Document ID: NHTSA-2011-0174-0001
Agency: nhtsa
Document Type: Proposed Rule
Title: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Theft Protection and Rollaway Prevention
Posted Date: 2011-12-12T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 238 (Monday, December 12, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 77183-77200]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-31441]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0174]
RIN 2127-AK88

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection and 
Rollaway Prevention

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: In this NPRM, we (NHTSA) address safety issues arising from 
increasing variations of keyless ignition controls, and the operation 
of those controls. At issue are drivers' inability to stop a moving 
vehicle in a panic situation, and drivers who unintentionally leave the 
vehicle without the vehicle transmission's being ``locked in park,'' or 
with the engine still running, increasing the chances of vehicle 
rollaway or carbon monoxide poisoning in an enclosed area.
    Therefore in this NPRM, among other matters, we propose to 
standardize the operation of controls that are used to stop the vehicle 
engine or other propulsion system and that do not involve the use of a 
physical key. We are also proposing to require that an audible warning 
be given to any driver who: Attempts to shut down the propulsion system 
without first moving the gear selection control to the ``park'' 
position (for vehicles with a ``park'' position); exits a vehicle 
without having first moved the gear selection control to ``park'' (for 
vehicles with a ``park'' position), or exits a vehicle without first 
turning off the propulsion system.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before March 12, 2012.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to the docket number identified in 
the heading of this document by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE. Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: West Building Ground Floor, Room 
W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern 
Time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    Regardless of how you submit your comments, you should mention the 
docket number of this document.
    You may call the Docket at (202) 366-9324.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public 
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this 
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change 
to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information 
provided.
    Privacy Act: Please see the Privacy Act heading under Rulemaking 
Analyses and Notices.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, Ms. Gayle 
Dalrymple, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards (telephone: 202-366-
5559) (fax: (202) 493-2990). Ms. Dalrymple's mailing address is 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NVS-112, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    For legal issues, Ms. Dorothy Nakama, Office of the Chief Counsel 
(telephone: (202) 366-2992) (fax: (202) 366-3820). Ms. Nakama's mailing 
address is National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NCC-112, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. Safety Need for Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114
    A. Inability To Stop a Moving Vehicle in a Panic Situation
    B. Rollaway--Leaving a Vehicle Not in ``Park''
    C. Leaving the Vehicle With the Vehicle Propulsion System 
Unintentionally Left Active
IV. Society of Automotive Engineers Effort in This Area
V. NHTSA's Proposal
    A. New Definitions
    B. Standardizing Shutting Down a Moving Vehicle's Propulsion 
System
    C. Audible Warning When Key Is in the Starting System and the 
Driver Opens the Door
    D. Audible Warning To Prevent Rollaways
    E. Audible Warning To Reduce Chances of Drivers' Leaving a 
Vehicle With the Propulsion System Active
    F. Owners' Manual Required Language
VI. Other Issues Considered by NHTSA
    A. Propulsion System Kill Switch in Plain View of the Driver
    B. Stepping on Brake Before Starting the Propulsion System

[[Page 77184]]

    C. Specified Actuation Time for the Propulsion System Start 
Control
    D. Automatic Timed Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a 
Stationary Vehicle
    E. Preventing Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary 
Vehicle Not in ``Park''
VII. Additional Questions
VIII. Benefits, Costs and Lead Time
IX. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
X. Public Participation

I. Executive Summary

    In this notice, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) addresses safety issues arising from increased availability of 
ignition systems that do not use physical keys to start and stop 
passenger motor vehicles' engines or other propulsion systems. At issue 
are drivers' inability to stop a moving vehicle in a panic situation, 
and drivers who unintentionally leave the vehicle without the vehicle 
transmission's being locked in ``park,'' or with the engine still 
running, increasing the chances of vehicle rollaway or carbon monoxide 
poisoning in an enclosed area.
    Therefore in this NPRM, among other matters, we propose to 
standardize the length of time it is necessary to push a control to 
stop the vehicle engine or other propulsion system. We are also 
proposing to require that an audible warning be given to any driver 
who: (1) Attempts to shut down the propulsion system without first 
moving the gear selection control to the ``park'' position (for 
vehicles with a ``park'' position); (2) exits a vehicle without having 
first moved the gear selection control to ``park'' (for vehicles with a 
``park'' position), or (3) exits a vehicle without first turning off 
the propulsion system.
    This rulemaking action is undertaken in response to our review of 
complaints from consumers to our Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) 
reporting incidents such as those described above and investigations of 
crashes and complaints regarding unintended acceleration.\1\ While we 
recognize that this is not the traditional data base upon which our 
agency typically bases a rulemaking, we believe that, in this instance, 
we are addressing an emerging safety issue with non-standardized new 
technology in way that imposes minimal cost on vehicle manufacturers, 
especially given that the proposed two-year lead time of the new 
requirements, and that many vehicles already have some form of the 
features we are proposing today.
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    \1\ We also note the recommendation of the National Aeronautic 
and Space Administration's (NASA) Engineering and Safety Center 
(NESC) that NHTSA consider regulation of ``controls for managing 
safety critical functions'' and that we noted that ``Keyless 
ignition systems can exacerbate UA incidents (particularly prolonged 
incidents involving a stuck accelerator pedal) if the driver cannot 
determine how to shut off the engine quickly.'' ``Technical 
Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) Systems,'' 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, February 2011, page 
65.
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    Today's proposal would, if finalized:
     Clarify that definitions for ``key'' and ``starting 
system'' currently in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 
114 apply to all propulsion systems.
     Propose a new definition for ``key code carrying device.''
     Propose to revise the definition of ``starting system.''
     Propose a new definition for ``stop control.''
     Delete the door opening alert exclusion currently in FMVSS 
No. 114 for a running vehicle (only for vehicles equipped with keyless 
ignition).
     Add requirements for the operation of a pushed stop 
control: The driver must hold the control for a minimum of 500 
milliseconds to shut down the propulsion system, whether the vehicle is 
moving or stationary, and the propulsion system must shut down within 1 
second of the initial push of the stop control.
     Add a requirement for an internal alert to the driver when 
s/he requests propulsion system shut down without first placing the 
gear selection control in ``park.''
     Add a requirement for an external alert that the driver 
and bystanders can hear when the vehicle is not in ``park'' and the 
driver exits the vehicle.
     Add a requirement for an external alert that sounds when 
the driver leaves a keyless ignition vehicle with the propulsion system 
active.
     Add new test procedures for the new requirements.
    We believe that the benefits of the new requirements proposed 
today, while not yet quantifiable on a national level, will reduce the 
risk that drivers will misuse these new keyless ignition systems and 
therefore also reduce:
     Crashes, injuries and deaths resulting from a driver's 
inability to shut down a moving vehicle;
     Rollaway incidents due to drivers failing to place the 
gear shift control in ``park'' before shutting down the propulsion 
system, and leaving the vehicle; and
     Incidents of carbon monoxide poisoning due to drivers 
inadvertently leaving a vehicle running or with its propulsion system 
active in an enclosed space, such as a garage adjoining a home.
    We believe that taking precautionary action now, before these non-
standardized systems become more widely available, will be beneficial 
to highway safety. Production of vehicles with these systems has grown 
from about 5,000 vehicles in model year 2002 to over 1,2 million in 
model year 2008. We believe we will accrue benefits by establishing a 
consistent experience for the users across all vehicles and a 
consistent way to turn off the propulsion system whether the vehicle is 
moving or not. This not only simplifies training new drivers, but also 
training drivers new to keyless ignition vehicles, and reduces the 
stress and confusion relating to fundamental differences in how one 
operates a vehicle. This is especially important in vehicles that 
provide less obvious cues as to the state of the engine and the 
starting system. If the measures we propose in this notice prevent just 
one serious injury over three years, the rule will be cost beneficial. 
We believe the countermeasures we have proposed can reasonably be 
expected to have their intended effect based on similar requirements 
already in place in FMVSS No. 114 and other standards and in common 
automotive practice. For example, the warning to drivers to take their 
keys with them when they leave their vehicles (currently in FMVSS No. 
114) and the threshold warning device for platform lifts (currently in 
FMVSS No. 403) are effective alerts, and we see no reason the new 
alerts proposed here should be less effective. The common automotive 
practice of the rotating ignition switch, combined with a physical key, 
has standardized the engine shut down procedure before the advent of 
the new electronic convenience controls. We believe standardizing the 
operation of these new controls, combined with the new alerts, will 
have the same effect. We believe these new requirements are especially 
worthwhile considering what we believe to be minimal costs to implement 
them.
    Today, in the vehicles with keyless ignition systems, the great 
majority use push-button type switches. Some require a momentary tap, 
some require longer hold times, and some use different hold times to 
affect different functions. The countermeasure for driver confusion 
over shutting down a moving vehicle is to require that the switch that 
turns off the propulsion system work consistently, whether the vehicle 
is moving or not. From our knowledge of the operation of current 
designs, we believe that our proposed 500 millisecond hold time is well 
within the functional range of the switches currently in use. The only

[[Page 77185]]

change necessary, in most cases, will be in the additional software 
coding. Thus, we believe there will be little incremental cost for 
changing the behavior of the keyless ignition control. There will be 
costs associated with testing the new software for correct operation.
    We are proposing to require one new internal driver alert and two 
new external driver alerts. Some models already use some version of 
these alerts and other alerts are already required by FMVSS No. 114. In 
most cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound 
generating systems to engage under the right circumstances. For this 
reason, we believe the warning cues proposed here have little cost 
associated with their implementation.
    Because the incremental cost for equipping every vehicle in the 
fleet would be very small, it follows that regardless of the number of 
vehicles needing a countermeasure, the cost to equip the entire fleet 
of keyless ignition vehicles would be similarly small.
    If the proposed changes in this NPRM are made final, NHTSA proposes 
a lead time of two years from the next September 1 after a final rule 
is published in the Federal Register. We believe that this lead time 
gives vehicle manufacturers ample time to implement the new 
requirements in the normal course of vehicle model updating at minimal 
cost.

II. Background

    Under 49 U.S.C. Section 30111(a), NHTSA (by delegation from the 
Secretary of Transportation) is directed to prescribe Federal motor 
vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs). Section 30111(a) also states that 
``Each standard shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle 
safety, and be stated in objective terms.'' This subsection was the 
statutory basis for the original promulgation of FMVSS No. 114, Theft 
protection and rollaway prevention (49 CFR Section 571.114) and is also 
the basis for this proposal.
    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114, specifies vehicle 
performance requirements intended to reduce the incidence of crashes, 
injuries and fatalities resulting from theft and accidental rollaway of 
motor vehicles. The purpose of this standard is to decrease the 
likelihood that a vehicle is in a crash as a result of theft, or 
accidentally set in motion. FMVSS No. 114 applies to all passenger 
cars, and to trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a gross 
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or 
less. However, it does not apply to walk-in vans.\2\
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    \2\ In addition, FMVSS No. 114 specifies requirements for a 
brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) at S5.3. S5.3 applies to 
all motor vehicles (except trailers and motorcycles) with a GVWR of 
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
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    To minimize crashes involving stolen vehicles, FMVSS No. 114 
specifies at S5.1.1 that each vehicle must have a starting system 
which, whenever the key is removed from the starting system prevents: 
(a) The normal activation of the vehicle's engine or motor and; (b) 
either steering, or forward self-mobility, of the vehicle, or both. To 
deter theft, Section 5.1.3 requires an audible alert to the driver if 
the driver's door is opened and the key left in the starting system. 
This serves as a reminder to the driver to always take the key. It is 
further specified at S5.1.4 that if a vehicle is equipped with a 
transmission with a ``park'' position, the means for deactivating the 
vehicle's engine or motor must not activate any device installed to 
prevent steering or forward self-mobility, unless the transmission is 
locked in the ``park'' position.
    To minimize rollaway in vehicles equipped with transmissions with a 
``park'' position, the standard specifies in S5.2.1 that the starting 
system must prevent key removal unless the transmission or gear 
selection control is locked in ``park'' or becomes locked in ``park'' 
as a direct result of key removal. The standard further specifies at 
S5.2.2 that the vehicle must be designed such that the transmission or 
gear selection control cannot move from the ``park'' position, unless 
the key is in the starting system.\3\
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    \3\ Exceptions (not relevant to this rulemaking) to these 
requirements are specified at S5.2.3 Key removal override option and 
S5.2.4 Gear selection control override option.
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    FMVSS No. 114 includes a specific definition of ``key'': ``means a 
physical device or an electronic code which, when inserted into the 
starting system (by physical or electronic means), enables the vehicle 
operator to activate the engine or motor.'' For purposes of FMVSS No. 
114, ``key'' means both the traditional physical key and codes that are 
electronically transmitted by a fob, plastic card, or a similar device. 
The electronic code also includes numeric codes entered onto a keypad 
inside the vehicle by the driver. The standard also includes a 
definition of ``starting system'': ``means the vehicle system used in 
conjunction with the key to activate the engine or motor.''
    While the new electronic keyless ignitions systems are currently 
subject to FMVSS No. 114, NHTSA is aware of emerging safety issues that 
we believe should be addressed by new requirements specific to these 
systems.
    Keyless ignition systems, as they are commonly called, usually 
consist of a device carried by the driver, which contains an electronic 
code that grants access to the vehicle (allows the doors to unlock) and 
the ignition system. The electronic code is transmitted to the 
vehicle's starting system without physical contact with the vehicle, 
other than its presence in the vehicle, and the driver is granted 
access to start the vehicle's propulsion system, usually by pushing a 
button or turning a rotary switch. Keyless ignition systems first 
became available in luxury models but are now migrating to more popular 
vehicles (for example, the 2011 Kia Sedona minivan has keyless entry 
and ignition standard on the base model, with a manufacturer's 
suggested retail price of $24,595). Implementation of keyless ignition 
differs across models. Circular push buttons are most common, but there 
are also rocker switches and rotary switches (similar to the familiar 
ignition switch that is turned with a key). Among the push button 
keyless ignition systems, there are differences in how these systems 
turn on and shut off the propulsion system, both while the vehicle is 
stationary (normal usage) and while moving (emergency situations). 
There are also differences in alerts given to the driver by different 
models if the driver does something unsafe while using the system, such 
as not putting the transmission in ``park'' before shutting down the 
engine, or leaving the vehicle while the propulsion system is still 
active.

III. Safety Need for Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114

    In this section, we describe alleged incidents, and those that we 
have investigated, resulting in crashes, injuries and fatalities, 
involving vehicles with electronic keyless ignition systems. We also 
describe how we believe such incidents may have occurred.
    The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is the office within 
NHTSA responsible for conducting defect investigations and 
administering safety recalls in support of NHTSA's mission to improve 
safety on our nation's roadways. One important means by which ODI 
discovers vehicle safety-related defects is self-reporting by vehicle 
owners. By relating the information over a toll-free hotline number (1-
(888) 327-4236, TTY for the hearing impaired: 1-(800) 423-9153) or 
filling out an on-line or paper questionnaire, the Vehicle Owner's

[[Page 77186]]

Questionnaire (VOQ), vehicle owners can provide complaint information 
that is entered into NHTSA's ODI vehicle owner's complaint database. 
This information is used with other complaints and information to 
determine if a safety-related defect trend exists.
    Traditionally, the data NHTSA uses for rulemakings are from data 
bases of police- or NHTSA-investigated crashes: the Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System (FARS), the National Automotive Sampling System 
Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS) and the National Automotive 
Sampling System General Estimates System (NASS-GES). Today's discussion 
is based on driver complaints to ODI through the VOQ because in this 
case the crashes or incidents of interest either cannot be identified 
from data elements available in those data bases (crashes involving a 
vehicle speeding out of control, such as with a stuck accelerator 
pedal) or they will not be present in those data bases in the first 
place because they do not involve a motor vehicle in transport 
(rollaways and carbon monoxide poisoning). The relatively new ``Not-In-
Traffic Surveillance'' (NiTS) data base was searched for these 
incidents, but no keyless ignition vehicles were found. Keyless 
ignition is an item of equipment that is still not widely used on 
vehicles, constituting less than 10 percent of vehicles sold, so it is 
not surprising that none of these vehicles are in the relatively new 
NiTS.
    We recognize that there are many caveats to using VOQs as a data 
source, among them are:
     The crashes are not randomly selected.
     VOQs are self-reported and for most there is no follow up 
investigation as to what actually happened in the incident.
     There is no analysis of the root cause of the crash so we 
cannot confirm if the type of ignition switch contributed to crash 
causation.
     We have no information on other possible contributing 
factors in these crashes.
     There may be many more incidents that were not reported to 
NHTSA because the driver did not know how or where to make the 
complaint.\4\
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    \4\ NASA ESC also observed this quality regarding the VOQ data, 
``The available incident reporting databases are valuable for 
identifying potential vehicle symptoms related to UA events. 
However, voluntary reporting systems may not allow for accurate 
quantitative estimates of incident rates or statistical trends. 
``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) 
Systems,'' National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, February 
2011, page 61.
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    However, an accumulation of VOQs from drivers stating a similar 
problem with a particular vehicle system points to emerging safety 
issues with new systems, which is what we are trying to document and 
correct with this precautionary proposal in a manner that has very 
little cost. We request comment on the use of vehicle owners complaints 
as a basis of this proposal.

A. Inability To Stop a Moving Vehicle in a Panic Situation

    On August 28, 2009, there was a passenger car crash near San Diego, 
California that resulted in the deaths of four people. The vehicle at 
issue had a keyless electronic starting system, including a start/stop 
control (a push button) on the front dashboard. This control would stop 
the engine immediately when the vehicle was stationary, but the driver 
needed to depress the ``stop'' control for as long as three seconds to 
stop the engine when the vehicle was moving. NHTSA's Office of Defects 
Investigation inspected this vehicle and crash site on September 3, 
2009 and a report was filed on September 30, 2009.\5\ The investigator 
noted the following:
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    \5\ Memorandum from Bill Collins (Investigator and Interviewer, 
Vehicle Research and Test Center) to Kathleen DeMeter (Director, 
Office of Defects Investigation), September 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/docservlet/Artemis/Public/Pursuits/2009/DP/INME-DP09001-37211P.pdf.
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     The vehicle was a loaned Lexus ES-350 traveling at a very 
high rate of speed that did not stop at the end of Highway 125.
     The driver was a 19 year veteran of the California Highway 
Patrol.
     The cause of the crash was ``very excessive speed.''
     The accelerator pedal had apparently been entrapped by the 
all-weather floor mat that was not the correct mat for the vehicle.
     Among the ``other significant factors'' was:

    Push Button Ignition Start with no Emergency Instantaneous Shut 
off Device--In the event that this vehicle was producing unwanted 
power, there was no ignition key that could be mechanically actuated 
to instantaneously disconnect electrical power to the engine. In 
place of the key is a software push button that delays engine 
shutdown for three seconds once depressed. This instruction is not 
indicated on the dashboard.

    In July of 2007, another fatal crash occurred in California 
involving a 2007 Toyota Camry equipped with keyless ignition 
experiencing an unwanted acceleration which hit a Honda Accord, killing 
its driver. This crash was investigated by Dynamic Science, Inc., under 
contract to NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation Division. The report on 
this crash notes,

    The driver reported that he attempted to turn off the vehicle by 
pushing the power button several times. The vehicle was equipped 
with a Smart Key system. In order to turn off the power while moving 
at speed requires the driver to press and hold the power button down 
for three seconds. The driver was unaware of this feature.\6\ \7\

    \6\ ``ODI Unintended Acceleration Investigation/Vehicle to 
Vehicle'', Dynamic Science, Inc. Case Number: DS07035, 2007 Toyota 
Camry, California, July 2007 available at http://www-nass.nhtsa.dot.gov/BIN/logon.exe/airmislogon by entering case number 
DS07035.
    \7\ Reviewers of UA complaints during NHTSA's investigation of 
Toyota UA incidents also noted the necessity of learning this new 
procedure for shutting down the propulsion system with a keyless 
ignition system. ``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic 
Throttle Control (ETC) Systems,'' National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, February 2011, page 51, section 2.7.7.
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    NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation has received complaints, 
through the submission of Vehicle Owner's Questionnaires (VOQ) \8\ 
submitted to the agency, of similar situations in which the driver 
attempted to shut down the propulsion system in a runaway vehicle with 
keyless ignition. Two examples are:
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    \8\ To see the questionnaire form, go to https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ivoq/online.cfm.

    While driving the car on the Falmouth connector with the toll 
booth in sight, I lifted my foot from the accelerator to decelerate 
and suddenly the accelerator just took off. I immediately applied 
the brake, but the car continued to try to accelerate, I then 
applied both feet to the brake as I tried desperately to stop the 
car while the front wheels were spinning and burning rubber. I tried 
to shut down the ignition with the pushbutton on the gear shifter 
and also desperately tried to move the gear shifter from drive but 
could not. Neither the ignition button nor the gear shifter would 
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respond.

and

    The critical safety concern is noted as follows: * * *, I was 
traveling with the cruise control active at 55 miles per hour. Upon 
approaching a slower vehicle and checking traffic, I proceeded to 
accelerate the vehicle in an attempt to quickly pass the vehicle 
driving before me. Upon successful passage of the vehicle, I let off 
the accelerator and pressed the brakes several times, but the 
vehicle continued to accelerate under full power. Under the 
conditions, I tried to quickly disrupt this safety critical issue. 
To the best of my recollection I tried to slow the vehicle by 
pushing the power button, manipulating the cruise control lever, and 
putting the vehicle in neutral. All attempts were unsuccessful.

    We can conclude from these VOQs and others like them that:
     Drivers will attempt to stop a vehicle in a wide open 
throttle event by using the engine stop control.
     Drivers expect the engine stop control to function the 
same way every time it is used, regardless of the vehicle state, 
stationary or moving.

[[Page 77187]]

     It is reasonable to link the driver's inability to shut 
down the moving vehicle to the difference between the expectation of 
how the control would work in this situation and the reality of how it 
actually does function.\9\
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    \9\ This difference in function was also noted by NASA NESC, 
``The keyless (push-button) ignition design can likewise have an 
unintended consequence. Here, the concern was that the driver (or 
passenger) might inadvertently turn off it the vehicle when it is in 
motion. To prevent such an error, the safeguard was added that the 
button must be held for three seconds to turn off the vehicle when 
the vehicle is in motion. However, this procedure is certainly not 
well practiced by drivers. Indeed, many owners are not even aware of 
this `hold the button' requirement. In any case, the most common 
behavior in an emergency situation is to revert to the well-learned, 
oft-practiced, always-successful procedure: push the button briefly 
to turn off the vehicle. However, this procedure fails in the off-
nominal situation, no matter how many times the driver executes it 
in rapid succession.'' NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical 
Assessment Report, ``Technical Support to the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on the Reported Toyota Motor 
Corporation (TMC) Unintended Acceleration (UA) Investigation,'' page 
44.
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B. Rollaway--Leaving a Vehicle Not in ``Park''

    When shutting down a stationary vehicle (with a transmission with a 
``park'' position) to leave it parked, the driver should first move the 
gear selection control to ``park'' and then request propulsion system 
shut down. Performing these actions in this order will ensure that the 
vehicle is in ``park'' before the driver leaves the vehicle. In a 
vehicle fitted with a traditional key and starting system, this 
involves moving to ``park,'' turning the ignition switch to ``off'' and 
removing the key. Due to a requirement in FMVSS No. 114, the driver 
will not be able to remove the key if the gear selection control is not 
in ``park'' unless it becomes locked in ``park'' as a direct result of 
key removal. To prevent rollaway in the keyless ignition vehicle, the 
gear selection control should be moved to ``park'' and then propulsion 
system shut down should be requested via whatever type of switch is 
used in the vehicle, most typically a push button. What we find drivers 
are reporting is that they occasionally (often while distracted) push 
the switch to shut down the engine without first moving the gear 
selection control into ``park.'' \10\ If they then leave the vehicle in 
this condition and it is on any kind of incline it can rollaway, 
possibly causing injury or fatality to the driver or bystanders or 
damage to surrounding property. In ODI's VOQ data base, we found six 
complaints of rollaway and another three complaints in which the 
drivers realized that the vehicle could have rolled in this condition, 
but it did not. Below are two examples of rollaway incidents (quoted 
exactly from the VOQ statement):
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    \10\ The vehicle complies with S5.2.1 of FMVSS No.114 because 
the key is the electronic code and that code can remain in the 
vehicle even if the physical device the driver carries is taken 
outside the vehicle.

    I bought a used 2006 Audi A6 two months before the accident. I 
had been using the ``keyless'' option when starting and stopping the 
vehicle. I stopped at a library, pushed the button twice to turn off 
the ignition and the vehicle's electrical system. I got out of the 
vehicle and noticed that it was rolling forward. I attempted to stop 
it; I opened the driver's door and as I was getting in the door 
struck a trash can in the parking lot, knocking me down. The 
vehicle's rear wheel caught my left heel and drug me across a curb 
before stopping on my left foot. Several men in the parking lot 
lifted the vehicle off my foot. I was transported to the hospital 
and kept for injuries to my left leg. Evidently I failed to put the 
vehicle's transmission in ``p'' and had left it in ``d''. Cars that 
use a physical key to start and stop the vehicle will not allow a 
driver to remove the key unless the vehicle's transmission has been 
shifted to ``park.'' A vehicle that does not utilize a physical key, 
does not have that built-in safety feature. Five weeks later I am in 
physical therapy and am grateful I did not sustain more serious 
injuries, or that an innocent bystander was not killed by a 
driverless car rolling through a parking lot at a library that is 
frequented by children. Now I am adamant about always setting the 
emergency brake. My concern is real: as more and more vehicles are 
manufactured with ``keyless'' ignition systems that contain no fail-
safe feature to prevent ``inadvertent rolling'' as explained in the 
Audi's owner's manual, I believe more injuries and deaths will be 
realized. In speaking with the regional representative at Audi, he 
explained that Audi publishes a ``book'' explaining the vehicle and 
what happened was totally my fault. My Audi has a sensor in the 
passenger seat that prevents an expensive airbag from deploying 
unnecessarily; how about a sensor in the driver's seat that prevents 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a vehicle from rolling when there is no driver?

and

    The contact owns a 2007 Toyota Avalon. The contact stated that 
when the vehicle is shut off, there is no way to determine if the 
vehicle is in park due to the keyless entry. She is able to exit the 
vehicle with the gear shift indicator in the drive position. This 
failure has caused the vehicle to roll away after she exits. The 
dealer stated that the failure was dangerous and was unable to 
perform the repair because the vehicle was designed in that manner. 
The manufacturer also stated that there was nothing they could do 
about the design.

C. Leaving the Vehicle With the Vehicle Propulsion System 
Unintentionally Left Active

    There were four VOQs regarding carbon monoxide incidents with 
keyless ignition vehicles in the past 10 years. Reviewing complaints 
involving vehicles without a physical key for the propulsion system, we 
note that drivers occasionally do not turn off the propulsion systems 
on their vehicles after parking them. One possibility for this behavior 
is that the driver may not immediately know that the propulsion system 
has not been turned off. In the following self-reported cases (quoted 
directly from the VOQs), the drivers only found that they did not turn 
off the propulsion system because their in-house carbon monoxide 
detectors were activated after an extended period of the vehicle 
running in an attached garage:

    I arrived home after dinner, drove my 2007 Lexus LS460 (equipped 
with keyless ignition) into my attached garage, closed the garage 
door and, leaving the key fob inside the vehicle, I entered my home 
and eventually went to sleep. I was awoken at approx. 2:15 a.m. by a 
carbon monoxide alarm located in the foyer inside my home adjacent 
to the entrance to the garage. I entered the garage to discover that 
the car's engine was still running, the garage filled with noxious 
fumes, and the entire vehicle extremely hot to touch, inside and 
out. I opened the garage door and was eventually able to shut down 
the engine and clear out the fumes. As I see it, the failure here 
was two-fold: (1) When I opened my door to exit the car, no alarm or 
other sound alerted me that the engine was still running, as is the 
case with ignitions requiring keys.\11\ This is particularly 
problematic because the car's engine runs in virtual silence; and 
(2) even after the car was unwittingly left idling while in park, 
the engine did not cut off after some predetermined period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ This statement by the vehicle owner is not correct for all 
vehicles. As previously discussed, FMVSS No. 114 excludes the 
situation of the running vehicle from the requirement to sound the 
alert to the driver when the door has opened and the key is in the 
ignition. However, some manufacturers do sound the alert when the 
engine is running, so this driver's experience may have been with 
those vehicles.

    The following incident was reported by the owner of another motor 
vehicle manufacturer's product which happens to have a hybrid 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
propulsion system:

    Our garage is attached to our house with our bedroom above the 
garage. With 3 kids, both my wife and I have been distracted leaving 
the car in the garage to unload groceries or help the children. When 
on electric power we have neglected to turn off the ignition since 
the car is silent. Only when the carbon-monoxide detector sounded in 
our garage did we realize the engine had started while we were in 
the house. We think this could be deadly to other families without 
carbon monoxide alarms who may also forget to turn off the engine 
when parked in an attached garage while on electric power.

    Because the above two owners had carbon monoxide detectors in their 
homes, they were alerted of the problem

[[Page 77188]]

in time to be able to shut down their vehicle propulsion systems. 
Others, not as fortunate, may have died because of carbon monoxide 
poisoning from their vehicles. For example, a September 1, 2010 article 
in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel.com, reported that Palm Beach County 
detectives were investigating whether a keyless ignition system on a 
vehicle that was left running in a garage attached to a house could 
have led to the death of a 29 year-old woman from carbon monoxide 
poisoning. (A copy of this article taken from www.sun-sentinel.com is 
placed in the docket cited in the heading of this notice.)

IV. Society of Automotive Engineers Effort in This Area

    In response to the above areas of safety concern and concern 
regarding the myriad different ways manufacturers are implementing 
keyless ignition features, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
created the Keyless Ignition Subcommittee as a subcommittee of the 
Controls and Displays Committee, which has worked since early 2009 to 
develop an SAE Recommended Practice (RP) to standardize the operation 
of keyless ignition systems.\12\ The committee consisted of experts in 
the study of how humans interact with machines (human factors experts) 
and designers of keyless ignition systems from auto manufacturers and 
suppliers. A NHTSA staff person attended the subcommittee meetings, but 
did not participate in decision making. The resulting RP is based on 
the subcommittee members' experience with their company's vehicles and 
systems, knowledge of consumers' comments about the operation of the 
systems, knowledge of human factors engineering and, in some cases, 
knowledge of proprietary studies done during the development of their 
products (actual data was not shared with the group). The RP applies to 
all passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), and trucks 
of 10,000 pounds GVWR and under, with automatic and manual 
transmissions (some provisions apply only to vehicles with automatic 
transmissions with a ``park'' position). The RP sets control actuation 
requirements for starting and stopping stationary and moving vehicles, 
and requirements in the form of visual or audible alerts to the driver 
to address leaving the vehicle without putting it in ``park'' and 
inadvertently leaving the engine running. NHTSA has used portions of 
the SAE RP as a foundation for the requirements proposed and explained 
in the next section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ SAE J2948-201101 ``Keyless Ignition Control Design,'' 
January 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to better address specific safety issues and to be more 
enforceable, our proposal today differs from the SAE RP on several 
points:
     The SAE RP has a range of 500msec-2sec for control 
actuation to stop a moving vehicle, while we propose a 500 millisecond 
control actuation for all stops regardless of whether the vehicle is 
moving or stationary.
     The SAE RP has requirements for control actuation to start 
the propulsion system, while we tentatively conclude that there is, at 
this time, no safety benefit upon which this agency can regulate 
propulsion system starting.
     The ``Not in Park'' alert required by the SAE RP sounds 
upon door opening, but has no measureable attributes. The internal 
audible alert we are proposing today sounds at 85dBA (500-3000 Hz) the 
instant the driver requests engine shut down (in a stationary vehicle) 
without the transmission in ``park'' and continues until the gear 
selection control is moved to ``park''.
     The SAE RP requires an unspecified audible or visual 
external alert if the vehicle is not in ``park'' and the key code 
carrying device is not in the vehicle, while we are proposing an 
external audible alert that sounds at 85dBA, 1 meter from the vehicle, 
for 1 minute when the vehicle is stationary, the key code carrying 
device leaves the vehicle, and the vehicle is not in ``park''.
     The SAE RP requires an unspecified audible alert if the 
propulsion system is active and the driver's door is opened, while our 
proposal is for an external audible alert at 85dBA, 1 meter from the 
vehicle, for 1 second when the vehicle is stationary, the key code 
carrying device leaves the vehicle, and the propulsion system is active 
(either an internal combustion engine is running, or in the case of a 
hybrid vehicle the propulsion system is in a state that the internal 
combustion engine could engage when the electric power became depleted 
over time).
    We seek comment on whether our deviations from the SAE RP are 
appropriate for an FMVSS.
    NHTSA requested that human factors experts at the John A. Volpe 
National Transportation Systems Center review the SAE RP to help us 
make our proposal more specific in addressing the safety issues we have 
noted in our VOQs. Their report has been placed in the docket for this 
notice.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ ``Review of SAE RP J2948 JAN2011: Keyless Ignition Control 
Design,'' John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 
March 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. NHTSA Proposal

    In this section, we will describe how we propose to amend FMVSS No. 
114 so that the safety issues described in Section III. Safety Need for 
Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114 may be mitigated.
    Based in part on NHTSA's ODI VOQ data, we are proposing regulatory 
text for addressing the following three types of safety related 
problems: (1) The driver's inability to shut down a moving vehicle in 
an emergency because the driver may be unfamiliar with the fact that 
the shut-down process is different in a moving vehicle than in a 
stopped vehicle. This situation may lead to a crash. (2) The 
possibility that the driver will walk away from a vehicle which is not 
locked in ``park'' because the driver is able to shut off the vehicle 
propulsion system without first putting the transmission in ``park.'' 
This results in a greater likelihood that the vehicle will roll away on 
its own. (3) The possibility that the driver will walk away from a 
vehicle whose propulsion system has been unintentionally left active 
(even though the driver may have placed the transmission in ``park.''). 
If the vehicle is in an enclosed garage connected to living quarters, 
this situation may result in carbon monoxide poisoning of persons in 
the dwelling; if outdoors, this increases the possibility of vehicle 
theft and a subsequent crash.
    As the earlier incidents related from the VOQs have shown, in many 
ignition systems that don't use physical keys, the driver may not know 
whether s/he has turned off the vehicle propulsion system.
    In this NPRM, NHTSA proposes additional requirements for vehicles 
using keyless ignition systems because, unlike systems which use the 
traditional physical key, the start/stop process on vehicles that use 
electronic codes as keys are not standardized across manufacturers. In 
particular, if a push-button type control is used, the amount of time 
the start/stop control must be pressed differs not only among 
manufacturers, but also on the same vehicle, depending on whether the 
vehicle is started from a stopped position, stopped while the vehicle 
is in motion, or whether the vehicle propulsion system is being turned 
off while the vehicle is stopped. Standardization of controls teaches 
drivers how the controls will operate and ensures that drivers' 
expectations about those operations are met.
    The problem presented by the lack of standardization is exacerbated 
by the fact that electronic keys lack many of the visual and tactile 
cues about the

[[Page 77189]]

status of the vehicle's propulsion system that are available to drivers 
when using traditional physical keys. In a system using the physical 
key, the driver knows from the angle of the key in the ignition whether 
the vehicle is in ``lock,'' ``accessory,'' ``start,'' or ``run.'' Also, 
the key will not release from the ignition switch unless the 
transmission is in ``park.'' The keyless ignition system provides no 
such physical cues to the driver.
    The requirement for a visible indication of transmission position 
comes from FMVSS No. 102, Transmission shift position sequence, starter 
interlock, and transmission braking effect. S3.1.4.1 requires that if 
the transmission shift position sequence includes a ``park'' position, 
identification of shift positions, including the positions in relation 
to each other and the position selected, shall be displayed in view of 
the driver whenever: (a) The ignition is in a position where 
transmission can be shifted; or (b) the transmission is not in 
``park.'' Despite this visual cue that the transmission is not in 
``park'', some drivers of vehicles equipped with keyless ignition 
systems, especially when distracted or unfamiliar with the operation of 
the vehicle they are driving, leave their vehicles without ensuring the 
transmission is in the ``park'' position. They do so because they do 
not have the tactile cue of being unable to remove the key unless the 
transmission or gear selection control is locked in ``park.'' \14\ Such 
actions result in a risk that the vehicle will roll away of its own 
accord.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ In keyless ignition vehicles, the ``key'' is the electronic 
code transmitted from a device carried by the driver to the 
vehicle's starting system. When the vehicle is not in ``park,'' this 
key code remains in the vehicle, thus the vehicle conforms to the 
requirement at 49 CFR 571.114 S5.2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note that the current title of Standard No. 114, ``Theft 
protection and rollaway prevention,'' may be made outdated and not 
inclusive if the proposals described in this notice were made final. 
However, a title that is fully descriptive of all the purposes served 
by the standard may be unwieldy. We seek comment on the need to update 
the title and ask commenters to suggest a new title if they believe a 
change would be necessary or beneficial.

A. New Definitions

    As mentioned in the Background section of this NPRM, FMVSS No. 114 
already contains definitions for ``key'' and ``starting system'' which 
are inclusive of systems that use electronic codes without a physical 
key to allow the driver to start the vehicle. However, we are proposing 
the addition of one definition specific to keyless ignition systems:

    Key code carrying device means a physical device which is 
capable of electronically transmitting a key code to the vehicle 
starting system without physical connection (other than its presence 
in the vehicle) between the device and the vehicle.

    This key code carrying device is typically called a ``key fob'' by 
consumers. It carries and transmits the electronic code to the vehicle 
that gives the driver permission to start the vehicle. The electronic 
code carried in the device is the ``key.'' The device is not the 
``key.'' This new definition for key code carrying device is based on 
that used in the SAE Recommended Practice discussed in Section IV 
above.\15\ We propose adding ``without physical connection (other than 
its presence in the vehicle) between the device and the vehicle,'' to 
SAE's RP language to differentiate these devices from physical keys 
which also carry a chip containing an electronic code as part of a 
theft deterrent system. These physical keys must be inserted into the 
ignition switch of the vehicle and the key is used to turn the switch. 
Our proposed definition is intended to specifically exclude any key 
which must be physically inserted into any part of the vehicle each 
time the driver desires to start the propulsion system. If a key must 
be inserted into the vehicle we consider it to be a physical key, 
regardless of whether or not it also contains electronic components 
which communicate with the vehicle intended to identify this particular 
key as belonging to this particular vehicle (i.e., for theft prevention 
purposes). Further, our proposed definition of key code carrying device 
(KCCD) is not intended to exclude a device which otherwise would be a 
KCCD simply because it occasionally must have physical contact with the 
vehicle to recharge the battery in the KCCD or because the vehicle 
manufacturer provides a place where the driver may insert the KCCD if 
s/he chooses for the convenience of providing a place to keep the 
device while driving. We note that the primary attraction of these 
keyless systems appears to be that the driver need not handle a key to 
access and start the vehicle. We seek comment on whether our proposed 
definition is specific enough to (a) Exclude devices that we would 
consider physical keys--they must be inserted to start the vehicle, and 
(b) include devices which may be inserted to charge a battery or for 
driver convenience, but do not need to be inserted for normal vehicle 
operation. We request comment on how the definition of KCCD could be 
improved to clarify these points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ SAE J2948-201101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time, we are not proposing to change our definition of 
``key,'' which provides that for keyless ignition systems, the 
electronic code, not the physical device carried by the driver, is the 
key. We note that NHTSA's definition of the code as the key is long-
standing. It was first articulated in a letter to Mr. Stephen Selander 
of General Motors in May of 1992.\16\ Further, in August of 2005 we 
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which, among other things, 
proposed the current definition of ``key.'' There were no comments 
which disagreed with our definition of ``key'' with regard to keyless 
ignition systems at that time and we finalized that rulemaking in April 
of 2006.\17\ However, we acknowledge that consumers may think of the 
key code carrying device as the key and that some manufacturers do 
refer to this device as a key in their consumer literature, so there 
may be some confusion on the part of consumers as to what is actually 
the key. Therefore, we seek comment on whether we should revise our 
definition of ``key'' and if so, what that definition should be and how 
we should differentiate between the device the driver carries and the 
code that actually allows the vehicle to start. Changing the definition 
of ``key'' may change the interpretation of what it means for the key 
to be removed from (S5.1.1) or inserted into the starting system 
(S5.1.3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Letter from Paul Jackson Rice, Chief Counsel to Stephen E. 
Selander, General Motors Corp, May 22, 1992.
    \17\ 71 FR 17752, April 7, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we are proposing to amend the definition of ``starting 
system.'' At present, ``starting system'' is defined as: ``means the 
vehicle system used in conjunction with the key to activate the engine 
or motor.'' In this NPRM, we propose to amend the end of the ``starting 
system'' definition to state: ``* * * activate the engine, motor, or 
other system which provides propulsion to the motor vehicle.'' We are 
proposing this clarification so that it is explicit that FMVSS No. 114 
applies to any propulsion ``starting system'' available in motor 
vehicles today, or at some point in the future.
    We are proposing to add a second definition, ``stop control means 
the device used by the driver to deactivate the engine, motor, or other 
system which provides propulsion to the motor

[[Page 77190]]

vehicle.'' In most vehicles available today, this control is a push 
button switch, but this definition is not limited to push button 
switches.

B. Standardizing Shutting Down a Moving Vehicle's Propulsion System

    As we have seen in the quoted VOQs, drivers recognize the need and 
desirability of shutting down the engine in a moving vehicle when they 
experience an event in which the acceleration of the vehicle does not 
seem to be under their control. The VOQs also point out that drivers 
are stymied in their efforts to shut down the engine in a moving 
vehicle by the fact that when the vehicle is moving the shut down 
procedure they are used to in every day operation does not work. To 
remedy this safety issue, NHTSA proposes to standardize the length of 
time the driver must press on a ``stop'' control in order to stop a 
vehicle, whether moving or stationary. At S5.4.2.1(a), we propose that 
for vehicles equipped with propulsion system stop controls that are 
activated by the driver pressing on the control, the vehicle's 
propulsion system must stop only after the control has been depressed 
for more than 500 milliseconds. The 500 milliseconds time is based on 
SAE Recommended Practice J2948 Keyless Ignition Control Design (January 
2011). Five hundred milliseconds is the lowest time specified by the 
Recommended Practice for engine shut down in a moving vehicle (the RP 
has a range of 500 milliseconds to 2 seconds, NHTSA believes that 
standardization is not achieved by allowing a window of operation).
    We are proposing to regulate only the operation of controls that 
are pushed because we believe that this covers the great majority of 
stop controls manufactured today (a circular push button) or 
contemplated for the future (pressing or touching a portion of a 
display screen). However, we note that other controls, such as rotary 
knobs and rocker switches \18\ have been used in keyless ignition 
systems in the past. We seek comment on what other controls are used or 
contemplated and whether there is a safety need to regulate the 
actuation of all types of stop controls (not just those that are 
pushed) and how that might be accomplished. NHTSA seeks comment on 
whether the language of S5.4 needs to be more specific as to the point 
at which the 500 msec time begins and what that more specific language 
would be. When offering suggestions, commenters should keep in mind 
that there are several different types of switch designs currently 
available and that could become available that would be subject to this 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ We noted that a rocker switch must be pressed and therefore 
would be subject to the regulatory text proposed in this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA understands manufacturers implemented the practice of 
designing keyless ignition systems to shut down differently while the 
vehicle is moving than while stationary to help prevent inadvertent 
propulsion system shut down, i.e. a situation in which the driver 
reaches for a different control, accidentally bumps the engine off 
control and as a result experiences an unintended, unexpected engine 
shut down, which can create a hazardous situation. However, different 
times for different modes of operation (for example, a light tap to 
start or stop a parked vehicle and several seconds to turn the 
propulsion system off while the vehicle is in motion) result in the 
driver experiencing an unexpected result when using his accustomed tap 
motion to request engine shut off (in a stationary vehicle). The 
drivers' accustomed tap motion does not have the expected effect in a 
moving vehicle in a panic situation. As previously discussed, this 
safety issue was identified in the VOQs by and NASA NESC in its review 
of UA incidents. NHTSA believes that requiring the driver to use the 
same action to request engine shut down in all cases should result in 
the safety benefit of drivers' ability to shut down a moving vehicle 
without the necessity of knowing or remembering a separate motion. We 
have chosen to propose the 500 millisecond control actuation time 
believing it will be long enough to guard against inadvertent shut 
down, while also short enough for drivers to tolerate for everyday 
normal stationary shut down. We ask for comment on whether this time is 
too long or too short and whether the danger of inadvertent shut down 
is that much greater than that of an inability to shut the propulsion 
system off in the event of a stuck throttle, engine fire, or other 
emergency situation. Please provide data on this risk comparison. We 
also believe that the instances of inadvertent shut down can be 
mitigated by other means, such as better control or switch location, 
which will not inadvertently get in the way of the driver's wrist, arm, 
bracelet, or other foreseeable obstruction and ask for comment on this 
facet of vehicle design.
    In our proposal, the time between when the control actuation starts 
the shut down process (500 milliseconds) and the time the engine must 
be stopped (1 second) allows for the signals to be sent and acted upon 
by the vehicle to bring the engine to a stop. We seek comment on this 
length of time and the problem of engine inertia working to keep the 
engine running when the vehicle is moving. We propose that the test 
procedures for compliance with this standard will be conducted on a 
level surface.
    We have proposed a requirement that once the propulsion system of a 
moving vehicle is shut down, any restart of the system must be 
initiated by the driver by actuation of the engine start control. This 
is to prevent automatic restart by any vehicle system, such as idle-
stop technology, when the driver has shut down the engine in an 
emergency situation.
    In developing this NPRM, we considered whether to make all control 
actuations the same, 500 millisecond hold for starting and stopping the 
engine under any condition, to emphasize to the driver that this 
control functions the same under all conditions. However, we understand 
that drivers are so anxious to get started as soon as possible that 
they would not tolerate a wait time as long as 500 milliseconds to 
start the engine. We have seen examples of vehicles in which the 
manufacturers have designed their systems such that if the driver 
``taps'' the start control (as little as 60 milliseconds) the vehicle 
will start. After careful consideration, we have tentatively decided 
that requiring all stops to be the same accomplishes the goal of 
standardizing the propulsion stop function without inconveniencing 
drivers in the start mode and that there is little additional safety 
benefit to be gained by regulating the starting of the propulsion 
system. However we note that more time spent in the starting up process 
would provide more time for systems like a rearview camera system to 
boot up and begin functioning before rearward movement begins. We ask 
for comment on this tentative decision.
    In S5.4.1.2(b), we are not proposing to allow auto-shift to 
``neutral'' in lieu of engine shut down because we believe, based on 
the VOQ data, that when drivers actuate the engine ``off'' control or 
switch, they expect the engine to shut off. An engine which continues 
to run could confuse the driver and cause unwanted actions by the 
driver. We are aware that some manufacturers currently do shift the 
transmission to ``neutral'' when the driver requests engine shut down 
while the vehicle is moving. These manufacturers believe that if the 
engine is shut down while the vehicle is moving, the driver's ability 
to control the vehicle will be hampered by the resulting loss of power 
steering and power braking. In the same vein, we are

[[Page 77191]]

not requiring auto-shift to ``neutral'' because, in addition to the 
issue of driver expectation, we know requiring this feature would 
require all vehicles to be fitted with electronic transmissions and 
this would be extremely costly. We note that drivers have dealt with 
this loss of control when shutting down conventionally keyed vehicles 
for many years. If we were to determine that loss of power control when 
shutting down the propulsion system of a moving vehicle is a safety 
concern, we believe we would need to address that safety issue for all 
vehicles, not just those fitted with keyless ignitions.
    We ask for comment on whether the safety problem associated with 
loss of power assist to braking and steering is greater than the safety 
risk of the driver believing that s/he has requested the engine to shut 
down and has instead experienced an unexpected action by the vehicle. 
If we were persuaded by comments to the NPRM on this issue that 
allowing auto-shift to ``neutral'' is a countermeasure that meets the 
need for safety, the regulatory language proposed today would be 
altered so that S5.4.1.1(b) would read ``The propulsion system must 
shut off, or remove motive power from the drive wheels, within 1 second 
after the control has been depressed for more than 500 milliseconds.'' 
The phrase ``or remove motive power from the drive wheels,'' is not 
part of the current proposal. We also note that we have seen examples 
where the manufacturer has chosen not to allow the vehicle's propulsion 
system to shut down at all while the vehicle is moving. If today's 
proposal is made final, these systems would not be allowed. We note 
that as early as 1997 we voiced our concern about the fact that such 
systems would not meet driver's expectations.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Letter to a redacted party from John Womack, Acting Chief 
Counsel, January 30, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also considered allowing a vehicle to enter a ``limp home'' 
mode instead of shutting down the propulsion system when shut down is 
requested in a moving vehicle. Such an operating mode would allow the 
driver to finish his or her trip at some reduced maximum allowable 
throttle output, rather than requiring the driver to pull over to the 
side of the road (encumbered with the loss of power assist to braking 
and steering) as would be the case with full engine shut down. While 
this mode has the advantage of allowing the driver to continue his or 
her trip, it has all the disadvantages of the auto-shift to neutral 
listed above. It is also uncertain whether whatever vehicle malfunction 
was causing the excessive throttle condition to which the driver was 
initially responding (by requesting shut down) would also affect the 
``limp home'' mode. For these reasons, we have tentatively decided not 
to allow this mode of operation, but we ask for comment on whether any 
manufacturer is currently using such a ``limp home'' mode when 
propulsion shut down is requested in a moving vehicle and what are the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of such an operating mode.
    Finally, we note that SAE J2948 specifies stop conditions at 
S4.3.2.1., '' Stop Conditions Met.'' Among other matters, S4.3.2.1 
states that the vehicle shall also exit the run mode after multiple 
actuations (defined at S3.7.3 as two or three actuations in a row) of 
the keyless ignition control system. We do not believe that NHTSA needs 
to include this requirement in our proposal since we believe that 
standardizing propulsion control shut down to a 500 msec hold obviates 
the likelihood that the driver will attempt to shut down the propulsion 
system using multiple short presses. We believe this has happened in 
current vehicles because the ``everyday'' shut down procedure is a 
momentary press of the control and the driver uses that momentary press 
in the moving condition also. When it does not work, s/he tries it 
again. S/he is not intentionally pressing multiple times because s/he 
knows the shut down procedure is different while the vehicle is moving, 
s/he's just repeating what s/he thought should work.\20\ If today's 
proposal were made final, the driver will experience no need for 
multiple control actuations; the propulsion system will have 
deactivated within the time period that the driver expects from normal 
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See footnote 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Audible Warning When Key Is in the Starting System and Driver Opens 
the Door

    At present, S5.1.3 of FMVSS No. 114 specifies that an audible 
warning must be activated when the key is in the ignition system and 
the door closest to the driver's designated seating position is opened. 
There are three exceptions to this requirement: (a) After the key has 
been inserted into the starting system, and before the driver takes 
further action; (b) if the key is in the starting system in a manner or 
position that allows the engine or motor to be started or to continue 
operating; or (c) for mechanical keys and starting systems, after the 
key has been withdrawn to a position from which it may not be turned.
    In this NPRM, we propose to limit the exclusion at S5.1.3(b) to 
vehicles with mechanical keys and starting systems. The original logic 
of S5.1.3(b) (i.e., applying to motor vehicles with all types of keys 
and starting systems) was that if the engine were running, then the 
driver must have intentionally left the key behind. However, with 
keyless ignition systems, it is not obvious to the driver that s/he has 
left the ``key'' (the electronic code) behind and also it may not be 
obvious that the engine or other propulsion system is running.
    Therefore, if this NPRM were made final, on vehicles with 
electronic keyless ignition systems, when the ``key'' is left in the 
starting system in a manner or position that allows the engine, motor 
or other propulsion system to be started or to continue operating, the 
audible warning currently excluded by S5.1.3(b) must be activated when 
.the driver's door is opened. S5.1.3 does not specify the volume or 
duration of this audible warning. Many manufacturers currently choose 
to sound this alarm regardless of whether they use a physical or 
electronic key in the vehicle.

D. Audible Warning To Prevent Rollaway

    In this NPRM at S5.4.2 Warnings to driver exiting a vehicle with 
the gear selection control not in ``park'' for vehicles equipped with a 
``park'' position, we propose two new audible alerts of no less than 85 
dBa between 500-3000 Hz. The first, S5.4.2.2, must sound if propulsion 
shut down is requested, the gear selection control is not in ``park,'' 
and the vehicle is moving at less than 15 km/h (9.3 miles per hour). We 
propose that the alert must continue until the gear selection control 
is placed in ``park.'' The gear selection control must be able to be 
moved to the ``park'' position without having to restart the propulsion 
system.
    We are proposing a loud audible warning as opposed to allowing the 
manufacturer a choice between an audible or visual warning (as allowed 
by the SAE RP) for two reasons. First, FMVSS No. 114 currently requires 
an audible warning as discussed above, so drivers are accustomed to 
this type of warning. Secondly, we believe that a visual alert, such as 
a written or pictographic message to the driver in the message center 
of the dashboard (currently used in some vehicles), is too easily 
ignored by the driver. The alert must be loud to guarantee a driver's 
response to this very dangerous situation. The sound level proposed, 85

[[Page 77192]]

dBA between 500-3000 Hz, comes from the threshold- warning alert 
required in FMVSS No. 403, Platform lift systems for motor vehicles. We 
seek comment on whether the test method proposed today in S6.3.1 is the 
best method to measure the sound level and whether the sound level is 
too loud or not loud enough (for this requirement and all other sound 
levels proposed in this NPRM).
    The test procedure proposed at S6.3.1 uses the height of a seated 
50th percentile male dummy to establish the height at which sound 
levels are measured. The proposal is that the sound be measured 740 mm 
above the driver's seat. This height was derived from the fact that the 
seated height of the 50th percentile male dummy (to the top of the 
head) is 909mm and the shoulder height is 565mm above the seat. The 
midpoint of the difference between those two distances is 740mm.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ 909--[(909--565)/2] = 737mm, rounded up is 740mm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An alternative to this loud warning sound could be an audible voice 
command telling the driver exactly what is wrong (for example, 
``Danger. Not in `park'.'') and how to remedy the situation (``Move 
gear selection control to `park'''). This solution may be more helpful 
to the driver, but we do not know if most vehicles currently have the 
capability for voice commands or if such capability could be added at 
very low cost. We know that such artificial human voice alerts have 
been used in some vehicles in the past to alert drivers and passengers 
to potentially harmful conditions, e.g. ``door ajar'' or ``turn off 
headlights.'' We have the following questions regarding this 
alternative form of alert:
     Is a voice command preferable to an unspecified loud 
audible warning?
     How loud should such a voice alert be?
     Should a voice alert be required to be in English?
     Should it be required to be able to be programmed to the 
driver's choice of language?
     Should NHTSA specify the exact words to be used and if so 
what should those words be?
     Are most vehicle manufacturers capable of providing such a 
voice alert and at what cost?
    We propose to use the phrase ``the vehicle is moving at less than 
15 km/h'' in lieu of ``the vehicle is stationary.'' We believe that 
most currently available wheel speed sensors are not capable of 
determining speeds of 0. The 15 km/h figure is also that referenced in 
the final rule establishing the electronic stability control 
system.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See 66 FR 17236, at 17264, April 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second alert, at S5.4.2.3, must sound outside the vehicle if 
the driver does not respond to the internal alarm and continues to exit 
the vehicle without placing the transmission in ``park.'' We propose to 
determine that the driver has left the vehicle by requiring the vehicle 
to sense the absence of the KCCD. The proposed regulatory text is:

    When tested in accordance with S6.3.2, an audible alert of no 
less than 85dBA between 500-3000 Hz, measured outside the vehicle, 
must sound when the door located closest to the driver's designated 
seating position is opened while the gear selection control is not 
in ``park'', the vehicle is moving at less than 15 km/h (9.3 mph), 
and the key code carrying device is not present in the vehicle. This 
alert must sound for 1 minute or until the gear selection control is 
moved to ``park,'' whichever occurs first. This alert is not 
required to sound if the transmission becomes locked in ``park'' as 
a direct result of key removal upon door opening, or upon removal of 
the key code carrying device from the vehicle.

    We seek comment on the ways in which vehicles manufactured today 
sense the absence of the key code carrying device. If the system does 
not already incorporate such a sensor, what would be the cost to add 
it? We realize that sensing the presence or absence of the KCCD is not 
an ideal substitute for sensing the presence or absence of the driver, 
for a number of reasons, primarily that the driver may not take the 
KCCD with him or her, in which case the warning will not sound and the 
vehicle will be left in an unsafe condition--vulnerable to rollaway and 
theft. (Sensing the absence of the KCCD is the approach used in SAE 
J2948.) The driver may be especially likely to leave the KCCD in the 
vehicle when the vehicle is in his or her own garage or driveway. As 
explained in the next section, we also seek comment on whether a one-
second audible warning to the driver leaving a vehicle with the 
propulsion system operating sufficiently reduces this risk.
    One way of sensing the driver's presence is to do it directly, such 
as is done for the right front passenger for the purpose of determining 
whether or not to deploy an air bag in a crash. However, we do not 
believe that most, if any, manufacturers currently have such sensors in 
the driver's position. We estimate that adding some sort of sensor to 
indicate the driver has left the vehicle would cost between $4 per 
vehicle for a seat belt sensor, and $12 per vehicle for a weight sensor 
in the driver's seat. We request comment on how such sensors might be 
used to indicate the presence or absence of the driver, the accuracy of 
our cost estimate, and whether this cost is commensurate with the 
safety risk we are attempting to reduce.
    The sound level required, again 85 dBA between 500-3000 Hz, is 
measured at 1580mm \23\ above the ground, one meter from the vehicle 
(S6.3.3). We also propose that the alarm discontinue after one minute 
(or until the gear selection control has been moved to ``park''), as 
after that time, we believe the alarm has been ignored by the driver 
and will be ignored by any bystanders. We seek comment on the duration 
of the alarm, on whether the alarm should be continuous, and on the 
test method proposed at S6.3.2. We also seek comment on whether such an 
alarm requirement can be readily confused with the antitheft alarm 
system that is already standard on many passenger motor vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ As with the previous discussion this height is based on the 
height of the 50th percentile male dummy. The height to the top of 
the standing dummy's head is 1750mm. Subtracting the same 172mm as 
above leaves 1578mm which we round up to 1580mm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Audible Warning To Reduce Chances of Drivers' Leaving a Vehicle With 
the Propulsion System Active

    In S5.5 Warning to driver exiting a vehicle with the propulsion 
system operating, we propose to require an audible alert to sound 
outside the vehicle if the propulsion system is running, or is capable 
of starting without reintroduction of the electronic key code into the 
starting system, the door closest to the driver's designated seating 
position is opened, and the KCCD is not in the vehicle.
    This is a proposed countermeasure for those cases in which a driver 
is unaware that s/he has inadvertently left the vehicle running. We are 
proposing an alert time of one second because a person walking at an 
average pace of three miles per hour will cover three feet in less than 
one second. After that time and distance, we assume that the driver has 
left the vehicle running intentionally, either because someone else is 
in the vehicle, to facilitate vehicle repair, or for some other reason. 
The alert would sound for one second (rather than one minute, as the 
alert for leaving the vehicle not in ``park'' would sound), because 
leaving the vehicle with the propulsion system on is more commonly 
intentional on the part of the driver, and less immediately risky to 
bystanders. If it sounds for longer than a second, the alert would also 
tend to

[[Page 77193]]

annoy bystanders and serve no purpose. However, we seek comment on 
whether one second is long enough for an alert that the driver has left 
the vehicle with the propulsion system active.
    We recognize that there is a competition between our desire to 
alert the driver to the fact that s/he has inadvertently left the 
vehicle with the propulsion system active and the potential to create a 
nuisance alert when the driver has left the vehicle running 
intentionally. Most of these potential nuisance situations will be 
alleviated if the driver takes the KCCD with him or her. We also 
recognize that there are occasions when a driver may leave the vehicle 
running while a passenger remains in the vehicle. The required alert 
then becomes a nuisance to the passenger, but this is very brief--one 
second. We seek comment on whether this warning would be necessary if 
the manufacturer could determine that seating positions other than the 
driver's are occupied. We know that most vehicles are capable of 
determining if the right front passenger position is occupied for 
purposes of complying with FMVSS No. 208, Occupant protection. Would 
manufacturers value the ability to reduce passenger annoyance equal to 
the cost of adding software to prevent this alarm if the seat were 
occupied, if given the option?
    As with the above section on the ``not in park'' alerts we seek 
comment on whether simulated voice alerts containing a warning (such as 
``Propulsion system active'') and how to remedy the situation (e.g. 
``Turn off propulsion system'') would be an effective alternative to 
the proposed alert and if manufacturers are capable of installing this 
type of alert and at what cost.
    We also recognize that this requirement will not have the intended 
result of preventing vehicle theft or death due to carbon monoxide 
poisoning if the driver does not take the KCCD from the vehicle. A 
driver may be especially prone to leave the KCCD in the vehicle when 
the vehicle is locked in the garage at home. This is another reason 
that we are seeking comment on the availability and cost of sensors 
that would indicate the presence or absence of the driver as discussed 
in the last section.
    As will be explained later, we considered requiring the engine to 
shut down after a specified period of time, however, there are many 
situations in which a driver intends to leave some electrical system or 
the engine in the vehicle running without his or her presence. An 
example is leaving a passenger with heat or air conditioning on while 
the driver runs an errand, or keeping the engine running to prevent the 
inability to restart the engine in a very cold climate. After reviewing 
many possible scenarios and careful consideration, we decided we could 
not propose a time period for shut down that would cover all possible 
reasons consumers would want to leave the propulsion system running in 
their absence from the vehicle.

F. Owner's Manual Required Language

    In order to ensure that drivers who are so inclined have access to 
information on how the propulsion system in their vehicles operates, 
normally, and in the event of an emergency, in this NPRM at S5.6, we 
are proposing to require that manufacturers place in the vehicle's 
owner's manual, instructions regarding the operation of the control(s) 
that stops and starts the propulsion system. This proposed language 
would provide a warning that power assist to steering and braking will 
be lost in the event the propulsion system is shut down while the 
vehicle is in motion. We are also proposing that there must be an 
explanation of how to handle the vehicle safely in the event power 
assist to steering and braking is lost.
    NHTSA has reviewed the available owner's manuals for many 
manufacturers. As a practical matter, we are not aware of any 
manufacturer whose manual does not already address this critical safety 
situation. The proposed language at S5.6 will ensure that this language 
will continue to be maintained. Nothing in this proposed language 
should dissuade a manufacturer from adding additional information, if 
it believes the information would help a driver safely handle the 
vehicle in the event of an emergency.
    We note that NHTSA's proposed language in the owner's manual, if 
made final, would be a ``collection of information'' as defined by the 
Office of Management and Budget at 5 CFR 1320 Controlling Paperwork 
Burdens on the Public. In this NPRM, we seek public comment on this 
proposed collection of information. A full description of this proposed 
collection of information is provided in Section IX Rulemaking Analyses 
and Notices.
    Since we believe that very few drivers actually read the owner's 
manual, we request comment on whether this proposed requirement (and 
hence the collection of information) is actually necessary and if 
manufacturers will continue to provide the instructions for these 
controls regardless of any requirement by NHTSA to do so.

VI. Other Issues Considered by NHTSA

    In the following sections, we will discuss additional measures, 
other than those mentioned above that we have taken under consideration 
to address the safety issues raised in this NPRM. We have considered 
whether each of these measures would meet the need for safety in both 
keyless ignition systems and systems using the traditional physical 
key. We are not proposing regulatory text for the following measures 
and explain why we are not doing so. However, we seek comment on each 
of them and may adopt provisions relating to one or more of them in the 
final rule, if it can be demonstrated that they can be incorporated by 
manufacturers at little cost. Further, nothing in this rulemaking 
should be construed as prohibitions against manufacturers from 
voluntarily incorporating these systems in the passenger motor vehicles 
they manufacture.

A. Propulsion System Kill Switch in Plain View of the Driver

    NHTSA considered whether to require a kill switch in plain view of 
the driver that would stop the propulsion system in the event of an 
emergency. Preferably, this switch would be an eye-catching color, such 
as red, and would be readily accessible on the instrument panel or 
other obvious location. Such a switch would, ideally, be used for all 
stops, not just emergency stops, so that drivers would learn the 
function and correct use of the switch. For example NHTSA requires such 
a switch for motorcycles.\24\ Boats, personal water craft, and 
construction equipment and power tools also have such switches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ FMVSS No. 123 Motorcycle controls and displays, at S5.1. 
states: ``Each motorcycle shall be equipped with a supplemental 
engine stop control, located and operable as specified in Table 1.'' 
Table 1 specifies that this control must be located on the right 
handlebar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has not proposed regulatory text that would require this kill 
switch in passenger motor vehicles. Requiring the separate switch would 
mean adding new equipment to the passenger motor vehicle at issue, thus 
adding expense to the vehicle and possibly requiring a significant 
amount of lead time to implement. We cannot at this time determine 
whether such a switch would be easier for drivers to understand and use 
in an emergency than a stop control that meets the requirements we are 
proposing today. We seek comment and data on whether a stand alone stop 
control would be safer than the combined start/stop control in use now,

[[Page 77194]]

if the stop control function complied with our proposal.

B. Stepping on Brake Before Starting the Propulsion System

    In thinking about the risks associated with today's keyless 
ignition systems, NHTSA considered whether we should propose requiring 
that the driver must first step on the service brake before the 
propulsion system can be started. This feature is currently available 
in some vehicles. It addresses the situation in which an unattended 
child left in a vehicle could play with power windows or other 
electrical system features to which s/he could have access by actuating 
a control that works with a simple touch, even in the absence of the 
KCCD. NHTSA has not proposed regulatory text for this requirement 
because we cannot estimate this risk at this time.
    We also note that on September 1, 2010, the requirement in FMVSS 
No. 114 for a brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) took effect. 
The requirement was mandated by Congress and implemented into FMVSS No. 
114 by rulemaking.\25\ The new S5.3 Brake transmission shift interlock 
states as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ 75 FR 15621, March 30, 2010.

    Each motor vehicle manufactured on or after September 1, 2010 
with a GVWR of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less with an 
automatic transmission that includes a ``park'' position shall be 
equipped with a system that requires the service brake to be 
depressed before the transmission can be shifted out of ``park.'' 
This system shall function in any starting system key position in 
which the transmission can be shifted out of ``park.'' This section 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
does not apply to trailers or motorcycles.

    This S5.3 requirement is intended to prevent children from being 
able to shift the transmission out of ``park'' even if the physical key 
is in the ignition. We believe it also will minimize sudden 
acceleration by brake/accelerator misapplication because the driver 
must have his foot on the brake before the vehicle can be shifted out 
of ``park.'' It would then take a conscious decision to remove the foot 
from the brake, and then onto the accelerator, before the vehicle can 
be set in motion.
    A new requirement that the driver must step on the service brake 
before the propulsion system can be started would extend the length of 
time the driver's foot must be on the brake (i.e., because the foot 
must be on the brake before the propulsion system can be started and 
then when the driver takes the vehicle out of ``park.'') S5.1.4 
specifies that the vehicle must be in ``park'' before the key can be 
removed, so the stopped vehicle should always begin in the ``park'' 
position. The vehicle can only move when the vehicle is taken out of 
``park.'' This is when the driver must step on the brake, before s/he 
makes a conscious decision to move, forward or in reverse.

C. Specified Actuation Time for the Propulsion System Start Control

    As mentioned above, we considered whether to propose specifying, 
for electronic key systems, the amount of time that the driver must 
press on the ``start'' control in order to start the vehicle. We were 
considering a 500 millisecond time period (the same as the time period 
we are proposing to shut down the propulsion system). This would 
indicate to the driver that pushing the control for the same period of 
time (500 milliseconds) would actuate both stopping and starting, i.e., 
that the control works the same way at all times. However, NHTSA 
understands that some manufacturers have received complaints from their 
customers regarding a perceived lengthy start time (such as 500 
milliseconds). To satisfy such drivers, some vehicle manufacturers have 
designed their vehicles to start at a mere tap on the ``start'' 
control, which could be as little as 60 milliseconds.
    After carefully considering this issue and the safety issue that 
would be addressed by such a requirement, NHTSA has decided not to 
propose regulatory text to specify the length of time the ``start'' 
control must be depressed to start the vehicle. We are not aware of any 
safety issues resulting from a ``start'' control that has to be pushed 
for either a too short (e.g., less than 60 millisecond) or a too long 
(e.g., more than two second) period of time.
    We have also considered the fact that when the vehicle is started, 
the transmission position should presumably still be in ``park.'' 
Therefore, even if a sudden start of the vehicle propulsion system 
should startle the driver, the vehicle should not move. Due to the 
brake transmission shift interlock requirement specified at S5.3, the 
driver would then need to depress the service brake in order to shift 
the transmission out of the ``park'' position to commence driving. The 
driver decides when to commence driving.

D. Automatic Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary Vehicle

    When examining possible countermeasures for the situation in which 
a driver walks away from a vehicle with its propulsion system active, 
thereby increasing the risk of theft or carbon monoxide poisoning, 
NHTSA considered a requirement for an automatic shut-off feature 
applied to vehicles fitted with electronic key code systems. We are 
aware that some manufacturers already provide this feature on their 
passenger motor vehicles. Such manufacturers have determined on their 
own the appropriate range of time (15 minutes to half an hour or 
longer) after which the vehicle propulsion system is automatically shut 
off. We are also aware that some systems that allow the vehicle to be 
started from a remote location rather than from inside the vehicle 
(``remote start'') have this feature as well--if the driver does not 
enter the vehicle after a certain amount of time after having remotely 
started the vehicle, the propulsion system will shut off.
    NHTSA is not proposing regulatory text to require these automatic 
shut off systems. We have been unable to conclude that there is a 
specified period of time after which the propulsion system should be 
shut down to effectively address various scenarios mentioned in VOQs 
submitted to the agency. There are scenarios, such as leaving pets in 
the vehicle with the air conditioning or heating system on while the 
driver shops or is at a restaurant, where an automatic shut off of the 
propulsion system would have adverse results. It is our understanding 
that some drivers may stay in their vehicles for hours, for example, to 
sleep, with the air conditioning or heating system on. For the pet 
owner or the person staying in the vehicle for an extended period, it 
would be inconvenient if the propulsion system had to be restarted 
every 15 minutes or so.
    As earlier noted, a consumer submitted a VOQ reporting a carbon 
monoxide build up situation where the driver parked the vehicle in the 
garage without turning off the engine, and locked the garage, but left 
the key fob, or key code carrying device, in the vehicle. Some 
propulsion systems that automatically shut off do so after they sense 
that the KCCD has been removed from the interior of the vehicle. In the 
situation reported in the VOQ, the automatic system would not have shut 
off the propulsion system because it continued to sense the presence of 
the KCCD in the vehicle interior.
    We believe that the new alert that we are proposing would refocus 
the driver's attention on the vehicle when s/he is leaving if s/he has 
inadvertently left the propulsion system active. For these reasons, we 
tentatively conclude that we do not need to regulate vehicle propulsion 
automatic shut off systems at

[[Page 77195]]

this time, however, we request comment on this issue.

E. Preventing Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary Vehicle 
not in ``Park''

    We have reviewed vehicles with keyless ignition systems in 
situations where the driver has forgotten to place the gear selection 
control in ``park'' before shutting down the propulsion system and 
leaving the vehicle. As a countermeasure to rollaway incidents in such 
situations, we have considered whether preventing the propulsion system 
from shutting down unless the gear selection control is in ``park'' 
would meet the need for safety. Some manufacturers already provide this 
feature on their passenger motor vehicles. We considered requiring this 
feature, but have tentatively decided that the internal and external 
alerts that we are proposing are more appropriate because they alert 
the driver to the situation rather than masking it (i.e., not only may 
the driver not realize the gear selection control is not in ``park'', 
s/he may not realize that the propulsion system has not shut down). 
This proposed remedy is simpler and more direct and reinforces the 
message that a driver must put the gear selection control in ``park'' 
before requesting propulsion system shut down, just as the inability to 
remove a traditional key from the ignition if the gear selection 
control was not in ``park'' does. We also believe that a strategy of 
not shutting down a vehicle that is not in ``park'' may contribute to 
an increased risk of carbon monoxide poisoning if a driver walks away 
from a vehicle in this condition. We seek comment on why manufacturers 
who choose to implement this strategy have done so and what are the 
perceived benefits. What would be the cost to implement such a 
strategy? If we were to require such a strategy, should it be instead 
of, or in addition to, the proposed internal and external alarms?

VII. Additional Questions

    NHTSA requests comment on the following questions:
    1. Is there any safety benefit to keyless ignition (separate from 
keyless entry) systems over the traditional physical key that is used 
to turn a rotary switch? Are there cost or weight savings? If there are 
no safety benefits to these new systems over the traditional key, do 
their convenience advantages outweigh the new safety risks we are 
seeing in VOQ submissions?
    2. What would be the effects--safety or otherwise--of requiring 
vehicles to have an ignition system that uses a physical key inserted 
by the driver, in other words, doing away with current ignition systems 
that are activated by electronic key codes and touching some sort of 
switch?
    3. Will vehicles with propulsion stop systems that meet the new 
FMVSS No. 114 requirements proposed in this notice somehow interfere 
with the functioning of anti-theft systems (immobilizers) that are part 
of vehicle antitheft systems available today? \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ We are aware that Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
No. 114 requires the use of immobilizers and that many manufacturers 
equip some or all of the U.S. market vehicles with immobilizers that 
meet the requirements of CMVSS 114 to sell the same vehicles in both 
the U.S. and Canada. We do not want to add requirements to FMVSS No. 
114 that would prevent this practice unnecessarily.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Benefits, Costs and Proposed Lead Time

Benefits
    We believe that the benefits of the new requirements proposed 
today, while not yet quantifiable, would be a reduction in the risk 
that drivers will misuse these new keyless ignition systems and 
therefore a reduction in:
     Crashes, injuries and deaths resulting from a driver's 
inability to shut down a moving vehicle,
     Rollaway incidents and their accompanying crashes, 
injuries, and deaths, and
     Incidents of carbon monoxide poisoning due to drivers 
inadvertently leaving a vehicle running or with its propulsion system 
active in an enclosed space, such as a garage underneath or adjoining a 
home.
    Although the current information indicates a clear safety problem, 
it is difficult to quantify the benefits. However, we believe the 
potential risks justify the costs of this rule. Given that we believe 
the total costs of this proposal would be relatively small, certainly 
less than $500,000 a year, for the entire industry, preventing even one 
serious injury over three years would make the proposed rule cost-
beneficial.
    We believe that taking precautionary steps now, before these non-
standardized systems become more widely available, would be beneficial 
to vehicle safety. The availability of these systems increases every 
model year. For example, for the 11 manufacturers for which we have 
data, production of models with any type of keyless ignition (as 
standard or optional equipment) increased from 5,000 vehicles in model 
year 2002 to over 1.2 million vehicles in model year 2008. For models 
equipped with push button controls as standard or optional equipment, 
production increased from 5,000 vehicles in model year 2002 to over 1.1 
million vehicles in model year 2008. We believe a benefit would accrue 
from establishing consistent experience for the users across all 
vehicles. This simplifies the operation of these systems for drivers, 
reducing the stress and confusion relating to fundamental differences 
in how one operates a vehicle. This is especially important in vehicles 
that provide less obvious cues as to the state of the engine and the 
starting system. We believe the countermeasures we have proposed can 
reasonably be expected to have their intended effect based on similar 
requirements already in place in FMVSS No. 114 and other standards and 
in common automotive practice. For example, the warning to drivers to 
take their key with them when they leave the vehicle (currently in 
FMVSS No. 114) and the threshold warning device for platform lifts 
(currently in FMVSS No. 403) are effective alerts. We see no reason why 
the new alerts proposed here should be less effective. The common 
automotive practice of the rotating ignition switch combined with a 
physical key has standardized engine shut down procedure before the 
advent of the new electronic convenience controls. We believe 
standardizing the operation of these new controls, combined with the 
new alerts, will have the same effect. We believe these new 
requirements are especially worthwhile considering what we believe to 
be minimal costs to implement them. We seek comments on this 
understanding of the benefit of the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 114.
Costs
    The countermeasure for driver confusion over how to shut down a 
moving vehicle is to require that the switch that turns off the 
propulsion system work consistently, whether the vehicle is moving or 
not. In the vehicles that are in production today and are fitted with 
keyless ignition systems, the great majority have push-button type 
switches. Some require a momentary tap, some require longer hold times, 
and some use different times to affect different functions. From our 
knowledge of the operation of current designs, we believe that our 
proposed 500 millisecond hold time is well within the functional range 
of the switches currently in use. The only change necessary, in most 
cases, would be in the lines of software coding for the system operated 
by button. Thus, we believe there would be little incremental cost for 
changing the behavior of the keyless ignition control. There would be 
costs associated with testing the new

[[Page 77196]]

software for correct operation. Those costs would be minimized by the 
lead time we are proposing below. This lead time would allow changes to 
be made between and not during model years.
    We are proposing to require one new internal driver alert and two 
new external driver alerts. Some models already use some version of 
these alerts and other alerts are already required by FMVSS No. 114. In 
most cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound 
generating systems to engage under the right circumstances. For this 
reason, we believe the warning cues proposed here have very little cost 
associated with their implementation.
    Because the incremental cost for equipping every vehicle in the 
fleet would be very small, it follows that regardless of the number of 
vehicles needing a countermeasure, the cost to equip the entire fleet 
would be similarly small.
    We seek comment on our tentative conclusions regarding the costs to 
manufacturers to implement the changes proposed today.
Proposed Lead Time
    If the proposed changes in this NPRM are made final, NHTSA proposes 
a lead time of two years from the next September 1 after a final rule 
is published in the Federal Register. This means, for example, if a 
final rule were published on September 2, 2012, the final rule would 
take effect on September 1, 2015. We believe that this lead time gives 
vehicle manufacturers ample time to implement the new requirements at 
minimal cost, especially given that we believe the required changes 
would be minimal. Manufacturers are already making changes to 
accommodate the SAE RP. The changes we are proposing today would be 
minimal changes from that RP. Comments are requested on this proposed 
lead time.
    We are not proposing a phased-in lead time because we believe that 
the changes we propose today are relatively minor and can be 
implemented in a two-year period. We tentatively conclude that a 
phased-in lead time would be an unnecessary complication that would 
increase cost to the manufacturers and to the agency due to the need to 
keep track of which vehicle lines are subject to compliance in a given 
model year. The percentage of vehicles now using keyless ignition and 
the number of model lines is so small that we believe the proposed 
changes can be made in the proposed two year lead time without phase 
in.\27\ We seek comment on our tentative conclusion that a phased-in 
lead time is not necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ The most recent information we have for a full year of 
production and sales indicates that the 2008 model year production 
of vehicles with keyless ignition standard or optional was 1,212,355 
vehicles while the 2008 calendar year sales of all vehicles was 
13,194,741 vehicles. Therefore, we believe the current sales level 
of keyless ignition vehicles is less than ten percent of the total 
U.S. sales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Orders 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    The agency has considered the impacts of this rulemaking action 
under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and the Department of 
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 11034; 
February 26, 1979). This proposal has been deemed ``non-significant'' 
by the Office of Management and Budget. This NPRM includes the 
following proposed changes to FMVSS No. 114: Establishing a 
standardized time for pushing a control to stop the vehicle propulsion 
system and several new warnings to the driver; requesting propulsion 
system shut down without first moving the gear selection control to the 
``park'' position (for vehicles with a ``park'' position), exiting a 
vehicle with the gear selection control not in ``park'' (for vehicles 
with a ``park'' position), and exiting a vehicle with the propulsion 
system operating.
    None of these proposed changes would require the addition of new 
systems or equipment on existing vehicles. The first proposed change, 
standardizing the time to push a control to stop the vehicle propulsion 
system, could be accomplished by reconfiguring lines of software coding 
for the system operated by the control. The costs involved in 
reconfiguring the software are minimal. For the proposed driver alerts 
(one new internal driver alert and two new external alerts), in most 
cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound generating 
systems to engage under the right circumstances. For these reasons, we 
have tentatively concluded that the warning cues proposed in this NPRM 
have little cost associated with their implementation.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice 
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make 
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that 
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small 
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions). 
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121 
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates 
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency 
certifies that the rule would not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities. The SBREFA amended the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a 
statement of the factual basis for certifying that a rule will not have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
    NHTSA has considered the effects of this rulemaking action under 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act. According to 13 CFR 121.201, the Small 
Business Administration's size standards regulations used to define 
small business concerns, manufacturers of passenger vehicles would fall 
under North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) No. 336111, 
Automobile Manufacturing, which has a size standard of 1,000 employees 
or fewer. Using the size standard of 1,000 employees or fewer, NHTSA 
estimates that there are a limited number of small business 
manufacturers of passenger vehicles subject to the proposed 
requirements. These small U.S. businesses, which include Tesla, 
manufacture specialty passenger cars which serve niche markets.
    I hereby certify that this proposed rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The basis for this certification is that as earlier stated, if made 
final, none of these proposed changes would require the addition of new 
systems or equipment on existing vehicles, and would result in minimal 
costs to all businesses, small and large. The first proposed change, 
standardizing the time to push a control to stop the vehicle propulsion 
system, would incur minimal costs resulting from reconfiguring lines of 
software coding for the system operated by the control. All the 
proposed driver alerts can rely on the existing systems that are 
already required by FMVSS No. 114 or used for other purposes. In most 
cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound generating 
systems to engage under the right circumstances.

[[Page 77197]]

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has examined today's NPRM pursuant to Executive Order 13132 
(64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional 
consultation with States, local governments or their representatives is 
mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that 
the rulemaking would not have sufficient federalism implications to 
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation 
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule would not have 
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    NHTSA rules can preempt in two ways. First, the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision:

    When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this 
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe 
or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of 
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if 
the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this 
chapter.

    49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1).
    It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-
identical State legislative and administrative law addressing the same 
aspect of performance.
    The express preemption provision described above is subject to a 
savings clause under which ``[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety 
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from 
liability at common law.'' 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) Pursuant to this 
provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle 
manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express 
preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied 
preemption of such State common law tort causes of action by virtue of 
NHTSA's rules, even if not expressly preempted. This second way that 
NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon there being an actual 
conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would 
effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone 
obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer, 
notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. 
Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum 
standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose 
a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be 
preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist--for 
example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum 
standard--the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly 
preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
    Pursuant to Executive Order 13132 and 12988, NHTSA has considered 
whether this rule could or should preempt State common law causes of 
action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the 
preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that 
preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.
    To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language 
and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of today's rule 
and finds that this rule, like many NHTSA rules, prescribes only a 
minimum safety standard. As such, NHTSA does not intend that this rule 
preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard 
on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by today's rule. 
Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not 
conflict with the minimum standard announced here. Without any 
conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common 
law tort cause of action. Nevertheless, we solicit the comments of the 
States and other interested parties on this assessment of issues 
relevant to E.O. 13132.

National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this NPRM for the purposes of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that implementation 
of this action would not have any significant impact on the quality of 
the human environment.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Before a Federal agency can collect certain information from the 
public, it must receive approval from the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a person is 
not required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal 
agency unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. 
Before seeking OMB approval, Federal agencies must publish a document 
in the Federal Register providing a 60-day public comment period and 
otherwise consult with members of the public and affected agencies 
concerning each proposed collection of information. In this NPRM, we 
are proposing a revision to an existing OMB approved collection, OMB 
Clearance No. 2127-0541, Consolidated Justification of Owner's Manual 
Requirements for Motor Vehicles and Equipment, for which we are 
soliciting public comment.
    Title: Consolidated Justification of Owner's Manual Requirements 
for Motor Vehicles and Equipment.
    OMB Control Number and Expiration Date: OMB Control No. 2127-0541, 
approved through May 31, 2012.
    Type of Request: Revision of a currently approved collection.
    Abstract: In this NPRM, at S5.6 Owner's manual required language, 
we are proposing that manufacturers must place in the vehicle owner's 
manual, instructions regarding the operation of the control(s) that 
stops and starts the propulsion system. This language (which the 
manufacturers would provide) must contain a warning that power assist 
to steering and braking will be lost in the event the propulsion system 
is shut down while the vehicle is in motion. There must also be an 
explanation of how to handle the vehicle safely in the event power 
assist to steering and braking is lost.
    If this proposed S5.6 language (in FMVSS No. 114) is made final, we 
will submit a request for OMB clearance of the proposed collection of 
information in time to obtain clearance prior to the effective date of 
the final rule.
    Description of the likely respondents--Manufacturers of passenger 
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and multipurpose 
passenger vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less. NHTSA estimates 
that there are a total of 21 such manufacturers.
    Estimated total annual reporting and recordkeeping burden of the 
proposed collection of information--The total estimated annual burden 
(counting all respondents) is estimated at 21 hours. This breaks down 
to an estimated one hour per manufacturer to write the information to 
be provided in the owner's manual. 21 times one hour each results in 21 
estimated burden hours for report preparation. Because the information 
to be provided is of a very general nature, NHTSA does not believe that 
manufacturers must provide separate explanations for each vehicle line 
or model they produce regarding how to handle a vehicle in the event of 
an emergency.
    There are no proposed recordkeeping requirements associated with 
this collection of information.
    Estimated total annual costs of the proposed collection of 
information--

[[Page 77198]]

NHTSA believes all manufacturers already have the engineering staff on 
hand needed to write the description, which they will accomplish in the 
regular performance of their duties. The additional few pages in an 
owner's manual (or, especially, information on a CD ROM) will result in 
minimal additional costs. NHTSA notes that it is not aware of any 
manufacturer that is not already providing this information in the 
vehicle owner's manuals. Therefore, NHTSA believes the cost of 
complying would be $0.
    Comments are invited on: (i) Whether the proposed collection of 
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of 
the agency, including whether the information will have practical 
utility; (ii) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of 
the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions; (iii) How to enhance the quality, utility, 
and clarity of the information to be collected; and (iv) How to 
minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are 
to respond, including the use of appropriate automated, electronic, 
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms 
of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of 
responses.
    Please provide comments on this proposed collection of information 
by the comment due date cited in the DATES section of this NPRM, and 
please reference the docket number cited in the heading of this notice 
in your comments. Any of the means of comment described in the 
ADDRESSES section of this NPRM may be used.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 
(NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), ``all Federal agencies and departments shall 
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary 
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means 
to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies 
and departments.'' For today's NPRM, NHTSA has relied on an SAE 
Recommended Practice, J2948 Keyless Ignition Control Design (January 
2011) for guidance.

Executive Order 12988

    With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, 
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR 
4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every 
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies 
the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing 
Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for 
affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; 
(4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately 
defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting 
clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the 
Attorney General. This document is consistent with that requirement.
    Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as follows.
    The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 
13132. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that 
individuals submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other 
administrative proceeding before they may file suit in court.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to 
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects 
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to 
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually 
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995 this is $141.23 million 
in 2009 dollars). This NPRM, if made final, would not result in 
expenditures by State, local or tribal governments, in the aggregate, 
or by the private sector in excess of $141.23 million annually.

Executive Order 13045

    Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997) applies to any 
rule that: (1) Is determined to be ``economically significant'' as 
defined under E.O. 12866, and (2) concerns an environmental, health, or 
safety risk that NHTSA has reason to believe may have a 
disproportionate effect on children. This rulemaking is not subject to 
the Executive Order because it is not economically significant as 
defined in E.O. 12866. However, since this NPRM, if made final, would 
make more explicit how the stop control on electronic keyless coded 
vehicles are to be actuated, and would provide warnings to the driver, 
it should have a beneficial safety effect on children riding in such 
vehicles.

Executive Order 13211

    Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 18, 2001) applies to any 
rulemaking that: (1) Is determined to be economically significant as 
defined under E.O. 12866, and is likely to have a significantly adverse 
effect on the supply of, distribution of, or use of energy; or (2) that 
is designated by the Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action. This rulemaking is 
not subject to E.O. 13211.

Plain Language

    Executive Order 12866 requires each agency to write all rules in 
plain language. Application of the principles of plain language 
includes consideration of the following questions:
     Have we organized the material to suit the public's needs?
     Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
     Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that 
isn't clear?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, 
use of headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
     Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
     Could we improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or 
diagrams?
     What else could we do to make the rule easier to 
understand?
    If you have any responses to these questions, please include them 
in your comments on this proposal.

Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier 
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of 
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center 
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may 
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document 
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78).

X. Public Participation

How do I prepare and submit comments?

    Your comments must be written and in English. To ensure that your 
comments are correctly filed in the Docket, please include the docket

[[Page 77199]]

number of this document in your comments.
    Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). 
We established this limit to encourage you to write your primary 
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may attach necessary 
additional documents to your comments. There is no limit on the length 
of the attachments.
    Comments may also be submitted to the docket electronically by 
logging onto the Federal Docket Management System Web site at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
    Please note that pursuant to the Data Quality Act, in order for 
substantive data to be relied upon and used by the agency, it must meet 
the information quality standards set forth in the OMB and DOT Data 
Quality Act guidelines. Accordingly, we encourage you to consult the 
guidelines in preparing your comments. OMB's guidelines may be accessed 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/reproducible.html. DOT's 
guidelines may be accessed at http://www.bts.gov/programs/statistical_policy_and_research/data_quality_guidelines/html/introduction.html.

How can I be sure that my comments were received?

    If you wish Docket Management to notify you upon its receipt of 
your comments, enclose a self-addressed, stamped postcard in the 
envelope containing your comments. Upon receiving your comments, Docket 
Management will return the postcard by mail.

How do I submit confidential business information?

    If you wish to submit any information under a claim of 
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete 
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential 
business information, to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given 
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, you should 
submit a copy, from which you have deleted the claimed confidential 
business information, to the docket at the address given above under 
ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed to be 
confidential business information, you should include a cover letter 
setting forth the information specified in our confidential business 
information regulation. (49 CFR part 512.)

Will the agency consider late comments?

    We will consider all comments received before the close of business 
on the comment closing date indicated above under DATES. To the extent 
possible, we will also consider comments that the docket receives after 
that date. If the docket receives a comment too late for us to consider 
in developing a final rule (assuming that one is issued), we will 
consider that comment as an informal suggestion for future rulemaking 
action.

How can I read the comments submitted by other people?

    You may read the comments received by the docket at the address 
given above under ADDRESSES. The hours of the docket are indicated 
above in the same location. You may also see the comments on the 
Internet. To read the comments on the Internet, go to  http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for accessing the 
dockets.
    Please note that even after the comment closing date, we will 
continue to file relevant information in the docket as it becomes 
available. Further, some people may submit late comments. Accordingly, 
we recommend that you periodically check the Docket for new material. 
You can arrange with the docket to be notified when others file 
comments in the docket. See www.regulations.gov for more information.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, and Tires.

    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA proposes to amend 49 CFR 
Part 571 as set forth below.

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

    1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117 and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    2. Section 571.114 is amended by:
    a. revising S1.;
    b. revising S2.;
    c. revising in S4, the definition of ``Key'';
    d. adding, in S4, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Key 
code carrying device'', ``Starting system'' and ``Stop control'';
    e. revising in S5, the first sentence;
    f. revising in S5.1.3, paragraph (b);
    g. adding S5.4;
    h. adding S5.4.1;
    i. adding S5.4.1.1, and paragraphs (a) through (c);
    j. adding S5.4.2;
    k. adding S5.4.2.1;
    l. adding S5.4.2.2;
    m. adding S5.4.2.3;
    n. adding S5.5;
    o. adding S5.6;
    p. revising S6.;
    q. revising S6.2;
    r. adding S6.3
    s. adding S6.3.1 paragraphs (a) through (i);
    t. adding S6.3.2 paragraphs (a) through (i); and
    u. adding S6.3.3 paragraphs (a) through (g).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  571.114  Standard No. 114; Theft protection and rollaway 
prevention.

    S1. Scope. This standard specifies vehicle performance requirements 
intended to reduce the incidence of crashes and injuries resulting from 
theft, accidental rollaway of motor vehicles, inability to deactivate 
the vehicle propulsion system and inadvertently leaving the system 
activated.
    S2. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to decrease the 
likelihood that a vehicle is stolen, is accidentally set in motion, 
cannot be stopped during a panic situation, or is shut down without the 
gear in the ``park'' position or without deactivating the vehicle 
propulsion system.
* * * * *
    S4. Definitions.
* * * * *
    Key means a physical device or an electronic code which, when 
inserted into the starting system (by physical or electronic means), 
enables the vehicle operator to activate the engine, motor or other 
system that provides propulsion to the motor vehicle.
    Key code carrying device means a physical device which is capable 
of electronically transmitting the key code to the vehicle starting 
system without physical connection (other than its presence in the 
vehicle) between the device and the vehicle.
* * * * *
    Starting system means the vehicle system used in conjunction with 
the key to activate the engine, motor or other system which provides 
propulsion to the motor vehicle.
    Stop control means the device used by the driver to deactivate the 
engine, motor or other system which provides propulsion to the motor 
vehicle.
* * * * *
    S5. Requirements. Each vehicle subject to this standard must meet 
the

[[Page 77200]]

requirements of S5.1 through S5.5. * * *
* * * * *
    S5.1.3 * * *
    (b) For mechanical keys and starting systems, if the key is in the 
starting system in a manner or position that allows the engine or motor 
to be started or to continue operating; or
* * * * *
    S5.4 Requirements for vehicles using electronic codes to access the 
starting system without physical connection between the key and the 
vehicle.
    S5.4.1 Propulsion system deactivation
    S5.4.1.1. For a vehicle equipped with a propulsion system stop 
control that is activated by the driver pressing on the control--
    (a) The vehicle's propulsion system must not stop until the control 
has been depressed for more than 500 milliseconds.
    (b) The propulsion system must shut off within 1 second after the 
control is first pressed.
    (c) Restarting the propulsion system after it has been stopped, but 
the vehicle is still moving at more than 15 km/h (9.3 mph), is 
permitted only by means of actuating the control used by the driver to 
start the propulsion system.
    S5.4.2 Warnings to driver exiting a vehicle with the gear selection 
control not in ``park,'' for vehicles equipped with a ``park'' 
position.
    S5.4.2.1. Motor vehicles whose transmissions have a ``park'' 
position and whose starting system is accessed by electronic key codes 
without any physical connection between the key and the vehicle shall 
meet the requirements of S5.4.2.2 and S5.4.2.3.
    S5.4.2.2 When tested in accordance with S6.3.1, an audible alert of 
no less than 85dBA between 500-3000 Hz must sound when the driver 
actuates the stop control while the gear selection control is not in 
``park'' and the vehicle is moving at less than 15 km/h (9.3 mph). This 
alert must continue until the gear selection control is placed in 
``park''. The gear selection control must be movable to the ``park'' 
position without the restarting of the propulsion system.
    S5.4.2.3. When tested in accordance with S6.3.2, an audible alert 
of no less than 85dBA between 500-3000 Hz, measured outside the 
vehicle, must sound when the door located closest to the driver's 
designated seating position is opened while the gear selection control 
is not in ``park'', the vehicle is moving at less than 15 km/h (9.3 
mph), and the key code carrying device is not present in the vehicle. 
This alert must sound for 1 minute or until the gear selection control 
is moved to ``park,'' whichever occurs first. This alert is not 
required to sound if the transmission becomes locked in ``park'' as a 
direct result of key removal upon door opening, or upon removal of the 
key code carrying device from the vehicle.
    S5.5 Warning to driver exiting a vehicle while propulsion system is 
operating. When tested in accordance with section S6.3.3, an audible 
alert of no less than 85dBA between 500-3000 Hz, measured outside the 
vehicle, must sound if, the propulsion system is actuated, or capable 
of actuating without reintroduction of the electronic key code into the 
starting system, the door located closest to the driver's designated 
seating position is opened, and the key code carrying device is not 
present in the vehicle. This alert must sound for no less than 1 
second.
    S5.6 Owner's manual required language. In the vehicle's owner's 
manual, the manufacturer must place instructions regarding the 
operation of the control(s) that starts and stops the propulsion 
system. This language must contain a warning that power assist to 
steering and braking will be lost in the event the propulsion system is 
shut down while the vehicle is in motion. There must be an explanation 
of how to handle the vehicle safely in the event power assist to 
steering and braking is lost.
    S6. Compliance test procedure.
* * * * *
    S6.2 Test procedure for vehicles with transmissions with a ``park'' 
position.
* * * * *
    S6.3 Test procedures for vehicles using electronic key codes with 
their starting systems.
    S6.3.1(a) Enter the vehicle with the key code carrying device.
    (b) Actuate the propulsion system start control.
    (c) Place the gear selection control in any position except 
``park''
    (d) Activate the propulsion system stop control.
    (e) Verify that an alert sounds.
    (f) Measure the sound level of this alert at 740 mm above the 
driver's seat.
    (g) Verify that the sound level is no less than 85dBA between 500-
3000Hz.
    (h) Move the gear selection control to the ``park'' position.
    (i) Verify that the alert stops.
    S6.3.2 (a) Enter the vehicle with the key code carrying device and 
sit in the driver's seat.
    (b) Actuate the propulsion system start control.
    (c) Place the gear selection control in any position except 
``park''.
    (d) Actuate the propulsion system stop control.
    (e) Open the driver's door, exit the vehicle with the key code 
carrying device and close the driver's door.
    (f) Verify that an alert can be heard exterior to the vehicle.
    (g) Verify the sound level of the alert is no less than 85 dBA at 
500-3000 Hz measured 1 meter perpendicular to the driver's door and 
1580 mm above the ground.
    (h) Without moving the gear selection control to the ``park'' 
position, verify that the alert continues to sound for 1 minute.
    (i) Verify that the alert sounds until the gear selection control 
is moved to the ``park'' position.
    S6.3.3 (a) Enter the vehicle with the key code carrying device and 
sit in the driver's seat.
    (b) Actuate the propulsion system start control.
    (c) Do not actuate the propulsion system stop control.
    (d) Open the driver's door, exit the vehicle with the key code 
carrying device and close the driver's door.
    (e) Verify that an alert can be heard exterior to the vehicle.
    (f) Verify the sound level of the alert is no less than 85 dBA at 
500-3000 Hz measured 1 meter perpendicular to the driver's door and 
1580mm above the ground.
    (g) Verify that the alert continues to sound for no less than 1 
sec.

    Issued on: December 1, 2011.
Christopher J. Bonanti,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 2011-31441 Filed 12-9-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P