Document ID: PHMSA-2022-0063-0001
Agency: phmsa
Document Type: Notice
Title: Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards
Posted Date: 2022-06-02T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 106 (Thursday, June 2, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33576-33579]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-11791]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2022-0063]

Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities 
Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of updated advisory bulletin.

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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this updated advisory bulletin to remind 
owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, including 
supercritical carbon dioxide pipelines, of the potential for damage to 
those pipeline facilities caused by earth movement in variable, steep, 
and rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing subsurface 
geological conditions. Additionally, changing weather patterns due to 
climate change, including increased rainfall and higher temperatures, 
may impact soil stability in areas that have historically been stable. 
These phenomena can pose a threat to the integrity of pipeline 
facilities if those threats are not identified and mitigated. Owners 
and operators should consider monitoring geological and environmental 
conditions, including changing weather patterns, in proximity to their 
facilities.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary McDaniel at 202-366-4595 or 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The purpose of this updated advisory bulletin is to remind owners 
and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, particularly those 
with facilities located onshore or in inland waters, about the serious 
safety-related issues that can result from earth movement and other 
geological hazards. Additionally, changing weather patterns due to 
climate change may result in heavier than normal rainfall and increased 
temperatures causing soil saturation and flooding or soil erosion. 
Either phenomenon may adversely impact the stability of soil 
surrounding or supporting nearby pipeline facilities. The United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) is a resource for pipeline owners and 
operators in evaluating earth movement vulnerabilities of pipeline 
facilities.
    Gas and hazardous liquid pipelines are required to be designed to 
withstand external loads including those that may be imposed by 
geological forces. Specifically, gas pipelines must be designed in 
accordance with 49 CFR 192.103 and hazardous liquid pipelines must be 
designed in accordance with 49 CFR 195.110. To comply with these 
regulations, the design of new pipelines, including repairs or 
replacement, must consider the load that may be imposed by geological 
forces.
    Once operational, Sec.  192.317(a) states that for gas transmission 
and part 192-regulated gathering pipelines ``[t]he operator must take 
all practicable steps to protect each transmission line or main from 
washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, or other hazards that may 
cause the pipeline to move or to sustain abnormal loads. In addition, 
the operator must take all practicable steps to protect offshore 
pipelines from damage by mudslides, water currents, hurricanes, ship 
anchors, and fishing operations.'' This advisory bulletin addresses 
those protective requirements associated with damage caused by 
geological factors.
    In addition, Sec.  192.705 requires operators of gas transmission 
lines, and applicable gas gathering lines, to have a patrol program to 
observe surface conditions on and adjacent to the pipeline right-of-way 
for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors 
affecting safety and operation. The frequency of these patrols must be 
based upon the size of the line, operating pressures, class locations, 
terrain, seasonal weather conditions, and other relevant factors. One 
of the primary reasons for this patrol requirement is to monitor 
geological movement, both slowly occurring and acute changes, which may 
affect the current or future safe operation of the pipeline.
    Furthermore, for applicable gas pipelines Sec.  192.613(a) states 
that ``each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance 
of its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning 
changes in class location, failures, leakage history, corrosion, 
substantial changes in cathodic protection requirements, and other 
unusual operating and maintenance conditions.'' Section 192.613(b) 
further states that ``[i]f a segment of pipeline is determined to be in 
unsatisfactory condition but no immediate hazard exists, the operator 
shall initiate a program to recondition or phase out the segment 
involved, or, if the segment cannot be reconditioned or phased out, 
reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure in accordance with 
Sec.  192.619(a) and (b).''
    For hazardous liquid pipelines, Sec.  195.401(b)(1) states that 
``[w]henever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely 
affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it must correct the 
condition within a reasonable time. However, if the condition is of 
such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard to persons or 
property, the operator may not operate the affected part of the system 
until it has corrected the unsafe condition.'' Section 195.401(b)(2) 
further states that ``[w]hen an operator discovers a condition on a 
pipeline covered under [the integrity management requirements in] Sec.  
195.452, the operator must correct the condition as prescribed in Sec.  
195.452(h).'' Land movement, soil instability due to saturation, severe 
flooding, river scour, and river channel migration are the types of 
conditions that can adversely affect the safe operation of a pipeline 
and require corrective action under Sec. Sec.  192.613(a) and 
195.401(b). Additional guidance for identifying risk factors and 
mitigating natural force

[[Page 33577]]

hazards on pipeline segments that could affect high consequence areas, 
are outlined in Appendix C, section I, subsection B, to part 195.
    PHMSA integrity management regulations require operators to take 
additional preventative and mitigative measures to prevent, and to 
mitigate the consequences of, failures on gas transmission lines in 
high consequence areas (Sec.  192.935) and hazardous liquid pipelines 
that are in or which could affect a high consequence area (Sec.  
195.452(i)). An operator must base the additional measures on the 
threats the operator has identified for each pipeline segment. If an 
operator determines there is a threat to the pipeline, such as outside 
force damage (e.g., earth movement or floods), the operator must take 
steps to prevent a failure and to minimize the consequences of a 
failure under these regulations.
    PHMSA is aware of recent earth movement and other geological-
related incidents and accidents and safety-related conditions 
throughout the country. Some of the more notable events, including 
those discussed in a prior advisory bulletin (ADB-2019-02; 84 FR 18919, 
05/02/2019) are briefly described below:
     On March 11, 2022, a 22-inch hazardous liquid pipeline 
spilled 3,900 barrels of crude oil adjacent to the Cahokia Creek 
approximately 15 miles east of St. Louis, Missouri. Preliminary 
information indicates land movement may have contributed to this 
failure. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation 
into the cause continues as of the date of this notice.
     On May 30, 2021, a hazardous liquid pipeline spilled 640 
barrels of gasoline in Greens Bayou affecting high consequence areas 
near Houston, Texas. The operator's reported cause indicated earth 
movement/progressive ground movement over time on a bayou bank.
     On February 19, 2021, 22,318 one thousand cubic feet \1\ 
(Mcf) of natural gas was released from a Type A gathering pipeline 
system in Belmont, Ohio. A third-party subject matter expert determined 
the proximate cause of this incident was land movement, or slip, that 
exerted force on the pipe causing a circumferential crack in an area 
where evidence of stress corrosion cracking and general corrosion were 
found.
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    \1\ Mcf stands for one thousand cubic feet. The ``M'' is 
representative of the roman numeral for one thousand.
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     On December 23, 2020, 4,450 Mcf natural gas was released 
from a gas distribution main line in the City of Newport News, 
Virginia. The operator report indicated that the apparent cause was 
pipe stress created by ground settlement which caused misalignment of a 
flange resulting in a pinhole leak on gasket.
     On November 19, 2020, a pipeline spilled 17.50 barrels of 
crude oil east of I-5 in Kern, California during routine start-up. A 
metallurgical analysis determined the root cause to be related to 
external factors (i.e., historical land movement, terrain, and cyclic 
weather patterns around this pipeline segment). There is a history of 
land movement in the area, all of which contributed to unintentional 
bending of the pipeline causing the circumferential cracking found at 
the leak site.
     On October 4, 2020, an intrastate gas transmission 
pipeline in Goodrich, Texas released 118,724 Mcf of natural gas below 
the Trinity River. While no definitive root cause was determined, the 
operator used the geological, meteorological, site-gathered information 
and historical data in its computer modeling and identified earth 
movement of the soil surrounding the pipe as the most plausible cause 
of the rupture. Circumferential stress corrosion cracking may have been 
a contributing factor to the failure.
     On May 19, 2020, 447 Mcf was released from a gas 
distribution main pipeline in Edenville Township, Michigan due to heavy 
rain fall. An investigation confirmed a 4-inch steel pipeline was 
severed when significant flooding in the area caused a road washout/
scouring.
     On May 4, 2020, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline ruptured 
and ignited near Hillsboro, Kentucky. Preliminary information indicates 
land movement may have contributed to this failure. The NTSB 
investigation into the cause continues as of the date of this notice.
     On February 22, 2020, a carbon dioxide pipeline failed 
approximately one mile southeast of Satartia, Mississippi, releasing 
approximately 30,000 barrels of liquid carbon dioxide that immediately 
began to vaporize at atmospheric conditions. The pipeline failed on a 
steep embankment which had subsided adjacent to a local highway. Heavy 
rains are believed to have triggered a landslide, which created axial 
strain on the pipeline and resulted in a full circumferential girth 
weld failure.
     On January 29, 2019, a pipeline ruptured near the town of 
Lumberport in Harrison County, West Virginia. The rupture was located 
at a girth weld of an elbow on the 12-inch interstate pipeline. The 
root cause investigation concluded that a landslide about 150 yards 
from the rupture moved the pipeline approximately 10 feet from its 
original location causing excessive stress on the pipe resulting in the 
rupture.
     On January 21, 2019, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline 
ruptured and ignited near Summerfield, Ohio. A metallurgical analysis 
indicates a girth weld failed due to ductile overload from a 
longitudinal tensile or bending force, likely from land movement.
     On June 7, 2018, a 36-inch pipeline ruptured in a rural, 
mountainous area near Moundsville, West Virginia, resulting in the 
release of approximately 165,000 Mcf of natural gas. According to a 
metallurgical analysis, the rupture was caused by earth movement on the 
right-of-way due to a single overload event. Overloading of the 
pipeline likely resulted from a series of lateral displacements with 
accompanying bending.
     On April 30, 2018, an 8-inch intrastate pipeline failed in 
a remote mountainous region of Marshall County, West Virginia resulting 
in the release of 2,658 barrels of propane. The failure was caused by 
lateral movement of the pipeline due to earth movement along the right-
of-way.
     On January 31, 2018, a 24-inch interstate pipeline 
ruptured near the city of Summerfield, Ohio releasing approximately 
23,500 Mcf of natural gas in a rural forested area. A root cause 
analysis concluded that the girth weld failure was caused by axial 
stress due to movement of the pipe that exceeded the cross-sectional 
tensile strength of the net section weld zone surrounding the crack 
initiation location.
     On January 9, 2018, a 22-inch transmission pipeline failed 
in Montecito, California. The incident resulted in a fire and explosion 
and the release of an estimated 12,000 Mcf of natural gas. Heavy rains 
and localized flooding contributed to the pipe failure.
     On December 5, 2016, approximately 14,400 barrels of crude 
oil were spilled into an unnamed tributary to Ash Coulee Creek, Ash 
Coulee Creek itself, the Little Missouri River, and their adjoining 
shorelines in Billings County, North Dakota. The metallurgical and root 
cause failure analysis indicated the failure was caused by compressive 
and bending forces due to a landslide impacting the pipeline. The 
landslide was the result of excessive moisture within the hillside 
creating unstable soil conditions.
     On October 21, 2016, a pipeline release of over 1,238 
barrels of gasoline spilled into the Loyalsock Creek in Lycoming 
County, Pennsylvania. The release was caused by extreme localized 
flooding and soil erosion.

[[Page 33578]]

    Within its rulemaking entitled ``Safety of Gas Transmission 
Pipelines: Repair Criteria, Integrity Management Improvements, Cathodic 
Protection, Management of Change, and Other Related Amendments'' (RIN 
2137-AF39), PHMSA notes that it is considering adopting revisions to 
Sec.  192.613 that would oblige operators of gas transmission pipelines 
to conduct inspections on their facilities following an extreme weather 
event to ensure timely identification and remediation of damage to 
those facilities. In addition, the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) recently issued interim guidance underscoring the importance of 
the evaluation of, and emergency planning for, geohazards for safe 
operation of carbon dioxide and other pipeline facilities.\2\
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    \2\ CEQ, ``Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration 
Guidance,'' 87 FR 8808, 8810 (Feb. 16, 2022).
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II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2022-01)

    Advisory: All owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid 
pipelines, including supercritical carbon dioxide pipelines, are 
reminded that earth movement, particularly in variable, steep, and 
rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing subsurface 
geological conditions, can pose a threat to the integrity of a pipeline 
if those threats are not identified and mitigated. Additionally, 
changing weather patterns due to climate change may result in heavier 
than normal rainfall and higher temperatures, resulting in soil 
saturation and flooding or soil erosion, each of which may adversely 
impact soil stability surrounding or supporting nearby pipeline 
facilities.
    Pipeline operators should consider taking the following actions to 
ensure pipeline safety:
    1. Identify areas surrounding the pipeline that may be prone to 
large earth movement, including but not limited to slope instability, 
subsidence, frost heave, soil settlement, erosion, earthquakes, and 
other dynamic geologic conditions that may pose a safety risk.
    2. Use geotechnical engineers during the design, construction, and 
ongoing operation of a pipeline system to ensure that sufficient 
information is available to avoid or minimize the impact of earth 
movement on the integrity of the pipeline system. At a minimum, 
operators should consider soil strength characteristics, ground and 
surface water conditions, propensity for erosion or scour of underlying 
soils, and the propensity of earthquakes or frost heave.
    3. Develop design, construction, and monitoring plans and 
procedures for each identified location, based on the site-specific 
hazards identified. When constructing new pipelines, develop and 
implement procedures for pipe and girth weld designs to increase their 
effectiveness for taking loads, either stresses or strains, exerted 
from pipe movement in areas where geological subsurface conditions and 
movement are a hazard to pipeline integrity.
    4. Monitoring plans may include provisions related to the 
following:
     Ensuring during construction of new pipelines that 
excavators do not steepen, load (including changing the groundwater 
levels) or undercut slopes which may cause excessive ground movement 
during construction or after operations commence.
     Conducting periodic visits and site inspections. Increased 
patrolling may be necessary due to potential hazards identified and 
existing/pending weather conditions. Right-of-way patrol staff must be 
trained on how to detect and report conditions that may lead to or 
exhibit ground movement to appropriate staff.
     Identifying geodetic monitoring points (i.e., survey 
benchmarks) to track potential ground movement.
     Installing slope inclinometers to track ground movement at 
depth which may otherwise not be detectable during right-of-way 
patrols.
     Installing standpipe piezometers to track changes in 
groundwater conditions that may affect slope stability.
     Evaluating the accumulation of strain on the pipeline by 
installing strain gauges.
     Conducting stress/strain analysis utilizing in-line 
inspection tools equipped with inertia mapping unit technology and high 
resolution deformation in-line inspection for pipe bending and denting 
from movement.
     Utilizing aerial mapping light detection and ranging or 
other technology to track changes in ground conditions.
    5. Develop mitigation measures to remediate the identified 
locations.
    6. Monitor environmental conditions and changing weather patterns 
in proximity to their facilities and evaluate soil stability that may 
have been adversely impacted.
     The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
National Centers for Environmental Information has excellent 
information publicly available. For example, see the National 
Temperature and Precipitation Maps at the National Centers for 
Environmental Information (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/us-maps/).
    7. Use available data and information resources to assess pipeline 
facility vulnerability relative to landslides and other types of earth 
movement.
     The USGS has excellent information publicly available 
regarding land movement. For example, see the Landslide Hazards Maps at 
the USGS website (https://www.usgs.gov/programs/landslide-hazards/maps).
    8. Consider the findings and recommendations of pertinent research 
projects, studies, and reports on the impact of changing weather 
patterns on soil stability.\3\ PHMSA also notes that industry and 
academic materials could be informative regarding relevant 
considerations and strategies for ensuring pipeline integrity in areas 
of land movement or soil subsidence.
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    \3\ For example, PHMSA has funded the following research and 
development projects on the impact of soil movement and pipeline 
monitoring: Pipeline Integrity Management for Ground Movement 
Hazards (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=202); 
Combined Vibration, Ground Movement, and Pipe Current Detector 
(https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=655); 
Definition of Geotechnical and Operational Load Effects on Pipeline 
Anomalies (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=561); 
and Fiber Optic Sensors for Direct Pipeline Monitoring Under 
Geohazard Conditions (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=889).
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    9. Mitigation measures should be based on site-specific conditions 
and may include:
     Re-routing the pipeline right-of-way prior to construction 
to avoid areas prone to large ground movement such as unstable slope 
areas, earthquake fault zones, permafrost movement, or scour.
     Utilize properly designed horizontal directional drilling 
to go below areas of potential land movement.
     Installation of drainage measures in the trench to 
mitigate subsurface flows and enhance surface water draining at the 
site including streams, creeks, runs, gullies, or other sources of 
surface run-off that may be contributing surface water to the site or 
changing groundwater levels that may exacerbate earth movement.
     Reducing the steepness of potentially unstable slopes, 
including installing retaining walls, soldier piles, sheet piles, wire 
mesh systems, mechanically stabilized earth systems and other 
mechanical structures.
     Installing trench breakers and slope breakers to mitigate 
trench seepage and divert trench flows along the surface to safe 
discharge points off the site or right-of-way.
     Building retaining walls and/or installing steel piling or 
concrete caissons to stabilize steep slope areas as

[[Page 33579]]

long as the corrosion control systems are not compromised.
     Reducing the loading on the site by removing and/or 
reducing the excess backfill materials to off-site locations. Soil 
placement should be carefully planned to avoid triggering earth 
movement in other locations.
     Compacting backfill materials at the site to increase 
strength, reduce water infiltration, and achieve optimal moisture 
content.
     Drying the soil using special additives such as lime-kiln 
dust or cement-kiln to allow the materials to be re-used and worked at 
the site. Over-saturated materials may require an extensive amount of 
time and space to dry.
     Regrading the pipeline right-of-way to minimize scour and 
erosion.
     Bringing the pipeline above ground and placing it on 
supports that can accommodate large ground movements (e.g., transitions 
across earthquake fault zones or unstable slopes, without putting 
excessive stress or strain on the pipeline).
     Reducing the operating pressure temporarily or shutting-in 
the affected pipeline segment completely.
     Re-routing the pipeline when other appropriate mitigation 
measures cannot be effectively implemented to maintain safety.
    Pipeline safety regulations require reporting of certain conditions 
that impair the serviceability of a pipeline, as noted in Sec. Sec.  
191.23 and 195.55.
    PHMSA encourages pipeline operators to enhance their preparations 
and procedures beyond the minimum Federal standards and to address the 
unique threats, vulnerabilities, and challenges of each individual 
pipeline facility. Pipeline operators, Federal and state regulators, 
and the public have a common goal of no damage and no releases from 
pipeline infrastructure. Working together will better achieve our goal 
of zero incidents and releases.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on May 26, 2022, under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2022-11791 Filed 6-1-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P