Document ID: FAA-2019-0494-0007
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: The Boeing Company Airplanes
Posted Date: 2019-12-12T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 239 (Thursday, December 12, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 67851-67854]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-26734]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2019-0494; Product Identifier 2019-NM-051-AD; Amendment 
39-19801; AD 2019-23-07]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. 
This AD was prompted by reports that the nose landing gear (NLG) 
retracted on the ground, with weight on the airplane's wheels, due to 
the incorrect installation of an NLG downlock pin in the apex pin inner 
bore of the NLG lock link assembly. This AD requires installing an 
insert to prevent installation of the pin in the incorrect location. 
The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these 
products.

DATES: This AD is effective January 16, 2020.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of January 16, 
2020.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule, 
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data 
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 
90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this service information at the 
FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. 
For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 
206-231-3195. It is also available on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2019-
0494.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2019-
0494; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains 
this final rule, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 
other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Allen Rauschendorfer, Aerospace 
Engineer, Airframe Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th 
St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206-231-3528; email: 
allen.rauschendorfer@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing 
Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. The NPRM published in 
the Federal Register on July 23, 2019 (84 FR 35352). The NPRM was 
prompted by reports that the NLG retracted on the ground, with weight 
on the airplane's wheels, due to the incorrect installation of an NLG 
downlock pin in the apex pin inner bore of the NLG lock link assembly. 
The NPRM proposed to require installing an insert to prevent 
installation of the pin in the incorrect location.
    The FAA is issuing this AD to address the NLG downlock pin being 
incorrectly installed in the apex pin inner bore of the NLG lock link 
assembly, which could result in the NLG retracting on the ground, 
possibly causing serious injuries to personnel and passengers and 
substantial damage to the airplane.

Comments

    The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in 
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments 
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Revise Applicability of the Proposed AD

    American Airlines (AAL) requested that the FAA revise the 
applicability of the AD to specify the affected part numbers of the NLG 
lock link assembly rather than the affected airplanes because the 
affected parts may be swapped between airplanes. AAL noted that 
paragraph A.2. of Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 
RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019, specifies to identify, modify, and 
part mark the spares. AAL suggested that once the apex bin inner bore 
insert is installed in the NLG lock link assembly in production, the 
NLG lock link assembly part number should also change. AAL requested 
that, should the FAA not revise the applicability of the proposed AD to 
affected part numbers, the applicability of the proposed AD be revised 
to include all Model 787 airplanes rather than only the airplanes 
specified in Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, 
Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019. AAL asserted that the unsafe condition 
applies to all airplanes.
    The FAA disagrees with the request to revise the applicability of 
this AD. This AD does not require operators to identify, modify, or 
part mark their spares. Paragraph (g) of this AD specifies to 
accomplish the actions in accordance with the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, 
Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019, and does not specify to accomplish 
actions in accordance with paragraph A.2. of Boeing Requirements 
Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019. 
Therefore, the FAA has determined that it is appropriate for this AD to 
apply to Boeing Model 787-8, 787-9, 787-10 airplanes, line numbers 6 
through 848 inclusive, as specified in Boeing Requirements Bulletin 
B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019. Only these 
airplanes need to have the apex bin inner bore insert installed in 
order to address the identified unsafe condition.
    Regarding AAL's request to revise the applicability to all Model 
787 airplanes, Boeing will incorporate the apex pin inner bore insert 
as part of the airplane type design at line number 849 and subsequent. 
At that time, the NLG lock link assembly will change part numbers, and 
the airplane type design will be changed as a result. If an operator 
installs an NLG lock link assembly of a different part number than what 
is defined as airplane type design, then the airplane would be out of 
compliance. Consequently, all airplanes will be required to have the 
apex pin inner bore insert installed in the NLG lock link assembly. No 
changes have been made to the applicability of this AD.

[[Page 67852]]

Requests To Change NLG Lock Link Assembly Part Number Post-Installation

    AAL requested that the FAA revise the proposed AD to add a 
requirement that the NLG lock link assembly part number be changed upon 
installing the apex pin inner bore insert. AAL reasoned that the NLG 
lock link would be modified as an assembly and that, even though the 
airplane may be in the proper configuration, there would be no 
documentation to support the modification having been accomplished. AAL 
also noted that there is no consistent procedure for marking the change 
identification of the NLG lock link assembly amongst operators, which 
could lead to configuration issues when parts are exchanged between 
airlines. AAL suggested that operators should be informed on how Boeing 
is marking the change identification of the NLG lock link assemblies 
that are in production.
    The FAA does not agree with the request. Boeing Requirements 
Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019, 
identifies the Boeing assigned NLG lock link assembly part number prior 
to installation of the apex pin inner bore insert and indicates that 
there is no new Boeing part number for the changed NLG lock link 
assembly. Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00, Issue 001, 
dated March 12, 2019 (which is referred to in Boeing Requirements 
Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019), 
specifies to mark the change identification of the NLG lock link 
assembly to indicate the apex pin bore insert has been installed. 
Operators are not required to change the identification as specified in 
Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00, Issue 001, dated March 
12, 2019. Each operator has the latitude to identify the installed part 
that is consistent with their internal operating procedures. Operators 
may contact Boeing for information on how production airplanes are 
being marked for change identification of the NLG lock link assembly. 
The AD has not been changed in this regard.

Request To Allow Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC)

    United Airlines (UAL) requested that the FAA issue an AMOC that 
would allow the apex pin inner bore to be completely filled with 
sealant. UAL stated that it recognized the possible unsafe condition of 
the NLG downlock pin being incorrectly installed in the apex pin inner 
bore of the NLG lock link assembly, and plugged the apex pin inner bore 
with sealant as a preventive modification. UAL explained that it 
applied this modification to its entire fleet prior to the issue of 
Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, 
dated March 12, 2019, and it proposed to add the apex pin inner bore 
insert at the time of the next component overhaul to maintain 
configuration control.
    The FAA disagrees with the request. The FAA and Boeing are 
concerned that filling the apex pin inner bore with sealant is not a 
long term solution because the sealant may deteriorate and degrade over 
the life of the landing gear. The FAA has determined that the proposed 
apex pin inner bore insert is a more robust solution that will address 
the unsafe condition and withstand the harsh environment of the NLG. 
The AD has not been changed in this regard. However, if any person has 
data that would justify an alternative solution, that person may 
request approval of an AMOC under the provisions of paragraph (i) of 
this AD.

Requests To Identify a Certain Step as Non-RC (Required for Compliance)

    UAL requested that the FAA identifies the step that specifies to 
mark the change identification of the NLG lock link assembly as Non-RC. 
UAL predicted that each operator will implement their own unique change 
identification method and reasoned that its own internal controls 
clearly identify its compliance with the requirements and 
accomplishment of the modification, which would negate the need to 
require change identification of the NLG lock link assembly.
    The FAA agrees to clarify. The change identification of the NLG 
lock link assembly is not required for compliance. The change 
identification in the Requirements Bulletin is a ``refer to'' 
procedure. As stated in a note under the Accomplishment Instructions of 
Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00, Issue 001, dated 
March 12, 2019, procedures marked as ``refer to'' may be deviated from 
using accepted methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or 
inspection program without obtaining approval of an AMOC. The AD has 
not been changed in this regard.

Request To Clarify NLG Retraction Incident

    Boeing requested that the FAA clarify the Discussion of the NPRM to 
state that the NLG retraction incident that took place in March of 2016 
was caused by the lack of an NLG downlock pin being installed on the 
NLG, not by the installation of an NLG downlock pin in an incorrect 
location. Boeing conceded that the event was an inadvertent NLG 
retraction, but maintained that the event was not due to the NLG 
downlock pin being installed incorrectly.
    We partially agree with the request to change the Discussion 
section of the NPRM. As specified above, the design approval holder 
noted in their investigation that the inadvertent NLG retraction in 
March of 2019 was caused by a missing NLG downlock pin. However, we 
also received a safety recommendation submitted by Aviation Technical 
Services that indicated the probable cause was that the NLG downlock 
pin was installed in the wrong location for both incidents referenced 
in the Discussion section of the NPRM.
    We note that we have received conflicting information about the 
March 2016 incident and what was the probable cause of the incident. 
However, we have not changed this final rule in this regard because the 
Discussion section of the NPRM is not restated in the final rule.

Conclusion

    The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments 
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest 
require adopting this final rule as proposed, except for minor 
editorial changes. The FAA determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-
00 RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019. The service information 
describes procedures for installing an insert into the apex pin inner 
bore of the NLG lock link assembly to prevent the NLG downlock pin from 
being inserted in the incorrect location. This service information is 
reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it 
through their normal course of business or by the means identified in 
the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD would affect 73 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The agency estimates the following costs to comply with this 
AD:

[[Page 67853]]

                                      Estimated Costs for Required Actions
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                                                                                    Cost per       Cost on U.S.
               Action                        Labor cost           Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install insert......................  2 work-hours x $85 per           $1,820           $1,990         $145,270
                                       hour = $170.
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Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.
    This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the 
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by 
FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is 
normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but 
during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the 
authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes and 
associated appliances to the Director of the System Oversight Division.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2019-23-07 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-19801; Docket No. FAA-
2019-0494; Product Identifier 2019-NM-051-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective January 16, 2020.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 
787-10 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in 
Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, 
dated March 12, 2019.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 32, Landing 
gear.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports that the nose landing gear (NLG) 
retracted on the ground, with weight on the airplane's wheels, due 
to the incorrect installation of an NLG downlock pin in the apex pin 
inner bore of the NLG lock link assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD 
to address the NLG downlock pin being incorrectly installed in the 
apex pin inner bore of the NLG lock link assembly, which could 
result in the NLG retracting on the ground, possibly causing serious 
injuries to personnel and passengers and substantial damage to the 
airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD: At the 
applicable times specified in the ``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing 
Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, dated 
March 12, 2019, do all applicable actions identified in, and in 
accordance with, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 
Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, Issue 001, dated 
March 12, 2019.
    Note 1 to paragraph (g): Guidance for accomplishing the actions 
required by this AD can be found in Boeing Service Bulletin B787-
81205-SB320040-00, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019, which is 
referred to in Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 
RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019.

(h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications

    For purposes of determining compliance with the requirements of 
this AD: Where Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 
RB, Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019, uses the phrase ``the Issue 001 
date of Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB,'' this AD 
requires using ``the effective date of this AD.''

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request 
to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District 
Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the 
manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the 
person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.
    (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD 
if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation 
Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 
ACO Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair 
method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet 
the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must 
specifically refer to this AD.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Allen 
Rauschendorfer, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Section, FAA, Seattle 
ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des

[[Page 67854]]

Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206-231-3528; email: 
allen.rauschendorfer@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed 
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do 
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB320040-00 RB, 
Issue 001, dated March 12, 2019.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services 
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-
5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport 
Standards Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 
206-231-3195.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated 
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at 
NARA, email fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Des Moines, Washington, on December 2, 2019.
John Piccola,
Acting Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2019-26734 Filed 12-11-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P