Document ID: SEC-2018-0263-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: BOX Options Exchange, LLC
Posted Date: 2018-02-13T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 30 (Tuesday, February 13, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6284-6288]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-02864]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-82654; File No. SR-BOX-2018-04]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; BOX Options Exchange LLC; Notice 
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To 
Amend Section VI. (Technology Fees) of the BOX Fee Schedule

February 7, 2018.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given 
that on January 31, 2018, BOX Options Exchange LLC (the ``Exchange'') 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the 
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which 
Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Exchange filed the 
proposed rule change pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act,\3\ 
and Rule 19b-4(f)(2) thereunder,\4\ which renders the proposal 
effective upon filing with the Commission. The Commission is publishing 
this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from 
interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
    \4\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the 
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange is filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission'') a proposed rule change to amend Section VI. 
(Technology Fees) of the BOX Fee Schedule. While changes to the fee 
schedule pursuant to this proposal will be effective upon filing, the 
changes will become operative on February 1, 2018. The text of the 
proposed rule change is available from the principal office of the 
Exchange, at the Commission's Public Reference Room and also on the 
Exchange's internet website at http://boxexchange.com.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The

[[Page 6285]]

Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C 
below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend Section VI (Technology Fees) in the 
Fee Schedule. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend Section 
VI.B. (High Speed Vendor Feed (``HSVF'')) in the BOX Fee Schedule to 
revise the fee charged per month for all market participants for 
receiving the HSVF. The Exchange's proprietary HSVF is currently 
available to all market participants at a fee of $750.00 per month; 
however, the Exchange now proposes to increase the fee to $1,500.00 per 
month for all market participants who receive the HSVF. This fee will 
be payable by any market participant that receives the HSVF through a 
direct connection to BOX and will be assessed once per market 
participant.
    In February 2013, the Exchange made its proprietary direct market 
data product, the HSVF, available to all market participants at no 
cost.\5\ In August 2016, the Exchange established a fee of $750 per 
month for the HSVF for all market participants.\6\ The Exchange now 
proposes to raise the monthly fee for the HSVF. The BOX HSVF is a 
proprietary product that provides: (i) Trades and trade cancelation 
information; (ii) best-ranked price level to buy and the best-ranked 
price level to sell; (iii) instrument summaries (including information 
such as high, low, and last trade price and traded volume); (iv) the 
five best limit prices for each option instrument; (v) request for 
Quote messages; \7\ (vi) PIP Order, Improvement Order and Block Trade 
Order (Facilitation and Solicitation) information; \8\ (vii) orders 
exposed at NBBO; \9\ (viii) instrument dictionary (e.g., strike price, 
expiration date, underlying symbol, price threshold, and minimum 
trading increment for instruments traded on BOX); (ix) options class 
and instrument status change notices (e.g., whether an instrument or 
class is in pre-opening, continuous trading, closed, halted, or 
prohibited from trading); and (x) options class opening time.
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    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68833 (February 5, 
2013), 78 FR 9758 (February 11, 2013) (SR-BOX-2013-04).
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78565 (August 18 
[sic], 2016), 81 FR 55251 (August 3 [sic], 2016) (SR-BOX-2016-40).
    \7\ See Exchange Rules 100(a)(57), 7070(h) and 8050.
    \8\ As set forth in Exchange Rules 7150 and 7270, respectively.
    \9\ As set forth in Exchange Rules 7130(b)(3) and 8040(d)(6), 
respectively.
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    The Exchange notes that data connection fees are charged by other 
options markets such as Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (``BZX''), Cboe EDGX 
Exchange, Inc. (``EDGX''), Cboe Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe''), Cboe C2 
Exchange, Inc. (``C2''), Nasdaq BX, Inc. (``BX''), The Nasdaq Options 
Market (``NOM''), and Nasdaq PHLX LLC (``PHLX'').\10\
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    \10\ See the BZX Fee Schedule, available at: http://
markets.;cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/bzx/, the EDGX 
Fee Schedule, available at: http://markets.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/edgx/, the Cboe Fee Schedule, available at 
http://www.cboe.com/publish/feeschedule/CBOEFeeSchedule.pdf and the 
Cboe Data Services Fee Schedule, available at https://www.cboe.org/publish/mdxfees/cboe-cds-fees-schedule-for-cboe-datafeeds.pdf, the 
C2 Fee Schedule, available at: http://www.cboe.com/publish/C2FeeSchedule/C2FeeSchedule.pdf and the C2 Data Services Fee 
Schedule, available at: https://www.cboe.org/publish/mdxfees/c2-cds-fees-schedule.pdf, the BX Fee Schedule, available at: http://nasdaqomxbx.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQBXTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_2_15&manual=%2FNASDAQOMXBX%2Fmain%2Fbx-eq-rules%2F; the NOM Fee Schedule, available at: http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_15_1_2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-optionsrules%2F, the PHLX Fee Schedule, available at: 
http://nasdaqomxphlx.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQPHLXTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_2&manual=%2Fnasdaqomxphlx%2Fphlx%2Fphlx-rulesbrd%2F, and the NASDAQ U.S. Derivatives Data Price 
List, available at: http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=DPPriceListOptions.
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2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposal is consistent with the 
requirements of Section 6(b) of the Act,\11\ in general, and Section 
6(b)(4) and (5) of the Act,\12\ in particular, in that it provides for 
the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges 
among BOX Participants and other persons using the Exchange's 
facilities and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination among 
them.
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    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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    The Commission and the courts have repeatedly expressed their 
preference for competition over regulatory intervention in determining 
prices, products, and services in the securities markets. In Regulation 
NMS, while adopting a series of steps to improve the current market 
model, the Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in 
determining prices and self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') revenues 
and, also, recognized that current regulation of the market system 
``has been remarkably successful in promoting market competition in its 
broader forms that are most important to investors and listed 
companies.'' \13\
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    \13\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 
70 FR 37496, 37499 (June 29, 2005) (``Regulation NMS Adopting 
Release'').
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    Likewise, in NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange Commission 
\14\ (``NetCoalition'') the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's use of 
a market-based approach in evaluating the fairness of market data fees 
against a challenge claiming that Congress mandated a cost-based 
approach.\15\ As the court emphasized, the Commission ``intended in 
Regulation NMS that `market forces, rather than regulatory 
requirements' play a role in determining the market data. . . . to be 
made available to investors and at what cost.'' \16\
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    \14\ NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
    \15\ See NetCoalition, at 534-535.
    \16\ Id. at 537.
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    Further, ``[n]o one disputes that competition for order flow is 
`fierce.' . . . As the SEC explained, `[i]n the U.S. national market 
system, buyers and sellers of securities, and the broker-dealers that 
act as their order-routing agents, have a wide range of choices of 
where to route orders for execution'; [and] `no exchange can afford to 
take its market share percentages for granted' because `no exchange 
possesses a monopoly, regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of 
order flow from broker dealers.' . . .'' \17\ Although the court and 
the SEC were discussing the cash equities markets, the Exchange 
believes that these views apply with equal force to the options 
markets.
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    \17\ Id. at 539 (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
59039 (December 2, 2008), 73 FR 74770, 74782-83 (December 9, 2008) 
(SR-NYSEArca-2006-21)).
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    BOX believes that the allocation of the proposed fee is fair and 
equitable in accordance with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act, and not 
unreasonably discriminatory in accordance with Section 6(b)(5) of the 
Act. As described in greater detail below, if BOX has calculated 
improperly and the market deems the proposed fees to be unfair, 
inequitable, or unreasonably discriminatory, firms can discontinue the 
use of their data because the proposed product is entirely optional to 
all parties. Firms are not required to purchase data and BOX is not 
required to make data available or to offer specific pricing 
alternatives for potential purchases. BOX can discontinue offering a 
pricing alternative (as it has in the past) and firms can discontinue 
their use at any time and for any reason (as they often do), including 
due to their assessment of the reasonableness of fees

[[Page 6286]]

charged. BOX continues to establish and revise pricing policies aimed 
at increasing fairness and equitable allocation of fees among 
subscribers.
    The Exchange's proprietary HSVF is currently available to all 
market participants at a fee of $750.00 per month; however, the 
Exchange now proposes to increase the fee to $1,500.00 per month for 
all market participants who receive the HSVF. The Exchange believes 
that raising the HSVF fee to $1,500 per month per connection is 
reasonable and appropriate as it is within the connectivity fee range 
that is charged by other options exchanges.\18\ The Exchange believes 
comparing the HSVF to the data connectivity fees at other exchanges is 
appropriate as the Exchange currently assess [sic] the HSVF fee by 
connection to and not consumption of the data.
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    \18\ See supra, note 10. Cboe's and C2's data distributor CDS 
charges a $500 port fee per month; BZX and EDGX charge a 
connectivity fee between $250 and $14,500 a month for connectivity 
depending upon the data feed; BX charges a port fee between $500 and 
$650 per month depending upon the port; NOM charges a port fee 
between $650 and $750 a month depending upon the port, and PHLX 
charges a connectivity fee between $65 and $6,000 a month depending 
upon the data feed. The Exchange notes that the above mentioned 
exchanges charge these fees per port, while the Exchange proposes to 
assess the fee once per market participant. Furthermore, the 
Exchange notes that Cboe, C2, BZX, EDGX, NASDAQ BX, NOM, and PHLX 
charge the above mentioned connectivity fees in addition to data 
fees, which range from $1 to $14,500 depending upon the data feed 
and user type.
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    In addition, the Exchange believes that its fees are equitable and 
not unfairly discriminatory because all market participants are charged 
the same fee for access to the HSVF. Further, the Exchange notes that 
all market participants who wish to receive the feed may, as the feed 
is available to anyone willing to pay the proposed $1,500 monthly fee.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The proposed 
change to the Fee Schedule will simply allow the Exchange to charge all 
market participants equally for the costs incurred by connecting to the 
BOX Network. The HSVF is similar to proprietary data products currently 
offered by other exchanges, and these other exchanges charge comparable 
monthly fees.\19\ While connection to the HSVF is required to receive 
the broadcasts for and participate in the Exchange's auction 
mechanisms,\20\ the Exchange does not believes [sic] the proposed 
monthly fee will impede competition within these auctions. As discussed 
above, the Exchange believes that fees for connectivity are constrained 
by the robust competition for order flow among exchanges and non-
exchange markets. Further, excessive fees for connectivity would serve 
to impair [sic] ability to compete for order flow rather than burdening 
competition. As such, the Exchange does not believe that the proposed 
rule change will impose any burden on competition not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
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    \19\ Id.
    \20\ BOX's auction mechanisms include the Price Improvement 
Period (``PIP''), Complex Order Price Improvement Period 
(``COPIP''), Facilitation Auction and Solicitation Auction.
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    Notwithstanding its determination that the Commission may rely upon 
competition to establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market 
data, the NetCoalition court found that the Commission had not, in that 
case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that 
the market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. BOX 
believes that a record may readily be established to demonstrate the 
competitive nature of the market in question.
    There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide 
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data 
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are 
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of 
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a 
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. Data products 
are valuable to many end subscribers only insofar as they provide 
information that end Subscribers expect will assist them or their 
customers in making trading decisions.
    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution 
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a 
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both 
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's 
Participant's view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a 
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer 
(``BD'') will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the 
expected revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net 
transaction execution costs and the cost of data that the BD chooses to 
buy to support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The 
choice of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the 
products in making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the 
product exceeds its expected value, the BD will choose not to buy it. 
Moreover, as a BD chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular 
exchange, the value of the product to that BD decreases, for two 
reasons. First, the product will contain less information, because 
executions of the BD's orders will not be reflected in it. Second, and 
perhaps more important, the product will be less valuable to that BD 
because it does not provide information about the venue to which it is 
directing its orders. Data from the competing venue to which the BD is 
directing orders will become correspondingly more valuable.
    Thus, an increase in the fees charged for either transactions or 
data has the potential to impair revenues from both products. ``No one 
disputes that competition for order flow is `fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 
24. However, the existence of fierce competition for order flow implies 
a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of BDs with order flow, 
since they may readily reduce costs by directing orders toward the 
lowest-cost trading venues. A BD that shifted its order flow from one 
platform to another in response to order execution price differentials 
would both reduce the value of that platform's market data and reduce 
its own need to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, 
if a platform increases its market data fees, the change will affect 
the overall cost of doing business with the platform, and affected BDs 
will assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing 
orders elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive 
data.
    Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from 
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data 
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is 
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and 
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs 
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, 
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data 
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's 
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, 
executing and/or routing orders,

[[Page 6287]]

and generating and selling data about market activity. The total return 
that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from the joint 
products and the total costs of the joint products.
    Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain 
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint 
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, 
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering 
total costs. Some exchanges pays rebates to attract orders, charges 
relatively low prices for market information and charges relatively 
high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose 
a strategy of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting 
relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity, and setting 
relatively high prices for market information. Still others may provide 
most data free of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to 
recover their costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by 
providing opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to 
charge lower direct fees for executions and data.
    In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating 
maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which 
suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint 
offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an ``excessive'' price 
for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in 
lower prices for other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm 
will experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse 
to its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price 
of data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the 
cost of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will 
fall.
    The level of competition and contestability in the market is 
evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow, 
including eleven SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and various 
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools 
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market 
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two 
FINRA-regulated TRFs compete to attract internalized transaction 
reports. It is common for BDs to further and exploit this competition 
by sending their order flow and transaction reports to multiple 
markets, rather than providing them all to a single market. Competitive 
markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide 
pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products.
    The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently 
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it 
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each 
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary 
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, 
including BOX, NYSE, NYSE MKT, NYSE Arca, and BATS/Direct Edge.
    Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs 
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order 
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple BDs' 
production of proprietary data products. The potential sources of 
proprietary products are virtually limitless. Notably, the potential 
sources of data include the BDs that submit trade reports to TRFs and 
that have the ability to consolidate and distribute their data without 
the involvement of FINRA or an exchange-operated TRF.
    The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete 
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data 
products, as BATS and NYSE Arca did before registering as exchanges by 
publishing proprietary book data on the internet. Second, because a 
single order or transaction report can appear in a core data product, a 
SRO proprietary product, and/or a non-SRO proprietary product, the data 
available in proprietary products is exponentially greater than the 
actual number of orders and transaction reports that exist in the 
marketplace.
    In addition to the competition and price discipline described 
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly 
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. 
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants 
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms 
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, 
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and BATS/Direct Edge. A 
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with 
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
    Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, 
has increased the contestability of that market. While BDs have 
previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation 
NMS encourages market data vendors and BDs to produce proprietary 
products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple 
market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and 
disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg and Thomson 
Reuters. In Europe, Cinnober aggregates and disseminates data from over 
40 brokers and multilateral trading facilities.\21\
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    \21\ See http://www.cinnober.com/boat-trade-reporting.
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    In this environment, a super-competitive increase in the fees 
charged for either transactions or data has the potential to impair 
revenues from both products. ``No one disputes that competition for 
order flow is `fierce'.'' NetCoalition I at 539. The existence of 
fierce competition for order flow implies a high degree of price 
sensitivity on the part of BDs with order flow, since they may readily 
reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. 
A BD that shifted its order flow from one platform to another in 
response to order execution price differentials would both reduce the 
value of that platform's market data and reduce its own need to consume 
data from the disfavored platform. If a platform increases its market 
data fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing business 
with the platform, and affected BDs will assess whether they can lower 
their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby lessening 
the need for the more expensive data.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were either solicited or received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Exchange Act \22\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(2) 
thereunder,\23\ because it establishes or changes a due, or fee.
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    \22\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
    \23\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that the action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 
would otherwise further the purposes of the Act. If the

[[Page 6288]]

Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute 
proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved 
or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-BOX-2018-04 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-BOX-2018-04. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments 
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are 
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying 
information from comment submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-BOX-2018-04, and should be submitted on 
or before March 6, 2018.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\24\
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    \24\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-02864 Filed 2-12-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P