958 (Pub. L. 85-684, 72 Stat. 635), and other appropriate 
State or interstate authorities (including legislative committees); 
consider whether a proposed standard is reasonable, practicable, and 
appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment for which it is prescribed; and consider the extent to which 
the standard will carry out section 30101 of this title.

B. Applicability

    With regard to the scope of vehicles covered by the mandate, the 
statute refers to all motor vehicles rated at not more than 10,000 
pounds gross vehicle weight (GVW) (except motorcycles and trailers). 
Specifically, it states that the Secretary shall ``revise [FMVSS No. 
111] to expand the required field of view to enable the driver of a 
motor vehicle to detect areas behind the motor vehicle * * *,'' and 
defines a ``motor vehicle'' for purposes of the Act as any motor 
vehicle whose GVWR is 10,000 pounds or less, except trailers and 
motorcycles. This language means that the revised regulation could be 
applied to passenger cars, low-speed vehicles (LSVs), multipurpose 
passenger vehicles (MPVs),\8\ buses (including small school buses and 
school vans), and trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. In this 
document, we are proposing that each of these types of vehicles would 
be subject to improved rear visibility requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Per 49 CFR 571.3, multipurpose passenger vehicle means a 
motor vehicle with motive power, except a low-speed vehicle or 
trailer, designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed 
either on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional 
off-road operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note, however, that in our review of real-world crashes, NHTSA 
could not determine whether there were any backover incidents involving 
LSVs, small school buses, and school vans. Accordingly, we seek comment 
and data related to the issue of whether, if the agency remains unable 
to find such incidents, it could reasonably conclude that those 
vehicles pose no unreasonable risk of backover crashes and whether it 
would be permissible therefore it to exclude these vehicles from the 
application of the final rule. The agency invites comment on whether 
the absence of incidents might reflect operational conditions (school 
vehicles-operation in environments in which the vulnerable age groups 
are unlikely to be present or perhaps avoidance of backing maneuvers) 
or a possible absence of any blind spot behind the vehicle (some LSVs).

C. Backover Crash Safety Problem

i. Definitions and Summary
    A backover crash is a specifically-defined type of incident, in 
which a non-occupant of a vehicle (i.e., a pedestrian or cyclist) is 
struck by a vehicle moving in reverse. As stated in the ANPRM, using a 
variety of available data sources, NHTSA has identified a total 
population of 228 fatalities and 17,000 injuries due to light vehicle 
backover crashes.\9\ Unlike other crashes, the overwhelming majority of 
backover crashes occur off of public roadways, in areas such as 
driveways and parking lots. Children and people over 70 are also far 
more likely than other groups to be victims of backover crashes. In the 
case of children, their short stature can make them extremely difficult 
for a driver to see using direct vision or existing mirrors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 49 FR 9482.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because many backover crashes occur off public roadways, NHTSA's 
traditional methodologies for collecting data as to the specific 
numbers and circumstances of backover incidents have not always given 
the agency a complete picture of the scope and circumstances of these 
types of incidents. The following sections detail NHTSA's attempts to 
both quantify the number of backover incidents and determine their 
nature.
    In response to section 2012 of the ``Safe, Accountable, Flexible, 
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users'' (SAFETEA-
LU),\10\ NHTSA developed the ``Not-in-Traffic Surveillance'' (NiTS) 
system to collect information about all nontraffic crashes, including 
nontraffic backing crashes. NiTS provided information on these backing 
crashes that occurred off the traffic way and which were not included 
in NHTSA's FARS database or NASS-GES. The subset of backing crashes 
that involve a pedestrian, bicyclist, or other person not in a vehicle, 
is referred to as ``backover crashes.'' This is distinguished from the 
larger category of ``backing crashes,'' which would include such non-
backover events such as a vehicle going in reverse and colliding with 
another vehicle, or a vehicle backing off an embankment or into a 
stationary object. While the primary purpose of this rulemaking is to 
prevent backover crashes, any improvements to rear visibility should 
also have a positive effect on all types of backing crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Public Law 109-59, August 10, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The national estimates for fatalities and injuries presented in the 
ANPRM were developed using data from FARS, NASS-GES, and the NiTS. 
While there are newer estimates available for FARS and NASS-GES, there 
are not for the NiTS and therefore the estimates we provided in the 
ANPRM and in this document represent the most current data available. 
As such, based on the currently available data, NHTSA estimates that 
463 fatalities and 48,000 injuries a year occur in traffic and 
nontraffic backing crashes.\11\ Most of these injuries are minor, but 
an estimated 6,000 per year are incapacitating injuries. Overall, an 
estimated 65 percent (302) of the fatalities and 62 percent (29,000) of 
the injuries in backing crashes occurred in nontraffic situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Fatalities and Injuries in Motor Vehicle Backing Crashes, 
NHTSA Report to Congress (2008), DOT HS 811 144. http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811144.PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on existing data, NHTSA estimates the following number of 
injuries and fatalities. Overall, backing crashes result in 
approximately 463 fatalities and 48,000 injuries. Of those, the subset 
of backover crashes comprises 292 fatalities (63 percent) and 18,000 
injuries (38 percent). These figures are reflected in Table 1 below.

[[Page 76192]]

         Table 1--Annual Estimated Fatalities and Injuries in All Backing Crashes for All Vehicles \12\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Total         Backover crashes    Other backing
                                                        --------------------------------------      crashes
                    Injury severity                                                           ------------------
                                                          Estimated total    Estimated total    Estimated total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities.............................................                463                292                171
Incapacitating Injury..................................              6,000              3,000              3,000
Non-incapacitating Injury..............................             12,000              7,000              5,000
Possible Injury........................................             27,000              7,000             20,000
Injured Severity Unknown...............................              2,000              1,000              2,000
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
    Total Injuries.....................................             48,000             18,000             30,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FARS 2002-2006, NASS-GES 2002-2006, NiTS 2007.
Note: Estimates may not add up to totals due to independent rounding. [Note to agency, unknowns will be updated
  prior OST approval to reflect optics that 2,000 + 1,000 does not equal 2.]

ii. Backover Crash Risk by Crash and Vehicle Type
    Backovers account for an estimated 63 percent of all fatal backing 
crashes involving all vehicle types. As indicated in Table 2, an 
estimated 15 percent (68) of the backing crash fatalities occur in 
multivehicle crashes, and an estimated 13 percent (62) occur in single-
vehicle non-collisions, such as occupants who fall out of and are 
struck by their own backing vehicles. About half of the backing crash 
injuries (20,000 per year) occur in multi-vehicle crashes involving 
backing vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Ibid.

                           Table 2--Fatalities and Injuries by Backing Crash Type \13\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    All vehicles           Passenger vehicles
                   Backing crash scenarios                   ---------------------------------------------------
                                                               Fatalities    Injuries    Fatalities    Injuries
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Backovers: Striking Non-occupant............................          292       18,000          228       17,000
Backing: Striking Fixed Object..............................           33        2,000           33        2,000
Backing: Single-vehicle Non-collision.......................           62        1,000           53        1,000
Backing: Striking/Struck by Other Vehicle (multi-vehicle)...           68       24,000           39       20,000
Backing: Other..............................................            8        3,000            8        3,000
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
    Total Backing...........................................          463       48,000          361       43,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FARS 2002-2006, NASS-GES 2002-2006, NiTS 2007.
Note: Estimates may not add up to totals due to independent rounding.

    Most backover fatalities and injuries involve passenger vehicles. 
Tables 2 and 3 indicate that all major passenger vehicle types (cars, 
trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and vans) with GVWR of 10,000 
pounds or less are involved in backover fatalities and injuries. 
However, the data indicate that some vehicles show a greater 
involvement in backing crashes than other vehicles. Table 3 illustrates 
that pickup trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles are 
statistically overrepresented in backover fatalities when compared to 
all non-backing traffic injury crashes and to their proportion to the 
passenger vehicle fleet. The agency's analysis revealed that while LTVs 
were statistically overrepresented in backover-related fatalities, they 
were not significantly overrepresented in backover crashes generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Ibid.

                Table 3--Passenger Vehicle Backover Fatalities and Injuries by Vehicle Type \14\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Estimated
 Backing vehicle type (GVWR 10,000 lb or less)    Fatalities   Percent of   Estimated    percent of   Percent of
                                                               fatalities    injuries     injuries      fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car............................................           59           26        9,000           54           58
Utility Vehicle................................           68           30        3,000           20           16
Van............................................           29           13        1,000            6            8
Truck..........................................           72           31        3,000           18           17
Other Vehicles.................................            0            0            *            2           <1
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Passenger Vehicles.........................          228          100       17,000          100          100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FARS 2002-2006, NASS-GES 2002-2006, NiTS 2007.
Note: * Indicates estimate less than 500, estimates may not add up to totals due to independent rounding.

[[Page 76193]]

iii. Backover Crash Risk by Victim Age
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's data indicate that children and adults over 70 years old 
are disproportionately represented in passenger vehicle backover 
crashes. Table 4 details the ages for fatalities and injuries for 
backover crashes involving all vehicles as well as those involving 
passenger vehicles only. It also details the proportion of the U.S. 
population in each age category from the 2007 U.S. Census Bureau's 
Population Estimates Program for comparison. Similar to previous 
findings, backover fatalities disproportionately affect children under 
5 years old and adults 70 or older. When restricted to backover 
fatalities involving passenger vehicles, children under 5 years old 
account for 44 percent of the fatalities, and adults 70 years of age 
and older account for 33 percent. The difference in the results between 
all backover crashes and passenger vehicle backover crashes occur 
because large truck backover crashes, which are excluded from the 
passenger vehicle calculations, tend to affect adults younger than 70 
years of age.

                     Table 4--All Backover Crash Fatalities and Injuries by Victim Age \15\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Estimated
                Age of victim                  Fatalities   Percent of   Estimated    percent of    Percent of
                                                            fatalities    injuries     injuries    population **
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  All Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under 5.....................................          103           35        2,000            8               7
5-10........................................           13            4            *            3               7
10-19.......................................            4            1        2,000           12              14
20-59.......................................           69           24        9,000           48              55
60-69.......................................           28            9        2,000            8               8
70+.........................................           76           26        3,000           18               9
Unknown.....................................  ...........  ...........            *            2  ..............
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................          292          100       18,000          100             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Passenger Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under 5.....................................          100           44        2,000            9               7
5-10........................................           10            4        1,000            3               7
10-19.......................................            1            1        2,000           12              14
20-59.......................................           29           13        8,000           46              55
60-69.......................................           15            6        1,000            8               8
70+.........................................           74           33        3,000           19               9
Unknown.....................................  ...........  ...........            *            2  ..............
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................          228          100       17,000          100             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * Indicates estimate less than 500, estimates may not add up to totals due to independent rounding.
Note: ** Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2007 Population Estimates; FARS 2002-2006,
  NASS-GES 2002-2006, NiTS 2007.

    The proportion of backover injuries by age group is more similar to 
the proportion of the population than for backover fatalities. However, 
while children under 5 years old appear to be slightly statistically 
overrepresented in backover injuries compared to the population, adults 
70 years of age and older appear to be greatly overrepresented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 5 presents passenger vehicle backover fatalities by year of 
age for victims less than 5 years old. Out of all backover fatalities 
involving passenger vehicles, 26 percent (60 out of 228) of victims are 
1 year of age and younger.

   Table 5--Breakdown of Backover Crash Fatalities Involving Passenger
               Vehicles for Victims Under Age 5 Years \16\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Number of
                   Age of victim (years)                      fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0..........................................................          < 1
1..........................................................           59
2..........................................................           23
3..........................................................           14
4..........................................................            3
                                                            ------------
    Total..................................................          100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Estimates may not add to totals due to independent rounding.
Source: US Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2007 Population
  Estimates; FARS 2002-2006, NASS-GES 2002-2006, NiTS 2007.

iv. Special Crash Investigation of Backover Crashes
    As reported in the ANPRM, NHTSA's efforts to collect data on 
police-reported backover crashes have included a Special Crash 
Investigation (SCI) program. The SCI program was created to examine the 
safety impact of rapidly changing technologies and to provide NHTSA 
with early detection of alleged or potential vehicle defects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 74 FR 9478.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SCI began investigating cases related to backover crashes in 
October 2006.\17\ SCI receives notification of potential backover cases 
from several different sources including media reports, police and 
rescue personnel, contacts within NHTSA, reports from the general 
public, as well as notifications from the NASS. As of August 2009, 
roughly 80 percent of 849 total ``Not-in-Traffic Surveillance'' system 
incident notifications that SCI had received regarded backover

[[Page 76194]]

crashes.\18\ For the purpose of the SCI cases, an eligible backover is 
defined as a crash in which a light passenger vehicle's back plane 
strikes or passes over a person who is either positioned to the rear of 
the vehicle or is approaching from the side. SCI primarily focuses on 
cases involving children; however, it investigates some cases involving 
adults. The majority of notifications received do not meet the criteria 
for case assignment. Typically, the reasons for not pursuing further 
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Fatalities and Injuries in Motor Vehicle Backing Crashes, 
NHTSA Report to Congress (2008).
    \18\ Since SCI investigates as many relevant cases that they are 
notified about as possible and not on a statistical sampling of 
incidents, results are not representative of the general population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The reported crash configuration is outside of the scope 
of the program,
     Minor incidents with no fatally or seriously injured 
persons, or
     Incidents where cooperation cannot be established with the 
involved parties.
    As an example, many reported incidents are determined to be side or 
frontal impacts, which exclude them from the program. Cases involving 
adult victims were generally excluded from the study unless they were 
seriously injured or killed or if the backing vehicles were equipped 
with backing or parking aids.
    The SCI effort to examine backover crashes includes an on-site 
inspection of the scene and vehicle, as well as interviews of the 
involved parties when possible. When an on-site investigation is not 
possible, backover cases are investigated remotely through an 
examination of police-provided reports and photos as well as interviews 
with the involved parties. For each backover case investigated, a case 
vehicle visibility study is also conducted to determine the size of the 
vehicle's blind zones and also to determine at what distance behind the 
vehicle the occupant may have become visible to the driver.
    Thus far, NHTSA has completed special crash investigations of 58 
backover cases. The 58 backing vehicles were comprised of 18 passenger 
cars, 22 multipurpose passenger vehicles, 5 vans (including minivans) 
and 13 pickup trucks. For cases in which an estimated speed for the 
backing vehicle was available, the average speed of the backing vehicle 
was approximately 3 mph. Of the 58 SCI backover cases, 95 percent (55) 
of the cases occurred in daylight conditions. Half (29) involved a non-
occupant fatality.
    Four of the 58 cases involved vehicles equipped with a parking aid 
system. All four systems were sensor-based parking aids. In two 
vehicles, the systems had been manually turned off for unknown reasons. 
In one backover case, the system did not detect an elderly female who 
had fallen behind a sensor-equipped vehicle, and presumably positioned 
at a height below the detection zone of the sensors. In the fourth case 
the system did detect the adult pedestrian victim and provided a 
warning that prompted the driver to stop the vehicle, but the driver 
looked rearward and did not see an obstacle so he began backing again 
and struck the victim.
    One issue that was evident from the SCI cases is that very few 
instances involved victims that were easily visible from the driver's 
position. Instead, most of the victims were either children (who were 
too short to be seen behind the vehicle), or adults who had fallen or 
bent over and were also thus not in the driver's field of view. Eighty-
eight percent of the backover crashes (51 of the 58) involved children, 
ranging in age from less than 8 months old up to 13 years old, who were 
struck by vehicles. The other 12 percent of the 58 cases involved adult 
victims aged 30 years or older. Of the 8 adult victims, 4 were in an 
upright posture either standing or walking and one of those 4, as noted 
in the prior paragraph, had been detected by a rear parking sensor 
system, but the driver only stopped briefly before continuing to back 
and then struck the person. Of the remaining four adult victims 
documented in the SCI cases, one was bending over behind a backing 
vehicle to pick up something from the ground, one was an elderly female 
who had fallen down in the path of the vehicle prior to being run over, 
and the postural orientation of the remaining two was unknown.
    Based on NHTSA's analysis of the quantitative data and narrative 
descriptions of how the 58 SCI-documented backover incidents 
transpired, the breakdown of the victim's path of travel prior to being 
struck is as follows: 41 (71 percent) were approaching from the right 
or left of the vehicle, 12 were in the path of the backing vehicle, 4 
were unknown, and one was ``other''.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Note that one or more cases examined involved multiple 
victims, causing the total of the path breakdown scenarios to be 53 
rather than 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequent to the ANPRM, NHTSA further analyzed these SCI backover 
cases to assess how far the vehicle traveled before striking the 
victim. Distances traveled for these cases ranged from 1 to 75 feet. 
Overall, as shown in Table 6 below, this analysis showed that in 77 
percent of real-world, SCI backover cases, the vehicle traveled up to 
20 feet. While the subset may or may not nationally representative of 
all backing crashes, we believe this information from the SCI cases 
could be used in the development of a required visible area and the 
associated development of a compliance test.

  Table 6--Average Distance Traveled by Backing Vehicle for First 58 SCI Backover Cases and Percent of Backover
                                          Crashes That Could Be Avoided
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Average distance
                                   Number of   traveled prior to   7ft  (%)    15ft  (%)   20ft  (%)   35ft  (%)
                                   SCI cases     Strike  (ft)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car.............................          18                13.7          39          56          78          89
SUV.............................          22                13.4          27          68          82         100
Minivan.........................           4                31.0          25          50          50          75
Van.............................           1                54.5           0           0           0           0
Pickup..........................          13                17.2          38          69          69          92
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All Light Vehicles..........          58                26.0          33          63          77          93
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 76195]]

v. Analysis of Backover Crash Risk by Pedestrian Location Using Monte 
Carlo Simulation
    As noted in the ANPRM, NHTSA also calculated backover crash risk as 
a function of pedestrian location using a Monte Carlo simulation.\20\ 
Data from a recent NHTSA study of drivers' backing behavior,\21\ such 
as average backing speed and average distance covered in a backing 
maneuver, were used to develop a backing speed distribution and a 
backing distance distribution that were used as inputs to the 
simulation. Similarly, published data 22 23 24 
characterizing walking and running speeds of an average 1-year-old 
child were also used as inputs. A Monte Carlo simulation was performed 
that drew upon the noted vehicle and pedestrian motion data to 
calculate a probability-based risk weighting for a test area centered 
behind the vehicle. The probability-based risk weightings for each grid 
square were based on the number of pedestrian-vehicle backing crashes 
predicted by the simulation for trials for which the pedestrian was 
initially (i.e., at the time that the vehicle began to back up) in the 
center of one square of the grid of 1-foot squares spanning 70 feet 
wide by 90 feet in range behind the vehicle. A total of 1,000,000 
simulation trials were run with the pedestrian initially in the center 
of each square.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ 49 FR 9484.
    \21\ Mazzae, E. N., Barickman, F. S., Baldwin, G. H. S., and 
Ranney, T. A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview 
Video Systems (ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, DOT HS 811 024.
    \22\ Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways, 2003 Edition. Washington, DC: FHWA, November 2003.
    \23\ Milazzo, J.S., Rouphail, J.E., and Alien, D.P. (1999). 
Quality of Service for Interrupted-Flow Pedestrian Facilities in 
Highway Capacity Manual 2000. Transportation Research Record, No. 
1678 (1999): 25-31.
    \24\ Chou, P., Chou, Y., Su, F., Huang, W., Lin, T. (2003). 
Normal Gait of Children. Biomedical Engineering--Applications, Basis 
& Communications, Vol. 15 No. 4 August 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The output of this analysis calculated relative crash risk values 
for each grid square representing a location behind the vehicle. 
Analysis results showed that the probability of crash decreases rapidly 
as the pedestrian's initial location is moved rearward, away from the 
rear bumper of the vehicle. Areas located behind the vehicle and to the 
side were also shown to have moderately high risk, giving pedestrians 
some risk of being hit even though they were not initially directly 
behind the vehicle. The results suggest that an area 12 feet wide by 36 
feet long centered behind the vehicle would address pedestrian 
locations having relative crash risks of 0.15 and higher (with a risk 
value of 1.0 being located directly aft of the rear bumper). To address 
crash risks of 0.20 and higher, an area 7 feet wide and 33 feet long 
centered behind the vehicle would need to be covered. The analysis 
showed that an area covering approximately the width of the vehicle out 
to a range of 19 feet would encompass risk values of 0.4 and higher.

D. Comparative Regulatory Requirements

    As of today, no country has established a requirement for the 
minimum area directly behind a light vehicle that must be directly or 
indirectly visible. All countries do, however, have standards for side 
and interior rearview mirrors, although slight differences do exist in 
terms of mirror requirements.
i. Current FMVSS No. 111
    FMVSS No. 111, Rearview mirrors, sets requirements for motor 
vehicles to be equipped with mirrors that improve rearward 
visibility.\25\ This standard sets different requirements for various 
classes of vehicles, notably including passenger cars in paragraph S5, 
and multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), trucks, and buses 
(including school buses and school vans) with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds 
or less in paragraph S6. The purpose of this standard is to reduce the 
number of deaths and injuries that occur when the driver of a motor 
vehicle does not have a clear and reasonably unobstructed view to the 
rear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ 49 CFR 571.111, Standard No. 111, Rearview mirrors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to passenger cars, paragraph S5 of the standard sets 
requirements for both the rearward area to the sides of the vehicle, as 
well as the area directly behind the vehicle. With regard to the 
requirements for viewing the area directly behind the vehicle, 
paragraph S5 requires that the inside mirror must have a field of view 
at least 20 degrees wide and a sufficient vertical angle to provide a 
view of a level road surface extending to the horizon beginning not 
more than 200 feet (61 m) behind the vehicle. If this requirement is 
not met, the standard requires that a flat \26\ or convex exterior 
mirror must be mounted on the passenger's side of the vehicle; although 
no specific field of view is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Flat mirrors are referred to as ``planar'' or ``unit 
magnification'' mirrors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to the rearward area to the side of the vehicle, 
paragraph S5 requires a driver's side rearview mirror to be mounted on 
the outside of the vehicle. This mirror is required to be a plane 
mirror that provides ``the driver a view of a level road surface 
extending to the horizon from a line, perpendicular to a longitudinal 
plane tangent to the driver's side of the vehicle at the widest point, 
extending 2.4 m (7.9 ft) out from the tangent plane 10.7 m (35.1 ft) 
behind the driver's eyes, with the seat in the rearmost position.''
    Paragraph S6 sets mirror requirements for buses (including school 
buses and school vans), trucks, and MPVs, with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds 
or less. Unlike the requirement for passenger cars, paragraph S6 does 
not set a requirement for a rear field of view directly behind the 
vehicle, but only sets a requirement for the rearward area to the sides 
of the vehicle. Pursuant to paragraph S6, vehicles must have either 
mirrors that conform to paragraph S5 or outside mirrors of unit 
magnification with reflective surface area of not less than 126 square 
centimeters (19.5 square inches) on each side of the vehicle. We note 
that under S6, manufacturers are given the option to have mirrors that 
conform to S5, instead of the requirements listed in S6. As paragraph 
S6 does not establish minimum rear field of view requirements for the 
area directly behind the vehicle, existing state laws or regulations 
may regulate the vehicle's rear field of view for vehicles subject to 
the requirements of paragraph S6.
    FMVSS No. 111 also includes requirements for school buses in 
paragraph S9. These requirements are substantially more robust than the 
mirror requirements for other vehicles. The standard also contains test 
procedures (paragraph S13) for determining the performance of school 
bus mirrors.
ii. Relevant European Regulations (Also United Kingdom and Australia)
    In 1981, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe enacted 
Regulation 46 (ECE R46), which details uniform provisions concerning 
the approval of devices for indirect vision.\27\ ECE R46 defines 
devices for indirect vision as those that observe the area adjacent to 
the vehicle which cannot be observed by direct vision, including 
``conventional mirrors, camera-monitors or other devices able to 
present information about the indirect field of vision to the driver.'' 
ECE R46 permits either exterior planar or convex mirrors

[[Page 76196]]

on both sides of the vehicle, provided a minimum field of view is 
satisfied. Specifications are also provided to define the required 
minimum surface area of the interior rearview mirror.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ ECE R46-02, Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval of: 
Devices for Indirect Vision and of Motor Vehicles with Regard to the 
Installation of these Devices, (August 7, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ECE R46 regulation previously outlined requirements for devices 
for indirect vision other than mirrors for vehicles with more than 
eight seating positions and those configured for refuse collection. 
However, in an August 7, 2008 amendment all performance requirements 
were removed and replaced with the statement, ``Vehicles may be 
equipped with additional devices for indirect vision.'' \28\ This 
change allows for indirect vision systems to be installed on European 
vehicles without meeting any performance requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Section 15.3.5 of ECE R46-02, Uniform Provisions Concerning 
the Approval of: Devices for Indirect Vision and of Motor Vehicles 
with Regard to the Installation of these Devices, (August 7, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Relevant Regulations in Japan and Korea
    The Japanese regulation, Article 44, provides a performance based 
requirement for rearview mirrors.\29\ For light vehicles, rearview 
mirrors must be present that enable drivers to check the traffic 
situation around the left-hand lane edge and behind the vehicle from 
the driver's seat.\30\ The regulation requires that the driver be able 
to ``visually confirm the presence of a cylindrical object 1 m high and 
0.3 m in diameter (equivalent to a 6-year-old child) adjacent to the 
front or the left-hand side of the vehicle (or the right-hand side in 
the case of a left-hand drive vehicle), either directly or indirectly 
via mirrors, screens, or similar devices.'' Article 44 does not specify 
requirements for rear-mounted convex mirrors and rearview video 
systems. Rear-mounted convex mirrors are commonly found on multipurpose 
passenger vehicles and vans in Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Japanese Safety Regulation Article 44 and attachments 79-
81.
    \30\ Vehicles manufactured for the Japanese market are right-
hand drive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Korean regulation on rearview mirrors, Article 50 outlines 
rearview mirror requirements for a range of vehicles. Article 50 
requires a flat or convex exterior mirror mounted on the driver's side 
for passenger vehicles and buses with less than 10 passengers. For 
buses, cargo vehicles, and special motor vehicles, flat or convex rear-
view mirrors are required on both sides of the vehicle. Article 50 does 
not address rear-mounted convex mirrors and rearview video systems, 
therefore these devices are allowed, but not required under the 
standard. Again, rear-mounted convex mirrors can be found on SUVs and 
vans in Korea.
iv. State Regulations
    In the ANPRM, NHTSA requested comment on whether states or 
municipalities have regulations pertaining to rear visibility 
requirements.\31\ NHTSA has found that two states, New York and New 
Jersey, have motor vehicle regulations that require some single-unit 
trucks to have a cross-view mirror or electronic backup device. 
Specifically, the regulations apply to vehicles with a ``cube-style'' 
or ``walk-in type'' cargo bay. We note that while the K.T. Safety Act 
applies primarily to passenger vehicles, the state regulations apply 
only to vehicles used for commercial purposes. However, we note that 
some commercial vehicles may be encompassed by the proposed 
regulations, and that issues of Federal preemption could apply. This is 
discussed in more detail in Section IX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 74 FR 9480.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    The ANPRM set forth the agency's analysis of the crash data and 
safety problem, our research progress, and ideas for possible 
proposals.\32\ Specifically, the ANPRM reiterated some previous 
findings on backover statistics, presented research findings on the 
effectiveness of various countermeasures, and outlined options for 
improving rear visibility including: Improved direct vision (i.e., 
looking directly out the vehicle's rear window) or indirect vision via 
rear-mounted convex mirrors, rearview video systems, and rear object 
detection sensors. The notice also set forth three approaches to 
defining the scope of the applicability of the enhancements to FMVSS 
No. 111 being contemplated by the agency. The approaches included 
requiring a rear visibility countermeasure on all light vehicles, only 
LTVs, or just a portion of the fleet as determined using a rear blind 
zone area threshold. Such a threshold would indicate what size of area 
behind the vehicle in which a driver cannot see obstacles is too large 
based on an associated high rate of backing or backover crashes. 
Several approaches for developing a threshold were provided, including 
a vehicle type approach and multiple implementations of a rear blind 
zone area threshold approach. Finally, the ANPRM sought responses to 
approximately forty-three specific questions addressing the feasibility 
and performance of various technologies, technology cost, and 
requesting feedback on NHTSA's ideas about possible approaches for 
countermeasure application throughout all or a portion of the fleet. 
Sections A through D of this section summarize the information 
presented and the subsequent sections summarize the comments received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ 74 FR 9478, [Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0041].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Technologies To Mitigate Backover Crashes

    Systems to aid drivers in performing backing maneuvers have been 
available for nearly two decades. To date, original equipment systems 
have been marketed as a convenience feature or ``parking aid'' for 
which the vehicle owner's manual often contains language denoting 
sensor performance limitations with respect to detecting children or 
small moving objects. Aftermarket systems, however, are often marketed 
as safety devices for warning drivers of the presence of small children 
behind the vehicle.
    Since the early 1990s, NHTSA has actively researched approaches to 
mitigate backing crashes with pedestrians for heavy and light vehicles 
by assessing the effectiveness of various backing aid technologies. In 
addition to sensor-based rear object detection systems, the agency has 
evaluated rear-mounted convex mirrors and rearview video systems. To 
date, our evaluation and testing results indicate that rearview video 
systems not only offer drivers the most comprehensive view behind a 
vehicle but drivers seem to use them more effectively in avoiding a 
conflict situation with a pedestrian when compared to additional 
mirrors and sensors. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the 
information presented in the ANPRM describing each of the system types 
assessed by NHTSA to date and our observations on how they could be 
used to improve the rear visibility of current vehicles.
i. Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors
    Rear-mounted convex mirrors are mirrors with a curved reflective 
surface that can be mounted internal or external to the vehicle. Their 
design is such that they compress a reflected image to provide a wider 
field of view than planar (i.e., flat) mirrors. When used on vehicles, 
the mirrors may be mounted at the rear to allow a driver to see areas 
behind the vehicle. A single rear-mounted mirror can be mounted at the 
upper center of the rear window with the reflective surface pointing at 
the ground (commonly referred to as backing mirrors, under mirrors, or 
``look-down'' mirrors) or at the driver's side on the upper corner of 
the vehicle

[[Page 76197]]

(commonly seen on delivery vans or mail delivery trucks and called 
``corner mirrors'') to show the area behind the vehicle. Both look-down 
and corner convex mirrors are typically positioned to show a portion of 
the rear of the vehicle to give drivers a visual reference point. 
Alternatively, rear convex ``cross-view'' mirrors pairs can be 
integrated into the inside face of both rearmost pillars or attached to 
the rear glass to show objects approaching on a perpendicular path 
behind the vehicle to aid a driver when backing into a right-of-way. 
While cross-view mirrors are available for passenger cars and LTVs, 
rear convex look-down and corner mirrors can only be mounted on 
vehicles with a vertical rear window, such as vans and SUVs. Rear-
mounted convex mirrors are primarily available as aftermarket products 
in the U.S., but are also available as original equipment on at least 
one multipurpose passenger vehicle.\33\ In Korea and Japan, rear-
mounted convex mirrors are used on small school buses, short delivery 
trucks, and some multipurpose vehicles (e.g., SUVs) to allow drivers to 
view areas behind a vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Rear-mounted convex mirrors have been available on the 
Toyota 4Runner base model vehicle since model year 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Generally, drivers use rear-mounted convex look-down mirrors to 
view the area behind a vehicle by looking directly at the mirror or by 
viewing them indirectly through their reflection in the interior 
rearview mirror. Cross-view mirrors also may be viewed either directly 
or indirectly through the interior rearview mirror. For a rear convex 
corner mirror, which is not in the driver's direct line of sight, he or 
she must look into the driver's side rearview mirror to view the 
reflection of the rear convex corner mirror.
    In the ANPRM, NHTSA outlined its observations about these mirrors 
based on our testing conducted in 2006 and 2007.34 35 The 
fields of view for look-down mirrors examined were found to extend from 
the rear bumper out approximately 6 feet radially from the mirror 
location, while the view provided by cross-view mirrors extended 
further due to the mirrors' vertical orientation. Overall, our testing 
generally indicated that convex mirrors compress and distort the image 
of reflected objects in their field of view, which makes objects and 
pedestrians appear very narrow and difficult for the driver to discern 
and identify in most locations within the reflected image. These 
aspects of image quality worsen as the length of the vehicle increases, 
since for longer vehicles the mirror is further from the driver. Our 
testing also has indicated that because rear cross-view mirrors are 
positioned to show an area to the side and rear of the vehicle, they do 
not provide a good view of the area directly behind the vehicle (the 
area bounded by two imaginary planes tangent to the sides of the 
vehicle). As such, it is possible that a pedestrian or object located 
directly behind the vehicle would not be visible to the driver. Rear 
cross-view mirrors can help drivers see objects approaching the rear of 
the vehicle along a perpendicular path.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ 74 FR 9486.
    \35\ The research studies and the observations are documented in 
''The Ability of Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors to Improve Rear 
Visibility,'' Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference 2009, Paper 
Number 09-0558. Since the ANPRM, NHTSA has conducted additional 
testing on drivers' use of rear-mounted convex mirrors, the findings 
of which will be discussed later in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Rearview Video Systems
    Rearview video systems are available as both original and 
aftermarket equipment and permit a driver to see the area directly 
behind the vehicle via a visual display (i.e., video screen) showing 
the image from a video camera mounted on the rear of the vehicle. NHTSA 
has observed the placement of these visual displays in a number of 
locations. Sometimes these displays serve the added purpose of 
providing a visual display for a navigation system or satellite radio. 
As stand-alone units, these displays have also been incorporated into 
the dash or into the interior rearview mirror. The video cameras 
installed with rearview video systems vary in field of view performance 
from approximately 130 to 180 degrees behind the vehicle.
    Drivers use rearview video systems as an additional source of 
visual information complementing the views provide by the interior and 
exterior rearview mirrors. In a 2008 report \36\ that documented 
NHTSA's research on drivers' use of rearview video systems, the agency 
asserted that proper use of a rearview video system by a driver would 
entail drivers beginning to back only when the rearview video system 
display image becomes visible and the driver has looked at the image, 
and that drivers should look at the display as well as the vehicle's 
mirrors periodically during backing rather than just taking one glance 
at the display at the start of the maneuver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Mazzae, E. N., Barickman, F. S., Baldwin, G. H. S., and 
Ranney, T. A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview 
Video Systems (ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, DOT 811 024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the ANPRM, NHTSA summarized its 2006 research that examined 
three rearview video systems: One in combination with original 
equipment rear parking sensors, one aftermarket system combining both 
rearview video and parking sensor technologies, and one original 
equipment rearview video system.37 38 This examination of 
rearview video systems included assessment of their fields of view and 
their potential to provide drivers with information about obstacles 
behind the vehicle. Through this study, the agency observed that the 
rearview video systems examined provided a clear image of the area 
behind the vehicle in daylight and indoor lighting conditions. Rearview 
video systems displayed images of pedestrians or obstacles behind the 
vehicle to a viewable range of 23 feet or more, except for an area 
within 8-12 inches of the rear bumper at ground level. Systems 
displayed an area as wide as the rear bumper at the immediate rear of 
the vehicle and the view increasingly widened further out from the rear 
of the vehicle as a function of the video camera's viewing angle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ 74 FR 9490.
    \38\ Mazzae, E.N. and Garrott, W.R., Experimental Evaluation of 
the Performance of Available Backover Prevention Technologies, NHTSA 
Technical Report No. DOT HS 810 634, September 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Sensor-Based Rear Object Detection Systems
    Sensor-based object detection systems are also available as 
aftermarket products and as original equipment. These systems use 
electronic sensors that transmit a signal which, if an obstacle is 
present in a sensor's detection field, reflects the signal back to the 
sensor producing a positive ``detection'' of the obstacle. These 
sensors detect objects in the vicinity of a vehicle at varying ranges 
depending on the technology. To date, commercially-available object 
detection systems have utilized short-range ultrasonic technology or 
longer range radar technology, although advanced infrared sensors are 
under development as well. Ultrasonic sensors inherently have detection 
performance that varies as a function of the degree of sonic 
reflectivity of the obstacle surface. For example, objects with a 
smooth surface such as plastic or metal reflect well, whereas objects 
with a textured surface, such as clothing, do not reflect very well. 
Radar sensors, which among other things can detect the water in a 
human's body, are better able to detect pedestrians overall, but 
demonstrate inconsistent detection performance for small children.
    In 2006, NHTSA evaluated the object detection performance of eight 
sensor-

[[Page 76198]]

based original equipment and aftermarket rear parking systems.\39\ 
Measurements included static field of view (i.e., both the vehicle and 
test objects were static), static field of view repeatability, and 
dynamic detection range for different laterally moving test objects, 
including adult and child pedestrians. Both ultrasonic and radar 
sensor-based systems tested were generally inconsistent and unreliable 
in detecting pedestrians, particularly children, located behind the 
vehicle. Testing showed that, in most cases, pedestrian size affected 
detection performance, as adults elicited better detection response 
than 1- or 3-year-old children. Specifically, each system could 
generally detect a moving adult pedestrian (or other objects) behind a 
stationary vehicle; however, each system exhibited difficulty in 
detecting moving children. The sensor-based systems tested exhibited 
some degree of variability in their detection performance and patterns. 
Five of eight systems tested were found to exhibit maximum system 
response times that exceeded the 0.35 second limit set forth by the 
performance requirements of the International Organization for 
Standards (ISO) International Standard 17386 \40\. NHTSA is aware that 
the performance of current sensor based systems can be influenced by 
the algorithms that are used for detection and that these systems, to 
date, have likely not been optimized for the detection of small 
children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Mazzae, E.N. and Garrott, W.R., Experimental Evaluation of 
the Performance of Available Backover Prevention Technologies, NHTSA 
Technical Report No. DOT HS 810 634, September 2006.
    \40\ ISO 17386:2004 Transport information and control systems--
Manoeuvring Aids for Low Speed Operation (MALSO)--Performance 
requirements and test procedures. This standard applies to object 
detection devices that provide information to the driver regarding 
the distance to an obstacle during low-speed operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Multi-Technology (Sensor + Video Camera) Systems
    Multi-technology systems, as the term is used here, refer to the 
situation of more than one backing aid technology being present on a 
vehicle. Historically, multi-technology backing aid systems have 
consisted of a rearview video and sensor-based technologies being both 
present on the vehicle, but functioning independently of each other. 
Recently, integrated systems have become commercially available that 
use data from rear object detection sensors to provide added 
convenience through presentation of obstacle warnings superimposed on 
the rearview video system image.
    It would seem reasonable to posit that such a combination system 
should have improved effectiveness over either technology alone. With a 
combined system, the sensor-based alerts could compensate for the 
passive rearview video technology by stimulating the driver to apply 
the brakes and glance at the rearview video system display to confirm 
the presence of an obstacle behind the vehicle (and inform the driver 
that the warning was not a false alarm). The intervention of the 
sensor-based warning should draw the driver's attention to the presence 
of a rear obstacle, rather than relying on the driver to look at the 
rearview video system display at the right moment when the obstacle is 
apparent.
    However, this hypothesis has not proven correct. NHTSA's research 
to date has shown that the combination of rearview video and sensor 
technologies to be less effective in aiding drivers to avoid a backing 
crash than rearview video alone.\41\ In laboratory testing of multi-
technology systems' ability to detect different types of objects 
without interaction from a driver,\42\ NHTSA found the performance of 
the combined technologies in detecting or displaying rear obstacles to 
be no better than that observed in the testing of those technologies as 
single-technology systems. As was the case with sensor-only systems, 
the sensor function of multi-technology systems have been shown to 
perform poorly and sporadically in detecting small children, while the 
rearview video component accurately displays rear obstacles located 
within the video camera's field of view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Mazzae, E. N., Barickman, F. S., Baldwin, G. H. S., and 
Ranney, T. A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview 
Video Systems (ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, DOT 811 024.
    \42\ Mazzae, E.N. and Garrott, W.R., Experimental Evaluation of 
the Performance of Available Backover Prevention Technologies, NHTSA 
Technical Report No. DOT HS 810 634, September 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Other Technologies
    NHTSA is aware of two additional sensor technologies currently 
under development by manufacturers that may, one day, be used to 
improve a vehicle's rear visibility. The technologies include infrared-
based object detection systems and video-based object recognition 
systems. As with other sensor systems, infrared-based systems emit a 
signal, which if an object is within its detection range, will bounce 
back and be detected by a receiver. Rear object detection via video 
camera uses real-time processing of the video image to identify 
obstacles behind the vehicle and then alert the driver of their 
presence. While these technology applications may eventually prove 
viable, because of their early stages of development and current 
unavailability as a production product, it is not possible at this time 
to assess their ability to effectively expand the visible area behind a 
vehicle. Also, it is anticipated that systems using such advanced 
technologies will not be available on vehicles for some time and will 
likely be more expensive than today's systems.
    In addition, NHTSA has recently completed cooperative research with 
the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute and General Motors (GM) on 
Advanced Collision Avoidance Technology relating to backing incidents. 
The research focused on assessing the ability of more advanced 
technologies to mitigate backing crashes and refining a tool to assess 
the potential safety benefit of these prototype technologies. NHTSA 
expects to publish the findings of this particular research effort by 
the end of 2010.

B. Approaches for Improving Vehicles' Rear Visibility

    In the ANPRM, NHSTA outlined three approaches that could be used to 
determine which vehicles would need a rear visibility countermeasure 
application to meet the requirements of the K. T. Safety Act: \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ 74 FR 9504.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Require improved rear visibility for all vehicles weighing 
10,000 pounds or less.
     Require improved rear visibility for LTVs weighing 10,000 
pounds or less.
     Require improved rear visibility for some vehicles 
weighing 10,000 pounds or less that do not meet a minimum rear 
visibility performance threshold.
    The first approach would require that all vehicles have improved 
rear visibility sufficient to allow the driver to see a pedestrian in a 
specified zone behind the vehicle. The size of the zone would have a 
direct impact on the likely means a manufacturer could use to meet the 
rear visibility requirements.
    The second approach would specify that all LTVs, as a vehicle 
class, should be required to have improved rear visibility. Crash data 
show that while multiple types of passenger vehicles (cars, 
multipurpose utility vehicles, trucks, and vans, but not LSVs and small 
buses) are involved in backover crashes, LTVs are statistically 
overrepresented in backover crash fatalities. Therefore, this 
alternative approach would target the class of vehicles which are 
disproportionately

[[Page 76199]]

responsible for the largest portion of backover fatalities.
    A third approach discussed in the ANPRM was to establish a maximum 
direct-view rear blind zone area limit based on size of blind zone and/
or crash rate.\44\ With this approach, any vehicle not meeting the 
minimum rear visibility threshold would be required to be equipped with 
a rear visibility countermeasure. Because vehicle styling engineers 
would have a target threshold giving them an idea of minimum 
``acceptable'' direct rear visibility, such an approach would allow 
manufacturers the flexibility to modify exterior structural physical 
attributes of a vehicle that impact rear visibility to provide adequate 
rear visibility without the need for a technological countermeasure to 
enhance rear visibility. Based on direct-view blind zone area 
measurements of the current fleet, we could determine a threshold and 
require vehicles that do not meet the threshold to be equipped with a 
countermeasure. Thus, the agency suggested that it could focus 
application on improved rear visibility requirements for vehicles with 
the largest rear blind zone areas and those vehicles that are most 
involved in backing and backover crashes. The goal of either of these 
partial-fleet approaches would be to remove the unreasonable risk 
associated with vehicles that are highly involved in backover crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ 74 FR 9504.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Rear Visibility Measurement

    The ANPRM also discussed a method for the measurement of a 
vehicle's rear blind zone area.\45\ If a maximum direct-view rear blind 
zone area threshold were to be used to establish the need for a vehicle 
to have improved rear visibility, its rear visibility characteristics 
would need to be measured and that vehicle's direct-view rear 
visibility and rear blind zone areas would need to be calculated. 
Therefore, a rear visibility measurement procedure would need to be 
developed. In the ANPRM, the agency identified existing measurement 
procedures, such as those by the Society of Automotive Engineers \46\ 
and Consumers Union \47\ and addressed advantages and disadvantages of 
the different identified methods. The ANPRM summarized NHTSA's 2007 
effort to measure rear visibility of a set of vehicles using drivers 
and outlined the potential for variability inherent in tests involving 
human subjects.\48\ Lastly, the ANPRM introduced a new measurement 
procedure developed by NHTSA that replaced the human driver previously 
used in rear visibility measurements with a laser-based fixture.\49\ 
The enhanced procedure approximated the direct rear visibility of a 
vehicle for a 50th percentile male driver using a fixture that 
incorporated two laser pointing devices to simulate a driver's line of 
sight. One laser pointing device was positioned at the midpoint of a 
50th percentile male's eyes when looking rearward over his left 
shoulder and the other device was placed at the midpoint of a 50th 
percentile male's eyes when looking rearward over his right shoulder 
during backing. Data documenting the high degree of repeatability of 
this test procedure were provided, as well as sample results. 
Additional aspects of the measurement procedure were summarized 
including size of the field over which measurements were made, 
coarseness of the test grid, and test object height.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 74 FR 9506.
    \46\ Society of Automotive Engineers, Surface Vehicle 
Recommended Practice: Describing and Measuring the Driver's Field of 
View. SAE J1050, Jan. 2003.
    \47\ Consumer Reports (August, 2006). Blind-zone measurements. 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/car-safety/car-safety-reviews/mind-that-blind-spot-1005/overview/. Accessed 9/2/2009.
    \48\ 74 FR 9496.
    \49\ 74 FR 9507.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Possible Countermeasure Performance Specifications

    The ANPRM also discussed possible countermeasure performance 
specifications.\50\ This included possible areas of required 
countermeasure coverage behind the vehicle, as well as various 
characteristics of a visual display, and system performance criteria. 
Visual display characteristics noted as being important included 
display size and location, response time, and various aspects of image 
quality for a video image display. In addition, possible video camera 
requirements were also noted, such as low light performance 
specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ 74 FR 9512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ANPRM discussed one basis for assertion of an appropriate 
countermeasure coverage area that used the results of a Monte Carlo 
simulation that examined backover crash risk as a function of a 
pedestrian's location behind a vehicle, as discussed in Section 
II.C.iv.\51\ The area of critical risk was then used to define an area 
behind a vehicle that must be visible to the driver during a backing 
maneuver. Based on the Monte Carlo simulation results, an area over 
which the test object should be visible could be defined to include an 
area 10 feet wide at the vehicle's rear bumper that widens 
symmetrically to width of 20 feet at a distance of approximately 6 feet 
aft of the rear bumper. The width of the area increased along diagonal 
lines of 45 degrees with respect to the vertical plane of the vehicle's 
rear bumper and extending outward from the vehicle's rear corners. The 
maximum longitudinal range of a possible required visible area noted in 
the ANPRM was 40 feet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ 74 FR 9484.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Summary of Comments Received

    NHTSA received comments from a total of 37 entities in response to 
the ANPRM, as well as one comment specifically directed at the 
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis. These comments came from 
industry associations, automotive and equipment manufacturers, safety 
advocacy organizations, and individuals. Industry associations 
submitting comments included the Alliance of Automotive Manufacturers 
(AAM), the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers 
(AIAM), the Automotive Occupant Restraints Council (AORC), and the 
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA). Vehicle 
manufacturers submitting comments included Ford, General Motors (GM), 
Honda, Mercedes-Benz USA, and Nissan, as well as Blue Bird, a 
manufacturer of buses. Several equipment manufacturers also submitted 
comments, including Continental, Delphi, Gentex, Magna, Sony, and 
Takata. Several companies focused on backing aid products specifically, 
included Ackton, a manufacturer of automotive parking sensors; 
Echomaster Obstacle Detection Technologies; Rosco Vision Systems, a 
maker of vision enhancement systems; and Sense Technologies, a 
manufacturer of aftermarket automotive mirror and radar-based sensor 
systems. Organizations submitting comments included the Advocates for 
Highway and Auto Safety, Consumers Union, Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety (IIHS), and Kids and Cars. Finally, 14 individuals 
commented on the ANPRM, and their points and suggestions are addressed 
as well.
    Because the ANPRM had an extremely broad scope, the comments 
addressed an extremely wide variety of issues and provided a large 
amount of information. Therefore, we have attempted to organize the 
comments received along some of the main issues, such as a blind zone 
area basis for determination of countermeasure need, countermeasure 
application based on vehicle type, and the adoption of convex driver's-
side mirrors. Additionally, the ANPRM contained 43

[[Page 76200]]

distinct questions, to which some commenters added appendices 
addressing individual questions specifically, in addition to their 
general comments. Because of the breadth of those questions, they are 
addressed separately in Section F below.
i. Measurement of Rear Blind Zone Area and Its Use as a Basis for 
Determination of Countermeasure Need
    Numerous commenters addressed the issue of direct visibility and 
the significance of a vehicle's blind zone.\52\ As stated above, 
identifying, measuring, and limiting blind zones was one of the issues 
discussed in the ANPRM. The document solicited comments on several 
issues relating to blind zones, including their significance relative 
to backover crashes, areas of the blind zone that could be considered 
more or less important for safety, and how they should be measured. The 
following summarizes the comments received on these issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ We note that this is different than what many informally 
call a ``blind spot,'' a term used to describe an area to the side 
of the car where people may not be able to see a vehicle when 
changing lanes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The first issue related to the area to be measured to determine a 
vehicle's blind zone. Delphi questioned the use of a 50-foot square 
blind zone area, stating that it combined high- and low-risk areas 
together. It also stated that mandating particular blind zones or 
direct visibility requirements could impose severe limitations on 
vehicle styling. Furthermore, the commenter suggested that a maximum 
blind zone area approach to rear visibility may not be as effective in 
reducing backover crashes as hoped under real-world conditions, as 
passengers, head restraints, cargo, etc., would obstruct the driver's 
direct view to the rear of the visibility in any event.
    AORC stated that it was against a ``zero blind zone'' requirement, 
arguing that it would create an extremely limiting requirement vehicle 
styling. To this end, the AORC recommended that a rear visibility 
countermeasure should be required to detect the presence of objects 
that are similar to standing children beginning 0.25 meters (0.82 ft) 
aft of the rear bumper and extending outward to a minimum of 3.0 meters 
(9.84 ft). IIHS strongly urged the agency to consider a requirement 
that would eliminate a vehicle's rear blind zone entirely. IIHS further 
suggested that it could be a good idea to augment an improved rear 
visibility requirement with a minimum requirement for direct 
visibility, stating that it is desirable to preclude vehicle design 
choices that result unnecessarily small directly viewable rear areas, 
to account for situations when video cameras are inoperative.
    In its comments, the AAM recommended that NHTSA define the area 
directly behind the vehicle into two zones, called the ``reaction 
subzone'' and the ``reverse obscuration subzone.'' The AAM defined the 
reaction subzone as extending from the rear of the vehicle to a point 
4.1 meters rearward. According to the AAM, this distance is ``the 
product of the average backing speed of 1.66 meters per second (5.49 
feet per second) and the mean perception response time between 
detection by a driver of a pedestrian and brake application of 2.5 
seconds.'' The reverse obscuration subzone, behind that, extends to the 
point at which a test object (representative of an 18-month old child) 
first becomes visible in the interior mirror, which would vary by 
vehicle. The AAM did not specifically recommend what to require with 
regard to these zones.
    Several commenters provided suggestions as to how to measure the 
blind zone, specifically, the height of the test target, and the 
position of the driver's ``eyepoint'' from which the target must be 
seen. In order to determine the size of the target, GM analyzed the age 
and height of children involved in backover crashes, noting that of the 
41 SCI cases available at that time that involving children under 5 
years old, 33 involved children 18 months and older. Based on that 
information, GM suggested that a height of 32 inches for any rear 
visibility test target would be justified, which it stated was the 50th 
percentile height of an 18-month-old child. GM stated that all the 
victims in the first 56 SCI backover cases would have been visible if 
the vehicle had permitted the driver to see the area at this height.
    Blue Bird stated that field of view mapping is a time and effort-
consuming enterprise, and that the company does not believe that the 
magnitude of the differences measured at multiple eyepoints would 
justify that effort. Instead, it stated that a single eyepoint should 
be used.
    Kids and Cars stated that eyepoints should be based on smaller 
statured persons or dummies, and that NHTSA should not use eyepoints 
based on a 95th percentile male. With similar concern for smaller-
statured drivers, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety indicated their 
concern that any attempt to expand rear visibility through improvements 
to direct visibility may not sufficiently accommodate 5th percentile 
females and other drivers of very small stature.
    Sony stated that NHTSA cannot satisfy the requirements of the Act 
solely by mandating limits on vehicle rear blind zones, since such an 
approach would only mitigate a portion of the total area of blind 
zones, and would do little to mitigate the ultimate danger of backover 
crashes.
    In addition, numerous commenters provided more detail in response 
to specific NHTSA questions, which are discussed in Section F below.
ii. Application of Countermeasures Among Vehicle Types
    One significant issue discussed in the ANPRM was the concept that 
different types of vehicles could be subject to different 
countermeasure requirements. For example, noting the higher proportion 
of fatalities in backover crashes involving LTVs, the agency presented 
the option of requiring only those vehicles to have a rear visibility 
countermeasure. Many commenters offered their thoughts on which 
vehicles should be equipped with countermeasures.
    Sony commented that the Act permits NHTSA to ``prescribe different 
requirements for different types of motor vehicles,'' but does not 
permit a total or partial exemption of a particular class of vehicles, 
or a percentage of a particular class of vehicles, from rear visibility 
requirements. Sony further stated that limiting the rear blind zone 
visibility requirements to LTVs ignores the fact that passenger cars 
account for 26 percent of backover deaths and 54 percent of backover 
injuries, and that these percentages will likely increase given the 
relative decline of LTV sales across the market. They also pointed out 
that the line between passenger cars and LTVs has blurred to the point 
where the weight and/or height of a particular vehicle does not 
necessarily correspond to rear visibility.
    Safety organizations generally commented against limiting 
countermeasures to certain vehicle types. Kids and Cars stated that all 
vehicles must be addressed in order to prevent backover injuries and 
fatalities, stating that even one car with a large blind zone should 
indicate the need for the regulation to cover all vehicle types. 
Similarly, IIHS and Consumers Union both supported uniform requirements 
across light vehicle classes.
    Some equipment manufacturers of rear visibility enhancement 
products also submitted comments recommending that rear visibility 
countermeasures not be limited to certain vehicle types, but be applied 
to

[[Page 76201]]

all vehicles. Delphi and Magna stated that it believes the backover 
problem is widespread enough that countermeasures should not be limited 
to any particular class of vehicles. Similarly, Ackton suggested that 
countermeasures should not be limited to a certain vehicle class and 
also raised the issue that trailers should be equipped with sensor 
systems as well.
    Several automakers commented in favor of limiting any rear 
visibility improvement to LTVs. Mercedes suggested that if the agency 
believes that advanced countermeasures are required for the portion of 
the vehicle fleet that is statistically overrepresented in backover 
crashes (i.e., LTVs), then NHTSA should require those countermeasures 
only for those types of vehicles. Mercedes stated that those advanced 
countermeasures are particularly well-suited for higher-belt-line 
vehicles, and that the limitation would make the requirement more cost-
effective. Honda also commented that rear visibility performance 
requirements should be instituted for only those vehicles with the 
highest rates of backover incidents, although it also suggested that 
NHTSA should actively monitor the data for all vehicle types so that it 
can consider broader application of the requirements based on the 
safety need.
    Automakers Nissan and GM both recommended that a maximum blind zone 
area approach be used to determine whether a vehicle warrants improved 
rear visibility rather than applying the new requirements by vehicle 
type.
    NHTSA received one comment, from Blue Bird, asserting that buses 
should not be subject to improved rear visibility requirements. First, 
Blue Bird noted that the backover statistics presented by NHTSA did not 
show any apparent backover crashes caused by buses. Second, it stated 
that most drivers of buses are required to obtain commercial driver 
licenses (CDLs), and that these drivers are subjected to additional 
training, limiting the chances of backover crashes. The company also 
stated that mirrors, in any of several configurations, would not be 
able to provide an adequate field of view to the rear of a bus, and 
would present exceptional mounting difficulties. Additionally, because 
many buses (such as school buses) are not equipped with navigation 
screens, the costs for installing rearview video systems in these 
vehicles would be higher than the average for passenger vehicles.
iii. Use and Efficacy of Rear-Mounted Mirror Systems and Convex 
Driver's-Side Mirrors
    In the ANPRM, NHTSA presented data on the ability of mirrors to 
display usable images of the area behind a vehicle.\53\ Several 
commenters provided information and opinions regarding mirrors. 
Furthermore, several manufacturers suggested that, due to the geometry 
of a number of backover scenarios analyzed, convex driver's-side 
mirrors could be an effective way to prevent backover crashes. We have 
summarized these comments below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 74 FR 9486.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters, including Consumers Union, Kids and Cars, IIHS, 
Blue Bird, Magna, and Nissan agreed with NHTSA's preliminary evaluation 
of rear-mounted mirror systems in Section V of the ANPRM, stating that 
they are generally not useful in aiding a driver of a backing vehicle 
to visually detect pedestrians, particularly children, located behind 
the vehicle. Based on the information presented in the ANPRM, the 
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety concluded that the coverage 
provided by rear-mounted convex mirrors is inadequate for the purpose 
of providing drivers with a sufficient rearward field of view to 
identify pedestrians and avoid backover crashes.
    According to the AAM and other commenters, rear-mounted convex 
mirrors are installed as backing/parking aids to help the driver locate 
fixed objects behind and near the rear bumper.
    One commenter, Sense Technologies, which manufactures rear cross-
view mirrors, suggested that NHTSA perform additional research into the 
types of backover crashes and backing crashes that could be prevented 
with rear-mounted cross-view mirrors, which would enable drivers of 
vehicles to see objects approaching from the sides of a vehicle, which 
are frequently obscured in parking lots. It also suggested that cross-
view mirrors could be mounted on the rear of passenger cars (unlike 
``look down'' mirrors, which are usually only mounted on LTVs).
    One issue mentioned by multiple commenters concerned the European 
standard for mirror performance, ECE R46. Several commenters suggested 
that replacing the side mirror requirement currently in FMVSS No. 111 
with the convex driver's-side mirror specifications in ECE R46 would 
help drivers be better able to detect pedestrians before they enter the 
path of the vehicle, if they are approaching from the sides. We note 
that ECE R46 allows either flat or convex driver's-side mirrors, 
provided they meet the minimum field of view requirements. It was 
unclear to the agency whether some commenters were suggesting mandating 
convex mirrors (and disallowing current flat mirrors) or simply allow 
convex mirrors as an option.
    The AAM recommended adopting ECE R46 convex driver's-side mirror 
requirements as a means to prevent a substantial number of backover 
crashes. It pointed to a number of purported benefits, such as an 
increase in viewing coverage, reduced glare, and driver preference for 
non-planar mirrors. Like other commenters, the AAM also discussed 
NHTSA's data that showed that a number of backover crashes resulted 
from side incursions. They stated that convex side mirrors could help 
the driver see these pedestrians earlier than flat mirrors. The AAM 
also cited research indicating that these mirrors would provide a 22.9 
percent reduction in lane change crashes.
    Mercedes commented that, given that many SCI cases indicated the 
children struck by backing vehicles moved into the path of the vehicle 
from either the left or right, it supported AAM's recommendation to 
adopt ECE R46 requirements for convex driver's-side exterior mirrors, 
as they substantially increase the driver's field of view to the sides 
and rear of a given vehicle, thus increasing the time that a moving 
pedestrian will be visible in the mirror and providing greater 
opportunity for the driver to detect them.
    Regarding convex mirrors, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety 
agreed that they may provide a wider field of view than that available 
with current rearview mirrors. However, they pointed out that convex 
mirrors may require drivers, even those with experience using convex 
mirrors, to interpret the altered view in order to understand precisely 
what is being conveyed regarding pedestrians and other objects present 
in the vehicle path.
iv. Use of Monte Carlo Simulation of Backover Crash Risk for 
Development of a Required Countermeasure Coverage Area
    GM raised some questions about the Monte Carlo simulation presented 
in the ANPRM, which calculated the backover risk for pedestrians as a 
function of their location relative to a backing vehicle. GM noted that 
while the Monte Carlo simulation calculated the risk of a backing 
vehicle striking a pedestrian at certain locations behind the vehicle, 
it did not factor in the probability that the pedestrian would actually 
be located in

[[Page 76202]]

that spot (e.g., even though a child six inches from the rear edge of 
the vehicle is almost certain to be hit, the chance of the child being 
actually located there is comparatively low). Considering that, 
according to GM's analysis, the areas indicated as high-risk in the 
Monte Carlo simulation may not correlate particularly well with the 
overall backover crash risk.
    On the other hand, Consumers Union praised the Monte Carlo 
simulation, and suggested using it as the basis for determining what a 
rearview video system should be able to detect, recommending that it 
detect any area where the risk factor was 0.10 or higher in that 
analysis.
v. Use and Efficacy of Sensor-Based Systems
    The issue of the use and efficacy of sensor systems, that is, how 
they are designed and how well they function to prevent backovers was 
discussed by many commenters. These comments addressed three main 
issues. The first was the purpose for which sensors are currently 
designed, which are as parking aids, rather than backover prevention 
aids. Commenters also discussed the capabilities of sensors to detect 
various obstacles, as well as the cost of production and 
implementation, and provided recommendations for test objects. We have 
summarized the comments below.
    One major issue addressed by numerous commenters was the assertion 
that NHTSA's analysis relating to sensor system effectiveness was 
flawed. Commenters felt that by testing currently available sensors, we 
were testing systems that were designed to detect large, dense or 
highly reflective, stationary objects (such as parked cars, walls, 
etc.) rather than smaller, lighter, and mobile objects like 
pedestrians. Because of this discrepancy, commenters suggested that 
NHTSA's testing of sensors may have led to artificially low estimates 
of system effectiveness.
    Delphi questioned whether NHTSA's effectiveness numbers were 
accurate. The company stated that NHTSA's analysis of sensor 
effectiveness, which showed that sensor systems had a 39 percent 
detection rate and that a combination sensor/video system had a 15 
percent driver performance result, should be used carefully because the 
sensors were not designed to detect children. Instead, Delphi stated 
that current OEM sensor systems are designed to the ISO 17386 
standard,\54\ which asserts performance requirements for object 
detection devices that provide information to the driver regarding the 
distance to an obstacle during low-speed operation. This ISO standard 
specifies a PVC cylinder for use in measuring systems' detection 
performance, and does not require the detection of objects low to the 
ground so that systems are permitted to avoid detecting curbs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ ISO 17386:2004 Transport information and control systems--
Manoeuvring Aids for Low Speed Operation (MALSO)--Performance 
requirements and test procedures. This standard applies to object 
detection devices that provide information to the driver regarding 
the distance to an obstacle during low-speed operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Delphi also provided extensive comments regarding sensor-based 
systems in terms of their abilities and how they may best be used. It 
suggested that sensors are an important addition to rearview video 
systems, as drivers need prompting in order to glance at the screen 
when an obstruction appears. The company also suggested that a sensor 
system with varying warnings, dependent on the calculated time-to-
collision, could provide drivers with additional information that could 
be used to prevent backover crashes. Delphi stated that radar sensors 
are more efficient at detecting children than ultrasonic sensors, and 
can detect targets at greater ranges. With regard to test targets for 
sensor systems, it commented that any test target should be chosen to 
provide a minimum reflectivity that is representative of the smallest 
required detectable object (e.g., 1-year-old child).
    Ackton was another company that noted that current sensors are 
designed to the ISO 17386 standard, and are not designed to detect 
children. It stated that until there is a pedestrian-detection 
standard, many systems will not be designed to pass it, and will 
therefore fail to detect pedestrians. Sony also stated that current 
sensors are designed as parking aids and are optimized to detect hard 
surface objects, but that technical advances may improve the ability of 
such systems to detect non-occupant pedestrians.
    Ackton also commented that its ``New-Gen'' ultrasonic technology 
can detect a 36-inch child at a distance of 15 feet. Along similar 
lines, Magna commented on two future technologies discussed in the 
ANPRM, infrared and video-based object recognition systems. Magna 
stated that these systems were in active development, and would be 
ready for production by 2011.
    Continental commented that in the future advanced systems may be 
developed that respond automatically with automatic braking to avoid a 
backing crash without any action from the driver. It stated that in the 
future, systems will be able to recognize pedestrians that are in 
danger of being struck and automatically intervene to prevent that from 
happening. Continental gave no indication of the timeframe for 
availability of such technology.
    IIHS stated that the combination of sensors' unreliability and 
drivers' slow and inconsistent reactions to audible warnings suggest 
that requiring, or even allowing, sensors in lieu of a visual backover 
countermeasure systems is not advisable at this time, although sensors 
could augment other technologies. Kids and Cars and Magna also pointed 
to the audible signals from sensors as a source of annoyance to many 
drivers, especially given the prevalence of false positives, which 
caused many drivers to ``tune out'' the warnings. However, Magna stated 
that if the sensor warnings were provided visually (such as on a 
graphical overlay), drivers would be less prone to be irritated by them 
and therefore less likely to ignore them.
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety suggested for sensor-based 
systems that the agency consider an interlock requirement that 
prohibits the vehicle from being able to be moved in reverse, even 
after the transmission has been placed in reverse gear, until a short 
period after the system becomes fully operational.
vi. Use and Efficacy of Rearview Video Systems
    In the ANPRM, NHTSA presented its research on rearview video 
systems. Commenters discussed these systems at length. In summarizing 
these comments, we have divided them into two general groups. The first 
section describes the comments relating to the general effectiveness of 
rearview video systems in aiding drivers to avoid backing crashes. The 
subsequent section summarizes the comments relating to the specific 
possible requirements for rearview video systems, such as camera 
performance, visual display characteristics, etc.
    Many commenters, including manufacturers of video cameras, safety 
organizations, and individual commenters, stated that rearview video 
systems would be the best system to prevent backover crashes. 
Commenters supporting this proposition included Consumers Union, Kids 
and Cars, IIHS, Magna, Nissan, and Sony.
    Consumers Union also supported the application of rearview video 
systems, noting their potential to save lives, and also asserted that 
their efficacy would improve as users grew more accustomed to using 
them in their everyday driving.

[[Page 76203]]

It added that it believed a rearview video system coupled with a sensor 
system would be the overall best system. While Consumers Union referred 
to NHTSA's research study as involving drivers ``trained'' to use 
rearview video systems and the other systems tested, the agency notes 
that all drivers who participated in the study had owned and driven the 
system-equipped vehicle and had driven it as their primary vehicle for 
at least 6 months prior to study participation, but did not receive any 
specific training in the use of a rearview video system.
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety pointed out that a video 
image of the area behind a vehicle immediately conveys information 
about rear obstacles and pedestrians within the system's field of view 
without any need for interpretation by the driver. This quality was 
noted as an advantage of rearview video systems over rear-mounted 
convex mirrors and sensor-based systems.
    Magna stated that it believes camera technology has the potential 
to significantly enhance safety and that a rearview video system ranks 
highest by far, in regard to system performance and overall 
effectiveness estimates. In its responses to specific questions, Magna 
provided some additional research showing the overall effectiveness of 
rearview video systems in preventing backover crashes, which is 
discussed in Section F below.
    Sony stated that it agrees with the majority of analysis provided 
and the preliminary conclusions reached observations made in the ANPRM. 
Specifically, Sony recommended that any amendment to FMVSS No. 111 
should require backover prevention technologies to detect obstacles in 
areas other than immediately behind the vehicle. Sony stated that 
rearview video systems with 180-degree video cameras would be best able 
to address real-world backover crash scenarios, in which a majority of 
pedestrians enter the vehicle's path from the side.
    Nissan provided some comments on its ``Around View Monitor'', which 
provides a birds-eye (i.e., overhead) view of the area around the 
vehicle on all four sides. The company stated that their system was 
designed primarily as a parking aid, and that it will have significant 
limitations if used to protect children. Nissan stated that rearview 
video technology in general is a useful parking aid, but that its 
utility in preventing backover crashes may be limited, because drivers 
must be looking at the screen in order to see a pedestrian incur into 
their path. Nissan drew attention to the glance behavior cited in 
NHTSA's research, noting that on average drivers looked at the visual 
display twice, or about 8-12 percent of the time. It stated that this 
may not be enough to detect the pedestrian in time to react, even if 
the driver is using the rearview video system correctly, and that 
driver glance behavior has a significant effect on rearview video 
system effectiveness. Nissan also cautioned against excessive reliance 
on a video-based backing aid, cautioning that if a driver is relying 
excessively upon rearview enhancement technology, the operator can miss 
seeing a person or an object positioned just outside of that field of 
view. Nissan also stated that it is imperative that the operator always 
confirm clearance of the entire path of travel, and turn around and 
look during a backup maneuver.
    The AAM made several comments similar to those of Nissan, stating 
that no safety countermeasure or safety technology is completely 
effective. AAM stated that regardless of the technology adopted to 
expand a driver's field of view, the driver is ultimately responsible 
for the safe operation of the vehicle. AAM characterized rear 
visibility enhancement systems as supplemental drivers with 
responsibility resting on drivers to use them properly.
    GM stated that its analysis showed some limited benefits may be 
provided by rearview video technologies, but that potential solutions 
will continue to be limited by driver behavior. GM stated that it 
agrees with NHTSA that drivers' expectations influence behavior and 
system effectiveness, and that further improvements in the 
effectiveness of rearview video technologies may be achieved by 
improving feedback to the driver and improving driver behavior through 
education.
vii. Characteristics of Rearview Video Systems
    NHTSA received numerous comments relating to the specific 
characteristics of rearview video systems. These related to issues of 
camera placement, durability, and performance, as well as visual 
display characteristics, such as location (i.e., in the dashboard, or 
in the rearview mirror), brightness, and the functionality of the 
backing image. Commenters presented extensive comments on issues such 
as visual display size, whether digital graphical overlays should be 
used, and other characteristics related to these systems. IIHS noted 
that there was a wide range of performance by various current rearview 
video systems it examined and, based on this; expect that NHTSA will 
need to specify performance requirements to ensure a minimum level of 
performance for those systems.
    Several commenters, including Consumers Union and Magna, 
recommended that NHTSA consider inclusion of graphic overlays as part 
of a video-based backover countermeasure, stating that this increases a 
driver's ability to detect obstacles, and makes the driver more likely 
to use the system.
    NHTSA also requested comment regarding characteristics such as 
video camera angle, durability, and low-light performance, as well as 
contrast, image response and linger time, and display size and 
location. Commenters provided a wide array of suggestions.
    IIHS stated that some rearview video systems are much more immune 
to weather and road dirt contamination than others, and recommended 
that NHTSA specify performance requirements to ensure that systems can 
withstand adverse conditions.
    Sony offered an observation that while adverse weather conditions 
can affect rearview video system performance, cameras utilized in such 
applications are sealed in watertight housings and mounted at a 
downward angle, and therefore generally protected from the elements. 
Sony also commented on the number of backover incidents in which 
victims were struck after approaching from the side of the vehicle, 
stating that the incidence rate was 45 percent. It stated that this 
indicated that wide-angle rearview video systems would best prevent 
backover incidents.
    Magna, on the other hand, commented that in order to assure overall 
system affordability across the widest possible range of vehicle types 
and models, NHTSA should not impose specific operational requirements 
on rearview video systems. It noted that ``anti-wetting'' and ``anti-
soiling'' techniques are known and currently implemented despite the 
lack of a legislative mandate.
    In its comments, Gentex stated that the interior rearview mirror is 
an ideal location for the rearview video system visual display. Gentex 
stated that that location is intuitive, logical, and ergonomic, and 
allows the driver to maintain a ``head-up'' position while viewing the 
display and the rearview mirror simultaneously. Furthermore, it noted 
that drivers are already trained to look in the interior rearview 
mirror when reversing. Magna also commented that the interior mirror is 
the best location for a rearview video system visual display, noting 
that the display in that location is much closer to the driver's eyes. 
However, Magna suggested that NHTSA not prescribe

[[Page 76204]]

specific requirements regarding display location, image size, or other 
requirements, as doing so may result in unintended restrictions on 
technology applications.
    With regard to image size, commenters submitted a number of ideas 
for what a minimum visual display size should be. Gentex stated that it 
disagreed with NHTSA's suggestion that a minimum 3.25 inch screen size 
might be specified. Instead, they suggested a minimum viewable display 
height of 1.3 inches, based on its calculation of what the human visual 
system can generally resolve and the mean distance between the driver's 
eyes and the visual display. Ford also commented on NHTSA's minimum 
visual display size suggestion, stating that the GM research cited by 
NHTSA was not designed to assess system effectiveness as a function of 
visual display size since it only used one in-mirror display size, and 
in fact concluded that rear effectiveness was not affected by image 
size in the scenario used. Instead, Ford suggested that GM used a 3.5 
inch screen in its study because it was offered as a regular production 
option, and that NHTSA's reliance on GM's research was inappropriate.
    In lieu of the 3.5 inch minimum visual display size, Ford suggested 
that an Australian regulation on screen sizes for rear visibility 
systems (specifically, New South Wales' Technical Specification No. 
149), could be used as a model. According to Ford's comment, this 
regulation states that when a 600 mm test cylinder is located five 
meters from the rear of the vehicle, the height on the screen should be 
no less than 0.5 percent of the distance between the driver's eye and 
the visual display. The company claimed that this technique has 
resulted in several iterations of a 2.4 inch screen size and that they 
have been readily accepted by consumers.
    Magna, on the other hand, referred to studies by GM and the 
Virginia Tech Transportation Institute indicating that a 3.5 inch 
visual display, mounted in the interior rearview mirror, led to the 
highest crash avoidance rates.
    Certain commenters focused on some of the other specifications of 
the visual display. Image response time, or the delay between when a 
vehicle is shifted into reverse and the rearview image from the video 
camera appears, was discussed extensively by Gentex. While NHTSA had 
suggested a maximum of 1.25 seconds for this value, Gentex recommended 
3 seconds, based on its calculations of the time needed for signal 
transfer, powering the camera, and the complexity of the electronics. 
GM supported Gentex's comments on this matter.
    Gentex made two additional recommendations with regard to visual 
displays in its comments. The company suggested a minimum brightness of 
500 candelas per square meter (cd/m\2\) for the screen, as well as a 
minimum contrast ratio of 10:1.
    Consumers Union made a number of suggestions regarding displays for 
rearview video systems, including that there needs to be a minimum 
display size and that a maximum image response time of 1 second, and a 
maximum linger time between 4 and 8 seconds should be required. GM 
recommended a maximum linger time of 10 seconds or, as an alternative, 
a speed-based limit in which the rearview video display would turn off 
when the vehicle reach a speed of 5 mph (8 kph). Based on their 
observations of drivers making parking maneuvers, the AAM also 
recommended a maximum linger time of 10 seconds, but specified an 
alternative speed-based value of 20 kph (12.4 mph).
    Ms. Susan Auriemma, of Kids and Cars, offered a personal testimony, 
stating that as a user of a rearview video system with an image 
response time of 2-3 seconds, there is a tendency to want to proceed to 
back the vehicle without waiting for the image to appear.
viii. Development of a Performance-Based or Technology-Neutral Standard
    Numerous commenters suggested that any NHTSA standard be 
performance-based and technology-neutral. These commenters generally 
supported the idea that the blind zone must be limited to a certain 
size, or that certain areas behind the vehicle should be visible, but 
did not want NHTSA to prescribe how these areas should be detected. 
Instead, these commenters stated that allowing the manufacturer to 
determine the means by which the required area is detectable would 
promote styling flexibility, technological innovation, and help to 
contain costs.
    MEMA stated that it supported a performance-based test, stating 
that ``it is clear that there is no one solution to mitigating backover 
events.'' It also suggested that various countermeasures can be 
incorporated, whether complementary or separately, to promote increases 
in the rear field of view.
    Delphi stated that there would be no reason to not grant compliance 
credits to vehicle manufacturers who choose any system, mirrors, 
sensors, or video, which detects the required areas behind a vehicle.
    AIAM, in its comments, pointed out specific problems with all three 
countermeasure technologies, and then suggested that some of the issues 
would present a greater challenge for certain classes of vehicles. In 
light of that, it suggested that performance-based requirements would 
allow vehicle manufacturers to achieve the best match of technical 
approach for each of their vehicle models.
    AORC stated that it believes that the regulation should allow for 
the enhancement of rear visibility via the implementation of rearview 
video systems or the use of sensor input. It stated that these systems 
should be subject to a pure performance requirement, and must able to 
detect children from a distance of 0.25-3.00 meters behind the vehicle.
    Kids and Cars urged the agency to not only set the highest feasible 
rear visibility standard, but to also allow new innovative product 
designs that will evolve as technology matures.
ix. Other Issues Addressed in Comments
    This section summarizes comments related to ancillary issues 
regarding rear visibility. For example, several commenters suggested 
that NHTSA design a performance rating system for rear visibility, 
issuing it in addition to, or in lieu of, a countermeasure performance 
requirement. Alternatively, suggestions for driver education proposals 
were made. Some commenters also discussed the rate at which any rear 
visibility standard be phased in.
    Several commenters suggested that a performance rating system be 
developed, to provide consumers information about the rearward 
visibility characteristics of various vehicles. Delphi stated that a 
performance rating system would have the effect of giving consumers the 
necessary facts to purchase vehicles that offer the best choice of 
safety and value, and would encourage continued innovation in backover 
avoidance technology.
    AORC suggested a performance rating system for rear visibility 
enhancement systems, similar to ones used in NHTSA's New Car Assessment 
Program, as it could give consumers information relating to vehicle 
purchase. This idea was also supported by Magna, which recommended a 
five-star Federal safety rating program.
    The AAM recommended that NHTSA provide information to consumers 
about proper backing procedures, as well as the capabilities and 
limitations of rear visibility countermeasures.

[[Page 76205]]

    Another remark by Kids and Cars member, Ms. Susan Auriemma, focused 
on ``proper backing procedures.'' Specifically, the commenter stated 
that research is needed to define what proper use of a rearview video 
system is in terms of how often a driver should look at a rearview 
image, and whether a driver should also look directly behind the 
vehicle and at the mirrors. Ms. Auriemma also questioned whether the 
sample size used by NHTSA, 37 drivers, was large enough to make 
definitive conclusions regarding backing behavior and rearview video 
system use.
    Several commenters requested that the phase-in period for rear 
visibility system requirements be extended beyond the four-year period 
mandated in the K.T. Safety Act. Honda stated that in addition to the 
cost of the systems, there could be considerable costs if major design 
changes are required before vehicles are scheduled for normal redesign. 
The company suggested that the costs could be substantially reduced if 
only one or two additional years are allowed for the phase-in schedule 
to coincide with existing redesign plans. AIAM also suggested a six-
year phase-in schedule so that changes could be implemented in 
accordance with vehicle redesign schedules. It also stated that small 
volume and limited line manufacturers should be excluded from the 
visibility requirements until the end of the phase-in period is 
reached, due to reduced access to technologies and generally longer 
product life cycles compared to larger manufacturers.
    One comment from Sony suggested that a mechanism to reduce costs 
would be to eliminate the U.S. import tariff on rearview video camera 
imports, which currently stand at 2.1 percent. Kids and Cars suggested 
that NHTSA also consider proposing a ``forward visibility'' standard to 
prevent ``frontovers,'' stating that fatalities from such accidents 
have increased substantially in recent years.
    Finally, NHTSA received several comments from individuals relating 
personal experiences involving backover crashes. One anonymous 
commenter, who had backed over their son, recommended that backup 
sensors and/or rearview video systems be put in all vehicles. Ms. 
Shannon Campbell described a personal backover experience with a 
``sport utility vehicle'' (SUV), and stated that it is impossible for 
the driver to see behind the vehicle without a rearview video system. 
Similarly, Mr. Donald Hampton, whose granddaughter was involved in a 
backover with an SUV, recommended that every new vehicle have a 
rearview video system, stating that an add-on video camera kit costs 
around $100. Ms. Sharron DiMario, who son was involved in a backover 
with a minivan, recommended safety modifications to dramatically 
improve vehicle blind spots. Ms. Karena Caputo, who son was involved in 
a backover with a Hummer, stated that children cannot be seen behind 
vehicles, and that every vehicle should have some type of backup safety 
device. Ms. Andriann Raschdorf-Nelson, whose 16-month old son was 
involved in a backover with an SUV, simply applauded NHTSA's decision 
to make all vehicles safer for children. Ms. AnnMarie Bartlett-
Pszybylski commented that she had installed a rearview video system on 
her vehicle after a backover incident involving her son. Mr. David 
Sarota requested that NHTSA promulgate a Federal regulation after 
witnessing a near-backover involving a small truck. Finally, Mr. Paul 
Faragher Anthony whose 23-month-old son was the victim of a near-fatal 
backover incident involving a van equipped with a rear-mounted convex 
mirror, which he stated ``do nothing to improve the field of view 
downward, where a toddler is likely to be.''
    Kids and Cars discussed the specifics of backover crashes. It 
stated that parents and relatives have a greater vulnerability to 
backover crashes because they are involved in more backing situations 
when young children are present. Kids and Cars stated that in all the 
backover cases they documented, the parent or relative driving the 
vehicle was unaware the child was behind the vehicle.
x. Suggested Alternative Proposals
    In their comments, several commenters laid out suggested proposals 
for addressing the problem of backover crashes. Suggestions were 
received from GM, AORC, Mr. Louis Martinez, and the AAM. We have 
summarized these alternative proposals below.
    GM suggested a two-part alternative proposal. First, GM suggested 
that NHTSA expand the required field of view to the sides and rear of 
the vehicle, through establishing passenger side mirror requirements 
and expanding the existing driver side requirements. Second, GM 
suggested that all vehicles meet a maximum blind zone requirement, 
using an alternative ``indirect'' measurement of rear visibility. GM 
proposed an indirect threshold limit of 100 to 125 square feet, which 
it indicated would correspond to a direct-view blind zone area of 
approximately 400-500 square feet using the methods described by NHTSA 
in the ANPRM. Vehicles that did not meet this threshold indirect 
visibility requirement would need additional rear vision enhancements, 
such as video cameras, to meet the requirements.
    The AAM suggested a three-part alternative proposal in its 
comments. First, it suggested that NHTSA adopt European mirror 
requirements (ECE R46) for both driver and passenger side convex 
mirrors, for reasons described above. Second, it suggested NHTSA 
develop performance-based criteria to identify vehicles that may 
require additional countermeasures. Third, it recommended that NHTSA 
increase consumer information about capabilities and available 
technology intended to enhance rear detection capability and enhance 
driver education.
    AORC suggested dividing the area behind the vehicle into a 
``warning zone,'' extending three meters behind a vehicle, and an 
``observation zone,'' extending an indefinite distance behind the 
warning zone. Video cameras and sensors would be required to perform 
different warning and obstacle-avoidance tasks for objects within the 
two zones, and would be tested using a 0.75 meter (2.5 ft) tall object 
with human form approximation.
    Mr. Louis Martinez submitted a description of a ``three-piece 
interior rear view mirror assembly for vehicles.'' According to the 
commenter, this planar mirror assembly would enable driver to view more 
areas to the sides and rear of the vehicle without having to turn his 
or her head or adjust the mirrors.
xi. Costs and Benefits
    Commenters also provided information which they stated could be 
used to develop the costs and benefits of the agency's rear visibility 
proposal.
    Consumers Union stated that it believes the cost of rearview video 
systems, cited in the ANPRM, were too high, as they related to stand 
alone options. They suggested that the true cost to the OEM is less 
than $100. Consumers Union did not cite a source for this figure.
    The Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety stated that the safety 
benefits noted in the ANPRM are in accord with project benefits for 
other NHTSA safety rules, such as the agency's recent upgrade of the 
roof crush resistance standard. The Advocates also posited that the 
benefits eventual savings in backover incidents may actually prove to 
be more effective than the roof crush rule.
    Magna stated that it believed the costs of rearview video systems, 
as cited by NHTSA, were on the high end of the spectrum. It added that 
as the number of automotive video cameras increases,

[[Page 76206]]

their price will decline. Magna did not provide any indication of how 
low the price may get.
    Ms. Susan Auriemma of Kids and Cars said that NHTSA should not be 
limited by monetary considerations in determining standards that may 
save children, stating that the value of the life of a child should not 
be equal to that of a 70-year old adult.

F. Questions Posed and Summary Response

    NHTSA asked a series of 43 questions in the ANPRM on a wide variety 
of topics. In this section, we have reprinted the questions and grouped 
the significant responses by topic. Because of some of the information 
we received and further research we undertook subsequent to the ANPRM 
publication, some of the questions we asked no longer have significant 
bearing on the proposal (such as questions about methodologies for 
measuring blind zone size), but we have summarized the responses for 
the sake of completeness. Because several commenters separated their 
general comments from their specific responses to NHTSA's inquiries, we 
have summarized those responses separately. Note that this section 
contains only responses from those commenters who elected to explicitly 
respond to each or a subset of questions. Comments that related to 
questions asked, but were included in the body of the text, are 
addressed above.
i. Technologies for Improving Rear Visibility
    The first series of questions was related to issues regarding the 
three main technological solutions--mirrors, sensors, and rearview 
video systems. NHTSA was interested in collecting information on the 
effectiveness, characteristics, and implementation of these 
technologies.
    Question 1: While the objective to ``expand the required field of 
view to enable the driver of a motor vehicle to detect areas behind'' 
the vehicle implies enhancement of what a driver can visually see 
behind a vehicle, the language of the K.T. Safety Act also mentions 
that the ``standard may be met by the provision of additional mirror, 
sensors, cameras, or other technology.'' NHTSA seeks comment with 
regard to the ability of object detection sensor technology to improve 
visibility and thereby comply with the requirements of the Act.
    Responses: The commenters generally did not address the question of 
whether object detection sensor technology was literally capable of 
expanding the driver's view of the area immediately behind his or her 
vehicle, as opposed to increasing the driver's awareness of objects 
within that area.\55\ They focused instead on the performance of that 
technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ As noted near the beginning of this document, the inclusion 
of sensors in this sentence as a ``technology to expand the driver's 
field of view'' suggests that ``expand the required field of view'' 
should not be read in the literal or natural way as meaning the 
driver must be able to see more of the area behind the vehicle. A 
literal or natural reading would make the reference to sensors 
superfluous, violating a basic canon of statutory interpretation. 
Instead, it seems that language could be read as meaning the driver 
must be able to monitor, visually or otherwise, an expanded area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA received mixed views about its performance, with industry 
groups, GM, and equipment manufacturers including Ackton, Continental, 
Delphi, and Magna requesting that the agency make any requirements as 
technology-neutral as possible, so as to allow innovation and 
technological improvements, while others agreed with NHTSA's tentative 
thinking in the ANPRM that sensor technology may not function 
effectively in preventing backover crashes.
    GM and Delphi said any technology is better than none, while Sony 
and Consumers Union recommended that rearview video may provide a 
better margin of safety with regard to backover crashes. GM and the AAM 
responded by saying that any technology that can provide a view of the 
rear of the vehicle should be permitted to comply with a rear 
visibility requirement. AAM added that given drivers' tendency to rely 
on mirrors once the backing maneuver starts, requirements should not 
preclude any technology.
    Specifically in regard to sensor-based systems, Ackton stated that 
their product uses ``New-Gen'' ultrasonic technology that can detect 
another vehicle at a range of up to 30 feet and can detect a 36-inch-
tall child at a range of up to 15 feet. On the other hand, Consumers 
Union and Nissan stated that they agreed with NHTSA's findings that 
sensor-based systems are inconsistent and unreliable in detection 
pedestrians, particularly small children, behind a vehicle. Nissan also 
commented that it generally agrees with NHTSA's evaluation of sensor-
based systems and believes that they are generally unreliable in 
detecting pedestrians, particularly children. Nissan also stated that 
sensor-based ``systems may not be able to detect children or detect 
them in time for the driver to react.'' Magna stated that it concurred 
with NHTSA's finding that sensor-based systems are inconsistent and 
unreliable in detecting children.
    Ms. Susan Auriemma stated that false alarms occur frequently with 
sensors, and that they would be unhelpful in situations where the 
vehicle was near known obstructions, such as in garages, therefore 
recommending that sensors not be permitted to meet the requirement. 
Furthermore, she added that a malfunctioning sensor system could impart 
a false sense of security to a driver, who hearing no warning, might 
assume the path is clear.
    Question 2: What specific customer feedback have OEMs received 
regarding vehicle equipped with rear parking sensor systems? Have any 
component reliability or maintenance issues arisen? Is sensor 
performance affected by any aspect of ambient weather conditions?
    Responses: GM responded to this question by stating that the 
parking sensor systems have been generally reliable. AAM stated that 
weather, dirt, snow, harsh sunlight, intense cold, or high levels of 
ambient noise can reduce sensor performance. Mercedes also responded to 
this question, but with information it wished to keep confidential. 
Kids and Cars stated that it believes that people tend to ``tune out'' 
the sound of a sensor as they back out of a garage, as it can register 
a false positive from the garage walls, which would lessen its 
efficiency in preventing backover crashes.
    Question 3: What specific customer feedback have OEMs received 
regarding vehicles equipped with rearview video systems? Have any 
rearview video system component or reliability issues arisen?
    Responses: NHTSA received several responses to this question, 
indicating that most rearview video systems demonstrated good 
reliability. Other commenters pointed out that the systems have not 
been installed on vehicles for significant periods of time, so the data 
regarding their reliability are limited. GM stated that they have 
generally received favorable customer feedback regarding the 
performance and operation of their rearview video systems, but have had 
some negative comments regarding the camera lens needing to be 
periodically cleaned to remove contaminants. Magna stated that 
consumers gave positive feedback to the following features in rearview 
video systems: A wide-angle field of view, electronic image distortion 
reduction, graphical overlays, and interior mirror screen locations. 
Furthermore, Magna commented that it was not aware of component 
reliability problems in excess of what is normally seen in automotive 
systems. Rosco added that audio-enhanced video systems were positively 
received by customers. Sony

[[Page 76207]]

stated that video camera design for vehicles focuses on reliability, 
with particular attention to water resistance, vibration 
susceptibility, EMI sensitivity, and scratch resistance, and stated 
that the number of warranty returns for its video cameras were low.
    Kids and Cars commented that 85 percent of individuals with these 
systems felt the systems were effective or very effective, and Ms. 
Auriemma noted a personal experience where a rearview video system had 
functioned for several years without malfunctioning.
    Question 4: What are the performance and usability characteristics 
of rearview video systems and rear-mounted convex mirrors in low light 
(e.g., nighttime) conditions?
    Responses: In general, commenters including Nissan, GM, and Sony, 
seemed confident that, combined with backup lamps (required by FMVSS 
No. 108), rearview video systems and mirrors would provide a 
sufficiently visible image in low light conditions. Ms. Auriemma 
commented that her rearview video system works well under low light 
conditions. One commenter did point out that sensors, unlike those 
other systems, would not be affected by low ambient light conditions. 
Magna stated that performance depends, in part, on the luminous 
intensity of the tail lamps and backup lamps, but that low-light 
performance of current systems does improve rear visibility. Rosco 
stated that to improve nighttime performance, it incorporates infrared 
and audio technology into its rearview video systems.
    Regarding specific performance information, GM stated that its 
rearview video system provide an image in 3 lux lighting conditions. 
While Sony indicated that their current video cameras operate in 
conditions as low as 1 lux, they recommended 5 lux with reverse gear 
and lamps engaged as an appropriate minimum light level for rearview 
video system compliance testing.
    Question 5: Is there data available regarding consumers' and 
vehicle manufacturers' research regarding backing speed limitation, 
haptic feedback to the driver, or use of automatic braking?
    Responses: Commenters, such as GM, indicated that these systems 
have not been applied to backing conditions. However, Magna indicated 
that some technologies have been applied in certain vehicles, and that 
haptic feedback alerts can be effective in capturing the driver's 
attention. The Alliance added that a review of the SCI cases indicates 
that excessive backing speed was not a primary risk factor in backover 
incidents, but Nissan stated that research is being conducted, and that 
it expects that performance of backover countermeasures will improve 
when used in combination with a reduction in backing speeds.
    Question 6: What types of rear visibility countermeasures are 
anticipated to be implemented in the vehicle fleet through the 2012 
timeframe?
    Responses: Without giving specific numbers, commenters did indicate 
that they expect rearview video systems to be installed on an 
increasing percentage of their fleets. The AAM stated that the same 
technologies employed today will likely be used in 2012. Nissan stated 
that it will continue to offer as parking systems a rearview video 
system, as well as its Around View Monitor system. Honda commented that 
rearview video systems are currently on Honda and Acura SUVs, as well 
as the Ridgeline pickup, Odyssey minivan, and several sedans and 
coupes. Magna stated that it forecast around 500,000-750,000 vehicles 
produced in North America will be equipped with a rearview video 
system, and Rosco added that the evolution of technology has been 
moving towards rearview video systems.
    Continental stated that in the future, systems will be able to 
recognize pedestrians that are in danger of being struck and 
automatically intervene to prevent that from happening. However, they 
gave no indication of the timeframe for availability of such 
technology.
    Takata provided confidential comments on anticipated developments 
in rear detection technology, including the estimated detection 
capabilities of future products.
    Question 7: Can rear-mounted convex mirrors be installed on light 
vehicles other than SUVs and vans? What is the rationale for U.S. 
manufacturers' choosing to install rear parking sensors and video 
cameras, rather than rear-mounted convex mirrors as are commonly 
installed on SUVs and minivans in Korea and Japan? NHTSA is 
particularly interested in any information on the effectiveness of 
rear-mounted convex mirrors in Korea and Japan.
    Responses: NHTSA received a number of responses to this question. 
AAM, GM, and other stated that rear-mounted convex mirrors cannot 
feasibly be mounted on passenger cars with a sloping rear window 
surface. The commenters stated that these sorts of mirrors are 
generally considered unattractive and are not well-received by 
consumers. Kids and Cars also speculated that consumers may find them 
unappealing, or that they may strike people or objects in tight areas.
    Honda provided information that these mirrors, widely used in Asia, 
are being phased out in favor of rearview video systems. Furthermore, 
it noted that these mirrors are used as parking aids, and would not be 
effective for obstacle avoidance in non-parking backing maneuvers. GM 
indicated that their research has shown that rear-mounted convex 
mirrors do not demonstrate any effectiveness in reducing backover 
crashes in the situations they examined. Rosco stated that it provides 
these mirrors to customers such as the United States Postal Service and 
other commercial package delivery services.
    Question 8: NHTSA seeks any available research data documenting the 
effectiveness of rear convex cross-view mirrors in specifically 
addressing backover crashes.
    Responses: GM and the Alliance stated that they were not aware of 
research on this topic.
    Question 9: NHTSA seeks comment and data on whether it is possible 
to provide an expanded field of view behind the vehicle using only 
rear-mounted convex mirrors.
    Responses: Honda and GM both responded that the utility of rear-
mounted convex mirrors was limited in this regard. Honda stated that 
this was due to ``minification'' (the small image size) and distortion 
problems. The AAM pointed to its responses to questions I-7, II-5, and 
III-10 as being relevant to this question.
    Question 10: NHTSA is aware of research conducted by GM that 
suggests that drivers respond more appropriately to visual image-based 
confirmation of object presence than to non-visual image based visual 
or auditory warnings. Is there additional research on this topic?
    Responses: GM responded to this question, and reiterated the 
results of its research, stating that while all people that saw the 
rear obstacle applied the brakes, most people who simply heard a 
warning looked for the object first, and did not stop if they did not 
get visual confirmation. Magna stated drivers have a higher tolerance 
for visual alerts than for auditory alerts, which drivers view to be 
intrusive (and hence, can get tuned out). Magna said that visual 
overlays are best tolerated by drivers, even when they discern that the 
object being highlighted is benign. The Alliance pointed to its answer 
to question I-1 as applying to this question.
    Question 11: NHTSA requests input and data on whether the provision 
of

[[Page 76208]]

graphical image-based displays (e.g., such as a simplified animation 
depicting rear obstacles), rather than true-color, photographic visual 
displays would elicit a similarly favorable crash avoidance response 
from the driver.
    Responses: In response to the questions regarding whether graphical 
image-based visual displays may be as effective as photographic video 
displays, GM reiterated its response to question VI-2 (below).
    Sony commented that graphical image-based displays offer inferior 
protection from backover crashes when compared to true-color, 
photographic visual images from a rearview video system. They indicated 
that rearview video images provide a wider and deeper viewable area. 
Sony also stated that a graphical image-based display would require the 
driver to exit the vehicle to confirm the presence of a rear obstacle, 
and that if false alarm rates were high, the driver might choose to 
ignore the warning and not check for an obstacle.
    Magna responded by emphasizing the benefits of graphical overlays 
superimposed on a rearview video image and urged NHTSA to consider 
inclusion of graphic overlays as part of a video camera-based rear 
backup aid. Magna indicated that they view graphical image-based 
displays as a supplement to a true color photographic visual image 
rather than a substitute for such an image.
    However, the Alliance responded by stating that these technologies 
are in their infancy, and requesting that regulations be crafted in 
such a way as to not impede their development.
    Question 12: To date, rearview video systems examined by NHTSA have 
displayed to the driver a rear-looking perspective of the area behind 
the vehicle. Recently introduced systems which provide the driver with 
a near 360-degree view of the area around the entire vehicle do so 
using a ``birds-eye'' perspective using images from four video cameras 
around the vehicle. During backing, it appears that, by default, this 
birds-eye view image is presented simultaneously along with the 
traditional rear-facing video camera image. NHTSA requests data or 
input on whether this presentation method is likely to elicit a 
response from the driver that is at least as favorable as that attained 
using traditional, rear-view image perspective, or whether this 
presentation is more confusing for drivers.
    Responses: Nissan, which uses this technology in some of its 
vehicles, stated that it has not received negative customer feedback 
about it. The AAM again stated that such systems have only recently 
been introduced into the marketplace.
ii. Drivers' Use and Associated Effectiveness of Available Technologies 
To Mitigate Backover Crashes
    These questions were posed in order to help NHTSA gain a better 
understanding of how technologies were being deployed and used by 
drivers, and to fill in gaps in research. The agency was particularly 
interested in any market or research studies indicating customer 
satisfaction and adoption of specific technologies.
    Question 1: NHTSA has not conducted research to estimate a drivers' 
ability to avoid crashes with a backing crash countermeasure system 
based only on sensor technology. We request any available data 
documenting the effectiveness of backing crash countermeasure systems 
based only on sensor technology in aiding drivers in mitigating backing 
crashes.
    Responses: AAM commented by stating that these devices have only 
been recently introduced into the marketplace, and that more time would 
be needed before results would be detectable. GM's comment referred to 
the results of the McLaughlin and Llaneras studies, which provided some 
evidence that although warnings influenced driver behavior, warnings 
were unreliable in terms of their ability to induce drivers to 
immediately brake to a complete stop. GM stated that their research has 
shown no additional benefit of integrated (rearview video and sensor) 
systems over simple rearview video alone. Kids and Cars stated that 
there is a common reaction for drivers to ``tune out'' the sensor, such 
as in situations where a driver is backing out of a garage.
    Question 2: NHTSA has not conducted research to estimate drivers' 
ability to avoid crashes with a backing crash countermeasure system 
based on multiple, integrated technologies (e.g., rear parking sensors 
and rearview video functions in one integrated system). We request any 
available objective data documenting the effectiveness of multi-
technology backing crash countermeasure systems in mitigating backing 
crashes. We also request comment on what types of technology 
combinations industry may consider feasible for use in improving rear 
visibility.
    Responses: NHTSA received a variety of responses on this issue. 
While AAM indicated that the technology is too new to have good 
effectiveness data, both GM and Nissan stated that multi-technology 
systems were less effective than video alone. Kids and Cars, on the 
other hand, commented that graphic overlays based on sensor data could 
improve the user experience with rearview video systems. It also stated 
that a sensor can alert a driver to a problem, and that a rearview 
video system can verify that there is an obstacle behind the vehicle. 
Magna stated that graphic overlays, which include fusion of ranging 
sensing (i.e., using infrared or radar technology), already exist, and 
can enhance the driver's ability to judge distance/depth and to 
assimilate what is being displayed on the video screen.
    Question 3: NHTSA requests any available data documenting the image 
quality of rear-mounted convex mirrors and their effectiveness in 
aiding drivers in preventing backing crashes.
    Responses: GM responded by stating that its research indicated 
rear-mounted convex mirrors offered no improvement in the prevention of 
backover crashes. The AAM stated that it does not have data documenting 
their performance in preventing backover crashes.
    Question 4: NHTSA requests any available additional objective 
research data documenting the effectiveness of sensor-based, rearview 
video, mirror, or combination systems that may aid in mitigating 
backover incidents.
    Responses: Magna pointed to a variety of research studies being 
performed by the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute and other 
entities. Some conclusions it summarizes include: That good image 
quality is important for customer acceptance; that a 3.5 inch in-mirror 
display led to the highest backover avoidance rates; and that in-mirror 
displays were preferred by a large majority of drivers. The AAM stated 
that it does not have any data on these systems, and given the 
uncertainty associated with them, recommends that NHTSA adopt a 
technology-neutral regulation. GM reiterated that it had already shared 
its relevant findings.
    Question 5: NHTSA requests information regarding mounting 
limitations for rear-mounted convex mirrors.
    Responses: Commenters stated that they are aware of no reasonable 
method for attaching effective rear-mounted mirrors to vehicles like 
sedans, where such mirrors could not be mounted on or near the roof and 
provide an image of the area directly behind the vehicle. The AAM 
cautioned that long bracket arms would be impractical and have a 
negative effect on component reliability. GM also reiterated that it 
had not found the mirrors effective even when mountable. Honda added 
that it believes it is impractical to apply a rear-mounted

[[Page 76209]]

convex mirror to vehicles with trunk lids.
iii. Approaches for Improving Vehicles' Rear Visibility
    In this section, NHTSA was presenting the regulatory concepts it 
could use in developing a rear detection system that would best prevent 
backover crashes. These ideas included the specific areas that would 
need to be detected by a rear visibility system, the design and 
possible placements of mirrors or video screens, and the ramifications 
of requiring certain systems (e.g., the maintenance costs of video 
cameras). This section also contained additional questions regarding 
the pricing and feasibility of a variety of potential systems.
    Question 1: NHTSA seeks comment on the areas behind a vehicle that 
may be most important to consider when improving rear visibility. 
Furthermore, while the distribution of visible area behind the vehicle 
was not considered in the blind zone area metrics (e.g., rear blind 
zone area) discussed in this document, it may be helpful to specify 
some specific areas behind the vehicle that must be visible.
    Responses: Commenters generally fell into two categories. Honda 
stated simply that the area immediately behind the vehicle's rear 
bumper is significant and should be addressed as a priority. Other 
commenters, such as AAM and GM, stated that based on a review of the 
SCI data, the area to the sides of the vehicle is of significant 
importance, since most victims intruded into the path of the backing 
vehicle from the sides, rather than starting from directly behind the 
vehicle. Rosco responded, with respect to school buses, that the area 
behind the bus closest to the curbside rear wheels may be the most 
important in order to see a child running to catch the bus.
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety encouraged the agency to make 
the coverage area behind the vehicle as large as possible to provide as 
much time as possible for the driver to determine that a pedestrian is 
behind the vehicle and to take measures to prevent a crash. The 
approach recommended by the Advocates was to eliminate vehicles' rear 
blind zones entirely. They indicated that allowing the degree of rear 
visibility improvement to be based on the size of the particular 
vehicle's rear blind zone would permit countermeasures that are 
tailored to produce the desired result for each vehicle model and type 
individually.
    Question 2: NHTSA invites comment as to how an actual threshold 
based on vehicles' rear blind zone area could be defined.
    Responses: This question was asked in relation to the considered 
rear visibility threshold, or how big the maximum permissible blind 
area could be before a countermeasure was needed. Commenters provided 
various responses. GM offered a method of measuring a vehicle's 
viewable area indirectly and noted an associated threshold value of 
100-125 square feet measured using a 32-inch target plane, but stated 
that either the direct or indirect field of view methodology could be 
used to determine a threshold. AAM, on the other hand, offered a 
suggestion relating to calculating pedestrian speed of 6 kph (3.7 mph), 
vehicle speed of 6 kph or less, and estimated driver perception and 
response time 2.5 seconds. However, no data were provided by the AAM to 
support the specific values. Honda stated that any specified minimum 
rear visibility value should be based on conclusive data to indicate a 
direct safety benefit that has been found to be cost-effective in light 
of all of the related design trade-offs. Consumers Union recommended 
that a threshold be established based on NHTSA's Monte Carlo analysis 
in which all areas with risk of 0.1 or higher are required to be 
visible.
    Question 3: NHTSA is considering specifying a minimum portion of a 
vehicle's rear visibility that must be provided via direct vision 
(i.e., without the use of mirrors or other indirect vision device). 
NHTSA seeks comments on this approach, such as input regarding how a 
minimum threshold should be specified, and how much of a vehicle's rear 
area should be visible via direct vision?
    Responses: Commenters were generally unsupportive of the idea of a 
direct visibility requirement. Honda stated that it would unduly 
restrict vehicle design and styling, and stated that it would be a 
design-restrictive standard that would not enhance vehicle safety. GM 
commented that while there are currently no field of view requirements, 
most vehicles provide them, and that market demand for direct field of 
view would continue for the foreseeable future. The Alliance stated 
that direct field of view should be incorporated into FMVSS No. 111 as 
well as indirect field of view. Rosco was concerned that it would be 
impossible for some vehicles, particularly larger vehicles, to meet any 
direct visibility requirements.
    Question 4: NHTSA requests information regarding anticipated costs 
for rear visibility enhancement countermeasures.
    Responses: Many specific responses to this question were provided 
on a confidential basis, which were taken into account in the agency's 
cost and benefit analysis. However, Kids and Cars did comment that the 
agency's estimated costs were too high, and that it did not take into 
consideration the amount of money saved by the reduction in minor 
parking accidents. Nissan urged NHTSA to consider the ``total cost'' of 
implementation of any countermeasure in its cost-benefit analysis. It 
stated that the total cost includes equipment, research and 
development, software redesign, wiring, electrical architecture, 
instrument panels, etc. It also stated that the costs can be especially 
significant for vehicles that do not already have an integrated liquid 
crystal display (LCD).
    Question 5: Given the increasing popularity of LCD panel 
televisions and likely resulting price decline, what decline in price 
can be anticipated for LCD displays used with rearview video systems? 
Will similar price reduction trends be seen for video cameras for 
rearview video system application?
    Responses: GM suggested that substantial changes in price were not 
likely in the foreseeable future, although not impossible. The company 
stated that while it is conceivable that cost reductions will be 
realized, the more severe requirements for automotive LCD displays than 
for home applications puts them in a different category, and that cost 
reductions may not be realized for some time.
    Question 6: NHTSA requests information on the estimated price of 
rear visibility enhancement countermeasures at higher sales volumes, as 
well as the basis for such estimates.
    Responses: In response to this question, GM stated that it did not 
estimate that there would be any significant cost reductions. It noted 
that ultrasonic technology and mirrors have existed for some time, and 
that cost reductions are unlikely.
    Question 7: NHTSA requests any available data on rearview video 
system maintenance frequency rates and replacement costs. How often are 
rearview video cameras damaged in the field?
    Responses: In general, commenters suggested that the number of 
warranty claims on rearview video systems was low. However, it was 
noted that the systems are still comparatively young. GM stated that 
its current warranty rate for rear video systems is approximately 0.1-
2.3 incidents per thousand vehicles.

[[Page 76210]]

Nissan stated that it is unaware of any issues that have arisen with 
regard to the damage rate of its systems. Mercedes provided 
confidential comments on this subject, which were also considered by 
NHTSA.
    Question 8: NHTSA requests comments on which types of possible rear 
visibility enhancement countermeasure technologies may be considered 
for use on which types of vehicles. This information is important for 
estimating the costs of countermeasure implementation in the fleet.
    Responses: This question also generated a variety of responses. GM 
stated that market forces are driving larger vehicles, such as SUVs and 
vans, to adopt rearview video systems. Rosco also suggested that larger 
vehicles would benefit most from having a rearview video system 
installed. Honda, on the other hand, suggested that rearview video 
systems would be better than mirrors on sedans and coupes, but with 
pickups, durability and tailgate placement must be considered. Finally, 
AAM stated that as a reasonably priced baseline, the ECE R46 mirror 
standard would be a good addition, and that for certain vehicles, 
countermeasures could supplement the mirror system. It is not clear to 
NHTSA whether AAM was suggesting convex mirrors should be required (and 
disallow current flat mirrors) or simply that convex mirrors should be 
allowed as an option.
    Question 9: NHTSA requests information regarding available studies 
or data indicating the effectiveness of dashboard display-based 
rearview video systems and rearview mirror based rearview video 
systems. What are the key areas that will impact the real-world 
effectiveness of these systems as they become more common in the fleet?
    Responses: GM suggested that as drivers grow more familiar with in-
mirror and in-dash video systems as backing aids, the effectiveness of 
these systems will increase, and pointed to a study presented at the 
May 2008 Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Government/Industry 
meeting, suggesting that the rearview mirror-based displays showed more 
benefits for inexperienced drivers, while more experienced drivers 
experienced about equal benefits from each type of system. The Alliance 
admitted it had no data, but said it believed the same thing. Rosco 
made several arguments for the ``integration'' of dashboard and 
rearview mirror-based systems, namely that integration will make the 
display more theft resistant and help propagate other technologies.
    Question 10: NHTSA requests objective data on the use, 
effectiveness, and cost of rear-mounted convex mirrors.
    Responses: Commenters provided little new data in response to this 
question. GM pointed to its earlier response regarding convex mirrors, 
where it stated that they did not show substantial safety benefits. 
Additionally, AAM stated that rear-mounted convex mirrors were 
essentially parking aids, and would not be effective in preventing 
backover crashes.
iv. Options for Measuring a Vehicle's Rear Visibility
    In this section, NHTSA asked a series of extremely specific 
questions relating to methodologies for measuring the direct rear 
visibility of vehicles. These questions focused on various aspects of 
the test procedures outlined in the ANPRM, such as how to set up the 
machines, what size dummies to use, and how to adjust rear head 
restraints so as to balance concerns between rear passenger safety and 
rear visibility.
    Question 1: NHTSA requests comment on the use of the 50th 
percentile male driver size as a midpoint in terms of driver height and 
whether using multiple driver heights for these tests [to determine 
direct visibility] would cause undue hardship relative to the safety 
value of assessing different driver heights. Specific information 
regarding additional cost, if any, that would be incurred by vehicle 
manufacturers due to the use of different driver sizes for these 
different portions of FMVSS No. 111 is requested.
    Responses: Commenters suggested a range of testing alternatives 
that could be used to measure a vehicle's direct visibility 
characteristics. GM stated that the 95th percentile eye-ellipse is used 
by manufacturers as the tool for evaluating visibility and is 
recognized in FMVSS No. 111, and that it would be consistent to apply 
that tool to determine rear visibility under the standard as well. 
Similarly, Nissan also recommended NHTSA investigate use of an eye-
ellipse method (in accordance with the Society of Automotive Engineers 
Recommended Practice J941), rather than using the 50th percentile male 
driver's eye locations. Alternatively, Sony suggested that NHTSA 
``should use a worst-case-scenario driver body size when conducting 
rear visibility measurements, such as the 25th percentile female, or at 
the least correlate size with the actual size of people involved'' in 
real backover crashes. A third alternative was suggested by AAM, which 
stated that the eyepoints and other incidentals of ECE R46 should be 
used in developing the criteria for FMVSS No. 111 visibility 
requirements. Honda, in its comment, did not offer a specific 
suggestion, but rather noted that using a variety of driver heights and 
eyepoints might encourage manufacturers to enlarge the mirror or change 
the curvature, which would add cost to the development and 
implementation of the system. Consumers Union stated that it did not 
see the need for a 95th percentile male test, as taller drivers always 
have a better view behind the vehicle. The organization stated that it 
has tested using only the 50th percentile, although testing at the 
eyepoint of the 5th percentile female would also be worthwhile.
    Question 2: NHTSA has been using seating position settings 
recommended by the vehicle manufacturers for agency crash tests. For 
most vehicles, the vertical seat position setting recommended for seats 
with vertical adjustability is the lowest position. NHTSA seeks comment 
on whether this setting is the most suitable position for a 50th 
percentile male, or if a midpoint setting would be more appropriate for 
measuring rear visibility. NHTSA also seeks comment on whether the 
specific crash test seating specifications used are the most 
appropriate for this context.
    Responses: Nissan, GM, and AAM commented in response to this 
question. They indicated that their responses to the previous question 
also applied to this issue. Honda pointed out the driver's eyepoint 
used affects visibility performance with rear-mounted convex mirrors, 
but does not affect the area behind a vehicle that is displayed by a 
rearview video system. Honda suggested that if a rule were to require 
accommodation of different driver sizes that manufacturers may modify 
the mirror to enlarge its size of change the radius of curvature. While 
Honda noted that such consideration would result in increased costs, 
although it did not specifically discourage this if NHTSA could show 
related enhanced safety benefits. Additionally, Honda stated that while 
the driver eyepoint is extremely relevant for direct view measurements, 
it would have no effect on rearview video systems.
    Question 3: NHTSA seeks comment on the placements of head 
restraints. For example, would our test procedure result in the 
elimination of rear head restraints or a reduction in their size? If 
so, please identify the affected vehicles and explain why the rear head 
restraints particularly impair visibility in those vehicles. Similarly, 
NHTSA seeks comment on the approach to setting the

[[Page 76211]]

longitudinal position of all adjustable head restraints for rear 
visibility measurements. While longitudinally adjustable head 
restraints positioned fully forward may minimize the chance of 
whiplash, a more reasonable option for this test may be to position the 
head restraint at the midpoint of the longitudinal adjustment range.
    Responses: NHTSA received comments on this subject from GM, Honda, 
Sony, and AAM. GM and Sony suggested that head restraints should be 
accounted for, as they contribute substantially to vehicle safety. 
Honda stated that head restraints should be adjusted to their lowest or 
stored position for rear visibility measurement, and that a direct 
visibility requirement should take into consideration the existence of 
safety features such as the center high-mounted stop lamp and rear 
window wiper and defogger. Honda added that if NHTSA believes the 
required head restraints unduly affect rear visibility, the agency 
should re-evaluate the recent upgrade of FMVSS No. 202a, Head 
Restraints, for which applicability took effect on September 1, 2009, 
and take into account rear visibility considerations. The AAM commented 
that the recently-updated standard FMVSS No. 202a has the effect of 
reducing rear visibility, and that NHTSA should adjust the head 
restraints to their lowest position for direct visibility testing 
purposes, similar to the procedures in ECE R46.
    Question 4: In our testing, we found that the laser beam is 
difficult to detect visually. Therefore, we used the laser detector. 
NHTSA invites comment on the availability of other options for 
detecting the laser beam as used in this test that does not involve the 
use of an electronic laser detector.
    Responses: GM and the AAM both responded to this question by noting 
the difficulties in using laser-based methods. GM stated that while it 
did not know of any better alternative methods for detecting lasers 
than what NHTSA described, it would likely use a math-based alternative 
to certify compliance. Similarly, the AAM stated that the European 
experience with laser measurement has generally been found to be 
cumbersome and that CAD-based measurement might be a more desirable 
option.
    Question 5: For locating the laser devices at the selected driver 
eyepoints, is there another device besides the H-point device which can 
be utilized for this purpose? For simplicity, should eyepoints be 
indicated in a similar fashion as is currently in FMVSS No. 111 for 
school bus testing in which a single eyepoint is located at a specified 
distance from the seat cushion/seat back intersection and within a 6-
inch semi-circular area?
    Responses: GM recommended an alternative in which the eye location 
would be specified from a body fiducial point on the vehicle, similar 
to methods used in evaluating mirrors under the current standard. AAM 
questioned whether any single eye location could be representative, and 
if the proposed measurement method was capturing what was important for 
rear visibility. AAM also stated that the view in mirrors, which was 
not contemplated as part of the direct visibility measurement, was an 
important aspect to consider, especially for older drivers whose range 
of movement may be limited. Honda stated that it did not consider the 
school bus measurement method appropriate for passenger vehicles, 
because that measurement method was designed by contemplating the 
movement of a bus driver's head.
v. Options for Assessing the Performance of Rear Visibility 
Countermeasures
    In determining a rear visibility threshold, NHTSA would first need 
to define a test area, from which the vehicle's viewable area could be 
subtracted, thereby calculating the size of the blind zone. These 
questions were asked in order to solicit comment on what that test area 
should cover, as well as other issues related to testing countermeasure 
performance.
    Question 1: NHTSA invites comments on the need for and adequacy of 
the described area which rear visibility countermeasure systems may be 
required to detect obstacles. NHTSA is particularly interested in any 
available data that may suggest an alternative area behind the vehicle 
over which a rear visibility enhancement countermeasure should be 
effective? Is the described area of coverage unrealistically large? Is 
it adequate to mimic real world angles at which children may approach 
vehicles?
    Responses: Many commenters used this question to comment on the 
number of instances in the SCI cases where the victim entered the 
vehicle's path from the side of the vehicle. Sony and Kids and Cars 
both stated that consideration should be given to areas to the sides of 
the vehicle, with Kids and Cars stating that all of the areas not 
visible directly or through side mirrors should be taken into 
consideration. GM and the AAM both stated that driver's-side convex 
mirrors, which have a wider field of view than that required by FMVSS 
No. 111, would help to prevent many of these incidents. Nissan 
commented that the area visible in side mirrors permitted in ECE R46 
should be factored into the measured field of view of a vehicle. Sony 
stated that limiting the test are to the edges of the vehicle would 
fail to account for obstacles that move into the rear blind zone from 
the outside of the immediate rear of the vehicle. Sony suggested that 
the test area should account for, at a minimum, vehicle backing speed, 
driver reaction time, and the speed of potential obstacles.
    Question 2: Is it reasonable to define the limits of the test zone 
such that it begins immediately behind the rear bumper for the test 
object defined here or should a gap be permitted before the visibility 
zone begins? What additional factors should the agency consider in 
defining the zone?
    Responses: Commenters generally split into two groups in responding 
to this question. Some supported the idea that the test area should 
begin at the edge of the bumper. Kids and Cars suggested that the test 
area should begin at the rear bumper because when children approach a 
vehicle from the side, they frequently intersect the path of the 
vehicle close to the bumper. Rosco stated that coverage should begin at 
a vertical plane tangent to the rearmost surface of the rear bumper. 
Consumers Union also stated that they believe no gap should exist in 
the test zone. Nissan stated that as long as the target area size is 
realistic, it would be appropriate to define the limits of the test 
zone such that it begins immediately behind the rear bumper. GM and 
Honda, however, supported the idea of a gap. GM stated that as most 
accidents either come from the sides or from the area 3-8 meters behind 
the vehicle, a gap in the area would not be unreasonable. Honda also 
supported a small gap of 0.3 meters (1 foot), noting that if no gap 
were permitted, video cameras might be placed in locations that could 
be subject to damage in low-speed collisions, thereby increasing the 
cost of ownership.
    Question 3: NHTSA requests comments on potentially requiring only 
the perimeter of the specified area to be tested for rear visibility 
enhancement systems. For video-based rear visibility countermeasure 
systems, NHTSA assumes that confirming the visibility of the test 
object over the perimeter of the required area is sufficient, since a 
system able to display the object at the perimeter of the required area 
should also be able to display the object at all points in between the 
extremities. Is this a reasonable assumption?
    Responses: We received two comments in response to this specific

[[Page 76212]]

question. GM stated that this was not an unreasonable suggestion for a 
single rearview video camera, but that it did not take into 
consideration a system made up of multiple sensors or cameras with 
limited lateral scope. Rosco also questioned this assumption, stating 
that this did not take into account the fact that an obstruction such 
as a marker light could block out some portion of the rearward view. 
The Alliance also referenced its earlier comments on threshold 
detection (regarding the need for detection zones behind the vehicle), 
as well as the zones of coverage provided by ECE R46-compliant side 
mirrors.
    Question 4: Would vehicles with rearview video cameras mounted away 
from the vehicle centerline have the ability to detect the test object 
over the area under consideration? Is there flexibility to relocate 
such off-center cameras to meet the requirements under consideration, 
if necessary?
    Responses: This question elicited several responses. Honda and 
Nissan suggested that it may be possible, but that moving the position 
of a video camera could be expensive. They recommended allowing as much 
design flexibility as possible. The AAM also stated that limiting video 
placement to the centerline would be overly restrictive. Rosco and 
Sony, two equipment manufacturers, stated that current technology did 
allow a video camera to be mounted off-center and still be able to see 
the entire test area, depending on the specifics of that area.
    Question 5: NHTSA seeks comment as to the availability of any 
mirrors that may have a field of view that encompasses a range of 50 
feet, as well as the quality of image that might be provided over such 
a range. How different is the image size and resolution, and how 
significant are the differences to the mirrors' potential 
effectiveness?
    Responses: No commenters stated they believe that rear mirrors 
could have an effective field of view that extends 50 feet. Nissan 
stated that it is difficult to describe variation in image size and 
resolution, as it varies by the mirror's fixed location on the vehicle 
body. Rosco stated that image sizes for rear cross-view mirrors become 
diminished beyond 30 feet. Honda questioned whether mirrors could 
provide a field of view that extended 50 feet back, but also questioned 
whether this was necessary for a typical backing maneuver.
    Question 6: If a gap is permitted behind the vehicle before the 
visibility zone begins, how will systems prevent children who may be 
immediately behind a vehicle from being backed over?
    Responses: In response to this question, Sony and Rosco stated that 
it would not be possible to prevent these backover crashes if the area 
in which the child was located was not visible to the driver, and 
reiterated that no gap in the visible zone should be permissible. GM, 
while acknowledging that not all backover crashes can be prevented, 
stated in its comments that NHTSA should focus on mitigating specific 
risks by focusing on the crashes that happen most often--incursions and 
instances where the vehicle is turning; and by focusing on vehicles 
that are statistically overrepresented in backover crash fatalities.
    Question 7: NHTSA seeks input on what level of ambient lighting 
would be appropriate to specify for conduct of this compliance test. 
What other environmental and ambient conditions, if any, should the 
agency include in the test procedure?
    Responses: Several commenters agreed that rear detection systems 
should be able to function in low light conditions. Kids and Cars and 
Rosco both stated that the systems should be able to work in dark 
conditions, while Honda and GM suggested that the low light conditions 
be specified with respect to the photometric requirements of backup 
lamps, which would be illuminated during a backing maneuver. Sony 
suggested that rear detection devices should function in 5 lux 
luminosity, which is slightly higher than the 3 lux suggested by GM.
    Question 8: NHTSA invites input regarding the composition of the 
countermeasure compliance test object and the types of technologies 
that are likely to be able to provide coverage of the related test 
area.
    Responses: In response to this query, AAM stated that based on 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) growth data charts, it recommended a 
test object that is cylindrical with a diameter of 15 cm and a height 
of 82 cm. Kids and Cars, alternatively, suggested a test object with a 
height of 28 inches, or approximately 71 cm. Honda did not provide a 
specific suggestion, but noted that the test object should reflect the 
age and height of the people at risk and not be made of materials that 
cause excessive reflection or have other characteristics that could 
interfere with the goals of a practical, reliable, and repeatable test. 
Similarly, Sony stated that the test object should simulate the size of 
a 1-year-old child. Finally, GM noted that it provided information on 
this topic as part of its involvement in NHTSA-sponsored cooperative 
research with the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute focused on 
advanced crash avoidance technologies relating to backover avoidance.
vi. Options for Characterizing Rear Visibility Countermeasures
    In this section, NHTSA sought comments that would provide insight 
into what specifications, if any, the agency should mandate for rear 
visibility enhancements. In the ANPRM, NHTSA noted a general lack of 
relevant existing industry consensus standards which could be 
considered in establishing regulatory performance requirements. The 
agency also noted it appeared there was no ongoing development to 
establish such consensus standards in the United States. Of particular 
interest were any standards that were being applied to specific types 
of countermeasures (such as sensors or cameras) by manufacturers. The 
agency also wanted to solicit comment on other considerations, such as 
display characteristics, durability measurements, or test procedures 
that could assist it in drafting a comprehensive proposed requirement. 
Questions posed also sought assistance in the identification of any 
additional parameters which the agency may need to consider specifying 
in a regulatory amendment to FMVSS No. 111.
    Question 1: Are there any existing industry consensus standards for 
rear visibility enhancement systems which address the parameters 
outlined in this section? Are there any ongoing efforts to develop such 
industry consensus standards? If so, when will the standards be 
published?
    Responses: Commenters generally agreed with NHTSA that industry 
consensus standards do not exist. Some commenters, such as Rosco, and 
Ford, cited international standards for items such as sensor 
performance and display requirements. Honda stated that ISO is 
currently reviewing performance requirements and test procedures for 
``Extended Range Backing Aids (ERBA)'' but that this document is not 
directly addressing backover incidents as NHTSA did in the ANPRM and 
that timing-wise, the document could be balloted by ISO and issued as 
soon as the end of 2009 or early 2010. Nissan noted that while there is 
a lack of existing industry consensus standards for rear visibility 
enhancement systems, there does not appear to be wide variation between 
systems offered by different automakers due to the small number of 
rearview video camera suppliers.

[[Page 76213]]

    Ford cited the initiation of updates to ECE R46 for rearview video 
displays and stated that while it did not support the standard in its 
entirety, it believes the Australian state of New South Wales' 
Technical Standard No.149 \56\ is instructive with regard to display 
image. Ford stated that this standard requires a cylinder test object 
located 5 meters from the rear of the vehicle to have a corresponding 
image height on the display of at least 0.5 percent of the distance 
between the driver's eye and the display. For example, for a driver's 
eye located 800 mm from the screen, the corresponding minimum height 
for the image on the display would be 4mm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Australian Design Rule 14/02 Rear Vision Mirrors; 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The most extensive comments received were in regard to ISO 
17386:2004 Transport information and control systems, Manoeuvring Aids 
for Low Speed Operation (MALSO). This standard contains test 
specifications and requirements to establish the ability of a sensor-
based system to detect stationary objects, primarily in the utilization 
as a parking aid. Delphi stated that tests used for system 
certification under this standard utilize an idealized target, a PVC 
pole, for uniform and repeatable performance. The tests were designed 
to ignore the area from 0 to 25 cm above the ground to prevent 
detection of parking curbs, presumably to limit the number of times the 
system alerted the driver to their presence so that drivers would not 
disable the system. As noted by the AAM, ISO 17386 pertains 
specifically to systems designed to assist drivers in maneuvering in 
tight spaces, such as in low-speed parking maneuvers. The AAM further 
noted that the parameters addressed in the ISO standard are not 
relevant for pedestrian impacts, nor are the systems designed for low-
speed maneuvering optimized for pedestrian detection. Delphi identified 
the need for a more realistic target specification to be developed, 
compared to the ISO standard, for sensor-based systems to be able to 
detect small children. Ackton stated that up to this point, ISO's MALSO 
standard with the PVC target pole has been the benchmark for all 
equipment manufacturers. However, Ackton stated that many manufacturers 
have created systems that ``go beyond'' the requirements of the ISO 
standard and that its own ``New-Gen'' system utilizes technology that 
allows it to detect moving objects.
    The AAM stated that ISO and SAE have several standards that pertain 
to human-machine interface (HMI) aspects including features employed by 
rearview video systems and sensor-based backing aids. It noted that 
these standards are recommendations, rather than specifications, due to 
the contingent nature of most HMI parameters, which are highly 
influenced by the specific context and implementation in question. The 
AAM concluded by stating that such standards do not lend themselves for 
incorporation into an FMVSS for rearward visibility.
    Question 2: Are there additional parameters which should be 
specified to define a rear visibility enhancement system? What should 
the minimum specified performance be for each parameter?
    Responses: Gentex suggested a minimum visual display brightness of 
500 cd/m\2\ for in-mirror displays, as measured at room temperature and 
in a dark room. Its rationale was that automaker research has confirmed 
this to be the minimally accepted value, presumably to account for a 
wide possible range of ambient conditions.
    Magna suggested that instead of regulating operational areas of 
video camera performance that NHTSA instead leave implementation to the 
automakers and suppliers to address to ensure overall system 
affordability.
    Question 3: Are future rear visibility systems anticipated which 
may have significantly different visual display types that may require 
other display specification parameters?
    Responses: NHTSA did not receive comments in response to this 
question.

IV. Analysis of ANPRM Comments and NHTSA's Tentative Conclusions

    Based upon the discussion in the ANPRM and the comments received, 
we have grouped the various ideas for mitigating backover crashes into 
five distinct threads. While there are numerous variations within each 
concept, we believe that these five concepts contain substantially all 
of the potential solutions discussed. The ideas are as follows: (1) The 
improvement of rear visibility for all vehicles within the scope of the 
K.T. Safety Act; (2) the improvement of rear visibility for certain 
high-risk vehicle types, namely those judged to be involved in a 
disproportionately high number of backover crashes; (3) the improvement 
of rear visibility for vehicles with blind zones that exceed a 
threshold or cannot view areas deemed to be critical; (4) the 
installation of driver's-side convex mirrors; and (5) the installation 
of advanced technology systems, such as combinations of sensors and 
video cameras, automatic braking systems, or other technology. We note 
that when referring to improved rear visibility via a 
``countermeasure,'' the term refers to any rearview video system, 
sensor, or mirror, although we discuss the specific differences between 
those technology types in the earlier ANPRM summary and in section V 
below. This section contains NHTSA's analysis of the various overall 
approaches that could be applied to backover prevention, as well as 
addresses comments germane to the discussion.
    Following the discussion of comments relating to the possible means 
for improving rear visibility and mitigating backover crashes and 
comments received regarding these, a discussion of comments relating to 
possible rear visibility system characteristics and compliance test 
methods is presented.

A. Application of Rear Visibility Systems Across the Light Vehicle 
Fleet

    One approach considered by NHTSA in the ANPRM was to require that 
all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less be subjected to 
improved rear visibility requirements. Going forward with a requirement 
for improved rear visibility for all light vehicles was an idea 
supported by a variety of commenters. First and foremost, safety 
organizations and individuals whose families had been involved in 
backover incidents strongly favored this alternative. In general, these 
commenters supported the most comprehensive possible proposal in order 
to achieve the maximum possible benefits, pointing out the particular 
tragedy that many of these incidents involved a parent or other family 
member injuring or killing their own children. Kids and Cars stated 
that all vehicles must be addressed in order to prevent backover 
injuries and fatalities, stating that even one car with a large blind 
zone should indicate the need for the regulation to cover all vehicle 
types. Similarly, IIHS and Consumers Union both supported uniform 
requirements across light vehicle classes.
    Several equipment manufacturers also were in support of requiring 
improved rear visibility on all light vehicles. Sony commented that the 
Act permits NHTSA to ``prescribe different requirements for different 
types of motor vehicles,'' but does not permit a total or partial 
exemption of a particular class of vehicles, or a percentage of a 
particular class of vehicles, from rear visibility requirements. Sony 
further stated that limiting the rear blind zone visibility 
requirements to LTVs ignores the fact that passenger cars account for 
26 percent of backover deaths and 54 percent of backover injuries, and 
that

[[Page 76214]]

these percentages will likely increase given the relative decline of 
LTV sales across the market. Delphi and Magna stated their belief that 
the backover problem is widespread enough that improved rear visibility 
requirements should not be limited to any particular class of vehicles. 
Similarly, Ackton suggested that rear visibility countermeasures should 
not be limited to a certain vehicle class and also raised the issue 
that trailers could be equipped with sensor-based object detection 
systems.
    In contrast to this broad approach, some automakers commented in 
favor of limiting any rear visibility improvement to just a portion of 
the fleet, such as LTVs, saying that, in terms of fatalities, they are 
statistically overrepresented in backover crashes. Nissan and GM both 
recommended that a maximum blind zone area approach be used to 
determine whether a particular model of vehicle warrants improved rear 
visibility, and recommended against the application of any new 
requirements by vehicle type. Mercedes suggested that if the agency 
believes that improved rear visibility should be required for the 
portion of the vehicle fleet that is statistically overrepresented in 
backover crashes (i.e., LTVs), then NHTSA should apply the requirements 
to only those types of vehicles. Honda also commented that rear 
visibility performance requirements should be instituted for only those 
vehicles with the highest rates of backover incidents, although it also 
suggested that NHTSA should actively monitor the data for all vehicle 
types so that it can consider broader application of the requirements 
based on the safety need.
    Lastly, some vehicle manufacturers generally supported alternative 
methods for preventing backovers. One manufacturer, Nissan, requested 
that the agency conduct more research before proposing to require any 
additional performance requirements for rear visibility. The AAM 
limited its support to the requirement for ECE R46-compliant convex 
side mirrors, instead of more advanced countermeasures. Mercedes echoed 
this approach, but allowed that if more advanced countermeasures were 
seen as essential, they be limited to LTVs, and not applied to 
passenger cars. The application of improved rear visibility 
requirements to LTVs only was also supported by Honda. GM was the lone 
manufacturer that recommended that NHTSA limit the requirement for 
improved rear visibility to vehicles with large blind zones only. We 
have addressed comments relating to those alternative proposals in the 
sections below.
    While NHTSA agrees that requiring enhanced rear visibility for all 
light vehicles would be the most comprehensive approach to mitigate 
backover crashes, it would also entail the highest costs of any 
possible proposal. Commenters also suggested that NHTSA's projected 
costs were too high and that costs would likely decline once systems 
such as these were put into wider production. In response to these 
comments, NHTSA has more fully analyzed the costs and benefits of the 
proposal in the preliminary regulatory impact analysis (PRIA), which is 
presented in tandem with this document.
    As described in Section II.B, NHTSA has tentatively decided to 
require improved rear visibility for all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 
pounds or less. Having taken into account the intent of Congress in 
passing the K.T. Safety Act, the smaller, yet still-significant number 
of fatalities involving passenger cars, and the fact that the injury 
rate for all classes of vehicles is approximately proportional to their 
representation in the fleet, we do not at this time believe it is in 
the best interest of safety or otherwise appropriate or permissible 
under the K.T. Safety Act to exclude passenger cars from rigorous rear 
visibility performance requirements. Passenger cars account for 
slightly more than half of the injuries from backover incidents.
    The rationale for proposing to require all light vehicles to have 
improved rear visibility is twofold. First, NHTSA, and Congress, are 
extremely concerned about the incidence of children being backed over 
by light vehicles. This is a phenomenon that is not limited to any 
particular vehicle type, and while the ANPRM did discuss blind zone 
area measurement, no driver of any type of vehicle could see the entire 
area behind the vehicle in which a pedestrian, especially a young 
child, might be located without the aid of an effective rear visibility 
countermeasure. Therefore, the obvious and most complete solution is to 
require an enhancement that enables drivers of all light vehicles to 
see children and other obstacles directly behind a vehicle.
    Second, and as noted by some commenters, applying improved rear 
visibility requirements to just a portion of the fleet would cause an 
awkward safety disparity between vehicles equipped with a 
countermeasure, and those without. As NHTSA has noted in the ANPRM and 
this notice, driver education about and acceptance of rear visibility 
countermeasures is crucial in realizing their effectiveness. To require 
visibility improvements in only some vehicles may send a mixed message 
to drivers that would not achieve the intent of the law.

B. Limitation of Countermeasure Application to Certain Vehicle Types

    A second concept explored in the ANPRM was the idea of limiting the 
requirement for improved rear visibility to certain vehicle types. The 
idea of having different rear visibility requirements for certain 
vehicle types was explicitly contemplated by Congress and articulated 
in the text of the K.T. Safety Act, which stated that ``The Secretary 
may prescribe different requirements for different types of motor 
vehicles to expand the required field of view to enable the driver of a 
motor vehicle to detect areas behind the motor vehicle to reduce death 
and injury resulting from backing incidents, particularly incidents 
involving small children and disabled persons.'' Furthermore, we 
believe that in particular, vehicles like multipurpose passenger 
vehicles and pickup trucks were contemplated by Congress as potentially 
warranting more of an improvement in rear visibility than do passenger 
cars. In noting the need for rear visibility performance requirements, 
the legislative history stated that, ``As larger vehicles, including 
SUVs, pickup trucks, and minivans, have become more popular, more 
drivers are confronted with larger blind spots.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ S. Rep. 110-275, S. Rep. No. 275, 110TH Cong., 2nd Sess. 
2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the ANPRM, NHTSA considered whether it would be appropriate to 
take this idea further and limit the requirements for improved rear 
visibility to the vehicles known as ``LTVs,'' which include 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and minivans with a GVWR of 
10,000 pounds or less. The agency reasoned that if a strong 
relationship between vehicle class and backover incidents existed, a 
targeted requirement for advanced rear visibility countermeasures could 
achieve a large percentage of the overall benefits of the technology at 
a fraction of the overall cost to the industry. Therefore, the agency 
conducted a statistical analysis and requested comment on the option.
    The agency's analysis revealed that while LTVs were statistically 
overrepresented in backover-related fatalities, they were not 
significantly overrepresented in backover-related injuries or in 
backover crashes

[[Page 76215]]

generally. Table 7 below lays out a summary of the results.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ This table is presented in more detail in section III of 
the PRIA.

 Table 7--Backover Crash Fatalities and Injuries and Percent of Fleet by
                              Vehicle Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Vehicle type (GVWR of 10,000 lb    Percent of   Percent of   Percent of
             or less)                 fleet       injuries    fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Car....................           58           54           26
Multipurpose Passenger Vehicle...           16           20           30
Truck............................           17           18           31
Van (including minivans).........            8            6           13
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As shown by Table 7, LTVs represent a disproportionate share of the 
overall backover-related fatalities, being involved in almost twice as 
many fatalities as their portion of the fleet. Conversely, passenger 
cars are represented in only one half as many fatalities as their fleet 
percentage would indicate. We note that this discrepancy is spread 
relatively evenly across multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and 
vans.
    However, unlike fatalities, the relationship between backover 
crashes generally and vehicle type for injuries is proportional to a 
vehicle type's proportion of the fleet. The data show that passenger 
cars are just as likely to be involved in a backover incident as are 
other types of vehicles. The substantially similar numbers of total 
backovers (including injuries and fatalities) between vehicle types 
cast doubt on whether it would be in the best interest of safety to 
limit rear visibility improvement to just LTVs even if it were 
permissible to do so.
    As indicated in the comment summary section above, commenters were 
split on the idea of imposing countermeasure requirements by vehicle 
class. Vehicle manufacturers in favor of a requirement that would 
affect only LTVs included Honda and Mercedes, while Nissan was against 
such a proposal. Mercedes suggested that if the agency believes that 
advanced countermeasures are required for the portion of the vehicle 
fleet that is statistically overrepresented in backover crashed (i.e., 
LTVs), then NHTSA should require those countermeasures only for those 
types of vehicles. Nissan stated that it supported using a blind zone 
threshold, rather than vehicle class, to determine which vehicles 
require improved rear visibility. Honda also commented that rear 
visibility performance requirements should be instituted for only those 
vehicles with the highest rates of backover incidents, although it also 
suggested that NHTSA should actively monitor the data for all vehicle 
types so that it can consider broader application of the requirements 
based on the safety need. Consumers Union made statements that they did 
not support improving rear visibility for only a portion of the light 
vehicle fleet, but they did not provide any data or rationale to 
support the statements.
    GM commented that the data provided in the ANPRM indicate that LTVs 
have a larger blind zone than most passenger cars, and that it can be 
extrapolated that the increased rate of LTVs in backing crashes could 
be the result of larger blind zones. Based on this idea, GM stated that 
this suggests the focus of the rulemaking should be on vehicle blind 
zone, not vehicle class. However, while NHTSA had considered this 
correlation, as described above, the agency has found that the 
relationship between rear visibility and backover crashes appears to 
involve too many factors to permit isolation of only the impact of rear 
visibility. This preliminary information suggests that the statistical 
overrepresentation of LTVs in backover crash incidence is not solely an 
effect of a vehicle's rear visibility characteristics.
    Blue Bird submitted a comment requesting that smaller buses not be 
subject to any new rear visibility requirements. As it noted, the 
language of the K.T. Safety Act would include small buses as part of 
the class of vehicles potentially affected by the regulation. However, 
Blue Bird offered several reasons why it believes that it would be a 
better policy decision to exclude buses from the rear visibility 
requirement. First, it pointed to the fatality and injury data 
presented in NHTSA's ANPRM, which indicated that buses, which were 
included in the ``Other Light Vehicle'' category, were involved in no 
fatalities and few injuries. Second, Blue Bird stated that many small 
buses (including small school buses), are not equipped with navigation 
or multifunction screens. The commenter added that the increased costs 
could deter some school districts from purchasing new school buses, 
which could lead to safety disbenefits. Third, Blue Bird noted that 
most drivers of buses must have commercial driver's licenses, and many 
are subject to far more training than drivers of passenger vehicles.
    We note that another commenter, Rosco, stated conversely that small 
buses should be subject to improved rear visibility requirements. It 
argued that small buses, frequently used for special needs children, 
are frequently used in situations around children. Rosco stated that 
because these vehicles have limited rearward visibility, they should be 
equipped with rearview video systems. However, Rosco also notes that 
operational guidelines (buses, in particular school buses, are driven 
by professional drivers) advise against traveling in reverse in normal 
operations. Furthermore, the statistics indicate that despite their 
proximity to children, the guidelines are effective, as our data 
indicates relatively few backover incidents involving school buses.
    We received no comments regarding LSVs.
    While sensitive to the issues cited by Blue Bird regarding school 
buses, we are proposing that school buses and low-speed vehicles also 
be included. We believe that it is apparent from the legislative 
history that Congress intended for this statute to address the problem 
of backover crashes involving all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds 
or less. Therefore, we are proposing to include all passenger vehicles 
among the vehicles subject to the enhanced rear visibility requirements 
without exception.

C. Using Blind Zone Area as a Basis for Countermeasure Requirement

    One option presented in the ANPRM was to limit the requirement for 
improved rear visibility using a vehicle's blind zone area (the area

[[Page 76216]]

behind a vehicle that cannot be seen directly through the vehicle's 
rear windows) threshold. This option was based on the preliminary 
indication that certain vehicles with larger rear blind zones may be 
more prone to backover incidents.
    In their comments, some vehicle manufacturers commented in favor of 
using a rear blind zone area threshold to determine which vehicles 
would need improved rear visibility. GM recommended that a maximum 
blind zone area approach should be used to determine whether a vehicle 
should be equipped with a countermeasure, and recommended against the 
application of countermeasures by vehicle type. GM offered a method of 
measuring a vehicle's viewable area indirectly and noted an associated 
threshold value of 100-125 square feet measured using a 32-inch target 
plane, but stated that either the direct or indirect field of view 
methodology could be used to determine a threshold. While GM commented 
extensively on how its indirect field of view measurement method 
correlated with and had some advantages over NHTSA's direct visibility 
method, it did not provide any additional information to aid in 
correlating measured direct rear visibility with backover incidents.
    AAM, on the other hand, offered a suggestion relating to 
calculating minimum required field of view using a pedestrian speed of 
6 kph (3.7 mph), vehicle speed of 6 kph or less, and estimated driver 
perception and response time 2.5 seconds. However, no data were 
provided by the AAM to support the specific values offered.
    Nissan also supported a maximum blind zone area approach to 
identifying which vehicles most warranted improved rear visibility. 
However, it did not provide any data or specific recommended value and 
associated justification for its use as a blind zone area threshold.
    Consumers Union recommended that a threshold be established based 
on NHTSA's Monte Carlo analysis in which all areas with risk of 0.1 or 
higher are required to be visible. However, no justification was 
provided for choosing 0.1 as a risk threshold as opposed to some other 
value.
    While several commenters stated that they supported use of a blind 
zone area threshold approach to determine which vehicles should have a 
countermeasure, those comments did not provide any data in addition to 
what NHTSA presented that might support such a proposal.
    As described in the ANPRM, to determine a suitable blind zone area 
threshold value at which vehicles with larger blind zones would be 
required to have a improved rear visibility, NHTSA plotted the average 
ratios of backing crashes to non-backing crashes and backover crashes 
to non-backing crashes versus the direct-view rear blind zone areas for 
28 vehicles, as shown in Figure 1. These 28 vehicles were selected 
because they were the ones for which NHTSA had measured direct rear 
visibility and for which sufficient state crash data were available.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.007

[[Page 76217]]

    Upon further examination, NHTSA has determined that using rear 
blind zone area to develop a threshold is not feasible at this time. We 
believe that the 28 vehicles we used to develop Figure 1 do not depict 
an obvious cutoff point where the risk of a backing crash dramatically 
increased with increasing blind zone area and that some vehicles with 
small blind zone areas (e.g., less than 300 square feet) have fairly 
high backing and backover crash rates. Also, while we found that direct 
rear blind zone area measured in a 50-foot square centered behind the 
vehicle was correlated with backing crashes to a mildly statistically 
significant degree, the relationship between size of the rear blind 
zone area directly behind vehicles and backover crash risk, was not 
correlated to a statistically significant degree.59 60 60 
Finally, during our SCI review, we determined that a majority of the 
victims in backover crashes were directly behind the vehicle and within 
a range of 20 feet from the rear bumper, an area that is not visible to 
the driver in many vehicles of all types.\61\ Therefore, any 
requirement for a maximum rear blind zone area that permitted the area 
within 20-foot aft of the rear bumper to not be visible to the driver 
would fail to address a large portion of backover crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The correlation between direct rear blind zone area and 
backing crashes was correlated to a statistically significant 
degree. However, this correlation was not sufficiently strong to use 
as a basis for determining a specific threshold.
    \60\ Partyka, S., Direct-View Rear Visibility and Backing Risk 
for Light Passenger Vehicles (2008).
    \61\ See analysis of SCI data, section V.B.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Use of Convex Driver's-Side Mirrors

    Several commenters recommended that NHTSA make modifications to the 
existing mirror requirements of FMVSS No. 111 in order to realize the 
goal of the K.T. Safety Act. Among other requirements, FMVSS No. 111 
currently requires a flat mirror on the driver's side, and permits, 
although does not require, a convex mirror on the passenger side 
(nearly all vehicles are equipped with such a mirror, however). NHTSA 
notes that FMVSS No. 111 does allow exterior rearview mirrors which 
incorporate an outer curved portion, as long as the required flat 
portion is also present. In the ANPRM, NHTSA did not consider 
modification of the existing side mirror provisions of FMVSS No. 111 
since we believed it to be an ancillary issue with regard to the rear 
visibility activity currently being pursued.
    In their comments on the ANPRM, the AAM, along with several vehicle 
manufacturers, recommended that NHTSA adopt European (ECE R46) mirror 
specifications to require non-planar side mirrors on both the driver 
and passenger sides of light vehicles. They stated that this would 
enable drivers to detect a majority of pedestrians involved in reported 
backover incidents, as most victims do not begin directly behind the 
vehicle, but rather enter the area directly behind the vehicle from one 
side or the other. Specifically, the AAM stated that its analysis of 
the agency's SCI cases indicated this expanded field of view (from non-
planar mirrors) would cover approximately 80 percent of the cases 
investigated for which the pre-crash movement of the pedestrian was 
recorded. Furthermore, the commenters stated that the increased field 
of view of convex driver's-side mirrors would give drivers a greater 
window of time in which they could see an incurring pedestrian in the 
side mirror. The AAM stated that using the ECE specification would 
result in an increase in the lateral angular field of view up to 286 
percent in expanded field of view over that required by FMVSS No. 111 
for vehicles meeting passenger car requirements. In addition, the AAM 
cited findings from a study which concluded that non-planar mirrors can 
increase angular viewing coverage by over 300 percent when compared to 
flat mirrors and that spherical and aspheric mirrors with spherical 
portions can provide a substantial reduction in glare for drivers under 
normal conditions and improvements in lane change situations.
    GM said it agrees with the AAM that 80 percent of the SCI cases are 
incursions from the side and could be addressed by modifying existing 
mirror requirements to the side and rear of the vehicle, and agreed 
with AAM on adopting ECE R46 requirements.
    Mercedes said it supports the AAM's recommendation to adopt ECE R46 
requirements for convex exterior mirrors, which it said would 
substantially expand the required field of view for all light vehicles 
and thereby improve the ability of drivers to detect pedestrians and 
pedal cyclists moving into the rearward pathway of the vehicle.
    Conversely, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety stated that 
simple changes in the current requirements for side and interior 
rearview mirrors will not fully address the problem of blind zones, 
enable drivers to see the entire area immediately behind the vehicle, 
or comply with the statutory mandate to ``expand the required field of 
view * * *''
    After careful consideration of the comments received, NHTSA 
believes that modifications to the side mirror requirements in FMVSS 
No. 111 are best handled in a separate rulemaking. We have come to this 
conclusion for two reasons. First, given that only marginal gains could 
be made in field of view to the sides of the vehicle, we do not believe 
that those gains would result in a reduction of backovers. NHTSA's rear 
visibility measurements show that rearview mirrors in current vehicles 
typically show a much wider area that exceeds the minimum requirements 
set forth in FMVSS No. 111, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. As a 
result, a fairly wide field of view provided by side rearview mirrors 
has already been present in the backover incidents that have occurred 
to date. At the extreme lateral distances from the vehicle, in the area 
in which an ECE-compliant convex mirror would display but a standard 
side-view mirror would not, pedestrians are sufficiently far from a 
vehicle that a driver (if the driver was using the mirror) would likely 
not perceive a risk that the individual would intersect the vehicle's 
path as the vehicle moved rearward.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

[[Page 76218]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.008

BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
    Second, ECE R46 compliant mirrors would not provide a field of view 
that includes what the agency has determined, through Monte Carlo 
simulation, to be the highest risk areas for backover crashes, which 
are the areas directly behind the vehicle. Any areas of crash risk for 
a pedestrian behind the vehicle that would fall within the field of 
view of a convex side mirror are already well within the field of view 
of an existing FMVSS No. 111-compliant side mirror. Thus, we anticipate 
that little or no net

[[Page 76219]]

improvement in backover rates would occur if there were a switch to ECE 
R46-compliant mirrors.
    Notwithstanding these observations, NHTSA plans to reexamine the 
side mirror requirements in FMVSS No. 111 in upcoming rulemaking 
actions. The suggestions of AAM and other commenters that these mirrors 
may provide safety benefits such as glare reduction and lane-change 
assistance will be considered in the context of those actions.

E. Advanced Systems and Combination Sensor/Rearview Video Systems

    NHTSA's analyses are based on currently available technology. 
However, it is known that additional technologies are under 
development, but the quality of their performance is not known at this 
time. Two additional sensor technologies are being developed by 
manufacturers that could be used to improve a vehicle's rear 
visibility: an infrared-based object detection and video-based real-
time image processing for object detection. Infrared-based systems 
operate by sensing the infrared radiation emitted by objects located in 
their detection range and can produce non-photographic images that 
portray the shapes and locations of objects detected. Rear object 
detection via video camera uses real-time image processing capability 
to identify obstacles behind the vehicle and then alert the driver of 
their presence. While these technology applications may eventually 
prove viable, because of their early stages of development, it is not 
possible at this time to assess their ability to effectively expand the 
visible area behind a vehicle.
    NHTSA is currently engaged in cooperative research with the 
Virginia Tech Transportation Institute and GM on Advanced Collision 
Avoidance Technology relating to backing incidents. The research is 
focused on assessing the ability of more advanced technologies to 
reduce the occurrence of backing crashes, and refining a tool to assess 
the potential safety benefit of technologies, such as an advanced 
object detection system with integrated automatic braking capability. 
The completion of NHTSA's advanced technology research effort is not 
expected until calendar year 2011.
    Commenters including Continental, Magna, and Takata indicated that 
they are either developing or anticipate development of advanced 
systems with pedestrian detection capability in the future. Nissan 
indicated that they are studying some potential future applications 
which could limit backing speed, apply automatic braking, or provide 
the driver with a haptic (i.e., tactile, e.g., vibration) response \62\ 
to indicate the presence of a rear obstacle. While future advanced 
safety systems may be developed to reduce backover crashes, no systems 
are currently ready for market. Therefore, the proposed improved rear 
visibility requirements specified in this notice, while not precluding 
use of promising advanced technology, cannot be based on the possible 
benefits that may be attainable with such future systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Providing a driver with a haptic response means providing 
tactile feedback such as by causing the steering wheel to vibrate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Rear Field of View

    In the ANPRM, NHTSA invited comment on what area behind the vehicle 
would need to be made visible to the driver in order to best improve 
safety. A wide area of up to 50 feet wide by 50 feet long was suggested 
as a possible coverage area option. NHTSA inquired about the 
feasibility of coverage such a large area and sought comments on which 
areas behind the vehicle may be most critical for backover mitigation.
    Multiple commenters discussed the average area that any 
countermeasure would be expected to ``see'' and, in particular, noted 
the number of SCI cases in which the victim entered the vehicle's path 
from the side of the vehicle. Sony and Kids and Cars both stated that 
consideration should be given to areas to the sides of the vehicle, 
with Kids and Cars stating that all of the areas not visible directly 
or through side mirrors should be taken into consideration. Sony stated 
that limiting the rear test area to the area within the edges of the 
vehicle would fail to account for obstacles that move into the rear 
blind zone from outside of the immediate rear of the vehicle. Sony 
suggested that the test area should account for, at a minimum, vehicle 
backing speed, driver reaction time, and the speed of potential 
obstacles. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety indicated that they 
believe that if the area immediately behind a motor vehicle is visible 
to a driver, substantial safety benefits will result for pedestrians, 
especially very young children.
    Many commenters expressed a desire to minimize or eliminate any 
``gap'' between the area that is required to be visible and the rear 
bumper. However, the rationale for allowing a gap seemed based to the 
difficulty of rear visibility systems might have in detecting areas 
directly behind the bumper. Kids and Cars suggested that the area of 
required coverage should begin at the rear bumper because when children 
approach a vehicle from the side, they frequently intersect the path of 
the vehicle close to the bumper. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety 
stated that the countermeasure needs to provide the driver with a field 
of view that eliminates the entire blind zone immediately behind the 
rear of the vehicle, suggesting that no gap should be allowed. 
Consumers Union also stated that they believe no gap should exist in 
the test zone. Nissan stated that as long as the target area size is 
realistic, it would be appropriate to define the limits of the test 
zone such that it begins immediately behind the rear bumper. Rosco 
stated that coverage should begin at a vertical plane tangent to the 
rearmost surface of the rear bumper. Sony indicated that NHTSA need not 
and should not permit any significant gap behind a vehicle before the 
visibility zone begins.
    On the other hand, some commenters supported the idea of a gap. The 
AORC stated that young children should be visible using a rearview 
video system beginning at a distance of 0.25 meters (0.82 ft) from the 
rear bumper and extending outward to a minimum distance of 3 meters 
(9.84 ft). GM stated that, as most of the documented SCI backover cases 
involved pedestrians entering the vehicle's path from the sides of the 
vehicle, a gap in the area immediately aft of the rear bumper would not 
be unreasonable. Honda also supported a small gap of 0.3 meters (1 
foot), noting that if no gap were permitted, video cameras might be 
placed in locations that could be subject to damage in low-speed 
collisions, thereby increasing the cost of ownership.
    In regard to the size of the visible area behind a vehicle may be 
needed to adequately mitigate backover crashes, Advocates for Highway 
and Auto safety stated that ``there is no reason why a rearview video 
system could not provide an optimal coverage area that is unlimited 
when the vehicle is on a flat surface or extends at least 20 feet 
behind the vehicle.'' Multiple commenters noted that rear-mounted 
convex mirrors could not be modified to attain such a range as was 
indicated in the ANPRM. NHTSA's test results for rear-mounted convex 
look-down and cross-view mirrors agree with this comment. 
Manufacturers' descriptions of current sensor-based systems included in 
their comments also did not indicate that sensors could meet this range 
requirement. While no comments were received regarding the ability of 
rearview video systems to cover this

[[Page 76220]]

range, NHTSA's testing has shown that while the systems may display 
such a range, image quality decreases as areas further out from the 
vehicle are displayed.
    In response to the ANPRM description of NHTSA's Monte Carlo 
analysis of backover risk as a function of pedestrian initial location, 
GM commented that NHTSA's analysis did not factor in the probability 
that a pedestrian would have actually been located at any specific 
point on the test grid. While NHTSA agrees with GM's comment, we note 
that the only available data for use in asserting such a probability of 
pedestrian location would be SCI case data, which is not nationally 
representative.
    As will be explained later in this document, based on the above 
comments and some new analysis, NHTSA has determined that a coverage 
area of 20 feet in length and 10 feet in width (5 feet to either side 
of the vehicles centerline) is the most feasible and effective range 
for mitigating backover crashes.

G. Rear Visibility System Characteristics

    In the ANPRM, NHTSA noted several possible system characteristics 
that may be important to require in order to ensure that the maximum 
possible effectiveness of a rear visibility system may be achieved. Our 
general approach in establishing performance requirements was to 
identify key areas that we believe are pertinent to overall system 
effectiveness. In the absence of existing consensus industry standards, 
we reviewed existing systems and made determinations regarding 
performance areas to specify. These areas include visual display 
characteristics and aspects of rearview image presentation. The 
following paragraphs summarize comments relating to system 
characteristics and describe NHTSA's analysis regarding those possible 
specifications.
i. Rearview Image Response Time
    Image response time is the time delay between the moment the 
vehicle is put into reverse gear, and the moment which an image to the 
rear of the vehicle is displayed by a rear visibility system. The 
importance of response time to safety is illustrated by a comment from 
Ms. Susan Auriemma, in which she describes having to wait several 
seconds for the image to appear and notes that drivers may proceed to 
back without waiting for the image to appear. NHTSA agrees with her 
concern that if the display takes too long to appear, drivers may be 
likely to begin a backing maneuver before the image behind the vehicle 
is displayed, rendering the system less effective. In the ANPRM, we 
suggested a maximum value of 1.25 seconds for the maximum allowable 
time for a rearview video image to be displayed to the driver, or image 
response time.
    Commenters generally concurred with NHTSA's concerns regarding 
image response time; however, manufacturers identified several 
technical issues which merit consideration. While GM and Gentex agreed 
that rearview video systems are able to display an image within 1.25 
seconds, they noted that based on the complexity of the system and the 
need for tolerances, systems can typically take longer to produce 
images in some situations due in part to electronic image quality 
control checks that are a precursor to the full display of an image. 
Therefore, NHTA's suggested maximum value of 1.25 seconds could 
unnecessarily restrict the operation of some systems and in theory 
impact the electronic quality control approach of manufacturers. GM and 
Gentex noted that a maximum image response time value of 2.0 seconds 
would allow for timely activation of the system based on a reverse 
signal and provide a reasonable tolerance for system variation while 
ensuring the availability of an image at the beginning of backing 
maneuvers. Specifically, Gentex stated ``In total, a typical 
application requires a nominal 1.20 seconds to display a rearview video 
image. With tolerance, as much as 2.00 seconds may be required--not 
including the time between the gear change * * *'' Gentex went on to 
recommend that a maximum image response time of 3.0 seconds allows the 
rearview video system enough time to ensure the driver is presented 
with a quality video image. However, no data justifying the need for 
the additional 1 second was provided by Gentex. While NHTSA understands 
that allowing time for system checks may result in a higher quality 
image, we also believe that providing an image soon after the vehicle 
is shifted into reverse may substantially increase the likelihood that 
a driver could detect a rear obstacle, if present.
    AAM recommended that maximum image response time be specified with 
reference to the time ``when the vehicle driveline is engaged in 
reverse''. NHTSA agrees that the point in time in which the vehicle's 
transmission is engaged in reverse gear is the most logical point in 
time from which to orient the image response time criterion.
    Also in regard to image response time, NHTSA acknowledges that 
liquid crystal displays require some warm-up time before an image can 
be displayed clearly. In-dash LCD displays that are used for multiple 
functions are typically already active before the driver shifts into 
reverse gear and therefore are already warm and able to display a 
rearview video image immediately upon shifting into reverse. However, 
in-mirror LCD displays remain off until reverse gear is selected and, 
therefore, require some warm-up time before a clear rearview video 
image can be displayed. Therefore, some requirement for additional 
image response time is inherent in the use of in-mirror LCD displays, 
but is avoided with in-dash displays. Conversely, given that the 
buildup of heat can also be an issue with in-mirror LCD displays due to 
the limited area within the mirror in which heat may dissipate, 
providing power to these displays at all times as a means of avoiding 
longer image response times is not feasible. Therefore, providing some 
allowance of time for an in-mirror LCD display to warm-up may be 
reasonable.
    Somewhat related to system the issue of system response time was a 
comment from the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety that suggested 
vehicles be equipped with an interlock feature that prohibits it from 
being able to move in reverse, even after the transmission has been 
placed in reverse gear, until a short period after the countermeasure 
system becomes fully operational. This sort of measure would ensure 
that drivers had all available information about the presence of any 
rear obstacles at the moment that backing began. While this idea 
appears to have merit, NHTSA is concerned that drivers that are parking 
or hitching a trailer may be annoyed by such a feature. NHTSA seeks 
comment on whether this feature might be acceptable to consumers and 
whether any substantial advantage of this feature over the use of a 
maximum response time specification exists. Based on the comments, the 
agency will consider whether to include this feature in the final rule.
ii. Rearview Image Linger Time
    Image linger time is another issue that was raised in the ANPRM. 
Linger time refers to the period in which a rearview image continues to 
be displayed after the vehicle's transmission has been shifted out of 
reverse gear. As noted by some commenters, a period of linger time may 
be desirable for situations where frequent transitions from reverse to 
forward gear are needed to adjust a vehicle's position (e.g., parallel 
parking and hitching). In the ANPRM, NHTSA indicated that a minimum of 
4 seconds but not more than 8 seconds of linger time may be appropriate 
after the vehicle is shifted from the reverse

[[Page 76221]]

position. NHTSA is concerned that excessive linger time may provide a 
source of distraction to the driver by a video image that is displayed 
longer than is needed. Consumers Union concurred with NHTSA's 
recommendation of 4-8 seconds for linger time. Nissan stated that its 
systems currently exhibit a linger time of approximately 200 
milliseconds and that it does not see value in allowing a longer linger 
time. GM recommended a maximum linger time of 10 seconds or, as an 
alternative, a speed-based limit in which the rearview video display 
would turn off when the vehicle reaches a speed of 5 mph (8 kph). GM 
noted that a time-based linger time would be less costly to implement 
than a speed-based linger time would. Based on their observations of 
drivers making parking maneuvers, the AAM also recommended a maximum 
linger time of 10 seconds, but specified an alternative speed-based 
value of 20 kph (12.4 mph).
    Because an excessive image linger time could result in adverse 
safety consequences associated with potential driver distraction when 
the vehicle is moving forward, NHTSA believes that linger time should 
be limited. On the other hand, NHTSA agrees with commenters who noted 
that allowing a reasonable linger time would provide a benefit to 
drivers who are parallel parking or hitching a trailer. Therefore, we 
believe there is a need to specify a maximum, but not a minimum, image 
linger time value for presentation of a rearview image.
iii. Rear Visibility System Visual Display Brightness
    In the ANPRM, NHTSA suggested that it is appropriate to adopt a 
minimum visual display luminance to ensure that a rearview image is 
displayed with sufficient brightness to be adequately visible in 
varying conditions, such as bright sunlight or low levels of ambient 
light. Adequately visible, in this case, would mean that a driver can 
discern the presence of obstacles in the rearview video image. We note 
that in the SCI sample, 95 percent of backovers took place in daylight 
hours. Therefore a rearview image should be bright enough to be visible 
in daylight conditions. Commenters noted that a minimum of 500 cd/m\2\ 
is appropriate based upon research performed by vehicle manufacturers 
and that internal specifications routinely require a luminance of at 
least this value. During the agency's review of existing rearview video 
systems, we found the display brightness of the existing systems to be 
adequate such that visual information was discernible under varying 
ambient conditions, such as background light level. While we do not 
currently have reason to believe that vehicle manufacturers are 
installing rearview video systems with displays having brightness 
values less than 500 cd/m\2\, we believe it is necessary to propose an 
appropriate minimum brightness so that drivers can see the image under 
varying ambient lighting conditions.
iv. Rear Visibility System Malfunction Indicator
    In the ANPRM, NHTSA indicated our belief that no malfunction 
indicator would be necessary for a system that presents a visual image 
of the area behind the vehicle since the absence of an image would 
clearly indicate a malfunction condition. Multiple commenters agreed 
with NHTSA's suggestion that such a malfunction indicator is not 
necessary for a system presenting a rearview image. We agree with these 
comments.

H. Rear Visibility System Compliance Test

    A majority of comments regarding a rear visibility system 
compliance test related to ambient lighting conditions during test and 
the specific test object used. Comments regarding these issues and 
NHTSA's analysis of them follow.
i. Compliance Test Ambient Light Level
    Given that ambient lighting conditions can affect how well a driver 
is able to see an in-vehicle visual display, the ANPRM solicited input 
regarding what ambient lighting conditions may be most appropriate for 
rear visibility system compliance testing. GM recommended that testing 
be conducted in 3 lux conditions, or the level provided in dark ambient 
conditions with the reverse lights operating. Sony suggested that the 
external ambient light level for testing should be 5 lux with reverse 
gear and lamps engaged. The AORC stated that tests should be conducted 
in a ``min/max illumination condition which best simulates daytime 
conditions since the field data indicates this is the accident 
condition present and will allow the best value solution to be used.'' 
Given that 55 of the 58 SCI backover cases occurred in daylight 
conditions, NHTSA tends to concur with the AORC's comment on this 
matter. We believe that for the purpose of preventing backover crashes 
a worst case, ``nighttime'' ambient lighting condition for system 
compliance testing may be an unnecessarily challenging requirement.
ii. Compliance Test Object
    NHTSA received many comments regarding specifications for a 
compliance test object. Certain features of the test object, most 
significantly the height, could have substantial ramifications on the 
burdens of compliance. Similarly, the shape and material composition of 
the test object would have had significant ramifications for 
manufacturers using sensors as a means of compliance. However, given 
that NHTSA is proposing a performance requirement that would most 
likely be met through the use of rearview video systems, the specific 
characteristics of the test object may not have as great of an impact 
on countermeasure performance (with the possible exception of the 
height and width of the test object). Nonetheless, we have summarized 
and addressed the comments on this subject below.
    The ANPRM indicated NHTSA's belief, based on real world data, that 
the test object should simulate the physical characteristics of a 
toddler. Specifically in the ANPRM and again in this document, we have 
stated that 26 percent of victims in passenger vehicle backover crashes 
are 1 year old or younger. To date, NHTSA has generally used the 
average height of a 12-month-old child to represent a ``1-year-old 
child'' size to evaluate technologies that could be used to mitigate 
backover crashes. However, looking at the first 58 SCI cases shows that 
the average age of the 21 victims aged 1 year or younger was 15 
months.\63\ In their comments in response to the ANPRM, the AAM and GM 
recommended that the target dimensions be based on an 18-month-old 
child to best represent the victims involved in the first 56 documented 
SCI backover crash cases. Anthropometric data published by the CDC 
shows that the height difference between an average 15-month-old child 
and an average 18-month-old child is approximately 1 inch.\64\ The 
difference in shoulder breadth for these two ages is approximately 0.2 
inches. Upon further consideration of the SCI data regarding the age of 
victims, the fact that the small difference in size between a 15-month-
old and 18-month-old child,

[[Page 76222]]

and the rationale provided by commenters, NHTSA agrees with the idea of 
basing the test object dimensions representing an average 12- to 23-
month-old child using a midpoint age value of 18 months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ This apparent disparity is explained by the fact that the 
category ``1-year-old child'' encompassed all children under age 2. 
Therefore, the average age of those children, some of whom were 
almost 2, and some younger than 12 months comes out to 15 months.
    \64\ CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 months: Boys; 
Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. Published May 30, 
2000 (modified 4/20/2001) CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 
months: Girls; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. 
Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the ANPRM, NHTSA suggested specific test object dimensions that 
correspond to a 12-month-old child. In regard to the height of the test 
object, NHTSA suggested in the ANPRM some specific test object 
dimensions that correspond to a 12-month-old child, including a height 
of 30 inches (0.762 meters). As stated earlier, the average height of a 
``1-year-old'' child was used in NHTSA testing since SCI data have 
indicated that 26 percent of victims are 1 year of age or younger. In 
response to the height value suggested in the ANPRM, the AAM and GM 
recommended alternative heights. Specifically, GM recommended a test 
object height of 32 inches (81 cm). The AAM recommended specific test 
object dimensions of 82 cm (32.28 in) height based on 2000 CDC data for 
an 18-month-old child.\65\ NHTSA believes that the difference between 
30, 32, and 32.28 to be minimal for this purpose and in the proposal 
offers a compromise amongst these values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 months: Boys; 
Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. Published May 30, 
2000 (modified 4/20/2001) CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 
months: Girls; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. 
Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In regard to test object width, NHTSA suggested a value of 5 inches 
to represent the breadth of an average child's head. In response to the 
suggested value, the AAM recommended an alternative test object width 
of 15 cm (5.9 in.) based on 2000 CDC data for an 18-month-old 
child.\66\ NHTSA agrees and has reconsidered the size of test object 
needed to adequately assess system performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 months: Boys; 
Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. Published May 30, 
2000 (modified 4/20/2001) CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 
months: Girls; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. 
Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's test data to date demonstrate that, except at the edges of 
the image and immediately aft of the rear bumper (i.e., within 1 foot), 
a rearview video system generally displays the entire body of the child 
when present within the video camera's field of view. Since the entire 
body of a child standing behind the vehicle is visible with a rearview 
video system, the agency now believes that the test object's width 
should represent the width of the child's entire body, rather than just 
the child's head. While the average shoulder breadth of a standing 18-
month-old child with their arms at their sides is approximately 8.5 
inches, the absolute, overall width of an 18-month-old child standing 
with arms relaxed approaches 12 inches. A 12-inch test object width is 
currently used to represent a small child in the school bus mirror test 
defined under paragraph S13 of FMVSS No. 111. Furthermore, in order to 
perform compliance testing in regard to visual display image quality, 
the test object must be large enough that when displayed at substantial 
longitudinal range behind the vehicle the object is still large enough 
to be measured across its smallest dimension with some accuracy and 
minimal obscuration due to image graininess (for an electronic 
display).

V. NHTSA Research Subsequent to the ANPRM

    As detailed in the ANPRM, NHTSA had conducted research to assess 
drivers' ability to avoid backing crashes in a controlled test 
involving presentation of an unexpected obstacle behind the vehicle 
while the driver backed out of a garage. Possible countermeasure 
technologies assessed in this research included a rearview video system 
with a 7.8-inch (measured diagonally) visual display in the center 
console, rearview video with a 7.8-inch in-dash visual display 
augmented by a separate rear parking system, and a baseline (or control 
group) condition in which no system was present.
    The results of this research, which were presented in detail in the 
ANPRM, showed that drivers avoided 42 percent of crashes when a 
rearview video system was present and only 15 percent of crashes when 
both rearview video and rear object detection sensors were present on 
the vehicle. Without a system, all participants crashed.
    While the results provided useful information regarding the 
potential of available technologies to aid drivers in avoiding backing 
crashes with unexpected obstacles, the study did not address the 
additional technologies being considered as a means of improving rear 
visibility per the Act. As a result, additional research was undertaken 
after publication of the ANPRM to assess drivers' ability to use a rear 
parking sensor system (alone), a rear-mounted convex ``look-down'' 
mirror, and rear-mounted cross-view mirrors. In addition, to assess 
whether display location for a rearview video system may affect 
drivers' performance in avoiding backing crashes using the system, 
drivers were also tested using rearview video systems with two sizes of 
in-mirror visual displays (2.4 inch and 3.5 inch). Finally, research 
aimed at investigating the effect of test location on results was also 
completed. All the research results that NHTSA has collected to date 
are available on the NHTSA Web site and in Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0041. 
A complete summary of NHTSA's research on rear visibility 
countermeasure technologies is presented in Section VI.

A. Rearview Video Systems With In-Mirror Visual Displays

    Two rearview video system conditions were assessed: one having a 
2.4-inch visual display and another with a 3.5-inch visual display. 
These tests used the same 2007 Honda Odyssey that was used in the 
previous rearview video system test, and the drivers in the tests were 
all drivers who personally owned a 2008 Honda Odyssey with a rearview 
video system with visual display (original equipment, 2.4 inch) 
integrated in the interior rearview mirror, to make sure that 
unfamiliarity with such a system was not a factor. The numbers of test 
participants run were 12 for the 2.4-inch display and 10 for the 3.5-
inch display. The test results showed very different results between 
the two visual display sizes. Thirty-three percent of subjects driving 
vehicles equipped with a rearview video system with 2.4-inch visual 
display avoided crashing into the obstacle. However, 70 percent of 
subjects driving vehicles equipped with a rearview video system with 
3.5-inch visual display avoided a crash. However, despite the observed 
37 percent more crashes avoided with the larger in-mirror display, the 
result was not found to be statistically significant due to the 
relatively small sample size of subjects tested.\67\ Across all system 
conditions tested, the rearview video system with 3.5-inch visual 
display proved to be the one with which drivers avoided the most 
crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ In2010, NHTSA intends to conduct additional trials of this 
experiment to obtain more data in an effort to attain statistical 
significance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors

    A similar test was conducted with rear-mounted convex ``look down'' 
mirrors and rear cross-view mirrors. These tests also used the 2007 
Honda Odyssey and were conducted using owners of this type of vehicle. 
Since no vehicle sold in the U.S. is known to offer rear convex look-
down mirrors as original equipment, an aftermarket mirror was used. To 
provide the test participants in this system condition with some 
experience using the mirror (before they were presented with the

[[Page 76223]]

unexpected obstacle event), the mirrors were installed on their 
vehicles for 4 weeks prior to the test event.\68\ During the test 
procedure, none of the thirteen participants that participated in the 
study successfully avoided the unexpected obstacle, giving a driver 
performance factor of zero.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ In order to conceal the fact that this was an experiment in 
rear obstacle detection, participants were told that recording 
devices were installed in the rear mirror.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A similar test was conducted with rear cross-view mirrors. This 
test condition involved use of a 2003 Toyota 4Runner, which is the only 
vehicle sold in the U.S. known to offer rear convex cross-view mirrors 
as original equipment. Test subjects were owners of a 2003-2007 Toyota 
4Runner who had owned and driven the vehicle for at least 6 months. 
During the test procedure, none of the seven participants that 
participated in the study successfully avoided the unexpected obstacle, 
giving the rear cross-view mirror system a driver performance factor of 
zero.

C. Rear Sensor Systems

    Using the same unexpected obstacle event scenario, NHTSA tested 
fourteen drivers of vehicles equipped with a rear parking sensor 
system. This system involved use of a 2009 Ford Flex with an original 
equipment rear parking aid system using ultrasonic sensors. As with the 
testing of the other system types, drivers of the Ford Flex with 
sensor-based rear parking aid system were persons who owned the vehicle 
and had driven it as their primary vehicle for at least 6 months, so 
that they would be familiar with the system. During the test, the 
parking aid system on this vehicle detected the plastic obstacle and 
produced an auditory warning in 100 percent of trials. This detection 
rate was significantly better than the 39 percent detection rate 
observed in the NHTSA's prior testing that used an identical scenario 
but a different test vehicle.\69\ Despite the consistent rate of object 
detection demonstrated by the Ford Flex rear parking sensors, only one 
test subject in this system condition successfully avoided crashing 
into the obstacle, resulting in only 7 percent of crashes avoided. 
However, we note that all of the participants braked slightly, and four 
came to a momentary, complete stop before resuming rearward motion and 
crashing into the obstacle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G. H.S., and 
Ranney, T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video 
Systems (ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
DOT 811 024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Ability of Currently Available Sensor Technology To Detect Small 
Child Pedestrians

    NHTSA's 2009 continuation of research to examine drivers' ability 
to avoid backing crashes used a 2009 Ford Flex equipped with a rear 
parking system. As noted in Section C above, this vehicle exhibited a 
100-percent detection rate for the plastic obstacle used in the final 
conflict scenario. Given the improved detection performance seen with 
this ultrasonic-based sensor system over prior testing results using 
other ultrasonic systems, NHTSA thought it appropriate to assess this 
system's ability to detect small children.
    Using a protocol developed previously and documented,\70\ NHTSA 
conducted static and dynamic tests using young children and recorded 
the sensor system's ability to detect the children. Testing was 
conducted with two 1-year-old children and four children aged 
approximately 3 years. Tests with 1-year-old children included 
standing, walking laterally, and riding a wheeled toy that was towed 
(by test staff) laterally behind the vehicle. Tests with the 3-year-old 
children included standing, walking laterally, running laterally, and 
riding a wheeled ride-on toy behind the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ Mazzae, E.N. and Garrott, W.R., Experimental Evaluation of 
the Performance of Available Backover Prevention Technologies, NHTSA 
Technical Report No. DOT HS 810 634, September 2006, and Vehicle 
Backover Avoidance Technology Study, Report to Congress, November 
2006.
    .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Testing showed that the 1-year-old children were detected in 100 
percent of trials at a range of 1, 2, or 3 feet behind the vehicle when 
walking or riding on the wheeled toy. At a range of 4 feet, the 1-year-
old children were detected in 4 of 6 trials (67 percent) when walking, 
but were not detecting at 4-foot range when riding the wheeled toy.
    The 3-year-old children were found to be detected out to a range of 
6 feet. Table 8 below summarizes the results for these tests and shows 
strong detection performance out to a range of 3 feet, as was seen for 
the younger children. However, detection performance appears to decline 
significantly at the 4-foot range.

Table 8--2009 Ford Flex Rear Sensor System Detection Performance With 3-
                            Year-Old Children
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Walking   Running   Ride-on
 Longitudinal range from rear bumper face      (%)       (%)     toy (%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ft......................................       100       100       100
2 ft......................................       100       100       100
3 ft......................................       100        67        87
4 ft......................................        40        13        47
5 ft......................................        20         0         0
6 ft......................................        20         0         0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These tests demonstrated improved consistency of detection over 
results from past NHTSA testing of ultrasonic-based sensor systems. 
However, the short detection range for young children is insufficient 
for the purposes of backover mitigation. NHTSA notes, however, that as 
with research results described in the ANPRM, all systems tested were 
designed as parking aids and were not intended to be used for the 
purpose of detecting children.

VI. Countermeasure Effectiveness Estimation Based on NHTSA Research 
Data

    Three conditions must be met for a rear visibility technology to 
provide a benefit to the driver. First, the crash must be one that is 
``avoidable'' through use of the device; i.e., the pedestrian must be 
within the target range for the sensor, or the viewable area of the 
camera or mirror. Second, once the pedestrian is within the system's 
range, the device must ``sense'' that fact, i.e., provide the driver 
with information about the presence and location of the pedestrian. 
Third, there must be sufficient ``driver response,'' i.e., before 
impact with the pedestrian, the driver must receive this information 
and respond appropriately by confirming whether someone is or is not 
behind the vehicle before proceeding. These factors are denoted as 
fA, fS, and fDR, respectively, in this 
analysis. Their product is the final system effectiveness.
    This three-phase concept is depicted in Figure 3 below for both 
sensor-based systems and visual systems (i.e., rearview video systems, 
mirrors).
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

[[Page 76224]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.009

BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
    Based on this general description of the process of avoiding a 
backing crash, NHTSA has developed overall effectiveness of various 
backover countermeasure technologies using three individual factors. 
First, SCI backover incident reports were examined to characterize the 
geometry of the specific situations in which a backing vehicle struck a 
pedestrian or cyclist to determine if the backover

[[Page 76225]]

crash was conceivably avoidable using a given technology and standard 
vehicle equipment (i.e., required rearview mirrors). We call this the 
``avoidability'' of the backing conflict situation, or factor 
``FA'' depicted in the figure above. Second, we estimated 
the probability that a countermeasure could sense and warn the driver 
of the rear obstacle, which we call ``system performance,'' or factor 
``FS'' in the figure above. Finally, we determined the 
likelihood of a driver responding appropriately to information provided 
by the system to successfully avoid a backing crash. We call this 
``driver reaction,'' depicted above as factor ``FDR.'' If an 
obstruction in the path of a backing vehicle is avoidable, detectable, 
and a driver reacts appropriately, a backover crash will be avoided. 
Therefore, the ``overall effectiveness'' of the system is calculated by 
multiplying FA, FS, and FDR together. 
The derivation of these three factors is described below.

A. Situation Avoidability

    Factor ``FA'' was derived by determining the 
``avoidability'' of a backover crash. In order to better understand how 
avoidable these situations are, NHTSA closely reviewed the SCI backover 
case reports. By qualitatively analyzing the case reports, NHTSA 
assessed a variety of factors concerning the case and how they 
contributed to ``avoidability'', including:
     Original and final position of the vehicle.
     Vehicle speed.
     If the victim was conceivably visible through direct 
vision or indirectly using the vehicle's mirrors given the visual 
aspects of the environment surrounding the vehicle during the backing 
maneuver (i.e., was the area clear of visual obstructions?).
     Position of the victim with respect to the vehicle.
     Size, orientation (i.e., standing, sitting), and movement 
of the victim.
     If the victim was detectable given the detection 
characteristics of a given technology.
     If the vehicle could have stopped in time given typical 
system performance for that technology (based on results of NHTSA 
testing of system capabilities).
    NHTSA used a general process to determine if a crash was avoidable. 
We examined the system detection zone, vehicle blind zone area, and 
visible areas surrounding the vehicle. If the pedestrian or cyclist was 
detectable either visually or by a sensor-based system, then what 
followed was a cataloguing of all the impediments to a typical, 
reasonable driver reacting in time after receiving a warning or 
recognizing a pedestrian or cyclist seen on a rearview video system 
display.
    While many backover crashes are theoretically avoidable, certain 
characteristics render some incidents impossible to prevent using rear 
object detection technology, even if the technology and the person 
using it act appropriately. Consider, for example, a situation where a 
vehicle is backing along a wall. If a child walks through a gap in the 
wall and enters the vehicle's path less than 2 feet from the vehicle, 
the backover would be judged ``unavoidable.'' This is because no known 
technology could have detected the child through the wall, and no car 
could brake fast enough to stop in time to avoid the child, once he 
became visible.
    Some backover crashes are avoidable for certain technologies, but 
not for others, a function that generally corresponds to the detection 
range of the rear visibility countermeasure. For example, an ultrasonic 
sensor might have an effective range of only 6 feet, while a rearview 
video system might be able to effectively display a child positioned 20 
feet behind a vehicle. If a vehicle were backing at a relatively high 
speed toward a child, it might take 10 feet once the brakes were 
applied to stop the vehicle. In that case, the backover crash would be 
unavoidable for the vehicle equipped with the sensor system, because it 
could have only detected the child at 6 feet. On the other hand, the 
same backover situation would be considered an ``avoidable'' incident 
for a vehicle equipped with the rearview video system. This is why the 
``FA'' factor differs for different technologies.
    We note, of course, that merely because a backover crash is 
avoidable does not mean it will be avoided. Furthermore, drivers differ 
in their tendencies to check rearview mirrors and rearview video system 
displays, and may not always react perfectly and with sufficiently fast 
reaction time. However, those factors are addressed in the two sections 
below. The avoidability of a situation merely describes whether 
backover avoidance technology could have had any effect at all on the 
outcome of the conflict situation.
    Based on our analysis of the SCI data, we have derived the 
following values for the percent of backover crashes that are avoidable 
using various technologies. Rear-mounted mirrors could prevent up to 49 
percent of backover crashes. Sensor technology, on average, could have 
prevented up to 52 percent of backover crashes. For a rearview video 
system, NHTSA's analysis concluded that up to 76 percent of backover 
crashes were avoidance with a 130-degree camera lens and 90 percent of 
backover crashes were avoidable with a 180-degree camera lens, through 
which more pedestrians could be seen approaching from the sides of the 
vehicle.

B. System Performance

    Factor ``FS'' was derived by determining the ability of 
the system to detect or display a rear obstacle based on the results of 
comprehensive NHTSA testing of systems' ability to detect various 
objects in a laboratory setting. Since mirrors and rearview video 
systems have the ability to display anything within their field of 
view, we used a figure of 100 percent effectiveness.\71\ Sensors, 
however, may not always detect an obstacle behind the vehicle, even 
when the object is within their specified detection zone. This may be 
the result of the reflectivity of the obstacle, such as if a child's 
clothing is textured and therefore absorbs the ultrasonic signal. Our 
specific value for sensor system performance is based on research 
described at length in the ANPRM. In NHTSA's 2007 study of drivers' 
ability to avoid a backing crash with an unexpected obstacle while 
driving a vehicle equipped with a rearview video system either alone or 
in conjunction with a rear parking system, the sensor-based system 
detected the rear obstacle in 39 percent of test trials.\72\ This value 
represents the system performance of sensor-based systems in the 
calculation of overall effectiveness presented in this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ While we realize a component of a rearview video system 
could malfunction or break or a mirror could break or be misaligned, 
for purposes of our analysis, we assume they, and sensors, are 
functioning properly.
    \72\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H. S., and 
Ranney, T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video 
Systems (ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
DOT 811 024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Driver Performance

    Factor FDR represents the degree to which drivers may 
use the various possible backover avoidance countermeasures to 
successfully avoid a crash. Unlike many other safety technologies, 
these countermeasures are only effective at preventing vehicle crashes 
if they are understood, trusted, and used by drivers. This is a 
particularly important issue considered in this rulemaking. Currently, 
drivers are most familiar with the interior and side rearview mirrors 
required or permitted by FMVSS No. 111. Signals from sensor-based rear 
object detection systems and images from new mirrors and rearview video 
system visual

[[Page 76226]]

displays must be noticed, understood, and reacted to by the driver in 
order to avoid a crash. A system merely detecting or displaying the 
obstacle in the path of the vehicle is not enough to avoid a crash.
    NHTSA has differing concerns related to all three types of 
technologies currently available for informing a driver of the presence 
of an obstacle behind a vehicle. With regard to rear-mounted convex 
mirrors, the primary concern is that the images they provide are too 
distorted to permit the driver to discern an obstacle within the image. 
In addition, the range that mirrors display behind the vehicle may be 
insufficient to allow a driver time to brake to a stop once the driver 
sees the rear obstacle. With all sensors, drivers may tend to not trust 
the warnings provided because they may not be able to visually confirm 
that an obstacle is present in the vehicle's rear blind zone. In 
addition, if a system is prone to frequent false positive signals, this 
may cause drivers to ignore, or even turn off, the system, a concern 
echoed by several commenters. Finally, we are concerned that drivers 
may have difficulty integrating glances at a rearview video system 
visual display into their normal glance patterns while backing, 
focusing more on direct view (glancing rearward over their shoulder) or 
existing mirrors. In this section, we present the driver performance 
research that NHTSA has conducted and continues to conduct on currently 
available system types that are relevant to backover avoidance.
    As described in the ANPRM and in Section V of this notice, NHTSA 
conducted research \73\ to assess drivers' ability to avoid backing 
crashes in a controlled test involving presentation of an unexpected 
obstacle behind the vehicle while the driver backed out of a garage. 
The tests were designed so that the crash was always preventable (i.e., 
an ``FA'' factor of 100%) for drivers of vehicles equipped 
with a countermeasure system. Drivers in the baseline condition whose 
vehicles were only equipped with standard rearview mirrors could not 
see the rear obstacle and therefore it was nearly impossible for them 
to avoid a crash (and none did). The tests were also designed such that 
the obstruction was detectable by the countermeasure \74\ in every 
trial (i.e., a ``FS'' factor of 100%). Therefore, any 
failure of the driver to avoid crashing into the obstacle should be 
attributable solely to the driver performance factor.\75\ Therefore, 
NHTSA believes that these experiments isolated, to the extent possible, 
the effects of driver performance in avoiding a backing crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H.S., and Ranney, 
T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems 
(ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 811 
024.
    \74\ This means that the obstacle's image either appeared on the 
mirror surface, was visible on a rearview video system visual 
display. For sensors, the obstacle as positioned at the centerline 
of the vehicle was assumed to be detectable by the system.
    \75\ However, the ultrasonic sensor-based system used in this 
testing was found to only detect the centered obstacle in 39 percent 
of trials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 9 summarizes the comparative driver effectiveness results for 
each of the seven systems assessed. This is how the various 
``FDR'' factor figures were derived, which are used in the 
overall effectiveness calculations, described below.

                  Table 9--Summary of Crash Results in Unexpected Obstacle Event by System Type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Driver
                                                                                     Number of      performance
                           Technology                                    N            crashes        (``FDR''
                                                                                                    factor) (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No system.......................................................              12              12               0
Rear-mounted convex mirrors.....................................              13              13               0
Rear cross-view mirrors.........................................               7               7               0
Sensors (ultrasonic and radar) \76\.............................              14              13               7
Rearview video, in-dash, combined with ultrasonic sensors.......              13              11              15
Rearview video, in-mirror, 2.4-inch display.....................              12               8              33
Rearview video, in-mirror, 3.5-inch display.....................              10               3              70
Rearview video, in-dash.........................................              12               7              42
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA\76\ has recently completed the third in a series of three 
studies that examined drivers' use of backing aid systems to avoid 
crashes while backing. Backing aid systems examined in the studies 
included rearview video (RV) systems with different display sizes and 
locations, rear sensor-based systems (RPS), and a combination system 
having both rearview video and rear sensors. For the five ``system'' 
conditions examined in both laboratory (studies 1 and 2) and non-
laboratory (study 3, daycare parking lot) settings, the relative crash 
rates were consistent. Given this observation, once our reduction of 
the data is complete, we will place these results in the docket and 
incorporate them for the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ A radar-based sensor system was not assessed in this test, 
however, for the purposes of assessing driver performance, sensor 
technology was deemed not critical in this research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Determining Overall Effectiveness

    Based on the above strategy of defining the components of 
effectiveness, we can estimate the overall effectiveness of each of the 
possible backover avoidance countermeasures examined. Overall, NHTSA's 
research showed that out of all technologies tested, rearview video 
systems were the most effective in aiding drivers to avoid backing 
crashes. With rear-mounted convex mirrors, the research showed that 
drivers were not inclined to use them in backing situations, presumably 
due to image distortion and limited range. While sensors may have the 
potential to show benefits, the research demonstrated that without 
visual confirmation, drivers tended not to believe the warnings 
provided by the sensor system, and continued the backing maneuver in 
spite of the warning. The agency requests comments on what steps could 
be taken and at what cost and with what consequences to improve the 
range and sampling rate of sensors, to address problems with detecting 
pedestrians wearing low reflectivity clothing and to improve driver 
response to sensor provided warnings. What sort of performance 
requirement would be needed to ensure that sampling frequency would be 
increased sufficiently? However, rearview video systems examined were 
able to consistently display the rear obstacles to the drivers, as well 
as enable and induce

[[Page 76227]]

drivers to avoid them. Table 10 below summarizes these results.

                        Table 10--Summary of Overall Effectiveness Values by System Type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Final effectiveness
                          System                              FA(%)     FS(%)    FDR(%)    (%)  FA x FS x FDR =
                                                                                                    FE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
180[deg] Camera...........................................        90       100        55                    49
130[deg] Camera...........................................        76       100        55                    42
Ultrasonic................................................        49        70         7                     2.5
Radar.....................................................        54        70         7                     2.7
Mirrors...................................................      * 33       100      ** 0                     0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* FA for mirrors is taken from separate source due to lack of inclusion in the SCI case review that generated FA
  for cameras and sensors.
** FDR for mirrors is taken from a small sample size of 20 tests. It is 0% because throughout testing, drivers
  did not take advantage of either cross-view or lookdown mirrors to avoid the obstacle in the test.

VII. Proposal To Mandate Improved Rear Visibility

    Based on the comments on the ANPRM and NHTSA's research on the 
various means available to mitigate backover crashes, NHTSA has 
developed the following proposal to improve light vehicle rear 
visibility. The proposal is based in part on our tentative conclusion 
that drivers need to be able to see a visual image of a 32-inch tall 
cylinder with 12-inch diameter behind the vehicle over an area 5 feet 
to either side of the vehicle centerline by 20 feet in longitudinal 
range from the vehicle's rear bumper face. We are also proposing to 
specify certain performance criteria for visual display performance, 
such as luminance and rearview image response time, which are detailed 
below, as well as durability requirements. We believe that these 
specifications are necessary to ensure robust and effective 
performance.
    These proposed improvements would apply to all passenger cars, 
MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 
pounds or less. Based on the substantial numbers of fatalities and 
injuries involving light vehicles other than LTVs, we are not proposing 
to limit these more stringent rear visibility performance requirements 
to LTVs only. Further, despite NHTSA's decision to propose a 
requirement for improved rear visibility for nearly all light vehicles, 
we have included in the preliminary regulatory impact analysis an 
economic analysis of an alternative in which only LTVs are subjected to 
these requirements. We invite comments on this additional analysis.
    In the near term, we believe that existing rearview video systems 
can be used to meet the requirements with minimal or no modifications. 
While we recognize that there are significant costs involved in 
addressing the safety problem at issue using rearview video systems, we 
believe that our research shows that rearview video systems currently 
represent the most effective technology to address the problem of 
backover crashes. This is because rear-mounted convex mirrors and 
sensor-based object detection systems offer few benefits compared to 
rearview video systems due to system performance and driver use issues. 
As we have previously said, use of a blind zone area threshold to focus 
the improve visibility requirements on vehicles with large rear blind 
zone areas, and presumably high backover crash rates, from these 
enhanced rear visibility requirements lacks a sufficient statistical 
basis while adding problematic issues. Some vehicles with comparatively 
small blind zones had high rates of backover incidents. Similarly, 
limiting countermeasures to LTVs, such as vans, multipurpose passenger 
vehicles, and trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, would leave 
large gaps in safety protection as well as a disparity in quality of 
rear visibility between these vehicles and passenger cars.
    In response to the suggestion of many commenters that, regardless 
of how broadly or narrowly the performance requirements are applied 
within the population of light vehicles, the requirements be 
technology-neutral, we believe we need to consider the practical 
consequences that adopting a technology neutral approach would have not 
only for the first phase of a backover crash, but also for each of the 
later phases. Adequate performance at the initial phase does not 
necessarily assure adequate performance at a later phase. The ultimate 
safety test of a technology in the context of this rulemaking is 
whether the technology enables the driver to detect the presence of a 
pedestrian in or near the path of the driver's backing vehicle and 
whether drivers use the technology and succeed in avoiding backover 
crashes.
    Under our proposal, current rear object detection sensors and rear-
mounted convex mirrors would not be sufficient as stand-alone 
technologies to meet the proposed rear visibility requirement. This is 
because sensors and mirrors, while able to detect pedestrians to some 
degree, simply do not induce the driver response needed to prevent 
backover crashes. NHTSA research indicates that the presence of a 
system consisting of rear-mounted convex mirrors was statistically 
equivalent to the absence of any system at all for seeing pedestrians 
behind a driver's vehicle. Therefore, we do not believe that any 
benefits would accrue from installation of rear-mounted convex mirrors.
    With regard to sensors, our research shows \77\ that, in the vast 
majority of cases, a sensor-activated warning of the presence of an 
obstacle will not lead to a successful (i.e., timely and sufficient) 
crash avoidance response from the driver unless the driver is also 
provided with visual confirmation of obstacle presence. Because of this 
apparent need for visual confirmation and that the fact that sensors 
induced a successful driver reaction only 7 percent of the time in 
NHTSA testing, we do not believe it is in the best interest of safety 
to propose allowing systems that rely on sensors alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Research by GM also showed this apparent tendency of 
drivers to want visual confirmation of obstacle presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, we note that we are not proposing to disallow sensor 
systems as a supplement to rearview video systems. While NHTSA 
research\78\ showed 27 percent worse driver crash avoidance performance 
in a vehicle equipped with both a rearview video system and rear 
sensors than in a vehicle with only rearview video, deficiencies in the 
performance of the sensor system may have confounded the isolation of 
driver performance. It is thus unclear to what extent the presence of 
sensors may

[[Page 76228]]

induce some drivers to rely on the sensors to some extent instead of 
relying exclusively on close and uninterrupted monitoring of the video 
display. To the extent that drivers rely on sensors and to the extent 
that the sensors fail to detect objects, driver crash avoidance 
performance will worsen. We seek comment on this issue. Furthermore, 
the cost of a combined rearview video and sensor system would be higher 
than that of a rearview video system alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H.S., and Ranney, 
T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems 
(ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 811 
024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, while NHTSA is not at this time proposing to mandate 
advanced multi-technology countermeasure systems, we note that research 
continues. These systems may include video-based systems with real-time 
image processing for object detection and combinations of sensors and 
video cameras, some of which (detailed by commenters) include sensor-
based graphic overlays superimposed over visual images from rearview 
video systems. Advances like infrared detection, automated braking, and 
backing speed limitation were all concepts raised either by commenters 
or NHTSA analysis.

A. Proposed Specifications

    Our general approach in developing performance requirements was to 
consider the various phases of backover crashes and identify key areas 
of performance pertinent to overall system effectiveness. In the 
absence of existing consensus industry standards, we reviewed existing 
systems and determined which aspects of performance should be addressed 
in the regulatory text of this proposal. Based on the systems we have 
tested and comments on the ANPRM, we believe that existing systems 
generally meet our proposed specifications and in cases in which they 
do not, changes could be made with minimal cost impact. For example, it 
is likely that existing systems would meet our durability requirements 
because they are typically subjected to vehicle level tests involving 
harsher conditions than we are proposing. Both vehicle and equipment 
manufacturers cited low warranty claim rates for rearview video systems 
in their comments. This indicates to us that today's systems are 
proving durable in typical driving conditions. Similarly, while some 
current systems would not satisfy our maximum image response time 
requirement, a change to the vehicle to prioritize display of the 
rearview video image over navigation software would significantly 
improve image response time with minimal cost.
i. Improved Rear Field of View
    To determine the appropriate minimum width of the required visible 
area, NHTSA reviewed both available SCI backover case data and our 
Monte Carlo analysis of backover crash risk as a function of pedestrian 
initial location. While some small risk exists as far as 9 feet 
laterally to the left and right of a rearward extension of a vehicle's 
longitudinal centerline, the vast majority of the risk is concentrated 
within a 10-foot wide area that extends symmetrically only 5 feet 
laterally to either side from the extended centerline. Accordingly, 
NHTSA proposes that the required area of improved visibility be this 
10-foot wide area that is centered on the vehicle's centerline.
    To determine the appropriate minimum longitudinal range (i.e., 
length) of the area that should be specified to maximize the 
feasibility and effectiveness of the proposal in reducing backover 
crashes, NHTSA considered comments on the ANPRM, SCI backover case 
data, and the results of our Monte Carlo analysis. Using the 58 SCI 
backover cases, NHTSA examined the distance the vehicle traveled prior 
to striking the pedestrian. Figure 4 shows the percent of cases 
encompassed by various ranges of longitudinal distance. These data show 
that in 77 percent of SCI backover cases the vehicle traveled 20 feet 
or less before striking the victim. The Monte Carlo analysis of 
backover crash risk as a function of the pedestrian's initial location 
used a distribution of actual backing maneuver travel distances based 
on those observed in naturalistic backing maneuvers made by test 
participants in NHTSA's research study that examined drivers' use of 
rearview video systems.\79\ The Monte Carlo analysis, which was 
outlined in Section II.C.v, indicated based on computer simulation that 
the highest risk for pedestrians being struck is within a range of 33 
feet aft of the rear bumper. Given that actual backover SCI case data 
are available, NHTSA proposes a longitudinal range for rear visibility 
coverage of 20 feet extending backward from the rearmost point of the 
rear bumper based on those rear-world data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H.S., and Ranney, 
T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems 
(ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 811 
024.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 76229]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.010

    To ensure adequate visibility of this area, the agency is 
specifying the placement of seven test objects (cylinders) within the 
area. Given the size of the area and the locations of the cylinders 
within the area, we believe that a view of the entire area can be 
captured through the installation of a single video camera that has a 
minimum 130-degree horizontal angle and is located at or near the 
centerline of the vehicle. For that reason, NHTSA's analysis has used 
the estimated costs and benefits of a rearview video system with a 130-
degree video camera.
ii. Visual Display Requirements
    The following sections describe the proposed requirements for 
visual displays used to present images of the area behind a vehicle. 
NHTSA believes these requirements are important to achieving reasonable 
system effectiveness. Further, we note that one potential concern 
expressed to NHTSA is that specifying requirements could increase costs 
for display manufacturers by requiring them to conduct expensive 
certification tests of equipment. We note that the requirements 
proposed today are vehicle requirements, not equipment requirements, 
and so we do not believe that equipment manufacturers will be unduly 
burdened.
a. Rearview Image Size
    NHTSA is proposing a performance requirement of at least 5 minutes 
of arc \80\ for the displayed size (i.e., how large the cylinders 
appear) in the rearview image of three test cylinders (cylinders A, B, 
and C) that are located 20 feet aft of the rearmost point on the 
vehicle's rear bumper. Specifically, we are proposing to require that 
when the images of these three test cylinders are measured, the average 
size of the three displayed test cylinders must not be less than 5 
minutes of arc. Additionally, the displayed size of each of the three 
displayed test cylinders individually must not be less than 3 minutes 
of arc. NHTSA does not believe that there is a need to propose 
displayed size requirements for any of the other test cylinders, 
because the three furthest test objects will always appear the 
smallest, thus representing the worst case visually observable 
condition for the 7 cylinders, and any additional measurements would be 
an unnecessary burden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ A minute of arc is a unit of angular measurement that is 
equal to one-sixtieth of a degree.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The reason for proposing 5 minutes of arc for the average displayed 
size of the test cylinders is that NHTSA believes this is the minimum 
size needed for non-professional drivers to distinguish and react to 
images. The 3 and 5 minutes of arc figures are based on research 
originally published by Satoh, Yamanaka, Kondoh, Yamashita, Matsuzaki, 
and Akisuzuki in 1983.\81\ Satoh et al examined the relationship 
between an object's subtended visual angle \82\ at a person's eyes and 
a person's subjective ability to see the object and to make judgments 
about what he or she is seeing. Satoh asserted that an object must 
subtend at least 5 minutes of arc for a person to be able to make 
judgments about the object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Satoh, H., Yamanaka, A., Kondoh, T., Yamashita, M., 
Matsuzaki, M., and Akisuzuki, K., ``Development of a Periscope 
Mirror System,'' JSAE Review, November 1983.
    \82\ The angle which an object or detail subtends at the point 
of observation; usually measured in minutes of arc. If the point of 
observation is the pupil of a person's eye, the angle is formed by 
two rays, one passing through the center of the pupil and touching 
the upper edge of the observed object and the other passing though 
the center of the pupil and touching the lower edge of the object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To date, NHTSA has based its requirements for minimum image size 
(the minimum subtended visual angle at the driver's eyes) on the Satoh 
et al. research. The school bus cross view mirror requirements in FMVSS 
No. 111 are based in part on the Satoh

[[Page 76230]]

research.\83\ For example, paragraph S9.4 of FMVSS No. 111 requires a 
school bus cross-view mirror to show the driver a specified child 
surrogate test object located at a specified location with a subtended 
visual angle of at least 3 minutes of arc for the worse case test 
object, cylinder ``P''. The rationale for using a visual angle value 
less than 5 minutes of arc for the school bus mirror requirements is 
threefold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Garrott, W.R., Rockwell, T.H., and Kiger, S.W. (1990). 
Ergonomic Research on School Bus Cross View Mirror Systems. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 807 676.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, school bus drivers must be specially licensed before they 
can drive a school bus carrying children. They are required to obtain a 
Commercial Drivers License with a School Bus Endorsement. The training 
required to obtain this special license and the necessity of being 
vigilant in all types of crashes in order to retain their license and 
employment is expected to increase school bus drivers' awareness of the 
possibility of pedestrians suddenly entering danger areas around their 
bus. The combined effect of this training and the necessity for 
attentiveness is expected to encourage drivers to pay more attention to 
small images that are visible in a bus's mirrors.
    Second, school bus drivers are specifically trained in the use of 
their bus's cross view mirrors. In the late 1980's, when the school bus 
cross-view mirror requirements of FMVSS No. 111 were being developed, 
49 states plus Washington, DC \84\ required annual training for all 
school bus drivers in the use of their bus's cross view mirrors. This 
training is expected to allow drivers to make better use of very small 
images that they see.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ California had no such requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, school bus cross-view mirrors are intended to be used before 
the bus begins to move, while the bus is stationary. As a result, 
drivers can take as much time as they need to determine what they see 
in their bus's cross-view mirrors. In contrast, in the passenger 
vehicle environment, drivers may use the display while the vehicle is 
stationary and while the vehicle is in motion backing up (albeit at 
fairly low speeds). As a result, drivers may have limits on the amount 
of time that they may use to determine what they are seeing in a 
rearview video display. Again, this argues for a larger minimum image 
size requirement.
    NHTSA considered whether the image size criterion used for school 
bus cross-view mirror requirements currently in FMVSS No. 111 should 
also be applied to rearview images required for passenger vehicles. 
After careful consideration, NHTSA has concluded it is appropriate to 
propose a stronger requirement for passenger vehicles since passenger 
vehicle drivers do not have the same vehicle and system (e.g., mirror 
use) training as school bus drivers do, nor do passenger vehicles 
typically use the systems in a stationary scenario. Based on this, the 
Satoh-recommended 5 minutes of arc subtended visual angle requirement 
is warranted and therefore recommended as a minimum performance 
requirement.
    Based upon NHTSA test data from an examination of a 2007 Honda 
Odyssey minivan fitted both with an original equipment (from a 2008 
Honda Odyssey) 2.4-inch diagonal rearview video display and an original 
equipment 3.5-inch diagonal rearview video display (from a GM vehicle), 
NHTSA estimates that a 2.8-inch or larger diagonal rearview video 
display in the interior rearview mirror would be necessary to meet the 
proposed 5 minutes of arc requirement for this vehicle.
b. Image Response Time
    Image response time is the time delay between the moment the 
vehicle's transmission is shifted into reverse gear, and the moment 
which an image to the rear of the vehicle is displayed. For vehicles in 
which an existing navigation system visual display is used to display a 
rearview video image, we believe that adopting a maximum image response 
time value will prevent manufacturers from giving priority, at 
ignition, to the loading of navigation system applications instead of 
the rearview video applications. We believe that giving display 
priority to a rearview video system image should increase the 
effectiveness of such systems in preventing backing crashes. As stated 
previously, NHTSA is concerned that if the display takes too long to 
appear, drivers will be more likely to begin a backing maneuver before 
the image of the area behind the vehicle is displayed. Given the 
importance of the ``initial check'' behind the vehicle, a long image 
response time could have a strong negative effect on the overall 
effectiveness of a rearview video system. As an appropriate balance 
between the importance of a quickly provided image and the need for 
sufficient opportunity to conduct system checks as noted in the ANPRM 
comments (see section IV.G), NHTSA proposes a 2.0-second maximum image 
response time after the vehicle's transmission is shifted into reverse 
based on the minimum time in which such system checks can be conducted.
c. Image Linger Time
    Image linger time refers to the period in which the rearview video 
image continues to be displayed after the vehicle's transmission has 
been shifted out of reverse gear. In the ANPRM, NHTSA indicated that a 
maximum of 8 seconds of linger time may be appropriate after the 
vehicle is shifted from the reverse position. Based on their 
observations of drivers making parking maneuvers, the AAM recommended a 
maximum linger time of 10 seconds or an alternative speed-based value 
in which the rearview video display would turn off when the vehicle 
reach a speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph).Similarly, GM recommended a maximum 
linger time of 10 seconds or a speed-based limit of 5 mph (8 kph). 
Based on commenters' findings regarding actual, observed maneuver 
durations, NHTSA is proposing a time-based maximum linger time of 10.0 
seconds to better aid to the driver.
d. Visual Display Luminance
    We believe it is appropriate to adopt a minimum visual display 
luminance value to ensure that the rearview video system visual display 
image is adequately visible in varying conditions, such as bright 
sunlight or low levels of ambient light. Adequately visible, in this 
case, would mean that a driver can discern the presence of and identify 
obstacles displayed within the rearview video image. Gentex recommended 
that a brightness level of 500 cd/m\2\ for in-mirror displays as 
measured at room temperature and in a dark room, and said that it has 
been confirmed by vehicle manufacturer research to be the minimally 
accepted value, presumably to account for a wide possible range of 
ambient conditions. Therefore, we are proposing a minimum visual 
display luminance requirement of 500 cd/m\2\ for rearview image 
displays.
e. Other Aspects of Visual Display
    NHTSA also requires comments regarding other aspects of visual 
display and image quality performance such as image resolution, 
minification, distortion, contrast ratio and low-light performance as 
well as regarding display location. While existing systems may perform 
well with regard to these aspects of performance, there is no certainty 
that future systems will be designed to perform as well. Depending on 
the public comments and other available information, we may include 
requirements on some or all of these aspects of performance in the 
final rule.

[[Page 76231]]

If we were to include requirements for some aspects, how should those 
aspects be regulated, at what level of stringency, and why? For 
example, what test procedures should be used for measuring these 
aspects of performance? Do any existing voluntary consensus standards 
have test procedures that would be appropriate for assessing 
performance?
iii. Requirements for External System Components
    We believe that for rear visibility systems to be effective in 
preventing real-world crashes, it is imperative that they perform 
across a wide range of environments typically encountered by drivers. 
For example, such systems should operate in various temperature ranges 
and should not be rendered inoperable by conditions such as rain or 
normal corrosion.
    As part of our technical review, we considered the possibility of 
adopting requirements from industry consensus standards. Unfortunately, 
such standards do not currently exist as manufacturers have indicated 
they consider their internal technical specifications for such systems 
to be proprietary. It is the agency's understanding that no such 
industry consensus standards will be developed and available for 
consideration within the timeframe of the current rulemaking process.
    Therefore, we reviewed existing requirements in our safety 
standards for other vehicle equipment in these areas. We believe there 
is merit in reviewing existing requirements for exterior motor vehicle 
equipment, such as lighting, particularly because components such as 
video cameras utilized in rearview video systems are typically mounted 
near rear lamps and subject to the same environmental conditions. While 
we considered that some vehicle manufacturers may conduct indirect 
vehicle level environmental tests that could potentially address some 
of these areas of interest, we noted that such testing is not required 
and that there is no basis to believe all vehicle manufacturers would 
adopt similar criteria. Therefore, based on the requirements outlined 
in FMVSS No. 108 for lighting, we are proposing requirements for the 
following areas to address rear visibility system external component 
durability: Salt spray (fog), temperature cycle, and humidity.
    We believe a salt spray evaluation will address both the necessary 
corrosion performance, as well as general moisture resistance required 
so that rear visibility systems can deliver the expected effectiveness 
to motorists in the real world. We are proposing that exterior 
components used in rear visibility systems application meet the 
required minimum performance of exterior lamps, which are required to 
be tested in accordance with ASTM B117-73, Method of Salt Spray (Fog) 
Testing for a total period of 50 hours. The 50 hour total period is 
comprised of 2 identical periods of 24 hours of exposure followed by 1 
hour of drying time. We believe that this standardized test procedure 
is a reasonable proxy for normal environmental conditions. At the end 
of the test, the system would still be required to meet the visibility 
and field of view requirements.
    We believe a specification combining temperature cycles and 
humidity levels is appropriate to establish the ability of rearview 
video systems to provide the anticipated level of effectiveness across 
a range of real world driving conditions. We are proposing to require 
that systems operated across both a high and low temperature range, 
with varying humidity level. Again, at the conclusion of the proposed 
test cycles, the system would be required to function within acceptable 
limits.

B. Proposed Compliance Tests

i. Ambient Lighting Conditions
    NHTSA believes that the ambient lighting conditions present for 
testing should mimic the lighting conditions in which the visual 
displays will be used. To ensure test repeatability, NHTSA believes 
that ambient lighting of a particular brightness level should be 
specified for testing. Daytime outdoor lighting (sunlight and varying 
degrees of cloud cover) ranges from 10,000 lux to 100,000 lux in full 
sunlight.\85\ NHTSA believes that the lower end of this brightness 
range should be used for testing to mimic the most typical manner of 
incidence of the sun's rays upon a console-mounted rearview image, 
which would involve at least some degree of obstruction by the 
vehicle's roof. Therefore, we propose that testing be conducted with 
evenly distributed lighting of 10,000 lux intensity as measured at the 
center of the exterior surface of vehicle's roof. While actual natural 
sunlight may strike an in-vehicle display at various angles through the 
day, for the purpose of test repeatability we believe that ambient 
lighting during testing should be provided by overhead light sources 
with the light presented in an evenly distributed manner. Because the 
overwhelming majority of backover crashes occur during the day, we are 
not proposing testing under nighttime ambient lighting conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ Ander, Gregg D. (1995). Daylighting performance and design. 
Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Rear Visibility Test Object
    For the purpose of determining compliance with the performance 
requirements specified in the preceding sections, NHTSA is proposing 
that a cylindrical test object be used for testing. Specifically, the 
agency is proposing the test cylinder be a 32-inch tall cylinder with a 
diameter of 12 inches to represent the approximate height and width of 
an average, standing 18-month-old child. The age of 18 months was 
selected based upon the agency's review of SCI backover cases and 
consideration of comments on the ANPRM. We believe that a test object 
with these dimensions is necessary to ensure robust performance not 
only of a countermeasure system's ability to meet specified coverage 
area requirements behind a vehicle, but also the system's ability to 
display an image of a rear obstacle to a driver.
    In developing the characteristics of the test object, NHTSA 
reviewed its own research, real world crash data, industry research, 
existing test procedures, and comments on the ANPRM. NHTSA considered 
and evaluated a number of different options ranging from crash dummies, 
clothing mannequins, and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe to traffic cones 
for use as possible compliance test objects. NHTSA also considered 
using a child-shaped, clothing mannequin identified by the agency's 
Advanced Collision Avoidance Technology (ACAT) Backing Crash 
Countermeasure Program as having a radar cross-section equivalent to 
that of a small child. However, this shape is not proposed since the 
sensitivity of the test object to radar detection is not relevant to 
the evaluation of a visual rearview image and the asymmetrical shape of 
the mannequin would cause rearview image quality measurement 
difficulties. Given that the test object is intended to be used both to 
confirm countermeasure coverage area and test cylinder displayed size, 
a shape that is conducive to accurate completion of both tests is 
needed. While the shape of the test object is not critical for 
assessment of countermeasure coverage area as long as the object's 
dimensions are appropriate, use of a sided shape could cause 
measurement difficulties when assessing visual display image quality. A 
cylindrical test object with a vertical axis would appear to have the 
same relative width regardless of the angle at which it is viewed and 
would not appear skewed, as a square column might. A cylindrical test 
object is also

[[Page 76232]]

suggested by the requirements of ISO 17386 that specify use of a 
cylinder to test the detection performance of ultrasonic parking aids. 
Therefore, the proposed test object shape consists of a cylinder with a 
vertical axis that can adequately represent the proportions of the 
children most commonly at risk in backover scenarios while at the same 
time ensuring robust system performance.
    To best represent the manner in which a child is displayed to the 
driver in a rearview image, NHTSA proposes that the cylindrical test 
object shall have a diameter of 12 inches to represent the width of an 
average 18-month-old child. Based on 2000 CDC data for the head breadth 
an 18-month-old child, NHTSA proposes 5.9 inches (15 cm) as the minimum 
width that must be visible in the rearview image for the three test 
objects located nearest the rear bumper of the vehicle.\86\ To aid in 
the assessment of whether the minimum width is visible, a contrasting 
colored vertical stripe of width 5.9 inches is proposed for the two 
cylinders closest to the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 months: Boys; 
Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. Published May 30, 
2000 (modified 4/20/2001) CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 
months: Girls; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. 
Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, given that the visual appearance of the test object is 
the dominant factor in the compliance test, we do not believe that we 
need to specify material properties at this time. While ultrasonic and 
radar sensors are better at detecting some materials and surface 
textures than others, rearview video systems display images of objects 
of all opaque material types. For these reasons, NHTSA is proposing 
that the test object merely consist of a cylindrical object of the 
dimensions specified above. However, we note that if in the future 
sensor-based systems are developed that may fulfill the requirements of 
providing to the driver a visual image of the area behind the vehicle, 
alternative test object material characteristics and dimensions may 
need to be specified in order to ensure that the object accurately 
simulates the physical presence of an 18-month-old child to the 
particular sensor technology being used.
    To provide a consistent and repeatable location in which to measure 
apparent test object width as part of rearview image quality 
assessment, NHTSA proposes that the three rearmost test objects be 
constructed with a 5.9-inch high colored band surrounding the perimeter 
of the upper portion of the cylinder that is of a different color than 
the rest of the cylinder. The 5.9-inch dimension is based on the 
breadth of the average 18-month-old child's head.\87\ The band can be 
of any color that contrasts with that of the rest of the test object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 months: Boys; 
Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. Published May 30, 
2000 (modified 4/20/2001) CDC, Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 
months: Girls; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles. 
Published May 30, 2000 (modified 4/20/2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Rear Visibility Compliance Test Procedures
    NHTSA is proposing a test to ensure that a rearview image provided 
to the driver (1) covers the required area behind the vehicle and (2) 
displays the images of obstacles with sufficient size to permit a 
driver to visually perceive their presence. The test procedure used to 
determine countermeasure performance in terms of rearview video system 
viewable area is similar to that currently used for school bus mirrors 
(Section 13, ``School bus mirror test procedures'' of FMVSS No. 111, 
``Rearview mirrors''). Like the school bus mirror test, the proposed 
test uses a large format camera placed with the imaging sensor located 
at a specific eyepoint location, referred to here as the ``test 
reference point''. A matte finish ruler affixed beneath the visual 
display and aligned laterally along the bottom edge of the visual 
display provides a reference for scaling purposes in the image quality 
portion of the test procedure.
    The proposed test reference point is intended to simulate the 
location of a 50th percentile male driver's eyes (rather than the 95th 
percentile male used in existing FMVSS No. 111 rearview mirror 
requirements) when glancing at the rearview image. Based on 
observations of drivers using rearview video systems in NHTSA 
testing,\88\ we assume that for visual displays located in the vicinity 
of the center console or interior rearview mirror, the driver will turn 
his or her head to look at the display with little or no lateral eye 
rotation. Therefore, to estimate the location of the driver's eyes when 
looking at a rearview image, the forward-looking eyepoint of the driver 
can be simulated to rotate toward the center of the vehicle as though 
the driver is turning his head. Anthropometric data from a NHTSA-
sponsored study of the dimensions of 50th percentile male drivers 
seated with a 25-degree seat-back angle (``Anthropometry of Motor 
Vehicle Occupants'' \89\) give the longitudinal and vertical location, 
with respect to the H point, of the left and right infraorbitale (a 
point just below each eye) and the head/neck joint center at which the 
head rotates about the spine. Given an average vertical eye diameter of 
approximately 0.96 inch (24 mm), we can assume that the center of the 
eye is located 0.48 inches (12 mm) above the infraorbitale. Taking the 
midpoint of the lateral locations of the driver's eyes gives a point in 
the mid-sagittal plane (the vertical/longitudinal plane of symmetry of 
the human body) of the driver's body indicated by Mf in 
Figure 5. Using the point at which the head rotates, Mf can 
be rotated toward the rearview image to obtain a new eyepoint, the test 
reference point, representing an eye midpoint for a driver when the 
head is turned to look at a rearview image. The proposed regulatory 
requirement sets forth clear instructions as to how to position the 
camera to conduct the test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H.S., and Ranney, 
T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems 
(ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 811 
024.
    \89\ Schneider, L.W., Robbins, D.H., Pfl[uuml]g, M.A. and 
Snyder, R.G. (1985). Anthropometry of Motor Vehicle Occupants; 
Volume 1--Procedures, Summary Findings and Appendices. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT 806 715.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

[[Page 76233]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.011

a. Rear Field of View Test Procedure
    To demonstrate a system's compliance with the field of view 
requirements, we are proposing that the perimeter of the minimum 
detection area that must be visible is marked using seven test objects. 
The locations of the seven test objects, represented by black circles, 
are illustrated in Figure 6.

[[Page 76234]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.012

BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
    For school bus cross-view mirrors, FMVSS No. 111 requires that the 
entire top surface of each cylinder must be visible. However, due to 
the potential for rearview video cameras to be mounted at heights of 
less than 32 inches on some compact cars and sporty vehicles, NHTSA is 
proposing an alternative detection criterion for this test. For test 
objects located 10 or more feet aft of the vehicle's rear bumper, NHTSA 
proposes that the entire height and width of each test object must be 
visible. This criterion equates to the driver being able to see the 
entire body

[[Page 76235]]

of an 18-month-old child and serves to ensure that detection of a 
child, if present, between 10 and 15 feet behind the vehicle is 
possible.
    Due to camera angle, only a portion of a child or child-sized 
object in close proximity to the rear bumper may be visible, 
particularly at the edges of the camera's viewing angle. To ensure that 
at least a portion of test objects `F' and `G' (in Figure 6) are 
visible, the proposed compliance test positions them 1 foot aft of the 
rear bumper face. To give the driver enough information to be able to 
discern an ``object'' as a child, if present, and to provide a 
quantitative basis for assessing field of view compliance, NHTSA 
believes it is important to indicate how much of the test objects must 
be visible. Seeing a child's face or another body area of similar size 
would likely result in successful visual recognition of the child by 
the driver. Therefore, NHTSA proposes that a minimum of a 5.9-inch 
width of test objects `F' and `G' must be visible.\90\ This criterion 
would result in a 5.9-inch square or larger portion of an object or 
child being visible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ The 5.9-inch dimension is the average breadth of an 18-
month-old child's head per CDC's ``Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 
36 months: Boys; Length-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles'' and 
``Clinical Growth Charts. Birth to 36 months: Girls; Length-for-age 
and Weight-for-age percentiles.'' Published May 30, 2000 (modified 
4/20/2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For NHTSA compliance testing, the displayed rearview image would be 
photographed to document the test results of this field of view test, 
as well as to provide data for use in completing the image quality 
test, which is described in the next section.
b. Rearview Image Size Test Procedure
    As stated previously, industry standards applicable to an image-
based rear visibility system do not exist. Therefore, to develop a 
method for assessing image quality, NHTSA looked to its prior work 
relating to school bus cross-view mirrors. The test procedure described 
below follows the same basic concept as the existing school bus mirror 
test procedure in FMVSS No. 111. This test serves to ensure that a 
minimum image quality is maintained throughout the required coverage 
area of the rearview image. Essentially, we are proposing that the 
apparent image of the individual test objects be large enough for an 
average driver to quickly determine their presence and nature.
    The test procedure proposed for use in assessing countermeasure 
visual display image quality compliance requires one additional step 
beyond the rearview video system viewable area test described above. 
Using the printed photograph of the rearview image taken to document 
the viewable area covered by the system, the size of each of the three 
test objects positioned 20 feet aft of the rear bumper (indicated in 
Figure 5 labeled `A', `B', and `C') is measured. The horizontal width 
of each of the three test objects is measured within the colored band 
surrounding the upper portion of the cylindrical test object by 
selecting a point at both the left and right edges of the object's 
displayed image. Similarly, two points on the ruler shown in the 
photograph are selected to acquire a measurement for use as a lateral 
scaling factor. Using the two measure widths and the distance between 
the driver's eyepoint (i.e., midpoint between an average 50th 
percentile male's eyes) and the center of the rearview image, the 
visual angle subtended by each test object may be calculated. To reduce 
the effects of measurement errors, the measured visual angle subtended 
from each of the three test objects (A, B, and C) are averaged 
together. Acceptable image quality is defined as the average measured 
visual angle subtended by the test object's width from these three 
locations exceeding 5 minutes of arc. The average value is used to 
assess compliance to minimize the effect of individual measurement 
error. The subtended visual angle for each of the three locations must 
exceed 3 minutes of arc.

C. Proposed Effective Date and Phase-In Schedule

    In accordance with the schedule set forth by Congress in the K.T. 
Safety Act, we are proposing that the requirement for rearview video 
systems be phased in within four years of publication of the final 
rule. Because we anticipate that a final rule will be published in 
early 2011, the statutory requirement would require that full 
compliance be achieved in late 2014 or early 2015. Furthermore, because 
we anticipate that this rule will require substantial design work to 
implement, we are proposing that, like other substantial rules, the 
compliance dates for the various stages of the phase-in be September 1 
of the relevant year, in order to correspond with model years. 
Therefore, given the likely schedule of this rulemaking, we are 
proposing that full compliance be achieved by September 1, 2014.
    NHTSA is concerned about the potential costs imposed on automotive 
manufacturers by this proposal, and is therefore taking into account 
both the current and projected future implementation of rearview video 
systems in our proposed phase-in schedule. Another factor that is being 
taken into consideration is the vehicle redesign cycle. Specifically, 
we are aware that it could cost substantially more to implement the 
best available technology (i.e., rearview video systems) into vehicles 
if it is not done during the normal vehicle design cycle. We are aware, 
for example, in comments received from Honda that the statutory 
deadline may not provide enough time for most vehicles to undergo a 
redesign before full compliance is required. In its comment, AIAM 
suggested that a 6-year phase-in schedule, rather than a 4-year one, 
might be needed in order to assure that the substantial majority of 
affected vehicles can integrate rearview video systems as part of their 
normal redesign cycle. The agency appreciates the challenges posed by 
the proposed rule, but notes that a phase-in period longer than four 
years would be inconsistent with the limitation specified by Congress.
    With the above considerations, we are proposing a rear-loaded 
phase-in schedule. For the year following the first September 1 after 
publication of the final rule (likely to be September 1, 2011), we are 
proposing a compliance target that is less than the total number of 
vehicles already anticipated to be equipped with rearview video 
systems. The proposed phase-in schedule then requires steady increases 
in the total percentage of the compliant vehicles in the two following 
years, based on these considerations and the percentage of vehicles 
that are anticipated to undergo a scheduled redesign. Finally, we are 
proposing to apply the requirements to all vehicles manufactured on or 
after September 1 of the following year (likely 2014). The specific 
percentages of the phase-in schedule are shown in Table 11 below.

                  Table 11--Proposed Phase-In Schedule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicles manufactured before September 1, 2011.................        0
Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2011, and before        0
 September 1, 2012.............................................
Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2012, and before       10
 September 1, 2013.............................................
Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2013, and before       40
 September 1, 2014.............................................
Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2014............      100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, we are proposing that small volume manufacturers need 
only comply with the requirement for

[[Page 76236]]

rearview video systems when the requirement has been fully phased in, 
that is, on September 1, 2014. This is based in part on the comment 
from AIAM, which requested this provision for small volume 
manufacturers due to their longer product life cycles and their reduced 
access to technology.
    The reasons for allowing small volume manufacturers a delay in the 
compliance schedule are twofold. First, because these manufacturers 
generally produce a single or low number of lines of vehicles, they 
would need to install these systems on a large portion or all of their 
fleet in order to meet the fleet percentage requirement. Considering 
that the installation of rearview video systems is most efficiently 
accomplished during a vehicle redesign, this would mean that small 
volume manufacturers are disproportionately negatively impacted by the 
requirement because they would likely have to install these systems in 
the middle of the design cycle, increasing their costs. Second, because 
small volume manufacturers frequently have longer product cycles than 
larger manufacturers, the need for a delay until the end of the 
compliance increases the likelihood that they will have the opportunity 
to integrate the rearview video system with their normal redesign 
cycle. While we believe that rearview video systems and displays are 
readily available so that small volume manufacturers will have access, 
we believe that the other two reasons are adequate to delay mandatory 
compliance until the end of the phase-in period.
    We are also proposing to include provisions under which 
manufacturers can earn credits towards meeting the applicable phase-in 
percentages if they meet the new rear visibility requirements ahead of 
schedule. In addition, as we have done with other standards, we are 
proposing a separate alternative schedule to address the special 
problems faced by limited line and multistage manufacturers and 
alterers in complying with phase-ins. A phase-in generally permits 
vehicle manufacturers flexibility with respect to which vehicles they 
choose to initially redesign to comply with new requirements. However, 
if a manufacturer produces a very limited number of lines, a phase-in 
would not provide such flexibility. NHTSA is accordingly proposing to 
permit ``limited line'' manufacturers that produce three or fewer 
carlines the option of achieving full compliance when the phase-in is 
completed. Flexibility would be allowed for vehicles manufactured in 
two or more stages and altered vehicles from the phase-in requirements. 
These vehicles would not be required to meet the phase-in schedule and 
would not have to achieve full compliance until the phase-in is 
completed. Also, as with previous phase-ins, NHTSA is proposing 
reporting requirements to accompany the phase-in.

D. Summary of Estimated Effectiveness, Costs and Benefits of Available 
Technologies

i. System Effectiveness
    Some systems, like airbags, have binary states; that is to say that 
either they are activated or they are not. Analysis includes a 
probability of whether or not it was being used, followed by a 
calculation of benefits in cases where it was in use.
    For rear visibility technologies, three conditions must be met for 
such a technology to provide a benefit to the driver. First, the crash 
must be one that is ``avoidable'' through use of the device; i.e., the 
pedestrian must be within the target range for the sensor, or the 
viewable area of the camera or mirror. Second, once the pedestrian is 
within the system's range, the device must ``sense'' that fact, i.e., 
provide the driver with information about the presence and location of 
the pedestrian. Third, there must be sufficient ``driver response,'' 
i.e., before impact with the pedestrian, the driver must receive this 
information and respond appropriately by confirming whether someone is 
or is not behind the vehicle before proceeding. As noted above, these 
factors are denoted as fA, fS, and 
fDR, respectively, in this analysis. Table 12 below shows 
these factors and their product, the final system effectiveness.

                                      Table 12--Final System Effectiveness
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Final  effectiveness
                          System                             FA (%)    FS (%)    FDR (%)  (%) FA x FS x FDR = FE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
180[deg] Camera...........................................        90       100        55                    49
130[deg] Camera...........................................        76       100         5                    42
Ultrasonic................................................        49        70         7                     2.5
Radar.....................................................        54        70         7                     2.7
Mirrors...................................................      * 33       100      ** 0                     0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* FA for mirrors is taken from separate source due to lack of inclusion in the SCI case review that generated FA
  for cameras and sensors.
** FDR for mirrors is taken from a small sample size of 20 tests. It is 0% because throughout testing, drivers
  did not take advantage of either cross-view or lookdown mirrors to avoid the obstacle in the test.

ii. Costs
    The most expensive technology option that the agency has evaluated 
is the rearview camera. When installed in a vehicle without any 
existing adequate display screen, rearview camera systems are estimated 
to cost consumers between $159 and $203 per vehicle. For a vehicle that 
already has an adequate display, such as one found in navigation units, 
their incremental cost is estimated at $58. The total incremental cost 
to equip a 16.6 million vehicle fleet with camera systems is estimated 
to be $1.9 to $2.7 billion.
    Rear object sensor systems are estimated to cost between $52 and 
$92 per vehicle. The total incremental cost to equip a 16.6 million 
vehicle fleet with sensor systems is estimated to be $0.3 to $1.2 
billion.
    Several different types of mirrors were investigated. Interior 
look-down mirrors could be mounted on vans and SUVs, but not cars, and 
are estimated to cost $40 per vehicle. The total incremental cost to 
equip a 16.6 million vehicle fleet with lookdown mirrors is estimated 
to be $0.6 billion.
    We also estimated the net property damage effects to consumers from 
using a camera or sensor system to avoid backing into fixed objects, 
along with the additional cost when a vehicle is struck in the rear and 
the camera or sensor is destroyed.

                    Table 13--Costs (2007 Economics)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs Per Vehicle....................  $51.49 to $202.94.
Total Fleet..........................  $723M to $2.4B.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 76237]]

iii. Benefits
    As noted above, the agency has spent considerable effort trying to 
determine the final effectiveness of these systems in reducing crashes, 
injuries and fatalities. We have researched the capabilities of the 
systems, the crash circumstances, and the percent of drivers that would 
observe and react in time to avoid a collision with a pedestrian or 
pedalcyclist. The estimated injury and fatality benefits of the various 
systems, based on NHTSA research to date, are shown below.

                                         Table 14--Quantifiable Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              180[deg]      130[deg]                                  Look-down
                                             Camera view   Camera view   Ultrasonic       Radar        mirror
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities Reduced........................           112            95             3             3             0
Injuries Reduced..........................         8,374         7,072           233           257             0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Net Benefits
    In addition to the one-time installation costs, and the benefits 
that occur over the life of the vehicle, there would also be 
maintenance costs as well as repair costs due to rear-end collisions 
and ``property damage only crashes'' (which, like the benefits, occur 
over time). Below Table 15 contains lifetime monetized benefits and 
lifetime costs, and their difference, the net benefit. In this case, 
the quantifiable costs outweigh the quantifiable benefits and therefore 
the final number is a cost. (Note that this analysis does not include 
nonquantifiable benefits, a point to which we will shortly return.) The 
primary estimate is based on a 130 degree camera system with an in-
mirror display. The low estimate is based on an ultrasonic system. The 
high estimate is based on a 180 degree camera system with an in-mirror 
display.

 Table 15--Summary of Benefits and Costs Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (Millions 2007$) MY 2016 and Thereafter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Primary                      High        Discount
                                                            estimate    Low estimate    estimate      rate (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits:
    Lifetime Monetized..................................        $618.6         $37.1        $732.6             7
    Lifetime Monetized..................................         777.6          46.7         920.8             3
Costs:
    Lifetime Monetized..................................       1,933.3          22.6       2,362.4             7
    Lifetime Monetized..................................       1,861.3         730.4       2,296.9             3
Net Benefits:
    Lifetime Monetized..................................      -1,314.7        -685.5      -1,629.8             7
    Lifetime Monetized..................................      -1,083.7        -683.7      -1,376.1             3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Cost Effectiveness
    While we examine several application scenarios (all passenger cars 
and all light trucks, only light trucks, and some combinations) and 
discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, the net cost per equivalent life 
saved for camera systems ranged from $11.8 to $19.7 million. For 
sensors, it ranged from $95.5 to $192.3 million per life saved. 
According to our present model, none of the systems are cost effective 
based on our comprehensive cost estimate of the value of a statistical 
life of $6.1 million.

                Table 16--Cost per Equivalent Life Saved
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Cost per equivalent life saved
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensors (Ultrasonic and Radar).........  $95.5 to $192.3 mill.
Camera Systems.........................  $11.8 to $19.7 mill.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The range presented is from a 3% to 7% discount rate.

    The agency is proposing requirements that would likely be currently 
met by using cameras for both passenger cars and light trucks. We also 
seek comment on an alternative aimed at reducing net costs that could 
be met by requiring having cameras for light trucks and either cameras 
or ultrasonic sensors for passenger cars. We also request comment on 
the extent to which the effectiveness of sensors and the response of 
drivers to sensor warnings could be improved.

E. Comparison of Regulatory Alternatives

    In order to explore fully other possible rulemaking options, the 
agency examined a variety of combinations of technology, specifically, 
ones in which light trucks were equipped with a rearview video system 
and passenger cars were either given no extra equipment, a rearview 
video system (using a camera) or another technology such as a sensor 
system. The results of examining such combinations are available below. 
Note the camera/radar and camera/ultrasonic options have decreased 
costs compared to mandating cameras for both vehicle types, but have a 
higher cost per life saved. It would not fulfill the requirements of 
the statute to require cameras for light trucks and nothing for 
passenger cars; those numbers are provided only as a point of 
comparison. Also, the camera/radar option has a higher net costs 
associated with it than simply mandating cameras for both, and will 
most likely not be viable on those grounds. Comments on these 
alternatives and suggestions of others are welcome.

[[Page 76238]]

                      Table 17--Rear Visibility Proposal and Alternatives Discounted at 3%
                                              [Millions of 2007 $]
                    [In decreasing order of installation costs and monetized safety benefits]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Per vehicle costs and benefits
                              ------------------------------------------------------------
  Proposal and alternatives                       Monetized   Property                          Net cost per
                                 Installation      safety      damage        Net costs     equivalent life saved
                                  costs \91\      Benefits      costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LT Camera, PC Camera.........  $1,919 to $2,275        $778       $-414  $727 to $1,084..  $11.8 to $14.6.
LT Camera, PC Radar..........  $1,512 to $1,710         439        -149  $924 to $1,122    $18.9 to $21.7.\93\
                                                                          \92\.
LT Camera, PC Ultrasonic \94\  $1,215 to $1,413         437        -165  $613 to $811....  $14.7 to $17.4.
LT Camera, PC Nothing \95\...  $841 to $1,039..         415        -189  $237 to $435....  $9.6 to $12.5.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The most effective technology option that the agency has evaluated 
is the rearview video system which, as already noted, consists of a 
video camera and a visual display. It is also the most expensive 
technology. When installed in a vehicle that does not already have any 
visual display screen, rearview video systems are estimated to cost 
consumers between $159 and $203 per vehicle. The upper end of the cost 
range is based on systems that have in-mirror (as opposed to in-dash or 
console) displays and a 180 degree (as opposed to 130 degree) lens. For 
a vehicle that already has a suitable visual display, such as one found 
in navigation units, the incremental cost of a rearview video system is 
estimated at $58-$88, depending on the angular width of the lens. The 
total incremental cost to equip a 16.6 million vehicle fleet with 
rearview video systems is estimated to be $1.9 to $2.7 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ The range of camera costs assumes 130 degree camera with 
the display in the dash (lower cost) to the display in the mirror 
(higher cost).
    \92\ The net costs are substantially more than those for any of 
the other options.
    \93\ The cost per equivalent life saved is substantially more 
for this option than that for any of the other options.
    \94\ Under this alternative, passenger cars could be equipped 
with either sensor systems or camera systems. For a fuller 
description of this alternative, see the discussion above at the 
very end of section I, Executive Summary.
    \95\ The agency tentatively concludes that not requiring any 
improved performance by passenger cars would be inconsistent with 
the mandate in the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act 
of 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters on the ANPRM noted that rearview video systems are a 
relatively new technology and stated that considerable reductions in 
costs will occur as these technologies proliferate in the fleet. NHTSA 
agrees that technological innovation will occur over the next couple of 
years and that the costs are likely to be substantially less when 
actually installed in future model years. However, we have not 
identified a way to estimate this lower cost.
    Given the effectiveness estimates that we have generated and 
assuming that all vehicles will be equipped with the most likely 
countermeasure technology, namely a rearview video system and 
associated display, we believe the fatalities that are occurring in 
backing crashes could be reduced by 95 to 112 per year. Similarly, 
injuries would be reduced by 7,072 to 8,374 per year. We estimate that 
the cost per equivalent lives for rearview video systems would range 
from $11.8 million based on a 3% discount rate and on the low end of 
the per vehicle cost range to $19.7 million based on a 7% discount rate 
and the high end of the per vehicle cost range.
    We note that while this cost per equivalent lives saved, even at 
the low end, is nearly double the Departmental value of a statistical 
life of $6.1 million,\96\ the proposed solution is the most 
comprehensive and effective, currently available solution to mitigate 
backover crashes, fatalities, and injuries. As we discussed above, the 
quantitative analysis does not offer a complete accounting. We have 
noted that well over 40 percent of the victims of backover crashes are 
very young children (under the age of five), with nearly their entire 
life ahead of them. Executive Order 12866 also refers explicitly to 
considerations of equity. (``(I)n choosing among alternative regulatory 
approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net 
benefits (including * * * equity), and there are strong reasons, 
grounded in those considerations, to prevent the deaths at issue here. 
In addition, this regulation will, in many cases, reduce a 
qualitatively distinct risk, which is that of directly causing the 
death or injury of one's own child.\97\ Drivers will also benefit from 
increased rear visibility in a variety of ways, including increased 
ease and convenience with respect to parking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ The $6.1 million represents the 2007 Departmental value of 
$5.8 million for a statistical life (VSL) adjusted for economic cost 
factors that are not inherently a part of the $5.8 million. These 
include, medical care, emergency services, legal costs, insurance 
administrative costs, workplace costs, property damage and the taxed 
portion of lost market productivity (the untaxed portion is assumed 
to be inherently included in the VSL).
    \97\ On the relevance of this fact, see J.K. Hammitt and K. 
Haninger, ``Valuing Fatal Risks to Children and Adults: Effects of 
Disease, Latency, and Risk Aversion,'' Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 40(1): 57-83, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While these benefits cannot be monetized, they could be 
significant. A breakeven analysis suggests that if the nonquantified 
benefits amount $65 to $79 per vehicle, the benefits would justify the 
costs. Taking all of the foregoing points alongside the quantifiable 
figures and the safety issue at hand, the agency tentatively concludes 
that the benefits do justify the costs. More specifically, we emphasize 
the following data and considerations:
     100 of the 228 (44%) annual victims of backover crashes 
are under 5 years of age with nearly their entire lives ahead of them; 
80 of the 100 children are under 3 years of age.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from 
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks * * * Section 1. Policy. 
1-101. A growing body of scientific knowledge demonstrates that 
children may suffer disproportionately from * * * safety risks. 
These risks arise because: children's neurological, immunological, 
digestive, and other bodily systems are still developing; * * * and 
children's behavior patterns may make them more susceptible to 
accidents because they are less able to protect themselves. * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     While this rulemaking would result in great cost if made 
final as proposed, it would also have substantial benefits, reducing 
the annual fatalities in backover crashes by 95 to 112 fatalities, and 
annual injuries by 7,072 to 8,374 injuries.
     In addition to those benefits, there are other benefits 
that are hard to quantify, but are nonetheless real and significant. 
One such benefit is that of not being the direct cause of the death or 
injury of a person and particularly a small child at one's place of 
residence. In some of these cases, parents are responsible for the 
deaths of their own children; avoiding that horrible outcome is a 
significant benefit. Another hard-to-

[[Page 76239]]

quantify benefit is the increased ease and convenience of driving, and 
especially parking, that extend beyond the prevention of crashes. While 
these benefits cannot be monetized at this time, they could be 
considerable.
     There is evidence that many people value the lives of 
children more than the lives of adults.\99\ \100\ In any event, there 
is special social solicitude for protection of children. In the area of 
motor vehicle safety, this special solicitude for the welfare of 
children has been evident in the area of motor vehicle safety in the 
mandates \101\ by Congress over the years for issuing standards 
primarily benefiting children. This solicitude regarding children is 
based, to a significant extent, on their greater vulnerability to 
injury and their inability to protect themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ J.K. Hammitt and K. Haninger, ``Valuing Fatal Risks to 
Children and Adults: Effects of Disease, Latency, and Risk 
Aversion,'' Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 40(1): 57-83, 2010. This 
stated preference study finds that the willingness to pay to prevent 
fatality risks to one's child is uniformly larger than that to 
reduce risk to another adult or to oneself. Estimated values per 
statistical life are $6-10 million for adults and $12-15 million for 
children. We emphasize that the literature is in a state of 
development.
    \100\ Other people argue for valuing all lives equally, 
regardless of age, and note there is also a special solicitude for 
another vulnerable population, the elderly. Some of the elderly have 
difficulty quickly moving out of dangerous situations. Special 
solicitude for the elderly is very germane to this rulemaking given 
that persons 70 years of age or older account for another large 
segment of fatalities, i.e., 74 (33 percent) of the 228 annual 
fatalities.
    \101\ Recent examples include Anton's Law, Public Law 107-318, 
Dec. 4, 2002, and the K.T. Safety Act. That solicitude is also 
evident in the requirement in Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Public Law 105-277 (5 
U.S.C. 601 note) for assessment of impacts of Federal regulations 
and policies on families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Given the very young age of most of the children fatally-
injured in backover crashes, attempting to provide them with training 
relevant to the particular circumstances of those crashes or with an 
audible warning would not enable them to identify or take steps to 
protect themselves, given their impulsiveness, their lack of 
understanding of the abstract concept of risk/danger/safety, and their 
lack of situational awareness, judgment and physical ability (e.g., 
dexterity) to take timely and effective self-protective action.
     Given the impossibility of reducing backover crashes 
through changing the behavior of very young children and given 
Congress' mandate, it is reasonable and necessary to rely on vehicle 
technology to address backover crashes and to that end the agency 
examined a variety of technologies to assess their value in improving 
driver awareness and performance: mirrors, sensors, cameras, and other 
technologies.
     Based on its extensive testing to determine how much area 
behind a vehicle a driver must be able to see in order to avoid 
backover crashes and on the relative effectiveness of the various 
technologies in improving driver awareness and performance, the agency 
has tentatively concluded that a camera-based system is the only 
effective type of technology currently available.
     Requiring additional rearview mirrors or changes to 
existing review mirrors cannot provide an effective solution to the 
problem of backover crashes. Changes to outside rearview mirrors 
mounted near the driver offer only very limited opportunities for any 
improvement in the existing rearward view to the sides of vehicles and 
no opportunity for providing any view of the area directly behind 
vehicles. While rearview mirrors mounted at or near the rear of 
vehicles could provide a view to the rear of vehicles, the coverage 
area would be relatively small. Further, the image, as viewed by the 
driver indirectly via outside rearview mirrors mounted near the driver, 
would be fairly small and distorted, making the viewed objects 
difficult to discern. Finally, rear-mounted rearview mirrors might not 
be reasonable, practicable and appropriate for many types of light 
vehicles.
     The agency's testing indicated that currently available 
sensors, which are designed primarily to avoid collisions with objects 
(like posts and other vehicles) that can cause property damage, had two 
shortcomings. First, they often failed to detect a human, particularly 
a small moving child, in tests in which the vehicle was not actually 
moving. Second, in tests in which the vehicle was moving, and in which 
the sensors did detect a manikin representing a child, the resulting 
warning did not induce drivers to pause more than briefly in backing. 
Being unable to confirm visually whether there was something or someone 
behind them, the drivers in these tests resumed their backing.
     In contrast, in the agency's tests of vehicles equipped 
with video camera-based systems, drivers not only saw a child-sized 
obstacle, but also stopped and remained stopped, thereby avoiding 
striking the obstacle in a substantial percentage of the tests.
     Consequently, the agency has tentatively concluded that 
requirements must have the effect of ensuring that the driver is 
provided with some type of image of the area directly behind his or her 
vehicle. However, the agency is not proposing to require that video 
camera-based systems be installed to provide that image.
     Instead, the agency is proposing a performance-based 
requirement for any system that can provide the driver with the 
requisite image. The proposal does not specify a single location within 
the vehicle as the location in which the image must be provided. Thus, 
the image can be provided on a display in the dash or interior rearview 
mirror.
     In time, types of technology other than a video camera-
based system may be able to provide a sufficiently clear visual image 
of the area behind the vehicle at lower cost than a video camera-based 
system can.
     In proposing a requirement that drivers must be provided 
with a visual image of the area behind their vehicles, the agency 
recognizes that among currently available candidate technologies, video 
cameras are the most expensive and mirrors are the least. Sensors fall 
in between.
     The agency's estimates of current costs for video camera-
based systems may be too high as the estimates are based on data that 
are a few years old.
     The agency has a contract in place for the conducting of 
up-to-date tear down cost studies of both camera and sensor 
technologies. These studies could produce somewhat lower cost 
estimates.
     To the extent that the agency may have underestimated the 
extent to which technological innovation and other factors will lead to 
future reductions in the costs of video camera-based systems, the 
future costs may be even lower than currently expected.
     In view of statutory requirements, the agency is limited 
in its ability to reduce the cost of this rulemaking through adjusting 
either the requirements or application of the proposed rule or the 
schedule for its implementation.
     Congress has mandated the issuance of a final rule instead 
of allowing the agency to retain discretion to decide whether to issue 
a final rule based on its consideration of all the relevant factors and 
information.
     While Congress has not mandated a system that provides the 
driver with an image of the area behind his or her vehicle, less 
expensive countermeasures, i.e., mirrors and sensors, have thus far 
shown very limited effectiveness and thus would not satisfy Congress' 
mandate for improving safety.
     Video camera-based systems are by far the most 
comprehensive and cost-effective currently available solution for 
reducing backover crashes, fatalities and

[[Page 76240]]

injuries. As the most cost-effective alternative, a requirement for a 
system that provides an image of the area behind the vehicle would be 
consistent with the policy preference underlying the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act.
     The agency is limited by law as to the amount of leadtime 
it can provide for this final rule. Were the agency able to provide 
even more leadtime than permitted, that additional time might be 
sufficient to enable suppliers to develop cheaper cameras. Given the 
limits within which the agency must operate, which require the agency 
to provide not more than four years of leadtime, the agency has 
proposed a back-loaded phase-in schedule, i.e., one focused on the 
latter part of the phase-in period, to maximize leadtime.
    As stated above, NHTSA is also considering whether there are any 
circumstances under which it would be appropriate and permissible under 
the K.T. Safety Act to limit the application of the proposed 
requirements to LTVs only, i.e., to exclude passenger cars. The 
agency's tentative conclusion is that there are not. If the improved 
rear visibility requirements \102\ were applied only to LTVs, we 
estimate that the fatalities occurring in backover crashes would still 
be reduced by 70 to 83 per year. Similarly, injuries would still be 
reduced by 3,284 to 3,888 per year. We estimate that the cost per 
equivalent lives for rearview video systems would range from $9.6 
million based on a 3% discount rate to $17.0 million based on a 7% 
discount rate. Table 18 contrasts the proposal and the alternative 
below using a 3% discount rate and 7% discount rate. The table includes 
ranges of costs and benefits based on a video camera having a 130- to 
180-degree horizontal viewing angle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ For illustration purposes, figures indicated represent 
rear visibility improvement provided using a rearview video system 
with 130-degree video camera.

           Table 18--Summary of Estimated Costs and Benefits--3% and 7% Discount Rate Scenarios \103\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Fatalities     Injuries     Net cost per  equivalent
        Applicability                  Total cost            prevented     prevented           life saved
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars, MPVs, Trucks,  $1.9-2.7 billion..........        95-112   7,072-8,374  $11.8-19.7 million.
 Buses with a GVWR of 10,000
 pounds or less.
MPVs, Trucks, Buses with a     0.8-1.2 billion...........         70-83   3,284-3,888  9.6-17.0 million.
 GVWR of 10,000 pounds or
 less.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 19 summarizes the impacts based on a primary estimate which 
assumes a 130 degree camera with the display in the rearview mirror, a 
low estimate that assumes ultrasonic sensors and auditory warnings, and 
a high estimate that assumes a 180 degree camera with the display in 
the rearview mirror. Property damage estimates are included in the 
costs, and net property damage costs are significantly different (even 
in sign) between ultrasonic/radar and any camera system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ For illustration purposes, figures indicated represent 
rear visibility improvement provided using a rearview video system 
with 130-degree video camera.

 Table 19--Summary of Benefits and Costs Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (Millions 2007$) MY 2015 and Thereafter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Primary                      High       Discount rate
                                                          estimate    Low estimate    estimate          (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits:
    Lifetime Monetized................................        $618.6         $37.1        $732.6              7
    Lifetime Monetized................................         777.6          46.7         920.8              3
Costs:
    Lifetime Monetized................................       1,933.3         722.6       2,362.4              7
    Lifetime Monetized................................       1,861.3         730.4       2,296.9              3
Net Benefits:
    Lifetime Monetized................................      -1,314.7        -685.5      -1,629.8              7
    Lifetime Monetized................................      -1,083.7        -683.7      -1,376.1              3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Public Participation

How do I prepare and submit comments?

    Your comments must be written and in English. To ensure that your 
comments are correctly filed in the Docket, please include the docket 
number of this document in your comments.
    Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). 
We established this limit to encourage you to write your primary 
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may attach necessary 
additional documents to your comments. There is no limit on the length 
of the attachments.
    Comments may be submitted to the docket electronically by logging 
onto the Docket Management System Web site at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
    You may also submit two copies of your comments, including the 
attachments, to Docket Management at the address given above under 
ADDRESSES.
    Please note that pursuant to the Data Quality Act, in order for 
substantive data to be relied upon and used by the agency, it must meet 
the information quality standards set forth in the OMB and DOT Data 
Quality Act guidelines. Accordingly, we encourage you to consult the 
guidelines in preparing your comments. OMB's guidelines may be accessed 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/reproducible.html. DOT's 
guidelines may be accessed at http://dms.dot.gov.

How can I be sure that my comments were received?

    If you wish Docket Management to notify you upon its receipt of 
your comments, enclose a self-addressed,

[[Page 76241]]

stamped postcard in the envelope containing your comments. Upon 
receiving your comments, Docket Management will return the postcard by 
mail.

How do I submit confidential business information?

    If you wish to submit any information under a claim of 
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete 
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential 
business information, to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given 
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, you should 
submit two copies, from which you have deleted the claimed confidential 
business information, to Docket Management at the address given above 
under ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed 
to be confidential business information, you should include a cover 
letter setting forth the information specified in our confidential 
business information regulation. (49 CFR part 512.)

Will the agency consider late comments?

    We will consider all comments that Docket Management receives 
before the close of business on the comment closing date indicated 
above under DATES. To the extent possible, we will also consider 
comments that Docket Management receives after that date. If Docket 
Management receives a comment too late for us to consider in developing 
a final rule (assuming that one is issued), we will consider that 
comment as an informal suggestion for future rulemaking action.

How can I read the comments submitted by other people?

    You may read the comments received by Docket Management at the 
address given above under ADDRESSES. The hours of the Docket are 
indicated above in the same location. You may also see the comments on 
the Internet. To read the comments on the Internet, go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for accessing the 
dockets.
    Please note that even after the comment closing date, we will 
continue to file relevant information in the Docket as it becomes 
available. Further, some people may submit late comments. Accordingly, 
we recommend that you periodically check the Docket for new material.

IX. Rulemaking Analyses

A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR 
51735, October 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a 
regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore subject to OMB 
review and to the requirements of the Executive Order. The Order 
defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to 
result in a rule that may:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal governments or 
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an 
action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
the Executive Order.
    We have considered the potential impact of this proposal under 
Executive Order 12866 and the Department of Transportation's regulatory 
policies and procedures. This rulemaking is economically significant 
because it is likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more and was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget 
under E.O. 12866. The rulemaking action has also been determined to be 
significant under the Department's regulatory policies and procedures. 
The preliminary regulatory impact analysis (PRIA) fully discusses the 
estimated costs and benefits of this rulemaking action. The costs and 
benefits are also summarized in section VII of this preamble, supra.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice 
of proposed rulemaking or final rule, it must prepare and make 
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that 
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small 
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions). 
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121 
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates 
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency 
certifies the proposal will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. SBREFA amended the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a statement of 
the factual basis for certifying that a proposal will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    I hereby certify that this proposed rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Small organizations and small governmental units would not be 
significantly affected since the potential cost impacts associated with 
this action would not significantly affect the price of new motor 
vehicles. We believe that the rulemaking would not have a significant 
economic impact on the small vehicle manufacturers because the systems 
are not technically hard to develop or install and the cost of the 
systems ($160 to $200) is a small proportion (less than half of one 
percent) of the overall vehicle cost for most of these specialty cars.
    The proposal would directly affect motor vehicle manufacturers and 
final-stage manufacturers. The majority of motor vehicle manufacturers 
would not qualify as a small business. There are six manufacturers of 
passenger cars that are small businesses.\104\ These manufacturers, 
along with manufacturers that do not qualify as a small business, are 
already required to comply with the current mirror requirements of 
FMVSS No. 111. Similarly, there are several manufacturers of low-speed 
vehicles that are small businesses. Currently, FMVSS No. 111 does not 
apply to low-speed vehicles, although they are required to have basic 
mirrors pursuant to FMVSS No. 500, Low-speed vehicles (including the 
option of having either an exterior driver-side mirror or an interior 
rearview mirror). The addition of a rearview video system can be 
accomplished via the purchase of an exterior video camera, integration 
of a console video screen or the addition of an interior rearview 
mirror-mounted screen, and wiring to connect the two as well as to 
connect them to the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ Fisker, Mosler, Panoz, Saleen, Standard Taxi, Tesla.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the K.T. Safety Act encompasses all motor vehicles with a 
GVWR or 10,000 pounds or less (except motorcycles and trailers) in its 
mandate

[[Page 76242]]

to reduce backovers, all of these small manufacturers could be affected 
by the proposed requirements. However, the economic impact upon these 
entities would not be significant for the following reasons.
    (1) Potential cost increases are small compared to the price of the 
vehicles being manufactured and can be passed on to the consumer as 
nearly all vehicles are subject to the proposed requirements.
    (2) The proposal provides four years lead-time, the limit permitted 
by the K.T. Safety Act, and would allow small volume manufacturers the 
option of waiting until the end of the phase-in (until September 1, 
2014) to meet the rear visibility requirements.
    In this NPRM, the agency has also considered several alternatives 
that could help to reduce the burden on small businesses. The agency 
considered an alternative under which passenger cars would be required 
to be equipped with either a visibility system or with a system that 
includes an ultrasonic sensor that monitors the specified area behind 
the vehicle and an audible warning, and other vehicles rated at 10,000 
pounds or less, gross vehicle weight, would be required to be equipped 
with a visibility system. This alternative would have substantially 
lower, but still significant, safety benefits, substantially lower 
installation costs and higher cost per equivalent life saved. The 
agency also considered reducing the types of vehicles subject to rear 
visibility performance by excluding low-speed vehicles explicitly or, 
in the alternative, limiting the applicability of the rule to MPVs and 
trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less.

C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has examined today's proposal pursuant to Executive Order 
13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional 
consultation with States, local governments or their representatives is 
mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that 
the rulemaking would not have sufficient Federalism implications to 
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation 
of a Federalism summary impact statement. The proposed rule would not 
have ``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    NHTSA rules can preempt in two ways. First, the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: 
``When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, 
a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue 
in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a 
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is 
identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.'' 49 U.S.C. 
30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any 
non-identical State legislative and administrative law addressing the 
same aspect of performance.
    The express preemption provision set forth above is subject to a 
savings clause under which ``[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety 
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from 
liability at common law.'' 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) Pursuant to this 
provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle 
manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express 
preemption provision are generally preserved.
    However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some 
instances, of implied preemption of such State common law tort causes 
of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules, even if not expressly preempted. 
This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon there 
being an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that 
would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone 
obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer, 
notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. 
Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum 
standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose 
a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be 
preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist--for 
example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum 
standard--the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly 
preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
    Pursuant to Executive Order 13132 and 12988, NHTSA has considered 
whether this proposal could or should preempt State common law causes 
of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding 
the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that 
preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.
    To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language 
and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of today's 
proposal and finds that this proposal, like many NHTSA rules, 
prescribes only a minimum safety standard. As such, NHTSA does not 
intend that this proposal preempt state tort law that would effectively 
impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that 
established by today's proposal. Establishment of a higher standard by 
means of State tort law would not conflict with the minimum standard 
proposed here. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied 
preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.
    We solicit the comments of the States and other interested parties 
on this assessment of issues relevant to E.O. 13132.

D. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    When promulgating a regulation, Executive Order 12988 specifically 
requires that the agency must make every reasonable effort to ensure 
that the regulation, as appropriate: (1) Specifies in clear language 
the preemptive effect; (2) specifies in clear language the effect on 
existing Federal law or regulation, including all provisions repealed, 
circumscribed, displaced, impaired, or modified; (3) provides a clear 
legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard, 
while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) specifies in 
clear language the retroactive effect; (5) specifies whether 
administrative proceedings are to be required before parties may file 
suit in court; (6) explicitly or implicitly defines key terms; and (7) 
addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general 
draftsmanship of regulations.
    Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as follows. The preemptive 
effect of this proposal is discussed above in connection with E.O. 
13132. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that 
individuals submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other 
administrative proceeding before they may file suit in court.

E. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children From Environmental 
Health and Safety Risks)

    Executive Order 13045, ``Protection of Children from Environmental 
Health and Safety Risks,'' (62 FR 19885; April 23, 1997) applies to any 
proposed or final rule that: (1) Is determined to be ``economically 
significant,'' as defined in Executive Order 12866, and (2) concerns an 
environmental health or safety risk that NHTSA has reason to believe 
may have a disproportionate effect on children. If a rule meets both 
criteria, the agency must evaluate the

[[Page 76243]]

environmental health or safety effects of the rule on children, and 
explain why the rule is preferable to other potentially effective and 
reasonably feasible alternatives considered by the agency.
    This proposed rule is subject to Executive Order 13045 because it 
is economically significant and available data demonstrate that the 
safety risk addressed by this proposal disproportionately involves 
children, especially very young ones. The issues that must be analyzed 
under this Executive Order are discussed extensively in the preamble 
above and in the PRIA.

F. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 
(NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), ``all Federal agencies and departments shall 
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary 
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means 
to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies 
and departments.'' Voluntary consensus standards are technical 
standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling 
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by 
voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE). The NTTAA directs us to provide Congress, through OMB, 
explanations when we decide not to use available and applicable 
voluntary consensus standards. The agency is not aware of any 
applicable voluntary consensus standards that apply to rearview video 
systems.
    While the agency examined two voluntary industry standards, 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 17386 and ISO 15008, as 
potentially relevant, the agency does not believe that either is 
relevant and thus has tentatively decided not to utilize them. While 
both standards have aspects that relate to the issue of rear visibility 
performance, neither addresses the specific type of rearview video 
system being proposed in this notice. ISO 17386, Maneuvering Aids for 
Low Speed Operations (MALSO), relates to the performance aspects of 
sensor-based rear object detection systems. While such systems were 
considered, NHTSA has not proposed them in this document, due to issues 
related to driver performance. ISO 15008 relates to the ergonomic 
aspects of in-vehicle screens.\105\ However, it specifically does not 
apply to the types of screens at issue in this proposal, which would be 
required to show closed-circuit video images. Furthermore, in response 
to comments, NHTSA endeavored to propose a requirement that is as 
performance based and technologically-neutral as possible, to allow 
maximum design freedom while still meeting the performance requirements 
needed for safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ ISO 15008-2009 specifies minimum requirements for the 
image quality and legibility of displays containing dynamic 
(changeable) visual information presented to the driver of a road 
vehicle by on-board transport information and control systems (TICS) 
used while the vehicle is in motion. These requirements are intended 
to be independent of display technologies, while reference to test 
methods and measurements for assessing compliance with them have 
been included where necessary.
    ISO 15008-2009 is applicable to mainly perceptual, and some 
basic cognitive, components of the visual information including 
character legibility and color recognition. It is not applicable to 
other factors affecting performance and comfort such as coding, 
format and dialogue characteristics, or to display using:
     Characters presented as part of a symbol or pictorial 
information;
     Superimposed information on the external field (e.g., high-up 
displays);
     Pictorial images (e.g., rear view camera);
     Maps and topographic representations (e.g., those for setting 
navigation systems); or
     Quasi-static information.
    http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=50805
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to 
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects 
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to 
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually 
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). NHTSA must comply with 
that requirement in connection with this rulemaking as the proposed 
rule would result in expenditures by the private sector of over $100 
million annually.
    As noted previously, the agency has prepared a detailed economic 
assessment in the PRIA. In that assessment, the agency analyzes the 
benefit and costs of a rear visibility countermeasure performance 
requirement for passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, 
trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or 
less. NHTSA's preliminary analysis indicates that the proposal could 
result in private expenditures of up to $2.7 billion annually.
    The PRIA also analyzes the expected benefits and costs of a wide 
variety of alternative countermeasure options, including mirrors, 
cameras, and sensors, as specified in the K.T. Safety Act. The agency 
subjected several types of each class of countermeasure to thorough 
effectiveness testing and cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, the 
agency previously published a detailed ANPRM and separate PRIA, in 
order to explain its thoughts on the technological solutions available 
and solicit information on costs, benefits, and applications on all 
possible solutions to the safety concern. NHTSA received a large 
variety of comments on the ANPRM and PRIA and used that information in 
formulating the instant proposal.
    Although the application of the rear visibility requirement to 
MPVs, trucks, and passenger cars is the highest cost option, the agency 
tentatively concludes that the costs are justified. As explained in 
detail in the PRIA for this NPRM, after carefully exploring all 
possible alternatives, NHTSA tentatively concludes that rearview video 
systems offer not only the highest overall benefits, but also the most 
efficient cost per life saved ratio.
    Above, NHTSA solicits comment on other alternatives, including one 
alternative limiting the application of rearview video systems to only 
MPVs and trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less and another 
alternative requiring those systems for MPVs and trucks and either 
sensors or those systems for cars. The PRIA summarizes the costs, 
benefits, and cost per life saved for the proposal and these 
alternatives. We note that, at this time, while one of the alternatives 
has overall lower costs and a slightly more efficient cost per life 
saved ratio than NHTSA's proposal, the agency tentatively concludes 
that the increased benefits of the proposal, especially in terms of 
fatalities and injuries to children, are worth the additional costs 
above those in the more limited alternative scenario.
    Since the agency has estimated that the proposed rule could result 
in expenditures of over $1 billion annually, NHTSA has performed a 
probabilistic uncertainty analysis to examine the degree of uncertainty 
in its cost and benefit estimates and included that analysis in the 
PRIA.

H. National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that 
implementation of this action would not have any significant impact on 
the quality of the human environment.

[[Page 76244]]

I. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), a person is not 
required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency 
unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. This 
proposal would include a collection of information, i.e., the proposed 
phase-in reporting requirements. If approved, the requirements would 
require manufacturers of passenger cars and of trucks, buses, MPVs and 
low-speed vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 lb) or less, to 
annually submit a report for each of two years concerning the number of 
such vehicles that meet the rear visibility system requirements.
    Accordingly, the Department of Transportation will be submitting 
the following information collection request to OMB for review and 
clearance under the PRA.
    Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
    Title: Phase-In Production Reporting Requirements for Rear 
Visibility Systems.
    Type of Request: New request.
    OMB Clearance Number: None assigned.
    Form Number: This collection of information will not use any 
standard forms.
    Affected Public: The respondents are manufacturers of passenger 
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed 
vehicles having a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000 
pounds) or less. The agency estimates that there are about 21 such 
manufacturers.
    Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden 
Resulting from the Collection of Information: NHTSA estimates that the 
total annual burden is 42 hours (2 hours per manufacturer per year). 
Two reports per manufacturer would be collected.
    Estimated Costs: NHTSA estimates that the total annual cost burden, 
in U.S. dollars, will be $2,100. No additional resources would be 
expended by vehicle manufacturers to gather annual production 
information because they already compile this data for their own uses.
    Summary of the Collection of Information: This collection would 
require manufacturers of passenger cars, multipurpose passenger 
vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles having a gross vehicle 
weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less to provide motor 
vehicle production data for the following two years: September 1, 2012 
through August 31, 2013; and September 1, 2013 through August 31, 2014.
    Description of the Need for the Information and the Proposed Use of 
the Information: The purpose of the reporting requirements will be to 
aid NHTSA in determining whether a manufacturer has complied with the 
requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, Rearview 
Mirrors, during the phase-in of new requirements for rear visibility 
systems.
    NHTSA requests comments on the agency's estimates of the total 
annual hour and cost burdens resulting from this collection of 
information. Organizations and individuals that wish to submit comments 
on the information collection requirements should direct them to 
NHTSA's docket for this NPRM. These comments must be received on or 
before February 7, 2011.

J. Plain Language

    Executive Order 12866 requires each agency to write all rules in 
plain language. Application of the principles of plain language 
includes consideration of the following questions:
     Have we organized the material to suit the public's needs?
     Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
     Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that 
isn't clear?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, 
use of headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
     Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
     Could we improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or 
diagrams?
     What else could we do to make the rule easier to 
understand?
    If you have any responses to these questions, please include them 
in your comments on this proposal.

K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier 
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of 
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center 
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may 
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document 
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

IX. Proposed Regulatory Text

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 571 and 585

    Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Tires.

    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA proposes to amend 49 CFR 
parts 571 and 585 as follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

    1. The authority citation for part 571 of title 49 continues to 
read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    2. Section 571.111 is amended by revising the heading, S1 and S3, 
adding in alphabetical order the following definitions to S4, and 
adding S5.5 through S5.5.3.7, S6.2 through S6.2.3.7, S14 through 
S14.3.3, and Figures 5 and 6 to read as follows:

Sec.  571.111  Standard No. 111; Rear visibility.

    S1. Scope. This standard specifies requirements for rearview 
devices and systems.
* * * * *
    S3. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, school buses, 
motorcycles and low-speed vehicles.
    S4. Definitions.
* * * * *
    Limited line manufacturer means a manufacturer that sells three or 
fewer carlines, as that term is defined in 49 CFR 583.4, in the United 
States during a production year.
    Rearview image means a visual image of the area directly behind a 
vehicle that is provided in a single location to the vehicle operator 
and by means of indirect vision.
    Small manufacturer means an original vehicle manufacturer that 
produces or assembles fewer than 5,000 vehicles annually for sale in 
the United States.
* * * * *
    S5.5 Rear visibility.
    (a) For passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 2012, 
but not later than August 31, 2014, a percentage of each manufacturer's 
production, as specified in S5.5.3, shall display a rearview image 
meeting the requirements of S5.5.1 through S5.5.2.
    (b) Each passenger car manufactured on or after September 1, 2014, 
shall display a rearview image meeting the requirements of S5.5.1 
through S5.5.2.
    S5.5.1 Rearview image performance.
    S5.5.1.1 Field of view. When tested in accordance with the 
procedures in S14.1 through S14.2.3, the rearview image shall display, 
in a location visible to a driver properly restrained by seat belts:
    (a) A minimum of a 150-mm wide portion of each test object located 
at positions F and G in Figure 5; and
    (b) The full width and height of each test object located at 
positions A through E in Figure 5.

[[Page 76245]]

    S5.5.1.2 Size. When the rearview image is measured in accordance 
with the procedures in S14.1 through S14.2.3, the calculated visual 
angle subtended by the horizontal width of:
    (a) The three test objects located at positions A, B, and C in 
Figure 5 shall average not less than 5 minutes of arc; and
    (b) The angular size of each individual test object (A, B, and C) 
shall not be less than 3 minutes of arc.
    S5.5.1.3 Response time. The rearview image meeting the requirements 
of S5.5.1 through 5.5.1.6 shall be displayed within 2.0 seconds of the 
time at which the vehicle transmission is shifted into reverse gear; 
and
    S5.5.1.4 Linger time. The rearview image shall not be displayed for 
more than 10.0 seconds after the vehicle transmission has been shifted 
out of reverse gear.
    S5.5.1.5 Deactivation. The rearview image shall not be 
extinguishable by any driver-controlled means.
    S5.5.1.6 Display luminance. When tested in accordance with S14.2, 
the luminance of an interior visual display used to present the 
rearview image shall not be less than 500 cd/m\2\.
    S5.5.2 Durability performance. After the vehicle is subjected to 
the test procedures in S14.2.1 through S14.2.3, the vehicle shall meet 
the requirements of S5.5.1.1 and S5.5.1.2.
    S5.5.3 Phase-in schedule.
    S5.5.3.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2012 and 
before September 1, 2014. At any time during the production years 
ending August 31, 2012 and August 31, 2013, each manufacturer shall, 
upon request from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide 
information identifying the vehicles (by make, model and vehicle 
identification number) that have been certified as complying with this 
standard. The manufacturer's designation of a vehicle as a certified 
vehicle is irrevocable.
    S5.5.3.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2012 and 
before September 1, 2013. Except as provided in S5.5.3.4, for passenger 
cars manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2012, and 
before September 1, 2013, the number of passenger cars complying with 
S5.5 through S5.5.2 shall be not less than 10 percent of the 
manufacturer's--
    (a) Production of passenger cars during that period; or
    (b) Average annual production of passenger cars manufactured in the 
three previous production years.
    S5.5.3.3 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2013 and 
before September 1, 2014. Except as provided in S5.5.3.4, for passenger 
cars manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2013, and 
before September 1, 2014, the number of passenger cars complying with 
S5.5 through S5.5.2 shall be not less than 40 percent of the 
manufacturer's--
    (a) Production of passenger cars during that period; or
    (b) Average annual production of passenger cars manufactured in the 
three previous production years.
    S5.5.3.4 Exclusions from phase-in. The requirements in S5.5.3.2 and 
S5.5.3.3 do not apply to--
    (a) Vehicles that are manufactured by small manufacturers or by 
limited line manufacturers.
    (b) Vehicles that are altered (within the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) 
before September 1, 2014, after having been previously certified in 
accordance with part 567 of this chapter, and vehicles manufactured in 
two or more stages before September 1, 2014.
    S5.5.3.5 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer. For the 
purpose of calculating average annual production of vehicles for each 
manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured by each 
manufacturer under S5.5.3.1 through S5.5.3.3, a vehicle produced by 
more than one manufacturer shall be attributed to a single manufacturer 
as follows, subject to S5.5.3.6--
    (a) A vehicle that is imported shall be attributed to the importer.
    (b) A vehicle manufactured in the United States by more than one 
manufacturer, one of which also markets the vehicle, shall be 
attributed to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
    S5.5.3.6 A vehicle produced by more than one manufacturer shall be 
attributed to any one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an 
express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration under 49 CFR part 585, between the manufacturer 
so specified and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise 
be attributed under S5.5.3.5.
    S5.5.3.7 Calculation of complying vehicles.
    (a) For the purposes of calculating the vehicles complying with 
S5.5.3.2, a manufacturer may count a vehicle if it is manufactured on 
or after [date that is 30 days after publication of the final rule in 
the Federal Register] but before September 1, 2013.
    (b) For purposes of complying with S5.5.3.3, a manufacturer may 
count a vehicle if it--
    (1) Is manufactured on or after [date that is 30 days after 
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register] but before 
September 1, 2014 and,
    (2) Is not counted toward compliance with S5.5.3.2.
    (c) For the purposes of calculating average annual production of 
vehicles for each manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured 
by each manufacturer, each vehicle that is excluded from having to meet 
the applicable requirement is not counted.
* * * * *
    S6.2 Rear visibility.
    (a) For multipurpose passenger vehicles, low-speed vehicles, 
trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 4.536 kg or less manufactured on or 
after September 1, 2012, but not later than August 31, 2014, a 
percentage of each manufacturer's production, as specified in S6.2.3, 
shall display a rearview image meeting the requirements of S6.2.1 
through S6.2.2.
    (b) Each multipurpose passenger vehicle, low-speed vehicle, truck, 
and bus with a GVWR of 4.536 kg or less manufactured on or after 
September 1, 2014, shall display a rearview image meeting the 
requirements of S6.2.1 through S6.2.2.
    S6.2.1 Rearview image performance.
    S6.2.1.1 Field of view. When tested in accordance with the 
procedures in S14.1 through S14.2.3, the rearview image shall display, 
in a location visible to a driver properly restrained by seat belts:
    (a) A minimum of a 150-mm wide portion of each test object located 
at positions F and G in Figure 5; and
    (b) The full width and height of each test object located at 
positions A through E in Figure 5.
    S6.2.1.2 Size. When the rearview image is measured in accordance 
with the procedures in S14.1 through S14.2.3, the calculated visual 
angle--subtended by the horizontal width of
    (a) The three test objects located at positions A, B, and C in 
Figure 5 shall average not less than 5 minutes of arc; and
    (b) The angular size of each individual test object (A, B, and C) 
shall not be less than 3 minutes of arc.
    S6.2.1.3 Response time. The rearview image meeting the requirements 
of S6.2.1 through 6.2.1.6 shall be displayed within 2.0 seconds of the 
time at which the vehicle transmission is shifted into reverse gear; 
and
    S6.2.1.4 Linger time. The rearview image shall not be displayed for 
more than 10.0 seconds after the vehicle transmission has been shifted 
out of reverse gear.

[[Page 76246]]

    S6.2.1.5 Deactivation. The rearview image shall not be 
extinguishable by any driver-controlled means.
    S6.2.1.6 Display luminance. When tested in accordance with S14.2, 
the luminance of an interior visual display used to present the 
rearview image shall not be less than 500 cd/m\2\.
    S6.2.2 Durability performance. After the vehicle is subjected to 
the test procedures in S14.2.1 through S14.2.3, the vehicle shall meet 
the requirements of S6.2.1.1 and S6.2.1.2.
    S6.2.3 Phase-in schedule.
    S6.2.3.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2012 and 
before September 1, 2014. At any time during the production years 
ending August 31, 2012 and August 31, 2013, each manufacturer shall, 
upon request from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide 
information identifying the vehicles (by make, model and vehicle 
identification number) that have been certified as complying with this 
standard. The manufacturer's designation of a vehicle as a certified 
vehicle is irrevocable.
    S6.2.3.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2012 and 
before September 1, 2013. Except as provided in S6.2.3.4, for 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles 
with a GVWR of 4.536 kg or less, manufactured by a manufacturer on or 
after September 1, 2012, and before September 1, 2013, the number of 
such vehicles complying with S6.2 through S6.2.2 shall be not less than 
33 percent of the manufacturer's--
    (a) Production of such vehicles during that period; or
    (b) Average annual production of such vehicles manufactured in the 
three previous production years.
    S6.2.3.3 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2013 and 
before September 1, 2014. Except as provided in S6.2.3.4, for 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles 
with a GVWR of 4.536 kg or less, manufactured by a manufacturer on or 
after September 1, 2013, and before September 1, 2014, the number of 
such vehicles complying with S6.2 through S6.2.2 shall be not less than 
67 percent of the manufacturer's--
    (a) production of such vehicles during that period; or
    (b) average annual production of such vehicles manufactured in the 
three previous production years.
    S6.2.3.4 Exclusions from phase-in. The requirements in S6.2.3.2 and 
S6.2.3.3 do not apply to--
    (a) Vehicles that are manufactured by small manufacturers or by 
limited line manufacturers.
    (b) Vehicles that are altered (within the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) 
before September 1, 2014, after having been previously certified in 
accordance with part 567 of this chapter, and vehicles manufactured in 
two or more stages before September 1, 2014.
    S6.2.3.5 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer. For the 
purpose of calculating average annual production of vehicles for each 
manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured by each 
manufacturer under S6.2.3.1 through S6.2.3.3, a vehicle produced by 
more than one manufacturer shall be attributed to a single manufacturer 
as follows, subject to S6.2.3.6--
    (a) A vehicle that is imported shall be attributed to the importer.
    (b) A vehicle manufactured in the United States by more than one 
manufacturer, one of which also markets the vehicle, shall be 
attributed to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
    S6.2.3.6 A vehicle produced by more than one manufacturer shall be 
attributed to any one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an 
express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration under 49 CFR part 585, between the manufacturer 
so specified and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise 
be attributed under S6.2.3.5.
    S6.2.3.7 Calculation of complying vehicles.
    (a) For the purposes of calculating the vehicles complying with 
S6.2.3.2, a manufacturer may count a vehicle if it is manufactured on 
or after [date that is 30 days after publication of the final rule in 
the Federal Register] but before September 1, 2013.
    (b) For purposes of complying with S6.2.3.3, a manufacturer may 
count a vehicle if it--
    (1) Is manufactured on or after [date that is 30 days after 
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register] but before 
September 1, 2014 and,
    (2) Is not counted toward compliance with S6.2.3.2.
    (c) For the purposes of calculating average annual production of 
vehicles for each manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured 
by each manufacturer, each vehicle that is excluded from having to meet 
the applicable requirement is not counted.
* * * * *
    S14 Rear visibility test procedure.
    S14.1 Test setup.
    S14.1.1 Lighting. The ambient illumination conditions in which 
testing is conducted consists of light that is evenly distributed from 
above and is at an intensity of 10,000 lux, as measured at the center 
of the exterior surface of vehicle's roof.
    S14.1.2 Vehicle conditions.
    S14.1.2.1 Tires. The vehicle's tires are set to the vehicle 
manufacturer's recommended cold inflation pressure.
    S14.1.2.2 Fuel tank loading. The fuel tank is full.
    S14.1.2.3 Vehicle load. The vehicle is loaded to simulate the 
weight of the driver and four passengers or the designated occupant 
capacity, if less, based on an average occupant weight of 68 kg. The 
weight of each occupant is represented by 45 kg resting on the seat pan 
and 23 kg resting on the vehicle floorboard.
    S14.1.2.4 Driver's seat positioning.
    S14.1.2.4.1 Adjust the driver's seat to the midpoint of the 
longitudinal adjustment range.
    S14.1.2.4.2 Adjust the driver's seat to the lowest point of all 
vertical adjustment ranges present.
    S14.1.2.4.3 Using the three dimensional SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) 
manikin, adjust the driver's seat back angle at the vertical portion of 
the H-point machine's torso weight hanger to 25 degrees. If this 
adjustment setting is not available, adjust the seat-back angle to the 
positional detent setting closest to 25 degrees in the direction of the 
manufacturer's nominal design riding position.
    S14.1.3 Test object. Each test object is a right circular cylinder 
that is 0.8 m high and 0.3 m in external diameter. There are seven test 
objects, A-G. Test objects A, B, C, D, and E are marked with a 
horizontal band encompassing the uppermost 150 mm of the side of the 
cylinder. Test objects F and G are marked on the side with a solid 
vertical stripe of 150 mm width extending from the top to the bottom of 
each cylinder. Both the horizontal band and vertical stripe shall be of 
a color that contrasts with both the rest of the cylinder and the test 
surface.
    S14.1.4 Test object locations and orientation. Place cylinders at 
locations specified in S14.1.5(a) through(d) and illustrated in Figure 
5. Measure the distances shown in Figure 5 from a cylinder to another 
cylinder or another object from the center (axis) of the cylinder as 
viewed from above. Each test object is oriented so that its axis is 
vertical.
    (a) Place cylinders G and F so that their centers are in a 
transverse vertical plane that is 0.3 m to the rear of a transverse 
vertical plane tangent to the rearmost surface of the rear bumper. 
Place cylinders E and D so that their centers are in a transverse 
vertical plane

[[Page 76247]]

that is 0.9 m to the rear of a transverse vertical plane tangent to the 
rearmost surface of the rear bumper. Place cylinders A, B and C so that 
their centers are in a transverse vertical plane that is 6.1 m to the 
rear of a transverse vertical plane tangent to the rearmost surface of 
the rear bumper.
    (b) Place cylinder B so that its center is in a longitudinal 
vertical plane passing through the vehicle's longitudinal centerline.
    (c) Place cylinders C, E, and G so that their centers are in a 
longitudinal vertical plane located 1.5 m, measured laterally and 
horizontally, to the left of the vehicle longitudinal center line.
    (d) Place cylinders A, D, and F so that their centers are in a 
longitudinal vertical plane located 1.5 m, measured laterally and 
horizontally, to the right of the vehicle longitudinal center line.
    S14.1.5 Test reference point. To obtain the test reference point, 
locate the center of the forward-looking eye midpoint (Mf) 
of a 50th percentile male driver in the sagittal plane of the driver's 
body, 632 mm vertically above the H point and 96 mm aft of the H point 
(H), as illustrated in Figure 6. Next, locate the head/neck joint 
center (J) illustrated in Figure 6 so that it is located 100 mm 
rearward of Mf and 588 mm vertically above the H point. Draw 
an imaginary horizontal line between Mf and a point 
vertically above J, defined as J2. Rotate the imaginary line 
about J2 in the direction of the rearview image until the 
straight-line distance between Mf and the center of the 
visual display reaches the shortest possible value. Define this new, 
rotated location of Mf to be Mr (eye midpoint 
rotated).
    S14.1.6 Measurement procedure. Locate a 35 mm or larger format 
still camera, video camera, or digital equivalent such that the center 
of the camera's image plane is located at Mr and the camera 
lens is directed at the center of the visual display's rearview image. 
Affix a ruler at the base of the rearview image in an orientation 
parallel with a transverse cylinder centerline. Photograph the image of 
the visual display with the ruler included in the frame.
    S14.1.6.1 Extract photographic data. Using the photograph, measure 
the horizontal width of a 50 mm delineated section of the in-photo 
ruler along the edge closest to the rearview image and at a point that 
would fall along the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. Using the 
photograph, measure the horizontal width of the colored band at the 
upper portion of each of the three test objects located at positions A, 
B, and C in Figure 5. Define the measured horizontal widths of the 
colored bands of the three test objects as da, 
db, and dc.
    S14.1.6.2 Obtain scaling factor. Using the measured length of the 
50 mm portion of the ruler as it appears in the photograph, divide this 
value by 50 mm to obtain a scaling factor. Define this scaling factor 
as sscale.
    S14.1.6.3 Determine viewing distance. Determine the actual distance 
from the rotated eye midpoint location (Mr) to the center of 
the rearview image. Define this viewing distance as aeye.
    S14.1.6.4 Calculate visual angle subtended by test objects. Use the 
following equation to calculate the subtended visual angles:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.015

where i can take on the value of either test object A, B, or C, and 
arcsine is calculated in units of degrees.

    S14.2 Visual display luminance testing. The visual display 
luminance is measured at room temperature in a dark room using a 
spectroradiometer. The minimum specified value of 500 cd/m\2\ must be 
met at any measured point within the display.
    S14.3 Durability testing.
    S14.3.1 Corrosion test procedure. The vehicle is subjected to two 
24-hour corrosion test cycles. In each corrosion test cycle, a portion 
of the vehicle, which must include all exterior components of the rear 
visibility system, is subjected to a salt spray (fog) test in 
accordance with ASTM B117-73, Method of Salt Spray (Fog) Testing 
(incorporated by reference, see Sec.  571.5) for a period of 24 hours. 
Allow 1 hour to elapse without spray between the two test cycles.
    S14.3.2 Humidity exposure procedure. The vehicle is subjected to 24 
consecutive 3-hour humidity test cycles. In each humidity test cycle, 
the exterior of the vehicle is subjected to a temperature of 100[deg] + 
7[deg] - 0 [deg]F (38[deg] + 4 [deg]C) with a relative humidity of not 
less than 90% for a period of 2 hours. After a period not to exceed 5 
minutes, the exterior of the vehicle is subjected to a temperature of 
32[deg] + 5[deg] - 0 [deg]F (0[deg] + 3[deg] -0 [deg]C) and a humidity 
of not more than 30% [deg] 10% for 1 hour. Allow no more 
than 5 minutes to elapse between each test cycle.
    S14.3.3 Temperature exposure procedure. The vehicle is subjected to 
4 consecutive 2-hour temperature test cycles. In each temperature test 
cycle, the exterior of the vehicle is first subjected to a temperature 
of 176[deg]  5 [deg]F (60[deg]  3 [deg]C) for a 
period of one hour. After a period not to exceed 5 minutes, the 
exterior of the vehicle is subjected to a temperature of 32[deg] + 
5[deg] - 0 [deg]F (0[deg] + 3[deg] - 0 [deg]C) for 1 hour. Allow no 
more than 5 minutes to elapse between each test cycle.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

[[Page 76248]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.013

[[Page 76249]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07DE10.014

BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
    3. Section 571.500 is amended by adding paragraph (11) at the end 
of paragraph S5(b) to read as follows:

Sec.  571.500  Standard No. 500; Low-speed vehicles.

* * * * *
    S5.* * *
    (b)* * *
    (11) Low-speed vehicles shall comply with the rear visibility 
requirements specified in S5.5 and S6.2 of FMVSS No. 111.
* * * * *

[[Page 76250]]

PART 585--PHASE-IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

    4. The authority citation for part 585 would continue to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    5. Part 585 is amended by adding subpart M to read as follows:
Subpart M--Rear Visibility Improvements Reporting Requirements
Sec.
585.121 Scope.
585.122 Purpose.
585.123 Applicability.
585.124 Definitions.
585.125 Response to inquiries.
585.126 Reporting requirements.
585.127 Records.

Subpart M--Rear Visibility Improvements Reporting Requirements

Sec.  585.121  Scope.

    This part establishes requirements for manufacturers of passenger 
cars, of trucks, buses, multipurpose passenger vehicles and low-speed 
vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms 
(kg) (10,000 pounds (lb)) or less, to submit a report, and maintain 
records related to the report, concerning the number of such vehicles 
that meet the rear visibility requirements (S5.5 and S6.2) of Standard 
No. 111, Rearview mirrors (49 CFR 571.111).

Sec.  585.122  Purpose.

    The purpose of these reporting requirements is to assist the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in determining whether a 
manufacturer has complied with the rear visibility requirements (S5.5 
and S6.2) of Standard No. 111, Rearview mirrors (49 CFR 571.111).

Sec.  585.123  Applicability.

    This part applies to manufacturers of passenger cars, of trucks, 
buses, multipurpose passenger vehicles and low-speed vehicles with a 
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms (kg) (10,000 
pounds (lb)) or less.

Sec.  585.124  Definitions.

    (a) All terms defined in 49 U.S.C. 30102 are used in their 
statutory meaning.
    (b) Bus, gross vehicle weight rating or GVWR, low-speed vehicle, 
multipurpose passenger vehicle, passenger car, and truck are used as 
defined in Sec.  571.3 of this chapter.
    (c) Production year means the 12-month period between September 1 
of one year and August 31 of the following year, inclusive.

Sec.  585.125  Response to inquiries.

    At anytime during the production years ending August 31, 2013, and 
August 31, 2014, each manufacturer shall, upon request from the Office 
of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide information identifying the 
vehicles (by make, model and vehicle identification number) that have 
been certified as complying with the rear visibility requirements of 
Standard No. 111, Rearview mirrors (49 CFR 571.111). The manufacturer's 
designation of a vehicle as a certified vehicle is irrevocable.

Sec.  585.126  Reporting requirements.

    (a) Advanced credit phase-in reporting requirements. Within 60 days 
after the end of the production year ending August 31, 2012, each 
manufacturer choosing to certify vehicles manufactured during that 
production year as complying with the rear visibility requirements of 
Standard No. 111 (49 CFR 571.111) shall submit a report to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration providing the information 
specified in paragraph (c) of this section and in Sec.  585.2 of this 
part.
    (b) Phase-in reporting requirements. Within 60 days after the end 
of each of the production years ending August 31, 2013 and August 31, 
2014, each manufacturer shall submit a report to the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration concerning its compliance with the rear 
visibility requirements of Standard No. 111 (49 CFR 571.111) for its 
vehicles produced in that year. Each report shall provide the 
information specified in paragraph (d) of this section and in section 
585.2 of this part.
    (c) Advanced credit phase-in report content; production of 
complying vehicles. With respect to the reports identified in Sec.  
585.126(a), each manufacturer shall report for the production year for 
which the report is filed the number of vehicles, by make and model 
year, that are certified as meeting the rear visibility requirements of 
Standard No. 111 (49 CFR 571.111).
    (d) Phase-in report content--
    (1) Basis for phase-in production goals. Each manufacturer shall 
provide the number of vehicles manufactured in the current production 
year, or, at the manufacturer's option, in each of the three previous 
production years. A new manufacturer that is, for the first time, 
manufacturing vehicles for sale in the United States must report the 
number of vehicles manufactured during the current production year.
    (2) Production of complying vehicles. Each manufacturer shall 
report for the production year being reported on, and each preceding 
production year, to the extent that vehicles produced during the 
preceding years are treated under Standard No. 111 as having been 
produced during the production year being reported on, information on 
the number of vehicles that meet the rear visibility requirements of 
Standard No. 111 (49 CFR 571.111).

Sec.  585.127  Records.

    Each manufacturer shall maintain records of the Vehicle 
Identification Number for each vehicle for which information is 
reported under Sec.  585.126 until December 31, 2020.

    Issued on: November 29, 2010.
Joseph S. Carra,
Acting Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 2010-30353 Filed 12-3-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P