Document ID: SEC-2020-1652-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: National Market System Plan: Consolidated Audit Trail To Enhance Data Security
Posted Date: 2020-10-16T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 201 (Friday, October 16, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65990-66106]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-18801]

[[Page 65989]]

Vol. 85

Friday,

No. 201

October 16, 2020

Part IV

Securities and Exchange Commission

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Proposed Amendments to the National Market System Plan Governing the 
Consolidated Audit Trail To Enhance Data Security; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 201 / Friday, October 16, 2020 / 
Notices  

[[Page 65990]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-89632; File No. S7-10-20]
RIN 3235-AM62

Proposed Amendments to the National Market System Plan Governing 
the Consolidated Audit Trail To Enhance Data Security

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed amendments to national market system plan.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is proposing amendments 
to the national market system plan governing the consolidated audit 
trail. The proposed amendments are designed to enhance the security of 
the consolidated audit trail.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before November 30, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File No. S7-10-20 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments to Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File No. S7-10-20. This file number 
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us 
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one 
method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's 
internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments 
are also available for website viewing and printing in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549 on 
official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. 
All comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting 
comments are cautioned that the Commission does not redact or edit 
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
    Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the 
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A 
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any such materials 
will be made available on the Commission's website. To ensure direct 
electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay 
Connected'' option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Erika Berg, Special Counsel, at (202) 
551-5925, Jennifer Colihan, Special Counsel, at (202) 551-5642, Rebekah 
Liu, Special Counsel, at (202) 551-5665, Susan Poklemba, Special 
Counsel, at (202) 551-3360, Andrew Sherman, Special Counsel, at (202) 
551-7255, Gita Subramaniam, Attorney Advisor, at (202) 551-5793, or 
Eugene Lee, Attorney Advisor, at (202) 551-5884, Division of Trading 
and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549-7010.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing amendments to 
the CAT NMS Plan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Background
II. Description of Proposed Amendments
    A. Comprehensive Information Security Program
    B. Security Working Group
    C. Secure Analytical Workspaces
    1. Provision of SAW Accounts
    2. Data Access and Extraction Policies and Procedures
    3. Security Controls, Policies, and Procedures for SAWs
    4. Implementation and Operational Requirements for SAWs
    5. Exceptions to the SAW Usage Requirements
    D. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and 
Extraction
    E. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    1. Adopt Revised Industry Member Reporting Requirements
    2. Establish a Process for Creating Customer-ID(s) in Light of 
Revised Reporting Requirements
    3. Plan Processor Functionality To Support the Creation of 
Customer-ID(s)
    4. Reporting Transformed Value
    5. Data Availability Requirements
    6. Customer and Account Attributes in CAIS and Transformed 
Values
    7. Customer-ID Tracking
    8. Error Resolution for Customer Data
    9. CAT Reporter Support and CAT Help Desk
    F. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    1. Application of Existing Plan Requirements to Customer and 
Account Attributes and the Customer Identifying Systems
    2. Defining the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow and the 
General Requirements for Accessing Customer Identifying Systems
    3. Introduction to Manual and Programmatic Access
    4. Manual CAIS Access
    5. Manual CCID Subsystem Access
    6. Programmatic Access--Authorization for Programmatic CAIS 
Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem
    7. Programmatic CAIS Access
    8. Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access
    G. Participants' Data Confidentiality Policies
    1. Data Confidentiality Policies
    2. Access to CAT Data and Information Barriers
    3. Additional Policies Relating to Access and Use of CAT Data 
and Customer and Account Attributes
    4. Approval, Publication, Review and Annual Examinations of 
Compliance
    H. Regulator & Plan Processor Access
    1. Regulatory Use of CAT Data
    2. Access to CAT Data
    I. Secure Connectivity & Data Storage
    J. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    K. Firm Designated ID and Allocation Reports
    L. Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan
    M. Proposed Implementation
    1. Proposed 90-Day Implementation Period
    2. Proposed 120-Day Implementation Period
    3. Proposed 180-Day Implementation Period
    N. Application of the Proposed Amendments to Commission Staff
III. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Summary of Collections of Information
    1. Evaluation of the CISP
    2. Security Working Group
    3. SAWs
    4. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and 
Extraction
    5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    7. Proposed Confidentiality Policies, Procedures and Usage 
Restrictions
    8. Secure Connectivity--``Allow Listing''
    9. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    10. Customer Information for Allocation Report Firm Designated 
IDs
    B. Proposed Use of Information
    1. Evaluation of the CISP
    2. Security Working Group
    3. SAWs
    4. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and 
Extraction
    5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    7. Proposed Confidentiality Policies, Procedures and Usage 
Restrictions
    8. Secure Connectivity--``Allow Listing''
    9. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    10. Customer Information for Allocation Report Firm Designated 
IDs
    C. Respondents
    1. National Securities Exchanges and National Securities 
Associations
    2. Members of National Securities Exchanges and National 
Securities Association
    D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burdens
    1. Evaluation of the CISP
    2. Security Working Group
    3. SAWs
    4. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and 
Extraction

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    5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    7. Proposed Confidentiality Policies, Procedures and Usage 
Restrictions
    8. Secure Connectivity--``Allow Listing''
    9. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    10. Customer Information for Allocation Report Firm Designated 
IDs
    E. Collection of Information is Mandatory
    F. Confidentiality of Responses to Collection of Information
    G. Retention Period for Recordkeeping Requirements
    H. Request for Comments
IV. Economic Analysis
    A. Analysis of Baseline, Costs and Benefits
    1. CISP
    2. Security Working Group
    3. Secure Analytical Workspaces
    4. OTQT and Logging
    5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    7. Participants' Data Confidentiality Policies
    8. Regulator & Plan Processor Access
    9. Secure Connectivity
    10. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    11. Firm Designated ID and Allocation Reports
    B. Impact on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    1. Baseline for Efficiency, Competition and Capital Formation in 
the Market for Regulatory Services
    2. Efficiency
    3. Competition
    4. Capital Formation
    C. Alternatives
    1. Private Contracting for Analytic Environments
    2. Not Allowing for Exceptions to the SAW Use Requirement
    3. Alternative Download Size Limits for the Online Targeted 
Query Tool
    4. Allowing Access to Customer Identifying Systems From Excepted 
Environments
    D. Request for Comment on the Economic Analysis
V. Consideration of Impact on the Economy
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
VI. Statutory Authority and Text of the Proposed Amendments to the 
CAT NMS Plan

I. Background

    In July 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
``Commission'') adopted Rule 613 of Regulation NMS, which required 
national securities exchanges and national securities associations (the 
``Participants'') \1\ to jointly develop and submit to the Commission a 
national market system plan to create, implement, and maintain a 
consolidated audit trail (the ``CAT'').\2\ The goal of Rule 613 was to 
create a modernized audit trail system that would provide regulators 
with more timely access to a sufficiently comprehensive set of trading 
data, thus enabling regulators to more efficiently and effectively 
reconstruct market events, monitor market behavior, and investigate 
misconduct. On November 15, 2016, the Commission approved the national 
market system plan required by Rule 613 (the ``CAT NMS Plan'').\3\
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    \1\ The Participants include BOX Exchange LLC, Cboe BYX 
Exchange, Inc., Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc., Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc., 
Cboe EDGA Exchange, Inc., Cboe EDGX Exchange, Inc., Cboe Exchange, 
Inc., Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., Investors' 
Exchange LLC, Long-Term Stock Exchange, Inc., MEMX LLC, Miami 
International Securities Exchange LLC, MIAX Emerald, LLC, MIAX 
PEARL, LLC, Nasdaq BX, Inc., Nasdaq GEMX, LLC, Nasdaq ISE, LLC, 
Nasdaq MRX, LLC, Nasdaq PHLX LLC, The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, New 
York Stock Exchange LLC, NYSE American LLC, NYSE Arca, Inc., NYSE 
Chicago, Inc., and NYSE National, Inc.
    \2\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67457 (July 18, 
2012), 77 FR 45722 (August 1, 2012) (``Rule 613 Adopting Release'').
    \3\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78318 (November 15, 
2016), 81 FR 84696, (November 23, 2016) (``CAT NMS Plan Approval 
Order''). The CAT NMS Plan is Exhibit A to the CAT NMS Plan Approval 
Order. See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, at 84943-85034. The CAT NMS 
Plan functions as the limited liability company agreement of the 
jointly owned limited liability company formed under Delaware state 
law through which the Participants conduct the activities of the CAT 
(the ``Company''). Each Participant is a member of the Company and 
jointly owns the Company on an equal basis. The Participants 
submitted to the Commission a proposed amendment to the CAT NMS Plan 
on August 29, 2019, which they designated as effective on filing. 
Under the amendment, the limited liability company agreement of a 
new limited liability company named Consolidated Audit Trail, LLC 
serves as the CAT NMS Plan, replacing in its entirety the CAT NMS 
Plan. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87149 (September 27, 
2019), 84 FR 52905 (October 3, 2019).
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    The security and confidentiality of CAT Data \4\ has been--and 
continues to be--a top priority of the Commission. The CAT NMS Plan 
approved by the Commission already sets forth a number of requirements 
regarding the security and confidentiality of CAT Data. The CAT NMS 
Plan states, for example, that the Plan Processor \5\ shall be 
responsible for the security and confidentiality of all CAT Data 
received and reported to the Central Repository.\6\ In furtherance of 
this directive, the CAT NMS Plan requires the Plan Processor to develop 
and maintain an information security program for the Central 
Repository. The Plan Processor must have appropriate solutions and 
controls in place to address data confidentiality and security during 
all communication between CAT Reporters,\7\ Data Submitters,\8\ and the 
Plan Processor; data extraction, manipulation, and transformation; data 
loading to and from the Central Repository; and data maintenance by the 
CAT System.\9\ The CAT NMS Plan also sets forth minimum data security 
requirements for CAT that the Plan Processor must meet, including 
requirements governing connectivity and data transfer, data encryption, 
data storage, data access, breach management, data requirements for 
personally identifiable information (``PII''),\10\ and applicable data 
security industry standards.\11\ CAT Data reported to and retained in 
the Central Repository is thus subject to what the Commission believes 
are stringent security policies, procedures, standards, and controls. 
Nevertheless, the Commission believes that it can and should take 
additional steps to further protect the security and confidentiality of 
CAT Data. Therefore, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan 
to enhance the security of the CAT and the protections afforded to CAT 
Data.
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    \4\ ``CAT Data'' is a defined term under the CAT NMS Plan and 
means ``data derived from Participant Data, Industry Member Data, 
SIP Data, and such other data as the Operating Committee may 
designate as `CAT Data' from time to time.'' See CAT NMS Plan, supra 
note 3, at Section 1.1.
    \5\ ``Plan Processor'' is a defined term under the CAT NMS Plan 
and means ``the Initial Plan Processor or any other Person selected 
by the Operating Committee pursuant to SEC Rule 613 and Sections 
4.3(b)(i) and 6.1, and with regard to the Initial Plan Processor, 
the Selection Plan, to perform the CAT processing functions required 
by SEC Rule 613 and set forth in this Agreement.'' See id.
    \6\ See id. at Section 6.5(f)(i). ``Central Repository'' is a 
defined term under the CAT NMS Plan and means ``the repository 
responsible for the receipt, consolidation, and retention of all 
information reported to the CAT pursuant to SEC Rule 613 and this 
Agreement.'' See id.
    \7\ ``CAT Reporter'' is a defined term under the CAT NMS Plan 
and means ``each national securities exchange, national securities 
association and Industry Member that is required to record and 
report information to the Central Repository pursuant to SEC Rule 
613(c).'' See id.
    \8\ ``Data Submitter'' is a defined term under the CAT NMS Plan 
and means ``national securities exchanges, national securities 
associations, broker-dealers, the SIPs for the CQS, CTA, UTP and 
Plan for Reporting of Consolidated Options Last Sale Reports and 
Quotation Information (``OPRA'') Plans, and certain other vendors or 
appropriate third parties.'' See id. at Appendix C, Section A(1)(a).
    \9\ See id. at Appendix D, Section 4.1. ``CAT System'' is a 
defined term in the CAT NMS Plan and means ``all data processing 
equipment, communications facilities, and other facilities, 
including equipment, utilized by the Company or any third parties 
acting on the Company's behalf in connection with operation of the 
CAT and any related information or relevant systems pursuant to [the 
CAT LLC Agreement].'' See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 
1.1.
    \10\ ``PII'' is a defined term under the CAT NMS Plan and means 
``personally identifiable information, including a social security 
number or tax identifier number or similar information; Customer 
Identifying Information and Customer Account Information.'' See id. 
at Section 1.1.
    \11\ See id. at Section 6.12; see also id. at Appendix D, 
Section 4.
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    Specifically, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to: 
(1) Define the scope of the current

[[Page 65992]]

information security program; (2) require the Operating Committee \12\ 
to establish and maintain a security-focused working group; (3) require 
the Plan Processor to create secure analytical workspaces, direct 
Participants to use such workspaces to access and analyze PII and CAT 
Data obtained through the user-defined direct query and bulk extract 
tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) of the CAT NMS Plan, set forth 
requirements for the data extraction, security, implementation, and 
operational controls that will apply to such workspaces, and provide an 
exception process that will enable Participants to use the user-defined 
direct query and bulk extract tools in other environments; (4) limit 
the amount of CAT Data that can be extracted from the Central 
Repository outside of a secure analytical workspace through the online 
targeted query tool described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(A) of the CAT NMS 
Plan and require the Plan Processor to implement more stringent 
monitoring controls on such data; (5) impose requirements related to 
the reporting of certain PII; (6) define the workflow process that 
should be applied to govern access to customer and account attributes 
that will still be reported to the Central Repository; (7) modify and 
supplement existing requirements relating to Participant policies and 
procedures regarding the confidentiality of CAT Data; (8) refine the 
existing requirement that CAT Data be used only for regulatory or 
surveillance purposes; (9) codify existing practices and enhance the 
security of connectivity to the CAT infrastructure; (10) require the 
formal cyber incident response plan to incorporate corrective actions 
and breach notifications; (11) amend reporting requirements relating to 
Firm Designated IDs and Allocation Reports; and (12) clarify that 
Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan has not been updated to reflect 
subsequent amendments to the CAT NMS Plan. The proposed amendments are 
discussed in more detail below.
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    \12\ ``Operating Committee'' is a defined term in the CAT NMS 
Plan and means ``means the governing body of the Company designated 
as such and described in Article IV.'' See id. at Section 1.1.
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II. Description of Proposed Amendments

A. Comprehensive Information Security Program

    Section 6.12 of the CAT NMS Plan requires the Plan Processor to 
develop and maintain an information security program for the Central 
Repository that, at a minimum, meets the security requirements set 
forth in Section 4 of Appendix D to the CAT NMS Plan.\13\ Section 4 of 
Appendix D sets out information security requirements that cover ``all 
components of the CAT System'' and is not limited to the Central 
Repository.\14\ The Commission preliminarily believes that the scope of 
the information security program referenced in Section 6.12 of the CAT 
NMS Plan should be more explicitly defined to apply to the CAT System, 
as well as to the Plan Processor.
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    \13\ See id. at Appendix D, Section 4 (Data Security). In 
Appendix D, Section 4, the Plan sets out the basic solutions and 
controls that must be met to ensure the security and confidentiality 
of CAT Data. Such requirements relate to Connectivity and Data 
Transfer (Section 4.1.1); Data Encryption (Section 4.1.2); Data 
storage and Environment (Section 4.1.3); Data Access (Section 
4.1.4); Breach Management (Section 4.1.5); PII Data Requirements 
(Section 4.1.6); and Industry Standards (Section 4.2).
    \14\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 4 
(``The Plan Processor must provide to the Operating Committee a 
comprehensive security plan that covers all components of the CAT 
System, including physical assets and personnel . . . .'' (emphasis 
added)).
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    Accordingly, the Commission proposes to add the term 
``Comprehensive Information Security Program'' (the ``CISP'') to 
Section 1.1 of the CAT NMS Plan and to define this term to mean the 
``organization-wide and system-specific controls and related policies 
and procedures required by NIST SP 800-53 \15\ that address information 
security for the information and information systems of the Plan 
Processor and the CAT System, including those provided or managed by an 
external organization, contractor, or source.'' The proposed definition 
would further state that the CISP will also apply to Secure Analytical 
Workspaces, new environments within the CAT System to which CAT Data 
may be downloaded.\16\ The Commission also proposes to make 
corresponding changes to Section 6.12 of the CAT NMS Plan. 
Specifically, the Commission proposes to rename Section 6.12 as 
``Comprehensive Information Security Program'' \17\ and to delete the 
phrase ``for the Central Repository'' in Section 6.12.\18\
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    \15\ See Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 
4, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce (April 2013), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf (``NIST SP 800-
53'').
    \16\ See Part II.C. infra, for a discussion of the definition of 
``Secure Analytical Workspace'' and the specific CISP requirements 
that would apply to such environments under proposed Section 6.13.
    \17\ Similar changes have been made throughout the CAT NMS Plan, 
at proposed Section 6.2(a)(v)(H), proposed Section 6.5(f)(i)(C), 
proposed Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), and proposed Section 4.1 of 
Appendix D.
    \18\ A similar change has been made at proposed Section 
6.5(f)(i)(C) to replace a reference to the Central Repository with a 
reference to the CAT System.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that these proposed 
amendments are appropriate to set forth all elements of the information 
security program that must be developed and maintained by the Plan 
Processor and approved and reviewed at least annually by the Operating 
Committee.\19\ While Section 6.12 of the CAT NMS Plan currently refers 
to the Central Repository, as noted above, Section 4 of Appendix D 
refers to information security program requirements that apply more 
broadly to the entire CAT System \20\ and also references the NIST SP 
800-53 standard as one that must be followed by the Plan Processor.\21\ 
NIST SP 800-53 defines and recommends security controls, policies, and 
procedures that should be employed as part of a well-defined risk 
management process for organizational-level information security 
programs, including personnel security controls.\22\ NIST SP 800-53, 
which sets forth security and privacy controls for federal information 
systems and organizations, requires the establishment of information 
security and risk management due diligence on an organizational 
level.\23\ The CAT NMS Plan's inclusion of NIST SP 800-53 as a relevant 
industry standard that must be followed to manage data security for 
information systems therefore requires that the Plan Processor apply 
its information security program at an organizational level, and not 
just to the Central Repository. The Commission preliminarily believes 
the proposed amendments to define the CISP and other corresponding 
changes should therefore clearly require the information security 
program to apply to personnel and information systems that support the 
CAT System.
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    \19\ To the extent that the CISP would be made up of multiple 
policies, procedures, or other documents, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the Operating Committee could review 
each document on an independent or rolling timeline, rather than 
reviewing all components of the CISP at the same time.
    \20\ See note 14 supra.
    \21\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 4.2.
    \22\ See NIST SP 800-53, at 1, supra note 15.
    \23\ See, e.g., id. at vi, x-xii. See also, e.g., id. at 1 
(``The security controls defined in this publication and recommended 
for use by organizations to satisfy their information security 
requirements should be employed as part of a well-defined risk 
management process that supports organizational information security 
programs.'').
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    As explained above, the proposed amendments, by referencing NIST SP

[[Page 65993]]

800-53 in the definition of the CISP, would amend Section 6.12 of the 
CAT NMS Plan to explicitly require the information security program to 
apply broadly at an organizational level--that is, to address specific 
organizational mission and/or business needs and risk tolerances for 
all of the information and information systems that support the 
operations of the Plan Processor and the CAT System, including Secure 
Analytical Workspaces.\24\ The proposed amendments would also 
explicitly require the information security program to be applied to 
information systems within the CAT System that are managed or provided 
by external organizations, contractors, or other sources that the Plan 
Processor or the Participants may determine that it is necessary to 
engage to perform functions related to the implementation, operation, 
or maintenance of the CAT.\25\ Appendix D, Section 4.1 of the CAT NMS 
Plan currently requires a comprehensive security plan, including 
information security requirements, that covers the entire CAT System, 
and the CAT System, as currently defined, encompasses the data 
processing equipment, communications facilities, and other facilities 
utilized by external parties acting on the Company's behalf in 
connection with the operation of the CAT.\26\ The proposed amendments 
would consolidate these requirements into one definition and explicitly 
require that external parties be subject to the CISP if they are 
providing or managing information or information systems that are 
within the CAT System. Finally, the proposed amendments would 
explicitly state that the CISP includes the controls, policies, and 
procedures required by NIST SP 800-53, including organizational-level 
controls. As noted above, this is already a requirement under Appendix 
D, Section 4 of the CAT NMS Plan, which states that NIST SP 800-53 must 
be followed as part of a comprehensive security plan applying to all 
components of the CAT System implemented by the Plan Processor.\27\ 
Nevertheless, the Commission preliminarily believes that including an 
explicit reference to NIST SP 800-53 in the proposed definition of the 
CISP will reinforce that fact.
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    \24\ Under the proposed amendments, Secure Analytical Workspaces 
would, by definition, be within the CAT System. See proposed Section 
1.1, ``Secure Analytical Workspace.'' The inclusion of Secure 
Analytical Workspaces in the proposed definition of the CISP would 
therefore not be an expansion, as the current information security 
program is required to cover the entire CAT System pursuant to 
Appendix D, Section 4 of the CAT NMS Plan.
    \25\ For example, the Plan Processor engaged an external 
contractor to implement and operate the component of the CAT known 
as the Customer and Account Information System (``CAIS''). The Plan 
Processor also selected an external cloud provider as the host for 
the CAT System.
    \26\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 1.1; see id. at 
Appendix D, Section 4.
    \27\ See id. at Section 6.12, Appendix D, Section 4.2.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that these changes should 
improve the security of the CAT by defining the scope of the 
information security program required to be developed and maintained by 
the Plan Processor to be sufficiently clear and to account for the 
entire CAT, with accompanying personnel security controls for all Plan 
Processor staff and relevant personnel from external organizations, 
contractors or other sources, and for all relevant information systems 
or environments.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed definition of the 
CISP and the proposed corresponding changes to the CAT NMS Plan. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    1. Is the proposed definition for the CISP necessary? Is it already 
clear that the information security requirements described in Section 
6.12 and Appendix D, Section 4 apply at an organizational level to the 
Plan Processor, to external parties acting on behalf of the Company to 
support CAT operations, and to all information systems or environments 
that are within the CAT System, including Secure Analytical Workspaces? 
Is it already clear that the information security requirements 
described in Section 6.12 and Appendix D, Section 4 must incorporate 
the controls, policies, and procedures required by NIST SP 800-53?
    2. Should the proposed definition for the CISP be expanded or 
modified? Are there other personnel, information systems, 
organizations, or environments that should be covered by the CISP? If 
so, please specifically identify those personnel, information systems, 
organizations, or environments and explain why it would be appropriate 
to include them in the definition of the CISP.
    3. Should additional references in the CAT NMS Plan related to the 
information security program be conformed to refer to the CISP? Should 
proposed Section 6.12 refer to any other provisions of the CAT NMS Plan 
in addition to Section 4 of Appendix D and Section 6.13? If so, please 
identify those provisions and explain why it would be appropriate to 
incorporate a reference to such provisions in proposed Section 6.12.

B. Security Working Group

    To provide support and additional resources to the Chief 
Information Security Officer of the Plan Processor (the ``CISO'') \28\ 
and the Operating Committee of the CAT NMS Plan, the proposed 
amendments would require the Operating Committee to establish and 
maintain a security working group composed of the CISO and the chief 
information security officer or deputy chief information security 
officer of each Participant (the ``Security Working Group'').\29\ 
Commission staff would be permitted to attend all meetings of the 
Security Working Group as observers, and the CISO and the Operating 
Committee would further be allowed to invite other parties to attend 
specific meetings.\30\ The proposed amendments would specify that the 
purpose of the Security Working Group shall be to advise the CISO and 
the Operating Committee,\31\ including with respect to issues 
involving: (1) Information technology matters that pertain to the 
development of the CAT System; (2) the development, maintenance, and 
application of the CISP; (3) the review and application of the 
confidentiality policies required by proposed Section 6.5(g); (4) the 
review and analysis of

[[Page 65994]]

third party risk assessments conducted pursuant to Section 5.3 of 
Appendix D, including the review and analysis of results and corrective 
actions arising from such assessments; and (5) emerging cybersecurity 
topics.\32\ In addition, the proposed amendments would require the CISO 
to apprise the Security Working Group of relevant developments and to 
provide the Security Working Group with all information and materials 
necessary to fulfill its purpose.\33\
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    \28\ ``Chief Information Security Officer'' is a defined term 
under the CAT NMS Plan and means ``the individual then serving (even 
on a temporary basis) as the Chief Information Security Officer 
pursuant to Section 4.6, Section 6.1(b), and Section 6.2(b).'' See 
CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 1.1. The CISO is an officer 
of the Company and has a fiduciary duty to the Company. See id. at 
Section 4.6(a), Section 4.7(c). The CISO, among other things, is 
responsible for creating and enforcing appropriate policies, 
procedures, and control structures regarding data security. See id. 
at Section 6.2(b)(i) and 6.2(b)(v).
    \29\ See proposed Section 4.12(c).
    \30\ See id. Given the sensitive nature of the issues that would 
be discussed at meetings of the Security Working Group, the 
Commission believes that the CISO and the Operating Committee should 
consider requiring any non-member invitees to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement or to adhere to some other protocol designed to prevent 
the release of confidential information regarding the security of 
the CAT System. Members of the Security Working Group, and any 
Participant staff that they consult regarding matters before the 
Security Working Group, would likewise be subject to the 
confidentiality obligations set forth in Section 9.6 of the CAT NMS 
Plan. See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 9.6(a) 
(stating that information disclosed by or on behalf of the Company 
or a Participant to the Company or any other Participant (the 
``Receiving Party'') shall be maintained by the Receiving Party in 
confidence with the same degree of care it holds its own 
confidential information and disclosed to its Representatives on a 
need-to-know basis and only to those of such Representatives who 
have agreed to abide by the non-disclosure and non-use provisions of 
Section 9.6).
    \31\ The proposed amendments would clearly state that the CISO 
shall continue to report directly to the Operating Committee in 
accordance with Section 6.2(b)(iii) of the CAT NMS Plan. See 
proposed Section 4.12(c).
    \32\ See id.
    \33\ See id. With respect to this provision, the Commission does 
not preliminarily believe that members of the Security Working Group 
would need access to CAT Data to fulfill their function. 
Nonetheless, because members of the Security Working Group would not 
be considered ``Regulatory Staff'' under the proposed amendments 
described in Part II.G.2.a., Security Working Group members would 
only be able to gain access to CAT Data by following the policies 
set forth in proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(E).
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    The Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to require 
the Operating Committee to formally establish and maintain a Security 
Working Group.\34\ Although a group has already been established by the 
Operating Committee to discuss the security of the CAT,\35\ the 
Commission preliminarily believes it is important to require the 
formation of a Security Working Group with a defined set of 
participants and a defined purpose. The proposed amendments, for 
example, would require that each Participant's chief information 
security officer or deputy chief information security officer be a 
member of the Security Working Group; other security and regulatory 
experts would not fulfill the requirements of the proposed 
amendments.\36\ The Commission preliminarily believes these membership 
requirements are appropriate, because the chief information security 
officer and deputy chief information security officer of each 
Participant are the parties that are most likely to have general 
expertise with assessing organizational-level security issues for 
complex information systems. Moreover, because the Central Repository 
is a facility of each Participant,\37\ the Commission preliminarily 
believes that the chief information security officer and deputy chief 
information security officer of each Participant are likely to have 
specific expertise with assessing organizational-level and system-
specific security issues for the CAT System, as well as an interest in 
making sure that the CAT System and CAT Data are sufficiently 
protected. The Commission therefore preliminarily believes that 
requiring the membership of each Participant's chief information 
security officer or deputy chief information security officer in the 
Security Working Group should help to provide effective oversight of 
CAT security issues.
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    \34\ See id. The Commission proposes a conforming change to the 
title of this section to make it clear that section will apply to 
both subcommittees and working groups.
    \35\ See CAT Security Overview: Safeguarding Data Reported to 
CAT, available at https://www.catnmsplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FINRA-CAT-Security-Approach-Overview_20190828.pdf.
    \36\ See proposed Section 4.12(c).
    \37\ See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix C 
(indicating that the CAT will be a facility of each Participant).
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    The proposed amendments would permit the CISO and the Operating 
Committee to invite other parties, including external consultants with 
expertise in organizational-level or system-specific security or 
industry representatives, to attend specific meetings. In addition, the 
proposed amendments would permit Commission observers to attend all 
meetings. The Commission preliminarily believes these provisions will 
enable the Security Working Group to obtain a broad spectrum of views 
and to present such views to the CISO and the Operating Committee on 
key security issues.
    Finally, the proposed amendments would state that the purpose of 
the group shall be to aid the CISO and the Operating Committee.\38\ 
This is a broad mandate, because the Commission preliminarily believes 
that the CISO and the Operating Committee would generally benefit from 
the combined expertise of the Security Working Group on a broad array 
of matters. To enable the Security Working Group to provide the 
requisite aid, the proposed amendments would further state that the 
CISO must apprise the Security Working Group of relevant developments 
and provide the Security Working Group with all information and 
materials necessary to fulfill its purpose. This provision is designed 
to keep the Security Working Group adequately informed about issues 
that fall within its purview.
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    \38\ The list of issues provided in proposed Section 4.12(c) is 
not exclusive; it may be appropriate for the Security Working Group 
to aid the CISO with respect to other issues, and the proposed 
amendments require the involvement of the Security Working Group on 
other matters. See, e.g., proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A) (requiring 
a Participant seeking an exception from the proposed Secure 
Analytical Workspace usage requirements to provide the Security 
Working Group with specified application materials).
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    The proposed amendments would also require the Security Working 
Group to aid the CISO and the Operating Committee on certain issues 
that the Commission preliminarily believes are particularly important. 
For example, issues involving information technology matters that 
pertain to the development of the CAT System,\39\ the development of 
the CISP,\40\ or emerging cybersecurity topics \41\ are likely to 
present questions of first impression, and it is important that such 
questions be handled appropriately in the first instance. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that the involvement of the Security 
Working Group could be of valuable assistance to the CISO. Similarly, 
issues involving the maintenance and application of the CISP \42\ and 
the review and application of the confidentiality policies required by 
proposed Section 6.5(g) \43\ relate to two initiatives that would 
protect the security and confidentiality of CAT Data. These initiatives 
would control access to and extraction of such data outside the Central 
Repository and would directly impact how Participants interact with CAT 
Data within and outside the CAT System.\44\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the Security Working Group would be able to 
provide valuable feedback on these initiatives, which, as explained 
more fully below, are critical to the security of the CAT because they 
would govern the development and implementation of the Participants' 
confidentiality and security policies for handling non-public data 
generally and CAT Data specifically.\45\ The Commission also 
preliminarily believes that the Security Working Group should aid the 
CISO in reviewing and analyzing third-party risk assessments conducted 
pursuant to Section 5.3 of Appendix D, as well as the results and 
corrective actions arising from such assessments.\46\ Given the 
combined expertise of the Security Working Group, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that its membership would be uniquely adept at 
understanding the results, assessing the criticality of findings, 
prioritizing necessary corrective action, and providing valuable 
feedback on the plan of action to address any open

[[Page 65995]]

issues that might be identified by these assessments.
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    \39\ See proposed Section 4.12(c)(i).
    \40\ See id. at (c)(ii).
    \41\ See id. at (c)(v).
    \42\ See id. at (c)(ii).
    \43\ See id. at (c)(iii).
    \44\ See Part II.A. supra, for a discussion of the proposed CISP 
and its importance to CAT security; Part II.C. infra, for a 
discussion of data access and extraction policies that would be 
applied as part of the proposed CISP. See also Part II.G. infra, for 
a discussion of the proposed amendments relating to Participants' 
data confidentiality policies, which would include restrictions on 
data access and extraction, and their importance to CAT security.
    \45\ See id.
    \46\ See proposed Section 4.12(c)(iv).
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    The Commission requests comment on proposed Section 4.12(c). 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    4. Should a Security Working Group be formally established and 
maintained?
    5. The proposed amendments require the Security Working Group to be 
composed of the CISO and the chief information security officer or 
deputy chief information security officer of each Participant. Do 
commenters agree that the chief information security officer or deputy 
chief information security officer of each Participant is likely to be 
best informed regarding security issues that might affect the CAT? 
Should any other parties be included as required members of the 
Security Working Group? If so, please identify these parties and 
explain why it would be appropriate to include them. For example, 
should representatives from the Advisory Committee established by 
Section 4.13 of the CAT NMS Plan be added as required members to the 
Security Working Group? Should the CISO and the Operating Committee be 
permitted to invite other parties to attend specific meetings? Should 
any limitations be placed on the kinds of parties the CISO and the 
Operating Committee may invite? For example, should the CISO and the 
Operating Committee be limited to inviting personnel employed by the 
Participants, because such personnel would already be subject to the 
confidentiality obligations set forth in Section 9.6 of the CAT NMS 
Plan for Representatives? If not, should external parties invited by 
the CISO and the Operating Committee be explicitly required by proposed 
Section 4.12(c) to sign a non-disclosure agreement or to comply with 
any other kind of security protocol in order to prevent the disclosure 
of confidential information regarding the security of the CAT System? 
If so, please identify the security protocol such parties should comply 
with and explain why such protocol would be effective.
    6. The proposed amendments state that the Security Working Group's 
purpose is to advise the CISO and the Operating Committee. Is that an 
appropriate mandate? If not, please identify a mandate that would be 
appropriate and explain why it is a better mandate for the Security 
Working Group. Should the Security Working Group advise the Plan 
Processor or some other party, instead of the CISO and the Operating 
Committee?
    7. Will the proposed amendments keep the Security Working Group 
apprised of relevant information or developments? Should the proposed 
amendments require the CISO and/or the Operating Committee to consult 
the Security Working Group only on certain matters? If so, please 
identify these matters and explain why it would be appropriate to 
require the CISO and/or the Operating Committee to consult the Security 
Working Group only on such matters. Should the proposed amendments 
require periodic meetings among the CISO, the Operating Committee and 
the Security Working Group? If so, how often should such meetings occur 
and why? Should the proposed amendments require the Security Working 
Group to provide the CISO and/or the Operating Committee with feedback 
on a regular basis?
    8. The proposed amendments include a non-exhaustive list of 
specific issues that would be within the purview of the Security 
Working Group. Should this list include any additional matters? Should 
any of these matters be removed from this list or amended?

C. Secure Analytical Workspaces

    The CAT NMS Plan must sufficiently enable regulators to access and 
extract CAT Data in order to achieve specific regulatory purposes. The 
CAT NMS Plan currently describes various means by which regulators may 
access and extract CAT Data. Section 6.5(c) of the CAT NMS Plan, for 
example, requires the Plan Processor to provide regulators access to 
the Central Repository for regulatory and oversight purposes and to 
create a method of accessing CAT Data that enables complex searching 
and report generation. Section 6.10(c) of the CAT NMS Plan specifies 
two methods of regulator access: (1) An online targeted query tool with 
predefined selection criteria to choose from; and (2) user-defined 
direct queries and bulk extracts of data via a query tool or language 
allowing querying of all available attributes and data sources.\47\ The 
CAT NMS Plan also specifies how regulators may download the results 
obtained in response to these queries. For example, with respect to the 
online targeted query tool, the CAT NMS Plan provides that, ``[o]nce 
query results are available for download, users are to be given the 
total file size of the result set and an option to download the results 
in a single or multiple file(s). Users that select the multiple file 
option will be required to define the maximum file size of the 
downloadable files. The application will then provide users with the 
ability to download the files. This functionality is provided to 
address limitations of end-user network environment[s] that may occur 
when downloading large files.'' \48\ With respect to the user-defined 
direct queries and bulk extracts of data, the CAT NMS Plan provides 
that ``[t]he Central Repository must provide for direct queries, bulk 
extraction, and download of data for all regulatory users. Both the 
user-defined direct queries and bulk extracts will be used by 
regulators to deliver large sets of data that can then be used in 
internal surveillance or market analysis applications.'' \49\
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    \47\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.10(c)(i); see 
also id. at Appendix D, Section 8.1 through Section 8.2. Section 
6.10(c) also requires the Plan Processor to reasonably assist 
regulatory staff with queries, to submit queries on behalf of 
regulatory staff (including regulatory staff of Participants) as 
reasonably requested, and to maintain a help desk to assist 
regulatory staff with questions about the content and structure of 
CAT Data. Id. at Section 6.10(c)(iv) through (vi).
    \48\ See id., at Appendix D, Section 8.1.1.
    \49\ See id., at Appendix D, Section 8.2.
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    To better protect CAT Data, the Commission preliminarily believes 
that efforts should be taken to minimize the attack surface associated 
with CAT Data; to maximize security-driven monitoring of CAT Data, both 
as it is reported to the CAT and as it is accessed and utilized by 
regulators; and to leverage, wherever possible, security controls and 
related policies and procedures that are consistent with those that 
protect the Central Repository.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that these objectives can be 
met by requiring the creation and use of Secure Analytical Workspaces 
(``SAWs'') that would be part of the CAT System and therefore subject 
to the CISP.\50\ The proposed amendments would define a ``Secure 
Analytical Workspace'' as ``an analytic environment account that is 
part of the CAT System, and subject to the Comprehensive Information 
Security Program, where CAT Data is accessed and analyzed as part of 
the CAT System pursuant to [proposed] Section 6.13. The Plan Processor 
shall provide a SAW account for each Participant that implements all 
common technical security controls required by the Comprehensive 
Information Security Program.'' \51\ The Commission also proposes to 
add a new Section 6.13 to the CAT NMS Plan to set forth the 
requirements that would apply to SAWs. The Commission understands that 
the Participants have recently

[[Page 65996]]

authorized the Plan Processor to build similar environments for some of 
the Participants and that each Participant would be responsible for the 
implementation of its own security controls.\52\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that it would be beneficial to require that the 
Plan Processor provide SAW accounts to be used by all Participants in 
certain circumstances and to formally codify the functionality 
available in and the security controls applicable to SAWs. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that this approach will best enable 
the implementation of the SAWs with a consistent and sufficient level 
of security.
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    \50\ In addition, the Commission also preliminarily believes 
that certain limitations on the downloading capabilities of the 
online targeted query tool will help to achieve these objectives. 
See Part II.D. infra, for a discussion of these proposed 
limitations.
    \51\ See proposed Section 1.1, ``Secure Analytical Workspace.''
    \52\ See Letter from Michael Simon, CAT NMS Plan Operating 
Committee Chair, to Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, Commission, dated 
November 27, 2019, at 4-5, available at https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-02/Simon-Letter-SIFMA-%28Final%29.pdf 
(``Simon Letter'').
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    Accordingly, the Commission is proposing amendments to the CAT NMS 
Plan that will specify: (1) The provision of the SAW accounts; (2) data 
access and extraction policies and procedures, including SAW usage 
requirements; (3) security controls, policies, and procedures for SAWs; 
(4) implementation and operational requirements for SAWs; and (5) 
exceptions to the SAW usage requirements. These proposed amendments are 
discussed in further detail below.
1. Provision of SAW Accounts
    The proposed amendments would require each Participant to use a SAW 
for certain purposes,\53\ but the proposed definition of ``Secure 
Analytical Workspace'' and proposed Section 6.1(d)(v) make it clear 
that Participants would not build their own SAWs within the CAT System 
or implement the technical security controls required by the CISP. 
Rather, the proposed amendments state that the ``Plan Processor shall 
provide a SAW account for each Participant that implements all common 
technical security controls required by the Comprehensive Information 
Security Program.'' \54\
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    \53\ See Part II.C.2. infra, for a discussion of the SAW usage 
requirements.
    \54\ See proposed Section 1.1, ``Secure Analytical Workspaces.'' 
See also proposed Section 6.1(d)(v) (stating that the Plan Processor 
shall ``provide Secure Analytical Workspaces in accordance with 
Section 6.13''). The Central Repository, as a facility of each of 
the Participants, is an SCI entity and the CAT System is an SCI 
system, and thus it must comply with Regulation SCI. See CAT NMS 
Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84758; see also 17 CFR 
242.1000 (definition of ``SCI system'' and ``SCI entity''). Because 
the CAT systems, including the Central Repository, are operated on 
behalf of the Participants by the Plan Processor, the Participants 
are responsible for having in place processes and requirements to 
ensure that they are able to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 
SCI for the CAT systems operated by the Plan Processor on their 
behalf. See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73639 (November 
19, 2014), 79 FR 72251, 72276 (December 5, 2014) (``Regulation SCI 
Adopting Release''). The CAT NMS Plan states that data security 
standards of the CAT System shall, at a minimum, satisfy all 
applicable regulations regarding database security, including 
provisions of Regulation SCI. The Plan Processor thus must 
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that the CAT System has levels of 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security adequate 
to maintain its operational capability to comply with Regulation 
SCI. See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84758-59; CAT 
NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.9(b)(xi)(A). See also, e.g., 
Letter from Michael J. Simon, Chair, CAT NMS, LLC Operating 
Committee, to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Commission, at 1-2, dated 
April 9, 2019, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613-info-notice-of-plan-processor-selection-040919.pdf (setting 
forth the material terms of the Plan Processor agreement, which 
obligate the Plan Processor to perform CAT-related functions and 
services in a manner that is consistent with and in accordance with 
the CAT NMS Plan and Commission rules and regulations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the Plan 
Processor to provide SAW accounts to the Participants that implement 
all common technical security controls required by the CISP is the most 
effective way to achieve a consistent level of security across multiple 
SAWs and between SAWs.\55\ The Commission preliminarily believes that 
the alternative of allowing each Participant to build its own SAW would 
inhibit the Plan Processor's ability to control, manage, operate, and 
maintain the CAT System, which would include the SAWs. By centralizing 
provision of the SAW accounts with the Plan Processor, the common 
technical controls associated with the CISP should be built 
consistently and in a way that newly enables the Plan Processor to 
conduct consistent and comprehensive monitoring of analytic 
environments employed by Participants to access and analyze CAT Data--a 
task the Plan Processor is not currently able to perform.\56\
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    \55\ See Part II.C.3. infra for a discussion of the common 
technical security controls that must be required for SAWs by the 
CISP. The Commission also preliminarily believes that this 
requirement would enable the Plan Processor to achieve a consistent 
level of security across the CAT System, as the Central Repository 
and the SAWs would have common controls that were implemented by the 
same party.
    \56\ See Part II.C.4.b. infra for a discussion of the monitoring 
requirements for SAWs.
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    The Plan Processor is the party most familiar with the existing 
information security program and would be the party most familiar with 
the security controls, policies, and procedures that would be required 
under the proposed CISP. The Commission preliminarily believes this 
familiarity would enable the Plan Processor to build the required 
security controls more efficiently and more effectively than if each 
Participant were responsible for its own SAW account.\57\ If each 
Participant were permitted to build the common security controls for 
its SAW account without the input or knowledge of the Plan Processor, 
different Participants might make different (and potentially less 
secure) decisions about how to implement the information security 
program or the proposed CISP. These different decisions could, in turn, 
hamper the Plan Processor's ability to consistently monitor the SAWs, 
because it would be difficult for the Plan Processor to automate its 
monitoring protocols or to uniformly monitor SAWs that had been not 
been uniformly implemented. A lack of consistent monitoring could 
endanger the overall security of the CAT, because the Plan Processor 
could be less likely to identify non-compliance with the CISP or with 
the SAW design specifications.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.12 
(requiring the Plan Processor to develop and maintain the 
information security program).
    \58\ See note 56 supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also preliminarily believes that centralizing 
provision of the SAW accounts with the Plan Processor is the most 
efficient approach.\59\ Given the size of the CAT database that the 
Plan Processor already manages in a cloud environment, the Plan 
Processor is in a position to leverage economies of scale and, 
possibly, to obtain preferential pricing in establishing SAW accounts 
with the same cloud provider and in the same cloud environment.\60\ 
Having the Plan Processor be responsible for the provision of all SAW 
accounts could also make administration of SAW security easier. For 
example, cloud environments offer features that enable security-related 
administrative functions to be performed simultaneously and 
consistently across multiple accounts. Such features could also be 
leveraged by the Plan Processor to extend its existing information 
security controls for the Central

[[Page 65997]]

Repository across all SAW accounts. Requiring each Participant to 
independently implement relevant security controls would be 
comparatively inefficient, needlessly duplicative, and, potentially, 
less secure.
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    \59\ Because SAW accounts are, by definition, part of the CAT 
System, the Commission preliminarily believes that SAW accounts 
would likely be built by the same cloud provider and in the same 
cloud environment as the Central Repository.
    \60\ See Part IV.C.1. infra for a discussion of the potential 
costs related to each Participant providing its own SAW account. 
With respect to SAW pricing, the Commission preliminarily believes 
that the Plan Processor will charge back variable cloud services 
fees to each Participant in a manner consistent with how current 
variable fees incurred by the Plan Processor are charged back to the 
Company. See Part IV.A.3. infra for further discussion of such 
pricing and potential fees.
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    Although the Plan Processor would provide each SAW account, the 
proposed amendments would still afford the Participants a fair amount 
of autonomy in the operation of the SAW. The definition of ``Secure 
Analytical Workspace'' would make it clear that proposed Section 6.13 
would govern the use of the SAWs, and proposed Section 6.13 explicitly 
states that each Participant would be allowed to provide and use its 
own choice of software, hardware configurations, and additional data 
within its SAW, so long as such activities otherwise comply with the 
CISP.\61\ This language would permit the Participants to create 
whatever analytic environment they prefer within the SAWs. For example, 
each Participant would be free to choose which hardware configurations 
inclusive of computing power and storage, analytical tools, and 
additional content should be available in its SAW. This language also 
would not prevent the Participants from collectively contracting with a 
third party, such as the Plan Processor, to provide each SAW with 
common tools or the infrastructure needed to query and process CAT 
Data. The Commission therefore preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments give each Participant sufficient flexibility to operate its 
SAW according to its own preferences, while still ensuring that the 
SAWs are built and implemented in a consistent and efficient 
manner.\62\
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    \61\ See proposed Section 6.13(c)(iii); see also Part II.C.4.b. 
infra, for a discussion of and questions about this provision.
    \62\ The Commission would have the same ability to configure its 
SAW to migrate third-party or in-house applications, analytical 
tools, or external data as the Participants.
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed requirements for 
SAWs. Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    9. Is the proposed definition for Secure Analytical Workspaces 
sufficient? Should the proposed definition specify that the SAW 
accounts must be built using the same cloud provider that houses the 
Central Repository? Is the Commission correct in its belief that SAW 
accounts would be built in the same environment as the Central 
Repository because they would be part of the CAT System? If not, should 
such a requirement be added?
    10. Is it possible that Participants might perform tasks in a SAW 
other than accessing and analyzing CAT Data, such as workflows for 
generating and handling alerts? Please identify any such tasks with 
specificity and explain whether the definition should include those 
tasks. Is it appropriate to characterize SAWs as ``part of the CAT 
System''? Are there alternative definitions of a SAW that would be more 
appropriate? If so, what are those definitions and why are they 
appropriate.
    11. Is it appropriate for the Plan Processor to provide the SAW 
accounts? To the extent that the Plan Processor has already been 
authorized to begin developing and/or implementing analytic 
environments for the Participants, will the Plan Processor be able to 
leverage any of this work to build the SAW accounts? If so, please 
explain what efforts have already been made by the Plan Processor and 
whether the Plan Processor will be able to leverage any of these 
efforts to build the SAW accounts. Should each Participant be permitted 
to provide its own SAW account? Is there a third party who should 
provide the SAW accounts? If so, please identify that party, explain 
why it would be appropriate for that party to provide the SAW accounts, 
and explain why such structure would not inhibit the Plan Processor's 
ability to control, manage, operate, and maintain the CAT System. Are 
there alternative structures that the Commission has not explicitly 
considered here? If so, please explain what these structures are and 
why they would be more appropriate for SAWs. Is it appropriate for the 
Plan Processor to implement all common security controls required by 
the CISP? Would implementation of such controls hamper the 
Participants' ability to customize their SAWs? Should each Participant 
be able to implement the common security controls on its own?
    12. Should the Plan Processor be required to provide each 
Participant with a SAW account? Should the proposed amendments 
explicitly specify that Participants are permitted to share SAW 
account(s)? If a Participant does not believe it will need to use a SAW 
account, should the Plan Processor still be required to build a SAW 
account for that Participant? If not, how and at what point should the 
Participant inform the Plan Processor that it does not need a SAW 
account? Should such a Participant be allowed to change its mind if the 
Participant later determines that it needs to use a SAW account? If so, 
how long should the Plan Processor be given to build a SAW account for 
that Participant? Should the Plan Processor be required to provide each 
Participant with more than one SAW account upon request?
    13. Do commenters agree that centralizing provision of the SAW 
accounts with the Plan Processor is the most effective and efficient 
way to implement the common technical controls associated with the CISP 
and to enable the Plan Processor to conduct consistent and 
comprehensive monitoring of SAWs? If not, please identify any 
alternative approaches that would be more effective and more efficient.
    14. The proposed amendments state that the Participants may provide 
and use their choice of software, hardware configurations, and 
additional data within their SAWs, so long as such activities otherwise 
comply with the CISP. Should the Plan Processor, as the provider of 
each SAW account, be required to assist with any such activities? If 
not, do commenters believe that the Participants will be able to 
provide their own software, hardware configurations, and additional 
data without the assistance of the Plan Processor? For example, do 
commenters believe that a Participant would need the Plan Processor to 
grant special access or other administrative privileges in order to 
provide such software, hardware configurations, or additional data? Are 
there any other administrative tasks that the Plan Processor would or 
should be expected to provide? If so, please identify any such tasks 
and explain whether the proposed amendments should explicitly address 
the performance of such tasks.
    15. Do commenters believe that the Plan Processor will charge back 
variable cloud services fees to each Participant for SAWs in a manner 
consistent with how current variable fees incurred by the Plan 
Processor are charged back to the Company? If not, how will the Plan 
Processor charge each Participant for SAW implementation and usage? 
Should the proposed amendments state how the Plan Processor may charge 
the Participants for SAW implementation and usage? If so, should each 
Participant be billed by the Plan Processor for providing a SAW, even 
if the Participants choose not to use that SAW? How should the 
Participants be billed for their use of the SAWs?
2. Data Access and Extraction Policies and Procedures
    The Commission continues to believe that regulators must be 
permitted to access and extract CAT Data when such access and 
extraction is for surveillance and regulatory purposes, but only as 
long as such access and extraction does not compromise the security of 
CAT

[[Page 65998]]

Data. Proposed Section 6.13(a)(i) would therefore require the CISP to, 
at a minimum, establish certain data access and extraction policies and 
procedures.\63\
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    \63\ Proposed Section 6.13(a) also states explicitly that the 
CISP shall apply to every Participant's SAW. This is also required 
by the proposed definition of ``Comprehensive Information Security 
Program.'' See proposed Section 1.1; see also Part II.A. supra, for 
a discussion of the proposed CISP. Similarly, proposed Section 6.12 
would make clear that the CISP should include the requirements set 
forth in proposed Section 6.13.
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    First, under proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(A), the CISP must 
establish policies and procedures that would require Participants to 
use their SAWs as the only means of accessing and analyzing customer 
and account data. While the database containing customer and account 
data would no longer include social security numbers, dates of birth, 
and/or account numbers for individual retail investors,\64\ the 
unauthorized access and use of the remaining customer and account 
data--Customer and Account Attributes--could still be damaging. Because 
Customer and Account Attributes data may currently be accessed outside 
of the CAT System, the Commission preliminarily believes that the 
proposed SAW usage requirement would better protect this information by 
ensuring that it is accessed and analyzed within the CAT System and 
therefore subject to the security controls, policies, and procedures of 
the CISP when accessed and analyzed by the Participants.\65\
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    \64\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88393 (March 17, 
2020), 85 FR 16152 (March 20, 2020) (granting conditional exemptive 
relief from certain requirements of the CAT NMS Plan, including 
requirements related to the reporting of PII). With the elimination 
of social security numbers, dates of birth, and/or account numbers 
from the CAT, the Commission proposes to eliminate the term ``PII'' 
and refer to the remaining customer and account data in the CAT as 
``Customer and Account Attributes'' throughout the CAT NMS Plan. See 
Part II.E. infra, for a discussion of this proposed change.
    \65\ The Commission is also proposing amendments to the CAT NMS 
Plan to define the security requirements of the Customer Identifying 
Systems Workflow. See Part II.F. infra, for a discussion of these 
amendments.
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    Second, under proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(B), the CISP must 
establish policies and procedures that would require the Participants 
to use their SAWs when accessing and analyzing CAT Data through the 
user-defined direct query and bulk extract tools described in Section 
6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan, unless 
an exception is granted pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d).\66\ Under 
the CAT NMS Plan, the online targeted query tool facilitates access to 
focused, narrowly-defined queries, while the user-defined direct query 
and bulk extract tools enable the Participants to download much larger 
sets of data from the Central Repository to external systems that are 
not required to comply with the information security program described 
in Section 6.12.\67\ The user-defined direct query and bulk extract 
tools therefore have a greater impact on the attack surface of the CAT. 
The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed SAW usage 
restrictions will keep more CAT Data within the CAT System and subject 
to the CISP, while still providing the Participants with the 
flexibility of performing focused searches outside of the SAW through 
the online targeted query tool.\68\
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    \66\ See Part II.C.5.a. infra, for a discussion of the proposed 
exception process.
    \67\ For example, the online targeted query tool limits searches 
using a date or time range and only makes certain predetermined 
fields available to users, whereas the user-defined direct query 
tool can be used to query all available attributes and data sources 
without such limitations. Cf., e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at 
Section 6.10(c)(1)(A); id. at Section 6.10(c)(1)(B).
    \68\ To further protect CAT Data, the Commission is also 
proposing amendments to the CAT NMS Plan that would reduce the 
amount of information that the Participants could extract via the 
online targeted query tool. See Part II.D. infra, for a discussion 
of these proposed amendments.
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    Third, under proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(C), the CISP must 
establish policies and procedures that would require that the 
Participants only extract from SAWs the minimum amount of CAT Data 
necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or regulatory purpose.\69\ 
While the proposed amendments require access and analysis of CAT Data 
within the SAW for Customer and Account Attributes and transaction data 
accessed with the user-defined direct query or bulk extract tools, the 
Commission recognizes that it may sometimes be necessary for the 
Participants to extract CAT Data that is otherwise required to be 
accessed or analyzed in a SAW to external systems or environments, 
including those beyond the Participants' control. For example, the 
Participants might need to extract CAT Data to respond to a court order 
or to some other regulatory or statutory mandate, to submit a matter to 
a disciplinary action committee, to file a complaint against a broker-
dealer, or to refer an investigation or examination to other regulators 
like the Commission.\70\ The Commission does not wish to unnecessarily 
constrain the Participants in situations like these, where only a 
targeted, small amount of CAT Data is needed to achieve a specific 
surveillance or regulatory purpose. The Commission preliminarily 
believes that these provisions strike an appropriate balance by 
maintaining CAT Data largely within the CAT System, but still enabling 
limited extraction of data to allow the Participants to comply with 
their regulatory or statutory obligations.
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    \69\ See also Part II.G. for further discussion of other 
proposed controls on access to and use of CAT Data, which would, 
among other things, limit the extraction of CAT Data to the minimum 
amount of data necessary to achieve a specific regulatory or 
surveillance purpose, define the staff that would be entitled to 
access or use CAT Data, and increase the oversight of the Chief 
Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation) 
of each Participant over access to and use of CAT Data.
    \70\ See also Part II.N. infra, for a discussion of how the 
proposed amendments would apply to Commission staff. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the restrictions set forth in the 
proposed amendments would still enable the extraction of required 
data--for example, to support discussions with a regulated entity 
regarding activity that raises concerns, to file a complaint against 
a regulated entity, or to support an investigation or examination of 
a regulated entity.
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    Fourth, under proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(D), the CISP must 
establish policies and procedures that would require that secure file 
sharing capability provided by the Plan Processor be the only mechanism 
for extracting CAT Data from SAWs. Because file-based sharing systems 
have the ability to track file size and recipients, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that requiring the use of file-based sharing 
will help the Plan Processor to monitor for non-compliant use of the 
SAWs. The Commission further preliminarily believes that requiring the 
use of a secure file sharing capability will better protect CAT Data by 
enabling confidential transmission of data between authorized users. 
Finally, the Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
for the Plan Processor to provide this capability. As the party 
responsible for developing and maintaining the CISP, the Plan Processor 
is in the best position to determine which file-based sharing system 
will fit the security needs of the CAT System. Requiring that the Plan 
Processor provide one universally-used secure file-based sharing system 
may also reduce the administrative burdens and security risks that 
might arise if each Participant developed and used a different file-
based sharing capability to extract CAT Data out of its SAWs.
    Finally, the CAT NMS Plan currently states that the Chief 
Compliance Officer \71\ (the ``CCO'') shall oversee the

[[Page 65999]]

regular written assessment of the Plan Processor's performance that is 
required to be provided to the Commission and that this assessment 
shall include an evaluation of the existing information security 
program ``to ensure that the program is consistent with the highest 
industry standards for the protection of data.'' \72\ In addition to 
replacing the reference to the ``information security program'' with a 
reference to the proposed ``Comprehensive Information Security 
Program,'' the proposed amendments would require the CCO, in 
collaboration with the CISO, to include in this evaluation a review of 
the quantity and type of CAT Data extracted from the CAT System to 
assess the security risk of permitting such CAT Data to be extracted 
\73\ and to identify any appropriate corrective measures.\74\ The 
Commission preliminarily believes that these proposed requirements will 
facilitate Commission oversight of the security risks posed by the 
extraction of CAT Data. The proposed review should enable a thorough 
assessment of security risks to CAT Data and whether changes to the 
current security measures are appropriate.
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    \71\ ``Chief Compliance Officer'' is a defined term in the CAT 
NMS Plan and means ``the individual then serving (even on a 
temporary basis) as the Chief Compliance Officer pursuant to Section 
4.6, Section 6.1(b), and Section 6.2(a).'' See CAT NMS Plan, supra 
note 3, at Section 1.1. The CCO is an officer of the Company and has 
a fiduciary duty to the Company. See id. at Section 4.6(a), Section 
4.7(c).
    \72\ See id. at Section 6.6(b)(i)(B), Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3). 
The CAT NMS Plan requires the written assessment of the Plan 
Processor's performance to be provided to the Commission annually or 
more frequently in connection with any review of the Plan 
Processor's performance under the CAT NMS Plan pursuant to Section 
6.1(n). See id. at Section 6.6(b)(i)(A).
    \73\ The Commission believes that such an evaluation could be 
performed using metrics associated with aggregated data. For 
example, the Plan Processor could review the amount of data that 
each Participant extracted on a monthly basis and analyze extraction 
trends for each Participant to identify any anomalies or to compare 
the amount of data extracted from the CAT against the amount of data 
ingested into the CAT.
    \74\ See proposed Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3). The proposed 
amendments do not limit this review to CAT Data extracted from SAWs; 
the proposed review should also include CAT Data extracted using 
other methods, like the online targeted query tool. These 
requirements are also enshrined in proposed Section 6.2. See also 
proposed Section 6.2(a)(v)(T) (requiring the CCO to determine, 
pursuant to Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), to review CAT Data that has 
been extracted from the CAT System to assess the security risk of 
allowing such CAT Data to be extracted); proposed Section 6.2(b)(x) 
(requiring the CISO to determine, pursuant to Section 
6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), to review CAT Data that has been extracted from 
the CAT System to assess the security risk of allowing such CAT Data 
to be extracted).
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed data access and 
extraction policies and procedures. Specifically, the Commission 
solicits comment on the following:
    16. Is it appropriate to require the CISP to establish data access 
and extraction policies and procedures? Should the proposed amendments 
specify each component that should be included in the data access and 
extraction policies and procedures? If so, please describe what 
components should be included and explain why those components would be 
appropriate. For example, should the proposed amendments specify that 
the data access and extraction policies and procedures should establish 
which data will be provided to Participants in the form of data 
extraction logs, how the proposed confidentiality policies described in 
Part II.G. should apply to SAW usage, or when data extraction should be 
permissible? Is CAT Data sufficiently protected by the current terms of 
the CAT NMS Plan? If so, please explain how the current protection is 
adequate.
    17. The proposed amendments require the CISP to establish policies 
and procedures that require the Participants to use SAWs as the only 
means of accessing and analyzing Customer and Account Attributes. 
Should Participants be allowed to analyze Customer and Account 
Attributes data outside of a SAW?
    18. The proposed amendments require the CISP to establish policies 
and procedures that require Participants to use SAWs when accessing and 
analyzing CAT Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk 
extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, 
Section 8.2, unless granted an exemption pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(d). Would it be more effective to limit the number of records that 
could be returned by these search tools? If so, please explain how 
those tools should be limited and explain why those limitations are 
appropriate. Should the proposed amendments also require the 
Participants to use SAWs when accessing and analyzing CAT Data 
retrieved through the online targeted query tool described in Section 
6.10(c)(i)(A)? Should the proposed amendments require that all CAT Data 
be accessed and analyzed in a SAW, regardless of how it was retrieved?
    19. The proposed amendments require the CISP to establish policies 
and procedures directing the Participants to extract only the minimum 
amount of CAT Data necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or 
regulatory purpose. Should the Commission revise this requirement to 
specifically limit the number of records, the size of the data that may 
be extracted, or the file types permitted for extraction in support of 
a specific surveillance or regulatory purpose? If so, what should the 
Commission specify as the number of records or the size of the data? 
For example, should the number of records be limited to 200,000 rows, 
the size of the data that may be extracted be limited to 1 gigabyte, or 
the file types permitted for extracted be limited to Excel 
spreadsheets? Please identify any appropriate limitations, explain why 
those limitations would be appropriate, and describe how regulatory use 
cases requiring the extraction of data from the SAW would be fully 
supported. Should the CISP be allowed to establish a more permissive 
policy governing the extraction of CAT Data from the SAWs? If so, 
please identify any conditions that should be placed on the extraction 
of CAT Data from the SAWs and explain why they are appropriate.
    20. Should the proposed amendments require the application of 
additional security controls, policies, or procedures for data that is 
extracted from a SAW or that is extracted directly from the Central 
Repository by Participants into a non-SAW environment that has not been 
granted an exception pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)--i.e., data 
extracted using the online targeted query tool? Or do existing rules 
and regulations under the Exchange Act, like Regulation SCI, 
sufficiently protect CAT Data that would be extracted from a SAW or 
from the Central Repository?
    21. The proposed amendments require the CISP to establish policies 
and procedures that state that secure file sharing capability provided 
by the Plan Processor shall be the only mechanism for extracting CAT 
Data from the SAW. Do commenters understand what is meant by ``secure 
file sharing'' or should the Commission specify criteria that should be 
used to assess whether a system provides ``secure file sharing 
capability''? What criteria would evaluate whether a system provides 
``secure file sharing capability''? Should a different method of 
extraction be permitted? If so, please identify that method of 
extraction and explain why it would be appropriate. Is it clear what 
the Commission means by ``secure file sharing capability''? Please 
explain what commenters understand this term to mean and whether it is 
appropriate for the Commission to add more detail to the proposed 
amendments. Should a different party provide the secure file sharing 
capability? If so, please identify that party and explain why that 
party would be a more appropriate choice. Should the proposed 
amendments be more specific about what kind of capability must be 
provided by the Plan Processor? If so, please explain what kinds of 
details would be helpful.
    22. The proposed amendments require the CCO, in collaboration with

[[Page 66000]]

the CISO, to include, in the regular written assessment of the Plan 
Processor's performance that is required to be provided to the 
Commission, a review of the quantity and type of CAT Data extracted 
from the CAT System to assess the security risk of permitting such 
extraction. This review must also identify any appropriate corrective 
measures. Is it appropriate to require this review to be included in 
the regular written assessment of the Plan Processor's performance that 
is required to be provided to the Commission? Is there a better vehicle 
for communicating this information to the Commission? If so, please 
identify that vehicle and explain why it would be a more appropriate 
way of communicating this information to the Commission. Should the 
Commission receive this information more often than it would receive 
the regular written assessment of the Plan Processor's performance? If 
so, how often should the Commission receive this information and 
through what means should such information should be communicated? Is 
there any other information that should be included in this review? If 
so, please identify such information and explain why it would be 
appropriate to include such information in the review.
3. Security Controls, Policies, and Procedures for SAWs
    To protect the security of the SAWs, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that it is appropriate to require the CISP to set forth the 
security controls, policies, and procedures that must apply to the 
SAWs. The Plan Processor already must adhere to the NIST Risk 
Management Framework and implement the security controls identified in 
National Institute of Standards and Technology's Special Publication 
800-53 to protect CAT Data that is reported to and retained at the 
Central Repository.\75\ To promote the consistent treatment of CAT Data 
that might be downloaded to SAWs, the proposed amendments would state 
that the CISP must establish security controls, policies, and 
procedures for SAWs that require all NIST SP 800-53 security controls 
and associated policies and procedures required by the CISP to apply to 
the Participants' SAWs.\76\
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    \75\ See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, 
Section 4.2 (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of applicable 
industry standards, including NIST SP 800-53). See also id. at 
Appendix D, Section 5.3 (``The Plan Processor must conduct third 
party risk assessments at regular intervals to verify that security 
controls implemented are in accordance with NIST SP 800-53.''). See 
also NIST SP 800-53, supra note 15, at 7-8 (explaining how NIST SP 
800-53 implements the NIST Risk Management Framework).
    \76\ See proposed Section 6.13(a)(ii).
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    The proposed amendments would also require the CISP to establish 
security controls, policies, and procedures that would specify that 
certain security controls, policies, and procedures must be applied to 
SAWs by the Plan Processor and that such security controls, policies, 
and procedures must be common to both the SAWs and the Central 
Repository in accordance with Section 2.4 of NIST SP 800-53, unless 
technologically or organizationally not possible.\77\ Common security 
controls, policies, and procedures would be required for at least the 
following NIST SP 800-53 control families: Audit and accountability, 
security assessment and authorization, configuration management, 
incident response, system and communications protection, and system and 
information integrity.\78\
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    \77\ See proposed Section 6.13(a)(ii)(A). See NIST SP 800-53, 
supra note 15, at Section 2.4 (explaining what common controls are 
and how they should be implemented).
    \78\ See proposed Section 6.13(a)(ii)(A).
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    The NIST SP 800-53 control families specifically identified by the 
proposed amendments are core families that would enable the Plan 
Processor to better monitor the security of the SAWs.\79\ For example, 
requiring that audit and accountability,\80\ security assessment and 
authorization,\81\ incident response,\82\ and systems and information 
integrity \83\ controls, policies, and procedures be ``common'' in 
accordance with Section 2.4 of NIST SP 800-53 would facilitate 
consistent monitoring of systems and personnel and associated analysis 
across the CAT System, including the generation and review of activity 
logs, identification of potential anomalies or attacks, incident-
specific monitoring and notification, analysis of security-related 
infrastructure and possible system vulnerabilities, and uniform 
issuance of security alerts. In addition, by requiring that security 
assessment and authorization controls, policies, and procedures be 
``common'' in accordance with Section 2.4 of NIST SP 800-53, the 
proposed amendments would include security assessments of the SAWs as 
part of the overall risk assessment of the CAT System; risks would be 
tracked and escalated in the same way. Common configuration management 
\84\ and system and communication protection \85\ controls, policies, 
and procedures would centralize the management of crucial 
infrastructure, so that each SAW would operate according to the same 
parameters as the rest of the CAT System and thereby enable the Plan 
Processor to conduct the above-described monitoring more efficiently.
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    \79\ Although the proposed amendments would require the Plan 
Processor to monitor the SAWs to verify that relevant security 
controls, policies, and procedures are being followed, the proposed 
amendments would not permit the Plan Processor to monitor analytical 
activities taking place within the SAWs, including analytical 
activities that may take place within any SAW provided for the 
Commission's use. See Part II.C.4.b. infra for further discussion of 
the monitoring requirements; see also Part II.N. infra for further 
discussion regarding the application of the proposed amendments to 
Commission staff.
    \80\ See NIST SP 800-53, supra note 15, at Appendix F-AU
    \81\ See id. at Appendix F-CA.
    \82\ See id. at Appendix F-IR.
    \83\ See id. at Appendix F-SI.
    \84\ See id. at Appendix F-CM.
    \85\ See id. at Appendix F-SC.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate for 
all NIST SP 800-53 security controls, policies, and procedures required 
by the CISP to apply to the SAWs; the same set of control families, 
policies, and procedures should apply when CAT Data is accessed and 
downloaded to a SAW. In addition, the Commission preliminarily believes 
that it is appropriate to further require common implementation for 
NIST SP 800-53 control families that relate to critical monitoring 
functions, unless technologically or organizationally not possible. By 
requiring the CISP to establish common security controls, policies, and 
procedures for these NIST SP 800-53 control families, the proposed 
amendments would establish security protections for SAWs that are 
harmonized to the greatest extent possible with the security 
protections of the Central Repository. The security of the SAWs should 
therefore be robust.\86\ Moreover, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that the proposed amendments would facilitate the efficient 
implementation of the SAWs by specifying that the Plan Processor will 
be responsible for implementing the common security controls, policies, 
and procedures. If each Participant were allowed to implement the 
common security controls, policies, and procedures, different 
Participants might

[[Page 66001]]

make different (and potentially less secure or less efficient) 
implementation choices. As the party who would be the most familiar 
with the CISP, the Plan Processor can more efficiently implement these 
common security controls, policies, and procedures \87\ and is the best 
situated to verify that such security controls, policies, and 
procedures are implemented consistently.
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    \86\ By contrast, if the proposed amendments were not adopted, 
the Participants would be allowed to build these analytical 
environments with their own security measures. Although the CAT NMS 
Plan requires the CISO to review the Participants' information 
security policies and procedures related to any such analytical 
environments to ensure that such policies and procedures are 
comparable to the information security policies and procedures that 
are applicable to the Central Repository, the proposed amendments 
will promote uniformity, which the Commission preliminarily believes 
is more likely to protect CAT Data for the reasons discussed above. 
See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.2(b)(vii).
    \87\ See Part II.C.1. supra (explaining why it is more efficient 
for the Plan Processor to implement and administer relevant security 
controls).
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    The Commission recognizes, however, that common implementation will 
likely not be feasible for all of the NIST SP 800-53 security controls, 
policies, and procedures required by the CISP. Accordingly, proposed 
Section 6.13(a)(ii)(B) would permit the security controls, policies, 
and procedures established by the CISP to indicate that implementation 
of NIST SP 800-53 security controls, policies, and procedures required 
by the CISP may be done in a SAW-specific way and by either the Plan 
Processor or each Participant.\88\ The Commission emphasizes, however, 
that ``SAW-specific'' does not mean that each Participant may 
independently select or assess the NIST SP 800-53 security controls, 
policies, and procedures that should apply for its SAWs. Rather, this 
provision would still require the CISP to provide the basis for the 
NIST SP 800-53 security controls, policies, and procedures that should 
be applied to SAWs, but allow that the implementation of controls, 
policies, and procedures may be different for each SAW. The Commission 
preliminarily believes this provision would provide an appropriate 
level of control to the Plan Processor while permitting SAW-specific 
implementation of the security controls, policies, and procedures that 
would apply to SAWs, as SAWs would have different functional and 
technical requirements from the Central Repository and may therefore 
require tailored implementation of controls.
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    \88\ It may also be technologically or organizationally 
impossible to commonly implement all of the security controls, 
policies, and procedures identified by proposed Section 
6.13(a)(ii)(A), in which case proposed Section 6.13(a)(ii)(B) would 
control how the security controls, policies, and procedures 
established by the CISP for SAWs address such implementation.
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed security controls, 
policies, and procedures requirements. Specifically, the Commission 
solicits comment on the following:
    23. The proposed amendments require the CISP to establish security 
controls, policies, and procedures such that all NIST SP 800-53 
security controls and associated policies and procedures required by 
the CISP apply to the SAWs. Should the CISP be required to establish 
security controls, policies, and procedures to implement any other 
industry standard for SAWs? If so, please identify the relevant 
industry standard(s) and explain why it would be appropriate to require 
the CISP to establish security controls, policies, and procedures to 
implement that standard(s). Should the CISP be required to implement 
additional NIST SP 800-53 security controls, policies, or procedures 
for SAWs, including security controls, policies, and procedures that 
would protect the boundary of each SAW from other SAWs and/or other 
components of the CAT System? If so, please identify those security 
controls, policies, or procedures and explain why they should be 
implemented for SAWs. Should the SAWs be required to implement all 
security controls, policies, and procedures required by the CISP? If 
not, please identify the security controls, policies, and procedures 
that might be required by the CISP (if adopted) that should not be 
applied to SAWs and explain why excluding such security controls, 
policies, or procedures would be appropriate.
    24. Unless technologically or organizationally not possible, the 
proposed amendments require the CISP to establish controls, policies, 
and procedures that require the following NIST SP 800-53 control 
families to be implemented by the Plan Processor and to be common to 
both the SAWs and the Central Repository: Audit and accountability, 
security assessment and authorization, configuration management, 
incident response, system and communications protection, and system and 
information integrity. Are there technological, organizational, or 
other impediments to requiring common implementation for the specified 
control families? Should the security controls, policies, and 
procedures for other NIST SP 800-53 control families be commonly 
implemented for the SAWs and the Central Repository? If so, please 
identify these control families and explain why it would be appropriate 
to require common implementation. Is it appropriate to require that the 
common security controls be implemented by the Plan Processor? Is there 
another party that should implement the common security controls? If 
so, please identify that party and explain why it would be more 
appropriate for that party to implement the common security controls.
    25. The proposed amendments require the CISP to establish security 
controls, policies, and procedures such that SAW-specific security 
controls, policies, and procedures are implemented to cover any NIST SP 
800-53 security controls for which common controls, policies, and 
procedures are not possible. Should the proposed amendments provide 
this flexibility? Does providing this flexibility endanger the security 
of the SAWs?
4. Implementation and Operational Requirements for SAWs
    To further the security of the CAT System, the Commission 
preliminarily believes it is important that the SAWs be implemented and 
operated consistently and in accordance with the CISP.
a. Implementation Requirements for SAWs
    Proposed Section 6.13(b)(i) would require the Plan Processor to 
develop, maintain, and make available to the Participants detailed 
design specifications for the technical implementation of the access, 
monitoring,\89\ and other controls required for SAWs by the CISP.\90\ 
Proposed Section 6.13(b)(ii) would further require the Plan Processor 
to notify the Operating Committee that each Participant's SAW has 
achieved compliance with the detailed design specifications issued by 
the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i) before such 
SAW may connect to the Central Repository.
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    \89\ In addition to the controls, policies, and procedures that 
specifically relate to or require monitoring, monitoring of security 
controls is part of the general risk management framework 
established by NIST SP 800-53. See, e.g., NIST SP 800-53, supra note 
15, at 8. Detailed design specifications implementing the NIST SP 
800-53 controls required by the CISP should therefore detail how the 
Plan Processor will perform such monitoring and give the Plan 
Processor sufficient access to the SAWs to conduct such monitoring.
    \90\ See Part II.A.1. and Part II.C.2.-3. supra, for a 
discussion of the CISP. The Commission preliminarily believes that 
the Plan Processor could make these detailed design specifications 
available to the Participants in a number of formats, including by 
making available a reference SAW account for the Participants to 
review and analyze.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to 
require the Plan Processor to develop and maintain detailed design 
specifications for the technical implementation of the CISP controls. 
As the party responsible for maintaining data security across the CAT 
System and for providing the SAWs, the Plan Processor would have the 
most information regarding the security requirements that are

[[Page 66002]]

applicable to SAWs.\91\ The Commission preliminarily believes that it 
would be appropriate for the Plan Processor to share this information 
with the Participants through detailed design specifications,\92\ 
because releasing such information through detailed design 
specifications would help the Participants to more precisely understand 
how they would be able to use and provision their SAWs, what 
information they would be required to share with the Plan Processor to 
enable the NIST SP 800-53 access and monitoring controls that are 
applicable to SAWs, and how the security parameters of the SAWs might 
impact their existing surveillance protocols.\93\ Requiring the Plan 
Processor to make available detailed design specifications for SAWs may 
thus increase the likelihood that Participants provision their SAWs 
with hardware, software, and data that complies with the CISP. 
Moreover, the development of detailed design specifications would also 
provide the Plan Processor with uniform criteria with which to evaluate 
and validate SAWs, which the Commission preliminarily believes should 
make the notification process required by proposed Section 6.13(b)(ii) 
more efficient for the Plan Processor and more fair for the 
Participants.
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    \91\ See Part II.A, Part II.C.1. supra
    \92\ As public disclosure of these detailed design 
specifications could raise security concerns, the Commission 
believes that the Plan Processor and the Participants generally 
should keep these detailed design specifications confidential.
    \93\ The Commission emphasizes that these detailed design 
specifications need only implement the access, monitoring, and other 
controls required by the CISP. Each Participant will have the 
flexibility to otherwise design the analytic capabilities of its own 
SAW and to provision it with its own hardware, software, and other 
data, so long as such activities comply with the CISP. See proposed 
Section 6.13(c)(iii); see also Part II.C.4.b. infra, for a 
discussion of the flexibility afforded to the Participants by the 
proposed amendments.
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    The security of the CAT is critically important, and the Commission 
preliminarily believes that it would be prudent to confirm that the 
detailed design specifications have been implemented properly before 
permitting any Participant to use its SAW to access CAT Data. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to 
require the Plan Processor to evaluate each Participant's SAW and 
notify the Operating Committee that each Participant's SAW has achieved 
compliance with the detailed design specifications required by proposed 
Section 6.13(b)(i) before that SAW may connect to the Central 
Repository. The Commission preliminarily believes that such an 
evaluation would establish that the access, monitoring, and other 
technical controls required for SAWs by the CISP have been implemented 
properly. The Commission preliminarily believes that SAWs that comply 
with these detailed design specifications should be sufficiently 
secure, because those detailed design specifications must implement the 
full battery of technical controls associated with the CISP, including 
all required NIST SP 800-53 security controls.\94\ The Plan Processor 
is not only knowledgeable about NIST SP 800-53 security controls, but 
is also responsible for developing the CISP and the detailed design 
specifications that would be used to implement the CISP controls.\95\ 
In addition, the Plan Processor would have access, through the CISO, to 
the collective knowledge and experience of the Security Working 
Group.\96\ For these reasons, the Commission further preliminarily 
believes that the Plan Processor is best situated to determine whether 
each Participant's SAW has achieved compliance with such detailed 
design specifications. Finally, the Commission believes it is 
appropriate to require that the Plan Processor notify the Operating 
Committee, that each Participant's SAW has achieved compliance with the 
detailed design specifications before that SAW may connect to the 
Central Repository, as this requirement would enable the Operating 
Committee to better oversee the Plan Processor and the security of the 
CAT.
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    \94\ See proposed Section 6.13(b)(i); proposed Section 
6.13(a)(ii). See also Part II.A.1. and Part II.C.2.-3. supra, for a 
discussion of the requirements of the CISP.
    \95\ See proposed Section 6.13(b)(i).
    \96\ See Part II.B. supra for a discussion of the proposed 
Security Working Group.
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    The Commission requests comment on proposed Section 6.13(b). 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    26. Do commenters agree that development and maintenance of 
detailed design specifications for the technical implementation of the 
CISP will enable the consistent, efficient, and secure implementation 
of SAWs?
    27. The proposed amendments require the Plan Processor to develop 
and maintain detailed design specifications for the technical 
implementation of the access, monitoring, and other controls required 
for SAWs by the CISP. Should a different party develop and maintain 
these detailed design specifications? If so, please identify the party 
that should develop and maintain these detailed design specifications 
and explain why. Should the detailed design specifications be subject 
to review by the Operating Committee, the Security Working Group, or 
some other entity? If so, please explain why and provide a detailed 
explanation of what such review process should entail.
    28. Should the proposed amendments specify the nature of the 
monitoring required by NIST SP 800-53 controls? Should the proposed 
amendments specify that monitoring should be continuous? If so, please 
explain how that term should be defined and why such definition would 
be appropriate. Should the proposed amendments indicate whether manual 
or automated processes (or both) should be used by the Plan Processor 
and whether automated support tools should be used? Should the proposed 
amendments explicitly state that the NIST SP 800-53 controls, policies, 
and procedures require the Participants to give the Plan Processor 
sufficient access to SAWs in order to enable the monitoring inherently 
required by such NIST SP 800-53 controls, policies, and procedures? If 
so, please explain what details should be included in the proposed 
amendments.
    29. The proposed amendments do not specify how the detailed design 
specifications should be provided by the Plan Processor. Should the 
proposed amendments require the Plan Processor to provide a reference 
SAW account? If a specific format should be used, please identify the 
format that the detailed design specifications should be provided in 
and explain why that format is appropriate.
    30. The proposed amendments require the Plan Processor to notify 
the Operating Committee that each Participant's SAW has achieved 
compliance with the detailed design specifications required by Section 
6.13(b)(ii) before that SAW may connect to the Central Repository. Is 
the Plan Processor the appropriate party to make this determination? If 
not, what other party should make this determination and why? Is 
evaluation against some benchmark appropriate in order to safeguard the 
security of CAT Data? Should the SAWs be allowed to connect to the 
Central Repository without any evaluation process? Are the detailed 
design specifications required by Section 6.13(b)(ii) an appropriate 
benchmark? If it is not an appropriate benchmark, please identify what 
benchmark would be appropriate and explain why. Is it appropriate for 
the Plan Processor to notify a third party? Should the Operating 
Committee receive the notification? Should any other parties receive 
the notification? If so, please identify the parties and

[[Page 66003]]

explain why it would be appropriate to provide the notification to 
these parties.
b. Operation of the SAWs
    Proposed Section 6.13(c) would set forth requirements for the Plan 
Processor and the Participants that are designed to promote compliance 
with the CISP. First, proposed Section 6.13(c)(i) would require the 
Plan Processor to monitor each Participant's SAW in accordance with the 
detailed design specifications developed pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(b)(i), for compliance with the CISP and the detailed designs 
specifications only, and to notify the Participant of any identified 
non-compliance with the CISP or the detailed design specifications.\97\ 
Second, proposed Section 6.13(c)(ii) would require the Participants to 
comply with the CISP, to comply with the detailed design specifications 
developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(b)(i), and to promptly remediate any non-compliance 
identified.\98\
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    \97\ The proposed amendments would require the Participant to 
comply with the CISP and the detailed design specifications 
developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(b)(i). See proposed Section 6.13(c)(ii). If adopted, these 
requirements would be part of the CAT NMS Plan. Any non-compliance 
by a Participant with the proposed amendments would constitute non-
compliance with the CAT NMS Plan and Rule 613(h)(1) and would also 
be a systems compliance issue, as defined in Regulation SCI, by such 
Participant (each Participant being an SCI entity). See 17 CFR 
242.613(h)(1) (requiring Participants to comply with the provisions 
of the CAT NMS Plan); 17 CFR 242.608(c) (``Each self-regulatory 
organization shall comply with the terms of any effective national 
market system plan of which it is a sponsor or a participant.''). 
See also 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining ``systems compliance issue'' as 
``an event at an SCI entity that has caused any SCI system of such 
entity to operate in a manner that does not comply with the 
[Exchange] Act and the rules and regulations thereunder,'' defining 
``SCI event'' to include ``systems compliance issues,'' and defining 
``SCI entity'' to include self-regulatory organizations like the 
Participants); 17 CFR 242.1002 (setting forth the notification and 
recordkeeping obligations related to SCI events).
    \98\ This provision would require each Participant to remedy any 
non-compliance promptly, whether such non-compliance was identified 
by the Participant or by the Plan Processor.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that these requirements will 
facilitate compliance with the CISP and, therefore, the overall 
security of the CAT. Requiring the Plan Processor to monitor each 
Participant's SAW in accordance with the detailed design specifications 
developed pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i) should enable the 
Plan Processor to conduct such monitoring consistently and efficiently 
across SAWs. It should also help the Plan Processor to identify and to 
escalate any non-compliance events, threats, and/or vulnerabilities as 
soon as possible, thus reducing the potentially harmful effects of 
these matters. Likewise, requiring the Plan Processor to notify the 
Participant of any identified non-compliance will likely speed 
remediation of such non-compliance by the Participant and thereby 
better protect the security of the SAW in question. The Commission also 
preliminarily believes it is appropriate to limit the scope of the Plan 
Processor's monitoring to compliance with the CISP and the detailed 
design specifications developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to 
Section 6.13(b)(i). The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
limitation would make it clear that analytical activities in the SAW 
would not be subject to third-party monitoring, without hampering the 
ability of the Plan Processor to adequately protect the security of 
each SAW.\99\
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    \99\ Similarly, any SAW operated by the Commission would only be 
subject to monitoring for compliance with the CISP and with the 
detailed design specifications developed by the Plan Processor 
pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i). See Part II.N. infra for further 
discussion regarding how the proposed amendments would apply to 
Commission staff.
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    The Commission also preliminarily believes it is appropriate to set 
forth the Participants' obligations to comply with the CISP, as well as 
the detailed design specifications developed by the Plan Processor 
pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i), and to require the Participants to 
promptly remediate any identified non-compliance.\100\
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    \100\ Determining whether remediation is prompt may depend on 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the non-compliance event. 
The Commission understands that the Plan Processor has developed a 
risk management policy that outlines appropriate timeframes for 
remediation based on the risks associated with the non-compliance 
event, and the Commission preliminarily believes that referring to 
this policy may be one way of determining whether remediation is 
prompt under the proposed amendments.
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    Such compliance is important, but the Commission does not wish to 
unnecessarily constrain the Participants from employing tools or 
importing external data that might support or enhance the utility of 
the SAWs. As noted above, the CISP and the detailed design 
specifications would only dictate that SAWs comply with certain 
security requirements; the Participants would still be responsible for 
building the internal architecture of their SAWs, for providing the 
analytical tools to be used in their SAWs, and for importing any 
desired external data into their SAWs. Accordingly, proposed Section 
6.13(c)(iii) would explicitly state that the Participants may provide 
and use their choice of software, hardware, and additional data within 
their SAWs, so long as such activities otherwise comply with the CISP 
and the detailed design specifications developed by the Plan Processor 
pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i). The Commission preliminarily 
believes that this provision would provide the Participants with 
sufficient flexibility in and control over the use of their SAWs, while 
still maintaining the security of the SAWs and the CAT Data that may be 
contained therein.\101\
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    \101\ The Commission would have the same flexibility in and 
control over the use of its SAW. See Part II.N. infra for further 
discussion regarding the application of the proposed amendments to 
Commission staff. The proposed amendments would not prevent the 
importation of existing third-party or in-house applications or 
analytical tools into the SAWs, the migration of external data into 
the SAWs, or the configuration of the internal architecture of the 
SAWs.
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    The Commission requests comment on proposed Section 6.13(c). 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    31. The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
monitor each Participant's SAW in accordance with the detailed design 
specifications developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed 
Section 6.13(b)(i). Instead of specifying that such monitoring should 
be conducted in accordance with the detailed design specifications 
developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(b)(i), should the proposed amendments specify the nature of the 
access and monitoring required by relevant NIST 800-53 controls? Should 
the proposed amendments specify the nature of the monitoring required 
by NIST SP 800-53 controls? Should the proposed amendments specify that 
monitoring should be continuous? If so, please explain how that term 
should be defined and why such definition would be appropriate. If not, 
please explain how often such monitoring should be conducted and 
explain why. Should the proposed amendments indicate whether manual or 
automated processes (or both) should be used by the Plan Processor and 
whether automated support tools should be used?
    32. The proposed amendments would restrict the Plan Processor to 
monitoring SAWs for compliance with the CISP and with the detailed 
design specifications developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i). Is this 
an appropriate limitation?
    33. Is the Plan Processor the right party to monitor each 
Participant's SAW for compliance with the CISP and with the detailed 
design specifications developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i)? If a 
different party should

[[Page 66004]]

conduct this monitoring, please identify that party and explain why it 
would be a more appropriate choice. Is there a different set of 
standards that should control the monitoring process? If so, please 
identify that set of standards and explain why it is a more appropriate 
choice.
    34. The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance with the CISP 
or the detailed design specifications developed by the Plan Processor 
pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i). Should a different party 
notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance? If so, please 
identify that party and explain why it would be appropriate for them to 
provide the notification. Are there any additional parties that the 
Plan Processor should notify of any identified non-compliance--for 
example, the Security Working Group or the Operating Committee? If so, 
please identify the party or parties that should also be notified, 
explain why such notification would be appropriate, and explain whether 
such notification would raise any confidentiality, security, or 
competitive concerns.
    35. The proposed amendments would specify that the Participants 
must comply with the CISP and the detailed design specifications 
developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i). Should the proposed 
amendments specify that the Participants must comply with any other 
security protocols or industry standards? If so, please identify these 
security protocols or industry standards and explain why it would be 
appropriate to require the Participants to comply with them.
    36. Should the proposed amendments specify a process to govern the 
resolution of potential disputes regarding non-compliance identified by 
the Plan Processor? For example, should the proposed amendments permit 
Participants to appeal to the Operating Committee? If such an appeal 
process should be included in the proposed amendments, please identify 
all aspects of that appeal process in detail and explain why those 
measures would be appropriate. How long should a Participant be given 
to make such an appeal and what materials should be provided to the 
Operating Committee? Would it be appropriate to require a Participant 
to appeal the determination to the Operating Committee within 30 days? 
Is 30 days enough time for a Participant to prepare an appeal? How long 
should the Operating Committee have to issue a final determination? 
Would 30 days be sufficient? Should the final determination be required 
to include a written explanation from the Operating Committee 
supporting its finding? Once the final determination has been issued, 
how long should the Participant be given to remediate any non-
compliance that is confirmed by the Operating Committee's 
determination? Should Participants who are appealing to the Operating 
Committee be permitted to continue to connect to the Central Repository 
while such an appeal is pending?
    37. Is it appropriate to require the Participants to promptly 
remediate any identified non-compliance or should another standard be 
used? Should the proposed amendments specify what would qualify as 
``prompt'' remediation? If so, please explain what amount of time 
should be specified and explain why that amount of time is sufficient. 
Would it be appropriate for the proposed amendments to refer 
specifically to the risk management policy developed by the Plan 
Processor for appropriate remediation timeframes? Is there another 
policy that provides remediation timeframes that would be more 
appropriate for these purposes? If so, please identify that policy and 
explain why it would be a better benchmark.
    38. The proposed amendments clarify that the Participants may 
provide and use their choice of software, hardware, and additional data 
within the SAWs, so long as such activities otherwise comply with the 
CISP. Is it appropriate to provide Participants with this level of 
flexibility in and control over their use of the SAWs?
    39. The proposed amendments do not require the Plan Processor to 
customize each SAW account for Participant use. Should the proposed 
amendments require the Plan Processor to provide each Participant with 
a SAW that already has certain analytic capabilities or internal 
architecture built into it? If so, please explain why that would be 
more appropriate and identify what analytic capabilities or internal 
architecture the Plan Processor should provide. Should the Plan 
Processor be required to take specific and individual instructions from 
each Participant as to how each SAW should be built? Should the 
proposed amendments specify that each SAW should be of a certain size 
and/or capable of supporting a certain amount of data? If so, please 
explain what parameters would be appropriate.
5. Exceptions to the SAW Usage Requirements
    As explained above, the Commission preliminarily believes that the 
CAT NMS Plan should be amended to better protect CAT Data accessed via 
the user-defined direct query or bulk extract tools described in 
Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan, 
as the current CAT NMS Plan does not limit the download capabilities 
associated with these tools.\102\ The Commission, however, recognizes 
that some Participants may have a reasonable basis for not using a SAW 
to access CAT Data via the user-defined direct query or bulk extract 
tools and may have built a sufficiently secure non-SAW environment in 
which these tools may be employed. The Commission therefore proposes to 
add provisions to the CAT NMS Plan that would set forth a process by 
which Participants may be granted an exception from the requirement in 
proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(B) of the CAT NMS Plan to use a SAW to 
access CAT Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk extract 
tools.\103\ The Commission also proposes to add provisions to the CAT 
NMS Plan that would set forth implementation and operational 
requirements for any non-SAW environments granted such an exception.
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    \102\ See also Part II.C. supra.
    \103\ Only transactional data can be accessed through the user-
defined direct query and bulk extract tools described in Section 
6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan. 
Therefore, the proposed exception process would not permit the 
Participants to access Customer and Account Attributes data in a 
non-SAW environment.
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a. Exception Process for Non-SAW Environments
    The proposed amendments would permit a Participant to be granted an 
exception to employ the user-defined direct query and bulk extract 
tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of 
the CAT NMS Plan in a non-SAW environment. Proposed Section 
6.13(d)(i)(A) would require the Participant requesting the exception to 
provide the Plan Processor's CISO, the CCO, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group with various application materials. First, the 
Participant would be required to provide a security assessment of the 
non-SAW environment, conducted within the prior twelve months by a 
named, independent third party security assessor,\104\ that (a) 
demonstrates the extent to which the non-SAW environment complies with 
the NIST SP 800-53 security controls and associated

[[Page 66005]]

policies and procedures required by the CISP pursuant to Section 
6.13(a)(ii), (b) explains whether and how the Participant's security 
and privacy controls mitigate the risks associated with extracting CAT 
Data to the non-SAW environment through the user-defined direct query 
or bulk extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix 
D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan, and (c) includes a Plan of Action 
and Milestones document detailing the status and schedule of any 
corrective actions recommended by the assessment.\105\ Second, the 
Participant would be required to provide detailed design specifications 
for the non-SAW environment demonstrating: (a) The extent to which the 
non-SAW environment's design specifications adhere to the design 
specifications developed by the Plan Processor for SAWs pursuant to 
proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), and (b) that the design specifications 
will enable the operational requirements set forth for non-SAW 
environments in proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii), which include, among 
other things, Plan Processor monitoring.\106\
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    \104\ For the purposes of the proposed amendments, affiliates of 
a Participant would not be considered ``independent third party 
security assessors.''
    \105\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1). NIST SP 800-53 
defines a Plan of Action and Milestones document as a ``document 
that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It details 
resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, any 
milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion dates for 
the milestones.'' See NIST SP 800-53, supra note 15, at B-16.
    \106\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2). See also proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(iii); Part II.C.5.b. infra, for a discussion of the 
operational requirements that must be enabled by the design 
specifications for a non-SAW environment.
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    Proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B) would then require the CISO and the 
CCO to simultaneously notify the Operating Committee and the requesting 
Participant of their determination within 60 days of receipt of these 
application materials. Under the proposed amendments, the CCO and CISO 
may jointly grant an exception if they determine, in accordance with 
policies and procedures developed by the Plan Processor, that the 
residual risks \107\ identified in the security assessment or detailed 
design specifications provided by the requesting Participant do not 
exceed the risk tolerance levels set forth in the risk management 
strategy developed by the Plan Processor for the CAT System pursuant to 
NIST SP 800-53.\108\ This standard effectively subjects each non-SAW 
environment to the same risk management policy as the CAT System 
itself, as the Commission preliminarily believes that the Participant 
applying for the exception should demonstrate that the CAT Data in its 
non-SAW environments will be protected in a similar manner as CAT Data 
within the CAT System.
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    \107\ By ``residual risks,'' the Commission means any risks that 
are associated with the absence of a security control or the 
deficiency of a security control, as evaluated by the required 
security assessment.
    \108\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(1). NIST SP 800-53 
requires the Plan Processor to develop an organization-wide risk 
management strategy that includes, among other things, ``an 
unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization . 
. . .'' See NIST SP 800-53, supra note 15, at Appendix G-6 
(providing supplemental guidance for the PM-9 control).
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    If the exception is granted or denied, the proposed amendments 
would require the CISO and the CCO to provide the requesting 
Participant \109\ with a detailed written explanation setting forth the 
reasons for that determination. For applications that are denied, the 
proposed amendments would further require the CISO and the CCO to 
specifically identify the deficiencies that must be remedied before an 
exception could be granted.\110\
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    \109\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(1).
    \110\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(2). Denied Participants 
would be permitted to re-apply for an exception, after remedying the 
deficiencies identified by the CISO and the CCO, by submitting a new 
security assessment that complies with the requirements of proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the materials 
specified in proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2). See proposed Section 
6.13(d)(i)(C).
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    The proposed amendments state that continuance of any exceptions 
that are granted is dependent upon an annual review process.\111\ To 
continue an exception, the proposed amendments would require the 
requesting Participant to provide a new security assessment that 
complies with the requirements of proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and 
up-to-date versions of the materials required by proposed Section 
6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) to the CISO, the CCO, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group at least once a year, as measured from the date 
that the initial application materials were submitted.\112\ Exceptions 
would be revoked by the CISO and the CCO for Participants who do not 
submit these application materials on time, in accordance with 
remediation timeframes developed by the Plan Processor.\113\ Such 
Participants would be required to cease using their non-SAW 
environments to access CAT Data through the user-defined direct query 
and bulk extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix 
D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan.\114\
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    \111\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii).
    \112\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A).
    \113\ See id. The Commission understands that the Plan Processor 
has developed a risk management policy that outlines appropriate 
timeframes for remediation based on the risks presented by a non-
compliance event, and the Commission preliminarily believes that 
referring to this policy would be an appropriate method for 
determining what timeframe is appropriate for revoking a 
Participant's exception.
    \114\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(C).
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    Within 60 days of receipt of these updated application materials, 
the CISO and the CCO would then be required to simultaneously notify 
the Operating Committee and the requesting Participant of their 
determination.\115\ The proposed amendments would require the CISO and 
the CCO to make this determination using the same criteria, and issue 
that determination following the same process, set forth for initial 
exceptions.\116\ Participants that receive a determination granting a 
continuance would be required to repeat this process annually; 
participants that receive a determination denying a continuance would 
be required by the CISO and the CCO to cease using the user-defined 
direct query and bulk extract tools to access CAT Data in their non-SAW 
environments in accordance with the remediation timeframes developed by 
the Plan Processor.\117\
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    \115\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(B). See also proposed 
Section 6.2(a)(v)(S) (requiring the CCO to determine, pursuant to 
Section 6.13(d), whether a Participant should be granted an 
exception from Section 6.13(a)(i)(B) and, if applicable, whether 
such exception should be continued); proposed Section 6.2(b)(ix) 
(requiring the CISO to determine, pursuant to Section 6.13(d), 
whether a Participant should be granted an exception from Section 
6.13(a)(i)(B) and, if applicable, whether such exception should be 
continued).
    \116\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(B). Likewise, denied 
Participants would be permitted to re-apply following the same 
process that was outlined above for initial exceptions. See proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(ii)(C); see also note 110 supra.
    \117\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A); proposed Section 
6.13(d)(ii)(C). See also note 113 supra. Denied Participants would 
be permitted to re-apply for an exception, after remedying the 
deficiencies identified by the CISO and the CCO, by submitting new 
and updated versions of the application materials that have been 
prepared within twelve months of the date of submission. See 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(C).
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    The proposed exception process is designed to help improve the 
security of CAT Data while allowing the Participants some flexibility 
in how they access CAT Data. Participants may have reasons for needing 
to use a non-SAW environment to access CAT Data, including, for 
example, reduction of burdensome costs and/or operational complexity. 
The Commission therefore preliminarily believes it is appropriate to 
provide the Participants with the option to use non-SAW environments, 
if that can be accomplished in a manner that will not compromise the 
overall security of CAT Data. To that end, the proposed exception 
process would not

[[Page 66006]]

permit the Participants to access Customer and Account Attributes data 
in a non-SAW environment; only transactional data is retrievable 
through the user-defined direct query or bulk extract tools described 
by Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS 
Plan.\118\ Non-SAW environments meeting the requirements outlined above 
may provide a sufficient level of security for all CAT Data, but it is 
of paramount importance that access to Customer and Account Attributes 
data is guarded by the highest possible level of protection. Because 
the Commission preliminarily believes that such protection is only 
available through the use of a SAW environment and through the proposed 
limitations on the extraction of Customer and Account Attributes data 
from a SAW environment,\119\ the proposed exception process would not 
apply to Customer and Account Attributes data.
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    \118\ See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.6 (``PII data must not be included in the result set(s) 
from online or direct query tools, reports or bulk data extraction. 
Instead, results will display existing non-PII unique identifiers 
(e.g., Customer-ID or Firm Designated ID).'').
    \119\ See Part II.C.2. supra for additional discussion of these 
proposed limitations.
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    With respect to the specific features of the proposed exception 
process, the Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to 
require Participants seeking an exception to provide the CISO and the 
CCO with the proposed application materials, because such materials 
should provide critical information to the parties responsible for 
deciding whether to grant an exception.\120\ The proposed requirement 
that the Participant produce a security assessment conducted within the 
last twelve months by an independent and named third party should give 
these decision-makers access to up-to-date, accurate, and unbiased 
information about the security and privacy controls put in place for 
the relevant non-SAW environment, including reliable information about 
risk mitigation measures and recommended corrective actions.\121\ The 
Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate, as part 
of this security assessment, to require the requesting Participant to 
demonstrate the extent to which the non-SAW environment complies with 
the NIST SP 800-53 security controls and associated policies and 
procedures required by the CISP pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(a)(ii), to explain whether and how the Participant's security and 
privacy controls mitigate the risks associated with extracting CAT Data 
to the non-SAW environment, and to include a Plan of Action and 
Milestones document detailing the status and schedule of any 
recommended corrective actions.\122\ The CAT NMS Plan requires the Plan 
Processor to perform similar security assessments to verify and 
validate the security of the CAT System,\123\ so the Commission 
preliminarily believes that it is reasonable to require a Participant 
seeking to export CAT Data outside of the CAT System to demonstrate a 
similar level of due diligence and a similar level of security as would 
be required for SAWs pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(a)(ii). The 
Commission also preliminarily believes that this information will help 
the CISO and the CCO to determine whether the non-SAW environment is 
sufficiently secure to be granted an exception from the SAW usage 
requirements set forth in proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(B).\124\
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    \120\ Certain aspects of the proposed amendments put the burden 
of proof on the requesting Participant. For example, in its 
application, the Participant would be required to demonstrate that 
the non-SAW environment complies with the NIST SP 800-53 security 
controls required by the CISP pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(a)(ii) and that the design specifications enable the 
operational requirements for non-SAW environments. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that this is the most appropriate and 
efficient approach; the party seeking an exception from the security 
requirements of the CAT should be required to bear the burden of 
demonstrating that such an exception is justified, and the 
requesting Participant will be better situated to marshal evidence 
to prove that its systems are secure than would be the CISO, the 
CCO, or the Security Working Group.
    \121\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1).
    \122\ See id.
    \123\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 5.3 
(``The Plan Processor must conduct third party risk assessments at 
regular intervals to verify that security controls implemented are 
in accordance with NIST SP 800-53.'').
    \124\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(1).
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    Similarly, the Commission preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to require the requesting Participant to provide detailed 
design specifications for its non-SAW environment that demonstrate the 
extent of adherence to the SAW design specifications developed by the 
Plan Processor pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i). The detailed design 
specifications developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed 
Section 6.13(b)(i) would implement the access, monitoring, and other 
technical controls of the CISP that are applicable to SAWs. Requiring 
Participants seeking an exception to the SAW usage requirements to 
demonstrate whether the design specifications for their non-SAW 
environment adhere to the SAW design specifications would therefore 
provide the CISO and the CCO with specific technical information 
regarding the security capabilities of the non-SAW environment and may 
therefore prove more informative than the review of the Participant's 
information security policies for comparability that is currently 
required by Section 6.2(b)(vii) of the CAT NMS Plan. The Commission 
further preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to require the 
requesting Participant to demonstrate that the design specifications 
will enable the proposed operational requirements for non-SAW 
environments.\125\ This information would help the CISO and the CCO to 
assess the security-related infrastructure of the non-SAW environment 
and whether the non-SAW environment would support the required non-SAW 
operations.\126\
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    \125\ See note 106 supra.
    \126\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is also appropriate 
for the members of the Security Working Group (and their designees) and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group to receive the 
above-described application materials.\127\ Although the Security 
Working Group is not a decision-maker under the proposed amendments, 
the Commission preliminarily believes that it would be in the public 
interest to enable both the decision-makers and the members of the 
Security Working Group (and their designees)--a body of information 
security experts that would be specifically established to assess and 
protect the security of the CAT--to review any application materials. 
Given the expertise of its members, which would include the chief or 
deputy chief information security officer for each Participant, the 
Security Working Group may be able to provide valuable feedback to the 
CISO and the CCO regarding any request for an exception to the SAW 
usage requirements.\128\ Moreover, by providing the application 
materials to the Commission observers of the Security Working Group, 
the Commission preliminarily believes that

[[Page 66007]]

the proposed amendments will better facilitate Commission oversight of 
the security of CAT Data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A). The proposed 
amendments specifically limit the distribution of the application 
materials to members of the Security Working Group and their 
designees so that the confidentiality obligations of Section 9.6 of 
the CAT NMS Plan will apply to protect the sensitive information 
contained in the application materials. See note 30 supra.
    \128\ The Commission does not preliminarily believe that 
competitive relationships between the Participants would affect how 
individual members of the Security Working Group review the 
application materials and advise the CISO and the CCO, because each 
Participant has an overriding interest in the security of the CAT. 
See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix C (indicating that the 
CAT will be a facility of each Participant); see also Part IV.A.2. 
infra for further discussion of this concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes, however, that only the CISO 
and the CCO should be the decision-makers regarding any requested 
exceptions. Not only are the CISO and the CCO fiduciaries to the Plan 
Processor and to the Company,\129\ but they also have the most 
experience, knowledge, and expertise regarding the overall operation of 
the CAT, the state of the CAT's security, and compliance with the CAT 
NMS Plan. These two officers are likely to be the best situated to 
identify any issues that may be raised by applications for exceptions 
from the SAW usage requirements. As the decision-makers, the CISO and 
the CCO would ultimately be responsible under the proposed amendments 
for determining whether an exception from the SAW usage requirements 
may be granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 4.6(a), Section 
4.7(c). In addition, to the extent that competitive relationships 
between the Participants may affect how individual members of the 
Security Working Group review the application materials and advise 
the CISO and the CCO, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
identifying the CISO and the CCO as the decision-makers will protect 
against any such bias in the review process. See Part IV.A.2. infra 
for further discussion of the Security Working Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments state that the CISO and the CCO must 
simultaneously notify the Operating Committee and the requesting 
Participant of their determination within 60 days of receiving the 
above-described application materials.\130\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the proposed 60-day review period provides 
the CISO and the CCO with sufficient time to examine, analyze, and 
investigate the application materials. Moreover, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that this limitation should also provide the 
requesting Participant with some amount of certainty regarding the 
length of the review period and the date by which a determination will 
be issued, which could be useful for planning purposes.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B).
    \131\ Participants that choose to rely solely on a non-SAW 
environment for certain surveillance or regulatory functions may not 
be able to perform those functions unless and until an exception is 
granted; therefore, placing a time limit on the review period may 
help these Participants to stage their resources appropriately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments also specify that an exception may only be 
granted if the CISO and the CCO determine, in accordance with policies 
developed by the Plan Processor, that the residual risks identified in 
the security assessment or detailed design specifications provided by 
the requesting Participant do not exceed the risk tolerance levels set 
forth in the risk management strategy developed by the Plan Processor 
for the CAT System pursuant to NIST SP 800-53.\132\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to identify the 
conditions under which an exception from the SAW usage requirements may 
be granted. By making it clear that an exception may only be granted if 
an objective standard is met or exceeded, the proposed amendments 
should facilitate a consistent and fair decision-making process.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(1).
    \133\ Similarly, the Commission believes that requiring the CISO 
and the CCO to reach their determination in accordance with policies 
developed by the Plan Processor will facilitate a consistent and 
fair decision-making process. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the Commission preliminarily believes that is it 
appropriate to require the CISO and the CCO to determine, in accordance 
with policies developed by the Plan Processor, that the residual risks 
identified in the security assessment or detailed design specifications 
provided by the requesting Participant do not exceed the risk tolerance 
levels set forth in the risk management strategy developed by the Plan 
Processor for the CAT System pursuant to NIST SP 800-53. This criterion 
would prohibit granting an exception to non-SAW environments that are 
not sufficiently secure to house CAT Data.
    As noted above, the Commission preliminarily believes that it is 
important that the review by the CISO and the CCO be consistent and 
fair, and transparency will advance both objectives. The proposed 
amendments therefore include measures designed to protect the 
transparency of the review process. First, the CISO and the CCO would 
be required to simultaneously notify both the requesting Participant 
and the Operating Committee of their determination.\134\ This 
requirement is designed to provide the Operating Committee with the 
most up-to-date information about non-SAW environments that house CAT 
Data. Second, the CISO and the CCO would be required to provide the 
Participant with a detailed written explanation setting forth the 
reasons for their determination and, for denied Participants, 
specifically identifying the deficiencies that must be remedied before 
an exception could be granted.\135\ The Commission preliminarily 
believes that this kind of feedback could be quite valuable--not only 
because it should require the CISO and the CCO to thoroughly review an 
application and to identify and articulate any deficiencies, but also 
because it should provide denied Participants with the information 
needed to effectively bring their non-SAW environments into compliance 
with the proposed standards.\136\
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    \134\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(1)-(2). The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the Advisory Committee generally should 
be notified when the Operating Committee is notified.
    \135\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(2).
    \136\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(C). The Commission does 
not believe that a formal appeals process is appropriate or 
necessary. However, the Commission preliminarily believes that a 
denied Participant should not be barred from re-applying for an 
exception from the SAW usage requirements set forth in proposed 
Section 6.13(a)(i)(B) if a Participant is able to remediate the 
issues identified by the CISO and the CCO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For exceptions that are granted, the proposed amendments would 
require the requesting Participant to seek a continuance of this 
exception by initiating an annual review process through the submission 
of a new security assessment that complies with the requirements of 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date application materials 
at least once a year, as measured from the date that the initial 
application materials were submitted. Participants that fail to submit 
updated application materials on time would have their exceptions 
revoked in accordance with the remediation timelines developed by the 
Plan Processor, and the proposed amendments would require such 
Participants to cease using their non-SAW environments to access CAT 
Data through the user-defined direct query or bulk extract tools 
described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the 
CAT NMS Plan.
    These proposed requirements essentially would impose an annual term 
on any exception granted by the CISO and the CCO. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that this limitation is appropriate. Technology 
and security concerns are constantly and rapidly evolving, and the 
conditions that might justify the initial grant of an exception from 
the proposed SAW usage requirements may no longer be in place at the 
end of an annual term.\137\ Accordingly, the Commission

[[Page 66008]]

preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to require a requesting 
Participant to provide a new security assessment and up-to-date design 
specifications for the non-SAW environment. Updated design 
specifications may adequately capture any technical changes made to a 
non-SAW environment over the course of a year, but the Commission 
preliminarily believes that a more in-depth approach is needed with 
respect to the required security assessment. Requiring the requesting 
Participant to provide a new security assessment that complies with the 
requirements of proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1)--as opposed to an 
updated version of the security assessment provided with the initial 
application--would better identify and describe any risks presented by 
a non-SAW environment, based on the current security control 
implementation of the Participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ This annual term is also consistent with existing 
requirements in the CAT NMS Plan that the Plan Processor's 
performance be evaluated on at least an annual basis. See CAT NMS 
Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.6(b). The Commission preliminarily 
believes it is reasonable to require a Participant seeking to export 
CAT Data outside of the CAT System to be evaluated with a similar 
frequency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For similar reasons, the Commission preliminarily believes that the 
proposed continuance process is appropriate. The proposed continuance 
process is substantially identical to the proposed process for initial 
exceptions; it requires that the requesting Participant submit a new 
security assessment that complies with the requirements of proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the materials 
required by proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) to the CISO, the CCO, the 
members of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group and that the CCO and 
CISO notify the Operating Committee and the requesting Participant of 
their determination, using the same criteria and process outlined for 
the initial exception process, within 60 days of receiving those 
application materials. The Commission preliminarily does not believe 
that it is appropriate to lighten the requirements for the continuance 
process. To best protect the CAT and CAT Data, Participants seeking a 
continued exception to the SAW usage requirements should not be allowed 
to meet a lesser standard for continuance than was required for the 
initial exception.\138\ Because technology and security concerns are 
constantly evolving, as noted above, the Commission preliminarily 
believes it is crucial to implement a continuance process that 
emphasizes regular and consistent reevaluation of the security of non-
SAW environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ For similar reasons, the Commission believes it is 
appropriate to require denied Participants to re-apply by submitting 
a new security assessment that complies with the requirements of 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date materials that 
comply with the requirements of proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) 
and by subjecting their non-SAW environments to the same review 
processes used for initial evaluations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, and for the same reasons expressed above, the Commission 
preliminarily believes it is appropriate for the proposed amendments to 
cut off access to the user-defined direct query and bulk extract tools 
if a Participant is denied a continuance or fails to submit updated 
application materials in a timely manner. Participants should not be 
indefinitely allowed to continue to access large amounts of CAT Data 
outside the security perimeter of the CAT without an affirmative 
determination that their systems are secure enough to adequately 
protect that information. However, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that the risks involved with permitting a Participant to 
continue using a non-SAW environment, after its exception has lapsed 
and while transitioning into a SAW, will likely depend on the facts and 
circumstances related to that particular Participant and the way it 
uses the non-SAW environment. Immediate revocation of access to CAT 
Data may be appropriate in some situations, particularly where a 
significant risk is posed to CAT Data, but a long transition period may 
be more appropriate in other situations. Requiring an exception to be 
revoked by the CISO and the CCO in accordance with remediation 
timeframes developed by the Plan Processor would allow the CISO and the 
CCO to take into account any relevant facts and circumstances and to 
craft an appropriate response to the presented risks.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed exception process. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    40. Should Participants be permitted to seek an exception from the 
requirement in proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(B) to use a SAW to access 
CAT Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk extract tools 
described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the 
CAT NMS Plan? Should Participants only be able to employ user-defined 
direct query and bulk extract tools in connection with a SAW?
    41. As noted above, Customer and Account Attributes data is not 
available through the user-defined direct query and bulk extraction 
tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of 
the CAT NMS Plan. Therefore, the proposed amendments would not permit 
any Participants to access Customer and Account Attributes in a non-SAW 
environment via the exceptions process. Should Participants be allowed 
to access Customer and Account Attributes data in a non-SAW environment 
approved by the CISO and the CCO? If so, please explain under what 
circumstances such access should be allowed and what limits, if any, 
should be applied.
    42. The proposed amendments would require the requesting 
Participant to submit to CISO, the CCO, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group the following materials: (1) A security 
assessment of the non-SAW environment, conducted within the last twelve 
months by a named, independent third party security assessor, that: (a) 
Demonstrates the extent to which the non-SAW environment complies with 
the NIST SP 800-53 security controls and associated policies and 
procedures required by the CISP pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(a)(ii), (b) explains whether and how the Participant's security 
and privacy controls mitigate the risks associated with exporting CAT 
Data to the non-SAW environment through the user-defined direct query 
or bulk extraction tools, and (c) includes a Plan of Action and 
Milestones document detailing the status and schedule of any corrective 
actions recommended by the assessment; and (2) detailed design 
specifications for the non-SAW environment demonstrating (a) the extent 
to which the non-SAW environment's design specifications adhere to the 
design specifications developed by the Plan Processor for SAWs pursuant 
to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), and (b) that the design specifications 
will enable the operational requirements set forth for non-SAW 
environments in proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii).
    a. Is it appropriate to require that the requesting Participant 
submit a security assessment of the non-SAW environment that has been 
conducted by a named, independent third party security assessor within 
the last twelve months? Should the Commission require that a more 
recent security assessment be submitted or permit a less recent 
security assessment to be submitted? If so, how recent should the 
security assessment be? Please explain. Would the security assessment 
be as reliable if the Commission eliminated the requirement that it be 
conducted by a named, independent third party security assessor?
    b. Is it appropriate to require that the proposed security 
assessment demonstrate the extent to which the non-SAW environment 
complies with

[[Page 66009]]

the NIST SP 800-53 security controls and associated policies and 
procedures required by the CISP established pursuant to proposed 
Section 6.13(a)(ii)? Would a different set of security and privacy 
controls be more appropriate? If so, please identify that set of 
security and privacy controls and explain in detail why that standard 
would be a better benchmark. Would it be more appropriate to require 
the non-SAW environment to demonstrate compliance with the security and 
privacy controls described in NIST SP-800-53 for low, moderate, and 
high baselines, as described in NIST SP 800-53? If so, please indicate 
which benchmark would be more appropriate and explain why.
    c. Is it appropriate to require that the proposed security 
assessment explain whether and how the Participant's security and 
privacy controls mitigate the risks associated with exporting CAT Data 
to the non-SAW environment through the user-defined direct query or 
bulk extraction tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix 
D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan?
    d. Is it appropriate to require that the proposed security 
assessment include a Plan of Action and Milestones document detailing 
the status and schedule of any recommended corrective actions?
    e. Are there any other items that should be included in the 
security assessment, including any items that would assist the CISO and 
the CCO to determine whether the non-SAW environment is sufficiently 
secure to be granted an exception from the SAW usage requirements set 
forth in proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(B)? Please identify these items 
and explain why they should be included.
    f. Is it appropriate to require that the requesting Participant 
provide detailed design specifications for its non-SAW environment that 
demonstrate the extent of adherence to the SAW design specifications 
developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(b)(i)? Is a different set of design specifications a better 
benchmark by which to judge the non-SAW environment's operational 
capabilities? If so, please identify that set of design specifications 
and explain why it is more appropriate. The proposed amendments also 
require that the requesting Participant demonstrate that the submitted 
design specifications will enable the proposed operational requirements 
for non-SAW environments under proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii). Is this 
an appropriate requirement?
    g. Is it appropriate to require that the proposed application 
materials be submitted to the CISO, the CCO, the members of the 
Security Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers 
of the Security Working Group? Should any different or additional 
parties receive the proposed application materials? If so, please 
identify those parties and explain why they should receive the proposed 
application materials. Does the inclusion of the members of the 
Security Working Group and their designees raise any confidentiality, 
security, or competitive concerns? If so, please identify such concerns 
and explain whether the benefits of including the Security Working 
Group nevertheless justify providing the members of the Security 
Working Group and their designees with the required application 
materials.
    43. The proposed amendments state that the CISO and the CCO must 
notify the Operating Committee and the requesting Participant of their 
determination regarding an exception (or a continuance) within 60 days 
of receiving the application materials described in proposed Section 
6.13(d)(i)(A).
    a. Is it appropriate to require that the CISO and the CCO make this 
determination? If it is not appropriate to require the CISO and the CCO 
to make this determination, which party or parties should be required 
to make this determination? Please explain why those parties would be 
appropriate decision-makers.
    b. Is it appropriate that the CISO and the CCO simultaneously 
notify the Operating Committee and the requesting Participant of their 
determination? Should the Participant be notified before the Operating 
Committee? If so, how long should the CISO and the CCO be required to 
wait before notifying the Operating Committee? Are there any different 
or additional parties that should receive the determination? If so, 
please identify those parties and explain why it would be appropriate 
for them to receive the determination issued by the CISO and the CCO. 
For example, should the proposed amendments require notification of the 
Advisory Committee, even though the Advisory Committee is likely to be 
informed of these determinations in regular meetings of the Operating 
Committee? Would notification of the Advisory Committee raise any 
security or confidentiality concerns, such that these matters should 
only be addressed in executive sessions of the Operating Committee? 
Should the rule specify that any issues related to exceptions should 
only be discussed in executive sessions of the Operating Committee? 
Does a Participant's application for an exception create circumstances 
in which it would be appropriate to exclude non-Participants from 
discussion of such applications? Should the Participants be required to 
submit requests to enter into an executive session of the Operating 
Committee on a written agenda, along with a clearly stated rationale 
for each matter to be discussed? If so, should each such request have 
to be approved by a majority vote of the Operating Committee?
    c. Is it appropriate to require the CISO and the CCO to make their 
determination within 60 days of receiving the application materials? If 
a different review period would be more appropriate, please state how 
much time the CISO and the CCO should have to review the application 
materials and explain why that amount of time would be more 
appropriate.
    d. Should the proposed amendments include provisions allowing the 
CISO and the CCO to extend the review period? If so, what limitations 
should be placed on their ability to extend the review period?
    44. The proposed amendments specify that an exception (or a 
continuance) may only be granted if the CISO and the CCO determine, in 
accordance with policies and procedures developed by the Plan 
Processor, that the residual risks identified in the security 
assessment or detailed design specifications provided pursuant to 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A) or proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A) do 
not exceed the risk tolerance levels set forth in the risk management 
strategy developed by the Plan Processor for the CAT System pursuant to 
NIST SP 800-53.
    a. This standard puts the burden of proof on the requesting 
Participant. Is that appropriate? If it is inappropriate, please 
identify the party that should bear the burden of proof and explain why 
putting the burden of proof on that party is a better choice.
    b. Is it appropriate for the proposed amendments to specify the 
exact conditions under which an exception (or a continuance) may be 
granted? Should the CISO and the CCO be required to make any specific 
findings before granting an exception? If so, please state what these 
findings should be and explain why they would be appropriate 
requirements. Are there any conditions that should bar the CISO and the 
CCO from granting an exception (or a continuance)? If so, please 
identify these conditions and explain why they are appropriate.

[[Page 66010]]

    c. Is it appropriate to specify that an exception (or a 
continuance) may not be granted unless the CISO and the CCO determine, 
in accordance with policies and procedures developed by the Plan 
Processor, that the residual risks identified in the provided security 
assessment or detailed design specifications do not exceed the risk 
tolerance levels set forth in the risk management strategy developed by 
the Plan Processor for the CAT System pursuant to NIST SP 800-53? 
Should the proposed amendments use a different set of risk tolerance 
levels as a benchmark? If so, please explain what risk tolerance levels 
should be used and why those levels would be more appropriate. Should 
the CISO and the CCO determine whether to grant an exception using a 
different standard of review? If so, please describe the standard of 
review that should be used and why that standard would be more 
appropriate. Should the CISO and the CCO make their determination in 
accordance with policies and procedures developed by the Plan 
Processor? Should a different party develop these policies and 
procedures--for example, the Operating Committee? If so, please 
identify the party that should develop the policies and procedures and 
explain why it would be appropriate for that party to do so.
    45. Is it appropriate to require the CISO and CCO to provide the 
requesting Participant with a detailed written explanation setting 
forth the reasons for that determination and, for denied Participants, 
specifically identifying the deficiencies that must be remedied before 
an exception (or a continuance) could be granted? Should the Operating 
Committee also be provided with this explanation? If so, should the 
CISO and the CCO be required to wait for a certain period of time 
before notifying the Operating Committee? How long should they be 
required to wait?
    46. Should the proposed amendments provide a process for denied 
Participants to appeal to the Operating Committee, or is it sufficient 
that a denied Participant may re-apply for an exception after remedying 
the deficiencies identified by the CISO and the CCO, by submitting a 
new security assessment that complies with the requirements of proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the materials 
specified in proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2)? If such an appeal 
process should be included in the proposed amendments, please identify 
all aspects of that appeal process and explain why those measures would 
be appropriate. How long should a denied Participant be given to make 
such an appeal and what materials should be included? Please explain 
your response in detail. For example, would it be appropriate to 
require a denied Participant to appeal the determination to the 
Operating Committee within 30 days by providing the Operating Committee 
with its most up-to-date application materials, the detailed written 
statement provided by the CISO and the CCO, and a rebuttal statement 
prepared by the denied Participant? Is 30 days enough time for a denied 
Participant to prepare an appeal? Should any additional materials be 
provided? If so, please describe those materials and describe why it 
would be helpful to provide them. How long should the Operating 
Committee have to issue a final determination? Would 30 days be 
sufficient? Should the final determination be required to include a 
written explanation from the Operating Committee supporting the 
finding? Once the final determination has been issued, should the 
requesting Participant be allowed to remedy any deficiencies and re-
apply? Do different considerations apply to appeals brought by 
Participants denied the initial exception and appeals brought by 
Participants denied a continuance of an exception? If so, what are 
these considerations, and how should the appeal process for each type 
of Participant differ? Please explain in detail. Should Participants 
who are denied a continuance be permitted to continue to connect to the 
Central Repository while any appeal is pending, even if that would 
enable them to connect to the Central Repository beyond the remediation 
timeframes developed by the Plan Processor?
    47. Is it appropriate to condition the continuance of any exception 
from the proposed SAW usage requirements on an annual review process to 
align with the Participants' review of the Plan Processor's 
performance? In light of the constantly-evolving nature of technology 
and security standards, should the continuance be evaluated more often? 
Should the continuance be evaluated less often? If so, please explain 
how often the continuance should be evaluated and why that frequency is 
appropriate.
    48. The proposed amendments provide that an exception will be 
revoked if a Participant fails to submit a new security assessment that 
complies with the requirements of proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and 
up-to-date versions of the materials specified by proposed Section 
6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) at least once a year, as measured from the date that 
the initial application materials were submitted. Should another date 
be used to measure the annual review--for example, the date that the 
CISO and the CCO issue their joint determination granting the 
exception? If so, please identify the date that should be used and 
explain why that date is more appropriate.
    49. Should the CISO and the CCO be enabled to revoke any exception 
at will, and prior to the expiration of the annual term, if they are 
able to determine that the residual risks presented in a security 
assessment or detailed design specifications for a non-SAW environment 
are no longer within the risk tolerance levels set forth in the risk 
management strategy developed by the Plan Processor for the CAT System 
pursuant to NIST SP 800-53 or if the Plan Processor identifies non-
compliance with the detailed design specifications submitted by the 
requesting Participant? If the CISO and the CCO should be enabled to 
revoke the exception at will, should the proposed amendments set forth 
a process for appealing to the Operating Committee that should be 
followed before the exception is revoked and the non-SAW environment is 
disconnected from the Central Repository? If such an appeal process 
should be included, please identify all aspects of that appeal process 
and explain why those measures would be appropriate. How long should a 
revoked Participant be given to make such an appeal and what materials 
should be included? Please explain your response in detail. For 
example, should the CISO and the CCO be required to provide a revoked 
Participant with a detailed written statement setting forth the reasons 
for that determination and specifically identifying the deficiencies 
that must be remedied? Would it be appropriate to require a revoked 
Participant to appeal the determination to the Operating Committee 
within 30 days by providing the Operating Committee with the most up-
to-date application materials, the detailed written statement provided 
by the CISO and the CCO, and a rebuttal statement prepared by the 
denied Participant? Is 30 days enough time for the revoked Participant 
to prepare an appeal? Should revoked Participants be permitted to 
connect to the Central Repository while an appeal is pending, even if 
such appeal would last beyond the remediation timeframe developed by 
the Plan Processor? Is 30 days too much time for a revoked Participant 
to be allowed to access CAT Data through the Central Repository if the 
CISO and the CCO have identified a deficiency? Should any additional 
materials be provided to the Operating Committee? If

[[Page 66011]]

so, please describe those materials and describe why it would be 
helpful to provide them. How long should the Operating Committee have 
to issue a final determination? Would 30 days be sufficient or too 
long? Should the final determination be required to include a written 
explanation by the Operating Committee supporting the finding? Once the 
final determination has been issued, should the requesting Participant 
be allowed to remedy any deficiencies and re-apply?
    50. The proposed amendments provide that Participants who are 
denied a continuance, or Participants who fail to submit their updated 
application materials on time, must cease using their non-SAW 
environments to access CAT Data through the user-defined direct query 
and bulk extract tools in accordance with the remediation timeframes 
developed by the Plan Processor. Should the exception be revoked 
immediately and automatically? Are there other processes that would be 
more appropriate here? If so, please identify such processes and 
explain why those processes are appropriate. Should such Participants 
be provided a standard grace period in which to cease using this 
functionality in their non-SAW environments? If so, please explain how 
long this grace period should be and why such a grace period would be 
appropriate. Should the proposed amendments instead indicate that such 
Participants should promptly cease using their non-SAW environments to 
access CAT Data through the user-defined query and bulk extract tools 
or specify a specific timeframe? Should the proposed amendments require 
the CISO and the CCO to provide preliminary findings to Participants 
that will be denied a continuance, such that those Participants have 
the ability to minimize any disruption? Should the proposed amendments 
address how CAT Data already exported to non-SAW environments that lose 
their exception should be treated? If so, how should the proposed 
amendments treat such data? Should the proposed amendments require that 
all such CAT Data be immediately or promptly deleted? Should the 
Participants be allowed to retain this data in their non-SAW 
environment? If so, please explain why this would be appropriate in 
light of the Commission's security concerns. Would such data be 
sufficiently stale so as to pose a minimal security threat?
    51. Is it appropriate to require that a Participant seeking a 
continued exception (or a Participant re-applying for an exception) 
provide a new security assessment that complies with the requirements 
of proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the 
materials specified by proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) to the CISO, 
the CCO, the members of the Security Working Group (and their 
designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working Group? 
Should a Participant seeking a renewed exception be allowed to provide 
an updated security assessment instead of a new security assessment? 
Should a Participant seeking a renewed exception be required to provide 
new design specifications instead of updated design specifications? 
Should a Participant seeking a renewed exception (or re-applying for an 
exception) be required to provide any additional materials? If so, 
please describe such additional materials and explain why such 
additional materials might be appropriate to include in an application 
for a renewed exception. Are there different or additional parties that 
should receive the application materials for a continued exception? If 
so, please identify these parties and explain why it would be 
appropriate for them to receive the application materials.
    52. Is it appropriate for the CISO and the CCO to follow the same 
process and to use the same standards to judge whether to grant initial 
exceptions and continued exceptions? If the standards or process should 
be different, please explain which aspects should differ and explain 
why that would be appropriate.
b. Operation of Non-SAW Environments
    To further safeguard the security of the CAT, the proposed 
amendments also include provisions that would govern how non-SAW 
environments are operated during the term of any exception granted by 
the CISO and the CCO.
    Specifically, proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(A) would state that an 
approved Participant may not employ its non-SAW environment to access 
CAT Data through the user-defined direct query or bulk extract tools 
described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 until 
the Plan Processor notifies the Operating Committee that the non-SAW 
environment has achieved compliance with the detailed design 
specifications submitted by that Participant as part of its application 
for an exception (or continuance). This provision mirrors the proposed 
requirements set forth for SAWs \139\ and serves the same purpose--
namely, to protect the security of the CAT. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that it is important to require approved 
Participants to adhere to and implement the detailed design 
specifications that formed a part of their application packages, 
because such detailed design specifications will have been reviewed and 
vetted by the CISO, the CCO, and the Security Working Group.\140\ 
Detailed design specifications for non-SAW environments that have been 
granted an exception by the CISO and the CCO should be detailed design 
specifications for an environment that does not exceed the risk 
tolerance levels set forth in the risk management strategy developed by 
the Plan Processor pursuant to NIST SP 800-53.\141\ Therefore, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that non-SAW environments that 
implement their submitted design specifications should be sufficiently 
secure, and, for an additional layer of protection and oversight, the 
proposed amendments require the Plan Processor \142\ to determine and 
notify the Operating Committee that the non-SAW environment has 
achieved compliance with such detailed design specifications before CAT 
Data can be accessed via the user-defined direct query or bulk 
extraction tools.
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    \139\ See, e.g., proposed Section 6.13(b); see also Part II.C.4. 
supra, for further discussion of these proposed requirements.
    \140\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A), (d)(ii)(A).
    \141\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B), (d)(ii)(B).
    \142\ The Commission preliminarily believes that the Plan 
Processor is best situated to perform this task. Under the proposed 
amendments, the Plan Processor will be required to perform a similar 
task for SAWs, see proposed Section 6.13(b)(ii), so the Plan 
Processor will be most familiar with the task and with similar 
design specifications. Moreover, the Plan Processor will be 
responsible for monitoring any approved non-SAW environments for 
compliance with the design specifications, so it makes sense to 
require the Plan Processor to perform the initial evaluation. See 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(B).
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    Proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(B) would require the Plan Processor 
to monitor the non-SAW environment in accordance with the detailed 
design specifications submitted with the exception (or continuance) 
application, for compliance with those detailed design specifications 
only,\143\ and to notify the Participant of any identified non-
compliance with such detailed

[[Page 66012]]

design specifications.\144\ This provision would also require the 
Participant to comply with the submitted design specifications and to 
promptly remediate any identified non-compliance.\145\ Moreover, 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(C) would require the Participant to 
simultaneously notify the Plan Processor, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group of any material changes to its security controls 
for the non-SAW environment.
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    \143\ The Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to 
limit the scope of the Plan Processor's monitoring to compliance 
with the detailed design specifications submitted by the Participant 
pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) or proposed Section 
6.13(d)(ii)(A). The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
limitation would protect the Participants by making it clear that 
analytical activities in their non-SAW environments would not be 
subject to monitoring by the Plan Processor, without hampering the 
ability of the Plan Processor to adequately protect the security of 
CAT Data.
    \144\ The proposed amendments would require the Participant to 
comply with the detailed design specifications submitted pursuant to 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) or proposed Section 
6.13(d)(ii)(A). See proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(B); see also note 
97 infra.
    \145\ This provision would require each Participant to remedy 
any non-compliance promptly, whether such non-compliance was 
identified by the Plan Processor or by the Participant. See note 100 
supra, for a discussion of what might constitute ``prompt'' 
remediation.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that these requirements will 
improve the security of the non-SAW environments that are granted an 
exception by the CISO and CCO and, therefore, the overall security of 
the CAT. Requiring the Plan Processor to monitor each non-SAW 
environment that has been granted an exception for compliance with the 
submitted design specifications would help the Plan Processor to 
identify and notify the Participants of any non-compliance events, 
threats, and/or vulnerabilities, thus reducing the potentially harmful 
effects these matters could have if left unchecked and 
uncorrected.\146\ The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to require approved Participants to simultaneously notify 
the Plan Processor, the members of the Security Working Group (and 
their designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working 
Group of any material changes to the security controls for the non-SAW 
environment.\147\ Exceptions would be granted after a review of a non-
SAW environment's existing security controls, policies, and procedures, 
but the importance of such protocols does not end at the application 
stage. Therefore, if the security controls reviewed and vetted by the 
CISO, the CCO, the members of the Security Working Group (and their 
designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working Group 
change in any material way, the Commission preliminarily believes it is 
appropriate to require the escalation of this information to the party 
responsible for monitoring the non-SAW environment for compliance--the 
Plan Processor. The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to simultaneously provide this information to the members 
of the Security Working Group (and their designees) and Commission 
observers of the Security Working Group.\148\ As noted above, the 
proposed amendments would require the Security Working Group to include 
the chief or deputy chief information security officers for each 
Participant. These experts would likely be able to provide valuable 
feedback to the CISO and the CCO (or to the Operating Committee) on how 
to address such non-compliance or how to prevent similar events in the 
future, and simultaneous notification of the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees) would help them to provide such 
feedback in a timely manner.
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    \146\ The detailed design specifications submitted pursuant to 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(i) or (ii) must demonstrate the extent to 
which they adhere to the detailed design specifications developed by 
the Plan Processor for SAWs pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), 
and they must enable substantially similar operational functions. 
Accordingly, the Commission does not preliminarily expect the 
monitoring required by proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii) to impose an 
undue burden on the Plan Processor, because the Plan Processor 
should be able to leverage and use the monitoring processes 
developed for SAWs. See, e.g., note 534 infra.
    \147\ An example of such a change would be if a Participant 
implements a new system which establishes a new control or changes a 
detail design specification.
    \148\ See note 30 supra for a discussion of the confidentiality 
obligations to which the members of the Security Working Group and 
their designees would be subject.
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    Finally, the Commission wishes to emphasize that the above-stated 
requirements for non-SAW environments only dictate that Participants 
must meet certain security requirements. The Participants would still 
be wholly responsible for all other aspects of their non-SAW 
environment, including the internal architecture of their non-SAW 
environment(s), the analytical tools to be used in their non-SAW 
environment(s), and the use of any additional data. Accordingly, 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(D) indicates that an approved Participant 
may provision and use its choice of software, hardware, and additional 
data within the non-SAW environment, so long as such activities 
otherwise comply with the detailed design specifications provided by 
the Participant pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) or 
proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A). The Commission preliminarily believes 
that this provision will give the Participants sufficient flexibility 
in and control over the use of their non-SAW environments, while still 
maintaining the security of such environments and the CAT Data that may 
be contained therein.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed operational 
requirements for non-SAW environments. Specifically, the Commission 
solicits comment on the following:
    53. The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
notify the Operating Committee that an approved Participant's non-SAW 
environment has achieved compliance with the detailed design 
specifications submitted pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)(i) or 
(ii) before that non-SAW may access CAT Data through the user-defined 
direct queries or bulk extraction tools. Is the Plan Processor the 
appropriate party to make this notification? If not, what other party 
should make the notification and why? Is it appropriate to notify the 
Operating Committee? Should any other parties be notified? If so, 
please identify those parties and explain why it would be appropriate 
for them to be notified. Should approved non-SAW environments be 
allowed to connect to the Central Repository without any evaluation 
process? Are the detailed design specifications submitted by the 
approved Participant as part of the application process an appropriate 
benchmark? If it is not an appropriate benchmark, please identify what 
benchmark would be appropriate and explain why.
    54. The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
monitor an approved Participant's non-SAW environment in accordance 
with the detailed design specifications submitted with that 
Participant's application for an exception. Is the Plan Processor the 
right party to conduct this monitoring? If a different party should 
conduct this monitoring, please identify that party and explain why it 
would be a more appropriate choice. Is it appropriate to require that 
the proposed monitoring be conducted in accordance with the detailed 
design specifications submitted with the Participant's application for 
an exception? Should a different benchmark provide the controlling 
standard for such monitoring? If so, please identify that benchmark and 
explain why it would provide a more appropriate standard. Instead of 
specifying that such monitoring should be conducted in accordance with 
the detailed design specifications submitted by the Participant, should 
the proposed amendments specify the nature of the access and monitoring 
required? Should the proposed amendments specify that monitoring should 
be continuous? If so, please explain how that term should be defined 
and why such definition would

[[Page 66013]]

be appropriate. If not, please explain how often such monitoring should 
be conducted and explain why. Should the proposed amendments indicate 
whether manual or automated processes (or both) should be used by the 
Plan Processor and whether automated support tools should be used? 
Should the proposed amendments indicate whether the Participant should 
provide the Plan Processor with market data feeds, log files, or some 
other data? Please identify any data that should be provided to the 
Plan Processor to enable the required monitoring.
    55. The proposed amendments would restrict the Plan Processor to 
monitor SAWs for compliance with the detailed design specifications 
submitted pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) or proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A). Is this an appropriate limitation? Should the 
Plan Processor be able to monitor any of the activities that might be 
conducted within a Participant's non-SAW environment? If so, please 
specify what activities the Plan Processor should be permitted to 
monitor and explain why such monitoring would be appropriate.
    56. The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance with the design 
specifications provided pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)(i) or 
(ii). Should a different party notify the Participant of any identified 
non-compliance? If so, please identify that party and explain why it 
would be appropriate for that party to provide the notification. Are 
there any additional parties that the Plan Processor should notify of 
any identified non-compliance--for example, the Operating Committee? If 
so, please identify the party or parties that should also be notified, 
explain why such notification would be appropriate, and explain whether 
notification of those parties would raise any confidentiality, 
security, or competitive concerns.
    57. The proposed amendments would specify that approved 
Participants must comply with the detailed design specifications 
provided pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d)(i) or (ii). Should the 
proposed amendments specify that the Participants should comply with 
another set of requirements? If so, please identify those requirements 
and explain why it would be more appropriate for a non-SAW environment 
to comply with those requirements.
    58. The proposed amendments would require the Participants to 
promptly remediate any identified non-compliance. Should the proposed 
amendments specify what would qualify as ``prompt'' remediation? If so, 
please explain what amount of time should be specified and explain why 
that amount of time is sufficient. Would it be appropriate for the 
proposed amendments to refer specifically to the risk management policy 
developed by the Plan Processor for appropriate remediation timeframes? 
Is there another policy that provides remediation timeframes that would 
be more appropriate for these purposes? If so, please identify that 
policy and explain why it would be a better benchmark.
    59. The proposed amendments would specify that approved 
Participants must simultaneously notify the Plan Processor, the members 
of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and Commission 
observers of the Security Working Group of any material changes to its 
security controls. Is it appropriate to require the Participant to 
simultaneously notify the members of the Security Working Group (and 
their designees) and Commission observers of the Security Working 
Group? Should the Plan Processor be provided with a notification before 
the members of the Security Working Group (and their designees) and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group? If so, how long 
should the Participant be required to wait before notifying the members 
of the Security Working Group (and their designees) and Commission 
observers of the Security Working Group? What kinds of changes should 
be considered ``material''? Please provide specific and detailed 
examples. Should the proposed amendments specify that the Participants 
must comply with any other security protocols? If so, please identify 
these security protocols and explain why it would be appropriate to 
require the Participants to comply with them. Should the Participants 
be allowed to make material changes to their non-SAW environments 
without first getting the express approval of the CISO and the CCO? 
Does the proposed notification of the members of the Security Working 
Group and their designees raise any confidentiality, security, or 
competitive concerns? If so, please identify such concerns and explain 
whether the benefits of notifying the members of the Security Working 
Group (and their designees) nevertheless justify such notification. Are 
there any other parties that should be notified if a material change is 
made to the security controls of a non-SAW environment--for instance, 
the CISO and the CCO? If so, please identify these parties and explain 
why it would be appropriate to notify them.
    60. The proposed amendments clarify that the Participants may 
provision and use approved non-SAW environments with their choice of 
software, hardware, and additional data, so long as such activities are 
sufficiently consistent with the detailed design specifications 
submitted by the Participant pursuant to proposed Section 
6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) or proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A). Are there specific 
software, hardware, or additional data that the Commission should 
explicitly disallow in the proposed amendments? If so, please identify 
such software, hardware, or data specifically and explain why it would 
be appropriate to disallow it.

D. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and Extraction

    The CAT NMS Plan does not limit the amount of CAT Data a regulator 
can extract or download through the online targeted query tool; the CAT 
NMS Plan states that the Plan Processor must define the maximum number 
of records that can be viewed in the online tool as well as the maximum 
number of records that can be downloaded.\149\ The Commission believes 
that certain limitations and changes are required to prevent the online 
targeted query tool from being used to circumvent the purposes of the 
proposed CISP and SAW usage requirements.\150\ Specifically, the 
Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 8.1.1 of the CAT NMS 
Plan to remove the ability of the Plan Processor to define the maximum 
number of records that can be downloaded via the online query tool, and 
instead limit the maximum number of records that can be downloaded via 
the online targeted query tool to 200,000 records per query 
request.\151\ In addition, the Commission proposes to

[[Page 66014]]

amend Appendix D, Section 8.1.1 of the CAT NMS Plan to permit the 
downloading of a result set through the online targeted query tool, in 
either a single or multiple file(s), only if the download per query 
result does not exceed 200,000 records. Proposed Appendix D, Section 
8.1.1 would also provide that users that select a multiple file option 
will be required to define the maximum file size of the downloadable 
files subject to the download restriction of 200,000 records per query 
result. As proposed, the Plan Processor may still define a maximum 
number of records that can be downloaded to a number lower than 
200,000.
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    \149\ The CAT NMS Plan does specify that the minimum number of 
records that the online targeted query tool is able to process is 
5,000 (if viewed within the online query tool) or 10,000 (if viewed 
via a downloadable file). See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at 
Appendix D, Section 8.1.1. Section 8.1.1 of Appendix D of the CAT 
NMS Plan also requires that result sets that exceed the maximum 
viewable or download limits must return to testers a message 
informing them of the size of the result set and the option to 
choose to have the result set returned via an alternate method 
(e.g., multiple files).
    \150\ Under the proposed amendments described in Part II.A 
above, regulators would be permitted to use the online targeted 
query tool outside of a Participant SAW.
    \151\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
8.1.1. If the Plan Processor provides more than one online targeted 
query tool, the proposed requirements of Appendix D, Section 8.1.1, 
and existing requirements of the CAT NMS Plan, would apply to each 
online targeted query tool.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As proposed, regulatory users that need to download specific result 
sets for regulatory and surveillance purposes from the targeted online 
query tool must refine their searches to fewer than 200,000 records in 
order to be able to download entire record sets. If a regulatory user 
receives a result set larger than 200,000 records in the online 
targeted query tool, the Commission believes that it is appropriate for 
the regulatory user to further refine the query used so that the result 
set is smaller than 200,000 records before the regulatory user would be 
permitted to download the entire record set. Alternatively, if a 
regulatory user must download more than 200,000 records for 
surveillance or regulatory purposes, the Commission believes that it is 
appropriate that the regulatory user be required to access CAT Data 
through the SAWs.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that limiting the number of 
records that can be downloaded to 200,000 is reasonable and appropriate 
because it is a sufficiently large number to allow for result sets to 
be generated for the type of targeted searches for which the online 
targeted query tool is designed.\152\ Based on the Commission's 
experience a 200,000 download limit would not prevent regulators from 
performing many investigations, such as investigations into 
manipulation schemes in over-the-counter stocks or investigations based 
on shorter-term trading activity. However, the Commission believes that 
programmatic analysis of very large downloaded datasets is more 
appropriately provided for in a SAW or approved non-SAW environment, 
which would be subject to the requirements of proposed Section 
6.13.\153\ The Commission also preliminarily believes that a 200,000 
download limit would help prevent large scale downloading of CAT Data 
outside of SAW or approved non-SAW environments using the online 
targeted query tool.
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    \152\ The Participants have stated that when fully complete, CAT 
will ingest ``in excess of 58 billion records per day.'' See CAT 
NMS, LLC, ``CAT NMS Selects FINRA as Consolidated Audit Trail Plan 
Processor,'' available at: https://www.catnmsplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CAT_FINRA_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf.
    \153\ See Part II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed limitations 
on downloading records would not prevent regulatory users from using 
the online query tool to perform regulatory analysis of result sets 
greater than 200,000 records,\154\ even if such result sets could not 
be downloaded. The Commission understands that the Plan Processor's 
online targeted query tool is designed to provide for the analysis of 
massive data sets like the CAT database. This functionality would allow 
users to perform their surveillance and regulatory functions within the 
online targeted query tool, as appropriate, and allow regulatory users 
to narrow queries to obtain more manageable data sets that are not 
greater than 200,000 records for download or further analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ The proposed amendments would not limit the query results 
that can be viewed within the online targeted query tool. The 
limitation would only apply to downloads from the tool.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires the targeted online query tool 
to log submitted queries, query parameters, the user ID of the 
submitter, the date and time of the submission, and the delivery of 
results.\155\ The CAT NMS Plan further requires that the Plan Processor 
provide monthly reports based on this information to each Participant 
and the SEC of its respective metrics on query performance and data 
usage, and that the Operating Committee receive the monthly reports to 
review items, including user usage and system processing 
performance.\156\ The CAT NMS Plan, however, does not require that the 
online query tool log information relating to the extraction of CAT 
Data.\157\ The Commission now proposes to make changes to these logging 
requirements.
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    \155\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
8.1.1.
    \156\ Id.
    \157\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
8.2.
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    First, the Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 8.1.1 
of the CAT NMS Plan to define the term ``delivery of results,'' to mean 
``the number of records in the result(s) and the time it took for the 
query to be performed.'' As noted above, the CAT NMS Plan requires the 
logging of ``the delivery of results,'' but does not define what that 
term means. The Commission preliminarily believes the proposed 
definition would result in logs that provide more useful information to 
the Plan Processor and Participants and will assist in the 
identification of potential issues relating to the security or access 
to CAT Data. For example, this information would provide the Plan 
Processor data that could be used to help assess the performance of 
access tools, and whether the system is meeting performance criteria 
related to the speed of queries.\158\
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    \158\ The Commission also preliminarily believes that this 
information could be used to help monitor whether or not Regulatory 
Staff are accessing CAT Data appropriately and whether or not 
Participants' extraction of CAT Data is limited to the minimum 
amount of data necessary to achieve specific surveillance or 
regulatory purposes. See infra Parts II.G.2 and II.G.3.a.
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    The Commission also proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 8.1.1 of 
the CAT NMS Plan to require that the online targeted query tool also 
log information relating to the access and extraction of CAT Data, when 
applicable. The CAT NMS Plan already requires the logging of access, 
but the Commission is proposing the change to require both access and 
extraction of CAT Data be logged. This change would also require the 
same logging of access and extraction of CAT Data from the user-defined 
direct queries and bulk extraction tools, which the Commission believes 
would be possible because of the required usage of SAWs proposed above. 
The Commission preliminarily believes that the requirement to log 
access and extraction of CAT Data for all three types of access is 
appropriate because the monthly reports of information relating to the 
query tools will be provided to the Operating Committee so that the 
Participants can review information concerning access and extraction of 
CAT Data regularly and to identify issues related to the security of 
CAT Data in accordance with Participants' data confidentiality 
policies, which are also being amended as described in Part II.G below.
    Lastly, the Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 8.2.2 
of the CAT NMS Plan to modify the sentence ``[t]he Plan Processor will 
use this logged information to provide monthly reports to the Operating 
Committee, Participants and the SEC of their respective usage of the 
online query tool,'' by replacing ``online query tool'' with ``user-
defined direct query and bulk extraction tool,'' because the relevant 
section of the CAT NMS Plan is about bulk extraction performance and 
the subject of the preceding sentence concerns logging of the user-
defined direct query and bulk extraction tool. The Commission 
preliminarily

[[Page 66015]]

believes that the intent of the sentence was to refer to user-defined 
direct query and bulk extraction tool and that it is appropriate to 
amend this to provide clarity and consistency to the sentence and 
section of the CAT NMS Plan.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to the 
provisions regarding the targeted online query tool and logging of 
access and extraction of CAT Data. Specifically, the Commission 
solicits comment on the following:
    61. Should the maximum the number of records that can be downloaded 
from the online targeted query tool to 200,000 records? If not, what 
should the maximum number of records be set at?
    62. Should the CAT NMS Plan define what ``delivery of results'' 
means in the context of logging? Is the proposed definition of 
``delivery of results'' reasonable and appropriate?
    63. Should the CAT NMS Plan require the CAT System to log 
extraction of CAT Data from the targeted online query tool, as the CAT 
System must do for the user-defined query tool and bulk extraction 
tool? Should other information be logged by the CAT System?

E. CAT Customer and Account Attributes

    Citing to data security concerns raised with regard to the 
reporting and collection of information that could identify a Customer 
in the CAT, and in particular the reporting of SSN(s)/ITIN(s), dates of 
birth and account numbers, the Participants submitted a request for an 
exemption from certain reporting provisions of the CAT NMS Plan 
pursuant to Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'') \159\ and Rule 608(e) of Regulation NMS under the 
Exchange Act \160\ (the ``PII Exemption Request'').\161\ Specifically, 
the Participants requested an exemption from (1) the requirement that 
Industry Members \162\ report SSN(s)/ITIN(s) to the CAT in order to 
create the Customer-ID, so as to allow for an alternative approach to 
generating a Customer ID without requiring SSN(s)/ITIN(s) to be 
reported to the CAT; and (2) the requirement that Industry Members 
report dates of birth and account numbers associated with natural 
person Customers to the CAT, and instead requiring Industry Members to 
report the year of birth associated with natural person Customers, and 
the Industry Member Firm Designated ID for each trading account 
associated with all Customers.\163\
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    \159\ 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1).
    \160\ 17 CFR 242.608(e).
    \161\ See letter from Michael Simon, Chair, CAT NMS Plan 
Operating Committee, to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, dated January 29, 2020 (the 
``PII Exemption Request'').
    \162\ ``Industry Member'' is a defined term under the CAT NMS 
Plan and means ``a member of a national securities exchange or a 
member of a national securities association.'' See CAT NMS Plan 
supra note 3 at Article I, Section 1.1.
    \163\ The ``Industry Member Firm Designated ID'' refers to the 
Firm Designated ID associated with that specific Industry Member.
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    On March 17, 2020, the Commission granted the Participants' request 
for an exemption from reporting the SSN(s)/ITIN(s), date of birth and 
account number associated with natural person Customers to the CAT, 
conditioned on the Participants meeting certain conditions (the ``PII 
Exemption Order'').\164\ The proposed amendments would modify the 
Customer-ID creation process and reporting requirements in a manner 
consistent with the PII Exemption Request, including all changes 
requested by the Participants to the data elements required to be 
reported to and collected by the CAT.\165\
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    \164\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 88393 (March 17, 
2020), 85 FR 16152, (March 20, 2020) (``PII Exemption Order'').
    \165\ See PII Exemption Request, supra note 161.
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    The Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to: (1) Adopt 
revised Industry Member reporting requirements to reflect that ITINs/
SSNs, dates of birth and account numbers will not be reported to the 
CAT; (2) establish a process for creating Customer-ID(s) in light of 
the revised reporting requirements; (3) impose specific obligations on 
the Plan Processor that would support the revised reporting 
requirements and creation of Customer-ID(s); and (4) amend existing 
provisions of the CAT NMS Plan to reflect the new reporting 
requirements and process for creating Customer-ID(s), as further 
discussed below.
1. Adopt Revised Industry Member Reporting Requirements
    The CAT NMS Plan requires Industry Members to collect and report 
``Customer Account Information'' \166\ and ``Customer Identifying 
Information'' \167\ to the CAT in order to identify Customers.\168\ As 
noted above, the PII Exemption Order permits the Participants to no 
longer require Industry Members to report SSN(s)/ITIN(s), dates of 
birth and account numbers for natural person Customers, which are data 
elements in the definition of Customer Account Information and Customer 
Identifying Information, provided that Industry Members report the year 
of birth for natural person Customers to the CAT.\169\ Consistent with 
the PII Exemption Order, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS 
Plan to delete the requirement that SSN(s)/ITIN(s) be reported to and 
collected by the CAT, and to replace the requirement that Industry 
Members report the dates of birth for their natural person Customers 
with the requirement that Industry Members report the year of birth for 
their natural person Customers.\170\ In addition, the Commission 
proposes to delete the requirement that account numbers be reported to 
and collected by the CAT as a data element in Account Attributes.\171\ 
The proposed amendments also would require that the Customer-ID of a 
legal entity Customer

[[Page 66016]]

be based on the transformation of that legal entity's EIN by the CCID 
Transformation Logic,\172\ just as the SSN of a natural person Customer 
would be transformed.\173\
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    \166\ The CAT NMS Plan defines ``Customer Account Information'' 
to ``include, but not be limited to, account number, account type, 
customer type, date account opened, and large trader identifier (if 
applicable); except, however, that (a) in those circumstances in 
which an Industry Member has established a trading relationship with 
an institution but has not established an account with that 
institution, the Industry Member will (i) provide the Account 
Effective Date in lieu of the ``date account opened''; (ii) provide 
the relationship identifier in lieu of the ``account number''; and 
(iii) identify the ``account type'' as a ``relationship''; (b) in 
those circumstances in which the relevant account was established 
prior to the implementation date of the CAT NMS Plan applicable to 
the relevant CAT Reporter (as set forth in Rule 613(a)(3)(v) and 
(vi)), and no ``date account opened'' is available for the account, 
the Industry Member will provide the Account Effective Date in the 
following circumstances: (i) Where an Industry Member changes back 
office providers or clearing firms and the date account opened is 
changed to the date the account was opened on the new back office/
clearing firm system; (ii) where an Industry Member acquires another 
Industry Member and the date account opened is changed to the date 
the account was opened on the post-merger back office/clearing firm 
system; (iii) where there are multiple dates associated with an 
account in an Industry Member's system, and the parameters of each 
date are determined by the individual Industry Member; and (iv) 
where the relevant account is an Industry Member proprietary 
account.''
    \167\ The CAT NMS Plan defines ``Customer Identifying 
Information'' to mean ``information of sufficient detail to identify 
a Customer, including, but not limited to, (a) with respect to 
individuals: name, address, date of birth, individual tax payer 
identification number (``ITIN'')/social security number (``SSN''), 
individual's role in the account (e.g., primary holder, joint 
holder, guardian, trustee, person with the power of attorney); and 
(b) with respect to legal entities: name, address, Employer 
Identification Number (``EIN'')/Legal Entity Identifier (``LEI'') or 
other comparable common entity identifier, if applicable; provided, 
however, that an Industry Member that has an LEI for a Customer must 
submit the Customer's LEI in addition to other information of 
sufficient detail to identify a Customer.''
    \168\ The CAT NMS Plan defines ``Customer'' as having the same 
meaning provided in SEC Rule 613(j)(3). See CAT NMS Plan supra note 
3 at Article I, Section 1.1 ``Customer.''
    \169\ See PII Exemption Order, supra note 164.
    \170\ See id.
    \171\ See infra this Part II.E.1 for a description and 
discussion of Account Attributes and the data elements contained in 
Account Attributes. See also PII Exemption Order, supra note 164 at 
16154.
    \172\ ``CCID Transformation Logic'' refers to ``the mathematical 
logic identified by the Plan Processor that accurately transforms an 
individual tax payer identification number(s)(ITIN(s))/social 
security number(s)(SSN(s))/Employer Identification Number (EIN(s)) 
into a Transformed Value(s) for submission into the CCID Subsystem, 
as set forth in Appendix D, Section 9.1.'' See proposed Section 1.1 
``CCID Transformation Logic''.
    \173\ See infra Part II.E.2 for a description of the use of the 
CCID Transformation Logic by Industry Members. The Commission is not 
changing the CAT NMS Plan's requirement that a legal entity's EIN be 
reported as part of Customer and Account Attributes to CAIS. See 
supra Part II.F.2 for a discussion of how Regulatory Staff and SEC 
staff can access and use a legal entity's EIN to obtain that 
entity's Customer-ID through the CCID Subsystem, or access the legal 
entity's EIN in CAIS to obtain related Customer and Account 
Attributes, Customer-ID or other identifier (e.g., Industry Member 
Firm Designated ID) associated with that legal entity.
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    The Commission proposes the following additional amendments to 
reflect the revised reporting requirements for Industry Members: The 
defined term ``Customer Attributes,'' would replace the defined term 
``Customer Identifying Information'' and ``Account Attributes'' would 
replace the defined term ``Customer Account Information'' to more 
accurately reflect the data elements being reported by Industry 
Members; and a newly defined term ``Customer and Account Attributes'' 
would be defined to include all the data elements, or attributes, in 
both ``Customer Attributes'' and ``Account Attributes.'' \174\ Finally, 
as a result of the changes to the Customer and Account Attributes that 
are reported to and collected by the CAT, which will no longer require 
the reporting of the most sensitive PII, the Commission proposes to 
delete the defined term ``PII'' from the CAT NMS Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``Customer Attributes'' would include all of the same data elements 
as ``Customer Identifying Information'' except the proposed definition 
would not include the requirement to report ITIN/SSN and date of birth, 
and the proposed definition would add the requirement that the year of 
birth for a natural person Customer be reported to CAT.\175\ As such, 
``Customer Attributes'' would be defined to mean ``information of 
sufficient detail to identify a Customer, including, but not limited 
to, (a) with respect to individuals: name, address, year of birth, 
individual's role in the account (e.g., primary holder, joint holder, 
guardian, trustee, person with the power of attorney); and (b) with 
respect to legal entities: Name, address, Employer Identification 
Number (``EIN'') and Legal Entity Identifier (``LEI'') or other 
comparable common entity identifier, if applicable; \176\ provided, 
however, that an Industry Member that has an LEI for a Customer must 
submit the Customer's LEI in addition to other information of 
sufficient detail to identify a Customer'' \177\
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    \175\ Specifically, name, address, individual's role in the 
account (e.g., primary holder, joint holder, guardian, trustee, 
person with the power of attorney); and legal entity name, address, 
EIN and LEI or other comparable common entity identifier, if 
applicable (provided, however, that an Industry Member that has an 
LEI for a Customer must submit the Customer's LEI in addition to 
other information of sufficient detail to identify a Customer) are 
data elements that will not be changed pursuant to the amendments 
proposed by the Commission.
    \176\ The proposed amendment also would clarify that a legal 
entity's EIN is different than the legal entity's Legal Entity 
Identifier (``LEI''). In relevant part, the CAT NMS Plan currently 
provides that the Industry Member will report ``Employer 
Identification Number (``EIN'')/Legal Entity Identifier (``LEI'') or 
other comparable common entity identifier, if applicable.'' The 
Commission is amending the CAT NMS Plan to require that an Industry 
Member report the ``Employer Identification Number (``EIN'') and 
Legal Entity Identifier (``LEI'') or other comparable common entity 
identifier, if applicable; provided, however, that an Industry 
Member that has an LEI for a Customer must submit the Customer's LEI 
in addition to other information of sufficient detail to identify a 
Customer.'' See Proposed Appendix D, Section 9.2.
    \177\ See id. As is currently required, Customer Attributes 
would be defined to ``include, but not be limited to'' the data 
elements listed in the definition of Customer Attributes. If the 
Participants intend to require additional data elements to be 
reported to the CAT, such changes must be filed with the Commission 
and would be subject to public notice and comment, and need to be 
approved by the Commission before becoming effective. See 17 CFR 
240.19b-4; see also 17 CFR 242.608(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, ``Account Attributes'' would be defined to include all 
of the same data elements as ``Customer Account Information,'' except a 
Customer's account number and the relationship identifier in lieu of an 
account number would not be reported by an Industry Member as an 
Account Attribute.\178\ As proposed, therefore, ``Account Attributes'' 
would be defined in part to ``include, but not limited to, account 
type, customer type, date account opened, and large trader identifier 
(if applicable).'' \179\
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    \178\ A relationship identifier is used when an Industry Member 
does not have an account number available to its order handling and/
or execution system at the time of order receipt, but can provide an 
identifier representing the client's trading. When a relationship 
identifier is used instead of a parent account number, and an 
Industry Member places an order on behalf of the client, any 
executed trades will be kept in a firm account until they are 
allocated to the proper subaccount(s). Relationship identifiers 
would be reported as Firm Designated IDs pursuant to the Firm 
Designated ID amendment in this situation.
    \179\ The proposed definition of Account Attributes would retain 
the alternative data elements that an Industry Member can report in 
the circumstances in which the Industry Member has established a 
trading relationship with an institution but has not established an 
account with that institution. See CAT NMS Plan supra note 3 at 
Article I, Section 1.1 ``Customer Account Information.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that eliminating reporting of 
SSNs to the CAT is appropriate because SSNs are considered among the 
most sensitive PII that can be exposed in a data breach, and the 
elimination of the SSNs from the CAT may reduce both the risk of 
attracting bad actors and the impact on retail investors in the event 
of a data breach.\180\ The Commission preliminarily believes that the 
same concern applies to the reporting of account numbers and thus it is 
appropriate to no longer require account numbers to be reported to the 
CAT as part of Account Attributes to the CAT.\181\ The removal of 
account numbers and dates of birth is expected to further reduce both 
the attractiveness of the database as a target for hackers and the 
impact on retail investors in the event of a data breach.\182\ The 
Commission also preliminarily believes that replacing the requirement 
that Industry Members report the date of birth with the year of birth 
of natural person Customers is appropriate because it will continue to 
allow Regulatory Staff to carry out regulatory analysis that focuses on 
certain potentially vulnerable populations, such as the elderly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ See PII Exemption Order, supra note 164, at 16156; see 
also Identify Theft Resource Center 2018 End of Year Breach Report, 
pg. 13, https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-YearAftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf.
    \181\ See proposed definition of ``Account Attributes'' in 
proposed Section 1.1.
    \182\ See PII Exemption Order, supra note 164, at 16156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, replacing the term ``Customer Identifying 
Information'' with the term ``Customer Attributes'' and replacing the 
term ``Customer Account Information'' with the term ``Account 
Attributes'' is also appropriate because the data elements in both 
categories are more accurately described as information that can be 
attributed to a Customer or a Customer's account in light of the PII 
that has been removed from these categories. Furthermore, adopting a 
new defined term, ``Customer and Account Attributes,'' that refers 
collectively to all the attributes in Customer Attributes and Account 
Attributes is a useful and efficient way to refer to all the attributes 
associated with a Customer that is either a natural person or a legal 
entity that are required to be reported by Industry Members and 
collected by the CAT.

[[Page 66017]]

    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to delete the term ``PII'' from the CAT NMS Plan and replace that term 
with ``Customer and Account Attributes'' as that would more accurately 
describe the attributes that must be reported to the CAT, now that 
ITINs/SSNs, dates of birth and account numbers would no longer be 
required to be reported to the CAT pursuant to the amendments being 
proposed by the Commission. Thus, the Commission proposes to eliminate 
the term ``PII'' in Article VI, Sections 6.2(b)(v)(F) and 6.10(c)(ii); 
and Appendix D, Sections 4.1; 4.1.2; 4.1.4; 6.2; 8.1.1; 8.1.3; 8.2; and 
8.2.2.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments that 
would adopt revised Industry Member reporting requirements to reflect 
that ITINs/SSNs, dates of birth and account numbers will not be 
reported to the CAT. Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on 
the following:
    64. The proposed amendments define ``Customer and Account 
Attributes'' as meaning the data elements in Account Attributes and 
Customer Attributes. Do commenters believe these definitions should be 
modified to add or delete data elements? If so, what elements?
2. Establish a Process for Creating Customer-ID(s) in Light of Revised 
Reporting Requirements
    The creation of a Customer-ID by the Plan Processor that accurately 
identifies a Customer continues to be a requirement under the CAT NMS 
Plan. The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to 
amend the CAT NMS Plan to set forth the process for how the Plan 
Processor would create Customer-IDs in the absence of the requirement 
that SSNs/ITINs, dates of birth and account numbers be reported to and 
collected by the CAT, consistent with the PII Exemption Order.\183\ As 
further discussed below, however, the amendments proposed by the 
Commission deviate from the PII Exemption Order by requiring that a 
Customer's EIN would also be transformed by the CCID Transformation 
Logic, along with SSNs/ITINs, so that the same process for creating 
Customer-IDs for natural persons also would apply to the creation of 
Customer-IDs for legal entities.\184\
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    \183\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.
    \184\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.1. In addition, a legal 
entity Customer would continue to be required to report its EIN to 
the CAT pursuant to the CAT NMS Plan because such EIN is an 
attribute included in Customer and Account Attributes. See proposed 
Appendix D, Section 9.2. Thus, a legal entity's EIN would be 
transformed by the CCID Transformation Logic into a Transformed 
Value and submitted to the CCID Subsystem, as well as reported to 
the CAT as an element of Customer and Account Attributes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Commission proposes the following amendments to 
the CAT NMS Plan: Section 9 of Appendix D, would be renamed ``CAIS, the 
CCID Subsystem and the Process for Creating Customer-IDs''; \185\ a new 
Section 9.1 would be added to Appendix D, entitled ``The CCID 
Subsystem,'' which would describe the operation of the CCID Subsystem 
and the process for creating Customer-IDs; Section 9.2, would be 
revised to describe the Customer and Account Attributes reported to and 
collected in the CAIS \186\ and Transformed Values; \187\ Section 9.3 
would be amended to reflect the revised reporting requirements that 
require the reporting of a Transformed Value and Customer and Account 
Attributes by Industry Members; and Section 9.4 would be amended to 
specify the error resolution process for the CCID Subsystem and CAIS, 
and the application of the existing validation process required by 
Section 7.2 of Appendix D applied to the Transformed Value, Customer-
IDs, the CCID Subsystem. The proposed amendments to each of these 
provisions is described below.
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    \185\ Currently, Section 9 of Appendix D is entitled ``CAT 
Customer and Customer Account Information.''
    \186\ ``CAIS'' refers to the Customer and Account Information 
System within the CAT System that collects and links Customer-ID(s) 
to Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers for queries 
by Regulatory Staff. See proposed Section 1.1 ``CAIS''.
    \187\ ``Transformed Value,'' would be defined to mean ``the 
value generated by the CCID Transformation Logic as set forth in 
proposed Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1 of the CAT NMS 
Plan. See infra note 190 for a discussion of this proposed 
definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes to describe the CCID Subsystem and the 
process for creating Customer-IDs for both natural person and legal 
entity Customers through the CCID Subsystem in Section 9.1 of Appendix 
D. The proposed amendments provide that Customer-IDs would be generated 
through a two-phase transformation process. In the first phase, a 
Customer's ITIN/SSN/EIN would be transformed into a Transformed Value 
using the CCID Transformation Logic provided by the Plan Processor. The 
Transformed Value, and not the ITIN/SSN/EIN of the Customer, would then 
be submitted to the CCID Subsystem, a separate subsystem within the CAT 
System,\188\ along with any other information and additional events 
(e.g., record number) as may be prescribed by the Plan Processor that 
would enable the final linkage between the Customer-ID and the Customer 
Account Attributes. The CCID Subsystem would perform a second 
transformation to create a globally unique Customer-ID for each 
Customer. From the CCID Subsystem, the Customer-ID for the natural 
person and legal entity Customer would be sent to the CAIS \189\ 
separately from any other CAT Data required to be reported by Industry 
Members to identify a Customer, which would include the Customer and 
Account Attributes.\190\ In CAIS, the Customer-ID would be linked to 
the Customer and Account Attributes associated with that Customer-ID, 
and linked data would be made available to Regulatory Staff for queries 
in accordance with Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer Identifying 
Systems Workflow) and Appendix D, Section 6 (Data Availability). The 
proposed amendments would make clear that the Customer-ID may not be 
shared with an Industry Member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ See proposed Section 1.1 ``CCID Subsystem.'' See also 
proposed Appendix D, Section 9.1 (The CCID Subsystem).
    \189\ See infra note 203 for a discussion of this proposed 
definition.
    \190\ A legal entity's EIN, which is an attribute included in 
Customer and Account Attributes, also would be sent directly to 
CAIS, as further discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments also would require the Plan Processor to 
provide the CCID Transformation Logic to Industry Members and 
Participants pursuant to the provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 
(Customer Identifying Systems Workflow).\191\ For Industry Members, the 
proposed amendments would provide that the CCID Transformation Logic 
would be embedded in the CAT Reporter Portal or used by the Industry 
Member in machine-to-machine processing.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.1 (The CCID Subsystem).
    \192\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For Regulatory Staff, the Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, 
Section 9.1 to first reflect the fact that, unlike Industry Members who 
receive ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) from their Customers as part of the 
process of identifying their Customers for purposes of reporting to the 
CAT, Regulatory Staff may receive ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of Customers 
from outside sources (e.g., via regulatory data, a tip, complaint, or 
referral).\193\ Therefore, the proposed amendments would provide that 
for Regulatory Staff, the Plan Processor would embed the CCID 
Transformation Logic in the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal for 
manual CCID Subsystem Access.\194\ For

[[Page 66018]]

Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access by Regulatory Staff, Participants 
approved for Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access would use the CCID 
Transformation Logic in conjunction with an API provided by the Plan 
Processor.\195\
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    \193\ See id.
    \194\ For a full discussion of Manual CCID Access, see infra 
Part II.F.4. As further discussed in Part II.F.4, Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access would be used when Regulatory Staff require the 
conversion of fifty or fewer ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s). See proposed 
Section 4.1.6.
    \195\ For a full discussion of Programmatic CCID Access, see 
infra Part II.F.7. As further discussed in Part II.F.7, Programmatic 
CCID Subsystem Access would allow Regulatory Staff to submit 
multiple ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of a Customer(s) of interest 
identified through regulatory efforts outside of CAT to obtain 
Customer-ID(s) in order to query CAT Data regarding such 
Customer(s). See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the need to safeguard the security of the CCID Subsystem, the 
Commission also proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to provide that the 
CCID Subsystem must be implemented using network segmentation 
principles to ensure traffic can be controlled between the CCID 
Subsystem and other components of the CAT System, with strong 
separation of duties between it and all other components of the CAT 
System.\196\ The proposed amendments would furthermore state that the 
design of the CCID Subsystem will maximize automation of all operations 
of the CCID Subsystem to prevent, if possible, or otherwise minimize 
human intervention with the CCID Subsystem and any data in the CCID 
Subsystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.1 (The CCID Subsystem).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as proposed, the CAT NMS Plan's existing requirement that 
the Participants ensure the timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and 
integrity of CAT Data would apply to the Transformed Value(s) and the 
overall performance of the CCID Subsystem to support the creation of a 
Customer-ID that uniquely identifies each Customer.\197\ The proposed 
amendments would also require that the annual Regular Written 
Assessment required by Article VI, Section 6.6(b)(i)(A) assess the 
overall performance and design of the CCID Subsystem and the process 
for creating Customer-ID(s).\198\ The proposed amendments would clarify 
that because the CCID Subsystem is part of the CAT System, all 
provisions of the CAT NMS Plan that apply to the CAT System would also 
apply to the CCID Subsystem.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See id. See also CAT NMS Plan 4.12(b)(ii).
    \198\ See id.
    \199\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to implement these proposed amendments, the Commission 
proposes to adopt several new definitions, as follows: ``CCID 
Subsystem'' would be defined to mean the ``subsystem within the CAT 
System which will create the Customer-ID from a Transformed Value(s),'' 
as set forth in proposed Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1 of 
the CAT NMS Plan.\200\ ``Transformed Value,'' would be defined to mean 
``the value generated by the CCID Transformation Logic as set forth in 
proposed Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1 of the CAT NMS 
Plan.'' \201\ ``CCID Transformation Logic'' would be defined to mean 
the mathematical logic identified by the Plan Processor that accurately 
transforms an ITIN/SSN/EIN into a Transformed Value(s) for submission 
to the CCID Subsystem as set forth in Appendix D, Section 9.1.\202\ 
``CAIS,'' would be defined to mean the ``Customer and Account 
Information System within the CAT System that collects and links 
Customer-ID(s) to Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers 
for queries by Regulatory Staff.'' \203\ ``Customer Identifying 
Systems'' would be defined to mean both the CAIS and the CCID 
Subsystem.\204\ Finally, the ``CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal'' 
would be defined to mean the online tool enabling Manual CAIS access 
and Manual CCID Subsystem access.\205\
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    \200\ See proposed Section 1.1.
    \201\ See proposed Section 1.1 ``Transformed Value.''
    \202\ See proposed Section 1.1 ``CCID Transformation Logic.''
    \203\ See proposed Section 1.1 ``CAIS.''
    \204\ See proposed Section 1.1 ``Customer Identifying Systems.''
    \205\ See infra Part II.F.3 for s discussion on Manual CAIS 
access and Manual CCID Subsystem access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to 
amend the CAT NMS Plan to establish the process for creating Customer 
IDs using Transformed Values. This approach would preserve and 
facilitate the creation of a unique Customer-ID for all Customers and 
would track orders from, or allocations to, any Customer or group of 
Customers over time, regardless of what brokerage account was used 
without requiring the submission of the ITIN/SSN to the CAT.
    As noted above, the proposed amendments would require that the EIN 
for a Customer that is a legal entity be submitted to the CCID 
Transformation Logic to create the legal entity's Customer-ID; as such, 
the creation of a legal entity's Customer-ID would undergo the same 
transformation by the CCID Transformation Logic as a natural person 
Customer's ITIN/SSN. The Commission believes that this requirement is 
appropriate in order to leverage the operational efficiency that can be 
gained by requiring the same process for creating Customer-IDs for both 
natural person Customers and Customers that are legal entity Customers. 
The Commission also believes that requiring a legal entity's EIN to 
undergo the same transformation by the CCID Transformation Logic should 
also facilitate the ability of the Plan Processor to check the accuracy 
of the Customer-ID creation process since the Plan Processor can 
confirm that the same Customer-ID is created for the same EIN.
    The Commission also preliminarily believes that these proposed 
amendments appropriately specify and describe the two systems within 
the CAT System that would ingest the various pieces of information that 
identify a Customer: (1) The CCID Subsystem, which would ingest the 
Transformed Value(s), along with any other information and additional 
events as may be prescribed by the Plan Processor that would enable the 
final linkage between the Customer-ID and the Customer Account 
Attributes, and (2) CAIS, which would collect the Customer and Account 
Attributes and other identifiers (e.g., Industry Member Firm Designated 
IDs and record numbers) and link this data with the Customer-ID(s) 
created by the CCID Subsystem. The creation of the CCID Subsystem would 
facilitate the ability to create Customer-IDs in a process that is 
separate from the process that would require Industry Members to report 
Customer and Account Attributes to CAIS, but would ultimately link the 
Customer-IDs of Customers with the associated Customer and Account 
Attributes, so that Customers could be identified by Regulatory Staff 
when appropriate.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate for 
the CAT NMS Plan to address the manner in which the CCID Transformation 
Logic is provided by the Plan Processor because the manner differs as 
between Industry Members on the one hand and Regulatory Staff on the 
other hand.

[[Page 66019]]

With respect to Industry Members, the manner in which the CCID 
Transformation Logic would be implemented depends on the submission 
method chosen by the Industry Member--e.g., CAT Reporter Portal \206\ 
or machine-to-machine submission \207\ (e.g., SFTP upload).\208\ 
Because the CAT Reporter Portal is provided by the Plan Processor, the 
CCID Transformation Logic would have to be embedded in the CAT Reporter 
Portal for use by the Industry Member. However, if the Industry Member 
were to connect to the CAT through a machine-to-machine interface, the 
Industry Member would have to embed the CCID Transformation Logic into 
its own reporting processes. In both cases, transformation of the 
Customer ITIN/SSN would be done by the Industry Member in its own 
environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ The Industry Member CAT Reporter Portal is a web-based 
tool that allows CAT Reporters to monitor and manage data 
submissions to the CAT. See Industry Member CAT Reporter Portal User 
Guide, Version 1.0 (dated April 20, 2020) at 4, available at https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-04/IM%20Reporter%20Portal%20User%20Guide_04202020.pdf.
    \207\ The machine-to-machine interface is available via the CAT 
Secure File Transfer Protocol (``SFTP'') Accounts, which enable 
Industry Members and CAT Reporting Agents to create a machine-to-
machine connection to securely transmit data to CAT and receive 
related feedback. See FINRA CAT Industry Member Onboarding Guide, 
Version 1.9 (dated April 15, 2020) at 17, available at https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-04/FINRA%20CAT%20Onboarding%20Guide%20v1.9.pdf.
    \208\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.1 (The CCID Subsystem).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the provision of the Transformation Logic to 
Regulatory Staff, the Commission preliminarily believes it is 
appropriate to first note in the proposed amendments that Regulatory 
Staff may receive ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) from outside sources such as 
through regulatory data, tips, complaints, or referrals. Regulatory 
Staff also would be using the CCID Transformation Logic to convert 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) for regulatory and oversight purposes, unlike 
Industry Members.\209\ Similar to Industry Members, however, Regulatory 
Staff would need to convert such ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) into Customer-
IDs, using the CCID Transformation Logic provided by the Plan 
Processor. Therefore, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to 
specify that the CCID Transformation Logic for Regulatory Staff will be 
based on the type of access to the CCID Subsystem sought by Regulatory 
Staff. For Manual CCID Subsystem Access, the Plan Processor would embed 
the CCID Transformation Logic in the client-side code of the CAIS/CCID 
Subsystem Regulator Portal; \210\ for Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
Access, Participants would use the CCID Transformation Logic with an 
API provided by the Plan Processor.\211\ Providing the CCID 
Transformation Logic in this manner would facilitate ITIN(s) and SSN(s) 
not being submitted to the CAT.\212\
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    \209\ SEC staff shall have the same access to and 
functionalities of the CAT as Regulatory Staff. For example, in the 
case of ITIN(s) and SSN(s), SEC would receive these data elements 
from sources outside of the CAT and use the CCID Transformation 
Logic for Regulatory Staff to convert such data elements into 
Customer-IDs. See proposed Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D, Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access.
    \210\ See infra Part II.F.4 for a discussion on Manual CCID 
Subsystem access.
    \211\ See infra Part II.F.; see also proposed Appendix D Section 
4.1.6. EINs are published in publicly available documents and will 
continue to be submitted to the CAT as Customer Attributes.
    \212\ Manual CCID Subsystem access would only be used when 
Regulatory Staff or SEC staff already have the ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) 
associated with a Customer of regulatory interest through regulatory 
efforts that have taken place outside of the CAT. See proposed 
Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D, Manual CCID Subsystem Access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments 
addressing the structure and operation of the CCID Subsystem are 
appropriate. Requiring that the CCID Subsystem be implemented using 
network segmentation principles to ensure traffic can be controlled 
between the CCID Subsystem and other components of the CAT System will 
facilitate the CCID Subsystem being designed, deployed, and operated as 
a separate and independent system within the CAT system. Strong 
separation of duties also will add an additional level of protection 
against unlawful access to the CCID Subsystem, CAIS, or any other 
component of the CAT System. Minimizing the need for human intervention 
in the operation of the CCID Subsystem and any data in the CCID 
Subsystem should also help minimize the introduction of human data-
entry errors into the operation of the CCID Subsystem.
    Finally, the existing CAT NMS Plan requires that the Participants 
provide to the SEC a Regular Written Assessment pursuant to Article VI, 
Section 6.6(b)(i)(A). As proposed, the Participants must include in 
this assessment an assessment of the overall performance and design of 
the CCID Subsystem and the process for creating Customer-ID(s).\213\ 
The Commission believes these amendments are appropriate because the 
assessment required by Article VI, Section 6.6.(b)(i)(A) includes an 
assessment of the CAT System, and the overall performance and design of 
the CCID Subsystem and the process for creating Customer-ID(s) are 
elements of the CAT System.\214\
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    \213\ See CAT NMS Plan supra note 3, Section 6.6.
    \214\ Article VI, Section 6.6(b)(i)(A) provides that ``annually, 
or more frequently in connection with any review of the Plan 
Processor's performance under this Agreement pursuant to Section 
6.1(n), the Participants shall provide the SEC with a written 
assessment of the operation of the CAT that meets the requirements 
of SEC Rule 613, Appendix D, and this Agreement.'' See CAT NMS Plan 
supra note 3, Article VI, Section 6.6(b)(i)(A). The ``CAT System'' 
is defined to mean ``all data processing equipment, communications 
facilities, and other facilities, including equipment, utilized by 
the Company or any third parties acting on the Company's behalf in 
connection with operation of the CAT and any related information or 
relevant systems pursuant to this Agreement,'' which would include 
the CCID Subsystem. See CAT NMS Plan Section 1.1 ``Cat System.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments that 
would serve to describe the process for creating Customer-ID(s) in 
light of the revised reporting requirements. Specifically, the 
Commission solicits comment on the following:
    65. The proposed amendments define the ``CAIS'' as the Customer and 
Account Information System within the CAT System that collects and 
links Customer-IDs to Customer and Account Attributes and other 
identifiers for queries by Regulatory Staff. Are there other data 
elements that should be included in CAIS, and if so, what are they and 
why would it be appropriate to include them? How would adding these 
data elements to the CAIS impact regulatory value? Please explain.
    66. The proposed amendments define the ``CAIS/CCID Subsystem 
Regulator Portal'' as the online tool enabling Manual CAIS access and 
Manual CCID Subsystem access. Is the term ``online tool'' in the 
proposed definition sufficient to describe the manner of access, or 
would it be beneficial to provide more detail regarding the access 
mechanism? Please explain.
    67. The proposed amendments define the ``CCID Subsystem'' as the 
subsystem within the CAT System that will create the Customer-ID from a 
Transformed Value, as set forth in Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, 
Section 9.1. Would it be beneficial to provide more information about 
how the CCID Subsystem functions based on the substance of Section 
6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1 in the proposed definition? If so, 
what additional information would be helpful?
    68. The proposed amendments define ``CCID Transformation Logic'' as 
the mathematical logic identified by the Plan Processor that accurately 
transforms an individual taxpayer

[[Page 66020]]

identification number, SSN, or EIN into a Transformed Value for 
submission into the CCID Subsystem, as set forth in Appendix D, Section 
9.1. Would it be beneficial to provide more information in the proposed 
definition about how the CCID Transformation Logic functions based on 
the substance of Appendix D, Section 9.1? If so, what additional 
information would be helpful?
    69. The proposed amendments define the ``Transformed Value'' as the 
value generated by the CCID Transformation Logic, as set forth in 
proposed Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1. Would it be 
beneficial to provide more information in the proposed definition about 
how the Transformed Value is used, based on the substance of proposed 
Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1? If so, what additional 
information would be helpful?
    70. The proposed amendments contain a description of how the Plan 
Processor would generate a Customer-ID, which would be made available 
to Regulatory Staff for queries, by using a two-phase transformation 
process that does not require ITINs, SSNs, or EINs to be reported to 
the CAT. Is the description of this process sufficient for a clear 
understanding of the process? Is the description of the process 
sufficient for a clear understanding of the process for generating a 
Customer-ID for a Customer that does not have an ITIN/SSN (e.g., a non-
U.S. citizen Customer)? Would additional detail be beneficial for 
understanding the process? If so, please explain what kind of detail 
would be helpful.
    71. The proposed amendments state that Industry Members or 
Regulatory Staff will transform the ITINs, SSNs, or EINs of a Customer 
using the CCID Transformation Logic into a Transformed Value, which 
will be submitted to the CCID Subsystem with any other information and 
additional elements required by the Plan Processor to establish a 
linkage between the Customer-ID and Customer and Account attributes. 
Are there other factors that would impact the ability of Industry 
Members or Regulatory Staff to execute the transformation process as 
described and to submit Transformed Values to the CCID Subsystem? If 
so, please explain.
    72. For Industry Members, the proposed amendments state that the 
CCID Transformation Logic will be either embedded in the CAT Reporter 
Portal or used by the Industry Member in machine-to-machine processing. 
Would additional detail be helpful for understanding the process? Do 
commenters understand what is meant by machine-to-machine processing? 
Please explain what kind of additional detail would be helpful.
    73. Do commenters agree that requiring the CCID Subsystem to be 
implemented using network segmentation principles to ensure that 
traffic can be controlled between the CCID Subsystem and other 
components of the CAT System, with strong separation of duties between 
it and all other elements of the CAT System, would be an effective 
mechanism to provide protection against unlawful access to the CCID 
Subsystem and any other component of the CAT System? Would additional 
requirements be beneficial? If so, please specify and explain why it 
would be appropriate to include them.
    74. As proposed, the Participants would be required to meet certain 
standards with respect to the process for creating Customer-IDs, i.e., 
ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and integrity of a 
Transformed Value, and ensuring the accuracy and overall performance of 
the CCID Subsystem. Do commenters agree that these standards would 
serve to accomplish the purpose of accurately attributing order flow to 
a Customer-ID? If not, please specify how the standards could be 
modified to achieve their intended goal and explain why it would be 
appropriate to impose these modified standards.
    75. As proposed, the Participants are required to assess both (1) 
the overall performance and design of the CCID Subsystem, and (2) the 
process for creating Customer-IDs annually as part of each annual 
Regular Written Assessment. Are there other specific aspects of the 
CCID Subsystem or the Customer-ID creation process that might benefit 
from regular assessment? If so, please specify and explain why it would 
be appropriate to include them.
3. Plan Processor Functionality To Support the Creation of Customer-
ID(s)
    The CCID Subsystem needs to function appropriately and be 
sufficiently secure. Therefore, the Commission proposes amendments to 
Article VI, Section 6 to add a new Section 6.1(v) that would require 
the Plan Processor to develop, with the prior approval of the Operating 
Committee, specific functionality to implement the process for creating 
a Customer-ID(s), consistent with both Section 6.1 and Appendix D, 
Section 9.1.\215\ With respect to the CCID Subsystem specifically, the 
proposed amendments would also require the Plan Processor to develop 
functionality to: Ingest Transformed Value(s) and any other required 
information and convert the Transformed Value(s) into an accurate 
Customer-ID(s); validate that the conversion from the Transformed 
Value(s) to the Customer-ID(s) is accurate and reliable; and transmit 
the Customer-ID(s), consistent with Appendix D, Section 9.1, to CAIS or 
a Participant's SAW.\216\
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    \215\ See proposed Section 6.1(v) (Plan Processor).
    \216\ See proposed Section 6.1(v).
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    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to require the Plan Processor to develop the functionality by the CCID 
Subsystem to ingest the Transformed Value(s), along with any other 
information and additional events as may be prescribed by the Plan 
Processor that would enable the final linkage between the Customer-ID 
and the Customer Account Attributes and convert the Transformed 
Value(s) into an accurate and reliable Customer-ID(s); to validate that 
the conversion from the Transformed Value(s) to the Customer-ID(s) is 
accurate and reliable; and to transmit the Customer-ID(s) to CAIS or a 
Participant's SAW because these are the critical operational phases 
that must be performed by the CCID Subsystem in order to facilitate the 
creation of accurate Customer-IDs.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments that 
would serve to impose specific obligations on the Plan Processor that 
will support the revised reporting requirements and creation of 
Customer-ID(s). Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the 
following:
    76. The proposed amendments require the Plan Processor to develop, 
with the prior approval of the Operating Committee, the functionality 
to implement the process for creating Customer-IDs consistent with this 
section and Appendix D, Section 9.1. Are the details provided in 
relation to developing this functionality between this section and 
Appendix D, Section 9.1 sufficient for purposes of implementation? 
Would additional detail be beneficial? If so, please explain.
    77. With respect to the CCID Subsystem, the proposed amendments 
require the Plan Processor to develop functionality to (1) ingest 
Transformed Values and any other required information to convert the 
Transformed Values into an accurate and reliable Customer-IDs, (2) 
validate that that conversion from the Transformed Values to the 
Customer-IDs is accurate, and (3) transmit the Customer-IDs, consistent 
with Appendix D, Section 9.1, to CAIS or a Participant's SAW. Should 
the proposed amendments be

[[Page 66021]]

more specific about what kind of functionality must be provided by the 
Plan Processor? If so, please explain what kinds of details would be 
helpful.
4. Reporting Transformed Value
    The Commission proposes to amend Article VI, Section 6.4 of the CAT 
NMS Plan to adopt Article VI, Section 6.4(d)(ii)(D) to require Industry 
Members to report on behalf of all Customers that have an ITIN/SSN/EIN 
the Transformed Value for that Customer's ITIN/SSN/EIN.\217\ The 
Commission preliminarily believes these amendments are appropriate 
because they reflect the fact that Industry Members will be required to 
report the Transformed Value for their Customers in order to create the 
Customer-IDs for natural person and legal entity Customers, rather than 
the ITIN/SSN/EIN of such a Customer.
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    \217\ See proposed Section 6.4(d)(ii)(D); see also infra Part 
II.K (Firm Designated ID and Allocation Reports) for a discussion 
that addresses another proposed amendment to Section 6.4(d)(ii), 
specifically a proposed amendment that would require Customer and 
Account Attributes and Firm Designated IDs associated with 
Allocation Reports to be reported.
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments that 
relate to reporting required Industry Member Data in Section 
6.4(d)(ii). Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the 
following:
    78. The proposed amendments require Industry Members to report on 
behalf of all Customers that have an ITIN/SSN/EIN the Transformed Value 
for that Customer's ITIN/SSN/EIN. Are there any factors that could 
impact the ability of Industry Members to report the Transformed Value? 
Please explain.
5. Data Availability Requirements
    Appendix D, Section 6.2 (Data Availability Requirements) of the CAT 
NMS Plan generally addresses the processing of information identifying 
Customers that is reported by Industry Members to the CAT, the 
reporting timeframes for such information that must be met by Industry 
Members, and the availability of such information to regulators.\218\ 
The Commission proposes to amend this section to require that (i) 
Industry Members submit Customer and Account Attributes and Transformed 
Values to the CCID Subsystem and CAIS, which are a part of the Central 
Repository, by the same deadline already required by the CAT NMS Plan 
(no later than 8:00 a.m. Eastern Time on T+1); \219\ (ii) the CAT NMS 
Plan's validation; generation of error reports; processing and 
resubmission of data; correction of data; and resubmission of corrected 
data requirements in Appendix D, Section 6.2 apply to the CCID 
Subsystem and CAIS, which are part of the Central Repository, and (iii) 
Customer and Account Attributes and Customer-IDs be available to 
regulators immediately upon receipt of initial data and corrected data, 
pursuant to security policies for retrieving Customer and Account 
Attributes and Customer-IDs.\220\ Finally, the Commission proposes to 
replace references to the term ``PII'' in this section with references 
to ``Customer and Account Attributes.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
6.2.
    \219\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 6.2.
    \220\ Previously, this section of Section 6.2 of Appendix D 
required that PII must be must be available to regulators 
immediately upon receipt of initial data and corrected data, 
pursuant to security policies for retrieving PII. See CAT NMS Plan, 
supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 6.2. Raw unprocessed data that 
has been ingested by the Plan Processor must be available to 
Participants' regulatory staff and the SEC prior to 12:00 p.m. 
Eastern Time on T+1. Access to all iterations of processed data must 
be available to Participants' regulatory staff and the SEC between 
12:00 p.m. Eastern Time on T+1 and T+5. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 
3, at Appendix D, Section 6.2. Processing timelines start on the day 
the order event is received by the Central Repository for 
processing. Most events must be reported to the CAT by 8:00 a.m. 
Eastern Time the Trading Day after the order event occurred, which 
is referred to as the transaction date. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 
3, at Appendix D, Section 6.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to provide Regulatory Staff with access to Customer and 
Account Attributes in a timely manner, the Commission believes it is 
appropriate for the proposed amendments to set forth the requirements 
for (i) processing Customer and Account Attributes and Transformed 
Value(s) that are reported by Industry Members to the CAT, (ii) the 
reporting timeframes for such information identifying a Customer(s) 
that must be met by Industry Members, and (iii) the availability of 
such information to regulators.
6. Customer and Account Attributes in CAIS and Transformed Values
    Appendix D, Section 9.1 of the CAT NMS Plan (Customer and Customer 
Account Information Storage) generally addresses the attributes 
identifying a Customer that are required to be reported to and 
collected by the Plan Processor; the validation, maintenance and 
storage of such attributes; the creation and use of a Customer-ID; and 
the manner in which attributes identifying a Customer should initially 
be reported to the Central Repository.\221\ Appendix D, Section 9.2 
generally lists the account attributes that would be reported to and 
collected by the Central Repository.\222\ The Commission proposes to 
combine those sections into one section that would comprehensively list 
all the Customer and Account Attributes that Industry Members must 
report to CAT and clarify existing requirements in the CAT NMS Plan. 
Accordingly, Section 9.2 will reflect the entire list of Customer and 
Account Attributes and other identifiers associated with a Customer 
(e.g., Firm Designated IDs) that must be reported by Industry Members. 
The Commission also proposes that for the name field, the first, 
middle, and last name must be reported; and for the address field, the 
street number, street name, street suffix and/or abbreviation (e.g., 
road, lane, court, etc.), city, state, zip code, and country must be 
provided.\223\ The Commission also proposes changes that would organize 
the attributes reported by Industry Members so that all attributes 
identifying a Customer would be grouped together and all attributes 
identifying an account would be grouped together (including any 
attributes currently listed in Sections 9.1 and 9.2 of the CAT NMS 
Plan).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
9.1. The Central Repository includes the CAIS system. The CAT NMS 
Plan defines ``Central Repository'' to mean ``the repository 
responsible for the receipt, consolidation, and retention of all 
information reported to the CAT pursuant to SEC Rule 613 and this 
Agreement.'' See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3 at Section 1.1.
    \222\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
9.2.
    \223\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments also would address the storage of Customer 
Account Attributes by requiring that ``[t]he CAT must collect and store 
Customer and Account Attributes in a secure database physically 
separated from the transactional database'' and would require that 
``[t]he Plan Processor must maintain valid Customer and Account 
Attributes for each trading day and provide a method for Participants' 
Regulatory Staff and SEC staff to easily obtain historical changes to 
Customer-IDs, Firm Designated IDs, and all other Customer and Account 
Attributes.'' \224\ The proposed amendments also would require that 
Industry Members initially submit full lists of Customer and Account 
Attributes, Firm Designated IDs, and Transformed Values for all active 
accounts and submit updates and changes on a daily basis.\225\ In 
addition, the proposed amendments would require that the Plan Processor 
must have a process to periodically receive updates, including a full 
refresh of all Customer and Account Attributes, Firm Designated IDs, 
and Transformed Values to ensure the completeness and

[[Page 66022]]

accuracy of the data in CAIS, and would require that the Central 
Repository must support account structures that have multiple account 
owners and associated Customer and Account Attributes, and must be able 
to link accounts that move from one Industry Member to another.\226\ 
Finally, the proposed amendments would delete the requirement that 
previous name and previous address be reported to the CAT.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ See id.
    \225\ See id.
    \226\ See id.
    \227\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments 
to Section 9.2 of Appendix D are appropriate because the CAT NMS Plan 
currently includes an incomplete list of all the Customer and Account 
Attributes that must be reported to the CAT. The proposed amendments 
would provide a list of all of the Customer and Account Attributes that 
Industry Members must report and would retain existing requirements in 
the CAT NMS Plan related to the availability of historical changes and 
the assignment of Customer-IDs, as well as reflect new definitions and 
reporting requirements (e.g., the requirement to report the Transformed 
Value to the CCID Subsystem). The proposed amendments also would update 
the CAT NMS Plan's requirement regarding the initial submission of full 
lists of Customer and Account Attributes and subsequent updates and 
refreshes of such information to reflect that these requirements would 
apply to Customer and Account Attributes, Firm Designated IDs, and 
associated Transformed Values.
    The Commission also believes that it is appropriate to amend the 
CAT NMS Plan to require that the name field for Customers include the 
Customer's first name, middle name, and last name, and that the address 
field include the street number, street name, street suffix and/or 
abbreviation (e.g., road, lane, court, etc.), city, state, zip code, 
and country.\228\ The Commission understands that such specificity is 
already collected by broker-dealer databases identifying individuals 
and believes that this level of specificity is required to facilitate 
regulatory or surveillance efforts, and could diminish the need to 
conduct broader searches of CAIS in order to identify an individual of 
regulatory interest because such specificity would enable more focused 
searches of CAT Customer and Account Attributes. Deleting the 
requirement for previous name and previous address fields to be 
reported is also appropriate because such information can be determined 
by the Plan Processor when providing historical information for the 
name and address attributes, as required by the proposed amendments to 
this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments that 
would combine Sections 9.1 and 9.2 of Appendix D of the CAT NMS Plan 
and the proposed revisions therein. Specifically, the Commission 
solicits comment on the following:
    79. For natural persons, Appendix D, Section 9.1 requires a name 
attribute to be captured and stored. For implementation purposes, the 
proposed amendments would specify that all of the aspects of the 
``Name'' attribute must be captured, including first, middle, and last 
name, as separate fields within the attribute. Do commenters agree that 
adding specificity to the ``Name'' attribute would aid in facilitating 
regulatory or surveillance efforts by enhancing the ability for 
regulators to search the data? Would it be helpful to add more 
specificity to any other attributes in proposed Appendix D, Section 9.1 
for implementation purposes? For example, would it be helpful to add a 
name suffix (e.g., Jr.)?
    80. For both natural persons and legal entities, Appendix D, 
Section 9.1 requires an address attribute to be captured and stored. 
For implementation purposes, the proposed amendments would specify that 
all of the aspects of the ``Address'' attribute must be captured, 
including street number, street name, street suffix and/or abbreviation 
(e.g., road, lane, court, etc.), city, state, zip code, and country, as 
separate fields within the attribute. Do commenters agree that adding 
specificity to the ``Address'' attribute would aid in facilitating 
regulatory or surveillance efforts by enhancing the ability for 
regulators to search the data? Alternatively, could this search 
capability be a function of the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal 
rather than a reporting requirement for Industry Members?
    81. Would it be helpful to add more specificity to any other 
attributes in proposed Appendix D, Section 9.2 for implementation 
purposes? For example, would it be helpful to add the last four digits 
to the zip code in the address attribute, so that the full nine digit 
zip code would be captured? Please identify what separate fields could 
be included within the attribute, and why it would be appropriate to 
include them.
    82. Appendix D, Section 9.1 requires full account lists for all 
active accounts and subsequent updates and changes to be submitted to 
the Plan Processor. As part of the process for periodically receiving 
updates, the proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
have a process to periodically receive updates, rather than full 
account lists, which could include a full refresh of all Customer and 
Account Attributes, Firm Designated IDs, and Transformed Values. Would 
it be appropriate to require the Plan Processor to have a process to 
periodically receive a full refresh update?
7. Customer-ID Tracking
    Appendix D, Section 9.3 (Customer-ID Tracking) generally describes 
the creation, linking, and persistence of a Customer-ID for use by 
regulators.\229\ The Commission proposes to amend this section to 
require that Customer-IDs would be created based on the Transformed 
Value, rather than the ITIN/SSN of a natural person Customer, and that 
the Customer-ID for a legal entity would be based on the EIN for the 
legal entity Customer, as discussed above.\230\ The Commission also 
proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to require the Plan Processor to 
resolve discrepancies in the Transformed Values.\231\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes these amendments are appropriate because they 
reflect the fact that ITINs/SSNs will no longer be reported to the CAT 
but that Transformed Values will be reported to and collected by the 
CAT, and that existing requirements regarding Customer-IDs and their 
function will continue to be required for natural person Customers and 
Customers that are legal entities under the amendments proposed by the 
Commission. In addition, the CAT NMS Plan currently requires that the 
Participants and the SEC must be able to use the unique CAT-Customer-ID 
to track orders from any Customer or group of Customers, regardless of 
what brokerage account was used to enter the order. The Commission 
proposes to amend this section to explicitly require that Participants 
and the SEC be able to use

[[Page 66023]]

the unique Customer-ID to track allocations to any Customer or group of 
Customers over time, regardless of what brokerage account was used to 
enter the order as well. The Commission believes these changes are 
appropriate so that regulators can track Customer-IDs over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ Currently, Section 9.3 of Appendix D provides that ``The 
Plan Processor will assign a CAT-Customer-ID for each unique 
Customer. The Plan Processor will determine a unique Customer using 
information such as SSN and DOB for natural persons or entity 
identifiers for Customers that are not natural persons and will 
resolve discrepancies. Once a CAT-Customer-ID is assigned, it will 
be added to each linked (or unlinked) order record for that 
Customer. Participants and the SEC must be able to use the unique 
CAT-Customer-ID to track orders from any Customer or group of 
Customers, regardless of what brokerage account was used to enter 
the order.'' See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
9.3.
    \230\ See supra Part II.E.2.
    \231\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 9.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to 
Appendix D, Section 9.3 (Customer-ID Tracking) of the CAT NMS Plan. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    83. Are there any factors that could impact the ability of the Plan 
Processor to resolve discrepancies in the Transformed Values?
8. Error Resolution for Customer Data
    Appendix D, Section 9.4 (Error Resolution for Customer Data) 
currently addresses the Plan Processor's general obligations with 
respect to errors, and minor and material inconsistencies.\232\ Section 
9.4 of Appendix D requires the Plan Processor to design and implement 
procedures and mechanisms to handle both minor and material 
inconsistencies in Customer information, and to accommodate minor data 
discrepancies such as variations in road name abbreviations in 
searches.\233\ This section of the CAT NMS Plan further provides that 
material inconsistencies such as two different people with the same SSN 
must be communicated to the submitting CAT Reporters and resolved 
within the established error correction timeframe as detailed in 
Section 8.\234\ Regarding the audit trail showing the resolution of all 
errors, this provision also requires that the audit trail include 
certain information including, for example, the CAT Reporter; the 
initial submission date and time; data in question or the ID of the 
record in question; and the reason identified as the source of the 
issue.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
9.4.
    \233\ See id.
    \234\ See id.
    \235\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to 
apply the error resolution process to the CCID Subsystem and CAIS; to 
provide details as to how the existing validation requirements of 
Section 7.2 of Appendix D relate to the CCID Subsystem and CAIS; and to 
amend the existing audit trail requirements addressing the resolution 
of all errors to take into account the revised reporting requirements 
that would require the submission of Transformed Values by Industry 
Members and Participants.
    Accordingly, the proposed amendments to Section 9.4 would require 
that the CCID Subsystem and CAIS support error resolution functionality 
which includes the following components: Validation of submitted data, 
notification of errors in submitted data, resubmission of corrected 
data, validation of corrected data, and a full audit trail of actions 
taken to support error resolution.\236\ The proposed amendments also 
would require, consistent with Section 7.2, the Plan Processor to 
design and implement a robust data validation process for all ingested 
values and functionality including, at a minimum: The ingestion of 
Transformed Values and the creation of Customer-IDs through the CCID 
Subsystem; the transmission of Customer-IDs from the CCID Subsystem to 
CAIS or a Participant's SAW; and the transmission and linking of all 
Customer and Account Attributes and any other identifiers (e.g., 
Industry Member Firm Designated ID) required by the Plan Processor to 
be reported to CAIS.\237\ The proposed amendments also provide that at 
a minimum, the validation process should identify and resolve errors 
with an Industry Member's submission of Transformed Values, Customer 
and Account Attributes, and Firm Designated IDs including where there 
are identical Customer-IDs associated with significantly different 
names, and identical Customer-IDs associated with different years of 
birth, or other differences in Customer and Account Attributes for 
identical Customer-IDs.\238\ The Commission also proposes to amend 
Section 9.4 to require that the proposed validations must result in 
notifications to the Industry Member to allow for corrections, 
resubmission of corrected data and revalidation of corrected data, and 
to note that as a result of this error resolution process there will be 
accurate reporting within a single Industry Member as it relates to the 
submission of Transformed Values and the linking of associated Customer 
and Account Attributes reported.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See id.
    \237\ See id.
    \238\ See id.
    \239\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Timely, accurate, and complete CAT Data is essential so that 
Regulatory Staff and SEC staff can rely on CAT Data in their regulatory 
and oversight responsibilities.\240\ Therefore, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that these proposed amendments addressing how 
the Plan Processor must address errors in data reported to CAIS and the 
CCID Subsystem are appropriate. The proposed amendments also set out 
the key components that such error resolution functionality must 
address, namely the validation of submitted data; notification of error 
in submitted data, resubmission of corrected data, validation of 
corrected data, and an audit trail of actions taken to support error 
resolution. Error resolution for each of these key functionalities will 
help ensure that CAT Data is timely, accurate and complete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at Part 
III.19 ``Error Rates.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 7.2 of Appendix D already requires that CAT Data be 
validated.\241\ The proposed amendments to Section 9.4 provide detail 
as to how the existing validation process in Section 7.2 of Appendix D 
should apply to the revised reporting requirements applicable to 
Industry Members and the process for creating Customer-IDs through the 
CCID Subsystem. As proposed, the amendments specify that the validation 
process must address the ingestion of Transformed Values and the 
creation of Customer-IDs through the CCID Subsystem; the transmission 
of Customer-IDs to CAIS or the Participant's SAW; and the linking 
between the Customer-IDs and the Customer and Account Attributes within 
CAIS.\242\ Each of those requirements addresses key reporting 
requirements and operations that must be validated by the Plan 
Processor as part of the validation process of CAT Data as required by 
Section 7.2 of Appendix D. The Commission also believes that the 
examples of what the validation process should, at a minimum, address 
is appropriate because these examples relate to the new reporting 
requirements related to Transformed Values and Customer and Account 
Attributes, and therefore were not discussed in the CAT NMS Plan. The 
Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to amend 
the CAT NMS Plan to require that the Plan Processor notify Industry 
Members of errors so that they can correct them. This notification 
facilitates a process for reporting corrected data to the CAT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Appendix D Section 7.2.
    \242\ See proposed Appendix D Section 9.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission also believes that it is appropriate to 
modify the existing CAT NMS Plan requirement that the Central 
Repository have an audit trail showing the resolution of all errors, 
including material inconsistencies, occurring in the CCID Subsystem and 
CAIS. Article VI, Section 6.5(d) of the CAT NMS Plan requires that CAT 
Data be accurate, which would

[[Page 66024]]

include data that is reported to the CCID Subsystem and CAIS.\243\ The 
Commission is proposing that there be an audit trail showing the 
resolution of all errors, including material inconsistencies, occurring 
in the CCID Subsystem and CAIS because tracking error resolution will 
assist in identifying compliance issues with CAT Reporters, and 
therefore help ensure that CAT Data is accurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Article VI, Section 
6.5(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    84. The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to 
design and implement a robust data validation process for all ingested 
values and functionality, consistent with Appendix D, Section 7.2. Are 
the minimum requirements set forth for inclusion in this data 
validation process sufficiently detailed for the purposes of 
implementing such a process? Should the proposed amendments be more 
specific about what kind of capability must be provided by the Plan 
Processor? If so, please explain what kinds of details would be 
helpful.
    85. The proposed amendments would require the CCID Subsystem and 
CAIS to support error resolution functionality which includes the 
following components: Validation of submitted data, notification of 
errors in submitted data, resubmission of corrected data, validation of 
corrected data, and an audit trail of actions taken to support error 
resolution. Do the proposed amendments set forth the components of the 
error resolution functionality that must be supported by the CCID 
Subsystem and CAIS with an appropriate amount of detail? If not, should 
other details be added or are some not necessary?
    86. Appendix D, Section 9.4 requires the Central Repository to have 
an audit trail showing the resolution of all errors. The proposed 
amendments would require the audit trail to show the resolution of all 
errors, including material inconsistencies, occurring in the CCID 
Subsystem and CAIS. Do the proposed amendments set forth the components 
of the audit trail requirements with an appropriate amount of detail? 
If not, what details should be added or are some not necessary?
    87. Should the proposed amendments address error resolution 
requirements with respect to Transformed Values and Customer and 
Account Attributes, and reporting Transformed Values to the CCID 
Subsystem and Customer and Account Attributes to CAIS? If error 
resolution requirements are not applied to Transformed Values and 
Customer and Account Attributes, and reporting Transformed Values to 
the CCID Subsystem and Customer and Account Attributes to CAIS, how 
would errors in those data elements be identified and corrected? Please 
be specific in your response.
9. CAT Reporter Support and CAT Help Desk
    Currently, Appendix D, Section 10.1 of the CAT NMS Plan addresses 
the technical, operational, and business support being offered by the 
Plan Processor to CAT Reporters as applied to all aspects of reporting 
to CAT, and Section 10.3 of Appendix D addresses the responsibilities 
of the CAT Help Desk to support broker-dealers, third party CAT 
Reporters, and Participant CAT Reporters with questions and issues 
regarding reporting obligations and the operation of the CAT.\244\ The 
Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to add the requirements 
that (i) the Plan Processor would also provide CAT Reporter Support and 
Help Desk support for issues related to the CCID Transformation Logic 
and reporting required by the CCID Subsystem, and (ii) the Plan 
Processor would have to develop tools to allow each CAT Reporter to 
monitor the use of the CCID Transformation Logic, including the 
submission of Transformed Values to the CCID Subsystem.\245\ The 
Commission believes these amendments are appropriate so that all CAT 
Reporters who must submit Transformed Values to the CCID Subsystem can 
get the assistance that they need should any problems arise with their 
efforts to report the required data to the CAT.
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    \244\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Sections 
10.1 and 10.3.
    \245\ See proposed Appendix D, Sections 10.1 and 10.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments that 
would amend Appendix D, Sections 10.1 and 10.3 of the CAT NMS Plan. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    88. With respect to CAT Reporter support, the proposed amendments 
would require the Plan Processor to develop functionality that allows 
each CAT Reporter to monitor the use of the CCID Transformation Logic 
including the submission of Transformed Values to the CCID Subsystem. 
Should the proposed amendments be more specific about what kind of 
functionality must be provided by the Plan Processor? If so, please 
explain what kinds of details would be helpful.
    89. The proposed amendments would require the CAT Help Desk to 
support responding to questions from and providing support to CAT 
Reporters regarding all aspects of the CCID Transformation Logic and 
CCID Subsystem. Are there any specific aspects that should be 
enumerated in relation to CAT Help Desk support?

F. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow

    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires Industry Members to report PII 
\246\ to the CAT, and states that such ``PII can be gathered using the 
`PII workflow' described in Appendix D, Data Security, PII Data 
Requirements.'' \247\ However, the ``PII workflow'' was neither defined 
nor established in the CAT NMS Plan.\248\ While the modifications 
proposed by the Commission in Part II.E no longer require a Customer's 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s), account number and date of birth be reported to and 
collected by the CAT, Customer and Account Attributes, as described in 
Part II.E., are still reported to and collected by the CAT and could be 
used to attribute order flow to a single Customer across broker-
dealers.\249\ The collection of Customer and Account Attributes and 
access to such attributes will facilitate the ability of Regulatory 
Staff to carry out their regulatory and oversight obligations.\250\ 
Therefore, the Commission is proposing to amend the CAT NMS Plan to 
define the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow for accessing Customer 
and Account Attributes, and to establish restrictions governing such 
access. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan 
to (1) specify how existing data security requirements apply to 
Customer and Account Attributes; (2) define the Customer Identifying 
Systems; (3) establish general requirements that must be met by 
Regulatory Staff before accessing the Customer Identifying Systems, 
which access will be divided between two types of access--manual access 
and programmatic access; and (4) establish the specific requirements 
for each type of access to the Customer Identifying Systems.\251\
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    \246\ See supra note 10.
    \247\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.6.
    \248\ Id.
    \249\ See supra Part II.E; see also proposed Section 1.1 for the 
proposed definition of ``Customer and Account Attributes.''
    \250\ See supra Part II.E for a discussion of the changes to the 
data collected by the CAT that would identify an individual or legal 
entity, and the associated defined term ``Customer and Account 
Attributes.''
    \251\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow).

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[[Page 66025]]

1. Application of Existing Plan Requirements to Customer and Account 
Attributes and the Customer Identifying Systems
    Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 of the CAT NMS Plan currently requires 
that PII must be stored separately from other CAT Data, and that PII 
must not be accessible from public internet connectivity.\252\ The CAT 
NMS Plan also states that PII data must not be included in the result 
set(s) from online or direct query tools, reports, or bulk data 
extraction; instead, results are to display existing non-PII unique 
identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID or Firm Designated ID).\253\ The PII 
corresponding to these identifiers can be gathered using a ``PII 
workflow.'' \254\ The CAT NMS Plan also provides that by default, users 
entitled to query CAT Data are not authorized for PII access, and that 
furthermore the process by which someone becomes entitled to PII 
access, and how they then go about accessing PII data, must be 
documented by the Plan Processor.\255\ The chief regulatory officer, or 
other such designated officer or employee at each Participant must 
review and certify that people with PII access have the appropriate 
level of access for their role at least annually.\256\ The CAT NMS Plan 
also provides that a full audit trail of PII access (i.e., who accessed 
what data, and when) must be maintained, and that the Chief Compliance 
Officer and the Chief Information Security Officer must have access to 
daily PII reports that list all users who are entitled to PII access, 
as well as the audit trail of all PII access that has occurred for the 
day being reported upon.\257\ In other sections of the CAT NMS Plan, 
PII data is also required to be ``masked'' unless a user has permission 
to view it.\258\
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    \252\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
    \253\ See id.
    \254\ See id.
    \255\ See id.
    \256\ See id.
    \257\ See id.
    \258\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.10(c)(ii) and 
Appendix D, Section 8.2.2.
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    The Commission proposes to amend these provisions to replace the 
term ``PII'' with ``Customer and Account Attributes'' and to reflect 
that Customer Identifying Systems, including CAIS, would now contain 
the information that identifies a Customer.\259\ Accordingly, the 
proposed amendments to Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 would provide that 
Customer and Account Attributes data must be stored separately from 
other CAT Data within the CAIS, that Customer and Account Attributes 
cannot be stored with the transactional CAT Data in the Central 
Repository, and that Customer and Account Attributes must not be 
accessible from public internet connectivity. Similarly, the proposed 
amendments would provide that Customer and Account Attributes must not 
be included in the result set(s) from online or direct query tools, 
reports, or bulk data extraction tools used to query transactional CAT 
Data. Instead, query results of transactional CAT Data would display 
unique identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID or Firm Designated ID) and the 
Customer and Account Attributes corresponding to these identifiers 
could be gathered by accessing CAIS in accordance with the ``Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow,'' as described in the proposed amendments 
and discussed below. The proposed amendments would provide that, by 
default, users entitled to query CAT Data would not be authorized to 
access Customer Identifying Systems, and the process by which someone 
becomes entitled to Customer Identifying Systems and how an authorized 
person then could access Customer Identifying Systems, would have to be 
documented by the Plan Processor. The proposed amendments also would 
modify the CAT NMS Plan to require that a similarly designated head(s) 
of regulation or the designee of the chief regulatory officer or such 
similarly designated head of regulation must, at least annually, review 
and certify that people with Customer Identifying Systems access have 
the appropriate level of access for their role, in accordance with the 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, as discussed and described 
below.\260\
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    \259\ See supra Part II.E.1; see also proposed Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.6.
    \260\ Other provisions of the CAT NMS Plan that refer to PII are 
also proposed to be similarly modified to remove the term ``PII'' 
and instead refer to ``Customer and Account Attributes'' or 
``Customer Identifying Systems'' as appropriate. See, e.g., Appendix 
D, Sections 4.1.6 and 8.2.2.
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    The proposed amendments also would modify the requirement related 
to maintaining a full audit trail to require that the audit trail must 
reflect access to the Customer Identifying Systems by each Participant 
and the Commission (i.e., who accessed what data, and when), and to 
require that the Plan Processor provide to each Participant and the 
Commission the audit trail for their respective users on a monthly 
basis. In addition, the proposed amendments would require that the 
Chief Compliance Officer and Chief Information Security Officer have 
access to daily reports that list all users who are entitled to 
Customer Identifying Systems access, and that such reports must be 
provided to the Operating Committee on a monthly basis.\261\
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    \261\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the proposed amendments are 
appropriate because storing Customer and Account Attributes separately 
from other CAT Data would aid in protecting the confidentiality of 
Customer identifying information that is reported to and collected by 
the CAT, and would reflect what the CAT NMS Plan currently requires for 
PII.\262\ Moreover, Customer and Account Attributes should neither be 
stored with transactional CAT Data nor be accessible by public internet 
in order to further aid in protecting this information. Similarly, to 
help safeguard Customer and Account Attributes, such attributes should 
not be included in result set(s) obtained from online or direct query 
tools or bulk extraction tools. The proposed amendments that would 
permit a designated head of regulation similar to the chief regulatory 
officer, or his or her designee, to at least annually review and 
certify that people with Customer Identifying Systems Access have the 
appropriate level of access for their role in accordance with the 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow are appropriate because this 
change will serve to ease any potential delays in the annual review and 
certification process. The proposed amendments would accomplish this by 
expanding the pool of individuals that are authorized to conduct such 
reviews and certifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ The CAT NMS Plan presently requires PII to be stored 
separately from other CAT Data. See Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposed amendments deleting ``masked'' Customer 
and Account Attributes are appropriate because ``masked'' Customer and 
Account Attributes implies that certain Customer and Account Attributes 
(i.e., ``masked'' Customer and Account Attributes) would be made 
available to certain Regulatory Staff outside of the access 
requirements set forth in these proposed amendments. The Commission 
believes that if Regulatory Staff do not meet the requirements to be 
entitled to access Customer and Account Attributes, then Regulatory 
Staff should not be allowed to access those Customer and Account 
Attributes, even if such data were to be masked.
    The Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to require 
the Plan Processor to provide the audit trail of access to Customer 
Identifying Systems by each Participant and the Commission (who 
accessed what data and when), and to require the Plan

[[Page 66026]]

Processor to provide to each Participant and the Commission the audit 
trail for their respective users on a monthly basis because providing 
such information may increase the accountability and transparency into 
the justification(s) for each Participant's access to Customer 
Identifying Systems. The benefit of providing the audit trail of 
Customer Identifying Systems access to each Participant is that it 
would enable each Participant to monitor use in accordance with their 
data confidentiality policies, procedures, and usage restriction 
controls. Similarly, the Commission could use such data in support of 
their internal policies governing access to Customer Identifying 
Systems.\263\ The Commission also believes that providing the daily 
reports of all users entitled to access the Customer Identifying 
Systems to the Operating Committee on a monthly basis would enable 
Participants and the Operating Committee to verify that only Regulatory 
Staff who are entitled to access Customer Identifying Systems have such 
access.
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    \263\ See also Part II.N. infra, for a discussion of how the 
proposed amendments would apply to Commission staff. The Commission 
understands that a full audit trail of all access to Customer 
Identifying Systems is required by NIST 800-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the continued application of 
existing provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 to help ensure the 
security and confidentiality of the information reported to and 
collected by the Customer Identifying Systems. Specifically, the 
Commission solicits comment on the following:
    90. Existing provisions of the CAT NMS Plan address the security 
and confidentiality of CAT Data by requiring that PII must be stored 
separately from other CAT Data. These provisions also specifically 
require that PII cannot be stored with transactional CAT Data and that 
PII must not be accessible from public internet connectivity. Should 
the existing provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 continue to apply 
so as to require: (i) That Customer and Account Attributes data are 
stored separately from other CAT Data within the CAIS, (ii) that 
Customer and Account Attributes cannot be stored with the transactional 
CAT Data in the Central Repository, and (iii) that Customer and Account 
Attributes must not be accessible from public internet connectivity? 
Why or why not? Please explain with specificity why such provisions 
should or should not apply.
    91. Should existing provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 
continue to apply so as to require that Customer and Account Attributes 
must not be included in the result set(s) from online or direct query 
tools, reports, or bulk data extraction tools used to query 
transactional CAT Data? In addition, is it appropriate to amend the CAT 
NMS Plan to require that query results of transactional CAT Data will 
display unique identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID or Firm Designated ID)? 
If such unique identifiers are not displayed, what should be provided 
in result set(s) from online or direct query tools, reports, or bulk 
data extraction tool queries?
    92. Is it appropriate to amend the CAT NMS Plan to state that by 
default, users entitled to query CAT Data are not authorized to access 
Customer Identifying Systems? Why or why not? Please explain with 
specificity why this provision should or should not apply and what 
other process would be appropriate to ensure that only authorized users 
access the Customer Identifying systems.
    93. The existing CAT NMS Plan requires that the Chief Regulatory 
Officer or another such designated officer or employee at each 
Participant must at least annually review and certify that people with 
PII access have the appropriate level of access in light of their 
respective roles. The proposed amendments state that the review and 
certification must be made by the Chief Regulatory Officer or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation, or his or her designee, at each 
Participant, and that the Chief Regulatory Officer or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation, or his or her designee must, at least 
annually, review the list of people who have access to Customer 
Identifying Systems at their organization, the role of each person on 
the list and the level of access of each person. Based on that review, 
the Chief Regulatory Office must certify that people with Customer 
Identifying Systems access have the appropriate level of access for 
their role, in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems 
Workflow. Is it appropriate to continue to facilitate oversight 
regarding who has access to the Customer Identifying Systems by 
applying these requirements to the Customer Identifying Systems 
Workflow? Why or why not? Please explain with specificity why such 
provisions should or should not apply.
    94. Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 of the CAT NMS Plan requires a full 
audit trail of access to PII (who accessed what data, and when) to be 
maintained. Should the proposed amendments require that the Plan 
Processor maintain a full audit trail of access to Customer Identifying 
Systems by each Participant and the Commission (who accessed what data 
and when), and require that the Plan Processor provide to each 
Participant and the Commission the audit trail for their respective 
users on a monthly basis? Furthermore, should the proposed amendments 
require that the Chief Compliance Officer and the Chief Information 
Security Officer l have access to daily reports that list all users who 
are entitled to Customer Identifying Systems access, and for such 
reports to be provided to the Operating Committee on a monthly basis? 
Why or why not? Is there another means of providing information to the 
Participants and the Operating Committee to facilitate their review of 
access to Customer Identifying Systems? If so, please identify this 
means and explain why it would be an appropriate way to facilitate 
review of access to Customer Identifying Systems.
2. Defining the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow and the General 
Requirements for Accessing Customer Identifying Systems
    Given that Regulatory Staff may seek to access both CAIS and the 
CCID Subsystem (collectively, the Customer Identifying Systems) in 
order to carry out their regulatory and oversight responsibilities, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to establish 
access requirements that would apply to both systems. Accordingly, the 
Commission proposes to amend Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D to require 
that access to Customer Identifying Systems be subject to the following 
restrictions, many of which already exist in the CAT NMS Plan today, as 
discussed below.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow, Access to Customer Identifying 
Systems).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, only Regulatory Staff may access Customer Identifying 
Systems and such access would have to follow the ``least privileged'' 
practice of limiting access to Customer Identifying Systems as much as 
possible.\265\ Second, using the role based access control (``RBAC'') 
model described in the CAT NMS Plan, access to Customer and Account 
Attributes would have to be configured at the Customer and Account 
Attributes level.\266\ Third, all queries of Customer Identifying 
Systems would have to be based on a ``need to know''

[[Page 66027]]

the data \267\ in the Customer Identifying Systems, and queries must be 
designed such that the query results would contain only the Customer 
and Account Attributes that Regulatory Staff reasonably believes will 
achieve the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries, 
consistent with Article VI, Section 6.5(g) of the CAT NMS Plan.\268\ 
Fourth, Customer Identifying Systems would have to be accessed through 
a Participant's SAW.\269\ Fifth, access to Customer Identifying Systems 
would be limited to two types of access: Manual access (which would 
include Manual CAIS Access and Manual CCID Subsystem Access, as further 
discussed below) and programmatic access (which would include 
Programmatic CAIS Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access, as 
further discussed below). Lastly, authorization to use Programmatic 
CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access would have to be 
requested and approved by the Commission, pursuant to the process as 
further described in the proposed amendments below.\270\
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    \265\ The CAT NMS Plan currently states that ``[u]sing the RBAC 
model described above, access to PII data shall be configured at the 
PII attribute level, following the `least privileged' practice of 
limiting access as much as possible.'' See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 
3, Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (PII Data Requirements).
    \266\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
    \267\ The Participants stated that they ``anticipate that access 
to PII will be limited to a `need-to-know' basis. Therefore, it is 
expected that access to PII associated with customers and accounts 
will have a much lower number of registered users, and access to 
this data will be limited to Participants' staff and the SEC who 
need to know the specific identity of an individual.'' See CAT NMS 
Plan, supra note 3, Appendix C, Section A.4.(b). The Plan also 
states that ``[t]he Participants are requiring multi-factor 
authentication and Role Based Access Control for access to PII, 
separation of PII from other CAT Data, restricted access to PII 
(only those with a `need to know' will have access), and an 
auditable record of all access to PII data contained in the Central 
Repository.'' See CAT NMS Plan Appendix C, Section D.12.(e).
    \268\ See id.
    \269\ See id. For a discussion of the requirements related to 
SAWs, see infra Part II.C.
    \270\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer and 
Accounts Attributes Data Requirements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposal to 
establish rules applicable to all forms of access to the Customer 
Identifying Systems by all Participants would facilitate the 
application of the same requirements and standards across all 
Regulatory Staff at each Participant seeking access to Customer 
Identifying Systems. Furthermore, restricting access to Regulatory 
Staff is appropriate because such staff are required to report directly 
to the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation), or to persons within the Participant's Chief 
Regulatory Officer's (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation's) 
reporting line, and because such staff must be specifically identified 
and approved in writing by the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer 
(or similarly designated head(s) of regulation).\271\ Thus, the 
proposed amendments would help to ensure that the Participant's staff 
accessing Customer and Account Attributes and other identifying 
information about a Customer are doing so for regulatory--not 
commercial--purposes, and that sufficient oversight of such access by 
the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer exists.\272\ In addition, by 
allowing a similarly designated head(s) of regulation to also approve 
such access, the Commission preliminarily believes that any operational 
issues in obtaining such approval should be minimized.
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    \271\ See proposed Section 6.5(g).
    \272\ See Part II.H.1, infra, for a discussion of proposed 
amendments related to restricting access to CAT Data solely for 
regulatory purposes. Access to Customer and Account Attributes, 
which are a subset of CAT Data, would be subject to these 
restrictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to limit access to Customer Identifying Systems to the minimum level of 
access that will achieve the Participant's regulatory purposes.\273\ 
For example, a regulator investigating alleged fraud against senior 
investors may only need the year of birth to investigate such matters; 
thus, under the ``least privileged practice'' model, such Regulatory 
Staff would only be entitled to view year of birth from CAIS in 
response to queries, and would only access the minimum amount of CAT 
Data, including Customer and Account Attributes, that would be required 
to conduct their investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3 at note 
1299.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The RBAC model, which is already an access requirement contained in 
the CAT NMS Plan, requires that the Plan Processor grant permission to 
access certain CAT Data based on the user's regulatory role.\274\ The 
Commission believes it is appropriate to apply the same RBAC model to 
access to Customer and Account Attributes because not all Regulatory 
Staff will need to access Customer and Account Attributes, and 
limitations on such access should be based on the role that such 
Regulatory Staff fill for the Participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Appendix D, Section 4.1.4 
(Data Access).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to require that all queries of the Customer Identifying Systems be 
based on a regulator's ``need to know'' the data in the Customer 
Identifying Systems, and to require that queries be designed such that 
query results contain only the Customer and Account Attributes that 
Regulatory Staff reasonably believes will achieve the regulatory 
purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries, consistent with Article VI, 
Section 6.5(g) of the CAT NMS Plan.\275\ The Participants stated that 
they intended the CAT NMS Plan to require that a regulator ``need to 
know'' the Customer and Account Attributes, and thus only those users 
who have ``need to know'' the Customer and Account Attributes will be 
granted access to the Customer and Account Attributes.\276\ The 
Commission believes that incorporating the ``need to know'' standard in 
the proposed amendments would require Regulatory Staff to articulate 
their reasons for needing access to search CAIS or use the CCID 
Subsystem. These proposed amendments also would help to limit the 
results of queries to containing only the Customer and Account 
Attributes that Regulatory Staff reasonably believes will achieve the 
regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries that are being 
pursued by Regulatory Staff, which would be consistent with the 
requirements set forth in Article VI, Section 6.5(g) of the CAT NMS 
Plan.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow, Access to Customer Identifying 
Systems).
    \276\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Appendix C, Section 
A.4(b); see also CAT NMS Plan Appendix C, Section D.12.(e).
    \277\ See proposed Appendix D, 4.1.6 (Customer Identifying 
Systems Workflow).
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    The Commission believes that the proposed amendments would result 
in Regulatory Staff continually assessing whether there is a need to 
know the volume of Customer and Account Attributes that may be returned 
in response to a query in light of the regulatory purpose of the query 
being submitted, and whether the query results contain only the 
Customer and Account Attributes that Regulatory Staff reasonably 
believes will achieve the regulatory purpose of the Regulatory Staff's 
inquiry or set of inquiries. The same requirement applies when 
Regulatory Staff utilizes programmatic access; to the extent 
applications to query Customer and Account Attributes are developed as 
part of programmatic access, such applications must support a design 
that limits Customer and Account Attributes to only those which 
Regulatory Staff reasonably believes are needed to achieve the 
regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries. The Commission 
also expects that this assessment would operate as a useful check on 
the scope of the queries being submitted by Regulatory Staff, and that 
this requirement would complement the proposed amendments

[[Page 66028]]

that address access-level requirements, as discussed above (i.e., that 
only Regulatory Staff may access Customer Identifying Systems and such 
access must follow the ``least privileged'' practice of limiting access 
to Customer Identifying Systems as much as possible).\278\
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    \278\ Similar to the requirement that applications developed in 
connection with programmatic access must support a design that 
limits the Customer and Account Attributes to only that which 
Regulatory Staff reasonably believes are needed to achieve the 
regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries as discussed 
above, these applications also must support all elements of the 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow (e.g., following the ``least 
privileged'' practice of limiting access to Customer Identifying 
Systems as much as possible).
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    The Commission also believes that it is appropriate to require that 
Customer Identifying Systems must be accessed through a Participant's 
SAW.\279\ As described above in Part II.C.3., each Participant's SAW is 
a secure analytic environment that would be part of the CAT System and 
therefore subject to the CISP.\280\ This provision together with 
Proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(A) establishes the SAW as the only means of 
accessing and analyzing Customer and Account Attributes and applies the 
security safeguards implemented in a Participant's SAW to protect all 
access to Customer Identifying Systems, leveraging security controls 
and related policies and procedures that are consistent with those that 
protect the Central Repository.\281\ Requiring access through a 
Participant's SAW also would enable the Plan Processor to capture 
information about CAT Data usage by Participants, which would assist 
Participants in analyzing such usage to determine whether CAT Data is 
being used for legitimate regulatory or oversight purposes.
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    \279\ See Part II.C. supra for a discussion of the proposed 
SAWs.
    \280\ See proposed Section 6.13.
    \281\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow).
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    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to limit access to the Customer Identifying Systems to two types of 
access--manual and programmatic.\282\ As noted above, the CAT NMS Plan 
currently follows the ``least privileged'' practice of limiting access 
to information identifying a Customer to the greatest extent 
possible.\283\ The Commission believes that applying this same security 
focused, minimum access approach to the data in the Customer 
Identifying systems is appropriate in order to safeguard the Customer 
information contained in each system from bad actors who obtain such 
information through a data breach. The Commission believes that the 
``least privileged practice'' approach also means that only Regulatory 
Staff will be permitted to access Customer Identifying Systems.\284\ 
Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to limit access to those 
systems to two methods: Manual access (which would include Manual CAIS 
Access and Manual CCID Subsystem Access) and programmatic access (which 
would include Programmatic CAIS Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
Access), which would be subject to an approval process, as further 
described below, and only granted if certain circumstances are 
met.\285\
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    \282\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow).
    \283\ See supra note 273.
    \284\ See also Part II.H.1, infra, for a discussion of proposed 
amendments requiring need for regulatory purpose for access to 
Customer and Account Attributes.
    \285\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
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    Finally, the Commission preliminarily believes that Programmatic 
CAIS Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access, as further detailed 
below, should only be used by Participants if requested and approved by 
the Commission.\286\ Indeed, the Participants represented in the CAT 
NMS Plan that ``general queries can be carried out using the Customer-
ID without the need to know specific, personally-identifiable 
information (i.e., who the individual Person or legal entity associated 
with the Customer-ID is). The Customer-ID will be associated with the 
relevant accounts of that Person; thus, the use of Customer-ID for 
querying will not reduce surveillance.'' \287\ Thus, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to require Regulatory 
Staff to use manual access to Customer Identifying Systems in order to 
carry out their regulatory responsibilities because such access should 
meet the regulatory purpose of their inquiry or set of inquiries--and 
only access CAIS and the CCID Subsystem programmatically if authorized 
by the Commission.\288\
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    \286\ See infra Part II.F.5.
    \287\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84983 
note 826.
    \288\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to 
define the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow and the requirements 
for accessing Customer Identifying Systems. Specifically, the 
Commission solicits comment on the following:
    95. Do Commenters agree that it is necessary to define and set 
forth the requirements for the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow? 
If not, what provisions of the CAT NMS Plan apply to govern access to 
Customer Identifying Systems? Please be specific about those provisions 
and explain how they protect the information reported to and collected 
by the Customer Identifying Systems.
    96. Is there a different set of requirements that should be applied 
to the proposed Customer Identifying Systems Workflow? If yes, please 
describe with specificity what those requirements are and how they 
would operate to support the security and confidentiality of the 
information reported to and collected by the Customer Identifying 
Systems.
    97. The proposed amendments require that only Regulatory Staff may 
access Customer Identifying Systems and such access must follow the 
``least privileged'' practice of limiting access to Customer 
Identifying Systems as much as possible. What are the advantages to 
limiting access to the Customer Identifying Systems in this manner? Are 
there other standards of access to Customer Identifying Systems that 
would be appropriate? If so, what are those standards? Please be 
specific in your response.
    98. The proposed amendments require that access to Customer and 
Account Attributes shall be configured at the Customer and Account 
Attributes level using the Role Based Access Model in the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow. Is there another more appropriate way to 
configure access to Customer and Account Attributes? Should access to 
identifiers in the transaction database (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or 
Industry Member Firm Designated ID(s)) be permitted, or entitled, 
separately such that Regulatory Staff would need specific permissions 
to access these identifiers? If so, how would regulatory use of CAT 
Data still be accomplished? Please discuss implementation details 
addressing both security and usability.
    99. The proposed amendments require that all queries of Customer 
Identifying Systems must be based on a ``need to know'' data in the 
Customer Identifying Systems. Is there a different standard that should 
apply to queries of the Customer Identifying Systems and if so, why is 
that standard more appropriate? Please be specific in your response.
    100. The proposed amendments state that the standard for assessing 
the Customer and Account Attributes that can be returned in response to 
a query is what Regulatory Staff reasonably believes will achieve the 
regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries in the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow. Is this standard appropriate?

[[Page 66029]]

Why or why not? If there is another standard that should apply, what 
should that standard be? Please be specific in your response.
    101. The proposed amendments require that Customer Information 
Systems must be accessed through a Participant's SAW in the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow. Should the proposed amendments permit 
access other than through a Participant's SAW? If so, is there another 
way to subject the accessing and analyzing of Customer and Account 
Attributes to the CISP?
    102. The proposed amendments state that access to Customer 
Identifying Systems will be limited to two types of access: Manual 
access (which would include Manual CAIS Access and Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access) and programmatic access (which would include 
Programmatic CAIS Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access). Are 
these methods of access appropriate for facilitating the ability of 
Regulatory Staff to fulfill their regulatory and oversight obligations? 
Please explain.
    103. The proposed amendments require that authorization to use 
Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access must be 
requested and approved by the Commission pursuant to the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow. Do Commenters agree that it is 
appropriate to require Commission authorization to use Programmatic 
Access to the CAIS and the CCID Subsystem?
3. Introduction to Manual and Programmatic Access
    As noted above, the proposed amendments would limit access to 
Customer Identifying Systems to two general methods of access--manual 
and programmatic access. Accordingly, the Commission is proposing 
amendments to the CAT NMS Plan that would define and set forth the 
requirements for (1) Manual CAIS Access and Manual CCID Subsystem 
Access; and (2) Programmatic CAIS Access and Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access. A description of the requirements applicable to each 
method of access follows.
4. Manual CAIS Access
    The Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to define Manual 
CAIS Access to mean ``[w]hen used in connection with the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow, as defined in Appendix D, shall mean the 
Plan Processor functionality to manually query CAIS, in accordance with 
Appendix D, Data Security, and the Participants' policies as set forth 
in Section 6.5(g).'' \289\ Under the proposed amendments, if Regulatory 
Staff have identified a Customer(s) of regulatory interest through 
regulatory efforts and require additional information from the CAT 
regarding such Customer(s), then they may use Manual CAIS Access.\290\ 
The proposed amendments also would provide that additional information 
about Customer(s) may be accessed through Manual CAIS Access by (1) 
using identifiers available in the transaction database (e.g., 
Customer-ID(s) or Industry Member Firm Designated ID(s)) to identify 
Customer and Account Attributes associated with the Customer-ID(s) or 
Industry Member Firm Designated ID(s), as applicable; or (2) using 
Customer Attributes in CAIS to identify a Customer-ID(s) or Industry 
Member Firm Designated ID(s), as applicable, associated with the 
Customer Attributes, in order to search the transaction database.\291\ 
The proposed amendments would not permit open-ended searching of 
parameters not specific to a Customer(s).\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ See proposed Section 1.1.
    \290\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow).
    \291\ See id.
    \292\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to 
require that Manual CAIS Access must provide Regulatory Staff with the 
ability to retrieve data in CAIS via the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator 
Portal with query parameters based on data elements including Customer 
and Account Attributes and other identifiers available in the 
transaction database (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or Industry Member Firm 
Designated ID(s)).\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \293\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the proposed amendments would require that the performance 
requirements for Manual CAIS Access be consistent with the criteria set 
out in Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System, Online Targeted 
Query Tool Performance Requirements.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ See id. ``Performance requirements'' refers to the 
response times Online Targeted Queries. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 
3, Appendix D Section 8.1.2. Pursuant to Appendix D, Section 8.1.2, 
the performance requirement for Manual CAIS Access must generally be 
in increments of less than one minute. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These proposed amendments reflect a principle that underlies the 
required use of manual access to CAIS (and manual access to the CCID 
Subsystem, as further discussed below) that if Regulatory Staff have 
already identified a Customer(s) of interest based on their regulatory 
efforts and Regulatory Staff have a ``need to know'' additional 
identifying information about the Customer(s), then manual access may 
be used to obtain such information.\295\ For example, manual access 
would be appropriate if Regulatory Staff have the Customer-ID of a 
Customer or the Industry Member Firm Designated ID of Customer as a 
result of a search of the transactional CAT database in furtherance of 
a regulatory purpose, and Regulatory Staff require additional Customer 
and Account Attributes associated with that Customer (e.g., the name 
and address associated with that Customer-ID). Manual CAIS Access also 
would be appropriate if Regulatory Staff have identifying information 
that are Customer and Account Attributes (e.g., name or address of a 
natural person Customer) and have a regulatory ``need to know'' that 
Customer's Customer-ID in order to search the transactional CAT 
Data.\296\
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    \295\ See Part II.G.2., infra for a discussion of policies and 
procedures relating to access to and use of CAT Data.
    \296\ Manual CAIS Access is distinct from Programmatic CAIS 
Access and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access, as discussed infra 
Part II.F.6 (Programmatic CAIS Access) and Part II.F.7 (Programmatic 
CCID Subsystem Access).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes these proposed amendments are 
appropriate because they describe the specific circumstances under 
which Regulatory Staff may use Manual CAIS Access. In accordance with 
the proposed amendments, if Regulatory Staff have already identified a 
Customer of regulatory interest, Manual CAIS Access may be used. If a 
Customer of regulatory interest has been identified, Regulatory Staff 
could access CAIS manually to seek additional information about that 
identified Customer. CAIS would contain Customer and Account Attributes 
and other identifiers associated with a Customer (e.g., Customer-ID and 
Industry Member Firm Designated ID).
    Consistent with this approach, the proposed amendments permit 
wildcard searches based on multiple spellings of the known Customer's 
name (e.g., Jone or Jones) or multiple spellings of a street associated 
with a known Customer's name (e.g., the name ``Sally Jones'' could be 
searched with ``Fis?her Street'' to identify individuals with that name 
that live on either ``Fisher'' or ``Fischer'' Street). However, open-
ended searching of parameters that are not specific to an identified 
Customer would be prohibited. Similarly, Regulatory Staff without 
additional Customer identifying information would not be permitted to 
search for all people sharing a common zip code, birth year or street. 
The Commission preliminarily believes this proposed provision is 
appropriate

[[Page 66030]]

because it extends the principle that Regulatory Staff must already 
have identified a Customer of regulatory interest pursuant to 
regulatory efforts before Manual CAIS Access will be permitted.
    The Commission also preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments requiring that Manual CAIS Access be provided by the Plan 
Processor via the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal are appropriate 
because they set forth access and use restrictions, while at the same 
time facilitating regulatory use. Specifically, the proposed 
requirement specifies how such manual access must be implemented (i.e., 
through the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulatory Portal) by the Plan 
Processor for access by Regulatory Staff. The CAIS/CCID Subsystem 
Regulator Portal must facilitate query parameters based on data 
elements in Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers 
available in the transaction database (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or Industry 
Member Firm Designated ID(s)).\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ See supra Part II.E.1; see also proposed Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.6 (Manual CAIS Access).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to amend the CAT NMS Plan to adopt performance requirements 
for Manual CAIS Access so that there is a baseline performance metric 
to assess the operation of Manual CAIS Access, and to facilitate the 
return of query results within a timeframe that facilitates the 
usefulness of the data obtained by Regulatory Staff from CAIS. Further, 
the Commission also believes that it is appropriate to base the Manual 
CAIS Access performance requirements on the Online Targeted Query Tool 
Performance Requirements because the Online Targeted Query Tool enables 
Regulatory Staff to retrieve transactional CAT Data using an on-line 
query screen and includes the ability to choose from a variety of pre-
defined selection criteria, which is similar in operation to Manual 
CAIS Access.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to 
define Manual CAIS Access and the requirements for using Manual CAIS 
Access. Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    104. The proposed amendments require Manual CAIS Access to be used 
if Regulatory Staff, having identified Customers of regulatory interest 
through regulatory efforts, require additional information from the CAT 
regarding such Customers. Are the circumstances in which Manual CAIS 
Access will be used clearly defined? If not, what additional detail 
would be helpful? Are there any other circumstances in which Manual 
CAIS Access might be appropriate? Please be specific in your response.
    105. The proposed amendments establish that additional information 
about Customers may be accessed through Manual CAIS Access by (1) using 
identifiers available in the transaction database to identify Customer 
and Account Attributes associated with the Customer-IDs or industry 
member Firm Designated IDs, as applicable; or (2) using Customer 
Attributes in CAIS to identify Customer-IDs or industry member Firm 
Designated IDs, as applicable, associated with the Customer Attributes, 
in order to search the transaction database. Should requirements be 
added in relation to accessing additional information about Customers 
through Manual CAIS Access, e.g., limiting the number of records that 
may be accessed? What limitation would be appropriate? Please be 
specific and describe the impact that any limitation on record numbers 
would have on regulatory value.
    106. The proposed amendments prohibit open-ended searching of 
parameters not specific to Customers in Manual CAIS Access. Is it clear 
to Commenters what an open-ended search is? Please explain what 
commenters understand the term to mean. Should open-ended searches be 
limited by other conditions in addition to the condition that it be 
specific to a Customer? Please be specific in your response and explain 
why any change to the proposed prohibition on open-ended searching 
would be appropriate.
    107. The proposed amendments require Manual CAIS Access to provide 
Regulatory Staff with the ability to retrieve data in CAIS via the 
CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal. Is the CAIS/CCID Subsystem 
Regulator Portal an appropriate mechanism by which to require 
Regulatory Staff to retrieve data in CAIS? Are there any other 
appropriate means of providing Manual CAIS Access? If so, please 
explain how those other means would operate and be implemented.
    108. The proposed amendments require query parameters for Manual 
CAIS Access to be based on data elements including Customer and Account 
Attributes and other identifiers available in the transaction database 
(e.g., Customer-IDs or Firm Designated IDs). Should the query 
parameters for Manual CAIS Access be based on these data elements? If 
not, why not? Are there other query parameters that are more 
appropriate? If so, why? Please be specific in your response.
    109. The proposed amendments require the Performance Requirements 
for Manual CAIS Access to be consistent with the criteria set out in 
Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System, Online Targeted Query Tool 
Performance Requirements. Is there another more appropriate performance 
requirement in the CAT NMS Plan that should apply to Manual CAIS 
Access? Why would alternative performance requirements more 
appropriate? Please be specific in your response.
5. Manual CCID Subsystem Access
    The Commission also proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to include 
requirements for manual access to the CCID Subsystem. ``Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access'' would be defined to mean ``when used in connection 
with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, as defined in Appendix 
D, shall mean the Plan Processor functionality to manually query the 
CCID Subsystem, in accordance with Appendix D, Data Security, and the 
Participants' policies as set forth in Section 6.5(g).'' \298\ In 
addition, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to state 
that if Regulatory Staff have the ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of a 
Customer(s) of regulatory interest identified through regulatory 
efforts outside of the CAT and now require additional information from 
the CAT regarding such Customer(s), then they may use Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access.\299\ The proposed amendments also state that Manual 
CCID Subsystem Access must allow Regulatory staff to convert ITIN(s)/
SSN(s)/EIN(s) into Customer-ID(s) using the CCID Subsystem, and that 
Manual CCID Subsystem Access will be limited to 50 ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) per query.\300\ The Commission also proposes to amend the CAT 
NMS Plan to state that Manual CCID Subsystem Access must allow 
Regulatory Staff to retrieve data from the CCID Subsystem via the CAIS/
CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal based on ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) \301\ 
where the CCID Transformation Logic is embedded in the client-side code 
of the CAIS/CCID Regulator Portal.\302\ The Commission also proposes to 
require that the performance requirements for the conversion of 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) to Customer-ID(s) shall be consistent with the 
criteria set out in Appendix D,

[[Page 66031]]

Functionality of the CAT System, Online Targeted Query Tool Performance 
Requirements.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \298\ See proposed Section 1.1.
    \299\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access).
    \300\ See id.
    \301\ Id.
    \302\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access).
    \303\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes the proposed amendments to 
adopt Manual CCID Subsystem Access are appropriate because such access 
would provide a way for Regulatory Staff that have the ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) of a natural person or legal entity Customer as a result of 
regulatory efforts outside of the CAT (e.g., from regulatory data, a 
tip, complaint, referral, or from other data in the possession of 
Regulatory Staff) to transform such ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) into 
Customer-ID(s) and subsequently obtain other information identifying a 
Customer that is associated with the Customer-ID, if that is in 
furtherance of a regulatory purpose. The Commission also preliminarily 
believes that limiting Manual CCID Subsystem Access to the submission 
of 50 SSN(s)/ITIN(s)/EIN(s) per query is appropriate because in the 
Commission's experience, 50 SSN(s)/ITIN(s)/EIN(s) is sufficient to 
accommodate the needs of most regulatory examinations or investigations 
involving SSN(s)/ITIN(s)/EIN(s).
    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to specify, as the proposed amendments would, that Manual CCID 
Subsystem access must be enabled through the CAIS/CCID Subsystem 
Regulatory Portal, and that Transformation Logic must be embedded in 
the client-side code of the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal. By 
embedding the Transformation Logic in the client-side code of the CAIS/
CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal, the proposed amendments would help to 
prevent the ITIN/SSIN/EIN of a Customer from entering any component of 
the CAT System.
    Finally, the Commission is amending the CAT NMS Plan to adopt 
performance requirements for Manual CCID Subsystem Access so that there 
is a baseline performance metric to assess the operation of Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access, and to facilitate the return of query results within 
a timeframe that facilitates the usefulness of the data obtained by 
Regulatory Staff from the CCID Subsystem.\304\ The Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access performance requirements are based on the Online 
Targeted Query Tool Performance Requirements because the Online 
Targeted Query Tool, which provides Regulatory Staff with the ability 
to retrieve transactional CAT Data using an on-line query screen and 
includes the ability to choose from a variety of pre-defined selection 
criteria, is most similar in operation to Manual CCID Subsystem Access. 
In addition, the Commission believes that the query performance 
requirement for the Online Targeted Query Tool is a reasonable 
performance requirement for Manual CCID Subsystem Access because that 
the Online Targeted Query Tool performance requirement of a one minute 
query response time is drawn from targeted queries that return less 
than 1 million rows of data based on a dataset covering less than a day 
for a single CAT Reporter whereas the Manual CCID Subsystem Access is 
transforming no more than 50 ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) per query.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ See supra note 294.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to 
define Manual CCID Subsystem Access and the requirements for using 
Manual CCID Subsystem Access. Specifically, the Commission solicits 
comment on the following:
    110. The proposed amendments require that Manual CCID Subsystem 
Access will be used when Regulatory Staff have the ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) of a Customer(s) of regulatory interest obtained through 
regulatory efforts outside of CAT and now require additional 
information from CAT regarding such Customer(s). Are the circumstances 
in which Manual CCID Subsystem Access will be used clearly defined? If 
not, what additional detail would be helpful? Are there any other 
circumstances in which Manual CCID Subsystem Access might be 
appropriate? Please be specific in your response.
    111. The proposed amendments require that Manual CCID Subsystem 
Access will be limited to 50 ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) per query. Is this 
limitation appropriate? If not, what number limitation would be 
appropriate and why? Please be specific in your response and please 
explain how a different threshold would not compromise the security of 
the CCID Transformation Logic algorithm.
    112. The proposed amendments require that Manual CCID Subsystem 
Access must provide Regulatory Staff with the ability to retrieve data 
from the CCID Subsystem via the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal 
with the ability to query based on ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) where the CCID 
Transformation Logic is embedded in the client-side code of the CAIS/
CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal. Are there any other appropriate means 
of providing Manual CCID Subsystem Access that also would not require 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s) being reported to CAT? Please be specific in your 
response.
    113. For Manual CCID Subsystem Access, should the CCID 
Transformation Logic be embedded in the client-side code of the CAIS/
CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal? If not, where should it be embedded 
and how would that prevent the reporting and collection of ITIN(s)/
SSN(s) to CAT?
    114. Is it appropriate to require that the performance requirements 
for Manual CCID Subsystem Access be consistent with the criteria set 
out in the Online Targeted Query Tool Performance Requirements set out 
in Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System? Is there another more 
appropriate performance requirement in the CAT NMS Plan that should 
apply to Manual CCID Subsystem Access? Why is that alternative 
performance requirement more appropriate? Please be specific in your 
response.
6. Programmatic Access--Authorization for Programmatic CAIS Access and 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem
    While the Commission believes that manual access to both CAIS and 
the CCID Subsystem will satisfy the vast majority of Participant use 
cases, the Commission preliminarily believes that certain regulatory 
inquiries based on the investigation of potential rule violations and 
surveillance patterns depend on more complex queries of Customer and 
Account Attributes and transactional CAT Data. Such inquiries could 
involve regulatory investigations of trading abuses and other practices 
proscribed by Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act,\305\ Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act,\306\ Rule 30(a) of Regulation SP \307\ and Rule 201 
of Regulation S-ID,\308\ and Sections 206 and 207 of the Advisers 
Act.\309\ Detecting and investigating trading based on hacked 
information in violation of Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) of the 
Exchange Act, for example, will often require the inclusion of 
transactional and customer criteria in misconduct detection queries 
with transactional and customer attributes in query result sets. With 
CAT Data, determining the scope and nature of hacking and associated 
trading misconduct could depend on tailored programmatic access to 
transactional CAT Data and information identifying a Customer collected 
in the CAT. Similar forms of complex queries and query result sets also 
will facilitate detection

[[Page 66032]]

and investigation of insider trading, including identifying potential 
illegal tippers. Complex query result sets that include transactional 
data and customer attributes also can advance regulatory investigations 
of unfair trade allocation practices (``cherry-picking''). In order to 
address these needs, the Commission preliminary believes it is 
appropriate to require the Plan Processor to provide programmatic 
access to the Customer Identifying Systems, as further described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ 17 CFR 240.10b-5.
    \306\ 15 U.S.C.77q.
    \307\ 17 CFR 248.30(a).
    \308\ 17 CFR 248.201.
    \309\ 15 U.S.C.80b-6; 15 U.S.C.80b-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to enable Regulatory Staff to carry out the regulatory 
responsibilities to enforce the statutes and rules noted above, among 
others, and to be consistent with and extend the ``least privileged'' 
practice of limiting access to Customer and Account Attributes, the 
Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to limit use of 
programmatic access to CAIS and the CCID Subsystem only to those 
Participants that receive Commission approval for programmatic access 
to those systems. Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to amend 
Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 of the CAT NMS Plan to require a Participant 
to submit an application, approved by the Participant's Chief 
Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation) to 
the Commission for authorization to use Programmatic CAIS Access or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access if a Participant requires 
programmatic access.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \310\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The application would seek three sets of information: (1) 
Identification of the system for which programmatic access is being 
requested (i.e., Programmatic CAIS Access and/or Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access); (2) discussion of the need for programmatic access; 
and (3) specifics on the regulatory purpose and systems that require 
programmatic access, including: (a) The Participant's rules that 
require programmatic access for surveillance and regulatory purposes; 
(b) the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquires requiring 
programmatic access; \311\ (c) a detailed description of the 
functionality of the Participant's system(s) that will use data from 
CAIS or the CCID Subsystem; (d) a system diagram and description 
indicating architecture and access controls to the Participant's system 
that will use data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem; and (e) the 
expected number of users of the Participant's system that will use data 
from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \311\ Id. While the application addresses the inquiries or set 
of inquiries that will be performed using programmatic access, the 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow applies at the query level. 
Each query must be designed such that query results would contain 
only the Customer and Account Attributes that Regulatory Staff 
reasonably believes will achieve the regulatory purpose of the 
inquiry or set of inquiries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposes amendments that would provide the 
process for Commission consideration of the application for 
Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access. 
Specifically, the Commission proposes that SEC staff shall review the 
application and may request supplemental information to complete the 
review prior to Commission action.\312\ Once the application is 
completed, the proposed amendments would provide that the Commission 
shall approve Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
Access if it finds that such access is generally consistent with one or 
more of the following standards: That such access is designed to 
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices; to promote just 
and equitable principles of trade; to foster cooperation and 
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, 
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions 
in, securities; to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a 
free and open market and a national market system; and, in general, to 
protect investors and the public interest.\313\ The proposed amendments 
further would provide that the Commission shall issue an order 
approving or disapproving a Participant's application for Programmatic 
CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access within 45 days of 
receipt of a Participant's application, which can be extended for an 
additional 45 days if the Commission determines that such longer period 
of time is appropriate and provides the Participant the reasons for 
such determination.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ Id.
    \313\ Id.
    \314\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that each requirement 
proposed for the application would elicit the essential information 
that the Commission needs in order to assess whether to grant 
programmatic access to CAIS or the CCID Subsystem, as further discussed 
below. As such, the application requirements are designed to require 
each Participant that applies for programmatic access to provide 
detailed and thorough information that is tailored to explain why 
programmatic access is required by such Participant in order to achieve 
that Participant's unique regulatory and surveillance purposes, and why 
such access to transactional CAT Data and Customer and Account 
Attributes will be responsive to a Participant's inquiry or set of 
inquiries. These requirements are designed to set a high bar for 
granting an application for programmatic access so that such access is 
only granted when there is a demonstrated need and ability to use such 
access responsibly.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that approval of the 
application process by the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or 
similarly designated head(s) of regulation) is appropriate because the 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer has the best understanding of 
how programmatic access to CAIS or the CCID Subsystem fits into the 
overall regulatory program and surveillance needs of the Participant. 
Approval by the Chief Regulatory Officer also would help to ensure that 
the need for programmatic access is assessed without any undue business 
pressures or concerns.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \315\ Importantly, the Chief Regulatory Office is subject to 
oversight by the Regulatory Oversight Committee, which provides a 
governance structure for the Chief Regulatory Officer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because there are two systems that contain information identifying 
Customers, the Commission also preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to require the Participant to indicate whether it is 
seeking Programmatic CAIS Access and/or Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
Access. Such identification would also enable the Commission to assess 
whether the type of access being requested by the Participant is 
consistent with the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of 
inquiries being pursued by the Participant's Regulatory Staff. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that given the different 
functionality of the two systems, separate applications and 
demonstrations of need and the ability to secure the data are required.
    As previously discussed, the CAT NMS Plan adheres to the ``least 
privileged'' practice of limiting access to Customer Identifying 
Systems as much as possible. Therefore, the Commission believes that it 
is appropriate to require the Participant's application for 
programmatic access to indicate why manual access to CAIS and the CCID 
Subsystem cannot achieve the regulatory purpose of an inquiry or set of 
inquiries being pursued by Regulatory Staff before permitting 
programmatic access to CAIS and the CCID Subsystem. Requiring this 
information also would help the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer 
(or similarly designated head(s) of

[[Page 66033]]

regulation) to conduct a fulsome analysis of his or her Regulatory 
Staff's need for programmatic access. The Commission preliminarily 
believes manual access will be sufficient in many cases and that need 
for programmatic access must be justified based on current and intended 
practices.
    The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
to require the Participant's application to identify the Participant's 
specific rules that necessitate Programmatic Access for surveillance 
and regulatory purposes. For example, programmatic access to CAIS might 
be reasonable if the investigation into the potential violation of such 
rule would require knowledge of Customer and Account Attributes and 
transactional CAT Data to identify misconduct. The Participants should 
be specific in their justification for Programmatic Access; generally 
stating that programmatic access is required for member regulation, for 
example, would not be sufficient to justify Programmatic Access. The 
Participants must identify the nature of the specific rules or 
surveillance patterns that they believe require programmatic access. 
The Commission preliminarily believes that many forms of misconduct can 
be addressed using manual access and that programmatic access will not 
be necessary.
    After considering the specific rule(s) that the Participant 
represents necessitates programmatic access, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the next logical step in the assessment of 
whether programmatic access should be granted is to consider the 
regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquires being conducted by 
Regulatory Staff; if a regulatory purpose for the inquiry or set of 
inquiries cannot be articulated, programmatic access cannot be 
justified. Therefore, the Commission preliminarily believes that a 
clear statement by a Participant that explicitly articulates the 
reasons that access should be granted and for what purposes, in light 
of the Participant's rule(s) that required programmatic access, is 
appropriate. If SEC staff believes that sufficient detail is lacking, 
staff may request additional information, as described below.
    While all access and analysis of Customer and Account Attributes 
must occur within the SAW, the Commission must be assured that Customer 
and Account Attributes will be incorporated securely into the 
Participant's system before granting programmatic access. Therefore, 
the Commission also preliminarily believes that sufficient information 
about how a Participant intends to incorporate data from the Customer 
Identifying Systems into the Participant's system is needed in order to 
assess whether programmatic access should be granted. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that in addition to detailed description of 
functionality, requiring a system diagram and description indicating 
architecture and access controls at the Participant's system would 
provide a sufficient starting point to assess whether access should be 
granted; if needed, SEC staff would request additional information from 
the Participant. The Commission preliminarily believes that only 
Participants who demonstrate they have the surveillance and technical 
expertise to use programmatic access in a secure manner may be granted 
programmatic access.
    While the Commission does not believe there is a number of users 
that is appropriate for all Participants and all regulatory inquiries, 
the number of users at a Participant that are performing inquiries can 
be relevant to data security concerns (i.e., the ability to protect the 
data in the Customer Identifying Systems can be affected by the number 
of users with access to the data in the Customer Identifying Systems). 
Therefore, the Commission preliminarily believes that information about 
the expected number of users for the Participant's system that would 
use data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem is an appropriate data point 
to solicit from the Participants.
    The Commission also believes it is appropriate to amend the CAT NMS 
Plan to provide that SEC staff may request supplemental information to 
complete the review prior to Commission action. Given the scope of data 
that can be accessed from the Customer Identifying Systems under 
programmatic access, the Commission believes that it is vital to the 
approval process that the Participant clearly assess and articulate its 
need for programmatic access, and that the Commission receive and 
understand the Participant's need for programmatic access. The 
information solicited by the application process would help to ensure 
that programmatic access follows the ``least privileged'' practice of 
limiting access to Customer Identifying Systems as much as possible, is 
based on a ``need to know'' the data in the Customer Identifying 
Systems, and contains only the data from the Customer Identifying 
Systems that Regulatory Staff reasonably believes will achieve the 
regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries; however, should 
SEC staff require additional information, the Commission believes that 
the CAT NMS Plan should allow SEC staff to request additional 
information about the programmatic application from the submitting 
Participant.\316\
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    \316\ Should a Participant receive approval for Programmatic 
Access, such Participant would not be precluded from incorporating 
in its analytical tools the ability to manually query CAIS and the 
CCID Subsystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As proposed, Programmatic CAIS Access and Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access would be used by certain approved Regulatory Staff in 
the Participant's SAW, subject to specific conditions, and focused on a 
defined regulatory purpose of an inquiry or set of inquiries. A 
Participant's application would be approved if it is generally 
consistent with one or more of the criteria. The Commission believes 
that this approval standard allows for flexibility and the ability to 
tailor access to specific regulatory needs.
    The Commission also believes that requiring the Commission to issue 
an order approving or disapproving a Participant's application for 
programmatic access within 45 days is appropriate in order to 
facilitate a timely decision on the application. However, it is also 
appropriate to allow for an extension of time for Commission action if 
the Commission needs more time to consider whether the application is 
appropriate and provides its reasons for the extension to the 
Participant. Allowing extensions of time should help to facilitate a 
thorough review of the application by the Commission.
    The Commission understands that a Participant's programmatic access 
may evolve over time. As such, the Commission believes that it is 
appropriate to require that policies be reasonably designed to 
implement and satisfy the Customer and Account Attributes data 
requirements of Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D, such that Participants 
must be able to demonstrate that a Participant's ongoing use of 
programmatic access adheres to the restrictions of the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow, as set forth in a Participant's Data 
Confidentiality Policies governing programmatic access, as required by 
Section 6.5(g)(i)(I) of the CAT NMS Plan, described below.\317\ Such 
policies also are subject to an annual independent examination, which 
will help ensure ongoing effectiveness of a Participant's Data 
Confidentiality Policies as they relate to that Participant's 
programmatic

[[Page 66034]]

access.\318\ In addition and as described above, other proposed 
amendments to the Plan will also protect transactional CAT Data and 
Customer and Account Attributes accessed through programmatic access; 
notably, access would be within the SAW and governed by the CISP, the 
organization-wide and system-specific controls and related policies and 
procedures required by NIST SP 800-53 and applicable to all components 
of the CAT System. Such requirements will enable ongoing oversight of 
each approved Participant's programmatic access by the Plan Processor 
and the Commission, and will help limit programmatic access to 
appropriate use cases initially and on an ongoing basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \317\ See infra Part II.G.3.c (Policies and Procedures Relating 
to Customer and Account Attributes).
    \318\ See infra Part II.G.4.
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to set 
forth the approval process for Programmatic CAIS and Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access. Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the 
following:
    115. The proposed amendments require that the Participant's 
application for programmatic access be approved by the Participant's 
Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of 
regulation). Is the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or 
similarly designated head(s) of regulation) the appropriate person to 
approve the application? If not, why not? Is there another person or 
entity that should approve the Participant's application?
    116. Is it appropriate for the application to require the 
Participant to indicate which programmatic access is being requested: 
Programmatic CAIS Access and/or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access? Why 
or why not?
    117. The proposed amendments require the Participant to detail in 
an application to the Commission why Programmatic CAIS Access or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem is required, and why Manual CAIS Access or 
Manual CCID Subsystem Access cannot achieve the regulatory purpose of 
an inquiry or set of inquiries. Is this information sufficient to 
explain why programmatic access is required? Should Participants have 
to provide more than an explanation of why manual access cannot achieve 
the regulatory purpose or an inquiry or set of inquiries? What other 
information should be solicited? Please be specific in your response.
    118. The proposed amendments require that the application explain 
the Participant's rules that require Programmatic Access for 
surveillance and regulatory purposes. Should any other aspect of the 
Participant rules to be explained in the application? If so, please 
explain.
    119. The proposed amendments require that the application explain 
the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries requiring 
programmatic access. Is there additional detail that could be added to 
this standard? If so, what provisions could be added to clarify this 
standard? Please be specific in your response.
    120. The proposed amendments require that an application to the 
Commission provide a detailed description of the functionality of the 
Participant's system(s) that will use data from CAIS or the CCID 
Subsystem. Is there anything in addition to the functionality of the 
Participant's system(s) that will use the data from CAIS and the CCID 
Subsystem that should be provided by the Participant? Please provide 
detail about why this additional information is necessary and how it 
would be appropriate for the Commission to consider in its assessment 
of whether to provide programmatic access to the Participant.
    121. The proposed amendments require that the application provide a 
system diagram and description indicating architecture and access 
controls to the Participant's system that will use data from CAIS or 
the CCID Subsystem. Is there any other information regarding the 
Participant's system and the architecture and access controls that 
should be provided? Please describe that additional information in 
detail and explain how this will be useful in the Commission's 
assessment of whether to provide programmatic access to the 
Participant.
    122. The proposed amendments require the application to indicate 
the expected number of users of the Participant's system that will use 
data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem. Is there any other information 
about users in the Participants' system that will use the data that 
should be required? Please be specific and explain why it would be 
appropriate to add such a requirement.
    123. The proposed amendments provide that the Commission shall 
approve Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access 
if it finds that such access is generally consistent with one or more 
of the following standards: That such access is designed to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices; to promote just and 
equitable principles of trade; to foster cooperation and coordination 
with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing 
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in, 
securities; to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a 
free and open market and a national market system; and, in general, to 
protect investors and the public interest. Are there other standards 
that should be used by the Commission to assess whether to grant a 
Participant's application for Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic 
CCID Subsystem Access? Please be specific and explain why such other 
standards would be more appropriate.
    124. Under the proposed amendments, the Commission shall issue an 
order approving or disapproving a Participant's application for 
programmatic access within 45 days, which can be extended by the 
Commission for an additional 45 days, if the Commission determines that 
such longer period of time is appropriate and provides the Participant 
with the reasons for such determination. Do commenters believes that 45 
days is an appropriate amount of time for Commission action? Is another 
time period for Commission action more appropriate? Is another time 
period for the extension of time for Commission action more 
appropriate? If so, what time would that be? Please be specific and 
explain why a different time period would be more appropriate.
    125. Once Commission approval of an application is granted, an 
approved Participant would be permitted to use programmatic access 
subject to the ongoing restrictions identified in Appendix D, Section 
4.1.6 and Article VI, Section 6.5(g), as well as those related to use 
of a SAW; however, the proposed amendments would not require an 
approved Participant to submit updated applications as its use of 
programmatic access evolves. Should updates to application materials be 
required in order for Participants to maintain their programmatic 
access, or should Participants have to re-apply to maintain their 
programmatic access? Or is it sufficient that the policies and 
procedures in Section 6.5(g)(i) require the Participants to establish, 
maintain and enforce their policies and procedures? If Participants 
were required to re-apply to maintain their programmatic access, what 
criteria should be used for requiring re-application? For example, 
should approval for programmatic access expire after a set amount of 
time, so that Participants would have to re-apply at regular intervals 
in order to maintain their programmatic access? If so, what time period 
would be reasonable? For example, should Participants be required to 
re-apply every two years to maintain their programmatic access?

[[Page 66035]]

Alternatively, should Participants be required to re-apply for 
programmatic access only if there is a material change in their use of 
programmatic access?
7. Programmatic CAIS Access
    The Commission believes that it is appropriate to set forth the 
circumstances and requirements for Programmatic CAIS Access. The 
proposed amendments will define Programmatic Access, when used in 
connection with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, to mean the 
Plan Processor functionality to programmatically query, and return 
results that include, data from the CAIS and transactional CAT Data, in 
support of the regulatory purpose of an inquiry or set of inquiries, in 
accordance with Appendix D, Data Security, and the Participants' 
policies as set forth in Section 6.5(g).\319\ The Commission proposes 
to amend the CAT NMS Plan to state that Programmatic CAIS Access may be 
used when the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries by 
Regulatory Staff requires the use of Customer and Account Attributes 
and other identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or Industry Member Firm 
Designated ID(s)) to query Customer and Account Attributes and 
transactional CAT Data.\320\ In addition, the Commission proposes to 
require that the Plan Processor provide Programmatic CAIS Access by 
developing and supporting an API that allows Regulatory Staff to use 
analytical tools and ODBC/JDBC drivers to access the data in CAIS, and 
that the Performance Requirements for Programmatic CAIS Access shall be 
consistent with the criteria set out in Appendix D, Functionality of 
the CAT System, User-Defined Direct Query Performance 
Requirements.\321\
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    \319\ See CAT NMS Plan, Section 6.5(g)(1).
    \320\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Programmatic CAIS 
Access).
    \321\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that these proposed 
amendments are appropriate because they set forth the parameters for 
Programmatic CAIS access, which would permit a programmatic interface 
that facilitates the submission of complex queries for both the 
transactional CAT Database and the Customer Identifying Systems. For 
example, if the regulatory purpose of an inquiry or set of inquiries 
being pursued by Regulatory Staff involved insider trading before a 
company news release, Programmatic CAIS Access could be an appropriate 
method for accessing CAIS because Regulatory Staff could search the 
transactional CAT Database for consistently profitable trading activity 
and filter the data using the parameters of name and zip code--part of 
Customer and Account Attributes--to find Customer-IDs or other 
information identifying Customers that might be responsive to the 
inquiry or set of inquiries.
    As discussed above, Programmatic CAIS Access must be within the 
SAW, adhere to the ``least privileged'' practice of limiting access to 
Customer Identifying Systems as much as possible, is based on a ``need 
to know'' the data in the Customer Identifying Systems, and must 
contain only the data from the Customer Identifying Systems that 
Regulatory Staff reasonably believes will achieve the regulatory 
purpose of the inquiry or set of inquiries. In addition, as required by 
Article VI, Section 6.5(g)(i)(I), the policies of the Participants must 
be reasonably designed to implement and satisfy the Customer and 
Account Attributes data requirements of Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D 
such that Participants must be able to demonstrate that a Participant's 
ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem access is in 
accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, which will 
enable an ongoing analysis of whether Programmatic CAIS Access is being 
used by an approved Participant appropriately.\322\ Therefore, the 
Commission believes that these are appropriate limitations on 
Programmatic CAIS Access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ See Part II.G.3.c, infra, for a discussion of the policies 
relating to Customer and Account Attributes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to amend the CAT NMS Plan to adopt performance requirements 
for Programmatic CAIS Access so that there is a baseline performance 
metric to assess the operation of such access, and to facilitate the 
return of query results within a timeframe that facilitates the 
usefulness of the data obtained by Regulatory Staff from CAIS. The 
Commission also believes that it is appropriate to base the 
Programmatic CAIS Access performance requirements on the User-Defined 
Direct Query Performance Requirements because User-Defined Direct 
Queries are the most similar to Programmatic CAIS Access and thus would 
provide Regulatory Staff with programmatic interfaces that would enable 
and support, for example, complex queries, including the ability to 
provide query results that are extractable/downloadable, multistage 
queries; and concurrent queries.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to 
define and set forth the requirements for Programmatic CAIS Access. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    126. The proposed amendments establish that Programmatic CAIS 
Access may be used when the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of 
inquiries by Regulatory Staff requires the use of Customer and Account 
Attributes and other identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or Firm 
Designated ID(s)) to query the Customer and Account Attributes and 
transactional CAT Data. Are the circumstances in which Programmatic 
CAIS Access may be used clearly defined? If not, what additional detail 
would be helpful? Are there any other circumstances in which 
Programmatic CAIS Access might be appropriate? Please be specific in 
your response.
    127. The proposed amendments require the Plan Processor to provide 
Programmatic CAIS Access by developing and supporting an API that 
allows Regulatory Staff to use analytical tools and ODBC/JDBC drivers 
to access the data in CAIS. Is there another more appropriate method to 
allow Regulatory Staff to access the data in CAIS? Please be specific 
in your response.
    128. The proposed amendments require that the performance 
requirements for Programmatic CAIS Access be consistent with the 
criteria in the User-Defined Direct Query Performance Requirements set 
out in Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System. Is there another 
more appropriate performance requirement in the CAT NMS Plan that 
should apply to Programmatic CAIS Access? Why is that alternative 
performance requirement more appropriate? Please be specific in your 
response.
8. Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access
    The Commission believes that it is appropriate to amend the CAT NMS 
Plan to set forth the circumstances and requirements for Programmatic 
CCID Subsystem Access. The proposed amendments would define CCID 
Subsystem Access when used in connection with the Customer Identifying 
Systems Workflow, to mean the Plan Processor functionality to 
programmatically query the CCID Subsystem to obtain Customer-ID(s) from 
Transformed Value(s), in support of the regulatory purpose of an 
inquiry or set of inquiries, in accordance with Appendix D, Data 
Security, and the Participants' policies as set forth in

[[Page 66036]]

Section 6.5(g).\323\ The Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan 
to state that Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access allows Regulatory 
Staff to submit multiple ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) \324\ for a Customer(s) 
of regulatory interest identified through regulatory efforts outside of 
the CAT to obtain Customer-ID(s) in order to query CAT Data regarding 
such Customer(s).\325\ The Commission also proposes to amend the CAT 
NMS Plan to explicitly state that the Plan Processor must provide 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access by developing and supporting the 
CCID Transformation Logic and an API to facilitate the submission of 
Transformed Values to the CCID Subsystem for the generation of 
Customer-ID(s).\326\ The proposed amendments would also state that 
Performance Requirements for the conversion of ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) to 
Customer-ID(s) shall be consistent with the criteria set out in 
Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System, User-Defined Direct Query 
Performance Requirements.\327\
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    \323\ See proposed Section 1.1.
    \324\ The CCID Subsystem will contain the functionality to 
facilitate the efficient and accurate conversion of multiple legal 
entity's EIN(s) into a Transformed Value(s) and a subsequent 
Customer-ID. However, because an EIN(s) will be reported to CAIS as 
a Customer Attribute for association with a Customer-ID, the need 
for Regulatory Staff to utilize the CCID Subsystem to convert 
multiple EIN(s) into a Transformed Value and a subsequent Customer-
ID will be minimized.
    \325\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access).
    \326\ See id.
    \327\ See id.
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    The Commission believes that it is appropriate to provide for 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access because such access would facilitate 
the ability of Regulatory Staff, who may be in possession of the 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of multiple Customers as a result of their 
regulatory efforts outside of the CAT, to obtain the Customer-IDs of 
such Customers and query CAT Data, including Customer and Account 
Attributes and CAT transactional data using an application that 
accommodates the input of multiple ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s). In addition, 
as required by Article VI, Section 6.5(g)(i)(I), the policies of the 
Participants must be reasonably designed to implement and satisfy the 
Customer and Account Attributes data requirements of Section 4.1.6 of 
Appendix D such that Participants must be able to demonstrate that a 
Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem 
access is in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, 
which will enable an ongoing analysis of whether Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access is being used by an approved Participant 
appropriately. Finally, the Commission believes that it is appropriate 
to amend the CAT NMS Plan to adopt the performance requirements 
applicable to User-Defined Direct queries because such queries provide 
Regulatory Staff with programmatic interfaces to enable complex queries 
in a manner most similar to Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to 
define and set forth the requirements for Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
Access. Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    129. The proposed amendments require the Plan Processor to provide 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access by developing and supporting the 
CCID Transformation Logic and an API to facilitate the submission of 
Transformed Values to the CCID Subsystem for the generation of 
Customer-ID(s). Is there another more appropriate method to facilitate 
the development and support for the Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access? 
Please be specific in your response.
    130. The proposed amendments require Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
access to allow Regulatory Staff to submit multiple ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) of a Customer(s) of regulatory interest identified through 
regulatory efforts outside of CAT to obtain Customer-ID(s) in order to 
query CAT Data regarding such Customer(s). Is this an appropriate way 
to facilitate Regulatory Staff obtaining Customer-IDs in order to query 
CAT Data? If not, is there another more appropriate way to facilitate 
obtaining Customer-IDs for Regulatory Staff?
    131. The proposed amendments that require the performance 
requirements for Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access be consistent with 
the criteria in the User-Defined Direct Query Performance Requirements 
set out in Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System. Is there 
another more appropriate performance requirement in the CAT NMS Plan 
that should apply to Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access? Why would an 
alternative performance requirement more appropriate? Please be 
specific in your response.

G. Participants' Data Confidentiality Policies

1. Data Confidentiality Policies
    When adopting Rule 613, the Commission recognized the importance of 
maintaining the confidentiality of all CAT Data reported to the Central 
Repository.\328\ The Commission noted at the time that the purpose and 
efficacy of the CAT would be compromised if the Commission, the SROs, 
and their members could not rely on the integrity, confidentiality, and 
security of the information stored in the Central Repository, noting 
that the Central Repository would contain confidential and commercially 
valuable information.\329\ Rule 613 required the CAT NMS Plan to 
include policies and procedures that are designed to ensure 
implementation of the privacy protections that are necessary to assure 
regulators and market participants that the CAT NMS Plan provides for 
rigorous protection of confidential information reported to the Central 
Repository.\330\ Furthermore, Rule 613 required the Participants and 
their employees to agree to not use CAT Data for any purpose other than 
surveillance and regulatory purposes, provided that a Participant is 
permitted to use the data that it reports to the Central Repository for 
regulatory, surveillance, commercial, or other purposes as otherwise 
permitted by applicable law, rule or regulation.\331\
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    \328\ See e.g., Rule 613 Adopting Release, supra note 2, at 
45781-83.
    \329\ See id. at 45783.
    \330\ 17 CFR 242.613(e)(4)(i).
    \331\ 17 CFR 242.613(e)(4)(i)(A). In addition, the CAT NMS Plan 
specifies that usage of the CAT Data is provided to Participants 
solely for the purpose of performing their respective regulatory and 
oversight responsibilities pursuant to federal securities laws, 
rules and regulations or any contractual obligations. CAT NMS Plan 
Section 6.5(g). As noted in the CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, 
regulatory purposes include, among other things, analysis and 
reconstruction of market events, market analysis and research to 
inform policy decisions, market surveillance, examinations, 
investigations, and other enforcement functions. See CAT NMS Plan 
Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84724 note 586.
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    The CAT NMS Plan has several provisions designed to protect the 
confidentiality of CAT Data. Specifically, Section 6.5(f)(ii) of the 
CAT NMS Plan requires Participants to adopt and enforce policies and 
procedures that: (1) Implement ``effective information barriers'' 
between the Participant's regulatory and non-regulatory staff with 
regard to access and use of CAT Data stored in the Central Repository; 
(2) permit only persons designated by Participants to have access to 
the CAT Data stored in the Central Repository; and (3) impose penalties 
for staff non-compliance with any of its or the Plan Processor's 
policies or procedures with respect to information security. Section 
6.5(f)(iii) of the CAT NMS Plan requires each Participant to, as 
promptly as reasonably practicable, and in any event

[[Page 66037]]

within 24 hours, report to the Chief Compliance Officer, in accordance 
with the guidance provided by the Operating Committee, any instance, of 
which such Participant becomes aware, of: (1) Noncompliance with the 
policies and procedures adopted by such Participant pursuant to Section 
6.5(e)(ii); or (2) a breach of the security of the CAT. Section 6.5(g) 
requires the Participants to establish, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to: (1) Ensure the 
confidentiality of the CAT Data obtained from the Central Repository; 
and (2) limit the use of CAT Data obtained from the Central Repository 
solely for surveillance and regulatory purposes. The CAT NMS Plan 
further requires each Participant to periodically review the 
effectiveness of the policies and procedures required by Section 
6.5(g), and to take prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such 
policies and procedures.\332\
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    \332\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.5(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that while the existing provisions 
discussed above are designed to protect the security and 
confidentiality of CAT Data, the CAT NMS Plan should be modified and 
supplemented to provide additional specificity concerning data usage 
and confidentiality policies and procedures, and to strengthen such 
policies and procedures with expanded and new requirements designed to 
protect the security and confidentiality of CAT Data.
    First, the Commission proposes to combine the existing CAT NMS Plan 
provisions applicable to Participants discussed above, specifically 
Sections 6.5(f)(ii), (f)(iii) and (g), into a single section of the CAT 
NMS Plan.\333\ The Commission also proposes to modify these provisions 
so that they would apply to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies and 
procedures and usage restriction controls \334\ in accordance with 
these policies, as required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i).\335\ This 
single section, Section 6.5(g)(i), would set forth the provisions that 
must be included in each Participant's confidentiality and related 
policies (``Proposed Confidentiality Policies''). Provisions that are 
applicable to Participants would be contained in one place and 
separated from those applicable to the Plan Processor. As proposed, 
Section 6.5(f) of the CAT NMS Plan would continue to relate to data 
confidentiality and related policies and procedures of the Plan 
Processor, while Section 6.5(g) would relate to data confidentiality 
and related policies and procedures of the Participants.
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    \333\ Specifically, the Commission proposes to move Sections 
6.5(f)(ii)(A) and (C), to Sections 6.5(g)(i)(D) and (H) 
respectively, and Section 6.5(f)(iii) to Section 6.5(g)(iii). 
Section 6.5(f)(ii)(B) would be deleted and replaced by a new 
provision regarding access to CAT Data in proposed Section 
6.5(g)(i)(C), as discussed below. See infra Part II.G.2.a. Due to 
the proposed deletions, paragraphs (f)(iv) and (f)(v) in Section 6.5 
would be re-designated as (f)(ii) and (f)(iii).
    \334\ See, infra, Part II.G.3.a.
    \335\ Revising these provisions to cover the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies would apply these existing safeguards to 
the identical Proposed Confidentiality Policies. For example, 
proposed Section 6.5(g)(iii) would be modified to reference the 
policies, procedures and usage restriction controls required by 
Section 6.5(g)(i) instead of Section 6.5(e)(ii). The Commission 
believes the provision is supposed to reference Section 6.5(f)(ii), 
because there is no Section 6.5(e)(ii) and because Participant 
policies and procedures are addressed in Section 6.5(f)(ii). In 
addition, the Commission proposes to revise the language of some of 
these provisions for clarity. Proposed Section 6.5(g)(iii) would 
thus require Participants to, as promptly as reasonably practicable, 
and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware, report to the 
Chief Compliance Officer, in accordance with the guidance provided 
by the Operating Committee: (A) Any instance of noncompliance with 
the policies, procedures and usage restriction controls adopted by 
such Participant pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i); or (B) a breach of 
the security of the CAT.
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    Second, the Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to 
require the Proposed Confidentiality Policies to be identical across 
Participants, which would result in shared policies that govern the 
usage of CAT Data by Participants and apply to all Participants 
equally. Currently, the CAT NMS Plan requires each individual 
Participant to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures 
relating to the usage and confidentiality of CAT Data. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that having policies that vary across 
Participants could result in the creation of policies that differ 
substantively even for the same regulatory role. For example, pursuant 
to Section 6.5(f)(ii) of the CAT NMS Plan, a Participant could 
establish policies that grant broad access to CAT Data to regulatory 
staff that are assigned to a particular regulatory role, even if such 
broad access is not necessary for that regulatory role, while another 
Participant could more appropriately establish policies limiting access 
to CAT Data for the same regulatory role to CAT Data necessary to 
perform the role. The Commission preliminarily believes that to the 
extent SROs have regulatory staff with roles that serve a consistent 
purpose across SROs, that SROs generally should be accessing CAT Data 
pursuant to identical policies. The Commission further believes that 
requiring one identical set of policies would allow for input and 
expertise of all Participants to be used in the development of such 
policies, and should reasonably be expected to result in more 
comprehensive Proposed Confidentiality Policies that incorporate the 
full range of regulatory activities performed by the SROs and are 
designed in a manner that is consistent with how SROs operate in 
practice.\336\ As proposed, while the Proposed Confidentiality Policies 
would be identical across Participants, the policies would incorporate 
different regulatory and surveillance roles and goals of the 
Participants and would apply to the whole scope of CAT Data usage by 
Participants, including use within a SAW, excepted non-SAW environment, 
or any other Participant environment.\337\
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    \336\ The Commission understands that the Participants have 
established policies and procedures pursuant to Section 6.5(f)(ii), 
and preliminarily believes that Participants can use these existing 
policies and procedures in order to help prepare, review, and 
approve the policies and procedures required by proposed Section 
6.5(g)(i). The Commission also understands Participants have 
policies and procedures outside of CAT, such as insider trading 
policies and non-public data policies, which could be used to help 
develop both the Proposed Confidentiality Policies and the related 
procedures.
    \337\ See infra Part II.G.2.
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    The Commission recognizes, though, that the internal organization 
structures, reporting lines, or other operations may differ across the 
Participants. Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
it is appropriate to permit Participants to develop their own 
procedures relating to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. In this 
regard, proposed Section 6.5(g)(i) would require each Participant to 
establish, maintain, and enforce procedures in accordance with the 
policies required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i). The Commission also 
preliminarily believes that it is not necessary to subject such 
Participant procedures to the same requirements as those policies that 
are discussed below, including the requirements that such procedures 
are approved by the CAT Operating Committee and subject to annual 
examination and publication, because Participant procedures will differ 
based on individual Participants' organizational, technical, and 
structural uniqueness.\338\
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    \338\ See infra Part II.G.4.
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2. Access to CAT Data and Information Barriers
    As noted above, current Sections 6.5(f)(ii)(A) and (B) of the CAT 
NMS Plan require each Participant to adopt and enforce policies and 
procedures that implement effective information barriers between such 
Participant's

[[Page 66038]]

regulatory and non-regulatory staff with regard to access and use of 
CAT Data stored in the Central Repository and permit only persons 
designated by Participants to have access to CAT Data stored in the 
Central Repository.\339\
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    \339\ See supra Part II.G.1.
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a. Regulatory Staff and Access to CAT Data
    Current Section 6.5(f)(ii)(A) and (B) do not impose specific 
restrictions or requirements for Participants in determining which 
staff are considered regulatory staff. The existing provisions also do 
not address whether there may be limited instances in which non-
regulatory staff--particularly technical staff--may have legitimate 
reasons to access CAT Data for regulatory purposes. The Commission 
believes that providing specificity regarding which staff are 
considered regulatory staff in the current CAT NMS Plan, and thus may 
have access to CAT Data, and specific limitations on access to CAT Data 
by both regulatory and non-regulatory staff may help better protect CAT 
Data and result in it being accessed and used appropriately.
    To address these issues, the Commission proposes to replace 
existing Section 6.5(f)(ii)(B) \340\ with Section 6.5(g)(i)(C) to the 
CAT NMS Plan. Section 6.5(g)(i)(C) would limit access to CAT Data to 
persons designated by Participants, which persons must be: (1) 
Regulatory Staff; or (2) technology and operations staff that require 
access solely to facilitate access to and usage of CAT Data stored in 
the Central Repository by Regulatory Staff. In contrast to existing 
Section 6.5(f)(ii)(B), the proposed requirement in Section 6.5(g)(i)(C) 
would apply more broadly to CAT Data, rather than ``CAT Data stored in 
the Central Repository,'' and the Commission preliminarily believes 
that this expansion is appropriate because access to CAT Data should be 
limited to appropriate Participant personnel whether or not the data is 
being accessed directly from the Central Repository. The Commission 
further believes that deleting Section 6.5(f)(ii)(B) is appropriate 
because proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(C) provides greater clarity and more 
specificity on which Participant staff are permitted to access CAT 
Data.
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    \340\ Current Section 6.5(f)(ii)(B) of the CAT NMS Plan states 
that each Participant shall adopt and enforce policies and 
procedures that: ``Permit only persons designated by Participants to 
have access to the CAT Data stored in the Central Repository.'' The 
Commission believes that proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(C) more clearly 
defines what Participant staff may have access to CAT Data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes to define ``Regulatory Staff,'' for the 
purposes of the Proposed Confidentiality Policies and the CAT NMS Plan. 
Specifically, ``Regulatory Staff'' would be defined in Section 1.1 of 
the CAT NMS Plan as the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or 
similarly designated head(s) of regulation) and staff within the Chief 
Regulatory Officer's (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation's) 
reporting line.\341\ In addition, the proposed definition would require 
that Regulatory Staff be specifically identified and approved in 
writing by the Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation). In addition to creating the definition, the 
Commission proposes to amend references throughout the CAT NMS Plan 
that refer to ``Participant regulatory staff'' or ``Participants' 
regulatory staff'' to ``Participants' Regulatory Staff,'' in Sections 
6.5(b)(i) and 6.5(f)(iv)(B) and in Appendix D, Sections 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, 
8.2.1, 8.3, 9.1, 10.2 and 10.3 of the CAT NMS Plan.\342\
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    \341\ See proposed CAT NMS Plan Section 1.1.
    \342\ The term ``regulatory staff'' appears in other existing 
provisions of the CAT NMS Plan, and in particular Appendix C, and 
the Commission is not proposing to amend these references. The 
Commission is not changing references to ``regulatory staff'' which 
clearly refer to both Participant and Commission staff, in Section 
6.10 of the CAT NMS Plan. In addition, the Commission is not 
amending the term in Appendix C because, as discussed in Part II.L 
below, Appendix C was not intended to be continually updated once 
the CAT NMS Plan was approved.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed definition 
of Regulatory Staff is reasonably designed to result in the 
identification of those with a legitimate regulatory role and such 
staff would be the only Participant staff that are generally provided 
access to CAT Data. The Commission preliminary believes considering a 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) 
of regulation) as Regulatory Staff is appropriate because generally 
that role with a Participant is regulatory in function and reports 
directly to a Participant's board of directors and/or a Participant's 
Regulatory Oversight Committee.\343\ The Commission is including staff 
within the Chief Regulatory Officer's (or similarly designated head(s) 
of regulation's) reporting line because the Commission believes that 
such Participant staff will have a primarily regulatory function. By 
contrast, Participant staff with other reporting lines and who 
primarily perform other functions for Participants, such as commercial 
or business functions generally should not have access to CAT Data. The 
Commission further believes that requiring the Chief Regulatory Officer 
(or similarly designated head(s) of regulation) to identify and approve 
which personnel are considered Regulatory Staff should help prevent 
staff with primarily non-regulatory obligations from being categorized 
as Regulatory Staff. A Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation) may determine that some Regulatory 
Staff should not have access to CAT Data. The Commission believes that 
this proposal would further clarify which Participant staff can access 
CAT Data outside of the CAT infrastructure. For example, in addition to 
the staff who are directly accessing CAT Data inside the CAT 
infrastructure, Participant regulatory staff assisting examination 
staff in analyzing data extracted by a Participant for a particular 
examination or participating in an enforcement matter would be 
accessing CAT Data and thus would need to be identified and approved 
for access to CAT Data.
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    \343\ The Commission is proposing to allow ``similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation'' to act as the Chief Regulatory 
Officer in the proposed definition because certain Participants do 
not have a ``Chief Regulatory Officer.'' With respect to FINRA, the 
Commission understands that it does not have a Chief Regulatory 
Officer and that it may have multiple Executive Vice Presidents that 
fit within for the definition.
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    Participants may have staff with the technical or operational 
expertise necessary to implement systems to access CAT Data within 
other departments or that otherwise fall outside of the proposed 
definition of Regulatory Staff. Limiting access solely to Regulatory 
Staff could make it difficult for Participants to adequately develop, 
monitor, test, improve, or fix technical and operational systems 
developed or designed to access, review, or analyze CAT Data. 
Accordingly, the Commission proposes to require that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies allow technology and operations staff access 
to CAT Data only insofar as it is necessary to facilitate access by 
Regulatory Staff. To better protect CAT Data however, the Commission 
believes that such staff should not be granted access to CAT Data as a 
matter of course, and further believes that such staff should be 
subject to affidavit and training requirements and other requirements 
applicable to regulatory users of CAT Data.
    The Commission understands that with regard to CAT 
responsibilities, certain Participants may choose to enter into 
regulatory services agreements (``RSAs'') or allocate regulatory 
responsibilities pursuant to Rule 17d-2 (through ``17d-2 agreements'') 
to other Participants to operate their surveillance and regulatory 
functions, and in

[[Page 66039]]

particular cross-market regulation and surveillance.\344\ Under an RSA 
an SRO contracts to perform certain regulatory functions on behalf of 
another SRO, but the outsourcing SRO maintains ultimate legal 
responsibility for the regulation of its members and market. In 
contrast, under a Commission approved plan for the allocation of 
regulatory responsibilities pursuant to Rule 17d-2, the SRO does not 
maintain ultimate legal responsibility.\345\ The amendment would not 
prohibit the outsourcing SRO from permitting its Regulatory Staff to 
access CAT Data to carry out their regulatory responsibilities. In 
addition, the Commission preliminarily believes it would be appropriate 
for Regulatory Staff to access CAT Data to oversee and audit the 
performance of the SRO under an RSA, since the ultimate regulatory 
responsibility remains with the outsourcing SRO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See 15 U.S.C. 78q(d)(1) and 17 CFR 240.17d-2.
    \345\ See Section 17(d)(1) of the Act and Rule 17d-2 thereunder, 
15 U.S.C. 78q(d)(1) and 17 CFR 240.17d-2. Section 17(d)(1) of the 
Act allows the Commission to relieve an SRO of certain 
responsibilities with respect to members of the SRO who are also 
members of another SRO. Specifically, Section 17(d)(1) allows the 
Commission to relieve an SRO of its responsibilities to: (i) Receive 
regulatory reports from such members; (ii) examine such members for 
compliance with the Act and rules and regulations thereunder, and 
the rules of the SRO; or (iii) carry out other specified regulatory 
responsibilities with respect to such members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission further believes that restricting access to CAT Data 
as proposed above would not foreclose 17d-2 agreements and RSAs, but 
that the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, 17d-2 agreements and RSAs 
would address access to CAT Data in light of these agreements. For 
example, the Commission preliminarily believes that the role of the 
relevant SROs' Chief Regulatory Officers, and designation of employees 
who may access CAT Data, may depend on the nature of the arrangement 
between the SROs. However, the proposed amendment would not foreclose 
SROs from considering both the outsourcing SRO's and the counterparty 
SRO's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of 
regulation) as a relevant Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation) for purposes of proposed Sections 1.1 
and 6.5(g)(i), and thus allowing each Chief Regulatory Officer (or 
similarly designated head(s) of regulation) to identify Regulatory 
Staff in a manner consistent with the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies.
b. Information Barriers
    Current Section 6.5(f)(ii)(A) of the CAT NMS Plan requires 
Participants to adopt and enforce policies and procedures that 
implement effective information barriers between such Participant's 
regulatory and non-regulatory staff with regard to access and use of 
CAT Data stored in the Central Repository. The Commission proposes to 
move this requirement to Section 6.5(g)(i)(D), and modify the provision 
to replace the references to ``regulatory and non-regulatory staff,'' 
with the new defined term to state ``Regulatory Staff and non-
Regulatory Staff,'' and correct the grammar of the provision.
    Because the CAT is intended to be a regulatory system, the 
Commission continues to believe that requiring effective information 
barriers between regulatory and non-regulatory Staff is appropriate. 
The Commission believes that proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(D) improves 
upon existing Section 6.5(f)(ii) by requiring such information barriers 
to be implemented in the identical set of policies required by Section 
6.5(g)(i), and because it more clearly defines between which types of 
staff effective information barriers must be established. Regulatory 
Staff, depending on their roles and regulatory responsibilities, will 
have access to transactional data and/or access to CAIS or CCID 
Subsystem data, and there should be effective information barriers that 
prevent disclosure of such data to non-Regulatory Staff. Effective 
information barriers would help restrict non-Regulatory Staff access to 
CAT Data to the limited circumstances in which such staff could access 
CAT Data, as described below.
c. Access by Non-Regulatory Staff
    The Commission understands that there might be limited 
circumstances in which non-Regulatory Staff access to CAT data may be 
appropriate. Accordingly, the Commission proposes new Section 
6.5(g)(i)(E), which would require that the Confidentiality Policies 
limit non-Regulatory Staff access to CAT Data to limited circumstances 
in which there is a specific regulatory need for such access and a 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) 
of regulation), or designee, provides written approval for each 
instance of access by non-Regulatory Staff.\346\
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    \346\ The Commission notes that this would not apply to certain 
technology and operations staff pursuant to proposed Section 
6.5(g)(i)(C) discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that it is appropriate to provide this 
specific exception to allow for access to CAT Data by non-Regulatory 
Staff where there is a specific regulatory need. The Commission 
preliminarily believes there could be circumstances that justify 
allowing non-Regulatory Staff to view limited CAT Data. For example, in 
the case of a market ``flash crash,'' Regulatory Staff may need to 
brief an exchange's Chief Executive Officer (who may not otherwise be 
considered Regulatory Staff) regarding the causes of such an event or 
share raw CAT Data about specific orders and trades. Another example in 
which non-Regulatory Staff access could be appropriate is if major 
market participant misconduct warrants a briefing to a Participant's 
board of directors because it presents a risk to the continued 
operation of an exchange. The Commission believes requiring approval 
and documentation of such approval by the Participant's Chief 
Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation) 
should obligate the Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation) to determine whether a specific regulatory need 
exists. As proposed, and described further below, such approval and the 
access of CAT Data by non-Regulatory Staff would be subject to an 
annual examination.\347\
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    \347\ See infra Part II.G.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Training and Affidavit Requirements
    The CAT NMS Plan currently has provisions relating to training and 
affidavit requirements for individuals who access CAT Data, enforced by 
the Plan Processor. Section 6.1(m) of the CAT NMS Plan requires the 
Plan Processor to develop and, with the prior approval of the Operating 
Committee, implement a training program that addresses the security and 
confidentiality of all information accessible from the CAT, as well as 
the operational risks associated with accessing the Central Repository. 
The training program must be made available to all individuals who have 
access to the Central Repository on behalf of the Participants or the 
SEC, prior to such individuals being granted access to the Central 
Repository. Section 6.5(f)(i)(B) states that the Plan Processor shall 
require all individuals who have access to the Central Repository 
(including the respective employees and consultants of the Participants 
and the Plan Processor, but excluding employees and Commissioners of 
the SEC) to execute a personal ``Safeguard of Information Affidavit'' 
in a form approved by the Operating Committee

[[Page 66040]]

providing for personal liability for misuse of data.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \348\ Although Commission personnel would be excluded from 
provisions such as Section 6.5(f)(i)(B), the rules and policies 
applicable to the Commission and its personnel will be comparable to 
those applicable to the Participants and their personnel. See CAT 
NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84765.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes in new Section 6.5(g)(i)(F) that the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies require all Participant staff who are 
provided access to CAT Data to: (1) Sign a ``Safeguard of Information'' 
affidavit as approved by the Operating Committee pursuant to Section 
6.5(f)(i)(B); and (2) participate in the training program developed by 
the Plan Processor that addresses the security and confidentiality of 
information accessible in the CAT pursuant to Section 6.1(m), provided 
that Participant staff may be provided access to CAT Data prior to 
meeting these requirements in exigent circumstances.\349\ This 
affidavit and training requirement is already required by the Plan 
Processor before individuals can access the Central Repository, 
pursuant to Sections 6.1(m) and 6.5(f)(i)(B) of the CAT NMS Plan, but 
this proposal would require the Proposed Confidentiality Policies to 
access to CAT Data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \349\ The Commission notes that the Safeguard of Information 
affidavit approved by the Operating Committee pursuant to Section 
6.5(f)(i)(B) must provide for personal liability for the misuse of 
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes it is important that any 
Participant staff with access to CAT Data, whether or not that staff 
has access to the Central Repository itself, should undergo appropriate 
training and sign the Safeguard of Information affidavit.\350\ The 
Commission further believes that an exception for exigent circumstances 
is appropriate to provide for the rare circumstance where non-
Regulatory Staff, who has not yet completed the training and affidavit 
requirements required by Section 6.5(g)(i)(F), must receive access to 
limited CAT Data to address an exceptional emergency. Examples might 
include the Chief Executive Officer of a securities exchange receiving 
a briefing relating to a sudden market-wide emergency or technical or 
operations staff being called upon to address an unanticipated threat 
to the continued functioning of a Participant's system. Under proposed 
Section 6.5(g)(i)(F), any Participant staff who does receive access to 
CAT Data prior to satisfying the requirements of proposed Section 
6.5(g)(i)(F), due to exigent circumstances, would have to fulfill such 
requirements thereafter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ In the CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, the Commission stated 
that it believed existing CAT NMS Plan provisions, including Section 
6.1(m), ``indicate that the Plan Processor will require that all 
persons that have access to CAT Data will be required to complete 
training prior to accessing CAT Data, and expects that only those 
persons that have been adequately trained will have access to CAT 
Data.'' See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84755. The 
Commission believes that proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(F) clarifies and 
affirms that these expectations regarding training should apply to 
all Participant staff with access to CAT Data, regardless of whether 
or not directly accessed through the Central Repository.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Additional Policies Relating to Access and Use of CAT Data and 
Customer and Account Attributes
    The Commission also proposes several additional requirements to the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies to expand upon existing provisions as 
described below. The Commission preliminarily believes that these 
additional requirements, and providing a comprehensive list of 
requirements for the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, would help 
result in policies that are sufficiently robust to protect CAT Data and 
to effectively regulate Participant usage of such data.
a. Limitations on Extraction and Usage of CAT Data
    Rule 613 and the CAT NMS Plan limit the usage of CAT Data solely to 
surveillance and regulatory purposes.\351\ In this regard, the CAT NMS 
Plan requires Participants to adopt policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to limit the use of CAT Data obtained from the 
Central Repository solely for surveillance and regulatory 
purposes.\352\ In order to broaden the scope of such policies, the 
Commission proposes to add Sections 6.5(g)(i)(B) to require that the 
policies limit the extraction of CAT Data to the minimum amount 
necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or regulatory 
purpose.\353\ The Commission recognizes the potential security risks 
that result from the extraction of CAT Data. At the same time, the 
Commission recognizes that there may be legitimate regulatory needs to 
extract CAT Data. Accordingly, the Commission believes that it is 
important for the CAT NMS Plan and the Participants' policies to 
require that only the minimum amount of CAT Data necessary to achieve 
surveillance or regulatory purposes shall be downloaded. Such a 
requirement would apply to all CAT Data, including transactional data 
and Customer and Account Attributes, as well as means of access to CAT 
Data, such as the online targeted query tool or Manual and Programmatic 
CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem Access. The Commission preliminarily does 
not believe that such a requirement would impede Participant ability to 
perform surveillance, investigate potential violations, and bring 
enforcement cases, because Participant Regulatory Staff can view and 
analyze CAT Data without extraction, such as through the proposed SAW 
environments or in the online targeted query tool, and to the extent 
that any CAT Data must be downloaded this proposed provision would not 
limit a Participant's ability to download the minimum amount of CAT 
Data necessary to achieve surveillance or regulatory purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ See, e.g., Rule 613(e)(4)(i)(A) and CAT NMS Plan, supra 
note 3, at Section 6.5(f)(i)(A), 6.5(g). However, a Participant may 
use data that it reports to the Central Repository for regulatory, 
surveillance, commercial, or other purposes as otherwise not 
prohibited by applicable law, rule or regulation. See CAT NMS Plan, 
supra note 3, at 6.5(h).
    \352\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.5(g). As 
proposed, the policies required by the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies would still require this. See proposed Section 
6.5(g)(i)(A). The Commission also proposes to modify this provision 
to state that the Proposed Confidentiality Policies must ensure the 
confidentiality of CAT Data and limit the use of CAT Data to solely 
surveillance and regulatory purposes, and not ``CAT Data obtained 
from the Central Repository,'' to avoid potential confusion and to 
make clear that requirements related to the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies extend to CAT Data outside of the Central Repository.
    \353\ This provision is consistent with proposed Section 
6.13(a)(i)(C). See, supra Part II.C.2. This provision of the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies, as well as the others, will be 
subject to an annual examination of compliance by an independent 
auditor, which should help ensure that the provision is adhered to 
by Participants. See, infra Part II.G.4.
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b. Individual Roles and Usage Restrictions
    The Commission proposes to add Section 6.5(g)(i)(F) to the CAT NMS 
Plan to require the Proposed Confidentiality Policies to define the 
individual roles and regulatory activities of specific users, including 
those users requiring access to Customer and Account Attributes, of the 
CAT. This provision would require Participants to define roles and 
responsibilities on an individual level. For example, the policies 
could provide for a role in which a regulatory analyst accesses CAT 
Data to determine whether industry members complied with specific laws 
or SRO or Commission rules. The policies would be expected to define 
all individual roles and regulatory activities of users that 
Participants require to perform their regulatory and surveillance 
functions. For example, this would include roles and regulatory 
activities related to CAIS and CCID Subsystem access. The Commission 
also proposes to require in

[[Page 66041]]

Section 6.5(f)(i) of the CAT NMS Plan that each Participant shall 
establish, maintain, and enforce usage restriction controls (e.g., data 
loss prevention controls within any environment where CAT Data is used) 
in accordance with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the 
Participants to define the individual roles and regulatory activities 
of specific users, including those requiring access to Customer and 
Account Attributes, will encourage the Participants to thoroughly 
consider the roles and regulatory activities that individual users at 
Participants will be engaged in when using CAT Data and to consider 
what roles and regulatory activities require CAT Data to accomplish 
Participants' regulatory goals. Clearly defined roles and regulatory 
activities for individual users would help Participants better develop 
appropriate policies, procedures and controls to appropriately limit 
access to CAT Data on an individual level, and in particular, to 
establish appropriate Participant-specific procedures and usage 
restriction controls as required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i). Over 
time, if Participants develop new roles and regulatory activities, or 
modify existing roles and regulatory activities, the Participants would 
be required to update the Proposed Data Confidentiality Policies, and 
related procedures and usage restriction controls, as appropriate. The 
Commission also preliminarily believes that requiring the Participants 
to define individual roles and regulatory activities of specific users 
should provide clarity and transparency with regard to the use of CAT 
Data to achieve specific regulatory and surveillance roles and goals of 
the Participants.\354\
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    \354\ See infra Part II.E.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In particular, the Commission preliminarily believes that this 
provision would help provide clarity with regard to individual roles in 
the context of regulatory coordination. In addition, the provision 
would add accountability for Regulatory Staff based on their individual 
roles. Some individual roles that are appropriate for some Participants 
may not be appropriate for others, because of differences between 
markets and the functions of the SROs. For example, FINRA may need to 
define individual roles and regulatory responsibilities that would not 
be applicable to exchange SROs. Or, an SRO with a trading floor may 
have to define individual roles that specifically relate to regulation 
and surveillance of trading floor activity. An SRO that has entered 
into an RSA with another SRO may need to define an individual role or 
roles for Regulatory Staff responsible for overseeing and monitoring 
the another SRO's performance under the RSA.
    The Commission believes that requiring the establishment of usage 
restriction controls should help achieve the goal that individuals with 
access to CAT Data are using only the amount of CAT Data necessary to 
accomplish that individual's regulatory function. For example, 
Regulatory Staff with a regulatory role that only requires access to 
transactional data should not be given manual access to CAIS or CCID 
Subsystem. Additionally, limiting the access of an individual to only 
the specific data elements required for his or her surveillance or 
regulatory function reduces the potential of inappropriate receipt and 
misuse of CAT Data. The Commission believes that this requirement also 
leverages existing requirements of the CAT NMS Plan.\355\ The 
Commission further believes that the CAT NMS Plan's logging 
requirements would provide information that would help Participants to 
establish and refine usage restriction controls.\356\
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    \355\ Pursuant to the CAT NMS Plan, the CAT System must support 
an arbitrary number of roles with access to different types of CAT 
Data, down to the attribute level. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, 
at Appendix D, Section 4.14. In addition, the administration and 
management of roles must be documented by the Plan Processor. Id. As 
noted below, the Commission proposing to amend Appendix D, Section 
4.14 to clarify what ``arbitrary number'' means, see, infra, note 
380.
    \356\ For example, the CAT NMS Plan requires the online targeted 
query tool to log ``submitted queries and parameters used in the 
query, the user ID of the submitter, the date and time of the 
submission, as well as the delivery of results. The Plan Processor 
will use this logged information to provide monthly reports to each 
Participant and the SEC of its respective metrics on query 
performance and data usage of the online query tool. The Operating 
Committee must receive all monthly reports in order to review items, 
including user usage and system processing performance.'' See CAT 
NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 8.1.1.
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c. Policies Relating to Customer and Account Attributes
    Currently, the policies and procedures required by Section 
6.5(f)(ii) of the CAT NMS Plan and (g) do not directly address PII or 
Customer and Account Attributes, CAIS or the CCID Subsystem. The 
Commission believes that requiring Participants to incorporate policies 
relating to the access of Customer and Account Attributes, Programmatic 
CAIS Access, and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access in the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies would help protect the security and 
confidentiality of Customer and Account Attributes and CCIDs.
    Specifically, the Commission proposes Section 6.5(g)(i)(I) of the 
CAT NMS Plan, which would require that the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies be reasonably designed to implement and satisfy the Customer 
and Account Attributes data requirements of proposed Section 4.1.6 of 
Appendix D such that Participants must be able to demonstrate that a 
Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem 
access is in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems 
Workflow.\357\ As discussed above in Part II.F, the Commission is 
proposing to amend Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D to more clearly define a 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, which sets forth explicit 
restrictions designed to limit the access and usage of Customer and 
Account Attributes only to the extent necessary to accomplish 
surveillance and regulatory purposes. The Commission believes that 
requiring the Proposed Confidentiality Policies to incorporate and 
implement the proposed Customer Identifying Systems Workflow would 
result in consistent application of the Customer Identifying Systems 
Workflow because all Participants would be subject to the policies 
which apply to Customer and Account Data usage both within and outside 
of a SAW. Together with Participant-specific procedures and usage 
restriction controls, these policies would help protect the security 
and confidentiality of Customer and Account Attributes, which would 
yield insight into a specific Customer's trading activity if coupled 
with transaction data, and would be collected and maintained by the CAT 
system.\358\ These policies would also be subject to the approval, 
publication, and examination provisions discussed below.
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    \357\ See supra Part II.E and Part II.F.
    \358\ In addition, the Commission believes that the logging and 
reports required by Appendix D, Section 8.1.1 of the CAT NMS Plan 
would help Participants review whether the requirements of Section 
4.1.6 of Appendix D are being followed. See, supra note 356.
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    The Commission also believes that it is appropriate to amend the 
CAT NMS Plan to highlight that the restrictions to a Participant's 
access to Customer and Account Attributes and Customer Identifying 
Systems through programmatic access continue to apply even after a 
Participant is initially approved for programmatic access. Thus, the 
proposed amendments state that the Proposed Confidentiality Policies 
must be reasonably designed to implement and satisfy the Customer and

[[Page 66042]]

Account Attributes data requirements of Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D 
such that Participants must be able to demonstrate that a Participant's 
ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem access is in 
accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow and the 
restrictions noted therein. As a result of these policies, Participants 
must be able to demonstrate that their ongoing use of programmatic 
access continues to be in compliance with the restrictions to Customer 
and Account Attributes. For example, a Participant could document the 
changes to the Participant's evolving use of the programmatic access, 
noting in particular how the Participant's programmatic access 
continues to comply with the restrictions around access to Customer and 
Account Attributes since the Commission's initial approval of the 
Participant's programmatic access.\359\ In light of this requirement, 
each Participant would be in a position to continually assess whether 
such ongoing programmatic access adheres to the restrictions of the 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow. For example, if the 
functionality of a Participant's programmatic access changed to address 
a new regulatory purpose, the Participant must be able to demonstrate 
that the changed functionality remains consistent with all of the 
restrictions of the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow including (1) 
that the ``least privileged'' practice of limiting access to Customer 
Identifying Systems has been applied but that programmatic access to 
achieve the new regulatory purpose is still required; (2) that 
Regulatory Staff accessing Customer and Account Attributes through 
programmatic access is limited to only those individuals that maintain 
the appropriate regulatory role for such access; (3) that queries 
submitted by Regulatory Staff using programmatic access are based on a 
``need to know'' data in the Customer Identifying Systems; and (4) that 
queries have been designed such that query results contain only the 
Customer and Account Attributes that Regulatory Staff reasonably 
believes will achieve the regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of 
inquiries. The Commission preliminarily believes that these 
requirements, in conjunction with other requirements of the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies discussed above, including monitoring, usage 
restriction controls and definitions of individual roles and regulatory 
activities of specific users, would help restrict Manual and 
Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem Access to narrowly tailored 
circumstances when initially approved by the Commission and on an 
ongoing basis.
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    \359\ The Commission generally believes that such documentation 
should at minimum have the same level of detail as the initial 
application material for programmatic access and should highlight 
how the Participant's programmatic access has changed over time.
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4. Approval, Publication, Review and Annual Examinations of Compliance
    Currently, Section 6.5(g) of the CAT NMS Plan requires Participants 
to periodically review the effectiveness of the policies and procedures 
required by Section 6.5(g), and take prompt action to remedy 
deficiencies in such policies and procedures. However, the Commission 
believes that the highly sensitive nature of CAT Data and the 
importance of confidentiality warrants further oversight of the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies, and in particular, the Commission 
believes it is appropriate to require approval of the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies; require publication of these policies; 
provide specifics regarding Participant review of policies, procedures, 
and usage restriction controls; and require an annual examination of 
compliance with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies by independent 
accountants.
    First, the Commission proposes to require that both the CISO and 
CCO of the Plan Processor be required to review the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies.\360\ In addition, the Commission proposes to 
require that the CCO of the Plan Processor obtain assistance and input 
from the Compliance Subcommittee,\361\ and require that the policies 
required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i) of the CAT NMS Plan be subject 
to review by the Operating Committee, after review by the CISO and 
CCO.\362\ Currently, no specific individual is responsible for 
reviewing or approving the Participant policies and procedures required 
by Section 6.5(f)(ii) or 6.5(g) of the CAT NMS Plan. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that these requirements will further help result 
in Proposed Confidentiality Policies that are consistent with the 
requirements of the CAT NMS Plan and proposed changes herein, while 
providing for multiple opportunities for feedback and input while the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies are being developed. It would allow 
the Plan Processor to have input in the creation of the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies and would encourage consistency with policies 
and procedures created by the Plan Processor itself. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to require the CCO to 
receive the assistance of the Compliance Subcommittee for broad input 
into the process of developing the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies.\363\ The Commission believes that it is reasonable to require 
the Operating Committee to review and approve the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies after review by the CCO and CISO to prevent 
such policies from going into effect until these relevant parties have 
had the opportunity to review and provide feedback if necessary. 
Similarly, it is important for the Operating Committee, CCO and CISO to 
review updates to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, as 
Participants make changes over time, because such parties can provide 
feedback and identify any inconsistencies with requirements of the CAT 
NMS Plan.
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    \360\ See proposed Sections 6.2(a)(v)(R) and 6.2(b)(viii).
    \361\ See proposed Section 6.2(a)(v)(R). The CAT NMS Plan 
requires the Operating Committee to maintain a compliance 
Subcommittee (the ``Compliance Subcommittee'') whose purpose shall 
be to aid the Chief Compliance Officer as necessary. See CAT NMS 
Plan, supra note 3, at Section 4.12(b).
    \362\ See proposed Section 6.5(g)(vi). The Commission 
anticipates that the Participants will provide the draft Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies to the CISO and CCO sufficiently in advance 
of the Operating Committee vote to permit review.
    \363\ Members of the Advisory Committee, composed of members 
that are not employed by or affiliated with any Participant or any 
of its affiliates or facilities, are currently on the Compliance 
Subcommittee. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 4.13.
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    Second, the Commission believes that public disclosure of the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies would be beneficial to investors and 
the public. Currently, the policies and procedures created by 
Participants pursuant to Section 6.5(f)(ii) and (g) are not required to 
be publicly disseminated. The Commission believes that public 
disclosure could help encourage the Participants to thoroughly consider 
the Proposed Confidentiality Policies and encourage the Participants to 
create robust Proposed Confidentiality Policies because they will be 
subject to public scrutiny. Thus, the Commission proposes new Section 
6.5(g)(iv) which would require the Participants to make the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies publicly available on each of the 
Participants' websites, or collectively on the CAT NMS Plan website, 
redacted of sensitive proprietary information.\364\

[[Page 66043]]

The Commission also believes that such a requirement would allow other 
Participants, broker-dealers, investors, and the public to better 
understand and analyze the Proposed Confidentiality Policies that 
govern Participant usage of and the confidentiality of CAT Data, and, 
when updated by Participants, any changes to these policies. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that broker-dealers and investors 
that generate the order and trade activity that is reported to CAT 
should be able to access the policies governing usage of CAT Data. In 
addition, due to the sensitivity and importance of CAT Data, which may 
contain personally identifiable information, trading strategies, and 
other valuable or sensitive information, it is important for broker-
dealers, investors and the public to understand how CAT Data will be 
used and confidentiality maintained by the Participants, and to know 
the policies that Participants are bound to follow to protect the 
confidentiality of such data. The Commission believes that this may be 
particularly important for policies relating to access to Customer 
Account Attributes, as well policies relating to Manual and 
Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem Access, which will allow 
customer attribution of order flow. The Commission is proposing an 
exception for sensitive proprietary information in the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies because certain information in the policies 
required in the Proposed Confidentiality Policies may jeopardize the 
security of CAT Data if publicly disclosed. However, the Commission 
preliminarily does not believe that the proposed requirements for the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies would require the disclosure of any 
substantial amount of sensitive proprietary information, and expects 
that there would be no redactions of information specifically required 
in the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, such as the identification of 
the individual roles and regulatory activities of specific users. The 
Commission believes that Participant-specific procedures and usage 
restriction controls, that would not be required to be made public, are 
more likely to contain the type of sensitive information that is 
inappropriate for public disclosure.
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    \364\ See supra note 362. As proposed, publication of the 
policies could occur on either each of the Participant websites or 
on the CAT NMS Plan website. The CAT NMS Plan website was created by 
the Participants shortly after the adoption of Rule 613 and has been 
used as a means to communicate information to the industry and the 
public at large since that time. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at 
Appendix C-109.
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    Currently, the CAT NMS Plan requires Participants to periodically 
review the effectiveness of the policies and procedures required by 
Section 6.5(g), maintain such policies and procedures, and take prompt 
action to remedy deficiencies in such policies and procedures, without 
further specifics regarding how this review is to occur. The Commission 
proposes changes to strengthen the review of the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies in proposed Sections 6.5(g)(i)(J), 6.5(g)(ii) 
and 6.5(g)(v).
    Proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(J) would require that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies document monitoring and testing protocols that 
will be used to assess Participant compliance with the policies (e.g., 
protocols monitoring CAT Data movement within any environment where CAT 
Data is used and associated testing to determine that such protocols 
are effective at identifying data leakage). In conjunction with this 
provision, proposed Section 6.5(g)(ii) would require the Participant to 
periodically review the effectiveness of the policies, procedures, and 
usage restriction controls required by Section 6.5(g)(i), including by 
using the monitoring and testing protocols documented within the 
policies pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i)(J), and taking prompt action to 
remedy deficiencies in such policies, procedures and usage restriction 
controls.\365\
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    \365\ The Commission would delete existing language in current 
Section 6.5(g)(i) that states: ``Each Participant shall periodically 
review the effectiveness of the policies and procedures required by 
this paragraph, and take prompt action to remedy deficiencies in 
such policies and procedures.'' The Commission believes that this 
language would be replaced and enhanced in substance by proposed 
Section 6.5(g)(i)(J).
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    The Commission believes that these requirements are appropriate and 
should result in Proposed Confidentiality Policies, and Participant-
specific procedures and usage restriction controls developed pursuant 
to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, that are effective and 
complied with by each Participant across all environments where CAT 
Data is used. The Commission believes that review of implementation is 
important since even robust confidentiality policies could be 
circumvented or violated due to poor or improper implementation. Such 
periodic review will also help assure broker-dealers, investors and the 
public that the Participants are complying with the publicly disclosed 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies and related procedures and usage 
restriction controls. In addition, such review would assist 
Participants in meeting their requirement to maintain the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies and related procedures and usage restriction 
controls as required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i), including updating 
and revising them as appropriate.
    The Commission also proposes a new Section 6.5(g)(v) which would 
require that, on an annual basis, each Participant shall engage an 
independent accountant to perform an examination of compliance with the 
policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i) in accordance with attestation 
standards of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(``AICPA'') (referred to as U.S. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
or GAAS) or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (``PCAOB''), 
and with Commission independence standards based on SEC Rule 2-01 of 
Regulation S-X.\366\ In addition, the examination results shall be 
submitted to the Commission upon completion, in a text-searchable 
format (e.g. a text-searchable PDF). The examination report shall be 
considered submitted to the Commission when electronically received by 
an email address provided by Commission staff. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that this additional oversight would help result 
in such data being used solely for surveillance and regulatory 
purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \366\ See 17 CFR 210.2-01. The Commission stresses that the 
proposed change relates only to a required ``examination'' by 
independent accountants, and has no relation to ``examinations'' 
performed by Commission staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the annual 
examination to be performed by an independent accountant should result 
in an examination that is performed by experienced professionals who 
are subject to certain professional standards. The Commission believes 
that permitting the examination to be in accordance with either the 
attestation standards of the AICPA or the PCAOB should give 
Participants greater flexibility in choosing an independent accountant. 
The Commission preliminarily believes that either standard is 
sufficient for the annual examinations to be performed adequately in 
these circumstances and both are familiar to the Commission, 
Participants and other market participants. The Commission believes 
that the independence standard of SEC Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X would 
require Participants to engage an independent accountant that is 
independent of the Participant. The Commission understands that under 
the proposed requirement, Participants can likely use their existing 
auditors to perform this task as long as the existing auditors meet the 
independence requirements. The Commission further believes that as 
proposed, Participants that are affiliated would be permitted to

[[Page 66044]]

use the same auditor for each affiliated entity.
    The Commission believes that it is appropriate to require that the 
Participants provide the examination reports to the Commission. The 
Commission believes that this will allow the Commission to review the 
results of the examination, and to assess whether or not Participants 
are adequately complying with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. 
The Commission believes that the examination reports should be 
protected from disclosure subject to the provisions of applicable 
law.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing 
the public availability of information obtained by the Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the amendments to consolidate 
and enhance Participants' data confidentiality policies and procedures. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    132. Are current requirements relating to Participant data usage 
and confidentiality policies and procedures in Section 6.5(f)(ii), 
6.5(f)(iii), and 6.5(g) in the CAT NMS Plan sufficient to protect the 
confidentiality and security of CAT Data?
    133. Are the requirements of the Proposed Confidentiality Policies 
sufficiently robust to protect the confidentiality and security of CAT 
Data? Would additional or fewer requirements for such policies be 
beneficial?
    134. Should the Proposed Confidentiality Policies be required to 
provide any other limitations on the extraction or usage of CAT Data? 
Do the proposed requirements sufficiently address concerns about 
policies and procedures related to the extraction and usage of CAT 
Data, including Customer and Account Attributes?
    135. Should the Proposed Confidentiality Policies include specific 
data security requirements to help protect the confidentiality of CAT 
Data (e.g., data loss prevention controls that include data access 
controls, data encryption, specific availability restrictions, and 
controls on data movement for securing CAT Data within any environment 
where CAT Data is used)? Should the Proposed Confidentiality Policies 
require Participants to maintain a full technical audit log of all CAT 
Data movement within their own environments?
    136. Should the Proposed Confidentiality Policies or the CAT NMS 
Plan itself be required to define what ``surveillance and regulatory 
purposes'' means?
    137. Should the Participants be required to establish, maintain, 
and enforce identical written policies as proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)? 
Should Participants be required to create procedures and usage 
restriction controls in accordance with the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies?
    138. Should the Proposed Confidentiality Policies limit extraction 
of CAT Data to the minimum amount of data necessary to achieve a 
specific surveillance or regulatory purpose? Should other policies and/
or procedures regarding the extraction of CAT Data be required?
    139. Should the Proposed Confidentiality Policies do more than 
define the individual roles and regulatory activities of specific 
users, e.g., require documentation relating to each instance of access 
of CAT Data or define both appropriate and inappropriate usages of CAT 
Data?
    140. The proposed amendments define Regulatory Staff. Is the 
proposed definition of Regulatory Staff appropriate and reasonable? Is 
the definition too broad or too narrow? Why or why not? For example, 
should the Commission limit the definition of Regulatory Staff to staff 
that exclusively report to the Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation) or to persons within the Chief 
Regulatory Officer's (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation's) 
reporting line?
    141. Is it reasonable and appropriate to require that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies limit access to CAT Data to Regulatory Staff 
and technology and operations staff that require access solely to 
facilitate access to and usage of the CAT Data by Regulatory Staff? 
Should any other Participant staff be permitted access to CAT Data?
    142. The proposed amendments provide that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies require, absent exigent circumstances, that 
all Participant staff who are provided access to CAT Data must sign a 
``Safeguard of Information affidavit'' and participate in the training 
program developed by the Plan Processor. Is this requirement 
appropriate and reasonable? Should Participants be permitted to allow 
access to CAT Data by staff that have not met the affidavit and 
training requirements if there are exigent circumstances? If so, how 
should exigent circumstances be defined? Who should determine what are 
exigent circumstances?
    143. The proposed amendments provide that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies shall provide for only one limited exception 
for access to CAT Data by non-Regulatory Staff (other than technology 
and operations staff as provided for in Section 6.5(g)(i)(B)), namely a 
``specific regulatory need for access.'' Is this exception clearly 
defined and easily understood? Is this exception too broad or too 
narrow? Should non-Regulatory Staff be permitted access to CAT Data in 
any other circumstance? Should non-Regulatory Staff be required to 
obtain written approval from a Participant's CRO for each instance of 
access to CAT Data? Should there be other requirements for non-
Regulatory Staff to access CAT Data? Would this proposed requirement 
restrict the ability of certain non-Regulatory Staff, such as Chief 
Executive Officers, from carrying out their oversight over regulatory 
matters?
    144. Is it appropriate and reasonable to require the Chief 
Information Security Officer of the Plan Processor, in collaboration 
with the Chief Compliance Officer of the Plan Processor, to review the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies? Is it appropriate and reasonable to 
require the Operating Committee to approve the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies? Should other individuals, entities, or the Commission be 
responsible for reviewing and/or approving these policies and 
procedures? Should such review and/or approval be subject to objective 
or subjective criteria, or explicit standards? If so, what should those 
criteria or standards be?
    145. Are the proposed requirements for policies relating to 
Customer and Account Attributes, and CAIS and CCID Subsystem access, 
specifically proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)(I), appropriate and reasonable? 
Should other requirements relating to access or usage of Customer and 
Account Attributes be required? Is it appropriate and reasonable to 
have policy provisions that apply only to Customer and Account 
Attributes data instead of CAT Data more broadly?
    146. Is it appropriate and reasonable to require that the 
Participants engage an independent accountant to examine on an annual 
basis each Participant's compliance with the policies required by 
proposed Section 6.5(g)(i)? Are the proposed attestation and 
independence standards appropriate?
    147. Is it appropriate and reasonable to require that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies document monitoring and testing protocols that 
will be used to assess Participant compliance with the policies? Should 
additional specificity be added regarding the monitoring and testing 
requirements, such as requiring that these requirements include 
specific data loss prevention controls? Is it

[[Page 66045]]

appropriate and reasonable to require that Participants periodically 
review the effectiveness of the policies and procedures and usage 
restriction controls required by Section 6.5(g)(i)? Should more or 
fewer requirements regarding review of Participant compliance with the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies or related procedures and/or usage 
restrictions be implemented?
    148. Is it appropriate and reasonable to require that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies be made public? Is it appropriate and 
reasonable to provide that Participants have no obligation to disclose 
sensitive information? Should Participants be permitted to withhold any 
other type of information? Should the policies be published or made 
public in a form different than publication on the CAT NMS Plan 
website?

H. Regulator & Plan Processor Access

1. Regulatory Use of CAT Data
    As noted earlier, Rule 613 and the CAT NMS Plan already limits the 
use of CAT Data to solely surveillance and regulatory purposes.\368\ 
The CAT NMS Plan also provides that the Plan Processor must provide 
Participants' regulatory staff and the Commission with access to CAT 
Data for regulatory purposes only.\369\ Examples of functions for which 
Participants' regulatory staff and the SEC could use CAT Data include 
economic analysis, market structure analyses, market surveillance, 
investigations, and examinations.\370\ The Commission has received 
letters stating that ``surveillance and regulatory purposes'' is too 
broad and vague a limit on the use of CAT Data and should be clarified 
to prohibit SROs from using CAT Data for any commercial purpose.\371\ 
The Commission believes that it is important that CAT Data be used only 
for surveillance and regulatory purposes. The Commission also believes 
it is important to prohibit Participants from using CAT Data in 
situations where use of CAT Data may serve both a surveillance or 
regulatory purpose, and commercial purpose, and, more specifically 
prohibit use of CAT Data for economic analyses or market structure 
analyses in support of rule filings submitted to the Commission 
pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act (``SRO rule filings'') in 
these instances.
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    \368\ See, e.g., Rule 613(e)(4)(i)(A) and CAT NMS Plan, supra 
note 3, at Section 6.5(f)(i)(A), 6.5(g). However, a Participant may 
use data that it reports to the Central Repository for regulatory, 
surveillance, commercial, or other purposes as otherwise not 
prohibited by applicable law, rule or regulation. See CAT NMS Plan, 
supra note 3, at Section 6.5(h).
    \369\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
8.1. Because this section currently only refers to ``regulatory 
purposes,'' the Commission proposes to amend this section to clarify 
that such access is for surveillance and regulatory purposes only, 
to be consistent with Rule 613 and other sections of the CAT NMS 
Plan. See, supra note 368. This change would also be consistent with 
proposed changes discussed below, that would clarify the requirement 
that CAT Data should be used only for surveillance and regulatory 
purposes.
    \370\ Id.
    \371\ See letter dated November 11, 2019 from Kenneth E. 
Bentsen, Jr., President and CEO, Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (``SIFMA''), to the Honorable Jay Clayton, 
Chairman, Commission (``[t]he Commission should clarify the meaning 
of the term `surveillance and regulatory purposes' . . . . In doing 
so, the Commission should ensure that the SROs will be clearly 
prohibited from using CAT Data for any commercial purpose''); letter 
dated December 16, 2019 from Ronald Newman, National Political 
Director, and Kate Ruane, Senior Legislative Counsel, American Civil 
Liberties Union, to the Honorable Jay Clayton, Chairman, Commission 
(``[t]his standard is far too broad and vague to assure that the 
data will only be acquired and used for specific and legitimate 
enforcement purposes. The SEC should provide a clearly defined 
standard that must be met in order to access and use information in 
the CAT and should specifically prohibit those with access from 
using the information for any commercial purpose'').
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    The Commission proposes to amend Section 8.1 of Appendix D to add 
to the requirement that access to CAT Data would be only for 
surveillance and regulatory purposes that the access should be 
consistent with Proposed Confidentiality Policies as set forth in 
Section 6.5(g) of the CAT NMS Plan. The Commission also proposes to 
amend Section 8.1 of Appendix D to specify that Regulatory Staff and 
the SEC must be performing regulatory functions when using CAT Data, 
including for economic analyses, market structure analyses, market 
surveillance, investigations, and examinations, and may not use CAT 
Data in such cases where use of CAT Data may serve both a surveillance 
or regulatory purpose, and a commercial purpose. The Commission further 
proposes that in any case where the use of CAT Data may serve both a 
surveillance or regulatory purpose and a commercial purpose, such as 
economic analyses or market structure analyses in support of SRO rule 
filings with both a regulatory and commercial purpose, use of CAT Data 
is not permitted. This would be consistent with the existing 
requirement in Rule 613 the CAT NMS Plan that CAT Data must be used for 
solely regulatory and surveillance purposes.\372\
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    \372\ See 17 CFR 242.613(e)(4)(i)(A); CAT NMS Plan, supra note 
3, Sections 6.5(c) and 6.5(g). Because the CAT NMS Plan requires CAT 
Data to be used for solely regulatory or surveillance purposes, 
Participants may not use CAT Data for any economic analyses or 
market structure analyses that do not have a solely regulatory or 
surveillance purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments 
to Section 8.1 of Appendix D are appropriate because adding the 
requirement that surveillance and regulatory purposes be consistent 
with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies would establish a minimum 
standard for what constitutes regulatory use of CAT Data that is 
identical across the Participants. It would additionally help protect 
the security of CAT Data by limiting the extraction of CAT Data to, as 
proposed, the minimum amount of data necessary to achieve a specific 
surveillance or regulatory purpose. The Commission's proposed 
amendments concerning the functions for which CAT Data can be used 
reiterate that the CAT Data may only be used for solely surveillance 
and regulatory purposes.
    The Commission believes that prohibiting the use of CAT Data for 
SRO rule filings with a regulatory and commercial purpose is important 
because exchange groups are no longer structured as mutual 
organizations that are owned, for the most part, by SRO members. Today, 
nearly all exchange SROs are part of publicly-traded exchange groups 
that are not owned by the SRO members, and, among other things, compete 
with broker-dealers and each other for market share and order 
flow.\373\ CAT Data includes data submitted by the SROs and broker-
dealers.\374\ The Commission believes that SROs may want to use CAT 
Data for legitimate surveillance and regulatory purposes in conjunction 
with an SRO rule filing, but many exchange SRO rule filings have at 
least some commercial component. For example, CAT Data could be used to 
determine whether or not a particular order type is working as intended 
or if changes would be beneficial to market participants--however, 
exchange SROs compete for order flow by offering different types and 
variations of order types, therefore potential SRO rule filings in this 
context would not be solely related to surveillance or regulation. 
Prohibiting the use of CAT Data for such a rule change is consistent 
with the existing

[[Page 66046]]

requirement that CAT Data must be used for solely regulatory and 
surveillance purposes,\375\ and the proposed amendments make clear that 
this restriction on the usage of CAT Data applies to SRO rule filings 
that do not have solely regulatory or surveillance purposes.\376\ 
However, this prohibition would not restrict an SRO's ability to use 
CAT Data for SRO rule filings with a solely surveillance or regulatory 
purpose, such as monitoring for market manipulation or compliance with 
sales practice rules.\377\
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    \373\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50699 (Nov. 18, 
2004), 69 FR 71125, 71132 (Dec. 8, 2004) (noting that SROs had been 
challenged by the trend to demutualize and that the ``impact of 
demutualization is the creation of another SRO constituency--a 
dispersed group of public shareholders--with a natural tendency to 
promote business interests'').
    \374\ SROs compete for order flow with off exchange venues, 
including alternative trading systems (which also match buyers and 
sellers but are subject to a different regulatory framework and in 
many cases do not display pricing information to the general public) 
and other liquidity providers (e.g., broker-dealer internalizers).
    \375\ See supra note 368.
    \376\ The Commission preliminarily believes that this is 
consistent with the Participants' understanding of the CAT NMS Plan, 
and notes that the current CAT Reporter Agreement, which is between 
the Plan Processor and CAT Reporters, states that the signing 
parties acknowledge that the Consolidated Audit Trail, LLC, the 
Participants, and the Plan Processor ``are not authorized by the CAT 
NMS Plan to use the submitted CAT Data for commercial purposes[.]'' 
See ``Consolidated Audit Trail Reporter Agreement,'' available at: 
https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-05/Consolidated-Audit-Trail-Reporter-Agreement-amended_0.pdf.
    \377\ Although the Participants would be permitted to use CAT 
Data to support a rule filing with a solely surveillance or 
regulatory purpose, proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(C) would permit only 
the extraction of the minimum amount of CAT Data necessary to 
achieve that specific regulatory purpose. However, the proposed 
amendment would not prevent a Participant from using the data that 
it reports to the Central Repository for regulatory, surveillance, 
commercial, or other purposes as otherwise not prohibited by 
applicable law, rule or regulation. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, 
at 6.5(h).
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2. Access to CAT Data
    As described above, the Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, 
Section 8.1 of the CAT NMS Plan to add that access to CAT Data must be 
consistent with the Participants' Confidentiality Policies and 
Procedures as set forth in proposed Section 6.5(g). The Commission also 
continues to believe that access of Participants' Regulatory Staff and 
the Commission to CAT Data must be based on an RBAC model. RBAC is a 
mechanism for authentication in which users are assigned to one or many 
roles, and each role is assigned a defined set of permissions.\378\ An 
RBAC model specifically assigns the access and privileges of individual 
CAT users based on the individual's job responsibilities and need for 
access. Users would not be directly assigned specific access and 
privileges but would instead receive access and privileges based on 
their assigned role in the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \378\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix C, note 250.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CAT NMS Plan currently provides that an RBAC model ``must be 
used to permission user[s] with access to different areas of the CAT 
System.'' \379\ The CAT NMS Plan further requires the CAT System to 
support an arbitrary number of roles with access to different types of 
CAT Data, down to the attribute level.\380\ The administration and 
management of roles must be documented, and Participants, the SEC, and 
the Operating Committee must be provided with periodic reports 
detailing the current list of authorized users and the date of their 
most recent access.\381\ The Plan Processor is required to log every 
instance of access to Central Repository data by users.\382\ The CAT 
NMS Plan, as part of its data requirements surrounding Customer and 
Account Attributes,\383\ further requires that using the RBAC model, 
access to Customer and Account Attributes shall be configured at the 
Customer and Account Attribute level, following the ``least 
privileged'' practice of limiting access to the greatest extent 
possible.
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    \379\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.4. The Commission also proposed to correct certain grammatical 
errors. See Appendix D, Sections 4.1.4, 8.2.2.
    \380\ The Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 4.1.4 
to state that the CAT System must support as many roles as required 
by Participants and the Commission to permit access to different 
types of CAT Data, down to the attribute level. The Commission 
believes that this change clarifies what ``arbitrary number of 
roles'' means in the context of the RBAC model required by the CAT 
NMS Plan and should result in the implementation of an RBAC model 
that will support the number of roles required by Participants and 
the Commission.
    \381\ The CAT NMS Plan provides that the reports of the 
Participants and the SEC will include only their respective list of 
users and that the Participants must provide a response to the 
report confirming that the list of users is accurate. The required 
frequency of this report would be defined by the Operating 
Committee. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.4. The Commission proposes to amend the language in Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.4 to make clear that the reports provided to the 
Participants and the SEC will include only their respective list of 
users and that the CAT NMS Plan obligates the Participants to 
provide a response to the report confirming that the list of users 
is accurate. The Commission believes that these changes are 
consistent with existing expectations and could help avoid potential 
confusion regarding obligations relating to these reports.
    \382\ Id.
    \383\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.6.
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    The Commission now believes that it is important to require that 
access of Participants' Regulatory Staff \384\ to all CAT Data must be 
through the RBAC model, and extend the practice of requiring ``least 
privileged'' access to all CAT Data, and not just to Customer and 
Account Attributes. Specifically, the Commission proposes to amend 
Appendix D, Section 8.1 of the CAT NMS Plan by adding that the Plan 
Processor must provide Participants' Regulatory Staff and the SEC with 
access to all CAT Data based on an RBAC model that follows ``least 
privileged'' practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \384\ As noted earlier, the Commission proposes to amend 
Appendix D, Section 8.1 to remove references to ``regulatory staff'' 
and replace them with the defined term ``Regulatory Staff.'' See 
supra note 342.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that this proposed amendment 
would strengthen the requirement that, in addition to requiring a 
regulatory purpose, access to CAT Data is also restricted by an RBAC 
model that follows ``least privileged'' practices. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that this proposed amendment would provide 
consistency across the CAT NMS Plan by requiring that the RBAC and 
``least privileged'' practices requirement that applies to the CAT 
System and the Customer and Account Attributes also applies to 
accessing CAT Data. An RBAC model and ``least privileged'' practices 
requirement would provide access only to those who have a legitimate 
purpose in accessing CAT Data, and limit the privileges of those users 
to the minimum necessary to perform their regulatory roles and 
functions.
    The Commission also proposes amendments to Appendix D, Section 
4.1.4 to address the general requirements relating to access to 
Customer Identifying Systems and transactional CAT Data by Plan 
Processor employees and contractors. Specifically, the Commission 
proposes amendments to Appendix D, Section 4.1.4 to require that 
``[f]ollowing `least privileged' practices, separation of duties, and 
the RBAC model for permissioning users with access to the CAT System, 
all Plan Processor employees and contractors that develop and test 
Customer Identifying Systems shall only develop and test with non-
production data and shall not be entitled to access production data 
(i.e., Industry Member Data, Participant Data, and CAT Data) in CAIS or 
the CCID Subsystem. All Plan Processor employees and contractors that 
develop and test CAT Systems containing transactional CAT Data shall 
use non-production data for development and testing purposes; if it is 
not possible to use non-production data, such Plan Processor employees 
and contractors shall use the oldest available production data that 
will support the desired development and testing, subject to the 
approval of the Chief Information Security Officer.'' \385\
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    \385\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.4 (Data Access).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that imposing the limitations on which Plan

[[Page 66047]]

Processor employees and contractors can access Customer Identifying 
Systems is appropriate as the possibility of misuse of CAT Data exists 
with those individuals as with any Regulatory Staff. Therefore it is 
also appropriate to require that Plan Processor employees and 
contractors accessing Customer Identifying Systems must follow ``least 
privileged'' practices, separation of duties, and the RBAC model for 
permissioning users with access to the CAT System. The Commission also 
believes it is appropriate to limit the actual testing and development 
of Customer Identifying Systems to non-production data because such 
non-production data will not contain Customer and Account Attributes 
and other data that could be used to identify Customers and other 
market participants. With respect to transactional CAT Data, the 
Commission believes that is reasonable to require that Plan Processor 
employees and contractors use non-production data if possible; however, 
the Commission recognizes that for practical purposes, it may be 
difficult or impossible to generate non-production transactional CAT 
Data sufficient for desired development and testing. As a result, Plan 
Processor employees and contractors may use production data in the 
testing and development of CAT Systems that contains transactional CAT 
Data, but they must use the oldest available production data that will 
support the desired development and testing. Given that production data 
will be accessed in this specific circumstance, the Commission believes 
that the Chief Information Security Officer should approve such access.
    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments 
concerning the access of regulators and the Plan Processor to CAT Data. 
Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    149. There is existing CAT NMS Plan language stating that CAT Data 
may be used solely for surveillance and regulatory purposes.\386\ Is it 
necessary to further provide that the use of CAT Data is prohibited in 
cases where it would serve both a regulatory or surveillance purpose, 
and a commercial purpose?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \386\ See supra note 368.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    150. The Commission proposes to prohibit the use of CAT Data in SRO 
rule filings that have both a regulatory and commercial purpose. Are 
there instances where it is necessary to use CAT Data in an SRO rule 
filing that may have a commercial impact but is essential for 
regulatory purposes? Please provide examples. If so, what should be the 
conditions or process by which SROs would be permitted to use CAT Data 
for SRO rule filings?
    151. Does requiring that access to CAT Data be restricted by an 
RBAC model that follows ``least privileged'' practices, and adding the 
requirement that access must be consistent with the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies enhance the security of CAT Data? Is adding 
the requirement that access to CAT Data must be consistent with the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies necessary and appropriate? Should the 
proposed amendments be more prescriptive and define potential roles 
generally or specifically that would be used in an RBAC model or least 
privileged access model?
    152. The proposed amendments require the Plan Processor employees 
and contractors that test and develop Customer Identifying Systems to 
follow ``least privileged'' practices, separation of duties, and the 
RBAC model for permissioning users with access to the CAT System. Do 
commenters agree that such employees and contractors should follow 
these principles and practices in order to access Customer Identifying 
Systems?
    153. Should Plan Processor contractors supporting the development 
or operation of the CAT System be subject to certain additional access 
restrictions? For example, should Plan Processor contractors be 
required to access CAT system components through dedicated systems? 
Should Plan Processor contractors be subject to heightened personnel 
security requirements before being granted access to Customer 
Identifying Systems or any component of the CAT System?
    154. The proposed amendment requires that all Plan Processor 
employees and contractors that develop and test Customer Identifying 
Systems shall only develop and test with non-production data and shall 
not be entitled to access production data (i.e., Industry Member Data, 
Participant Data, and CAT Data) in CAIS or the CCID Subsystem. Do 
commenters agree that is appropriate? If data other than non-production 
data should be permitted to be used, what type of data should be used 
by Plan Processor employees and contractors to test and develop 
Customer Identifying Systems? Please be specific in your response.
    155. The proposed amendments require that if non-production data is 
not available for Plan Processor employees and contractors to develop 
and test CAT Systems containing transactional CAT Data, then such 
employees and contractors shall use the oldest available production 
data that will support the desired development and testing. Do 
commenters agree that Plan Processor employees and contractors should 
be permitted to use the oldest available production data that will 
support the desired development and testing?
    156. The proposed amendments require that the Chief Information 
Security Officer approve access to the oldest available production data 
that will support the desired development and testing for Plan 
Processor employees and contractors that are testing and developing 
systems that contain transactional CAT Data. Do commenters agree that 
the Chief Information Security Officer should approve such access?
    157. Should additional restrictions be required to enhance 
security, such as imposing U.S. citizenship requirements on all 
administrators or other staff with access to the CAT System and/or the 
Central Repository? Please explain the impact on the implementation and 
security of the CAT including costs and benefits. Should the Commission 
only apply these additional access restrictions to access the Customer 
Identifying Systems and associated data?

I. Secure Connectivity & Data Storage

    The Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to enhance the 
security of connectivity to the CAT infrastructure. Currently under the 
CAT NMS Plan, Appendix D, Section 4.1.1, the CAT System ``must have 
encrypted internet connectivity'' and CAT Reporters must connect to the 
CAT infrastructure, ``using secure methods such as private lines or 
(for smaller broker-dealers) Virtual Private Network connections over 
public lines.'' The Participants have stated that the CAT NMS Plan does 
not require CAT Reporters to use private lines to connect to the CAT 
due to cost concerns, particularly for small broker dealers.\387\ 
Because the CAT NMS Plan does not explicitly require private lines for 
any CAT Reporters and does not differentiate between Participants and 
Industry Members, the Commission now proposes to amend Section 4.1.1 of 
Appendix D to codify and enhance existing secure connectivity 
practices, and to differentiate between connectivity requirements for 
Participants and Industry Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84760.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the Commission proposes to amend Section 4.1.1 of Appendix D 
to require Participants to connect to CAT infrastructure using private 
lines. Since

[[Page 66048]]

the Commission approved the CAT NMS Plan and the Participants began 
implementing the CAT, the Participants have determined that they would 
connect to the CAT infrastructure using private lines only. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate for the CAT 
NMS Plan to reflect a current practice which provides additional 
security benefits over allowing Participants to connect to CAT 
infrastructure through public lines, even if through encrypted internet 
connectivity. The Commission preliminarily believes that this practice 
is warranted because public lines are shared with other users, 
including non-Participants, and usage of public lines could result in 
increased cybersecurity risks because traffic could be intercepted or 
monitored by other users. Private lines, managed by Participants 
themselves, could provide more robust and reliable connectivity to CAT 
infrastructure because such lines would not be shared with other users 
and could be tailored to bandwidth and stability requirements 
appropriate for connecting to CAT infrastructure.
    Next, the Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 4.1.1 to 
clarify the methods that CAT Reporters may use to connect to the CAT 
infrastructure and to make the provision consistent with existing 
practice. The Commission proposes to state that Industry Members must 
connect to the CAT infrastructure using secure methods such as private 
lines for machine-to-machine interfaces or encrypted Virtual Private 
Network connections over public lines for manual web-based submissions. 
``Machine-to-machine'' interfaces mean direct communications between 
devices or machines, with no human interface or interaction, and in the 
CAT context would generally be automated processes that can be used to 
transmit large amounts of data. In contrast, manual web-based 
submissions would require human interaction and input. These proposed 
amendments would be consistent with existing requirements imposed by 
FINRA CAT, LLC (``FINRA CAT'') regarding connectivity, which has 
required that all machine-to-machine interfaces utilize private lines 
and only permits the use of public lines by establishing an 
authenticated, encrypted connection through the CAT Secure Reporting 
Gateway.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \388\ See FINRA CAT Connectivity Supplement for Industry 
Members, Version 1.5 (dated February 27, 2020), available at: 
https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-03/FINRA_CAT_Connectivity_Supplement_for_Industry_Members_1.5.pdf. The 
FINRA CAT Connectivity Supplement for Industry Members describes the 
methods available for Industry Members and CAT Reporting Agents to 
connect to the CAT system. The CAT Secure Reporting Gateway enables 
end users with secure access to the CAT Reporter Portal via a web 
browser. FINRA CAT is the Plan Processor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that codifying these existing 
FINRA CAT secure connectivity requirements for Industry Members is 
appropriate. The Commission preliminarily believes that all machine-to-
machine interfaces, which facilitate the automated transfer of 
potentially large amounts of data, should only occur on private lines 
instead of public lines, and that it is only appropriate for public 
lines to be used for manual web-based submissions on an encrypted 
Virtual Private Network. The Commission preliminarily believes that 
private lines would be more robust and capable of handling the 
automated transfer of potentially large amounts of data, in comparison 
to public lines, because the private lines would not be shared with 
public users and the private lines could be designed to meet the 
bandwidth and stability requirements necessary for CAT reporting. In 
addition, as noted above, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
private lines are more secure than public lines, which may be shared 
with other users. However, the Commission believes that for manual web-
based submissions, it is appropriate to codify FINRA CAT's existing 
secure connectivity framework, which allows broker-dealers that do not 
need or use machine-to-machine connectivity to submit data to CAT using 
the CAT Secure Reporting Gateway.\389\ The Commission preliminarily 
believes that such an allowance is appropriate for Industry Members 
that can meet their reporting obligations through manual web-based 
submissions that do not contain an amount of data that justifies the 
expense and effort required to install and maintain private lines. 
Requiring manual web-based submissions to be submitted in an encrypted 
Virtual Private Network should result in submissions that remain 
secure, even if transmitted over public lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \389\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is also proposing to add specific requirements 
relating to connections to CAT infrastructure, specifically, to amend 
Appendix D, Section 4.1.1 to require ``allow listing.'' Specifically, 
the Commission proposes to require that for all connections to CAT 
infrastructure, the Plan Processor must implement capabilities to allow 
access (i.e., ``allow list'') only to those countries where CAT 
reporting or regulatory use is both necessary and expected. In 
addition, proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.1 would require, where 
possible, more granular ``allow listing'' to be implemented (e.g., by 
IP address). Lastly, the Plan Processor would be required to establish 
policies and procedures to allow access if the source location for a 
particular instance of access cannot be determined technologically.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that while this control will 
not eliminate threats pertaining to potential unauthorized access to 
the CAT system, this proposed requirement would enhance the security of 
CAT infrastructure and connections to the CAT infrastructure. While the 
CAT NMS Plan currently specifies certain connectivity requirements, it 
does not require the Plan Processor to limit access to the CAT 
infrastructure based on an authorized end user's location. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that it is not generally appropriate 
for CAT Reporters or Participants to access the CAT System in countries 
where regulatory use is not both necessary and expected. As proposed, 
CAT Reporters or Participants would need to justify to the Participants 
and the Plan Processor the addition of a new country to the ``allow 
list.'' The Commission further believes that the Plan Processor has a 
detailed understanding of both authorized users and their 
organization's IP address information and has the ability to restrict 
access accordingly. The Commission also preliminarily believes that the 
burden of maintaining an allowed list may be minimized by using the 
same set of allowed countries for both CAT Reporters and regulatory 
user access.
    In cases where it is not possible to use multi-factor 
authentication technology to determine the location of a CAT Reporter 
or a regulatory user, the Commission preliminarily believes that a 
policies and procedures approach to compliance is appropriate. The 
proposed amendments would allow the Plan Processor to allow access in 
such circumstances under established policies and procedures that would 
improve the security of the CAT System. Similarly, when using bypass 
codes, the policies and procedures could mandate that Help Desk staff 
facilitating such access ask relevant questions on the location of the 
CAT Reporter or Regulatory Staff and remind them of CAT access geo-
restrictions. Based on its experience during the implementation of CAT, 
the Commission believes that it is likely that the usage of bypass 
codes will be minimal compared to standard multi-factor authentication 
push technology or other technologies that allow for geo-

[[Page 66049]]

restrictions, and preliminarily believes that policies and procedures 
applicable to such circumstances would help protect the security of CAT 
Data.
    The Commission recognizes that it may not always be possible to 
accurately detect the location of a CAT Reporter or Regulatory Staff 
given distributed networking, and that there is a potential for 
malicious spoofing of location or IP addresses. As discussed above, in 
situations where a CAT Reporter or Regulatory Staff is unable to be 
located, the proposed policies and procedures could address whether or 
not connectivity is possible and address how such connectivity is 
granted. With regard to malicious spoofing by third parties, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that existing protections, such as 
the private line connectivity described above, should help result in a 
framework where only authorized CAT Reporters or Regulatory Staff are 
able to connect to CAT infrastructure. In addition, in spite of these 
potential issues, the Commission believes that in comparison to 
existing requirements, the benefits of ``allow listing,'' and in 
particular identifying specific known access points such as specific 
countries and IP addresses, would enhance the security of connectivity 
to the CAT while not being substantially difficult to implement in 
available technologies.
    Currently, the CAT NMS Plan imposes requirements on data centers 
housing CAT Systems (whether public or private), but does not impose 
any geographical restrictions or guidelines.\390\ The Commission now 
believes it is appropriate the enhance requirements applicable to data 
centers housing CAT Systems by imposing geographic restrictions. 
Specifically, the Commission proposes to amend Appendix D, Section 
4.1.3 to require that data centers housing CAT Systems (whether public 
or private) must be physically located in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \390\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Appendix D, Section 4.1.3. 
While the CAT NMS Plan does not impose geographical restrictions on 
CAT Systems, Regulation SCI, which applies to the Central 
Repository, see supra note 54, requires SCI entities to establish, 
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that, among 
other things, shall include business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans that include maintaining backup and recovery 
capabilities sufficiently resilient and geographically diverse and 
that are reasonably designed to achieve two-hour resumption of 
critical SCI systems following a wide-scale disruption. See 17 CFR 
242.1001(a)(2)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring CAT data 
centers to be physically located in the United States will help 
strengthen the security of CAT Data by ensuring that no data center 
housing CAT Systems with CAT Data is located outside of the United 
States. Locating data centers housing the CAT System outside of the 
United States could subject such data centers, and the CAT System and 
CAT Data within, to security risks that may arise only because of their 
location. The Commission also preliminarily believes that requiring CAT 
data centers to be physically located in the United States would result 
in CAT data centers that are within the jurisdiction of both the 
Commission and the United States legal system. The Commission also 
preliminarily believes that any benefit, such as any cost advantages, 
of locating data centers housing the CAT System outside of the United 
States would not justify the increased risks associated with locating 
the data centers outside of the United States.
    158. Should the current secure connectivity practices in place for 
the Participants to connect to the CAT infrastructure using only 
private lines be codified in the CAT NMS Plan?
    159. Is it appropriate to clarify when private line and Virtual 
Private Network connections should be used?
    160. Should the CAT NMS Plan be amended to require the Plan 
Processor to allow access based on countries and where possible, based 
on IP addresses? Is it too restrictive or should the restriction be 
more granular? Should the CAT NMS Plan specify which countries are or 
are not acceptable to be allowed access or provide specific guidance or 
standards on how the Plan Participant can select countries to be 
allowed access? Do CAT Reporters have business or regulatory staff or 
operations in countries outside of the United States? Should 
Participant access be restricted to specific countries, e.g., the 
United States, Five Eyes? If so, which countries and why? Should Plan 
Processor access be restricted to specific countries, e.g., the United 
States, Five Eyes? If so, which countries and why?
    161. Is it appropriate to require the Plan Processor to establish 
policies and procedures governing access when the location of a CAT 
Reporter or Regulatory Staff cannot be determined technologically? Do 
commenters believe that such a provision is necessary, or would it be 
more appropriate for the CAT NMS Plan to prohibit access if the 
location of a CAT Reporter or Regulatory Staff cannot be determined 
technologically?
    162. Should the CAT NMS Plan specifically prescribe what types of 
multi-factor authentication are permissible? Should the CAT NMS Plan 
prohibit the usage of certain methods of multi-factor authentication, 
such as usage of one-time passcodes?
    163. Should the CAT NMS Plan require data centers housing CAT 
Systems (whether public or private) to be physically located within the 
United States? Would it be appropriate to locate data centers housing 
CAT Systems in any foreign countries?
    164. Currently, the CAT NMS Plan states that the CAT databases must 
be deployed within the network infrastructure so that they are not 
directly accessible from external end-user networks. If public cloud 
infrastructures are used, virtual private networking and firewalls/
access control lists or equivalent controls such as private network 
segments or private tenant segmentation must be used to isolate CAT 
Data from unauthenticated public access. Should additional isolation 
requirements be added to the CAT NMS Plan to increase system 
protection? For example, should the Commission require that the CAT 
System use dedicated cloud hosts that are physically isolated from a 
hardware perspective? Please explain the impact on the implementation 
of the CAT including costs and benefits.
    165. Should the use of multiple dedicated hosts be required so that 
development is physically isolated from production? Should all 
development and production be done on a separate dedicated host or 
should only Customer Identifying Systems development and/or production 
be done on its own dedicated cloud host? Please explain the impact on 
the implementation and security of the CAT including costs and 
benefits.

J. Breach Management Policies and Procedures

    Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan requires the Plan 
Processor to develop policies and procedures governing its responses to 
systems or data breaches, including a formal cyber incident response 
plan and documentation of all information relevant to breaches.\391\ 
The CAT NMS Plan further specifies that the cyber incident response 
plan will provide guidance and direction during security incidents, but 
otherwise states that the cyber incident response plan may include 
several items.\392\ The Commission believes that due to the importance 
of the security of CAT Data and the CAT System, and the potential

[[Page 66050]]

for serious harm should a system or data breach (e.g., any unauthorized 
entry into the CAT System or indirect SCI systems) \393\ occur, that 
more specific requirements for the formal cyber incident response plan 
required by Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan would be 
beneficial.\394\ Specifically, as discussed below, the Commission 
believes that requiring the formal cyber incident response plan to 
incorporate corrective actions and breach notifications, modeled after 
similar provisions in Regulation SCI, is appropriate.
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    \391\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.5. The cyber incident response plan is subject to review by the 
Operating Committee. See id.
    \392\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.5. The CAT NMS Plan also lists a series of items that 
documentation of information relevant to breaches should include. 
Id.
    \393\ ``Indirect SCI systems'' are defined as ``any systems of, 
or operated by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that, if breached, 
would be reasonably likely to pose a security threat to SCI 
systems.'' 17 CFR 242.1000.
    \394\ The Commission adopted Regulation SCI in November 2014 to 
strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. securities 
markets. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73639 (November 19, 
2014), 79 FR 72251 (December 5, 2014). Regulation SCI is designed to 
reduce the occurrence of systems issues in the U.S. securities 
markets, improve resiliency when systems problems occur, and enhance 
the Commission's oversight of securities market technology 
infrastructure. Regulation SCI applies to certain core technology 
systems (``SCI systems'') of key market participants called ``SCI 
entities'' which include, among others, the Participants. The CAT 
System is an SCI system of the Participants. Regulation SCI imposes 
corrective action and breach management obligations on SCI entities, 
but also includes requirements for SCI entities to, among other 
things: Establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that their key automated 
systems have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security adequate to maintain their operational 
capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets; 
operate such systems in accordance with the Exchange Act and the 
rules and regulations thereunder and the entities' rules and 
governing documents, as applicable; provide certain notifications 
and reports to the Commission regarding systems problems and systems 
changes; inform members and participants about systems issues; 
conduct business continuity and disaster recovery testing and 
penetration testing; conduct annual reviews of their automated 
systems; and make and keep certain books and records.
    The Commission notes that the proposed changes to Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.5, would apply separately and independently to the 
Participants, but would not in any way increase, reduce or otherwise 
change the Plan Processor and Participants' responsibilities 
applicable under Regulation SCI.
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    The Commission believes that the cyber incident response plan 
should require the Plan Processor to take appropriate corrective action 
in response to any data security or breach (e.g., any unauthorized 
entry into the CAT System or indirect SCI systems). Specifically, the 
Commission proposes to modify Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS 
Plan to require that the formal cyber incident response plan must 
include ``taking appropriate corrective action that includes, at a 
minimum, mitigating potential harm to investors and market integrity, 
and devoting adequate resources to remedy the systems or data breach as 
soon as reasonably practicable.'' This language relating to taking 
corrective action and devoting adequate resources mirrors the similar 
requirement applicable to SCI entities for SCI events \395\ in Rule 
1002(a) of Regulation SCI.\396\ This requirement would obligate the 
Plan Processor to respond to systems or data breaches with appropriate 
steps necessary to remedy each systems or data breach and mitigate the 
negative effects of the breach, if any, on market participants and the 
securities markets more broadly.\397\ The specific steps that the Plan 
Processor would need to take to mitigate the harm will be dependent on 
the particular systems or data breach, its causes, and the estimated 
impact of the breach, among other factors. To the extent that a systems 
or data breach affects not only just the users of the CAT System, but 
the market as a whole, the Plan Processor would need to consider how it 
might mitigate any potential harm to the overall market to help protect 
market integrity. In requiring ``appropriate'' corrective action, this 
provision would not prescribe with specificity the types of corrective 
action that must be taken, but instead would afford flexibility to the 
Plan Processor in determining how to best respond to a particular 
systems or data breach in order to remedy the issue and mitigate the 
resulting harm after the issue has already occurred.\398\ In addition, 
as with Rule 1002(a) of Regulation SCI, the proposed provision does not 
require ``immediate'' corrective action, but instead would require that 
corrective action be taken ``as soon as reasonably practicable,'' which 
would allow for appropriate time for the Plan Processor to perform an 
initial analysis and preliminary investigation into a potential systems 
or data breach before beginning to take corrective action.
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    \395\ An ``SCI event'' is an event at an SCI entity that 
constitutes a system disruption, a systems compliance issue, or a 
systems intrusion. A ``systems disruption'' means an event in an SCI 
entity's SCI systems that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the 
normal operation of an SCI system. A ``systems compliance issue'' 
means ``an event at an SCI entity that has caused any SCI system of 
such entity to operate in a manner that does not comply with the Act 
and the rules and regulations thereunder or the entity's rules or 
governing documents, as applicable.'' A ``systems intrusion'' means 
any unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems 
of an SCI entity.'' See Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI, 17 CFR 
242.1000.
    \396\ See Rule 1002(a) of Regulation SCI, 17 CFR 242.1002(a).
    \397\ The CAT NMS Plan already requires the Plan Processor to 
develop policies and procedures that include ``documentation of all 
information relevant to breaches,'' which ``should include,'' among 
other things, a chronological timeline of events, relevant 
information related to the breach, response efforts and the impact 
of the breach. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.5. In addition, to the extent that a systems or data 
breach meets the definition of an SCI Event, see supra note 395, 
Regulation SCI would require written notification to the Commission 
that includes, among other things: (i) The SCI entity's assessment 
of the impact of the SCI event on the market; (ii) the steps the SCI 
entity has taken, is taking, or plans to take with respect to the 
SCI event; (iii) the time the SCI event was resolved; (iv) the SCI 
entity's rule(s) and or governing document(s), as applicable, that 
relate to the SCI event; and (v) any other pertinent information 
known by the SCI entity about the SCI event. See 
242.1002(b)(4)(ii)(A).
    \398\ For example, appropriate corrective action to a CAT Data 
breach could include the rotation of CCIDs, to limit the potential 
harm of inadvertent disclosure of CCIDs. See also Regulation SCI 
Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 72307-08.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission believes that the Plan Processor should 
be required to provide breach notifications of systems or data 
breaches, and that such notifications should be incorporated into the 
formal cyber incident response plan. Specifically, the Commission 
proposes to modify Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan to 
require the Plan Processor to provide breach notifications of systems 
or data breaches to CAT Reporters that it reasonably estimates may have 
been affected, as well as to the Participants and the Commission, 
promptly after any responsible Plan Processor personnel have a 
reasonable basis to conclude that a systems or data breach has 
occurred.\399\ The Commission also proposes to require that the cyber 
incident response plan provide for breach notifications. As proposed, 
such breach notifications could be delayed, as described in greater 
detail below, if the Plan Processor determines that dissemination of 
such information would likely compromise the security of the CAT System 
or an investigation of the systems or data breach, and would not be 
required if the Plan Processor reasonably estimates the systems or data 
breach would have no or a de minimis impact on the Plan Processor's 
operations or on market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \399\ CAT Reporter means each national securities exchange, 
national securities association, and Industry Member that is 
required to record and report information to the Central Repository 
pursuant to SEC Rule 613(c). See CAT NMS Plan supra note 3, Section 
1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that in the case of systems or data 
breaches, impacted parties should receive notifications, including CAT 
Reporters affected by the systems or data breaches, such as the SROs or 
Industry Members, as well as the Participants and Commission, which use 
the CAT System for regulatory and surveillance purposes. The Commission 
notes that these breach notifications could

[[Page 66051]]

potentially allow affected CAT Reporters, the Participants, and the 
Commission to proactively respond to the information in a way to 
mitigate any potential harm to themselves, customers, investors, and 
the public. The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring breach 
notifications promptly after any responsible Plan Processor personnel 
have a reasonable basis to conclude that a systems or data breach has 
occurred should result in breach notifications that are not delayed for 
inappropriate reasons once the conclusion that a systems or data breach 
has occurred is made, but the proposed requirement would not require 
breach notifications to be prematurely released before Plan Processor 
personnel have adequate time to investigate potential systems or data 
breaches and consider whether or not such dissemination would likely 
compromise the security of the CAT System or an investigation of the 
systems or data breach.
    Pursuant to proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan, 
these breach notifications would be required to include a summary 
description of the systems or data breach, including a description of 
the corrective action taken and when the systems or data breach was or 
is expected to be resolved. This requirement mirrors the information 
dissemination requirement in Rule 1002(c)(2) of Regulation SCI for 
systems intrusions. Notably, in contrast to other types of ``SCI 
events'' for which more detailed information is required to be 
disseminated, only summary descriptions are required for systems 
intrusions under Regulation SCI. The Commission recognizes that 
information relating to systems or data breaches in many cases may be 
sensitive and could raise security concerns, and thus preliminarily 
believes that it is appropriate that the required breach notifications 
be provided in a summary form. Even so, the proposal would still 
require a summary description of the systems or data breach, which 
would be required to describe the impacted data, and which must also 
include a description of the corrective action taken and when the 
systems or data breach has been or is expected to be resolved.
    In addition, as proposed, the Plan Processor would be allowed to 
delay breach notifications ``if the Plan Processor determines that 
dissemination of such information would likely compromise the security 
of the CAT System or an investigation of the systems or data breach, 
and documents the reasons for such determination,'' which mirrors the 
similar provision in Rule 1002(c)(2) of Regulation SCI. The Commission 
preliminarily believes this proposed provision is appropriate so that 
breach notifications do not expose the CAT System to greater security 
risks or compromise an investigation into the breach. The proposal 
would require the affirmative documentation of the reasons for the Plan 
Processor's determination to delay a breach notification, which would 
help prevent the Plan Processor from improperly invoking this 
exception. In addition, the breach notification may only be 
temporarily, rather than indefinitely, delayed; once the reasons for 
the delay no longer apply, the Plan Processor must provide the 
appropriate breach notification to affected CAT Reporters, the 
Participants, and the Commission.
    Finally, proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan 
would provide an exception to the requirement for breach notifications 
for systems or data breaches ``that the Plan Processor reasonably 
estimates would have no or a de minimis impact on the Plan Processor's 
operations or on market participants'' (``de minimis breach''), which 
also mirrors the Commission's approach relating to information 
dissemination for de minimis SCI events under Rule 1002(c) of 
Regulation SCI. Importantly, the Plan Processor would be required to 
document all information relevant to a breach the Plan Processor 
believes to be de minimis. The Plan Processor should have all the 
information necessary should its initial determination that a breach is 
de minimis prove to be incorrect, so that it could promptly provide 
breach notifications as required. In addition, maintaining 
documentation for all breaches, including de minimis breaches, would be 
helpful in identifying patterns among systems or data breaches.\400\
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    \400\ Importantly, the proposed exception to breach 
notifications for de minimis breaches would apply specifically to 
the proposed breach notification requirement under the CAT NMS Plan. 
It would not apply to any obligations of the Plan Processor with 
respect to Regulation SCI, and thus, for example, would not obviate 
the need for the Plan Processor to immediately share information for 
all SCI events, including systems or data breaches that are systems 
intrusions, with those SCI SROs for which the CAT System is an SCI 
system and which themselves are independently subject to Regulation 
SCI.
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed amendments to the 
breach management policies and procedures. Specifically, the Commission 
solicits comment on the following:
    166. Are the proposed modifications to the breach notification 
provision of the CAT NMS Plan necessary and appropriate? Should 
specific methods of notifying affected CAT Reporters, the Participants, 
and the Commission be required? Should specific corrective action 
measures be required, such as the provision of credit monitoring 
services to impacted parties or rotation of CCIDs in the event of a 
breach of CAT Data? If so, under what circumstances should such 
corrective actions be required?
    167. Should the Plan Processor be required to provide breach 
notifications of systems or data breaches to CAT Reporters that it 
reasonably estimates may have been affected, as well as to the 
Participants and the Commission? Is it necessary and appropriate to 
require such breach notifications promptly after any responsible Plan 
Processor personnel have a reasonable basis to conclude that a systems 
or data breach has occurred? Should any disclosure to the public be 
required? For example, should breach notifications of systems or data 
breaches be reported by the Plan Processor on a publicly accessible 
website (such as the CAT NMS Plan website)? Should other requirements 
or direction regarding the breach notifications be adopted? Should 
there be an exception for de minimis breaches?
    168. Is it reasonable to require that breach notifications be part 
of the formal cyber incident response plan? Should any currently 
optional items of the cyber incident response plan be required to be in 
the cyber incident response plan?
    169. The proposed modifications to the breach notification 
provision of the CAT NMS Plan are modeled, in part, after Regulation 
SCI. Should other industry standards or objective criteria (e.g., NIST) 
be used to determine when and how breach notifications will be 
required?

K. Firm Designated ID and Allocation Reports

    Prior to approval of the CAT NMS Plan, the Commission granted 
exemptive relief to the SROs, for, among other things, relief related 
to allocations of orders.\401\ Specifically, the Commission, pursuant 
to Section 36(a)(1) of the Act,\402\ exempted the SROs from Rule 
613(c)(7)(vi)(A),\403\ which requires the Participants to require each 
CAT Reporter to record and report the account number for any 
subaccounts to which an execution is allocated. As a condition to this 
exemption, the SROs must require that

[[Page 66052]]

(i) CAT Reporters submit an ``Allocation Report'' to the Central 
Repository, which would at minimum contain several elements, including 
the unique firm-designated identifier assigned by the broker-dealer of 
the relevant subaccount (i.e., the Firm Designated ID), and (ii) the 
Central Repository be able to link the subaccount holder to those with 
authority to trade on behalf of the account.\404\ This approach was 
incorporated in the CAT NMS Plan that was approved by the 
Commission.\405\
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    \401\ See Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 77265 (March 
1, 2016), 81 FR 11856 (March 7, 2016) (``2016 Exemptive Order'').
    \402\ 15 U.S.C. 78mm(A)(1).
    \403\ 17 CFR 242.613(c)(7)(vi)(A).
    \404\ See 2016 Exemptive Order, supra note 401, at 11868.
    \405\ See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 1.1 
(defining ``Allocation Report'') and Section 6.4(d)(ii)(A)(i) 
(requiring an Allocation Report if an order is executed in whole in 
or in part).
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    Under the Allocation Report approach there is no direct link in the 
Central Repository between the subaccounts to which an execution is 
allocated and the execution itself. Instead, CAT Reporters are required 
to report the Firm Designated ID of the relevant subaccount on an 
Allocation Report, which could be used by the Central Repository to 
link the subaccount holder to those with authority to trade on behalf 
of the account. However, the Commission believes that because the CAT 
NMS Plan does not currently explicitly require Customer and Account 
Attributes be reported for Firm Designated IDs that are submitted in 
Allocation Reports, as it does for Firm Designated IDs associated with 
the original receipt or origination of an order, there is a potential 
for confusion with regard to reporting requirements for Firm Designated 
IDs.
    The Commission proposes to amend Section 6.4(d)(ii)(C) of the CAT 
NMS Plan to require that Customer and Account Attributes be reported 
for Firm Designated IDs submitted in connection with Allocation 
Reports, and not just for Firm Designated IDs submitted in connection 
with the original receipt or origination of an order. Specifically, the 
Commission proposes to amend Section 6.4(d)(ii)(C) of the CAT NMS Plan 
to state that each Participant shall, through its Compliance Rule, 
require its Industry Members to record and report, for original receipt 
or origination of an order and Allocation Reports, the Firm Designated 
ID for the relevant Customer, and in accordance with Section 
6.4(d)(iv), Customer and Account Attributes for the relevant Customer.
    The Commission believes that if Industry Members do not provide 
Customer and Account Attributes for the relevant Firm Designated ID 
submitted in an Allocation Report, then there would be no ability for 
the Central Repository to link the subaccount holder to those with 
authority to trade on behalf of the account. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that amending the language in Section 
6.4(d)(ii)(C) to implement the previously approved exemptive relief is 
appropriate.
    In addition, the Commission believes that these proposed amendments 
do not substantively change the obligations of Industry Members, who, 
through Participant Compliance Rules, are already required to submit 
customer information for all Active Accounts pursuant to the CAT NMS 
Plan.\406\ Specifically, Section 6.5(d)(iv) states that Participant 
Compliance Rules must require Industry Members to, among other things, 
submit an initial set of Customer information required in Section 
6.4(d)(ii)(C) for Active Accounts to the Central Repository upon the 
Industry Member's commencement of reporting, and submit updates, 
additions or other changes on a daily basis for all Active Accounts. 
Active Accounts are defined as ``an account that has activity in 
Eligible Securities within the last six months,'' and the Commission 
believes that ``activity'' would include the allocation of shares to an 
account, reflected in Allocation Reports.\407\ Thus, Section 6.5(d)(iv) 
already requires the information required by proposed Section 
6.4(d)(ii)(C), but the Commission preliminarily believes that amending 
the language in Section 6.4(d)(ii)(C) would help avoid confusion 
regarding when Customer and Account Attributes are required to be 
submitted for Firm Designated IDs.
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    \406\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.4(d)(ii)(C).
    \407\ Section 6.5(d)(iv) of the CAT NMS Plan was amended in the 
CAT NMS Plan Approval Order ``to clarify that each Industry Member 
must submit an initial set of customer information for Active 
Accounts at the commencement of reporting to the Central Repository, 
as well as any updates, additions, or other changes in customer 
information, including any such customer information for any new 
Active Accounts.'' See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 
84868-69.
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    170. Is it reasonable and appropriate to clarify that Industry 
Members, for Allocation Reports, are required to report the Firm 
Designated ID for the relevant Customer, and in accordance with Section 
6.4(d)(iv) of the CAT NMS Plan, Customer Account Information and 
Customer Identifying Information for the relevant Customer?

L. Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan

    Rule 613(a) \408\ required the Participants to discuss various 
considerations related to how the Participants propose to implement the 
requirements of the CAT NMS Plan, cost estimates for the proposed 
solution, and the costs and benefits of alternate solutions considered 
but not proposed.\409\ Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan generally 
contains a discussion of the considerations enumerated in Rule 
613,\410\ which were required to be addressed when the CAT NMS Plan was 
filed with the Commission, prior to becoming effective.\411\ The Rule 
613 Adopting Release stated that the additional information and 
analysis generated by discussing these considerations was intended to 
ensure that the Commission and the Participants had sufficiently 
detailed information to carefully consider all aspects of the NMS plan 
that would ultimately be submitted by the Participants.\412\ Therefore 
the Commission believes that the discussion of these considerations was 
not intended to be continually updated once the CAT NMS Plan was 
approved.\413\ However, in addition to the discussion of 
considerations, Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan also contains provisions 
such as those that set forth objective milestones with required 
completion dates to assess the Participants' progress toward the 
implementation of the CAT.\414\ Therefore, the Commission proposes to 
amend Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan to insert introductory language to 
clarify that Appendix C has not been updated to reflect subsequent 
amendments to the CAT NMS Plan and Appendix D.\415\
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    \408\ 17 CFR 242.613(a).
    \409\ See Rule 613 Adopting Release, supra note 2, at 45789.
    \410\ 17 CFR 242.613(a)(1).
    \411\ See Rule 613 Adopting Release, supra note 2, at 45789-90.
    \412\ See id.
    \413\ See id. The CAT NMS Plan was approved on November 15, 
2016. See supra note 3.
    \414\ See Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan, at Section C.10.
    \415\ See proposed Appendix C.
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M. Proposed Implementation

    As discussed below, the Commission proposes to allow additional 
time beyond the effective date for the Participants to comply with 
certain requirements in the proposed amendments.
1. Proposed 90-Day Implementation Period
    The Commission proposes that requirements related to developing and 
implementing certain policies and procedures, design specifications, 
and changes to logging in the proposed amendments must be met no later 
than

[[Page 66053]]

90 days from the effective date of the amendment. Specifically, the 
Commission believes that this timeframe would provide sufficient time 
for the Participants to collectively develop and approve the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies \416\ pursuant to proposed Section 6.5(g)(i), 
as well as to develop and establish their own procedures and usage 
restrictions related to these policies. The Commission also believes 
that a 90-day timeframe would provide sufficient time for the Plan 
Processor to implement SAW-specific policies and procedures for the 
CISP \417\ pursuant to proposed Sections 6.12 and 6.13(a), and to 
develop detailed design specifications for the SAWs \418\ pursuant to 
proposed Section 6.13(b), because the Plan Processor is already 
familiar with the security requirements necessary to protect CAT Data 
and would merely be extending these requirements to the SAWs for the 
purposes of implementation and creating a roadmap for Participants to 
follow via the design specifications. In addition, the Commission 
believes that the 90-day timeframe would provide sufficient time for 
the Plan Processor to make necessary programming changes to implement 
the new logging requirements contained in proposed Appendix D, Section 
8.1.1.
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    \416\ See Part II.G.1-2 supra.
    \417\ See Part II.C.2-3 supra.
    \418\ See Part II.C.4 supra.
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2. Proposed 120-Day Implementation Period
    The Commission proposes that requirements related to the Plan 
Processor providing the SAWs to Participants \419\ contained in 
proposed Section 6.1(d)(v) must be met no later than 120 days from the 
effective date of the amendment. The Commission believes that this 
timeframe would provide sufficient time for the Plan Processor to 
establish the Participants' SAWs because the Plan Processor has already 
been authorized to build similar environments for some of the 
Participants since November 2019.\420\ In addition, to the extent that 
the Plan Processor has already developed design specifications and 
implemented the policies and procedures for the SAWs within the 90-day 
timeframe following the effective date of the amendment, the Plan 
Processor will already have achieved interim elements of SAW 
implementation.
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    \419\ See Part II.C.2 supra.
    \420\ See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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3. Proposed 180-Day Implementation Period
    The Commission proposes that requirements related to the 
Participants complying with SAW access and usage \421\ pursuant to 
proposed Section 6.13(a), or having received an exception,\422\ 
pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d), must be met no later than 180 
days from the effective date of the amendment. The Commission believes 
that this timeframe would provide sufficient time for the Participants 
to (1) build internal architecture for their SAWs and customize their 
SAWs with the desired analytical tools, (2) import external data into 
their SAWs as needed, and (3) demonstrate their compliance with the SAW 
design specifications. The Commission also believes that this timeframe 
would provide sufficient time for Participants seeking an exception 
from the requirement to use the SAW to access CAT Data through the 
user-defined direct query and bulk extract tools to go through the 
required process. Specifically, these Participants would have 30 days 
after the SAW design specifications have been provided to prepare their 
application materials for submission to the Plan Processor's CISO, CCO, 
and the Security Working Group. Then, the CISO and CCO would be 
required to issue a determination to the requesting Participant within 
60 days of receiving the application materials, with the result that 
the requesting Participant should have a response by the compliance 
date 180 days from the effective date of the amendment.
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    \421\ See Parts II.C.2 and II.C.4 supra.
    \422\ See Part II.C.5 supra.
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    The Commission requests comment on the proposed implementation 
timeframes. Specifically, the Commission solicits comment on the 
following:
    171. Does the proposed 90-day implementation period with respect to 
the requirement for the Participants to develop and approve the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies strike an appropriate balance between 
timely implementation and the time needed for the Participants to 
develop these policies and related procedures?
    172. Does the proposed 90-day implementation period with respect to 
the requirement for the Plan Processor to implement SAW-specific 
policies and procedures for the CISP and to develop detailed design 
specifications for the SAWs strike an appropriate balance between 
timely implementation and the time needed for the Plan Processor to 
complete these tasks? Does the proposed 90-day implementation period 
with respect to the requirement for the Plan Processor to make 
programming changes to implement the new logging requirements strike an 
appropriate balance between timely implementation and the time needed 
for the Plan Processor to complete the necessary coding to its systems?
    173. Does the proposed 120-day implementation period with respect 
to the requirement for the Plan Processor to provide the SAWs to 
Participants strike an appropriate balance between timely 
implementation and the time needed for the Plan Processor to achieve 
implementation of the SAWs?
    174. Does the proposed 180-day implementation period with respect 
to the requirements for the Participants to either comply with SAW 
access and usage, or receive an exception, strike an appropriate 
balance between timely implementation and the time needed for the 
Participants to either complete their components of the SAW, or seek 
and receive an exception from the CISO and CCO?

N. Application of the Proposed Amendments to Commission Staff

    The Commission takes very seriously concerns about maintaining the 
security and confidentiality of CAT Data and believes that it is 
imperative that all CAT users, including the Commission, implement and 
maintain a robust security framework with appropriate safeguards to 
ensure that CAT Data is kept confidential and used only for 
surveillance and regulatory purposes. However, the Commission is not a 
party to the CAT NMS Plan.\423\ By statute, the Commission is the 
regulator of the Participants, and the Commission oversees and enforces 
their compliance with the CAT NMS Plan.\424\ To impose obligations on 
the Commission under the CAT NMS Plan would invert this structure, 
raising questions about the Participants monitoring their own 
regulator's compliance with the CAT NMS Plan.\425\ Accordingly, the 
Commission does not believe that it is appropriate for its security and 
confidentiality obligations, or those of its personnel, to be reflected 
through CAT NMS Plan provisions. Accordingly, the Commission is not 
including its staff within the definition of Regulatory Staff in the 
proposed amendments. Rather, the obligations of the Commission and

[[Page 66054]]

its personnel with respect to the security and confidentiality of CAT 
Data should be reflected through different mechanisms from those of the 
Participants. The Commission reiterates that in each instance the 
purpose of excluding Commission personnel from these provisions is not 
to subject the Commission or its personnel to more lenient data 
security or confidentiality standards. Despite these differences in the 
origins of their respective obligations, the rules and policies 
applicable to the Commission and its personnel will be comparable to 
those applicable to the Participants and their personnel.\426\
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    \423\ See 17 CFR 242.608(a)(1) (stating that NMS plans are filed 
by two or more SROs).
    \424\ See 17 CFR 242.608(b)(2), (c), (d); 17 CFR 242.613(b).
    \425\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84764-
65.
    \426\ See id. at 84765. In addition, Commission and SEC staff 
are subject to federal and Commission rules and policies that 
address security and confidentiality obligations. For example, 
disclosure or misuse of CAT Data would potentially subject 
Commission personnel to criminal penalties (including fines and 
imprisonment), disciplinary action (including termination of 
employment), civil injunction, and censure by professional 
associations for attorneys and accountants. Id.
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    Consistent with the CAT Approval Order,\427\ a cross-divisional 
steering committee of senior Commission Staff was formed that has 
designed and continue to maintain comparable policies and procedures 
regarding Commission and Commission Staff access to, use of, and 
protection of CAT Data. These policies and procedures also must comply 
with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and the 
NIST standards required thereunder,\428\ and are subject to audits by 
the SEC Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability 
Office. The Commission will review and update, as necessary, its 
existing confidentiality and data use policies and procedures to 
account for access to the CAT, and, like the Participants, will 
periodically review the effectiveness of these policies and procedures 
and take prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such policies and 
procedures.
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    \427\ See id. at 84765.
    \428\ See id. See also Public Law 113-283 (Dec. 18, 2014); NIST, 
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations, Special Publication 800-53, revision 4 (Gaithersburg, 
Md.: April 2013); NIST, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal 
Information Systems, Special Publication 800-34, revision 1 
(Gaithersburg, Md.: May 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, with respect to restrictions on the use of Manual and 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem and CAIS Access, the Commission intends to 
have comparable policies and restrictions as the Participants but as 
adopted and enforced by the Commission. In addition, under the 
restrictions set forth in the proposed amendments, Commission personnel 
would also be permitted to extract only the minimum amount of CAT Data 
necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or regulatory purpose--
which could include supporting discussions with a regulated entity 
regarding activity that raises concerns, filing a complaint against a 
regulated entity, or supporting an investigation or examination of a 
regulated entity. Consistent with what the Commission stated when the 
CAT NMS Plan was approved, the Commission will ensure that its policies 
and procedures impose protections upon itself and its personnel that 
are comparable to those required under the proposed provisions in the 
CAT NMS Plan from which the Commission and its personnel are excluded, 
which includes reviewing and updating, as necessary, existing 
confidentiality and data use policies and procedures.\429\
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    \429\ See id. at 84765-66.
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III. Paperwork Reduction Act

    As discussed above, the Commission is proposing to make various 
changes to the CAT NMS Plan, and certain provisions of the proposed 
amendment contain ``collection of information requirements'' within the 
meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\430\ The 
Commission is requesting public comment on the new collection of 
information requirements in this proposed amendment to the CAT NMS 
Plan. The Commission is submitting these collections of information to 
the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review in accordance 
with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.\431\ An agency may not 
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a 
collection of information unless the agency displays a currently valid 
control number.\432\ The title of the new collection of information is 
``CAT NMS Plan Data Security Amendments.''
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    \430\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \431\ 44 U.S.C. 3507; 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \432\ 5 CFR 1320.11(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Summary of Collections of Information

    The proposed amendments to the CAT NMS Plan include several 
obligations that would require a collection of information within the 
meaning of the PRA.
1. Evaluation of the CISP
    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires the CCO to oversee the regular 
written assessment of the Plan Processor's performance, which must be 
provided to the Commission at least annually and which must include an 
evaluation of the existing information security program ``to ensure 
that the program is consistent with the highest industry standards for 
the protection of data.'' \433\ The proposed amendments would require 
the CCO to evaluate the newly-defined CISP. This change would newly 
require the CCO to evaluate elements of the CISP that relate to the 
SAWs provided by the Plan Processor.\434\ The proposed amendments would 
also require the CCO, in collaboration with the CISO, to include in 
this evaluation a review of the quantity and type of CAT Data extracted 
from the CAT System to assess the security risk of permitting such CAT 
Data to be extracted and to identify any appropriate corrective 
measures.\435\ The Participants, under the existing provisions of the 
CAT NMS Plan, would be entitled to review and comment on these new 
elements of the written assessment of the Plan Processor's 
performance.\436\
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    \433\ See Section 6.6(b)(i)(A)-(B); Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3).
    \434\ See id.; see also proposed Section 1.1, definition of 
``Comprehensive Information Security Program'' and ``Secure 
Analytical Workspace.'' The Commission preliminarily believes that 
all other elements of the CISP are currently required by the CAT NMS 
Plan.
    \435\ See proposed Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3). These requirements 
are also enshrined in proposed Section 6.2. See also proposed 
Section 6.2(a)(v)(T) (requiring the CCO to determine, pursuant to 
Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), to review CAT Data that has been extracted 
from the CAT System to assess the security risk of allowing such CAT 
Data to be extracted); proposed Section 6.2(b)(x) (requiring the 
CISO to determine, pursuant to Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), to review 
CAT Data that has been extracted from the CAT System to assess the 
security risk of allowing such CAT Data to be extracted).
    \436\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.6(b)(i)(B).
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2. Security Working Group
    The proposed amendments would require the Security Working Group to 
advise the CISO and the Operating Committee, including with respect to 
issues involving: (1) Information technology matters that pertain to 
the development of the CAT System; (2) the development, maintenance, 
and application of the CISP; (3) the review and application of the 
confidentiality policies required by proposed Section 6.5(g); (4) the 
review and analysis of third-party risk security assessments conducted 
pursuant to Section 5.3 of Appendix D, including the review and 
analysis of results and corrective actions arising from such 
assessments; and (5) emerging cybersecurity topics.\437\ The proposed 
amendments would also require the CISO to apprise the Security Working 
Group of relevant developments and to provide it with all

[[Page 66055]]

information and materials necessary to fulfill its purpose.\438\
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    \437\ See proposed Section 4.12(c).
    \438\ See id.
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3. SAWs
    There are a number of information collections related to the 
proposed SAW requirements, including collections related to the 
following categories: (a) Policies, Procedures, and Detailed Design 
Specifications; (b) Implementation and Operation Requirements; and (c) 
Non-SAW Environment Requirements. These collections are explained in 
more detail below.
a. Policies, Procedures, and Detailed Design Specifications
    The proposed definition for the CISP would define the scope of the 
existing information security program. However, the proposed amendments 
would add one new element to this information security program or 
CISP--the SAWs provided by the Plan Processor.\439\ The proposed 
amendments would therefore require the Plan Processor to develop and 
maintain a CISP that would include SAWs \440\ and, more specifically, 
that would include data access and extraction policies and procedures 
and security controls, policies, and procedures for SAWs.\441\
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    \439\ See proposed Section 1.1, definition of ``Comprehensive 
Information Security Program'' and ``Secure Analytical Workspace.''
    \440\ See proposed Section 6.12. The Commission preliminarily 
believes that all other elements of the CISP are currently required 
by the CAT NMS Plan.
    \441\ See proposed Section 6.13(a).
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    In addition, the proposed amendments would require the Plan 
Processor to develop, maintain, and make available to the Participants 
detailed design specifications for the technical implementation of the 
access, monitoring, and other controls required for SAWs by the CISP.
b. Implementation and Operation Requirements
    The proposed amendments would require the Plan Processor to notify 
the Operating Committee that each Participant's SAW has achieved 
compliance with the detailed design specifications required by proposed 
Section 6.13(b)(i) before that SAW may connect to the Central 
Repository.\442\
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    \442\ See proposed Section 6.13(b)(ii).
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    The proposed amendments would also require the Plan Processor to 
monitor each Participant's SAW in accordance with the detailed design 
specifications developed pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), for 
compliance with the CISP and the detailed design specifications only, 
and to notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance with the 
CISP or the detailed design specifications.\443\
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    \443\ See proposed Section 6.13(c)(i).
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c. Non-SAW Environments
    There are a number of information collections related to the 
proposed requirements for non-SAW environments, including collections 
related to the following categories: (i) Application Materials; (ii) 
Exception Determinations; and (iii) Non-SAW Implementation and 
Operation Requirements. These collections are explained in more detail 
below.
i. Application Materials
    The proposed amendments would require the Participant requesting an 
exception from the proposed SAW usage requirements to provide the CISO, 
the CCO, the members of the Security Working Group (and their 
designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working Group with 
various application materials. First, the Participant would be required 
to provide a security assessment of the non-SAW environment, conducted 
within the prior twelve months by a named, independent third party 
security assessor, that (a) demonstrates the extent to which the non-
SAW environment complies with the NIST SP 800-53 security controls and 
associated policies and procedures required by the CISP pursuant to 
Section 6.13(a)(ii), (b) explains whether and how the Participant's 
security and privacy controls mitigate the risks associated with 
extracting CAT Data to the non-SAW environment through the user-defined 
direct query or bulk extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) 
and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan, and (c) includes a 
Plan of Action and Milestones document detailing the status and 
schedule of any corrective actions recommended by the assessment.\444\ 
Second, the Participant would be required to provide detailed design 
specifications for the non-SAW environment demonstrating: (a) The 
extent to which the non-SAW environment's design specifications adhere 
to the design specifications developed by the Plan Processor for SAWs 
pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), and (b) that the design 
specifications will enable the operational requirements set forth for 
non-SAW environments in proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii), which include, 
among other things, Plan Processor monitoring.\445\
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    \444\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1).
    \445\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed amendments, Participants who are denied an 
exception or who want to apply for a continuance must submit a new 
security assessment that complies with the requirements of proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the materials 
required by proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2).\446\
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    \446\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(C), (d)(ii)(C).
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ii. Exception and Revocation Determinations
    The proposed amendments would require the CISO and the CCO to 
review initial application materials submitted by requesting 
Participants, in accordance with policies and procedures developed by 
the Plan Processor, and to simultaneously notify the Operating 
Committee and the requesting Participant of their determination.\447\ 
If the exception is granted, the proposed amendments would require the 
CISO and the CCO to provide the requesting Participant with a detailed 
written explanation setting forth the reasons for that 
determination.\448\ For applications that are denied, the proposed 
amendments would require the CISO and the CCO to specifically identify 
the deficiencies that must be remedied before an exception could be 
granted.\449\ The proposed amendments would also require the CISO and 
the CCO to follow the same procedures when reviewing applications for a 
continued exception and issuing determinations regarding those 
applications.\450\
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    \447\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B).
    \448\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(1).
    \449\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(2).
    \450\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For Participants that are denied a continuance, or for Participants 
that fail to submit the proper application materials, the CISO and the 
CCO would also be required to revoke the exception and require such 
Participants to cease using their non-SAW environments to access CAT 
Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk extract tools 
described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the 
CAT NMS Plan, in accordance with the remediation timeframes developed 
by the Plan Processor.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A), (C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Non-SAW Implementation and Operation Requirements
    The proposed amendments would prevent an approved Participant from 
employing a non-SAW environment to access CAT Data through the user-

[[Page 66056]]

defined direct query or bulk extract tools described in Section 
6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 until the Plan Processor 
notifies the Operating Committee that the non-SAW environment has 
achieved compliance with the detailed design specifications submitted 
by that Participant as part of its application for an exception (or 
continuance).\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \452\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would also require the Plan Processor to 
monitor the non-SAW environment in accordance with the detailed design 
specifications submitted with the exception (or continuance) 
application, for compliance with those detailed design specifications 
only, and to notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance 
with such detailed design specifications.\453\ Furthermore, the 
proposed amendments would require the Participant to simultaneously 
notify the Plan Processor, the members of the Security Working Group 
(and their designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working 
Group of any material changes to its security controls for the non-SAW 
environment.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \453\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(B).
    \454\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and Extraction
    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires the targeted online query tool 
to log submitted queries, query parameters, the user ID of the 
submitter, the date and time of the submission, and the delivery of 
results.\455\ The CAT NMS Plan further requires that the Plan Processor 
provides monthly reports based on this information to each Participant 
and the SEC of its respective metrics on query performance and data 
usage, and that the Operating Committee receive the monthly reports to 
review items, including user usage and system processing performance. 
The Commission proposes to modify these requirements by defining the 
term ``delivery of results'' as ``the number of records in the 
result(s) and the time it took for the query to be performed'' and 
requiring that access and extraction of CAT Data be logged.\456\ This 
change would also require the same logging of access and extraction of 
CAT Data from the user-defined direct queries and bulk extraction 
tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \455\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
8.1.1.
    \456\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 8.1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires that Industry Members report a 
Customer's SSN or ITIN as part of the information necessary for the 
Plan Processor to create a Customer-ID.\457\ The Commission is 
proposing to amend the Plan to modify the information that Industry 
Members must report to CAT to be consistent with the CCID Alternative 
for creating Customer-IDs outlined in the PII Exemption Request and the 
PII Exemption Order. First, in lieu of reporting a Customer's SSN or 
ITIN to CAT, the Commission is proposing that Industry Members would 
use the CCID Transformation Logic \458\ in conjunction with an API 
provided by the Plan Processor to transform their Customer's SSN/ITIN 
using the CCID Transformation Logic to create a Transformed Value and 
then report that Transformed Value to the CCID Subsystem.\459\ Once the 
Transformed Value is reported to the CCID Subsystem, the CCID Subsystem 
would perform another transformation of the Transformed Value to create 
a globally unique Customer-ID for each Customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \457\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 9.1
    \458\ The Commission is proposing that the CCID Transformation 
Logic will be embedded in the CAT Reporter Portal or used by the 
Industry Member in machine-to machine-processing. See proposed 
Appendix D, Section 9.1.
    \459\ See proposed Section 6.4(D)(ii)(d), Appendix D, Section 
9.1 and 9.2. See also notes 168-173, supra and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires the CCO to oversee the Regular 
Written Assessment of the Plan Processor's performance, which must be 
provided to the Commission at least annually and which must include an 
evaluation of the performance of the CAT.\460\ As proposed, the overall 
performance and design of the CCID Subsystem and the process for 
creating Customer-ID(s) must be included in the annual Regular Written 
Assessment of the Plan Processor, as required by Article VI, Section 
6.6(b)(ii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \460\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Section 6.6(b)(ii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    The CAT NMS Plan currently requires Industry Members to report PII 
\461\ to the CAT, and states that such ``PII can be gathered using the 
`PII workflow' described in Appendix D, Data Security, PII Data 
Requirements.'' \462\ However, the ``PII workflow'' was neither defined 
nor established in the CAT NMS Plan.\463\ The Commission is therefore 
proposing to amend the CAT NMS Plan to define the PII workflow for 
accessing Customer and Account Attributes, and to apply the existing 
provisions of the CAT NMS Plan to Customer and Account Attributes going 
forward.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \461\ See supra note 10.
    \462\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.6.
    \463\ Id.
    \464\ See Part II.F., supra and accompanying text for a complete 
description of the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current CAT NMS Plan requires that a full audit trail of PII 
access (who accessed what data, and when) be maintained, and that the 
CCO and the CISO have access to daily PII reports that list all users 
who are entitled to PII access, as well as the audit trail of all PII 
access that has occurred for the day.\465\ The Commission is proposing 
to amend the Plan to require that the Plan Processor maintain a full 
audit trail of access to Customer Identifying Systems by each 
Participant and the Commission (who accessed what data within each 
Participant, and when), and to require that the Plan Processor provide 
to each Participant and the Commission the audit trail for their 
respective users on a monthly basis. The CCO and the CISO will continue 
to have access to daily reports that list all users who are entitled to 
Customer Identifying Systems access, as is the case today; however, the 
Commission is proposing that such reports also be provided to the 
Operating Committee on a monthly basis.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \465\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 
(PII Data Requirements).
    \466\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed Customer Identifying Systems Workflow would permit 
regulators to use Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access to query those databases. The Commission is proposing 
to require that each Participant submit an application that has been 
approved by the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation) to the Commission for authorization 
to use Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access 
if a Participant requires programmatic access. The application must 
explain:
     Which programmatic access is being requested: Programmatic 
CAIS Access and/or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access;
     Why Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem is required, and why Manual CAIS Access or Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access cannot achieve the regulatory purpose of an inquiry or 
set of inquiries;
     The Participant's rules that require Programmatic Access 
for surveillance and regulatory purposes;
     The regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of inquires 
requiring programmatic access;

[[Page 66057]]

     A detailed description of the functionality of the 
Participant's SAW system(s) that will use data from CAIS or the CCID 
Subsystem;
     A system diagram and description indicating architecture 
and access controls to the Participant's SAW system(s) that will use 
data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem; and
     The expected number of users of the Participant's 
system(s) that will use data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem.
7. Proposed Confidentiality Policies, Procedures and Usage Restrictions
    The Commission is proposing to amend Section 6.5(g)(i) of the CAT 
NMS Plan to require the Participants to create and maintain identical 
confidentiality and related policies (``Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies''). Proposed Section 6.5(g)(i) would require each Participant 
to establish, maintain and enforce procedures and usage restriction 
controls in accordance with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. As 
proposed, the Proposed Confidentiality Policies must: (i) Be reasonably 
designed to (1) ensure the confidentiality of the CAT Data; and (2) 
limit the use of CAT Data to solely surveillance and regulatory 
purposes; (ii) limit extraction of CAT Data to the minimum amount of 
data necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or regulatory 
purpose; (iii) limit access to CAT Data to persons designated by 
Participants, who must be (1) Regulatory Staff or (2) technology and 
operations staff that require access solely to facilitate access to and 
usage of the CAT Data by Regulatory Staff; \467\ (iv) implement 
effective information barriers between such Participants' Regulatory 
Staff and non-Regulatory Staff with regard to access and use of CAT 
Data; (v) limit access to CAT Data by non-Regulatory Staff, by allowing 
such access only where there is a specific regulatory need for such 
access and requiring that a Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or 
similarly designated head(s) of regulation), or his or her designee, 
document his or her written approval of each instance of access by non-
Regulatory Staff; (vi) require that, in the absence of exigent 
circumstances, all Participant staff who are provided access to CAT 
Data, or have been provided access to CAT Data, must (1) sign a 
``Safeguard of Information'' affidavit as approved by the Operating 
Committee pursuant to Section 6.5(f)(i)(B); and (2) participate in the 
training program developed by the Plan Processor that addresses the 
security and confidentiality of information accessible in the CAT 
pursuant to Section 6.1(m); (vii) define the individual roles and 
regulatory activities of specific users; (viii) impose penalties for 
staff non-compliance with Participants' or the Plan Processor's 
policies or procedures with respect to information security, including, 
the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i); (ix) be reasonably designed 
to implement and satisfy the Customer and Account Attributes data 
requirements of Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D such that Participants must 
be able to demonstrate that a Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic 
CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem access is in accordance with the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow; and (x) document monitoring and testing 
protocols that will be used to assess Participant compliance with the 
policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \467\ The Commission proposes to define Regulatory Staff as the 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation) and staff within the Chief Regulatory 
Officer's (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation's) 
reporting line. See proposed Section 1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Section 6.5(g)(ii) would require the Participant to 
periodically review the effectiveness of the policies and procedures 
and usage restriction controls required by Section 6.5(g)(i), including 
by using the monitoring and testing protocols documented within the 
policies pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i)(J), and take prompt action to 
remedy deficiencies in such policies, procedures and usage restriction 
controls. In addition, proposed Section 6.5(g)(iii) would require that 
each Participant, as reasonably practicable, and in any event within 24 
hours of becoming aware, report to the Chief Compliance Officer, in 
accordance with the guidance provided by the Operating Committee: (A) 
any instance of noncompliance with the policies, procedures, and usage 
restriction controls adopted by such Participant pursuant to Section 
6.5(g)(i); or (B) a breach of the security of the CAT.
    Proposed Section 6.5(g)(iv) would require that that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies be made publicly available on each of the 
Participants' websites, or collectively on the CAT NMS Plan website, 
redacted of sensitive proprietary information.\468\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \468\ See proposed Section 6.5(g)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Section 6.5(g)(v) would require that, on an annual basis, 
each Participant engage an independent accountant to perform an 
examination of compliance with the policies required by Section 
6.5(g)(i) in accordance with attestation standards of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (``AICPA'') (referred to as 
U.S. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards or GAAS) or the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (``PCAOB''), and with Commission 
independence standards based on SEC Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X.\469\ 
In addition, the examination results shall be submitted to the 
Commission upon completion, in a text-searchable format (e.g. a text-
searchable PDF). The examination report shall be considered submitted 
to the Commission when electronically received by Commission staff at 
the Commission's principal office in Washington DC.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \469\ See 17 CFR 210.2-01.
    \470\ See proposed Section 6.5(g)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes Sections 6.2(a)(v)(R) and 6.2(b)(viii) in 
the CAT NMS Plan to require that both the CISO and CCO of the Plan 
Processor be required to review the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. 
In addition, the Commission proposes to require that the CCO of the 
Plan obtain assistance and input from the Compliance Subcommittee,\471\ 
and require that the policies required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i) of 
the CAT NMS Plan be subject to review and approval by the Operating 
Committee, after review by the CISO and CCO.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \471\ See proposed Section 6.2(a)(v)(R). The CAT NMS Plan 
requires the Operating Committee to maintain a compliance 
Subcommittee (the ``Compliance Subcommittee'') whose purpose shall 
be to aid the Chief Compliance Officer as necessary. See CAT NMS 
Plan, supra note 3, at Section 4.12(b).
    \472\ See proposed Section 6.5(g)(vi).
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8. Secure Connectivity--``Allow Listing''
    The Commission is proposing to amend Appendix D, Section 4.1.1 of 
the CAT NMS Plan to require ``allow listing.'' Specifically, the 
Commission proposes to require that for all connections to CAT 
infrastructure, the Plan Processor must implement capabilities to allow 
access (i.e., ``allow list'') only to those countries where CAT 
reporting or regulatory use is both necessary and expected. In 
addition, proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.1 would require, where 
possible, more granular ``allow listing'' to be implemented (e.g., by 
IP address). Lastly, the Plan Processor would be required to establish 
policies and procedures to allow access if the source location for a 
particular instance of access cannot be determined technologically.
9. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    Appendix D, Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan requires the Plan 
Processor to

[[Page 66058]]

develop policies and procedures governing its responses to systems or 
data breaches, including a formal cyber incident response plan, and 
documentation of all information relevant to breaches.\473\ The CAT NMS 
Plan further specifies that the cyber incident response plan will 
provide guidance and direction during security incidents, but otherwise 
states that the cyber incident response plan may include several 
items.\474\ The Commission proposes to require that the formal cyber 
incident response plan incorporate corrective actions and breach 
notifications.\475\
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    \473\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.5. The cyber incident response plan is subject to review by the 
Operating Committee. See id.
    \474\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Appendix D, Section 
4.1.5. The CAT NMS Plan also lists a series of items that 
documentation of information relevant to breaches should include. 
Id.
    \475\ See supra Part II.J.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the Commission is proposing to modify Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan to require that the formal cyber 
incident response plan must include ``taking appropriate corrective 
action that includes, at a minimum, mitigating potential harm to 
investors and market integrity, and devoting adequate resources to 
remedy the systems or data breach as soon as reasonably practicable.'' 
In addition, the Commission is proposing to modify Appendix D, Section 
4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan to require the Plan Processor to provide 
breach notifications of systems or data breaches to CAT Reporters that 
it reasonably estimates may have been affected, as well as to the 
Participants and the Commission, promptly after any responsible Plan 
Processor personnel have a reasonable basis to conclude that a systems 
or data breach has occurred. The Commission also proposes to state that 
the cyber incident response plan must provide for breach notifications. 
As proposed, these breach notifications would be required to include a 
summary description of the systems or data breach, including a 
description of the corrective action taken and when the systems or data 
breach has been or is expected to be resolved.
    As proposed, the Plan Processor would be allowed to delay breach 
notifications ``if the Plan Processor determines that dissemination of 
such information would likely compromise the security of the CAT System 
or an investigation of the systems or data breach, and documents the 
reasons for such determination.'' The proposal would further require 
affirmative documentation of the reasons for the Plan Processor's 
determination to delay a breach notification. In addition, breach 
notifications would not be required for systems or data breaches ``that 
the Plan Processor reasonably estimates would have no or a de minimis 
impact on the Plan Processor's operations or on market participants.'' 
\476\ For a breach that the Plan Processor believes to be a de minimis 
breach, the Plan Processor would be required to document all 
information relevant to such breach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \476\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Customer Information for Allocation Report Firm Designated IDs
    Proposed Section 6.4(d)(ii)(C) would explicitly require that 
Customer and Account Attributes be reported for Firm Designated IDs 
submitted in connection with Allocation Reports, and not just for Firm 
Designated IDs submitted in connection with the original receipt or 
origination of an order. Specifically, proposed Section 6.4(d)(ii)(C), 
as amended, of the CAT NMS Plan would state that each Participant 
shall, through its Compliance Rule, require its Industry Members to 
record and report, for original receipt or origination of an order and 
Allocation Reports, the Firm Designated ID for the relevant Customer, 
and in accordance with Section 6.4(d)(iv), Customer and Account 
Attributes for the relevant Customer.

B. Proposed Use of Information

1. Evaluation of the CISP
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed review of 
CAT Data extracted from the CAT System will facilitate Commission 
oversight of the security risks posed by the extraction of CAT Data. 
The proposed review would be part of the evaluation of the CISP 
attached by the Participants to the written assessment of the Plan 
Processor's performance and provided to the Commission at least 
annually.\477\ The Commission preliminarily believes the proposed 
review should enable the Commission to better assess whether the 
current security measures should be enhanced or lightened and whether 
any planned corrective measures are appropriate. The proposed 
amendments require the CCO to evaluate the CISP, which includes SAWs, 
and the evaluation would be included in the regular written assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \477\ See Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Security Working Group
    The proposed amendments require the CISO to keep the Security 
Working Group apprised of relevant developments, and to provide it with 
all information and materials necessary to fulfill its purpose, which 
will help to keep the Security Working Group adequately informed about 
issues that fall within its purview. The Commission further 
preliminarily believes that the Security Working Group will be able to 
provide the CISO and the Operating Committee with valuable feedback 
regarding the security of the CAT.
3. SAWs
a. Policies, Procedures, and Detailed Design Specifications
    By requiring the Plan Processor to develop and maintain a CISP that 
would include SAWs and, more specifically, that will include specified 
data access and extraction policies and procedures and security 
controls, policies, and procedures for SAWs, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments would better 
protect CAT Data by keeping it within the CAT System and therefore 
subject to the security controls, policies, and procedures of the CISP 
when accessed and analyzed by the Participants. In addition, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the Plan Processor to 
develop, maintain, and make available to the Participants detailed 
design specifications for the technical implementation of the access, 
monitoring, and other controls required for SAWs may increase the 
likelihood that the CISP is implemented consistently across the SAWs 
and at a high standard.
b. Implementation and Operation Requirements
    Requiring the Plan Processor to notify the Operating Committee that 
each Participant's SAW has achieved compliance with the detailed design 
specifications developed pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i) before 
that SAW may connect to the Central Repository will protect the CAT, 
because this process will confirm that the CISP has been implemented 
properly before any Participant is permitted to use its SAW to access 
CAT Data.
    Requiring the Plan Processor to monitor each Participant's SAW in 
accordance with the detailed design specifications developed pursuant 
to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i) should enable the Plan Processor to 
conduct such monitoring, including automated monitoring, consistently 
and efficiently across SAWs. It should also help the Plan Processor to 
identify and to escalate any non-compliance events,

[[Page 66059]]

threats, and/or vulnerabilities as soon as possible, thus reducing the 
potentially harmful effects of these matters. Likewise, requiring the 
Plan Processor to notify the Participant of any identified non-
compliance will likely speed remediation of such non-compliance by the 
Participant.
c. Non-SAW Environments
i. Application Materials
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the 
Participants to submit new and/or up-to-date versions of the specified 
application materials in connection with an initial application, a re-
application, or a continuance will help the CISO and the CCO to 
determine whether it is appropriate to grant an exception (or 
continuance) to the proposed SAW usage requirements. For example, the 
proposed requirement that the Participant produce a security assessment 
conducted within the last twelve months by an independent and named 
third party security assessor should give these decision-makers access 
to up-to-date, accurate, and unbiased information about the security 
and privacy controls put in place for the relevant non-SAW environment, 
including reliable information about risk mitigation measures and 
recommended corrective actions.\478\ The Commission preliminarily 
believes that this information will help the CISO and the CCO to 
determine whether the non-SAW environment is sufficiently secure to be 
granted an exception (or continuance) from the SAW usage requirements 
set forth in proposed Section 6.13(a)(i)(B). Similarly, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that requiring the requesting Participant to 
provide detailed design specifications for its non-SAW environment that 
demonstrate the extent of adherence to the SAW design specifications 
developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i) and that 
the detailed design specifications will support required non-SAW 
environment operations will help the CISO and the CCO to assess the 
security-related infrastructure of the non-SAW environment and to 
determine whether the non-SAW environment will support the required 
functionality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \478\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Exception and Revocation Determinations
    For both initial applications and applications for a continued 
exception, the proposed amendments would require the CISO and the CCO 
to notify the Operating Committee and the requesting Participant and to 
provide the Participant with a detailed written explanation setting 
forth the reasons for their determination and, for denied Participants, 
specifically identifying the deficiencies that must be remedied before 
an exception could be granted. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that this kind of feedback could be quite valuable--not only because it 
should prevent the CISO and the CCO from denying applications without 
basis, but also because it should provide denied Participants with the 
information needed to effectively bring their non-SAW environments into 
compliance with the proposed standards. The Commission also 
preliminarily believes it is valuable to require that the Operating 
Committee be notified of determinations related to non-SAW 
environments, because this should enhance the ability of the Operating 
Committee to oversee the security of CAT Data.
iii. Non-SAW Implementation and Operation Requirements
    By requiring the Plan Processor to notify the Operating Committee 
that a non-SAW environment has achieved compliance with the detailed 
design specifications submitted by a Participant in connection with its 
application for an exception (or continuance), the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments will protect the 
security of the CAT.\479\ The Commission preliminarily believes that it 
is important for approved Participants to adhere to and implement the 
detailed design specifications that formed a part of their application 
packages, because such detailed design specifications will have been 
reviewed and vetted by the CISO, the CCO, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group.\480\ Therefore, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that non-SAW environments that implement their submitted 
design specifications should be sufficiently secure, and, for an 
additional layer of protection and oversight, the proposed amendments 
require the Plan Processor to determine and notify the Operating 
Committee that the non-SAW environment has achieved compliance with 
such detailed design specifications before CAT Data can be accessed via 
the user-defined direct query or bulk extraction tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \479\ The proposed amendments do not specify a particular format 
for this notification; the Commission preliminarily believes that 
such notification could be made with a phone call or through email.
    \480\ See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A), (d)(ii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, the Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
monitoring and notification requirements will improve the security of 
the non-SAW environments that are granted an exception by the CISO and 
the CCO and, therefore, the overall security of the CAT. Requiring the 
Plan Processor to monitor each non-SAW environment that has been 
granted an exception will help the Plan Processor to identify any non-
compliance events, threats, and/or vulnerabilities, thus reducing the 
potentially harmful effects these matters could have if left unchecked 
and uncorrected. The Commission also preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to require approved Participants to simultaneously notify 
the Plan Processor, the members of the Security Working Group (and 
their designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working 
Group of any material changes to the security controls for the non-SAW 
environment. If the security controls reviewed and vetted by the CISO, 
the CCO, the members of the Security Working Group (and their 
designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working Group 
change in any material way, the Commission preliminarily believes it is 
appropriate to require the simultaneous escalation of this information 
to the Plan Processor, the members of the Security Working Group (and 
their designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working 
Group.
4. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and Extraction
    The Commission preliminarily believes the proposed definition of 
``delivery of results'' would result in logs that provide more useful 
information to the Plan Processor and Participants and will assist in 
the identification of potential issues relating to the security or 
access to CAT Data. The Commission also preliminarily believes that the 
requirement to log access and extraction of CAT Data is appropriate 
because the monthly reports of information relating to the query tools 
will permit the Operating Committee and Participants to review 
information concerning access and extraction of CAT Data regularly and 
to identify issues related to the security of CAT Data.
5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to 
amend the CAT NMS Plan to eliminate the

[[Page 66060]]

requirement that Industry Members report SSNs/ITINs and instead require 
that they report a Transformed Value. As proposed, the Transformed 
Value will be reported to the CCID Subsystem, which will perform 
another transformation to create the Customer-ID.\481\ The Plan 
Processor will then link the Customer-ID to the Customer and Account 
Attributes for use by Regulatory Staff for regulatory and surveillance 
purposes. Replacing the reporting of ITIN(s)/SSN(s) of a natural person 
Customer with the reporting of Transformed Values obviates the need for 
the CAT to collect certain sensitive pieces of identifying information 
associated with a natural person Customer.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \481\ See proposed Section 6.1(v) and proposed Appendix D, 
Section 9.1 of the CAT NMS Plan.
    \482\ See PII Exemption Order, supra note 5, at 16156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed language in 
Appendix D, Section 9.1 requires that the Participants must assess the 
overall performance and design of the CCID Subsystem and the process 
for creating Customer-ID(s) as part of each annual Regular Written 
Assessment of the Plan Processor, as required by Article VI, Section 
6.6(b)(ii)(A). The Commission preliminarily believes the assessment 
should enable the Commission to better assess the overall performance 
and design of the CCID Subsystem, including the ingestion of the 
Transformed Value and the subsequent creation of an accurate Customer-
ID, to confirm the CCID Subsystem is operating as intended, or whether 
any additional measures should be taken to address the creation and 
protection of Customer-IDs.
6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    The Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate to require 
the Plan Processor to maintain a full audit trail of access to Customer 
Identifying Systems by each Participant and the Commission (who 
accessed what data and when), and to require the Plan Processor to 
provide to each Participant and the Commission the audit trail for 
their respective users on a monthly basis. The information contained in 
the audit trail and the reports could help the Participants, the 
Commission, and the Operating Committee develop and implement internal 
policies, procedures and control systems that allow only Regulatory 
Staff who are entitled to access to Customer Identifying Systems to 
have such access.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring each 
Participant to submit an application that has been approved by the 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) 
of regulation) to use Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem Access will help the Commission to determine whether it is 
appropriate for a particular Participant to have authorization to use 
programmatic access. The Commission preliminarily believes that some 
Participants may not require programmatic access to either CAIS or the 
CCID Subsystem in order to carry out their regulatory and oversight 
responsibilities. However, the Commission recognizes that in some 
circumstances, e.g., determining the scope and nature of hacking and 
associated trading misconduct may require programmatic access. The 
specific information required in the application will assist the 
Commission in evaluating on a case-by-case basis whether programmatic 
access is needed for a Participant.
7. Proposed Confidentiality Policies, Procedures and Usage Restrictions
    The Commission believes that the proposed amendments to Section 
6.5(g)(i), which would require the Participants to create and maintain 
identical confidentiality and related policies, and individualized 
procedures and usage restrictions, would help protect the security and 
confidentiality of CAT Data and help ensure that CAT Data is used only 
for appropriate regulatory and surveillance purposes.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the 
Participants to periodically review the effectiveness of the policies 
and procedures and usage restriction controls required by Section 
6.5(g)(i), including by using the monitoring and testing protocols 
documented within the policies pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i)(J), and 
take prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such policies, procedures 
and usage restriction controls, should help ensure that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies, as well as the Participant-specific 
procedures and usage restriction controls developed pursuant to the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies, are effective and being complied 
with by each Participant.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring each 
Participant, as reasonably practicable, and in any event within 24 
hours of becoming aware, report to the Chief Compliance Officer, in 
accordance with the guidance provided by the Operating Committee: (A) 
Any instance of noncompliance with the policies, procedures, and usage 
restriction controls adopted by such Participant pursuant to Section 
6.5(g)(i); or (B) a breach of the security of the CAT should help 
ensure that Participants comply with the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies and related procedures, and help ensure the security of CAT 
Data.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring that the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies be made publicly available on each of 
the Participants' websites, or collectively on the CAT NMS Plan 
website, redacted of sensitive proprietary information, could help 
ensure that the Proposed Confidentiality Policies are robust and 
thoroughly considered by Participants. The Commission also believes 
that such a requirement will allow other Participants, broker-dealers, 
investors and the public to better understand and analyze the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies that govern Participant usage of and the 
confidentiality of CAT Data. The Commission preliminarily believes that 
broker-dealers and investors that generates the order and trade 
activity that is reported to CAT should have some insight on the 
policies governing usage of CAT Data, particularly due to the 
sensitivity and importance of CAT Data, which may contain personally 
identifiable information, trading strategies and other valuable or 
sensitive information.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring each 
Participant to engage an independent accountant to perform an 
examination of compliance with the policies required by Section 
6.5(g)(i) would provide additional oversight which should enhance 
confidence that Participants are complying with policies designed to 
ensure the confidentiality of CAT Data and would help ensure that such 
data is used solely for surveillance and regulatory purposes. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the Participants to 
submit the examination reports to the Commission would allow the 
Commission to review the results of the examination that was performed, 
and to assess whether or not Participants are adequately complying with 
the Proposed Confidentiality Policies.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the policies 
required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i) be subject to review and 
approval by the Operating Committee, after review by the CISO and CCO, 
will further help ensure that the Proposed Confidentiality Policies are 
consistent with the requirements of the CAT NMS Plan and proposed 
changes herein, while

[[Page 66061]]

providing for multiple opportunities for feedback and input while the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies are being developed. It would allow 
the Plan Processor to have input in the creation of the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies and help ensure consistency with policies and 
procedures created by the Plan Processor itself. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that it is appropriate to require the CCO to 
receive the assistance of the Compliance Subcommittee because the 
Compliance Subcommittee's purpose is to aid the CCO and because it 
would further allow for more input into the process of developing the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies.\483\
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    \483\ Members of the Advisory Committee, composed of members 
that are not employed by or affiliated with any Participant or any 
of its affiliates or facilities, are currently on the Compliance 
Subcommittee. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 4.13.
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8. Secure Connectivity--``Allow Listing''
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring ``allow 
listing,'' which would require the Plan Processor to allow access only 
to those countries or more granular access points where CAT reporting 
or regulatory use is both necessary and expected would enhance the 
security of CAT infrastructure and connections to the CAT 
infrastructure by requiring the Plan Processor to limit access to the 
CAT infrastructure based on an authorized end user's geolocation of the 
IP addresses of CAT Reporters. Similarly, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that requiring the Plan Processor to establish policies and 
procedures to allow access if the source location for a particular 
instance of access cannot be determined technologically would improve 
the security of the CAT System, by addressing whether or not 
connectivity is possible and how such connectivity could be granted.
9. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the Plan 
Processor's cyber incident response plan to include ``taking 
appropriate corrective action that includes, at a minimum, mitigating 
potential harm to investors and market integrity, and devoting adequate 
resources to remedy the systems or data breach as soon as reasonably 
practicable,'' would obligate the Plan Processor to respond to systems 
or data breaches with appropriate steps necessary to remedy each 
systems or data breach and mitigate the negative effects of the breach, 
if any, on market participants and the securities markets more broadly.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the Plan 
Processor's cyber incident response plan to incorporate breach 
notifications, and requiring the Plan Processor to provide breach 
notifications, would inform affected CAT Reporters, and the 
Participants and the Commission, in the case of systems or data 
breaches. The Commission preliminarily believes that it is appropriate 
for these breach notifications to include a summary description of the 
systems or data breach, including a description of the corrective 
action taken and when the systems or data breach has been or is 
expected to be resolved. These breach notifications could potentially 
allow affected CAT Reporters, Participants and/or the Commission to 
proactively respond to the information in a way to mitigate any 
potential harm to themselves, customers, investors and the public. 
Furthermore, requiring the Plan Processor to document all information 
relevant to de minimis breaches should ensure that the Plan Processor 
has all the information necessary should its initial determination that 
a breach is de minimis prove to be incorrect, so that it could promptly 
provide breach notifications as required, and would be helpful in 
identifying patterns among systems or data breaches.
10. Customer Information for Allocation Report Firm Designated IDs
    The Commission preliminarily believes proposed Section 
6.4(d)(ii)(c) would explicitly require that Customer and Account 
Attributes be reported for Firm Designated IDs submitted in connection 
with Allocation Reports, and will require Industry Members to report 
such information. The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
proposed amendment is consistent with previously granted exemptive 
relief, which requires the Central Repository to have the ability to 
use elements of Allocation Reports to link the subaccount holder to 
those with authority to trade on behalf of the account.\484\ The 
Commission preliminarily believes that if Industry Members do not 
provide Customer and Account Attributes for the relevant Firm 
Designated ID submitted in an Allocation Report, then there would be no 
ability for the Central Repository to link the subaccount holder to 
those with authority to trade on behalf of the account. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that amending the language in Section 
6.4(d)(ii)(C) to implement the previously approved exemptive relief is 
appropriate. However, the Commission does not believe that the proposed 
amendment substantively changes the obligations of Industry Members, 
who, through Participant Compliance Rules, are already required to 
submit customer information for all Active Accounts pursuant to the CAT 
NMS Plan.\485\
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    \484\ See Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 77265 (March 
1, 2016), 81 FR 11856, 11868 (March 7, 2016); see also CAT NMS Plan, 
supra note 3, at Section 1.1 (defining ``Allocation Report'') and 
Section 6.4(d)(ii)(A)(i) (requiring an Allocation Report if an order 
is executed in whole in or in part).
    \485\ See supra, note 407.
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C. Respondents

1. National Securities Exchanges and National Securities Associations
    The respondents to certain proposed collections of information 
would be the 25 Participants (the 24 national securities exchanges and 
one national securities association (FINRA)) currently registered with 
the Commission.\486\
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    \486\ The Participants are: BOX Options Exchange LLC, Cboe BZX 
Exchange, Inc., Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc., Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc., 
Cboe EDGA Exchange, Inc., Cboe EDGX, Inc., Cboe Exchange, Inc., 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., Investors Exchange 
Inc., Long-Term Stock Exchange, Inc., MEMX, LLC, Miami International 
Securities Exchange LLC, MIAX PEARL, LLC, MIAX Emerald, LLC, NASDAQ 
BX, Inc., NASDAQ GEMX, LLC, NASDAQ ISE, LLC, NASDAQ MRX, LLC, NASDAQ 
PHLX LLC, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange LLC, 
NYSE MKT LLC, and NYSE Arca, Inc., NYSE Chicago Stock Exchange, 
Inc., NYSE National, Inc.
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2. Members of National Securities Exchanges and National Securities 
Association
    The respondents for certain information collection are the 
Participants' broker-dealer members, that is, Industry Members. The 
Commission understands that there are currently 3,734 broker-dealers; 
however, not all broker-dealers are expected to have CAT reporting 
obligations. The Commission estimates that approximately 1,500 broker-
dealers currently quote or execute transactions in NMS Securities, 
Listed Options or OTC Equity Securities and would likely have CAT 
reporting obligations.\487\
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    \487\ The Commission understands that the remaining 2,234 
registered broker-dealers either trade in asset classes not 
currently included in the definition of Eligible Security or do not 
trade at all (e.g., broker-dealers for the purposes of underwriting, 
advising, private placements).
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D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burdens

    The Commission's total burden estimates in this Paperwork Reduction 
Act section reflect the total burden on

[[Page 66062]]

all Participants and Industry Members. The burden estimates per 
Participant or Industry Member are intended to reflect the average 
paperwork burden for each Participant or Industry Member, but some 
Participants or Industry Members may experience more burden than the 
Commission's estimates, while others may experience less. The burden 
figures set forth in this section are the based on a variety of 
sources, including Commission staff's experience with the development 
of the CAT and estimated burdens for other rulemakings.
    Many aspects of the proposed amendment to the CAT NMS Plan would 
require the Plan Processor to do certain activities. However, because 
the CAT NMS Plan applies to and obligates the Participants and not the 
Plan Processor, the Commission preliminarily believes it is appropriate 
to estimate the Participants' external cost burden based on the 
estimated Plan Processor staff hours required to comply with the 
proposed obligations. The Commission derives these estimated costs 
associated with Plan Processor staff time based on per hour figures 
from SIFMA's Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities 
Industry 2013, modified by Commission staff to account for an 1800-hour 
work-year, and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, 
employee benefits and overhead, and adjusted for inflation based on 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on CPI-U between January 2013 and 
January 2020 (a factor of 1.12).\488\
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    \488\ For example, the 2020 inflation-adjusted effective hourly 
wage rate for attorneys is estimated at $426 ($380 x 1.12). For 
purposes of this Paperwork Reduction Act analysis, the Commission 
has preliminarily estimated the per hour cost of a Chief Information 
Security Officer to be identical to the per hour cost of a Chief 
Compliance Officer ($543 per hour).
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1. Evaluation of the CISP
    The CAT NMS Plan already requires the Participants to submit to the 
Commission, at least annually, a written assessment of the Plan 
Processor's performance that is prepared by the CCO. As part of this 
assessment, the Participants are required to include an evaluation of 
the information security program ``to ensure that the program is 
consistent with the highest industry standards for the protection of 
data,'' which the Participants may review and comment on before 
providing the assessment to the Commission.
    The proposed amendments would newly require the CCO to evaluate 
elements of the CISP that relate to SAWs and, in collaboration with the 
CISO, to include a review of CAT Data extracted from the CAT System to 
assess the security risk of permitting such CAT Data to be extracted. 
In connection with these new requirements, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing aggregate 
expense of $129,900 per year, or that each Participant would incur an 
annual expense of $5,196, in connection with these proposed amendments, 
based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would need 
approximately 250 hours per year to comply with these new 
requirements.\489\
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    \489\ The estimated 250 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 100 hours by the CCO, 100 hours by the CISO, and 50 hours 
for an attorney. Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates 
that the Participants would together incur an ongoing annual expense 
of $129,900. (100 hours for CCO = $54,300) + (100 hours for CISO = 
$54,300) + (50 hours for Attorney = $21,300). Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $5,196. $129,900/25 
Participants = $5,196 per Participant.
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    Under the CAT NMS Plan, the Participants would also have the right 
to review and comment on these new elements of the written assessment. 
The Commission preliminarily estimates that each Participant would 
spend approximately 25 hours reviewing and commenting on these new 
elements \490\ and that all Participants would incur an aggregate 
burden of approximately 625 hours.\491\ In addition, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that each Participant would spend approximately 
$1,000 on external legal consulting costs \492\ or that all 
Participants would spend approximately $25,000 on external legal 
consulting costs.\493\
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    \490\ The Commission is basing these estimates on the CAT NMS 
Plan Approval Order, which estimated that each Participant would 
incur a burden of 171.43 hours to review and comment on the entire 
written assessment required by Section 6.6(b)(ii). See CAT NMS Plan 
Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84925 note 3409. The written 
assessment is made up of many components, and the Commission 
preliminarily believes the proposed amendments would only require a 
portion of the time that was originally estimated for the entire 
assessment. The Commission therefore preliminarily believes that 
each Participant would incur a burden of 25 hours to review and 
comment on the new elements of the written assessment. 15 hours for 
attorney + 10 hours for chief compliance officer = 25 hours.
    \491\ 25 hours per Participant * 25 Participants = 625 hours.
    \492\ The Commission is basing these estimates on the CAT NMS 
Plan Approval Order, which estimated that each Participant would 
spend $1,000 on external legal consulting costs in order to review 
and comment on the entire written assessment required by Section 
6.6(b)(ii). See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84925-
26. The Commission preliminarily believes this is an appropriate 
estimate for the amount the Participants might spend on the proposed 
elements of the written assessment.
    \493\ $1,000 per Participant * 25 Participants = $25,000.
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2. Security Working Group
    The Commission preliminarily believes that each Participant would 
incur an ongoing annual burden of 364 hours to comply with the proposed 
requirement that the Security Working Group aid the CISO and the 
Operating Committee or that the Participants will incur an aggregated 
annual burden of 9,100 hours.\494\
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    \494\ The Commission preliminarily believes, based on the 
activity of the current group established by the Operating Committee 
to discuss the security of the CAT, that the Security Working Group 
will meet weekly. The Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
chief or deputy chief information security officer of each 
Participant will likely spend approximately 5 hours per week, on 
average, to prepare for this meeting and 2 hours to attend this 
meeting. 7 hours * 52 weeks = 364 hours per Participant. 364 hours 
per Participant * 25 Participants = 9,100 hours.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the CISO to 
keep the Security Working Group apprised of relevant developments, to 
provide it with all information and materials necessary to fulfill its 
purpose, and to prepare for and attend meetings of the Security Working 
Group will take the CISO approximately 570 hours per year. Accordingly, 
the Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would 
incur an ongoing aggregate expense of approximately $309,510 per year, 
or that each Participant would incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$12,380, in connection with these proposed amendments.\495\
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    \495\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Security 
Working Group will meet weekly and that the CISO will spend 8 hours 
preparing for each meeting of the Security Working Group and 2 hours 
to attend each meeting. 10 hours * 52 weeks = 520 hours. In 
addition, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the CISO will 
spend approximately 50 hours per year to keep the Security Working 
Group apprised of relevant developments and to provide it with all 
information and materials necessary to fulfill its purpose. 520 
hours + 50 hours = 570 hours for CISO. 570 hours for CISO = 
$309,510. $309,510/25 Participants = $12,380.40 per Participant. The 
Commission does not believe that any initial or one-time burdens 
would be incurred in association with these proposed amendments.
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3. SAWs
a. Policies, Procedures, and Detailed Design Specifications
    The burdens associated with the development and maintenance of the 
CISP are already largely accounted for in the CAT NMS Plan Approval 
Order.\496\ For the Plan Processor to develop a CISP that incorporates 
the SAW-specific additions that would be

[[Page 66063]]

required under the proposed amendments,\497\ the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an initial, 
one-time expense of approximately $89,020, or that each Participant 
would incur an initial, one-time annual expense of approximately 
$3,561, based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would 
need approximately 270 hours to comply with these new 
requirements.\498\ The Commission also preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would incur an initial, one-time burden of approximately 
$27,000 in external legal and consulting costs \499\ or that each 
Participant would incur an initial, one-time burden of $1,080.\500\ 
Furthermore, to maintain a CISP that incorporated the SAW-specific 
additions that would be required under the proposed amendments, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an 
ongoing expense of approximately $56,648 per year, or that each 
Participant would incur an ongoing, annual expense of approximately 
$2,266, based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would 
need approximately 175 hours per year to maintain those elements of the 
CISP that relate to SAWs.\501\
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    \496\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84219-
20. In addition, to the extent that the CISO consults with the 
Security Working Group regarding the development and maintenance of 
the CISP, those costs have already been detailed elsewhere. See Part 
III.D.2. supra.
    \497\ See proposed Section 1.1, ``Comprehensive Information 
Security Program'' and ``Secure Analytical Workspace.'' See also 
proposed Section 6.12; proposed Section 6.13(a).
    \498\ The estimated 270 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 200 hours by a senior systems analyst, 40 hours by a 
compliance attorney, 20 hours by the chief compliance officer, and 
10 hours by a director of compliance. Accordingly, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would together incur 
an ongoing annual expense of $89,020. (200 hours for senior systems 
analyst = $58,200) + (40 hours for compliance attorney = $14,960) + 
(20 hours for chief compliance officer = $10,860) + (10 hours for 
director of compliance = $5,000) = $89,020. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $3,560.80. $89,020/25 
Participants = $3,560.80 per Participant. This estimate is based on 
burdens estimated in the adopting release for Regulation SCI for the 
development of systems compliance policies and procedures. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. (November 19, 2014), 79 FR 
72252, at 72378 (December 5, 2014) (``Regulation SCI Adopting 
Release'').
    \499\ This estimate is based on burdens estimated in the 
adopting release for Regulation SCI for the development of systems 
compliance policies and procedures. See Regulation SCI Adopting 
Release, supra note 498, at 72378.
    \500\ $27,000/25 Participants = $1,080 per Participant.
    \501\ The estimated 175 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 134 hours by a senior systems analyst, 26 hours by a 
compliance attorney, 10 hours by the chief compliance officer, and 5 
hours by a director of compliance. Accordingly, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would together incur 
an ongoing annual expense of $56,648. (134 hours for senior systems 
analyst = $38,994) + (26 hours for compliance attorney = $9,724) + 
(10 hours for chief compliance officer = $5,430) + (5 hours for 
director of compliance = $2,500) = $56,648. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $2,265.92. $56,648/25 
Participants = $2,265.92 per Participant. This estimate is based on 
burdens estimated in the adopting release for Regulation SCI for the 
development of systems compliance policies and procedures. See 
Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 498, at 72378.
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    For the Plan Processor to develop detailed design specifications 
for the technical implementation of the access, monitoring, and other 
controls required for SAWs,\502\ the Commission preliminarily estimates 
that the Participants would incur an initial, one-time expense of 
approximately $56,180, or that each Participant would incur an initial, 
one-time annual expense of approximately $2,247, based on a preliminary 
estimate that Plan Processor staff would need approximately 160 hours 
to comply with these new requirements.\503\ The Commission also 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an initial, 
one-time burden of approximately $47,000 in external legal and 
consulting costs \504\ or that each Participant would incur an initial, 
one-time burden of $1,880.\505\ In addition, the Commission believes 
that the Participants would incur an initial, one-time expense of 
approximately $2,965 to make the required detailed design 
specifications available to the Participants \506\ or that each 
Participant would incur an initial, one-time expense of approximately 
$119.\507\ Furthermore, to maintain the required detailed design 
specifications, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would incur an ongoing expense of approximately $48,250 
per year, or that each Participant would incur an ongoing, annual 
expense of approximately $1,930, based on a preliminary estimate that 
Plan Processor staff would need approximately 145 hours per year to 
maintain the required detailed design specifications.\508\
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    \502\ See proposed Section 6.13(b)(i).
    \503\ The estimated 160 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 100 hours by a senior systems analyst, 30 hours by a 
compliance attorney, 20 hours by the chief compliance officer, and 
10 hours by a director of compliance. Accordingly, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would together incur 
an ongoing annual expense of $56,180. (100 hours for senior systems 
analyst = $29,100) + (30 hours for compliance attorney = $11,220) + 
(20 hours for chief compliance officer = $10,860) + (10 hours for 
director of compliance = $5,000) = $56,180. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $2,247.20. $56,180/25 
Participants = $2,247.20 per Participant. This estimate is based on 
burdens estimated in the adopting release for Regulation SCI for the 
development of policies and procedures related to the design, 
development, testing, maintenance, operation, and surveillance of 
systems. See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 498, at 
72377. To the extent that the CISO consults with the Security 
Working Group regarding the development and maintenance of the 
required detailed design specifications, those costs have already 
been accounted elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
    \504\ This estimate is based on burdens estimated in the 
adopting release for Regulation SCI for the development of policies 
and procedures related to the design, development, testing, 
maintenance, operation, and surveillance of systems. See Regulation 
SCI Adopting Release, supra note 498, at 72377.
    \505\ $47,000/25 Participants = $1,880 per Participant.
    \506\ The Commission's estimate includes 5 hours by a senior 
systems analyst, 2 hours by a compliance attorney, and 3 hours by a 
webmaster. (5 hours for senior systems analyst = $1,455) + (2 hours 
for compliance attorney = $748) + (3 hours for webmaster = $762) = 
$2,965.
    \507\ $2,965/25 Participants = $118.60 per Participant.
    \508\ The estimated 145 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 100 hours by a senior systems analyst, 30 hours by a 
compliance attorney, 10 hours by the chief compliance officer, and 5 
hours by a director of compliance. Accordingly, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would together incur 
an ongoing annual expense of $48,250. (100 hours for senior systems 
analyst = $29,100) + (30 hours for compliance attorney = $11,220) + 
(10 hours for chief compliance officer = $5,430) + (5 hours for 
director of compliance = $2,500) = $48,250. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $1,930. $48,250/25 
Participants = $1,930 per Participant. This estimate is based on 
burdens estimated in the adopting release for Regulation SCI for the 
development of policies and procedures related to the design, 
development, testing, maintenance, operation, and surveillance of 
systems. See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 498, at 
72377. To the extent that the CISO consults with the Security 
Working Group regarding the development and maintenance of the 
required detailed design specifications, those costs have already 
been accounted for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
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b. Implementation and Operation Requirements
    For the Plan Processor to evaluate each Participant's SAW to 
confirm that the SAW has achieved compliance with the detailed design 
specifications required by proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an initial, 
one-time expense of approximately $463,750, or that each Participant 
would incur an initial, one-time expense of $18,550, based on a 
preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would need approximately 
45 hours per SAW to perform the required evaluation and notification of 
the Operating Committee.\509\
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    \509\ The estimated 45 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 20 hours by a senior systems analyst, 20 hours by the chief 
information security officer, and 5 hours by a compliance attorney. 
Assuming each Participant will only have one SAW, the Commission 
therefore preliminarily estimates that the Participants would 
together incur an initial, one-time expense of $18,550 per SAW, or 
an initial, one-time expense of $463,750. (20 hours for senior 
systems analyst = $5,820) + (20 hours for chief information security 
officer = $10,860) + (5 hours for compliance attorney = $1,870) = 
$18,550 per SAW. $18,550 * 25 Participants = $463,750. Each 
Participant would therefore incur an initial, one-time expense of 
$18,550. $463,750/25 Participants = $18,550 per Participant. To the 
extent that the CISO consults with the Security Working Group 
regarding the evaluation or validation of the SAWs, those costs have 
already been accounted for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.

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[[Page 66064]]

    For the Plan Processor to build automated systems that will enable 
monitoring of the SAWs, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would incur an initial, one-time expense of $52,350, or 
that each Participant would incur an initial, one-time expense of 
$2,094, based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would 
need approximately 170 hours to build the required systems.\510\ For 
the Plan Processor to maintain such systems and to monitor each 
Participant's SAW in accordance with the detailed design specifications 
developed pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(b)(i), the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing 
annual expense of approximately $629,220, or that each Participant 
would incur an ongoing annual expense of approximately $25,169, based 
on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would need 
approximately 2,150 hours to maintain the required systems and to 
conduct such monitoring.\511\ For the Plan Processor to simultaneously 
notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance with the CISP 
or the detailed design specifications, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing annual expense 
of approximately $58,969, or that each Participant would incur an 
ongoing annual expense of approximately $2,359, based on a preliminary 
estimate that Plan Processor staff would need approximately 1.5 hours 
for each notification of non-compliance.\512\
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    \510\ Because the SAWs should all be implementing the CISP 
according to the detailed design specifications developed by the 
Plan Processor, the Commission preliminarily believes that much of 
the monitoring required by the proposed amendments could be 
automated. To build a system that would enable such monitoring, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that Plan Processor would require 
170 hours, including 40 hours by a senior programmer, 40 hours by 3 
programmers, and 10 hours by the CISO. Accordingly, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would together incur 
an initial, one-time expense of $52,350. (40 hours for senior 
programmer = $13,560) + (40 hours for programmer = $11,120) + (40 
hours for programmer = $11,120) + (40 hours for programmer = 
$11,120) + (10 hours for CISO = $5,430) = $52,350. Each Participant 
would therefore incur an initial, one-time expense of $2,094. 
$52,350/25 Participants = $2,094. To the extent that the CISO 
consults with the Security Working Group regarding the build of such 
monitoring systems, those costs have already been accounted for 
elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
    \511\ The Commission preliminarily believes that one senior 
systems analyst working 40 hours per week could conduct the required 
monitoring for all SAWs. Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would together incur an ongoing 
annual expense of $605,280. 40 hours * 52 weeks = 2,080 hours. 2,080 
hours for senior systems analyst = $605,280. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $24,211.20. $605,280/25 
Participants = $24,211.20. In addition, to maintain the automated 
monitoring systems, the Commission preliminarily estimates that Plan 
Processor staff would need 70 hours, including 30 hours for a senior 
programmer, 30 hours for a programmer, and 10 hours for the CISO. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$23,940. (30 hours for senior programmer = $10,170) + (30 hours for 
programmer = $8,340) + (10 hours for CISO = $5,430) = $23,940. Each 
Participant would therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$957.60. $23,940/25 Participants = $957.60 per Participant. 
Altogether, the ongoing annual expenses to the Participants as a 
whole would be $629,220, or $25,168.80 for each individual 
Participant. $605,280 + $23,940 = $629,220. $629,220/25 Participants 
= $25,168.80 per Participant. To the extent that the CISO consults 
with the Security Working Group regarding SAW monitoring or the 
results of such monitoring, those costs have already been accounted 
for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
    \512\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Plan 
Processor would identify 5 non-compliance events per year for each 
SAW or, assuming that each Participant only has one SAW, 125 non-
compliance events across all SAWs. 5 events per SAW * 25 SAWs = 125 
events. For each non-compliance event, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Plan Processor will spend 1.5 hours notifying the 
Participant of the identified non-compliance, including 0.5 hours by 
a senior systems analyst, 0.25 hours by a compliance manager, 0.25 
hours by an attorney, and 0.5 hours by a senior business analyst. 
(0.5 hours for senior systems analyst = $145.50) + (0.25 for 
compliance manager = $79.25) + (0.25 for attorney = $106.50) + (0.5 
hours for senior business analyst = $140.50) = $471.75 per event. 
This estimate is based on estimates set forth in the Regulation SCI 
Adopting Release for oral notifications of SCI events, as the 
Commission preliminarily expects that such notifications would 
typically be provided orally on a phone call or in a short email. 
See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 498, at 72384. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$58,968.75. 125 events * $471.75 = $58,968.75. Each Participant 
would therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $2,358.75. 
$58,968.75/25 Participants = $2,358.75. To the extent that the CISO 
consults with the Security Working Group regarding any non-
compliance events, those costs have already been accounted for 
elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
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c. Non-SAW Environments
i. Application Materials
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that 6 Participants will 
apply for an exception to the SAW usage requirements, based on the 
assumption that one exchange family will seek an exception.\513\ In 
connection with the initial application for an exception, the 
Commission further estimates that each of these Participants would 
spend an initial, one-time amount of approximately $250,000 on external 
consulting costs to obtain the required security assessment from a 
named and independent third party security assessor and approximately 
270 hours to provide the required detailed design specifications.\514\ 
The Commission further estimates that the each Participant would spend 
5 hours submitting these materials to the CCO, the CISO, the members of 
the Security Working Group (and their designees), and Commission 
observers of the Security Working Group.\515\ Accordingly, with respect 
to initial application materials, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would incur an initial, one-time 
expense of approximately $1,500,000 \516\ and an initial, one-time 
burden of approximately 1,650 hours.\517\
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    \513\ For example, there are six Participants in the Cboe Global 
Markets, Inc. exchange group, six Participants in the Nasdaq, Inc. 
exchange group, and five Participants in the Intercontinental 
Exchange, Inc. exchange group. All estimates in this section 
represent an average; the Commission believes that some Participants 
may incur greater costs and some lesser costs due to variances in 
economies of scale for Participants who share a common corporate 
parent.
    \514\ The estimated 270 hours include 200 hours by a senior 
systems analyst, 40 hours by a compliance attorney, 20 hours by the 
chief compliance officer, and 10 hours by a director of compliance. 
These estimates mirror the estimated hours for the Plan Processor to 
perform the similar task of developing the detailed design 
specifications for the SAWs.
    \515\ The estimated 5 hours include 5 hours by a compliance 
attorney.
    \516\ $250,000 per non-SAW environment * 6 non-SAW environments 
= $1,500,000.
    \517\ 270 hours + 5 hours = 275 hours per non-SAW environment. 
275 hours per non-SAW environment * 6 non-SAW environments = 1,650 
hours.
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    Under the proposed amendments, Participants that are denied an 
exception or that want to apply for a continuance must submit a new 
security assessment that complies with the requirement of proposed 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the design 
specifications required by proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2). The 
Commission preliminarily believes that the cost to obtain a new 
security assessment would still be $250,000 in these scenarios, because 
the Participants would have to obtain the security assessment from a 
named and independent third party security assessor that might not be 
able to leverage previous work. However, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that each Participant would only incur about half of the 
hourly burdens associated with preparation of initial application 
materials to prepare the updated detailed design specifications needed 
to support a re-application or an application for a continuance, 
because

[[Page 66065]]

the Commission believes that each Participant would be able to 
significantly leverage its previous work. Accordingly, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that each of these Participants would spend an 
ongoing annual \518\ amount of approximately $250,000 on external 
consulting costs to obtain the required security assessment from a 
named and independent third party and approximately 135 hours to 
provide the required detailed design specifications.\519\ The 
Commission further estimates that each Participant would spend 5 hours 
submitting these materials to the CCO, the CISO, the members of the 
Security Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers 
of the Security Working Group.\520\ Accordingly, with respect to 
updated application materials submitted in connection with a re-
application or an application for a continuance, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing 
annual expense of approximately $1,500,000 \521\ and an ongoing annual 
burden of approximately 840 hours.\522\
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    \518\ Participants that are denied an exception and re-apply may 
incur these ongoing costs more quickly than Participants that are 
initially granted an exception and subsequently seek a continuance. 
For example, a denied Participant might incur these ongoing costs 
approximately 90 days after submitting its initial application 
materials, whereas a Participant that is initially granted an 
exception may not incur these costs for 11 months. Nevertheless, the 
Commission preliminarily believes these costs and burdens will most 
likely be incurred annually in both scenarios, in part because 
Participants that re-apply are unlikely to be denied an exception 
twice. The proposed amendments require the CISO and the CCO to 
detail the deficiencies in a denied Participant's application, thus 
making it easier for the Participant to correct such deficiencies. 
See proposed Section 6.13(d)(i)(B)(2); proposed Section 
6.13(d)(ii)(B)(2).
    \519\ The estimated 135 hours include 100 hours by a senior 
systems analyst, 20 hours by a compliance attorney, 10 hours by the 
chief compliance officer, and 5 hours by a director of compliance.
    \520\ The estimated 5 hours include 5 hours by a compliance 
attorney.
    \521\ $250,000 per non-SAW environment * 6 non-SAW environments 
= $1,500,000.
    \522\ 135 hours + 5 hours = 140 hours per non-SAW environment. 
140 hours per non-SAW environment * 6 non-SAW environments = 840 
hours.
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ii. Exception and Revocation Determinations
    In connection with the requirement that the Plan Processor develop 
policies and procedures governing the review of applications for 
exceptions to the proposed SAW usage requirements, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an initial, 
one-time expense of $63,400, or that each Participant would incur an 
initial, one-time expense of $2,536, based on a preliminary estimate 
that Plan Processor staff would need approximately 130 hours to develop 
such policies and procedures.\523\ The Commission also preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing annual expense 
of $31,700, or that each Participant would incur an ongoing annual 
expense of approximately $1,268, based on a preliminary estimate that 
Plan Processor staff would need approximately 65 hours to maintain and 
update such policies and procedures as needed.\524\
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    \523\ The estimated 130 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 40 hours by the CISO, 40 hours by the CCO, 40 hours by a 
compliance attorney, and 10 hours by a director of compliance. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$63,400. (40 hours for CISO = $21,720) + (40 hours for CCO = 
$21,720) + (40 hours for compliance attorney = $14,960) + (10 hours 
for director of compliance = $5,000) = $63,400. Each Participant 
would therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $2,536. $63,400/
25 Participants = $2,536 per Participant.
    \524\ The estimated 65 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 20 hours by the CISO, 20 hours by the CCO, 20 hours by a 
compliance attorney, and 5 hours by a director of compliance. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$31,700. (20 hours by the CISO = $10,860) + (20 hours by the CCO = 
$10,860) + (20 hours for compliance attorney = $7,480) + (5 hours 
for director of compliance = $2,500) = $31,700. Each Participant 
would therefor incur an ongoing annual expense of $1,268. $31,700/25 
Participants = $1,268 per Participant.
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    As noted above, the Commission preliminarily estimates that 6 
Participants will apply for an exception to the SAW usage requirements. 
In connection with initial applications for an exception, the 
Commission also preliminarily estimates that the Participants would 
incur an initial, one-time expense of approximately $550,560, or that 
each Participant would incur an initial, one-time expense of $22,022, 
based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would need 
approximately 200 hours per initial application to review the 
application and issue the required determination and supporting written 
statement.\525\ The Commission preliminarily believes that the ongoing 
annual expenses associated with each application for a continued 
exception would be the same, as the process for continued exceptions is 
the same as the process for initial applications. Therefore, in 
connection with applications for a continued exception, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing 
annual expense of approximately $550,560, or that each Participant 
would incur an ongoing annual expense of $22,022, based on a 
preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would need approximately 
200 hours per application to review the application and issue the 
required determination and supporting written statement.\526\
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    \525\ The estimated 200 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 60 hours by the CCO, 60 hours by the CISO, 40 hours by a 
senior systems analyst, and 40 hours by a compliance attorney. 
Assuming only 6 Participants will apply for an exception to use a 
non-SAW environment, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an initial, one-time expense of 
$550,560. (60 hours by the CCO = $32,580) + (60 hours by the CISO = 
$32,580) + (40 hours for senior systems analyst = $11,640) + (40 
hours for compliance attorney = $14,960) = $91,760 per initial 
application. $91,760 * 6 Participants = $550,560. Each Participant 
would therefore incur an initial, one-time expense of $22,022.40. 
$550,560/25 Participants = $22,022.40 per Participant. To the extent 
that the CISO consults with the Security Working Group regarding 
these applications, those costs have already been accounted for 
elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
    \526\ The estimated 200 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 60 hours by the CCO, 60 hours by the CISO, 40 hours by a 
senior systems analyst, and 40 hours by a compliance attorney. 
Assuming that 6 Participants will apply for a continued exception to 
use a non-SAW environment, and that 6 Participants will submit their 
application materials on time, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would together incur an ongoing 
annual expense of $550,560. (60 hours by the CCO = $32,580) + (60 
hours by the CISO = $32,580) + (40 hours for senior systems analyst 
= $11,640) + (40 hours for compliance attorney = $14,960) = $91,760 
per application. $91,760 * 6 Participants = $550,560. Each 
Participant would therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$22,022.40. $550,560/25 Participants = $22,022.40 per Participant. 
To the extent that the CISO consults with the Security Working Group 
regarding these applications, those costs have already been 
accounted for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra. To the extent that 
Participants fail to submit their continuance application materials 
on time, the costs associated with continuance determinations would 
be lower.
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    The Commission is unable to estimate in advance whether 
Participants would submit their application materials for a continued 
exception on time or whether Participants would be denied a continued 
exception by the CISO and the CCO. For each such instance, however, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that the Participants would incur an 
ongoing annual expense of approximately $17,510, or that each 
Participant would incur an ongoing annual expense of approximately 
$700, based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would 
need approximately 40 hours to revoke an exception and to determine on 
which remediation timeframe the Participant should be required to cease 
using its non-SAW environment to access CAT Data through the user-
defined direct query and bulk extract tools described in Section 
6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 of the CAT NMS Plan.\527\
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    \527\ The estimated 40 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 10 hours by the CCO, 10 hours by the CISO, 10 hours by a 
senior systems analyst, and 10 hours by a compliance attorney. The 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would 
together incur an ongoing annual expense of $17,510. (10 hours by 
the CCO = $5,430) + (10 hours by the CISO = $5,430) + (10 hours for 
senior systems analyst = $2,910) + (10 hours for compliance attorney 
= $3,740) = $17,510 per application. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $700.40. $17,510/25 
Participants = $700.40 per Participant. To the extent that the CISO 
consults with the Security Working Group regarding such a decision, 
those costs have already been accounted for elsewhere. See Part 
III.D.2. supra. To the extent that Participants that are denied a 
continuance, or that fail to submit their continuance application 
materials on time, do not re-apply for an exception, the ongoing 
annual costs detailed above for preparation of application materials 
and for exception determinations would be lower.

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[[Page 66066]]

iii. Non-SAW Environment Implementation and Operation Requirements
    The requirement that the Plan Processor notify the Operating 
Committee that a non-SAW environment has achieved compliance with the 
detailed design specifications submitted by a Participant as part of 
its application for an exception (or continuance) largely mirrors the 
proposed requirements set forth for SAWs.\528\ However, as noted above, 
the Commission preliminarily believes that only 6 Participants will 
apply for an exception to use a non-SAW environment, such that the Plan 
Processor will only need to evaluate 6 non-SAW environments.\529\ As 
the above estimates set forth for SAWs assume that the Plan Processor 
will need to perform this task for 25 SAWs,\530\ instead of for 6 
environments, the Commission has correspondingly reduced the 
preliminary estimates described above for the Plan Processor to 
evaluate each Participant's SAW and notify the Operating Committee. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would incur an initial, one-time expense of approximately 
$111,300, or that each Participant would incur an initial, one-time 
expense of $4,452, based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor 
staff would need approximately 45 hours per non-SAW environment to 
perform the required evaluation and notification.\531\
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    \528\ See, e.g., proposed Section 6.13(b); see also Part 
III.D.3.b. supra.
    \529\ See note 513 and associated text supra.
    \530\ See note 509 and associated text supra.
    \531\ The estimated 45 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 20 hours by a senior systems analyst, 20 hours by the chief 
information security officer, and 5 hours by a compliance attorney. 
Assuming only 6 Participants will apply for an exception to use a 
non-SAW environment, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an initial, one-time expense of 
$111,300. (20 hours for senior systems analyst = $5,820) + (20 hours 
for chief information security officer = $10,860) + (5 hours for 
compliance attorney = $1,870) = $18,550 per non-SAW environment. 
$18,550 * 6 Participants = $111,300. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an initial, one-time expense of $4,452. $111,300/25 
Participants = $4,452 per Participant. To the extent that the CISO 
consults with the Security Working Group regarding the evaluation of 
the non-SAW environments, those costs have already been accounted 
for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
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    The requirement that the Plan Processor monitor the non-SAW 
environment in accordance with the detailed design specifications 
submitted with the exception (or continuance) application and notify 
the Participant of any identified non-compliance with such detailed 
design specifications largely mirrors the proposed requirements set 
forth for SAWs.\532\ However, as explained above, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that only 6 Participants will apply for an 
exception to use a non-SAW environment and has correspondingly reduced 
the preliminary estimates described above for the Plan Processor to 
monitor each SAW and notify Participants of any identified non-
compliance.\533\ Accordingly, for the Plan Processor to monitor non-SAW 
environments for compliance with the detailed design specifications 
submitted with the exception (or continuance) application, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an 
ongoing annual expense of approximately $302,640, or that each 
Participant would incur an ongoing annual expense of approximately 
$12,106, based on a preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff 
would need approximately 1,040 hours to conduct such monitoring.\534\ 
For the Plan Processor to notify the Participant of any identified non-
compliance with the detailed design specifications, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an ongoing 
annual expense of approximately $14,153, or that each Participant would 
incur an ongoing annual expense of approximately $566, based on a 
preliminary estimate that Plan Processor staff would need approximately 
1.5 hours for each notification of non-compliance.\535\
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    \532\ See proposed Section 6.13(c)(i); see also Part III.D.3.b. 
supra.
    \533\ For the purposes of this section, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that all Participants will choose to utilize 
a SAW in some capacity, but that only 6 Participants will choose to 
apply for an exception to use a non-SAW environment to access CAT 
Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk extraction 
tools. See note 513 and associated text supra.
    \534\ Because Participants seeking an exception are required to 
demonstrate the extent to which non-SAW environments are consistent 
with the detailed design specifications developed by the Plan 
Processor for SAWs, the Commission preliminarily believes that much 
of the monitoring required by the proposed amendments could be 
automated. Therefore, the Commission preliminarily believes that a 
senior systems analyst working 20 hours per week could perform the 
required monitoring for all non-SAW environments. Accordingly, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would 
together incur an ongoing annual expense of $302,640. 20 hours * 52 
weeks = 1,040 hours. 1,040 hours for senior systems analyst = 
$302,640. Each Participant would therefore incur an ongoing annual 
expense of $12,105.60. $302,640/25 Participants = $12,105.60.
    \535\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Plan 
Processor would identify 5 non-compliance events per year for each 
non-SAW environment, or, assuming that only 6 Participants have non-
SAW environments, 30 non-compliance events across all non-SAW 
environments. 5 events per non-SAW environment * 6 non-SAW 
environments = 30 events. For each non-compliance event, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Plan Processor will 
spend 1.5 hours notifying the Participant of the identified non-
compliance, including 0.5 hours by a senior systems analyst, 0.25 
hours by a compliance manager, 0.25 hours by an attorney, and 0.5 
hours by a senior business analyst. (0.5 hours for senior systems 
analyst = $145.50) + (0.25 for compliance manager = $79.25) + (0.25 
for attorney = $106.50) + (0.5 hours for senior business analyst = 
$140.50) = $471.75 per event. This estimate is based on estimates 
set forth in the Regulation SCI Adopting Release for oral 
notifications of SCI events, as the Commission preliminarily 
believes that such notifications would typically be provided orally 
on a conference call or in a short email to all relevant parties. 
See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 498, at 72384. 
Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would together incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$14,152.50. 30 events * $471.75 = $14,152.50. Each Participant would 
therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of $566.10. $14,152.50/25 
Participants = $566.10. To the extent that the CISO consults with 
the Security Working Group regarding any non-compliance events, 
those costs have already been accounted for elsewhere. See Part 
III.D.2. supra.
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    Finally, with respect to the requirement that each Participant 
using a non-SAW environment simultaneously notify the Plan Processor, 
the members of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group of any material 
changes to its security controls for the non-SAW environment, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that 6 Participants would apply for 
an exception to use a non-SAW environment and that each of these 
Participants would need to simultaneously notify the Plan Processor, 
the members of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group of a material change 
to its security controls approximately 4 times a year. The Commission 
also preliminarily believes that each such notification would require 
15 burden hours.\536\

[[Page 66067]]

Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Participants would incur an ongoing annual burden of approximately 360 
hours, or that each Participant would incur an ongoing annual burden of 
approximately 60 hours.\537\
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    \536\ This estimate includes 10 hours by a senior systems 
analyst, 3 hours by a compliance attorney, and 2 hours by the chief 
information security office. To the extent that the CISO consults 
with the Security Working Group regarding notifications of material 
changes to security controls, those costs have already been 
accounted for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
    \537\ 15 hours per notification * 4 notifications per year = 60 
hours per year. 60 hours per year * 6 non-SAW environments = 360 
hours.
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4. Online Targeted Query Tool and Logging of Access and Extraction
    The CAT NMS Plan currently states that the logs required by 
Appendix D, Section 8.1.1 of the CAT NMS Plan are to be submitted to 
the Operating Committee on a monthly basis. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the ongoing burden of Participants to 
review the newly required information in these logs, through the 
Operating Committee, would be an estimated 10 aggregate internal burden 
hours each month. The Commission preliminarily believes it is 
reasonable to estimate aggregate internal burden hours because the 
obligation to receive and review the logs required by Appendix D, 
Section 8.1.1 is with the Operating Committee itself and is not an 
obligation of individual Participants. This results in an estimated 
annual ongoing total burden of 120 burden hours for Participants,\538\ 
or an annual burden of 4.8 burden hours for each Participant.\539\
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    \538\ 12 months x 10 hours = 120 burden hours.
    \539\ 120 burden hours/25 Participants = 4.8 burden hours per 
Participant.
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    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would 
incur an initial, one-time external expense of $87,960, or a per 
Participant expense of $3,518.40 \540\ for Plan Processor staff time 
required to make the initial necessary programming and systems changes 
to log delivery of results and the access and extraction of CAT Data, 
based on a preliminarily estimate that it would take 260 hours of Plan 
Processor staff time to implement these changes.\541\ The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would incur an annual 
ongoing external expense of $5,100, or $204 per Participant,\542\ for 
Plan Processor staff time required to generate and provide the 
additional information required by proposed Section Appendix D, Section 
8.1.1, which the Commission preliminarily estimates to be 2 hours for 
each monthly report or 24 hours annually.\543\
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    \540\ $87,960/25 Participants = $3,518.40 per Participant.
    \541\ The estimated 260 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 160 hours by a Senior Programmer, 40 hours by a Senior 
Database Administrator, 40 hours for a Senior Business Analyst and 
20 hours for an Attorney. The Commission is basing this figure on 
the estimated internal burden for a broker-dealer that handles 
orders subject to customer specific disclosures required by Rule 
606(b)(3) to both update its data capture systems in-house and 
format the report required by Rule 606. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 84528 (November 2, 2018), 83 FR 58338, 58383 (November 
19, 2018) (``Rule 606 Adopting Release''). The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the initial, one-time external expense 
for Participants will be $87,960 = (Senior Programmer for 160 hours 
at $339 an hour = $54,240) + (Senior Database Administrator for 40 
hours at $349 an hour = $13,960) + (Senior Business Analyst for 40 
hours at $281 an hour = $11,240) + (Attorney for 20 hours at $426 an 
hour = $8,520).
    \542\ $5,100/25 Participants = $204 per Participant.
    \543\ The estimated 2 hours of Plan Processor staff time include 
1 hour by a Programmer Analyst and 1 hour by a Junior Business 
Analyst. This estimate would apply monthly, meaning the annual 
ongoing estimate would be 24 hours of Plan Processor staff time, 
which would include 12 hours by a Programmer Analyst and 12 hours by 
a Junior Business Analyst. The Commission is basing this figure on 
the estimated internal burden for broker-dealer that handle relevant 
orders and respond in-house to a customer request under Rule 
606(b)(3). See Rule 606 Adopting Release, supra note 541, at 58385. 
The Commission preliminarily estimates the annual ongoing external 
cost to generate and provide the proposed information on logs would 
be $5,100 = (Programmer Analyst for 12 hours at $246 per hour = 
$2,952) + (Junior Business Analyst for 12 hours at $179 an hour = 
$2,148).
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5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the one-time burden to 
Industry Members to modify systems to report a Transformed Value to the 
CAT instead of SSNs or ITINs per the proposed amendment to Section 
6.4(d)(ii)(D), will be minimal. However, the Commission preliminarily 
believes there will be a cost to install and test the transformation 
logic. As proposed, Industry Members would use the CCID Transformation 
Logic in conjunction with an API provided by the Plan Processor and the 
only cost to Industry Members will be installation and testing of the 
transformation logic. The Commission estimates that the one-time burden 
to each Industry Member to install and test this technology will be 80 
staff burden hours per Industry Member or 120,000 hours in the 
aggregate.\544\ The Commission believes that the on-going annual burden 
to report the Transformed Value will be the same as the burden to 
report a SSN or ITIN once the CCID Transformation Logic is installed.
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    \544\ 80 burden hours x 1,500 Industry Members = 120,000.
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    The Commission estimates that the modifications necessary to the 
CAT System to develop the CCID Subsystem to generate Customer-IDs using 
Transformed Values, as opposed to SSNs or ITINs, would result in an 
initial, one-time aggregate external cost of $650,052 for the 
Participants,\545\ or $26,002 for each Participant.\546\ This estimated 
one-time aggregate external cost represents ten percent of Commission's 
estimate in the CAT NMS Approval Order to develop the Central 
Repository, of which the CCID Subsystem is a part.\547\
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    \545\ The Commission preliminarily estimates the one-time 
aggregate external cost to update the CAT System to ingest and use 
the Transformed Value reported by Industry Members would be 
$650,052. The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
modification will take an estimated 2,101 hours of Plan Processor 
staff time including 130 hours by the CCO, 130 hours by the CISO, 
602 hours by a Senior Programmer and 1239 hours by a Program 
Analyst. Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily estimates that 
the Participants would together incur a one-time aggregated external 
cost $650,052. (Chief Compliance Officer for 130 hours at $543 per 
hour = $70,590) + (Chief Information Security Officer for 130 hours 
at $543 per hour = $70,590) + (Senior Programmer for 602 hours at 
$339 = $204,078) + (Program Analyst for 1239 hours at $246 = 
$304,794) = $650,052. $650,052/25 Participants = $26,002/
Participant.
    \546\ $650,052/25 Participants = $26,002 per Participant.
    \547\ See CAT NMS Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84918. 
(``[T]he Commission estimates that the initial one-time cost to 
develop the Central Repository would be an aggregate initial 
external cost to the Participants of $65 million, or $3,095,238.09 
per Participant.'')
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    The CAT NMS Plan, Article VI, Section 6.6(b)(ii)(A), currently 
requires the CCO to oversee the Regular Written Assessment of the Plan 
Processor's performance, which must be provided to the Commission at 
least annually and which must include an evaluation of the performance 
of the CAT.\548\ As proposed, Appendix D, Section 9.1 requires an 
evaluation of the overall performance and design of the CCID Subsystem 
and the process for creating Customer-ID(s) to be included in each such 
annual Regular Written Assessment of the Plan Processor's Performance.
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    \548\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, Section 6.6(b)(ii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the CAT NMS Plan Adopting Release, the Commission estimated that 
the annual on-going cost of preparing the Regular Written Assessment 
would be 171.43 ongoing burden hours per Participant, plus $1,000 of 
external costs for outsourced legal counsel per Participant per year, 
for an estimated aggregate annual ongoing burden of approximately 
3,600.03 hours and an estimated aggregate ongoing external cost of 
$21,000.\549\ The amendments propose a new method for creating a 
Customer-ID that involve a new CCID

[[Page 66068]]

Subsystem, which performs a two-phase transformation of a Customer's 
ITIN/SSN in order to create a Customer-ID; thus, the Commission 
preliminarily believes there is added complexity to the process for 
creating a Customer-ID. Due to this increase in complexity, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that assessment the CCID subsystem 
require an additional 50 ongoing burden hours of internal legal, 
compliance, business operations, and information technology, per 
Participant, for an aggregate ongoing burden of approximately 1,250 
hours.\550\
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    \549\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84925-6
    \550\ 50 burden hours x 25 Participants = 1,250 hours.
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6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the requirement that the 
Plan Processor maintain a full audit trail of access to Customer 
Identifying Systems by each Participant and the Commission (who 
accessed what data within each Participant, and when) and provide such 
audit trail of each Participant's and the Commission's access to each 
the Participant and the Commission for their respective users on a 
monthly basis, and the requirement to provide the Operating Committee 
with the daily reports that list all users who are entitled to Customer 
Identifying Systems access on a monthly basis \551\ will require 4 
hours of Plan Processor Staff time per report and will result in an 
aggregate ongoing annual external cost to the Participants of $373,464 
per year or $14,939 per Participant.\552\ This cost represents 
approximately $700 per monthly report--one monthly report to the 
Operating Committee, and the daily reports of all users to the 
Operating Committee on a monthly basis. This estimate recognizes that 
Plan Processor currently is required to collect the audit trail 
information and create the daily reports of all users entitled to 
access Customer and Account Attributes. The Commission does not believe 
that the compilation of new reports will require the Plan Processor to 
gather any new information, but would however require the re-packaging 
of information to provide to the Participants and the Operating 
Committee according to the amended requirements of Appendix D, Section 
9.1.\553\
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    \551\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6.
    \552\ The Commission estimates that each monthly report will 
require 2 hours by an Operations Specialist, 1 hour by an Attorney, 
and 1 hour by the Chief Compliance Officer. The ongoing aggregate 
cost for Participants is preliminarily estimated to be $373,464. (2 
hours for Operational Specialist x $140 = $280) + (1 hours for 
compliance attorney x $374 = $374) + (1 hour for chief compliance 
officer x $543 = $543) = $1,197. $1,197 x 12 months = $14,364. 
$14,364 x 25 Participants + the Commission = $373,464. Each 
Participant would therefore incur an ongoing annual expense of 
$14,939 ($373,464/25 Participants).
    \553\ The Commission preliminarily believes that creation of the 
monthly reports documentation necessary for ``allow listing'' could 
require legal advice, discussions with staff familiar with CAT 
security and higher level discussions and analysis. The estimated 30 
hours of Plan Processor staff time include 5 hours by an Attorney, 5 
hours by an Operations Specialist, 10 hours by the Chief Compliance 
Officer and 10 hours by the Chief Information Security Officer. The 
initial, one-time aggregate external cost for Participants is 
preliminarily estimated to be $13,690 = (Attorney for 5 hours at 
$426 per hour = $2,130) + (Operations Specialist for 5 hours at $140 
per hour = $700) + (Chief Compliance Officer for 10 hours at $543 
per hour = $5,430) + (Chief Information Security Officer for 10 
hours at $543 per hour = $5,430).
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    The Commission cannot precisely estimate the number of Participants 
that will apply for authorization to use Programmatic CAIS Access and/
or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access.\554\ As noted above, the 
Commission does not believe that all the Participants require 
programmatic access to conduct effect surveillance. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that number of Participants that may apply for 
such access will range from 1 to 25 Participants. The Commission is 
taking a conservative approach and preliminarily estimating that 25 
Participants will submit an application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \554\ See proposed Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow).
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    In connection with the application for authorization, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that each of these Participants 
would incur a one-time burden of 50 burden hours to prepare each 
application for authorization to use Programmatic CAIS Access or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access and have that application approved 
by the Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation).\555\ Accordingly, with respect to preparation 
and review of the application that seeks Programmatic CAIS and/or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would incur a one-time burden of 
approximately 1,250 hours per application.\556\
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    \555\ This estimate of 50 burden hours include 15 hours by an 
Attorney, 10 hours by a Compliance Manager, 10 hours by an 
Operations Specialist, 15 hours by a Chief Compliance Officer.
    \556\ 50 hours per application x 25 Participants = 1,250 hours.
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7. Proposed Confidentiality Policies, Procedures and Usage Restrictions
    The Commission preliminarily believes that proposed Section 6.5(g) 
creates three different types of paperwork burdens: (i) A third-party 
disclosure burden relating to preparation, review and public disclosure 
of the Proposed Confidentiality Policies; (ii) a recordkeeping burden 
associated with the related documentation, procedures, and usage 
restriction controls required by the Proposed Confidentiality Policies; 
and (iii) a reporting burden associated with the annual requirement to 
provide the Commission an examination report in Section 6.5(g)(v).
Data Confidentiality Policies--Identical Policies
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the hourly burden of 
preparing, reviewing and approving the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies would be an aggregate 500 hours for the Participants, or 20 
hours for each individual Participant.\557\ This estimation includes 
burden hours associated with: (i) Preparing and reviewing the identical 
policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i); (2) making the policies 
publicly available on each of the Participant websites, or collectively 
on the CAT NMS Plan website, redacted of sensitive proprietary 
information as required by Section 6.5(g)(iv); and (3) Operating 
Committee review and approval as required by Section 6.5(g)(vi).\558\ 
The Commission believes that Participants already have individual 
policies and procedures relating to the confidentiality of CAT Data, as 
required by existing provisions of the CAT NMS Plan, and Participants 
can use these existing policies and procedures in order to help 
prepare, review and approve the policies and procedures required by 
proposed Section 6.5(g)(i).
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    \557\ 500 hours/25 Participants = 20 hours per Participant.
    \558\ To the extent that the CISO consults with the Security 
Working Group regarding the development and approval of the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies, those burdens and costs have already been 
accounted for elsewhere. See Part III.D.2. supra.
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    The Commission preliminarily estimates that it would require 10 
hours by the CCO and 10 hours by the CISO, both employees of the Plan 
Processor and not the Participants, to review the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies, as required by proposed Sections 6.2(a)(v)(R) 
and 6.2(b)(viii). The Commission preliminarily estimates that this 
would result in a one-time external cost of $10,860 for 
Participants,\559\ or $434.40 for each Participant.\560\ The Commission 
also

[[Page 66069]]

preliminarily believes that the Participants will consult with outside 
legal counsel in the drafting of the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, 
and estimates this external cost to be $50,000, or $2,000 \561\ for 
each Participant.\562\ The Commission believes that the total initial 
one-time external cost burden for each Participant will be $2,434.40, 
or $60,860 for all Participants.\563\
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    \559\ $10,860 = (Chief Compliance Officer for 10 hours at $543 
per hour = $5,430) + (Chief Information Security Officer for 10 
hours at $543 per hour = $5,430).
    \560\ $10,860/25 Participants = $434.40 per Participant.
    \561\ $50,000/25 Participants = $2,000 per Participant.
    \562\ $50,000 = (100 hours at $500 an hour). For purposes of 
this Paperwork Reduction Act analysis, the Commission is estimating 
the cost of outside legal counsel to be $500 an hour.
    \563\ $2,434.40 x 25 Participants = $60,860.
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    The Commission preliminarily estimates that Participants will 
require 100 burden hours annually to comply with proposed Section 
6.5(g)(ii), which requires the Participants to periodically review the 
effectiveness of the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i), including 
by using the monitoring and testing protocols documented within the 
policies pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i)(J), and take prompt action to 
remedy deficiencies in such policies. The Commission preliminarily 
believes it is appropriate to estimate that review of and updates to 
the Proposed Confidentiality Policies should be one-fifth the burden 
hours necessary for initially creating and approving the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies because the Commission preliminarily believes 
it should take substantially less time and effort to review and update 
the Proposed Confidentiality Policies than in initially creating and 
approving them. This estimated burden includes any updates to the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies initiated by the Participants, based 
on their review pursuant to proposed Section 6.5(g)(ii) or based on 
changed regulatory needs.
    For purposes of this Paperwork Reduction Act analysis only, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants would revise 
the Proposed Confidentiality Policies once a year, which would require 
review by the CCO and CISO of the Plan Processor, as required by 
proposed Sections 6.2(a)(v)(R) and 6.2(b)(viii). The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the CCO and CISO would require less time to 
review subsequent updates to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, so 
the Commission preliminarily estimates that it would require 5 hours of 
review by the CCO and 5 hours of review by the CISO, which would result 
in an external cost of $5,430 for the Participants,\564\ and $217.20 
for each Participant annually.\565\ In addition, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that Participants will consult with outside 
legal counsel in updating the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, and 
preliminarily estimates this external cost to be $5,000.\566\ In total, 
the Commission preliminarily estimates an aggregate external cost of 
$10,430 for all Participants related to reviewing and updating the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies, or $417.20 per Participant.\567\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \564\ $5,430 = (Chief Compliance Officer for 5 hours at $543 per 
hour = 2,715) + (Chief Information Security Officer for 5 hours at 
$543 per hour = $2,715).
    \565\ $5,430/25 Participants = $217.20 per Participant.
    \566\ $5,000 = (outside legal counsel for 10 hours at $500 an 
hour).
    \567\ $10,430/25 Participants = $417.20 per Participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Data Confidentiality Policies--Procedures and Usage Restriction 
Controls
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that each Participant would 
require an average of 282 burden hours to initially develop and draft 
the procedures and usage restriction controls required by proposed 
Section 6.5(g)(i).\568\ The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
estimation should include all initial reporting burdens associated with 
the procedures and usage restriction controls required by Section 
6.5(g)(i), such as the requirement to implement effective information 
barriers between such Participants' Regulatory Staff and non-Regulatory 
Staff with regard to access and use of CAT Data, the requirement to 
document each instance of access by non-Regulatory Staff as proposed in 
Section 6.5(g)(i)(E) and the requirement that Participants must be able 
to demonstrate that a Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS 
and/or CCID Subsystem access is in accordance with the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow as proposed in Section 6.5(g)(i)(I).
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    \568\ This estimate of 282 burden hours include 96 hours by an 
Attorney, 96 hours by a Compliance Manager, 30 hours by a Senior 
Systems Analyst, 30 hours by an Operations Specialist, 20 hours by a 
Chief Compliance Officer and 10 hours by a Director of Compliance. 
The Commission is basing this estimate on the estimated burden for 
SCI entities, that participated in the ``ARP Inspection Program,'' 
to initially develop and draft the policies and procedures required 
by Rule 1001(a) (except for the policies and procedures for 
standards that result in systems being designed, developed, tested, 
maintained, operated, and surveilled in a matter that facilitates 
the successful collection, processing, and dissemination of market 
data). See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 54 at 72377. 
The Commission believes this comparison is appropriate because 
Participants should already have some internal policies and 
procedures that could be enhanced to comply with the new proposed 
requirements of Section 6.5(g)(i).
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    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the ongoing annual 
burden of maintaining and reviewing the procedures and usage 
restriction controls required by Section 6.5(g)(i), including by using 
monitoring and testing protocols documented within the policies 
pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i)(J), and taking prompt action to remedy 
deficiencies in such policies, procedures and usage restriction 
controls as required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(ii), would be 87 burden 
hours for each Participant,\569\ or 2,175 burden hours for all 
Participants.\570\ The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
estimation includes all ongoing reporting burdens associated with the 
procedures and usage restriction controls required by Section 
6.5(g)(i), such as the requirement to document each instance of access 
by non-Regulatory Staff as proposed in Section 6.5(g)(i)(E) or the 
requirement that Participants must be able to demonstrate that a 
Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem 
access is in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow 
as proposed in Section 6.5(g)(i)(I). This estimation also includes the 
hourly burden associated with proposed Section 6.5(g)(iii), which 
requires each Participant, as reasonably practicable, and in any event 
within 24 hours of becoming aware, report to the Chief Compliance 
Officer, in accordance with the guidance provided by the Operating 
Committee, any instance of noncompliance with the policies, procedures, 
and usage restriction controls adopted by such Participant pursuant to 
Section 6.5(g)(i).\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \569\ This estimate of 87 hours includes 28 hours by an 
Attorney, 28 hours by a Compliance Manager, 8 hours by a Senior 
Systems analyst, 8 hours by an Operations Specialist, 10 hours by a 
Chief Compliance Officer and 5 hours by a Director of Compliance. 
This estimate of 87 hours annually is based on the estimated burden 
for SCI entities, that participated in the ``ARP Inspection 
Program,'' to review and update policies and procedures required by 
Rule 1001(a) (except for the policies and procedures for standards 
that result in systems being designed, developed, tested, 
maintained, operated, and surveilled in a matter that facilitates 
the successful collection, processing, and dissemination of market 
data). See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 72377.
    \570\ 87 burden hours x 25 Participants = 2,175 burden hours.
    \571\ Proposed Section 6.5(g)(iii) also requires reporting of 
any instance a Participant becomes aware of a breach of the security 
of the CAT, but this obligation is a pre-existing obligation and not 
a new information collection requirement. See CAT NMS Plan, supra 
note 3, at Section 6.5(f)(iii).

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[[Page 66070]]

Data Confidentiality Policies--Examination Report
    The Commission preliminarily believes that Participants will incur 
annual hour burdens to comply with proposed Section 6.5(g)(v), which 
the Commission preliminarily estimates to be 15 hours for each 
Participant, or 375 hours for all Participants.\572\ The Commission 
believes that this burden hour estimation includes the staff time 
necessary to engage an independent accountant, staff time required to 
allow the independent auditor to review compliance and prepare the 
examination report and the staff time required to submit the 
examination report to the Commission. The Commission believes that 
proposed Section 6.5(g)(v) does not require Participants to review and 
respond to the examination report, and only requires a Participant to 
submit the prepared examination report to the Commission. However, the 
Commission notes that such examination report may require Participants 
to take action pursuant to proposed Section 6.5(g)(ii) or Section 
6.5(g)(iii), including updating policies, procedures and usage 
restrictions, but such burdens are accounted for in other areas of this 
Paperwork Reduction Act analysis.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \572\ 15 hours x 25 Participants = 375 hours.
    \573\ See supra Part III.D.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the external cost of 
compliance with Section 6.5(g)(v), which requires each Participant to 
engage an independent accountant to perform an examination of 
compliance with the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i) and submit 
the examination report to the Commission, would be $57,460 for each 
Participant,\574\ or $1,436,500 for all Participants.\575\ The 
Commission preliminarily believes that this would be the average cost 
of engaging an independent accountant to perform the necessary 
examination on an annual basis.
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    \574\ The Commission is basing this estimate based on the number 
of estimated hours of work by a Manager Internal Audit would be 
required to comply with Rule 1003(b)(1) of Regulation SCI, which 
requires each SCI entity to conduct an SCI review of its compliance 
with Regulation SCI not less than once each calendar year, with 
certain exceptions. See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 
54, at 72391. Specifically, the Commission preliminarily estimates 
it would require 170 hours by a Manager Internal Audit to perform 
the examination. The preliminary estimated cost of engaging an 
independent accountant to perform the examination of compliance and 
submit an examination report is $57,460 (Manager Internal Audit at 
$338 an hour for 170 hours).
    \575\ $57,460 x 25 Participants = $1,436,500.
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8. Secure Connectivity--``Allow Listing''
    The Commission estimates that the proposed amendment to Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.1 of the CAT NMS Plan, requiring the Plan Processor to 
implement capabilities to allow access (i.e., ``allow list'') only to 
those countries or more granular access points where CAT reporting or 
regulatory use is both necessary and expected would result in an 
initial, one-time aggregate external cost of $13,690 for the 
Participants, or $547.60 for each Participant.\576\ This cost 
represents expenses associated with Plan Processor staff time required 
to develop the list of discrete access points that are approved for 
use, which the Commission estimates would be 30 hours of staff 
time.\577\ In addition, the Commission estimates that Participants will 
incur an aggregate ongoing external cost burden of $1,226, or $49.04 
for each Participant,\578\ for Plan Processor staff time required to 
maintain and update the list of discrete access points, which the 
Commission estimates would be 3 hours of staff time.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \576\ $13,690/25 Participants = $547.60 per Participant.
    \577\ The Commission preliminarily believes that creation of the 
documentation necessary for ``allow listing'' could require legal 
advice, discussions with staff familiar with CAT security and higher 
level discussions and analysis. The estimated 30 hours of Plan 
Processor staff time include 5 hours by an Attorney, 5 hours by an 
Operations Specialist, 10 hours by the Chief Compliance Officer and 
10 hours by the Chief Information Security Officer. The initial, 
one-time aggregate cost for Participants is preliminarily estimated 
to be $ = $13,690 (Attorney for 5 hours at $426 per hour = $2,130) + 
(Operations Specialist for 5 hours at $140 per hour = $700) + (Chief 
Compliance Officer for 10 hours at $543 per hour = $5,430) + (Chief 
Information Security Officer for 10 hours at $543 per hour = 
$5,430).
    \578\ $1,226/25 Participants = $49.04 per Participant.
    \579\ The Commission believes it is appropriate to estimate that 
the Plan Processor staff time required to maintain and update the 
list as approximately one-tenth the staff time required to initially 
create the list. Specifically, the estimated aggregate ongoing 
external cost is based on an estimate of 3 hours of Plan Processor 
staff time include 1 hour by an Operations Specialist, 1 hour by the 
Chief Compliance Officer and 1 hour by the Chief Information 
Security Officer. The estimated aggregate ongoing external cost is 
preliminarily estimated to be $1,226 = (Operations Specialist for 1 
hour at $140) + (Chief Compliance Officer for 1 hour at $543) + 
(Chief Information Security Officer for 1 hour at $543).
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    The Commission estimates that the proposed requirement that the 
Plan Processor develop policies and procedures to allow access if the 
source location for a particular instance of access cannot be 
determined technologically, as required by proposed Appendix D, Section 
4.1.1 of the CAT NMS Plan, would require an aggregate one-time initial 
external cost of $19,430 for the Participants, or $777.20 for each 
individual Participant.\580\ This cost represents expenses associated 
with Plan Processor staff time required to create these policies and 
procedures, which the Commission estimates would be 50 hours of staff 
time.\581\ Further, the Commission estimates that the Participants will 
incur an aggregate ongoing external cost of $1,943, or $77.72 for each 
individual Participant,\582\ for Plan Processor staff time required to 
maintain, update and enforce these policies and procedures, which the 
Commission estimates would be 5 hours of staff time.\583\
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    \580\ $19,430/25 Participants = $777.20 per Participant.
    \581\ The estimate 50 hours of Plan Processor staff time include 
10 hours by an Attorney, 10 hours by a Senior Systems Analyst, 10 
hours by an Operations Specialist, 10 hours by the Chief Compliance 
Officer and 10 hours by the Chief Information Security Officer. The 
initial, one-time aggregate cost for Participants is preliminarily 
estimated to be $19,430 = (Attorney for 10 hours at $426 per hour = 
$4,260) + (Senior Systems Analyst for 10 hours at $291 per hour = 
$2,910) + (Operations Specialist for 10 hours at $140 per hour = 
$1,400) + (Chief Compliance Officer for 10 hours at $543 per hour = 
$5,430) + (Chief Information Security Officer for 10 hours at $543 
per hour = $5,430).
    \582\ $1,943/25 Participants = $77.72 per Participant.
    \583\ The Commission believes it is appropriate to estimate that 
the Plan Processor staff time required to maintain, update and 
enforce these policies and procedures should be approximately one-
tenth the staff time required to initially create these policies and 
procedures. Specifically, the Commission estimates 5 hours of Plan 
Processor staff time that includes 1 hour by an Attorney, 1 hour by 
a Senior Systems Analyst, 1 hour by an Operations Specialist, 1 hour 
by the Chief Compliance Officer and 1 hour by the Chief Information 
Security Officer. The ongoing external cost is preliminarily 
estimated to be $1,943 = (Attorney for 1 hour at $426) + (Senior 
Systems Analyst for 1 hour at $291) + (Operations Specialist for 1 
hour at $140) + (Chief Compliance Officer for 1 hour at $543) + 
(Chief Information Security Officer for 1 hour at $543).
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9. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed changes to 
Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan creates new information collections 
associated with revising, maintaining and enforcing the policies and 
procedures and the cyber incident response plan in a manner consistent 
with the proposed requirements of Section 4.1.5 and the breach 
notification requirement.
    The Plan Processor is already required to establish policies and 
procedures and a cyber incident response plan pursuant to Section 4.1.5 
of the CAT NMS Plan, so the Commission believes it is appropriate to 
estimate a burden of revising breach management policies and procedures 
and the cyber incident response plan relate to the new

[[Page 66071]]

elements required by proposed Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that these requirements would result 
in a one-time external cost of $49,805 for Participants, or $1,992.20 
per Participant,\584\ based on the Commission's estimation that it 
would require approximately 124 Plan Processor staff hours to 
incorporate the new elements required by proposed Section 4.1.5 of the 
CAT NMS Plan.\585\ The Commission believes that there would be an 
initial internal burden of 25 hours for the Participants, or 1 hour per 
Participant \586\ for review and approval of the updated cyber incident 
response plan by the Operating Committee.
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    \584\ $49,805/25 Participants = $1,992.20 per Participant.
    \585\ The estimate of 124 hours of Plan Processor staff time 
include 32 hours by an Attorney, 32 hours by a Compliance Manager, 
10 hours by a Senior Systems Analyst, 10 hours by an Operations 
Specialist, 20 hours by the Chief Compliance Officer and 20 hours by 
the Chief Information Security Officer. The Commission is basing 
this estimation on the estimated initial burden to implement 
corrective action processes required by Rule 1002(a) of Regulation 
SCI. See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 72393. 
The total estimated one-time external cost for Participants is 
$49,805 = (Attorney for 32 hours at $426 per hour = $13,631) + 
(Compliance Manager for 32 hours at $317 per hour = $10,144) + 
(Senior Systems Analyst for 10 hours at $291 per hour = $2,910) + 
(Operations Specialist for 10 hours at $140 per hour = $1,400) + 
(Chief Compliance Officer for 20 hours at $543 per hour = $10,860) + 
(Chief Information Security Officer at $543 per hour = $10,860).
    \586\ 25 hours/25 Participants = 1 hour per Participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Commission estimates that the Participants will incur 
an aggregate ongoing external cost of $42,205, or $1,688.20 for each 
individual Participant,\587\ for Plan Processor staff time required to 
maintain, update and enforce these policies and procedures and the 
cyber incident response plan, which the Commission estimates would be 
103 hours of Plan Processor staff time annually.\588\ This external 
cost estimate includes enforcement of the requirements of the cyber 
incident response plan relating to the proposed breach notification 
requirement,\589\ as well as staff time for documenting breaches that 
the Plan processor reasonably estimates would have no impact or a de 
minimis impact on the Plan Processor's operations or on market 
participants.\590\
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    \587\ $42,205/25 Participants = $1,688.20 per Participant.
    \588\ The estimated aggregate ongoing external cost is based on 
an estimate of 103 hours of Plan Processor staff time that includes 
23 hours by an Attorney, 23 hours by a Compliance Manager, 16 hours 
by a Senior Systems Analyst, 3 hours by an Operations Specialist, 9 
hours by an Assistant General Counsel, 17 hours by the Chief 
Compliance Officer and 12 hours by the Chief Information Security 
Officer. The Commission is basing this estimate on the ongoing 
burden to implement corrective action processes required by Rule 
1002(a) of Regulation SCI and estimated burden for providing written 
notifications of Regulation SCI events under Rule 1002(b)(2). See 
Regulation SCI Adopting Release, supra note 54 at 72384 and 72393-
94. The estimated aggregate ongoing external cost is preliminarily 
estimated to be $42,205 = (Attorney for 23 hours at $426 per hour = 
$9,798) + (Compliance Manager for 23 hours at $317 per hour = 
$7,291) + (Senior Systems Analyst for 16 hours at $291 per hour = 
$4,656) + (Operations Specialist for 3 hours at $140 per hour = 
$420) + (Assistant General Counsel for 9 hours at $477 per hour = 
$4,293) + (Chief Compliance Officer for 17 hours at $543 per hour = 
$9,231) + (Chief Security Officer for 12 hours at $543 per hour = 
$6,516).
    \589\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that this 
requirement will require 34 hours of staff time annually from the 
Plan Processor, resulting in an ongoing annual external cost burden 
of $13,756 for the Participants, or $550.24 for each Participant 
($13,756/25 Participants). The 34 hours include 8 hours by an 
Attorney (Attorney for 8 hours at $426 an hour = $3,408), 8 hours by 
a Compliance Manager (Compliance Manager for $317 an hour = $2,536), 
7 hours by a Senior Systems Analyst (Senior Systems Analyst for 7 
hours at $291 an hour = $2,037), 3 hours by an Assistant General 
Counsel (Assistant General Counsel for 3 hours at $477 per hour = 
$1,431), 4 hours by a Chief Compliance Officer (Chief Compliance 
Officer for 4 hours at $543 per hour = $2,172) and 4 hours by the 
Chief Information Security Officer (Chief Information Security 
Officer for 4 hours at $543 per hour = $2,172) = $13,756. This 
estimate relates only to the proposed requirement that the Plan 
Processor provide breach notifications and does not include other 
costs related to breaches, such as determination of whether a breach 
has occurred or assessing the scope of any breach, which is already 
required by the CAT NMS Plan.
    \590\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that this 
requirement will require 30 hours of staff time annually from the 
Plan Processor, resulting in an ongoing annual external cost of 
$12,324 to the Participants, or $492.96 per Participant ($12,324/25 
Participants). The 30 hours include 6 hours by an Attorney, 6 hours 
by a Compliance Manager, 6 hours by a Senior Systems Analyst, 6 
hours by an Assistant General Counsel, 3 hours by the Chief 
Compliance Officer and 3 hours by the Chief Information Security 
Officer. The ongoing external cost of this obligation is 
preliminarily estimated to be $12,324 = (Attorney for 6 hours at 
$426 per hour = $2,556) + (Compliance Manager for 6 hours at $317 
per hour = $1,902) + (Senior Systems Analyst for 6 hours at $291 per 
hour = $1,746) + (Assistant General Counsel for 6 hours at $477 per 
hour = $2,862) + (Chief Compliance Officer for 3 hours at $543 per 
hour = $1,629) + (Chief Information Security Officer for 3 hours at 
$543 per hour = $1,629).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Cumulatively, the Commission preliminarily estimates that to 
implement the changes proposed in Section 4.1.5 of the CAT NMS Plan, 
each Participant will incur an initial hourly burden of 1 hour, or 25 
hours for all Participants, an initial one-time external cost burden of 
$1,992.20, or $49,805 for all Participants, and an ongoing annual 
external cost burden of $42,205 for all Participants, or $1,688.20 for 
each individual Participant.\591\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \591\ $42,205/25 Participants = $1,688.20 per Participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Customer Information for Allocation Report Firm Designated IDs
    The Commission preliminarily believes that this requirement is 
already accounted for in the existing information collections burdens 
associated with Rule 613 and the CAT NMS Plan Approval Order submitted 
under OMB number 3235-0671.\592\ Specifically, the CAT NMS Plan 
Approval Order takes into account requirements on broker-dealer members 
to record and report CAT Data to the Central Repository in accordance 
with specified timelines, including customer information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \592\ See, CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at 84911-
43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory

    Each collection of information discussed above would be a mandatory 
collection of information.

F. Confidentiality of Responses to Collection of Information

    The Commission preliminarily believes that all information required 
to be submitted to the Commission under the proposed amendments, 
including the evaluation of the Plan Processor's performance under 
proposed Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), the examination reports required by 
proposed Section 6.5(g)(v), the application materials for non-SAW 
environments as required under proposed Section 6.13(d), the annual 
Regular Written Assessment of the Plan Processor under proposed Section 
6.6(b)(ii)(A) and the application for Programmatic CAIS Access and 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access under proposed Appendix D, Section 
4.1.6 should be protected from disclosure subject to the provisions of 
applicable law.\593\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \593\ See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing 
the public availability of information obtained by the Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Public disclosure of other collections of information could raise 
concerns about the security of the CAT and therefore the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the Plan Processor and the Participants, as 
applicable, would keep these materials confidential.\594\ Such

[[Page 66072]]

collections of information include the development of SAW-specific 
provisions for the CISP and related policies, procedures, and security 
controls required pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(a); the development 
of the detailed design specifications required pursuant to proposed 
Section 6.13(b)(i); the evaluation of each Participant's SAW and 
related notification to the Operating Committee under proposed Section 
6.13(b)(ii), the monitoring of SAWs and non-SAW environments and 
notification of non-compliance events required by proposed Section 
6.13(c)(i) and proposed Section 6.13(d)(iii); the collection of 
application materials for an exception to the proposed SAW usage 
requirements pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d); the development of 
policies and procedures for review of such applications and the 
issuance of exceptions to the SAW usage requirements by the CISO and 
the CCO pursuant to proposed Section 6.13(d); and the audit trail of 
access to Customer Identifying Systems and the daily reports of users 
entitled to access Customer Identifying Systems as required by the 
proposed amendments to Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \594\ The Participants must comply with the security plan 
developed by the Plan Processor pursuant to Appendix D, Section 4.1 
of the CAT NMS Plan and any security-related policies and procedures 
developed pursuant to Regulation SCI. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 
3, at Appendix D, Section 4.1 (requiring the Plan Processor to 
provide to the Operating Committee a comprehensive security plan, 
including a process for responding to security incidents and 
reporting of such incidents); 17 CFR 242.1001 (requiring each SCI 
entity to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its SCI systems have 
levels of security adequate to maintain operational capabilities and 
promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets). In some cases, 
non-member invitees of the Security Working Group may be given 
access to otherwise confidential information, but the Commission 
believes that the CISO and the Operating Committee should consider 
requiring any non-member invitees sign a non-disclosure agreement or 
adhere to some other protocol designed to prevent the release of 
confidential information regarding the security of the CAT System. 
Members of the Security Working Group (and their designees) would be 
subject to the confidentiality obligations set forth in Section 9.6 
of the CAT NMS Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the policies required by proposed Section 6.5(g)(i) would 
not be confidential. Rather, the proposed rule would require 
Participants to make the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i) 
publicly available on each of the Participant websites, or collectively 
on the CAT NMS Plan website, redacted of sensitive proprietary 
information.

G. Retention Period for Recordkeeping Requirements

    National securities exchanges and national securities associations 
would be required to retain records and information pursuant to Rule 
17a-1 under the Exchange Act.\595\ The Plan Processor would be required 
to retain the information reported to Rule 613(c)(7) and (e)(6) for a 
period of not less than five years.\596\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \595\ See 17 CFR 242.17a-1.
    \596\ See 17 CFR 242.613.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Request for Comments

    Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits 
comments to:
    175. Evaluate whether the proposed collections of information are 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information shall have practical utility;
    176. Evaluate the accuracy of our estimates of the burden of the 
proposed collection of information;
    177. Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, 
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and
    178. Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of 
collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology.
    Persons submitting comments on the collection of information 
requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and 
should also send a copy of their comments to Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090, with 
reference to File Number 4-698. Requests for materials submitted to OMB 
by the Commission with regard to this collection of information should 
be in writing, with reference to File Number 4-698 and be submitted to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of FOIA/PA Services, 100 
F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-2736. As OMB is required to make a 
decision concerning the collection of information between 30 and 60 
days after publication, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its 
full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.

IV. Economic Analysis

    Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission, whenever 
it engages in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action would promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.\597\ In addition, Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act 
requires the Commission, when making rules under the Exchange Act, to 
consider the impact such rules would have on competition.\598\ Exchange 
Act Section 23(a)(2) prohibits the Commission from adopting any rule 
that would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. The discussion 
below addresses the likely economic effects of the proposed rule, 
including the likely effect of the proposed rule on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \597\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \598\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing amendments to the CAT NMS Plan that 
would (1) define the scope of the current information security program; 
(2) require the Operating Committee to establish and maintain a 
security-focused working group; (3) require the Plan Processor to 
create SAWs, direct Participants to use such workspaces to access and 
analyze PII and CAT Data obtained through the user-defined direct query 
and bulk extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) of the CAT 
NMS Plan, set forth requirements for the data extraction, security, 
implementation and operational controls that will apply to such 
workspaces, and provide an exception process that will enable 
Participants to use the user-defined direct query and bulk extract 
tools in other environments; (4) limit the amount of CAT Data that can 
be extracted from the Central Repository outside of a secure analytical 
workspace through the online targeted query tool described in Section 
6.10(c)(i)(A) of the CAT NMS Plan and require the Plan Processor to 
implement more stringent monitoring controls on such data; (5) impose 
requirements related to the reporting of certain PII; (6) define the 
workflow process that should be applied to govern access to customer 
and account attributes that will still be reported to the Central 
Repository; (7) modify and supplement existing requirements relating to 
Participant policies and procedures regarding the confidentiality of 
CAT Data; (8) refine the existing requirement that CAT Data be used 
only for regulatory or surveillance purposes; (9) codify existing 
practices and enhance the security of connectivity to the CAT 
infrastructure; (10) require the formal cyber incident response plan to 
incorporate corrective actions and breach notifications; (11) amend 
reporting requirements relating to Firm Designated IDs and Allocation 
Reports; and (12) clarify that Appendix C of the CAT NMS Plan has not 
been updated to reflect subsequent amendments to the CAT NMS Plan.

[[Page 66073]]

A. Analysis of Baseline, Costs and Benefits

    The Commission preliminarily believes the proposed amendments would 
improve the security of CAT Data through a number of mechanisms. The 
amendments are likely to reduce the attack surface of CAT by further 
limiting the extraction of CAT Data beyond the security perimeter of 
the CAT System. In addition, the proposed amendments may increase the 
uniformity of security monitoring across environments from which CAT 
Data is accessed and analyzed by facilitating centralized monitoring by 
the Plan Processor. In addition, the Commission preliminarily believes 
that provisions allowing for exceptions to the SAW usage requirement 
may allow Participants to achieve or maintain the security standards 
required by the CAT NMS Plan more efficiently. Additional effects upon 
efficiency and competition are discussed in Part IV.B.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments outside of the SAW use requirement will result in 
one-time costs of approximately $2.0MM.\599\ In addition, these 
provisions of the proposed amendments would result in ongoing annual 
costs of approximately $5.9MM.\600\ The Commission also preliminarily 
estimates that depending on the number of Participants that choose to 
work within SAWs, the SAW or exception requirement will entail $4.9MM 
to $61.6MM in initial costs and $4.7MM to $32.8MM in ongoing annual 
costs. These costs are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 \601\ below, 
and discussed further in the sections that follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \599\ ($1,165,400 + $812,300) = $1,977,700.
    \600\ ($3,613,800 + $1,451,500 + $869,200) = $5,934,500.
    \601\ See infra Part IV.A.3.

                               Table 1--Summary of Costs Other Than SAW Costs ($)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Participants                   Plan Processor
                    Activity                     ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Labor         External          Labor         External
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial
    OTQT logging................................  ..............  ..............          88,000  ..............
    CAIS programmatic access....................  ..............  ..............         620,200  ..............
    Policies and procedures.....................       1,155,900          50,000          10,900  ..............
    Regulator and Plan Processor access.........  ..............  ..............          10,300  ..............
    Secure connectivity.........................  ..............  ..............          33,100  ..............
    Breach management policies and procedures...           9,500  ..............          49,800  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total One-Time Costs....................       1,165,400  ..............         812,300  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual
    CISP........................................         106,400           9,000         129,900  ..............
    Security Working Group......................       2,056,600  ..............         310,000  ..............
    OTQT logging................................         970,200  ..............           5,100  ..............
    Customer Identifying Systems Workflow.......  ..............  ..............         373,500  ..............
    Policies and procedures.....................         480,600       1,442,500           5,400  ..............
    Secure connectivity.........................  ..............  ..............           3,100  ..............
    Breach management policies and procedures...  ..............  ..............          42,200  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total ongoing annual costs..............       3,613,800       1,451,500         869,200  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. CISP
    In Section 6.12, the Plan requires the Plan Processor to develop 
and maintain an information security program for the Central 
Repository. Section 4 of Appendix D sets out information security 
requirements that cover ``all components of the CAT System'' and is not 
limited to the Central Repository.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \602\ See supra Part II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To more explicitly define the scope of the information security 
program referenced in Section 6.12, the proposed amendments would 
define the term ``Comprehensive Information Security Program'' \603\ 
(CISP) to encompass the Plan Processor and the CAT System, including 
any systems provided or managed by external contractors, organizations 
or other sources. Additionally, the scope of the CISP would include the 
SAWs.\604\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \603\ ``Comprehensive Information Security Program'' includes 
the organization-wide and system-specific controls and related 
policies and procedures required by NIST SP 800-53 that address 
information security for the information and information systems 
that support the operations of the Plan Processor and the CAT 
System, including those provided or managed by an external 
organization, contractor, or source, inclusive of Secure Analytical 
Workspaces. See supra Part II.A.
    \604\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the benefit of this 
provision of the proposed amendments is a potential improvement to the 
efficiency of CAT implementation by specifically defining the scope of 
the information security program required by the CAT NMS Plan to the 
extent that the Participants did not understand that these requirements 
applied to the Plan Processor, the entire CAT System, and external 
parties. Section 6.12 of the CAT NMS Plan requires the Plan Processor 
to develop and maintain an information security program for the Central 
Repository that, at a minimum, meets the security requirements set 
forth in Section 4 of Appendix D to the CAT NMS Plan.\605\ If 
Participants do not apply the Plan Processor's information security 
program to the Plan Processor and the entire CAT System, including any 
components of the CAT System managed by external providers, the 
proposed amendments may increase the efficiency by which the CAT is 
implemented by preventing Participants from investing in initial 
implementations that do not meet CAT NMS Plan requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \605\ See supra Part II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would newly require the CCO to evaluate 
elements of the CISP that relate to SAWs as part of the regular written 
assessment and, in collaboration with the CISO, to include a review of 
the quantity and type of CAT Data extracted from the CAT System to 
assess the security risk

[[Page 66074]]

of permitting such CAT Data to be extracted.\606\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the Plan Processor \607\ will incur 
expenses of $129,900 \608\ annually to execute this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \606\ See supra Part III.D.1.
    \607\ Costs attributed to the Plan Processor will be passed on 
to Participants and Industry Members according to a fee schedule 
that has not yet been approved by the Commission. See CAT NMS Plan, 
supra note 3, at Section 11.3.
    \608\ See supra note 489.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan provides for the Participants to review and comment on the 
regular written assessment provided by the Plan Processor.\609\ The 
proposed amendments newly require the CCO to evaluate the CISP, which 
includes SAWs, as part of the regular written assessment which the 
Participants must review each year.\610\ The Commission preliminarily 
believes that Participants that are part of a larger exchange group 
will perform this task at the group (``Participant Group'') level of 
organization because doing so will reduce duplication of effort.\611\ 
The Commission preliminarily believes that Participants would spend 
$106,400 \612\ in labor costs to perform this review, as well as 
incurring $9,000 in external legal costs in performing this review and 
providing comments upon it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \609\ Id.
    \610\ See supra Part II.A.
    \611\ See infra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of organization of 
exchanges into groups. There are nine Participant Groups. Four of 
these groups operate a single exchange while four control multiple 
exchanges. FINRA, the sole national securities association, 
comprises the final Participant Group.
    \612\ Throughout this Economic Analysis, the Commission derives 
estimated costs associated with staff time based on per hour figures 
from SIFMA's Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities 
Industry 2013, modified by Commission staff to account for an 1800-
hour work-year, and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm 
size, employee benefits and overhead, and adjusted for inflation 
based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data on CPI-U between January 
2013 and January 2020 (a factor of 1.12). Labor costs include 15 
hours of attorney labor and 10 hours of chief compliance officer 
labor per Participant Group. (15 hours x $426/hour + 10 hours x 
$543/hour) = $11,820. ($11,820 per group x 9 groups) = $106,380. 
($1,000 per group x 9 groups) = $9,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Security Working Group
    Although the Plan does not require formation of a Security Working 
Group, the Operating Committee has established such a group, which 
currently includes the CISO, and chief information security officers 
and/or other security experts from each Participant.\613\ The extant 
Security Working Group makes recommendations to the Operating Committee 
regarding technical issues related to the security of the CAT, but has 
no formal charter or mandate outlining its responsibilities or ensuring 
its continued existence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \613\ See https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-01/FINRA-CAT-Security-Approach-Overview_20190828.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To provide support and additional resources to the CISO, the 
proposed amendments would require the Operating Committee to establish 
and maintain a security working group composed of the CISO and the 
chief information security officer or deputy chief information security 
officer of each Participant.\614\ Currently, the Plan does not include 
a requirement for the Security Working Group. The Plan also does not 
require that the membership of this group will have a sufficient level 
of security expertise. Further, without language in the Plan describing 
the group's role, there is no requirement that the group will 
participate in decisions that will affect CAT Data security, such as in 
evaluating exception requests. Consequently, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the degree to which this group will improve 
decisions affecting CAT Data at present and in the future is uncertain. 
The Commission preliminarily believes that the provisions of the 
proposed amendments that codify the existence of the Security Working 
Group and describe its role will improve the security of CAT Data in 
several ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \614\ See supra Part II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, although a security working group has been established by 
the Participants already, its existence is not codified in the Plan. 
Including these provisions in the Plan will assure the group's 
continued activity.
    Second, the Commission preliminarily believes that these proposed 
amendments may improve CAT Data security because they provide the 
Security Working Group with a broad mandate to advise the CISO and the 
Operating Committee on critical security-related issues. Further, 
defining the membership of the Security Working Group may improve the 
quality of recommendations emanating from the Security Working Group, 
as the group already established by the Operating Committee does not 
currently require the participation of the chief information security 
officer or deputy chief information security officer of each 
Participant. The proposed amendments also permit the CISO to invite 
non-Security Working Group members to attend. Including subject matter 
experts outside of the Participants and Plan Processor that are 
knowledgeable about security may broaden or deepen the level of 
expertise brought to bear.
    Because the Security Working Group is not required by the Plan, the 
Plan has no defined role as it would under the proposed amendments. For 
example, the proposed amendments require that the Security Working 
Group advise the CISO and the Operating Committee with information 
technology matters that pertain to the development of the CAT System. 
Such issues are likely to be complex and technical. To the extent that 
the proposed amendments result in the involvement of a range of 
individuals with expertise in assessing organizational-level security 
issues for complex information systems, the proposed amendments may 
result in additional security issues being considered and considered 
more thoroughly by the CISO and Operating Committee.
    The Commission preliminarily believes however, that there are 
potential conflicts of interest in involving the Security Working Group 
in the review of certain issues. For example, the proposed amendments 
call for the members of the Security Working Group (and their 
designees) to receive application materials for exceptions to the 
requirement that Participants use Plan Processor provided SAWs to 
access and analyze CAT Data using the user defined direct query tool 
and bulk extract tools. To the extent that the Participant members of 
the Security Working Group (and their designees) also plan to obtain or 
maintain exceptions to the SAW requirement, they may be less critical 
of other Participants' application materials. Alternatively, to the 
extent that Participant members of the Security Working Group (and 
their designees) plan to use the Plan Processor's SAWs, they may be 
more critical of other Participants' exception application materials. 
Competitive relationships between Participants may also affect how 
Security Working Group members (and their designees) evaluate such 
applications. The Commission preliminarily believes that this concern 
is largely mitigated by its preliminary belief that Participants will 
adopt a variety of approaches to complying with the SAW usage 
requirement,\615\ so reviews of these application materials are likely 
to reflect a variety of viewpoints. To the extent that Participants' 
decisions do not reflect a variety of approaches, the Commission 
recognizes that the potential conflicts of interest may be more 
pronounced. Furthermore, the exception application procedure does not 
require a vote of the Security Working Group, so the

[[Page 66075]]

Commission preliminarily believes that in the Security Working Group's 
advisory role to the CISO and Operating Committee, a conflict of 
interest in providing feedback on a competitor's SAW exception 
application is less likely to be a significant factor in a 
Participant's ability to secure an exception. Finally, the Commission 
believes that the Participants are incentivized to avoid security 
problems in all environments from which CAT Data is accessed and 
analyzed. Consequently, the Commission preliminarily believes that even 
if exceptions are widely sought by Participants, their Security Working 
Group members are likely to bring forward any problems they identify in 
their review of exception application materials because a data breach 
concerning CAT Data irrespective of its source is likely to be costly 
to all Participants both in remediation costs and reputation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \615\ See infra Part IV.A.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates Participants will incur 
costs of approximately $2,056,600 \616\ annually to comply with 
provisions of the proposed amendments related to participation in the 
Security Working Group. In addition, requiring the Plan Processor CISO 
to keep the Security Working Group apprised of relevant developments, 
to provide it with all information and materials necessary to fulfill 
its purpose, and to prepare for and attend meetings of the Security 
Working Group will cause the Plan Processor to incur approximately 
$310,000 \617\ per year in labor costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \616\ The proposed amendments require the CISO to participate in 
the Security Working Group. Because the Participants have already 
formed a security working group that the Commission preliminarily 
believes meets weekly, some of the labor costs associated with this 
group are in the baseline. To estimate the costs attributable to the 
proposed amendments, the Commission assumes that on average the 
current security working groups' participants have hourly labor 
rates equivalent to a Compliance Manager ($317 per hour). To the 
extent that the current Security Working Group participants have 
hourly labor rates that are greater than this rate, the estimated 
additional costs of the amendments would be reduced. Consequently, 
the Commission preliminarily estimates that the incremental hourly 
labor cost of the proposed amendments would the difference between 
the estimated hourly rate of the CISO and a Compliance Manager 
($543/hour-$317/hour) = $226 per hour. For the CISO hourly rate 
calculations, the Commission uses the hourly rate for Chief 
Compliance Officer. 7 hours per week x 52 weeks = 364 hours of CISO 
labor per Participant. (364 hours per Participant x 25 Participants 
x $226/hour) = $2,056,600.
    \617\ See supra note 495.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Secure Analytical Workspaces
    The Commission understands that the Participants have recently 
authorized the Plan Processor to build analytic environments for the 
Participants.\618\ Use of such environments is currently optional; the 
Participants are not required to use the analytic environments built by 
the Plan Processor when accessing and analyzing Customer and Account 
Attributes and, without the proposed amendments, could continue to 
access large amounts of CAT Data outside of these controlled 
environments.\619\ The Commission also understands that the security 
controls for these analytic environments would not be implemented by 
one centralized party. Rather, each Participant would be responsible 
for the selection and implementation of security controls for its own 
analytic environment(s).\620\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \618\ See Simon Letter, supra note 52, at 4-5.
    \619\ See id.
    \620\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The central repository is hosted in an Amazon Web Services 
(``AWS'') cloud environment.\621\ The Commission is aware of two 
Participant Groups that have presences in this environment.\622\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \621\ See https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/finra-cat-selects-aws-for-consolidated-audit-trail/.
    \622\ See http://technology.finra.org/articles/video/trade-analytics-and-surveillance-on-aws.html and https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/nasdaq-data-lake/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CAT NMS Plan requires that the Plan Processor CISO ``review the 
information security policies and procedures of the Participants that 
are related to the CAT to ensure that such policies and procedures are 
comparable to the information security policies and procedures 
applicable to the Central Repository.'' \623\ If the CISO finds that a 
Participant is not meeting this standard and if the deficiency is not 
promptly addressed, the CISO, in consultation with the CCO, is required 
by the CAT NMS Plan to notify the Operating Committee. Consequently, 
security within the Participants' analytic environments that access CAT 
Data is expected to be comparable to that of the Central Repository.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \623\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3 at Section 6.2(b)(vii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments that require Participants to work within SAW or 
non-SAW environments that have been granted an exception for the 
proposed SAW usage requirements set forth in proposed Section 
6.13(a)(i)(B) (``Excepted Environments'') would provide a number of 
benefits. First, to the extent that the Plan Processor implements 
common security controls for SAWs more uniformly than they would be 
under the current approach, wherein each Participant would be allowed 
to implement selected security controls for its own analytic 
environment(s), security may improve by reducing variability in 
security control implementation, potentially preventing relatively 
weaker implementations. Second, because implementation of common 
security controls will be uniform, the proposed amendments may increase 
the ability of the Plan Processor to conduct centralized and uniform 
monitoring across all environments from which CAT Data is accessed and 
analyzed. Third, the Commission preliminarily believes that exceptions 
to the proposed SAW usage requirements may allow Participants to 
achieve or maintain the security standards required by the Plan more 
efficiently. Fourth, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
provisions in the proposed amendments that provide for a third-party 
annual review process for the continuance of any exceptions that are 
granted would provide a procedure and timeline for remedying security 
deficiencies in Excepted Environments.
    Finally, to the extent that policies and procedures governing data 
security \624\ are less rigorous in application than the security 
provisions for SAWs in the proposed amendments, data downloaded to SAWs 
would be more secure than it might be in other analytic environments 
permitted under the CAT NMS Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \624\ See supra text accompanying note 623.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed below, each Participant will choose whether to access 
CAT Data from the Plan Processor provided SAW accounts or to obtain an 
exception from the SAW usage requirement.\625\ The Commission cannot 
predict how each Participant will approach this decision, but it 
preliminarily believes approaches will vary across Participants due to 
differences in size, operations, use of RSAs and 17d-2 agreements to 
satisfy regulatory responsibilities, current AWS cloud presence, and 
membership in a Participant Group that controls multiple exchanges. 
Consequently, in its cost estimates the Commission includes the Plan 
Processor's costs of designing and implementing the SAWs, but estimates 
ongoing operational costs to the Participants as a range. At one end of 
the range, the Commission assumes that all Participants obtain 
exceptions to the SAW usage requirements. At the other end, the 
Commission assumes that all Participants work within the Plan 
Processor's SAWs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \625\ See infra Part IV.A.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes that the costs the Participants incur due 
to the requirements of the proposed amendment is likely an overestimate

[[Page 66076]]

because the Commission is unable to identify costs included in the 
analysis that would be incurred in the absence of the proposed 
amendments. For example, some Participants would likely work in the 
Plan Processor's planned analytic environments without the proposed 
amendments. For those Participants, some of the costs they incur to 
implement their operations within the SAWs under the proposed 
amendments would be incurred in the baseline case, as would at least 
some of their ongoing costs of using SAWs. Similarly, the Plan 
Processor's costs to implement SAWs under the proposed amendments may 
include costs that would have been incurred to implement similar 
analytic environments without the proposed amendments.
    The Commission further believes that this range does not encompass 
the costs that Participants incur to perform their regulatory duties 
using CAT Data because Participants that seek exceptions will perform 
those duties in another manner, such as by working within their current 
analytic environments or through RSAs and 17d-2 agreements. Both of 
those approaches carry costs, but those costs are not consequences of 
the proposed amendments because the Participants currently perform 
their regulatory duties in a non-SAW environment. Consequently, those 
costs are part of the baseline.
    Table 2 presents a summary of estimated costs for compliance with 
the proposed amendments' requirement that Participants work within a 
Plan Processor provided SAW or obtain an exception. The table 
summarizes $274,600 \626\ in initial base costs and $860,200 in ongoing 
annual base costs that are required to develop and implement the SAWs; 
these costs must be incurred regardless of whether any Participants 
choose to work within SAWs. The table then presents marginal costs for 
all Participants working within SAWs versus all Participants working 
within Excepted Environments. The Commission preliminarily estimates a 
range of costs for the SAW or exception requirements.\627\ All 
Participants working within a SAW would entail $61.6MM \628\ in initial 
costs and $32.8MM \629\ in ongoing annual costs including base costs. 
All Participants working in Excepted Environments would entail $4.9MM 
\630\ in initial costs and $4.7MM \631\ in ongoing annual costs. These 
costs are broken down and discussed further in the sections that 
follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \626\ $200,600 + $74,000 = $274,600.
    \627\ It is possible that this range may overestimate the costs 
Participants incur if some Participants can comply with the proposed 
amendments at a lower cost by employing 17d-2 or RSAs to avoid 
obtaining an exception or contracting for a SAW.
    \628\ ($61,200,200 + $167,000 + $200,600 + $74,000) = 
$61,641,600.
    \629\ ($19,000,000 + $12,900,000 + $860,200) = $32,760,200.
    \630\ ($1,289,600 + $2,250,000 + $1,048,800 + $200,600 + 
$74,000) = $4,863,000.
    \631\ ($417,400 + $2,250,000 + $1,160,100 + $860,200) = 
$4,687,700.

                               Table 2--Costs for SAW or Exception Requirement ($)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Participants                   Plan processor
                    Activity                     ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Labor         External          Labor         External
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial base costs
    Incorporate SAW requirements into CISP......  ..............  ..............          89,000          27,000
    Develop detailed design specifications for    ..............  ..............          56,200          47,000
     SAWs.......................................
    Provide Participants with detailed design     ..............  ..............           3,000  ..............
     specifications.............................
    Develop automated monitoring systems........  ..............  ..............          52,400  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total base initial costs................  ..............  ..............         200,600          74,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Base Costs
    Maintain and monitor CISP SAW requirements..  ..............  ..............          56,600  ..............
    Maintain detailed design specifications.....  ..............  ..............          48,300  ..............
    Additional costs for third party annual       ..............  ..............         150,000  ..............
     audit......................................
    Maintain automated monitoring systems and     ..............  ..............         605,300  ..............
     monitor....................................
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total base annual costs.................  ..............  ..............         860,200  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Additional Costs for All Participants in SAWs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial.........................................
    Technical development costs.................      39,500,000  ..............  ..............
    Evaluate nine SAWs for compliance...........  ..............  ..............         167,000  ..............
    SAW operations implementation costs.........      21,700,000  ..............  ..............  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Additional Initial Costs..........      61,200,000  ..............         167,000  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual..........................................
    SAW usage costs.............................  ..............      12,900,000  ..............  ..............
    Technical maintenance costs.................      19,000,000  ..............  ..............  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Annual Additional Costs...........      19,000,000      12,900,000  ..............  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Additional Costs for All Participants Excepted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Initial Costs........................       1,289,600       2,250,000       1,048,800  ..............
Additional Ongoing Costs........................         417,400       2,250,000       1,160,100  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 66077]]

a. SAW Versus Exception Decisions
    Under the proposed amendments, each Participant will be required to 
limit some of its use of CAT Data to SAWs provided by the Plan 
Processor unless it obtains an exception to certain SAW usage 
requirements.\632\ Consequently, each Participant will likely meet its 
regulatory obligations using one or more of three approaches. First, 
the Participant may decide to use the Plan Processor provided SAWs that 
would be established under the proposed amendments. Second, the 
Participant may decide to apply for an exception to allow it to use a 
different analytic environment to access and analyze CAT Data. Third, 
the Participant may decide to employ a 17d-2 or RSA to discharge its 
regulatory responsibilities. Each of these potential approaches has 
direct and indirect costs to the Participant that are discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \632\ Participants will be able to use the online direct query 
tool from their own analytic environments under certain 
restrictions, but the number of records of CAT Data they extract, 
and their access to Customer Information, would be limited for this 
manner of access. See supra Part II.C and Part II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the first approach, a Participant may elect to use a SAW 
provided by the Plan Processor. The costs of operating and maintaining 
this SAW would be paid by the Participant, and the magnitude of these 
costs would be dependent on the resources used by the Participant 
within the SAW.\633\ If a Participant adopts this approach, it may have 
lower expenses associated with maintaining its private analytic 
environment. However, to the degree that the Participant currently uses 
IT resources that it also uses for operational activities to perform 
its regulatory activities, this may create inefficiencies because those 
resources may be less utilized during hours when operational demands 
are lower, such as when exchanges are not operating, if it performs 
regulatory activities in the SAW. Under this approach, to the degree 
that the lack of excess operational resources limit the Participant's 
ability to perform its regulatory activities in-house, the Participant 
may be able to insource more of its regulatory activities when working 
in the SAW, reducing its dependence on and costs associated with 17d-2s 
and RSAs.\634\ Utilizing a SAW may also open competitive opportunities 
to the Participant to perform regulatory services for other 
Participants within its SAW.\635\ Moving regulatory activities to the 
SAW is likely to entail significant implementation costs: the 
Participant would need to develop or license analytic tools for that 
environment or adapt its current analytical tools to that environment, 
and train its regulatory staff in using the SAW environment. The 
Commission preliminarily believes this approach is more likely to be 
adopted by Participants in Participant Groups that operate multiple 
exchanges because these costs might be spread over more exchanges,\636\ 
and by Participants that already have a significant cloud presence 
because their implementation costs would likely be lower than those for 
a Participant that did not have a cloud presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \633\ The estimated costs of SAWs are discussed further below.
    \634\ RSAs are discussed further below.
    \635\ See infra Part IV.B.1.
    \636\ Participants that operate multiple exchanges often have 
commonalities in data structures and rules across their exchanges 
that allow economies of scale in performing regulatory activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the second approach, a Participant may apply to use a private 
analytical environment through the exception procedure. In this 
approach, the Participant would incur costs to document that its 
private analytic environment meets the security requirements of the 
proposed amendments, and to adapt its analytic tools to those 
requirements. Further, the Participant would incur costs associated 
with applying for and obtaining the exception, and complying with 
annual renewal requirements. The Participant may also encounter certain 
inefficiencies in accessing CAT Data to the extent that download speeds 
between the Central Repository and the private analytic environment are 
inferior to those within the SAW.\637\ A Participant that adopts this 
approach may also choose to change the scope of its use of 17d-2s and 
RSAs as a provider or user of regulatory services through such 
agreements. For example, a Participant may choose to pursue an 
exception to the SAW use requirement and add additional 17d-2 and RSA 
coverage for functions that are more difficult to perform within its 
private analytic environment. Alternatively, there may be analytic 
tools that are more efficient to use outside of SAWs, allowing a 
Participant to provide regulatory services to other Participants that 
would be less efficient to provide in the SAWs. The Commission 
preliminarily believes this approach is more likely to be adopted by 
Participants that have a significant investment in private analytic 
workspaces, and proprietary tools for regulatory activities that are 
optimized for those workspaces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \637\ See infra Part IV.B.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the third approach, a Participant would change its use of RSAs 
and 17d-2 agreements to avoid using a SAW or obtaining an exception to 
the SAW use requirement. This approach is likely to increase a 
Participant's expenses associated with RSAs and 17d-2 agreements, but 
may allow a Participant to avoid SAW expenses entirely. It is possible 
that even with maximal use of RSAs and 17d-2 agreements, a Participant 
may want to perform some regulatory functions that would not be 
possible with only use of the online targeted query tool. In this case, 
a minimal SAW would also have to be supported if the Participant did 
not wish to seek an exception to the SAW use requirement. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that this approach is most likely to 
be adopted by Participants that operate a single venue, and 
Participants that currently outsource much of their regulatory 
activities to other Participants. The Commission recognizes it is 
possible that many Participants will take this approach considering 
that many Participants make broad use of RSAs and 17d-2 agreements to 
discharge their regulatory responsibilities.
    Finally, the Commission recognizes that a Participant may take a 
mixed approach to this decision. A Participant may elect to use the SAW 
for some regulatory activities, and outsource other activities that 
would significantly increase its use of resources in the SAW, and thus 
its costs of using the SAW. It is also possible that a Participant may 
choose to invest heavily in the SAW to compete in the market for 
regulatory services as an RSA provider, while also obtaining an 
exception to the SAW use requirement to allow it to capitalize on its 
current infrastructure.
b. Amendments for SAWs
    The Commission is proposing amendments to the CAT NMS Plan that 
will require (1) the provision of SAW accounts; (2) data access and 
extraction policies and procedures, including SAW usage requirements; 
(3) security controls, policies, and procedures for SAWs; (4) 
implementation and operational requirements for SAWs.\638\ The 
Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments may 
improve the security of CAT Data in two ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \638\ See supra Part II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, to the extent that CISP security controls are implemented 
more uniformly than they would be under the CAT NMS Plan, security may 
improve

[[Page 66078]]

by reducing variability in security control implementation.\639\ 
Currently, each Participant would be responsible for implementing 
security controls in their analytic environments and their approaches 
are likely to vary if each Participant designs those implementations to 
accommodate their current operations and analytic environments. This 
variability might result in some environments being more secure than 
others.\640\ To the extent that having the Plan Processor provide SAWs 
that implement common security controls reduces this variability,\641\ 
these provisions may increase CAT Data security by preventing 
relatively weaker implementations. The Commission recognizes it is also 
possible that the Plan Processor's implementation might be relatively 
less secure than an implementation designed by an individual 
Participant under the current CAT NMS Plan. The Commission 
preliminarily believes these provisions should improve security by 
reducing the variability of implementations as long as the Plan 
Processor's implementation of common security controls is relatively 
secure compared to other possible approaches. Further, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the requirement that the Plan Processor 
must evaluate and notify the Operating Committee that each 
Participant's SAW has achieved compliance with the detailed design 
specifications before that SAW may connect to the Central Repository 
will further increase uniformity of security control 
implementations.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \639\ See supra Part II.C.3.
    \640\ The Commission preliminarily believes that different 
environments that satisfy the CISP might vary in their overall level 
of security due to differences in implementation, third-party 
software and policies and procedures for monitoring the security of 
the environments. To the extent that a bad actor would focus an 
incursion attempt upon the least secure environment, reducing 
variability between environments may improve CAT Data security by 
reducing vulnerabilities within environments from where CAT Data is 
accessed and analyzed.
    \641\ See supra Part II.C.1.
    \642\ See supra Part II.C.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the proposed amendments may increase the uniformity of 
security monitoring across all environments from which CAT Data is 
accessed and analyzed.\643\ By assigning this duty to a single entity, 
the Plan Processor, and making provisions for the uniformity of this 
monitoring through detailed design specifications, the proposed 
amendments may enhance the security of CAT Data by ensuring that 
security monitoring is uniform. Currently under the CAT NMS Plan, most 
security monitoring of environments other than the Central Repository 
would fall to the Participants that controlled those environments.\644\ 
To the extent that the rigor of this monitoring and the manner in which 
requirements were implemented varied across Participants and the Plan 
Processor, some environments might be more robustly monitored than 
others, potentially delaying the identification of security issues 
within less robustly monitored environments. In addition, having a 
single entity perform this security monitoring may improve its quality 
by facilitating development of expertise of the single entity 
performing the monitoring. To the extent that the Security Working 
Group participates in the development of this monitoring, expertise 
from the wider group of Participants might also improve the quality of 
monitoring. Further, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
standardizing implementation of security protocols through the common 
detailed design specifications may be more efficient than having each 
Participant that implements a SAW or private environment for CAT Data 
do so independently because it avoids duplication of effort. This may 
also improve efficiency by reducing the complexity of security 
monitoring of environments from which CAT Data is accessed and analyzed 
because the detailed design specifications will include provisions that 
facilitate this central monitoring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \643\ See supra Part II.C.4.
    \644\ See supra Part IV.A.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of 
the proposed amendments that establish security controls, policies, and 
procedures for SAWs may improve CAT Data security. Currently, under the 
CAT NMS Plan, Participants must establish security protocols comparable 
to those required for the central repository for all environments from 
which Participants access CAT Data.\645\ The proposed amendments 
require that SAWs comply with the same security standards as the 
Central Repository, including compliance with and common implementation 
of certain NIST SP 800-53 security controls, policies, and procedures. 
To the extent that the security controls, policies and procedures 
required for SAWs in the proposed amendments are more rigorous than 
what the Participants would implement under the current CAT NMS Plan, 
the security of CAT Data may be improved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \645\ See supra text accompanying note 623.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 3 summarizes the Commission's preliminarily cost estimates if 
all Participants were to work within SAWs. The Commission estimates 
that Participants would collectively incur $61.2MM in initial costs and 
$31.9MM \646\ in ongoing annual costs, while the Plan Processor would 
incur $441,600 \647\ in initial costs and $860,200 in ongoing annual 
costs. These costs are discussed further in the analysis that follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \646\ ($19,000,000 + $12,900,000) = $31,900,000.
    \647\ ($367,600 + $74,000) = $441,600.

                               Table 3--Costs for All Participants To Use SAWs ($)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Participants                   Plan processor
                    Activity                     ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Labor         External          Labor         External
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial
    Incorporate SAW requirements into CISP......  ..............  ..............          89,000          27,000
    Develop detailed design specifications for    ..............  ..............          56,200          47,000
     SAWs.......................................
    Provide Participants with detailed design     ..............  ..............           3,000  ..............
     specifications.............................
    Evaluate nine SAWs for compliance...........  ..............  ..............         167,000  ..............
    Technical development costs.................      39,500,000  ..............  ..............  ..............
    Develop automated monitoring system.........  ..............  ..............          52,400  ..............
    SAW operations implementation costs.........      21,700,000  ..............  ..............  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total initial costs.....................      61,200,000  ..............         367,600          74,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual
    Maintain and monitor CISP SAW requirements..  ..............  ..............          56,600  ..............

[[Page 66079]]

 
    Maintain detailed design specifications.....  ..............  ..............          48,300  ..............
    Maintain automated monitoring system and      ..............  ..............         605,300  ..............
     monitor....................................
    Additional costs for third party annual       ..............  ..............         150,000  ..............
     audit......................................
    Technical maintenance of SAWs...............      19,000,000  ..............  ..............  ..............
    SAW usage costs.............................  ..............      12,900,000  ..............  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total ongoing costs.....................      19,000,000      12,900,000         860,200  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed amendments, the Plan Processor would be required 
to incorporate SAW-specific additions into the CISP.\648\ The 
Commission preliminarily estimates the Plan Processor will incur 
approximately $89,000 \649\ in initial labor and $27,000 \650\ in 
external consulting costs to fulfill this requirement. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates the Plan Processor will also incur $56,600 
\651\ in recurring annual costs to meet those provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \648\ See supra Part III.D.3.a.
    \649\ See supra note 498.
    \650\ See supra Part III.D.3.a.
    \651\ See supra note 501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Plan Processor will 
incur initial, one-time costs of approximately $56,200 \652\ in labor 
costs and $47,000 \653\ in external legal and consulting costs to 
develop detailed design specifications for the technical implementation 
of the access, monitoring and other controls required for SAWs.\654\ 
The Commission preliminarily believes the Plan Processor will incur 
$3,000 \655\ in labor costs to make the required detailed design 
specifications available to the Participants, and will incur an 
additional $48,300 \656\ per year to maintain those detailed design 
specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \652\ See supra note 503.
    \653\ See supra Part III.D.3.a.
    \654\ Id.
    \655\ See supra note 506.
    \656\ See supra note 508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the Plan Processor to evaluate each Participant Group's \657\ 
SAW to confirm that the SAW has achieved compliance with the detailed 
design specifications and to notify the Operating Committee, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the Plan Processor would incur 
an initial, one-time expense of approximately $167,000.\658\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \657\ The Commission preliminarily believes that each 
Participant Group will contract for a single SAW because it 
preliminarily believes that each Participant Group largely 
centralizes its regulatory functions that would require CAT Data.
    \658\ See supra note 509. $18,550 per group x 9 groups = 
$166,950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the Plan Processor to build automated systems that will enable 
monitoring of the SAWs and Excepted Environments, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Plan Processor would incur an initial, 
one-time expense of $52,400.\659\ For the Plan Processor to maintain 
such systems and to monitor each Participant's SAW in accordance with 
the detailed design specifications, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates the Plan Processor would incur annual recurring costs of 
$605,300.\660\ For each instance of non-compliance with the CISP or 
detailed design specifications, the Plan Processor would incur costs of 
$500 to notify the non-compliant Participant.\661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \659\ See supra note 510.
    \660\ See supra note 511.
    \661\ See supra note 512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan currently requires that the Plan Processor conduct a 
third-party annual security audit.\662\ The Commission preliminarily 
estimates the proposed amendments would increase the cost of that 
security assessment by $150,000 per year because of its increased scope 
and complexity due to the addition of the SAWs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \662\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.2(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Participants would incur additional technical implementation 
costs to set-up and configure their SAWs, develop tools for interacting 
with CAT Data, develop and implement cluster computing capabilities if 
applicable,\663\ and implement technical monitoring. The Commission 
estimates the Participants will incur labor costs of $39.5MM \664\ for 
these one-time development costs. These activities will also entail 
ongoing labor costs to the Participants that the Commission 
preliminarily estimates at $19.0MM \665\ annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \663\ The Commission preliminarily believes Participant Groups 
that operate a single exchange are unlikely to use cluster computing 
capabilities because these Participants tend to use RSA and 17d-2 
agreements to satisfy their regulatory responsibilities that would 
require CAT Data.
    \664\ Setting up and configuring SAWs includes license 
procurement, development of the SAW environment, development of 
cluster computing capabilities if applicable, development of tools 
to interact with CAT Data, and implementation of technical 
monitoring. Costs for transitioning from a private analytic 
environment to the SAW are accounted for separately below. See infra 
note 674. Labor estimates include 900 hours from operations 
specialists and 900 hours from systems analysts. Labor estimates to 
develop tools include 2,700 hours from senior programmers and 2,700 
hours from senior systems analysts. Labor costs to implement cluster 
computing capabilities include 7,200 hours from senior programmers 
and 7,200 hours from senior systems analysts. Labor estimates to 
implement technical monitoring include 2,700 hours from operations 
specialists. ((900 + 2,700) hours x $140/hour + (900 x $269/hour) + 
(2,700 + 7,200) hours x $339/hour + (2,700 + 7,200) x $291/hour = 
$6,983,100. The Commission preliminarily believes that Participant 
Groups that operate a single exchange are unlikely to implement 
cluster computing capabilities. Consequently, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates these single exchange Participant Groups 
will have technical development costs of ($6,983,100--(7,200 hours x 
$339/hour + 7,200 hours x $291/hour)) = $2,447,100. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that FINRA has already completed most of this 
technical development work because FINRA is already working within 
an AWS analytic cloud. Thus, the Commission preliminarily believes 
that FINRA's technical development costs will be approximate 25% of 
those of a Participant Group that operates multiple exchanges. 
Consequently, the Commission's estimate of total technical 
development costs for the nine Participant Groups is ((4 single 
exchange groups x $2,447,100/group) + (4 multiple exchange groups x 
$6,983,100/group) + ($6,983,100 x 25%)) = $39,466,575.
    \665\ Ongoing labor estimates to maintain the SAW's technical 
environment include 1 senior programmer and 1 senior systems 
analyst. Ongoing labor costs to maintain cluster computing 
capabilities include 1 senior programmer and 2 senior systems 
analysts. Labor estimates to maintain technical monitoring include 
1.25 operations specialists. Assuming an 1,800 hour work year, for a 
Participant Group with multiple exchanges, these costs would total 
(1.25 x 1,800 hours x $140/hour + 2 x 1,800 hours x $339/hour + 3 x 
1,800 hours x $291) = $3,106,800 annually. For a Participant Group 
with a single exchange that does not implement cluster computer 
capabilities, these costs would total (1.25 x 1,800 hours x $140/
hour + 1 x 1,800 hours x $339/hour + 1 x 1,800 hours x $291) = 
$1,449,000 annually. The Commission preliminarily believes that 
FINRA is already maintaining most of this functionality in its 
current AWS environment, and thus believes its additional annual 
costs associated with maintaining its SAW technical environment 
would be approximate 25% of those incurred by a Participant Group 
that operates multiple exchanges. Consequently, to maintain their 
SAW's technical environment, the Commission preliminarily estimates 
that the nine Participant Groups would incur annual ongoing costs of 
((4 single exchange groups x $1,449,000/group) + (4 multiple 
exchange groupsx$3,106,800/group) + ($3,106,800 x 25%)) = 
$18,999,900.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 66080]]

    The Participants would incur additional costs from their usage of 
the SAWs.\666\ The Commission preliminarily believes these estimates 
may overestimate actual costs the Participants might incur in moving 
their operations to SAWs because it does not recognize cost savings 
that might be obtained by retiring redundant resources that they would 
no longer require for operations being conducted in SAWs.\667\ The 
Commission preliminarily believes that the Plan Processor would be 
billed for SAW usage and would pass those costs on to Participants 
directly such that each Participant Group's SAW costs would reflect its 
own usage of SAW resources. To the extent that the Plan Processor marks 
up those costs before passing them on to Participant Groups, actual 
costs would exceed what the Commission estimates. To estimate the 
magnitude of these costs, the Commission assumes three scenarios of SAW 
use that vary in the types of instances employed within the SAW.\668\ 
These estimates assume that supporting more advanced instances 
increases costs due to greater demands on computing resources. Certain 
general \669\ and technical \670\ assumptions are common across all SAW 
usage cost estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \666\ The Commission estimated SAW usage costs through the AWS 
Simple Monthly Cost estimator at https://calculator.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html.
    \667\ For example, Participants may maintain servers, cloud 
environments, and IT personnel that support operations such as 
surveillance and investigations. If these functions are performed 
within a SAW, such IT resources may be retired and personnel may be 
reassigned to support SAW technical operations. If Participants 
perform these functions using resources that cannot be retired, such 
as the servers they use to operate exchanges, such savings may be 
limited. The Commission notes that such savings would not apply to 
FINRA because its ongoing SAW costs are considered to be baseline 
costs.
    \668\ For its cost estimates, the Commission assumes different 
virtual computers: a basic instance involves a single node on a AWS 
EC2- t2.2xlarge virtual computer; a cluster computing instance 
involves a group of AWS EC2--p2.16xlarge virtual computers; an 
advanced instance involves a AWS EC2- x1e.32xlarge virtual computer; 
and each instance is associated with a shared services and common 
charge of $6,000 per year.
    \669\ Data transfers cost eliminated by hosting the SAWs in the 
same region as the Central Repository. AWS usage based on minimum 
and peak instance with daily spike traffic for 8.5 hours Monday 
through Friday using Compute Savings Plan. One AWS instance can 
support more than one user depending on the complexity of work when 
leveraging cluster computing.
    \670\ The following technical options were used in all scenario 
estimates: Operating system (Linux), Storage for each EC2 instance 
(General Purpose SSD (gp2)), Snapshot Frequency (2x Daily), Data 
transfer cost (0), Pricing strategy (Compute Savings Plans 3 Year 
None upfront).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission assumes three levels of usage for its estimates. 
Participant Groups can be classified in their SAW usage as single-
exchange, exchange group or association.\671\ Table 4 presents 
preliminarily estimated Participant Group SAW use costs.\672\ 
Consequently, the Commission preliminarily estimates that Participants 
will incur $12.9MM \673\ annually in SAW use costs. The Commission 
further estimates that Participants will incur one-time costs of 
$21.7MM \674\ to adapt current systems and train personnel to perform 
regulatory duties in the SAWs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \671\ Single exchange usage assumes 5 basic instances and 100 
terabytes of SAW storage. Exchange group assumes 25 basic instances, 
30 cluster computing instances, and 15 advanced instances as well as 
2 petabytes of SAW storage; 10 of these cluster instances and 10 of 
these advanced instances proxy for exchange groups' expected higher 
use of computing resources to conduct surveillance activities. 
Association assumes 150 basic instances, 120 cluster computing 
instances and 30 advanced instances as well as 5 petabytes of SAW 
storage. The Commission preliminarily believes FINRA, the sole 
national securities association, will have significantly higher CAT 
usage than exchange groups because the CAT NMS Plan anticipates the 
retirement of OATS, which is the data source FINRA currently uses to 
perform many of its regulatory activities, and many of those 
regulatory activities involve cross market data. With the retirement 
of OATS, FINRA will be unable to perform these activities without 
CAT Data.
    \672\ The Commission preliminarily believes that the four 
Participant Groups that operate single exchanges are likely to 
outsource regulatory duties that would regularly require external 
data and thus use RSAs to fulfill those requirements. Consequently, 
their use of the SAW would be situational. The Commission 
preliminarily believes its cost estimate for FINRA is a significant 
overestimate because FINRA already has established and is working in 
an AWS environment. Consequently, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that FINRA's SAW usage costs would be in the baseline 
because FINRA is already performing its regulatory duties in an AWS 
workspace. Although FINRA's use might increase with the retirement 
of OATS, the Commission preliminarily believes this would be a 
consequence of the CAT NMS Plan rather than the proposed amendments.
    \673\ (4 x $67,000 + 4 x $3,146,000) = $12,852,000.
    \674\ In its economic analysis of the Plan, the Commission 
estimated the cost of the Plan as approximately $2.4 billion in 
initial aggregate implementation costs and recurring annual costs of 
$1.7 billion. See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at Part 
V.B. The Commission preliminarily estimates SAW implementation costs 
for all Participant Groups other than FINRA by using the same ratio 
of implementation to ongoing costs as estimated for the Plan. (2.4/
1.7 x $12,852,000) = $18,144,000. The Commission preliminarily 
believes this approach is likely to significantly overestimate 
FINRA's implementation costs because FINRA is already working in an 
AWS environment and is thus unlikely to face many of the 
implementation costs that other Participants will face in 
implementing SAWs. Consequently, the Commission is reducing its 
estimate of FINRA's implementation costs by 75%. FINRA's share of 
implementation costs is (2.4/1.7 x $10,005,000 x 25%) = $3,531,176. 
Thus the Commission preliminary estimate of implementation costs 
would be $18,144,000 + $3,531,176 = $21,675,176.

                                           Table 4--Estimated Participant Group Incremental SAW Use Costs ($)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Single exchange                 Exchange group                    Association
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Instances         Cost          Instances         Cost          Instances         Cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic instance..........................................               5           6,000              25          26,000             150         154,000
Cluster compute instance................................               0               0              30       1,169,000             120       4,676,000
Advanced instance.......................................               0               0              15         942,000              30       1,912,000
Shared services & common charge.........................               5          30,000              70         420,000             300       1,800,000
SAW storage.............................................          100 TB          31,000            2 PB         589,000            5 PB       1,463,000
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................................  ..............          67,000  ..............       3,146,000  ..............      10,005,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that some provisions of the 
proposed amendments will entail indirect costs that regulators will 
incur to access and use CAT Data. The requirements that Participants 
work within SAWs and only access Customer and Account Attributes data 
through SAWs may raise the costs of regulatory access to CAT Data, or 
cause Participants to make operational changes to how they perform 
their regulatory duties in response to the decreased flexibility of the 
Plan under the proposed amendments. By

[[Page 66081]]

restricting the use of most data access methods to SAWs or Excepted 
Environments, the CAT NMS Plan may make it more difficult or impossible 
for Participants to perform certain functions in the manner they 
currently do, for example by limiting the set of regulatory tools that 
are available to perform surveillance or enforcement investigations. 
This may result in some Participants developing new tools to perform 
these functions, or entering into RSAs and 17d-2 agreements with 
another regulator to avoid incurring such costs.
c. Amendments for Excepted Environments
    The proposed amendments add provisions to the CAT NMS Plan that set 
forth a process by which Participants may be granted an exception from 
the requirement that Participants use their respective SAWs to access 
CAT Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk extract 
tools.\675\ The Commission also proposes to add provisions to the CAT 
NMS Plan that would set forth implementation and operational 
requirements for any Excepted Environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \675\ See supra Part II.C.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that providing for exceptions 
for the SAW usage requirements offers three benefits. First, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that provisions allowing for 
exceptions to the SAW usage requirements may allow Participants to 
achieve or maintain the security standards required by the CAT NMS Plan 
\676\ more efficiently. Some Participants may have significant 
investments in private analytic environments and regulatory tools that 
they currently use or are developing to conduct regulatory activities 
in their analytic environments. To the extent that it would be 
impossible, impractical, or inefficient to adapt these processes to the 
SAWs, a mechanism for an exception to this policy may allow 
Participants to achieve the security standards required by the CAT NMS 
Plan without bearing the expense of redeveloping or implementing these 
processes within the SAWs. Further, if a Participant is able to conduct 
these activities with IT resources that would otherwise be idle if the 
Participant moved its activities to the SAW, an exception process may 
prevent the inefficiency of underutilizing existing resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \676\ See supra text accompanying note 623.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the Commission preliminarily believes that provisions in 
the proposed amendments that provide for an annual review process for 
the continuance of any exceptions that are granted would provide a 
procedure and timeline for remedying security deficiencies in Excepted 
Environments.\677\ Although the CAT NMS Plan currently requires the 
CISO to review information security policies and procedures of the 
Participants that are related to the CAT, under the proposed 
amendments, this review will include a third-party security assessment 
and documentation of detailed design specifications of the 
Participant's security implementation. The Commission preliminarily 
believes that this additional information is likely to improve the 
quality of the review of the Participant's data security because it 
extends beyond information in the Participant's policies and procedures 
related to CAT. This may allow identification and remediation of 
security deficiencies that might not have been identified under the CAT 
NMS Plan. To the extent that these provisions identify security 
deficiencies that would otherwise not be identified, or identifies 
these deficiencies more rapidly, they may improve the security of CAT 
Data because the CAT NMS Plan does not currently establish procedures 
for periodic third-party review of Participants' private analytic 
environments, nor does it provide timelines for addressing any security 
deficiencies identified within these environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \677\ See supra Part II.C.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, the Commission preliminarily believes that provisions in the 
proposed amendments that require the Plan Processor to monitor some 
elements of security within Excepted Environments may improve CAT Data 
security by providing additional monitoring in Excepted Environments. 
The proposed amendments require Participants operating Excepted 
Environments to facilitate security monitoring within those 
environments by the Plan Processor. To the extent that this provides 
additional monitoring in Excepted Environments rather than substituting 
for monitoring by Participants with Excepted Environments, security 
monitoring of those environment may increase in effectiveness under the 
proposed amendments.
    Finally, the Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of 
the proposed amendments that establish third-party security audits for 
Exempted Environments may improve CAT Data security. Currently, under 
the CAT NMS Plan, Participants are expected to establish comparable 
security protocols to those required for the central repository for all 
environments from which Participants access CAT Data. While the CAT NMS 
Plan currently requires the Plan Processor CISO to review Participants' 
policies and procedures to verify they are comparable to those for the 
central repository, the proposed amendments require that Exempted 
Environments undergo third-party security audits when they are first 
approved, and annually thereafter. Because these audits have a broader 
scope than the policy and procedure review required by the CAT NMS 
Plan, the Commission preliminarily believes they may provide a more 
comprehensive review of Participant security. To the extent that these 
third-party audits identify potential security concerns that would 
otherwise persist, security of CAT Data may improve.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that Participants will make 
the decision to seek exceptions or work within the SAW at the 
Participant Group level.\678\ The Commission estimates that if all nine 
Participant Groups were to obtain exceptions to the SAW use 
requirements, the Participants would incur initial costs of $3.5MM 
\679\ to apply for exceptions and the Plan Processor would incur 
initial costs of $1.0MM to evaluate those applications and validate 
Excepted Environments. The Commission further estimates Participants 
would incur $2.7MM \680\ in annual ongoing costs to update exception 
applications and the Plan Processor would incur $1.2MM in annual 
ongoing costs to process those applications and monitor Excepted 
Environments. Cost estimates are presented in Table 5 and discussed 
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \678\ The Commission preliminarily believes that Participant 
Groups that operate multiple exchanges perform most regulatory 
duties that would require CAT Data centrally. Consequently, the 
Commission expects that application costs for multiple exchange 
Participant Groups would not be substantially more complex than 
those for a Participant Group that does not operate multiple 
exchanges.
    \679\ ($1,289,600 + $2,250,000) = $3,539,600.
    \680\ ($417,400 + $2,250,000) = $2,667,400.

[[Page 66082]]

                       Table 5--Costs for Nine Participant Groups To Obtain Exceptions ($)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Participants           Plan processor
                            Activity                             -----------------------------------------------
                                                                       Labor         External          Labor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial
    Third party security assessment.............................  ..............       2,250,000  ..............
    Prepare detailed design specification.......................         801,200  ..............
    Submit materials to CCO, CISO, SWG..........................          16,800  ..............  ..............
    Develop policies and procedures to review applications......  ..............  ..............          56,000
    Plan Processor review of exception application..............  ..............  ..............         825,800
    Plan Processor validation of Excepted Environment...........  ..............  ..............         167,000
    Implement Participant systems to enable monitoring..........         471,600  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
        Total initial costs for nine Participant Groups.........       1,289,600       2,250,000       1,048,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual
    Third party security assessment.............................  ..............       2,250,000  ..............
    Update application materials................................         400,600  ..............  ..............
    Submit materials to CCO, CISO, SWG..........................          16,800  ..............  ..............
    Maintain and update application review policies.............  ..............  ..............          31,700
    Plan Processor review of application........................  ..............  ..............         825,800
    Plan Processor monitoring of Excepted Environments..........  ..............  ..............         302,600
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
        Total ongoing costs for nine Participant Groups.........         417,400       2,250,000       1,160,100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that each Participant Group would incur an 
initial, one-time cost of approximately $250,000 \681\ in external 
consulting costs to obtain the required security assessment from a 
named and independent third party security assessor. Providing the 
required detailed design specifications would result in an additional 
$89,000 \682\ in labor costs. Submitting those materials to the CCO, 
CISO, the members of the Security Working Group (and their designees), 
and Commission observers of the Security Working Group would entail an 
additional $1,900 \683\ in labor costs. Participants would face 
additional costs to implement processes required by the detailed design 
specifications that facilitate the Plan Processor's monitoring of 
Excepted Environments. The Commission preliminarily estimates each 
Participant Group seeking an exception would incur labor costs of 
approximately $52,400 \684\ to implement those processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \681\ See supra Part II.D.3.d.i. ($250,000 per group x 9 groups) 
= $2,250,000.
    \682\ Labor costs include 200 hours by a senior systems analyst, 
40 hours by a compliance attorney, 20 hours by the chief compliance 
officer, and 10 hours by a director of compliance. (200 hours x 
$291/hour + 40 hours x $374/hour + 20 hours x $543 + 10 hours x 
$500) = $89,020. ($89,020 per group x 9 groups) = $801,180.
    \683\ Labor costs include 5 hours by a compliance attorney. (5 
hours x $374/hour) = $1,870. ($1,870 per group x 9 groups) = 
$16,830.
    \684\ The Commission preliminarily believes that development 
costs for the processes that produce log files that support Plan 
Processor monitoring would require similar development activities to 
developing the automated monitoring processes themselves. See supra 
note 510. ($52,400 per group x 9 groups) = $471,600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to maintain the SAW exception, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that each Participant Group would incur costs of 
$250,000 \685\ to obtain an updated security assessment. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the costs associated with updating 
application materials would be approximately $44,500,\686\ which is 
half of the cost to initially prepare the materials to support the 
exception application.\687\ The Commission further estimates that each 
Participant Group would spend $1,900 \688\ in labor costs submitting 
these materials to the CCO, the CISO, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \685\ See supra Part III.D.3.c.i.
    \686\ Costs for initial application materials are $89,020 to 
prepare detailed design specifications. $44,510 is half of this 
total. ($44,510 per group x 9 groups) = $400,590.
    \687\ See supra Part III.D.3.d.i.
    \688\ Labor costs include 5 hours by a compliance attorney. (5 
hours x $374/hour) = $1,870. ($1,870 per group x 9 groups) = 
$16,830.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan Processor would incur costs to develop policies and 
procedures governing the review of applications for exceptions to the 
SAW use requirement. The Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Plan Processor will incur labor costs of $56,000 \689\ to develop these 
policies and procedures, and annual ongoing costs of $31,700 \690\ to 
maintain and update these policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \689\ See supra note 523.
    \690\ See supra note 524.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan Processor will incur costs to review exception 
applications.\691\ Each initial exception application would cause the 
Plan Processor to incur one-time labor costs of approximately 
$91,760.\692\ Review of materials for continuation of exceptions would 
cause the Plan Processor to incur the same review costs annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \691\ See supra Part III.D.3.d.ii.
    \692\ See supra Part III.D.3.d.ii. The PRA estimates that the 
Plan Processor would incur $91,760 in labor costs to review each 
application. In this analysis, the Commission assumes all nine 
Participant Groups would apply for exceptions. (9 Participant Groups 
x $91,760 per application) = $825,840.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan Processor will incur costs to notify the Operating 
Committee that each Excepted Environment is compliant with the detailed 
design specifications that Participants provide as part of their 
application materials for an exception.\693\ The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Plan Processor will incur $18,550 
\694\ in labor costs to evaluate each Excepted Environment and notify 
the Operating Committee. Should the Plan Processor need to notify a 
Participant Group of an identified non-compliance with the detailed 
design specifications, additional costs would be incurred.\695\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \693\ Id.
    \694\ See supra note 531. The PRA estimates that the Plan 
Processor would incur $18,550 in labor costs to validate each 
Excepted Environments. In this analysis, the Commission assumes all 
nine Participant Groups would apply for exceptions. (9 Participant 
Groups x $18,550 per validation) = $166,950.
    \695\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan Processor will incur costs to monitor the Excepted 
Environments in accordance with the detailed design

[[Page 66083]]

specifications and notify the Participant of any identified non-
compliance. The Commission preliminarily estimates the Plan Processor 
will incur annual ongoing costs of $302,600 \696\ to perform these 
tasks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \696\ See supra note 534.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments require that each Participant using a non-
SAW environment simultaneously notify the Plan Processor, the members 
of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and Commission 
observers of the Security Working Group of any material changes to its 
security controls for the non-SAW environment. The Commission cannot 
predict how many such changes would occur because the Commission does 
not know how often each Participant Group would make changes to its 
Excepted Environment that would necessitate material changes to its 
security controls, but for each such instance, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates the notifying Participant Group would incur 
labor costs of approximately $5,200.\697\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \697\ Labor costs include 10 hour of Senior Systems Analyst 
labor, 3 hours by a compliance attorney, and 2 hours by the CISO. 
For the CISO, hourly rate calculations use the hourly rate for a 
Chief Compliance Officer. (10 hours x $291/hour + 3 hours x $374/
hour + 2 hours x $543/hour) = $5,118.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes that by providing an exception procedure 
to the requirement that Participants employ the user-defined direct 
query and bulk extract tools to access CAT Data within SAWs, 
variability across environments from where CAT Data is accessed and 
analyzed will necessarily increase. The amendments will provide for a 
level of security in Excepted Environments that will be similar but not 
identical to security within SAWs because Excepted Environments may 
implement security controls, policies, and procedures differently than 
SAWs. The Commission preliminarily believes the risk of individual 
Excepted Environments being less secure than SAWs is mitigated by the 
review process of applications for exceptions and Plan Processor 
verification and monitoring steps required by the proposed amendments.
4. OTQT and Logging
    The CAT NMS Plan does not limit the amount of CAT Data a regulator 
can extract or download through the online targeted query tool 
(``OTQT''); the CAT NMS Plan only states that the Plan Processor must 
define the maximum number of records that can be viewed in the OTQT as 
well as the maximum number of records that can be downloaded.\698\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \698\ See supra Part II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would remove the ability of the Plan 
Processor to define the maximum number of records that can be 
downloaded via the OTQT, and instead limit the maximum number of 
records that can be downloaded via the OTQT to no more than 200,000 
records per query request.\699\ The Plan does not explicitly prevent 
use of the OTQT to download significant quantities of CAT Data, 
although the OTQT does not provide access to all fields in 
transactional CAT Data that are available through the user defined 
direct query tool, (``UDDQ''). Because the Plan does not currently 
distinguish between what types of analytic environments (SAWs versus 
Excepted Environments) may access particular tools (i.e., OTQT versus 
UDDQ), this may not be a significant security distinction under the 
Plan because downloading such data through the OTQT would be merely 
less efficient than doing so with other data extraction tools if either 
approach were available in a given analytic environment. However, with 
the proposed amendments' provisions that restrict the use of the UDDQ 
and bulk extract methods to Plan Processor provided SAWs and Excepted 
Environments, some regulatory users may be incentivized to use a 
succession of queries to download larger samples of CAT Data using the 
OTQT to avoid the need to work within the SAWs or Excepted 
Environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \699\ See supra Part II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that by limiting the number 
of records of CAT Data that can be extracted from the OTQT, the 
proposed amendments are likely to result in more regulatory analysis of 
CAT Data being performed within the security perimeter established by 
the CISP of the Plan Processor because regulatory activities that 
require extraction of more than 200,000 records would need to be 
performed using the UDDQ or by bulk extraction, activities that would 
be limited to Plan Processer provided SAWs or Excepted Environments 
under the proposed amendments. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that this is likely to reduce the attack surface of CAT by reducing the 
magnitude of CAT Data accessed outside of these potentially more secure 
environments. The Commission recognizes, however, that limiting the use 
of the OTQT to queries that extract fewer than 200,000 records may also 
reduce regulatory use of CAT Data to the extent that a regulatory user 
may not have the technical skills that would be required to use other 
access methods.\700\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \700\ The Commission preliminarily believes that access to CAT 
Data through the UDDQ would require greater technical skills on the 
part of the user such as knowledge of a structured query language 
and an understanding of structured databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments extend the information in log files that 
the Participants are required under the Plan to submit to the Operating 
Committee monthly, specifically, by defining the term ``delivery of 
results'' and requiring the logging of access and extraction of CAT 
Data.\701\ The Commission estimates that the Plan Processor will incur 
one-time labor costs of $87,960 \702\ to make the initial necessary 
programming and systems changes to log delivery of results of queries 
of CAT Data and the access and extraction of CAT Data. In addition, the 
Plan Processor would incur an annual ongoing expense of $5,100 \703\ to 
generate and provide the additional information in monthly reports 
required by the proposed amendments. The Commission preliminarily 
estimates that the Participants would incur ongoing annual labor costs 
of $970,200 \704\ for the Operating Committee to review the additional 
information in the monthly reports. Further, the requirement that 
limits the number of records that can be extracted through use of the 
OTQT may make it impossible for some regulatory functions that are 
required only situationally (such as ad hoc queries to investigate 
trading by a single trader in all symbols or by multiple traders in a 
single symbol) to be performed outside the SAW (or Excepted 
Environments). This restriction may cause some Participants to 
establish SAWs, obtain an exception, or extend their use of RSAs for 
activities that are performed infrequently. This outcome may be more 
costly to these Participants than working less efficiently through the 
OTQT in ad hoc situations because it may be less costly to Participants 
to use the OTQT inefficiently than to make these alternative 
arrangements for only occasional use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \701\ See supra Part III.D.4.
    \702\ See supra Part III.D.4.
    \703\ See supra Part III.D.4.
    \704\ Cost estimate assumes each Participant would annually 
incur 12 hours of Operating Committee Member labor and 108 hours of 
Compliance Manager labor. (12 hours x $381/hour + 108 hours x $317/
hour) = $38,808 per Participant. Collectively, Participants would 
incur ($38,808 per Participant x 25 Participants) = $970,200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. CAT Customer and Account Attributes
    As noted above, the Commission granted the Participants' PII 
Exemption

[[Page 66084]]

Request to allow for an alternative approach to generating a Customer-
ID and to allow for an alternative approach which would exempt the 
reporting of dates of birth and account numbers associated with retail 
customers who are natural persons.\705\ This exemptive relief allows 
the Participants to implement an alternative approach to generating 
Customer-ID(s), subject to certain conditions set forth in the 
exemptive relief, but does not bar the Participants from implementing 
the Plan's original Customer-ID approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \705\ See supra Part II.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The baseline for customer and account information availability in 
CAT assumes the implementation of the alternative approach described in 
the PII Exemption Order and the creation of the CCID Subsystem. The 
exemptive relief includes certain conditions that also are included in 
the baseline for the proposed amendments.\706\ First, the exemptive 
relief requires that the Participants ``ensure the timeliness, 
accuracy, completeness, and integrity of interim value[s]'' in the CCID 
Subsystem.\707\ Second, the Participants must assess the overall 
performance and design of the CCID Alternative process and the CCID 
Subsystem as part of each annual Regular Written Assessment of the Plan 
Processor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \706\ See PII Exemption Order, supra note 164, at 16157.
    \707\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to: (1) Delete 
the Industry Member reporting of ITINs/SSNs, dates of birth and account 
numbers for natural persons and require the reporting of year of birth; 
(2) establish a process for creating Customer-ID(s); (3) impose 
specific obligations on the Plan Processor that will support the 
revised reporting requirements and creation of Customer-ID(s); and (4) 
amend existing provisions of the CAT NMS Plan to reflect the new 
reporting requirements and process for creating Customer-ID(s), as 
further discussed below.\708\ These provisions reflect the PII 
exemptive relief previously granted by the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \708\ See supra Part II.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the provisions of the 
proposed amendments discussed in this section largely reflect exemptive 
relief and current implementation specifications of the Participants, 
with the exception of the requirement that customer addresses reported 
to the CAIS have separate fields for street numbers and names. Because 
the specifications are still in development, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the cost impact of this provision on 
Participants is likely to be de minimis. The Commission further 
preliminarily believes that CAT Reporters have not implemented an 
alternative street address specification and the costs to CAT Reporters 
to implement this change will be de minimis because the requirement 
does not require additional information to be reported.
    The proposed amendments include provisions that by design, reduce 
certain options for future development of the Plan. For example, the 
Participants would not be able to decide at a later date to no longer 
use their exemptive relief and instead change the CAT implementation to 
conform to the Plan as it stands at that time. Although the Commission 
believes that the Participants would be unlikely to take such an 
approach in the future after incurring the costs to secure exemptive 
relief and implement alternative approaches required by such relief, it 
recognizes that the proposed amendments curtail that option to the 
Participants.
6. Customer Identifying Systems Workflow
    The Commission is proposing to amend the CAT NMS Plan to define the 
workflow for accessing Customer and Account Attributes, and to 
establish access restrictions.\709\ Accordingly, the Commission 
proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan to (1) specify how existing data 
security requirements apply to Customer and Account Attributes; (2) 
define the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow and the General 
Requirements for accessing Customer Identifying Systems; (3) establish 
general requirements that must be met by Regulatory Staff before 
accessing the Customer Identifying Systems, which access will be 
divided between two types of access--manual access and programmatic 
access; and (4) establish the specific requirements for each type of 
access to the Customer Identifying Systems. Some of these provisions 
would reflect the PII exemptive relief previously granted by the 
Commission, making the alternative approach described in the PII 
Exemption Order a requirement of the Plan. The Commission discusses 
potential benefits of the proposed new provisions of the Plan relative 
to the baseline below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \709\ See supra Part II.F.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would replace the term ``PII'' with 
``Customer and Account Attributes'' and to reflect that Customer 
Identifying Systems, including CAIS, now contain the information that 
identifies a Customer; prohibit Customer and Account Attributes from 
being included in the result sets to queries of transactional CAT Data; 
and update requirements related to the PII access audit trail to 
reflect the CAIS approach. These requirements mirror requirements for 
access to customer information already contained in the Plan or the PII 
Exemptive Order.\710\ The Commission preliminarily believes that these 
provisions may avoid inefficiencies in implementation to the extent 
that Participants might make investments in implementation activities 
that do not reflect the approach to customer information and account 
attributes outlined in the exemptive relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \710\ See supra Part II.F.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments include provisions that limit access to the 
Customer Identifying Systems to two types of access--manual and 
programmatic. The Commission preliminarily believes that this may 
improve the security of CAT Data by limiting access to CAIS data to two 
defined access methods. The Commission preliminarily believes that by 
doing so the likelihood that customer information might be compromised 
in a potential breach will be decreased. To the extent that a bad actor 
would be limited in his or her ability to access customer information 
in a manner other than these two access pathways, customer information 
within the CAT System should be more secure.
    The proposed amendments include provisions that establish that 
access to Customer Identifying Systems are subject to certain 
restrictions, including requiring that authorization to use 
Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access be 
requested and approved by the Commission.\711\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that this authorization step may reduce the risk 
of inappropriate use of customer and account information by ensuring 
that programmatic access that can potentially return information about 
a large group of customers is only granted when an appropriate 
regulatory use exists. Further, the Commission preliminarily believes 
this requirement may reduce the amount of CAT Data exposed to 
regulators as they perform their duties because it may increase 
regulatory use of manual as opposed to programmatic access to the CCID 
Subsystem and CAIS when manual access is sufficient for a regulatory 
purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \711\ See supra Part II.F.5.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 66085]]

    The proposed amendments would establish programmatic access as a 
required element of the CAT NMS Plan.\712\ The provision of 
programmatic access enables authorized Regulatory Staff to query the 
CAIS and CCID Subsystems to access information on multiple customers or 
accounts simultaneously.\713\ The Commission recognizes that allowing 
programmatic access to CAIS and CCID data by authorized users 
potentially will allow Regulatory Staff to be exposed to a greater 
quantity of Customer and Account Attributes. To the extent that this 
exposure provides more opportunities for this data to be used 
inappropriately, this may reduce the confidentiality of CAIS and CCID 
data. However, the Commission preliminarily believes the Commission 
authorization step required before programmatic access can be exercised 
mitigates this risk because the application review process requires 
documentation establishing the regulatory purpose of the programmatic 
access, and provides for an approval process based on such access being 
generally consistent with specific standards that would justify such 
access.\714\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \712\ See supra Part II.
    \713\ See supra Part II.F.7.
    \714\ See supra Part II.F.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Plan Processor will 
incur labor costs of $620,200 \715\ to establish programmatic access to 
the CCID Subsystem and CAIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \715\ The estimates assumes 640 hours each of labor by a Senior 
Database Administrator, a Senior Programmer and a Senior Business 
Analyst. (640 hours x $349/hour + 640 hours x $339/hour + 640 hours 
x $281/hour) = $620,160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed amendments, Participants that require 
programmatic access to the CAIS or CCID Subsystems would need to apply 
for authorization from the Commission.\716\ The Commission cannot 
estimate how many Participants would need to apply for authorization, 
or how many applications might be required for each Participant that 
would access these subsystems. The Commission preliminarily estimates 
that each application for authorization would cause a Participant to 
incur $19,100 \717\ in labor costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \716\ Id.
    \717\ Labor cost estimate assumes 15 hours of attorney labor, 10 
hours of compliance manager labor, 10 hours of operations specialist 
labor and 15 hours by a chief compliance officer. (15 hours x $426/
hour + 10 hours x $317/hour + 10 hours x $140/hour + 15 hours x 
$543/hour) = $19,105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that the requirements to 
maintain and provide to Participants, the Commission, and the Operating 
Committee monthly audit reports that track permissions for and access 
to Customer Identifying Systems will result in an aggregate ongoing 
annual cost to the Plan Processor of $373,500 \718\ per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \718\ See supra note 552.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the requirement that regulators obtain Commission 
approval before exercising programmatic access to the CCID Subsystem or 
the CAIS may reduce or delay regulatory use of the customer data 
contained in these databases. The Commission recognizes that a possible 
indirect cost of the proposed amendments is less overall regulatory use 
of CAT Data. In the CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, the Commission 
discussed certain benefits that were likely to result from CAT, 
including benefits from analysis and reconstruction of market 
events.\719\ To the extent that provisions of the proposed amendments 
complicate access to CAT Data, prohibit its use for purposes that are 
both regulatory and commercial, or make use of CAT Data more expensive 
to regulators, fewer of these benefits may accrue to investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \719\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at Part 
V.E.2. For example, in the wake of a market event, a regulator might 
perform an analysis of cross-market trading before the event. To the 
extent that making such an analysis public is a commercial as well 
as regulatory activity under the proposed amendments, fewer such 
analyses are likely to be performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Participants' Data Confidentiality Policies
    To maintain CAT Data confidentiality, the Plan requires the 
Participants to implement policies related to information barriers, 
restricts access only to designated persons for regulatory purposes, 
and imposes penalties for non-compliance to these requirements.\720\ 
The Plan currently requires each Participant to periodically review the 
effectiveness of these policies and procedures, and that they take 
prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such policies and procedures. 
The Plan does not require the Participants to make their policies 
related to data confidentiality publicly available. Although 
Participants may disclose data confidentiality policies relating to 
information collected from customers in the course of business, these 
policies do not generally extend to policies and procedures in place to 
deal with CAT Data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \720\ See supra Part II.G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed below, the Commission is proposing amendments to 
modify and supplement the Plan to provide additional specificity 
concerning data usage and confidentiality policies and procedures and 
to make the policies publicly available.\721\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \721\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would modify the existing Plan provisions 
designed to protect the confidentiality of CAT Data so that they apply 
to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies, and Participant-specific 
procedures and usage restriction controls.\722\ As a result of this 
change, Participants would be required to report any instance of 
noncompliance with the data confidentiality policies, procedures, and 
usage restrictions adopted by such Participant to the Chief Compliance 
Officer within 24 hours of becoming aware. While the Plan currently 
requires reporting of a CAT security breach within 24 hours, it does 
not require reporting instances of noncompliance with the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies or procedures and usage restriction controls 
adopted by such Participant pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i). The 
Commission preliminarily believes that this requirement will improve 
the security of CAT Data in two ways. First, bringing any instance of 
noncompliance to the attention of the Chief Compliance Officer would 
provide an opportunity for such a weakness to be addressed and reduce 
the risk of future instances of noncompliance to the extent that an 
instance of noncompliance may demonstrate a weakness in the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies, procedures, or usage restrictions, and such a 
weakness can then be addressed when it would not have otherwise been. 
Second, the Commission preliminarily believes that the notification 
requirement may elevate the profile of the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies among the Participants because an instance of noncompliance 
could not be handled through solely internal channels, instead 
triggering review by the Chief Compliance Officer. This may incentivize 
the Participants to more effectively implement these policies to avoid 
instances of noncompliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \722\ See supra Part II.G.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies to be identical across Participants. While the proposed 
amendments allow for each Participant to establish its own procedures 
and usage restrictions to operationalize these policies, accommodating 
the Participants' organizational, technical and structural uniqueness, 
the overarching policies would be centrally established and common 
across Participants. The Commission preliminarily believes that having 
common data confidentiality policies

[[Page 66086]]

across Participants may avoid unnecessary variation across Participants 
in how they meet the data confidentiality requirements of the Plan. 
However, the Commission recognizes it is also possible that the 
Participants could adopt relatively weak central policies that would 
ultimately reduce the security of CAT Data. The Commission 
preliminarily believes this outcome is unlikely because central 
development of these policies allows the Participants to access their 
collective expertise in creation of these policies. The Commission 
recognizes that in situations where policies are centrally developed, 
it is possible that an individual Participant might have developed 
stronger policies and procedures in the absence of the proposed 
amendments. However, the Commission believes this potential outcome is 
mitigated by the fact that having multiple Participants involved in the 
development of these policies is likely to result in more robust 
policies because more expertise can be incorporated into their 
development.
    The proposed amendments would define ``Regulatory Staff'' and limit 
access to CAT Data to persons designated by Participants, which persons 
must be Regulatory Staff or technology and operations staff that 
require access solely to facilitate access to and usage of CAT Data 
stored in the Central Repository by Regulatory Staff.\723\ Currently, 
the CAT NMS Plan has numerous references to ``regulatory staff,'' and 
outlines benefits and limitations on such regulatory staff, including 
the ability to access all CAT Data, but does not define the term or 
provide any guidance or limitations on how Participants may identify 
``regulatory staff.'' \724\ The Commission preliminarily believes that 
defining Regulatory Staff may improve the confidentiality of CAT Data 
by preventing expansive interpretations of this term (such as 
classifying staff members that have primarily business functions as 
Regulatory Staff) that could result in non-Regulatory Staff of 
Participants having exposure to CAT Data that might be used 
inappropriately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \723\ See supra Part II.G.2.
    \724\ See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 
6.5(f)(ii) and Appendix D, Sections 6.1, 6.2, 8.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require that the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies limit non-Regulatory Staff access to CAT Data 
to circumstances in which there is a specific regulatory need for such 
access and a Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly 
designated head(s) of regulation), or designee, provides written 
approval for each instance of access by non-Regulatory Staff. The Plan 
has no provision that bars non-Regulatory Staff from accessing CAT 
Data, though it does limit the use of CAT Data to only regulatory or 
surveillance purposes. The Commission preliminarily believes that the 
proposed amendments would further limit the number of individuals that 
have access to CAT Data by barring access to non-Regulatory Staff 
members (subject to proposed exceptions) and that limiting the number 
of individuals that have access to CAT Data reduces the risk that it 
would ultimately be used inappropriately because fewer people would 
have the opportunity to engage in an inappropriate use. However, while 
the requirement that non-Regulatory Staff not have access to CAT Data 
may reduce the risk of CAT Data being used inappropriately, the 
Commission also recognizes that this restriction may slow a 
Participant's ability to respond to urgent situations such as a market 
event. A provision to allow a Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer to 
allow such access may mitigate inefficiencies such as a slowed response 
to a market event that could result from an absolute prohibition of 
staff other than Regulatory Staff accessing CAT Data. For example, in 
the case of a market event, a Participant's analysis of events may need 
access to expert staff in operations or business functions of the 
Participant, and the need for rapid analysis of CAT Data may warrant 
such an exception to further this regulatory purpose. The Commission 
recognizes that providing this access to staff other than Regulatory 
Staff may increase the risk that CAT Data would be used inappropriately 
because additional Participant Staff would necessarily be exposed to 
CAT Data in such a case. However, the Commission preliminarily believes 
this risk is mitigated by the requirement that the Participant's Chief 
Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation) 
provide written permission for such access because it is likely to 
limit its use to exceptional situations because ensuring the 
confidentiality of CAT Data is among the Chief Regulatory Officer's (or 
similarly designated head(s) of regulation's) primary responsibilities 
and because the CAT NMS Plan requires CAT Data only to be accessed for 
surveillance or regulatory purposes. Furthermore, establishing 
documentation of such instances will facilitate the Plan Processor's 
and independent accountant's \725\ review of the Participant's 
compliance with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. This may further 
limit the use of and any additional risk posed by this provision only 
to exceptional circumstances because such use is likely to be reviewed 
by the independent auditor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \725\ The role of independent accountants in reviewing 
Participants' compliance is discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would limit the extraction of CAT Data to 
the minimum amount necessary to achieve specific surveillance or 
regulatory purposes.\726\ The Commission preliminarily believes that 
this provision may improve CAT Data security by reducing the attack 
surface of CAT because extracted data would reside outside of the scope 
of the CAT security provisions and would be beyond the Plan Processor's 
security monitoring scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \726\ See supra Part II.G.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies to define the individual roles and regulatory activities of 
specific users, including those users requiring access to Customer and 
Account Attributes, of the CAT.\727\ The Commission preliminarily 
believes that this provision may improve the security of CAT Data by 
allowing the Participants to identify regulatory users whose roles do 
not regularly require access to more sensitive information stored in 
the CCID Subsystem and CAIS and restrict that access. To the extent 
that fewer users have access to this more sensitive data, the risk of 
inappropriate use of customer information may be reduced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \727\ See supra Part II.G.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments require that Participants incorporate 
policies relating to the access of Customer and Account Attributes, 
Programmatic CAIS Access, and Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access in the 
Proposed Confidentiality Policies.\728\ This requirement would result 
in the adoption of a common policy for access to Customer and Account 
Attributes across Participants. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that this may improve security of CAT Data by reducing variation among 
policies across Participants.\729\ The proposed amendments also require 
that the Proposed Confidentiality Policies be reasonably designed to 
implement and satisfy the Customer and Account Attributes data 
requirements of Section 4.1.6 of Appendix D such that Participants must 
be able to demonstrate

[[Page 66087]]

that a Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID 
Subsystem access is in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems 
Workflow.\730\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \728\ See supra Part II.G.3.c.
    \729\ See supra note 640.
    \730\ See supra Part II.F.7 and Part II.F.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require that each Participant shall 
engage an independent accountant annually to perform an examination of 
compliance with the policies required by the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies.\731\ The Commission preliminarily believes that this 
provision may improve the security of CAT Data by facilitating external 
review of the Participants' compliance with the Proposed 
Confidentiality Policies by an independent third party. To the extent 
that this independent third party identifies deficiencies in the 
Participants' compliance with the Proposed Confidentiality Policies 
that would not otherwise be identified and the identification of such 
deficiencies leads to remediation that makes such deficiencies less 
likely to recur, the Commission preliminarily believes these provisions 
may improve CAT Data security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \731\ See supra Part II.G.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments discussed in this section would entail one-time 
costs of $1.2MM,\732\ and ongoing annual costs of $1.9MM.\733\ These 
costs are summarized in Table 6 and discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \732\ ($1,115,900 + $50,000 + $10,900) = $1,216,800.
    \733\ ($480,600 + $1,442,500 + $5,400) = $1,928,500.

                            Table 6--Summary of Costs for Policies and Procedures ($)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Participants                   Plan processor
                    Activity                     ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Labor         External          Labor         External
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial
    Develop central Proposed Confidentiality             254,900          50,000  ..............  ..............
     Policies...................................
    Review and approve Proposed Confidentiality   ..............  ..............          10,900  ..............
     Policies...................................
    Develop procedures to implement the PCP.....         901,000  ..............  ..............  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................................       1,155,900          50,000          10,900  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual
    Review Proposed Confidentiality Policies and          51,000           5,000  ..............  ..............
     remediate..................................
    Review and approve Proposed Confidentiality   ..............  ..............           5,400  ..............
     Policies...................................
    Maintain and remediate procedures...........         289,700  ..............  ..............  ..............
    Annual third party audit....................         139,900       1,437,500  ..............  ..............
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................................         480,600       1,442,500           5,400  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require that the Participants jointly 
develop the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates the Participants will incur labor costs of 
$254,900 \734\ to develop these policies.\735\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \734\ Labor cost estimate assumes 150 hours by Chief Regulatory 
Officers, 150 hours by Chief Compliance Officers, 100 hours by 
Compliance Managers, 50 hours by Compliance Attorneys, 20 hours by 
Sr. Operations Managers and 10 hours by Deputy General Counsels. An 
additional 20 hours would be required for Operating Committee 
members to review and approve the policies. Labor costs for 
Operating Committee members assume an hourly rate for a Vice 
President of Operations. Hourly rate estimated by using the median 
annual salary from www.payscale.com, multiplying by 5.35 to account 
for other compensation, benefits and overhead and adjusting for 1800 
hours of labor per year. (($128,159 x 5.35/1800 = $381/hour). The 
Commission estimates the hourly rate of a Chief Regulatory Officer 
as 125% of the rate of a Chief Compliance Officer, or $543/hour x 
1.25 = $679/hour. (150 hours x $679/hour + 150 hours x $543/hour + 
100 hours x $317/hour + 50 hours x $374/hour + 20 x $374/hour + 10 
hours x $612/hour + 20 hours x $381/hour) = $254,920.
    \735\ See supra Part III.D.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that it would require 10 
hours by the CCO and 10 hours by the CISO, both employees of the Plan 
Processor, to review the Proposed Confidentiality Policies. The 
Commission preliminarily estimates that this would result in the Plan 
Processor incurring $10,900 \736\ in labor costs.\737\ The Commission 
also preliminarily believes that the Participants will consult with 
outside legal counsel in the drafting of the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies, and estimates this external cost to be $50,000.\738\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \736\ Labor cost estimate assumes 10 hours of CCO labor and 10 
hours of CISO labor. (10 hours x $543/hour + 10 x $543/hour) = 
$10,860.
    \737\ See supra Part III.D.7.
    \738\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require the Participants to jointly 
review the effectiveness of the Proposed Confidentiality Policies 
annually and take prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such 
policies.\739\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that this review 
would require approximately 20% of the labor of the initial effort to 
jointly draft those policies because presumably many of the policies 
would not need revision annually. Consequently, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that the Participants would annually incur 
$51,000 \740\ in labor costs and outside legal costs of $5,000 \741\ to 
complete these tasks. In addition, the Commission preliminarily 
estimates the Plan Processor would incur annual labor costs of $5,400 
\742\ to review updates to the Proposed Confidentiality Policies.\743\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \739\ Id.
    \740\ $254,900 x 20% = $50,980.
    \741\ See supra Part III.D.7.
    \742\ See supra Part III.D.7. The Commission assumes review of 
the Proposed Confidentiality Policies would require half the labor 
of initial review of the policies. See supra note 736. $10,860 x 50% 
= $5,430.
    \743\ See supra Part III.D.7. The Commission is assuming that 
such updates would occur annually. If updates were more frequent, 
costs would be proportionately higher.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After the Participants jointly develop the Proposed Confidentiality 
Procedures, each Participant would incur costs to develop procedures 
and usage restriction controls to implement those policies. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that Participants will perform this 
task at the Participant Group level of organization: For example, a 
Participant Group that controls four exchanges will centrally develop 
those policies and then individualize them as necessary across its 
exchanges.

[[Page 66088]]

The Commission preliminarily estimates that the Participants 
collectively would incur labor costs of $901,000 \744\ to initially 
develop and draft the procedures and usage restriction controls. The 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the ongoing annual labor cost 
to Participants of maintaining and reviewing the procedures and usage 
restriction controls and taking prompt action to remedy deficiencies in 
such policies, procedures and usage restriction controls would be 
approximately $289,700.\745\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \744\ See supra note 568. Labor cost estimate includes 96 hours 
by an Attorney, 96 hours by a Compliance Manager, 30 hours by a 
Senior Systems Analyst, 30 hours by an Operations Specialist, 20 
hours by a Chief Compliance Officer and 10 hours by a Director of 
Compliance. (96 hours x $426/hour + 96 hours x $317/hour + 30 hours 
x $291/hour + 30 hours x $140/hour + 20 hours x $543/hour + 10 hours 
x $500/hour) = $100,118. ($100,118 per group x 9 groups) = $901,062.
    \745\ See supra note 569. Labor cost estimate includes 28 hours 
by an Attorney, 28 hours by a Compliance Manager, 8 hours by a 
Senior Systems analyst, 8 hours by an Operations Specialist, 10 
hours by a Chief Compliance Officer and 5 hours by a Director of 
Compliance. (28 hours x $426/hour + 28 hours x $317/hour + 8 hours x 
$291/hour + 8 hours x $140/hour + 10 hours x $543/hour + 5 hours x 
$500/hour) = $32,182. ($32,182 x 9) = $289,638.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require each Participant to engage an 
independent accounting firm annually to perform an examination of 
compliance with the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i) and submit 
the examination report to the Commission.\746\ The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that each Participant would incur labor costs 
of $5,600 \747\ to satisfy this requirement, as well as $57,500 \748\ 
in external consulting costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \746\ See supra Part III.D.7. It is possible that Participants 
may realize economies of scale by engaging for this review at the 
Participant Group level. However, because the third party audit is 
required for each Participant regardless of Participant Group 
membership, the Commission preliminarily believes that it is 
appropriate to estimate this expense at the Participant level 
because efficiencies in third-party reviews is not under the 
Participants' direct control.
    \747\ Labor cost estimate assumes 3 hours of Chief Compliance 
Officer labor, 5 hours of Compliance Manager labor, 3 hours of 
Compliance Attorney labor, 2 hours of Senior Systems Analyst labor, 
and 2 hours of Senior Programmer labor. (3 hours x $543/hour + 5 
hours x $317/hour + 3 hours x $374/hour + 2 hours x $291/hour + 2 
hours x $339/hour) = $5,596. ($5,596 per Participant x 25 
Participants) = $139,900.
    \748\ See supra note 574. ($57,500 per Participant x 25 
Participants) = $1,437,500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Regulator & Plan Processor Access
    The Plan does not specify any restrictions on data sources used in 
the development of CAT systems, tools and applications. Currently, Plan 
Processor staff and contractors are not prohibited from using any CAT 
Data during development and testing activities.
    The proposed amendments would restrict such development and testing 
activities to non-production data in all cases for CAIS data. Further, 
they would restrict such development activities to non-production data 
for transactional data, unless it were not possible to do so. In such a 
case, development work could access the oldest available production 
data. The Commission preliminarily believes that these provisions may 
improve the confidentiality of CAT Data by preventing Plan Processor 
employees and contractors having exposure to CAT Data that might be 
used inappropriately.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that test transactional data 
has already been prepared and used in the implementation of CAT 
reporting. However, the Plan Processor may need to prepare test data to 
be used in development work for systems, tools and applications that 
would access the CAIS. The Commission preliminarily estimates that the 
Plan Processor will incur costs of $10,270 \749\ to create this data 
and make it available to Plan Processor staff and contractors 
performing this development and testing work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \749\ Estimate assumes 20 hours of Senior Programmer labor and 
10 hours of Senior Database Administrator labor. (20 hours x $339/
hour + 10 hours x $349/hour) = $10,270.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments that prohibit any use of CAT Data that has both 
regulatory and other uses may reduce Participants' use of CAT Data. 
While the Plan already prohibits commercial use of CAT Data, it does 
not specifically prohibit a regulatory use that also serves a non-
regulatory purpose. This proposed amendment may prevent some 
Participants from using CAT Data in a rule filing that might lead the 
Commission to approve or disapprove a filing that could reduce trading 
costs to some investors. The Commission preliminarily believes that it 
is unlikely that such a rule filing would be approved or disapproved 
due to the Participants' inability to support their rule filings with 
CAT Data because Participants retain the ability to analyze their own 
in-house data in support of their rule filings, and to provide both 
quantitative arguments based on that in-house data as well as 
qualitative arguments that support those rule filings.
9. Secure Connectivity
    The Plan allows CAT Data reporters and users to connect over 
private lines or secured public lines.\750\ There is no specific 
requirement that any reporters use private lines and connectivity 
requirements do not differentiate between Participants and Industry 
Members in this regard.\751\ Since approval of the Plan, the 
Participants have determined that they will connect to the CAT 
infrastructure using only private lines. However, the Commission 
recognizes that no language in the Plan requires that Participants will 
use only private lines in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \750\ See supra Part II.I.
    \751\ The distinction between Industry Members and Participants 
may be significant because while Participants are reporters of CAT 
Data, they are also users of CAT Data in their regulatory roles and 
thus have the ability to access and extract CAT Data. Industry 
Members are not potential users of CAT Data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Plan Processor requires two-factor authentication for 
connection to CAT. Authentication incorporates a geolocation blacklist 
including 16 countries.\752\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \752\ See FINRA CAT Industry Member Onboarding Guide at https://www.catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-02/FINRA-CAT-Onboarding-Guide-v1.5.pdf, item 7, page 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, the CAT NMS Plan imposes requirements on data centers 
housing CAT Systems (whether public or private), but does not impose 
any geographical restrictions or guidelines. The Commission believes 
that all current CAT Data centers are located in the United States.
    The proposed amendments would require Participants to connect to 
CAT infrastructure using private lines, and Industry Members to connect 
to CAT using secure methods such as private lines for machine-to-
machine interfaces or encrypted Virtual Private Network connections 
over public lines for manual web-based submissions.\753\ The proposed 
amendments would also require the Plan Processor to implement 
capabilities to restrict access through an ``allow list'' that would 
only allow access to CAT from countries where CAT reporting or 
regulatory use is both necessary and expected.\754\ In addition, the 
proposed amendments would require that CAT Data centers be located in 
the United States.\755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \753\ See supra Part II.I.
    \754\ An ``allow list'' could be based on geography, server or 
IP. This is discussed further below.
    \755\ See supra Part II.I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes these provisions of the 
proposed amendments will improve the security of CAT Data in two ways. 
First, although all Participants currently plan to connect to CAT using 
private lines,

[[Page 66089]]

codifying this decision reduces the risk that, at a later date, one or 
more Participants might elect to connect with CAT in a less secure 
manner than with private lines, as they currently plan to connect to 
CAT. Furthermore, the Commission preliminarily believes that because 
Participants are not only reporters, but also users of CAT Data in 
their regulatory roles, ensuring that they connect to CAT in the most 
secure manner may further safeguard CAT Data by making the normal 
access mode for CAT Data be through private lines.\756\ The Commission 
recognizes that this restriction may also prevent the Participants from 
electing to connect to CAT through a more secure method developed in 
the future that does not rely upon private lines. The Commission 
preliminarily believes this concern is mitigated by the Participants' 
ability to amend the Plan at a later date to allow such an access 
method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \756\ The Commission preliminarily believes that use of the 
Online Targeted Query Tool through encrypted connections over public 
lines may still occur, but because of the 200,000 row limit to OTQT 
queries, it would be more difficult for a bad actor that gained 
access through a public line to access CAT Data if the Plan 
Processor is able to make other tools only available to users 
connecting through private lines. To the extent that the Plan 
Processor does not restrict access to other tools to users not 
connecting through public lines, this potential benefit would not be 
realized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the Commission preliminarily believes that the requirement 
to establish ``allow listing'' procedures to allow connections to CAT 
only to those countries where CAT reporting or regulatory use is both 
necessary and expected might reduce the risk of a security breach by 
limiting connections from other sources.
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that provisions of the 
proposed amendments concerning secure connectivity will cause the Plan 
Processor to incur initial one-time labor costs of $33,100 \757\ and 
ongoing annual labor costs of $3,100.\758\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \757\ ($13,700 + $19,400) = $33,100.
    \758\ ($1,200 + $1,900) = $3,100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that requiring the Plan 
Processor to develop ``allow listing'' capability will cause the Plan 
Processor to incur initial one-time implementation labor costs of 
$13,700.\759\ Maintaining this list will cause the Plan Processor to 
incur $1,200 \760\ in ongoing annual costs. In addition, the Plan 
Processor is estimated to incur $19,400 \761\ in one-time labor costs 
to implement procedures to allow access to CAT if the source location 
for a particular instance of access request cannot be determined 
technologically. The Commission estimates that the Plan Processor will 
incur $1,900 \762\ in annual ongoing costs to maintain and enforce this 
restriction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \759\ See supra note 577.
    \760\ See supra note 579.
    \761\ See supra note 581.
    \762\ See supra note 583.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes that the requirement that CAT data 
centers be located in the United States may prevent the Plan Processor 
from locating CAT data centers in other areas that might reduce the 
costs associated with maintaining CAT data centers. This could cause 
future costs of CAT to be higher than they might be otherwise.\763\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \763\ See supra Part II.I for policy discussion of this 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Breach Management Policies and Procedures
    The Plan includes a requirement for reporting noncompliance 
incidents and security breaches to the Chief Compliance Officer.\764\ 
The Plan also requires the Plan Processor to develop policies and 
procedures governing its responses to systems or data breaches, 
including a formal cyber incident response plan, and documentation of 
all information relevant to breaches.\765\ CAT LLC has stated that in 
the event of unauthorized access to CAT Data that it will ``. . .take 
all reasonable steps to investigate the incident, mitigate potential 
harm from the unauthorized access and protect the integrity of the CAT 
System. CAT LLC also will report unauthorized access to law 
enforcement, the SEC and other authorities as required or as it deems 
appropriate. CAT LLC will notify other parties of unauthorized access 
to CAT Data where required by law and as it otherwise deems 
appropriate. CAT LLC will maintain insurance that is required by law.'' 
\766\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \764\ See supra Part II.J.
    \765\ See supra Part II.J.
    \766\ See CAT NMS Plan website frequently asked questions, 
``What happens if there is unauthorized access to CAT Data?'' #S.11 
at https://www.catnmsplan.com/faq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require the formal cyber incident 
response plan to incorporate corrective actions and breach 
notifications, modeled after similar provisions in Regulation SCI.\767\ 
Because of the lack of specificity in requirements for the cyber 
incident response in the Plan, it is possible that Participants might 
satisfy the existing provisions without providing for breach 
notifications to affected CAT Reporters, the Participants and the 
Commission, and prompt remediation of security threats. While the 
Commission believes it is unlikely the Participants would leave a 
security threat unaddressed, it also preliminarily believes that 
requiring procedures to be in place to deal with an incident ahead of 
time facilitates a quicker response should such an incident occur 
because procedures can specify who is to be involved in the response 
and in what capacity, and where authority lies in making the response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \767\ See supra Part II.J.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require the formal cyber incident 
response plan to include taking appropriate corrective action that 
includes, at a minimum, mitigating potential harm to investors and 
market integrity, and devoting adequate resources to remedy the systems 
or data breach as soon as reasonably practicable. While the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the Participants are likely to take 
corrective action in the wake of a security breach without this 
explicit provision in the Plan, to the extent that this provision 
hastens the Participants' corrective action in the wake of a cyber 
incident, this provision may improve the security of CAT Data by 
reducing potential harm to investors and market integrity that may 
accrue if such a response were delayed.
    In addition, the proposed amendments would require the Plan 
Processor to provide breach notifications of systems or data breaches 
to CAT Reporters that it reasonably estimates may have been affected, 
as well as to the Participants and the Commission, promptly after any 
responsible Plan Processor personnel have a reasonable basis to 
conclude that a systems or data breach has occurred. In addition, the 
proposed amendments state that the cyber incident response plan must 
provide for breach notifications. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that breach notifications in the wake of a cyber incident may reduce 
harm to CAT reporters and investors whose data was exposed through a 
cyber incident. While the proposed amendments allow for delay in breach 
notification when such notification could expose environments from 
which CAT Data is accessed and analyzed to greater security risks, or 
compromise an investigation into the breach, the proposal would require 
the affirmative documentation of the reasons for the Plan Processor's 
determination to temporarily delay a breach notification, which is 
important to prevent the Plan Processor from improperly invoking this 
exception.
    The proposed amendments would provide an exception to the 
requirement for breach notifications for systems or data breaches 
``that the Plan Processor reasonably estimates would have no or

[[Page 66090]]

a de minimis impact on the Plan Processor's operations or on market 
participants.'' The Commission preliminarily believes that the 
exception to the breach notification requirement may help to focus the 
Plan Processor's resources on security issues with more significant 
impacts. Importantly, even for a breach that the Plan Processor 
believes to be a de minimis breach, the Plan Processor would be 
required to document all information relevant to such a breach. This 
would increase the likelihood that the Plan Processor has all the 
information necessary should its initial determination that a breach is 
de minimis prove to be incorrect, so that it could promptly provide 
breach notifications as required. In addition, maintaining 
documentation for all breaches, including de minimis breaches, would be 
helpful in identifying patterns among systems or data breaches. While 
the Commission preliminarily believes that these limitations on the 
breach notification requirement may slightly limit the benefits of 
breach notification in the wake of a breach, it preliminarily believes 
these modifications may reduce the potential impact of a breach in the 
case of the delay notification provision because it would facilitate 
accurate later notification if deemed necessary.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring breach 
management policies and procedures and the cyber incident response plan 
to incorporate new elements required by the proposed amendments would 
result in a one-time labor cost of $49,800 \768\ for the Plan 
Processor.\769\ Further, the Commission estimates that the Plan 
Processor will incur an ongoing labor cost of $42,200 \770\ to 
maintain, update and enforce these policies and procedures and the 
cyber incident response plan. The Commission believes that the 
Participants would incur initial labor costs of $9,500 \771\ for review 
and approval of the updated cyber incident response plan by the 
Operating Committee.\772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \768\ See supra note 585.
    \769\ See supra Part III.D.9.
    \770\ See supra note 588.
    \771\ Labor costs include one hour per Participant of Vice 
President of Operations labor. Hourly rate estimated by using the 
median annual salary from www.payscale.com, multiply by 5.35 to 
account for other compensation, benefits and overhead and adjusting 
for 1800 hours of labor per year. (($128,159 x 5.35/1800 = $381/
hour). (25 hours x $381/hour) = $9,525.
    \772\ Id.
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11. Firm Designated ID and Allocation Reports
    Prior to approval of the CAT NMS Plan, the Commission granted 
exemptive relief related to allocations of orders, which relieved the 
Participants from the requirement to link allocations to orders and 
allowed the usage of ``Allocation Reports.'' \773\ This exemptive 
relief is conditioned on, among other things, the Central Repository 
having the ability to use information provided in Allocation Reports to 
link the subaccount holder to those with authority to trade on behalf 
of the account. However, the CAT NMS Plan as approved does not 
currently explicitly require Customer and Account Attributes be 
reported for Firm Designated IDs that are submitted in Allocation 
Reports, as it does for Firm Designed IDs that are submitted in 
connection with the original receipt or origination of an order.\774\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \773\ See supra Part II.K.
    \774\ See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 3, at Section 6.5(d)(ii)(C). 
However while the CAT NMS Plan does require such information for 
Firm Designated IDs that are submitted in Allocation Reports, it is 
required in a separate provision, Section 6.5(d)(iv). See supra Part 
II.K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would require that Customer and Account 
Attributes must be reported for Firm Designated IDs submitted in 
connection with Allocation Reports, and not just for Firm Designated 
IDs submitted in connection with the original receipt or origination of 
an order.\775\ The Commission preliminarily believes that these 
provisions of the proposed amendments are unlikely to have significant 
economic benefits and costs because implementation of the exemptive 
relief is already underway and thus its benefits and costs are included 
in the baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \775\ See supra Part II.K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Impact on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments 
are likely to have effects on efficiency and competition, with minimal 
if any effects on capital formation. The Commission anticipates 
moderate mixed effects on efficiency due to negative effects on the 
efficiency with which Participants perform their regulatory tasks but 
positive effects on the efficiency by which the CAT NMS Plan is 
implemented by Participants by standardizing policies and procedures 
across Participants and improving efficiencies in how Participants 
perform some regulatory activities. The Commission preliminarily 
believes that the proposed amendments will have minor mixed effects on 
competition. In the case of the market for regulatory services, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that competition may increase due to 
additional Participants seeking out RSAs if the amendments are adopted. 
In the case of the market to serve as Plan Processor, the Commission 
preliminarily believes the proposed amendments may serve to increase 
the switching costs Participants would face in replacing the Plan 
Processor, thus reducing competition in this market. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments would not 
significantly affect capital formation.
1. Baseline for Efficiency, Competition and Capital Formation in the 
Market for Regulatory Services
    There are currently nine Participant Groups.\776\ The 24 national 
securities exchanges are each Plan Participants. The exchanges are 
currently controlled by eight separate entities and thus comprise eight 
Participant Groups; four of these operate a single exchange.\777\ The 
sole national securities association, FINRA, is also a CAT NMS Plan 
Participant and comprises its own Participant Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \776\ See supra note 611.
    \777\ Cboe Global Markets, Inc. controls BYX, BZX, C2, EDGA, 
EDGX, and Cboe; Miami Internal Holdings, Inc. controls Miami 
International, MIAX Emerald, and MIAX PEARL; Nasdaq, Inc. controls 
BX, GEMX, ISE, MRX, PHLX, and Nasdaq; Intercontinental Exchange, 
Inc. controls NYSE, Arca, American, Chicago, and National. The four 
entities that control a single-exchange are IEX Group which controls 
IEX, a consortium of broker-dealers which controls BOX, Long Term 
Stock Exchange, Inc. which controls LTSE, and MEMX Holdings LLC, 
which controls MEMX LLC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Participants compete in the market for regulatory services. These 
services include conducting market surveillance, cross-market 
surveillance, oversight, compliance, investigation, and enforcement, as 
well as the registration, testing, and examination of broker-dealers. 
Although the Commission oversees exchange Participants' supervision of 
trading on their respective venues, the responsibility for direct 
supervision of trading on an exchange resides in the Participant that 
operates the exchange. Currently, Participants compete to provide 
regulatory services in at least two ways.
    First, because Participants are responsible for regulating trading 
within venues they operate, their regulatory services are bundled with 
their operation of the venue. Consequently, for a broker-dealer, 
selecting a trading venue also entails the selection of a provider of 
regulatory services surrounding the trading activity.
    Second, Participants could provide this supervision not only for 
their own venues, but for other Participants' venues as well through 
the use of RSAs

[[Page 66091]]

or a plan approved pursuant to Rule 17d-2 under the Exchange Act.
    Consequently, Participants compete to provide regulatory services 
to venues they do not operate. Because providing trading supervision is 
characterized by high fixed costs (such as significant IT 
infrastructure and specialized personnel), some Participants could find 
that another Participant could provide some regulatory services more 
efficiently or at a lower cost than they would incur to provide this 
service in-house. Currently, nearly all the Participants that operate 
equity and option exchanges contract with FINRA for some or much of 
their trading surveillance and routine inspections of members' 
activity. FINRA provides nearly 100% of the cross-market surveillance 
for equity markets. Within options markets, through RSAs FINRA provides 
approximately 50% of cross-market surveillance. As a result, the market 
for regulatory services in the equity and options markets currently has 
one dominant competitor: FINRA. This may provide relatively uniform 
levels of surveillance across trading venues.
    As discussed in the CAT NMS Plan Approval Order,\778\ as exchanges 
provide data to the Central Repository to comply with requirements of 
the Plan, it will become less costly from an operational standpoint for 
Participants to contract with other Participants to conduct both within 
market and cross-market surveillance of members because data will 
already be centralized and uniform due to Plan requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \778\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at Part 
IV.G.1.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Efficiency
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments 
will have moderate and mixed effects on efficiency. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that improvements to CAT Data security from the 
proposed amendments may improve efficiency by reducing the likelihood 
of a CAT Data breach. To the extent that the likelihood of a data 
breach is reduced, the Commission preliminarily believes that taking 
measures that may prevent a data breach is inherently more efficient 
than remediating the consequences of a data breach after it has 
occurred. The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments that require the creation and use of SAWs and set 
forth requirements that will apply to such workspaces may have negative 
effects on the efficiency with which Participants perform their 
regulatory tasks. To the extent that participants implement the current 
CAT NMS Plan in a manner that is efficient for them individually, 
provisions increasing uniformity may reduce efficiency by requiring 
some Participants to abandon decisions that were efficient for them in 
favor of a potentially less efficient mandated alternative. Finally, 
the Commission preliminarily believes that the relatively more 
standardized SAW environments may also enable efficiencies in how 
Participants perform regulatory activities by facilitating commercial 
opportunities to license tools between Participants.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that improvements to CAT Data 
security from the proposed amendments may improve efficiency by 
reducing the likelihood of a CAT Data breach. Because the costs of a 
data breach are potentially high and would be borne primarily by 
investors and CAT Data reporters and because the economic impact of a 
significant data breach is likely to exceed the costs of measures in 
the proposed amendments that are designed to prevent such a data 
breach, the Commission preliminarily believes that to the extent that 
the likelihood of a data breach is reduced, taking measures that may 
prevent a data breach is inherently more efficient than remediating the 
consequences of a data breach after it occurred.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments that require the creation and use of SAWs and set 
forth requirements that will apply to such workspaces are likely to 
have negative effects on the efficiency with which Participants perform 
their regulatory tasks. The CAT NMS Plan as it currently stands does 
not include provisions for the manner in which Participants access and 
work with CAT Data beyond the security provisions discussed 
previously.\779\ Currently, Participants discharge their regulatory 
duties through a number of approaches, with some Participants 
performing those duties in their private analytic workspaces while 
others outsource many of their regulatory duties, particularly those 
requiring data that is not collected by their normal operations, to 
other Participants through the use of RSAs or under a plan approved 
pursuant to Rule 17d-2 under the Exchange Act.\780\ The Commission 
believes this diversity of approaches represents strategic choices on 
the part of Participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \779\ See supra Part IV.B.1.
    \780\ See supra Part IV.D.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 613 requires that Participants update their surveillance and 
oversight activities to make use of CAT Data that will be made 
available through the Plan.\781\ Planned approaches for incorporating 
CAT Data into regulatory activities that may currently be optimal for a 
Participant, such as performing most of its regulatory duties in-house, 
may become more difficult for Participants. For example, a 
Participant's regulatory staff may be proficient in technical 
infrastructure that may not be available or might be less efficient in 
the SAWs. Consequently, adapting to the requirements of the proposed 
amendments may reduce the efficiency with which a Participant can 
discharge its regulatory duties with staff and infrastructure already 
in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \781\ See discussion of the adoption of Rule 613(a)(3)(iv), 77 
FR 45788 (Aug. 1, 2012), available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-08-01/pdf/2012-17918.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, working within the SAW may be less efficient than 
alternative environments Participants might have selected to access and 
analyze CAT Data. The proposed amendments impose some uniformity across 
SAWs and the Commission preliminarily believes that this uniformity 
reduces the flexibility of design options for Participants in designing 
their analytic environments, which may result in more costly or less 
efficient solutions.\782\ The Commission preliminarily believes that 
these reductions in efficiency are partially mitigated by provisions in 
the proposed amendments that provide for exceptions to the SAW use 
requirement although it recognizes that exercising these provisions is 
also costly to Participants.\783\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \782\ See supra Part IV.A.
    \783\ See supra Part IV.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission preliminarily believes that provisions 
of the proposed amendments that require regulators to secure Commission 
approval before exercising programmatic access to the Customer 
Information Subsystems will impose costs \784\ upon regulators. These 
provisions are likely to delay regulators' access to such data as well, 
further reducing the efficiency with which regulators perform duties 
that rely upon programmatic access of Customer Identifying Systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \784\ See supra Part IV.A.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Commission recognizes that provisions of the proposed 
amendments that reduce the options Participants have (for example, by 
requiring use of a SAW or an Exempted Environment)

[[Page 66092]]

are likely to impact how regulators perform their regulatory duties, 
the Commission preliminarily believes security improvements to CAT Data 
may partially mitigate these inefficiencies. The proposed amendments 
are intended to reduce the likelihood of a CAT Data breach. To the 
extent that security in environments from which Participants access and 
analyze CAT Data is improved, the likelihood that investors and CAT 
Data reporters are harmed by a data breach and the likelihood that 
Participants will need to address the consequences of a data breach, 
are likely to be reduced. While Participants are likely to see 
reductions in the efficiency with which they perform their regulatory 
duties, investors and CAT Data reporters, the parties likely to 
experience the greatest harm in the event of a data breach, directly 
benefit from improvements to security from the proposed amendments.
    The Commission preliminarily believes other provisions of the 
proposed amendments are likely to increase efficiency. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that standardizing implementation of security 
protocols through the common detailed design specifications may be more 
efficient than having each Participant that implements a SAW or 
Excepted Environment for CAT Data because it avoids duplication of 
effort. This may also improve efficiency by reducing the complexity of 
security monitoring of environments from which CAT Data is accessed and 
analyzed.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the relatively more 
standardized SAW environments may also lead to efficiencies in how 
Participants perform regulatory activities. To the extent that 
Participants will be working in similar environments on similar 
regulatory tasks, tools developed to facilitate one Participant's 
activities in the SAW may be potentially useful to others. This may 
facilitate commercial opportunities to license tools between 
Participants, possibly improving efficiency to the extent that 
licensing agreements are less costly than development activities. Such 
tools may also be superior to those developed by a Participant in 
isolation because there may be opportunities over time for common tools 
to be updated to reflect evolving best practices.
3. Competition
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments 
will have minor mixed effects on competition. In the case of the market 
for regulatory services, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
competition may increase due to additional Participants seeking out 
RSAs if the amendments are adopted.
    In the CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, the Commission discussed 
potential changes to competition in the market for regulatory 
services.\785\ The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments could further increase competition in the market of 
regulatory services because the proposed amendments' provisions 
requiring the creation and use of SAWs and limiting access to Customer 
Identifying Systems to SAWs may incentivize other Participants to enter 
such agreements as providers of regulatory services or as customers of 
other Participants that provide such services. Participants are likely 
to face additional operational challenges in performing regulatory 
duties using CAT Data because of the proposed amendments, particularly 
in the case of a Participant that elects to work in an Exempted 
Environment and thus cannot access Customer Identifying Systems from 
their primary analytic environment without also maintaining a SAW. 
Consequently, it is possible some Participants that otherwise would 
have performed some of these duties in house may instead choose to 
outsource. An increase in the market for these services may incentivize 
Participants to enter into or increase their competition within this 
market as providers of regulatory services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \785\ See CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 3, at Part 
V.G.1.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Capital Formation
    Because the proposed amendments concern the security of data used 
by regulators to reconstruct market events, monitor market behavior, 
and investigate misconduct, the Commission preliminarily does not 
anticipate that the proposed rules would encourage or discourage assets 
being invested in the capital markets and thus do not expect the rules 
will significantly affect capital formation.

C. Alternatives

1. Private Contracting for Analytic Environments
    The Commission considered an alternative wherein the Participants 
would be required to work in analytic environments that would be 
provided by individual Participants, instead of SAWs provided by the 
Plan Processor, unless they sought exceptions so they could work in 
Excepted Environments. This alternative approach would differ from the 
baseline by requiring Participants to obtain an exception if they did 
not choose to work within the analytic environments currently being 
developed by the Plan Processor.
    Under the alternative approach, security monitoring of the analytic 
environments might be less uniform. Responsibility for the 
implementation of security controls and monitoring compliance of those 
controls would reside with the Participant that provided the analytic 
environment.\786\ This would be likely to result in the security of 
some implementations being greater than others, for example if security 
monitoring in some analytic environments occurred more frequently than 
in others. This could result in some implementations being less secure 
than they would be under the proposed approach where the Plan Processor 
is responsible for security monitoring in the SAWs and has more 
involvement in the configuration of the SAWs.\787\ The Commission 
recognizes that this variability could also lead to some analytic 
environments being more secure than they would be under the proposed 
approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \786\ See supra Part IV.B.2.
    \787\ To the extent that a bad actor would focus an incursion 
attempt upon the least secure environment, reducing variability 
between environments may improve CAT Data security by reducing 
vulnerabilities within environments from where CAT Data is accessed 
and analyzed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also preliminarily believes that the alternative 
approach might be less efficient than the proposed approach. Under the 
alternative, each Participant would need to configure its analytic 
environment and develop security protocols within its analytic 
environment. Under the current proposal, some of these tasks would be 
performed by the Plan Processor.\788\ This duplication of effort across 
Participants may be inefficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \788\ See supra Part II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the alternative approach 
may also be more costly to Participants. Cloud computing resources 
exhibit volume pricing discounts. Under the proposed approach, the Plan 
Processor would presumably contract for all the cloud computing 
resources required by the Participants collectively. This may reduce 
not only recurring operating costs for the SAWs, but implementation 
costs including costs incurred to contract with the cloud services 
provider. The Commission cannot determine if the Plan Processor would 
share any savings that result with individual Participants that 
contracted for SAWs through the Plan Processor, but the potential for 
favorable pricing exists.

[[Page 66093]]

2. Not Allowing for Exceptions to the SAW Use Requirement
    The Commission considered an alternative approach that would not 
provide an exception process to the requirement that Participants use 
SAWs when employing the UDDQ and bulk extract tools to access and 
analyze CAT Data. Under the alternative approach, each Participant 
would use a SAW provided by the Plan Processor to perform its 
regulatory duties with CAT Data.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that under the alternative 
approach, there would necessarily be less variability in the security 
of environments from which CAT Data is accessed and analyzed. To the 
extent that variation results in some environments being more secure 
than others, the proposed approach could potentially lead to the 
existence of relatively weaker security controls within some 
environments. On the other hand, it is not necessarily true that 
Excepted Environments would have weaker security than SAWs because an 
Excepted Environment could have security controls that exceed those 
within SAWs. However, the Commission recognizes that under the 
alternative approach, variability between environments that access and 
analyze CAT Data is likely to be minimized because security controls 
for all SAWs would be configured by the Plan Processor.
    The alternative approach prevents participants from seeking 
exceptions to the requirement that CAT data be analyzed in a SAW, which 
may be suboptimal for some participants because they have alternative 
analytic environments and in which they plan to access and analyze CAT 
Data. The Commission preliminarily believes that under this alternative 
approach, Participants may achieve or maintain the security standards 
required by the CAT NMS Plan less efficiently than they might under the 
proposed amendments because Participants have significant investments 
in private analytic environments and regulatory tools that could not be 
used in the absence of an exception process.\789\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \789\ See supra Part IV.A.3.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Alternative Download Size Limits for the Online Targeted Query Tool
    The Commission considered alternative download size limits for the 
OTQT. Under the proposed approach, downloads through the OTQT are 
limited to extracting no more than 200,000 records per query 
result.\790\ Under the alternative approach, downloads through the OTQT 
would be limited to a different number of maximum records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \790\ See supra Part II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that increasing the proposed 
download size limit such that more records could be downloaded through 
a single OTQT query might reduce inefficiencies that may result from 
the 200,000 record download limit.\791\ However, increasing this limit 
would also allow more CAT Data to be extracted from CAT, increasing the 
attack surface of CAT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \791\ See supra Part IV.A.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that decreasing the download 
size limit such that fewer records could be downloaded through a single 
OTQT query might potentially increase inefficiencies that may result 
from the 200,000 download limit. However, decreasing this limit would 
also allow less CAT Data to be extracted through OTQT, decreasing the 
attack surface of CAT.
4. Allowing Access to Customer Identifying Systems From Excepted 
Environments
    The Commission considered an alternative approach where 
Participants would be able to access data in Customer Identifying 
Systems from Excepted Environments. Under the proposed approach, access 
to Customer Identifying Systems is only available through SAWs.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that the alternative approach 
might reduce inefficiencies that Participants working within Excepted 
Environments are likely to experience under the proposed amendments. It 
is possible that under the proposal, some Participants may seek 
exceptions to work within Excepted Environments and may have no need of 
a SAW outside of their need to access data within the CAIS. The 
proposed restriction on Customer Identifying Systems access from SAWs 
may reduce efficiency by forcing some Participants to maintain a 
minimal SAW that they do not use other than to access Customer 
Identifying Systems, or cause them to enter into 17d-2s or RSAs in 
order to satisfy those regulatory duties they cannot otherwise perform 
in their Excepted Environments. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that the alternative approach may provide less security for sensitive 
customer and account information contained in Customer Identifying 
Systems. As discussed previously, Customer and Account Attribute data 
is among the most sensitive data in CAT.\792\ To the extent that 
Excepted Environments increase the variability of security across 
environments that access and analyze CAT Data,\793\ restricting 
Customer Identifying Systems access to within SAWs provides more 
uniform security across environments accessing this data and thus may 
improve its security to the extent that one or more Excepted 
Environments exist that are not as secure as SAWs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \792\ See supra Part II.C.2.
    \793\ See supra Part IV.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Request for Comment on the Economic Analysis

    The Commission is sensitive to the potential economic effects, 
including the costs and benefits, of the proposed amendments to the CAT 
NMS Plan. The Commission has identified above certain costs and 
benefits associated with the proposal and requests comment on all 
aspects of its preliminary economic analysis. The Commission encourages 
commenters to identify, discuss, analyze, and supply relevant data, 
information, or statistics regarding any such costs or benefits. In 
particular, the Commission seeks comment on the following:
    179. Please explain whether you believe the Commission's analysis 
of the potential effects of the proposed amendments to the CAT NMS Plan 
is reasonable.
    180. The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments may improve the efficiency of CAT implementation by 
explicitly defining the scope of the information security program 
required by the CAT NMS Plan. Do you agree? Are there other economic 
effects of defining the scope of the information security program that 
the Commission should consider?
    181. Please explain if you agree or disagree with the Commission's 
assessment of the benefits of the proposed amendments. Are there 
additional benefits that the Commission should consider?
    182. Do you believe the Commission's cost estimates are reasonable? 
If not, please provide alternative estimates where possible. Are there 
additional costs that the Commission should consider?
    183. Please explain whether you agree with the Commission's 
assessment of potential conflicts of interests involving the Security 
Working Group. Are there further conflicts of interest that the 
Commission should consider? Are there factors that the Commission has 
not considered that may further mitigate

[[Page 66094]]

potential conflicts of interest involving the Security Working Group?
    184. In its calculations of cost estimates, the Commission assumes 
that the hourly labor rate for the CISO is equivalent to that of a 
Chief Compliance Officer. Do you agree with this assumption? If not, 
please provide an alternative estimate if possible.
    185. In its calculation of cost estimates, the Commission assumes 
that the hourly rate of a Chief Regulatory Officer as 125% of the rate 
of a Chief Compliance Officer. Do you agree with this assumption? If 
not, please provide an alternate estimate if possible.
    186. In its calculation of cost estimates, the Commission estimates 
the hourly rate of an Operating Committee member using an adjusted 
hourly rate for a Vice President of Operations of $381 per hour. Is 
this estimate reasonable? If not, please provide an alternate estimate 
if possible.
    187. Do you agree or disagree with the Commission's assessment of 
the benefits of providing for exceptions for the SAW usage 
requirements? Are there additional benefits of the SAW exception 
provision that the Commission should consider?
    188. The Commission preliminarily believes that each Participant 
Group will establish a single SAW or Excepted Environment because it 
preliminarily believes that each Participant Group largely centralizes 
its regulatory functions that would require CAT Data. Are there reasons 
why a single Participant Group may wish to have multiple SAWs? Are 
there reasons some Participant Groups may decide to maintain both a SAW 
and an Excepted Environment?
    189. The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments' provisions related to the CISP may improve the security of 
CAT Data because, to the extent that security controls are implemented 
more uniformly than they would be under the current CAT NMS Plan, they 
reduce variability in security control implementation. Do you agree? 
Are there additional economic effects of provisions of the proposed 
amendments related to the CISP that the Commission should consider?
    190. The Commission preliminarily believes that the requirement 
that the Plan Processor must evaluate and notify the Operating 
Committee that each Participant's SAW has achieved compliance with the 
detailed design specifications before that SAW may connect to the 
Central Repository will further increase uniformity of security control 
implementations. Do you agree? Are there other economic effects of this 
provision that the Commission should consider?
    191. Do you agree that provisions allowing for exceptions to the 
SAW usage requirement may allow Participants to achieve or maintain the 
security standards required by the CAT NMS Plan more efficiently? Are 
there other economic effects of this provision that the Commission 
should consider?
    192. The proposed amendments require that each Participant using a 
non-SAW environment simultaneously notify the Plan Processor, the 
members of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group of any material 
changes to its security controls for the non-SAW environment. How often 
would a Participant Group make changes to its Excepted Environment that 
would necessitate material changes to its security controls?
    193. The proposed amendments require that Participants would need 
to implement processes in Excepted Environments to enable Plan 
Processor security monitoring. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that development costs for the processes that produce log files that 
support Plan Processor monitoring would require similar development 
activities to developing the automated monitoring processes themselves. 
Do you agree? Please provide alternate estimates of the costs of these 
development activities if possible.
    194. The Commission believes that by limiting the number of records 
of CAT Data that can be extracted through the OTQT will increase 
security by limiting the data that is accessed outside of secure 
environments. Do you agree? Are there other economic effects of 
limiting the number of records that can be extracted through the OTQT 
that the Commission should consider?
    195. The Commission preliminarily believes that limiting the number 
of records of CAT Data that can be extracted through the OTQT this may 
reduce the regulatory use of CAT Data. Do you agree with this 
assessment? Are there additional indirect costs to regulators from this 
provision that the Commission should consider?
    196. The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring the Plan 
Processor to evaluate and validate each Participant's SAW before that 
SAW may connect to the Central Repository will further increase 
uniformity of security control implementations. Do you agree? Are there 
other economic effects of requiring the Plan Processor to perform this 
evaluation and validation that the Commission should consider?
    197. The Commission preliminarily believes that standardizing 
implementation of security protocols through the common detailed design 
specifications may be more efficient than having each Participant that 
implements a SAW or private environment for CAT Data do so 
independently because it avoids duplication of effort. Do you agree? 
Are there other economic effects of these provisions that the 
Commission should consider?
    198. The Commission preliminarily believes that the requirement 
that customer addresses be reported to CAIS with separate fields for 
street number and street name is likely to have a de minimis economic 
impact upon both Participants and CAT Reporters. Do you agree? If 
possible, please provide cost estimates for providing this information 
in separate fields.
    199. Do you agree with the Commission's cost estimates for the Plan 
Processor to establish programmatic access to the Customer Identifying 
Systems? Please provide alternative estimates if possible. Are there 
additional direct or indirect costs to providing this programmatic 
access that the Commission should consider?
    200. Do you agree that placing restrictions on access to Customer 
Identifying Systems to Regulatory Staff will reduce the risk of 
inappropriate use of customer and account information? Are there 
additional economic effects of these restrictions that the Commission 
should consider?
    201. Do you agree with the Commission's analysis of the economic 
effects of provisions of the proposed amendments that prohibit any use 
of CAT Data that has both regulatory and commercial uses? Are there 
additional economic effects of these provisions that the Commission 
should consider?
    202. The proposed amendments would require the Participants to 
periodically review the effectiveness of the Proposed Confidentiality 
Policies and take prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such 
policies. The Commission preliminarily estimates that this review would 
require approximately 20% of the labor of the initial effort to jointly 
draft those policies because presumably many of the policies would not 
need revision with each review. Do you agree? Please provide 
alternative cost estimates if possible.
    203. The Commission preliminarily believes that providing an 
exception allowing non-regulatory staff to access CAT data in certain 
circumstances may help avoid inefficiencies where a Participant's 
response to a market event

[[Page 66095]]

is slowed due to prohibitions on staff other than Regulatory Staff 
having access to CAT Data. Do you agree? Are there additional economic 
effects of providing this exception that the Commission should 
consider?
    204. The Commission preliminarily believes the risk that CAT data 
will be misused by allowing non-regulatory staff to use the data in 
certain circumstances is mitigated by the requirement that the 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer provide written permission for 
such access. Do you agree? Are there additional security risks or 
economic effects of these provisions that the Commission should 
consider?
    205. The Commission preliminarily believes that the Plan Processor 
has transactional test data available for its staff and contractors to 
use for development activities. Do you agree? If not, please provide an 
estimate of the costs the Plan Processor would incur to create such 
test data.
    206. The Commission believes that the ability to amend the plan in 
the future mitigates the concern that participants may be prevented in 
the future from using more secure methods to connect to CAT that have 
yet to be developed. Do you agree? Are there other indirect costs of 
these provisions that the Commission should consider?
    207. The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments are likely to have moderate mixed effects on efficiency. Do 
you agree? Are there other effects of the proposed amendments on 
efficiency that the Commission should consider?
    208. The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments are likely to have minor mixed effects on competition. Do 
you agree? Are there other effects of the proposed amendments on 
competition that the Commission should consider?
    209. The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments' effects on capital formation likely won't be significant. 
Do you agree? Are there other effects of the proposed amendments on 
capital formation that the Commission should consider?
    210. Do you believe that provisions of the proposed amendments that 
require the creation and use of SAWs and set forth requirements that 
will apply to such workspaces may have negative effects on the 
efficiency with which Participants perform their regulatory tasks? Are 
there other economic effects of these provisions that the Commission 
should consider?
    211. The Commission preliminarily believes that the relatively more 
standardized SAW environments may also enable efficiencies in how 
Participants perform regulatory activities by facilitating commercial 
opportunities to license tools between Participants. Do you agree? Are 
there other economic effects of these provisions that the Commission 
should consider?
    212. The Commission preliminarily believes that provisions of the 
proposed amendments that require the creation and use of SAWs and set 
forth requirements that will apply to such workspaces are likely to 
have negative effects on the efficiency with which Participants perform 
their regulatory tasks. Do you agree? Are there other economic effects 
on how Participants perform their regulatory tasks that the Commission 
should consider?
    213. The Commission preliminarily believes that the uniformity 
across SAWs imposed by the plan reduces the flexibility of design 
options for Participants potentially resulting in in more costly and/or 
less efficient solutions. Do you agree with this assessment? In what 
manner could the flexibility of design options available to 
Participants be affected by the proposed amendments?
    214. Do you agree that the potential reductions in efficiency due 
to the imposed uniformity across SAWs are partially mitigated by 
provisions in the proposed amendments that providing for exceptions to 
the SAW use requirement?
    215. The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendments could further increase competition in the market of 
regulatory services because the proposed amendments' provision 
requiring the creation and use of secure analytical workspaces may 
incentivize other Participants to enter such agreements as providers of 
regulatory services or as customers of other Participants that provide 
such services. Are there likely to be additional economic effects on 
how Participants provide and use 17d-2 and RSA agreements?
    216. Do you believe that the alternative approach of private 
contracting for analytic environments would likely lead to some 
implementations to be less secure than they would be under the proposed 
approach? Are there additional economic effects of the alternative 
approach that the Commission should consider?
    217. Do you agree with the Commission's analysis of the alternative 
approach of not allowing exceptions to the SAW use requirement? Are 
there additional economic effects of the alternative approach that the 
Commission should consider?
    218. The proposed amendments would limit downloads through the OTQT 
to 200,000 records. Would an alternative limit to download size have 
security or efficiency benefits?
    219. Do you agree with the Commission's analysis of the alternative 
approach of allowing access to CAIS from Exempted Environments? Are 
there additional economic effects of the alternative approach that the 
Commission should consider?

V. Consideration of Impact on the Economy

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996 (``SBREFA''),\794\ the Commission requests comment on the 
potential effect of this proposal on the United States economy on an 
annual basis. The Commission also requests comment on any potential 
increases in costs or prices for consumers or individual industries, 
and any potential effect on competition, investment, or innovation. 
Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other factual 
support for their views, to the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \794\ Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) 
(codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and as a note 
to 5 U.S.C. 601).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \795\ requires Federal 
agencies, in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those rules 
on small entities. Section 603(a) \796\ of the Administrative Procedure 
Act,\797\ as amended by the RFA, generally requires the Commission to 
undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis of all proposed rules, or 
proposed rule amendments, to determine the impact of such rulemaking on 
``small entities.'' \798\ Section 605(b) of the RFA states that this 
requirement shall not apply ``to any proposed or final rule if the head 
of the agency certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.'' \799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \795\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \796\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \797\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
    \798\ The Commission has adopted definitions for the term 
``small entity'' for purposes of Commission rulemaking in accordance 
with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this proposed 
rulemaking, are set forth in 17 CFR 240.0-10. See Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 18451 (January 28, 1982), 47 FR 5215 
(February 4, 1982) (File No. AS-305).
    \799\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to the CAT NMS Plan would only impose 
requirements on national securities

[[Page 66096]]

exchanges registered with the Commission under Section 6 of the 
Exchange Act and FINRA. With respect to the national securities 
exchanges, the Commission's definition of a small entity is an exchange 
that has been exempt from the reporting requirements of Rule 601 of 
Regulation NMS, and is not affiliated with any person (other than a 
natural person) that is not a small business or small 
organization.\800\ None of the national securities exchanges registered 
under Section 6 of the Exchange Act that would be subject to the 
proposed amendments are ``small entities'' for purposes of the RFA. In 
addition, FINRA is not a ``small entity.'' \801\ For these reasons, the 
proposed rule will not apply to any ``small entities.'' Therefore, for 
the purposes of the RFA, the Commission certifies that the proposed 
amendments would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \800\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(e).
    \801\ See 13 CFR 121.201
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment regarding this certification. In 
particular, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    220. Do commenters agree with the Commission's certification that 
the proposed amendments would not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities? If not, please describe the 
nature of any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to 
illustrate the extent of the impact.

VI. Statutory Authority and Text of the Proposed Amendments to the CAT 
NMS Plan

    Pursuant to the Exchange Act and, particularly, Sections 2, 3(b), 
5, 6, 11A(a)(3)(B), 15, 15A, 17(a) and (b), 19 and 23(a) thereof, 15 
U.S.C. 78b, 78c(b), 78e, 78f, 78k-1, 78o, 78o-3, 78q(a) and (b), 78s, 
78w(a), and pursuant to Rule 608(a)(2) and (b)(2),\802\ the Commission 
proposes to amend the CAT NMS Plan in the manner set forth below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \802\ 17 CFR 242.608(a)(2) and (b)(2). These provisions enable 
the Commission to propose amendments to any effective NMS Plan by 
``publishing the text thereof, together with a statement of the 
purpose of such amendment,'' and providing ``interested persons an 
opportunity to submit written comments.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additions are italicized; deletions are [bracketed].
* * * * *

Section 1.1. Definitions

    As used throughout this Agreement (including, for the avoidance 
of doubt, the Exhibits, Appendices, Attachments, Recitals and 
Schedules identified in this Agreement):
* * * * *
    ``[Customer]Account [Information]Attributes'' shall include, but 
not be limited to, [account number,] account type, customer type, 
date account opened, and large trader identifier (if applicable); 
except, however, that (a) in those circumstances in which an 
Industry Member has established a trading relationship with an 
institution but has not established an account with that 
institution, the Industry Member will (i) provide the Account 
Effective Date in lieu of the ``date account opened''[; (ii) provide 
the relationship identifier in lieu of the ``account number'';] and 
([i]ii) identify the ``account type'' as a ``relationship''; (b) in 
those circumstances in which the relevant account was established 
prior to the implementation date of the CAT NMS Plan applicable to 
the relevant CAT Reporter (as set forth in Rule 613(a)(3)(v) and 
(vi)), and no ``date account opened'' is available for the account, 
the Industry Member will provide the Account Effective Date in the 
following circumstances: (i) Where an Industry Member changes back 
office providers or clearing firms and the date account opened is 
changed to the date the account was opened on the new back office/
clearing firm system; (ii) where an Industry Member acquires another 
Industry Member and the date account opened is changed to the date 
the account was opened on the post-merger back office/clearing firm 
system; (iii) where there are multiple dates associated with an 
account in an Industry Member's system, and the parameters of each 
date are determined by the individual Industry Member; and (iv) 
where the relevant account is an Industry Member proprietary 
account.
* * * * *
    ``CAIS'' refers to the Customer and Account Information System 
within the CAT System that collects and links Customer-ID(s) to 
Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers for queries by 
Regulatory Staff.
    ``CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal'' refers to the online 
tool enabling Manual CAIS access and Manual CCID Subsystem access.
* * * * *
    ``CCID Subsystem'' refers to the subsystem within the CAT System 
which will create the Customer-ID from a Transformed Value(s), as 
set forth in Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, Section 9.1.
    ``CCID Transformation Logic'' refers to the mathematical logic 
identified by the Plan Processor that accurately transforms an 
individual tax payer identification number(s)(ITIN(s))/social 
security number(s)(SSN(s))/Employer Identification Number (EIN(s)) 
into a Transformed Value(s) for submission into the CCID Subsystem, 
as set forth in Appendix D, Section 9.1.
* * * * *
    ``Comprehensive Information Security Program'' includes the 
organization-wide and system-specific controls and related policies 
and procedures required by NIST SP 800-53 that address information 
security for the information and information systems that support 
the operations of the Plan Processor and the CAT System, including 
those provided or managed by an external organization, contractor, 
or source, inclusive of Secure Analytical Workspaces.
* * * * *
    ``Customer and Account Attributes'' shall mean the data elements 
in Account Attributes and Customer Attributes.
* * * * *
    ``Customer [Identifying Information] Attributes'' means 
information of sufficient detail to identify a Customer, including, 
but not limited to, (a) with respect to individuals: Name, address, 
[date] year of birth, [individual tax payer identification number 
(``ITIN'')/social security number (``SSN'')], individual's role in 
the account (e.g., primary holder, joint holder, guardian, trustee, 
person with the power of attorney); and (b) with respect to legal 
entities: Name, address, Employer Identification Number (``EIN''), 
and [/]Legal Entity Identifier (``LEI'') or other comparable common 
entity identifier, if applicable; provided, however, that an 
Industry Member that has an LEI for a Customer must submit the 
Customer's LEI in addition to other information of sufficient detail 
to identify a Customer.
* * * * *
    ``Customer Identifying Systems'' means CAIS and the CCID 
Subsystem.
* * * * *
    ``Customer Identifying Systems Workflow'' describes the 
requirements and process for accessing Customer Identifying Systems 
as set forth in Appendix D, Data Security.
* * * * *
    ``Manual CAIS Access'' when used in connection with the Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow, as defined in Appendix D, shall mean 
the Plan Processor functionality to manually query CAIS, in 
accordance with Appendix D, Data Security, and the Participants' 
policies as set forth in Section 6.5(g).
* * * * *
    ``Manual CCID Subsystem Access'' when used in connection with 
the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, as defined in Appendix D, 
shall mean the Plan Processor functionality to manually query the 
CCID Subsystem, in accordance with Appendix D, Data Security, and 
the Participants' policies as set forth in Section 6.5(g).
* * * * *
    [``PII'' means personally identifiable information, including a 
social security number or tax identifier number or similar 
information; Customer Identifying Information and Customer Account 
Information.]
* * * * *
    ``Programmatic CAIS Access'' when used in connection with the 
Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, as defined in Appendix D, 
shall mean the Plan Processor functionality to programmatically 
query, and return results that include, data from the CAIS and 
transactional CAT Data, in support of the regulatory purpose of an 
inquiry or set of inquiries, in accordance with Appendix D, Data 
Security, and the Participants' policies as set forth in Section 
6.5(g).

[[Page 66097]]

    ``Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access'' when used in connection 
with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, as defined in 
Appendix D, shall mean the Plan Processor functionality to 
programmatically query the CCID Subsystem to obtain Customer-ID(s) 
from Transformed Value(s), in support of the regulatory purpose of 
an inquiry or set of inquiries, in accordance with Appendix D, Data 
Security, and the Participants' policies as set forth in Section 
6.5(g).
* * * * *
    ``Regulatory Staff'' means the Participant's Chief Regulatory 
Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation) and staff 
within the Chief Regulatory Officer's (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation's) reporting line. In addition, Regulatory 
Staff must be specifically identified and approved in writing by the 
Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of 
regulation).
* * * * *
    ``Secure Analytical Workspace'' or ``SAW'' means an analytic 
environment account that is part of the CAT System, and subject to 
the Comprehensive Information Security Program, where CAT Data is 
accessed and analyzed by Participants pursuant to Section 6.13. The 
Plan Processor shall provide a SAW account for each Participant that 
implements all common technical security controls required by the 
Comprehensive Information Security Program.
* * * * *
    ``Secure File Sharing'' means a capability that allows files to 
be extracted and shared outside of the SAW in a manner consistent 
with the provisions of Section 6.13(a)(i)(D).
* * * * *
    ``Transformed Value'' refers to the value generated by the CCID 
Transformation Logic, as set forth in Section 6.1(v) and Appendix D, 
Section 9.1.
* * * * *

Section 4.12. Subcommittees and Working Groups

* * * * *
    (c) The Operating Committee shall establish and maintain a 
security working group composed of the Chief Information Security 
Officer, and the chief information security officer or deputy chief 
information security officer of each Participant (the ``Security 
Working Group''). Commission observers shall be permitted to attend 
all meetings of the Security Working Group, and the CISO and the 
Operating Committee may invite other parties to attend specific 
meetings. The Security Working Group's purpose shall be to advise 
the Chief Information Security Officer (who shall directly report to 
the Operating Committee in accordance with Section 6.2(b)(iii)) and 
the Operating Committee, including with respect to issues involving:
    (i) Information technology matters that pertain to the 
development of the CAT System;
    (ii) the development, maintenance, and application of the 
Comprehensive Information Security Program;
    (iii) the review and application of the confidentiality policies 
and procedures required by Section 6.5(g);
    (iv) the review and analysis of third party risk assessments 
conducted pursuant to Section 5.3 of Appendix D, including the 
review and analysis of results and corrective actions arising from 
such assessments; and
    (v) emerging cybersecurity topics.
    The Chief Information Security Officer shall apprise the 
Security Working Group of relevant developments and provide it with 
all information and materials necessary to fulfill its purpose.
* * * * *

Section 6.1. Plan Processor

* * * * *
    (d) The Plan Processor shall:
* * * * *
    (v) provide Secure Analytical Workspaces in accordance with 
Section 6.13.
* * * * *
    (v) The Plan Processor shall develop, with the prior approval of 
the Operating Committee, the functionality to implement the process 
for creating a Customer-ID(s), consistent with this Section and 
Appendix D, Section 9.1. With respect to the CCID Subsystem, the 
Plan Processor shall develop functionality to:
    (i) Ingest Transformed Value(s) and any other required 
information and convert the Transformed Value(s) into an accurate 
and reliable Customer-ID(s);
    (ii) Validate that the conversion from the Transformed Value(s) 
to the Customer-ID(s) is accurate; and
    (iii) Transmit the Customer-ID(s), consistent with Appendix D, 
Section 9.1, to CAIS or a Participant's SAW.
* * * * *

Section 6.2. Chief Compliance Officer and Chief Information 
Security Officer

    (a) Chief Compliance Officer.
* * * * *
    (v) The Chief Compliance Officer shall:
* * * * *
    (H) regularly review the Comprehensive I[i]nformation 
S[s]ecurity P[p]rogram developed and maintained by the Plan 
Processor pursuant to Section 6.12 and determine the frequency of 
such reviews;
* * * * *
    (Q) oversee the Plan Processor's compliance with applicable 
laws, rules and regulations related to the CAT system, in its 
capacity as Plan Processor[.];
    (R) in collaboration with the Chief Information Security 
Officer, review the Participants' policies developed pursuant to 
Section 6.5(g)(i), and, if the Chief Compliance Officer, in 
consultation with the Chief Information Security Officer, finds that 
such policies are inconsistent with the requirements of the Plan, 
notify the Operating Committee of such deficiencies;
    (S) in collaboration with the Chief Information Security 
Officer, determine, pursuant to Section 6.13(d), whether a 
Participant should be granted an exception from Section 
6.13(a)(i)(B) and, if applicable, whether such exception should be 
continued; and
    (T) as required by Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), in collaboration 
with the Chief Information Security Officer, review CAT Data that 
has been extracted from the CAT System to assess the security risk 
of allowing such CAT Data to be extracted.
    (b) Chief Information Security Officer.
* * * * *
    (v) Consistent with Appendices C and D, the Chief Information 
Security Officer shall be responsible for creating and enforcing 
appropriate policies, procedures, and control structures to monitor 
and address data security issues for the Plan Processor and the 
Central Repository including:
* * * * *
    (F) [PII] Customer and Account Attributes data requirements, 
including the standards set forth in Appendix D, [PII Data 
Requirements] Customer Identifying Systems Requirements and Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow;
* * * * *
    (viii) In collaboration with the Chief Compliance Officer, the 
Chief Information Security Officer shall review the Participants' 
policies developed pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i). If the Chief 
Information Security Officer, in consultation with the Chief 
Compliance Officer, finds that such policies are inconsistent with 
the requirements of the Plan, they will be required to notify the 
Operating Committee of such deficiencies.
    (ix) In collaboration with the Chief Compliance Officer, the 
Chief Information Security Officer shall determine, pursuant to 
Section 6.13(d), whether a Participant should be granted an 
exception from Section 6.13(a)(i)(B) and, if applicable, whether 
such exception should be continued.
    (x) As required by Section 6.6(b)(ii)(B)(3), in collaboration 
with the Chief Compliance Officer, review CAT Data that has been 
extracted from the CAT System to assess the security risk of 
allowing such CAT Data to be extracted.
* * * * *

Section 6.4. Data Reporting and Recording by Industry Members

* * * * *
    (d) Required Industry Member Data.
* * * * *
    (ii) Subject to Section 6.4(c) and Section 6.4(d)(iii) with 
respect to Options Market Makers, and consistent with Appendix D, 
Reporting and Linkage Requirements, and the Technical 
Specifications, each Participant shall, through its Compliance Rule, 
require its Industry Members to record and report to the Central 
Repository the following, as applicable (``Received Industry Member 
Data'' and collectively with the information referred to in Section 
6.4(d)(i) ``Industry Member Data''):
* * * * *
    (C) for original receipt or origination of an order and 
Allocation Reports, the Firm Designated ID for the relevant 
Customer, and in accordance with Section 6.4(d)(iv), Customer and 
Account Attributes [Information and Customer Identifying 
Information] for the relevant Customer[.]; and
    (D) for all Customers with an ITIN/SSN/EIN, the Transformed 
Value.
* * * * *

[[Page 66098]]

Section 6.5. Central Repository

* * * * *
    (b) Retention of Data
* * * * *
    (i) Consistent with Appendix D, Data Retention Requirements, the 
Central Repository shall retain the information collected pursuant 
to paragraphs (c)(7) and (e)(7) of SEC Rule 613 in a convenient and 
usable standard electronic data format that is directly available 
and searchable electronically without any manual intervention by the 
Plan Processor for a period of not less than six (6) years. Such 
data when available to the Participant's R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and 
the SEC shall be linked.
* * * * *
    (f) Data Confidentiality
    (i) The Plan Processor shall, without limiting the obligations 
imposed on Participants by this Agreement and in accordance with the 
framework set forth in, Appendix D, Data Security, and Functionality 
of the CAT System, be responsible for the security and 
confidentiality of all CAT Data received and reported to the Central 
Repository. Without limiting the foregoing, the Plan Processor 
shall:
* * * * *
    (C) develop and maintain a C[c]omprehensive I[i]nformation 
S[s]ecurity P[p]rogram with a dedicated staff for the [Central 
Repository, consistent with Appendix D, Data Security] CAT System, 
that employs state of the art technology, which program will be 
regularly reviewed by the Chief Compliance Officer and Chief 
Information Security Officer;
* * * * *
    (ii) [Each Participant shall adopt and enforce policies and 
procedures that:
    (A) implement effective information barriers between such 
Participant's regulatory and non-regulatory staff with regard to 
access and use of CAT Data stored in the Central Repository;
    (B) permit only persons designated by Participants to have 
access to the CAT Data stored in the Central Repository; and
    (C) impose penalties for staff non-compliance with any of its or 
the Plan Processor's policies or procedures with respect to 
information security.
    (iii) Each Participant shall as promptly as reasonably 
practicable, and in any event within 24 hours, report to the Chief 
Compliance Officer, in accordance with the guidance provided by the 
Operating Committee, any instance of which such Participant becomes 
aware of: (A) noncompliance with the policies and procedures adopted 
by such Participant pursuant to Section 6.5(e)(ii); or (B) a breach 
of the security of the CAT.
    (iv)] The Plan Processor shall:
* * * * *
    (B) require the establishment of secure controls for data 
retrieval and query reports by Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff; 
and
* * * * *
    ([v]iii) The Company shall endeavor to join the FS-ISAC and 
comparable bodies as the Operating Committee may determine.
    (g) Participants' Confidentiality Policies and Procedures.
    (i) The Participants shall establish, maintain and enforce 
identical written policies [and procedures] that apply to each 
Participant. Each Participant shall establish, maintain and enforce 
procedures and usage restriction controls in accordance with these 
policies. The policies must:
    (A) be reasonably designed to (1) ensure the confidentiality of 
[the ]CAT Data[ obtained from the Central Repository]; and (2) limit 
the use of CAT Data to [obtained from the Central Repository] solely 
[for ]surveillance and regulatory purposes[.]; [Each Participant 
shall periodically review the effectiveness of the policies and 
procedures required by this paragraph, and take prompt action to 
remedy deficiencies in such policies and procedures.]
    (B) limit extraction of CAT Data to the minimum amount of data 
necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or regulatory purpose;
    (C) limit access to CAT Data to persons designated by 
Participants, who must be (1) Regulatory Staff or (2) technology and 
operations staff that require access solely to facilitate access to 
and usage of the CAT Data by Regulatory Staff;
    (D) implement effective information barriers between such 
Participants' Regulatory Staff and non-Regulatory Staff with regard 
to access and use of CAT Data;
    (E) limit access to CAT Data by non-Regulatory Staff, by 
allowing such access only where there is a specific regulatory need 
for such access and requiring that a Participant's Chief Regulatory 
Officer (or similarly designated head(s) of regulation), or his or 
her designee, document his or her written approval of each instance 
of access by non-Regulatory Staff;
    (F) require all Participant staff who are provided access to CAT 
Data to: (1) sign a ``Safeguard of Information'' affidavit as 
approved by the Operating Committee pursuant to Section 
6.5(f)(i)(B); and (2) participate in the training program developed 
by the Plan Processor that addresses the security and 
confidentiality of information accessible in the CAT pursuant to 
Section 6.1(m), provided that Participant staff may be provided 
access to CAT Data prior to meeting these requirements in exigent 
circumstances;
    (G) define the individual roles and regulatory activities of 
specific users;
    (H) impose penalties for staff non-compliance with the 
Participant's or the Plan Processor's policies, procedures, or usage 
restriction controls with respect to information security, 
including, the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i);
    (I) be reasonably designed to implement and satisfy the Customer 
and Account Attributes data requirements of Section 4.1.6 of 
Appendix D such that Participants must be able to demonstrate that a 
Participant's ongoing use of Programmatic CAIS and/or CCID Subsystem 
access is in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems 
Workflow; and
    (J) document monitoring and testing protocols that will be used 
to assess Participant compliance with the policies.
    (ii) The Participants shall periodically review the 
effectiveness of the policies and procedures and usage restriction 
controls required by Section 6.5(g)(i), including by using the 
monitoring and testing protocols documented within the policies 
pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i)(J), and take prompt action to remedy 
deficiencies in such policies, procedures and usage restriction 
controls.
    (iii) Each Participant shall as promptly as reasonably 
practicable, and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware, 
report to the Chief Compliance Officer, in accordance with the 
guidance provided by the Operating Committee: (A) any instance of 
noncompliance with the policies, procedures, and usage restriction 
controls adopted by such Participant pursuant to Section 6.5(g)(i); 
or (B) a breach of the security of the CAT.
    (iv) The Participants shall make the policies required by 
Section 6.5(g)(i) publicly available on each of the Participant 
websites, or collectively on the CAT NMS Plan website, redacted of 
sensitive proprietary information.
    (v) On an annual basis, each Participant shall engage an 
independent accountant to perform an examination of compliance with 
the policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i) in accordance with 
attestation standards of the AICPA (referred to as U.S. Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards or GAAS) or the PCAOB, and with 
Commission independence standards based on SEC Rule 2-01 of 
Regulation S-X. The independent accountant's examination report 
shall be submitted to the Commission upon completion, in a text-
searchable format (e.g. a text-searchable PDF). The examination 
report provided for in this paragraph shall be considered submitted 
with the Commission when electronically received by an email address 
provided by Commission staff.
    (vi) The policies required by Section 6.5(g)(i) are subject to 
review and approval by the Operating Committee, after such policies 
are reviewed by the Chief Compliance Officer and Chief Information 
Security Officer pursuant to Sections 6.2(a)(v)(R) and 6.2(b)(viii).
* * * * *

Section 6.6 [Regular] Written Assessments, Audits and Reports.

* * * * *
    (b) Regular Written Assessment of the Plan Processor's 
Performance.
* * * * *
    (ii) Contents of Written Assessment. The annual written 
assessment required by this Section 6.6 shall include:
* * * * *
    (B) a detailed plan, based on the evaluation conducted pursuant 
to Section 6.6(b)(i), for any potential improvements to the 
performance of the CAT with respect to the items specified in SEC 
Rule 613(b)(6)(ii), as well as:
* * * * *
    (3) an evaluation of the Comprehensive I[i[nformation 
S[s]ecurity P[p]rogram to ensure that the program is consistent with 
the highest industry standards for the protection of data[;], as 
part of which, the CCO, in collaboration with the CISO, shall review 
the quantity and type of CAT Data

[[Page 66099]]

extracted from the CAT System to assess the security risk of 
permitting such CAT Data to be extracted and identify any 
appropriate corrective measures;
* * * * *

Section 6.10 Surveillance

* * * * *
    (c) Use of CAT Data by Regulators.
* * * * *
    (ii) Extraction of CAT Data shall be consistent with all 
permission rights granted by the Plan Processor. All CAT Data 
returned shall be encrypted, and [PII] Customer and Account 
Attributes data shall be [masked]unavailable unless users have 
permission to view the CAT Data that has been requested.
* * * * *

Section 6.12. Comprehensive Information Security Program

    The Plan Processor shall develop and maintain the 
C[c]omprehensive I[i]nformation S[s]ecurity P[p]rogram [for the 
Central Repository], to be approved and reviewed at least annually 
by the Operating Committee, and which contains at a minimum the 
specific requirements detailed in Appendix D, Data Security and 
Section 6.13.
* * * * *

Section 6.13. Secure Analytical Environments

    (a) SAW Environments. The Comprehensive Information Security 
Program shall apply to every Participant's SAW and must, at a 
minimum:
    (i) Establish data access and extraction policies and procedures 
that include the following requirements:
    (A) Participants shall use SAWs as the only means of accessing 
and analyzing Customer and Account Attributes.
    (B) Participants shall use SAWs when accessing and analyzing CAT 
Data through the user-defined direct query and bulk extract tools 
described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2, 
unless receiving an exception as set forth in Section 6.13(d).
    (C) Participants shall only extract from SAWs the minimum amount 
of CAT Data necessary to achieve a specific surveillance or 
regulatory purpose.
    (D) Secure file sharing capability provided by the Plan 
Processor shall be the only mechanism for extracting CAT Data from 
SAWs.
    (ii) Establish security controls, policies, and procedures for 
SAWs that require all NIST SP 800-53 security controls and 
associated policies and procedures required by the Comprehensive 
Information Security Program to apply to the SAWs, provided that:
    (A) For the following NIST SP 800-53 control families, at a 
minimum, security controls, policies, and procedures, shall be 
applied by the Plan Processor and shall be common to both the SAWs 
and the Central Repository in accordance with Section 2.4 of NIST SP 
800-53, unless technologically or organizationally not possible: 
audit and accountability, security assessment and authorization, 
configuration management, incident response, system and 
communications protection, and system and information integrity; and
    (B) SAW-specific security controls, policies, and procedures 
shall be implemented to cover any remaining NIST SP 800-53 security 
controls for which common security controls, policies, and 
procedures are not possible.
    (b) Detailed Design Specifications.
    (i) The Plan Processor shall develop, maintain, and make 
available to the Participants detailed design specifications for the 
technical implementation of the access, monitoring, and other 
controls required for SAWs by the Comprehensive Information Security 
Program controls.
    (ii) The Plan Processor shall notify the Operating Committee 
that each Participant's SAW has achieved compliance with the 
detailed design specifications before that SAW may connect to the 
Central Repository.
    (c) SAW Operations.
    (i) In accordance with the detailed design specifications 
developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i), the Plan Processor shall 
monitor each Participant's SAW, for compliance with the 
Comprehensive Information Security Program and the detailed design 
specifications developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i) only, and 
notify the Participant of any identified non-compliance with the 
Comprehensive Information Security Program or with the detailed 
design specifications developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i).
    (ii) Participants shall comply with the Comprehensive 
Information Security Program, comply with the detailed design 
specifications developed pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i), and 
promptly remediate any identified non-compliance.
    (iii) Each Participant may provide and use its choice of 
software, hardware configurations, and additional data within its 
SAW, so long as such activities comply with the Comprehensive 
Information Security Program.
    (d) Non-SAW Environments.
    (i) A Participant may seek an exception from the requirements of 
Section 6.13(a)(i)(B). If such exception is granted, the Participant 
may employ the user-defined direct query or bulk extract tools 
described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, Section 8.2 in a 
non-SAW environment.
    (A) To seek an exception from Section 6.13(a)(i)(B), the 
requesting Participant shall provide the Chief Information Security 
Officer, the Chief Compliance Officer, the members of the Security 
Working Group (and their designees), and Commission observers of the 
Security Working Group with:
    (1) A security assessment of the non-SAW environment, conducted 
within the last twelve (12) months by a named, independent third 
party security assessor, that: (a) demonstrates the extent to which 
the non-SAW environment complies with the NIST SP 800-53 security 
controls and associated policies and procedures required by the 
Comprehensive Information Security Program pursuant to Section 
6.13(a)(ii), (b) explains whether and how the Participant's security 
and privacy controls mitigate the risks associated with extracting 
CAT Data to the non-SAW environment through user-defined direct 
query or bulk extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and 
Appendix D, Section 8.2, and (c) includes a Plan of Action and 
Milestones document detailing the status and schedule of any 
corrective actions recommended by the assessment; and
    (2) Detailed design specifications for the non-SAW environment 
demonstrating: (a) the extent to which the non-SAW environment's 
design specifications adhere to the design specifications developed 
by the Plan Processor for SAWs pursuant to Section 6.13(b)(i), and 
(b) that the design specifications will enable the operational 
requirements set forth for non-SAW environments in Section 
6.13(d)(iii).
    (B) Within 60 days of receipt of the materials described in 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A), the Chief Information Security Officer and 
the Chief Compliance Officer must simultaneously notify the 
Operating Committee and the requesting Participant of their 
determination.
    (1) The Chief Information Security Officer and the Chief 
Compliance Officer may jointly grant an exception if they determine, 
in accordance with policies and procedures developed by the Plan 
Processor, that the residual risks identified in the security 
assessment or detailed design specifications provided pursuant to 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A) do not exceed the risk tolerance levels set 
forth in the risk management strategy developed by the Plan 
Processor for the CAT System pursuant to NIST SP 800-53. If an 
exception is granted, the Chief Information Security Officer and the 
Chief Compliance Officer shall provide the requesting Participant 
with a detailed written explanation setting forth the reasons for 
that determination.
    (2) If the Chief Information Security Officer and the Chief 
Compliance Officer decide not to grant an exception to the 
requesting Participant, they must provide the Participant with a 
detailed written explanation setting forth the reasons for that 
determination and specifically identifying the deficiencies that 
must be remedied before an exception could be granted.
    (C) If a request for an exception from Section 6.13(a)(i)(B) is 
denied, the requesting Participant may attempt to re-apply, after 
remedying the deficiencies identified by the Chief Information 
Security Officer and the Chief Compliance Officer, by submitting a 
new security assessment that complies with the requirements of 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the materials 
specified in Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2).
    (ii) Continuance of any exception granted pursuant to Section 
6.13(d)(i) is dependent upon an annual review process.
    (A) To continue an exception, the requesting Participant shall 
provide a new security assessment that complies with the 
requirements of Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of 
the materials required by Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2) to the Chief 
Information Security Officer, the Chief Compliance Officer, the 
members of the Security Working Group (and their designees), and 
Commission observers of the Security Working Group at least once a 
year, as measured from the date that the initial

[[Page 66100]]

application materials were submitted. If these materials are not 
provided by the specified date, the Chief Information Security 
Officer and the Chief Compliance Officer must revoke the exception 
in accordance with remediation timelines developed by the Plan 
Processor.
    (B) Within 60 days of receipt of the updated application 
materials, the Chief Information Security Officer and the Chief 
Compliance Officer must simultaneously notify the Operating 
Committee and the requesting Participant of their determination.
    (1) The Chief Information Security Officer and the Chief 
Compliance Officer may jointly continue an exception if they 
determine, in accordance with policies and procedures developed by 
the Plan Processor, that the residual risks identified in the 
security assessment or detailed design specifications provided 
pursuant to Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A) do not exceed the risk tolerance 
levels set forth in the risk management strategy developed by the 
Plan Processor for the CAT System pursuant to NIST SP 800-53. If the 
exception is continued, the Chief Information Security Officer and 
the Chief Compliance Officer shall provide the requesting 
Participant with a detailed written explanation setting forth the 
reasons for that determination.
    (2) If the Chief Information Security Officer and the Chief 
Compliance Officer decide not to continue an exception, they must 
provide the requesting Participant with a detailed written 
explanation setting forth the reasons for that determination and 
specifically identifying the deficiencies that must be remedied 
before an exception could be granted anew.
    (C) If a request for a renewed exception from Section 
6.13(a)(i)(B) is denied, or if an exception is revoked pursuant to 
Section 6.13(d)(ii)(A), the CISO and the CCO must require the 
requesting Participant to cease employing the user-defined direct 
query or bulk extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and 
Appendix D, Section 8.2 in its non-SAW environment in accordance 
with the remediation timeframes developed by the Plan Processor. The 
requesting Participant may attempt to re-apply for an exception, 
after remedying the deficiencies identified by the Chief Information 
Security Officer and the Chief Compliance Officer, by submitting a 
new security assessment that complies with the requirements of 
Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(1) and up-to-date versions of the materials 
specified in Section 6.13(d)(i)(A)(2).
    (iii) Non-SAW Operations. During the term of any exception 
granted by the Chief Information Security Officer and the Chief 
Compliance Officer:
    (A) The Participant shall not employ the non-SAW environment to 
access CAT Data through the user-defined direct query or bulk 
extract tools described in Section 6.10(c)(i)(B) and Appendix D, 
Section 8.2 until the Plan Processor notifies the Operating 
Committee that the non-SAW environment has achieved compliance with 
the detailed design specifications provided by the Participant 
pursuant to Section 6.13(d)(i) or (ii).
    (B) The Plan Processor shall monitor the non-SAW environment in 
accordance with the detailed design specifications provided by the 
Participant pursuant to Section 6.13(d)(i) or (ii), for compliance 
with those detailed design specifications only, and shall notify the 
Participant of any identified non-compliance with these detailed 
design specifications. The Participant shall comply with such 
detailed design specifications and promptly remediate any identified 
non-compliance.
    (C) The Participant shall simultaneously notify the Plan 
Processor, the members of the Security Working Group (and their 
designees), and Commission observers of the Security Working Group 
of any material changes to its security controls for the non-SAW 
environment.
    (D) The Participant may provide and use its choice of software, 
hardware, and additional data within the non-SAW environment, so 
long as such activities comply with the detailed design 
specifications provided by the Participant pursuant to Section 
6.13(d)(i) or (ii).
* * * * *

Appendix C

    Appendix C was filed with the CAT NMS Plan that was published 
for comment on May 17, 2016.\803\ As required by Rule 613, Appendix 
C includes discussion of various considerations related to how the 
Participants propose to implement the requirements of the CAT NMS 
Plan, cost estimates for the proposed solution, and the costs and 
benefits of alternate solutions considered but not proposed. Because 
these discussions were intended to ensure that the Commission and 
the Participants had sufficiently detailed information to carefully 
consider all aspects of the national market system plan that would 
ultimately be submitted by the Participants, these discussions have 
not been updated to reflect the subsequent amendments to the CAT NMS 
Plan and Appendix D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \803\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 77724 (April 27, 
2016), 81 FR 30613.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion of Considerations

SEC Rule 613(a)(1) Considerations

* * * * *

Appendix D

* * * * *

4.1 Overview

* * * * *
    The Plan Processor must provide to the Operating Committee a 
C[c]omprehensive Information S[s]ecurity P[p]lan that covers all 
components of the CAT System, including physical assets and 
personnel, and the training of all persons who have access to the 
Central Repository consistent with Article VI, Section 6.1(m). The 
Comprehensive Information S[s]ecurity P[p]lan must be updated 
annually. The Comprehensive Information S[s]ecurity P[p]lan must 
include an overview of the Plan Processor's network security 
controls, processes and procedures pertaining to the CAT Systems. 
Details of the Comprehensive Information S[s]ecurity P[p]lan must 
document how the Plan Processor will protect, monitor and patch the 
environment; assess it for vulnerabilities as part of a managed 
process, as well as the process for response to security incidents 
and reporting of such incidents. The Comprehensive Information 
S[s]ecurity P[p]lan must address physical security controls for 
corporate, data center, and leased facilities where Central 
Repository data is transmitted or stored. The Plan Processor must 
have documented ``hardening baselines'' for systems that will store, 
process, or transmit CAT Data or [PII] Customer and Account 
Attributes data.

4.1.1 Connectivity and Data Transfer

    [The CAT System(s) must have encrypted internet connectivity. 
CAT Reporters] Industry members must connect to the CAT 
infrastructure using secure methods such as private lines for 
machine-to machine interfaces or [(for smaller broker-dealers)] 
encrypted Virtual Private Network connections over public lines for 
manual web-based submissions. Participants must connect to the CAT 
infrastructure using private lines. For all connections to CAT 
infrastructure, the Plan Processor must implement capabilities to 
allow access (i.e., ``allow list'') only to those countries where 
CAT reporting or regulatory use is both necessary and expected. 
Where possible, more granular ``allow listing'' should be 
implemented (e.g., by IP address). The Plan Processor must establish 
policies and procedures to allow access if the location cannot be 
determined technologically.
* * * * *

4.1.2 Data Encryption

    All CAT Data must be encrypted at rest and in flight using 
industry standard best practices (e.g., SSL/TLS) including archival 
data storage methods such as tape backup. Symmetric key encryption 
must use a minimum key size of 128 bits or greater (e.g., AES-128), 
larger keys are preferable. Asymmetric key encryption (e.g., PGP) 
for exchanging data between Data Submitters and the Central 
Repository is desirable.
    Storage of unencrypted [PII] Customer and Account Attributes 
data is not permissible. [PII] Customer and Account Attributes 
encryption methodology must include a secure documented key 
management strategy such as the use of HSM(s). The Plan Processor 
must describe how [PII] Customer and Account Attributes encryption 
is performed and the key management strategy (e.g., AES-256, 3DES).
* * * * *

4.1.3 Data Storage and Environment

    Data centers housing CAT Systems (whether public or private) 
must, at a minimum, be AICPA SOC 2 certified by a qualified third-
party auditor that is not an affiliate of any of the Participants or 
the CAT Processor, and be physically located in the United States. 
The frequency of the audit must be at least once per year.
* * * * *

4.1.4 Data Access

    The Plan Processor must provide an overview of how access to 
[PII] Customer and Account Attributes and other CAT Data by

[[Page 66101]]

Plan Processor employees and administrators is restricted. This 
overview must include items such as, but not limited to, how the 
Plan Processor will manage access to the systems, internal 
segmentation, multi-factor authentication, separation of duties, 
entitlement management, background checks, etc.
    The Plan Processor must develop and maintain policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate the 
impact of unauthorized access or usage of data in the Central 
Repository. Such policies and procedures must be approved by the 
Operating Committee, and should include, at a minimum:
     Information barriers governing access to and usage of 
data in the Central Repository;
     Monitoring processes to detect unauthorized access to 
or usage of data in the Central Repository; and
     Escalation procedures in the event that unauthorized 
access to or usage of data is detected.
    A Role Based Access Control (``RBAC'') model must be used to 
permission users with access to different areas of the CAT System. 
The CAT System must support [an arbitrary number of]as many roles as 
required by Participants and the Commission to permit [with ]access 
to different types of CAT Data, down to the attribute level. The 
administration and management of roles must be documented. Periodic 
reports detailing the current list of authorized users and the date 
of their most recent access must be provided to Participants, the 
SEC and the Operating Committee. The reports provided to[of] the 
Participants and the SEC will include only their respective list of 
users. The Participants must provide a response to the report 
confirming that the list of users is accurate. The required 
frequency of this report will be defined by the Operating Committee. 
The Plan Processor must log every instance of access to Central 
Repository data by users.
    Following ``least privileged'' practices, separation of duties, 
and the RBAC model for permissioning users with access to the CAT 
System, all Plan Processor employees and contractors that develop 
and test Customer Identifying Systems shall only develop and test 
with non-production data and shall not be entitled to access 
production data (i.e., Industry Member Data, Participant Data, and 
CAT Data) in CAIS or the CCID Subsystem. All Plan Processor 
employees and contractors that develop and test CAT Systems 
containing transactional CAT Data shall use non-production data for 
development and testing purposes; if it is not possible to use non-
production data, such Plan Processor employees and contractors shall 
use the oldest available production data that will support the 
desired development and testing, subject to the approval of the 
Chief Information Security Officer.
    Passwords stored in the CAT System must be stored according to 
industry best practices. Reasonable password complexity rules should 
be documented and enforced, such as, but not limited to, mandatory 
periodic password changes and prohibitions on the reuse of the 
recently used passwords.
    Password recovery mechanisms must provide a secure channel for 
password reset, such as emailing a one-time, time-limited login 
token to a pre-determined email address associated with that user. 
Password recovery mechanisms that allow in-place changes or email 
the actual forgotten password are not permitted.
    Any login to the system that is able to access [PII] Customer 
and Account Attributes data must follow [non-PII password] rules 
that do not allow personally identifiable information to be used as 
part of a password and must be further secured via multi-factor 
authentication (``MFA''). The implementation of MFA must be 
documented by the Plan Processor. MFA authentication capability for 
all logins is required to be implemented by the Plan Processor.
* * * * *

4.1.5 Breach Management

    The Plan Processor must develop written policies and procedures 
governing its responses to systems or data breaches. Such policies 
and procedures will include a formal cyber incident response plan 
(which must include taking appropriate corrective action that 
includes, at a minimum, mitigating potential harm to investors and 
market integrity, and devoting adequate resources to remedy the 
systems or data breach as soon as reasonably practicable), and 
documentation of all information relevant to breaches. The Plan 
Processor must provide breach notifications of systems or data 
breaches to CAT Reporters that it reasonably estimates may have been 
affected, as well as to the Participants and the Commission, 
promptly after any responsible Plan Processor personnel have a 
reasonable basis to conclude that a systems or data breach has 
occurred. Such breach notifications, which must include a summary 
description of the systems or data breach, including a description 
of the corrective action taken and when the systems or data breach 
has been or is expected to be resolved: (a) may be delayed if the 
Plan Processor determines that dissemination of such information 
would likely compromise the security of the CAT System or an 
investigation of the systems or data breach, and documents the 
reasons for such determination; and (b) do not apply to systems or 
data breaches that the Plan Processor reasonably estimates would 
have no or a de minimis impact on the Plan Processor's operations or 
on market participants.
    The cyber incident response plan will provide guidance and 
direction during security incidents and must provide for breach 
notifications. The plan will be subject to approval by the Operating 
Committee. The plan may include items such as:
* * * * *

4.1.6 [PII Data Requirements] Customer Identifying Systems 
Requirements and Customer Identifying Systems Workflow

    Customer and Account Attributes data must be stored separately 
from other CAT Data within the CAIS. It cannot be stored with the 
transactional CAT Data in the Central Repository, and it must not be 
accessible from public internet connectivity.
    [PII data] Customer and Account Attributes must not be included 
in the result set(s) from online or direct query tools, reports or 
bulk data extraction tools used to query transactional CAT Data. 
Instead, query results of transactional CAT Data will display 
[existing non-PII] unique identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID or Firm 
Designated ID). The [PII] Customer and Account Attributes 
corresponding to these identifiers can be gathered [using the PII] 
by accessing CAIS in accordance with the Customer Identifying 
Systems [w]Workflow described below [in Appendix D, Data Security, 
PII Data Requirements]. By default, users entitled to query CAT Data 
are not authorized to access [for PII] Customer Identifying Systems 
access. The process by which someone becomes entitled [for PII] to 
Customer Identifying Systems[ access], and how [they]an authorized 
person then [go about accessing PII data] can access Customer 
Identifying Systems, must be documented by the Plan Processor. The 
chief regulatory officer (or similarly designated head(s) of 
regulation), or his or her designee, [or other such designated 
officer or employee] at each Participant must, at least annually, 
review and certify that people with [PII] Customer Identifying 
Systems access have the appropriate level of access for their role, 
in accordance with the Customer Identifying Systems Workflow, as 
described below.
    [Using the RBAC model described above, access to PII data shall 
be configured at the PII attribute level, following the ``least 
privileged'' practice of limiting access as much as possible.
    PII data must be stored separately from other CAT Data. It 
cannot be stored with the transactional CAT Data, and it must not be 
accessible from public internet connectivity. A full audit trail of 
PII access (who accessed what data, and when) must be maintained. 
The Chief Compliance Officer and the Chief Information Security 
Officer shall have access to daily PII reports that list all users 
who are entitled for PII access, as well as the audit trail of all 
PII access that has occurred for the day being reported on.]
    A full audit trail of access to Customer Identifying Systems by 
each Participant and the Commission (who accessed what data and 
when) must be maintained by the Plan Processor, and the Plan 
Processor must provide to each Participant and the Commission the 
audit trail for their respective users on a monthly basis. The Chief 
Compliance Officer and the Chief Information Security Officer shall 
have access to daily reports that list all users who are entitled to 
Customer Identifying Systems access, such reports to be provided to 
the Operating Committee on a monthly basis.

Customer Identifying Systems Workflow

Access to Customer Identifying Systems

    Access to Customer Identifying Systems are subject to the 
following restrictions:
     Only Regulatory Staff may access Customer Identifying 
Systems and such access must follow the ``least privileged'' 
practice of limiting access to Customer Identifying Systems as much 
as possible.
     Using the RBAC model described above, access to 
Customer and Account Attributes shall be configured at the Customer 
and Account Attributes level.

[[Page 66102]]

     All queries of Customer Identifying Systems must be 
based on a ``need to know'' data in the Customer Identifying 
Systems, and queries must be designed such that query results 
contain only the Customer and Account Attributes that Regulatory 
Staff reasonably believes will achieve the regulatory purpose of the 
inquiry or set of inquiries, consistent with Article VI, Section 
6.5(g) of the CAT NMS Plan.
     Customer Information Systems must be accessed through a 
Participant's SAW.
     Access to Customer Identifying Systems will be limited 
to two types of access: manual access (which shall include Manual 
CAIS Access and Manual CCID Subsystem Access) and programmatic 
access (which shall include Programmatic CAIS Access and 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access).
     Authorization to use Programmatic CAIS Access or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access must be requested and approved by 
the Commission, pursuant to the provisions below.
     Manual CAIS Access
    If Regulatory Staff have identified a Customer(s) of regulatory 
interest through regulatory efforts and now require additional 
information from CAT regarding such Customer(s), Manual CAIS Access 
will be used. Additional information about Customer(s) may be 
accessed through Manual CAIS Access by (1) using identifiers 
available in the transaction database (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or 
industry member Firm Designated ID(s)) to identify Customer and 
Account Attributes associated with the Customer-ID(s) or industry 
member Firm Designated ID(s), as applicable; or (2) using Customer 
Attributes in CAIS to identify a Customer-ID(s) or industry member 
Firm Designated ID(s), as applicable, associated with the Customer 
Attributes, in order to search the transaction database. Open-ended 
searching of parameters not specific to a Customer(s) is not 
permitted.
    Manual CAIS Access will provide Regulatory Staff with the 
ability to retrieve data in CAIS via the CAIS/CCID Subsystem 
Regulator Portal with query parameters based on data elements 
including Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers 
available in the transaction database (e.g., Customer-ID(s) or Firm 
Designated ID(s)).
    Performance Requirements for Manual CAIS Access shall be 
consistent with the criteria set out in Appendix D, Functionality of 
the CAT System, Online Targeted Query Tool Performance Requirements.
     Manual CCID Subsystem Access
    Manual CCID Subsystem Access will be used when Regulatory Staff 
have the ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of a Customer(s) of regulatory 
interest obtained through regulatory efforts outside of CAT and now 
require additional information from CAT regarding such Customer(s). 
Manual CCID Subsystem Access must allow Regulatory staff to convert 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) into Customer-ID(s) using the CCID Subsystem. 
Manual CCID Subsystem Access will be limited to 50 ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) per query.
    Manual CCID Subsystem Access must provide Regulatory Staff with 
the ability to retrieve data from the CCID Subsystem via the CAIS/
CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal based on ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) where 
the CCID Transformation Logic is embedded in the client-side code of 
the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal.
    Performance Requirements for the conversion of ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) to Customer-ID(s) shall be consistent with the criteria set 
out in Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System, Online Targeted 
Query Tool Performance Requirements.

Programmatic Access--Authorization for Programmatic CAIS Access and 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem

    A Participant must submit an application, approved by the 
Participant's Chief Regulatory Officer (or similarly designated 
head(s) of regulation) to the Commission for authorization to use 
Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access if a 
Participant requires programmatic access. The application must 
explain:
     Which programmatic access is being requested: 
Programmatic CAIS Access and/or Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access;
     Why Programmatic CAIS Access or Programmatic CCID 
Subsystem is required, and why Manual CAIS Access or Manual CCID 
Subsystem Access cannot achieve the regulatory purpose of an inquiry 
or set of inquiries;
     The Participant's rules that require Programmatic 
Access for surveillance and regulatory purposes;
     The regulatory purpose of the inquiry or set of 
inquires requiring programmatic access;
     A detailed description of the functionality of the 
Participant's system(s) that will use data from CAIS or the CCID 
Subsystem;
     A system diagram and description indicating 
architecture and access controls to the Participant's system that 
will use data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem; and
     The expected number of users of the Participant's 
system that will use data from CAIS or the CCID Subsystem.
    SEC staff shall review the application and may request 
supplemental information to complete the review prior to Commission 
action.
    The Commission shall approve Programmatic CAIS Access or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access if it finds that such access is 
generally consistent with one or more of the following standards: 
that such access is designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of 
trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged 
in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with 
respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market 
and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors 
and the public interest.
    The Commission shall issue an order approving or disapproving a 
Participant's application for Programmatic CAIS Access or 
Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access within 45 days, which can be 
extended for an additional 45 days if the Commission determines that 
such longer period of time is appropriate and provides the 
Participant with the reasons for such determination.
     Programmatic CAIS Access
    The Plan Processor will provide Programmatic CAIS Access by 
developing and supporting an API that allows Regulatory Staff to use 
analytical tools and ODBC/JDBC drivers to access the data in CAIS.
    Programmatic CAIS Access may be used when the regulatory purpose 
of the inquiry or set of inquiries by Regulatory Staff requires the 
use of Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers (e.g., 
Customer-ID(s) or Firm Designated ID(s)) to query the Customer and 
Account Attributes and transactional CAT Data.
    Performance Requirements for Programmatic CAIS Access shall be 
consistent with the criteria set out in Appendix D, Functionality of 
the CAT System, User-Defined Direct Query Performance Requirements.
     Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access
    The Plan Processor will provide Programmatic CCID Subsystem 
Access by developing and supporting the CCID Transformation Logic 
and an API to facilitate the submission of Transformed Values to the 
CCID Subsystem for the generation of Customer-ID(s).
    Programmatic CCID Subsystem Access allows Regulatory Staff to 
submit multiple ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of a Customer(s) of regulatory 
interest identified through regulatory efforts outside of CAT to 
obtain Customer-ID(s) in order to query CAT Data regarding such 
Customer(s).
    Performance Requirements for the conversion of ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) to Customer-ID(s) shall be consistent with the criteria set 
out in Appendix D, Functionality of the CAT System, User-Defined 
Direct Query Performance Requirements.
* * * * *

6.1 Data Processing

    CAT order events must be processed within established timeframes 
to ensure data can be made available to Participants' R[r]egulatory 
S[s]taff and the SEC in a timely manner. The processing timelines 
start on the day the order event is received by the Central 
Repository for processing. Most events must be reported to the CAT 
by 8:00 a.m. Eastern Time the Trading Day after the order event 
occurred (referred to as transaction date). The processing 
timeframes below are presented in this context. All events submitted 
after T+1 (either reported late or submitted later because not all 
of the information was available) must be processed within these 
timeframes based on the date they were received.
    The Participants require the following timeframes (Figure A) for 
the identification, communication and correction of errors from the 
time an order event is received by the processor:

Noon Eastern Time T+1 (transaction date + one day)--Initial data 
validation, lifecycle linkages and communication of errors to CAT 
Reporters;
8:00 a.m. Eastern Time T+3 (transaction date + three days)--
Resubmission of corrected data; and
8:00 a.m. Eastern Time T+5 (transaction date

[[Page 66103]]

+ five days)--Corrected data available to Participants' 
R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC.
* * * * *

6.2 Data Availability Requirements

    Prior to 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time on T+1, raw unprocessed data 
that has been ingested by the Plan Processor must be available to 
Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC.
    Between 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time on T+1 and T+5, access to all 
iterations of processed data must be available to Participants' 
R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC.
    The Plan Processor must provide reports and notifications to 
Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC regularly during 
the five-day process, indicating the completeness of the data and 
errors. Notice of major errors or missing data must be reported as 
early in the process as possible. If any data remains un-linked 
after T+5, it must be available and included with all linked data 
with an indication that the data was not linked.
    If corrections are received after T+5, Participants' 
R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC must be notified and informed as 
to how re-processing will be completed. The Operating Committee will 
be involved with decisions on how to re-process the data; however, 
this does not relieve the Plan Processor of notifying the 
Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC.
    Figure B: Customer and Account Attributes [Information 
(Including PII)]
* * * * *
    CAT [PII] Customer and Account Attributes data must be processed 
within established timeframes to ensure data can be made available 
to Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC in a timely 
manner. Industry Members submitting [new or modified] Transformed 
Values and Customer and Account Attributes [information] must 
provide [it] them to the CCID Subsystem and Central Repository 
respectively no later than 8:00 a.m. Eastern Time on T+1. The CCID 
Subsystem and Central Repository must validate the data and generate 
error reports no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on T+1. The CCID 
Subsystem and Central Repository must process the resubmitted data 
no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on T+4. Corrected data must be 
resubmitted no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on T+3. The Central 
Repository must process the resubmitted data no later than 5:00 p.m. 
Eastern Time on T+4. Corrected data must be available to regulators 
no later than 8:00 a.m. Eastern Time on T+5.
    Customer information that includes [PII data] Customer and 
Account Attributes and Customer-ID(s) must be available to 
regulators immediately upon receipt of initial data and corrected 
data, pursuant to security policies for retrieving [PII] Customer 
and Account Attributes and Customer-IDs.
* * * * *

8.1 Regulator Access

    The Plan Processor must provide Participants' [r]Regulatory 
[s]Staff and the SEC with access to [all ]CAT Data based on a roles-
based access control model that follows ``least privileged'' 
practices and only for surveillance and regulatory purposes[ only] 
consistent with Participants Confidentiality Policies and Procedure 
as set forth in Article VI, Section 6.5(g). Participants' 
[r]Regulatory [s]Staff and the SEC [will access CAT Data to]must be 
performing regulatory functions when using CAT Data, including for 
economic analyses, market structure analyses, market surveillance, 
investigations, and examinations, and may not use CAT Data in such 
cases where use of CAT Data may serve both a surveillance or 
regulatory purpose, and a commercial purpose. In any case where use 
of CAT Data may serve both a surveillance or regulatory purpose, and 
a commercial purpose (e.g., economic analyses or market structure 
analyses in support of rule filings submitted to the Commission 
pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act), use of CAT Data is 
not permitted.
* * * * *

8.1.1 Online Targeted Query Tool

* * * * *
    The tool must provide a record count of the result set, the date 
and time the query request is submitted, and the date and time the 
result set is provided to the users. In addition, the tool must 
indicate in the search results whether the retrieved data was linked 
or unlinked (e.g., using a flag). In addition, the online targeted 
query tool must not display any [PII] Customer and Account 
Attributes data. Instead, it will display existing [non-PII] unique 
identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID or Firm Designated ID). The [PII] 
Customer and Account Attributes corresponding to these identifiers 
can be gathered using the [PII] Customer Identifying Systems 
[w]Workflow described in Appendix D, Data Security, [PII] Customer 
and Account Attributes Data Requirements. The Plan Processor must 
define the maximum number of records that can be viewed in the 
online tool as well as the maximum number of records that can be 
downloaded (which may not exceed 200,000 records per query request). 
Users must have the ability to download the results to .csv, .txt, 
and other formats, as applicable. These files will also need to be 
available in a compressed format (e.g., .zip, .gz). Result sets that 
exceed the maximum viewable or download limits must return to users 
a message informing them of the size of the result set and the 
option to choose to have the result set returned via an alternate 
method.
    The Plan Processor must define a maximum number of records that 
the online targeted query tool is able to process. The minimum 
number of records that the online targeted query tool is able to 
process is 5,000 (if viewed within the online query tool) or 10,000 
(if viewed via a downloadable file). The maximum number of records 
that can be viewed via downloadable file is 200,000.
    Once query results are available for download, users are to be 
given the total file size of the result set and an option to 
download the results in a single or multiple file(s), if the 
download does not exceed 200,000 records. Users that select the 
multiple file option will be required to define the maximum file 
size of the downloadable files subject to the download restriction 
of 200,000 records per query result. The application will then 
provide users with the ability to download the files. This 
functionality is provided to address limitations of end-user network 
environment that may occur when downloading large files.
    The tool must log submitted queries and parameters used in the 
query, the user ID of the submitter, the date and time of the 
submission, as well as the delivery of results (the number of 
records in the result(s) and the time it took for the query to be 
performed). The tool must log the same information for data accessed 
and extracted, when applicable. The Plan Processor will use this 
logged information to provide monthly reports to each Participant 
and the SEC of its respective metrics on query performance and data 
usage of the online query tool. The Operating Committee must receive 
all monthly reports in order to review items, including user usage 
and system processing performance.
* * * * *

8.1.3 Online Targeted Query Tool Access and Administration

    Access to CAT Data is limited to authorized regulatory users 
from the Participants and the SEC. Authorized regulators from the 
Participants and the SEC may access all CAT Data, with the exception 
of [PII] Customer and Account Attributes data. A subset of the 
authorized regulators from the Participants and the SEC will have 
permission to access and view [PII] Customer and Account Attributes 
data. The Plan Processor must work with the Participants and SEC to 
implement an administrative and authorization process to provide 
regulator access. The Plan Processor must have procedures and a 
process in place to verify the list of active users on a regular 
basis.
    A two-factor authentication is required for access to CAT Data. 
[PII] Customer and Account Attributes data must not be available via 
the online targeted query tool or the user-defined direct query 
interface.
* * * * *

8.2 User-Defined Direct Queries and Bulk Extraction of Data

    The Central Repository must provide for direct queries, bulk 
extraction, and download of data for all regulatory users. Both the 
user-defined direct queries and bulk extracts will be used by 
regulators to deliver large sets of data that can then be used in 
internal surveillance or market analysis applications. The data 
extracts must use common industry formats.
    Direct queries must not return or display [PII] Customer and 
Account Attributes data. Instead, they will return existing [non-
PII] unique identifiers (e.g., Customer-ID or Firm Designated ID). 
The [PII] Customer and Account Attributes corresponding to these 
identifiers can be gathered using the [PII] Customer Identifying 
Systems [w]Workflow described in Appendix D, Data Security, [PII] 
Customer and Account Attributes Data Requirements.
* * * * *

[[Page 66104]]

8.2.1 User-Defined Direct Query Performance Requirements

    The user-defined direct query tool is a controlled component of 
the production environment made available to allow the Participants' 
R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC to conduct queries. The user-
defined direct query tool must:

Provide industry standard programmatic interface(s) that allows 
Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC with the ability to 
create, save, and run a query;
* * * * *

8.2.2 Bulk Extract Performance Requirements

* * * * *
    Extraction of data must be consistently in line with all 
permissioning rights granted by the Plan Processor. Data returned 
must be encrypted, password protected, and sent via secure methods 
of transmission. In addition, [PII] Customer and Account Attributes 
data will be unavailable [must be masked] unless users have 
permission to view the data that has been requested.
* * * * *
    The user-defined direct query and bulk extraction tool must log 
submitted queries and parameters used in the query, the user ID of 
the submitter, the date and time of the submission, and the date and 
time of the delivery of results. The Plan Processor will use this 
logged information to provide monthly reports to the Operating 
Committee, Participants and the SEC of their respective usage of the 
[online query tool]user-defined direct query and bulk extraction 
tool.
* * * * *

8.3 Identifying Latency and Communicating Latency Warnings to CAT 
Reporters

    The Plan Processor will measure and monitor Latency within the 
CAT network. Thresholds for acceptable levels of Latency will be 
identified and presented to the Operating Committee for approval. 
The Plan Processor will also define policies and procedures for 
handling and the communication of data feed delays to CAT Reporters, 
the SEC, and Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff that occur in the 
CAT. Any delays will be posted for public consumption, so that CAT 
Reporters may choose to adjust the submission of their data 
appropriately, and the Plan Processor will provide approximate 
timelines for when system processing will be restored to normal 
operations.
* * * * *

9. [CAT Customer and Customer Account Information] CAIS, the CCID 
Subsystem and the Process for Creating Customer-IDs

9.1 The CCID Subsystem

    The Plan Processor will generate a Customer-ID using a two-phase 
transformation process that does not require ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) 
to be reported to the CAT. In the first phase, Industry Members or 
Regulatory Staff will transform the ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) of a 
Customer using the CCID Transformation Logic, as further outlined 
below, into a Transformed Value which will be submitted to the CCID 
Subsystem with any other information and additional elements 
required by the Plan Processor to establish a linkage between the 
Customer-ID and Customer and Account Attributes. The CCID Subsystem 
will perform a second transformation to create the globally unique 
Customer-ID for each Customer. From the CCID Subsystem, the 
Customer-ID will be sent to CAIS separately from any other CAT Data 
(e.g., Customer and Account Attributes) required by the Plan 
Processor to identify a Customer. The Customer-ID will be linked to 
the associated Customer and Account Attributes and made available to 
Regulatory Staff for queries in accordance with Appendix D, 4.1.6 
(Customer Identifying Systems Workflow) and Appendix D, Section 6 
(Data Availability). The Customer-ID may not be shared with the 
Industry Member.
    The CCID Transformation Logic will be provided to Industry 
Members and Participants (pursuant to the provisions of Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.6 (Customer Identifying Systems Workflow), as described 
below.
    Industry Members: The CCID Transformation Logic will be embedded 
in the CAT Reporter Portal or used by Industry Member in machine-to-
machine processing.
    Regulatory Staff: Regulatory Staff may receive ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s) of Customers from outside sources (e.g., via regulatory data, 
a tip, complaint, or referral) and require the conversion of 
ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/EIN(s) to Customer-ID(s). Consistent with the 
provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer Identifying 
Systems Workflow), for conversion of fifty or fewer ITIN(s)/SSN(s)/
EIN(s), the Plan Processor will embed the CCID Transformation Logic 
in the client-side code of the CAIS/CCID Subsystem Regulator Portal. 
For Programmatic CCID Access, Participants and the SEC will use the 
CCID Transformation Logic pursuant to the provisions of Appendix D, 
Section 4.1.6 (Customer Identifying Systems Workflow).
    The CCID Subsystem must be implemented using network 
segmentation principles to ensure traffic can be controlled between 
the CCID Subsystem and other components of the CAT System, with 
strong separation of duties between the CCID Subsystem and all other 
components of the CAT System. The design of the CCID Subsystem will 
maximize automation of all operations of the CCID Subsystem to 
prevent, if possible, or otherwise minimize human intervention with 
the CCID Subsystem and any data in the CCID Subsystem.
    The Participants must ensure the timeliness, accuracy, 
completeness, and integrity of a Transformed Value(s), and must 
ensure the accuracy and overall performance of the CCID Subsystem to 
support the creation of a Customer-ID that uniquely identifies each 
Customer. The Participants also must assess the overall performance 
and design of the CCID Subsystem and the process for creating 
Customer-ID(s) as part of each annual Regular Written Assessment of 
the Plan Processor, as required by Article VI, Section 6.6(b)(i)(A). 
Because the CCID Subsystem is part of the CAT System, all provisions 
of the CAT NMS Plan that apply to the CAT System apply to the CCID 
Subsystem.

9.[1]2 Customer and [Customer] Account Attributes in CAIS and 
Transformed Values [Information Storage]

    The CAT must [capture] collect and store Customer and [Customer 
Account Information] Account Attributes in a secure database 
physically separated from the transactional database. The Plan 
Processor will maintain information of sufficient detail to uniquely 
and consistently identify each Customer across all CAT Reporters, 
and associated accounts from each CAT Reporter. The following 
attributes, at a minimum, must be captured:
     [Social security number (SSN) or Individual Taxpayer 
Identification Number (ITIN);
     Date of birth;
     Current n]Name (including first, middle and last name);
     [Current a]Address (including street number, street 
name, street suffix and/or abbreviation (e.g., road, lane, court, 
etc.), city, state, zip code, and country;
     [Previous name] Year of Birth; and
     [Previous address] Role in the Account.
    For legal entities, the CAT must [capture] collect the following 
attributes:
     [Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) (if available);
     Tax identifier;
     [Full legal name; [and]
     Address[.] (including street number, street name, 
street suffix and/or abbreviation (e.g., road, lane, court, etc.), 
city, state, zip code, and country;
     Employer Identification Number (EIN); and
     Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), or other comparable 
common entity identifier (if available), provided that if an 
Industry Member has an LEI for a Customer, the Industry Member must 
submit the Customer's LEI.
    For the account of a Customer, the Plan Processor must collect, 
at a minimum, the following data:
     Account Owner Name
     Account Owner Mailing Address
     Account type;
     Customer type;
     Date Account Opened, or Account Effective Date, as 
applicable;
     Large Trader Identifier (if applicable);
     Prime Broker ID;
     Bank Depository ID; and
     Clearing Broker.
    The Plan Processor must maintain valid Customer and [Customer] 
Account Attributes [Information] for each trading day and provide a 
method for Participants' [r]Regulatory [s]Staff and [the ]SEC staff 
to easily obtain historical changes to [that information (e.g., name 
changes, address changes, etc.)] Customer-IDs, Firm Designated IDs, 
and all other Customer and Account Attributes.
    [The Plan Processor will design and implement a robust data 
validation process for submitted Firm Designated ID, Customer 
Account Information and Customer Identifying Information, and must 
continue to process orders while investigating Customer information 
mismatches. Validations should:
     Confirm the number of digits on a SSN,

[[Page 66105]]

     Confirm date of birth, and
     Accommodate the situation where a single SSN is used by 
more than one individual.]
    The Plan Processor will use the [Customer information submitted 
by all broker-dealer CAT Reporters] Transformed Value to assign a 
unique Customer-ID for each Customer. The Customer-ID must be 
consistent across all [broker-dealers] Industry Members that have an 
account associated with that Customer. This unique [CAT-]Customer-ID 
will not be returned to [CAT Reporters and will only be used 
internally by the CAT] Industry Members.
    [Broker-Dealers] Industry Members will initially submit full 
[account] lists of Customer and Account Attributes, Firm Designated 
IDs, and Transformed Values for all [a]Active [a]Accounts to the 
Plan Processor and subsequently submit updates and changes on a 
daily basis. In addition, the Plan Processor must have a process to 
periodically receive [full account lists] updates, including a full 
refresh of all Customer and Account Attributes, Firm Designated IDs, 
and Transformed Values to ensure the completeness and accuracy of 
the [account database] data in CAIS. The Central Repository must 
support account structures that have multiple account owners and 
associated Customer and Account Attributes [information] (joint 
accounts, managed accounts, etc.), and must be able to link accounts 
that move from one [CAT Reporter] Industry Member to another (e.g., 
due to mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, etc.).

[ 9.2 Required Data Attributes for Customer Information Data 
Submitted by Industry Members

    At a minimum, the following Customer information data attributes 
must be accepted by the Central Repository:

 Account Owner Name;
 Account Owner Mailing Address;
 Account Tax Identifier (SSN, TIN, ITIN);
 Market Identifiers (Larger Trader ID, LEI);
 Type of Account;
 Firm Identifier Number;
    [cir] The number that the CAT Reporter will supply on all orders 
generated for the Account;
 Prime Broker ID;
 Bank Depository ID; and
 Clearing Broker.]

9.3. Customer-ID Tracking

    The Plan Processor will assign a [CAT-]Customer-ID for each 
unique Customer. The Plan Processor will [determine] create a unique 
Customer-ID using [information such as SSN and DOB] the Transformed 
Value for natural persons Customers or an EIN for legal entity 
[identifiers for]-Customers [that are not natural persons] and will 
resolve discrepancies in Transformed Values). Once a [CAT-]Customer-
ID is assigned, it will be added to each linked (or unlinked) order 
record for that Customer.
    Participants and the SEC must be able to use the unique [CAT-
]Customer-ID to track orders from, and allocations to, any Customer 
or group of Customers over time, regardless of what brokerage 
account was used to enter the order.

9.4 Error Resolution for [Customer Data] the CCID Subsystem and 
CAIS

    The CCID Subsystem and CAIS shall support error resolution 
functionality which includes the following components: validation of 
submitted data, notification of errors in submitted data, 
resubmission of corrected data, validation of corrected data, and an 
audit trail of actions taken to support error resolution.
    Consistent with Section 7.2, the Plan Processor will design and 
implement a robust data validation process for all ingested values 
and functionality including, at a minimum:
     The ingestion of Transformed Values and the creation of 
Customer-IDs through the CCID Subsystem;
     The transmission of Customer-IDs from the CCID 
Subsystem to CAIS or a Participant's SAW; and
     The transmission and linking of all Customer and 
Account Attributes and any other identifiers (e.g., Industry Member 
Firm Designated ID) required by the Plan Processor to be reported to 
CAIS.
    For example, the validation process should at a minimum identify 
and resolve errors with an Industry Member's submission of 
Transformed Values, Customer and Account Attributes, and Firm 
Designated IDs including where there are identical Customer-IDs 
associated with significantly different names, and identical 
Customer-IDs associated with different years of birth, or other 
differences in Customer and Account Attributes for identical 
Customer-IDs.
    These validations must result in notifications to the Industry 
Member to allow for corrections, resubmission of corrected data and 
revalidation of corrected data. As a result of this error resolution 
process there will be accurate reporting within a single Industry 
Member as it relates to the submission of Transformed Values and the 
linking of associated Customer and Account Attributes reported.
    The Plan Processor must design and implement procedures and 
mechanisms to handle both minor and material inconsistencies in 
Customer information. The Central Repository needs to be able to 
accommodate minor data discrepancies such as variations in road name 
abbreviations in searches. Material inconsistencies such as two 
different people with the same [SSN] Customer-ID must be 
communicated to the submitting [CAT Reporters] Industry Members and 
resolved within the established error correction timeframe as 
detailed in Appendix D, Section [8]6.2.
    The Central Repository must have an audit trail showing the 
resolution of all errors including material inconsistencies, 
occurring in the CCID Subsystem and CAIS. The audit trail must, at a 
minimum, include the:

 [CAT Reporter] Industry Members and Participants (pursuant 
to the provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer Identifying 
Systems Workflow) submitting the [data] Transformed Value or 
Customer and Account Attributes and other identifiers, as 
applicable;
 Initial submission date and time;
 Data in question or the ID of the record in question;
 Reason identified as the source of the [issue]error, such 
as:
    [cir] Transformed Value outside the expected range of values;
    [cir] duplicate [SSN]Customer-ID, significantly different Name;
    [cir] duplicate [SSN]Customer-ID, different [DOB]year of birth;
    [cir] discrepancies in LTID; or
    [cir] others as determined by the Plan Processor;
 Date and time notification of the [issue] error was 
transmitted to the [CAT Reporter]Industry Member or Participant 
(pursuant to the provisions of Appendix D, Section 4.1.6 (Customer 
Identifying Systems Workflow), include[ed]ing each time the issue 
was re-transmitted, if more than once;
 Corrected submission date and time, including each 
corrected submission if more than one, or the record ID(s) of the 
corrected data or a flag indicating that the issue was resolved and 
corrected data was not required; and
 Corrected data, the record ID, or a link to the corrected 
data.

10. User Support

10.1 CAT Reporter Support

    The Plan Processor will provide technical, operational and 
business support to CAT Reporters for all aspects of reporting 
including, but not limited to, issues related to the CCID 
Transformation Logic and reporting required by the CCID Subsystem. 
Such support will include, at a minimum:
     Self-help through a web portal;
     Direct support through email and phone;
     Support contact information available through the 
internet; and
     Direct interface with Industry Members and Data 
Submitters via industry events and calls, industry group meetings 
and informational and training sessions.
    The Plan Processor must develop tools to allow each CAT Reporter 
to:
     Monitor its submissions;
     View submitted transactions in a non-bulk format (i.e., 
non-downloadable) to facilitate error corrections;
     Identify and correct errors;
     Manage Customer and [Customer ]Account 
Attributes[Information];
     Monitor its compliance with CAT reporting 
requirements;[and]
     Monitor system status[.]; and
     Monitor the use of the CCID Transformation Logic 
including the submission of Transformed Values to the CCID 
Subsystem.
* * * * *

10.2 CAT User Support

    The Plan Processor will develop a program to provide technical, 
operational and business support to CAT users, including 
Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC. The CAT help desk 
will provide technical expertise to assist regulators with questions 
and/or functionality about the content and structure of the CAT 
query capability.
    The Plan Processor will develop tools, including an interface, 
to allow users to monitor the status of their queries and/or

[[Page 66106]]

reports. Such website will show all in-progress queries/reports, as 
well as the current status and estimated completion time of each 
query/report.
    The Plan Processor will develop communication protocols to 
notify regulators of CAT System status, outages and other issues 
that would affect Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC's 
ability to access, extract, and use CAT Data. At a minimum, 
Participants' R[r]egulatory S[s]taff and the SEC must each have 
access to a secure website where they can monitor CAT System status, 
receive and track system notifications, and submit and monitor data 
requests.
    The Plan Processor will develop and maintain documentation and 
other materials as necessary to train regulators in the use of the 
Central Repository, including documentation on how to build and run 
reporting queries.

10.3 CAT Help Desk

    The Plan Processor will implement and maintain a help desk to 
support broker-dealers, third party CAT Reporters, and Participant 
CAT Reporters (the ``CAT Help Desk''). The CAT Help Desk will 
address business questions and issues, as well as technical and 
operational questions and issues. The CAT Help Desk will also assist 
Participants' regulatory staff and the SEC with questions and issues 
regarding obtaining and using CAT Data for regulatory purposes.
    The CAT Help Desk must go live within a mutually agreed upon 
reasonable timeframe after the Plan Processor is selected, and must 
be available on a 24x7 basis, support both email and phone 
communication, and be staffed to handle at minimum 2,500 calls per 
month. Additionally, the CAT Help Desk must be prepared to support 
an increased call volume at least for the first few years. The Plan 
Processor must create and maintain a robust electronic tracking 
system for the CAT Help Desk that must include call logs, incident 
tracking, issue resolution escalation.
    CAT Help Desk support functions must include:
     Setting up new CAT Reporters, including the assignment 
of CAT-Reporter-IDs and support prior to submitting data to CAT;
     Managing CAT Reporter authentication and entitlements;
     Managing CAT Reporter and third party Data Submitters 
testing and certification;
     Managing Participants and SEC authentication and 
entitlements;
     Supporting CAT Reporters with data submissions and data 
corrections, including submission of Customer and [Customer] Account 
Attributes [Information];
     Coordinating and supporting system testing for CAT 
Reporters;
     Responding to questions from CAT Reporters about all 
aspects of CAT reporting, including reporting requirements, 
technical data transmission questions, potential changes to SEC Rule 
613 that may affect the CAT, software/hardware updates and upgrades, 
entitlements, reporting relationships, and questions about the 
secure and public websites;
     Responding to questions from Participants' regulatory 
staff and the SEC about obtaining and using CAT Data for regulatory 
purposes, including the building and running of queries; [and]
     Responding to administrative issues from CAT Reporters, 
such as billing; and
     Responding to questions from and providing support to 
CAT Reporters regarding all aspects of the CCID Transformation Logic 
and CCID Subsystem.

    By the Commission.

    Dated: August 21, 2020.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-18801 Filed 10-15-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P