Document ID: SEC-2018-1105-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Proposed Rule
Title: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds
Posted Date: 2018-07-17T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 137 (Tuesday, July 17, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 33432-33605]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-13502]

[[Page 33431]]

Vol. 83

Tuesday,

No. 137

July 17, 2018

Part III

Department of the Treasury

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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Federal Reserve System

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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

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Securities and Exchange Commission

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Commodity Futures Trading Commission

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12 CFR Parts 44, 248, and 351

17 CFR Parts 75 and 255

Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds 
and Private Equity Funds; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 137 / Tuesday, July 17, 2018 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 33432]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 44

[Docket No. OCC-2018-0010]
RIN 1557-AE27

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 248

[Docket No. R-1608]
RIN 7100-AF 06

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 351

RIN 3064-AE67

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 255

[Release no. BHCA-3; File no. S7-14-18]
RIN 3235-AM10

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 75

RIN 3038-AE72

Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (``OCC''); 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (``Board''); Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (``FDIC''); Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``SEC''); and Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(``CFTC'').

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The OCC, Board, FDIC, SEC, and CFTC (individually, an 
``Agency,'' and collectively, the ``Agencies'') are requesting comment 
on a proposal that would amend the regulations implementing section 13 
of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act). Section 13 contains certain 
restrictions on the ability of a banking entity and nonbank financial 
company supervised by the Board to engage in proprietary trading and 
have certain interests in, or relationships with, a hedge fund or 
private equity fund. The proposed amendments are intended to provide 
banking entities with clarity about what activities are prohibited and 
to improve supervision and implementation of section 13.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 17, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties are encouraged to submit written comments 
jointly to all of the Agencies. Commenters are encouraged to use the 
title ``Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds'' to 
facilitate the organization and distribution of comments among the 
Agencies. Commenters are also encouraged to identify the number of the 
specific question for comment to which they are responding. Comments 
should be directed to:
    OCC: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC 
is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments 
through the Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please 
use the title ``Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds'' to facilitate the organization 
and distribution of the comments. You may submit comments by any of the 
following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal--``regulations.gov'': Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2018-0010'' in the Search 
Box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Comment Now'' to submit public 
comments.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for 
submitting public comments.
     Email: [email protected].
     Mail: Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, Suite 3E-
218, Washington, DC 20219.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th Street SW, Suite 3E-218, 
Washington, DC 20219.
     Fax: (571) 465-4326.
    Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and 
``Docket ID OCC-2018-0010'' in your comment. In general, the OCC will 
enter all comments received into the docket and publish the comments on 
the Regulations.gov website without change, including any business or 
personal information that you provide such as name and address 
information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received, 
including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the 
public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any 
information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider 
confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
    You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to 
this rulemaking action by any of the following methods:
     Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2018-0010'' in the Search 
box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Open Docket Folder'' on the right 
side of the screen and then ``Comments.'' Comments can be filtered by 
clicking on ``View All'' and then using the filtering tools on the left 
side of the screen.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov. Supporting materials may 
be viewed by clicking on ``Open Docket Folder'' and then clicking on 
``Supporting Documents.'' The docket may be viewed after the close of 
the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
     Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect 
and photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW, Washington, DC 
20219. For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an 
appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-
6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-
5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid 
government-issued photo identification and submit to security screening 
in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
    Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. R-1608; 
RIN 7100-AF 06, by any of the following methods:
     Agency Website: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
     Email: [email protected]. Include docket 
and RIN numbers in the subject line of the message.
     Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
     Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, 
Washington, DC 20551. All public comments are available from the 
Board's website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted, unless modified for technical

[[Page 33433]]

reasons or to remove sensitive personal information at the commenter's 
request. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in paper 
form in Room 3515, 1801 K Street NW. (between 18th and 19th Streets NW) 
Washington, DC 20006 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays.
    FDIC: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3064-AE67 by any 
of the following methods:
     Agency Website: http://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html. Follow instructions for submitting comments on 
the Agency website.
     Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: 
Comments/Legal ESS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th 
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivered/Courier: Comments may be hand-delivered to 
the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street Building (located 
on F Street) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
     Email: [email protected]. Include the RIN 3064-AE67 on the 
subject line of the message.
     Public Inspection: All comments received must include the 
agency name and RIN 3064-AE67 for this rulemaking. All comments 
received will be posted without change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/, including any personal information provided. 
Paper copies of public comments may be ordered from the FDIC Public 
Information Center, 3501 North Fairfax Drive, Room E-1002, Arlington, 
VA 22226 or by telephone at (877) 275-3342 or (703) 562-2200.
    SEC: You may submit comments by the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the SEC's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
    Send an email to [email protected]. Please include File Number 
S7-14-18 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-14-18. This file number 
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us 
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one 
method. The SEC will post all comments on the SEC's website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments are also available for 
website viewing and printing in the SEC's Public Reference Room, 100 F 
Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the 
hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted 
without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that the SEC 
does not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment 
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make 
available publicly.
    Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the 
SEC or SEC staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A 
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any materials will 
be made available on the SEC's website. To ensure direct electronic 
receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay Connected'' 
option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.
    CFTC: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3038-AE72 and 
``Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds 
and Private Equity Funds,'' by any of the following methods:
     Agency Website: https://comments.cftc.gov. Follow the 
instructions on the website for submitting comments.
     Mail: Send to Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, 
DC 20581.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as Mail above.
    Please submit your comments using only one method. All comments 
must be submitted in English, or if not, accompanied by an English 
translation. Comments will be posted as received to www.cftc.gov and 
the information you submit will be publicly available. If, however, you 
submit information that ordinarily is exempt from disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act, you may submit a petition for confidential 
treatment of the exempt information according to the procedures set 
forth in CFTC Regulation 145.9.1. The CFTC reserves the right, but 
shall have no obligation, to review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse 
or remove any or all of your submission from www.cftc.gov that it may 
deem to be inappropriate for publication, such as obscene language. All 
submissions that have been redacted or removed that contain comments on 
the merits of the rulemaking will be retained in the public comment 
file and will be considered as required under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and other applicable laws, and may be accessible under 
the Freedom of Information Act.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    OCC: Suzette Greco, Assistant Director; Tabitha Edgens, Senior 
Attorney; Mark O'Horo, Attorney, Securities and Corporate Practices 
Division (202) 649-5510; for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, 
TTY, (202) 649-5597, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th 
Street SW, Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: Kevin Tran, Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 452-2309, 
Amy Lorenc, Financial Analyst, (202) 452-5293, David Lynch, Deputy 
Associate Director, (202) 452-2081, David McArthur, Senior Economist, 
(202) 452-2985, Division of Supervision and Regulation; Flora Ahn, 
Senior Counsel, (202) 452-2317, Gregory Frischmann, Counsel, (202) 452-
2803, or Kirin Walsh, Attorney, (202) 452-3058, Legal Division, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets NW, 
Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only, Telecommunication 
Device for the Deaf (TDD), (202) 263-4869.
    FDIC: Bobby R. Bean, Associate Director, [email protected], Michael 
Spencer, Chief, Capital Markets Strategies Section, 
[email protected], or Brian Cox, Capital Markets Policy Analyst, 
[email protected], Capital Markets Branch, (202) 898-6888; Michael B. 
Phillips, Counsel, [email protected], Benjamin J. Klein, Counsel, 
[email protected], or Annmarie H. Boyd, Counsel, [email protected], Legal 
Division, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20429.
    SEC: Andrew R. Bernstein (Senior Special Counsel), Sophia Colas 
(Attorney-Adviser), Sam Litz (Attorney-Adviser), Office of Derivatives 
Policy and Trading Practices, or Aaron Washington (Special Counsel), 
Elizabeth Sandoe (Senior Special Counsel), Carol McGee (Assistant 
Director), or Josephine J. Tao (Assistant Director), at (202) 551-5777, 
Division of Trading and Markets, and Nicholas Cordell, Matthew Cook, 
Aaron Gilbride (Branch Chief), Brian McLaughlin Johnson (Assistant 
Director), and Sara Cortes (Assistant Director), at (202) 551-6787 or 
[email protected], Division of Investment Management, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.
    CFTC: Erik Remmler, Deputy Director, (202) 418-7630, 
[email protected]; Cantrell Dumas, Special Counsel, (202) 418-5043, 
[email protected]; Jeffrey Hasterok, Data and Risk Analyst, (646) 746-
9736, [email protected], Division

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of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight; Mark Fajfar, Assistant 
General Counsel, (202) 418-6636, [email protected], Office of the 
General Counsel; Stephen Kane, Research Economist, (202) 418-5911, 
[email protected], Office of the Chief Economist; Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre,1155 21st Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the 
``Dodd-Frank Act'') was enacted on July 21, 2010.\1\ Section 619 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act added a new section 13 to the BHC Act (codified at 12 
U.S.C. 1851), also known as the Volcker Rule, that generally prohibits 
any banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading or from 
acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having 
certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund 
(``covered fund''), subject to certain exemptions.\2\
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    \1\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    \2\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851. Section 13 of the BHC Act does not 
prohibit a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board from 
engaging in proprietary trading, or from having the types of 
ownership interests in or relationships with a covered fund that a 
banking entity is prohibited or restricted from having under section 
13 of the BHC Act. However, section 13 of the BHC Act provides that 
a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board would be subject 
to additional capital requirements, quantitative limits, or other 
restrictions if the company engages in certain proprietary trading 
or covered fund activities. See 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(2) and (f)(4).
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    Section 13 of the BHC Act generally prohibits banking entities from 
engaging as principal in trading for the purpose of selling financial 
instruments in the near term or otherwise with the intent to resell in 
order to profit from short-term price movements.\3\ Section 13(d)(1) 
expressly exempts from this prohibition, subject to conditions, certain 
activities, including:
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    \3\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1)(A); 1851(h)(4) and (6).
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     Trading in U.S. government, agency, and municipal 
obligations;
     Underwriting and market-making-related activities;
     Risk-mitigating hedging activities;
     Trading on behalf of customers;
     Trading for the general account of insurance companies; 
and
     Foreign trading by non-U.S. banking entities.\4\
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    \4\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1).
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    Section 13 of the BHC Act also generally prohibits banking entities 
from acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, or sponsoring, a 
hedge fund or private equity fund.\5\ Section 13 contains several 
exemptions that permit banking entities to make limited investments in 
covered funds, subject to a number of restrictions designed to ensure 
that banking entities do not rescue investors in these funds from loss 
and are not themselves exposed to significant losses from investments 
or other relationships with these funds.\6\
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    \5\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1)(B).
    \6\ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(G).
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    Under the statute, authority for developing and adopting 
regulations to implement the prohibitions and restrictions of section 
13 of the BHC Act is divided among the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (individually, 
an ``Agency,'' and collectively, the ``Agencies'').\7\ The Agencies 
issued a final rule implementing these provisions in December 2013 (the 
``2013 final rule'').\8\
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    \7\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(2). Under section 13(b)(2)(B) of the 
BHC Act, rules implementing section 13's prohibitions and 
restrictions must be issued by: (i) The appropriate Federal banking 
agencies (i.e., the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC), jointly, with 
respect to insured depository institutions; (ii) the Board, with 
respect to any company that controls an insured depository 
institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company for 
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act, any nonbank 
financial company supervised by the Board, and any subsidiary of any 
of the foregoing (other than a subsidiary for which an appropriate 
Federal banking agency, the SEC, or the CFTC is the primary 
financial regulatory agency); (iii) the CFTC with respect to any 
entity for which it is the primary financial regulatory agency, as 
defined in section 2 of the Dodd-Frank Act; and (iv) the SEC with 
respect to any entity for which it is the primary financial 
regulatory agency, as defined in section 2 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
See id.
    \8\ See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity Funds; Final Rule, 79 FR 5535 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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    The Agencies have now had several years of experience implementing 
the 2013 final rule and believe that supervision and implementation of 
the 2013 final rule can be substantially improved. The Agencies 
acknowledge concerns that some parts of the 2013 final rule may be 
unclear and potentially difficult to implement in practice. Based on 
experience since adoption of the 2013 final rule, the Agencies have 
identified opportunities, consistent with the statute, for improving 
the rule, including further tailoring its application based on the 
activities and risks of banking entities. Accordingly, the Agencies are 
issuing this proposal (the ``proposal'' or ``proposed amendments'') to 
amend the 2013 final rule, in order to provide banking entities with 
greater clarity and certainty about what activities are prohibited and 
seek to improve effective allocation of compliance resources where 
possible. The Agencies also believe that the modifications proposed 
herein would improve the ability of the Agencies to examine for, and 
make supervisory assessments regarding, compliance relative to the 
statute and the implementing rules.
    While section 13 of the BHC Act addresses certain risks related to 
proprietary trading and covered fund activities of banking entities, 
the Agencies note that the nature and business of banking entities 
involves other inherent risks, such as credit risk and general market 
risk. To that end, the Agencies have various tools, such as the 
regulatory capital rules of the Federal banking agencies and the 
comprehensive capital analysis and review framework of the Board, to 
require banking entities to manage the risks associated with their 
activities. The Agencies believe that the proposed changes to the 2013 
final rule would be consistent with safety and soundness and enable 
banking entities to implement appropriate risk management policies in 
light of the risks associated with the activities in which banking 
entities are permitted to engage under section 13.
    The Agencies also note that the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
and Consumer Protection Act,\9\ which was enacted on May 24, 2018, 
amends section 13 of the BHC Act by narrowing the definition of banking 
entity and revising the statutory provisions related to the naming of 
covered funds. The Agencies plan to address these statutory amendments 
through a separate rulemaking process; no changes have been proposed 
herein that would implement these amendments. The amendments took 
effect upon enactment, however, and in the interim between enactment 
and the adoption of implementing regulations, the Agencies will not 
enforce the 2013 final rule in a manner inconsistent with the 
amendments to section 13 of the BHC Act with respect to institutions 
excluded by the statute and with respect to the naming restrictions for 
covered funds. Additionally, the specific regulatory amendments 
proposed herein would not be inconsistent with the

[[Page 33435]]

recent statutory amendments to section 13 of the BHC Act.
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    \9\ Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296-1368 (2018).
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A. Rulemaking Framework

    Section 13 of the BHC Act requires that implementation of its 
provisions occur in several stages. The first stage in implementing 
section 13 of the BHC Act was a study by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (``FSOC'').\10\ The FSOC study was issued on January 
18, 2011, and included a detailed discussion of key issues and 
recommendations related to implementation of section 13 of the BHC 
Act.\11\
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    \10\ FSOC, Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity Funds (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf (FSOC 
study); see 12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(1). Prior to publishing its study, the 
FSOC requested public comment on a number of issues to assist the 
FSOC in conducting its study. See Public Input for the Study 
Regarding the Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary 
Trading and Certain Relationships With Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 75 FR 61758 (Oct. 6, 2010). Approximately 8,000 
comments were received from the public, including from members of 
Congress, trade associations, individual banking entities, consumer 
groups, and individuals. As noted in the issuing release for the 
FSOC study, these comments were considered by the FSOC when drafting 
the FSOC study.
    \11\ See id.
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    Following the FSOC study, and as required by section 13(b)(2) of 
the BHC Act, the Board, OCC, FDIC, and SEC in October 2011 invited the 
public to comment on a proposal implementing the requirements of 
section 13 of the BHC Act.\12\ In February 2012, the CFTC issued a 
proposal that was substantially identical to the one proposed in 
October 2011 by the other four Agencies.\13\ The Agencies received more 
than 600 unique comment letters, including from members of Congress; 
domestic and foreign banking entities and other financial services 
firms; trade groups representing banking, insurance, and the broader 
financial services industry; U.S. state and foreign governments; 
consumer and public interest groups; and individuals. The comments 
addressed all major sections of the 2011 proposal. To improve 
understanding of the issues raised by commenters, the staffs of the 
Agencies met with a number of these commenters to discuss issues 
relating to the 2011 proposal, and summaries of these meetings are 
available on each of the Agencies' public websites.\14\ The CFTC staff 
also hosted a public roundtable on the 2011 proposal.\15\ In 
formulating the 2013 final rule, the Agencies carefully reviewed all 
comments submitted in connection with the rulemaking and considered the 
suggestions and issues they raised in light of the statutory 
requirements as well as the FSOC study. In December 2013, the Agencies 
issued the 2013 final rule implementing section 13 of the BHC Act.
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    \12\ See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading 
and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity Funds, 76 FR 68846 (Nov. 7, 2011) (``2011 
proposal'').
    \13\ See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading 
and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity Funds, 77 FR 8331 (Feb. 14, 2012).
    \14\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=OCC-2011-
0014 (OCC); http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_systemic.htm (Board); http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2011/11comAD85.html (FDIC); http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111.shtml (SEC); and http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/DF_28_VolckerRule/index.htm (CFTC).
    \15\ See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Staff to 
Host a Public Roundtable to Discuss the Proposed Volcker Rule (May 
24, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6263-12; transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/transcript053112.pdf.
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    The Agencies are committed to revisiting and revising the rule as 
appropriate to improve its implementation. Since the adoption of the 
2013 final rule, the Agencies have gained several years of experience 
implementing the 2013 final rule, and banking entities have had more 
than four years of experience implementing the 2013 final rule.\16\
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    \16\ The 2013 final rule was published in the Federal Register 
on January 31, 2014, and became effective on April 1, 2014. Banking 
entities were required to fully conform their proprietary trading 
activities and their new covered fund investments and activities to 
the requirements of the 2013 final rule by the end of the 
conformance period, which the Board extended to July 21, 2015. The 
Board extended the conformance period for certain legacy covered 
fund activities until July 21, 2017. Upon application, banking 
entities also have an additional period to conform certain illiquid 
funds to the requirements of section 13 and implementing 
regulations.
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    In particular, the Agencies have received various communications 
from the public and other sources since adoption of the 2013 final rule 
and over the course of its implementation. These communications include 
written comments from members of Congress; domestic and foreign banking 
entities and other financial services firms; trade groups representing 
banking, insurance, and other firms within the broader financial 
services industry; U.S. state and foreign governments; consumer and 
public interest groups; and individuals. The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury also issued reports in June 2017 and October 2017, which 
contained recommendations regarding section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations.\17\ In addition, the OCC issued a Request for 
Information (``OCC Notice for Comment'') in August 2017 and received 87 
unique comment letters and over 8,400 standardized letters regarding 
section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations.\18\ 
Moreover, staffs of the Agencies have held numerous meetings with 
market participants to discuss the 2013 final rule and its 
implementation. Collectively, these sources of public feedback have 
provided the Agencies with a better understanding of the concerns and 
challenges surrounding implementation of the 2013 final rule.
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    \17\ See A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities, 
Banks and Credit Unions (June 2017), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf and A Financial System that Creates 
Economic Opportunities, Capital Markets (October 2017), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-Capital-Markets-FINAL-FINAL.pdf.
    \18\ See Notice Seeking Public Input on the Volcker Rule (August 
2017), available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2017/nr-occ-2017-89a.pdf. Corresponding comment letters are 
available at https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=OCC-2017-0014. A summary of the comment letters is available at https://occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading-volcker-rule/volcker-notice-comment-summary.pdf.
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    Furthermore, the Agencies have collected nearly four years of 
quantitative data required under Appendix A of the 2013 final rule. The 
data collected in connection with the 2013 final rule, compliance 
efforts by banking entities, and the Agencies' experience in reviewing 
trading and investment activity under the 2013 final rule, have 
provided valuable insights into the effectiveness of the 2013 final 
rule. These insights highlighted areas in which the 2013 final rule may 
have resulted in ambiguity, overbroad application, or unduly complex 
compliance routines. With this proposal, and based on experience gained 
over the past few years, the Agencies seek to simplify and tailor the 
implementing regulations, where possible, in order to increase 
efficiency, reduce excess demands on available compliance capacities at 
banking entities, and allow banking entities to more efficiently 
provide services to clients, consistent with the requirements of the 
statute.\19\
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    \19\ A number of Agency principals have suggested modifications 
to the 2013 final rule. See Randal K. Quarles, Mar. 5, 2018, 
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/quarles20180305a.htm; Daniel K. Tarullo, Apr. 4, 2017, available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20170404a.htm; Martin J. Gruenberg, Nov. 14, 2017, available 
at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spnov1417.html.

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[[Page 33436]]

B. Agency Coordination

    Section 13(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the BHC Act directs the Agencies to 
``consult and coordinate'' in developing and issuing the implementing 
regulations ``for the purpose of assuring, to the extent possible, that 
such regulations are comparable and provide for consistent application 
and implementation of the applicable provisions of section 13 of the 
BHC Act to avoid providing advantages or imposing disadvantages to the 
companies affected . . . .'' \20\ The Agencies recognize that 
coordinating with respect to regulatory interpretations, examinations, 
supervision, and sharing of information is important to maintain 
consistent oversight, promote compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act 
and implementing regulations, and foster a level playing field for 
affected market participants. The Agencies further recognize that 
coordinating these activities helps to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
oversight, reduces costs for banking entities, and provides for more 
efficient regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comment on coordination generally and the 
following specific questions:
    Question 1. Would it be helpful for the Agencies to hold joint 
information gathering sessions with a banking entity that is supervised 
or regulated by more than one Agency? If not, why not, and, if so, what 
should the Agencies consider in arranging these joint sessions?
    Question 2. In what ways could the Agencies improve the 
transparency of their implementation of section 13 of the BHC Act? What 
specific steps with respect to Agency coordination would banking 
entities find helpful to make compliance with section 13 and the 
implementing rules more efficient? What steps would commenters 
recommend with respect to coordination to better promote and protect 
the safety and soundness of banking entities and U.S. financial 
stability?

II. Overview of Proposal

A. General Approach

    The proposal would adopt a revised risk-based approach that would 
rely on a set of clearly articulated standards for both prohibited and 
permitted activities and investments, consistent with the requirements 
of section 13 of the BHC Act. In formulating the proposal, the Agencies 
have attempted to simplify and tailor the 2013 final rule, as described 
further below, to allow banking entities to more efficiently provide 
services to clients.
    The Agencies seek to address a number of targeted areas for 
potential revision in this proposal. First, the Agencies are proposing 
to tailor the application of the rule based on the size and scope of a 
banking entity's trading activities. In particular, the Agencies aim to 
further reduce compliance obligations for small and mid-sized firms 
that do not have large trading operations and therefore reduce costs 
and uncertainty faced by small and mid-size firms in complying with the 
final rule, relative to their amount of trading activity.\21\ In the 
experience of the Agencies since adoption of the 2013 final rule, the 
costs and uncertainty faced by small and mid-sized firms in complying 
with the 2013 final rule can be disproportionately high relative to the 
amount of trading activity typically undertaken by these firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The Federal banking agencies issued guidance relating to 
compliance with the final rule for community banks in conjunction 
with the final rule in December of 2013. See The Volcker Rule: 
Community Bank Applicability, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20131210a4.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to tailoring the application of the rule, the Agencies 
also seek to streamline and clarify for all banking entities certain 
definitions and requirements related to the proprietary trading 
prohibition and limitations on covered fund activities and investments. 
In particular, this proposal seeks to codify or otherwise addresses 
matters currently addressed by staff responses to Frequently Asked 
Questions (``FAQs'').\22\ Additionally, the Agencies are seeking in 
this proposal to reduce metrics reporting, recordkeeping, and 
compliance program requirements for all banking entities and expand 
tailoring to make the scale of compliance activity required by the rule 
commensurate with a banking entity's size and level of trading 
activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading-volcker-rule/volcker-rule-implementation-faqs.html (OCC); https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm (Board); https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/volcker/faq.html (FDIC); https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-volcker-rule-section13.htm (SEC); https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/DF_28_VolckerRule/index.htm 
(CFTC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In tailoring these proposed changes to the 2013 final rule, the 
Agencies note the following statutory limitations to the permitted 
proprietary trading and covered fund activities,\23\ which are 
incorporated in the 2013 final rule and have not been changed in the 
proposed rule. These statutory limitations provide that such permitted 
activities must not: (1) Involve or result in a material conflict of 
interest between the banking entity and its clients, customers, or 
counterparties; (2) result, directly or indirectly, in a material 
exposure by the banking entity to a high-risk asset or a high-risk 
trading strategy; or (3) pose a threat to the safety and soundness of 
the banking entity or to the financial stability of the United 
States.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(2).
    \24\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a matter of structure, the proposed amendments would maintain 
the 2013 final rule's division into four subparts, and would maintain a 
metrics appendix while removing the 2013 final rule's second appendix 
regarding enhanced minimum standards for compliance programs, as 
follows:
     Subpart A of the 2013 final rule, as amended by the 
proposal, would describe the authority, scope, purpose, and 
relationship to other authorities of the rule and define terms used 
commonly throughout the rule;
     Subpart B of the 2013 final rule, as amended by the 
proposal, would prohibit proprietary trading, define terms relevant to 
covered trading activity, establish exemptions from the prohibition on 
proprietary trading and limitations on those exemptions, and require 
certain banking entities to report certain information with respect to 
their trading activities;
     Subpart C of the 2013 final rule, as amended by the 
proposal, would prohibit or restrict acquisition or retention of an 
ownership interest in, and certain relationships with, a covered fund; 
define terms relevant to covered fund activities and investments; and 
establish exemptions from the restrictions on covered fund activities 
and investments and limitations on those exemptions; and
     Subpart D of the 2013 final rule, as amended by the 
proposal, would generally require banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities to establish a compliance program 
regarding section 13 of the BHC Act and the rule, including written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, a management framework, 
independent testing of the compliance program, training, and 
recordkeeping; establish metrics reporting requirements for banking 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities, pursuant to 
the Appendix; provide tailored compliance program requirements for 
banking entities without significant trading assets and liabilities, 
including a presumption of compliance for banking entities with limited 
trading assets and liabilities; and require certain larger

[[Page 33437]]

banking entities to submit a chief executive officer (``CEO'') 
attestation regarding the compliance program.
    Given the complexities associated with the 2013 final rule, the 
Agencies request comment on the potential impact the proposal may have 
on banking entities and the activities in which they engage. The 
Agencies are interested in receiving comments regarding revisions 
described in the proposal relative to the 2013 final rule.\25\ 
Additionally, the Agencies recognize that there are economic impacts 
that would potentially arise from the proposal and its implementation 
of section 13 of the BHC Act. The Agencies have provided an assessment 
of the expected impact of the proposed modifications contained in the 
proposal, and the Agencies request comment on all aspects of such 
impacts, including quantitative data, where possible. Specific requests 
for comment are included in the following sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ This proposal contains certain proposed amendments to the 
2013 final rule. The 2013 final rule would continue in effect where 
no change is made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Scope of Proposal

    To better tailor the application of the rule, the proposal would 
establish three categories of banking entities based on their level of 
trading activity.\26\ The first category would include banking entities 
with ``significant trading assets and liabilities,'' defined as those 
banking entities that, together with their affiliates and subsidiaries, 
have trading assets and liabilities (excluding obligations of or 
guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the United States) 
equal to or exceeding $10 billion. These banking entities, which 
generally have large trading operations, would be required to comply 
with the most extensive set of requirements under the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The proposal would amend Sec.  __.2 of the 2013 final rule 
to include a new defined term for each of these categories. The 
Agencies are proposing to republish Sec.  __.2 in its entirety for 
clarity due to the renumbering of certain definitions. These 
proposed banking entity categories are discussed in further detail 
in Section II.G. of the Supplementary Information, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second category would include banking entities with ``moderate 
trading assets and liabilities,'' defined as those banking entities 
that do not have significant trading assets and liabilities or limited 
trading assets and liabilities. Banking entities with moderate trading 
assets and liabilities are those entities that, together with their 
affiliates and subsidiaries, have trading assets and liabilities 
(excluding obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any 
agency of the United States) less than $10 billion, but above the 
threshold described below for banking entities with limited trading 
assets and liabilities.\27\ These banking entities would be subject to 
reduced compliance requirements and a more tailored approach in light 
of their smaller and less complex trading activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ This category would also include banking entities with 
trading assets and liabilities of less than $1 billion for which the 
presumption of compliance described below has been rebutted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The third category includes banking entities with ``limited trading 
assets and liabilities,'' defined as those banking entities that have, 
together with their affiliates and subsidiaries, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) less than $1 billion. This $1 billion threshold would be 
based on the worldwide trading assets and liabilities of a banking 
entity and all of its affiliates. With respect to a foreign banking 
organization (``FBO'') and its subsidiaries, the $1 billion threshold 
would be based on worldwide consolidated trading assets and 
liabilities, and would not be limited to its combined U.S. operations.
    The proposal would establish a presumption of compliance for all 
banking entities with limited trading assets and liabilities. Banking 
entities operating pursuant to this proposed presumption of compliance 
would have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with subparts B and 
C of the proposal on an ongoing basis. If, however, upon examination or 
audit, the relevant Agency determines that the banking entity has 
engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund activities that are 
prohibited under subpart B or subpart C, such Agency may exercise its 
authority to rebut the presumption of compliance and require the 
banking entity to comply with the requirements of the rule applicable 
to banking entities that have moderate trading assets and liabilities. 
The purpose of this presumption of compliance would be to further 
reduce compliance costs for small and mid-size banks that either do not 
engage in the types of activities subject to section 13 of the BHC Act 
or engage in such activities only on a limited scale.
    The proposal also includes a reservation of authority that would 
allow an Agency to require a banking entity with limited or moderate 
trading assets and liabilities to apply any of the more extensive 
requirements that would otherwise apply if the banking entity had 
significant or moderate trading assets and liabilities, if the Agency 
determines that the size or complexity of the banking entity's trading 
or investment activities, or the risk of evasion, warrants such 
treatment.

C. Proprietary Trading Restrictions

    Subpart B of the 2013 final rule implements the statutory 
prohibition on proprietary trading and the various exemptions to this 
prohibition included in the statute. Section __.3 of the 2013 final 
rule contains the core prohibition on proprietary trading and defines a 
number of related terms. The proposal would make several changes to 
Sec.  __.3 of the 2013 final rule. Notably, the proposal would revise, 
in a manner consistent with the statute, the definition of ``trading 
account'' in order to increase clarity regarding the positions included 
in the definition.\28\ The definition of ``trading account'' is a 
threshold definition that tells a banking entity whether the purchase 
or sale of a financial instrument is subject to the restrictions and 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule in 
the first instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Definitions used in the proposal would remain the same as 
in the 2013 final rule except as otherwise specified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2013 final rule, the Agencies defined the statutory term 
``trading account'' to include three prongs. The first prong includes 
any account that is used by a banking entity to purchase or sell one or 
more financial instruments principally for the purpose of short-term 
resale, benefitting from short-term price movements, realizing short-
term arbitrage profits, or hedging another trading account position 
(the ``short-term intent prong'').\29\ For purposes of this part of the 
definition, the 2013 final rule also contains a rebuttable presumption 
that the purchase or sale of a financial instrument by a banking entity 
is for the trading account if the banking entity holds the financial 
instrument for fewer than 60 days or substantially transfers the risk 
of the financial instrument within 60 days of purchase (or sale).\30\ 
The second prong covers trading positions that are both covered 
positions and trading positions for purposes of the Federal banking 
agencies' market risk capital rules, as well as hedges of covered 
positions (the ``market risk capital prong'').\31\ The third prong 
covers any account used by a banking entity that is a securities 
dealer, swap dealer, or security-based swap dealer that is licensed or 
registered, or required to be licensed or registered, as a dealer, swap 
dealer, or

[[Page 33438]]

security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such (the ``dealer prong'').\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(i).
    \30\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(2).
    \31\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(ii).
    \32\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(iii)(A). The dealer 
prong also includes positions entered into by a banking entity that 
is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or security-
based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent the 
instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities of 
such business. See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(iii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the experience of the Agencies, determining whether or not 
positions fall into the short-term intent prong of the trading account 
definition has often proved unclear and subjective, and, consequently, 
may result in ambiguity or added costs and delays. For this reason, the 
proposal would remove the short-term intent prong from the 2013 final 
rule's definition of trading account and eliminate the associated 
rebuttable presumption, and would also modify the definition of trading 
account as described below to include other accounts described in the 
statutory definition of ``trading account.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6). As in the 2013 final rule, the 
Agencies note that the term ``trading account'' is a statutory 
concept and does not necessarily refer to an actual account. 
``Trading account'' is simply nomenclature for the set of 
transactions that are subject to the prohibitions on proprietary 
trading under the 2013 final rule, including as it would be amended 
by the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The remaining two prongs of the trading account definition in the 
2013 final rule, the market risk capital prong and the dealer prong, 
generally would remain unchanged because, in the experience of the 
Agencies, interpretation of both prongs has been relatively 
straightforward and clear in practice for most banking entities. The 
proposal would, however, modify the market risk capital prong to cover 
the trading positions of FBOs subject to similar requirements in the 
applicable foreign jurisdiction. The Agencies are proposing this 
modification for FBOs to take into account the different frameworks and 
supervisors FBOs may have in their home countries. Specifically, the 
proposal would modify the market risk capital prong to apply to FBOs 
that are subject to capital requirements under a market risk framework 
established by their respective home country supervisors, provided the 
market risk framework is consistent with the market risk framework 
published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as amended. 
The Agencies expect that this standard, similar to the current market 
risk capital prong referencing the U.S. market risk capital rules, 
would include trading account activities of FBOs consistent with the 
statutory trading account requirements. The Agencies believe the 
proposed approach would be an appropriate interpretation of the 
statutory trading account definition. The Agencies likewise believe 
that application of the market risk capital prong to FBOs as described 
herein would be relatively straightforward and clear in practice.
    In addition, the Agencies are proposing two changes related to the 
trading account definition that are intended to replace the short-term 
intent prong. These changes include: (i) The addition of an accounting 
prong and (ii) a presumption of compliance with the prohibition on 
proprietary trading for trading desks that are not subject to the 
market risk capital prong or the dealer prong, based on a prescribed 
profit and loss threshold. Under the proposed accounting prong, a 
trading desk that buys or sells a financial instrument (as defined in 
the 2013 final rule and unchanged by the proposal) that is recorded at 
fair value on a recurring basis under applicable accounting standards 
would be doing so for the ``trading account'' of the banking 
entity.\34\ Financial instruments that would be covered by the proposed 
accounting prong generally include, but are not limited to, 
derivatives, trading securities, and available-for-sale securities. For 
example, a security that is classified as ``trading'' under U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles (``GAAP'') would be included 
in the proposal's definition of ``trading account'' under the proposed 
approach because it is recorded at fair value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ ``Applicable accounting standards'' is defined in the 2013 
final rule, and the proposal would not make any change to this 
definition. ``Applicable accounting standards'' means U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles or such other accounting standards 
applicable to a covered banking entity that the relevant Agency 
determines are appropriate, that the covered banking entity uses in 
the ordinary course of its business in preparing its consolidated 
financial statements. See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(d)(1). The 
proposal would move this defined term to Sec.  __.2, to accommodate 
its proposed usage outside of subpart C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed presumption of compliance, which would apply at the 
trading desk level, would provide that each trading desk that purchases 
or sells financial instruments for a trading account pursuant to the 
accounting prong may calculate the net gain or loss on the trading 
desk's portfolio of financial instruments each business day, reflecting 
realized and unrealized gains and losses since the previous business 
day, based on the banking entity's fair value for such financial 
instruments.
    If the sum of the absolute values of the daily net gain and loss 
figures for the preceding 90-calendar-day period does not exceed $25 
million, the activities of the trading desk would be presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition on proprietary trading, and the banking 
entity would have no obligation to demonstrate that such trading desk's 
activity complies with the rule on an ongoing basis. If this 
calculation exceeds the $25 million threshold, the banking entity would 
have to demonstrate compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations, as described in more detail below. The 
Agencies are also proposing to include a reservation of authority to 
address any positions that may be incorrectly scoped into or out of the 
definition.
    Section __.3 of the 2013 final rule also details various exclusions 
from the definition of proprietary trading for certain purchases and 
sales of financial instruments that generally do not involve the 
requisite short-term trading intent under the statute. The proposal 
would make several changes to these exclusions. First, the proposal 
would clarify and expand the scope of the financial instruments covered 
in the liquidity management exclusion. Second, it would add an 
exclusion from the definition of proprietary trading for transactions 
made to correct errors made in connection with customer-driven or other 
permissible transactions.
    Section __.4 of the 2013 final rule implements the statutory 
exemptions for underwriting and market making-related activities. The 
proposal would make several changes to this section intended to improve 
the practical application of these exemptions. In particular, the 
proposal would establish a presumption that trading within internally 
set risk limits satisfies the requirement that permitted underwriting 
and market making-related activities must be designed not to exceed the 
reasonably expected near-term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties (``RENTD''). The Agencies believe this presumption would 
allow for a clearer application of these exemptions, and would provide 
banking entities with more flexibility and certainty in conducting 
permissible underwriting and market making-related activities. In 
addition, the proposal would make the exemptions' compliance program 
requirements applicable only to banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities.
    The proposal would also modify the 2013 final rule's implementation 
of the statutory exemption for permitted risk-mitigating hedging 
activities in Sec.  __.5, by reducing restrictions on the eligibility 
of an activity to qualify as a

[[Page 33439]]

permitted risk-mitigating hedging activity. For banking entities with 
moderate or limited trading assets and liabilities, the proposal would 
remove all requirements under the 2013 final rule except the 
requirement that hedging activity be designed to reduce or otherwise 
mitigate one or more specific, identifiable risks arising in connection 
with and related to one or more identified positions, contracts, or 
other holdings and that the hedging activity be recalibrated to 
maintain compliance with the rule. For banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities, the proposal would maintain 
many of the 2013 final rule's requirements, including the requirement 
that the hedging activity be designed to reduce or otherwise mitigate 
one or more specific, identifiable risks. The proposal would, however, 
eliminate the current requirement that the hedging activity 
``demonstrably reduces'' or otherwise ``significantly mitigates'' risk, 
reduce documentation requirements associated with risk-mitigating 
hedging transactions that are conducted by one desk to hedge positions 
at another desk with pre-approved types of instruments within pre-set 
hedging limits, and eliminate the 2013 final rule's correlation 
analysis requirement. These foregoing changes are intended to reduce 
costs and uncertainty and improve the utility of the hedging exemption.
    Section __.6(e) of the proposal would remove certain requirements 
of the 2013 final rule implementing the statutory exemption for trading 
by a foreign banking entity that occurs solely outside of the United 
States. In particular, the proposal would modify the requirement that 
any personnel of the banking entity or any of its affiliates that 
arrange, negotiate, or execute such purchase or sale not be located in 
the United States. It also would (1) remove the requirement that no 
financing for the banking entity's purchase or sale be provided, 
directly or indirectly, by any branch or affiliate that is located in 
the United States or organized under the laws of the United States or 
of any state, and (2) eliminate certain limitations on a foreign 
banking entity's ability to enter into transactions with a U.S. 
counterparty.
    The proposal would retain the other requirements of Sec.  __.6(e) 
of the 2013 final rule, including the requirement that the banking 
entity engaging as principal in the purchase or sale (including 
relevant personnel) not be located in the United States or organized 
under the laws of the United States or of any State, that the banking 
entity not book a transaction to a U.S. affiliate or branch, and that 
the banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes the 
decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the United 
States or organized under the laws of the United States or of any 
State. Taken as a whole, the proposed amendments to this exemption seek 
to reduce the impact of the 2013 final rule on foreign banking 
entities' operations outside of the United States by focusing on where 
the trading of these banking entities as principal occurs, where the 
trading decision is made, and whether the risk of the transaction is 
borne outside the United States.

D. Covered Fund Activities and Investments

    Subpart C of the 2013 final rule implements the statutory 
prohibition on directly or indirectly acquiring and retaining an 
ownership interest in, or having certain relationships with, a covered 
fund, as well as the various exemptions to this prohibition included in 
the statute. Section __.10 of the 2013 final rule defines the scope of 
the prohibition on the acquisition and retention of ownership interests 
in, and certain relationships with, a covered fund, and provides the 
definition of ``covered fund.'' The Agencies request comment on a 
number of potential modifications to this section.
    Section __.11(c) of the 2013 final rule outlines the requirements 
that apply when a banking entity engages in underwriting or market 
making-related activities with respect to a covered fund. The proposal 
would modify these requirements with respect to covered fund ownership 
interests for third-party covered funds to generally allow for the same 
types of activities as are permitted for other financial instruments. 
The proposal would also make changes to Sec.  __.13(a) of the 2013 
final rule to expand a banking entity's ability to engage in hedging 
activities involving an ownership interest in a covered fund.

E. Compliance Program Requirements

    Subpart D of the 2013 final rule requires a banking entity engaged 
in covered trading activities or covered fund activities to develop and 
implement a program reasonably designed to ensure and monitor 
compliance with the prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary 
trading activities and covered fund activities and investments set 
forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule.
    As in the 2013 final rule, the proposal would provide that a 
banking entity that does not engage in proprietary trading activities 
(other than trading in U.S. government or agency obligations, 
obligations of specified government-sponsored entities, and state and 
municipal obligations) or covered fund activities and investments need 
only establish a compliance program prior to becoming engaged in such 
activities or making such investments. To further enhance compliance 
efficiencies, the proposal would reduce compliance requirements for 
most banking entities and expand tailoring of the requirements based on 
the banking entity categories previously described in this 
Supplementary Information section.
    Under the proposal, a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities would be required to establish a six-pillar 
compliance programs commensurate with the size, scope, and complexity 
of its activities and business structure that meets six specific 
requirements already included in the 2013 final rule. These 
requirements include (1) written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to document, describe, monitor and limit trading activities 
and covered fund activities and investments conducted by the banking 
entity; (2) a system of internal controls; (3) a management framework 
that, among other things, includes appropriate management review of 
trading limits, strategies, hedging activities, investments, incentive 
compensation and other matters identified in the rule or by management 
as requiring attention; (4) independent testing and audits; (5) 
training for certain personnel; and (6) recordkeeping requirements.\35\ 
Certain additional documentation requirements for covered funds would 
also apply to banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. Because the proposal would eliminate Appendix B of the 
2013 final rule, which requires large banking entities and banking 
entities engaged in significant trading activities to have a separate 
compliance program that complies with certain enhanced minimum 
standards, the proposed rule would essentially permit a banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities to integrate compliance 
programs meeting these requirements into its existing compliance 
regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See infra SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, Part III.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, a banking entity with moderate trading assets 
and liabilities would be required to include in its existing compliance 
policies and procedures appropriate references to the requirements of 
section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing rules as appropriate 
given the activities, size,

[[Page 33440]]

scope, and complexity of the banking entity.
    The proposal would also include in subpart D the specifications for 
the presumption of compliance noted above that would apply for banking 
entities with limited trading assets and liabilities.
    The proposal would eliminate Appendix B of the 2013 final rule, 
which specifies enhanced minimum standards for compliance programs of 
large banking entities and banking entities engaged in significant 
trading activities. The proposal would, however, maintain the 2013 
final rule's CEO attestation requirement, and would apply it to all 
banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities and 
moderate trading assets and liabilities.

F. Metrics Reporting Requirement

    As part of adopting the 2013 final rule, the Agencies committed to 
reviewing and assessing the quantitative measurements data 
(``metrics'') for their effectiveness in monitoring covered trading 
activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations. Since that time and as part of implementing 
the 2013 final rule, the Agencies have reviewed the metrics submitted 
by the banking entities and considered whether all of the quantitative 
measurements are useful for all asset classes and markets, as well as 
for all of the trading activities subject to the metrics requirement, 
or whether modifications are appropriate.
    In the proposal, the Agencies aim to better align the effectiveness 
of the metrics data with its associated value in monitoring compliance. 
To that end, the proposal would streamline the metrics reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements by tailoring the requirements based on a 
banking entity's size and level of trading activity, completely 
eliminating particular metrics based on experience working with the 
data, and adding a limited set of new metrics. The proposal also would 
provide certain firms with additional time to report metrics to the 
Agencies, beyond the current deadlines set forth in Appendix A of the 
2013 final rule. The Agencies solicit comment regarding whether a 
single point of collection among the Agencies for metrics would be more 
effective.

G. Banking Entity Categorization and Tailoring

    As noted, the proposal would define three different categories of 
banking entities based on thresholds of trading assets and liabilities, 
in order to improve compliance efficiencies for all banking entities 
generally and further reduce compliance costs for firms that have 
little or no activity subject to the prohibitions and restrictions of 
section 13 of the BHC Act.
    The first category would include any banking entity with 
significant trading assets and liabilities, defined under the proposal 
to mean a banking entity that, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries, has trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading 
assets and liabilities involving obligations of, or guaranteed by, the 
United States or any agency of the United States) the average gross sum 
of which (on a worldwide consolidated basis) over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, equals or exceeds $10 billion.\36\ 
The Agencies believe that this threshold would capture a significant 
portion of the trading assets and liabilities in the U.S. banking 
system, but would reduce burdens for smaller, less complex banking 
entities. The Agencies estimate that approximately 95 percent of the 
trading assets and liabilities in the U.S. banking system are currently 
held by those banking entities that would have significant trading 
assets and liabilities under the proposal. Under the proposal, the most 
stringent compliance requirements would apply to these banking 
entities, which generally have large trading operations. For example, 
as described in the relevant sections of this Supplementary Information 
section below, the proposal would require banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities to comply with a greater set 
of requirements than other banking entities to meet the conditions of 
the exemptions for permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities and risk-mitigating hedging activities. In addition, the 
proposal would require these banking entities to maintain a six-pillar 
compliance program (i.e., written policies and procedures, internal 
controls, management framework, independent testing, training, and 
records), commensurate with the size, scope, and complexity of their 
activities and business structure, which the banking entities could 
integrate into their existing compliance regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See proposal Sec.  __.2(ff). With respect to a banking 
entity that is an FBO or a subsidiary of an FBO, the threshold would 
apply based on the trading assets and liabilities of the FBO's 
combined U.S. operations, including all subsidiaries, affiliates, 
branches, and agencies. This threshold would align with the 
threshold currently used under the 2013 final rule to determine 
whether a banking entity is subject to the metrics reporting 
requirements of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule.
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    The second category would include any banking entity with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities, defined as a banking entity that does 
not have significant trading assets and liabilities or limited trading 
assets and liabilities (described below). These banking entities, 
together with their affiliates and subsidiaries, generally have trading 
assets and liabilities (excluding obligations of or guaranteed by the 
United States or any agency of the United States) of $1 billion or more 
but less than $10 billion. As with the threshold described above for 
firms with significant trading assets and liabilities, the Agencies 
believe that the proposed threshold for firms with moderate trading 
assets and liabilities would appropriately cover a significant 
percentage of trading activities in the United States. The Agencies 
estimate that approximately 98 percent of the trading assets and 
liabilities in the U.S. banking system are currently held by those 
firms that would have trading assets and liabilities of $1 billion or 
more, including firms with both significant and moderate trading assets 
and liabilities. Relative to banking entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, banking entities with moderate trading assets 
and liabilities would be subject to reduced requirements and a tailored 
approach in light of their smaller portfolio of trading activity. For 
example, the proposal would require banking entities with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities to comply with a more tailored set of 
requirements under the underwriting, market-making, and risk-mitigating 
hedging exemptions, as compared to the requirements applicable to 
banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities. In 
addition, these firms would be subject to a simplified compliance 
program requirement, which would allow the banking entity to comply 
with the applicable requirements by updating existing policies and 
procedures. The Agencies believe these changes could substantially 
reduce the costs of compliance for banking entities that do not have 
significant trading assets and liabilities.
    The third category would include any banking entity with limited 
trading assets and liabilities, defined under the proposal to mean a 
banking entity that, together with its affiliates and subsidiaries, has 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of, or guaranteed by, the United 
States or any agency of the United States) the average

[[Page 33441]]

gross sum of which (on a worldwide consolidated basis) over the 
previous consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of 
each of the four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1 
billion.\37\ While entities with less than $1 billion in trading assets 
and liabilities engage in some activities covered by section 13 of the 
BHC Act and the implementing rules, as noted above, these activities 
constitute a relatively small percentage of the trading assets and 
liabilities in the U.S. banking system. In light of the relatively 
small scale of activities engaged in by such firms, the Agencies are 
proposing to provide significant tailoring of requirements for such 
firms. Under the proposal, a banking entity with limited trading assets 
and liabilities would be presumed to be in compliance with subpart B 
and subpart C of the implementing regulations and would have no 
affirmative obligation to demonstrate compliance with subpart B and 
subpart C on an ongoing basis. If, upon examination or audit, the 
relevant Agency determines that the banking entity has engaged in 
covered trading activities or covered fund activities that are 
otherwise prohibited under subpart B or subpart C, such Agency may 
exercise its authority to rebut the presumption of compliance and 
require the banking entity to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of the rule applicable to a banking entity with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities. Additionally, as noted below, the 
relevant Agency would retain its authority to require a banking entity 
to apply any compliance requirements that would otherwise apply if the 
banking entity had moderate or significant trading assets and 
liabilities if such Agency determines that the size or complexity of 
the banking entity's trading or investment activities, or the risk of 
evasion, does not warrant a presumption of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ The Agencies are proposing to adopt a different measure of 
trading assets and liabilities in determining whether a banking 
entity has less than $1 billion in trading assets and liabilities 
for purposes of tailoring the requirements of the rule described 
herein. Specifically, the proposed test would look at worldwide 
trading assets and liabilities of all banking entities, including 
foreign banking entities. By contrast, the test for whether a 
foreign banking entity has significant trading assets and 
liabilities provides that the banking entity need only include the 
trading assets and liabilities of its consolidated U.S. operations 
in this calculation. Banking entities with limited trading assets 
and liabilities under the proposal would be eligible for a 
presumption of compliance, but such a presumption may not be 
appropriate for large foreign banking entities that have substantial 
worldwide trading assets and liabilities. Therefore, the Agencies 
have proposed to adopt one test that would apply to both domestic 
and foreign banking entities for purposes of the limited trading 
assets and liabilities threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The purpose of this proposed presumed compliance provision would be 
to significantly reduce compliance program obligations for small and 
mid-size banking entities that do not engage on a large scale in 
activities subject to the proposal. Based on data from the December 31, 
2017, reporting period, all but approximately 40 top-tier banking 
entities would be eligible for presumed compliance.
    The proposal would apply the 2013 final rule's CEO attestation 
requirement for all banking entities with significant or moderate 
trading assets and liabilities. Furthermore, all banking entities would 
remain subject to the covered fund provisions of the 2013 final rule, 
with some modifications described further below, including to the 
applicable compliance program requirements based on the trading assets 
and liabilities of the banking entity. As under the 2013 final rule, 
banking entities that do not engage in covered funds activities or 
proprietary trading would not be required to establish a compliance 
program unless or until prior to becoming engaged in such activities or 
making such investments.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See Sec.  __.20(f) of the 2013 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal also includes a reservation of authority that would 
allow an Agency to require a banking entity with limited or moderate 
trading assets and liabilities to apply any of the more extensive 
requirements that would otherwise apply if the banking entity had 
moderate or significant trading assets and liabilities, if the Agency 
determines that the size or complexity of the banking entity's trading 
or investment activities, or the risk of evasion, warrants such 
treatment.
    The proposal seeks to tailor requirements based on a relatively 
simple, straightforward, and objective measure connected to the 
activities subject to section 13 of the BHC Act. Therefore, the 
Agencies are proposing thresholds that are based on the trading 
activities of a banking entity, and are considered on a consolidated 
basis with its affiliates and subsidiaries. In addition, many of the 
requirements that the proposal would apply on a tailored basis to 
banking entities based on these thresholds relate to the statutory 
prohibition on proprietary trading and the associated exemptions, such 
as for permitted underwriting, market making, and risk-mitigating 
hedging activities. In general, this approach would seek to apply 
requirements commensurate with the size and complexity of a banking 
entity's trading activities.
    Under this approach, banking entities with the largest trading 
activity (banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities) would be subject to the most extensive requirements. These 
firms are currently subject to reporting requirements under Appendix A 
of the 2013 final rule due to the fact that they engage in the most 
trading activity subject to section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations.\39\ Banking entities with moderate trading 
activities and liabilities would be subject to more tailored 
requirements, commensurate with the smaller scale of their trading 
activities. These firms are generally subject to the Federal banking 
agencies' market risk capital rules (like banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities) and engage in some level of 
trading activity that is subject to the requirements of section 13 of 
the BHC Act, but not to the same degree as firms with significant 
trading assets and liabilities. Banking entities with limited trading 
assets and liabilities would be subject to significantly reduced 
requirements in recognition of the relatively small scale of covered 
activities in which they engage, and in order to reduce compliance 
costs associated with activities that are less likely to be relevant 
for these firms.
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    \39\ As noted above, with respect to foreign banking entities, 
the proposal would measure whether a banking entity has significant 
trading assets and liabilities by reference to the aggregate assets 
of the foreign banking entity's U.S. operations, including its U.S. 
branches and agencies, rather than worldwide operations. This 
approach is intended to be consistent with the statute's focus on 
the risks posed by trading activities within the United States and 
also to address concerns regarding the level of burden for foreign 
banking entities with respect to their foreign operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comment regarding all aspects of the proposed 
approach to tailoring application of the rule. In particular, the 
Agencies request comment on the following questions:
    Question 3. Would the general approach of the proposal to establish 
different requirements for banking entities based on thresholds of 
trading assets and liabilities be appropriate? Are the proposed 
thresholds appropriate or are there different thresholds that would be 
better suited and why? If so, what thresholds should be used and why? 
Would the proposed approach materially reduce compliance and other 
costs for banking entities that do not have significant trading 
activity? Would the proposed approach maintain sufficient measures to 
ensure compliance with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act? 
If not, what approach would work better? Would an approach based on the 
risk profile of the

[[Page 33442]]

banking entity be more appropriate? Why or why not?
    Question 4. The proposal seeks to establish a streamlined and 
comprehensive version of the rule for banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities. Is the proposed definition of 
``significant trading assets and liabilities'' appropriate? If not, 
what definition would be better and why? Would it be more appropriate 
to define a banking entity with significant trading assets and 
liabilities to include all banking entities subject to the Federal 
banking agencies' market risk capital rules? Why or why not?
    Question 5. Are the proposed requirements for a banking entity with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities appropriate? Why or why not? If 
not, what requirements would be better and why? Should any requirements 
be added? Should any requirements be removed or modified? If so, please 
explain.
    Question 6. The proposal contains a presumption of compliance for 
banking entities with limited trading assets and liabilities. Should 
the Agencies presume compliance for any other levels of activity? Why 
or why not? Are the proposed requirements for a banking entity with 
limited trading assets and liabilities appropriate? Should any 
requirements be added? If so, please explain which requirements should 
be added and why. Do commenters believe this approach would work in 
practice? Would it reduce costs and increase certainty for small firms? 
If not, what approach would work better or be more appropriate and why? 
Is the proposed scope of banking entities that would be eligible for 
the presumption of compliance appropriately defined? Why or why not? 
Please explain. If not, what scope would be more appropriate?
    Question 7. The proposal would tailor application of the regulation 
by categorizing a banking entity, together with its subsidiaries and 
affiliates, based on trading assets and liabilities. Should the 
Agencies consider further tailoring the application of the regulation 
by categorizing certain banking entities separately from their 
subsidiaries and affiliates? For example, should the Agencies consider 
further tailoring for a banking entity, including an SEC registered 
broker-dealer, that is an affiliate of a banking entity with 
significant trading assets and liabilities, but which generally 
operates on a basis that the banking entity believes is separate and 
independent from its affiliates and parent company for purposes 
relevant for compliance with the implementing regulations. Why or why 
not?
    Question 8. How might a banking entity within a corporate group 
demonstrate that it has separate and independent operations from that 
of the consolidated holding company group (e.g., information barriers, 
separate corporate formalities and management; status as a registered 
securities dealer, investment adviser, or futures commission merchant; 
written policies and procedures designed to separate the activities of 
the affiliate from other banking entities)? Alternatively, could such 
entities be identified using certain quantitative measurements, such as 
by creating a specific dollar threshold of trading activity or by 
calculating a ratio comparing the entity's individual trading assets 
and liabilities to the gross trading assets and liabilities of the 
consolidated group? Why or why not? In addition, what standards could 
be applied to distinguish such arrangements from corporate structures 
established to evade compliance requirements that would otherwise apply 
under section 13 of the BHC Act and the proposal? Please discuss, 
identify, and describe any conditions, functional barriers, or business 
practices that may be relevant. Commenters that suggest additional 
tailoring of the regulation for certain affiliates of large bank 
holding companies should suggest specific and detailed parameters for 
such a category. Commenters should also describe why they believe such 
parameters are appropriate and are designed to prevent substantial risk 
to the holding company, its affiliates, and the financial system.
    Question 9. For purposes of determining the appropriate standard 
for compliance, the proposal would establish a threshold of $10 billion 
in trading assets and liabilities; banking entities with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities would be subject to a streamlined set of 
requirements under the proposal. If the Agencies were to apply 
additional tailoring for certain affiliates of banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities, should such banking 
entities be subject to the same set of standards for compliance as 
those that are being proposed for banking entities with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities? Why or why not? Are there requirements 
that are not currently contemplated for banking entities with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities that nevertheless should apply, 
consistent with the statute? Please explain.
    Question 10. What are the potential consequences if certain banking 
entities were to be subject to a more streamlined set of standards for 
compliance than their parent company and affiliates? What are the 
potential costs and benefits? Please explain. Are there ways in which a 
more tailored compliance regime for these types of banking entities 
could be crafted to mitigate any potential negative consequences 
associated with this approach, if any, consistent with the statute? 
Please explain.
    Question 11. Could one or more aspects of the proposed rule 
incentivize banking entities to restructure their business operations 
to achieve a specific result relative to the rule, such as to 
facilitate compliance under the rule in a particular way or to avoid 
some or all of its requirements? If so, how? Please be as specific as 
possible.

III. Section by Section Summary of Proposal

A. Subpart A--Authority and Definitions

1. Section __.2: Definitions
a. Banking Entity
    The 2013 final rule, consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act, 
defines the term ``banking entity'' to include: (i) Any insured 
depository institution; (ii) any company that controls an insured 
depository institution; (iii) any company that is treated as a bank 
holding company for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking 
Act of 1978; and (iv) any affiliate or subsidiary of any entity 
described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.2(c). Consistent with the 
statute, for purposes of this definition, the term ``insured 
depository institution'' does not include certain institutions that 
function solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity. See 2013 final 
rule Sec.  __.2(r).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the BHC Act, an entity is generally considered an affiliate 
of an insured depository institution, and therefore a banking entity 
itself, if it controls, is controlled by, or is under common control 
with an insured depository institution. Under the BHC Act, a company 
controls another company if: (i) The company directly or indirectly or 
acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power 
to vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of the 
company; (ii) the company controls in any manner the election of a 
majority of the directors of trustees of the other company; or (iii) 
the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that 
the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence 
over the management or policies of the company.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2); 12 CFR 225.2(e).

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[[Page 33443]]

    The 2013 final rule excludes covered funds and other types of 
entities from the definition of banking entity.\42\ In the 2011 
proposal, the Agencies reasoned that excluding covered funds from the 
definition of banking entity would ``avoid application of section 13 of 
the BHC Act in a way that appears unintended by the statute and would 
create internal inconsistencies in the statutory scheme.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ A covered fund is not excluded from the banking entity 
definition if it is itself an insured depository institution, a 
company that controls an insured depository institution, or a 
company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of 
section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978. The 2013 final 
rule also excludes from the banking entity definition a portfolio 
company held under the authority contained in section 4(k)(4)(H) or 
(I) of the BHC Act, or any portfolio concern, as defined under 13 
CFR 107.50, that is controlled by a small business investment 
company, as defined in section 103(3) of the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958, so long as the portfolio company or 
portfolio concern is not itself an insured depository institution, a 
company that controls an insured depository institution, or a 
company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of 
section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978. The definition 
also excludes the FDIC acting in its corporate capacity or as 
conservator or receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    \43\ See 2011 proposal, 76 FR at 68885. The Agencies proposed 
the clarification ``because the definition of `affiliate' and 
`subsidiary' under the BHC Act is broad, and could include a covered 
fund that a banking entity has permissibly sponsored or made an 
investment in because, for example, the banking entity acts as 
general partner or managing member of the covered fund as part of 
its permitted sponsorship activities.'' Id. The Agencies observed 
that if ``such a covered fund were considered a `banking entity' for 
purposes of the proposed rule, the fund itself would become subject 
to all of the restrictions and limitations of section 13 of the BHC 
Act and the proposed rule, which would be inconsistent with the 
purpose and intent of the statute.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the adoption of the 2013 final rule, the Agencies have 
received a number of requests for guidance regarding instances in which 
certain funds that are excluded from the covered fund definition are 
considered banking entities. This situation may occur as a result of 
the sponsoring banking entity having control over the fund, as defined 
under the BHC Act. A banking entity sponsoring a U.S. registered 
investment company (``RIC''), a foreign public fund (``FPF''), or 
foreign excluded fund could be considered to control the fund by virtue 
of a 25 percent or greater investment in any class of voting securities 
during a seeding period or, for FPFs and foreign excluded funds, by 
virtue of corporate governance structures abroad such as where the 
fund's sponsor selects the majority of the fund's directors or 
trustees, or otherwise controls the fund for purposes of the BHC Act by 
contract or through a controlled corporate director.\44\ Questions 
regarding these funds' potential status as banking entities arise, in 
part, because of the interaction between the statute's and the 2013 
final rule's definitions of the terms ``banking entity'' and ``covered 
fund.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Corporate governance structures for RICs have not raised 
similar questions because the Board's regulations and orders have 
long recognized that a bank holding company may organize, sponsor, 
and manage a RIC, including by serving as investment adviser to the 
RIC, without controlling the RIC for purposes of the BHC Act. See 79 
FR at 5676.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In particular, following the adoption of the 2013 final rule, the 
staffs of the Agencies received numerous inquiries about this issue in 
connection with RICs and FPFs, which are excluded from the covered fund 
definition. The Agencies similarly received numerous inquiries 
regarding certain foreign funds offered and sold outside of the United 
States that are excluded from the covered fund definition with respect 
to a foreign banking entity (foreign excluded funds).
    Sponsors of RICs, FPFs, and foreign excluded funds asserted that 
the treatment of these funds as banking entities would disrupt bona 
fide asset management activities involving funds that are not covered 
funds, which these sponsors argued would be inconsistent with section 
13 of the BHC Act. These disruptions would arise because many funds' 
investment strategies involve proprietary trading prohibited by the 
2013 final rule, and may also involve investments in covered funds. 
Sponsors of these funds further asserted that the permitted activities 
in the 2013 final rule also do not appear to be designed for funds, 
which by design invest in financial instruments for their own account. 
The 2013 final rule, for example, provides exemptions from the rule's 
proprietary trading restrictions for underwriting and market-making-
related activities--exemptions for activities in which broker-dealers 
engage but that are not applicable to funds.
    In addition, sponsors of RICs, FPFs, and foreign excluded funds 
asserted that restricting banking entities' bona fide investment 
management businesses in order to avoid treatment of their funds as 
banking entities would put bank-affiliated investment advisers at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to non-bank affiliated advisers 
engaged in the same activities without advancing the statutory purposes 
underlying section 13 of the BHC Act. Sponsors of FPFs and foreign 
excluded funds also have asserted that treating a foreign banking 
entity's foreign funds offered outside of the United States as banking 
entities themselves would be an inappropriate extraterritorial 
application of section 13 and the 2013 final rule and also unnecessary 
to reduce risks posed to banking entities and U.S. financial stability 
by proprietary trading activities and investments in or relationships 
with covered funds.
    In response to these inquiries, the staffs of the Agencies issued 
responses to FAQs addressing the treatment of RICs and FPFs. The staffs 
observed in response to an FAQ that the preamble to the 2013 final rule 
recognized that a banking entity may own a significant portion of the 
shares of a RIC or FPF during a brief period during which the banking 
entity is testing the fund's investment strategy, establishing a track 
record of the fund's performance for marketing purposes, and attempting 
to distribute the fund's shares (the so-called ``seeding period'').\45\ 
The staffs therefore stated that they would not advise the Agencies to 
treat a RIC or FPF as a banking entity under the 2013 final rule solely 
on the basis that the RIC or FPF is established with a limited seeding 
period, absent other evidence that the RIC or FPF was being used to 
evade section 13 and the 2013 final rule. The staffs stated their 
understanding that the seeding period for an entity that is a RIC or 
FPF may take some time. Recognizing that the length of a seeding period 
can vary, the staffs provided an example of three years, the maximum 
period of time expressly permitted for seeding a covered fund under the 
2013 final rule, without setting any maximum prescribed period for a 
RIC or FPF seeding period. Accordingly, the staffs stated that they 
would neither advise the Agencies to treat a RIC or FPF as a banking 
entity solely on the basis of the level of ownership of the RIC or FPF 
by a banking entity during a seeding period, nor expect that a banking 
entity would submit an application to the Board to determine the length 
of the seeding period.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See supra note 22, FAQ 16.
    \46\ The staffs also made clear that this guidance was equally 
applicable to SEC-regulated business development companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The staffs also provided a response to an FAQ regarding FPFs.\47\ 
In this response, staffs of the Agencies stated their understanding 
that, unlike in the case of RICs, sponsors of FPFs in some foreign 
jurisdictions select the majority of the fund's directors or trustees, 
or otherwise control the fund for purposes of the BHC Act by contract 
or through a controlled corporate director. These and other corporate 
governance structures abroad therefore had raised questions regarding 
whether FPFs that

[[Page 33444]]

are sponsored and distributed outside the United States and in 
accordance with foreign laws are banking entities by virtue of their 
relationships with a banking entity. The staffs further observed that, 
by referring to characteristics common to publicly distributed foreign 
funds rather than requiring that FPFs organize themselves identically 
to RICs, the 2013 final rule recognized that foreign jurisdictions have 
established their own frameworks governing the details for the 
operation and distribution of FPFs. The staffs also observed that Sec.  
__.12 of the 2013 final rule further provides that, for purposes of 
complying with the covered fund investment limits, a RIC, SEC-regulated 
business development company (``BDC''), or FPF will not be considered 
to be an affiliate of the banking entity so long as the banking entity 
meets the conditions set forth in that section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See supra note 22, FAQ 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on these considerations, the staffs stated that they would 
not advise that the activities and investments of an FPF that meet the 
requirements in Sec.  __.10(c)(1) and Sec.  __.12(b)(1) of the 2013 
final rule be attributed to the banking entity for purposes of section 
13 of the BHC Act or the 2013 final rule, where the banking entity, 
consistent with Sec.  __.12(b)(1) of the 2013 final rule, (i) does not 
own, control, or hold with the power to vote 25 percent or more of any 
class of voting shares of the FPF (after the seeding period), and (ii) 
provides investment advisory, commodity trading, advisory, 
administrative, and other services to the fund in compliance with 
applicable limitations in the relevant foreign jurisdiction. The staffs 
further stated that they would not advise that the FPF be deemed a 
banking entity under the 2013 final rule solely by virtue of its 
relationship with the sponsoring banking entity, where these same 
conditions are met.
    With respect to foreign excluded funds, the Federal banking 
agencies released a policy statement on July 21, 2017 (the ``policy 
statement''), in response to concerns expressed by a number of foreign 
banking entities, foreign government officials, and other market 
participants about the possible unintended consequences and 
extraterritorial impact of section 13 and the 2013 final rule for these 
funds, which are excluded from the definition of ``covered fund'' in 
the 2013 final rule.\48\ The policy statement provided that the staffs 
of the Agencies are considering ways in which the 2013 final rule may 
be amended, or other appropriate action that may be taken, to address 
any unintended consequences of section 13 and the 2013 final rule for 
foreign excluded funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Statement regarding Treatment of Certain Foreign Funds 
under the Rules Implementing Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company 
Act (July 21, 2017), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20170721a1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To provide additional time, the policy statement provides that the 
Federal banking agencies would not propose to take action during the 
one-year period ending July 21, 2018, against a foreign banking entity 
\49\ based on attribution of the activities and investments of a 
qualifying foreign excluded fund (as defined below) to the foreign 
banking entity, or against a qualifying foreign excluded fund as a 
banking entity, in each case where the foreign banking entity's 
acquisition or retention of any ownership interest in, or sponsorship 
of, the qualifying foreign excluded fund would meet the requirements 
for permitted covered fund activities and investments solely outside 
the United States, as provided in section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act 
and Sec.  __.13(b) of the 2013 final rule, as if the qualifying foreign 
excluded fund were a covered fund. For purposes of the policy 
statement, a ``qualifying foreign excluded fund'' means, with respect 
to a foreign banking entity, an entity that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ ``Foreign banking entity'' was defined for purposes of the 
policy statement to mean a banking entity that is not, and is not 
controlled directly or indirectly by, a banking entity that is 
located in or organized under the laws of the United States or any 
State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Is organized or established outside the United States and the 
ownership interests of which are offered and sold solely outside the 
United States;
    (2) Would be a covered fund were the entity organized or 
established in the United States, or is, or holds itself out as being, 
an entity or arrangement that raises money from investors primarily for 
the purpose of investing in financial instruments for resale or other 
disposition or otherwise trading in financial instruments;
    (3) Would not otherwise be a banking entity except by virtue of the 
foreign banking entity's acquisition or retention of an ownership 
interest in, or sponsorship of, the entity;
    (4) Is established and operated as part of a bona fide asset 
management business; and
    (5) Is not operated in a manner that enables the foreign banking 
entity to evade the requirements of section 13 or implementing 
regulations.
    The Agencies are continuing to consider the issues raised by the 
interaction between the 2013 final rule's definitions of the terms 
``banking entity'' and ``covered fund,'' including the issues addressed 
by the Agencies' staffs and the Federal banking agencies discussed 
above. Accordingly, nothing in the proposal would modify the 
application of the staff FAQs discussed above, and the Agencies will 
not treat RICs or FPFs that meet the conditions included in the 
applicable staff FAQs as banking entities or attribute their activities 
and investments to the banking entity that sponsors the fund or 
otherwise may control the fund under the circumstances set forth in the 
FAQs. In addition, to accommodate the pendency of the proposal, for an 
additional period of one year until July 21, 2019, the Agencies will 
not treat qualifying foreign excluded funds that meet the conditions 
included in the policy statement discussed above as banking entities or 
attribute their activities and investments to the banking entity that 
sponsors the fund or otherwise may control the fund under the 
circumstances set forth in the policy statement. This additional time 
will allow the Agencies to benefit from public feedback in response to 
the requests for comment that follow. Specifically, the Agencies 
request comment on the following:
    Question 12. Have commenters experienced disruptions to bona fide 
asset management activities involving RICs, FPFs, and foreign excluded 
funds as a result of the interaction between the statute's and the 2013 
final rule's definitions of the terms ``banking entity'' and ``covered 
fund?'' If so, what sorts of disruptions, and how have commenters 
addressed them?
    Question 13. Has the guidance provided by the staffs of the 
Agencies' and the Federal banking agencies discussed above been 
effective in allowing banking entities to engage in asset management 
activities, consistent with the restrictions and requirements of 
section 13?
    Question 14. Do commenters believe that there is uncertainty about 
the length of permissible seeding periods for RICs, FPFs, and SEC-
regulated business development companies due to the Agencies' 
description of a seeding period with reference to the activities a 
banking entity undertakes while seeding a fund without specifying a 
maximum period of time? Would an approach that specified a particular 
period of time beyond which a seeding period cannot extend provide 
additional clarity? If so, what would be an appropriate time period? 
Should any specified time period be based on the period of time that 
typically is required for a RIC or FPF to develop a performance track 
record, recognizing that some additional time will also be needed to 
market the

[[Page 33445]]

fund after developing the track record? How much time is necessary to 
develop a performance track record for a RIC or FPF to effectively 
market the fund to third-party investors and how does this vary based 
on the fund's strategy or other factors? If the Agencies did specify a 
fixed amount of time for seeding generally, should the Agencies also 
provide relief that permits a fund's seeding period to exceed this 
period of time, without the fund being considered a banking entity, 
subject to additional conditions, such as documentation of the business 
need for the sponsor's continued investment? Should such additional 
relief include the lengthening of the seeding period for such 
investments? Conversely, would the current approach of not prescribing 
a fixed period of time for a seeding period be more effective in 
providing flexibility for funds that may need more time to develop a 
track record without having to specify a particular time period that 
will be appropriate for all funds?
    Question 15. Are there other situations not addressed by the 
staffs' guidance for RICs and FPFs that may result in a banking entity 
sponsor's investment in the fund exceeding 25 percent, and that limit 
banking entities' ability to engage in asset management activities? For 
example, could a sponsor's investment exceed 25 percent as investors 
redeem in anticipation of a liquidation, causing the sponsor's 
investment to increase as a percentage of the fund's assets? Are there 
instances in which one or more large investors may redeem from a fund 
and, as a result, the sponsor may seek to temporarily invest in the 
fund for the benefit of remaining shareholders?
    Question 16. Have foreign excluded funds been able to effectively 
rely on the policy statement to continue their asset management 
activities? Why or why not? Have foreign banking entities experienced 
any difficulties in complying with the condition in the policy 
statement that a foreign banking entity's acquisition or retention of 
any ownership interest in, or sponsorship of, the qualifying foreign 
excluded fund would need to meet the requirements for permitted covered 
fund activities and investments solely outside the United States, as 
provided in section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act and Sec.  __.13(b) of 
the 2013 final rule? Would the proposed changes in this proposal to 
Sec.  __.13(b) or any other provision of the 2013 final rule help 
foreign banking entities comply with the policy statement? Is the 
policy statement's definition of ``qualifying foreign excluded fund'' 
appropriate, or is it too narrow or too broad? Is further guidance 
needed with respect to any of the requirements in the definition of 
``qualifying foreign excluded fund''? For example, is it clear what 
constitutes a bona fide asset management business? Has the policy 
statement posed any issues for foreign banking entities and their 
compliance programs?
    Question 17. As stated above, the Agencies will not treat RICs or 
FPFs that meet the conditions included in the staff FAQs discussed 
above as banking entities or attribute their activities and investments 
to the banking entity that sponsors the fund or otherwise may control 
the fund under the circumstances set forth in the FAQs. In addition, 
the Agencies are extending the application of the policy statement with 
respect to qualifying foreign excluded funds for an additional year to 
accommodate the pendency of the proposal. The Agencies are requesting 
comment on other approaches that the Agencies could take to address 
these issues, consistent with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC 
Act.
    Question 18. Instead of, or in addition to, providing Agency 
guidance as discussed above, should the Agencies modify the 2013 final 
rule to address the issues raised by the interaction between the 2013 
final rule's definitions of the terms ``banking entity'' and ``covered 
fund,'' consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act, and if so, how? For 
example, should the Agencies modify the 2013 final rule to provide that 
a banking entity may elect to treat certain entities, such as a 
qualifying foreign excluded fund that meets the conditions of the 
policy statement, as covered funds, which would result in exclusion of 
these entities from the term ``banking entity?'' Would allowing a 
banking entity to invest in, sponsor, or have certain relationships 
with, the fund subject to the covered fund limitations in the 2013 
final rule be an effective way for banking entities to address the 
issues raised? For example, a banking entity could sponsor and retain a 
de minimis investment in such a fund, subject to Sec. Sec.  __.11 and 
__.12 of the 2013 final rule. A foreign bank could invest in or sponsor 
such a fund so long as these activities and investments occur solely 
outside the United States, subject to the limitations in Sec.  __.13(b) 
of the 2013 final rule.
    Question 19. If a banking entity is willing to subject its 
activities and investments with respect to a non-covered fund to the 
covered fund limitations in section 13 and the 2013 final rule, which 
are designed to prevent banking entities from being exposed to 
significant losses from investments in or other relationships with 
covered funds, is there any reason that the ability to make this 
election should be limited to particular types of non-covered funds? 
Conversely, should a banking entity only be permitted to elect to treat 
as a covered fund a ``qualifying foreign excluded fund,'' as defined in 
the policy statement issued by the Federal banking agencies? \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See supra note 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 20. If a banking entity elected to treat an entity as a 
covered fund, what potentially adverse effects could result and how 
should the Agencies address them? For example, if a foreign banking 
entity elected to treat a foreign excluded fund as a covered fund, 
would the application of the restrictions in Sec.  __.14 and the 
compliance obligations under Sec.  __.20 of the 2013 final rule involve 
the same or similar disruptions and extraterritorial application of 
section 13's restrictions that this approach would be designed to 
avoid? If so, what approach, consistent with the statute, should the 
Agencies take to address this issue? As discussed below in this 
Supplementary Information section, the Agencies are also requesting 
comment regarding potential changes in interpretation with respect to 
the 2013 final rule's implementation of section 13(f) of the BHC Act. 
How would any such modifications change any effects relating to an 
election to treat an entity as a covered fund?
    Question 21. With respect to foreign excluded funds, to what extent 
would the proposed changes, and especially the proposed changes to 
Sec. Sec.  __.6(e) and __.13(b) of the 2013 final rule, adequately 
address the concerns raised regarding the treatment of foreign excluded 
funds as banking entities? If not, what additional modifications to 
these sections would enable such a fund to engage in proprietary 
trading or covered fund activity? Should the Agencies provide or modify 
exemptions under the 2013 final rule such that a qualifying foreign 
excluded fund could operate more effectively and efficiently, 
notwithstanding its status as a banking entity? If so, please explain 
how such an exemption would be consistent with the statute.
    Question 22. Are there any other investment vehicles or entities 
that are treated as banking entities and for which commenters believe 
relief, consistent with the statute, would be appropriate? Which ones 
and why? What form of relief could be provided in a way consistent with 
the statute? For example, staffs of the Agencies have received 
inquiries regarding employees' securities companies (``ESCs''), which

[[Page 33446]]

generally rely on an exemption from registration under the Investment 
Company Act provided by section 6(b) of that Act. These funds are 
controlled by their sponsors and, if those sponsors are banking 
entities, may themselves be treated as banking entities. Treating these 
ESCs as banking entities, however, may conflict with their stated 
investment objectives, which commonly are to invest in covered funds 
for the benefit of the employees of the sponsoring banking entity. 
Should an ESC be treated differently if its banking entity sponsor 
controls the ESC by virtue of corporate governance arrangements, which 
is a required condition of the exemptive relief under section 6(b) of 
the Investment Company Act that ESCs receive from the SEC, but does not 
acquire or retain any ownership interest in the ESC? If so, how should 
the Agencies consider residual or reversionary interests resulting from 
employees forfeiting their interests in the ESC? In pursuing their 
stated investment objectives on behalf of employees, do ESCs make these 
investment ``as principal,'' as contemplated by section 13? To what 
extent do banking entities invest directly in ESCs? Are there any other 
investment vehicles or entities, in pursuing their stated investment 
objectives on behalf of employees, that banking entities invest in ``as 
principal'' (e.g., nonqualified deferred compensation plans such as 
trusts modeled under IRS Revenue Procedure 92-64, commonly referred to 
as ``rabbi trusts'')? How should the Agencies consider these investment 
vehicles or entities with respect to section 13? Please include an 
explanation of how the commenters' preferred treatment of any 
investment vehicle would be consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act, 
including the statutory definition of ``banking entity.''
b. Limited Trading Assets and Liabilities
    The proposed rule would add a definition of limited trading assets 
and liabilities. As described in greater detail in Part II.G above, 
limited trading assets and liabilities would be defined under the 
proposal as trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets 
and liabilities involving obligations of, or guaranteed by, the United 
States or any agency of the United States) the average gross sum of 
which (on a worldwide consolidated basis) over the previous consecutive 
four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of the four 
previous calendar quarters, does not exceed $1 billion.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See supra note 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Moderate Trading Assets and Liabilities
    The proposed rule would add a definition of moderate trading assets 
and liabilities. As described in greater detail in Part II.G above, 
moderate trading assets and liabilities would be defined under the 
proposal as trading assets and liabilities that are not significant 
trading assets and liabilities or limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
d. Significant Trading Assets and Liabilities
    The proposed rule would add a definition of significant trading 
assets and liabilities. As described in greater detail in Part II.G 
above, significant trading assets and liabilities would be defined 
under the proposal as trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading 
assets and liabilities involving obligations of, or guaranteed by, the 
United States or any agency of the United States) the average gross sum 
of which (on a worldwide consolidated basis) over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, equals or exceeds $10 billion.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See supra note 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Subpart B--Proprietary Trading Restrictions

1. Section __.3 Prohibition on Proprietary Trading
    Section 13 of the BHC Act generally prohibits banking entities from 
engaging in proprietary trading.\53\ The statute defines ``proprietary 
trading'' as engaging as principal for the trading account of the 
banking entity in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise 
acquire or dispose of, any of a number of financial instruments.\54\ 
The statute defines ``trading account'' as any account used for 
acquiring or taking positions in financial instruments ``principally 
for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the 
intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements), 
and any such other accounts as the Agencies may, by rule, determine.'' 
\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1)(A).
    \54\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(4). The statutory proprietary trading 
definition applies to the purchase or sale, or the acquisition or 
disposition of, any security, derivative, contract of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery, option on any such security, 
derivative, or contract, or any other security or financial 
instrument that the Agencies by rule determine.
    \55\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6) (defining ``trading account'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Definition of Trading Account
    The 2013 final rule, like the statute, defines proprietary trading 
as engaging as principal for the trading account of the banking entity 
in any purchase or sale of one or more financial instruments.\56\ The 
2013 final rule implements the statutory definition of trading account 
with a three-pronged definition. The first prong (the ``short-term 
intent prong'') includes within the definition of trading account any 
account used by a banking entity to purchase or sell one or more 
financial instruments principally for the purpose of (a) short-term 
resale, (b) benefitting from short-term price movements, (c) realizing 
short-term arbitrage profits, or (d) hedging any of the foregoing.\57\ 
Banking entities and others have informed the Agencies that this prong 
of the definition imposes significant compliance costs and uncertainty 
because it requires determining the intent of each individual who 
purchases and sells a financial instrument.\58\ In gaining experience 
implementing the 2013 final rule, the Agencies recognize that banking 
entities lack clarity about whether particular purchases and sales of a 
financial instrument are included under this prong of the trading 
account. The 2013 final rule includes a rebuttable presumption that the 
purchase or sale of a financial instrument is for the trading account 
under the short-term intent prong if the banking entity holds the 
financial instrument for fewer than 60 days or substantially transfers 
the risk of the position within 60 days (the ``60-day rebuttable 
presumption'').\59\ If a banking entity sells or transfers the risk of 
a position within 60 days, it may rebut the presumption by 
demonstrating that it did not purchase or sell the financial instrument 
principally for short-term trading purposes. In the Agencies' 
experience, a broad range of transactions could trigger the 60-day 
rebuttable presumption. For example, the purchase of a security with a 
maturity (or remaining maturity) of fewer than 60 days to meet the 
regulatory requirements of a foreign government or to manage the 
banking entity's risks could trigger the 60-day rebuttable presumption 
because the banking entity holds the security for fewer than 60 days. 
In both cases, however, it is unlikely that the banking entity intended 
to purchase or sell the instrument principally for the purpose of 
short-term resale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Sec.  __.3(a) of the proposed rule.
    \57\ Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(i) of the proposed rule.
    \58\ See supra note 18.
    \59\ Sec.  __.3(b)(2) of the proposed rule.

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[[Page 33447]]

    The other two prongs of the 2013 final rule's definition of trading 
account are the ``market risk capital prong'' and the ``dealer prong.'' 
The ``market risk capital prong'' applies to the purchase or sale of 
financial instruments that are both market risk capital rule covered 
positions and trading positions.\60\ The ``dealer prong'' applies to 
the purchase or sale of financial instruments by a banking entity that 
is licensed or registered, or required to be licensed or registered, as 
a dealer, swap dealer, or security-based swap dealer, to the extent the 
instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities that 
require the banking entity to be licensed or registered as such.\61\
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    \60\ Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(ii) of the proposed rule.
    \61\ Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(iii)(A) of the proposed rule. The dealer 
prong also includes positions entered into by a banking entity that 
is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or security-
based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent the 
instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities of 
such business. See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(iii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies are proposing to revise the regulatory trading account 
definition to address concerns that the 2013 final rule's short-term 
intent prong requires banking entities and the Agencies to make 
subjective determinations with respect to each trade a banking entity 
conducts, and that the 60-day rebuttable presumption may scope in 
activities that do not involve the types of risks or transactions the 
statutory definition of proprietary trading appears to have been 
intended to cover. Specifically, the Agencies propose to retain the 
existing dealer prong and a modified version of the market risk capital 
prong, and to replace the 2013 final rule's short-term intent prong 
with a new third prong based on the accounting treatment of a position, 
in each case to implement the requirements of the statutory definition. 
The new prong would provide that ``trading account'' means any account 
used by a banking entity to purchase or sell one or more financial 
instruments that is recorded at fair value on a recurring basis under 
applicable accounting standards (the ``accounting prong''). The 
Agencies also propose to eliminate the 60-day rebuttable presumption in 
the 2013 final rule.
    The Agencies further propose to add a presumption of compliance 
with the prohibition on proprietary trading for trading desks that do 
not purchase or sell financial instruments subject to the market risk 
capital prong or the dealer prong and operate under a prescribed profit 
and loss threshold.\62\ While still subject to the prohibition on 
proprietary trading under section 13 of the BHC Act and the applicable 
regulatory requirements, such eligible trading desks that remain under 
the threshold would not have to demonstrate their compliance with 
subpart B on an ongoing basis, as discussed below. Notwithstanding this 
regulatory presumption of compliance, the Agencies would reserve 
authority to determine on a case-by-case basis that a purchase or sale 
of one or more financial instruments by a banking entity either is or 
is not for the trading account, and, as a result, may require that a 
trading desk demonstrate compliance with subpart B on an ongoing basis 
with respect to a financial instrument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ In addition, the Agencies are proposing to adopt a 
presumption of compliance for banking entities with limited trading 
activities. See Sec.  __.20(g) of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed approach, ``trading account'' would continue to 
include any account used by a banking entity to (1) purchase or sell 
one or more financial instruments that are both market risk capital 
rule covered positions and trading positions (or hedges of other market 
risk capital rule covered positions), if the banking entity, or any 
affiliate of the banking entity, is an insured depository institution, 
bank holding company, or savings and loan holding company, and 
calculates risk-based capital ratios under the market risk capital 
rule, or (2) purchase or sell one or more financial instruments for any 
purpose, if the banking entity is licensed or registered, or required 
to be licensed or registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, 
swap dealer, or security-based swap dealer, if the instrument is 
purchased or sold in connection with the activities that require the 
banking entity to be licensed or registered as such \63\ (or if the 
banking entity is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer outside of the United States, if the 
instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities of 
such business).\64\ The Agencies are proposing to retain these prongs 
because both prongs provide clear lines and well-understood standards 
for purposes of determining whether or not a purchase or sale of a 
financial instrument is in the trading account. The Agencies also 
propose to adapt the market risk capital prong to apply to the 
activities of FBOs in order to take into account the different 
regulatory frameworks and supervisors that FBOs may have in their home 
countries. Specifically, the Agencies propose to include within the 
market risk capital prong, with respect to a banking entity that is 
not, and is not controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity 
that is, located in or organized under the laws of the United States or 
any State, any account used by the banking entity to purchase or sell 
one or more financial instruments that are subject to capital 
requirements under a market risk framework established by the home-
country supervisor that is consistent with the market risk framework 
published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as amended 
from time to time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ An insured depository institution may be registered as, 
among other things, a swap dealer and a security-based swap dealer, 
but only the swap and security-based dealing activities that require 
it to be so registered are included in the trading account by virtue 
of the dealer prong. If an insured depository institution purchases 
or sells a financial instrument in connection with activities of the 
insured depository institution that do not trigger registration as a 
swap dealer, such as lending, deposit-taking, the hedging of 
business risks, or other end-user activity, the financial instrument 
would be included in the trading account only if the purchase or 
sale of the financial instrument falls within the market risk 
capital trading account prong under Sec.  __.3(b)(1) or the 
accounting prong under Sec.  __.3(b)(3) of the proposed rule. See 79 
FR at 5549, note 135.
    \64\ See Sec.  __.3(b)(2) of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Trading Account--Accounting Prong
    The proposal's definition of ``trading account'' for purposes of 
section 13 of the BHC Act would replace the short-term intent prong in 
the 2013 final rule with a new prong based on accounting treatment, by 
reference to whether a financial instrument (as defined in the 2013 
final rule and unchanged by the proposal) is recorded at fair value on 
a recurring basis under applicable accounting standards. Such 
instruments generally include, but are not limited to, derivatives, 
trading securities, and available-for-sale securities. For example, for 
a banking entity that uses GAAP, a security that is classified as 
``trading'' under GAAP would be included in the proposal's definition 
of ``trading account'' under this approach because it is recorded at 
fair value. ``Fair value'' refers to a measurement basis of accounting, 
and is defined under GAAP as the price that would be received to sell 
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 820-10-20 and 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 13.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal's inclusion of this prong in the definition of 
``trading account'' is intended to give greater certainty and clarity 
to banking entities about what financial instruments would be included 
in the trading account, because banking entities should know which 
instruments are recorded at fair value on

[[Page 33448]]

their balance sheets. This modification of the rule's definition of 
trading account would include other accounts that may be used by 
banking entities for the purpose described in the statutory definition 
of ``trading account.'' \66\ The proposal is intended to address 
concerns that the statutory definition of trading account may be read 
to contemplate an inquiry into the subjective intent underlying a 
trade.\67\ The proposal would therefore adopt the accounting prong as 
an objective means of ensuring that such positions entered into by 
banking entities principally for the purpose of selling in the near 
term, or with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term 
price movements, are incorporated in the definition of trading account. 
For entities that are not subject to the market-risk capital prong or 
the dealer prong, the accounting prong would therefore be the sole 
avenue by which such banking entities would become subject to the 
requirements in subpart B of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    \67\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 23. Should the Agencies adopt the proposed new accounting 
prong and remove the short-term intent prong? Why or why not? Does 
using such a prong provide sufficient clarity regarding which financial 
instruments are included in the trading account for purposes of the 
proposal? Are there differences in the application of IFRS and GAAP 
that the Agencies should consider? What are they and how would they 
impact the scope of the proposed accounting prong?
    Question 24. Is using the accounting prong appropriate considering 
the fact that entities may have discretion over whether certain 
financial instruments are recorded at fair value (and therefore subject 
to the restrictions in section 13 of the BHC Act)? Could the proposed 
accounting prong incentivize banking entities to modify their 
accounting treatment with respect to certain financial instruments in 
order to evade the prohibition on proprietary trading? Why or why not? 
If so, could those effects have an impact on the banking entity's 
accounting practices?
    Question 25. Should the Agencies include all financial instruments 
that are recorded at fair value on a banking entity's balance sheet as 
part of the proposed accounting prong? Why or why not? Would such a 
definition be overly broad? If so, why and how should the definition be 
narrowed, consistent with the statute? Would such a definition be too 
narrow and exclude financial instruments that should be included? If 
so, should the Agencies apply a different approach? Why or why not?
    Question 26. Is the proposal's inclusion of available-for-sale 
securities under the proposed accounting prong appropriate? Why or why 
not?
    Question 27. The proposed accounting prong would include all 
derivatives in the proposed accounting prong since derivatives are 
required to be recorded at fair value. Is this appropriate? Why or why 
not?
    Question 28. Should the scope of the proposed accounting prong be 
further specified? In particular, should practical expedients to fair 
value measurements permitted under applicable accounting standards be 
included in the ``trading account'' definition (e.g., equity securities 
without readily determinable fair value under ASC 321 or investments 
using the net asset value (``NAV'') practical expedient under ASC 820)? 
Why or why not? Are there other relevant examples that cause concern?
    Question 29. Is there a better approach to defining ``trading 
account'' for purposes of section 13 of the BHC Act, consistent with 
the statute? If so, please explain.
    Question 30. Would the short-term intent prong in the 2013 final 
rule be preferable to the proposed accounting prong? Why or why not? 
Should the Agencies rely on a potentially objective measure, such as 
the accounting treatment of a financial instrument, to implement the 
definition of ``trading account'' in section 13(h)(6), which includes 
any account used for acquiring or taking positions in certain 
securities and instruments ``principally for the purpose of selling in 
the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to 
profit from short-term price movements''? \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 31. Would references to accounting treatment be better 
formulated as safe harbors or presumptions within the short-term intent 
prong under the 2013 final rule? Why or why not?
    Question 32. What impact, if any, would the proposed accounting 
prong have on the liquidity of corporate bonds or other securities? 
Please explain.
    Question 33. For purposes of determining whether certain trading 
activity is within the definition of proprietary trading, is the 
proposed accounting prong over- or under-inclusive? If over- or under-
inclusive, is there another alternative that would be a more 
appropriate replacement for the short-term prong? Please explain. If 
over-inclusive, what types of transactions or positions could 
potentially be included in the definition of proprietary trading that 
should not be? Please explain, and provide specific examples of the 
particular transactions or positions. If under-inclusive, what types of 
transactions or positions could potentially be omitted from the 
definition of proprietary trading that should be included in light of 
the language and purpose of the statute? Please explain and provide 
specific examples of the particular transactions or positions.
    Question 34. The dealer prong of the trading account definition 
includes accounts used for purchases or sales of one or more financial 
instruments for any purpose, if the banking entity is, among other 
things, licensed or registered, or is required to be licensed or 
registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such. In adopting the 2013 final 
rule, the Agencies recognized that banking entities that are registered 
dealers may not have previously engaged in such an analysis, thereby 
resulting in a new regulatory requirement for these entities. The 
Agencies did, however, note that if the regulatory analysis otherwise 
engaged in by banking entities was substantially similar to the dealer 
prong analysis, then any increased compliance burden could be small or 
insubstantial. Have any banking entities incurred increased compliance 
costs resulting from the requirement to analyze whether particular 
activities would require dealer registration? If so, how substantial 
are those additional costs and have those costs changed over time, 
including as a result of the banking entity becoming more accustomed to 
engaging in the required analysis?
    Question 35. In the case of banking entities that are registered 
dealers, how often does the analysis of whether particular activities 
would require dealer registration result in identifying transactions or 
positions that would not be included under the dealer prong? How does 
the volume of those transactions or positions compare to the volume of 
transactions or positions that are included under the dealer prong? 
What types of transactions or positions would not be included under the 
dealer prong and how often are those transactions included by a 
different part of the definition of ``trading account,'' namely the 
short-term prong?
    Question 36. For transactions or positions not covered by the 
dealer

[[Page 33449]]

prong, would those transactions or positions be covered by the proposed 
accounting treatment prong? Why or why not?
    Question 37. As compared to the 2013 final rule's dealer and short-
term intent prongs taken together, would the proposed accounting prong 
result in a greater or lesser amount of trading activity being included 
in the definition of ``trading account''? What are the resulting costs 
and benefits? In responding to this question, commenters are encouraged 
to be as specific as possible in describing the transactions or 
positions used to support their analysis.
    Question 38. Would banking entities regulated by Agencies that are 
market regulators incur additional (or lesser) compliance costs or 
burdens in the course of complying with the proposal as compared to the 
costs and burdens of other banking entities? How would the costs and 
burdens incurred by these banking entities compare as a whole to those 
of other banking entities? Please explain.
c. Presumption of Compliance With the Prohibition on Proprietary 
Trading
    The Agencies propose to include a presumption of compliance with 
the proposed rule's proprietary trading prohibition based on an 
objective, quantitative measure of a trading desk's activities. This 
presumption of compliance would apply to a banking entity's individual 
trading desks rather than to the banking entity as a whole. As 
described below, a trading desk operating pursuant to the proposed 
presumption would not be obligated to demonstrate that the activities 
of the trading desk comply with subpart B on an ongoing basis. The 
proposed presumption would only be available for a trading desk's 
activities that may be within the trading account under the proposed 
accounting prong, for a trading desk that is not subject to the market 
risk capital prong or the dealer prong of the trading account 
definition. The replacement of the short-term intent prong with the 
accounting prong would represent a significant change from the 2013 
final rule and could potentially apply to certain activities that were 
previously not within the regulatory definition of trading account. 
However, the presumption of compliance would limit the expansion of the 
definition of ``trading account'' to include--unless the presumption is 
rebutted--only the activities of a trading desk that engages in a 
greater than de minimis amount of activity (unless the presumption is 
rebutted).
    The proposed presumption would not be available for trading desks 
that purchase or sell positions that are within the trading account 
under the market risk capital prong or the dealer prong. The Agencies 
are not proposing to extend the presumption of compliance with the 
prohibition on proprietary trading to activities of banking entities 
that are included under the market risk capital prong or the dealer 
prong because, based on their experience implementing the 2013 final 
rule, the Agencies believe that these two prongs are reasonably 
designed to include the appropriate trading activities. Banking 
entities subject to the market risk capital prong and the dealer prong 
have had several years of experience complying with the requirements of 
the 2013 final rule and experience with identifying these activities in 
other contexts. The Agencies believe that banking entities with 
activities that are covered by these prongs are able to conduct 
appropriate trading activities in an efficient manner pursuant to 
exclusions from the definition of proprietary trading or pursuant to 
the exemptions for permitted activities. The Agencies further note that 
the proposed revisions to the exemptions (described herein) are 
intended to facilitate the ability of banking entities subject to the 
market risk capital prong and the dealer prong to better engage in 
otherwise permitted activities such as market-making. Additionally, the 
Agencies note that the presumption of compliance with the prohibition 
on proprietary trading is optional for a banking entity. Accordingly, 
if a banking entity prefers to demonstrate ongoing compliance for 
activity captured by the accounting prong rather than calculating the 
threshold for presumed compliance described below, it may do so at its 
discretion.
    Under the proposed compliance presumption, the activities of a 
trading desk of a banking entity that are not covered by the market 
risk capital prong or the dealer prong would be presumed to comply with 
the proposed rule's prohibition on proprietary trading if the 
activities do not exceed a specified quantitative threshold. The 
trading desk would remain subject to the prohibition, but unless the 
desk engages in a material level of trading activity (or the 
presumption of compliance is rebutted as described below), the desk 
would not be required to comply with the more extensive requirements 
that would otherwise apply under the proposal in order to demonstrate 
compliance. As described further below, the Agencies propose to use the 
absolute value of the trading desk's profit and loss (``absolute P&L'') 
on a 90-calendar-day rolling basis as the relevant quantitative measure 
for this threshold.
    The proposed rule includes a threshold for the presumption of 
compliance based on absolute P&L because this measure tends to 
correlate with the scale and nature of a trading desk's trading 
activities.\69\ In addition, if the positions of a trading desk have 
recently significantly contributed to the financial position of the 
banking entity, such that the absolute P&L-based threshold is exceeded, 
the proposed trading-desk-level presumption would become unavailable 
and the banking entity would be required to comply with more extensive 
requirements of the rule to ensure compliance. Using absolute P&L as 
the relevant measure of trading desk risk would provide an additional 
advantage as an objective measure that most banking entities are 
already equipped to calculate.\70\ This measure would also indicate the 
realized outcomes of the risks of a trading desk's positions, rather 
than modeled estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ For example, trading desks that contemporaneously and 
effectively offset or hedge the assets and liabilities that they 
acquire through trades with customers as a result of engagement in 
customer-driven activities could be expected under most conditions 
to generally experience lower amounts of daily profit or loss 
attributable to daily fluctuations in the value of the desk's 
positions than desks engaged in speculative activities.
    \70\ Some banking entities without meaningful trading activities 
may not currently calculate P&L as described in this proposal, but 
the Agencies believe that many, if not most, of those banking 
entities would be banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities that would be presumed to comply with the proposed rule 
under proposed Sec.  __.20(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, the proposed presumption of compliance would take the 
approach that a trading desk that consistently does not generate more 
than a threshold amount of absolute P&L does not engage in trading 
activities of a sufficient scale to warrant the costs associated with 
more extensive requirements of the rule to otherwise demonstrate 
compliance with the prohibition on proprietary trading. Such an 
approach is intended to reflect a view that the lesser activity of 
these trading desks does not justify the costs of an extensive ongoing 
compliance regime for those trading desks in order to ensure compliance 
with section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations.
    Under the proposal, each trading desk that operates under the 
presumption of compliance with the prohibition on proprietary trading 
would be required to determine on a daily basis the absolute value of 
its net realized and unrealized

[[Page 33450]]

gains or losses on its portfolio of financial instruments based on the 
fair value of the financial instruments. The sum of the absolute values 
of gains or losses for each trading date in any 90-calendar-day period 
is the trading desk's 90-calendar-day absolute P&L. If this value 
exceeds $25 million at any point, then the banking entity would be 
required to notify the appropriate Agency that it has exceeded the 
threshold in accordance with the Agency's notification policies and 
procedures.
    The Agencies propose to use the absolute value of a trading desk's 
daily P&L because absolute value would ensure that losses would be 
counted toward the measurement to the same extent as gains. Thus, a 
trading desk could not avoid triggering compliance by offsetting 
significant net gains on one day with significant net losses on another 
day. Measuring absolute P&L on a rolling basis would mean that the 
threshold could be triggered in any 90-calendar-day period.
    This proposed trading-desk-level presumption of compliance with the 
prohibition on proprietary trading would be intended to allow banking 
entities to conduct ordinary banking activities without having to 
assess every individual trade for compliance with subpart B of the 
implementing regulations and, in particular, the proposed accounting 
prong.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Provided that a trading desk's absolute P&L does not exceed 
the $25 million threshold, a banking entity would not have to assess 
the accounting treatment of each transaction of a trading desk that 
operates pursuant to the presumption of compliance with the 
prohibition on proprietary trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, one advantage of using absolute P&L as the relevant 
measure of trading desk risk is that it would provide a relatively 
simple and objective measure that most banking entities are already 
equipped to calculate. For example, banking entities subject to the 
current metrics reporting requirements should already be equipped to 
calculate P&L on a daily basis. Other banking entities with significant 
trading activities likely currently calculate P&L on a daily basis for 
the purpose of monitoring their positions and risks. Moreover, a 
banking entity's methodology for calculating P&L is generally subject 
to internal and external audit requirements, managerial monitoring, and 
applicable public reporting requirements under the U.S. securities 
laws. Under the proposed approach, the Agencies would review banking 
entities' methodologies for calculating absolute P&L for purposes of 
the presumption of compliance with the prohibition on proprietary 
trading.
    The specific threshold chosen aims to characterize trading desks 
not engaged in prohibited proprietary trading. Based on the metrics 
collected by the Agencies since issuance of the 2013 final rule, 90-
calendar-day absolute P&L values below $25 million dollars are 
typically indicative of trading desks not engaged in prohibited 
proprietary trading. Under the proposal, the activities of a trading 
desk that exceeds the $25 million threshold would not presumptively 
comply with the prohibition on proprietary trading. If a trading desk 
operating pursuant to the proposed presumption of compliance with the 
prohibition on proprietary trading exceeded the $25 million threshold, 
the banking entity would be required to notify the appropriate Agency, 
demonstrate that the trading desk's purchases and sales of financial 
instruments comply with subpart B (e.g., the desk's purchases and sales 
are not included in the rule's definition of trading account or meet 
the terms of an exclusion from the definition of proprietary trading or 
a permitted activity exemption), and demonstrate how the trading desk 
that exceeded the threshold will maintain compliance with subpart B on 
an ongoing basis. The proposed presumption of compliance is intended to 
apply to the desks of banking entities that are not engaged in 
prohibited proprietary trading and is not intended as a safe harbor. 
The Agencies therefore propose to include within the presumption of 
compliance a process by which an Agency may rebut this regulatory 
presumption of compliance. Under the proposal, the Agency would be able 
to rebut the presumption of compliance with the prohibition on 
proprietary trading for the activities of a trading desk that does not 
exceed the $25 million threshold by providing the banking entity 
written notification of the Agency's determination that one or more of 
the trading desk's activities violates the prohibition on proprietary 
trading under subpart B.
    In addition, the proposed rule includes a reservation of authority 
(described further below) that would allow an Agency to designate any 
activity as a proprietary trading activity if the Agency determines on 
a case-by-case basis that the banking entity has engaged as principal 
for the trading account of the banking entity in any purchase or sale 
of one or more financial instruments under 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    Question 39. Should the Agencies consider any objective measures 
other than accounting treatment to replace the 2013 final rule's short-
term intent prong? For example, should the Agencies consider including 
an objective quantitative threshold (such as the absolute P&L threshold 
described in the proposed presumption of compliance with the 
proprietary trading prohibition) as an element of the trading account 
definition? Why or why not, and how would such a measure be consistent 
with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act?
    Question 40. Is the proposed desk-level threshold for presumed 
compliance with the prohibition on proprietary trading ($25 million 
absolute P&L) an appropriate measure for indicating that the scale of a 
trading desk's activities may not warrant the cost of more extensive 
compliance requirements? Why or why not? If not, what other measure 
would be more appropriate? If absolute P&L is an appropriate measure, 
is $25 million an appropriate threshold? Why or why not? Should this 
threshold be periodically indexed for inflation?
    Question 41. What issues do commenters expect would arise if the 
$25 million threshold is applied to each trading desk at a banking 
entity? Would variations in levels and types of activity of the 
different trading desks raise challenges in the application of the 
threshold?
    Question 42. What factors, if any, should the Agencies keep in mind 
as they consider how the $25 million threshold should be applied over 
time, as trading desks' activities change and banking entities may 
reorganize their trading desks? Would the $25 million threshold require 
any adjustment if a banking entity consolidated more than one trading 
desk into one, or split the activities of a trading desk among multiple 
trading desks?
    Question 43. As described further below, the Agencies are 
requesting comment regarding a potential change to the definition of 
``trading desk'' that would allow a banking entity greater discretion 
to define the business units that constitute trading desks for purposes 
of the 2013 final rule. If the Agencies were to adopt both this change 
to the definition of ``trading desk'' and the trading desk-level 
presumption of compliance described above, would such a combination 
create opportunities for evasion? If so, how could such concerns be 
mitigated?
    Question 44. Recognizing that the Agencies that are market 
regulators operate under an examination and enforcement model that 
differs from a bank supervisory model, from a practical perspective 
would the proposal to replace the current short-

[[Page 33451]]

term intent prong with an accounting prong, including the presumption 
of compliance, apply differently to banking entities regulated by 
market regulators as compared to other banking entities? Please 
explain.
    Question 45. Is the process by which the Agencies may rebut the 
presumption of compliance sufficiently clear? If not, how should the 
process be changed?
    Question 46. Under the proposed presumption of compliance, banking 
entities would be required to notify the appropriate Agency whenever 
the activities of a trading desk with the relevant activities crosses 
the $25 million P&L threshold. Should the Agencies consider an 
alternative methodology in which a banking entity regulated by the SEC 
or CFTC, as appropriate, makes and keeps a detailed record of each 
instance and provides such records to SEC or CFTC staff promptly upon 
request or during an examination? Why or why not?
    Question 47. Would an alternative methodology to the notification 
requirement, applicable solely to banking entities regulated by 
Agencies that are market regulators, whereby these firms would be 
required to escalate notices of instances when the P&L threshold has 
been exceeded internally for further inquiry and determination as to 
whether notice should be given to the applicable regulator, using 
objective factors provided by the rule? Why or why not? If such an 
approach would be more appropriate, what objective factors should be 
used to determine when notice should be given to the applicable 
regulator? Please be as specific as possible.
    Question 48. Should the Agencies specify notice and response 
procedures in connection with an Agency determination that the 
presumption is rebutted pursuant to Sec.  __.3(c)(2) of the proposal? 
Why or why not? If not, what other approach would be appropriate?
d. Excluded Activities.
    As previously discussed, Sec.  __.3 of the 2013 final rule 
generally prohibits a banking entity from engaging in proprietary 
trading.\72\ In addition to defining the scope of trading activity 
subject to the prohibition on proprietary trading, the 2013 final rule 
also provides several exclusions from the definition of proprietary 
trading.\73\ Based on their experience implementing the 2013 final 
rule, the Agencies are proposing to modify the exclusion for liquidity 
management and to adopt new exclusions for transactions made to correct 
errors and for certain offsetting swap transactions. In addition, the 
Agencies request comment regarding whether any additional exclusions 
should be added, for example, to address certain derivatives entered 
into in connection with a customer lending transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(a).
    \73\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Liquidity Management Exclusion
    The 2013 final rule excludes from the definition of proprietary 
trading the purchase or sale of securities for the purpose of liquidity 
management in accordance with a documented liquidity management 
plan.\74\ This exclusion is subject to several requirements. First, the 
liquidity management exclusion is limited by its terms to securities 
and requires that transactions be pursuant to a liquidity management 
plan that specifically contemplates and authorizes the particular 
securities to be used for liquidity management purposes; describes the 
amounts, types, and risks of securities that are consistent with the 
entity's liquidity management; and the liquidity circumstances in which 
the particular securities may or must be used. Second, any purchase or 
sale of securities contemplated and authorized by the plan must be 
principally for the purpose of managing the liquidity of the banking 
entity, and not for the purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from 
actual or expected short-term price movements, realizing short-term 
arbitrage profits, or hedging a position taken for such short-term 
purposes. Third, the plan must require that any securities purchased or 
sold for liquidity management purposes be highly liquid and limited to 
instruments the market, credit, and other risks of which the banking 
entity does not reasonably expect to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements. Fourth, the plan 
must limit any securities purchased or sold for liquidity management 
purposes to an amount that is consistent with the banking entity's 
near-term funding needs, including deviations from normal operations of 
the banking entity or any affiliate thereof, as estimated and 
documented pursuant to methods specified in the plan. Fifth, the 
banking entity must incorporate into its compliance program internal 
controls, analysis, and independent testing designed to ensure that 
activities undertaken for liquidity management purposes are conducted 
in accordance with the requirements of the final rule and the entity's 
liquidity management plan. Finally, the plan must be consistent with 
the supervisory requirements, guidance, and expectations regarding 
liquidity management of the Agency responsible for regulating the 
banking entity. These requirements are designed to ensure that the 
liquidity management exclusion is not misused for the purpose of 
impermissible proprietary trading.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(d)(3).
    \75\ See 79 FR at 5555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies propose to amend the exclusion for liquidity 
management activities to allow banking entities to use foreign exchange 
forwards and foreign exchange swaps, each as defined in the Commodity 
Exchange Act,\76\ and physically settled cross-currency swaps (i.e., 
cross-currency swaps that involve an actual exchange of the underlying 
currencies) as part of their liquidity management activities. 
Currently, the liquidity management exclusion is limited to the 
``purchase or sale of a security . . . for the purpose of liquidity 
management . . .'' if several specified requirements are met.\77\ As a 
result, banking entities may not currently rely on the liquidity 
management exclusion for foreign exchange derivative transactions used 
for liquidity management because the exclusion is limited to 
securities. However, the Agencies understand that banking entities 
often use foreign exchange forwards, foreign exchange swaps, and cross-
currency swaps for liquidity management purposes. In particular, 
foreign exchange forwards, foreign exchange swaps, and cross-currency 
swaps are often used by trading desks to manage liquidity both in the 
United States and in foreign jurisdictions. For example, foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banking entities often have liquidity 
requirements mandated by foreign jurisdictions, and foreign exchange 
products can be used to address currency risk arising from holding this 
liquidity in foreign currencies. As a particular example, a U.S. 
banking entity may have U.S. dollars to fund its operations but require 
Japanese yen for its branch in Japan. The banking entity could use a 
foreign exchange swap to convert its U.S. dollars to Japanese yen to 
fund the operations of its Japanese branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See 7 U.S.C. 1a(24) and 1a(25).
    \77\ Sec.  __.3(d)(3) of the proposed rule (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To streamline compliance for banking entities operating in foreign 
jurisdictions and using foreign exchange forwards, foreign exchange 
swaps, and cross-currency swaps for liquidity management purposes, the 
Agencies propose to expand the liquidity management exclusion to permit 
the

[[Page 33452]]

purchase or sale of foreign exchange forwards (as that term is defined 
in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)), 
foreign exchange swaps (as that term is defined in section 1a(25) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25)), and physically-settled 
cross-currency swaps \78\ entered into by a banking entity for the 
purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan. The proposed rule would permit a banking 
entity to purchase or sell foreign exchange forwards, foreign exchange 
swaps, and physically-settled cross-currency swaps to the same extent 
that a banking entity may purchase or sell securities under the 
existing exclusion, and the existing conditions that apply for 
securities transactions would also apply to transactions in foreign 
exchange forwards, foreign exchange swaps, and physically-settled 
cross-currency swaps.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ The Agencies propose to define a cross-currency swap as a 
swap in which one party exchanges with another party principal and 
interest rate payments in one currency for principal and interest 
rate payments in another currency, and the exchange of principal 
occurs on the date the swap is entered into, with a reversal of the 
exchange of principal at a later date that is agreed upon when the 
swap is entered into. This definition is consistent with regulations 
pertaining to margin and capital requirements for covered swap 
entities, swap dealers, and major swap participants. See 12 CFR 
45.2; 12 CFR 237.2; 12 CFR 349.2; 17 CFR 23.151.
    \79\ See Sec.  __.3(e)(3)(i)-(vi) of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The inclusion of cross-currency swaps would be limited to swaps for 
which all payments are made in the currencies being exchanged, as 
opposed to cash-settled swaps, to limit the potential for these 
instruments to be used for proprietary trading that is not for 
liquidity management purposes. While foreign exchange forwards and 
foreign exchange swaps, as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act, are 
by definition limited to an exchange of the designated currencies, no 
similarly limited definition of the term ``cross-currency swap'' is 
available for this purpose. Cross-currency swaps generally are more 
flexible in their terms, may have longer durations, and may be used to 
achieve a greater variety of potential outcomes. Accordingly, out of 
concern that cross-currency swaps could be used for prohibited 
proprietary trading, the Agencies propose to limit the use of cross-
currency swaps for purposes of the liquidity management exclusion to 
only those swaps for which the payments are made in the two currencies 
being exchanged.
    Question 49. In addition to the example noted above, are there 
additional scenarios under which commenters would envision foreign 
exchange forwards, foreign exchange swaps, or physically-settled cross-
currency swaps to be used for liquidity management? Are the existing 
conditions of the liquidity management exclusion appropriate for these 
types of derivatives activities, or should additional conditions be 
added to account for the particular characteristics of the financial 
instruments that the Agencies are proposing to be added? Should any 
existing restrictions be removed to account for the proposed addition 
of these transactions?
    Question 50. Do the requirements of the existing liquidity 
management exclusion, as proposed to be modified by expanding the 
exclusion to include foreign exchange forwards, foreign exchange swaps, 
or physically-settled cross-currency swaps, sufficiently protect 
against the possibility of banking entities using the exclusion to 
conduct impermissible speculative trading, while also permitting bona 
fide liquidity management? Should the proposal be further modified to 
protect against the possibility of firms using the liquidity management 
exclusion to evade the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and 
implementing regulations?
    Question 51. Should banking entities be permitted to purchase and 
sell physically-settled cross-currency swaps under the liquidity 
management exclusion? Should banking entities be permitted to purchase 
and sell any other financial instruments under the liquidity management 
exclusion?
2. Transactions to Correct Bona Fide Trade Errors
    The Agencies understand that, from time to time, a banking entity 
may erroneously execute a purchase or sale of a financial instrument in 
the course of conducting a permitted or excluded activity. For example, 
a trading error may occur when a banking entity is acting solely in its 
capacity as an agent, broker, or custodian pursuant to Sec.  __.3(d)(7) 
of the 2013 final rule, such as by trading the wrong financial 
instrument, buying or selling an incorrect amount of a financial 
instrument, or purchasing rather than selling a financial instrument 
(or vice versa). To correct such errors, a banking entity may need to 
engage in a subsequent transaction as principal to fulfill its 
obligation to deliver the customer's desired financial instrument 
position and to eliminate any principal exposure that the banking 
entity acquired in the course of its effort to deliver on the 
customer's original request. Under the 2013 final rule, banking 
entities have expressed concern that the initial trading error and any 
corrective transactions could, depending on the facts and circumstances 
involved, fall within the proprietary trading definition if the 
transaction is covered by any of the prongs of the trading account 
definition and is not otherwise excluded pursuant to a different 
provision of the rule.
    Accordingly, the Agencies are proposing a new exclusion from the 
definition of proprietary trading for trading errors and subsequent 
correcting transactions because such transactions do not appear to be 
the type of transaction the statutory definition of ``proprietary 
trading'' was intended to cover. In particular, these transactions 
generally lack the intent described in the statutory definition of 
``trading account'' to profit from short-term price movements. The 
proposed exclusion would be available for certain purchases or sales of 
one or more financial instruments by a banking entity if the purchase 
(or sale) is made in error in the course of conducting a permitted or 
excluded activity or is a subsequent transaction to correct such an 
error. The Agencies note that the availability of the proposed 
exclusion will depend on the facts and circumstances of the 
transactions. For example, the failure of a banking entity to make 
reasonable efforts to prevent errors from occurring--as indicated, for 
example, by the magnitude or frequency of errors, taking into account 
the size, activities, and risk profile of the banking entity--or to 
identify and correct trading errors in a timely and appropriate manner 
may indicate trading activity that is not truly an error and therefore 
inconsistent with the exclusion.
    As an additional condition, once the banking entity identifies 
purchases made in error, it would be required to transfer the financial 
instrument to a separately-managed trade error account for disposition, 
as a further indication that the transaction reflects a bona fide 
error. The Agencies believe that this separately-managed trade error 
account should be monitored and managed by personnel independent from 
the traders who made the error and that banking entities should monitor 
and manage trade error corrections and trade error accounts. Doing so 
would help prevent personnel from using these accounts to evade the 
prohibition on proprietary trading, such as by retaining positions in 
error accounts to benefit from short-term price movements or by 
intentionally and incorrectly classifying transactions as error trades 
or as corrections of error trades in order to realize short term 
profits.

[[Page 33453]]

    Question 52. Does the proposed exclusion align with existing 
policies and procedures that banking entities use to correct trading 
errors? Why or why not?
    Question 53. Is the proposed exclusion for bona fide errors 
sufficiently narrow so as to prevent banking entities from evading 
other requirements of the rule? Conversely, would it be too narrow to 
be workable? Why or why not?
    Question 54. Do commenters believe that the proposed exclusion for 
bona fide trade errors is sufficiently clear? If not, why not, and how 
should the Agencies clarify it?
    Question 55. Does the proposed exclusion conflict with any of the 
requirements of a self-regulatory organization's rules for correcting 
trading errors? If it does, should the Agencies give banking entities 
the option of complying with those rules instead of the requirements of 
the proposed exclusion? When answering this question, commenters should 
explain why the rules of self-regulatory organizations are sufficient 
to prevent personnel from evading the prohibition on proprietary 
trading.
    Question 56. Should the Agencies provide specific criteria or 
factors to help banking entities determine what constitutes a 
separately managed trade error account? Why or why not? How would these 
factors or criteria help banking entities identify activities that are 
covered by the proposed exclusion for trading errors?
3. Definition of Other Terms Related to Proprietary Trading
    The Agencies are requesting comment on alternatives to the 2013 
final rule's definition of ``trading desk.'' The trading desk 
definition is significant because compliance with the underwriting and 
market-making provisions is determined at the trading-desk level.\80\ 
For example, the ``reasonably expected near-term customer demand,'' or 
RENTD, requirements for both underwriting and market-making activities 
must be calculated for each trading desk.\81\ Additionally, under the 
2013 final rule, banking entities must furnish metrics at the trading-
desk level.\82\ Further, the proposed presumption of compliance with 
the prohibition on proprietary trading would require trading desks 
operating pursuant to the presumption to calculate absolute P&L at the 
trading desk level and would apply to all the activities of the trading 
desk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4(a)(2); Sec.  __.4(b)(2).
    \81\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4(b)(2)(ii).
    \82\ See 2013 final rule Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the 2013 final rule, ``trading desk'' is defined as ``the 
smallest discrete unit of organization of a banking entity that 
purchases or sells financial instruments for the trading account of the 
banking entity or an affiliate thereof.'' \83\ Some banking entities 
have indicated that, in practice, this definition has led to 
uncertainty regarding the meaning of ``smallest discrete unit.'' Some 
banking entities have also communicated that this definition has caused 
confusion and duplicative compliance and reporting efforts for banking 
entities that also define trading desks for purposes not related to the 
2013 final rule, including for internal risk management and reporting 
and calculating regulatory capital requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(e)(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Agencies are requesting comment on whether to 
revise the trading desk definition to align with the trading desk 
concept used for other purposes. The Agencies are seeking comment on a 
potential multi-factor trading desk definition based on the same 
criteria typically used to establish trading desks for other 
operational, management, and compliance purposes. For example, the 
Agencies could define a trading desk as a unit of organization of a 
banking entity that purchases or sells financial instruments for the 
trading account of the banking entity or an affiliate thereof that is:
     Structured by the banking entity to establish efficient 
trading for a market sector;
     Organized to ensure appropriate setting, monitoring, and 
management review of the desk's trading and hedging limits, current and 
potential future loss exposures, strategies, and compensation 
incentives; and
     Characterized by a clearly-defined unit of personnel that 
typically:
    [cir] Engages in coordinated trading activity with a unified 
approach to its key elements;
    [cir] Operates subject to a common and calibrated set of risk 
metrics, risk levels, and joint trading limits;
    [cir] Submits compliance reports and other information as a unit 
for monitoring by management; and
    [cir] Books its trades together.
    The Agencies believe that this potential approach to the definition 
of trading desk could be easier to monitor and for banking entities to 
apply. At the same time, however, any revised definition should not be 
so broad as to hinder the ability of the Agencies or the banking 
entities to detect prohibited proprietary trading.
    Under the alternative approach on which the Agencies are requesting 
comment, a banking entity's trading desk designations would be subject 
to Agency review, as appropriate, through the examination process or 
otherwise. Such a definition would be intended to reduce the burdens on 
banking entities by aligning the regulation's trading desk concept with 
the organizational structure that firms already have in place for 
purposes of carrying out their ordinary course business activities. 
Specifically, to the extent the trading desk definition in the 2013 
final rule has been interpreted to apply at too granular a level, the 
Agencies request comment as to whether such a definition would reduce 
compliance costs by clarifying that banking entities are not required 
to maintain policies and procedures and to collect and report 
information at a level of the organization identified solely for 
purposes of section 13 of the BHC Act and implementing regulations.
    Question 57. Should the Agencies revise the trading desk definition 
to align with the level of organization established by banking entities 
for other purposes, such as for other operational, management, and 
compliance purposes? Which of the proposed factors would be appropriate 
to include in the trading desk definition? Do these factors reflect the 
same principles banking entities typically use to define trading desks 
in the ordinary course of business? Are there any other factors that 
the Agencies should consider such as, for example, how a banking entity 
would monitor and aggregate P&L for purposes other than compliance with 
section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulation?
    Question 58. How would the adoption of a different trading desk 
definition affect the ability of banking entities and the Agencies to 
detect impermissible proprietary trading? Please explain. Would a 
different definition of ``trading desk'' make it easier or harder for 
banking entities and supervisors to monitor their trading activities 
for consistency with section 13 of the BHC Act and implementing 
regulations? Would allowing banking entities to define ``trading desk'' 
for purposes of compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations create opportunities for evasion, and if so, 
how could such concerns be mitigated?
    Question 59. Please discuss any positive or negative consequences 
or costs and benefits that could result if a ``trading desk'' is not 
defined as ``the

[[Page 33454]]

smallest discrete unit of organization of a banking entity that 
purchases or sells financial instruments for the trading account of the 
banking entity or an affiliate thereof.'' Please include in your 
discussion any positive or negative impact with respect to (i) the 
ability to record the quantitative measurements required in the 
Appendix and (ii) the usefulness of such quantitative measurements.
e. Reservation of Authority
    The Agencies propose to include a reservation of authority allowing 
an Agency to determine, on a case-by-case basis, that any purchase or 
sale of one or more financial instruments by a banking entity for which 
it is the primary financial regulatory agency either is or is not for 
the trading account as defined in section 13(h)(6) of the BHC Act.\84\ 
In evaluating whether the Agency should designate a purchase or sale as 
for the trading account, the Agency will consider consistency with the 
statutory definition, and, to the extent appropriate and consistent 
with the statute, may consider the impact of the activity on the safety 
and soundness of the financial institution or the financial stability 
of the United States, the risk characteristics of the particular 
activity, or any other relevant factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comment as to whether such a reservation of 
authority would be necessary in connection with the proposed definition 
of trading account, which would focus on objective factors rather than 
on subjective intent.\85\ While the Agencies recognize that the use of 
objective factors to define proprietary trading is intended to simplify 
compliance, the Agencies also recognize that this approach may, in some 
circumstances, produce results that are either under-inclusive or over-
inclusive with respect to the definition of proprietary trading. The 
Agencies further recognize that the underlying statute sets forth 
elements of proprietary trading that are inherently subjective, for 
example, ``intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price 
movements.'' \86\ In order to provide appropriate balance and to 
recognize the subjective elements of the statute, the Agencies request 
comment as to whether a reservation of authority is appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See Sec.  __.3(b) of the proposed rule.
    \86\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies propose to administer this reservation of authority 
with appropriate notice and response procedures. In those circumstances 
where the primary financial regulatory agency of a banking entity 
determines that the purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments is for the trading account, the Agency would be required to 
provide written notice to the banking entity explaining why the 
purchase or sale is for the trading account. The Agency would also be 
required to provide the banking entity with a reasonable opportunity to 
provide a written response before the Agency reaches a final decision. 
Specifically, a banking entity would have 30 days to respond to the 
notice with any objections to the determination and any factors that 
the banking entity would have the Agency consider in reaching its final 
determination. The Agency could, in its discretion, extend the response 
period beyond 30 days for good cause. The Agency could also shorten the 
response period if the banking entity consents to a shorter response 
period or, if, in the opinion of the Agency, the activities or 
condition of the banking entity so requires, provided that the banking 
entity is informed promptly of the new response period. Failure to 
respond within the time period would amount to a waiver of any 
objections to the Agency's determination that a purchase or sale is for 
the trading account. After the close of banking entity's response 
period, the Agency would decide, based on a review of the banking 
entity's response and other information concerning the banking entity, 
whether to maintain the Agency's determination that the purchase or 
sale is for the trading account. The banking entity would be notified 
of the decision in writing. The notice would include an explanation of 
the decision.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ These notice and response procedures would be consistent 
with procedures that apply to many banking entities in other 
contexts. See 12 CFR 3.404.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 60. Is the reservation of authority to allow the 
appropriate Agency to determine whether a particular activity is 
proprietary trading appropriate? Why or why not?
    Question 61. Would the proposed reservation of authority further 
the goals of transparency and consistency in interpretation of section 
13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations? Would it be more 
appropriate to have these type of determinations made jointly by the 
Agencies? Is the standard by which an Agency would make a determination 
under the proposed reservation of authority sufficiently clear? If 
determinations are not made jointly by the Agencies, what concerns 
could be presented if two banking entity affiliates receive different 
or conflicting determinations from different Agencies?
    Question 62. Should Agencies' determinations pursuant to the 
reservation of authority be made public? Would publication of such 
determinations further the goals of consistency and transparency? 
Please explain. Should the Agencies follow consistent practices with 
respect to publishing notices of determinations pursuant to the 
reservation of authority?
    Question 63. Are the notice and response procedures adequate? Why 
or why not? Recognizing that market regulators operate under a 
different regulatory structure as compared to the Federal banking 
agencies, should the proposed notice and response procedures be 
modified to account for such differences (including by creating 
separate procedures that would be applicable solely in the case of 
reporting to market regulators)? Why or why not?
2. Section __.4: Permitted Underwriting and Market-Making Activities
a. Permitted Underwriting Activities
    Section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act contains an exemption from the 
prohibition on proprietary trading for the purchase, sale, acquisition, 
or disposition of securities, derivatives, contracts of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery, and options on any of the foregoing in 
connection with underwriting activities, to the extent that such 
activities are designed not to exceed RENTD.\88\ Section __.4(a) of the 
2013 final rule implements the statutory exemption for underwriting and 
sets forth the requirements that banking entities must meet in order to 
rely on the exemption. Among other things, the 2013 final rule requires 
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The banking entity act as an ``underwriter'' for a 
``distribution'' of securities and the trading desk's underwriting 
position be related to such distribution;
     The amount and types of securities in the trading desk's 
underwriting position be designed not to exceed the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, and 
reasonable efforts be made to sell or otherwise reduce the underwriting 
position within a reasonable period, taking into account the liquidity, 
maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant type of security;
     The banking entity has established and implements, 
maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program that is 
reasonably designed to

[[Page 33455]]

ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of the 
underwriting exemption, including reasonably designed written policies 
and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent testing 
identifying and addressing:
    [cir] The products, instruments, or exposures each trading desk may 
purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities;
    [cir] Limits for each trading desk, based on the nature and amount 
of the trading desk's underwriting activities, including the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, on 
the amount, types, and risk of the trading desk's underwriting 
position, level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from the 
trading desk's underwriting position, and period of time a security may 
be held;
    [cir] Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    [cir] Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures 
that require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a 
trading desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis of the basis for any 
temporary or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s), and 
independent review of such demonstrable analysis and approval;
     The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
banking entity's underwriting activities are designed not to reward or 
incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
     The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
the activity described in the underwriting exemption in accordance with 
applicable law.
    As the Agencies explained in the 2013 final rule, underwriters play 
an important role in facilitating issuers' access to funding, and thus 
underwriters are important to the capital formation process and 
economic growth.\89\ Obtaining new financing can be expensive for an 
issuer because of the natural information advantage that less well-
known issuers have over investors about the quality of their future 
investment opportunities.\90\ An underwriter can help reduce these 
costs by mitigating the information asymmetry between an issuer and its 
potential investors.\91\ The underwriter does this based in part on its 
familiarity with the issuer and other similar issuers as well as by 
collecting information about the issuer. This allows investors to look 
to the reputation and experience of the underwriter as well as its 
ability to provide information about the issuer and the 
underwriting.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See 79 FR at 5561 (internal footnotes omitted).
    \90\ See id.
    \91\ See id.
    \92\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In recognition of how the underwriting market functions, the 
Agencies adopted a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach in the 2013 
final rule. In the several years since the adoption of the 2013 final 
rule, however, public commenters have observed that the significant 
compliance requirements in the regulation may unnecessarily constrain 
underwriting without a corresponding reduction in the type of trading 
activities that the rule was designed to prohibit.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See supra Part I.A of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described in further detail below, the Agencies are proposing to 
tailor, streamline, and clarify the requirements that a banking entity 
must satisfy to avail itself of the underwriting exemption. In that 
regard, the Agencies are proposing to modify the underwriting exemption 
to clarify how a banking entity may measure and satisfy the statutory 
requirement that underwriting activity be designed not to exceed the 
reasonably expected near term demand of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. Specifically, the proposal would establish a 
presumption, available to banking entities both with and without 
significant trading assets and liabilities, that trading within 
internally set risk limits satisfies the statutory requirement that 
permitted underwriting activities must be designed not to exceed RENTD.
    The Agencies also are proposing to tailor the underwriting 
exemption's compliance program requirements to the size, complexity, 
and type of activity conducted by the banking entity by making those 
requirements applicable only to banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities. Based on feedback the Agencies have 
received, banking entities that do not have significant trading assets 
and liabilities can incur costs to establish, implement, maintain, and 
enforce the compliance program requirements in the 2013 final rule, 
notwithstanding the lower level of such banking entities' trading 
activities.\94\ Accordingly, the Agencies believe that the proposed 
revisions to the underwriting exemption would provide banking entities 
that do not have significant trading assets and liabilities with more 
flexibility to meet client and customer demands and facilitate the 
capital formation process, while, consistent with the statute, 
continuing to safeguard against trading activity that could threaten 
the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial 
stability of the United States, by more appropriately aligning the 
associated compliance obligations with the size of banking entities' 
trading activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. RENTD Limits and Presumption of Compliance
    As described above, the statutory exemption for underwriting in 
section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act requires that such activities be 
designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of 
clients, customers, or counterparties.\95\ Consistent with the statute, 
Sec.  __.4(a)(2)(ii) of the 2013 final rule's underwriting exemption 
requires that the amount and type of the securities in the trading 
desk's underwriting position be designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
and reasonable efforts are made to sell or otherwise reduce the 
underwriting position within a reasonable period, taking into account 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant type 
of security.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(B).
    \96\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies' experience implementing the 2013 final rule has 
indicated that the approach the Agencies have taken to give effect to 
the statutory standard of reasonably expected near term demands of 
clients, customers, or counterparties may be overly broad and complex, 
and also may inhibit otherwise permissible underwriting activity. The 
Agencies have received feedback as part of implementing the rule that 
compliance with the factors in the rule can be complex and costly.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ See supra Part I.A. of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Instead of the approach for the underwriting exemption in the 2013 
final rule, the Agencies are proposing to establish the articulation 
and use of internal risk limits as a key mechanism for conducting 
trading activity in accordance with the rule's underwriting 
exemption.\98\ In particular, the proposal would provide that the 
purchase or sale of a financial instrument by a banking entity shall be 
presumed to be designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the 
reasonably expected near term demands

[[Page 33456]]

of clients, customers, or counterparties if the banking entity 
establishes internal risk limits for each trading desk, subject to 
certain conditions, and implements, maintains, and enforces those 
limits, such that the risk of the financial instruments held by the 
trading desk does not exceed such limits. The Agencies believe that 
this approach would provide firms with more flexibility and certainty 
in conducting permissible underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ As a consequence of these proposed changes to focus on risk 
limits, many of the requirements of the 2013 final rule relating to 
risk limits associated with underwriting would be incorporated into 
this requirement and modified or removed as appropriate in this 
section of the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, all banking entities, regardless of their 
volume of trading assets and liabilities, would be able to voluntarily 
avail themselves of the presumption of compliance with the statutory 
RENTD requirement in section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act by establishing 
and complying with these internal risk limits. Specifically, the 
proposal would provide that a banking entity would establish internal 
risk limits for each trading desk that are designed not to exceed the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties, based on the nature and amount of the trading desk's 
underwriting activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risk of its underwriting position;
    (2) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
underwriting position; and
    (3) Period of time a security may be held.
    Banking entities utilizing this presumption would be required to 
maintain internal policies and procedures for setting and reviewing 
desk-level risk limits in a manner consistent with the statute.\99\ The 
proposed approach would not require that a banking entity's risk limits 
be based on any specific or mandated analysis, as required under the 
2013 final rule. Rather, a banking entity would establish the risk 
limits according to its own internal analyses and processes around 
conducting its underwriting activities in accordance with section 
13(d)(1)(B).\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Under the proposal, banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities would continue to be required to 
establish internal risk limits for each trading desk as part of the 
underwriting compliance program requirement in Sec.  
__.4(a)(2)(iii)(B), the elements of which would cross-reference 
directly to the requirement in proposed Sec.  __.4(a)(8)(i). Banking 
entities that do not have significant trading assets and liabilities 
would no longer be required to establish a compliance program that 
is specific for the purposes of complying with the exemption for 
underwriting, but would need to do so if they chose to utilize the 
proposed presumption of compliance with respect to the statutory 
RENTD requirement in section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act.
    \100\ The Agencies expect that the risk and position limits 
metric that is already required for certain banking entities under 
the 2013 final rule (and would continue to be required under the 
Appendix to the proposal) would help banking entities and the 
Agencies to manage and monitor the underwriting activities of 
banking entities subject to the metrics reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements of the Appendix. See infra Part III.E.2.i.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would require a banking entity to promptly report to 
the appropriate Agency when a trading desk exceeds or increases its 
internal risk limits. A banking entity would also be required to report 
to the appropriate Agency any temporary or permanent increase in an 
internal risk limit. In the case of both reporting requirements (i.e., 
notice of an internal risk limit being exceeded and notice of an 
increase to the limit), the notice would be submitted in the form and 
manner as directed by the applicable Agency.
    As noted, a banking entity would not be required to adhere to any 
specific, pre-defined requirements for the limit-setting process beyond 
the banking entity's own ongoing and internal assessment of the amount 
of activity that is required to conduct underwriting, including to 
reflect the banking entity's ongoing and internal assessment of the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The proposal would, however, provide that internal risk 
limits established by a banking entity shall be subject to review and 
oversight by the appropriate Agency on an ongoing basis. Any review of 
such limits would assess whether or not those limits are established 
based on the statutory standard--i.e., the trading desk's reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties on 
an ongoing basis, based on the nature and amount of the trading desk's 
underwriting activities. So long as a banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces such limits, the proposal would 
presume that all trading activity conducted within the limits meets the 
requirements that the underwriting activity be based on the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. 
The Agencies would expect to closely monitor and review any instances 
of a banking entity exceeding a risk limit as well as any temporary or 
permanent increase to a trading desk limit.
    Under the proposal, the presumption of compliance for permissible 
underwriting activities may be rebutted by the Agency if the Agency 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the trading 
desk's reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties on an ongoing basis. The Agency would provide notice of 
any such determination to the banking entity in writing.
    The Agencies request comment on the proposed addition of a 
presumption that conducting underwriting activities within internally 
set risk limits satisfies the requirement that permitted underwriting 
activities be designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near-term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. In particular, the 
Agencies request comment on the following questions:
    Question 64. Is the proposed presumption of compliance for 
underwriting activity within internally set risk limits sufficiently 
clear? If not, what changes should the Agencies make to further clarify 
the rule?
    Question 65. How would the proposed approach, as it relates to the 
establishment and reliance on internal trading limits, impact the 
capital formation process and the liquidity of particular markets?
    Question 66. How would the proposed approach, as it relates to the 
establishment and reliance on internal trading limits, impact the 
underlying objectives of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final 
rule? For example, how should the Agencies assess internal trading 
limits and any changes in them?
    Question 67. By proposing an approach that permits banking entities 
to rely on internally set limits to comply with the statutory RENTD 
requirement, the rule would no longer expressly require firms to, among 
other things, conduct a demonstrable analysis of historical customer 
demand, current inventory of financial instruments, and market and 
other factors regarding the amount, types, and risks of or associated 
with positions in financial instruments in which the trading desk makes 
a market, including through block trades. Do commenters agree with the 
revised approach? What are the costs and benefits of eliminating these 
requirements?
    Question 68. Would the proposal's approach to permissible 
underwriting activities effectively implement the statutory exemption? 
Why or why not? Would this approach improve the ability of banking 
entities to engage in underwriting relative to the 2013 final rule? If 
not, what approach would be better? Please explain.
    Question 69. Does the proposed reliance on using a trading desk's 
internal risk limits to comply with the statutory RENTD requirement in 
section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act present opportunities to evade the 
overall

[[Page 33457]]

prohibition on proprietary trading? If so, how? Please be as specific 
as possible. Additionally, please provide any changes to the proposal 
that might address such potential circumvention. Alternatively, please 
explain why the proposal to rely on a trading desk's internal risk 
limits to comply with the statutory RENTD requirement should not 
present opportunities to evade the prohibition on proprietary trading.
    Question 70. Do banking entities need greater clarity about how to 
set the proposed internal risk limits for permissible underwriting 
activity? If so, what additional information would be useful? Please 
explain.
    Question 71. Are the proposed changes to the exemption for 
underwriting appropriately tailored to the operation and structure of 
the underwriting market, particularly firm commitment offerings? Could 
the proposal be modified in order to better align with the operation 
and structure of the underwriting market? Recognizing that the proposal 
would not require banking entities to use their internal risk limits to 
establish a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the requirements 
of section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act, would the proposal be workable 
in the context of underwritten offerings, including firm commitment 
underwritings? How would an Agency rebut the presumption of compliance 
in the context of underwritten offerings, including firm commitment 
underwritings? Could the proposal, if adopted, affect a banking 
entity's willingness to participate in a firm commitment underwriting? 
Please explain, being as specific as possible.
    Question 72. Should any additional guidance or information be 
provided to explain the process and standard by which the Agencies 
could rebut the presumption of permissible underwriting? If so, please 
explain. Please include specific subject areas that could be addressed 
in such guidance (e.g., criteria used as the basis for a rebuttal, the 
rebuttal process, etc.).
    Question 73. Are there other modifications to the 2013 final rule's 
requirements for permitted underwriting that would improve the 
efficiency of the rule's underwriting requirements while adhering to 
the statutory requirement that such activity be designed not to exceed 
the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, and 
counterparties? If so, please describe these modifications as well as 
how they would improve the efficiency of the underwriting exemption and 
meet the statutory standard.
    Question 74. Under the proposed presumption of compliance for 
permissible underwriting activities, banking entities would be required 
to notify the appropriate Agency when a trading limit is exceeded or 
increased (either on a temporary or permanent basis), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by each Agency. Is this requirement 
sufficiently clear? Should the Agencies provide greater clarity about 
the form and manner for providing this notice? Should those notices be 
required to be provided ``promptly'' or should an alternative time 
frame apply? Alternatively, should each Agency establish its own 
deadline for when these notices should be provided? Please explain.
    Question 75. Should the Agencies instead establish a uniform method 
of reporting when a trading desk exceeds or increases an internal risk 
limit (e.g., a standardized form)? Why or why not? If so, please 
provide as much detail as possible. If not, please describe any 
impediments or costs to implementing a uniform notification process and 
explain why such a system may not be efficient or might undermine the 
effectiveness of the proposed notification requirement.
    Question 76: Should the Agencies implement an alternative reporting 
methodology for notifying the appropriate Agency when a trading limit 
is exceeded or increased that would apply solely in the case of a 
banking entity's obligation to report such occurrences to a market 
regulator? For example, instead of an affirmative notice requirement, 
should such banking entities be required to make and keep a detailed 
record of each instance as part of its books and records, and to 
provide such records to SEC or CFTC staff promptly upon request or 
during an examination? Why or why not? As an additional alternative, 
should banking entities be required to escalate notices of limit 
exceedances or changes internally for further inquiry and determination 
as to whether notice should be given to the applicable market 
regulator, using objective factors provided by the rule, be a more 
appropriate process for these banking entities? Why or why not? If such 
an approach would be more appropriate, what objective factors should be 
used to determine when notice should be given to the applicable 
regulator? Please be as specific as possible.
    Question 77. Should the Agencies specify notice and response 
procedures in connection with an Agency determination that the 
presumption pursuant to Sec.  __.4(a)(8)(iv) is rebutted? Why or why 
not? If so, what type of procedures should they specify? For example, 
should the notice and response procedures be similar to those in Sec.  
__.3(g)(2)? If not, what other approach would be appropriate?
c. Compliance Program and Other Requirements
    The underwriting exemption in the 2013 final rule requires that a 
banking entity establishes and implements, maintains, and enforces a 
compliance program, as required by subpart D, that is reasonably 
designed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the exemption. 
Such compliance program is required to include reasonably designed 
written policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis and 
independent testing identifying and addressing: (i) The products, 
instruments, or exposures each trading desk may purchase, sell, or 
manage as part of its underwriting activities; (ii) limits for each 
trading desk, based on the nature and amount of the trading desk's 
underwriting activities, including the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on certain 
factors; (iii) internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of 
each trading desk's compliance with its limits; and (iv) authorization 
procedures, including escalation procedures that require review and 
approval of any trade that would exceed one or more of a trading desk's 
limits, demonstrable analysis of the basis for any temporary or 
permanent increase to one or more of a trading desk's limits, and 
independent review (i.e., by risk managers and compliance officers at 
the appropriate level independent of the trading desk) of such 
demonstrable analysis and approval.
    Banking entities and others have stated that the compliance program 
requirements of the underwriting exemption are overly complex and 
burdensome. The Agencies generally believe the compliance program 
requirements play an important role in facilitating and monitoring a 
banking entity's compliance with the exemption. However, with the 
benefit of experience, the Agencies also believe those requirements can 
be appropriately tailored to the scope of the underwriting activities 
conducted by each banking entity.
    Specifically, the Agencies are proposing a tiered approach to the 
underwriting exemption's compliance program requirements so as to make 
them commensurate with the size, scope, and complexity of the relevant 
banking entity's trading activities and business structure. Consistent 
with the

[[Page 33458]]

2013 final rule, a banking entity with significant trading assets and 
liabilities would continue to be required to establish, implement, 
maintain, and enforce a comprehensive internal compliance program as a 
condition for relying on the underwriting exemption. However, the 
Agencies propose to eliminate the exemption's compliance program 
requirements for banking entities that have moderate or limited trading 
assets and liabilities.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Under the 2013 final rule, the compliance program 
requirement in Sec.  __.4(a)(2)(iii) is part of the compliance 
program required by subpart D, but is specifically used for purposes 
of complying with the exemption for underwriting activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed removal of the exemption's compliance program 
requirements for banking entities that do not have significant trading 
assets and liabilities would not relieve those banking entities of the 
obligation to comply with the prohibitions on proprietary trading, and 
the other requirements of the exemption for underwriting activities, as 
set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule, both as 
currently written and as proposed to be amended. However, eliminating 
the compliance program requirements as a condition to being able to 
rely on the underwriting exemption should provide these banking 
entities that do not have significant trading assets and liabilities an 
appropriate amount of flexibility to tailor the means by which they 
seek to ensure compliance with the underlying requirements of the 
exemption for underwriting activities, and to allow them to structure 
their internal compliance measures in a way that takes into account the 
risk profile and underwriting activity of the particular trading desk. 
This proposed change would also be consistent with the proposed 
modifications to the general compliance program requirements for these 
banking entities under Sec.  __.20 of the 2013 final rule, discussed 
further below in this Supplementary Information section.
    The Agencies understand that banking entities that do not have 
significant trading assets and liabilities can incur significant costs 
to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce the compliance program 
requirements contained in the 2013 final rule. In some instances, those 
costs may be disproportionate to the banking entity's trading activity 
and risk. Accordingly, eliminating the compliance program requirements 
for banking entities that do not have significant trading assets and 
liabilities may reduce costs that are passed on to investors and 
increase capital formation without materially impacting the rule's 
ability to ensure that the objectives set forth in section 13 of the 
BHC Act are satisfied.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ Under the proposal, the compliance program requirements 
that are specific for the purposes of complying with the exemption 
for underwriting activities in Sec.  __.4(a) would remain unchanged 
for banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities, although the requirements related to limits for each 
trading desk would be moved (but not modified) into new Sec.  
__.4(a)(8)(i) as part of the proposed presumption of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comment on the proposed revisions to the 
exemption for the underwriting activities compliance program 
requirement. In particular, the Agencies request comment on the 
following questions:
    Question 78. Would the proposed tiered compliance approach based on 
a banking entity's trading assets and liabilities appropriately balance 
the costs and benefits for banking entities that do not have 
significant trading assets and liabilities? Why or why not? If so, how? 
If not, what other approach would be more appropriate?
    Question 79. Should the Agencies simplify and streamline the 
exemption for underwriting activities compliance requirements for 
banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities? If 
so, please explain.
    Question 80. Do commenters agree with the proposal to have the 
underwriting exemption specific compliance program requirements apply 
only to banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities? Why or why not?
    Question 81. In addition to the proposed changes to the 
underwriting exemption, are there any technical corrections the 
Agencies should make to Sec.  __.4(a), such as to eliminate redundant 
or duplicative language or to correct or refine certain cross-
references? If so, please explain.
d. Market-Making Activities
    Section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act contains an exemption from the 
prohibition on proprietary trading for the purchase, sale, acquisition, 
or disposition of securities, derivatives, contracts of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery, and options on any of the foregoing in 
connection with market making-related activities, to the extent that 
such activities are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near 
term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.\103\ 
Section__.4(b) of the 2013 final rule implements the statutory 
exemption for market making-related activities and sets forth the 
requirements that all banking entities must meet in order to rely on 
the exemption. Among other things, the 2013 final rule requires that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The trading desk that establishes and manages the 
financial exposure routinely stands ready to purchase and sell one or 
more types of financial instruments related to its financial exposure 
and is willing and available to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise 
enter into long and short positions in those types of financial 
instruments for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and 
throughout market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, 
maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant types of financial 
instruments;
     The amount, types, and risks of the financial instruments 
in the trading desk's market maker inventory are designed not to 
exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected near term demands 
of clients, customers, or counterparties, as required by the statute 
and based on certain factors and analysis specified in the rule;
     The banking entity has established and implements, 
maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program that is 
reasonably designed to ensure its compliance with the market making 
exemption, including reasonably designed written policies and 
procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent testing 
identifying and assessing certain specified factors; \104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See 79 FR at 5612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     To the extent that any required limit \105\ established by 
the trading desk is exceeded, the trading desk takes action to bring 
the trading desk into compliance with the limits as promptly as 
possible after the limit is exceeded;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See id. at 5615.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The compensation arrangements of persons performing market 
making-related activities are designed not to reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading; and
     The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
market making-related activities in accordance with applicable law.
    When adopting the 2013 final rule, the Agencies endeavored to 
balance two goals of section 13 of the BHC Act: To allow market making 
to take place, which is important to well-functioning and liquid 
markets as well as the economy, and simultaneously to prohibit 
proprietary trading unrelated to market making or other permitted 
activities, consistent with the statute.\106\

[[Page 33459]]

To accomplish these goals the Agencies adopted a comprehensive, multi-
faceted approach. In the several years since the adoption of the 2013 
final rule, however, the Agencies have observed that the significant 
compliance requirements and lack of clear bright lines in the 
regulation may unnecessarily constrain market making,\107\ and the 
Agencies believe some of the requirements are unnecessary to prevent 
the type of trading activities that the rule was designed to prohibit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ See id. at 5576. In addition, staffs from some of the 
Agencies have analyzed the liquidity of the corporate bond market in 
the time since the 2013 final rule was adopted. For example, Federal 
Reserve Board staff have prepared quarterly reports to monitor 
market-level liquidity in corporate bond markets since 2014. See 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/corporate-bond-liquidity-reports.htm. See also Report to Congress: Access to Capital and 
Market Liquidity, SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis staff, 
https://www.sec.gov/files/access-to-capital-and-market-liquidity-study-dera-2017.pdf (``Access to Capital and Market Liquidity'').
    \107\ See supra Part I of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described in further detail below, the Agencies are proposing to 
tailor, streamline, and clarify the requirements that a banking entity 
must satisfy to avail itself of the market making exemption. Similar to 
the proposed underwriting exemption,\108\ the Agencies are proposing to 
modify the market making exemption by providing a clearer way to 
measure and satisfy the statutory requirement that market making-
related activity be designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near 
term demand of clients, customers, or counterparties. Specifically, the 
proposal would establish a presumption, available to banking entities 
both with and without significant trading assets and liabilities, that 
trading within internally set risk limits satisfies the statutory 
requirement that permitted market making-related activities must be 
designed not to exceed RENTD. In addition, the Agencies also are 
proposing to tailor the market making exemption's compliance program 
requirements to the size, complexity, and type of activity conducted by 
the banking entity by making those requirements applicable only to 
banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ See supra Part III.B.2.a of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on feedback the Agencies have received, banking entities that 
do not have significant trading assets and liabilities can incur 
substantial costs to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce the 
compliance program requirements in the 2013 final rule, notwithstanding 
the lower level of such banking entities' trading activities.\109\ 
Accordingly, the Agencies believe that the proposed revisions to the 
market making exemption would provide banking entities that do not have 
significant trading assets and liabilities with more flexibility to 
meet customer demands and facilitate robust trading markets, while 
continuing to safeguard against trading activity that could threaten 
the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial 
stability of the United States by more appropriately aligning the 
associated compliance obligations with the size of banking entities' 
trading activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. RENTD Limits and Presumption of Compliance
    As described above, the statutory exemption for market making-
related activities in section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act requires that 
such activities be designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near 
term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.\110\ Consistent 
with the statute, Sec.  __.4(b)(2)(ii) of the 2013 final rule's market 
making exemption requires that the amount, types, and risks of the 
financial instruments in the trading desk's market maker inventory be 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on 
certain market factors and analysis.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(B).
    \111\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4(b)(2)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2013 final rule provides two factors for assessing whether the 
amount, types, and risks of the financial instruments in the trading 
desk's market maker inventory are designed not to exceed, on an ongoing 
basis, the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, 
or counterparties. Specifically, these factors are: (i) The liquidity, 
maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant type of financial 
instrument(s), and (ii) demonstrable analysis of historical customer 
demand, current inventory of financial instruments, and market and 
other factors regarding the amount, types, and risks of or associated 
with positions in financial instruments in which the trading desk makes 
a market, including through block trades. Under Sec.  
__.4(b)(2)(iii)(C) of the 2013 final rule, a banking entity must 
account for these considerations when establishing risk and inventory 
limits for each trading desk.
    The Agencies' experience implementing the 2013 final rule has 
indicated that the approach the Agencies have taken to give effect to 
the statutory standard of reasonably expected near term demands of 
clients, customers, or counterparties may be overly broad and complex, 
and also may inhibit otherwise permissible market making-related 
activity. In particular, the Agencies have received feedback as part of 
implementing the rule that compliance with the factors in the rule can 
be complex and costly.\112\ For example, banking entities have 
communicated that they must engage in a number of complex and intensive 
analyses to meet the ``demonstrable analysis'' requirement under Sec.  
__.4(b)(2)(ii)(B) and may still be unable to gain comfort that their 
bona fide market making-related activity meets these factors. Finally, 
the Agencies' experience implementing the rule also indicates that the 
requirements of the 2013 final rule do not provide bright line 
conditions under which trading can clearly be classified as permissible 
market making.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See supra Part I.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Agencies are seeking comment on a proposal to 
implement this key statutory factor in a manner designed to provide 
banking entities and the Agencies with greater certainty and clarity 
about what activity constitutes permissible market making pursuant to 
the exemption. The Agencies are proposing to establish the articulation 
and use of internal risk limits as a key mechanism for conducting 
trading activity in accordance with the rule's market making 
exemption.\113\ In particular, the proposal would provide that the 
purchase or sale of a financial instrument by a banking entity shall be 
presumed to be designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties, based on the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the 
market for the relevant types of financial instrument, if the banking 
entity establishes internal risk limits for each trading desk, subject 
to certain conditions, and implements, maintains, and enforces those 
limits, such that the risk of the financial instruments held by the 
trading desk does not exceed such limits. The Agencies believe that 
this approach would allow for a clearer application of these 
exemptions, and would provide firms with more flexibility and certainty 
in conducting market making-related activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ As a consequence of these changes to focus on risk limits, 
many of the requirements of the 2013 final rule relating to risk 
limits associated with market making-related activity have been 
incorporated into this requirement and modified or deleted as 
appropriate in this section of the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, all banking entities, regardless of their 
volume of

[[Page 33460]]

trading assets and liabilities, would be able to voluntarily avail 
themselves of the presumption of compliance with the statutory RENTD 
requirement in section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act by establishing and 
complying with internal risk limits. Specifically, the proposal would 
provide that a banking entity would establish internal risk limits for 
each trading desk that are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
based on the nature and amount of the trading desk's market making-
related activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risks of its market maker positions;
    (2) Amount, types, and risks of the products, instruments, and 
exposures the trading desk may use for risk management purposes;
    (3) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
financial exposure; and
    (4) Period of time a financial instrument may be held.
    Banking entities utilizing this presumption would be required to 
maintain internal policies and procedures for setting and reviewing 
desk-level risk limits in a manner consistent with the statute.\114\ 
The proposed approach would not require that a banking entity's risk 
limits be based on any specific or mandated analysis, as required under 
the 2013 final rule. Rather, a banking entity would establish the risk 
limits according to its own internal analyses and processes around 
conducting its market making activities in accordance with section 
13(d)(1)(B).\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ Under the proposal, banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities would continue to be required to 
establish internal risk limits for each trading desk as part of the 
market making compliance program requirement in Sec.  
__.4(b)(2)(iii)(C), the elements of which would cross-reference 
directly to the requirement in proposed Sec.  __.4(b)(6)(i). Banking 
entities without significant trading assets and liabilities would no 
longer be required to establish a compliance program that is 
specific for the purposes of complying with the exemption for market 
making-related activity, but would need to establish and implement, 
maintain, and enforce these limits if they chose to utilize the 
proposed presumption of compliance with respect to the statutory 
RENTD requirement in section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act.
    \115\ The Agencies expect that the risk and position limits 
metric that is already required for certain banking entities under 
the 2013 final rule (and would continue to be required under the 
Appendix to the proposal) would help banking entities and the 
Agencies to manage and monitor the market making activities of 
banking entities subject to the metrics reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements of the Appendix. See infra Part III.E.2.i.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would require a banking entity to promptly report to 
the appropriate Agency when a trading desk exceeds or increases its 
internal risk limits. A banking entity would also be required to report 
to the appropriate Agency any temporary or permanent increase in an 
internal risk limit. In the case of both reporting requirements (i.e., 
notice of an internal risk limit being exceeded and notice of an 
increase to the limit), the notice would be submitted in the form and 
manner as directed by the applicable Agency.
    As noted, a banking entity would not be required to adhere to any 
specific, pre-defined requirements for the limit-setting process beyond 
the banking entity's own ongoing and internal assessment of the amount 
of activity that is required to conduct market making activity, 
including to reflect the banking entity's ongoing and internal 
assessment of the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties. The proposal would, however, provide that 
internal risk limits established by a banking entity shall be subject 
to review and oversight by the appropriate Agency on an ongoing basis. 
Any review of such limits would assess whether or not those limits are 
established based on the statutory standard--i.e., the trading desk's 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties on an ongoing basis, based on the nature and amount of 
the trading desk's market making-related activities. So long as a 
banking entity has established and implements, maintains, and enforces 
such limits, the proposal would presume that all trading activity 
conducted within the limits meets the requirements that the market 
making activity be based on the reasonably expected near term demands 
of clients, customers, or counterparties. The Agencies would expect to 
closely monitor and review any instances of a banking entity exceeding 
a risk limit as well as any temporary or permanent increase to a 
trading desk limit.
    Under the proposal, the presumption of compliance for permissible 
market making-related activities may be rebutted by the Agency if the 
Agency determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that 
a trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the trading 
desk's reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties on an ongoing basis. The Agency would provide notice of 
any such determination to the banking entity in writing.
    The following is an example of the presumption of compliance for 
permissible market making-related activities. A transport company 
customer may seek to hedge its long-term exposure to price fluctuations 
in fuel by asking a banking entity to create a structured ten-year fuel 
swap with a notional amount of $1 billion because there is no liquid 
market for this type of swap. A trading desk at the banking entity that 
makes a market in energy swaps may respond to this customer's hedging 
needs by executing a custom fuel swap with the customer. If the risk 
resulting from activities related to the transaction does not exceed 
the internal risk limits for the trading desk that makes a market in 
energy swaps, the banking entity shall be presumed to be engaged in 
permissible market making-related activity that is designed not to 
exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected near term demands 
of clients, customers, or counterparties. Moreover, if assuming the 
position would result in an exposure exceeding the trading desk's 
limits, the banking entity could increase the risk limit in accordance 
with its internal policies and procedures for reviewing and increasing 
risk limits so long as the increase was consistent with meeting the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, and 
counterparties.
    The Agencies request comment on the proposed addition of a 
presumption that trading within internally set risk limits satisfies 
the statutory requirement that permitted market making-related 
activities be designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near-term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. In particular, the 
Agencies request comment on the following questions:
    Question 82. Is the proposed presumption of compliance for 
transactions that are within internally set risk limits sufficiently 
clear? If not, what changes would further clarify the rule? Is there 
another approach that would be more appropriate?
    Question 83. Would the proposed approach--namely the reliance on 
internally set limits based on RENTD--adequately eliminate the need for 
a definition for ``market maker inventory?'' Why or why not?
    Question 84. How would the proposed approach, as it relates to the 
establishment and reliance on internal trading limits, impact the 
liquidity of particular markets?
    Question 85. How would the proposed approach, as it relates to the 
establishment and reliance on internal trading limits, impact the 
underlying objectives of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final 
rule? For example, how should the Agencies assess internal trading 
limits and any changes in them?
    Question 86. By proposing an approach that permits banking entities 
to rely on internally set limits to comply

[[Page 33461]]

with the statutory RENTD requirement, the rule would no longer 
expressly require firms to, among other things, conduct a demonstrable 
analysis of historical customer demand, current inventory of financial 
instruments, and market and other factors regarding the amount, types, 
and risks of or associated with positions in financial instruments in 
which the trading desk makes a market, including through block trades. 
Do commenters agree with the revised approach? What are the costs and 
benefits of eliminating these requirements?
    Question 87. Would the market making exemption, as proposed, 
present any problems for a trading desk that makes a market in 
derivatives? Are there any changes the Agencies could make to the 
proposal to clarify how the market making exemption applies to trading 
desks that make a market in derivatives?
    Question 88. Would the proposal's approach to permissible market 
making-related activities effectively implement the statutory 
exemption? Why or why not? Would this approach improve the ability of 
banking entities to engage in market making relative to the 2013 final 
rule? If not, what approach would be better? Please explain.
    Question 89. Does the proposed reliance on using a trading desk's 
internal risk limits to comply with the statutory RENTD requirement in 
section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act present opportunities to evade the 
overall prohibition on proprietary trading? If so, how? Please be as 
specific as possible. Additionally, please provide any changes to the 
proposal that might address such potential circumvention. 
Alternatively, please explain whether the proposal to rely on a trading 
desk's internal risk limits to comply with the statutory RENTD 
requirement would present opportunities to evade the prohibition on 
proprietary trading.
    Question 90. Do banking entities require greater clarity about how 
to set their internal risk limits for permissible market making-related 
activity? If so, what additional information would be useful? Please 
explain.
    Question 91. Should any additional guidance or information be 
provided to explain the process and standard by which the Agencies 
could rebut the presumption of permissible market making, including 
specific subject areas that could be addressed in such guidance (e.g., 
criteria used as the basis for a rebuttal, the rebuttal process, etc.)? 
If so, please explain.
    Question 92. Are there other modifications to the 2013 final rule's 
requirements for permitted market making that would improve the 
efficiency of the rule's requirements while adhering to the statutory 
requirement that such activity be designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, and counterparties? 
If so, please describe these modifications as well as how they would 
improve the efficiency of the rule and meet the statutory standard.
    Question 93. Under the proposed presumption of compliance for 
permissible market making-related activities, banking entities would be 
required to notify the appropriate Agency when a trading limit is 
exceeded or increased (either on a temporary or permanent basis), in 
each case in the form and manner as directed by each Agency. Is this 
requirement sufficiently clear? Should the Agencies provide greater 
clarity about the form and manner for providing this notice? Should 
those notices be required to be provided ``promptly'' or should an 
alternative timeframe apply? Alternatively, should each Agency 
establish its own deadline for when these notices should be provided? 
Please explain.
    Question 94. Should the Agencies instead establish a uniform method 
of reporting when a trading desk exceeds or increases an internal risk 
limit (e.g., a standardized form)? Why or why not? If yes, please 
provide as much detail as possible. If not, please describe any 
impediments or costs to implementing a uniform notification process and 
explain why such a system may not be efficient or might undermine the 
effectiveness of the proposed notification requirement.
    Question 95: Should the Agencies implement an alternative reporting 
methodology for notifying the appropriate Agency when a trading limit 
is exceeded or increased that would apply solely in the case of a 
banking entity's obligation to report such occurrences to a market 
regulator? For example, instead of an affirmative notice requirement, 
should such banking entity instead be required to make and keep a 
detailed record of each instance as part of its books and records, and 
to provide such records to SEC or CFTC staff promptly upon request or 
during an examination? Why or why not? As an additional alternative, 
should banking entities be required to escalate notices of limit 
exceedances or changes internally for further inquiry and determination 
as to whether notice should be given to the applicable market 
regulator, using objective factors provided by the rule? Why or why 
not? If such an approach would be more appropriate, what objective 
factors should be used to determine when notice should be given to the 
applicable regulator? Please be as specific as possible.
    Question 96. Should the Agencies specify notice and response 
procedures in connection with an Agency determination that the 
presumption pursuant to Sec.  __.4(b)(6)(iv) is rebutted? Why or why 
not? If so, what type of procedures should they specify? For example, 
should the notice and response procedures be similar to those in Sec.  
__.3(g)(2)? If not, what other approach would be appropriate?
f. Compliance Program and Other Requirements
    The market making exemption in the 2013 final rule requires that a 
banking entity establish and implement, maintain, and enforce a 
compliance program, as required by subpart D, that is reasonably 
designed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the exemption. 
Such a compliance program is required to include reasonably designed 
written policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and 
independent testing identifying and addressing: (i) The financial 
instruments each trading desk stands ready to purchase and sell in 
accordance with the exemption for market making-related activities; 
(ii) the actions the trading desk will take to demonstrably reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate the risks of its financial exposure 
consistent with the limits required under paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(C), the 
products, instruments, and exposures each trading desk may use for risk 
management purposes; the techniques and strategies each trading desk 
may use to manage the risks of its market making-related activities and 
inventory; and the process, strategies, and personnel responsible for 
ensuring that the actions taken by the trading desk to mitigate these 
risks are and continue to be effective; (iii) limits for each trading 
desk, based on the nature and amount of the trading desk's market 
making activities, including the reasonably expected near term demands 
of clients, customers, or counterparties; (iv) internal controls and 
ongoing monitoring and analysis of each trading desk's compliance with 
its limits; and (v) authorization procedures, including escalation 
procedures that require review and approval of any trade that would 
exceed one or more of a trading desk's limits, demonstrable analysis of 
the basis for any temporary or permanent increase to one or more of a 
trading desk's limits, and independent review (i.e., by risk managers 
and compliance officers at the appropriate

[[Page 33462]]

level independent of the trading desk) of such demonstrable analysis 
and approval.
    Banking entities and others have stated that the compliance program 
requirements of the market making exemption can be overly complex and 
burdensome. The Agencies generally believe the compliance program 
requirements play an important role in facilitating and monitoring a 
banking entity's compliance with the exemption. However, with the 
benefit of time and experience, the Agencies believe it is appropriate 
to tailor those requirements to the scope of the market making-related 
activities conducted by each banking entity.
    Specifically, the Agencies are proposing a tiered approach to the 
market making exemption's compliance program requirements so as to make 
them commensurate with the size, scope, and complexity of the relevant 
banking entity's activities and business structure. Consistent with the 
2013 final rule, a banking entity with significant trading assets and 
liabilities would continue to be required to establish, implement, 
maintain, and enforce a comprehensive internal compliance program as a 
condition for relying on the market making exemption. However, the 
Agencies propose to eliminate the exemption's compliance program 
requirements for banking entities that have moderate or limited trading 
assets and liabilities.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ Under the 2013 final rule, the compliance program 
requirement in Sec.  __.4(b)(2)(iii) is part of the compliance 
program required by subpart D, but is specifically used for purposes 
of complying with the exemption for market making-related activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed removal of the exemption's compliance program 
requirements for banking entities that do not have significant trading 
assets and liabilities would not relieve those banking entities of the 
obligation to comply with the prohibitions on proprietary trading, and 
the other requirements of the exemption for market making-related 
activities, as set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 
final rule, both as currently written and as proposed to be amended. 
However, eliminating the compliance program requirements as a condition 
to being able to rely on the market making exemption should provide 
these banking entities that do not have significant trading assets and 
liabilities an appropriate amount of flexibility to tailor the means by 
which they seek to ensure compliance with the underlying requirements 
of the exemption for market making-related activities, and to allow 
them to structure their internal compliance measures in a way that 
takes into account the risk profile and market making activity of the 
particular trading desk.
    As noted in the discussion pertaining to the underwriting 
exemption,\117\ banking entities that do not have significant trading 
assets and liabilities can incur significant costs to establish, 
implement, maintain, and enforce the compliance program requirements 
contained in the 2013 final rule. In some instances, those costs may be 
disproportionate to the banking entity's trading activity and risk. 
Accordingly, eliminating the compliance program requirements for 
banking entities that do not have significant trading assets and 
liabilities may reduce costs that are passed on to investors and 
increase liquidity without materially impacting the rule's ability to 
ensure that the objectives set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act are 
satisfied.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See supra Part III.B.2 of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section.
    \118\ Under the proposal, the compliance program requirements 
that are specific for the purposes of complying with the exemption 
for market making-related activities in Sec.  __.4(b) would remain 
unchanged for banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities, although the requirements related to limits for each 
trading desk would be moved (but not modified) into new Sec.  
__.4(b)(6)(i) as part of the proposed presumption of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comment on the proposed revisions to the 
exemption for market making-related activities compliance program 
requirement. In particular, the Agencies request comment on the 
following questions:
    Question 97. Would the proposed tiered compliance approach based on 
a banking entity's trading assets and liabilities appropriately balance 
the costs and benefits for banking entities that do not have 
significant trading assets and liabilities? Why or why not?
    Question 98. Should the Agencies make specific changes to simplify 
and streamline the compliance requirements of the exemption for market 
making-related activities for banking entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities? If so, how?
    Question 99. Do commenters agree with the proposal to have the 
market making exemption specific compliance program requirements apply 
only to banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities? Why or why not?
    Question 100. In addition to the proposed changes to the market 
making exemption, are there any technical corrections the Agencies 
should make to Sec.  __.4(b), such as to eliminate redundant or 
duplicative language or to correct or refine certain cross-references? 
If so, please explain.
g. Loan-Related Swaps
    The Agencies have received inquiries--typically from smaller 
banking entities that are not subject to the market risk capital rule 
and are not required to register as dealers--as to the treatment of 
certain swaps entered into with a customer in connection with a loan 
(``loan-related swap'').\119\ These loan-related swaps are financial 
instruments under the 2013 final rule and would also be financial 
instruments under the proposal. In addition, if the proposed accounting 
prong of the trading account definition is adopted, any derivative 
transaction would constitute proprietary trading pursuant to the 
definition of ``trading account'' if it were recorded at fair value on 
a recurring basis under applicable accounting standards. The Agencies 
believe it is likely that loan-related swaps would be considered 
proprietary trading on this basis. Accordingly, for the transaction to 
be permissible, a banking entity would need to rely on an applicable 
exclusion from the definition of proprietary trading or exemption in 
the implementing regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ In the case of national banks, a loan-related swap is 
considered to be a customer-driven derivatives transaction. See 12 
U.S.C 24 (Seventh). See also OCC, Activities Permissible for 
National Banks and Federal Savings Associations, Cumulative (Oct. 
2017), available at https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-other-activities-permissible-october-2017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a loan-related swap transaction, a banking entity enters into a 
swap with a customer in connection with a customer's loan and 
contemporaneously offsets the swap with a third party. The swap with 
the loan customer is directly related to the terms of the customer's 
loan, such as a term loan, revolving credit facility, or other 
extension of credit. A common example of a loan-related swap begins 
with a banking entity offering a loan to a customer. The banking entity 
seeks to make a floating-rate loan to reduce interest rate risk, but 
the customer would prefer a fixed-rate loan. To achieve the desired 
result, the banking entity makes a floating-rate loan to the customer 
and contemporaneously or nearly contemporaneously enters into an 
interest rate swap with the same customer and an offsetting swap with 
another counterparty. As a result, the customer receives economics 
similar to a fixed-rate loan. The banking entity has offset its market 
risk associated with the customer-facing swap but retains counterparty 
risk from both swaps.
    The inquiries received by the Agencies have asked whether the loan-
related swap and the offsetting hedging swap would be permissible under 
the

[[Page 33463]]

exemption for market making related activities.\120\ In particular, 
some banking entities enter into these swaps relatively infrequently 
and, as a result, have asked whether such activity could satisfy the 
requirement of the exemption in the 2013 final rule that the trading 
desk using the exemption routinely stands ready to purchase and sell 
the relevant type of financial instrument, in commercially reasonable 
amounts and throughout market cycles on a basis appropriate for the 
liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the type of financial 
instrument.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ The Agencies note that ``market making'' for purposes of 
the 2013 final rule, including for this proposal, is limited to the 
context of the 2013 final rule and is not applicable to any other 
rule, the federal securities laws, or in any other context outside 
of the 2013 final rule.
    \121\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4(b)(2)(i); 79 FR at 5595-
5597.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies understand that a banking entity's decision to enter 
into loan-related swaps tends to be situational and dependent on 
changes in market conditions, as well as the interaction of a number of 
factors specific to the banking entity, such as the nature of the 
customer relationship. Under certain market conditions and with certain 
types of customers, the frequency and use of loan-related swaps may be 
infrequent, or the frequency may change over time as conditions change. 
It also may be the case that a banking entity, particularly smaller 
banking entities, may enter into a limited number of loan-related swaps 
in one quarter and then not execute another such swap for a year or 
more. Accordingly, for these swaps it may be appropriate to apply the 
market making exemption by focusing on the characteristics of the 
relevant market. For purposes of the exemption, the relevant market may 
be a market with minimal demand, such as a market with a customer base 
that demands, for example, only a few loan-related swaps in a 
year.\122\ The Agencies therefore request comment as to whether it is 
appropriate to permit loan-related swaps to be conducted pursuant to 
the exemption for market making-related activities where the frequency 
with which a banking entity executes such swaps is minimal, but the 
banking entity remains prepared to execute such swaps when a customer 
makes an appropriate request.\123\ For example, a banking entity could 
meet the requirement to routinely stand ready to make a market in loan-
related swaps in the context of its customer base and the relevant 
market if it is willing and available to engage in loan-related swap 
transactions with its loan customers to meet the customers' needs in 
respect of one or more loans entered into with such banking entity 
throughout market cycles and as such customers' needs change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See, e.g., 79 FR at 5596 (``. . . the Agencies continue to 
recognize that market makers in highly illiquid markets may trade 
only intermittently or at the request of particular customers, which 
is sometimes referred to as trading by appointment.'') (emphasis 
added).
    \123\ The Agencies understand that, for the reasons described in 
this section, loan-related swaps present a particular challenge for 
smaller banking entities that are neither subject to the market risk 
rule nor registered as dealers. On the other hand, such swaps 
typically do not present the same challenges for banking entities 
that are subject to the market risk rule or are registered as 
dealers because the availability of the market-making exemption is 
apparent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Agencies note that a banking entity may also 
infrequently enter into loan-related swaps in both directions because 
of how those swaps are commonly used by market participants. For 
example, providing a floating to fixed swap is common in connection 
with a floating rate loan (as described in the example above), but the 
reverse (i.e., seeking to convert from a fixed rate to a floating rate) 
is much less common. Accordingly, the Agencies request comment on 
whether loan-related swaps should be permitted under the market-making 
exemption if the banking entity stands ready to make a market in both 
directions whenever a customer makes an appropriate request, but in 
practice primarily makes a market in the swaps in one direction because 
of how the swaps are used.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ This section's focus on market making is provided solely 
for purpose of the proposal's implementation of section 13 of the 
BHC Act and does not affect a banking entity's obligation to comply 
with additional or different requirements under applicable 
securities, derivatives, banking, or other laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies are also considering whether it would be appropriate 
to exclude loan-related swaps from the definition of proprietary 
trading for some banking entities or to permit the activity pursuant to 
an exemption from the prohibition on proprietary trading other than 
market making. For example, possible additions or alternatives could 
include a new exclusion in Sec.  __.3(d) or a new exemption in Sec.  
__.6 pursuant to the Agencies' exemptive authority under section 
13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act. In particular, the Agencies request comment 
regarding a specific option that would add an exclusion in Sec.  
__.3(d), which would specify that ``proprietary trading'' under Sec.  
__3 does not include the purchase or sale of related swaps by a banking 
entity in a transaction in which the banking entity purchases (or 
sells) a swap with a customer and contemporaneously sells (or 
purchases) an offsetting derivative in connection with a loan or open 
credit facility between the banking entity and the customer, if the 
rate, asset, liability or other notional item underlying the swap with 
the customer is, or is directly related to, a financial term of the 
loan or open credit facility with the customer (including, without 
limitation, the loan or open credit facility's duration, rate of 
interest, currency or currencies, or principal amount) and the 
offsetting swap is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate one or more specific, identifiable risks of the swap(s) with 
the customer.
    In considering any of these alternatives, the Agencies request 
comment on what parameters would be appropriate for the exclusion or 
exemption and what conditions should be considered to address any 
concerns about whether such an exclusion or exemption could be too 
broad.
    Question 101. Is it appropriate to treat loan-related swaps as 
permissible under the market making exemption if a banking entity 
stands ready to enter into such swaps upon request by a customer, but 
enters into such swaps on an infrequent basis due to the nature of the 
demand for such swaps? Why or why not?
    Question 102. Should a banking entity standing ready to transact in 
either direction on behalf of customers in such swaps be eligible for 
the market making exemption if, as a practical matter, it more 
frequently encounters demand on one side of the market and less 
frequently encounters demand on the other side for such products? Why 
or why not?
    Question 103. Is the scenario described above for the treatment of 
loan-related swaps workable? If not, why not? Are there alternative 
approaches that would be more effective and consistent with the 
statute?
    Question 104. Should the Agencies exclude loan-related swaps from 
the definition of proprietary trading under Sec.  __.3? Would including 
loan-related swaps within the definition of the ``trading account'' or 
``proprietary trading'' be consistent with the statutory definition of 
trading account? Why or why not?
    Question 105. In the alternative, should the Agencies provide an 
exclusion for such loan-related swaps under Sec.  __.6? What would be 
the benefits or drawbacks of each approach? How would permitting such 
loan-related swaps pursuant to the Agencies' authority under section 
13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act promote and protect the safety and soundness 
of banking entities and

[[Page 33464]]

the financial stability of the United States? If an exclusion or 
permitted activity is adopted, should the Agencies limit which banking 
entities may use the exclusion or permitted activity, and what 
conditions, if any, should be placed on the types, volume, or other 
characteristics of the loan-related swaps and the related activity?
    Question 106. How should loan-related swaps be defined? What 
parameters should be used to assess which swaps meet the definition?
    Question 107. Should other types of swaps also be addressed in the 
same manner? For example, should the Agencies provide further guidance, 
or include in any exclusion or exemption other end-user customer driven 
swaps used by the customer to hedge commercial risk?
h. Market Making Hedging
    During implementation of the 2013 final rule, the Agencies received 
a number of inquiries regarding the circumstances under which banking 
entities could elect to comply with market making risk management 
provisions permitted in Sec.  __.4(b) or alternatively the risk-
mitigating hedging requirements under Sec.  __.5. These inquiries 
generally related to whether a trading desk could treat an affiliated 
trading desk as a client, customer, or counterparty for purposes of the 
market making exemption's RENTD requirement; and whether, and under 
what circumstances, one trading desk could undertake market making risk 
management activities for one or more other trading desks.
    Each trading desk engaging in a transaction with an affiliated 
trading desk that meets the definition of proprietary trading must rely 
on one of the exemptions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 
final rule in order for the transaction to be permissible. In one 
example presented to the Agencies, one trading desk of a banking entity 
may make a market in a certain financial instrument (e.g., interest 
rate swaps), and then transfer some of the risk of that instrument 
(e.g., foreign exchange (``FX'') risk) to a second trading desk (e.g., 
an FX swaps desk) that may or may not separately engage in market 
making-related activity. The Agencies request comment as to whether, in 
such a scenario, the desk taking the risk (in the preceding example, 
the FX swaps desk) and the market making desk (in the preceding 
example, the interest rate desk) should be permitted to treat each 
other as a client, customer, or counterparty for purposes of 
establishing risk limits or reasonably expected near-term demand levels 
under the market making exemption.
    The Agencies also request comment as to whether each desk should be 
permitted to treat swaps executed between the desks as permitted market 
making-related activities of one or both desks if the swap does not 
cause the relevant desk to exceed its applicable limits and if the swap 
is entered into and maintained in accordance with the compliance 
requirements applicable to the desk, without treating the affiliated 
desk as a client, customer, or counterparty for purposes of 
establishing or increasing its limits. This approach would be intended 
to maintain appropriate limits on proprietary trading by not permitting 
an expansion of a trading desk's market making limits based on internal 
transactions. At the same time, this approach would be intended to 
permit efficient internal risk management strategies within the limits 
established for each desk. The Agencies are also requesting comment on 
the circumstances in which an organizational unit of an affiliate 
(``affiliated unit'') of a trading desk engaged in market making-
related activities in compliance with Sec.  __.4(b) (``market making 
desk'') would be permitted to enter into a transaction with the market 
making desk in reliance on the market making risk management exemption 
available to the market making desk. In this scenario, to effect such 
reliance the market making desk would direct the affiliated unit to 
execute a risk-mitigating transaction on the market making desk's 
behalf. If the affiliated unit does not independently satisfy the 
requirements of the market making exemption with respect to the 
transaction, it would be permitted to rely on the market making 
exemption available to the market making desk for the transaction if: 
(i) The affiliated unit acts in accordance with the market making 
desk's risk management policies and procedures established in 
accordance with Sec.  __.4(b)(2)(iii); and (ii) the resulting risk 
mitigating position is attributed to the market making desk's financial 
exposure (and not the affiliated unit's financial exposure) and is 
included in the market making desk's daily profit and loss calculation. 
If the affiliated unit establishes a risk-mitigating position for the 
market making desk on its own accord (i.e., not at the direction of the 
market making desk) or if the risk-mitigating position is included in 
the affiliated unit's financial exposure or daily profit and loss 
calculation, then the affiliated unit may still be able to comply with 
the requirements of the risk-mitigating hedging exemption pursuant to 
Sec.  __.5 for such activity.
    The Agencies request comment on the issues identified above. In 
particular, the Agencies request comment on the following questions:
    Question 108. Should the Agencies clarify the ability of banking 
entities to engage in hedging transactions directly related to market 
making positions, including multi-desk market making hedging, 
regardless of which desk undertakes the hedging trades?
    Question 109. Have banking entities found that certain restrictions 
on market making hedging activities under the final rule impede the 
ability of banking entities to effectively and efficiently engage in 
such hedging transactions? If so, what specific requirements have 
proved to be the most problematic?
    Question 110. How effective are the existing restrictions on market 
making hedging activities at reducing risks within a banking entity's 
investment portfolio? Please explain.
    Question 111. Should the Agencies permit banking entities to 
include affiliate hedging transactions in determining the reasonably 
expected near-term demand of customers, clients, and counterparties, 
and in establishing internal risk limits? Why or why not?
    Question 112. Would the changes separately proposed to Sec.  __.5 
of the 2013 final rule, or other changes to Sec.  __.5, eliminate the 
need for the additional interpretations described above, for example, 
because a banking entity could more easily conduct these activities in 
accordance with the requirements of Sec.  __.5?
3. Section __.5: Permitted Risk-Mitigating Hedging Activities
a. Section __.5 of the 2013 Final Rule
    Section 13(d)(1)(C) provides an exemption for risk-mitigating 
hedging activities that are designed to reduce the specific risks to a 
banking entity in connection with and related to individual or 
aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings. Section _.5 of the 
2013 final rule implements section 13(d)(1)(C) of the BHC Act.
    Section __.5 of the 2013 final rule provides a multi-faceted 
approach to implementing the hedging exemption to ensure that hedging 
activity is designed to be risk-reducing and does not mask prohibited 
proprietary trading. Risk-mitigating hedging activities must comply 
with certain conditions for those activities to qualify for the 
exemption. Generally, a banking entity relying on the hedging exemption 
must have in place an appropriate internal

[[Page 33465]]

compliance program that meets specific requirements to support its 
compliance with the terms of the exemption, and the compensation 
arrangements of persons performing risk-mitigating hedging activities 
must be designed not to reward or incentivize prohibited proprietary 
trading.\125\ In addition, the hedging activity itself must meet 
specified conditions; for example, at inception, it must be designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate and must demonstrably reduce 
or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks arising in connection with and related to identified positions, 
contracts, or other holdings of the banking entity, and the activity 
must not give rise to any significant new or additional risk that is 
not itself contemporaneously hedged.\126\ Finally, Sec.  __.5 
establishes certain documentation requirements with respect to the 
purchase or sale of financial instruments made in reliance of the risk-
mitigating exemption under certain circumstances.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(b)(1) and (3).
    \126\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(b)(2).
    \127\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(c).
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b. Proposed Amendments to Section __.5
i. Correlation Analysis for Section __.5(b)(1)(iii)
    Section __.5(b)(1)(iii) of the 2013 final rule requires a 
correlation analysis as part of the broader analysis of whether a 
hedging position, technique, or strategy (1) may reasonably be expected 
to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the specific risks being 
hedged, and (2) demonstrably reduces or otherwise significantly 
mitigates the specific risks being hedged.
    In adopting the 2013 final rule, the Agencies indicated that they 
expected the banking entity to undertake a correlation analysis that 
will provide a strong indication of whether a potential hedging 
position, strategy, or technique will or will not demonstrably reduce 
the risk it is designed to reduce. The nature and extent of the 
correlation analysis undertaken would be dependent on the facts and 
circumstances of the hedge and the underlying risks targeted. If 
sufficient correlation cannot be demonstrated, then the Agencies 
expected that such analysis would explain why not and also how the 
proposed hedging position, technique, or strategy was designed to 
reduce or significantly mitigate risk and how that reduction or 
mitigation can be demonstrated.
    In the course of implementing Sec.  __.5 of the 2013 final rule, 
the Agencies have become aware of practical difficulties with the 
correlation analysis requirement. In particular, banking entities have 
communicated that the correlation analysis requirement can add delays, 
costs, and uncertainty, and have questioned the extent to which the 
required correlation analysis helps to ensure the accuracy of hedging 
activity or compliance with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC 
Act.
    During implementation, the Agencies have observed that a banking 
entity may sometimes develop or modify its hedging activities as the 
risks it seeks to hedge are occurring, and the banking entity may not 
have enough time to undertake a complete correlation analysis before it 
needs to put the hedging transaction in place to fully hedge against 
the risks as they arise. In other cases, the hedging activity, while 
designed to reduce risk as required by the statute, may not be 
practical if delays or compliance costs resulting from undertaking a 
correlation analysis outweigh the benefits of performing the analysis. 
In addition, the extent to which two activities are correlated and will 
remain correlated into the future can vary significantly from one 
position, strategy, or technique to another. Assessing whether a 
particular hedge is sufficiently correlated to satisfy the correlation 
requirement of Sec.  __.5(b)(1)(iii) may be difficult, especially if 
that assessment must be justified after the hedge is entered into (when 
information that may not have been available earlier may become 
relevant). Given this uncertainty, banking entities may be hesitant to 
undertake a risk-mitigating hedge out of concern of inadvertently 
violating the regulation because the hedge did not satisfy one of the 
requirements.
    Based on the implementation experience of the Agencies and public 
feedback, the Agencies are proposing to remove the correlation analysis 
requirement for risk-mitigating hedging activities. The Agencies 
anticipate that removing this correlation analysis requirement would 
avoid the uncertainties described above without significantly impacting 
the conditions that risk-mitigating hedging activities must meet in 
order to qualify for the exemption. The Agencies also note that section 
13 of the BHC Act does not specifically require this correlation 
analysis. Instead, the statute only provides that a hedging position, 
technique, or strategy is permitted so long as it is ``. . . designed 
to reduce the specific risks to the banking entity . . .'' \128\ The 
2013 final rule added the correlation analysis requirement as a measure 
intended to ensure compliance with this exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Hedge Demonstrably Reduces or Otherwise Significantly Mitigates 
Specific Risks for Section __.5(b)(2)(iv)(B)
    Similarly, the requirement in Sec.  __.5(b)(2)(iv)(B) that a risk-
mitigating hedging activity demonstrably reduces or otherwise 
significantly mitigates specific risks is not directly required by 
section 13(d)(1)(C) of the BHC Act. As noted above, the statute instead 
requires that the hedge be designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate specific risks. The Agencies believe that this 
is effective for addressing the relevant risks.
    In practice, it appears that the requirement to show that hedging 
activity demonstrably reduces or otherwise significantly mitigates a 
specific, identifiable risk that develops over time can be complex and 
could potentially reduce bona fide risk-mitigating hedging activity. 
The Agencies recognize that in some circumstances, it may be difficult 
for banking entities to know with sufficient certainty that a potential 
hedging activity being considered will continuously demonstrably reduce 
or significantly mitigate an identifiable risk after it is implemented. 
For example, unforeseeable changes in market conditions, event risk, 
sovereign risk, and other factors that cannot be known in advance could 
reduce or eliminate the otherwise intended hedging benefits. In these 
events, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a banking 
entity to comply with the continuous requirement to demonstrably reduce 
or significantly mitigate the identifiable risks. In such cases, a 
banking entity may determine not to enter into what would otherwise be 
an effective hedge of foreseeable risks out of concern that the banking 
entity may not be able to effectively comply with the continuing 
hedging or mitigation requirement if unforeseen risks occur. Therefore, 
the proposal would remove the ``demonstrably reduces or otherwise 
significantly mitigates'' specific risk requirement from Sec.  
__.5(b)(1)(iv)(B).\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ For the same reasons, the Agencies are proposing to revise 
Sec.  __.13(a) of the 2013 final rule (relating to permitted risk-
mitigating hedging activities involving acquisition or retention of 
an ownership interest in a covered fund) to remove the references to 
covered fund ownership interests acquired or retained by the banking 
entity ``demonstrably'' reducing or otherwise significantly 
mitigating the specific, identifiable risks to the banking entity 
described in that section.

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[[Page 33466]]

iii. Reduced Compliance Requirements for Banking Entities that do not 
have Significant Trading Assets and Liabilities for Section __.5(b) and 
(c)
    Consistent with the proposed changes relating to the scope of the 
requirements for banking entities that do not have significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the Agencies have reassessed the requirements 
in Sec.  __.5(b) and Sec.  __.5(c) for banking entities that do not 
have significant trading assets and liabilities. For these firms, the 
Agencies are proposing to eliminate the requirements for a separate 
internal compliance program for risk-mitigating hedging under Sec.  
__.5(b)(1); certain of the specific requirements of Sec.  __.5(b)(2); 
the limits on compensation arrangements for persons performing risk-
mitigating activities in Sec.  __.5(b)(3); and the documentation 
requirements for those activities in Sec.  __.5(c). These requirements 
are overly burdensome and complex for banking entities with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities. In general, the Agencies expect that 
banking entities without significant trading assets and liabilities are 
less likely to engage in the types of trading activities and hedging 
strategies that would necessitate these additional compliance 
requirements.
    Given these considerations, it appears that removing the 
requirements for banking entities that do not have significant trading 
assets and liabilities to comply with the requirements of Sec.  __.5(b) 
and Sec.  __.5(c) is unlikely to materially increase risks to the 
safety and soundness of the banking entity or U.S. financial stability. 
Therefore, the Agencies are proposing to eliminate and modify these 
requirements for banking entities that do not have significant trading 
assets and liabilities. In place of those requirements, new Sec.  
__.5(b)(2) of the proposal would require that risk-mitigating hedging 
activities for those banking entities be: (i) At the inception of the 
hedging activity (including any adjustments), designed to reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks, including the risks specifically enumerated in the proposal; and 
(ii) subject to ongoing recalibration, as appropriate, to ensure that 
the hedge remains designed to reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate one or more specific, identifiable risks. The Agencies 
anticipate that these tailored requirements for banking entities 
without significant trading assets and liabilities would effectively 
implement the statutory requirement that the hedging transactions be 
designed to reduce specific risks the banking entity incurs. In 
connection with these proposed changes, the proposal also includes 
conforming changes to Sec.  __.5(b)(1) and Sec.  __.5(c) of the final 
2013 rule to make the requirements of those sections applicable only to 
banking entities that have significant trading assets and liabilities.
iv. Reduced Documentation Requirements for Banking Entities That Have 
Significant Trading Assets and Liabilities for Section __.5(c)
    Section __.5(c) of the 2013 final rule requires enhanced 
documentation for hedging activity conducted under the risk-mitigating 
hedging exemption if the hedging is not conducted by the specific 
trading desk establishing or responsible for the underlying positions, 
contracts, or other holdings, the risks of which the hedging activity 
is designed to reduce.\130\ The 2013 final rule also requires enhanced 
documentation for hedges established to hedge aggregated positions 
across two or more desks. The 2013 final rule recognizes that a trading 
desk may be responsible for hedging aggregated positions of that desk 
and other desks, business units, or affiliates. In that case, the 
trading desk putting on the hedge is at least one step removed from 
some of the positions being hedged. Accordingly, the 2013 final rule 
provides that the documentation requirements in Sec.  __.5(c) apply if 
a trading desk is hedging aggregated positions that include positions 
from more than one trading desk.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(c)(1)(i).
    \131\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(c)(1)(iii)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2013 final rule also requires enhanced documentation for hedges 
established by the specific trading desk establishing or directly 
responsible for the underlying positions, contracts, or other holdings, 
the risks of which the hedge is designed to reduce, if the hedge is 
effected through a financial instrument, technique, or strategy that is 
not specifically identified in the trading desk's written policies and 
procedures as a product, instrument, exposure, technique, or strategy 
that the trading desk may use for hedging.\132\ The Agencies note that 
this documentation requirement does not apply to hedging activity 
conducted by a trading desk in connection with the market making-
related activities of that desk or by a trading desk that conducts 
hedging activities related to the other permissible trading activities 
of that desk so long as the hedging activity is conducted in accordance 
with the compliance program for that trading desk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(c)(1)(ii)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For banking entities that have significant trading assets and 
liabilities, the proposal would retain the enhanced documentation 
requirements for the hedging transactions identified in Sec.  
__.5(c)(1) to permit evaluation of the activity. While this 
documentation requirement results in certain more extensive compliance 
efforts (as acknowledged by the Agencies when the 2013 final rule was 
adopted),\133\ the Agencies continue to believe this requirement serves 
an important role to prevent evasion of the requirements of section 13 
of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ 79 FR at 5638-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, based on the Agencies' experience during the first several 
years of implementation of the 2013 final rule, it appears that many 
hedges established by one trading desk for other affiliated desks are 
often part of common hedging strategies that are used repetitively. In 
those instances, the regulatory purpose for the documentation 
requirements of Sec.  __.5(c) of the 2013 final rule, to permit 
subsequent evaluation of the hedging activity and prevent evasion, is 
much less relevant. In weighing the significantly reduced regulatory 
and supervisory relevance of additional documentation of common hedging 
trades against the complexity of complying with the enhanced 
documentation requirements, it appears that the documentation 
requirements are not necessary in those instances. Reducing the 
documentation requirement for common hedging activity undertaken in the 
normal course of business for the benefit of one or more other trading 
desks would also make beneficial risk-mitigating activity more 
efficient and potentially improve the timeliness of important risk-
mitigating hedging activity, the effectiveness of which can be time 
sensitive.
    Accordingly, the Agencies are proposing a new paragraph (c)(4) in 
Sec.  __.5 that would eliminate the enhanced documentation requirement 
for hedging activities that meets certain conditions. In excluding a 
trading desk's common hedging instruments from the enhanced 
documentation requirements in Sec.  __.5(c), the Agencies seek to 
distinguish those financial instruments that are commonly used for 
hedging activities and require the banking entity to have in place 
appropriate limits so that less common or unusual levels of hedging 
activity would still be subject to

[[Page 33467]]

the enhanced documentation requirements. Accordingly, the proposal 
would provide that compliance with the enhanced documentation 
requirement would not apply to purchases and sales of financial 
instruments for hedging activities that are identified on a written 
list of financial instruments pre-approved by the banking entity that 
are commonly used by the trading desk for the specific types of hedging 
activity for which the financial instrument is being purchased or sold. 
In addition, under the proposal, at the time of the purchase or sale of 
the financial instruments, the related hedging activity would need to 
comply with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the trading desk 
purchasing or selling the financial instrument, which would be required 
to be appropriate for the size, types, and risks of the hedging 
activities commonly undertaken by the trading desk; the financial 
instruments purchased and sold by the trading desk for hedging 
activities; and the levels and duration of the risk exposures being 
hedged. These conditions on the pre-approved limits are intended to 
provide clarity as to the types and characteristics of the limits 
needed to comply with the proposal. The Agencies would expect that a 
banking entity's pre-approved limits should be reasonable and set to 
correspond to the type of hedging activity commonly undertaken and at 
levels consistent with the hedging activity undertaken by the trading 
desk in the normal course.
    The Agencies request comment on the proposed revisions to Sec.  
__.5 regarding permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities. In 
particular, the Agencies request comment on the following questions:
    Question 113. What factors, if any, should the Agencies consider in 
determining whether to remove the requirement that a correlation 
analysis must be used to determine whether a hedging position, 
technique, or strategy reduces or otherwise significantly mitigates the 
specific risk being hedged?
    Question 114. Is the Agencies' assessment of the complexities of 
the correlation analysis requirement across the spectrum of hedging 
activities accurate? Why or why not?
    Question 115. How does the requirement to undertake a correlation 
analysis impact a banking entity's decision on whether to enter into 
different types of hedges?
    Question 116. How does the correlation analysis requirement affect 
the timing of hedging activities?
    Question 117. Does the current requirement that a hedge must 
demonstrably reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate specific risks 
lead banking entities to decline to enter into hedging transactions 
that would otherwise be designed to reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate specific risks arising in connection with identified 
positions, contracts, or other holdings of the banking entity? If so, 
under what circumstances?
    Question 118. Would reducing the compliance requirements of Sec.  
__.5(b) and Sec.  __.5(c) for banking entities that do not have 
significant trading assets and liabilities reduce compliance costs and 
increase certainty for these banking entities?
    Question 119. Would the proposed reductions in the compliance 
requirements for risk-mitigating hedging activities by banking entities 
that do not have significant trading assets and liabilities increase 
materially the risks to the safety and soundness of the banking entity 
or U.S. financial stability? Why or why not?
    Question 120. Would the proposed exclusion from the enhanced 
documentation requirements for trading desks that hedge risk of other 
desks under the circumstances described make risk-mitigating hedging 
activities more efficient and timely? Why or why not? Should any of the 
existing documentation requirements be retained for firms without 
significant trading assets and liabilities? Are there any hedging 
documentation requirements applicable in other contexts (e.g., 
accounting) that could be leveraged for the purposes of this 
requirement? How would the proposed exclusion from the enhanced 
documentation requirements impact both internal and external compliance 
and oversight of a banking entity?
    Question 121. With respect to the proposed exclusion from enhanced 
documentation for trading desks that hedge risk of other desks under 
certain circumstances, are the requirements for a pre-approved list of 
financial instruments and pre-approved hedging limits reasonable? 
Should those requirements be modified, expanded, or reduced? If so, 
how? Should the Agencies provide greater clarity for determining which 
financial instruments are ``commonly used by the trading desk for the 
specific type of hedging activity for which the financial instrument is 
being purchased or sold'' for inclusion on the pre-approved list? 
Similarly, should the Agencies provide greater clarity for determining 
pre-approved hedging limits?
    Question 122: The Agencies have proposed using accounting 
principles as part of the definition of trading account. Should the 
Agencies similarly use accounting principles to refer to risk-mitigated 
hedging activity? For example, should the Agencies provide an exemption 
for hedging activity that is accounted for under the provisions of ASC 
815 (Derivatives and Hedging)? Why or why not? Should the Agencies 
require entities that engage in risk-mitigating hedging activity 
measure hedge effectiveness? Why or why not?
4. Section __.6(e): Permitted Trading Activities of a Foreign Banking 
Entity
    Section 13(d)(1)(H) of the BHC Act \134\ permits certain foreign 
banking entities to engage in proprietary trading that occurs solely 
outside of the United States (the foreign trading exemption).\135\ The 
statute does not define when a foreign banking entity's trading occurs 
``solely outside of the United States.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Section 13(d)(1)(H) of the BHC Act permits trading 
conducted by a foreign banking entity pursuant to paragraph (9) or 
(13) of section 4(c) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(c)), if the 
trading occurs solely outside of the United States, and the banking 
entity is not directly or indirectly controlled by a banking entity 
that is organized under the laws of the United States or of one or 
more States. See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(H).
    \135\ This section's discussion of the concept of ``solely 
outside of the United States'' is provided solely for purposes of 
the proposal's implementation of section 13(d)(1)(H) of the BHC Act, 
and does not affect a banking entity's obligation to comply with 
additional or different requirements under applicable securities, 
banking, or other laws. Among other differences, section 13 of the 
BHC Act does not necessarily include the customer protection, 
transparency, anti-fraud, anti-manipulation, and market orderliness 
goals of other statutes administered by the Agencies. These other 
goals or other aspects of those statutory provisions may require 
different approaches to the concept of ``solely outside of the 
United States'' in other contexts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Permitted Trading Activities of a Foreign Banking Entity
    The 2013 final rule includes several conditions on the availability 
of the foreign trading exemption. Specifically, in addition to limiting 
the exemption to foreign banking entities where the purchase or sale is 
made pursuant to paragraph (9) or (13) of section 4(c) of the BHC 
Act,\136\ the 2013 final rule provides that the foreign trading 
exemption is available only if:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ 12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(9), (13). See 2013 final rule Sec.  
__.6(e)(1)(i) and (ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including any personnel of the banking entity or its affiliate 
that arrange, negotiate, or execute such purchase or sale) is not 
located in the United States or organized under the laws of the United 
States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal

[[Page 33468]]

is not located in the United States or organized under the laws of the 
United States or of any State;
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (iv) No financing for the banking entity's purchase or sale is 
provided, directly or indirectly, by any branch or affiliate that is 
located in the United States or organized under the laws of the United 
States or of any State;
    (v) The purchase or sale is not conducted with or through any U.S. 
entity,\137\ other than:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ ``U.S. entity'' is defined for purposes of this provision 
as any entity that is, or is controlled by, or is acting on behalf 
of, or at the direction of, any other entity that is, located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State. See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.6(e)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (A) A purchase or sale with the foreign operations of a U.S. 
entity, if no personnel of such U.S. entity that are located in the 
United States are involved in the arrangement, negotiation or execution 
of such purchase or sale.
    The Agencies also exercised their authority under section 
13(d)(1)(J) \138\ to allow the following types of purchases or sales to 
be conducted with a U.S. entity:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(J).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (B) A purchase or sale with an unaffiliated market intermediary 
acting as principal, provided the purchase or sale is promptly cleared 
and settled through a clearing agency or derivatives clearing 
organization acting as a central counterparty; or
    (C) A purchase or sale through an unaffiliated market intermediary, 
provided the purchase or sale is conducted anonymously (i.e., each 
party to the purchase or sale is unaware of the identity of the other 
party(ies) to the purchase or sale) on an exchange or similar trading 
facility and promptly cleared and settled through a clearing agency or 
derivatives clearing organization acting as a central counterparty.
    The proposal would modify the requirements of the 2013 final rule 
relating to the foreign trading exemption in a number of ways. 
Specifically, the proposal would retain the first three requirements of 
the 2013 final rule, with a modification to the first requirement, and 
would remove the last two requirements of Sec.  __.6(e)(3). As a 
result, Sec.  __.6(e)(3), as modified by the proposal, would require 
that for a foreign banking entity to be eligible for this exemption:
    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including relevant personnel) is not located in the United States 
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.
    The proposal would maintain these three requirements in order to 
ensure that the banking entity (including any relevant personnel) that 
engages in the purchase or sale as principal or makes the decision to 
purchase or sell as principal is not located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or any State. 
Furthermore, the proposal would retain the 2013 final rule's 
requirement that the purchase or sale, including any transaction 
arising from a related risk-mitigating hedging transaction, is not 
accounted for as principal at the U.S. operations of the foreign 
banking entity. The proposal would, however, modify the first 
requirement relative to the 2013 final rule, to replace the requirement 
that any personnel of the banking entity that arrange, negotiate, or 
execute such purchase or sale are not located in the United States with 
one that would restrict only the relevant personnel engaged in the 
banking entity's decision in the purchase or sale not located in the 
United States. Under the proposed approach, for purposes of section 13 
of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations, the focus of the 
requirement would be on whether the banking entity that engages in the 
purchase or sale as principal (including any relevant personnel) is 
located in the United States. The purpose of this modification is to 
make clear that some limited involvement by U.S. personnel (e.g., 
arranging or negotiating) would be consistent with this exemption so 
long as the principal bearing the risk of a purchase or sale is outside 
the United States. The proposed modifications would permit a foreign 
banking entity to engage in a purchase or sale under this exemption so 
long as the principal risk and actions of the purchase or sale do not 
take place in the United States for purposes of section 13 and the 
implementing regulations. The proposal would also eliminate the 
following two requirements from Sec.  __.6(e), which are referred to as 
the ``financing prong'' and the ``counterparty prong,'' respectively, 
in the discussion that follows:
    No financing for the banking entity's purchase or sale is provided, 
directly or indirectly, by any branch or affiliate that is located in 
the United States or organized under the laws of the United States or 
of any State;
    The purchase or sale is not conducted with or through any U.S. 
entity, other than:
    A purchase or sale with the foreign operations of a U.S. entity, if 
no personnel of such U.S. entity that are located in the United States 
are involved in the arrangement, negotiation or execution of such 
purchase or sale.
    A purchase or sale with an unaffiliated market intermediary acting 
as principal, provided the purchase or sale is promptly cleared and 
settled through a clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization 
acting as a central counterparty; or
    A purchase or sale through an unaffiliated market intermediary, 
provided the purchase or sale is conducted anonymously (i.e. each party 
to the purchase or sale is unaware of the identity of the other 
party(ies) to the purchase or sale) on an exchange or similar trading 
facility and promptly cleared and settled through a clearing agency or 
derivatives clearing organization acting as a central counterparty.
    Since the adoption of the 2013 final rule, foreign banking entities 
have communicated to the Agencies that these requirements have unduly 
limited their ability to make use of the statutory exemption for 
proprietary trading and have resulted in an impact on foreign banking 
entities' operations outside of the United States that these banking 
entities believe is broader than necessary to achieve compliance with 
the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act. In response to these 
concerns, the Agencies are proposing to remove the financing prong and 
the counterparty prong, which would focus the key requirements of this 
exemption on the principal actions and risk of the transaction. In 
addition, the proposal would remove the financing prong to address 
concerns that the fungibility of financing has made this requirement 
difficult to apply in practice in certain circumstances to determine 
whether particular financing is tied to a

[[Page 33469]]

particular trade. Market participants have raised a number of questions 
about the financing prong and have indicated that identifying whether 
financing has been provided by a U.S. affiliate or branch can be 
exceedingly complex, in particular with respect to demonstrating that 
financing has not been provided by a U.S. affiliate or branch with 
respect to a particular transaction. To address the concerns raised by 
foreign banking entities and other market participants, the proposal 
would amend the foreign trading exemption to focus on the principal 
risk of a transaction and the location of the actions as principal and 
trading decisions, so that a foreign banking entity would be able to 
make use of the exemption so long as the risk of the transaction is 
booked outside of the United States. While the Agencies recognize that 
a U.S. branch or affiliate that extends financing could bear some 
risks, the Agencies note that the proposed modifications to the foreign 
trading exemption are designed to require that the principal risks of 
the transaction occur and remain solely outside of the United States. 
For example, the exemption would continue to provide that the purchase 
or sale, including any transaction arising from risk-mitigating hedging 
related to the instruments purchased or sold, may not be accounted for 
as principal directly or indirectly on a consolidated basis by any U.S. 
branch or affiliate.
    Similarly, foreign banking entities have communicated to the 
Agencies that the counterparty prong has been overly difficult and 
costly for banking entities to monitor, track, and comply with in 
practice. As a result, the Agencies are proposing to remove the 
requirement that any transaction with a U.S. counterparty be executed 
solely with the foreign operations of the U.S. counterparty (including 
the requirement that no personnel of the counterparty involved in the 
arrangement, negotiation, or execution may be located in the United 
States) or through an unaffiliated intermediary and an anonymous 
exchange in order to materially reduce the reported inefficiencies 
associated with rule compliance. In addition, market participants have 
indicated that this requirement has in practice led foreign banking 
entities to overly restrict the range of counterparties with which 
transactions can be conducted, as well as disproportionately burdened 
compliance resources associated with those transactions, including with 
respect to counterparties seeking to do business with the foreign 
banking entity in foreign jurisdictions.
    As a result, the Agencies propose to remove the counterparty prong. 
The proposal would focus the requirements of the foreign trading 
exemption on the location of a foreign banking entity's decision to 
trade, action as principal, and principal risk of the purchase or sale. 
This proposed focus on the location of actions and risk as principal is 
intended to align with the statute's definition of ``proprietary 
trading'' as ``engaging as principal for the trading account of the 
banking entity.'' \139\ Consistent with that approach, the focus of the 
proposed approach would be on the activities of a foreign banking 
entity as principal in the United States. The statute exempts the 
trading of foreign banking entities that is conducted ``solely'' 
outside the United States. Under the proposal, the relevant inquiry 
would focus on whether the principal risk of the transaction is located 
or held outside of the United States and the location of the trading 
decision and banking entity acting as principal. The proposal would 
remove the requirements of Sec.  __.6(e)(3) that are less directly 
relevant to these considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(4) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Information provided by foreign banking entities has demonstrated 
that few trading desks of foreign banking entities have utilized the 
foreign trading exemption in practice. This information has raised 
concerns that the current requirements for the exemption may be overly 
restrictive of permitted activities. Accordingly, the proposal would 
modify the exemption under the 2013 final rule to make the requirements 
more workable, so that it may be available to foreign banking entities 
trading solely outside the United States.
    The Agencies request comment as to whether the proposed 
modifications to the foreign trading exemption would result in 
disadvantages for U.S. banking entities competing with foreign banking 
entities. The statute contains an exemption to allow foreign banking 
entities to engage in trading activity that is solely outside the 
United States. The statute also contains a prohibition on proprietary 
trading for U.S. banking entities regardless of where their activity is 
conducted. The statute generally prohibits U.S. banking entities from 
engaging in proprietary trading because of the perceived risks of those 
activities to U.S. banking entities and the U.S. economy. The Agencies 
believe that this means that the prohibition on proprietary trading is 
intended make U.S. banking entities safer and stronger, and reduce 
risks to U.S. financial stability, and that the foreign operations of 
foreign banking entities should not be subject to the prohibition on 
proprietary trading for their activities overseas. The proposal would 
implement this distinction with respect to transactions that occur 
outside of the United States where the principal risk is booked outside 
of the United States and the actions and decisions as principal occur 
outside of the United States by foreign operations of foreign banking 
entities. Under the statute and the rulemaking framework, U.S. banking 
entities would be able to continue trading activities that are 
consistent with the statute and regulation, including permissible 
market-making, underwriting, and risk-mitigating hedging activities as 
well as other types of trading activities such as trading on behalf of 
customers. U.S. banking entities are permitted to engage in these 
trading activities as exemptions from the general prohibition on 
proprietary trading under the statute. Moreover, and consistent with 
the statute, the proposal seeks to streamline and reduce the 
requirements of several of these key exemptions to make them more 
workable and available in practice to all banking entities subject to 
section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ At the same time, however, the Agencies recognize the 
possibility that there may also be risks to U.S. banking entities 
and the U.S. economy as a result of allowing foreign banking 
entities to conduct a broader range of activities within the United 
States. For example, and as discussed above, the Agencies are 
requesting comment on whether the proposal would give foreign 
banking entities a competitive advantage over U.S. banking entities 
with respect to identical trading activity in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the 2013 final rule, the exemption under the 
proposal would not exempt the U.S. or foreign operations of U.S. 
banking entities from having to comply with the restrictions and 
limitations of section 13 of the BHC Act. Thus, the U.S. and foreign 
operations of a U.S. banking entity that is engaged in permissible 
market making-related activities or other permitted activities may 
engage in those transactions with a foreign banking entity that is 
engaged in proprietary trading in accordance with the exemption under 
Sec.  __.6(e) of the 2013 final rule, so long as the U.S. banking 
entity complies with the requirements of Sec.  __.4(b), in the case of 
market making-related activities, or other relevant exemption 
applicable to the U.S. banking entity. The proposal, like the 2013 
final rule, would not impose a duty on the foreign banking entity or 
the U.S. banking entity to ensure that its counterparty is conducting 
its activity in conformance with section 13 and the implementing 
regulations. Rather, that

[[Page 33470]]

obligation would be on each party subject to section 13 to ensure that 
it is conducting its activities in accordance with section 13 and the 
implementing regulations.
    The proposal's exemption for trading of foreign banking entities 
outside the United States could potentially give foreign banking 
entities a competitive advantage over U.S. banking entities with 
respect to permitted activities of U.S. banking entities because 
foreign banking entities could trade directly with U.S. counterparties 
without being subject to the limitations associated with the market-
making or other exemptions under the rule. This competitive disparity 
in turn could create a significant potential for regulatory arbitrage. 
In this respect, the Agencies seek to mitigate this concern through 
other changes in the proposal; for example, U.S. banking entities would 
continue to be able to engage in all of the activities permitted under 
the 2013 final rule and the proposal, including the simplified and 
streamlined requirements for market-making and risk-mitigating hedging 
and other types of trading activities. The proposal's modifications 
therefore in general seek to balance concerns regarding competitive 
impact while mitigating the concern that an overly narrow approach to 
the foreign trading exemption may cause market bifurcations, reduce the 
efficiency and liquidity of markets, make the exemption overly 
restrictive to foreign banking entities, and harm U.S. market 
participants.
    The Agencies request comment on the proposal's revised approach to 
implementing the foreign trading exemption. In particular, the Agencies 
request comment on the following questions:
    Question 123. Is the proposal's implementation of the foreign 
trading exemption appropriate and effectively delineated? If not, what 
alternative would be more appropriate and effective?
    Question 124. Are the proposal's provisions regarding when an 
activity will be considered to have occurred solely outside the United 
States for purposes of the foreign trading exemption effective and 
sufficiently clear? If not, what alternative would be clearer and more 
effective? Should any requirements be modified or removed? If so, which 
requirements and why? Should additional requirements be added? If so, 
what requirements and why? For example, should the financing prong or 
the counterparty prong be retained or modified rather than eliminated? 
Why or why not? Do the proposed modifications effectively focus the 
foreign trading exemption on the principal actions and risk of the 
transaction and ensure that the principal risk remains solely outside 
the United States? Are there any other conditions the Agencies should 
include in the foreign trading and foreign fund exemptions to address 
the possibility that risks associated with foreign trading or covered 
fund activities could flow into the U.S. financial system through 
financing for those activities coming from U.S. branches of affiliates, 
without raising the same compliance difficulties banking entities have 
experienced with the current financing prong?
    Question 125. What effects do commenters believe the proposed 
modifications to the foreign trading exemption, particularly with 
respect to trading with U.S. entities, would have with respect to the 
safety and soundness of banking entities and U.S. financial stability? 
Would the proposed modifications allow for risks to aggregate in the 
United States based on activity of foreign banking entities? For 
example, what effects would removal of the counterparty prong have for 
U.S. financial market liquidity, and what consequences could such 
effects have for the safety and soundness of banking entities and U.S. 
financial stability? Could the proposal be further modified, consistent 
with statutory requirements, to better promote and protect the safety 
and soundness of banking entities and U.S. financial stability? Please 
explain.
    Question 126. What impact could the proposal have on a foreign 
banking entity's ability to trade in the United States? Should any 
additional requirements of the 2013 final rule be removed? Why or why 
not? If so, which requirements and why? Should any of the requirements 
of the 2013 final rule that the Agencies are proposing to eliminate be 
retained? Why or why not? If so, which requirements and why?
    Question 127. Does the proposal's approach raise competitive equity 
concerns for U.S. banking entities? If so, in what ways? Would the 
proposed modifications allow for foreign entities to access the U.S. 
markets without commensurate regulation? How would this impact 
competition? Would this disadvantage U.S. entities? Would the proposed 
revisions to the 2013 final rule's exemptions for market making, 
underwriting, and risk-mitigating hedging and new exclusions contained 
in this proposal help to mitigate these concerns? How could such 
concerns be addressed while effectively implementing this statutory 
exemption?
    Question 128. The proposed approach would eliminate the requirement 
in the 2013 final rule that trading performed pursuant to the foreign 
trading exemption not be conducted with or through any U.S. entity, 
subject to certain exceptions.\141\ Would eliminating this requirement 
give foreign banking entities a competitive advantage over U.S. banking 
entities with respect to identical trading activity in the United 
States? For example, would eliminating this requirement give foreign 
banking entities a competitive advantage over U.S. banking entities 
with respect to permitted market-making or underwriting activities? Why 
or why not? Are there ways that any such competitive disparities could 
potentially be mitigated or eliminated in a manner consistent with the 
statute? If so, please explain. Would the proposed approach create 
opportunities for certain banking entities to avoid the operation of 
the rule in ways that would frustrate the purposes of the statute? If 
so, how?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ See Sec.  __.6(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 129. The proposed approach would eliminate the requirement 
in the 2013 final rule that personnel of the banking entity who 
arrange, negotiate, or execute a purchase or sale under the foreign 
trading exemption be located outside the United States.\142\ Should 
this requirement be removed? Why or why not? Would eliminating this 
restriction, thereby allowing foreign banking entities to perform 
certain core market-facing activities in the United States and with 
U.S. customers, create competitive disparities between foreign banking 
entities and U.S. banking entities? Please explain. Are there ways that 
any such competitive disparities could potentially be mitigated or 
eliminated in a manner consistent with the statute? If so, please 
explain. Would the proposed approach create opportunities for banking 
entities to avoid the operation of the rule in ways that would 
frustrate the purposes of the statute? If so, how?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See Sec. Sec.  __.6(e)(3)(i) and __.6(e)(3)(v)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 130. Instead of removing the requirement that any 
personnel of the banking entity that arrange, negotiate, or execute a 
purchase or sale be located outside of the United States, should the 
Agencies provide definitions or guidance on these terms, for example, 
similar to definitions and guidance adopted or issued by the SEC and 
CFTC under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act and implementing 
regulations? Are there any other modifications that would be more 
appropriate?

[[Page 33471]]

C. Subpart C--Covered Fund Activities and Investments

1. Section __.10: Prohibition on Acquisition or Retention of Ownership 
Interests in, and Certain Relationships With, a Covered Fund
a. Prohibition Regarding Covered Fund Activities and Investments
    As noted above and except as otherwise permitted, section 
13(a)(1)(B) of the BHC Act generally prohibits a banking entity from 
acquiring or retaining any ownership interest in, or sponsoring, a 
covered fund.\143\ Section 13(d) of the BHC Act contains certain 
exemptions to this prohibition. Subpart C of the 2013 final rule 
implements these and other provisions of section 13 related to covered 
funds. Specifically, Sec.  __.10(a) of the 2013 final rule establishes 
the scope of the covered fund prohibitions and Sec.  __.10(b) of the 
2013 final rule defines a number of key terms, including ``covered 
fund.'' Section __.10(c) of the 2013 final rule tailors the definition 
of ``covered fund'' by providing particular exclusions. The covered 
fund definition, taking into account the particular exclusions, is 
central to the operation of subpart C of the 2013 final rule because it 
specifies the types of entities to which the prohibition contained in 
Sec.  __.10(a) of the 2013 final rule applies, unless the relevant 
activity is specifically permitted under an available exemption 
contained elsewhere in subpart C of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2013 final rule, the Agencies adopted a tailored definition 
of ``covered fund'' that covers issuers of the type that would be 
investment companies but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act \144\ with exclusions for certain specific types 
of issuers. The Agencies designed the exclusions to focus the covered 
fund definition on vehicles used for the investment purposes that the 
Agencies believed were the target of section 13 of the BHC Act.\145\ 
The definition of ``covered fund'' under the 2013 final rule also 
includes certain funds organized and offered outside of the United 
States to address the potential for circumvention of the restrictions 
in section 13 through foreign fund structures and certain types of 
commodity pools for which a registered commodity pool operator has 
elected to claim the exemption provided by section 4.7 of the CFTC's 
regulations or investor limitations apply.\146\ In the preamble to the 
2013 final rule, the Agencies stated their belief that the definition 
was consistent with the words, structure, purpose, and legislative 
history of section 13 of the BHC Act.\147\ In particular, the Agencies 
stated that the purpose of section 13 appears to be to limit the 
involvement of banking entities in high-risk proprietary trading, as 
well as their investment in, sponsorship of, and other connections 
with, entities that engage in investment activities for the benefit of 
banking entities, institutional investors, and high-net worth 
individuals.\148\ Further, the Agencies indicated that section 13 
permitted them to tailor the scope of the definition to funds that 
engage in the investment activities contemplated by section 13 (as 
opposed, for example, to vehicles that merely serve to facilitate 
corporate structures).\149\ Tailoring the scope of the definition was 
intended to allow the Agencies to avoid any unintended results that 
might follow from a definition that was inappropriately imprecise.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act 
are exclusions commonly relied on by a wide variety of entities that 
would otherwise be covered by the broad definition of ``investment 
company'' contained in that Act. 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(2). Sections 
3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, in relevant part, 
provide two exclusions from the definition of ``investment company'' 
for: (1) Any issuer whose outstanding securities are beneficially 
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making 
and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its 
securities (other than short-term paper); or (2) any issuer, the 
outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons 
who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are ``qualified 
purchasers'' as defined by section 2(a)(51) of the Investment 
Company Act, and which is not making and does not at that time 
propose to make a public offering of such securities. See 15 U.S.C. 
80a-3(c)(1) and (c)(7).
    \145\ See 79 FR at 5671.
    \146\ Id. In the preamble to the 2013 final rule, the Agencies 
also expressed their intent to exercise the statutory anti-evasion 
authority provided in section 13(e) of the BHC Act and other 
prudential authorities in order to address instances of evasion. The 
2013 final rule permits the Agencies to jointly determine to include 
within the definition of ``covered fund'' any fund excluded from 
that definition, and this authority may be exercised to address 
instances of evasion. See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c).
    \147\ See 79 FR at 5670. Section 13(h)(2) provides that: ``the 
terms `hedge fund' and `private equity fund' mean an issuer that 
would be an investment company as defined in the [Investment Company 
Act] (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) 
of that Act, or such similar funds as the [Agencies] may, by rule, 
as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.'' See 12 U.S.C. 
1851(h)(2) (emphasis added).
    \148\ See 79 FR at 5670.
    \149\ See id. at 5666.
    \150\ In adopting the 2013 final rule, the Agencies referred to 
legislative history that suggested that Congress may have foreseen 
that its base definition could lead to unintended results and might 
be overly broad, too narrow, or otherwise off the mark. See id. at 
5670-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comment on whether the 2013 final rule's 
covered fund definition effectively implements the statute and is 
appropriately tailored to identify funds that engage in the investment 
activities contemplated by section 13. The Agencies also request 
comment on whether the definition has been inappropriately imprecise 
and, if so, whether that has led to any unintended results.
i. Covered Fund ``Base Definition''--Section __.10(b)
    In considering whether to further tailor the covered fund 
definition, the Agencies seek comment in this section on the 2013 final 
rule's general approach to defining the term ``covered fund'' and the 
2013 final rule's ``base definition'' of covered fund, that is, the 
definition as provided in Sec.  __.10(b) before applying the exclusions 
found in Sec.  __.10(c), as well as alternatives to this base 
definition.\151\ In the sections that follow the Agencies request 
comment on exclusions from the covered fund definition that relate to 
specific areas of concern expressed to the Agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 131. The Agencies adopted in the 2013 final rule a unified 
definition of ``covered fund'' rather than having separate definitions 
for ``hedge fund'' and ``private equity fund'' because the statute 
defines ``hedge fund'' and ``private equity fund'' without 
differentiation. Instead of retaining a unified definition of ``covered 
fund,'' should the Agencies separately define ``hedge fund'' and 
``private equity fund'' or define ``covered fund'' as a ``hedge fund'' 
or ``private equity fund''? Would such an approach more effectively 
implement the statute? If so, how should the Agencies define these 
terms and why? Alternatively, the Agencies request comment below as to 
whether the Agencies should provide exclusions from the covered fund 
base definition for an issuer that does not share certain 
characteristics commonly associated with a hedge fund or private equity 
fund. If the Agencies were to define the terms ``hedge fund'' and 
``private equity fund,'' would it be more effective to do so with an 
exclusion from the covered fund definition for issuers that do not 
resemble ``hedge funds'' and ``private equity funds''?
    Question 132. In the 2013 final rule, the Agencies tailored the 
scope of the definition to funds that engage in the investment 
activities contemplated by section 13. Does the 2013 final rule's 
definition of ``covered fund'' effectively include funds that engage in 
those

[[Page 33472]]

investment activities? Are there funds that are included in the 
definition of ``covered fund'' that do not engage in those investment 
activities? If so, what types of funds, and should the Agencies modify 
the definition to exclude them? Are there funds that engage in those 
investment activities but are not included in the definition of 
``covered fund''? If so, what types of funds and should the Agencies 
modify the definition to include them? If the Agencies should modify 
the definition, how should it be modified?
    Question 133. In the preamble to the 2013 final rule, the Agencies 
stated that tailoring the scope of the definition of ``covered fund'' 
would allow the Agencies to avoid unintended results that might follow 
from a definition that is ``inappropriately imprecise.'' \152\ Has the 
final definition been ``inappropriately imprecise'' in practice? If so, 
how? Should the Agencies modify the base definition to be more precise? 
If so, how? Alternatively or in addition to modifying the base 
definition, could the Agencies modify or add any exclusions to make the 
definition more precise, as discussed below?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ See 79 FR at 5670-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 134. The 2013 final rule's definition of ``covered fund'' 
includes certain funds organized and offered outside of the United 
States with respect to a U.S. banking entity that sponsors or invests 
in the fund in order to address structures that might otherwise allow 
circumvention of the restrictions of section 13. Does this ``foreign 
covered fund'' provision effectively address those circumvention 
concerns? If not, should the Agencies modify this provision to address 
those circumvention concerns more directly or in some other way? If so, 
how?
    Question 135. The 2013 final rule's definition of ``covered fund'' 
includes certain commodity pools in order to address structures that 
might otherwise allow circumvention of the restrictions in section 13. 
In adopting this ``covered commodity pool'' provision, the Agencies 
sought to take a tailored approach that is designed to accurately 
identify those commodity pools that are similar to issuers that would 
be investment companies as defined in the Investment Company Act but 
for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, consistent with section 
13(h)(2) of the BHC Act. Does this ``covered commodity pool'' provision 
effectively address those circumvention concerns? If not, should the 
Agencies modify this provision to address those circumvention concerns 
more directly or in some other way? If so, how? Has the covered 
commodity pool provision been effective in including in the covered 
fund base definition those commodity pools that are similar to issuers 
that would be investment companies but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7)? 
Has it been under- or over-inclusive? What kinds of commodity pools 
have been included in or excluded from the covered fund base definition 
and are these inclusions or exclusions appropriate? If the covered 
commodity pool provision is under- or over-inclusive, what changes 
should the Agencies make and how would those changes be more effective?
    Question 136. What kinds of compliance and other costs have banking 
entities incurred in analyzing whether particular issuers are covered 
funds and implementing compliance programs for covered fund activities? 
Has the breadth of the base definition raised particular compliance 
challenges? Have the 2013 final rule's exclusions from the covered fund 
definition helped to reduce compliance costs or provided greater 
certainty as to the scope of the covered fund definition?
    Question 137. If the Agencies modify the covered fund base 
definition in whole or in part, would banking entities expect to incur 
significant costs or burdens in order to become compliant? That is, 
after having established compliance, trading, risk management, and 
other systems predicated on the 2013 final rule's covered fund 
definition, what are the kinds of costs and any other burdens and their 
magnitude that banking entities would experience if the Agencies were 
to modify the covered fund base definition?
    Question 138. The Agencies understand that banking entities have 
already expended resources in reviewing a wide range of issuers to 
determine if they are covered funds, as defined in the 2013 final rule. 
What kinds of costs and burdens would banking entities and others 
expect to incur if the Agencies were to modify the covered fund base 
definition to the extent any modifications were to require banking 
entities to reevaluate issuers to determine if they meet any revised 
covered fund definition? To what extent would modifying the covered 
fund base definition require banking entities to reevaluate issuers 
that a banking entity previously had determined are not covered funds? 
Would any costs and burdens be justified to the extent the Agencies 
more effectively tailor the covered fund definition to focus on the 
concerns underlying section 13? Could any costs and burdens be 
mitigated if the Agencies further tailored or added exclusions from the 
covered fund definition or developed new exclusions, as opposed to 
changing the covered fund base definition?
    Question 139. To what extent do the proposed modifications to other 
provisions of the 2013 final rule affect the impact of the scope of the 
covered fund definition? For example, as described below, the Agencies 
are proposing to eliminate some of the additional, covered-fund 
specific limitations that apply under the 2013 final rule to a banking 
entity's underwriting, market making, and risk-mitigating hedging 
activities. As another example, the Agencies are requesting comment 
below about whether to incorporate into Sec.  __.14's limitations on 
covered transactions the exemptions provided in section 23A of the 
Federal Reserve Act (``FR Act'') and the Board's Regulation W. To the 
extent commenters have concerns regarding the breadth of the covered 
fund definition, would these concerns be addressed or mitigated by the 
changes the Agencies are proposing to the other covered fund provisions 
or on which the Agencies are seeking comment?
ii. Particular Exclusions From the Covered Fund Definition
    As discussed above, the 2013 final rule contains exclusions from 
the base definition of ``covered fund'' that tailor the covered fund 
definition. The Agencies designed these exclusions to avoid any 
unintended results that might follow from a definition of ``covered 
fund'' that was inappropriately imprecise. In this section, the 
Agencies request comment on whether to modify certain existing 
exclusions from the covered fund definition. The Agencies also request 
comment on whether to provide new exclusions in order to more 
effectively tailor the definition. Finally, with respect to all of the 
potential modifications the Agencies discuss in this section, the 
Agencies seek comment as to the potential effect of the other changes 
the Agencies are proposing today to the covered fund provisions and on 
additional changes on which the Agencies seek comment. That is, would 
these proposed changes address in whole or in part any concerns about 
the breadth of the covered fund definition?
iii. Foreign Public Funds
    The 2013 final rule generally excludes from the definition of 
``covered fund'' any issuer that is organized or established outside of 
the United States and the ownership interests of which are (i) 
authorized to be offered and sold to retail investors in the issuer's 
home jurisdiction and (ii) sold predominantly

[[Page 33473]]

through one or more public offerings outside of the United States.\153\ 
The Agencies stated in the preamble to the 2013 final rule that they 
generally expect that an offering is made predominantly outside of the 
United States if 85 percent or more of the fund's interests are sold to 
investors that are not residents of the United States.\154\
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    \153\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(1); See also 79 FR at 
5678 (``For purposes of this exclusion, the Agencies note that the 
reference to retail investors, while not defined, should be 
construed to refer to members of the general public who do not 
possess the level of sophistication and investment experience 
typically found among institutional investors, professional 
investors or high net worth investors who may be permitted to invest 
in complex investments or private placements in various 
jurisdictions. Retail investors would therefore be expected to be 
entitled to the full protection of securities laws in the home 
jurisdiction of the fund, and the Agencies would expect a fund 
authorized to sell ownership interests to such retail investors to 
be of a type that is more similar to a [RIC] rather than to a U.S. 
covered fund.''); 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(1)(iii) (defining 
the term ``public offering'' for purposes of this exclusion to mean 
a ``distribution,'' as defined in Sec.  __.4(a)(3) of subpart B, of 
securities in any jurisdiction outside the United States to 
investors, including retail investors, provided that, the 
distribution complies with all applicable requirements in the 
jurisdiction in which such distribution is being made; the 
distribution does not restrict availability to investors having a 
minimum level of net worth or net investment assets; and the issuer 
has filed or submitted, with the appropriate regulatory authority in 
such jurisdiction, offering disclosure documents that are publicly 
available).
    \154\ 79 FR at 5678.
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    The 2013 final rule places an additional condition on a U.S. 
banking entity's ability to rely on the FPF exclusion with respect to 
any FPF it sponsors.\155\ The FPF exclusion is only available to a U.S. 
banking entity with respect to a foreign fund sponsored by the U.S. 
banking entity if, in addition to the requirements discussed above, the 
fund's ownership interests are sold predominantly to persons other than 
the sponsoring banking entity, affiliates of the issuer and the 
sponsoring banking entity, and employees and directors of such 
entities.\156\ The Agencies stated in the preamble to the 2013 final 
rule that, consistent with the Agencies' view concerning whether an FPF 
has been sold predominantly outside of the United States, the Agencies 
generally expect that an FPF will satisfy this additional condition if 
85 percent or more of the fund's interests are sold to persons other 
than the sponsoring U.S. banking entity and the specified persons 
connected to that banking entity.\157\
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    \155\ Although the discussion of this condition generally refers 
to U.S. banking entities for ease of reading, the condition also 
applies to foreign affiliates of a U.S. banking entity. See 2013 
final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(1)(ii) (applying this limitation ``[w]ith 
respect to a banking entity that is, or is controlled directly or 
indirectly by a banking entity that is, located in or organized 
under the laws of the United States or of any State and any issuer 
for which such banking entity acts as sponsor'').
    \156\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(1)(ii).
    \157\ 79 FR at 5678.
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    In adopting the FPF exclusion, the Agencies' view was that it is 
appropriate to exclude these funds from the ``covered fund'' definition 
because they are sufficiently similar to U.S. RICs.\158\ The Agencies 
also expressed the view that the additional condition applicable to 
U.S. banking entities is designed to treat FPFs consistently with 
similar U.S. funds and to limit the extraterritorial application of 
section 13 of the BHC Act, including by permitting U.S. banking 
entities and their foreign affiliates to carry on traditional asset 
management businesses outside of the United States, while also seeking 
to limit the possibility for evasion through foreign public funds.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ Id. (``The requirements that a foreign public fund both be 
authorized for sale to retail investors and sold predominantly in 
public offerings outside of the United States are based in part on 
the Agencies' view that foreign funds that meet these requirements 
generally will be sufficiently similar to [RICs] such that it is 
appropriate to exclude these foreign funds from the covered fund 
definition.'')
    \159\ Id. (``This additional condition reflects the Agencies' 
view that the foreign public fund exclusion is designed to treat 
foreign public funds consistently with similar U.S. funds and to 
limit the extraterritorial application of section 13 of the BHC Act, 
including by permitting U.S. banking entities and their foreign 
affiliates to carry on traditional asset management businesses 
outside of the United States. The exclusion is not intended to 
permit a U.S. banking entity to establish a foreign fund for the 
purpose of investing in the fund as a means of avoiding the 
restrictions imposed by section 13.'').
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    The Agencies request comment on all aspects of the FPF exclusion, 
including whether the exclusion is effective in identifying foreign 
funds that may be sufficiently similar to RICs and permitting U.S. 
banking entities and their foreign affiliates to carry on traditional 
asset management businesses outside of the United States, as the 
Agencies contemplated in adopting this exclusion. As reflected in the 
detailed questions that follow, the Agencies seek comment on a range of 
possible ways to modify this exclusion, including: (i) Whether the 
Agencies could simplify or omit certain of the exclusion's conditions--
including those not applicable to excluded RICs--while still 
identifying funds that should be excluded and addressing the 
possibility for evasion through the Agencies' broad anti-evasion 
authority; (ii) whether the exclusion's conditions requiring a fund to 
be authorized for sale to retail investors in the issuer's home 
jurisdiction and sold predominantly in public offerings outside of the 
United States should be retained and, if so, whether the Agencies 
should modify or clarify these conditions; and (iii) whether the 
additional conditions for U.S. banking entities with respect to the 
FPFs they sponsor are appropriate. Specifically, in considering whether 
to further tailor the FPF exclusion, the Agencies seek comment below on 
the following:
    Question 140. Are foreign funds that satisfy the current conditions 
in the FPF exclusion sufficiently similar to RICs such that it is 
appropriate to exclude these foreign funds from the covered fund 
definition? Why or why not? Are there foreign funds that cannot satisfy 
the exclusion's conditions but that are nonetheless sufficiently 
similar to RICs such that it is appropriate to exclude these foreign 
funds from the covered fund definition? If so, how should the Agencies 
modify the exclusion's conditions to permit these funds to rely on it? 
Conversely, are there foreign funds that satisfy the exclusion's 
conditions but are not sufficiently similar to RICs such that it is not 
appropriate to exclude these funds from the covered fund definition? If 
so, how should the Agencies modify the exclusion's conditions to 
prohibit these funds from relying on it? Conversely, are changes to the 
FPF exclusion necessary given the other changes the Agencies are 
proposing today and on which the Agencies seek comment?
    Question 141. RICs are excluded from the covered fund definition 
regardless of whether their ownership interests are sold in public 
offerings or whether their ownership interests are sold predominantly 
to persons other than the sponsoring banking entity, affiliates of the 
issuer and the sponsoring banking entity, and employees and directors 
of such entities. Is such an exclusion appropriate? Why or why not?
    Question 142: As discussed above, the Agencies designed the FPF 
exclusion to identify foreign funds that are sufficiently similar to 
RICs such that it is appropriate to exclude these foreign funds from 
the covered fund definition, but included additional conditions not 
applicable to RICs in part to limit the possibility for evasion of the 
2013 final rule. Do FPFs present a heightened risk of evasion that 
justifies these additional conditions, as they currently exist or with 
any of the modifications on which the Agencies request comment below? 
Why or why not?
    Question 143: As an alternative, should the Agencies address 
concerns about evasion through other means, such as the anti-evasion 
provisions in Sec.  __.21 of the 2013 final rule? \160\ The

[[Page 33474]]

2013 final rule includes recordkeeping requirements designed to 
facilitate the Agencies' ability to monitor banking entities' 
investments in FPFs to ensure that banking entities do not use the 
exclusion for FPFs in a manner that functions as an evasion of section 
13. Specifically, under the 2013 final rule, a U.S. banking entity with 
more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets is required to 
document its investments in foreign public funds, broken out by each 
FPF and each foreign jurisdiction in which any FPF is organized, if the 
U.S. banking entity and its affiliates' ownership interests in FPFs 
exceed $50 million at the end of two or more consecutive calendar 
quarters.\161\ The Agencies are proposing to retain these and other 
covered fund recordkeeping requirements with respect to banking 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ Section __.21 of the 2013 final rule provides in part that 
whenever an Agency finds reasonable cause to believe any banking 
entity has engaged in an activity or made an investment in violation 
of section 13 of the BHC Act or the 2013 final rule, or engaged in 
any activity or made any investment that functions as an evasion of 
the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act or the 2013 final 
rule, the Agency may take any action permitted by law to enforce 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule, 
including directing the banking entity to restrict, limit, or 
terminate any or all activities under the 2013 final rule and 
dispose of any investment.
    \161\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alternatively, would retaining specific provisions designed to 
address anti-evasion concerns, whether as they currently exist or 
modified, provide greater clarity as to the scope of foreign funds 
excluded from the definition and avoid uncertainty that could result 
from a less prescriptive exclusion?
    Question 144. One condition of the FPF exclusion is that the fund 
must be ``authorized to offer and sell ownership interests to retail 
investors in the issuer's home jurisdiction.'' The Agencies understand 
that banking entities generally interpret the 2013 final rule's 
reference to the issuer's ``home jurisdiction'' to mean the 
jurisdiction in which the issuer is organized. Is this condition 
helpful in identifying FPFs that should be excluded from the covered 
fund definition? Why or why not? The Agencies provided guidance 
regarding the 2013 final rule's current reference to ``retail 
investors.'' \162\ Has this provided sufficient clarity? Additionally, 
as discussed below, the 2013 final rule contains an additional 
condition requiring that to meet the exclusion, a fund must sell 
ownership interests predominantly through one or more public offerings 
outside the United States. As an alternative to requiring that the fund 
be authorized to sell interests to retail investors, should the 
Agencies instead require that the fund be authorized to sell interests 
in a ``public offering''?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ See supra note 153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 145. The Agencies understand that some funds may be formed 
under the laws of one non-U.S. jurisdiction, but offered to retail 
investors in another. For example, Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (``UCITS'') funds and investment 
companies with variable capital, or SICAVs, may be domiciled in one 
jurisdiction in the European Union, such as Ireland or Luxembourg, but 
may be offered and sold in one or more other E.U. member states. In 
this case a foreign fund could be authorized for sale to retail 
investors, as contemplated by the FPF exclusion, but fail to satisfy 
this condition. Should the Agencies modify this condition to address 
this situation? If so, how?
    Question 146. Should the Agencies, for example, modify the 
condition to omit any reference to the fund's ``home jurisdiction'' and 
instead provide, for example, that the fund must be authorized to offer 
and sell ownership interests to retail investors in ``the primary 
jurisdiction'' in which the issuer's ownership interests are offered 
and sold? Would that or a similar approach effectively identify funds 
that are sufficiently similar to RICs, including funds that are formed 
under the laws of one jurisdiction and offered and sold in another? For 
purposes of determining the primary jurisdiction, would the Agencies 
need to define the term ``primary'' or a similar term to provide 
sufficient clarity? If so, how should the Agencies define this or a 
similar term? Are there funds for which it could be difficult to 
identify a ``primary'' jurisdiction? Does the condition need to refer 
to a ``primary jurisdiction,'' or would it be sufficient to require 
that the fund be authorized to offer and sell ownership interests to 
retail investors in ``any jurisdiction'' in which the issuer's 
ownership interests are offered and sold? Should the exclusion focus on 
whether the fund is authorized to make a public offering in the 
primary, or any, jurisdiction in which it is offered and sold as a 
proxy for whether it is authorized for sale to retail investors?
    If the Agencies were to make a modification like the one described 
immediately above, should the exclusion retain the reference to the 
issuer's ``home'' jurisdiction? For example, should the Agencies modify 
this condition to require that the fund be ``authorized to offer and 
sell ownership interests to retail investors in the primary 
jurisdiction in which the issuer's ownership interests are offered and 
sold,'' without any reference to the home jurisdiction? Would this 
modification be effective, or does the exclusion need to retain a 
reference to an issuer the ownership interests of which are authorized 
for sale to retail investors in the home jurisdiction, as well as the 
primary jurisdiction in which the issuer's ownership interests are 
offered and sold? Why? If the rule retained a reference to 
authorization in the fund's home jurisdiction, would this raise 
concerns if a fund were authorized to be sold to retail investors in 
the fund's home jurisdiction, but was not sold in that jurisdiction and 
instead was sold to institutions or other non-retail investors in a 
different jurisdiction in which the fund was not authorized to sell 
interests to retail investors or to make a public offering? Are there 
other formulations the Agencies should make to identify foreign funds 
that are authorized to offer and sell their ownership interests to 
retail investors? Which formulations and why?
    Question 147. Under the 2013 final rule, a foreign public fund's 
ownership interests must be sold predominantly through one or more 
``public offerings'' outside of the United States, in addition to the 
condition discussed above that the fund must be authorized for sale to 
retail investors. One result of this ``public offerings'' condition is 
that a fund that is authorized for sale to retail investors--including 
a fund authorized to make a public offering--cannot rely on the 
exclusion if the fund does not in fact offer and sell ownership 
interests in public offerings. Some foreign funds, like some RICs, may 
be authorized for sale to retail investors but may choose to offer 
ownership interests to high-net worth individuals or institutions in 
non-public offerings. Do commenters believe it is appropriate that 
these foreign funds cannot rely on the FPF exclusion? Should the 
Agencies further tailor the FPF exclusion to focus on whether the 
fund's ownership interests are authorized for sale to retail investors 
or the fund is authorized to conduct a public offering, as discussed 
above, rather than whether the fund interests were actually sold in a 
public offering? Would the investor protection and other regulatory 
requirements that would tend to make foreign funds similar to a U.S. 
registered fund generally be a consequence of a fund's authorization 
for sale to retail investors or authorization to make a public 
offering?
    If a fund is authorized to conduct a public offering in a non-U.S. 
jurisdiction, would the fund be subject to all of the regulatory 
requirements that apply in that jurisdiction for funds

[[Page 33475]]

intended for broad distribution, including to retail investors, even if 
the fund is not in fact sold in a public offering to retail investors?
    Question 148. The 2013 final rule defines the term ``public 
offering'' for purposes of this exclusion to mean a ``distribution'' 
(as defined in Sec.  __.4(a)(3) of the 2013 final rule) of securities 
in any jurisdiction outside the United States to investors, including 
retail investors, provided that (i) the distribution complies with all 
applicable requirements in the jurisdiction in which such distribution 
is being made; (ii) the distribution does not restrict availability to 
investors having a minimum level of net worth or net investment assets; 
and (iii) the issuer has filed or submitted, with the appropriate 
regulatory authority in such jurisdiction, offering disclosure 
documents that are publicly available.\163\ If the Agencies were to 
modify the FPF exclusion to focus on whether the fund's ownership 
interests are authorized for sale to retail investors or the fund is 
authorized to conduct a public offering--rather than whether the fund's 
interests were actually sold in a public offering--should the Agencies 
retain some or all of the conditions included in the 2013 final rule's 
definition of the term ``public offering''? For example, should the 
Agencies retain the requirement that a public offering is one that does 
not restrict availability to investors having a minimum level of net 
worth or net investment assets; and/or the requirement that an FPF file 
or submit, with the appropriate regulatory authority in such 
jurisdiction, offering disclosure documents that are publicly 
available? Would either of these two conditions, either alone or 
together, help to identify foreign funds that are sufficiently similar 
to RICs? Why or why not? Is the reference to a ``distribution'' (as 
defined in Sec.  __.4(a)(3) of the 2013 final rule) effective? Should 
the Agencies modify the reference to a ``distribution'' to address 
instances in which a fund's ownership interests generally are sold to 
retail investors in secondary market transactions, as with exchange-
traded funds, for example? Should the definition of ``public offering'' 
also take into account whether a fund's interests are listed on an 
exchange?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(1)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 149. The public offering definition provides in part that 
the distribution does not restrict availability to investors having a 
minimum level of net worth or net investment assets. Are there 
jurisdictions that permit offerings that would otherwise meet the 
definition of a public offering but that restrict availability to 
investors having a minimum level of net worth or net investment assets 
or that otherwise restrict the types of investors who can participate?
    Conversely, should the Agencies retain the requirement that an FPF 
actually conduct a public offering outside of the United States? Would 
a foreign fund that actually sells ownership interests in public 
offerings outside of the United States tend to provide greater 
information to the public or be subject to additional regulatory 
requirements than a fund that is authorized to conduct a public 
offering but offers and sells its ownership interests in non-public 
offerings?
    Question 150. If the Agencies retain the requirement that an FPF 
actually conduct a public offering outside of the United States, should 
the Agencies retain the requirement that the fund's ownership interests 
must be sold ``predominantly'' through one or more such offerings? Why 
or why not? As mentioned above, the Agencies stated in the preamble to 
the 2013 final rule that they generally expect a fund's offering would 
satisfy this requirement if 85 percent or more of the fund's interests 
are sold to investors that are not residents of the United States. Has 
this guidance been helpful in identifying FPFs that should be excluded, 
if the Agencies retain the requirement that an FPF actually conduct a 
public offering outside of the United States?
    Question 151. The Agencies understand that some banking entities 
have faced compliance challenges in determining whether 85 percent or 
more of the fund's interests are sold to investors that are not 
residents of the United States. Where foreign funds are listed on a 
foreign exchange, for example, it may not be feasible to obtain 
sufficient information about a fund's owners to make these 
determinations. The Agencies understand that banking entities also have 
experienced difficulties in obtaining sufficient information about a 
fund's owners in some cases where the foreign fund is sold through 
intermediaries. What sorts of compliance and other costs have banking 
entities incurred in developing and maintaining compliance systems to 
track foreign public funds' compliance with this condition? To the 
extent that commenters have experienced these or other compliance 
challenges, how have commenters addressed them? Have funds failed to 
qualify for the FPF exclusion because of this condition? Which kinds of 
funds and why? Do commenters believe that these funds should 
nonetheless be treated as FPFs? Why? If the Agencies retain this 
condition, should they reduce the required percentage of a fund's 
ownership interests that must be sold to investors that are not 
residents of the United States? Which percentage would be appropriate? 
Should the percentage be more than 50 percent, for example? Would a 
lower percentage mitigate the compliance challenges discussed above? If 
the Agencies do not retain the condition that an FPF must be sold 
predominantly through one or more public offerings outside of the 
United States, should the Agencies impose any limitations on the extent 
to which the fund can be offered in private offerings in the United 
States?
    Question 152. The 2013 final rule places an additional condition on 
a U.S. banking entity's ability to rely on the FPF exclusion with 
respect to any FPF it sponsors: The fund's ownership interests must be 
sold predominantly to persons other than the sponsoring banking entity 
and certain persons connected to that banking entity. Has this 
additional condition been effective in identifying FPFs that should be 
excluded from the covered fund definition? Has it been effective in 
permitting U.S. banking entities to continue their asset management 
businesses outside of the United States while also limiting the 
opportunity for evasion of section 13? Conversely, has this additional 
condition resulted in the compliance challenges discussed above in 
connection with the Agencies' view that a fund generally is sold 
``predominantly'' in public offerings outside of the United States if 
85 percent or more of the fund's interests are sold to investors that 
are not residents of the United States? The Agencies understand that 
determining whether the employees and directors of a banking entity and 
its affiliates have invested in a foreign fund has been particularly 
challenging for banking entities because the 2013 final rule defines 
the term ``employee'' to include a member of the immediate family of 
the employee.\164\ Is there a more direct way to define the term 
``employee'' to mitigate the compliance challenges but still be 
effective in limiting the opportunity for evasion of section 13? If so, 
how? Should a revised definition specify who is included in an 
employee's immediate family for this purpose? Should a revised 
definition exclude immediate family members? If so, why?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.2(j).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 153. What other aspects of the conditions for FPFs have 
resulted in

[[Page 33476]]

compliance challenges? Has the condition that FPFs be sold 
predominantly through public offerings outside of the United States 
resulted in U.S. banking entities, including their foreign affiliates 
and subsidiaries, determining not to sponsor new FPFs because of 
concerns about compliance challenges and costs? If the Agencies retain 
this additional condition, should they reduce the required percentage 
of a fund's ownership interests sold to persons other than the 
sponsoring U.S. banking entity and certain persons connected to that 
banking entity? Which percentage would be appropriate? Would a lower 
percentage mitigate the compliance challenges discussed above? Are 
there other conditions that might better serve the same purpose but 
reduce the challenges presented by this condition? One effect of this 
condition is that a U.S. banking entity can own up to 15 percent of an 
FPF that it sponsors, but can own up to 25 percent of a RIC after the 
seeding period.\165\ Is this disparate treatment appropriate? Another 
effect of this condition is that a U.S. banking entity can own up to 15 
percent of an FPF that it sponsors, but a foreign banking entity can 
own up to 25 percent of an FPF that it sponsors. Is this disparate 
treatment appropriate?
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    \165\ The limitation on a banking entity's investment in a U.S. 
registered fund under the 2013 final rule results from the 
definition of ``banking entity.'' If a banking entity owns, 
controls, or has power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of another company, including a U.S. registered 
fund after a seeding period, that other company will itself be a 
banking entity under the 2013 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 154. Following the adoption of the 2013 final rule, staffs 
of the Agencies provided responses to certain FAQs, including whether 
an entity that is formed and operated pursuant to a written plan to 
become an FPF would receive the same treatment as an entity formed and 
operated pursuant to a written plan to become a RIC or BDC.\166\
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    \166\ All the Agencies have published all FAQs on each of their 
public websites. See Frequently Asked Question number 5, available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm#5; Covered Fund Definition, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-volcker-rule-section13.htm; 
Foreign Public Fund Seeding Vehicles, available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/volcker/faq/foreign.html; Foreign 
Public Fund Seeding Vehicles, available at https://occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading-volcker-rule/volcker-rule-implementation-faqs.html#foreign; Foreign Public Fund Seeding 
Vehicles, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@externalaffairs/documents/file/volckerrule_faq060914.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The staffs observed that the 2013 final rule explicitly excludes 
from the covered fund definition an issuer that is formed and operated 
pursuant to a written plan to become a RIC or BDC in accordance with 
the banking entity's compliance program as described in Sec.  
__.20(e)(3) of the 2013 final rule and that complies with the 
requirements of section 18 of the Investment Company Act. The staffs 
observed that the 2013 final rule does not include a parallel provision 
for an issuer that will become a foreign public fund. The staffs stated 
that they do not intend to advise the Agencies to treat as a covered 
fund under the 2013 final rule an issuer that is formed and operated 
pursuant to a written plan to become a qualifying foreign public fund. 
The staffs observed that any written plan would be expected to document 
the banking entity's determination that the seeding vehicle will become 
a foreign public fund, the period of time during which the seeding 
vehicle will operate as a seeding vehicle, the banking entity's plan to 
market the seeding vehicle to third-party investors and convert it into 
an FPF within the time period specified in Sec.  __.12(a)(2)(i)(B) of 
the 2013 final rule, and the banking entity's plan to operate the 
seeding vehicle in a manner consistent with the investment strategy, 
including leverage, of the seeding vehicle upon becoming a foreign 
public fund. Has the staffs' position facilitated consistent treatment 
for seeding vehicles that operate pursuant to a plan to become an FPF 
as that provided for seeding vehicles that operate pursuant to plans to 
become RICs or BDCs? Why or why not? Should the Agencies amend the 2013 
final rule to implement this or a different approach for seeding 
vehicles that will become foreign public funds? What other approaches 
should the Agencies take and why? Should the Agencies amend the 2013 
final rule to require seeding vehicles that operate pursuant to a 
written plan to become an FPF to include in such written plan the same 
or different types of documentation as the documentation required of 
seeding vehicles that operate pursuant to plans to become RICs or BDCs? 
If different types of documentation should be required of seeding 
vehicles that will become foreign public funds, why would those 
different types of documentation be appropriate? Would requiring those 
different types of documentation impose costs or burdens on the issuers 
that are greater or less than the costs and burdens imposed on issuers 
that will become RICs or BDCs?
iv. Family Wealth Management Vehicles
    Some families manage their wealth by establishing and acquiring 
ownership interests in ``family wealth management vehicles.'' Family 
wealth management vehicles take a variety of legal forms, including 
limited liability companies, limited partnerships, other pooled 
investment vehicles, and trusts. The structures in which these vehicles 
operate vary in complexity, ranging from simple standalone arrangements 
covering a single beneficiary to complex multi-tier structures intended 
to benefit multiple generations of family members. In some cases, these 
vehicles have been in existence for more than 100 years while in other 
cases, they are nascent entities with little to no operating history. 
The Agencies are aware of no set of consistent standards that govern 
the characteristics of family wealth management vehicles or the manner 
in which they operate.
    Because family wealth management vehicles might hold assets that 
meet the definition of ``investment securities'' \167\ in the 
Investment Company Act, they may be investment companies that either 
need to register as such or otherwise rely on an exclusion from the 
definition of investment company. Many family wealth management 
vehicles rely on the exclusions provided by sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) 
of the Investment Company Act. Family wealth management vehicles that 
would be investment companies but for sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) will 
therefore be covered funds unless they satisfy the conditions for one 
of the 2013 final rule's exclusions from the covered fund definition. 
Concerns regarding family wealth management vehicles were raised to the 
Agencies following the adoption of the 2013 final rule, which does not 
provide an exclusion from the covered fund definition specifically 
designed to address these vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ Section 3(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act defines 
``investment securities'' to include all securities except 
Government securities, securities issued by employees' securities 
companies, and majority-owned subsidiaries of the owner which are 
not investment companies, and are not relying on the exception from 
the definition of investment company in section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7). 
Section 3(a)(1)(C) defines an investment company, in part, as any 
issuer that is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of 
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, 
and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value 
exceeding 40 per centum of the value of each such issuer's total 
assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an 
unconsolidated basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Family wealth management vehicles also often maintain accounts and 
advisory arrangements with banking entities. These banking entities may 
provide a range of services to family wealth management vehicles, 
including investment advice, brokerage execution, financing, and 
clearance and settlement services. Family wealth management vehicles 
structured as trusts for the benefit of family members also often

[[Page 33477]]

appoint banking entities, acting in a fiduciary capacity, as trustees 
for the trusts.
    Section __.14 of the 2013 final rule provides, in part, that no 
banking entity that serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment 
manager, investment adviser, commodity trading advisor, or sponsor to a 
covered fund, or that organizes and offers the fund under Sec.  __.11 
of the 2013 final rule, may enter into a transaction with the covered 
fund that would be a ``covered transaction,'' as defined in section 23A 
of the FR Act.\168\ To the extent that a family wealth management 
vehicle is a covered fund, then Sec.  __.14 would apply. Specifically, 
if a banking entity provides services, such as advisory services, that 
trigger application of Sec.  __.14, the banking entity would be 
prohibited from providing the family wealth management vehicle a range 
of customer-facing banking services that involve ``covered 
transactions.'' Examples of these prohibited covered transactions 
include intraday or short-term extensions of credit in connection with 
the clearance and settlement of securities transactions executed by the 
banking entity for the family wealth management vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.14(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies are not proposing changes in the status of family 
wealth management vehicles in the proposal, but are seeking comment on 
their reliance on exclusions in the Investment Company Act, whether or 
not they should be excluded from the definition of covered fund, the 
role of banking entities with respect to family wealth management 
vehicles, and the potential implications of changes in their status 
under the 2013 final rule. In considering whether to address the status 
of family wealth management vehicles, the Agencies seek comment on the 
following:
    Question 155. Do family wealth management vehicles typically rely 
on the exclusions in sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) under the Investment 
Company Act? Are there other exclusions from the definition of 
``investment company'' in the Investment Company Act upon which family 
wealth management vehicles can rely? What have been the additional 
challenges for family wealth management vehicles and the banking 
entities that service them when considering whether these vehicles rely 
on the exclusions in sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7)?
    Question 156. Should the Agencies exclude family wealth management 
vehicles from the definition of ``covered fund''? If so, how should the 
Agencies define ``family wealth management vehicle,'' and is this the 
appropriate terminology? What factors should the Agencies consider to 
distinguish a family wealth management vehicle from a hedge fund or 
private equity fund, as contemplated by the statute, given that these 
vehicles may utilize identical structures and pursue comparable 
investment strategies? Would any of the definitions in rule 
202(a)(11)(G)-1 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 effectively 
define family wealth management vehicle? Should the Agencies, for 
example, define a family wealth management vehicle to mean an issuer 
that would be a ``family client,'' as defined in rule 202(a)(11)(G)-
1(d)(4)? What modifications to that definition would be appropriate for 
purposes of any exclusion from the covered fund definition? For 
example, that definition defines a ``family client,'' in part, to 
include any company wholly owned (directly or indirectly) exclusively 
by, and operated for the sole benefit of, one or more other family 
clients, which include any family member or former family member. That 
rule defines a ``family member'' to mean ``all lineal descendants 
(including by adoption, stepchildren, foster children, and individuals 
that were a minor when another family member became a legal guardian of 
that individual) of a common ancestor (who may be living or deceased), 
and such lineal descendants' spouses or spousal equivalents; provided 
that the common ancestor is no more than 10 generations removed from 
the youngest generation of family members.'' Would this approach to 
defining a ``family member'' be appropriate in the context of an 
exclusion from the covered fund definition? Why or why not and, if not, 
what other approaches should the Agencies take? Are there any family 
wealth management vehicles organized or managed outside of the United 
States that raise similar concerns? If so, should the Agencies define 
these family wealth management vehicles differently?
    Question 157. Would an exclusion for family wealth management 
vehicles create any opportunities for evasion, for example, by allowing 
a banking entity to structure investment vehicles in a manner to evade 
the restrictions of section 13 on covered fund activities? Why or why 
not? If so, how could such concerns be addressed? Please explain.
    Question 158. What services do banking entities provide to family 
wealth management vehicles? Below, the Agencies seek comment on whether 
section 14 of the implementing regulation should incorporate the 
exemptions within section 23A of the FR Act and the Board's Regulation 
W. Would this approach permit banking entities to provide these 
services to family wealth management vehicles? Are there other ways in 
which the Agencies should address the issue of banking entities being 
prohibited from providing services to family wealth vehicles that would 
be covered transactions?
    Question 159. Are there any similar vehicles outside of the family 
wealth management context that pose similar issues?
v. Fund Characteristics
    As the Agencies stated in the preamble to the 2013 final rule, an 
alternative to the 2013 final rule's approach of defining a covered 
fund would be to reference fund characteristics. In the preamble to the 
2013 final rule, the Agencies stated that a characteristics-based 
definition could be less effective than the approach taken in the 2013 
final rule as a means to prohibit banking entities, either directly or 
indirectly, from engaging in the covered fund activities limited or 
proscribed by section 13.\169\ The Agencies also stated that a 
characteristics-based approach could require more analysis by banking 
entities to apply those characteristics to every potential covered fund 
on a case-by-case basis and could create greater opportunity for 
evasion. Finally, the Agencies stated that although a characteristics-
based approach could mitigate the costs associated with an investment 
company analysis, depending on the characteristics, such an approach 
could result in additional compliance costs in some cases to the extent 
banking entities would be required to implement policies and procedures 
to prevent issuers from having characteristics that would bring them 
within the covered fund definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See 79 FR at 5671.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the Agencies consider whether to further tailor the covered fund 
definition, the Agencies invite commenters' views and request comment 
on whether it may be appropriate to exclude from the definition of 
``covered fund'' entities that lack certain characteristics commonly 
associated with being a hedge fund or a private equity fund:
    Question 160. Should the Agencies exclude from the definition of 
``covered fund'' entities that lack certain enumerated traits or 
factors of a hedge fund or private equity fund? If so, what traits or 
factors should be incorporated and why? For instance, the SEC's Form

[[Page 33478]]

PF defines the terms ``hedge fund'' and ``private equity fund,'' as 
described below.\170\ Would it be appropriate to exclude from the 
definition of ``covered fund'' an entity that does not meet either of 
the Form PF definitions of ``hedge fund'' and ``private equity fund''? 
If the Agencies were to take this approach, should we, for example, 
modify the 2013 final rule to provide that an issuer is excluded from 
the covered fund definition if that issuer is neither a ``hedge fund'' 
nor a ``private equity fund,'' as defined in Form PF, or should the 
Agencies incorporate some or all of the substance of the definitions in 
Form PF into the 2013 final rule?
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    \170\ See Form PF, Glossary of Terms. Form PF uses a 
characteristics-based approach to define different types of private 
funds. A ``private fund'' for purposes of Form PF is any issuer that 
would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the 
Investment Company Act, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that 
Act. Form PF defines the following types of private funds: Hedge 
funds, private equity funds, liquidity funds, real estate funds, 
securitized asset funds, venture capital funds, and other private 
funds. See infra at note 167.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 161. If the Agencies were to incorporate the substance of 
the definitions of hedge fund and private equity fund in Form PF, 
should the Agencies make any modifications to these definitions for 
purposes of the 2013 final rule? Also, Form PF is designed for 
reporting by funds advised by SEC-registered advisers. Would any 
modifications be needed to have the characteristics-based exclusion 
apply to funds not advised by SEC-registered advisers, in particular 
foreign funds with non-U.S. advisers not registered with the SEC?
    Question 162. Form PF defines ``hedge fund'' to mean any private 
fund (other than a securitized asset fund): (a) With respect to which 
one or more investment advisers (or related persons of investment 
advisers) may be paid a performance fee or allocation calculated by 
taking into account unrealized gains (other than a fee or allocation 
the calculation of which may take into account unrealized gains solely 
for the purpose of reducing such fee or allocation to reflect net 
unrealized losses); (b) that may borrow an amount in excess of one-half 
of its net asset value (including any committed capital) or may have 
gross notional exposure in excess of twice its net asset value 
(including any committed capital); or (c) that may sell securities or 
other assets short or enter into similar transactions (other than for 
the purpose of hedging currency exposure or managing duration). If the 
Agencies were to incorporate these provisions as part of a 
characteristics-based exclusion, should any of these provisions be 
modified? If so, how? Additionally, Form PF's definition of the term 
``hedge fund'' provides that, solely for purposes of Form PF, any 
commodity pool is categorized as a hedge fund.\171\ If the Agencies 
were to define the term ``hedge fund'' based on the definition in Form 
PF, should the term include only those commodity pools that come within 
the ``hedge fund'' definition without regard to this clause in the Form 
PF definition that treats every commodity pool as a hedge fund for 
purposes of Form PF? Why or why not?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ Form PF defines ``commodity pool'' by reference to the 
definition in section 1a(10) of the Commodity Exchange Act. See 7 
U.S.C. 1a(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 163. By contrast, Form PF primarily defines ``private 
equity fund'' not by affirmative characteristics, but as any private 
fund that is not a hedge fund, liquidity fund, real estate fund, 
securitized asset fund or venture capital fund, as those terms are 
defined in Form PF,\172\ and that does not provide investors with 
redemption rights in the ordinary course. If the Agencies were to 
provide a characteristics-based exclusion, should the Agencies do so by 
incorporating the definitions of these other private funds? If so, 
should the Agencies modify such definitions, and if so, how? 
Alternatively, rather than referencing the definition of private equity 
fund in Form PF in a characteristics-based exclusion, the Agencies 
could design their own definition of a private equity fund based on 
traits and factors commonly associated with a private equity fund. For 
example, the Agencies understand that private equity funds commonly (i) 
have restricted or limited investor redemption rights; (ii) invest in 
public and non-public companies through privately negotiated 
transactions resulting in private ownership of the business; (iii) 
acquire the unregistered equity or equity-like securities of such 
companies that are illiquid as there is no public market and third 
party valuations are not readily available; (iv) require holding 
investments long-term; (v) have a limited duration of ten years or 
less; and (vi) realize returns on investments and distribute the 
proceeds to investors before the anticipated expiration of the fund's 
duration. Are there other traits or factors the Agencies should 
incorporate if the Agencies were to provide a characteristics-based 
exclusion? Should any of these traits or factors be omitted?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ Form PF defines ``liquidity fund'' to mean any private 
fund that seeks to generate income by investing in a portfolio of 
short term obligations in order to maintain a stable net asset value 
per unit or minimize principal volatility for investors; ``real 
estate fund'' to mean any private fund that is not a hedge fund, 
that does not provide investors with redemption rights in the 
ordinary course and that invests primarily in real estate and real 
estate related assets; ``securitized asset fund'' to mean any 
private fund whose primary purpose is to issue asset backed 
securities and whose investors are primarily debt-holders; and 
``venture capital fund'' to mean any private fund meeting the 
definition of venture capital fund in rule 203(l)-1 under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 164. A venture capital fund, as defined in rule 203(l)-1 
under the Advisers Act, is not a ``private equity fund'' or ``hedge 
fund,'' as those terms are defined in Form PF. In the preamble to the 
2013 final rule, the Agencies explained why they believed that the 
statutory language of section 13 did not support providing an exclusion 
for venture capital funds from the definition of ``covered fund.'' 
\173\ If the Agencies were to adopt a characteristics-based exclusion 
based on the definition of private equity fund in Form PF, should the 
Agencies specify that venture capital funds are private equity funds 
for purposes of this rule so that venture capital funds would not be 
excluded from the covered fund definition? Do commenters believe that 
this approach would be consistent with the statutory language of 
section 13?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ See 79 FR at 5704 (``The final rule does not provide an 
exclusion for venture capital funds. The Agencies believe that the 
statutory language of section 13 does not support providing an 
exclusion for venture capital funds from the definition of covered 
fund. Congress explicitly recognized and treated venture capital 
funds as a subset of private equity funds in various parts of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and accorded distinct treatment for venture capital 
fund advisers by exempting them from registration requirements under 
the Investment Advisers Act. This indicates that Congress knew how 
to distinguish venture capital funds from other types of private 
equity funds when it desired to do so. No such distinction appears 
in section 13 of the BHC Act. Because Congress chose to distinguish 
between private equity and venture capital in one part of the Dodd-
Frank Act, but chose not to do so for purposes of section 13, the 
Agencies believe it is appropriate to follow this Congressional 
determination.'') (footnotes omitted). Section 13 also provides an 
extended transition period for ``illiquid funds,'' which section 13 
defines, in part, as a hedge fund or private equity fund that, as of 
May 1, 2010, was principally invested in, or was invested and 
contractually committed to principally invest in, illiquid assets, 
such as portfolio companies, real estate investments, and venture 
capital investments. Congress appears to have contemplated that 
covered funds would include funds principally invested in venture 
capital investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 165. The Agencies request that commenters advocating for a 
characteristics-based exclusion explain why particular characteristics 
are appropriate, what kinds of funds and what kinds of investment 
strategies or portfolio holdings might be excluded by the commenters' 
suggested approach, and why that would be appropriate.
    Question 166. If the Agencies were to provide a characteristics-
based exclusion, should it exclude only funds that have none of the 
enumerated

[[Page 33479]]

characteristics? Alternatively, are there any circumstances where a 
fund should be able to rely on a characteristics-based exclusion if it 
had some, but not most, of the characteristics?
    Question 167. Would a characteristics-based exclusion present 
opportunities for evasion? Should the Agencies address any concerns 
about evasion through other means, such as the anti-evasion provisions 
in Sec.  __.21 of the 2013 final rule, rather than by including a 
broader range of funds in the covered fund definition?
    Question 168. If the Agencies were to provide a characteristics-
based exclusion, would any existing exclusions from the definition of 
``covered fund'' be unnecessary? If so, which ones and why?
    Question 169. If the Agencies were to provide a characteristics-
based exclusion, to what extent and how should the Agencies consider 
section 13's limitations both on proprietary trading and on covered 
fund activities? For example, section 13 limits a banking entity's 
ability to engage in proprietary trading, which section 13 defines as 
engaging as a principal for the trading account, and defines the term 
``trading account'' generally as any account used for acquiring or 
taking positions in the securities and the instruments specified in the 
proprietary trading definition principally for the purpose of selling 
in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to 
profit from short-term price movements).\174\ This suggests that a fund 
engaged in selling financial instruments in the near term, or otherwise 
with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price 
movements, should be included in the covered fund definition in order 
to prevent a banking entity from evading the limitations in section 13 
through investments in funds. The statute also, however, contemplates 
that the covered fund definition would include funds that make longer-
term investments and specifically references private equity funds. For 
example, the statute provides for an extended conformance period for 
``illiquid funds,'' which section 13 defines, in part, as hedge funds 
or private equity funds that, as of May 1, 2010, were principally 
invested in, or were invested and contractually committed to 
principally invest in, illiquid assets, such as portfolio companies, 
real estate investments, and venture capital investments.\175\ Trading 
strategies involving these and other types of illiquid assets generally 
do not involve selling financial instruments in the near term, or 
otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term 
price movements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(4) (defining ``proprietary 
trading''); 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6) (defining ``trading account'').
    \175\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 170. Should the Agencies therefore provide an exclusion 
from the covered fund definition for a fund that (i) is not engaged in 
selling financial instruments in the near term, or otherwise with the 
intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements; 
and (ii) does not invest, or principally invest, in illiquid assets, 
such as portfolio companies, real estate investments, and venture 
capital investments? Would this or a similar approach help to exclude 
from the covered fund definition issuers that do not engage in the 
investment activities contemplated by section 13? Would such an 
approach be sufficiently clear? Would it be clear when a fund is and is 
not engaged in selling financial instruments in the near term, or 
otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term 
price movements? Would this approach result in funds being excluded 
from the definition that commenters believe should be covered funds 
under the rule? The Agencies similarly request comment as to whether a 
reference to illiquid assets, with the examples drawn from section 13, 
would be sufficiently clear and, if not, how the Agencies could provide 
greater clarity.
    Question 171. Rather than providing a characteristics-based 
exclusion, should the Agencies instead revise the base definition of 
``covered fund'' using a characteristics-based approach? \176\ That is, 
should the Agencies provide that none of the types of funds currently 
included in the base definition--investment companies but for section 
3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) and certain commodity pools and foreign funds--will 
be covered funds in the first instance unless they have characteristics 
of a hedge fund or private equity fund?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ See supra Part III.C.1.a.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi. Joint Ventures
    The Agencies, in tailoring the covered fund definition, noted that 
many joint ventures rely on section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7). Under the 2013 
final rule, a joint venture is excluded from the covered fund 
definition if the joint venture (i) is between the banking entity or 
any of its affiliates and no more than 10 unaffiliated co-venturers; 
(ii) is in the business of engaging in activities that are permissible 
for the banking entity other than investing in securities for resale or 
other disposition; and (iii) is not, and does not hold itself out as 
being, an entity or arrangement that raises money from investors 
primarily for the purpose of investing in securities for resale or 
other disposition or otherwise trading in securities.\177\ The Agencies 
observed in the preamble to the 2013 final rule that, with this 
exclusion, banking entities ``will continue to be able to share the 
risk and cost of financing their banking activities through these types 
of entities which . . . may allow banking entities to more efficiently 
manage the risk of their operations.'' \178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(3).
    \178\ 79 FR at 5681.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2015, the staffs of the Agencies provided a response to FAQs 
regarding the extent to which an excluded joint venture could invest in 
securities, consistent with the condition in the 2013 final rule that 
an excluded joint venture may not be an entity or arrangement that 
raises money from investors primarily for the purpose of investing in 
securities for resale or other disposition or otherwise trading in 
securities.\179\ The Agencies observed in the preamble to the 2013 
final rule that this condition ``prevents a banking entity from relying 
on this exclusion to evade section 13 of the BHC Act by owning or 
sponsoring what is or will become a covered fund.'' \180\ The staffs 
expressed the view in their response to a FAQ that this condition 
generally could not be met by, and the exclusion would therefore not be 
available to, an issuer that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ See supra note. 21.
    \180\ 79 FR at 5681. The Agencies also observed that, 
``[c]onsistent with this restriction and to prevent evasion of 
section 13, a banking entity may not use a joint venture to engage 
in merchant banking activities because that involves acquiring or 
retaining shares, assets, or ownership interests for the purpose of 
ultimate resale or disposition of the investment.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [cir] ``[R]aise[s] money from investors primarily for the purpose 
of investing in securities for the benefit of one or more investors and 
sharing the income, gain or losses on securities acquired by that 
entity,'' observing that ``[t]he limitations in the joint venture 
exclusion are meant to ensure that the joint venture is not an 
investment vehicle and that the joint venture exclusion is not used as 
a means to evade the limitations in the BHC Act on investing in covered 
funds'';
    [cir] ``[R]aises money from a small number of investors primarily 
for the purpose of investing in securities, whether the securities are 
intended to be traded frequently, held for a longer duration, held to 
maturity, or held until the dissolution of the entity''; or
    [cir] ``[R]aises funds from investors primarily for the purpose of 
sharing in

[[Page 33480]]

the benefits, income, gains or losses from ownership of securities--as 
opposed to conducting a business or engaging in operations or other 
non-investment activities,'' reasoning that such an issuer ``would be 
raising money from investors primarily for the purpose of `investing in 
securities,' even if the vehicle may have other purposes,'' and that 
the exclusion ``also is not met by an entity that raises money from 
investors primarily for the purpose of investing in securities for 
resale or other disposition or otherwise trading in securities merely 
because one of the purposes for establishing the vehicle may be to 
provide financing to an entity to obtain and hold securities.''
    The staffs also observed that, in addition to the conditions in the 
joint venture exclusion, as an initial matter, an entity seeking to 
rely on the exclusion must be a joint venture. The staffs observed that 
the basic elements of a joint venture are well recognized, including 
under state law, although the term is not defined in the 2013 final 
rule. The staffs also observed that although any determination of 
whether an arrangement is a joint venture will depend on the facts and 
circumstances, the staffs generally would not expect that a person that 
does not have some degree of control over the business of an entity 
would be considered to be participating in ``a joint venture between a 
banking entity or any of its affiliates and one or more unaffiliated 
persons,'' as specified in the 2013 final rule's joint venture 
exclusion.
    The Agencies request comment on all aspects of the 2013 final 
rule's exclusion for joint ventures, including the extent to which the 
Agencies should modify the joint venture exclusion:
    Question 172. Has the 2013 final rule's exclusion for joint 
ventures allowed banking entities to continue to be able to share the 
risk and cost of financing their banking activities through joint 
ventures, and therefore allowed banking entities to more efficiently 
manage the risk of their operations, as contemplated by the Agencies in 
adopting this exclusion? If not, what modifications should the Agencies 
make to the joint venture exclusion?
    Question 173. Should the Agencies make any changes to the joint 
venture exclusion to clarify the condition that a joint venture may not 
be an entity or arrangement that raises money from investors primarily 
for the purpose of investing in securities for resale or other 
disposition or otherwise trading in securities? Should the Agencies 
incorporate some or all of the views expressed by the staffs in their 
FAQ response? If so, which views and why? Should the Agencies, for 
example, modify the conditions to clarify that an excluded joint 
venture may not be, or hold itself out as being, an entity or 
arrangement that raises money from investors primarily for the purpose 
of investing in securities, whether the securities are intended to be 
traded frequently, held for a longer duration, held to maturity, or 
held until the dissolution of the entity? Conversely, do the views 
expressed by the staffs in their FAQ response, or similar conditions 
the Agencies might add to the joint venture exclusion, affect the 
utility of the joint venture exclusion? If so, how could the Agencies 
increase or preserve the utility of the joint venture exclusion as a 
means of structuring business arrangements without allowing an excluded 
joint venture to be used by a banking entity to invest in or sponsor 
what is in effect a covered fund that merely has no more than ten 
unaffiliated investors?
    Question 174. Are there other conditions the Agencies should 
include, or modifications to the exclusion's current conditions that 
the Agencies should make, to clarify that the joint venture exclusion 
is designed to allow banking entities to structure business ventures, 
as opposed to an entity that may be labelled a joint venture but that 
is in reality a hedge fund or private equity fund established for 
investment purposes?
    Question 175. The 2013 final rule does not define the term ``joint 
venture.'' Should the Agencies define that term? If so, how should the 
Agencies define the term? Should the Agencies, for example, modify the 
2013 final rule to reflect the view expressed by the staffs that a 
person that does not have some degree of control over the business of 
an entity would generally not be considered to be participating in ``a 
joint venture between a banking entity or any of its affiliates and one 
or more unaffiliated persons''? Would this modification serve to 
differentiate a participant in a joint venture from an investor in what 
would otherwise be a covered fund? Has state law been useful in 
determining whether a structure is a joint venture for purposes of the 
2013 final rule? Are there other changes to the joint venture exclusion 
the Agencies should make on this point?
vii. Securitizations
    The 2013 final rule contains several provisions designed to address 
securitizations and to implement the rule of construction in section 
13(g)(2) of the BHC Act, which provides that nothing in section 13 
shall be construed to limit or restrict the ability of a banking entity 
to sell or securitize loans in a manner that is otherwise permitted by 
law. These provisions include the 2013 final rule's exclusions from the 
covered fund definition for loan securitizations, qualifying asset-
backed commercial paper conduits, and qualifying covered bonds. The 
Agencies request comment on all aspects of the 2013 final rule's 
application to securitizations, including:
    Question 176. Are there any concerns about how the 2013 final 
rule's exclusions from the covered fund definition for loan 
securitizations, qualifying asset-backed commercial paper conduits, and 
qualifying covered bonds work in practice? If commenters believe the 
Agencies can make these provisions more effective, what modifications 
should the Agencies make and why?
    Question 177. The 2013 final rule's loan securitization exclusion 
excludes an issuing entity for asset-backed securities that, among 
other things, has assets or holdings consisting solely of certain types 
of permissible assets enumerated in the 2013 final rule. These 
permissible assets generally are loans, certain servicing assets, and 
special units of beneficial interest and collateral certificates. Are 
there particular issues with complying with the terms of this exclusion 
for vehicles that are holding loans? Are there any modifications the 
Agencies should make and if so, why and what are they? How would such 
modifications be consistent with the statutory provisions? For example, 
debt securities generally are not permissible assets for an excluded 
loan securitization.\181\ What effect does this limitation have on loan 
securitization vehicles? Should the Agencies consider permitting a loan 
securitization vehicle to hold 5 percent or 10 percent of assets that 
are considered debt securities rather than ``loans,'' as defined in the 
2013 final rule? Are there other types of similar assets that are not 
``loans,'' as defined in the 2013 final rule, but that have similar 
financial characteristics that an excluded loan securitization vehicle 
should be permitted to own as 5 percent or 10 percent of the vehicle's 
assets? Conversely, would this additional flexibility be necessary or 
appropriate now that banking entities have restructured loan 
securitizations as necessary to comply with the 2013 final

[[Page 33481]]

rule and structured loan securitizations formed after the 2013 final 
rule was adopted in order to comply with the 2013 final rule? After 
banking entities have undertaken these efforts, would allowing an 
excluded loan securitization to hold additional types of assets allow a 
banking entity indirectly to engage in investment activities that may 
implicate section 13 rather than as an alternative way for a banking 
entity either to securitize or own loans through a securitization, as 
contemplated by the rule of construction in section 13(g)(2) of the BHC 
Act?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ The 2013 final rule does, however, permit an excluded loan 
securitization to hold cash equivalents for purposes of the rights 
and assets in paragraph (c)(8)(i)(B) of the final rule, and 
securities received in lieu of debts previously contracted with 
respect to the loans supporting the asset-backed securities. See 
2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(8)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 178. Should the Agencies modify the loan securitization 
exclusion to reflect the views expressed by the Agencies' staffs in 
response to a FAQ \182\ that the servicing assets described in 
paragraph 10(c)(8)(i)(B) of the 2013 final rule may be any type of 
asset, provided that any servicing asset that is a security must be a 
permitted security under paragraph 10(c)(8)(iii) of the 2013 final 
rule? Should the Agencies, for example, modify paragraph 10(c)(8)(i)(B) 
of the 2013 final rule to add the underlined text: ``Rights or other 
assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of 
proceeds to holders of such securities and rights or other assets that 
are related or incidental to purchasing or otherwise acquiring and 
holding the loans, provided that each asset that is a security meets 
the requirements of paragraph (c)(8)(iii) of this section.'' Should the 
2013 final rule be amended to include this language? Are there other 
clarifying modifications that would better address the expressed 
concern?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ See supra note 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 179. Are there modifications the Agencies should make to 
the 2013 final rule's definition of the term ``ownership interest'' in 
the context of securitizations? If so, what modifications should the 
Agencies make and how would they be consistent with the ownership 
interest restrictions? Banking entities have raised questions regarding 
the scope of the provision of the 2013 final rule that provides that an 
ownership interest includes an interest that has, among other 
characteristics, ``the right to participate in the selection or removal 
of a general partner, managing member, member of the board of directors 
or trustees, investment manager, investment adviser, or commodity 
trading advisor of the covered fund (excluding the rights of a creditor 
to exercise remedies upon the occurrence of an event of default or an 
acceleration event)'' in the context of creditor rights. Should the 
Agencies modify this parenthetical to provide greater clarity to 
banking entities regarding this parenthetical? For example, should the 
Agencies modify the parenthetical to provide that the ``rights of a 
creditor to exercise remedies upon the occurrence of an event of 
default or an acceleration event'' include the right to participate in 
the removal of an investment manager for cause, or to nominate or vote 
on a nominated replacement manager upon an investment manager's 
resignation or removal? Would the ability to participate in the removal 
or replacement of an investment manager under these limited 
circumstances more closely resemble a creditor's rights upon default to 
protect its interest, as opposed to the right to vote on matters 
affecting the management of an issuer that may be more typically 
associated with equity or partnership interests? Why or why not? What 
actions do holders of interests in loan securitizations today take with 
respect to investment managers and under what circumstances? Are such 
rights limited to certain classes of holders?
    Question 180. The Agencies understand that in many securitization 
transactions, there are multiple tranches of interests that are sold. 
The Agencies also understand that some of these interests may have 
characteristics that are the same as debt securities with fixed 
maturities and fixed rates of interest, and with no other residual 
interest or payment. In the context of the definition of ownership 
interest for securitization vehicles, should the Agencies consider 
whether securitization interests that have only these types of 
characteristics be considered ``other similar interests'' for purposes 
of the ownership interest definition? If so, why or why not? If so, why 
should a distribution of profits from a passive investment such as a 
securitization be treated differently than a distribution of profits 
from any other type of passive investment? Please explain why 
securitization vehicles should be treated differently than other 
covered funds, some of which also could have tranched investment 
interests.
viii. Selected Other Issuers
    In this section the Agencies request comment on the 2013 final 
rule's application to certain types of issuers for which banking 
entities and others have expressed concern to one or more of the 
Agencies:
    Question 181. The 2013 final rule excludes from the covered fund 
definition an issuer that is a small business investment company, as 
defined in section 103(3) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 
or that has received from the Small Business Administration notice to 
proceed to qualify for a license as a small business investment 
company, which notice or license has not been revoked. A small business 
investment company that relinquishes its license as the company 
liquidates its holdings, however, will no longer be a ``small business 
investment company,'' as defined in section 103(3) of the Small 
Business Investment Act of 1958, and will therefore no longer be 
excluded from the covered fund definition. Should the Agencies modify 
the exclusion to provide that the exclusion will remain available under 
these circumstances when a small business investment company 
relinquishes or voluntarily surrenders its license? If so, how should 
the Agencies specify the circumstances under which the company may 
operate after relinquishing or voluntarily surrendering its license 
while still relying on the exclusion? Does the absence of a license 
from the Small Business Administration under these circumstances affect 
whether the company is engaged in the investment activities 
contemplated by section 13? Why or why not? Are there other examples of 
an entity that is excluded from the covered fund definition and that 
could no longer satisfy the relevant exclusion as the entity is 
liquidated? Which kinds of entities, what causes them to no longer 
satisfy the exclusion, and what modifications to the 2013 final rule do 
commenters believe would be appropriate to address them? For example, 
have banking entities encountered any difficulties with respect to RICs 
that use liquidating trusts?
    Question 182. The 2013 final rule does not provide a specific 
exclusion from the definition of ``covered fund'' for an issuer that is 
a municipal securities tender option bond vehicle.\183\

[[Page 33482]]

The 2013 final rule ``does not prevent a banking entity from owning or 
otherwise participating in a tender option bond vehicle; it requires 
that these activities be conducted in the same manner as with other 
covered funds.'' \184\ To the extent that a tender option bond vehicle 
is a covered fund, then, Sec.  __.14 would apply. If a banking entity 
organizes and offers or sponsors a tender option bond vehicle, for 
example, Sec.  __.14 of the 2013 final rule prohibits the banking 
entity from engaging in any ``covered transaction'' with the vehicle. 
Such a ``covered transaction'' could include the sponsoring banking 
entity providing a liquidity facility to support the put right that is 
a key feature of the ``floater'' security issued by a tender option 
bond vehicle. The Agencies understand that after adoption of the 2013 
final rule, banking entities restructured tender option bond vehicles, 
or structured new tender option bond vehicles formed after adoption, in 
order to comply with the 2013 final rule. What role do banking entities 
play in creating the tender option bond trust and how have the 
restrictions on ``covered transactions'' affected the continuing use of 
this financing structure? Why should tender option bond vehicles 
sponsored by banking entities be viewed differently than other types of 
covered funds sponsored by banking entities? As discussed above, the 
Agencies are requesting comment about whether to incorporate into Sec.  
__.14's limitations on covered transactions the exemptions provided in 
section 23A of the FR Act and the Board's Regulation W. Would 
incorporating some or all of these exemptions address any challenges 
banking entities that sponsor tender option bond trusts have faced with 
respect to subsequent and ongoing covered transactions with such tender 
option bond vehicles?
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    \183\ In the preamble to the 2013 final rule, the Agencies noted 
commenters' description of a ``typical tender option bond 
transaction'' as consisting of ``the deposit of a single issue of 
highly-rated, long-term municipal bonds in a trust and the issuance 
by the trust of two classes of securities: a floating rate, puttable 
security (the ``floaters''), and an inverse floating rate security 
(the ``residual'') with no tranching involved. According to 
commenters, the holders of the floaters have the right, generally on 
a daily or weekly basis, to put the floaters for purchase at par. 
The put right is supported by a liquidity facility delivered by a 
highly-rated provider (in many cases, the banking entity sponsoring 
the trust) and allows the floaters to be treated as a short-term 
security. The floaters are in large part purchased and held by money 
market mutual funds. The residual is held by a longer-term investor 
(in many cases the banking entity sponsoring the trust, or an 
insurance company, mutual fund, or hedge fund). According to 
commenters, the residual investors take all of the market and 
structural risk related to the tender option bonds structure, with 
the investors in floaters taking only limited, well-defined 
insolvency and default risks associated with the underlying 
municipal bonds generally equivalent to the risks associated with 
investing in the municipal bonds directly. According to commenters, 
the structure of tender option bond transactions is governed by 
certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in order to preserve 
the tax-exempt treatment of the underlying municipal securities.'' 
See 79 FR at 5702.
    \184\ See 79 FR at 5703.
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2. Section __.11: Activities Permitted in Connection With Organizing 
and Offering a Covered Fund
a. Underwriting and Market Making for a Covered Fund
    Section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act permits a banking entity to 
purchase and sell securities and other instruments described in 
13(h)(4) in connection with certain underwriting or market making-
related activities.\185\ The 2013 final rule addressed how this 
exemption applied in the context of underwriting or market making of 
ownership interests in covered funds. In particular, Sec.  __.11(c) of 
the 2013 final rule provides that the prohibition in Sec.  __.10(a) on 
ownership or sponsorship of a covered fund does not apply to a banking 
entity's underwriting and market making-related activities involving a 
covered fund so long as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The banking entity conducts the activities in accordance with the 
requirements of the underwriting exemption in Sec.  __.4(a) of the 2013 
final rule or market-making exemption in Sec.  __.4(b) of the 2013 
final rule, respectively;
    The banking entity includes the aggregate value of all ownership 
interests of the covered fund acquired or retained by the banking 
entity and its affiliates for purposes of the limitation on aggregate 
investments in covered funds (the ``aggregate-fund limit'') \186\ and 
capital deduction requirement; \187\ and
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    \186\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.12(a)(iii).
    \187\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.12(d).
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    The banking entity includes any ownership interests that it 
acquires or retains for purposes of the limitation on investments in a 
single covered fund (the ``per-fund limit'') if the banking entity (or 
an affiliate): (i) Acts as a sponsor, investment adviser, or commodity 
trading advisor to the covered fund; (ii) otherwise acquires and 
retains an ownership interest in the covered fund in reliance on the 
exemption for organizing and offering a covered fund in Sec.  __.11(a) 
of the 2013 final rule; (iii) acquires and retains an ownership 
interest in such covered fund and is either a securitizer, as that term 
is used in section 15G(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, or is acquiring and 
retaining an ownership interest in such covered fund in compliance with 
section 15G of that Act and the implementing regulations issued 
thereunder, each as permitted by Sec.  __.11(b) of the 2013 final rule; 
or (iv) directly or indirectly, guarantees, assumes, or otherwise 
insures the obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any 
covered fund in which such fund invests.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.11(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies continue to believe that providing a separate 
provision relating to permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities for ownership interests in covered funds is supported by 
section 13(d)(1)(B) of the BHC Act. The exemption for underwriting and 
market making-related activities under section 13(d)(1)(B), by its 
terms, is a statutorily permitted activity and exemption from the 
prohibitions in section 13(a), whether on proprietary trading or on 
covered fund activities. Applying the statutory exemption in this 
manner accommodates the capital raising activities of covered funds and 
other issuers in accordance with the underwriting and market making 
provisions under the statute.
    The proposed amendments to Sec.  __.11(c) are intended to better 
achieve these objectives, consistent with the requirements of the 
statute and based on the experience of the Agencies following 
implementation of the 2013 final rule. Specifically, for a covered fund 
that the banking entity does not organize or offer pursuant to Sec.  
__.11(a) or (b) of the 2013 final rule, the proposal would remove the 
requirement that the banking entity include for purposes of the 
aggregate fund limit and capital deduction the value of any ownership 
interests of the covered fund acquired or retained in accordance with 
the underwriting or market-making exemption. Under the proposed 
amendments, these limits, as well as the per fund limit, would only 
apply to a covered fund that the banking entity organizes or offers and 
in which the banking entity retains an ownership interest pursuant to 
Sec.  __.11(a) or (b) of the 2013 final rule. The Agencies seek with 
this change to more closely align the requirements for engaging in 
underwriting or market-making-related activities with respect to 
ownership interests in a covered fund with the requirements for 
engaging in these activities with respect to other financial 
instruments. The Agencies expect this change would reduce compliance 
costs for banking entities that engage in these activities without 
exposing banking entities to additional risks beyond those inherent in 
underwriting and market making-related activities involving otherwise 
similar financial instruments as permitted by the statute. This is 
because banking entities that engage in underwriting or market making-
related activities with respect to covered funds would remain subject 
to the

[[Page 33483]]

requirements of those exemptions in subpart B, as modified by the 
proposal, including requirements relating to risk management and 
limitations based on the reasonably expected near term demand of 
clients, customers, or counterparties.
    The proposal would retain the requirements of the 2013 final rule 
associated with the per-fund limit, aggregate fund limit, and capital 
deduction where the banking entity engages in activity in reliance on 
Sec.  __.11(a) or (b) with respect to a covered fund, consistent with 
the limitations of section 13(d)(1)(G)(iii) of the BHC Act that 
restrict a banking entity that relies on this exemption from acquiring 
or retaining an ownership interest in a covered fund beyond a de 
minimis investment amount.
    In addition, the proposal would maintain the requirement that the 
underwriting or market-making-related activities be conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __4(b) of 
the 2013 final rule (as modified by the proposal), respectively. These 
requirements are designed specifically to address a banking entity's 
underwriting and market making-related activities and to permit holding 
exposures consistent with the reasonably expected near term demand of 
clients, customers and counterparties.
    Question 183. What effects do commenters believe the proposed 
changes to the requirements for engaging in underwriting or market-
making-related activities with respect to ownership interests in 
covered funds would have on the capital raising activities of covered 
funds and other issuers? What other changes should the Agencies 
consider, if any, to more closely align the requirements for engaging 
in underwriting or market-making-related activities with respect to 
ownership interests in a covered fund with the requirements for 
engaging in these activities with respect to other financial 
instruments? For example, because the exemption for underwriting and 
market making-related activities under section 13(d)(1)(B), by its 
terms, is a statutorily permitted activity and an exemption from the 
prohibitions in section 13(a), is it necessary to continue to retain 
the per-fund limit, aggregate fund limit, and capital deduction where 
the banking entity engages in activity in reliance on Sec.  __.11(a) or 
(b)? Should these limitations apply only with respect to covered fund 
interests acquired or retained by the banking entity in reliance on 
section 13(d)(1)(G)(iii) of the BHC Act, and not to interests held in 
reliance on the separate exemption provided for underwriting and market 
making activities, where the banking entity seeks to rely on separate 
exemptions for permitted activities related to the same covered fund? 
That is, should we remove the requirement that the banking entity 
include for purposes of the per fund limit, aggregate fund limit, and 
capital deduction the value of any ownership interests of the covered 
fund acquired or retained in accordance with the underwriting or 
market-making exemption, regardless of whether the banking entity 
engages in activity in reliance on Sec.  __.11(a) or (b) with respect 
to the fund? Why or why not? Conversely, should the Agencies retain the 
requirement that all covered fund ownership interests acquired or 
retained in connection with underwriting or market-making-related 
activities be included for purposes of the aggregate fund limit and 
capital deduction as a means to effectuate the limitations on permitted 
activities in section (d)(2)(A) of the BHC Act?
    Question 184. Please describe whether the restrictions on 
underwriting or market making of ownership interests in covered funds 
are appropriate. Why or why not?
    Question 185. Please describe any potential restrictions that 
commenters believe should be included or indicate any restrictions that 
should be removed, along with the commenter's rationale for such 
changes, and how such changes would be consistent with the statute.
3. Section __.13: Other Permitted Covered Fund Activities
a. Permitted Risk-Mitigating Hedging Activities
    Section 13(d)(1)(C) of the BHC Act provides an exemption for 
certain risk-mitigating hedging activities.\189\ In the context of 
covered fund activities, the 2013 final rule implemented this authority 
narrowly, permitting only limited risk-mitigating hedging activities 
involving ownership interests in covered funds for hedging employee 
compensation arrangements. In particular, Sec.  __.13(a) of the 2013 
final rule permits a banking entity to acquire or retain an ownership 
interest in a covered fund provided that the ownership interest is 
designed to demonstrably reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risks to the banking entity in connection with a 
compensation arrangement with an employee who directly provides 
investment advisory or other services to the covered fund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2011 proposal, the Agencies considered permitting a banking 
entity to acquire or retain an ownership interest in a covered fund as 
a hedge in a second context, in addition to hedging employee 
compensation arrangements. Specifically, the 2011 proposal included a 
provision that would have allowed a banking entity to acquire or retain 
an ownership interest in a covered fund as a risk-mitigating hedge when 
acting as an intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a 
banking entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the 
profits and losses of the covered fund.\190\ After receiving comments 
on the 2011 proposal, the Agencies determined not to include this 
second provision in the 2013 final rule. At the time, the Agencies 
determined based on information available and comments received, that 
transactions by a banking entity to act as principal in providing 
exposure to the profits and losses of a covered fund for a customer, 
even if hedged by the entity with ownership interests of the covered 
fund, constituted a high-risk strategy that could threaten the safety 
and soundness of the banking entity. The Agencies were concerned that 
these transactions could expose the banking entity to the risk that the 
customer will fail to perform, thereby effectively exposing the banking 
entity to the risks of the covered fund, and that a customer's failure 
to perform may be concurrent with a decline in value of the covered 
fund, which could expose the banking entity to additional losses. The 
Agencies therefore concluded that these transactions could pose a 
significant potential to expose banking entities to the same or similar 
economic risks that section 13 of the BHC Act sought to eliminate.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ See 2011 proposal.
    \191\ See 79 FR at 5737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the Agencies' adoption of the 2013 final rule, some market 
participants have argued that the 2013 final rule should be modified to 
permit a banking entity to acquire or retain an ownership interest in a 
covered fund as a risk-mitigating hedge when acting as an intermediary 
on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking entity to 
facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and losses of 
the covered fund. These market participants have urged that allowing 
banking entities to facilitate customer activity would be consistent 
with the intent of the statute. In the view of these market 
participants, permitting such activity would not be inconsistent with 
safety and soundness because it would be conducted consistent with the 
requirements of the 2013 final rule, as modified by the proposal, 
including the requirements

[[Page 33484]]

with respect to risk-mitigating hedging transactions. For example, such 
exposures would be subject to required risk limits and policies and 
procedures and must be appropriately monitored and risk managed. 
Although a banking entity could be exposed to the risk of the covered 
fund if the customer fails to perform, this counterparty default risk 
would be present whenever a banking entity facilitates the exposure by 
the customer to the profits and losses of a financial instrument and 
seeks to hedge its own exposure by investing in the financial 
instrument.
    Accordingly, the Agencies are including this provision in the 
proposal and requesting comment below as to whether the 2013 final rule 
should be modified to permit this additional category of risk-
mitigating hedging transactions.
    As in the 2011 proposal, this proposal would allow a banking entity 
to acquire a covered fund interest as a hedge when acting as an 
intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund. The hedging of employee compensation 
arrangements involving covered fund interests would remain unchanged 
from the 2013 final rule. Moreover, a banking entity that seeks to use 
a covered fund interest to hedge on behalf of a customer would need to 
comply with all of the requirements of Sec.  __.13(a), which generally 
track the requirements of Sec.  __.5, as modified by this 
proposal.\192\ The Agencies believe that to effectively implement the 
statute, banking entities should have a broader ability to acquire or 
retain a covered fund interest as a permissible hedging activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ The proposal would also amend Sec.  __.13(a) to align with 
the proposed modifications to Sec.  __5. In particular, the proposal 
would require that a risk-mitigating hedging transaction pursuant to 
Sec.  __.13(a) be designed to reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate one or more specific, identifiable risks to the banking 
entity. It would also remove the requirement that the hedging 
transaction ``demonstrably reduces or otherwise significantly 
mitigates'' the relevant risks, consistent with the proposed 
modifications to Sec.  __.5. See supra Part III.B.3 of this 
Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to those questions raised in connection with the 
proposed implementation of the risk-mitigating hedging exemption under 
Sec.  __.5 of the proposal, the Agencies request comment on the 
proposed implementation of that same exemption with respect to covered 
fund activities. In particular, the Agencies request comment on the 
following questions:
    Question 186. Should a banking entity be permitted to acquire or 
retain an ownership interest in a covered fund as a hedge when acting 
as an intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund? If so, what kinds of transactions would 
banking entities enter into to facilitate the exposure by the customer 
to the profits and losses of the covered fund, what types of covered 
funds would be used to hedge, how would they be used to hedge, and what 
kinds of customers would be involved? Should the Agencies place 
additional limitations on these arrangements, such as a requirement for 
a banking entity to take prompt action to hedge or eliminate its 
covered fund exposure if the customer fails to perform?
    Question 187. At the time the Agencies adopted the 2013 final rule, 
they determined that transactions by a banking entity to act as 
principal in providing exposure to the profits and losses of a covered 
fund for a customer, even if hedged by the entity with ownership 
interests of the covered fund, constituted a high-risk strategy that 
could threaten the safety and soundness of the banking entity. Do these 
arrangements constitute a high-risk strategy, threaten the safety and 
soundness of a banking entity, and pose significant potential to expose 
banking entities to the same or similar economic risks that section 13 
of the BHC Act sought to eliminate? Why or why not? Commenters are 
encouraged to provide specific information that would help the 
Agencies' analysis of this question.
    Question 188. Are there other circumstances on which a banking 
entity should be permitted to acquire or retain an ownership interest 
in a covered fund? If so, please explain. For example, should the 
Agencies amend the 2013 final rule to provide that, in addition to the 
proposed amendment, banking entities be permitted to acquire or retain 
ownership interests in covered funds where the acquisition or retention 
meets the requirements of Sec.  __.5 of the 2013 final rule, as 
modified by the proposal?
b. Permitted Covered Fund Activities and Investments Outside of the 
United States
    Section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act \193\ permits foreign banking 
entities to acquire or retain an ownership interest in, or act as 
sponsor to, a covered fund, so long as those activities and investments 
occur solely outside the United States and certain other conditions are 
met (the foreign fund exemption).\194\ The purpose of this statutory 
exemption appears to be to limit the extraterritorial application of 
the statutory restrictions on covered fund activities and investments, 
while preserving national treatment and competitive equity among U.S. 
and foreign banking entities within the United States.\195\ The statute 
does not explicitly define what is meant by ``solely outside of the 
United States.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act permits a banking 
entity to acquire or retain an ownership interest in or have certain 
relationships with, a covered fund notwithstanding the restrictions 
on investments in, and relationships with, a covered fund, if: (i) 
Such activity or investment is conducted by a banking entity 
pursuant to paragraph (9) or (13) of section 4(c) of the BHC Act; 
(ii) the activity occurs solely outside of the United States; (iii) 
no ownership interest in such fund is offered for sale or sold to a 
resident of the United States; and (iv) the banking entity is not 
directly or indirectly controlled by a banking entity that is 
organized under the laws of the United States or of one or more 
States. See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(I).
    \194\ This section's discussion of the concept ``solely outside 
of the United States'' is provided solely for purposes of the 
proposal's implementation of section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act, and 
does not affect a banking entity's obligation to comply with 
additional or different requirements under applicable securities, 
banking, or other laws.
    \195\ See 156 Cong. Rec. S5897 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Merkley). (``Subparagraphs (H) and (I) recognize 
rules of international regulatory comity by permitting foreign 
banks, regulated and backed by foreign taxpayers, in the course of 
operating outside of the United States to engage in activities 
permitted under relevant foreign law. However, these subparagraphs 
are not intended to permit a U.S. banking entity to avoid the 
restrictions on proprietary trading simply by setting up an offshore 
subsidiary or reincorporating offshore, and regulators should 
enforce them accordingly. In addition, the subparagraphs seek to 
maintain a level playing field by prohibiting a foreign bank from 
improperly offering its hedge fund and private equity fund services 
to U.S. persons when such offering could not be made in the United 
States.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Activities or Investments Solely Outside of the United States
    The 2013 final rule establishes several conditions on the 
availability of the foreign fund exemption. Specifically, the 2013 
final rule provides that an activity or investment occurs solely 
outside the United States for purposes of the foreign fund exemption 
only if:
     The banking entity acting as sponsor, or engaging as 
principal in the acquisition or retention of an ownership interest in 
the covered fund, is not itself, and is not controlled directly or 
indirectly by, a banking entity that is located in the United States or 
established under the laws of the United States or of any State;
     The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that 
makes the decision to acquire or retain the ownership interest or act 
as sponsor to the covered fund is not located in the

[[Page 33485]]

United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State;
     The investment or sponsorship, including any transaction 
arising from risk-mitigating hedging related to an ownership interest, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or indirectly on a 
consolidated basis by any branch or affiliate that is located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
     No financing for the banking entity's ownership or 
sponsorship is provided, directly or indirectly, by any branch or 
affiliate that is located in the United States or organized under the 
laws of the United States or of any State (the ``financing 
prong'').\196\
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    \196\ See final rule Sec.  __.13(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Much like the similar requirement under the exemption for permitted 
trading activities of a foreign banking entity, experience since 
adoption of the 2013 final rule has indicated that the financing prong 
has been difficult to comply with in practice. As a result, the 
proposal would remove the financing prong of the foreign fund exemption 
for the same reasons as described above for the trading outside of the 
United States exemption. This modification would streamline the 
requirements of this exemption with the intention of improving 
implementation of the statutory exemption. Although a U.S. branch or 
affiliate that extends financing for a covered fund investment solely 
outside of the United States could bear some risks--for example, if the 
U.S. branch of an affiliate provides a loan secured by a covered fund 
interest that then declines in value--the conditions to the foreign 
fund exemption, as modified by the proposal, are designed to require 
that the principal risks of covered fund investments and sponsorship by 
foreign banking entities permitted under the foreign fund exemption 
occur and remain solely outside of the United States. For example, the 
foreign fund exemption would continue to provide that the investment or 
sponsorship, including any transaction arising from risk-mitigating 
hedging related to an ownership interest, may not be accounted for as 
principal directly or indirectly on a consolidated basis by any U.S. 
branch or affiliate. One of the principal purposes of section 13 of the 
BHC Act appears to be to limit the risks that covered fund investments 
and activities may pose to the safety and soundness of U.S. banking 
entities and the U.S. financial system. A purpose of the foreign fund 
exemption appears to be to limit the extraterritorial application of 
section 13 as it applies to foreign banking entities subject to section 
13. The modifications to these requirements under the proposal are 
intended to ensure that any foreign banking entity engaging in activity 
under the foreign fund exemption does so in a manner that ensures the 
risk and sponsorship of the activity or investment occurs and resides 
solely outside of the United States.
ii. Offered for Sale or Sold to a Resident of the United States
    One of the restrictions of the exemption for covered fund 
activities conducted by foreign banking entities outside the United 
States is the restriction that no ownership interest in the covered 
fund may be offered for sale or sold to a resident of the United 
States.\197\ To implement this restriction, Sec.  __.13(b) of the 2013 
final rule requires, as one condition of the foreign fund exemption, 
that ``no ownership interest in such hedge fund or private equity fund 
is offered for sale or sold to a resident of the United States'' (the 
``marketing restriction''). Section __.13(b)(3) of the 2013 final rule 
further specifies that an ownership interest in a covered fund is not 
offered for sale or sold to a resident of the United States for 
purposes of the marketing restriction if it is sold or has been sold 
pursuant to an offering that does not target residents of the United 
States.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(I).
    \198\ 2013 final rule Sec.  __.13(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After issuance of the 2013 final rule, foreign banking entities 
requested clarification from the Agencies regarding whether the 
marketing restriction applied only to the activities of a foreign 
banking entity that is seeking to rely on the foreign fund exemption or 
whether it applied more generally to the activities of any person 
offering for sale or selling ownership interests in the covered fund. 
Specifically, sponsors of covered funds and foreign banking entities 
asked how this condition would apply to a foreign banking entity that 
has made, or intends to make, an investment in a covered fund where the 
foreign banking entity (including its affiliates) does not sponsor, or 
serve, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, investment 
adviser, commodity pool operator, or commodity trading advisor to the 
covered fund (a third-party covered fund).
    After issuance of the 2013 final rule, the staffs of the Agencies 
issued guidance to address these issues, and the proposal would amend 
the 2013 final rule to clearly incorporate this guidance.\199\ The 
proposal therefore provides that an ownership interest in a covered 
fund is not offered for sale or sold to a resident of the United States 
for purposes of the marketing restriction only if it is not sold and 
has not been sold pursuant to an offering that targets residents of the 
United States in which the banking entity or any affiliate of the 
banking entity participates. If the banking entity or an affiliate 
sponsors or serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, 
investment adviser, commodity pool operator, or commodity trading 
advisor to a covered fund, then the banking entity or affiliate will be 
deemed for purposes of the marketing restriction to participate in any 
offer or sale by the covered fund of ownership interests in the covered 
fund.\200\
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    \199\ https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm#13.
    \200\ See proposal Sec.  __.13(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The purpose of this provision is to make clear that the marketing 
restriction applies to the activity of the foreign banking entity that 
is seeking to rely on the exemption (including its affiliates). The 
marketing restriction constrains the foreign banking entity in 
connection with its own activities with respect to covered funds rather 
than the activities of unaffiliated third parties, thereby requiring 
that the foreign banking entity seeking to rely on this exemption does 
not engage in an offering of ownership interests that targets residents 
of the United States. This view is consistent with limiting the 
extraterritorial application of section 13 to foreign banking entities 
while seeking to ensure that the risks of covered fund investments by 
foreign banking entities occur and remain solely outside of the United 
States. If the marketing restriction were applied to the activities of 
third parties, such as the sponsor of a third-party covered fund 
(rather than the foreign banking entity investing in a third-party 
covered fund), this exemption may not be available in certain 
circumstances where the risks and activities of a foreign banking 
entity with respect to its investment in the covered fund are solely 
outside the United States.\201\ In describing the

[[Page 33486]]

marketing restriction in the preamble to the 2013 final rule, the 
Agencies stated that the marketing restriction serves to limit the 
foreign fund exemption so that it ``does not advantage foreign banking 
entities relative to U.S. banking entities with respect to providing 
their covered fund services in the United States by prohibiting the 
offer or sale of ownership interests in related covered funds to 
residents of the United States.'' \202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ The Agencies note that foreign funds that sell securities 
to residents of the United States in an offering that targets 
residents of the United States will be covered funds under Sec.  
__.10(b)(i) of the 2013 final rule if such funds are unable to rely 
on an exclusion or exemption under the Investment Company Act other 
than section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act. If the marketing 
restriction were to apply more generally to the activities of any 
person (including the covered fund itself), the applicability of the 
foreign fund exemption would be significantly limited because a 
third-party foreign fund's offering that targets residents of the 
United States would make the foreign fund exemption unavailable for 
all foreign banking entity investors in the fund.
    \202\ See, 79 FR at 5742 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A foreign banking entity (including its affiliates) that seeks to 
rely on the foreign fund exemption must comply with all of the 
conditions to that exemption, including the marketing restriction. A 
foreign banking entity that participates in an offer or sale of covered 
fund interests to a resident of the United States thus cannot rely on 
the foreign fund exemption with respect to that covered fund. Further, 
where a banking entity sponsors or serves, directly or indirectly, as 
the investment manager, investment adviser, commodity pool operator, or 
commodity trading advisor to a covered fund, that banking entity will 
be viewed as participating in an offer or sale by the covered fund of 
ownership interests in the covered fund, and therefore such foreign 
banking entity would not qualify for the foreign fund exemption for 
that covered fund if that covered fund offers or sells covered fund 
ownership interests to a resident of the United States. The Agencies 
request comment on the proposal's approach to implementing the foreign 
fund exemption. In particular, the Agencies request comment on the 
following questions:
    Question 189. Is the proposal's implementation of the foreign fund 
exemption effective? If not, what alternative would be more effective 
and/or clearer?
    Question 190. Are the proposal's provisions effective and 
sufficiently clear regarding when a transaction or activity will be 
considered to have occurred solely outside the United States? If not, 
what alternative would be more effective and/or clearer?
    Question 191. Should the financing prong of the foreign fund 
exemption be retained? Why or why not? Should additional requirements 
be added to the foreign fund exemption? If so, what requirements and 
why? Should additional requirements be modified or removed? If so, what 
requirements and why and how? How would such changes be consistent with 
the statute?
    Question 192. Is the proposed exemption consistent with limiting 
the extraterritorial reach of the rule with respect to FBOs? Does the 
proposed exemption create competitive advantages for foreign banking 
entities with respect to U.S. banking entities? Why or why not?
    Question 193. Is the Agencies' proposal regarding the 2013 final 
rule's marketing restriction, which reflects the staff interpretations 
incorporated within previous FAQs, sufficiently clear? Should the 
marketing restriction apply more broadly to third-party funds that the 
foreign banking entity does not advise or sponsor? Why or why not?
4. Section __.14: Limitations on Relationships With a Covered Fund
    Section 13(f) of the BHC Act generally prohibits a banking entity 
that, directly or indirectly, serves as investment manager, investment 
adviser, or sponsor to a covered fund (or that organizes and offers a 
covered fund pursuant to section 13(d)(1)(G) of the BHC Act) from 
entering into a transaction with such covered fund that would be a 
covered transaction as defined in section 23A of the FR Act.\203\ In 
the 2013 final rule, the Agencies noted that ``[s]ection 13(f) of the 
BHC Act does not incorporate or reference the exemptions contained in 
section 23A of the FR Act or the Board's Regulation W.'' \204\ However, 
the Agencies also noted that notwithstanding the prohibition in section 
13(f)(1) of the BHC Act, ``other specific portions of the statute 
permit a banking entity to engage in certain transactions or 
relationships'' with a related covered fund.\205\ The Agencies 
addressed the apparent conflict between section 13(f)(1) and particular 
provisions in section 13(d)(1) of the BHC Act in the 2013 final rule by 
interpreting the statutory language to permit a banking entity ``to 
acquire or retain an ownership interest in a covered fund in accordance 
with the requirements of section 13.'' \206\ In doing so, the Agencies 
noted that a contrary interpretation would make the ``specific 
transactions that permit covered transactions between a banking entity 
and a covered fund mere surplusage.'' \207\ In light of the apparent 
conflict and ambiguity between particular provisions in sections 
13(d)(1) and 13(f)(1) of the BHC Act, the Agencies solicit comment 
below on the approach adopted in the 2013 final rule and potential 
alternative approaches to interpreting these provisions and reconciling 
any apparent conflicts or redundancies between these provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ 12 U.S.C. 371c. The Agencies note that this does not alter 
the applicability of section 23A of the FR Act and the Board's 
Regulation W to covered transactions between insured depository 
institutions and their affiliates.
    \204\ 79 FR at 5746.
    \205\ Id.
    \206\ Id.
    \207\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 13(f) also provides an exemption for prime brokerage 
transactions between a banking entity and a covered fund in which a 
covered fund managed, sponsored, or advised by that banking entity has 
taken an ownership interest. In addition, section 13(f) subjects any 
transaction permitted under section 13(f) of the BHC Act (including a 
permitted prime brokerage transaction) between a banking entity and 
covered fund to section 23B of the FR Act.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ 12 U.S.C. 371c-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, section 23B of the FR Act requires that the transaction 
be on market terms or on terms at least as favorable to the banking 
entity as a comparable transaction by the banking entity with an 
unaffiliated third party. Section __.14 of the 2013 final rule 
implemented these provisions.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Prime Brokerage Transactions
    Section 13(f) of the BHC Act provides an exemption from the 
prohibition on covered transactions with a covered fund for any prime 
brokerage transaction with a covered fund in which a covered fund 
managed, sponsored, or advised by a banking entity has taken an 
ownership interest (a ``second-tier fund''). The statute by its terms 
permits a banking entity with a relationship to a covered fund 
described in section 13(f) of the BHC Act to engage in prime brokerage 
transactions (that are covered transactions) only with second-tier 
funds and does not extend to covered funds more generally. Neither the 
statute nor the proposal limits covered transactions between a banking 
entity and a covered fund for which the banking entity does not serve 
as investment manager, investment adviser, or sponsor (as defined in 
section 13 of the BHC Act) or have an interest in reliance on section 
13(d)(1)(G) of the BHC Act. Under the statute, the exemption for prime 
brokerage transactions is available only so long as certain enumerated 
conditions are satisfied.\210\ The conditions are that (i) the banking 
entity is in compliance with each of the limitations set forth in Sec.  
__.11 of the 2013 final rule with respect to a covered

[[Page 33487]]

fund organized and offered by the banking entity or any of its 
affiliates; (ii) the CEO (or equivalent officer) of the banking entity 
certifies in writing annually that the banking entity does not, 
directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the 
obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any covered fund 
in which such covered fund invests; and (iii) the Board has not 
determined that such transaction is inconsistent with the safe and 
sound operation and condition of the banking entity. The proposal would 
retain each of these provisions, including that the required 
certification be made to the appropriate Agency for the banking entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(f)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The staffs of the Agencies previously issued guidance explaining 
when a banking entity was required to provide this certification during 
the conformance period.\211\ To reflect this guidance, the Agencies are 
proposing a change to the rule that provides the timing for when a 
banking entity must submit such certification. In particular, the 
proposal provides a banking entity must provide the CEO certification 
annually no later than March 31 of the relevant year. As under the 2013 
final rule, under the proposal, the CEO would have a duty to update the 
certification if the information in the certification materially 
changes at any time during the year when he or she becomes aware of the 
material change. This change is intended to provide banking entities 
with certainty about when the required certification must be provided 
to the appropriate Agency in order to comply with the prime brokerage 
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm#18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. FCM Clearing Services
    On March 29, 2017, the CFTC's Division of Swap Dealer and 
Intermediary Oversight (``DSIO'') issued a letter to a futures 
commission merchant (``FCM'') stating that the DSIO would not recommend 
that an enforcement action against the FCM be initiated in connection 
with Sec.  __.14(a) of the 2013 final rule. The letter provides relief 
for futures, options, and swaps clearing services provided by a 
registered FCM to covered funds for which affiliates of the FCM are 
engaged in the services identified in Sec.  __.14(a) including, for 
example, investment management services.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ CFTC Staff Letter 17-18 (Mar. 29, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CFTC believes the relief provided to the FCM is warranted and 
would extend the relief from the requirements of Sec.  __.14(a) of the 
2013 final rule to all FCMs performing futures, options, and swaps 
clearing services. Providing such clearing services to customers of 
affiliates does not appear to be the type of relationship that was 
intended to be limited under section 13(f) of the BHCA. The provision 
of futures, options, and swaps clearing services by an FCM is a 
facilitation service that the CFTC believes would not give rise to a 
relationship that might evade the prohibition against acquiring or 
retaining an interest in or sponsoring a covered fund. An FCM earns 
clearing fees and is not in a position to profit from any gain or loss 
that the customer may have on its cleared futures, options, or swaps 
positions. The other Agencies do not object to the relief provided to 
the FCMs as described above.
    Question 194. Are clearing services provided by an FCM to its 
customers a relationship that would give rise to the policy concerns 
addressed by Sec.  __.14 of the 2013 final rule?
    Question 195. Does the no-action relief provided by the CFTC staff 
together with the statement herein provide sufficient certainty for 
market participants regarding the application of Sec.  __.14(a) of the 
2013 final rule to FCM clearing services?
    Question 196. If the exemptions in section 23A of the FR Act and 
the Board's Regulation W are made available under a modification to 
Sec.  __.14 of the 2013 final rule, what would be the effect, if any, 
for FCM clearing services? Would incorporating those exemptions further 
support the relief provided by the CFTC? If so, how?
    The Agencies request comment on all aspects of the proposal's 
approach to implementing the limitations on certain relationships with 
covered funds. In particular, the Agencies request comment on the 
following questions:
    Question 197. Is the proposal's approach to implementing the 
limitations on certain transactions with a covered fund effective? If 
not, what alternative approach would be more effective and why?
    Question 198. Should the Agencies adopt a different interpretation 
of section 13(f)(1) of the BHC Act than the interpretation adopted in 
the preamble to the 2013 final rule? For example, should the Agencies 
amend Sec.  __.14 of the 2013 final rule to incorporate some or all of 
the exemptions in section 23A of the FR Act and the Board's Regulation 
W? Why or why not? Why should these transactions be permitted? For 
example, what would be the effect on banking entities' ability to meet 
the needs and demands of their clients and how would incorporating some 
or all of the exemptions that exist in section 23A of the FR Act and 
the Board's Regulation W facilitate a banking entity's ability to meet 
client needs and demands? If permitted, should these additional 
transactions be subject to any limitations?
    Question 199. Should the Agencies amend Sec.  __.14 of the 2013 
final rule to incorporate the quantitative limits in section 23A of the 
Federal Reserve and the Board's Regulation W? Why or why not? Are there 
any other elements of section 23A and the Board's Regulation W that the 
Agencies should consider incorporating? Please explain.
    Question 200. Are there other transactions between a banking entity 
and covered funds that should be prohibited or limited as part of this 
rulemaking?
    Question 201. Is the definition of ``prime brokerage transaction'' 
under the proposal appropriate? If not, what definition would be 
appropriate? Are there any transactions that should be included in the 
definition of ``prime brokerage transaction'' that are not currently 
included?
    Question 202. With respect to the CEO (or equivalent officer) 
certification required under section 13(f)(3)(A)(ii) and Sec.  
__.14(a)(2)(ii)(B) of this proposal, what would be the most useful, 
efficient method of certification (e.g., a new stand-alone 
certification, a certification incorporated into an existing form or 
filing, website certification or certification filed directly with the 
relevant Agency?) Is it sufficiently clear by when a certification must 
be provided by a banking entity? If not, how could the Agencies provide 
additional clarity?

D. Subpart D--Compliance Program Requirements; Violations

1. Section __.20: Program for Compliance; Reporting
    Section __.20 of the 2013 final rule contains compliance program 
and metrics collection and reporting requirements. These requirements 
are tailored based on banking entity size and complexity of activity. 
The 2013 final rule was intended to focus the most significant 
compliance obligations on the largest and most complex organizations, 
while minimizing the economic impact on small banking entities.\213\ 
However, public feedback

[[Page 33488]]

has indicated that even determining whether a banking entity is 
eligible for the simplified compliance program can require significant 
analysis for small banking entities. In addition, certain traditional 
banking activities of small banks have fallen within the scope of the 
proprietary trading and covered fund prohibitions and exemptions, 
making them ineligible for the simplified program available to banking 
entities with no covered activities. Public feedback has indicated that 
the compliance program requirements are also significant for larger 
banking entities that must implement the rule's enhanced compliance 
program, metrics, and CEO attestation requirements. The Agencies 
propose to revise the compliance program requirements to allow greater 
flexibility and focus the requirements on the banking entities with the 
most significant and complex activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ The OCC, Board and FDIC statement on the 2013 final rule's 
applicability to community banks recognized that ``[t]he vast 
majority of these community banks have little or no involvement in 
prohibited proprietary trading or investment activities in covered 
funds. Accordingly, community banks do not have any compliance 
obligations under the final rule if they do not engage in any 
covered activities other than trading in certain government, agency, 
State or municipal obligations.'' Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, The Volcker Rule: Community Bank 
Applicability (Dec. 10, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the Agencies propose to apply the compliance program 
requirement to banking entities as follows:
     Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities would be subject to the six-pillar compliance program 
requirement (currently set forth in Sec.  __.20(b) of the 2013 final 
rule), the metrics reporting requirements (Sec.  __.20(d) of the 2013 
final rule), the covered fund documentation requirements (Sec.  
__.20(e) of the 2013 final rule), and the CEO attestation requirement 
(currently in Appendix B of the 2013 final rule).
     Banking entities with moderate trading assets and 
liabilities. Banking entities with moderate trading assets and 
liabilities would be required to establish the simplified compliance 
program (currently described in Sec.  __.20(f)(2) of the 2013 final 
rule), and comply with the CEO attestation requirement (currently in 
Appendix B of the 2013 final rule).
     Banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities. Banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities would be presumed to be in compliance with the proposal and 
would have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with subpart B and 
subpart C of the implementing regulations on an ongoing basis. These 
banking entities would not be required to demonstrate compliance with 
the rule unless and until the appropriate Agency, based upon a review 
of the banking entity's activities, determines that the banking entity 
must establish the simplified compliance program (currently described 
in Sec. Sec.  __.20(b) or __.20(f)(2) of the 2013 final rule).
a. Compliance Program Requirements for Banking Entities With 
Significant Trading Assets and Liabilities
i. Section 20(b)--Six-Pillar Compliance Program
    Section __.20(b) of the 2013 final rule specifies six elements that 
each compliance program required under that section must at a minimum 
contain.
    The six elements specified in Sec.  __.20(b) are:
     Written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
document, describe, monitor and limit trading activities and covered 
fund activities and investments conducted by the banking entity to 
ensure that all activities and investments that are subject to section 
13 of the BHC Act and the rule comply with section 13 of the BHC Act 
and the 2013 final rule;
     A system of internal controls reasonably designed to 
monitor compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the rule and to 
prevent the occurrence of activities or investments that are prohibited 
by section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule;
     A management framework that clearly delineates 
responsibility and accountability for compliance with section 13 of the 
BHC Act and the 2013 final rule and includes appropriate management 
review of trading limits, strategies, hedging activities, investments, 
incentive compensation and other matters identified in the rule or by 
management as requiring attention;
     Independent testing and audit of the effectiveness of the 
compliance program conducted periodically by qualified personnel of the 
banking entity or by a qualified outside party;
     Training for trading personnel and managers, as well as 
other appropriate personnel, to effectively implement and enforce the 
compliance program; and
     Records sufficient to demonstrate compliance with section 
13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule, which a banking entity must 
promptly provide to the relevant Agency upon request and retain for a 
period of no less than 5 years.
    Under the 2013 final rule, these six elements must be part of the 
compliance program of each banking entity with total consolidated 
assets greater than $10 billion that engages in covered trading 
activities and investments subject to section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations.
    The Agencies are proposing to apply the six-pillar compliance 
program requirements only to banking entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities. The Agencies preliminarily believe these 
banking entities are engaged in activities at a scale that warrants the 
costs of establishing the compliance program elements described in 
Sec. Sec.  __.20(b) and __.20(e) of the 2013 final rule. Accordingly, 
the Agencies believe it is appropriate to require banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities to maintain a six-pillar 
compliance program to ensure that banking entities' activities are 
conducted in compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations.
    As described further in the ``Enhanced Minimum Standards for 
Compliance Programs'' below, the Agencies are proposing to eliminate 
the current enhanced compliance program requirements found in Appendix 
B of the 2013 final rule. The Agencies believe that the six-pillar 
compliance program requirements (currently in Sec.  __.20(b) of the 
2013 final rule) can be appropriately tailored to the size and 
activities of each banking entity that is subject to these 
requirements. The proposed approach would afford banking entities 
flexibility to integrate the Sec.  __.20 compliance program 
requirements into other compliance programs of the banking entity, 
which may reduce complexity for banking entities currently subject to 
the enhanced compliance program requirements.
    Question 203. Should the six-pillar compliance program requirements 
apply only to banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities? Is the scope of the six-pillar compliance program 
appropriate? Why or why not? Are there particular aspects of this 
requirement that should be modified or eliminated? If so, which ones 
and why?
ii. CEO Attestation Requirement
    The 2013 final rule includes a requirement, currently included in 
Appendix B, that a banking entity CEO must review and annually attest 
in writing to the appropriate Agency that the banking entity has in 
place processes to establish, maintain, enforce, review, test and 
modify the compliance program established pursuant to Appendix B and 
Sec.  __.20 of the 2013 final rule in a manner reasonably designed to 
achieve compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing 
regulations.

[[Page 33489]]

The Agencies are proposing to eliminate the current Appendix B (as 
described further below) but to apply a modified CEO attestation 
requirement for banking entities other than those with limited trading 
assets and liabilities. While the Agencies believe the revisions to the 
compliance program requirements under the proposal generally simplify 
the compliance program requirements, this simplification should be 
balanced against the requirement for all banking entities to maintain 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing 
regulations. Accordingly, the Agencies believe that applying the CEO 
attestation requirement for banking entities with meaningful trading 
activities would ensure that the compliance programs established by 
these banking entities pursuant to Sec.  __.20(b) or Sec.  __.20(f)(2) 
of the proposal are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with 
section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations as proposed. 
The Agencies propose limiting the CEO attestation requirement to 
banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities or 
moderate trading assets and liabilities because, if the Agencies' 
proposal is adopted, banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities would be subject to a rebuttable presumption of compliance, 
as described below. The Agencies do not believe it is necessary to 
require a CEO attestation for banking entities with limited trading 
assets and liabilities as those banking entities would not be subject 
to the express requirement to maintain a compliance program pursuant to 
Sec.  __.20 under the proposal.
    Question 204. What are the costs associated with preparing the 
required CEO attestation? How significant are those costs relative to 
the potential benefits of requiring a CEO attestation? What are some of 
the specific operational or other burdens or expenses associated with 
the CEO attestation requirement? Please explain the circumstances under 
which those potential burdens or expenses may arise.
    Question 205. Are there existing business practices and procedures 
that render the CEO attestation requirement redundant and/or 
unnecessary? If so, please identify and describe those existing 
business practices. Alternatively, are there other regulatory 
requirements that fulfill the same purpose as the CEO attestation with 
respect to a compliance program? Please explain.
    Question 206. Is the scope of the CEO attestation requirements 
appropriate? Should banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities, but with a large amount of consolidated assets, for 
example consolidated assets in excess of $50 billion be required to 
provide a CEO attestation with respect to the banking entity's 
compliance program notwithstanding that such institution may be 
entitled to the rebuttable presumption of compliance under the 
proposal?
    Question 207. How costly are the existing CEO attestation 
requirements for banking entities, broken down based on whether they 
are categorized as having significant, moderate, and limited trading 
assets and liabilities under the proposal? How would those annual costs 
change if the modifications described in the proposal were adopted? Can 
the costs described above, both as the requirement is currently drafted 
and as proposed to be amended, be broken down based on the type of 
banking entity involved, such as for broker-dealers and registered 
investment advisers? Please be as specific as possible.
    Question 208. Under the proposal, banking entities with limited 
trading assets and liabilities (for which the presumption of compliance 
has not been rebutted) would not be subject to the CEO attestation 
requirement? Do commenters agree with that approach? As an alternative, 
should a banking entity with limited trading assets and liabilities be 
subject to a similar requirement? For example, should these types of 
banking entities be required to conduct an annual review, to be 
performed by objective, qualified personnel, of its compliance with the 
rule and submit such annual review to its Board of Directors and the 
Agencies? Why or why not? What are the costs and benefits of such 
requirement?
iii. Covered Fund Documentation Requirements
    Currently, Sec.  __.20(e) of the 2013 final rule requires banking 
entities with greater than $10 billion in total consolidated assets to 
maintain additional documentation related to covered funds as part of 
their compliance program. The Agencies are proposing to apply the 
covered fund documentation requirements only to banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities. The Agencies do not believe 
that these additional documentation requirements are necessary for 
banking entities without significant trading assets and liabilities 
because the Agencies expect that their covered funds activities may 
generally be smaller in scale and less complex than banking entities 
with significant trading assets and liabilities. Accordingly, the 
Agencies believe these banking entities' activities are unlikely to 
justify the costs associated with complying with these documentation 
requirements. Furthermore, the Agencies expect they would be able to 
examine and supervise these banking entities' compliance with the 
covered fund prohibition without requiring such additional 
documentation as part of the banking entities' compliance program.
b. Compliance Program Requirements for Banking Entities With Moderate 
Trading Assets and Liabilities
    The 2013 final rule provides that a banking entity with total 
consolidated assets of $10 billion or less as measured on December 31 
of the previous two years that engages in covered activities or 
investments pursuant to subpart B or subpart C of the 2013 final rule 
(other than trading activities permitted under Sec.  __.6(a) of the 
2013 final rule) may satisfy the compliance program requirements by 
including in its existing compliance policies and procedures references 
to the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and subpart D of the 
implementing regulations and adjustments as appropriate given the 
activities, size, scope, and complexity of the banking entity.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ 12 CFR 44.20(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies propose to extend availability of this simplified 
compliance program to all banking entities with moderate trading assets 
and liabilities. The Agencies believe that streamlining the compliance 
program requirements for banking entities with moderate trading assets 
and liabilities is appropriate. The scale and nature of the activities 
and investments in which these banking entities are engaged may not 
justify the additional costs associated with establishing the 
compliance program elements under Sec. Sec.  __.20(b) and (e) of the 
2013 final rule and may be appropriately examined and supervised 
through an appropriately tailored simplified compliance program. 
Consistent with the compliance program requirements for banking 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities, the Agencies 
note that banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities 
would be able to incorporate their simplified compliance program as 
part of any existing compliance policies and procedures and tailor 
their compliance program to the size and nature of their activities.

[[Page 33490]]

c. Compliance Program Requirements for Banking Entities With Limited 
Trading Assets and Liabilities
    The proposal would include a presumption of compliance for certain 
banking entities with limited trading assets and liabilities. Under the 
proposal, a banking entity that, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries on a worldwide basis, has trading assets and liabilities 
(excluding obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any 
agency of the United States) the average gross sum of which over the 
previous four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of the 
four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1 billion, would be 
presumed to be in compliance with the proposal. Banking entities 
meeting these conditions would have no obligation to demonstrate 
compliance with subpart B and subpart C of the implementing regulations 
on an ongoing basis. The Agencies believe, based on experience 
implementing and supervising compliance with the 2013 final rule, that 
these banking entities are generally engaged in traditional banking 
activities. The Agencies do not believe it is necessary to require 
banking entities with limited trading assets and liabilities to 
demonstrate compliance with the prohibitions of section 13 of the BHC 
Act by establishing a compliance program, given the limited scale of 
their trading operations. Further, the Agencies believe that the 
limited trading assets and liabilities of the banking entities 
qualifying for the presumption of compliance are unlikely to warrant 
the costs of establishing a compliance program under Sec.  __.20.
    A banking entity that meets the proposed criteria for the 
presumption of compliance would be subject to the statutory 
prohibitions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing 
regulations on an ongoing basis. The Agencies would not expect a 
banking entity that meets the proposed criteria for the presumption of 
compliance to demonstrate compliance with the proposal in conjunction 
with the Agencies' normal supervisory and examination processes. 
However, the appropriate Agency may exercise its authority to treat the 
banking entity as if it does not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities if, upon review of the banking entity's activities, the 
relevant Agency determines that the banking entity has engaged in 
proprietary trading or covered fund activities that are otherwise 
prohibited under subpart B or subpart C. A banking entity would be 
expected to remediate any impermissible activity upon being notified of 
such determination by the Agency. A banking entity would be required to 
remediate the impermissible activity within a period of time deemed 
appropriate by the relevant Agency.
    The Agencies believe this presumption of compliance for certain 
banking entities with limited trading assets and liabilities would 
allow flexibility for these banking entities to operate under their 
existing internal policies and procedures. The Agencies generally 
expect these banking entities, in the ordinary course of business, to 
develop and adhere to internal policies and procedures that promote 
prudent risk management practices.
    Irrespective of whether a banking entity has engaged in activities 
in violation of subpart B or C of this proposal, the relevant Agency 
retains its authority to require a banking entity to apply the 
compliance program requirements that would otherwise apply if the 
banking entity had significant or moderate trading assets and 
liabilities if the relevant Agency determines that the size or 
complexity of the banking entities trading or investment activities, or 
the risk of evasion, does not warrant a presumption of compliance.
    Question 209. Should the Agencies specify the notice and response 
procedures in connection with an Agency determination that the 
presumption pursuant to __.20(g)(2) is rebutted? Why or why not?
d. Enhanced Minimum Standards
i. Enhanced Minimum Standards for Compliance Programs
    Section __. 20(c) of the 2013 final rule requires certain banking 
entities to establish, maintain and enforce an enhanced compliance 
program that includes the requirements and standards. Appendix B of the 
2013 final rule specifies the enhanced minimum standards applicable to 
the compliance programs of large banking entities and banking entities 
engaged in significant trading activities. Section I.a of Appendix B 
provides that the enhanced compliance program must:
     Be reasonably designed to identify, document, monitor, and 
report the covered trading and covered fund activities and investments 
of the banking entity; identify, monitor and promptly address the risks 
of these covered activities and investments and potential areas of 
noncompliance; and prevent activities or investments prohibited by, or 
that do not comply with, section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final 
rule;
     Establish and enforce appropriate limits on the covered 
activities and investments of the banking entity, including limits on 
the size, scope, complexity, and risks of the individual activities or 
investments consistent with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC 
Act and the 2013 final rule;
     Subject the effectiveness of the compliance program to 
periodic independent review and testing, and ensure that the entity's 
internal audit, corporate compliance and internal control functions 
involved in review and testing are effective and independent;
     Make senior management, and others as appropriate, 
accountable for the effective implementation of the compliance program, 
and ensure that the board of directors and CEO (or equivalent) of the 
banking entity review the effectiveness of the compliance program; and
     Facilitate supervision and examination by the Agencies of 
the banking entity's covered trading and covered fund activities and 
investments.
    The Agencies continue to believe that banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities should have detailed and 
comprehensive programs for ensuring compliance with the requirements of 
section 13 of the BHC Act. The Agencies recognize, however, that many 
banking entities have found implementing certain aspects of the 
enhanced compliance program requirements of Appendix B to be 
inefficient, duplicative of, and in some instances inconsistent with, 
their existing compliance regimes and risk management programs.
    While recognizing the need to establish and maintain an appropriate 
compliance program, the Agencies also believe that banking entities 
should be provided discretion to tailor their compliance programs to 
the structure and activities of their organizations. The flexibility to 
build on compliance regimes that already exist at banking entities, 
including risk limits, risk management systems, board-level governance 
protocols, and the level at which compliance is monitored, may reduce 
the costs and complexity of compliance while also enabling a robust 
compliance mechanism for section 13 of the BHC Act. After carefully 
considering the overall effects of the enhanced compliance program 
standards in the context of existing banking entity compliance 
frameworks, the Agencies are proposing certain modifications to limit 
the implementation, operational or other complexities associated with 
the compliance program requirements set forth in Sec.  __.20.
    The Agencies believe that many of the compliance requirements of 
the current

[[Page 33491]]

enhanced compliance program could be implemented effectively if 
incorporated into a risk management framework already developed and 
designed to fit a banking entity's organizational and reporting 
structure. The prescribed six-pillar compliance requirements in Sec.  
__.20 are consistent with general standards of safety and soundness as 
well as diligent supervision, the implementation of which conforms with 
the traditional risk management processes of ensuring governance, 
controls, and records appropriately tailored to the risks and 
activities of each banking entity. Accordingly, the Agencies propose to 
eliminate the requirements of Appendix B (other than the CEO 
attestation) and permit banking entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities to satisfy compliance program requirements by 
meeting the six elements currently specified in Sec.  __.20(b) of the 
2013 final rule, commensurate with the size, scope, and complexity of 
their activities and business structure, and subject to a CEO 
attestation requirement.
    A banking entity that does not have significant trading assets and 
liabilities under the proposal, but which is currently subject to 
Appendix B under the 2013 final rule, would be permitted to satisfy its 
compliance requirements in the proposal by including in its existing 
compliance policies and procedures appropriate references to the 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act as appropriate given the 
activities, size, scope, and complexity of the banking entity.
ii. Proprietary Trading Activities
    Section II.a of Appendix B of the 2013 final rule generally 
requires a banking entity subject to the Appendix, in addition to the 
requirements of Sec.  __.20, to: (1) Have written policies and 
procedures governing each trading desk; (2) include a comprehensive 
description of the risk management program for the trading activity of 
the banking entity; (3) implement and enforce limits and internal 
controls for each trading desk that are reasonably designed to ensure 
that trading activity is conducted in conformance with section 13 of 
the BHC Act and subpart B and with the banking entity's policies and 
procedures; (4) establish, maintain and enforce policies and procedures 
regarding the use of risk-mitigating hedging instruments and 
strategies; (5) perform robust analysis and quantitative measurement of 
its trading activities that is reasonably designed to ensure that the 
trading activity of each trading desk is consistent with the banking 
entity's compliance program, monitor and assist in the identification 
of potential and actual prohibited proprietary trading activity, and 
prevent the occurrence of prohibited proprietary trading; (6) identify 
the activities of each trading desk that will be conducted in reliance 
on the exemptions contained in Sec. Sec.  __.4 through __.6; and (7) be 
reasonably designed and established to effectively monitor and identify 
for further analysis any proprietary trading activity that may indicate 
potential violations of section 13 of the BHC Act and subpart B and to 
prevent violations of section 13 of the BHC Act and subpart B.
    These requirements of Appendix B in the 2013 final rule reflect the 
Agencies' expectation that banking organizations with significant 
trading activities adopt compliance regimes that, among other things, 
take into account the size and complexity of the banking entity's 
activities and structure of its business. However, the Agencies 
recognize that operationalizing the prescriptive requirements of 
Appendix B may limit the ability of banking entities to adapt their 
existing risk management frameworks for purposes of compliance with the 
2013 final rule. Therefore, based on experience since the adoption of 
the 2013 final rule, the Agencies believe that a banking entity 
currently subject to Appendix B requirements under the 2013 final rule 
should be permitted to implement an appropriately robust compliance 
program by tailoring the requirements of Sec.  __.20 to the type, size, 
scope, and complexity of its activities and business structure. The 
Agencies are therefore proposing to eliminate the requirements of 
section II.a of Appendix B in order to reduce the operational 
complexities associated with the compliance requirements of the 2013 
final rule. As described above, the Agencies believe that the 
compliance program requirements in Sec. Sec.  __.20 can be 
appropriately scaled (pursuant to Sec.  __.20(a)) to the size, scope, 
and complexity of each banking entity and should afford banking 
entities flexibility to integrate their Sec.  __.20 compliance program 
into their other compliance programs.
    The Agencies believe that, under the proposal, compliance programs 
that satisfy Sec.  __.20 and that are appropriately tailored to the 
size, scope, and complexity of the banking entity's activities, would 
be effective in meeting the objectives underlying the enhanced 
requirements set forth in Appendix B of the 2013 final rule with 
respect to proprietary trading activities. Furthermore, affording 
banking entities the flexibility to adapt their existing risk 
management frameworks to satisfy the requirements of Sec.  __.20 would 
reduce the complexity of compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and 
the implementing regulations.
    Question 210. The Agencies are requesting comment on whether the 
requirements of Sec.  __.20 of the proposal would be effective in 
ensuring that banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities and banking entities with moderate trading assets and 
liabilities comply with the proprietary trading requirements and 
restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the proposal. In addition 
to the CEO attestation requirement in proposed Sec.  __.20(c), are 
there certain requirements included in Appendix B that should be 
incorporated into the requirements of Sec.  __.20, particularly with 
respect to banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities, in order to ensure compliance with the proprietary trading 
requirements and restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
proposal? To what extent would the elimination of Appendix B reduce the 
complexity of compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act? What other 
options should the Agencies consider in order to reduce complexity 
while still ensuring robust compliance with the proprietary trading 
requirements and restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations?
iii. Covered Fund Activities and Investments
    The enhanced minimum standards in section II.b of Appendix B of the 
2013 final rule prescribe the establishment, maintenance and 
enforcement of a compliance program that includes written policies and 
procedures that are appropriate for the type, size, complexity, and 
risks of the covered fund and related activities conducted and 
investments made, by a banking entity. In addition to the requirements 
of Sec.  __.20, Sec.  II.b of Appendix B requires that compliance 
programs be designed to: (1) Include appropriate management review and 
independent testing for identifying and documenting covered funds in 
which the banking entity invests, or that each unit within the banking 
entity's organization sponsors or organizes and offers, and covered 
funds in which each such unit invests; (2) identify, document, and map 
each unit within the organization that is permitted to acquire or hold 
an interest in any covered fund or sponsor any covered fund; (3) 
explain the banking entity's strategy for monitoring, mitigating, or 
prohibiting conflicts of interest, transactions or covered fund 
activities and investments that may

[[Page 33492]]

threaten safety and soundness, and exposure to high-risk assets and 
trading strategies presented by its covered fund activities and 
investments; (4) document the covered fund activities and investments 
that each organizational unit is authorized to conduct, the banking 
entity's plan for actively seeking unaffiliated investors to ensure 
that any investment by the banking entity conforms to the limits 
contained in section 12 or registered in compliance with the securities 
laws and is thereby exempt from those limits within the time periods 
allotted in section 12, and how it complies with the requirements of 
subpart C; (5) establish, maintain, and enforce internal controls that 
are reasonably designed to ensure that the banking entity's covered 
fund activities or investments are compliant and to detect potential 
compliance violations; and (6) identify, document, address, and remedy 
any compliance violations.
    The 2013 final rule subjects certain banking entities to the 
enhanced minimum compliance standards of Appendix B to reflect the 
Agencies' expectation that banking entities with significant covered 
fund activities or investments adopt sophisticated compliance regimes. 
However, the Agencies recognize that operationalizing these 
requirements may restrict the flexibility of banking entities to adapt 
their existing risk management frameworks for purposes of compliance 
with the 2013 final rule. The Agencies believe that a banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities or moderate trading 
assets and liabilities currently subject to Appendix B requirements 
could effectively implement an appropriately robust compliance program 
by tailoring the requirements of Sec.  __.20 to the type, size, scope, 
and complexity of its covered fund activities and business structure. 
Accordingly, the Agencies propose to eliminate the requirements of 
Sec.  II.b of Appendix B to the 2013 final rule.
    Under the proposal, a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities or with moderate trading assets and liabilities 
would satisfy the compliance program requirements by appropriately 
scaling the compliance program requirements in Sec.  __.20. A banking 
entity with significant trading assets and liabilities would also be 
required to adopt the covered fund documentation requirements in Sec.  
__.20(e) of the proposal.
    The Agencies believe that, under the proposal, compliance programs 
that satisfy the foregoing requirements and that are appropriately 
tailored to the size, scope, and complexity of the banking entity's 
activities, would be effective in meeting the objectives underlying the 
enhanced requirements set forth in Appendix B of the 2013 final rule 
with respect to covered fund investments and activities. Furthermore, 
affording banking entities the flexibility to adapt their existing risk 
management frameworks to satisfy the Sec.  __.20 compliance program 
requirements would reduce the complexity of compliance with section 13 
of the BHC Act.
    Question 211. The Agencies are requesting comment on whether the 
requirements of Sec.  __.20 of the proposal would, if appropriately 
tailored to the size, scope, and complexity of the banking entity's 
activities, be effective in ensuring that banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities and banking entities with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities comply with the covered fund 
requirements and restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations. In addition to CEO attestation requirement in 
proposed Sec.  __.20(c), are there certain requirements included in 
Appendix B that should be incorporated into the requirements of Sec.  
__.20, particularly with respect to banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities, in order to ensure compliance with the 
covered fund requirements and restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act 
and the implementing regulations? To what extent would the elimination 
of Appendix B reduce the complexity of compliance with section 13 of 
the BHC Act? What other options should the Agencies consider in order 
to reduce complexity while still ensuring robust compliance with the 
covered fund requirements and restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act 
and the implementing regulations?
    Question 212. How do banking entities that are registered 
investment advisers currently meet their compliance program 
obligations? That is, to what extent are banking entities' compliance 
programs related to the covered fund prohibitions of the 2013 final 
rule implemented by the registered investment adviser as opposed to the 
other affiliates or subsidiaries that are part of the banking entity? 
How costly are the existing compliance program requirements for banking 
entities that are registered investment advisers, broken down based on 
whether they are categorized as having significant, moderate, and 
limited trading assets and liabilities under the proposal? How would 
those annual costs change if the modifications described in the 
proposal were adopted?
iv. Responsibility and Accountability
    Appendix B of the 2013 final rule contains a CEO attestation 
requirement as part of the enhanced minimum standards for compliance 
programs as a means to ensure that a strong governance framework is 
implemented with respect to compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act. 
This provision requires a banking entity's CEO to review and annually 
attest in writing to the appropriate Agency that the banking entity has 
in place processes to establish, maintain, enforce, review, test and 
modify the compliance program established pursuant to Appendix B and 
Sec.  __.20 of the 2013 final rule in a manner reasonably designed to 
achieve compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final 
rule. Appendix B of the 2013 final rule also specifies that in the case 
of the U.S. operations of a foreign banking entity, including a U.S. 
branch or agency of a foreign banking entity, the attestation may be 
provided for the entire U.S. operations of the foreign banking entity 
by the senior management officer of the U.S. operations of the foreign 
banking entity who is located in the United States.
    Consistent with the Agencies' proposal to remove the specific, 
enhanced minimum standards included in Appendix B of the 2013 final 
rule, the Agencies propose to incorporate the CEO attestation 
requirement within Sec.  __.20(c) so that it will to apply to banking 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities and banking 
entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. Further, the 
Agencies propose that the CEO attestation requirement in Sec.  __.20(c) 
specify that in the case of the U.S. operations of a foreign banking 
entity, including a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign banking entity, 
the attestation may be provided for the entire U.S. operations of the 
foreign banking entity by the senior management officer of the U.S. 
operations of the foreign banking entity who is located in the United 
States.
    Preserving the CEO attestation requirement and incorporating it 
within the proposal underscores the importance of CEO engagement within 
the overall compliance framework for banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities and for banking entities with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities. The Agencies believe that the CEO 
attestation requirement may reinforce the importance of creating and 
communicating an appropriate ``tone at the top,'' setting an 
appropriate culture of compliance, and establishing

[[Page 33493]]

clear policies regarding the management of the firm's covered trading 
activities and its covered fund activities and investments.
    The Agencies believe that incorporating the CEO attestation 
requirement into proposed Sec.  __.20(c) could help to ensure that the 
compliance program established pursuant to that section is reasonably 
designed to achieve compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations, while the removal of the specific, enhanced 
minimum standards in Appendix B will afford a banking entity 
considerable flexibility to satisfy the elements of Sec.  __.20 in a 
manner that it determines to be most appropriate given its existing 
compliance regimes, organizational structure, and activities.
    Question 213. The Agencies are requesting comment on whether 
incorporating the CEO attestation requirement in proposed Sec.  
__.20(c) would ensure that a strong governance framework is implemented 
with respect to compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
proposal. What other options should the Agencies consider in order to 
encourage CEO engagement in ensuring robust compliance with section 13 
of the BHC Act and the proposal?
v. Independent Testing
    After careful consideration, the Agencies propose to eliminate the 
specific enhanced minimum standards for independent testing prescribed 
in Appendix B, section IV of the 2013 final rule and permit banking 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities to satisfy the 
compliance program requirements by meeting the independent testing 
requirements outlined in Sec.  __.20(b)(4) of the proposal. Section 
__.20(b)(4) of the proposal specifies that the contents of the 
compliance program shall include independent testing and audit of the 
effectiveness of the compliance program conducted periodically by 
qualified personnel of the banking entity or by a qualified outside 
party. As with all elements of the required compliance program under 
proposed Sec.  __.20(b), independent testing should be designed and 
implemented in a manner that is appropriate for the type, size, scope, 
and complexity of activities and business structure of the banking 
entity. Section __.20(b)(4) allows for a tailored approach to ensure 
that the effectiveness of the compliance program is subject to an 
objective review with appropriate frequency and depth. Under the 
proposal, a banking entity with moderate trading assets and liabilities 
would be permitted to incorporate independent testing into its existing 
compliance programs as appropriate given the activities, size, scope, 
and complexity of the banking entity.
vi. Training
    After careful consideration, the Agencies propose to eliminate the 
training element of the enhanced compliance program of Appendix B, 
section V of the 2013 final rule and permit banking entities to satisfy 
compliance program requirements by meeting the training requirements 
outlined in Sec.  __.20(b)(5) of the proposal. Section __.20(b)(5) 
specifies that the contents of the compliance program shall include 
training for trading personnel and managers, as well as other 
appropriate personnel, to effectively implement and enforce the 
compliance program. As with all elements of the required compliance 
program under Sec.  __.20(b), the Agencies expect the training regimen 
to be designed and implemented in a manner that is appropriate for the 
type, size, scope, and complexity of activities and business structure 
of the banking entity. Under the proposal, a banking entity with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities would be permitted to 
incorporate training into its existing compliance programs as 
appropriate given the activities, size, scope and complexity of the 
banking entity.
vii. Recordkeeping
    Appendix B, section VI of the 2013 final rule requires banking 
entities to create and retain records sufficient to demonstrate 
compliance and support the operations and effectiveness of the 
compliance program. After careful consideration, the Agencies believe 
that the enhanced minimum standards under Appendix B, section VI can be 
replaced by the requirements prescribed in Sec.  __.20(b)(6) of the 
proposal. Section __.20(b)(6) of the proposal specifies that the 
banking entity must establish records sufficient to demonstrate 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and subpart D and promptly 
provide to the relevant Agency upon request and retain such records for 
no less than 5 years or for such longer period as required by the 
relevant Agency. As with all elements of the required compliance 
program under Sec.  __.20(b), the Agencies expect the record keeping 
requirement to be designed and implemented in a manner that is 
appropriate for the type, size, scope, and complexity of activity and 
business structure of the banking entity. A banking entity with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities would be permitted to 
incorporate recordkeeping into its existing compliance programs as 
appropriate given the activities, size, scope, and complexity of the 
banking entity.
    Question 214. The Agencies are requesting comment on whether the 
existing independent testing, training, and recordkeeping requirements 
of Sec.  __.20(b) would, if appropriately tailored to the size, scope, 
and complexity of the banking entity's activities, be effective in 
ensuring that banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities and moderate trading assets and liabilities comply with the 
requirements and restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 
implementing regulations. Are there certain requirements included in 
independent testing, training, and recordkeeping requirements of 
Appendix B that should be incorporated into the requirements of Sec.  
__.20, particularly with respect to banking entities with significant 
trading, in order to ensure compliance with the requirements and 
restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing 
regulations? To what extent would the elimination of the independent 
testing, training, and recordkeeping requirements of Appendix B reduce 
the complexity of complying with section 13 of the BHC Act? What other 
options should the Agencies consider with respect to independent 
testing, training, and recordkeeping in order to reduce complexity 
while still ensuring robust compliance with the requirements and 
restrictions of section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing 
regulations?
e. Summary of Proposed Revisions to Compliance Program Requirements
    The following table provides a summary of the proposed changes to 
the compliance program requirements:

[[Page 33494]]

     Summary of Proposed Changes to Compliance Program Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Banking entities      Banking entities
  Requirement (citation to         subject to            subject to
      2013 final rule)         requirement in 2013     requirement in
                                   final rule             proposal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Pillar Compliance Program   Banking entities      Banking entities
 (Section __.20(b)).           with more than $10    with significant
                               billion in total      trading assets and
                               consolidated assets.  liabilities.
Enhanced compliance program   Banking entities      Not applicable.
 (Section __.20(c), Appendix   with:                 Enhanced compliance
 B).                                                 program eliminated
                                                     (but see CEO
                                                     Attestation
                                                     Requirement below).
                                  $50
                                  billion or more
                                  in total
                                  consolidated
                                  assets, or.
                                  Trading
                                  assets and
                                  liabilities of
                                  $10 billion or
                                  greater over the
                                  previous
                                  consecutive four
                                  quarters, as
                                  measured as of
                                  the last day of
                                  each of the four
                                  prior calendar
                                  quarters, if the
                                  banking entity
                                  engages in
                                  proprietary
                                  trading activity
                                  permitted under
                                  subpart B.
                                 
                                  Additionally,
                                  any other
                                  banking entity
                                  notified in
                                  writing by the
                                  Agency.
CEO Attestation Requirement   Banking entities       Banking
 (Section __.20(c), Appendix   with:                 entities with
 B).                                                 significant trading
                                                     assets and
                                                     liabilities.
                                  $50
                                  billion or more
                                  in total
                                  consolidated
                                  assets, or.
                                  Trading    Banking
                                  assets and         entities with
                                  liabilities of     moderate trading
                                  $10 billion or     assets and
                                  greater over the   liabilities.
                                  previous
                                  consecutive four
                                  quarters, as
                                  measured as of
                                  the last day of
                                  each of the four
                                  prior calendar
                                  quarters.
                                             Any other
                                  Additionally,      banking entity
                                  any other          notified in writing
                                  banking entity     by the Agencythe
                                  notified in        Agency.
                                  writing by the
                                  Agency.
Metrics Reporting              Banking       Banking
 Requirements (Section         entities with         entities with
 __.20(d), Appendix A).        trading assets and    significant trading
                               liabilities the       assets and
                               average gross sum     liabilities.
                               of which over the
                               previous
                               consecutive four
                               quarters, as
                               measured as of the
                               last day of each of
                               the four prior
                               calendar quarters,
                               is $10 billion or
                               greater, if the
                               banking entity
                               engages in
                               proprietary trading
                               activity permitted
                               under subpart B.
                                  Any
                                  other banking
                                  entity notified
                                  in writing by
                                  the Agency.
Additional covered fund       Banking entities      Banking entities
 documentation requirements    with more than $10    with significant
 (Section __.20(e)).           billion in total      trading assets and
                               consolidated assets   liabilities.
                               as reported on
                               December 31 of the
                               previous two
                               calendar years.
Simplified program for        Banking entities      Banking entities
 banking entities with no      that do not engage    that do not engage
 covered activities (Section   in activities or      in activities or
 __.20(f)(1)).                 investments           investments
                               pursuant to subpart   pursuant to subpart
                               B or subpart C        B or subpart C
                               (other than trading   (other than trading
                               activities            activities
                               permitted pursuant    permitted pursuant
                               to Sec.   __.6(a)     to Sec.   __.6(a)
                               of subpart B).        of subpart B).
Simplified program for        Banking entities      Banking entities
 banking entities with         with $10 billion or   with moderate
 modest activities (Section    less in total         trading assets and
 __.20(f)(2)).                 consolidated assets   liabilities.
                               as reported on
                               December 31 of the
                               previous two
                               calendar years that
                               engage in
                               activities or
                               investments
                               pursuant to subpart
                               B or subpart C
                               (other than trading
                               activities
                               permitted pursuant
                               to Sec.   __.6(a)
                               of subpart B).
No compliance program         Not applicable......  Banking entities
 requirement unless Agency                           with limited
 directs otherwise (N/A).                            trading assets and
                                                     liabilities subject
                                                     to the presumption
                                                     of compliance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Appendix to Part []--Reporting and Recordkeeping 
Requirements

1. Overview of the Proposal and Significant Changes From the 2013 Final 
Rule
    As provided in the preamble to the 2013 final rule, the Agencies 
have assessed the metrics data for its effectiveness in monitoring 
covered trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and for its costs.\215\ The Agencies have also considered whether 
all of the quantitative measurements are useful for all asset classes 
and markets, as well as for all the trading activities subject to the 
metrics requirement, or whether modifications are appropriate.\216\ As 
a result of this evaluation, and as described in detail below, the 
Agencies are proposing the following amendments to Appendix A of the 
2013 final rule:\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ See 79 FR at 5772.
    \216\ Id.
    \217\ In connection with the Appendix, the following documents 
have also been published and made available on each Agency's 
respective website: Instructions for Preparing and Submitting 
Quantitative Measurement Information (``Instructions''), Technical 
Specifications Guidance, and an eXtensible Markup Language Schema 
(``XML Schema'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Limit the applicability of certain metrics only to market 
making and underwriting desks.
     Replace the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio with a new 
Transaction Volumes metric to more precisely cover types of trading 
desk transactions with counterparties.
     Replace Inventory Turnover with a new Positions metric, 
which measures the value of all securities and derivatives positions.

[[Page 33495]]

     Remove the requirement to separately report values that 
can be easily calculated from other quantitative measurements already 
reported.
     Streamline and make consistent value calculations for 
different product types, using both notional value and market value to 
facilitate better comparison of metrics across trading desks and 
banking entities.
     Eliminate inventory aging data for derivatives because 
aging, as applied to derivatives, does not appear to provide a 
meaningful indicator of potential impermissible trading activity or 
excessive risk-taking.
     Require banking entities to provide qualitative 
information specifying for each trading desk the types of financial 
instruments traded, the types of covered trading activity the desk 
conducts, and the legal entities into which the trading desk books 
trades.
     Require a Narrative Statement describing changes in 
calculation methods, trading desk structure, or trading desk 
strategies.
     Remove the paragraphs labeled ``General Calculation 
Guidance'' from the regulation. The Instructions generally would 
provide calculation guidance.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ The Instructions are available on each Agency's respective 
website at the addresses specified in the Paperwork Reduction Act 
section of this Supplementary Information. For the SEC and CFTC, 
this document represents the views of SEC staff and CFTC staff, and 
neither Commission has approved nor disapproved the Staff 
Instructions for Preparing and Submitting Quantitative Measurement 
Information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Remove the requirement that banking entities establish and 
report limits on Stressed Value-at-Risk at the trading desk-level 
because trading desks do not typically use such limits to manage and 
control risk-taking.
     Require banking entities to provide descriptive 
information about their reported metrics, including information 
uniquely identifying and describing certain risk measurements and 
information identifying the relationships of these measurements within 
a trading desk and across trading desks.
     Require electronic submission of the Trading Desk 
Information, Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, and 
each applicable quantitative measurement in accordance with the XML 
Schema specified and published on each Agency's website.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ The staff-level Technical Specifications Guidance 
describes the XML Schema. The Technical Specifications Guidance and 
the XML Schema are available on each Agency's respective website at 
the addresses specified in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of 
this Supplementary Information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Taken together, these changes--particularly limiting the 
applicability of certain metrics requirements only to trading desks 
engaged in certain types of covered trading activity--are designed to 
reduce compliance-related inefficiencies relative to the 2013 final 
rule. The proposed amendments to Appendix A of the 2013 final rule 
should allow collection of data that permits the Agencies to better 
monitor compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ As previously noted in the section entitled ``Enhanced 
Minimum Standards for Compliance Programs,'' the Agencies are 
proposing to eliminate Appendix B of the 2013 final rule. If that 
aspect of the proposal is adopted, current Appendix A, as modified 
by the proposal, would be re-designated as the ``Appendix.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of the Proposal
a. Purpose
    Paragraph I.c of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule provides that 
the quantitative measurements that are required to be reported under 
the rule are not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for 
identifying permissible or impermissible activities. The Agencies 
propose to expand paragraph I.c of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule to 
cover all information that must be furnished pursuant to the appendix, 
rather than only to the quantitative measurements themselves. \221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ The proposed amendment to paragraph I.c. of Appendix A 
would make clear that none of the information that a banking entity 
would be required to report under the proposal is intended to serve 
as a dispositive tool for identifying permissible or impermissible 
activities. Currently, that qualifying language only applies to the 
quantitative measurements. As proposed, that information would 
continue to be used to monitor patterns and identify activity that 
may warrant further review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies propose to remove paragraph I.d. in Appendix A of the 
2013 final rule, which provides for an initial review by the Agencies 
of the metrics data and revision of the collection requirement as 
appropriate. The Agencies have conducted this preliminary evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the quantitative measurements collected to date 
and are proposing modifications to Appendix A of the 2013 final rule 
where appropriate. The Agencies are, however, requesting comment on 
whether the rule should provide for a subsequent Agency review within a 
fixed period of time after adoption to consider whether further changes 
are warranted. The Agencies further note that they continue to monitor 
and review the effectiveness of the data as part of their ongoing 
oversight of the banking entities and will continue to do so should the 
proposed changes to Appendix A be adopted.
b. Definitions
    The Agencies are proposing a clarifying change to the definition of 
``covered trading activity.'' The Agencies are proposing to add the 
phrase ``in its covered trading activity'' to clarify that the term 
``covered trading activity,'' as used in the proposed appendix, may 
include trading conducted under Sec. Sec.  __.3(e), __.6(c), __.6(d), 
or __.6(e) of the proposal. The proposed change would simply clarify 
that banking entities would have the discretion (but not the 
obligation) to report metrics with respect to a broader range of 
activities.
    In addition, the proposal defines two additional terms for purposes 
of the appendix, ``applicability'' and ``trading day,'' that were not 
defined in the 2013 final rule. In particular, the proposal provides:
     Applicability identifies the trading desks for which a 
banking entity is required to calculate and report a particular 
quantitative measurement based on the type of covered trading activity 
conducted by the trading desk.
     Trading day means a calendar day on which a trading desk 
is open for trading.
    ``Applicability'' is defined in this proposal to clarify when 
certain metrics are required to be reported for specific trading desks. 
As described further below, this proposal would make several metrics 
applicable only to desks engaged in market making or underwriting.
    The Agencies are proposing to create a definition of ``trading 
day'' to clarify the meaning of a term that is used throughout Appendix 
A of the 2013 final rule. Appendix A provides that the calculation 
period for each quantitative measurement is one trading day. The 
proposal would make clear that a banking entity would be required to 
calculate each metric for each calendar day on which a trading desk is 
open for trading.\222\ If a trading desk books positions to a banking 
entity on a calendar day that is not a business day (e.g., a day that 
falls on a weekend), then the desk is considered open for trading on 
that day. Even if a trading desk does not conduct any trades on a 
business day, the banking entity would be required to report metrics on 
the trading desk's existing positions for that calendar day because the 
trading desk is open to conduct trading. Similarly, if a trading desk 
spans a U.S. entity and a

[[Page 33496]]

foreign entity and a national holiday occurs on a business day in the 
United States but not in the foreign jurisdiction (or vice versa), the 
banking entity would be required to report metrics for the trading desk 
on that calendar day because the trading desk is open to conduct 
trading in at least one jurisdiction. The Agencies believe that the 
proposed definition of trading day is both objective and transparent, 
while also providing flexibility to banking entities by tying the 
definition directly to the schedule in which they operate their trading 
desks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ As a general matter, a trading desk is not considered to 
be open for trading on a weekend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies request comments on the definitions in this proposal, 
including comments on the following questions:
    Question 215. Is the proposed definition of ``Applicability'' 
effective and clear? If not, what alternative definition would be more 
effective and/or clearer?
    Question 216. Is the proposed definition of ``Trading day'' 
effective and clear? If not, what alternative definition would be more 
effective and/or clearer?
    Question 217. Is the proposed modification of ``Covered trading 
activity'' effective and clear? If not, what alternative definition 
would be more effective and/or clearer?
    Question 218. Should any other terms be defined? If so, are there 
existing definitions in other rules or regulations that could be used 
in this context? Why would the use of such other definitions be 
appropriate?
c. Reporting and Recordkeeping
i. Scope of Required Reporting
    The Agencies are proposing several modifications to paragraph III.a 
of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule. The Agencies are proposing to 
remove the Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics 
and replace them with the Positions and Transaction Volumes 
quantitative measurements, respectively. In addition, as discussed 
below, the proposal provides that the Inventory Aging metric would only 
apply to securities, and would not apply to derivatives or securities 
that also meet the 2013 final rule's definition of a derivative.\223\ 
As a result, the Agencies are proposing to change the name of the 
Inventory Aging quantitative measurement to the Securities Inventory 
Aging metric. Moreover, as described in more detail below, the Agencies 
are proposing amendments to Appendix A that would limit the application 
of certain quantitative measurements to trading desks that engage in 
specific covered trading activities.\224\ As a result, the Agencies are 
proposing to add the phrase ``as applicable'' to paragraph III.a.\225\ 
Finally, the Agencies are proposing to add references in paragraph 
III.a to the proposed Trading Desk Information, Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and Narrative Statement 
requirements.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ See infra Part III.E.2.i.v (discussing the Securities 
Inventory Aging quantitative measurement). The definition of 
``security'' and ``derivative'' are set forth in Sec.  __.2 of the 
2013 final rule. See 2013 final rule Sec. Sec.  __.2 (h), (y).
    \224\ As discussed below, the proposed Positions, Transaction 
Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging quantitative measurements 
generally apply only to trading desks that rely on Sec.  __.4(a) or 
Sec.  __.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market making-
related activity, respectively. See infra Part III.E.2.i.iii 
(discussing the Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities 
Inventory Aging quantitative measurements).
    \225\ See 79 FR at 5616.
    \226\ In addition, the Agencies propose to add to paragraph 
III.a. a requirement that banking entities include file identifying 
information in each submission to the relevant Agency pursuant to 
Appendix A of the 2013 final rule. File identifying information 
reflects administrative information needed to identify the reporting 
requirement that is being met and distinguish between files 
submitted pursuant to Appendix A. File identifying information must 
include the name of the banking entity, the RSSD ID assigned to the 
top-tier banking entity by the Board, the reporting period, and the 
creation date and time.
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d. Trading Desk Information
    The Agencies are proposing to add new paragraph III.b to Appendix A 
to require banking entities to report certain descriptive information 
regarding each trading desk engaged in covered trading activity:
i. Trading Desk Name and Trading Desk Identifier
    Under paragraph III.b. of the proposed Appendix, the banking entity 
would be required to provide the trading desk name and trading desk 
identifier for each desk engaged in covered trading activities. While 
this proposed requirement may affect the banking entity's overall 
reporting obligations, this identifying information should enable the 
Agencies to track a banking entity's trading desk structure over time, 
which the Agencies believe will help identify situations when a 
significant data change is the result of a structural change and assist 
the Agencies' ability to monitor patterns in the quantitative 
measurements. The Agencies also believe that the proposed qualitative 
information, including the items identified in the sections below, 
potentially could provide the Agencies with enough contextual basis to 
facilitate the examination and supervisory processes. Such context also 
could potentially lessen the need for Agency follow-up in when a red 
flag is identified.
    The trading desk name must be the name of the trading desk used 
internally by the banking entity. The trading desk identifier is a 
unique identification label that should be permanently assigned to a 
desk by the banking entity. A trading desk at a banking entity may not 
have the same trading desk identifier as another desk at that banking 
entity. The trading desk identifier that is assigned to each desk 
should remain the same for each submission of quantitative 
measurements. In the event a banking entity restructures its operations 
and merges two or more trading desks, the banking entity should assign 
a new trading desk identifier to the merged desk (i.e., the merged 
desk's identifier should not replicate a trading desk identifier 
assigned to a previously unmerged trading desk) and permanently retire 
the unmerged desks' identifiers. Similarly, if a banking entity 
eliminates a trading desk, the trading desk identifier assigned to the 
eliminated desk should be permanently retired (i.e., the eliminated 
desk's identifier should not be reassigned to a current or future 
trading desk).
    Question 219. Should the Agencies require banking entities to 
report changes in desk structure in the XML reporting format in 
addition to a description of the changes in the Narrative Statement? 
For example, a ``change event'' element could be added to the proposal 
that would link the trading desk identifiers of predecessor and 
successor desks before and after trading desk mergers and splits. Would 
the modifications improve the banking entities' and the Agencies' 
ability to track changes in trading desk structure and strategy across 
reporting periods? How significant are any potential costs relative to 
the potential benefits in facilitating the tracking of trading desk 
changes? Please quantify your answers, to the extent feasible.
ii. Type of Covered Trading Activity
    Proposed paragraph III.b. would require a banking entity to 
identify each type of covered trading activity that the trading desk 
conducts. As previously discussed, the proposal defines ``covered 
trading activity,'' in part, as trading conducted by a trading desk 
under Sec. Sec.  __.4, __.5, __.6(a), or __.6(b).\227\ To the extent a 
trading desk relies on one or more of these permitted activity 
exemptions, the banking entity would be required to identify the 
type(s)

[[Page 33497]]

of covered trading activity (e.g., underwriting, market making, risk-
mitigating hedging, etc.) in which the trading desk is engaged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ See supra Part III.E.2.b (discussing the covered trading 
activity definition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed definition of ``covered trading activity'' also 
provides that a banking entity may include in its covered trading 
activity trading conducted under Sec. Sec.  __.3(e), __.6(c), __.6(d), 
or __.6(e). If a trading desk relies on any of the exclusions discussed 
in Sec.  __.3(e) or the permitted activity exemptions discussed in 
Sec. Sec.  __.6(c) through __.6(e) and the banking entity includes such 
activity as ``covered trading activity'' for the desk under the 
proposed Appendix, the banking entity would need to identify these 
activity types (e.g., securities lending, liquidity management, 
fiduciary transactions, etc.) for the trading desk.
    While this proposed requirement may impact a firm's overall 
reporting obligations, the Agencies believe the identification of each 
desk's covered trading activity will help the relevant Agency establish 
the appropriate scope of examination of such activity and assist with 
identifying the relevant exemptions or exclusions for a particular 
trading desk, which in turn enables an evaluation of a desk's reported 
data in the context of those exemptions or exclusions.
iii. Trading Desk Description
    Proposed paragraph III.b. would require a banking entity to provide 
a description of each trading desk engaged in covered trading 
activities. Specifically, the banking entity would be required to 
provide a brief description of the trading desk's general strategy 
(i.e., the method for conducting authorized trading activities). The 
Agencies believe this descriptive information would improve the 
Agencies ability to assess the risks associated with a given covered 
trading activity and would further assist the relevant Agency in 
determining the appropriate frequency and scope of examination of such 
activity.
iv. Types of Financial Instruments and Other Products
    Proposed paragraph III.b. would require a banking entity to provide 
descriptive information regarding the financial instruments and other 
products traded by each desk engaged in covered trading activities. 
Under the proposal, a banking entity would be required to prepare a 
list identifying all the types of financial instruments purchased and 
sold by the trading desk.\228\ The banking entity may include other 
products that are not defined as financial instruments under Sec.  
__.3(c)(1) of the 2013 final rule in this list. In addition, the 
proposal requires a banking entity to indicate which of these financial 
instruments and other products (if applicable) are the main instruments 
and products purchased and sold by the trading desk. If the trading 
desk relies on the permitted activity exemption for market making-
related activities, the banking entity would be required to specify 
whether each type of financial instrument included in the listing of 
all financial instruments is or is not included in the trading desk's 
market-making positions.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ For example, a banking entity may specify that its high 
grade credit trading desk purchases and sells the following types of 
financial instruments: U.S. corporate debt, convertible bonds, 
credit default swaps, and credit default swap indices.
    \229\ The term ``market-maker positions'' means all of the 
positions in the financial instruments for which the trading desk 
stands ready to make a market in accordance with paragraph Sec.  
__.4(b)(2)(i) of the proposal, that are managed by the trading desk, 
including the trading desk's open positions or exposures arising 
from open transactions. See proposal Sec.  __.4(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal also addresses ``excluded products'' traded by desks 
engaged in covered trading activities. The definition of the term 
``financial instrument'' in the 2013 final rule does not include loans, 
spot commodities, and spot foreign exchange or currency (collectively, 
``excluded products'').\230\ While positions in excluded products are 
not subject to the 2013 final rule's restrictions on proprietary 
trading, a banking entity may decide to include exposures in excluded 
products that are related to a trading desk's covered trading 
activities in its quantitative measurements.\231\ A banking entity 
generally should use a consistent approach for including or excluding 
positions in products that are not financial instruments when 
calculating metrics for a trading desk.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(c)(2).
    \231\ The Agencies note that banking entities are not required 
to calculate quantitative measurements based on positions in 
products that are not ``financial instruments,'' as defined under 
Sec.  __.3(c)(2) of the 2013 final rule, or positions that do not 
represent ``covered trading activity.'' However, a banking entity 
may decide to include exposures in products that are not financial 
instruments in a trading desk's calculations where doing so provides 
a more accurate picture of the risks associated with the trading 
desk. For example, a market maker in foreign exchange forwards or 
swaps that mitigates the risks of its market-maker inventory with 
spot foreign exchange may include spot foreign exchange positions in 
its metrics calculations.
    \232\ A banking entity generally should not incorporate excluded 
products in the quantitative measurements of a trading desk one 
month, and omit these products from the trading desk's measurements 
the following month. Excluded products generally should be reported 
consistently from period to period. Any change in reporting practice 
for excluded products must be identified in the banking entity's 
Narrative Statement for the relevant trading desk(s). See infra Part 
III.E.2.f (discussing the Narrative Statement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In recognition that a banking entity may include excluded products 
in its quantitative measurements, proposed paragraph III.b. would 
require a banking entity to indicate whether each trading desk engaged 
in covered trading activities is including excluded products in its 
quantitative measurements. If excluded products are included in a 
trading desk's metrics, the banking entity would have to identify the 
specific products that are included.
    This information should enable the Agencies to better understand 
the scope of covered trading activities, and thus help in identifying 
the profile of particular covered trading activities of a banking 
entity and its individual trading desks. Such identification is 
necessary to establish the appropriate frequency and scope of 
examination by the relevant Agency of such activity, evaluate whether a 
banking entity's covered trading activity is consistent with the 2013 
final rule, and assess the risks associated with the activity.
v. Legal Entities the Trading Desk Uses
    As discussed in the preamble to the 2013 final rule, the Agencies 
recognize that a trading desk may book positions into a single legal 
entity or into multiple affiliated legal entities.\233\ To assist in 
establishing the appropriate scope of examination by the relevant 
Agency of a banking entity's covered trading activities, the Agencies 
are proposing to require each banking entity to identify each legal 
entity that serves as a booking entity for each trading desk engaged in 
covered trading activities, and to indicate which of these legal 
entities are the main booking entities for covered trading activities 
of each desk. The banking entity would have to provide the complete 
name for each legal entity (i.e., the banking entity could not use 
abbreviations or acronyms), and the banking entity would have to 
provide any applicable entity identifiers.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \233\ 79 FR at 5591.
    \234\ The Agencies are not proposing to require each legal 
entity that serves as a booking entity to obtain an entity 
identifier to comply with the proposed appendix. If a legal entity 
does not have an applicable entity identifier, it should report 
``None'' in the appropriate field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi. Legal Entity Type Identification
    The Agencies are proposing to require each banking entity to 
specify any applicable entity type for each legal entity that serves as 
a booking entity for

[[Page 33498]]

trading desks engaged in covered trading activities. The proposal 
provides a list of key entity types for this purpose. For example, if a 
trading desk books trades into a legal entity that is a U.S.-registered 
broker-dealer, the banking entity would indicate ``U.S.-registered 
broker-dealer'' in the entity type identification field for that 
particular trading desk. If more than one entity type applies to a 
particular legal entity that serves as a booking entity, the banking 
entity must specify any applicable entity type for that legal entity. 
For example, if a trading desk books trades into a legal entity that is 
a U.S.-registered broker-dealer and a registered futures commission 
merchant, the banking entity would indicate ``U.S.-registered broker-
dealer'' and ``futures commission merchant'' in the entity type 
identification field for that particular trading desk.
    The proposal also requires that a banking entity identify entity 
types that are not otherwise enumerated in the proposed Appendix, 
including a subsidiary of a legal entity that is listed where the 
subsidiary itself is not included in the list. For example, the 
Agencies understand that a trading desk may book some or all of its 
positions into a legal entity that is incorporated under foreign law. 
In this situation, the banking entity should provide a brief 
description of the entity (e.g., foreign-registered securities dealer) 
in the entity type identification field for that trading desk. The 
Agencies believe that the information collected under this section 
would assist banking entities and the Agencies in monitoring and 
understanding the scope of covered trading activities. In particular, 
the proposed entity type information, in conjunction with the 
identification of legal entities used by the trading desk (discussed 
above), would facilitate the Agencies' ability to coordinate with each 
other, as appropriate.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ See 79 FR at 5758. The Agencies expect to continue to 
coordinate their efforts related to section 13 of the BHC Act and to 
share information as appropriate in order to effectively implement 
the requirements of that section and the 2013 final rule. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Trading Day Indicator
    In order to facilitate metrics reporting, paragraph III.b. of the 
proposed Appendix requires a banking entity to indicate whether each 
calendar date is a trading day or not a trading day for each trading 
desk engaged in covered trading activities. The Agencies believe that 
this information would assist banking entities and the Agencies in 
monitoring covered trading activities. Specifically, the identification 
of trading days and non-trading days will allow the Agencies to 
understand why metrics may not be reported on a particular day for a 
particular trading desk. In addition, the Agencies expect that this 
information would improve consistency in metrics reports by requiring 
banking entities to determine whether metrics are, or are not, required 
to be reported for each calendar day.
viii. Currency Reported and Currency Conversion Rate
    In recognition that a banking entity may report quantitative 
measurements for a trading desk engaged in covered trading activities 
in a currency other than U.S. dollars, paragraph III.b. of the proposed 
Appendix requires a banking entity to specify the currency used by that 
trading desk as well as the conversion rate to U.S. dollars. Under the 
proposal, the banking entity would be required to provide the currency 
reported on a monthly basis and the currency conversion rate for each 
trading day. The Agencies believe this information would assist banking 
entities and the Agencies in monitoring covered trading activities by 
facilitating the identification of quantitative measurements reported 
in a currency other than U.S. dollars and the conversion of such 
measurements to U.S. dollars. The ability to convert a banking entity's 
reported quantitative measurements into one consistent currency 
enhances the ability of the Agencies to evaluate the metrics and 
facilitates cross-desk comparisons.
    Question 220. Is the description of the proposal's Trading Desk 
Information requirement effective and sufficiently clear? If not, what 
alternative would be more effective or clearer? Is more or less 
specific guidance necessary? If so, what level of specificity is needed 
to prepare the proposed Trading Desk Information? If the proposed 
Trading Desk Information is not sufficiently specific, how should it be 
modified to reach the appropriate level of specificity? If the proposed 
Trading Desk Information is overly specific, why is it too specific and 
how should it be modified to reach the appropriate level of 
specificity?
    Question 221. Is the proposed Trading Desk Information helpful to 
understanding the scope, type, and profile of a trading desk's covered 
trading activities and associated risks? Why or why not? Does the 
proposed Trading Desk Information appropriately highlight relevant 
changes in a banking entity's trading desk structure and covered 
trading activities over time? Why or why not? Do banking entities 
expect that the proposed Trading Desk Information would reduce, 
increase, or have no effect on the number of information requests from 
the Agencies regarding the quantitative measurements? Please explain.
    Question 222. Is any of the information required by the proposed 
Trading Desk Information already available to banking entities? Please 
explain.
    Question 223. Does the proposed Trading Desk Information strike the 
appropriate balance between the potential benefits of the reporting 
requirements for monitoring and assuring compliance and the potential 
costs of those reporting requirements? If not, how could that balance 
be improved?
    Question 224. Are there burdens or costs associated with preparing 
the proposed Trading Desk Information, and if so, how burdensome or 
costly would it be to prepare such information? What are the additional 
burdens or costs associated with preparing this information for 
particular trading desks? How significant are those potential costs 
relative to the potential benefits of the information in understanding 
the scope, type, and profile of a trading desk's covered trading 
activities and associated risks? Are there potential modifications that 
could be made to the proposed Trading Desk Information that would 
reduce the burden or cost while achieving the purpose of the proposal? 
If so, what are those modifications? Please quantify your answers, to 
the extent feasible.
    Question 225. In light of the size, scope, complexity, and risk of 
covered trading activities, do commenters anticipate the need to hire 
new staff with particular expertise in order to prepare the proposed 
Trading Desk Information (e.g., collect data and map legal entities)? 
Do commenters anticipate the need to develop additional infrastructure 
to obtain and retain data necessary to prepare this schedule? Please 
explain and quantify your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 226. What operational or logistical challenges might be 
associated with preparing the proposed Trading Desk Information and 
obtaining any necessary informational inputs?
    Question 227. How might the proposed Trading Desk Information 
affect the behavior of banking entities? To what extent and in what 
ways might uncertainty as to how the Agencies will review and evaluate 
the proposed Trading Desk Information affect the behavior of banking 
entities?
    Question 228. Is the meaning of the term ``main,'' as that term is 
used in the proposed Trading Desk Information (e.g., main financial 
instruments or

[[Page 33499]]

products, main booking entities), effective and sufficiently clear? If 
not, how should the Agencies define this term such that it is more 
effective and/or clearer? Should the meaning of the term ``main'' be 
the same with respect to: (i) Main financial instruments or other 
products; and (ii) main booking entities? Why or why not?
    Question 229. In addition to reporting ``main'' financial 
instruments or products and ``main'' booking entities, should banking 
entities be required to report the amount of profit and loss 
attributable to each ``main'' financial instrument or product and/or 
``main'' booking entity utilized by the trading desk in the Trading 
Desk Information? Why or why not?
    Question 230. Is the proposal's requirement that a banking entity 
identify all financial instruments or other products traded on a desk 
effective and clear? Why or why not? Should the Agencies provide a 
specific list of financial instruments or other product types from 
which to choose when identifying financial instruments or other 
products traded on a desk? If so, please provide examples.
    Question 231. Should banking entities be required to report at 
least one valid unique entity identifier (e.g., LEI, CRD, RSSD, or CIK) 
for each legal entity identified as a booking entity for covered 
trading activities of a desk? How burdensome and costly would it be for 
a banking entity to obtain an entity identifier for each legal entity 
serving as a booking entity that does not already have an identifier? 
What are the additional burdens or costs associated with obtaining an 
entity identifier for particular legal entities? How significant are 
those potential costs relative to the potential benefits in 
facilitating the identification of legal entities? Please quantify your 
answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 232. Is more guidance needed on what a banking entity 
should report in response to the proposed requirement to specify the 
applicable entity type(s) for each legal entity that serves as a 
booking entity for covered trading activities of a trading desk? If so, 
please explain.
    Question 233. How burdensome and costly would it be for banking 
entities to report which Agencies receive reported quantitative 
measurements for each specific trading desk?
e. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information
    The Agencies are proposing to add new paragraph III.c. to the 
proposed Appendix to require banking entities to prepare and report 
descriptive information regarding their quantitative measurements. This 
information would have to be reported collectively for all relevant 
trading desks. For example, a banking entity would report one Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedule, rather than separate Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedules for each of those trading desks.
i. Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule
    The proposed Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule requires 
banking entities to provide detailed information regarding each limit 
reported in the Risk and Position Limits and Usage quantitative 
measurement, including the unique identification label for the limit, 
the limit name, limit description, whether the limit is intraday or 
end-of-day, the unit of measurement for the limit, whether the limit 
measures risk on a net or gross basis, and the type of limit. The 
unique identification label for the limit should be a character string 
identifier that remains consistent across all trading desks and 
reporting periods. When reporting the type of limit, the banking entity 
would identify which of the following categories best describes the 
limit: Value-at-Risk, position limit, sensitivity limit, stress 
scenario, or other. If ``other'' is reported, the banking entity would 
provide a brief description of the type of limit. The Agencies believe 
this more detailed limit information would enable the Agencies to 
better understand how banking entities assess and address risks 
associated with their covered trading activities.
ii. Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule
    The proposed Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule 
requires banking entities to provide detailed information regarding 
each risk factor sensitivity reported in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
quantitative measurement, including the unique identification label for 
the risk factor sensitivity, the name of the risk factor sensitivity, a 
description of the risk factor sensitivity, and the risk factor 
sensitivity's risk factor change unit. The unique identification label 
for the risk factor sensitivity should be a character string identifier 
that remains consistent across all trading desks and reporting periods. 
The risk factor change unit is the measurement unit of the risk factor 
change that impacts the trading desk's portfolio value.\236\ This 
proposed schedule should enable the Agencies to better understand the 
exposure of a banking entity's trading desks to individual risk 
factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ For example, the risk factor change unit for the dollar 
value of a one-basis point change (DV01) could be reported as 
``basis point.'' Similarly, the risk factor change unit for equity 
delta could be reported as ``dollar change in equity prices'' or 
``percentage change in equity prices.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule
    The proposed Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule requires 
banking entities to provide detailed information regarding each 
attribution of existing position profit and loss to risk factor 
reported in the Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution quantitative 
measurement, including the unique identification label for each risk 
factor or other factor attribution, the name of the risk factor or 
other factor, a description of the risk factor or other factor, and the 
risk factor or other factor's change unit. The unique identification 
label for the risk factor or other factor attribution should be a 
character string identifier that remains consistent across all trading 
desks and reporting periods. The factor change unit is the measurement 
unit of the risk factor or other factor change that impacts the trading 
desk's portfolio value.\237\ This proposed schedule should improve the 
Agencies' understanding of the individual risk factors and other 
factors that contribute to the daily profit and loss of trading desks 
engaged in covered trading activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ See supra note 236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule
    The Agencies recognize that risk factor sensitivities that are 
reported in the Risk Factor Sensitivities quantitative measurement 
frequently relate to, or are associated with, risk and position limits 
that are reported in the Risk and Position Limits and Usage metric. In 
recognition of the relationship between risk and position limits and 
associated risk factor sensitivities, the Agencies propose an amendment 
to Appendix A of the 2013 final rule that would require banking 
entities to prepare a Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule. 
Specifically, banking entities would be required to cross-reference, by 
unique identification label, a limit reported in the Risk and Position 
Limits Information Schedule to any associated risk factor sensitivity 
reported in the Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule.
    Highlighting the relationship between limits and risk factor 
sensitivities should provide a broader picture of a

[[Page 33500]]

trading desk's covered trading activities and improve the Agencies' 
understanding of the quantitative measurements. For example, the 
proposed Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule should help the 
Agencies better evaluate a reported limit on a risk factor sensitivity 
by allowing the Agencies to efficiently identify additional contextual 
information about the risk factor sensitivity in the banking entity's 
metrics submission.
v. Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference Schedule
    The Agencies note that the specific risk factors and other factors 
that are reported in the Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution 
quantitative measurement may relate to the risk factor sensitivities 
reported in the Risk Factor Sensitivities metric. As a result, the 
Agencies are proposing an amendment to Appendix A of the 2013 final 
rule that would require banking entities to prepare a Risk Factor 
Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference Schedule. Specifically, banking 
entities would be required to cross-reference, by unique identification 
label, a risk factor sensitivity reported in the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities Information Schedule to any associated risk factor 
attribution reported in the Risk Factor Attribution Information 
Schedule. This proposed cross-reference schedule is intended to clarify 
the relationship between risk factors that serve as sensitivities and 
the profit and loss that is attributed to those risk factors. In 
conjunction with the Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule, the 
Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference Schedule should 
assist the Agencies in understanding the broader scope, type, and 
profile of a banking entity's covered trading activities and assessing 
associated risks, and facilitate the relevant Agency's efforts in 
monitoring those covered trading activities. For example, the proposed 
Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference Schedule should 
help the Agencies compare the variables that a banking entity has 
identified as significant sources of its trading desks' profitability 
and risk for purposes of the Risk Factor Sensitivities metric to the 
factor(s) that account for actual changes in the banking entity's 
trading desk-level profit and loss, as reported in the Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss Attribution metric. This comparison will allow the 
Agencies to evaluate whether a banking entity has identified risk 
factors in the Risk Factor Sensitivities metric of a trading desk that 
help explain the trading desk's profit and loss.
    Question 234. Is the information required by the proposed 
Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information effective and 
sufficiently clear? If not, what alternative would be more effective or 
clearer? Is more or less specific guidance necessary? If so, what level 
of specificity is needed to prepare the relevant schedule? If the 
proposed Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information is not 
sufficiently specific, how should it be modified to reach the 
appropriate level of specificity? If the proposed Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information is overly specific, why is it too 
specific and how should it be modified to reach the appropriate level 
of specificity?
    Question 235. Is the information required by the proposed 
Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information helpful or not 
helpful to understanding a banking entity's covered trading activities 
and associated risks? Identify which specific pieces of information are 
helpful or not helpful and explain why. Does the information provide 
necessary clarity about a banking entity's risk measures and how such 
risk measures relate to one another over time and within and across 
trading desks? Do banking entities expect that the schedules will 
reduce, increase, or have no effect on the number of information 
requests from the Agencies regarding the quantitative measurements? 
Please explain.
    Question 236. Is the information required by the proposed 
Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information already available to 
banking entities? Please explain.
    Question 237. Does the proposed Quantitative Measurements 
Identifying Information strike the appropriate balance between the 
potential benefits of the reporting requirements for monitoring and 
assuring compliance and the potential costs of those reporting 
requirements? If not, how could that balance be improved?
    Question 238. How burdensome and costly would it be to prepare each 
schedule within the proposed Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information? What are the additional burdens costs associated with 
preparing these schedules for particular trading desks? How significant 
are those potential costs relative to the potential benefits of the 
schedules in monitoring covered trading activities and assessing risks 
associated with those activities? Are there potential modifications 
that could be made to these schedules that would reduce the burden or 
cost? If so, what are those modifications? Please quantify your 
answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 239. In light of the size, scope, complexity, and risk of 
covered trading activities, do commenters anticipate the need to hire 
new staff with particular expertise in order to prepare the information 
required by the proposed Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information (e.g., to program information systems and collect data)? Do 
commenters anticipate the need to develop additional infrastructure to 
obtain and retain data necessary to prepare these schedules? Please 
explain and quantify your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 240. What operational or logistical challenges might be 
associated with preparing the information required by the proposed 
Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information and obtaining any 
necessary informational inputs?
    Question 241. How might the proposed Quantitative Measurements 
Identifying Information affect the behavior of banking entities? To 
what extent and in what ways might uncertainty as to how the Agencies 
will review and evaluate the proposed Quantitative Measurements 
Identifying Information affect the behavior of banking entities?
f. Narrative Statement
    The proposed paragraph III.d. requires a banking entity to submit a 
Narrative Statement in a separate electronic document to the relevant 
Agency that describes any changes in calculation methods used for its 
quantitative measurements and to indicate when this change occurred. In 
addition, a banking entity would have to prepare and submit a Narrative 
Statement when there are any changes in the banking entity's trading 
desk structure (e.g., adding, terminating, or merging pre-existing 
desks) or trading desk strategies. Under these circumstances, the 
Narrative Statement would have to describe the change, document the 
reasons for the change, and specify when the change occurred.
    Under the proposal, the banking entity would have to report in a 
Narrative Statement any other information the banking entity views as 
relevant for assessing the information schedules or quantitative 
measurements, such as a further description of calculation methods that 
the banking entity is using. In addition, a banking entity would have 
to explain its inability to report a particular quantitative 
measurement in the Narrative Statement. A banking entity also would 
have to provide notice in its Narrative Statement if a trading desk 
changes its approach to including or

[[Page 33501]]

excluding products that are not financial instruments in its metrics.
    If a banking entity does not have any information to report in a 
Narrative Statement, the banking entity would have to submit an 
electronic document stating that it does not have any information to 
report in a Narrative Statement.
    Question 242. Should the Narrative Statement be required? If so, 
why? Should the proposed requirement apply to all changes in the 
calculation methods a banking entity uses for its quantitative 
measurements or should the proposed rule text be revised to apply only 
to changes that rise to a certain level of significance? Please 
explain.
    Question 243. Is the proposed Narrative Statement requirement 
effective and sufficiently clear? If not, what alternative would be 
more effective or clearer? Are there other circumstances in which a 
Narrative Statement should be required? If so, what are those 
circumstances?
    Question 244. How burdensome or costly is the proposed Narrative 
Statement to prepare? Are there potential benefits of the Narrative 
Statement to banking entities, particularly as it relates to the 
ability of banking entities and the Agencies to monitor a firm's 
covered trading activities?
g. Frequency and Method of Required Calculation and Reporting
    The 2013 final rule established a reporting schedule in Sec.  __.20 
that required banking entities with $50 billion or more in trading 
assets and liabilities to report the information required by Appendix A 
of the 2013 final rule within 10 days of the end of each calendar 
month. The Agencies are proposing to adjust this reporting schedule to 
extend the time to be within 20 days of the end of each calendar 
month.\238\ Experience with implementing the 2013 final rule has shown 
that the information submitted within ten days is often incomplete or 
contains errors. Banking entities must regularly provide resubmissions 
to correct or complete their initial information submission. This 
extension of the time for reporting is expected to reduce compliance 
costs as the additional time would allow the required workflow to be 
conducted under less time pressure and with greater efficiency and 
fewer resubmissions should be necessary. The schedule for banking 
entities with less than $50 billion in trading assets and liabilities 
would remain unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See Sec.  __.20(d) of the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 245. Is the proposed frequency of reporting the Trading 
Desk Information, Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, 
and Narrative Statement appropriate and effective? If not, what 
frequency would be more effective? Should the information be required 
to be reported quarterly, annually, or upon the request of the 
applicable Agency and, if so, why?
    Question 246. Would providing banking entities with additional time 
to report quantitative measurements meaningfully reduce resubmissions? 
If so, would the additional time reduce burdens on banking entities? 
Please provide quantitative data to the extent feasible.
    Question 247. Is there a calculation period other than daily that 
would provide more meaningful data for certain metrics? For example, 
would weekly inventory aging instead of daily inventory aging be more 
effective? Why or why not?
    Appendix A of the 2013 final rule did not specify a format in which 
metrics should be reported. As a technical matter, banking entities may 
currently report quantitative measurements to the relevant Agency using 
various formats and conventions. After consultation with staffs of the 
Agencies, the reporting banking entities submitted their quantitative 
measurement data electronically in a pipe-delimited flat file format. 
However, this flat file format has proved to be unwieldy and its 
syntactical requirements have been unclear. There has been no easy way 
for banking entities to validate that their data files are in the 
correct format before submitting them, and so banking entities have 
often needed to resubmit their quantitative measurements to address 
formatting issues.
    To make the formatting requirements for the data submissions 
clearer, and to help ensure the quality and consistency of data 
submissions across banking entities, the Agencies are proposing to 
require that the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and each applicable quantitative 
measurement be reported in accordance with an XML Schema to be 
specified and published on the relevant Agency's website.\239\ By 
requiring the XML Schema, the Agencies look to establish a structured 
model through which reported data can be recognized and processed by 
standard computer code or software (i.e., made machine-readable). The 
proposed reporting format should promote complete and intelligible 
records of covered trading activities and facilitate the reporting of 
key identifying and descriptive information. Submissions structured 
according to the XML Schema should enhance the Agencies' ability to 
normalize, aggregate, and analyze reported metrics. In turn, the 
proposed reporting format should facilitate monitoring of covered 
trading activities and enable the relevant Agency to more efficiently 
interpret and evaluate reported metrics. For example, the proposed 
reporting format should enhance the Agencies' ability to compare data 
across trading desks and analyze data over different time horizons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ To the extent the XML Schema is updated, the version of 
the XML Schema that must be used by banking entities would be 
specified on the relevant Agency's website. A banking entity must 
not use an outdated version of the XML Schema to report the Trading 
Desk Information, Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, 
and applicable quantitative measurements to the relevant Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 248. How burdensome and costly would it be to develop new 
systems, or modify existing systems, to implement the proposed 
Appendix's electronic reporting requirement and XML Schema? How 
significant are those potential costs relative to the potential 
benefits of electronic reporting and the XML Schema in facilitating 
review and analysis of a banking entity's covered trading activities? 
Are there potential modifications that could be made to the proposal's 
electronic reporting requirement or XML Schema that would reduce the 
burden or cost? If so, what are those modifications? Please quantify 
your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 249. Is the proposed XML reporting format for submission 
of the Trading Desk Information, applicable quantitative measurements, 
and the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information appropriate 
and effective? Why or why not?
    Question 250. Is there a reporting format other than the XML Schema 
that the Agencies should consider as acceptable? Should the Agencies 
allow banking entities to develop their own reporting formats? If so, 
are there any general reporting standards that should be included in 
the rule to facilitate the Agencies' ability to normalize, aggregate, 
and analyze data that is reported pursuant to different electronic 
formats or schemas? Please explain in detail.
    Question 251. What would be the costs to a banking entity to 
provide quantitative measurements data according to the proposed XML 
reporting format? Please quantify your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 252. For a banking entity currently reporting quantitative

[[Page 33502]]

measurements in some other electronic format, what would be the costs 
(such as equipment, systems, training, or ongoing staffing or 
maintenance) to convert current systems to use the proposed XML 
reporting format? Please quantify your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 253. Is there a more effective way to distribute the XML 
Schema than the current proposal of having each Agency host a copy of 
the XML Schema on its respective website? For example, would it be more 
effective for all Agencies to point to only one location where the XML 
Schema will be hosted? If so, please identify how the alternative would 
improve data quality and accessibility. How long should the 
implementation period be?
    Question 254. Currently banking entities are reporting quantitative 
measurements separately to each Agency using tailored data files 
containing only the measurements for the trading desks that book into 
legal entities for which an Agency is the primary supervisor. Would it 
be more effective for all Agencies to use a single point of collection 
for the quantitative measurements? If so, would there be any impact on 
Agencies ability to review and analyze a banking entity's covered 
trading activities? How significant are the costs of reporting 
separately to each Agency? Please quantify your answers, to the extent 
feasible. Are there any other ways to make the metrics requirements 
more efficient? For example, are any banking entities subject to any 
separate or related data reporting requirements that could be leveraged 
to make the proposal more efficient?
h. Recordkeeping
    Under paragraph III.c. of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule, a 
banking entity's reported quantitative measurements are subject to the 
record retention requirements provided in the appendix. Under the 
proposal, this provision would be in paragraph III.f. of the appendix. 
The Agencies propose to expand this provision to include the Narrative 
Statement, the Trading Desk Information, and the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information in the appendix's record retention 
requirements.
    Question 255. Is the proposed application of Appendix A's record 
retention requirement to the Trading Desk Information, Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and Narrative Statement 
appropriate? If not, what alternatives would be more appropriate? What 
costs would be associated with retaining the Narrative Statements and 
information schedules on that basis, and how could those costs be 
reduced or eliminated? Please quantify your answers, to the extent 
feasible.
    Question 256. Should the proposed Trading Desk Information, 
Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, and Narrative 
Statement be subject to the same five-year retention requirement that 
applies to the quantitative measurements? Why or why not? If not, how 
long should the information schedules and Narrative Statements be 
retained, and why?
i. Quantitative Measurements
    Section IV of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule sets forth the 
individual quantitative measurements required by the appendix. The 
Agencies are proposing to add an ``Applicability'' paragraph to each 
quantitative measurement that identifies the trading desks for which a 
banking entity would be required to calculate and report a particular 
metric based on the type of covered trading activity conducted by the 
desk. In addition, the Agencies are proposing to remove the ``General 
Calculation Guidance'' paragraphs that appear in section IV of Appendix 
A of the 2013 final rule for each quantitative measurement. Content of 
these General Calculation Guidance paragraphs would instead generally 
be addressed in the Instructions.
i. Risk-Management Measurements

A. Risk and Position Limits and Usage

    The Agencies are proposing to remove references to Stressed Value-
at-Risk (Stressed VaR) in the Risk and Position Limits and Usage 
metric. Eliminating the requirement to report desk-level limits for 
Stressed VaR should reduce reporting obligations for banking entities 
without reducing the Agencies' ability to monitor proprietary trading.
    The proposal clarifies in new ``Applicability'' paragraph 
IV.a.1.iv. that, as in the 2013 final rule, the Risk and Position 
Limits and Usage metric applies to all trading desks engaged in covered 
trading activities. For each trading desk, the proposal requires that a 
banking entity report the unique identification label for each limit as 
listed in the Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule, the limit 
size (distinguishing between the upper bound and lower bound of the 
limit, where applicable), and the value of usage of the limit.\240\ The 
unique identification label should allow the Agencies to efficiently 
obtain the descriptive information regarding the limit that is 
separately reported in the Risk and Position Limits Information 
Schedule.\241\ The proposal requires a banking entity to report this 
descriptive information in the Risk and Position Limits Information 
Schedule for the entire banking entity's covered trading activity, 
rather than multiple times in the Risk and Position Limits and Usage 
metric for different trading desks, to help alleviate inefficiencies 
associated with reporting redundant information and reduce electronic 
file submission sizes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ If a limit is introduced or discontinued during a calendar 
month, the banking entity must report this information for each 
trading day that the trading desk used the limit during the calendar 
month.
    \241\ Such information includes the name of the limit, a 
description of the limit, whether the limit is intraday or end-of-
day, the unit of measurement for the limit, whether the limit 
measures risk on a net or gross basis, and the type of limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unlike the 2013 final rule, the proposal requires a banking entity 
to report the limit size of both the upper bound and the lower bound of 
a limit if a trading desk has both an upper and lower limit. The 
Agencies understand that, based on a review of the collected data and 
discussions with banking entities, trading desks may have upper and 
lower limits. An upper limit means the value of risk cannot go above 
the limit, while a lower limit means the value of risk cannot go below 
the limit. This proposed amendment is intended to help identify when a 
trading desk has both an upper limit and a lower limit and avoid 
incomplete or unclear reporting under these circumstances. In addition, 
receipt of information about upper and lower limits, where applicable, 
should allow the Agencies to better evaluate the constraints that a 
banking entity places on the risks of a trading desk. For example, if a 
trading desk has both upper and lower limits but only one such limit is 
reported, the Agencies would not have complete information about the 
desk's limits or the usage of such limits, including potential limit 
breaches that may warrant further review.
    The proposal also clarifies the 2013 final rule's requirement to 
separately report a trading desk's usage of its limit. As noted above, 
usage is the value of the trading desk's risk or positions that are 
accounted for by the current activity of the desk. The value of the 
usage generally should be reported as of the end of the day for limits 
that are accounted for at the end of the day; conversely, banking 
entities generally should report the maximum value of the usage for 
limits accounted for intraday.

[[Page 33503]]

    Question 257. Should Stressed VaR limits be removed as a reporting 
requirement for desks engaged in permitted market making-related 
activity or risk-mitigating hedging activity? Are VaR limits without 
accompanying Stressed VaR limits adequate for these desks? Should 
another type of limit be required to replace Stressed VaR, such as 
expected shortfall? Should Stressed VaR limits instead be required for 
other types of covered trading activities besides market making-related 
activity or risk-mitigating hedging activity?
    Question 258. Should VaR limits be removed as a reporting 
requirement for trading desks engaged in permitted market making-
related activity or risk-mitigating hedging activity? Why or why not?
    Question 259. The proposal requires a banking entity to report the 
limit size of both the upper bound and the lower bound of a limit if a 
trading desk has both an upper and lower limit. Should banking entities 
be required to report both the upper bound and the lower bound of a 
limit (if applicable) or should the requirement only apply to the upper 
limit? Please discuss the anticipated costs and other burdens of this 
new requirement and how they compare to the benefits.

B. Risk Factor Sensitivities

    The proposed ``Applicability'' paragraph IV.a.2.iv. provides that, 
as in the 2013 final rule, the Risk Factor Sensitivities metric applies 
to all trading desks engaged in covered trading activities. Under the 
proposal, a banking entity would have to report for each trading desk 
the unique identification label associated with each risk factor 
sensitivity of the desk, the magnitude of the change in the risk 
factor, and the aggregate change in value across all positions of the 
desk given the change in risk factor.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ If a risk factor sensitivity is introduced or discontinued 
during a calendar month, the banking entity must report this 
information for each trading day that the trading desk used the 
sensitivity during the calendar month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed unique identification label should allow the Agencies 
to efficiently obtain the descriptive information for the Risk Factor 
Sensitivity that is separately reported in the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities Information Schedule.\243\ The proposal requires a 
banking entity to report this descriptive information in the Risk 
Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule for the entire banking 
entity's covered trading activity, rather than multiple times in the 
Risk Factor Sensitivities metric for different trading desks, to help 
alleviate inefficiencies associated with reporting redundant 
information and reduce electronic file submission sizes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ Such information includes the name of the sensitivity, a 
description of the sensitivity, and the sensitivity's risk factor 
change unit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk

    The proposal modifies the description of Stressed VaR to align its 
calculation with that of Value-at-Risk and removes the General 
Calculation Guidance. A new ``Applicability'' paragraph IV.a.3.iv. 
provides that Stressed VaR is not required to be reported for trading 
desks whose covered trading activity is conducted exclusively to hedge 
products excluded from the definition of financial instrument in Sec.  
__.3(d)(2) of the proposal. The Agencies believe that limiting the 
applicability of the Stressed VaR metric in this manner may reduce 
burden without impacting the ability of the Agencies to monitor for 
prohibited proprietary trading. In particular, the Agencies believe 
that applying Stressed VaR to trading desks whose covered trading 
activity is conducted exclusively to hedge excluded products does not 
provide meaningful information about whether the trading desk is 
engaged in proprietary trading. For example, when Stressed VaR is 
applied to hedges of loans held-to-maturity on a trading desk, Stressed 
VaR is unlikely to provide an accurate indication of the risk taken on 
that desk. Thus, the Agencies are providing that Stressed VaR need not 
be reported under these circumstances.
    Question 260. Is Stressed VaR a useful metric for monitoring 
covered trading activity for trading desks engaged in permitted market 
making-related activity or underwriting activity? Why or why not? Are 
there other covered trading activities for which Stressed VaR is useful 
or not useful?
ii. Source-of-Revenue Measurements

A. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution

    It is unnecessary for banking entities to calculate and report 
volatility of comprehensive profit and loss because the measurement can 
be calculated from the profit and loss amounts reported under the 
Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution metric. Thus, the proposed 
Appendix would remove this requirement.
    With respect to the profit and loss attribution to individual risk 
factors and other factors, the Agencies are proposing to add to the 
proposed Appendix a new paragraph IV.b.1.B. Under the proposal, a 
banking entity would be required to provide, for one or more factors 
that explain the preponderance of the profit or loss changes due to 
risk factor changes, a unique identification label for the factor and 
the profit or loss due to the factor change. The proposal requires a 
banking entity to report a unique identification label for the factor 
so the Agencies can efficiently obtain the descriptive information 
regarding the factor that is separately reported in the Risk Factor 
Attribution Information Schedule.\244\ The proposal requires a banking 
entity to report this descriptive information in the Risk Factor 
Attribution Information Schedule for the entire banking entity's 
covered trading activity, rather than multiple times in the 
Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution metric for different trading 
desks, to help alleviate inefficiencies associated with reporting 
redundant information and reduce electronic file submission sizes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ Such information includes the name of the risk factor or 
other factor, a description of the risk factor or other factor, and 
the change unit of the risk factor or other factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A new ``Applicability'' paragraph IV.b.1.iv provides that, as in 
the 2013 final rule, the Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution 
metric applies to all trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.
    Question 261. Appendix A of the 2013 final rule specified under 
Source-of-Revenue Measurements that Comprehensive Profit and Loss be 
divided into three categories: (i) Profit and loss attributable to 
existing positions; (ii) profit and loss attributable to new positions; 
and (iii) residual profit and loss that cannot be specifically 
attributed to existing positions or new positions. The sum of (i), 
(ii), and (iii) must equal the trading desk's comprehensive profit and 
loss at each point in time. Appendix A of the 2013 final rule further 
required that the portion of comprehensive profit and loss that cannot 
be specifically attributed to known sources must be allocated to a 
residual category identified as an unexplained portion of the 
comprehensive profit and loss. The proposed Appendix does not change 
these specifications. However, the Agencies' experience implementing 
the 2013 final rule has shown that the two statements about residual 
profit and loss can give rise to conflicting interpretations. The 
Agencies see value in monitoring any profit and loss that cannot be 
attributed to existing or new positions. The Agencies also see value in 
monitoring the profit and loss

[[Page 33504]]

attribution to risk factors, and the Agencies' experience is that many 
reporters of quantitative measurements include the remainder from 
profit and loss attribution in the item for Residual Profit and Loss. 
In practice, however, profit and loss attribution is performed on 
existing position profit and loss, so this interpretation breaks the 
additivity of (i), (ii), and (iii) above. A potential resolution of 
this conflict would be to clarify in the Instructions for Preparing and 
Submitting Quantitative Measurements Information that Residual Profit 
and Loss is only profit and loss that cannot be attributed to existing 
or new positions, and to add a separate reporting item for Unexplained 
Profit and Loss from Existing Positions. The Agencies are seeking 
comment on how beneficial for institutions and regulators this 
additional item would be to show and assess banking entities' profit 
and loss attribution analysis. How much would adding this item consume 
additional compliance resources of reporters?
    Question 262. Appendix A of the 2013 final rule specified that 
profit and loss from existing positions be further attributed to (i) 
the specific risk factors and other factors that are monitored and 
managed as part of the trading desk's overall risk management policies 
and procedures; and (ii) any other applicable elements, such as cash 
flows, carry, changes in reserves, and the correction, cancellation, or 
exercise of a trade. The metrics reporting instructions further 
specified that the preponderance of profit and loss due to risk factor 
changes should be reported as profit and loss attributions to 
individual factors. The proposed Appendix and metrics instructions do 
not change these requirements. However, experience implementing the 
2013 final rule has shown that the definition of Profit and Loss Due to 
Changes in Risk Factors is vague and open to multiple interpretations. 
The Agencies see value in monitoring the total profit and loss 
attribution to risk factors that banking entities use to monitor their 
sources of revenue, which may go beyond the preponderance of profit and 
loss that is reported as attributions to individual factors. Moreover, 
in practice profit and loss attribution is often sensitivity-based and 
an approximation. Banking entities also routinely calculate 
``hypothetical'' or ``clean'' profit and loss, which is the full 
revaluation of existing positions under all risk factor changes, and is 
used in banking entities' risk management to compare to VaR. The 
Agencies are seeking comment on how best to specify the calculation for 
Profit and Loss Due to Risk Factor Changes. Do commenters expect that 
``hypothetical'' profit and loss can be derived from other items 
already reported? If not, what are the costs and benefits of clarifying 
the definition of Profit and Loss Due to Risk Factor Changes to make it 
align with ``hypothetical'' or ``Clean P&L'' as prescribed by market 
risk capital rules? Alternatively, what are the costs and benefits of 
clarifying the definition to be the sum of all profit and loss 
attributions regardless of whether they are reported individually? What 
would be the additional compliance costs of requiring that both 
``hypothetical'' profit and loss and the sum of all profit and loss 
attributions be reported as separate items in the quantitative 
measurements?
iii. Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging 
Measurements

A. Positions and Inventory Turnover

    Paragraph IV.c.1. of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule requires 
banking entities to calculate and report Inventory Turnover. This 
metric is required to be calculated on a daily basis for 30-day, 60-
day, and 90-day calculation periods. The Agencies are proposing to 
replace the Inventory Turnover metric with the daily data underlying 
that metric, rather than proposing specific calculation periods, 
because the Agencies may choose to use different inventory turnover 
calculation periods depending on the particular trading desk or covered 
trading activity under review. The proposal replaces Inventory Turnover 
with the daily Positions quantitative measurement. In conjunction with 
the proposed Transaction Volumes metric (discussed below), the proposed 
Positions metric would provide the Agencies with flexibility to 
calculate inventory turnover ratios over any period of time, including 
a single trading day.
    Based on an evaluation of the information collected pursuant to the 
Inventory Turnover quantitative measurement, the Agencies are proposing 
to limit the scope of applicability of the Positions metric to trading 
desks that rely on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __.4(b) to conduct 
underwriting activity or market making-related activity, respectively. 
As a result, a trading desk that does not rely on Sec.  __.4(a) or 
Sec.  __.4(b) would not be subject to the proposed Positions 
metric.\245\ The proposed Positions metric would require a banking 
entity to report the value of securities and derivatives positions 
managed by an applicable trading desk. Thus, if a trading desk relies 
on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __.4(b) and engages in other covered trading 
activity, the reported Positions metric would have to reflect all of 
the covered trading activities conducted by the desk.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ For example, a trading desk that relies solely on Sec.  
__.5 to conduct risk-mitigating hedging activity is not subject to 
the proposed Positions metric.
    \246\ For example, if a trading desk relies on Sec.  __.4(b) and 
Sec.  __.5 to conduct market making-related activity and risk-
mitigating hedging activity, respectively, the reported Positions 
metric for the desk would be required to reflect its risk-mitigating 
hedging activity in addition to its market making-related activity. 
The Agencies note, however, that a trading desk would not be 
required to include trading activity conducted under Sec. Sec.  
__.3(e), __6(c), __.6(d), or __.6(e) in the proposed Positions 
metric, unless the banking entity includes such activity as 
``covered trading activity'' for the desk under the appendix. This 
is consistent with the proposed definition of ``covered trading 
activity,'' which provides that a banking entity may include in its 
covered trading activity trading conducted under Sec. Sec.  __.3(e), 
__.6(c), __.6(d), or __.6(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal provides that banking entities subject to the appendix 
would have to separately report the market value of all long securities 
positions, the market value of all short securities positions, the 
market value of all derivatives receivables, the market value of all 
derivatives payables, the notional value of all derivatives 
receivables, and the notional value of all derivatives payables.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ The Agencies note that banking entities must report the 
effective notional value of derivatives receivables and derivatives 
payables for those derivatives whose stated notional amount is 
leveraged. For example, if an exchange of payments associated with a 
$2 million notional equity swap is based on three times the return 
associated with the underlying equity, the effective notional amount 
of the equity swap would be $6 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the proposal addresses the classification of securities 
and derivatives for purposes of the proposed Positions quantitative 
measurement. The Agencies recognize that the 2013 final rule's 
definition of ``security'' and ``derivative'' overlap.\248\ For 
example, under the 2013 final rule a security-based swap is both a 
``security'' and a ``derivative.'' \249\ The proposed Positions 
quantitative measurement would require banking entities to separately 
report the value of all securities and derivatives positions managed by 
a

[[Page 33505]]

trading desk. To avoid double-counting financial instruments, the 
proposed Positions metric would require banking entities subject to the 
appendix to not include in the Positions calculation for ``securities'' 
those securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are 
defined under the final rule. Instead, securities that are also 
derivatives under the final rule are required to be reported as 
``derivatives'' for purposes of the proposed Positions metric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See 2013 final rule Sec. Sec.  __.2(h), (y).
    \249\ The term ``security'' is defined in the 2013 final rule by 
reference to section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ``Exchange Act''). See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.2(y). Under the 
Exchange Act, the term ``security'' means, in part, any security-
based swap. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10). The term ``security-based 
swap'' is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act. See 15 
U.S.C. 78c(a)(68). Under the 2013 final rule, the term 
``derivative'' means, in part, any security-based swap as that term 
is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act. See 2013 final 
rule Sec.  __.2(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 263. Should the Agencies eliminate the Inventory Turnover 
quantitative measurement? Why or why not? Should the Agencies replace 
Inventory Turnover with the proposed Positions metric in the proposed 
Appendix? Why or why not? Should the Agencies modify the Inventory 
Turnover metric rather than remove it from the proposed Appendix? If 
so, what modifications should the Agencies make to the Inventory 
Turnover metric, and why?
    Question 264. What are the current benefits and costs associated 
with calculating the Inventory Turnover metric? To what extent would 
the removal of this metric reduce the costs of compliance with the 
proposed Appendix? Please quantify your answers, to the extent 
feasible.
    Question 265. Is the use of the proposed Positions metric to help 
distinguish between permitted and prohibited trading activities 
effective? If not, what alternative would be more effective? What 
factors should be considered in order to further refine the proposed 
Positions metric to better distinguish prohibited proprietary trading 
from permitted trading activity? Does the proposed Positions metric 
provide any additional information of value relative to other 
quantitative measurements?
    Question 266. Is the use of the proposed Positions metric to help 
determine whether an otherwise-permitted trading strategy is consistent 
with the requirement that such activity not result, directly or 
indirectly, in a material exposure by the banking entity to high-risk 
assets and high-risk trading strategies effective? If not, what 
alternative would be more effective?
    Question 267. Is the proposed Positions metric substantially likely 
to frequently produce false negatives or false positives that suggest 
that prohibited proprietary trading is occurring when it is not, or 
vice versa? If so, why? If so, how should the Agencies modify this 
quantitative measurement, and why? If so, what alternative quantitative 
measurement would better help identify prohibited proprietary trading?
    Question 268. How beneficial is the information that the proposed 
Positions metric provides for evaluating underwriting activity or 
market making-related activity? Does the proposed Positions metric, 
alone or coupled with other required metrics, provide information that 
is useful in evaluating the customer-facing activity of a trading desk? 
Do any of the other quantitative measurements provide the same level of 
beneficial information for underwriting activity or market making-
related activity? Would the proposed Positions metric be useful to 
evaluate other types of covered trading activity?
    Question 269. How burdensome and costly would it be to calculate 
the proposed Positions metric at the specified calculation frequency 
and calculation period? What are the additional burdens or costs 
associated with calculating the measurement for particular trading 
desks? How significant are those potential costs relative to the 
potential benefits of the measurement in monitoring for impermissible 
proprietary trading? Are there potential modifications that could be 
made to the measurement that would reduce the burden or cost? If so, 
what are those modifications? Please quantify your answers, to the 
extent feasible.
    Question 270. How will the proposed Positions and Inventory 
Turnover requirements impact burdens as compared to benefits? Would the 
proposed changes affect a firm's confidential business information?
iv. Transaction Volumes and the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio
    Paragraph IV.c.3. of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule requires 
banking entities to calculate and report a Customer-Facing Trade Ratio 
comparing transactions involving a counterparty that is a customer of 
the trading desk to transactions with a counterparty that is not a 
customer of the desk. Appendix A of the 2013 final rule requires the 
Customer-Facing Trade Ratio to be computed by measuring trades on both 
a trade count basis and value basis. In addition, Appendix A of the 
2013 final rule provides that the term ``customer'' for purposes of the 
Customer-Facing Trade Ratio is defined in the same manner as the terms 
``client, customer, and counterparty'' used in Sec.  __.4(b) of the 
2013 final rule describing the permitted activity exemption for market 
making-related activities. This metric is required to be calculated on 
a daily basis for 30-day, 60-day, and 90-day calculation periods.
    While the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio may provide directionally 
useful information in some circumstances regarding the extent to which 
trades are conducted with customers, the Agencies are proposing to 
replace this metric with the daily Transaction Volumes quantitative 
measurement, set out in paragraph IV.c.2. of the proposed Appendix, for 
two reasons. First, the information provided by the Customer-Facing 
Trade Ratio metric has not been sufficiently granular to permit the 
Agencies to effectively assess the extent to which a trading desk's 
covered trading activities are focused on servicing customer demand. 
Reviewing and analyzing data representing trading activity that occurs 
over a single trading day should be more effective. The proposed 
Transaction Volumes metric will provide the Agencies with flexibility 
to calculate customer-facing trade ratios over any period of time, 
including a single trading day. This will assist banking entities and 
the Agencies in monitoring covered trading activities. The Agencies are 
proposing to replace the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio with the daily 
data underlying that metric rather than proposing a daily calculation 
period for the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio because the Agencies may 
choose to use different customer-facing trade ratio calculation periods 
depending on the particular trading desk or covered trading activity 
under review.
    Second, based on a review of the collected data, the Agencies 
recognize that the current Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metric does not 
provide meaningful information when a trading desk only conducts 
customer-facing trading activity. The numerator of the ratio represents 
transactions with counterparties that are customers, while the 
denominator represents transactions with counterparties that are not 
customers. If a trading desk only trades with customers, it will not be 
able to calculate this ratio because the denominator will be zero. The 
proposed Transaction Volumes metric enables the analysis of customer-
facing activity using more meaningful and appropriate calculations.
    The proposed Transaction Volumes metric measures the number and 
value \250\ of all securities and derivatives transactions conducted by 
a trading desk engaged in permitted underwriting activity or market 
making-related activity under the 2013 final rule with

[[Page 33506]]

four categories of counterparties: (i) Customers (excluding internal 
transactions); (ii) non-customers (excluding internal transactions); 
(iii) trading desks and other organizational units where the 
transaction is booked into the same banking entity; and (iv) trading 
desks and other organizational units where the transaction is booked 
into an affiliated banking entity. To avoid double-counting 
transactions, these four categories are exclusive of each other (i.e., 
a transaction must only be reported in one category). The proposal 
requires this quantitative measurement to be calculated each trading 
day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ For purposes of the proposed Transaction Volumes metric, 
value means gross market value with respect to securities. For 
commodity derivatives, value means the gross notional value (i.e., 
the current dollar market value of the quantity of the commodity 
underlying the derivative). For all other derivatives, value means 
the gross notional value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, the Agencies have evaluated the data collected 
under Appendix A of the 2013 final rule to determine whether certain 
quantitative measurements should be tailored to specific covered 
trading activities. The Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metric has 
primarily been used to assist in the evaluation of a trading desk's 
customer-facing activity, which is a relevant consideration for desks 
engaged in underwriting or market making-related activity under Sec.  
__.4 of the 2013 final rule. Such analysis is less relevant to, for 
example, desks that use only the risk-mitigating hedging exemption 
under Sec.  __.5 of the 2013 final rule. Based on an evaluation of the 
information collected under the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio, the 
Agencies are proposing to limit the applicability of the proposed 
Transaction Volumes metric.
    Specifically, the proposal provides that a banking entity would be 
required to calculate and report the proposed Transaction Volumes 
metric for all trading desks that rely on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  
__.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market making-related 
activity, respectively. This means that a trading desk that does not 
rely on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __.4(b) would not be subject to the 
proposed Transaction Volumes metric.\251\ The proposed Transaction 
Volumes metric measures covered trading activity conducted by an 
applicable trading desk with specific categories of counterparties. 
Thus, if a trading desk relies on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __.4(b) and 
engages in other covered trading activity, the reported Transaction 
Volumes metric would have to reflect all of the covered trading 
activities conducted by the desk.\252\ Limiting the scope of the 
Transaction Volumes metric to only those trading desks engaged in 
market-making activity or underwriting activity may reduce reporting 
inefficiencies for banking entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ For example, a trading desk that relies solely on Sec.  
__.5 to conduct risk-mitigating hedging activity would not be 
subject to the proposed Transaction Volumes metric.
    \252\ For example, if a trading desk relies on Sec.  __.4(b) and 
Sec.  __.5 to conduct market making-related activity and risk-
mitigating hedging activity, respectively, the reported Transaction 
Volumes metric for the desk would have to reflect its risk-
mitigating hedging activity in addition to its market making-related 
activity. The Agencies note, however, that a trading desk would not 
be required to include trading activity conducted under Sec. Sec.  
__.3(e), __.6(c), __.6(d), or __.6(e) in the proposed Transaction 
Volumes metric, unless the banking entity includes such activity as 
``covered trading activity'' for the desk under the proposed 
Appendix. The Agencies note that this is consistent with the 
definition of ``covered trading activity,'' which provides that a 
banking entity may include in its covered trading activity trading 
conducted under Sec. Sec.  __.3(e), __.6(c), __.6(d), or __.6(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This metric should provide meaningful information regarding the 
extent to which a trading desk facilitates demand for each category of 
counterparty. While the Agencies recognize that the requirement to 
provide additional granularity may require banking entities to expend 
additional compliance resources, the Agencies believe the information 
would enhance compliance efficiencies. In particular, by requiring 
transactions to be separated into these four categories, the 
information collected under this metric will facilitate better 
classification of internal trades, and thus, will assist banking 
entities and the Agencies in evaluating whether the covered trading 
activities of desks engaged in underwriting or market making-related 
activities are consistent with the final rule's requirements governing 
those activities. For example, the Agencies believe that this metric 
could be helpful in evaluating the extent to which a market making desk 
routinely stands ready to purchase and sell financial instruments 
related to its financial exposure, as well as the extent to which a 
trading desk engaged in underwriting or market making-related activity 
facilitates customer demand in accordance with the reasonably expected 
near term demand requirements under the relevant exemption.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See 2013 final rule Sec. Sec.  __.4(a)(2)(ii) and 
__.4(b)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The definition of the term ``customer'' that is used for purposes 
of this quantitative measurement depends on the type of covered trading 
activity a desk conducts. For a trading desk engaged in market making-
related activity pursuant to Sec.  __.4(b) of the 2013 final rule, the 
desk must construe the term ``customer'' in the same manner as the 
terms ``client, customer, and counterparty'' used for purposes of the 
market-making exemption under the 2013 final rule. For a trading desk 
engaged in underwriting activity pursuant to Sec.  __.4(a) of the 2013 
final rule, the desk must construe the term ``customer'' in the same 
manner as the terms ``client, customer, and counterparty'' used for 
purposes of the underwriting exemption under the final rule.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ Under the proposal, the calculation guidance regarding 
reporting of transactions with another banking entity with trading 
assets and liabilities of $50 billion or more would be moved from 
Appendix A of the 2013 final rule into the reporting instructions. 
The proposed instructions for the Transaction Volumes quantitative 
measurement would clarify that any transaction with another banking 
entity with trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion or more 
would be included in one of the four categories noted above, 
including: (i) Customers (excluding internal transactions); (ii) 
non-customers (excluding internal transactions); (iii) trading desks 
and other organizational units where the transaction is booked into 
the same banking entity; and (iv) trading desks and other 
organizational units where the transaction is booked into an 
affiliated banking entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to the proposed Positions metric, the proposed Transaction 
Volumes metric addresses the classification of securities and 
derivatives for purposes of the proposed Transaction Volumes 
quantitative measurement. The proposed Transaction Volumes metric 
requires banking entities to separately report the value and number of 
securities and derivatives transactions conducted by a trading desk 
with the four categories of counterparties described above. To avoid 
double-counting financial instruments, the proposed Transaction Volumes 
metric would require banking entities subject to the appendix to not 
include in the Transaction Volumes calculation for ``securities'' those 
securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined 
under the 2013 final rule.\255\ Instead, securities that are also 
derivatives under the final rule would be required to be reported as 
``derivatives'' for purposes of the proposed Transaction Volumes 
metric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ See 2013 final rule Sec. Sec.  __.2(h), (y). See also 
supra Part III.E.2.i (discussing the classification of securities 
and derivatives for purposes of the proposed Positions quantitative 
measurement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 271. Should the Agencies eliminate the Customer-Facing 
Trade Ratio? Why or why not? Should the Agencies replace the Customer-
Facing Trade Ratio with the proposed Transaction Volumes metric in the 
proposed Appendix? Why or why not? Should the Agencies modify the 
Customer-Facing Trade Ratio rather than remove it from the proposed 
Appendix? If so, what modifications should the Agencies make to the 
Customer-Facing Trade Ratio, and why?
    Question 272. What are the current benefits and costs associated 
with

[[Page 33507]]

calculating the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio? To what extent would the 
removal of this metric reduce the costs of compliance with the proposed 
Appendix? Please quantify your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 273. Would the use of the proposed Transaction Volumes 
metric to help distinguish between permitted and prohibited trading 
activities be effective? If not, what alternative would be more 
effective? What factors should be considered in order to further refine 
the proposed Transaction Volumes metric to better distinguish 
prohibited proprietary trading from permitted trading activity? Does 
the proposed Transaction Volumes metric provide any additional 
information of value relative to other quantitative measurements?
    Question 274. Is the scope of the four categories of counterparties 
set forth in the proposed Transaction Volumes metric appropriate and 
effective? Why or why not?
    Question 275. Is the proposed Transaction Volumes metric 
substantially likely to frequently produce false negatives or false 
positives that suggest that prohibited proprietary trading is occurring 
when it is not, or vice versa? If so, why? If so, how should the 
Agencies modify this quantitative measurement, and why? If so, what 
alternative quantitative measurement would better help identify 
prohibited proprietary trading?
    Question 276. How beneficial is the information that the proposed 
Transaction Volumes metric provides for evaluating underwriting 
activity or market making-related activity? Could these changes affect 
legitimate underwriting activity or market making-related activity? If 
so, how? Do any of the other quantitative measurements provide the same 
level of beneficial information for underwriting activity or market 
making-related activity? Would this metric be useful to evaluate other 
types of covered trading activity?
    Question 277. What operational or logistical challenges might be 
associated with performing the calculation of the proposed Transaction 
Volumes metric and obtaining any necessary informational inputs? Please 
explain.
    Question 278. How burdensome and costly would it be to calculate 
the proposed Transaction Volumes metric at the specified calculation 
frequency and calculation period? What are the additional burdens or 
costs associated with calculating the measurement for particular 
trading desks? How significant are those potential costs relative to 
the potential benefits of the measurement in monitoring for 
impermissible proprietary trading? Are there potential modifications 
that could be made to the measurement that would reduce the burden or 
cost? If so, what are those modifications? Please quantify your 
answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 279. Should the Agencies develop and publish more detailed 
instructions for how different transaction life cycle events such as 
amendments, novations, compressions, maturations, allocations, unwinds, 
terminations, option exercises, option expirations, and partial 
amendments affect the calculation of Transaction Volumes and the 
Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution? Please explain.
v. Securities Inventory Aging
    The Agencies have evaluated whether the Inventory Aging metric is 
useful for all financial instruments, as well as for all covered 
trading activities. Based on this evaluation and a review of the data 
collected under this quantitative measurement, the Agencies understand 
that, with respect to derivatives, Inventory Aging is not easily 
calculated and does not provide useful risk or customer-facing activity 
information. Thus, the Agencies are proposing several modifications to 
the Inventory Aging metric.
    First, the scope of the proposed Securities Inventory Aging metric, 
set forth in proposed paragraph IV.c.3., would be limited to a trading 
desk's securities positions. Under the proposal, banking entities 
subject to the Appendix would be required to measure and report the age 
profile of a trading desk's securities positions through a security-
asset aging schedule and a security liability-aging schedule. The 
proposed Securities Inventory Aging metric would not require banking 
entities to prepare an aging schedule for derivatives or include in its 
securities aging schedules those ``securities'' that are also 
``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined under the 2013 final 
rule.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ See 2013 final rule Sec. Sec.  __.2(h), (y). See also 
supra Part III.E.2.i (discussing the classification of securities 
and derivatives for purposes of the proposed Positions quantitative 
measurement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the Agencies are proposing to limit the applicability of 
the Securities Inventory Aging metric to trading desks that engage in 
specific covered trading activities. Consistent with the proposed 
Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics, the proposal provides that a 
banking entity would be required to calculate and report the Securities 
Inventory Aging metric for all trading desks that rely on Sec.  __.4(a) 
or Sec.  __.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market making-
related activity, respectively. This means that a trading desk that 
does not rely on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __.4(b) would not be subject to 
the proposed Securities Inventory Aging metric.\257\ The proposal would 
require that the Securities Inventory Aging metric measure the age 
profile of an applicable trading desk's securities positions. Thus, if 
a trading desk relies on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  __.4(b) and engages in 
other covered trading activity, the reported Securities Inventory Aging 
metric would have to reflect all of the covered trading activities in 
securities \258\ conducted by the desk.\259\ Narrowing the scope of the 
Inventory Aging metric to securities inventory and to desks that engage 
in market-making and underwriting activities should reduce reporting 
inefficiencies for banking entities without reducing the usefulness of 
the metric, as it has proved to be of limited utility for derivative 
positions or trading desks that engage in other types of covered 
trading activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ For example, a trading desk that relies solely on Sec.  
__.5 to conduct risk-mitigating hedging activity would not be 
subject to the proposed Securities Inventory Aging metric.
    \258\ The Agencies note that a banking entity would not be 
required to prepare an Inventory Aging schedule for any derivatives 
traded by a trading desk, including ``securities'' that are also 
``derivatives'' as those terms are defined under the 2013 final 
rule, in the event the trading desk relies on Sec.  __.4(a) or Sec.  
__.4(b) and another permitted activity exemption.
    \259\ For example, if a trading desk relies on Sec.  __.4(b) and 
Sec.  __.5 to conduct market making-related activity and risk-
mitigating hedging activity, respectively, the reported Securities 
Inventory Aging metric for the desk would have to reflect the risk-
mitigating hedging activity and market making-related activity 
associated with the desk's securities positions. The Agencies note, 
however, that a trading desk would not be required to include 
trading activity conducted under Sec. Sec.  __.3(e), __.6(c), 
__.6(d), or __.6(e) in the proposed Securities Inventory Aging 
metric, unless the banking entity includes such activity as 
``covered trading activity'' for the desk under the proposed 
Appendix. The Agencies note that this is consistent with the 
definition of ``covered trading activity,'' which provides that a 
banking entity may include in its covered trading activity trading 
conducted under Sec. Sec.  __.3(e), __.6(c), __.6(d), or __.6(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the proposal would require a banking entity to calculate 
and report the Securities Inventory Aging metric according to a 
specific set of age ranges. Specifically, banking entities would have 
to calculate and report the market value of security assets and 
security liabilities over the following holding periods: 0-30 calendar 
days; 31-60 calendar days; 61-90 calendar days; 91-180 calendar days; 
181-360 calendar days; and greater than 360 calendar days.
    Question 280. How beneficial is the information that the proposed 
Securities Inventory Aging metric provides for evaluating underwriting 
activity or

[[Page 33508]]

market making-related activity? Do any of the other quantitative 
measurements provide the same level of beneficial information for 
underwriting activity or market making-related activity?
    Question 281. Is inventory aging of derivatives a useful metric for 
monitoring covered trading activity at trading desks? Why or why not?
    Question 282. Is inventory aging of futures a useful metric for 
monitoring covered trading activity at trading desks? Why or why not?
    Question 283. Would it reduce the calculation burden on banking 
entities to limit the scope of the Inventory Aging metric to securities 
inventory and to trading desks engaged in market-making and 
underwriting activities? Why or why not?
    Question 284. Should the Agencies require banking entities to 
report the Securities Inventory Aging metric according to a specific 
set of age ranges? Why or why not? If so, taken together, are the 
proposed age ranges appropriate and effective, or should the proposed 
Securities Inventory Aging metric require different age ranges? Do 
banking entities already routinely measure their securities positions 
using the same, or similar, age ranges?
j. Request for Comment
    The Agencies request comment on the costs and benefits of the 
proposal's revised approach under revisions to Appendix A of the 2013 
final rule. In particular, the Agencies request comment on the 
following questions:
    Question 285. Are the quantitative measurements, both as currently 
existing and as proposed to be modified, appropriate in general? If 
not, is there an alternative(s) approach that the banking entities and 
the Agencies could use to more effectively and efficiently identify 
potentially prohibited proprietary trading? If so, being as specific as 
possible, please describe that alternative. Should certain proposed 
quantitative measurements be eliminated? If so, which requirements, and 
why? Should additional quantitative measurements be added? If so, which 
measurements, and why? How would those additional measurements be 
described and calculated?
    Question 286. What are the current annual compliance costs for 
banking entities to comply with the requirements in Appendix A of the 
2013 final rule to calculate and report certain quantitative 
measurements to the Agencies? Please discuss the benefits of the 
proposal, including but not limited to the benefits derived from 
qualitative information, such as narratives and trading desk 
information, as compared to the costs and burdens of preparing such 
information. How would those annual compliance costs change if the 
modifications described in the proposal were adopted? Please be as 
specific as possible and, where feasible, provide quantitative data 
broken out by requirement. Would this proposal affect certain types of 
banking entities, such as broker-dealers and registered investment 
advisers, differently as compared to other banking entities in terms of 
annual compliance costs?
    Question 287. In addition to the proposed changes to the 
requirement to calculate and report quantitative measurements to the 
Agencies, the proposed Appendix contains new qualitative requirements 
that are not currently required in Appendix A of the 2013 final rule, 
including, but not limited to, trading desk information, quantitative 
measurements identifying information, and a narrative statement. Please 
discuss the benefits and costs associated with such proposed 
requirements. How would the overall burden change, in terms of both 
costs and benefits, as a result of the proposal, taken as a whole, as 
compared to the existing requirements under Appendix A? Please provide 
quantitative data to the extent feasible.
    Question 288. Which of the proposed quantitative measurements do 
banking entities currently use? What are the current benefits, and 
would the proposed revisions result in increased compliance costs 
associated with calculating such quantitative measurements? Would the 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements in the proposed Appendix for 
such quantitative measurements generate any significant, additional 
benefits or costs? Please quantify your answers, to the extent 
feasible.
    Question 289. How are the ongoing costs of compliance associated 
with the requirements of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule allocated 
among the different steps in the process (e.g., calculating 
quantitative measurements, preparing reports, delivering reports to the 
relevant Agencies, etc.)?
    Question 290. Which requirements of Appendix A of the 2013 final 
rule are costliest to comply with, and what are those burdens? Please 
be as specific as possible. Does the proposal meaningfully reduce these 
aspects? Why or why not? Please quantify your answers, to the extent 
feasible.
    Question 291. Which of the proposed quantitative measurements do 
banking entities currently not use? What are the potential benefits and 
costs of calculating these quantitative measurements and complying with 
the proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements? Please quantify 
your answers, to the extent feasible.
    Question 292. For each individual quantitative measurement that is 
proposed, is the description sufficiently clear? Is there an 
alternative that would be more appropriate or clearer? Is the 
description of the quantitative measurement appropriate, or is it 
overly broad or narrow? If it is overly broad, what additional 
clarification is needed? If the description is overly narrow, how 
should it be modified to appropriately describe the quantitative 
measurement, and why? Should the Agencies provide any additional 
clarification to the Appendix's description of the quantitative 
measurement, and why?
    Question 293. For each individual quantitative measurement that is 
proposed, is the calculation guidance provided in the proposal 
effective and sufficiently clear? If not, what alternative would be 
more effective or clearer? Is more or less specific calculation 
guidance necessary? If so, what level of specificity is needed to 
calculate the quantitative measurement? If the proposed calculation 
guidance is not sufficiently specific, how should the calculation 
guidance be modified to reach the appropriate level of specificity? If 
the proposed calculation guidance is overly specific, why is it too 
specific and how should it be modified to reach the appropriate level 
of specificity?
    Question 294. Does the use of the proposed Appendix as part of the 
multi-faceted approach to implementing the prohibition on proprietary 
trading continue to be appropriate? Why or why not?
    Question 295. Should a trading desk be permitted not to furnish a 
quantitative measurement otherwise required under the proposed Appendix 
if it can demonstrate that the measurement is not, as applied to that 
desk, calculable or useful in achieving the purposes of the Appendix 
with respect to the trading desk's covered trading activities? How 
might a banking entity make such a demonstration?
    Question 296. Where a trading desk engages in more than one type of 
covered trading activity, such as activity conducted under the 
underwriting and risk-mitigating hedging exemptions, should the 
quantitative measurements be calculated, reported, and recorded 
separately for trading activity conducted under each exemption relied 
on by the trading desk? What are the costs and benefits of such an 
approach? Please explain.

[[Page 33509]]

    Question 297. How much time do banking entities need to develop new 
systems and processes, or modify existing systems and processes, to 
implement for banking entities that are subject to the proposed 
Appendix's reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and why? Does the 
amount of time needed to develop or modify information systems to 
comply with proposed Appendix, including the electronic reporting and 
XML Schema requirements, vary based on the size of a banking entity's 
trading assets and liabilities? Why or why not? What are the costs 
associated with such requirements?
    Question 298. Under both the 2013 final rule and the proposal, 
banking entities that, together with their affiliates and subsidiaries, 
have significant trading assets and liabilities are required to 
calculate, maintain, and report a number of quantitative measurements. 
Should the Agencies eliminate this metrics reporting requirement and 
instead require banking entities to: (1) Calculate the required 
quantitative measurements data, in the same form, manner, and 
timeframes as they would otherwise be required to under the rule; (2) 
maintain the required quantitative measurements data; and (3) provide 
the relevant Agency or Agencies with the data upon request for 
examination and review?
    Question 299. Should the requirement to calculate and report 
quantitative metrics be eliminated and replaced by a different method 
for assisting banking entities and the Agencies in monitoring covered 
trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and 
the 2013 final rule? If so, what alternative approaches should the 
Agencies consider?
    Question 300. Should some or all reported quantitative measurements 
be made publicly available? Why or why not? If so, which quantitative 
measurements should be made publicly available, and what are the 
benefits and costs of making such measurements publicly available? If 
so, how should quantitative measurements be made publicly available? 
Should quantitative measurements be made publicly available in the same 
form they are furnished to the Agencies, or should information be 
aggregated before it is made publicly available? If information should 
be aggregated, how should it be aggregated, and what are the benefits 
and costs associated with aggregate data being available to the public? 
Should quantitative measurements be made publicly available at-or-near 
the same time such measurements are reported to the Agencies, or should 
information be made publicly available on a delayed basis? If 
information should be made public on a delayed basis, how much time 
should pass before information is publicly available, and what are the 
benefits and costs associated with non-current metrics information 
being available to the public? Are there other approaches the Agencies 
should consider to make the quantitative measurements publicly 
available, and if so, what are the benefits and costs associated with 
each approach? What are the costs and benefits of such an approach? 
Please discuss and provide detailed examples of any costs or benefits 
identified.
    Question 301. Do commenters have concerns about the potential for 
the inadvertent exposure of confidential business information, either 
as part of the reporting process or to the extent that any of the 
quantitative measurements (or related information) are made publicly 
available? If so, what are the risks involved and how might they be 
mitigated? Are certain quantitative measurements more likely to contain 
confidential information? If so, which ones and why?

IV. The Economic Impact of the Proposal Under Section 13 of the BHC 
Act--Request for Comment

    The Agencies are proposing a number of changes to the 2013 final 
rule that are intended to reduce the costs of compliance while 
continuing the rule's effectiveness in limiting prohibited activities. 
In what follows, the key proposed changes to the regulation that are 
expected to have a material impact on the costs of implementing the 
regulation are discussed as is the rationale for expecting a material 
reduction in the costs associated with compliance. The Agencies seek 
broad comment from the public on any and all aspects of the proposed 
changes to the regulation and the extent to which these changes will 
reduce compliance costs and improve the effectiveness of the 
implementing regulations. The Agencies also seek comment on whether 
there are any additional ways to reduce compliance costs while 
effectively implementing the statute. Finally, commenters are 
encouraged to provide the Agencies with any specific data or 
information that could be useful for quantifying the reductions or 
increases in costs associated with the proposed changes.
    A key proposed change to the rule relates to the treatment of 
banking entities with limited trading activities, which under the 2013 
final rule can face compliance costs that are disproportionately high 
relative to the amount of trading activity typically undertaken and the 
amount of risk the activities of these firms that are subject to 
section 13 pose to financial stability. More specifically, the Agencies 
are proposing to identify those banking entities with total 
consolidated trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets 
and liabilities involving obligations of, or guaranteed by, the United 
States or any agency of the United States) the average gross sum of 
which (on a worldwide consolidated basis) over the previous consecutive 
four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of the four 
previous calendar quarters, is less than $1 billion. These banking 
entities with limited trading assets and liabilities would be subject 
to a presumption of compliance under the proposal, while remaining 
subject to the rule's prohibitions in subparts B and C. The relevant 
Agency may rebut the presumption of compliance by providing written 
notice to the banking entity that it has determined that one or more of 
the banking entity's activities violates the prohibitions under 
subparts B or C.
    The Agencies expect that this presumption would materially reduce 
the costs associated with complying with the rule for two reasons. 
First, as a result of presumed compliance, these banking entities would 
not be required to demonstrate compliance with many of the rule's 
specific requirements on an ongoing basis. As a specific example, 
entities with limited trading assets and liabilities would not be 
required to comply with the documentation requirements associated with 
the hedging exemption. Additionally, these entities would not be 
required to specify and maintain trading risk limits to comply with the 
rule's market making exemption. As a result, this proposed change is 
expected to meaningfully reduce the costs associated with rule 
compliance for smaller banking entities that do not engage in the types 
of trading the rule seeks to address.
    Second, these banking entities would not be subject to the express 
requirement to maintain a compliance program pursuant to Sec.  __.20 
under the proposal to demonstrate compliance with the rule. The 
presumption would be rebuttable, so firms may need to maintain a 
certain level of resources to respond to supervisory requests for 
information in the event that the Agencies exercise their authority to 
rebut the presumption of compliance for any activity that they 
determine to violate prohibitions under subparts B and C. The amount of 
resources required for such purposes is expected to be significantly 
smaller than the

[[Page 33510]]

amount of resources that would be required to maintain and execute an 
ongoing compliance program.
    Question 302. Do commenters agree that the proposed establishment 
of a presumption of compliance for certain banking entities would 
meaningfully reduce the compliance costs associated with the rule 
relative to the requirements of the 2013 final rule?
    Question 303. Have commenters quantified the extent to which such 
costs are reduced? If so, could this information be provided to the 
Agencies during the notice and comment period?
    Question 304. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
establishment of a presumption of compliance would increase the costs 
associated with rule compliance? If so, which aspects of the 
presumption would raise costs, why, and to what extent? How could these 
compliance costs be addressed or reduced?
    Question 305. What costs do commenters anticipate a banking entity 
subject to presumed compliance would bear to respond to possible 
questions from the Agencies about the banking entity's compliance with 
the statute and the sections of the regulation that remain applicable 
to it? In general, how and to what extent does a shifting of the burden 
from banking entity to Agencies affect compliance costs? What steps 
could the Agencies take to appropriately reduce compliance burdens in 
this regard--especially for banking entities that engage in less 
trading activity?
    The Agencies are also proposing two changes related to the 2013 
final rule's definition of ``trading account'' that are expected to 
simplify the analysis associated with determining whether or not a 
banking entity's purchase or sale of a financial instrument is for the 
trading account, and thereby are expected to reduce the costs 
associated with complying with the rule. Specifically, the Agencies are 
proposing to add an accounting prong to the definition of ``trading 
account'' and to remove the short-term intent prong and the 60-day 
rebuttable presumption. The Agencies expect that the removal of the 
short-term intent prong will substantially reduce the costs of 
complying with the rule.
    In the case of the short-term intent prong and the 60-day 
rebuttable presumption, the Agencies' experience with implementing the 
2013 final rule strongly suggests that application of the short-term 
intent prong resulted in a variety of analyses to determine if a 
financial position was taken with the ``intent'' of generating short-
term profits, or benefitting from short-term price movements. Assessing 
intent is qualitative and can be subject to significant interpretation. 
Accordingly, experience suggests that banking entities engage in a 
number of lengthy analyses to determine whether or not a financial 
position needs to be included in the trading account, and that these 
analyses may not always result in a clear indication.
    In the case of the 60-day rebuttable presumption, the Agencies' 
experience suggests that the 60-day rebuttable presumption may be an 
overly inclusive instrument to determine whether a financial instrument 
is in the trading account. Many financial positions are scoped into the 
trading account automatically due to the 60-day presumption, and 
banking entities routinely conduct detailed and lengthy assessments of 
transactions to document that these positions should not be included in 
the trading account. However, experience indicates that there is no 
clear set of analyses that may be conducted to rebut the presumption 
and a clear standard for successfully rebutting the presumption has 
been difficult to establish in practice. Accordingly, the Agencies 
expect that removing the 60-day rebuttable presumption would materially 
reduce the costs associated with complying with the rule and 
determining whether a financial instrument is in the trading account.
    The Agencies expect that this proposal would reduce the costs of 
rule compliance since banking entities are already familiar with 
accounting standards and use these standards to classify financial 
instruments on a regular basis to satisfy reporting and related 
requirements. The Agencies would expect that no new compliance costs 
would result from using accounting concepts that are already familiar 
to banking entities for purposes of identifying activity in the trading 
account.
    The Agencies are also proposing to include a presumption of 
compliance for trading desks, the positions of which are included in 
the trading account due to the accounting prong, so long as the profit 
and loss of the desk does not exceed a certain threshold. Specifically, 
the trading activity conducted by a trading desk is presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition on proprietary trading if (i) none of 
the financial instruments of the desk are included in the trading 
account pursuant to the market risk capital prong, (ii) none of the 
financial instruments of the desk are booked in a dealer, swap dealer, 
or security-based swap dealer, and (iii) the sum over the preceding 90-
calendar-day period of the absolute values of the daily net realized 
and unrealized gains and losses of the desk's portfolio of financial 
instruments does not exceed $25 million. Banking entities and 
supervisors will only need to consider cases in which the size of 
trading activity exceeds the $25 million threshold for these desks. 
Moreover, this analysis draws on profit and loss metrics that banking 
entities already regularly maintain and consequently would not be 
expected to contribute to any increased regulatory costs.
    The Agencies recognize that implementing the new definition of 
``trading account'' and the presumption of compliance would result in 
some amount of compliance costs. However, the Agencies expect that the 
compliance costs associated with this new definition and presumption of 
compliance would be significantly less than the compliance costs of 
either the short-term intent prong or the 60-day rebuttable 
presumption. As noted above, the new trading account definition ties to 
accounting concepts that are already familiar to banking entities. 
Similarly, the new presumption of compliance ties to profit and loss 
metrics that banking entities already maintain. As such, the Agencies 
expect that the new trading account definition and the presumption of 
compliance would materially reduce the costs of rule compliance 
relative to the 2013 final rule's existing requirements.
    Question 306. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes to 
the trading account definition would materially reduce costs associated 
with rule compliance relative to the final rule? Why or why not?
    Question 307. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs would be 
reduced under the proposal?
    Question 308. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to the trading account definition increase the costs associated 
with rule compliance? If so, which aspects of the proposed changes 
raise costs, why, and to what extent?
    As described in section 1(d)(3) of this Supplementary Information, 
the Agencies are proposing a specific alternative to allow banking 
entities to define trading desks in a manner consistent with their own 
internal business unit organization. The Agencies request comment 
regarding the relative costs and benefits of this possible alternative.
    Question 309. Do commenters believe that the relative benefits of 
the definition of ``trading desk'' in the current 2013 final rule 
outweigh any

[[Page 33511]]

potential cost reductions for banking entities under the alternative?
    Question 310. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs would be 
reduced?
    Question 311. Do commenters think that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to the trading desk definition increases the regulatory burden 
associated with rule compliance? If so which aspects of the proposed 
changes raise the regulatory burden, why, and to what extent?
    A key statutory exemption from the prohibition on proprietary 
trading is the exemption for underwriting. The 2013 final rule contains 
a number of complex requirements that are intended to ensure that 
banking entities comply with the underwriting exemption and that 
proprietary trading activity is not conducted under the guise of 
underwriting. Since adoption of the 2013 final rule, banking entities 
have communicated to the Agencies that complying with all of the 2013 
final rule's underwriting requirements can be difficult and costly 
relative to the underlying activities. In particular, banking entities 
have communicated that they believe they must engage in a number of 
complex and intensive analyses to gain comfort that their underwriting 
activities meets all of the 2013 final rule's requirements. Moreover, 
banking entities have communicated that they find the requirements of 
the 2013 final rule ambiguous to apply in practice and do not provide 
sufficiently bright-line conditions under which trading activity can 
clearly be classified as permissible underwriting.
    The Agencies are proposing to establish the articulation and use of 
internal risk limits as a key mechanism for conducting trading activity 
in accordance with the underwriting exemption. These risk limits would 
be established by the banking entity at the trading desk level and 
designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of 
clients, customers, or counterparties. The proposed risk limits would 
not be required to be based on any specific or mandated analysis. 
Rather, a banking entity would be permitted to establish the risk 
limits according to its own internal analyses and processes around 
conducting its underwriting activities. Banking entities would be 
expected to maintain internal policies and procedures for setting and 
reviewing desk-level risk limits in a manner consistent with the 
applicable statutory factor. A banking entity's risk limits would be 
subject to general supervisory review and oversight, but the limit-
setting process would not be required to adhere to specific, pre-
defined requirements beyond adherence to the banking entity's own 
ongoing and internal assessment of the reasonably expected near-term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. So long as a banking 
entity maintains an ongoing and consistent process for setting such 
limits in accordance with the proposal, then the Agencies anticipate 
that trading activity conducted within the limits would generally be 
presumed to be underwriting.
    The Agencies expect that the proposed reliance on risk limits to 
satisfy the underwriting exemption will materially reduce the costs of 
complying with the final rule's underwriting exemption. In particular, 
the limit-setting process is intended to leverage a banking entity's 
existing internal risk management and capital allocation processes, and 
would not be required to conform to any specific or pre-defined 
requirements other than being set in accordance with RENTD. The 
Agencies expect that reliance on risk limits would therefore align with 
the firm's internal policies and procedures for conducting underwriting 
in a manner consistent with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC 
Act. Accordingly, the Agencies expect that this proposed approach would 
generally be more efficient and less costly than the practices required 
by the 2013 final rule as they rely to a greater extent on the banking 
entity's own internal policies, procedures, and processes.
    Question 312. The Agencies are also proposing to further tailor the 
requirements for banking entities with moderate trading activities and 
liabilities. In particular, the compliance program requirements that 
are part of the underwriting exemption would not apply to these firms. 
Do commenters believe that the proposed changes related to the use of 
risk limits in satisfying the underwriting exemption would materially 
reduce the costs associated with rule compliance relative to the 2013 
final rule?
    Question 313. Do commenters believe there are any benefits of the 
approach in the 2013 final rule that would be forgone with the proposed 
changes related to the use of risk limits in satisfying the 
underwriting exemption?
    Question 314. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 315. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes related to the use of risk limits in satisfying the 
underwriting exemption increases the costs associated with rule 
compliance? If so which aspects of the proposed changes raise 
compliance costs, why, and to what extent?
    Question 316. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes 
related to the reduced compliance program requirements for banking 
entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities to satisfy the 
underwriting exemption would materially reduce the costs associated 
with rule compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?
    Question 317. Do commenters believe there are any benefits to the 
approach in the 2013 final rule that would be forgone with the proposed 
changes related to the compliance requirements in satisfying the 
underwriting exemption?
    Question 318. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 319. Do commenters think that any aspect of the proposed 
changes related to the use of compliance program requirements in 
satisfying the underwriting exemption would increase the costs 
associated with rule compliance? If so, which aspects of the proposed 
changes would increase compliance costs, why, and to what extent?
    Another key statutory exemption from the prohibition on proprietary 
trading is the exemption for market making. The 2013 final rule 
contains a number of complex requirements that are intended to ensure 
that proprietary trading activity is not conducted under the guise of 
market making. Since adoption of the 2013 final rule, banking entities 
have communicated that complying with all of the 2013 final rule's 
market making requirements can be difficult and costly. In particular, 
banking entities have communicated that they believe they must engage 
in a number of complex and intensive analyses to gain comfort that 
their bona fide market making activity meets all of the 2013 final 
rule's requirements. Moreover, banking entities have communicated that 
they view the requirements of the 2013 final rule as ambiguous and not 
providing sufficiently bright-line conditions under which trading 
activity can clearly be classified as permissible market making.
    The Agencies are proposing to establish the articulation and use of 
internal risk limits as the key mechanism for conducting trading 
activity in accordance with the rule's exemption for market making-
related activities. These risk limits would be established by the 
banking entity at the trading desk level and be designed not to exceed 
the reasonably expected near

[[Page 33512]]

term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. Banking entities 
would be expected to maintain internal policies and procedures for 
setting and reviewing desk-level risk limits in a manner consistent 
with the applicable statutory factor. Moreover, the proposed risk 
limits would not be required to be based on any specific or mandated 
analysis. Rather, a banking entity would be permitted to establish the 
risk limits according to its own internal analyses and processes around 
conducting its market making activities as market making is defined by 
the applicable statutory factor. A banking entity's risk limits would 
be subject to supervisory review and oversight, but the limit-setting 
process would not be required to adhere to any specific, pre-defined 
requirements beyond adherence to the banking entity's own ongoing and 
internal assessment of the reasonably expected near-term demand of 
clients, customers, or counterparties. So long as a banking entity 
maintains an ongoing and consistent process for setting such limits in 
accordance with the proposal, then the Agencies anticipate that trading 
activity conducted within the limits would generally be presumed to be 
market making.
    The Agencies expect that the proposed reliance on internal risk 
limits to satisfy the statutory requirement that market making-related 
activities be designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties would materially 
reduce the costs of complying with the 2013 final rule's market making 
exemption. In particular, the limit-setting process would be intended 
to leverage a banking entity's existing internal risk management and 
capital allocation processes and would not be required to conform to 
specific or pre-defined requirements. The Agencies expect that reliance 
on risk limits would therefore align with the firm's internal policies 
and procedures for conducting market making in a manner consistent with 
the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act. Accordingly, the 
agencies expect that this proposed approach would generally be more 
efficient and less costly than the practices required by the 2013 final 
rule as they rely to a greater extent on the banking entity's own 
internal policies, procedures, and processes.
    The Agencies are also proposing to further tailor the requirements 
for banking entities with moderate trading activities and liabilities. 
In particular, the compliance program requirements that are part of the 
market making exemption would not apply to these firms.
    Question 320. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes 
related to the use of risk limits in satisfying the market making 
exemption would materially reduce the costs associated with rule 
compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?
    Question 321. Do commenters believe there are any benefits of the 
approach in the 2013 final rule that would be forgone with the proposed 
changes related to the use of risk limits in satisfying the market 
making exemption?
    Question 322. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 323. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes related to the use of risk limits in satisfying the market 
making exemption increases the costs associated with rule compliance? 
If so, which aspects of the proposed changes raise compliance costs, 
why, and to what extent?
    Question 324. Do commenters agree that the proposed changes related 
to the reduced compliance program requirements for banking entities 
with moderate trading assets and liabilities to satisfy the market 
making exemption materially reduce the costs associated with rule 
compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?
    Question 325. Do commenters believe there are any benefits of the 
approach in the 2013 final rule that would be forgone with the proposed 
changes related to the compliance requirements in satisfying the market 
making exemption?
    Question 326. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 327. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes related to the use of risk limits in satisfying the market 
making exemption increases the costs associated with rule compliance? 
If so, which aspects of the proposed changes raise compliance costs, 
why, and to what extent?
    The agencies are proposing a number of changes to the requirements 
of the 2013 final rule's exemption for risk-mitigating hedging 
activities that are expected to reduce the costs associated with 
complying with the final rule's requirements.
    First, for banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities, the 2013 final rule's requirement in the risk mitigating 
hedging exemption to conduct a correlation analysis would be removed. 
Since adoption of the 2013 final rule, banking entities have 
communicated that this requirement has in practice been unclear and 
often not useful in determining whether or not a given transaction 
provides meaningful hedging benefits. The Agencies expect that the 
proposed removal of this requirement from the final rule would 
materially reduce the costs of rule compliance since larger banking 
entities would not be required to conduct a specific analysis that is 
currently required under the 2013 final rule.
    Second, for these banking entities with significant trading assets 
and liabilities, the Agencies are proposing that the requirement that 
the hedging transaction ``demonstrably reduce (or otherwise 
significantly mitigate)'' risk be removed. Banking entities have 
communicated that these requirements can be unclear and these banking 
entities must often engage in a number of complex and time-intensive 
analyses to assess whether these standards have been met. Moreover, the 
above hedging standards have not aligned well with banking entities' 
internal processes for assessing the economic value of a hedging 
transaction. Accordingly, the Agencies expect that eliminating these 
requirements would materially reduce the costs associated with 
complying with the requirements of the rule's hedging exemption.
    Third, for banking entities with moderate trading assets and 
liabilities, the Agencies are proposing to remove all of the hedging 
requirements under the 2013 final rule except for the requirement that 
the transaction be designed to reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate one or more specific, identifiable risks in connection with 
and related to one or more identified positions and that the hedging 
activity be recalibrated to maintain compliance with the rule. The 
Agencies expect this proposed change to materially reduce the costs of 
rule compliance since no additional documentation or prescribed 
analyses would be required beyond a banking entity's already existing 
practices and whatever analyses are required to ascertain that the 
remaining factors are satisfied, consistent with the statute. In light 
of Agency experience with the hedging requirements of the 2013 final 
rule, the Agencies expect that this proposed change would result in a 
material reduction in the costs associated with complying with the 
rule's hedging requirements.
    Question 328. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes that 
streamline the hedging requirements of the rule materially reduce the 
costs associated with rule compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?

[[Page 33513]]

    Question 329. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 330. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to streamline the hedging requirements of the rule increases 
the costs associated with rule compliance? If so, which aspects of the 
proposed changes raise costs, why, and to what extent?
    The Agencies are proposing to eliminate a number of requirements 
related to the foreign trading exemption. These proposed changes are 
intended to respond to concerns raised by FBOs subject to the 2013 
final rule that they find its foreign trading exemption to be difficult 
to comply with in practice.
    The Agencies are proposing to modify the requirement of this 
exemption that personnel of the banking entity who arrange, negotiate, 
or execute a purchase or sale must be outside the United States and to 
eliminate the requirements that: (1) No financing be provided by a U.S. 
affiliate or branch, and (2) a transaction with a U.S. counterparty 
must be executed through an unaffiliated intermediary and an anonymous 
exchange.
    The Agencies expect that the modification and removal of these 
requirements would materially reduce the compliance costs associated 
with the foreign trading exemption.
    In addition, banking entities have communicated that the 
requirement that any transaction with a U.S. counterparty be executed 
without involvement of U.S. personnel of the counterparty or through an 
unaffiliated intermediary and an anonymous exchange may in some cases 
significantly reduce the range of counterparties with which 
transactions can be conducted as well as increase the cost of those 
transactions, including with respect to counterparties seeking to do 
business with a foreign banking entity in foreign jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the Agencies also expect that removing this requirement 
would materially reduce the costs associated with rule compliance.
    Question 331. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes to 
modify and eliminate certain requirements from the foreign trading 
exemption would materially reduce the regulatory burden associated with 
rule compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?
    Question 332. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 333. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to eliminate certain requirements from the foreign trading 
exemption increases the costs associated with rule compliance? If so 
which aspects of the proposed changes raise costs, why, and to what 
extent?
    The Agencies are proposing to make a number of changes to the 
metrics reporting requirements that are intended to improve the 
effectiveness of the metrics. On the whole, these changes are also 
expected to reduce the compliance costs associated with the metrics 
reporting requirements. In particular, the Agencies are proposing to 
add qualitative information schedules that would improve the Agencies' 
ability to understand and analyze the quantitative measurements. The 
Agencies are also proposing to remove certain metrics, such as 
inventory aging for derivatives and stressed value-at-risk for risk 
mitigating hedging desks, that based on experience with implementing 
the 2013 final rule, are not effective for identifying whether a 
banking entity's trading activity is consistent with the requirements 
of the 2013 final rule. In addition, the Agencies are proposing to 
switch to a standard XML format for the metrics data file. The Agencies 
expect this to improve consistency and data quality by both clarifying 
the format specification and making it possible to check the validity 
of data files against a published template using generally available 
software. Finally, the Agencies are proposing to make a number of 
changes to the technical calculation guidance for a number of metrics 
that should make the required calculations clearer and less 
complicated.
    The Agencies are also proposing to provide certain banking entities 
that must report metrics with additional time to report metrics. 
Specifically, the firms with $50 billion in trading assets and 
liabilities would have 20 days instead of 10 days to report metrics to 
the Agencies. This change is expected to reduce compliance costs as the 
additional time would allow the required workflow to be conducted under 
less time pressure and with greater efficiency and accuracy.
    Question 334. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes to 
the metrics reporting requirements would materially reduce the costs 
associated with rule compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?
    Question 335. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 336. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to the metrics reporting requirements would increase the costs 
associated with rule compliance? If so, which aspects of the proposed 
changes increase costs, why, and to what extent?
    The Agencies are proposing to modify certain requirements regarding 
the ability of banking entities to engage in underwriting and market-
making of third-party covered funds that would remove some of the 
restrictions on activities with respect to covered fund interests. The 
Agencies expect that this proposed change would reduce the costs of 
compliance with the 2013 final rule's requirements. In particular, the 
2013 final rule places a number of restrictions on underwriting and 
market-making of covered fund interests that banking entities have 
indicated are costly to comply with and view as unduly limiting 
activity that is otherwise consistent with bona fide underwriting and 
market-making activity that would be allowed with respect to any other 
type of financial instrument, consistent with the statutory factors 
defining these activities.
    Question 337. Do commenters believe that the proposed changes to 
certain restrictions on covered fund related activities would 
materially reduce the costs associated with rule compliance relative to 
the 2013 final rule?
    Question 338. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 339. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to certain restrictions on covered fund related activities 
would increase the costs associated with rule compliance? If so, which 
aspects of the proposed changes would raise costs, why, and to what 
extent?
    The Agencies are proposing several changes to the required 
compliance program requirements that are expected to materially reduce 
the costs associated with complying with the rule's requirements. 
Specifically, banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities would only need to maintain a standard six-pillar 
compliance program (i.e., written policies and procedures, internal 
controls, management framework, independent testing, training, and 
records) and would not be required to maintain most aspects of the 
enhanced compliance program that is required by the 2013 final rule for 
such large banking entities. Agency experience with implementing the 
2013 final rule indicates that the operation of the 2013 final rule's 
enhanced compliance program can be costly and unrelated to other 
compliance efforts that these banking entities routinely conduct. 
Accordingly, eliminating this requirement would be expected to

[[Page 33514]]

materially reduce the costs of complying with the rule.
    In the case of banking entities with moderate trading assets and 
liabilities, these banking entities would only be required to maintain 
the simplified compliance program that is described in the 2013 final 
rule. Namely, these entities would only be required to update their 
existing compliance policies and procedures and would not be required 
to maintain a standard six-pillar compliance program as is required 
under the 2013 final rule. Since the simplified compliance program is 
much less intensive and costly to implement than the standard six-
pillar compliance program, the Agencies expect that this proposed 
change would materially reduce the costs associated with complying with 
the 2013 final rule's compliance program requirements for these smaller 
banking entities.
    Question 340. Do commenters agree that the proposed changes to the 
compliance program requirements would materially reduce the costs 
associated with rule compliance relative to the 2013 final rule?
    Question 341. Do commenters have any specific data or information 
that could be used to quantify the extent to which such costs are 
reduced?
    Question 342. Do commenters believe that any aspect of the proposed 
changes to the compliance program requirements increases the costs 
associated with rule compliance? If so which aspects of the proposed 
changes would raise costs, why, and to what extent?
    The above discussion outlines the Agencies' views on the most 
significant sources of cost reduction that arise from this proposal. At 
the same time, the Agencies are aware that there may be other aspects 
of the proposal that commenters view as either decreasing or increasing 
costs associated with the 2013 final rule. Accordingly, the Agencies 
seek broad comment on any other aspects of the proposal that would 
either increase or decrease the costs associated with the rule. 
Commenters are encouraged to be specific and to provide any data or 
information that would help demonstrate their views as well as 
potential ways to mitigate costs.

V. Administrative Law Matters

A. Solicitation of Comments on Use of Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Pub. L. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338, 1471, 12 U.S.C. 4809), requires the Federal banking 
agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules 
published after January 1, 2000. The Federal banking agencies have 
sought to present the proposal in a simple and straightforward manner, 
and invite your comments on how to make this proposal easier to 
understand.
    For example:
     Have the agencies organized the material to suit your 
needs? If not, how could this material be better organized?
     Are the requirements in the proposal clearly stated? If 
not, how could the proposal be more clearly stated?
     Does the proposal contain language or jargon that is not 
clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
     Would a different format (e.g., grouping and order of 
sections, use of headings, paragraphing) make the proposal easier to 
understand? If so, what changes to the format would make the proposal 
easier to understand?
     Would more, but shorter, sections be better? If so, which 
sections should be changed?
     What else could the agencies do to make the regulation 
easier to understand?

B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis Request for Comment on Proposed 
Information Collection

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and a respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number. The agencies reviewed the proposed 
rule and determined that the proposed rule revises certain reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements that have been previously cleared under 
various OMB control numbers. The agencies are proposing to extend for 
three years, with revision, these information collections. The 
information collection requirements contained in this joint notice of 
proposed rulemaking have been submitted by the OCC and FDIC to OMB for 
review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of the OMB's implementing regulations (5 
CFR 1320). The Board reviewed the proposed rule under the authority 
delegated to the Board by OMB. The Board will submit information 
collection burden estimates to OMB and the submission will include 
burden for Federal Reserve-supervised institutions, as well as burden 
for OCC-, FDIC-, SEC-, and CFTC-supervised institutions under a holding 
company. The OCC and the FDIC will take burden for banking entities 
that are not under a holding company.
    Comments are invited on:
    a. Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the agencies' functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    b. The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information 
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
used;
    c. Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    d. Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    e. Estimates of capital or startup costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on 
aspects of this notice that may affect reporting, recordkeeping, or 
disclosure requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the 
addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section. A copy of the comments may 
also be submitted to the OMB desk officer for the Agencies by mail to 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW, #10235, 
Washington, DC 20503, by facsimile to 202-395-5806, or by email to 
[email protected], Attention, Commission and Federal Banking 
Agency Desk Officer.
Abstract
    Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 13 to the BHC Act, 
which generally prohibits any banking entity from engaging in 
proprietary trading or from acquiring or retaining an ownership 
interest in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with a covered 
fund, subject to certain exemptions. The exemptions allow certain types 
of permissible trading activities such as underwriting, market making, 
and risk-mitigating hedging, among others. Each agency issued a common 
final rule implementing section 619 that became effective on April 1, 
2014. Section __.20(d) and Appendix A of the final rule require certain 
of the largest banking entities to report to the appropriate agency 
certain quantitative measurements.
Current Actions
    The proposed rule contains requirements subject to the PRA and the 
changes relative to the current final rule are discussed herein. The 
new and modified reporting requirements are

[[Page 33515]]

found in sections __.3(c), __.3(g), __.4(a)(8)(iii), __.4(a)(8)(iv), 
__.4(b)(6)(iii), __.4(b)(6)(iv), __.20(d), and __.20(g)(3). The 
modified recordkeeping requirements are found in sections __.5(c), 
__.20(b), __.20(c), __.20 (d), __.20(e), and __.20(f)(2). The modified 
information collection requirements \260\ would implement section 619 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. The respondents are for-profit financial 
institutions, including small businesses. A covered entity must retain 
these records for a period that is no less than 5 years in a form that 
allows it to promptly produce such records to the relevant Agency on 
request.
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    \260\ In an effort to provide transparency, the total cumulative 
burden for each agency is shown. In addition to the changes 
resulting from the proposed rule, the agencies are also applying a 
conforming methodology for calculating the burden estimates in order 
to be consistent across the agencies.
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Reporting Requirements
    Section __.3(c) would require that under the revised short-term 
prong, certain banking entities to report to the appropriate agency 
when a trading desk exceeds $25 million in absolute values of the daily 
net realized and unrealized gain and loss over the preceding 90 day 
period if the banking entity chooses to perform this calculation for a 
trading desk in order to meet the presumption of compliance. The 
agencies estimate that the new reporting requirement would be collected 
twice a year with an average hour per response of 1 hour.
    Section __.3(g) would require that notice and response procedures 
be followed under the reservation of authority provision. The agencies 
estimate that the new reporting requirement would be collected once a 
year with an average hours per response of 2 hours.
    Sections __.4(a)(8)(iii) and __.4(b)(6)(iii) would require that 
banking entities report to the appropriate agency when their internal 
risk limits under the RENTD framework for market-making and 
underwriting have been exceeded. These reporting requirements would be 
included in the section __.20(d) reporting requirements.
    Section __.20(d) would be modified by extending the reporting 
period for banking entities with $50 billion or more in trading assets 
and liabilities from within 10 days of the end of each calendar month 
to 20 days of the end of each calendar month. The agencies estimate 
that the current average hours per response would decrease by 14 hours 
(decrease 40 hours for initial set-up).
    Sections __.3(c)(2), __.3(g)(2), __.4(a)(8)(iv), __.4(b)(6)(iv), 
and __.20(g)(3) would set forth proposed notice and response procedures 
that an agency would follow when exercising its reservation of 
authority to modify what is in or out of the trading account. These 
reporting requirements would be included in the section __.3(c) 
reporting requirements for section __.3(c)(2); the section __.3(g) 
reporting requirements for section __.3(g)(2); and the section __.20(d) 
reporting requirements for section __.4(a)(8)(iv), __.4(b)(6)(iv), and 
__.20(g)(3).
Recordkeeping Requirements
    Section __.5(c) would be modified by reducing the requirements for 
banking entities that do not have significant trading assets and 
liabilities and eliminating documentation requirements for certain 
hedging activities. The agencies estimate that the current average 
hours per response would decrease by 20 hours (decrease 10 hours for 
initial set-up).
    Section __.20(b) would be modified by limiting the requirement only 
to banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities. 
The agencies estimate that the current average hour per response would 
not change.
    Section __.20(c) would be modified by limiting the CEO attestation 
requirement to a banking entity that has significant trading assets and 
liabilities or moderate trading assets and liabilities. The agencies 
estimate that the current average hours per response would decrease by 
1,100 hours (decrease 3,300 hours for initial set-up).
    Section __.20(d) would be modified by extending the time period for 
reporting for banking entities with $50 billion or more in trading 
assets and liabilities from within 10 days of the end of each calendar 
month to 20 days of the end of each calendar month. The agencies 
estimate that the current average hours per response would decrease by 
3 hours.
    Section __.20(e) would be modified by limiting the requirement to 
banking entities with significant trading assets and liabilities. The 
agencies estimate that the current average hours per response would not 
change.
    Section __.20(f)(2) would be modified by limiting the requirement 
to banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. The 
agencies estimate that the current average hours per response would not 
change.
    The Instructions for Preparing and Submitting Quantitative 
Measurement Information, Technical Specifications Guidance, and XML 
Schema are available for review on each agency's public website:
     OCC: http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/volcker-rule-implementation/index-volcker-rule-implementation.html;
     Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/review.aspx;
     FDIC: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/volcker/index.html;
     CFTC: https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/DF_28_VolckerRule/index.htm;
     SEC: https://www.sec.gov/structureddata/dera_taxonomies.
Proposed Revision, With Extension, of the Following Information 
Collections
    Estimated average hours per response:
    Reporting
    Section __.3(c)--1 hour for an average of 2 times per year.
    Section __.3(g)--2 hours.
    Section __.12(e)--20 hours (Initial set-up 50 hours) for an average 
of 10 times per year.
    Section __.20(d)--41 hours (Initial set-up 125 hours) for quarterly 
and monthly filers.
    Recordkeeping
    Section __.3(e)(3)--1 hour (Initial set-up 3 hours).
    Section __.4(b)(3)(i)(A)--2 hours for quarterly filers.
    Section __.5(c)--80 hours (Initial setup 40 hours).
    Section __.11(a)(2)--10 hours.
    Section __.20(b)--265 hours (Initial set-up 795 hours).
    Section __.20(c)--100 hours (Initial set-up 300 hours).
    Section __.20(d) (entities with $50 billion or more in trading 
assets and liabilities)--13 hours.
    Section __.20(d) (entities with at least $10 billion and less than 
$50 billion in trading assets and liabilities)--10 hours.
    Section __.20(e)--200 hours.
    Section __.20(f)(1)--8 hours.
    Section __.20(f)(2)--40 hours (Initial set-up 100 hours).
Disclosure
    Section __.11(a)(8)(i)--0.1 hours for an average of 26 times per 
year.
OCC
    Title of Information Collection: Reporting, Recordkeeping, and 
Disclosure Requirements Associated with Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds.
    Frequency: Annual, monthly, quarterly, and on occasion.

[[Page 33516]]

    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents: National banks, state member banks, state nonmember 
banks, and state and federal savings associations.
    OMB control number: 1557-0309.
    Estimated number of respondents: 38.
    Proposed revisions estimated annual burden: -469 hours.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 20,712 hours (1,784 hour for initial 
set-up and 18,928 hours for ongoing).
Board
    Title of Information Collection: Reporting, Recordkeeping, and 
Disclosure Requirements Associated with Regulation VV.
    Frequency: Annual, monthly, quarterly, and on occasion.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents: State member banks, bank holding companies, savings 
and loan holding companies, foreign banking organizations, U.S. State 
branches or agencies of foreign banks, and other holding companies that 
control an insured depository institution and any subsidiary of the 
foregoing other than a subsidiary for which the OCC, FDIC, CFTC, or SEC 
is the primary financial regulatory agency. The Board will take burden 
for all institutions under a holding company including:
     OCC-supervised institutions,
     FDIC-supervised institutions,
     Banking entities for which the CFTC is the primary 
financial regulatory agency, as defined in section 2(12)(C) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and
     Banking entities for which the SEC is the primary 
financial regulatory agency, as defined in section 2(12)(B) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.
    Legal authorization and confidentiality: This information 
collection is authorized by section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act 
(BHC Act) (12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(2) and 12 U.S.C. 1851(e)(1)). The 
information collection is required in order for covered entities to 
obtain the benefit of engaging in certain types of proprietary trading 
or investing in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with a 
hedge fund or private equity fund, under the restrictions set forth in 
section 13 and the final rule. If a respondent considers the 
information to be trade secrets and/or privileged such information 
could be withheld from the public under the authority of the Freedom of 
Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)). Additionally, to the extent that 
such information may be contained in an examination report such 
information could also be withheld from the public (5 U.S.C. 552 
(b)(8)).
    Agency form number: FR VV.
    OMB control number: 7100-0360.
    Estimated number of respondents: 41.
    Proposed revisions estimated annual burden: -51,219 hours.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 45,558 hours (1,784 hour for initial 
set-up and 43,774 hours for ongoing).
FDIC
    Title of Information Collection: Volcker Rule Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds.
    Frequency: Annual, monthly, quarterly, and on occasion.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents: State nonmember banks, state savings associations, and 
certain subsidiaries of those entities.
    OMB control number: 3064-0184.
    Estimated number of respondents: 53.
    Proposed revisions estimated annual burden: -10,305 hours.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 10,632 hours (1,784 hours for 
initial set-up and 8,848 hours for ongoing).

C. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \261\ requires an agency 
to either provide an initial regulatory flexibility analysis with a 
proposal or certify that the proposal will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The U.S. 
Small Business Administration (``SBA'') establishes size standards that 
define which entities are small businesses for purposes of the 
RFA.\262\ Except as otherwise specified below, the size standard to be 
considered a small business for banking entities subject to the 
proposal is $550 million or less in consolidated assets.\263\ The 
Agencies are separately publishing initial regulatory flexibility 
analyses for the proposals as set forth in this NPR.
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    \261\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \262\ U.S. SBA, Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched 
to North American Industry Classification System Codes, available at 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf.
    \263\ See id. Pursuant to SBA regulations, the asset size of a 
concern includes the assets of the concern whose size is at issue 
and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates. 13 CFR 121.103(6).
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Board
    The Board has considered the potential impact of the proposed rule 
on small entities in accordance with the RFA. Based on the Board's 
analysis, and for the reasons stated below, the Board believes that 
this proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial of number of small entities. Nevertheless, the Board is 
publishing and inviting comment on this initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis. A final regulatory flexibility analysis will be conducted 
after comments received during the public comment period have been 
considered.
    The Board welcomes comment on all aspects of its analysis. In 
particular, the Board requests that commenters describe the nature of 
any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to illustrate 
and support the extent of the impact.
1. Reasons for the Proposal
    As discussed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the Agencies are 
proposing to revise the 2013 final rule in order to provide clarity to 
banking entities about what activities are prohibited, reduce 
compliance costs, and improve the ability of the Agencies to make 
supervisory assessments regarding compliance relative to the 2013 final 
rule. To minimize the costs associated with the 2013 final rule in a 
manner consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act, the Agencies are 
proposing to simplify and tailor the rule in a manner that would 
substantially reduce compliance costs for all banking entities and, in 
particular, small banking entities and banking entities without 
significant trading operations.
2. Statement of Objectives and Legal Basis
    As discussed above, the Agencies' objective in proposing this rule 
is to reduce the compliance costs for all banking entities and, in 
particular, to tailor the rule based on the size of the banking entity 
and the complexity of its trading operations. The Agencies are 
explicitly authorized under section 13(b)(2) of the BHC Act to adopt 
rules implementing section 13.\264\
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    \264\ 12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(2).
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3. Description of Small Entities to Which the Regulation Applies
    The Board's proposal would apply to state-chartered banks that are 
members of the Federal Reserve System (state member banks), bank 
holding companies, foreign banking organizations, and nonbank financial 
companies supervised by the Board (collectively, ``Board-regulated 
banking entities''). However, the Board notes that the Economic Growth, 
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,\265\ which was enacted 
on May 24, 2018,

[[Page 33517]]

amends section 13 of the BHC Act by narrowing the definition of banking 
entity. Accordingly, no small top-tier bank holding company would meet 
the threshold criteria for application of the provisions provided in 
this proposal and, therefore, the proposed amendments to the 2013 final 
rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.
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    \265\ Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296-1368 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    The proposal would reduce reporting, recordkeeping, and other 
compliance requirements for small entities. First, banking entities 
with consolidated gross trading assets and liabilities below $10 
billion would be subject to reduced requirements and a tailored 
approach in light of their significantly smaller and less complex 
trading activities. Second, in order to further reduce compliance 
requirements for small and mid-sized banking entities, the Agencies 
have proposed a rebuttable presumption of compliance for firms that do 
not have consolidated gross trading assets and liabilities in excess of 
$1 billion. All Board-regulated banking entities that meet the SBA 
definition of small entities (i.e., those with consolidated assets of 
$550 million or less) have consolidated gross trading assets and 
liabilities below $1 billion and thus would be subject to the 
presumption of compliance.
    As discussed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the Agencies expect 
that this rebuttable presumption of compliance would materially reduce 
the costs associated with complying with the rule. As a result of this 
presumed compliance, these banking entities would not be required to 
comply with many of the rule's specific requirements to demonstrate 
compliance, such as the documentation requirements associated with the 
hedging exemption. Additionally, these entities would not be required 
to specify and maintain trading risk limits to comply with the rule's 
market making exemption. Accordingly, these smaller entities would 
generally not be required to devote resources to demonstrate compliance 
with any of the rule's requirements.
    Without this presumption of compliance, these banking entities 
would generally be required to comply with the rule's applicable 
substantive requirements to demonstrate compliance with the rule. As a 
result, this proposed change is expected to meaningfully reduce the 
costs associated with rule compliance for small banking entities. The 
presumption would be rebuttable, so a banking entity would need to 
maintain a certain level of resources to respond to supervisory 
requests for information in the event that the presumption of 
compliance is rebutted; however, the Agencies would not expect these 
banking entities to maintain anything other than what they would 
normally maintain in the ordinary course. The amount of resources 
required for such purposes is expected to be significantly smaller than 
the amount of resources that would be required to maintain and execute 
ongoing compliance with the 2013 final rule's requirements.
5. Identification of Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal 
Regulations
    The Board has not identified any federal statutes or regulations 
that would duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed revisions.
6. Discussion of Significant Alternatives
    The Board believes the proposed amendments to the 2013 final rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on small banking entities 
supervised by the Board and therefore believes that there are no 
significant alternatives to the proposal that would reduce the economic 
impact on small banking entities supervised by the Board.
OCC
    The RFA, requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to 
prepare an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the 
impact of the proposed rule on small entities, or to certify that the 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. For purposes of the RFA, the SBA 
defines small entities as those with $550 million or less in assets for 
commercial banks and savings institutions, and $38.5 million or less in 
assets for trust companies.
    The OCC currently supervises approximately 886 small entities.\266\ 
Pursuant to section 203 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act (May 24, 2018), OCC-supervised institutions 
with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or less are not ``banking 
entities'' within the scope of Section 13 of the BHCA, if their trading 
assets and trading liabilities do not exceed 5 percent of their total 
consolidated assets, and they are not controlled by a company that has 
total consolidated assets over $10 billion or total trading assets and 
trading liabilities that exceed 5 percent of total consolidated assets. 
The proposal may impact two OCC-supervised small entities, which is not 
a substantial number. Therefore, the OCC certifies that the proposal 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.
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    \266\ The number of small entities supervised by the OCC is 
determined using the SBA's size thresholds for commercial banks and 
savings institutions, and trust companies, which are $550 million 
and $38.5 million, respectively. Consistent with the General 
Principles of Affiliation 13 CFR 121.103(a), the OCC counts the 
assets of affiliated financial institutions when determining if we 
should classify an OCC-supervised institution as a small entity. The 
OCC used December 31, 2017, to determine size because a ``financial 
institution's assets are determined by averaging the assets reported 
on its four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year.'' 
See footnote 8 of the U.S. Small Business Administration's Table of 
Size Standards.
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FDIC
a. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    The RFA, generally requires an agency, in connection with a 
proposed rule, to prepare and make available for public comment an 
initial regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the impact of a 
proposed rule on small entities.\267\ However, a regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required if the agency certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The SBA has defined ``small entities'' to include banking 
organizations with total assets of less than or equal to $550 
million.\268\ As discussed further below, the FDIC certifies that this 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of FDIC-supervised small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \268\ 13 CFR 121.201 (as amended, effective December 2, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Reasons for and Policy Objectives of the Proposed Rule
    The Agencies are issuing this proposal to amend the 2013 final rule 
in order to provide banking entities with additional certainty and 
reduce compliance obligations and costs where possible. The Agencies 
acknowledge that many small banking entities have found certain aspects 
of the 2013 final rule to be complex or difficult to apply in 
practice.\269\ The proposed rule amends existing requirements in order 
the make them more efficient. However, the proposed amendments do not 
alter the Volcker Rule's existing restrictions on the ability of 
banking entities to engage in proprietary trading and have

[[Page 33518]]

certain interests in, and relationships with, covered funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ The FDIC has issued twenty-one FAQs since inception of the 
2013 rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Description of the Rule
    The Agencies are proposing to tailor the application of the 2013 
final rule based on a banking entity's risk profile and the size and 
scope of its trading activities. Second, the Agencies aim to further 
streamline compliance obligations, particularly for entities without 
large trading operations. Third, the agencies seek to streamline and 
refine certain definitions and requirements related to the proprietary 
trading prohibition and limitations on covered fund activities and 
investments. Please refer to Section II: Overview of Proposal, for 
further information.
d. Other Statutes and Federal Rules
    The FDIC has not identified any likely duplication, overlap, and/or 
potential conflict between the proposed rule and any other federal 
rule.
    On May 24, 2018, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act was enacted, which, among other things, amends 
section 13 of the BHC Act. As a result, section 13 excludes from the 
definition of banking entity any institution that, together with their 
affiliates and subsidiaries, has: (1) Total assets of $10 billion or 
less, and (2) trading assets and liabilities that comprise 5 percent or 
less of total assets. This excludes every FDIC-supervised small entity 
from the statutory definition of banking entity, except those that are 
controlled by a company that is not excluded. The SBA has defined 
``small entities'' to include banking organizations with total assets 
less than or equal to $550 million.\270\
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    \270\ 13 CFR 121.201.
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e. Small Entities Affected
    The FDIC supervises 3,597 depository institutions,\271\ of which, 
2,885 are defined as small entity.\272\ There are no FDIC-supervised 
small entities that engage in significant or moderate trading of assets 
and liabilities at the depository institution level.\273\ There are 
only five FDIC-supervised small entities, which are controlled by 
companies not excluded by section 13, as amended, that would be 
required to implement compliance elements prescribed by the proposed 
rule and would have compliance obligations under the proposed rule, of 
which one is categorized as having ``significant'' trading, one is 
categorized as having ``moderate'' trading and three are categorized as 
having ``limited'' trading activity.\274\
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    \271\ FDIC-supervised institutions are set forth in 12 U.S.C. 
1813(q)(2).
    \272\ FDIC Call Report, March 31, 2018.
    \273\ Based on data from the December 31, 2017 Call Reports and 
Y9C reports. Top tier institutions that have a four-quarter average 
trading assets and liabilities, excluding U.S. treasuries and 
obligations or guarantees of government agencies, exceeding $10 
billion have ``significant'' trading activity while those between $1 
billion and $10 billion have ``moderate'' trading activity and those 
below $1 billion have ``limited'' trading activity.
    \274\ Id.
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f. Expected Effects of the Proposed Rule
    The potential benefits of this proposed rule consist of any 
reduction in the regulatory costs borne by covered entities. The 
potential costs of this rule consist of any reduction in the efficacy 
of the objectives in the existing regulatory framework. As explained in 
the following sections, certain of these potential costs and benefits 
are difficult to quantify.
1. Expected Costs
    By reducing the reporting requirements of the 2013 final rule, 
there is a chance that the Agencies would fail to recognize prohibited 
proprietary trading, resulting in additional risk of loss to an 
institution, the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), the financial sector, 
and the economy. The FDIC believes the potential costs associated with 
these risks are minimal. First, the reporting metrics that would be 
removed or replaced by the proposed rule have contributed little as 
indicators of risk, and there would be no cost associated with 
replacing them. Second, the banking entities that would be relieved 
from compliance requirements under section __.20 of the proposed rule 
are primarily small entities that conduct limited to no trading 
activity, and which are therefore excluded from Section 13 by the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The 
FDIC would maintain its ability to recognize and respond to potential 
risks of prohibited activity by these small entities through off-site 
monitoring of Call Reports as well as periodic on-site examinations. 
The proposed rule has no additional or transition costs because the new 
reporting metrics in the proposed rule consist of data that covered 
entities already collect in the course of business and for regulatory 
compliance.
2. Expected Benefits
    The potential benefits of the proposed rule can be expressed in 
terms of the potential reduction in the costs of compliance incurred by 
small, FDIC-supervised affected banking entities under the proposed 
rule. These benefits cannot be quantified because covered institutions 
do not collect data and report to the FDIC the precise burden relating 
to parts of the 2013 final rule. Nevertheless, supervisory experience 
and feedback received from FDIC-supervised banking entities have 
demonstrated that these burdens exist. The proposed rule clarifies many 
requirements and definitions that are expected to enable banking 
entities to more efficiently and effectively comply with the rule, thus 
providing benefits to those entities.
g. Alternatives Considered
    The primary alternative to the proposed rule is to maintain the 
status quo under the 2013 final rule. As discussed above, however, the 
proposed rule implements the statutory requirements, but is expected to 
provide more certainty and result in lower costs.
    The proposed rule also seeks public comment on alternative 
regulatory approaches that would reduce the compliance burden of the 
2013 final rule without reducing its effectiveness in eliminating the 
moral hazard of proprietary trading.
h. Certification Statement
    Section 13, as amended, exempts almost all of the FDIC-supervised 
small institutions from compliance with the Volcker Rule. The proposed 
rule provides benefits to the remaining five FDIC-supervised small 
institutions with parent companies subject to the rule. Therefore, the 
FDIC certifies that this proposed rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of FDIC-supervised small 
entities.\275\
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    \275\ Notwithstanding S.2155, the rule does provide benefits to 
a substantial number of moderate sized banks above $550 million in 
total assets and below $1 billion in trading assets and liabilities 
as well as to large banks with very little trading activity.
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i. Request for Comments
    The FDIC invites comments on all aspects of the supporting 
information provided in this RFA section. In particular, would this 
rule have any significant effect on small entities that the FDIC has 
not identified? If the proposed rule is implemented, how many hours of 
burden would small institutions save?
SEC
    Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the SEC hereby certifies that the 
proposed amendments to the 2013 final rule would not, if adopted, have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
    As discussed in the Supplementary Information, the Agencies are 
proposing

[[Page 33519]]

to revise the 2013 final rule in order to provide clarity to banking 
entities about what activities are prohibited, reduce compliance costs, 
and improve the ability of the Agencies to make assessments regarding 
compliance relative to the 2013 final rule. To minimize the costs 
associated with the 2013 final rule in a manner consistent with section 
13 of the BHC Act, the Agencies are proposing to simplify and tailor 
the rule in a manner that would substantially reduce compliance costs 
for all banking entities and, in particular, small banking entities and 
banking entities without significant trading operations.
    The proposed revisions would generally apply to banking entities, 
including certain SEC-registered entities. These entities include bank-
affiliated SEC-registered broker-dealers, investment advisers, and 
security-based swap dealers. Based on information in filings submitted 
by these entities, the SEC preliminarily believes that there are no 
banking entity registered investment advisers \276\ or broker-dealers 
\277\ that are small entities for purposes of the RFA.\278\ For this 
reason, the SEC believes that the proposed amendments to the 2013 final 
rule would not, if adopted, have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
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    \276\ For the purposes of an SEC rulemaking in connection with 
the RFA, an investment adviser generally is a small entity if it: 
(1) Has assets under management having a total value of less than 
$25 million; (2) did not have total assets of $5 million or more on 
the last day of the most recent fiscal year; and (3) does not 
control, is not controlled by, and is not under common control with 
another investment adviser that has assets under management of $25 
million or more, or any person (other than a natural person) that 
had total assets of $5 million or more on the last day of its most 
recent fiscal year. See 17 CFR 275.0-7.
    \277\ For the purposes of an SEC rulemaking in connection with 
the RFA, a broker-dealer will be deemed a small entity if it: (1) 
Had total capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less 
than $500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year as of which its 
audited financial statements were prepared pursuant to 17 CFR 
240.17a-5(d), or, if not required to file such statements, had total 
capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than 
$500,000 on the last day of the preceding fiscal year (or in the 
time that it has been in business, if shorter); and (2) is not 
affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) that is not 
a small business or small organization. See 17 CFR 240.0-10(c). 
Under the standards adopted by the SBA, small entities also include 
entities engaged in financial investments and related activities 
with $38.5 million or less in annual receipts. See 13 CFR 121.201 
(Subsector 523).
    \278\ Based on SEC analysis of Form ADV data, the SEC 
preliminarily believes that there are not a substantial number of 
registered investment advisers affected by the proposed amendments 
that would qualify as small entities under RFA. Based on SEC 
analysis of broker-dealer FOCUS filings and NIC relationship data, 
the SEC preliminarily believes that there are no SEC-registered 
broker-dealers affected by the proposed amendments that would 
qualify as small entities under RFA. With respect to security-based 
swap dealers, based on feedback from market participants and our 
information about the security-based swap markets, the Commission 
believes that the types of entities that would engage in more than a 
de minims amount of dealing activity involving security-based 
swaps--which generally would be large financial institutions--would 
not be ``small entities'' for purposes of the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The SEC encourages written comments regarding this certification. 
Specifically, the SEC solicits comment as to whether the proposed 
amendments could have an impact on small entities that has not been 
considered. Commenters should describe the nature of any impact on 
small entities and provide empirical data to support the extent of such 
impact.
CFTC
    Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the CFTC hereby certifies that the 
proposed amendments to the 2013 final rule would not, if adopted, have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
for which the CFTC is the primary financial regulatory agency.
    As discussed in this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the Agencies are 
proposing to revise the 2013 final rule in order to provide clarity to 
banking entities about what activities are prohibited, reduce 
compliance costs, and improve the ability of the Agencies to make 
assessments regarding compliance relative to the 2013 final rule. To 
minimize the costs associated with the 2013 final rule in a manner 
consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act, the Agencies are proposing 
to simplify and tailor the rule in a manner that would substantially 
reduce compliance costs for all banking entities and, in particular, 
small banking entities and banking entities without significant trading 
operations.
    The proposed revisions would generally apply to banking entities, 
including certain CFTC-registered entities. These entities include 
bank-affiliated CFTC-registered swap dealers, FCMs, commodity trading 
advisors and commodity pool operators.\279\ The CFTC has previously 
determined that swap dealers, futures commission merchants and 
commodity pool operators are not small entities for purposes of the RFA 
and, therefore, the requirements of the RFA do not apply to those 
entities.\280\ As for commodity trading advisors, the CFTC has found it 
appropriate to consider whether such registrants should be deemed small 
entities for purposes of the RFA on a case-by-case basis, in the 
context of the particular regulation at issue.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ The proposed revisions may also apply to other types of 
CFTC registrants that are banking entities, such as introducing 
brokers, but the CFTC believes it is unlikely that such other 
registrants will have significant activities that would implicate 
the proposed revisions. See 79 FR 5808, 5813 (Jan. 31, 2014) (CFTC 
version of 2013 final rule).
    \280\ See Policy Statement and Establishment of Definitions of 
``Small Entities'' for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
47 FR 18618 (Apr. 30, 1982) (futures commission merchants and 
commodity pool operators); Registration of Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants, 77 FR 2613, 2620 (Jan. 19, 2012) (swap dealers 
and major swap participants).
    \281\ See Policy Statement and Establishment of Definitions of 
``Small Entities'' for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
47 FR 18618, 18620 (Apr. 30, 1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the context of the proposed revisions to the 2013 final rule, 
the CFTC believes it is unlikely that a substantial number of the 
commodity trading advisors that are potentially affected are small 
entities for purposes of the RFA. In this regard, the CFTC notes that 
only commodity trading advisors that are registered with the CFTC are 
covered by the 2013 final rule, and generally those that are registered 
have larger businesses. Similarly, the 2013 final rule applies to only 
those commodity trading advisors that are affiliated with banks, which 
the CFTC expects are larger businesses. The CFTC requests that 
commenters address in particular whether any of these commodity trading 
advisors, or other CFTC registrants covered by the proposed revisions 
to the 2013 final rule, are small entities for purposes of the RFA.
    Because the CFTC believes that there are not a substantial number 
of registered, banking entity-affiliated commodity trading advisors 
that are small entities for purposes of the RFA, and the other CFTC 
registrants that may be affected by the proposed revisions have been 
determined not to be small entities, the CFTC believes that the 
proposed revisions to the 2013 final rule would not, if adopted, have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
for which the CFTC is the primary financial regulatory agency.
    The CFTC encourages written comments regarding this certification. 
Specifically, the CFTC solicits comment as to whether the proposed 
amendments could have a direct impact on small entities that were not 
considered. Commenters should describe the nature of any impact on 
small entities and provide empirical data to support the extent of such 
impact.

A. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The OCC analyzed the proposed rule under the factors set forth in 
the

[[Page 33520]]

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under this 
analysis, the OCC considered whether the proposed rule includes a 
federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by state, local, and 
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year (adjusted annually for inflation).
    The OCC has determined this proposed rule is likely to result in 
the expenditure by the private sector of approximately $11.6 million in 
the first year. Therefore, the OCC concludes that implementation of the 
proposed rule would not result in an expenditure of $100 million or 
more annually by state, local, and tribal governments, or by the 
private sector.

B. SEC: Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996, or ``SBREFA,'' \282\ the SEC requests comment on the 
potential effect of the proposed amendments on the U.S. economy on an 
annual basis; any potential increase in costs or prices for consumers 
or individual industries; and any potential effect on competition, 
investment or innovation. Commenters are requested to provide empirical 
data and other factual support for their views to the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) 
(codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and as a note 
to 5 U.S.C. 601).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. SEC Economic Analysis

1. Broad Economic Considerations
    Section 13 of the BHC Act generally prohibits banking entities from 
engaging in proprietary trading and from acquiring or retaining an 
ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with 
covered funds, subject to certain exemptions. Under the BHC Act, 
``banking entities'' include insured depository institutions, any 
company that controls an insured depository institution or that is 
treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of the 
International Banking Act of 1978, and their affiliates and 
subsidiaries.\283\ Accordingly, certain SEC-regulated entities, such as 
broker-dealers, security-based swap dealers (``SBSDs''), and registered 
investment advisers (``RIAs'') affiliated with a banking entity, fall 
under the definition of ``banking entity'' and are subject to the 
prohibitions of section 13 of the BHC Act.\284\ In addition, the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
enacted on May 24, 2018, amends section 13 of the BHC Act to exclude 
from the scope of ``insured depository institution'' in the banking 
entity definition any entity that does not have and is not controlled 
by a company that has (1) more than $10 billion in total consolidated 
assets; and (2) total trading assets and trading liabilities, as 
reported on the most recent applicable regulatory filing filed by the 
institution, that are more than 5% of total consolidated assets.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(1).
    \284\ Throughout this economic analysis, the term ``banking 
entity'' generally refers only to banking entities for which the SEC 
is the primary financial regulatory agency unless otherwise noted. 
While section 13 of the BHC Act and its associated rules apply to a 
broader set of banking entities, this economic analysis is limited 
to those banking entities for which the SEC is the primary financial 
regulatory agency as defined in section 2(12)(B) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. See 12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(2); 12 U.S.C. 5301(12)(B).
    We recognize that compliance with SBSD registration requirements 
is not yet required and that there are currently no registered 
SBSDs. However, the SEC has previously estimated that as many as 50 
entities may potentially register as security-based swap dealers and 
that as many as 16 of these entities may already be SEC-registered 
broker-dealers. See Registration Process for Security-Based Swap 
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act 
Release No. 75611 (Aug. 5, 2015), 80 FR 48963 (Aug. 14, 2015) 
(``SBSD and MSP Registration Release'').
    For the purposes of this economic analysis, the term ``dealer'' 
generally refers to SEC-registered broker-dealers and SBSDs.
    Throughout this economic analysis, ``we'' refers only to the SEC 
and not the other Agencies, except where otherwise indicated.
    \285\ The legislation also alters the name sharing provisions in 
section 13(d)(1)(G)(vi). This economic analysis assumes that the 
legislation's changes to section 13 of the BHC Act are in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies issued final regulations implementing section 13 of 
the BHC Act in December 2013, with an initial effective date of April 
1, 2014.\286\ The 2013 final rule prohibits banking entities (e.g., 
bank-affiliated broker-dealers, SBSDs, and investment advisers) from 
engaging, as principal, in short-term trading of securities, 
derivatives, futures contracts, and options on these instruments, 
subject to certain exemptions. In addition, the 2013 final rule 
generally prohibits the same entities from acquiring or retaining an 
ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with 
a ``covered fund,'' subject to certain exemptions. The 2013 final rule 
defines the term ``covered fund'' to include any issuer that would be 
an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 if it 
were not otherwise excluded by sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that act, 
as well as certain foreign funds and commodity pools.\287\ However, the 
definition contains a number of exclusions for entities that would 
otherwise meet the covered fund definition but that the Agencies did 
not believe are engaged in investment activities contemplated by 
section 13 of the BHC Act.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ See 79 FR at 5536. The 2013 final rule was published in 
the Federal Register on January 31, 2014, and became effective on 
April 1, 2014. Banking entities were required to fully conform their 
proprietary trading activities and their new covered fund 
investments and activities to the requirements of the final rule by 
the end of the conformance period, which the Board extended to July 
21, 2015. The Board extended the conformance period for legacy-
covered fund activities until July 21, 2017. Upon application, 
banking entities also have an additional period to conform certain 
illiquid funds to the requirements of section 13 and implementing 
regulations.
    \287\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(b).
    \288\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In implementing section 13 of the BHC Act, the Agencies sought to 
increase the safety and soundness of banking entities, promote 
financial stability, and reduce conflicts of interest between banking 
entities and their customers.\289\ The regulatory regime created by the 
2013 final rule may enhance regulatory oversight and compliance with 
the substantive prohibitions but could also impact capital formation 
and liquidity. The Agencies also recognized that client-oriented 
financial services, such as underwriting and market making, are 
critical to capital formation and can facilitate the provision of 
market liquidity, and that the ability to hedge is fundamental to 
prudent risk management as well as capital formation.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ See, e.g., 79 FR at 5666, 5574, 5541, 5659. An extensive 
body of research has examined moral hazard arising out of federal 
deposit insurance, implicit bailout guarantees, and systemic risk 
issues. See, e.g., Atkeson, d'Avernas, Eisfeldt, and Weill, 2018, 
``Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks,'' 
working paper. See also Bianchi, 2016, ``Efficient Bailouts?'' 
American Economic Review 106 (12), 3607-3659; Kelly, Lustig, and Van 
Nieuwerburgh, 2016, ``Too-Systematic-to-Fail: What Option Markets 
Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees,'' American Economic 
Review 106(6), 1278-1319; Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014, 
``How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the 
Recent Crisis,'' Journal of Banking and Finance 48, 312-321; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012, ``The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why 
Did Some Banks Perform Better?'' Journal of Financial Economics 105, 
1-17; Veronesi and Zingales, 2010, ``Paulson's Gift,'' Journal of 
Financial Economics 97(3), 339-368. For a literature review, see, 
e.g., Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin, and Perignon, 2017, ``Where the 
Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk,'' Review of Finance 21(1), 
109-152.
    See also, e.g., Avci, Schipani, and Seyhun, 2017, ``Eliminating 
Conflicts of Interests in Banks: The Significance of the Volcker 
Rule,'' Yale Journal on Regulation 35 (2).
    \290\ See, e.g., 79 FR at 5541, 5546, 5561. In addition, a 
significant amount of research has focused on changes in liquidity 
provision following the financial crisis and regulatory reforms. 
See, e.g., Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman 2017, 
``Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds,'' Journal 
of Finance, forthcoming. See also Bao, O'Hara and Zhou, 2017, ``The 
Volcker Rule and Corporate Bond Market Making in Times of Stress,'' 
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. Bao et al. (2017) shows 
that dealers not subject to the Volcker rule increased their market-
making activities, partially offsetting the reduction market making 
by dealers affected by the Volcker Rule. See also, Anderson and 
Stulz, 2017, ``Is Post-Crisis Bond Liquidity Lower?'' working paper; 
Goldstein and Hotchkiss, 2017, ``Providing Liquidity in an Illiquid 
Market: Dealer Behavior in U.S. Corporate Bonds,'' working paper.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 33521]]

    Section 13 of the BHC Act also provides a number of statutory 
exemptions to the general prohibitions on proprietary trading and 
covered funds activities. For example, the statute exempts from the 
proprietary trading restrictions certain underwriting, market making, 
and risk-mitigating hedging activities, as well as certain trading 
activities outside of the United States.\291\ Similarly, section 13 
provides exemptions for certain covered funds activities, such as 
exemptions for organizing and offering covered funds.\292\ The 2013 
final rule implemented these exemptions.\293\ In addition, some banking 
entities engaged in proprietary trading are required to furnish 
periodic reports that include a variety of quantitative measurements of 
their covered trading activities, and banking entities engaged in 
activities covered by section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule 
are required to establish a compliance program reasonably designed to 
ensure and monitor compliance with the 2013 final rule.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \291\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851(d).
    \292\ See section 13(d)(1)(G) of the BHC Act.
    \293\ See 2013 final rule Sec. Sec.  __.4, __.5, __.6, __.11, 
__.13.
    \294\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certain aspects of the rule may have resulted in a complex and 
costly compliance regime that is unduly restrictive and burdensome on 
some affected banking entities, particularly smaller firms that do not 
qualify for the simplified compliance and reporting regime. The 
Agencies also recognize that distinguishing between permissible and 
prohibited activities may be complex and costly for some firms. 
Moreover, the 2013 final rule may have included in its scope some 
groups of market participants that do not necessarily engage in the 
activities or pose the risks that section 13 of the BHC Act intended to 
address. For example, the 2013 final rule's definition of the term 
``covered fund'' is broad and, as a result, may include funds that do 
not engage in the investment activities contemplated by section 13 of 
the BHC Act. As another example, foreign banking entities' ability to 
trade financial instruments in the United States may have been 
significantly limited despite the foreign trading exemption in the 2013 
final rule.
    The amendments to the 2013 final rule proposed in this release 
include those that influence the scope of permitted activities for all 
or a subset of banking entities and covered funds, and those that 
simplify, tailor, or eliminate the application of certain aspects of 
the rule to reduce compliance and reporting burdens.
    Some of the proposed amendments affect the scope of permitted 
activities (e.g., foreign trading, underwriting, market making, and 
risk-mitigating hedging). These changes would expand the scope of 
permitted activities, which may benefit the parties to those 
transactions and broader capital markets, for example, if reduced 
compliance costs translate into increased willingness of banking 
entities to underwrite securities or make markets. These changes also, 
however, could facilitate risk-taking or create conflicts of interest 
among certain groups of market participants. Moreover, amendments that 
redefine the scope of entities subject to certain provisions of the 
rule may impact competition, allocative efficiency, and capital 
formation. Broadly, to the extent that the proposed amendments and 
changes on which the Agencies are requesting comment increase or 
decrease the scope of permissible activities, they may magnify or 
attenuate the economic tradeoffs above. As we discuss below, to the 
extent that the proposed amendments or changes on which the Agencies 
are requesting comments reduce burdens on some groups of market 
participants (e.g., on entities without significant trading assets and 
liabilities, foreign banking entities, certain types of covered funds), 
the proposed amendments may increase competition and trading activity 
in various market segments.
    Other proposed amendments reduce compliance program, reporting, and 
documentation requirements for some entities. While these amendments 
are designed to reduce the compliance burdens of regulated entities, 
they may also reduce the efficacy of regulatory oversight, internal 
compliance, and supervision. Amendments and changes on which the 
Agencies are requesting comment that decrease (or increase) compliance 
program and reporting requirements tip the balance of economic 
tradeoffs toward (or away from) competition, trading activity, and 
capital formation on the one hand, and against (or in favor of) 
regulatory and internal oversight on the other. However, as discussed 
below, some of the changes need not reduce the efficacy of the 
Agencies' regulatory oversight. Further, under the proposal, banking 
entities (other than banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities for which the proposed presumption of compliance has not 
been rebutted) would still be required to develop and provide for the 
continued administration of a compliance program reasonably designed to 
ensure and monitor compliance with the prohibitions and restrictions 
set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule, as it 
is proposed to be amended.
    Where possible, we have attempted to quantify the costs and 
benefits expected to result from the proposed amendments. In many 
cases, however, the SEC is unable to quantify these potential economic 
effects. Some of the primary economic effects, such as the effect on 
incentives that may give rise to conflicts of interest in various 
regulated entities and the efficacy of regulatory oversight under 
various compliance regimes, are inherently difficult to quantify. 
Moreover, some of the benefits of the 2013 final rule's definitions and 
prohibitions that are being amended here, for example potential 
benefits for resilience during a crisis, are less readily observable 
under strong economic conditions. Lastly, because of overlapping 
implementation periods of various post-crisis regulations affecting the 
same group of SEC registrants, the long implementation timeline of the 
2013 final rule, and the fact that many market participants changed 
their behavior in anticipation of future changes in regulation, it is 
difficult to quantify the net economic effects of the individual 
amendments to rule provisions proposed here.
    In some instances, we lack the information or data necessary to 
provide reasonable estimates for the economic effects of the proposed 
amendments. For example, we lack information and data on the volume of 
trading activity that does not occur because of uncertainty about how 
to demonstrate that underwriting or market-making activities satisfy 
the RENTD requirement; the extent to which internally-set risk limits 
capture expected customer demand; how accurately correlation analysis 
reflects underlying exposures of banking entities with, and without, 
significant trading assets and liabilities in normal times and in times 
of market stress; the feasibility and costs of reorganization that may 
enable some U.S. banking entities to become foreign banking entities 
for the purposes of relying on the foreign trading exemption; how 
market participants may choose to

[[Page 33522]]

restructure their interests in various types of private funds in 
response to the proposed amendments or other changes on which the 
Agencies seek comment; the amount of capital formation in covered funds 
that does not occur because of current covered fund provisions, 
including those concerning underwriting, market making, or hedging with 
covered funds; or the volume of loans, guarantees, securities lending, 
and derivatives activity dealers may wish to engage in with the covered 
funds they advise; the extent of risk reduction associated with the 
2013 final rule. Where we cannot quantify the relevant economic 
effects, we discuss them in qualitative terms.
    In addition, the broader economic effects of the proposed 
amendments, such as those related to efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation, are difficult to quantify with any degree of 
certainty. The proposed amendments tailor, remove, or alter the scope 
of requirements in the 2013 final rule. Thus, some of the 
methodological challenges in analyzing market effects of these 
amendments are somewhat similar to those that arise when analyzing the 
effects of the 2013 final rule. As we have noted elsewhere, analysis of 
the effects of the implementation of the 2013 final rule is confounded 
by, among others, macroeconomic factors, other policy interventions, 
post-crisis changes to market participants' risk aversion and return 
expectations, and technological advancements unrelated to regulations. 
Because of the extended timeline of implementation of section 13 of the 
BHC Act and the overlap of the 2013 final rule period with other post-
crisis changes affecting the same group of SEC registrants, typical 
quantitative methods that might otherwise enable causal attribution and 
quantification of the effects of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 
final rule on measures of capital formation, liquidity, and 
informational or allocative efficiency are not available. Where 
existing research has sought to test causal effects and to measure them 
quantitatively, the presence, direction, and magnitude of the effects 
are sensitive to econometric methodology, measurement, choice of 
market, and the time period studied.\295\ Moreover, empirical measures 
of capital formation or liquidity do not reflect issuance and 
transaction activity that does not occur as a result of the 
implementing rules. Accordingly, it is difficult to quantify the 
primary issuance and market liquidity that would have been observed 
following the financial crisis absent the ensuing reforms. Finally, 
since section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule combined a 
number of different requirements, it is difficult to attribute the 
observed effects to a specific provision or set of requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ See, e.g., Access to Capital and Market Liquidity supra 
note 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the existing securities markets--including market 
participants, their business models, market structure, etc.--differ in 
significant ways from the securities markets that existed prior to the 
2013 final rule's implementation. For example, the role of dealers in 
intermediating trading activity has changed in important ways, 
including: Bank-dealer capital commitment declined while non-bank 
dealer capital commitment increased; electronic trading in some 
securities markets became more prominent; the profitability of trading 
after the financial crisis may have decreased significantly; and the 
introduction of alternative credit markets may have contributed to 
liquidity fragmentation across markets.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \296\ See, e.g., Bessembinder et al. (2017), Bao et al. (2017), 
Anderson and Stulz (2017). See also, Trebbi and Xiao, 2018, 
``Regulation and Market Liquidity,'' Management Science, 
forthcoming; Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2017, ``The Anatomy of the CDS 
Market,'' Review of Financial Studies 30(1), 80-119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The SEC continues to recognize that post-crisis financial reforms 
in general, and the 2013 final rule in particular, impose costs on 
certain groups of market participants. Since the rule became effective, 
new estimates regarding compliance burdens and new information about 
the various effects of the final rule have become available. The 
passage of time has also enabled an assessment of the value of 
individual requirements that enable SEC oversight, such as the 
requirement to report certain quantitative metrics, relative to 
compliance burdens. This and other information and considerations 
inform the SEC's economic analysis.
    From the outset, we note that this analysis is limited to areas 
within the scope of the SEC's function as the primary securities 
markets regulator in the United States. In particular, the SEC's 
economic analysis is focused on the potential effects of the proposed 
amendments on SEC registrants, the functioning and efficiency of the 
securities markets, and capital formation. Specifically, this economic 
analysis generally concerns entities subject to the 2013 final rule for 
which the SEC is the primary financial regulatory agency, including 
SEC-registered broker-dealers, SBSDs, and RIAs.\297\ In addition, the 
analysis of the covered funds provisions discusses their economic 
effects on covered funds as well as the economic effects of the 
Agencies modifying the definition of covered funds. Thus, the below 
analysis does not consider broker-dealers, SBSDs, and investment 
advisers that are not banking entities, and banking entities that are 
not SEC registrants, beyond the potential spillover effects on these 
entities and effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation 
in securities markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ See Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the 
Commission's Rule under Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act 
(the ``Volcker Rule''), June 10, 2014; Updated March 4, 2016, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-volcker-rule-section13.htm (providing background on the application of the 
Commission's rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Overview of the Baseline
    In the context of this economic analysis, the economic costs and 
benefits, and the impact of the proposed amendments on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation, are considered relative to a 
baseline that includes the 2013 final rule and recent legislative 
amendments as applicable and current practices aimed at compliance with 
these regulations.
a. Regulation
    To assess the economic impact of the proposed rule, we are using as 
our baseline the legal and regulatory framework as it exists at the 
time of this release. Thus, the regulatory baseline for our economic 
analysis includes section 13 of the BHC Act as amended by the Economic 
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act and the 2013 
final rule. Further, our baseline accounts for the fact that since the 
adoption of the 2013 final rule, the staffs of the Agencies have 
provided FAQ responses related to the regulatory obligations of banking 
entities, including SEC-regulated entities that are also banking 
entities under the 2013 final rule, which likely influenced these 
entities' means of compliance with the 2013 final rule.\298\ In 
addition, the Federal banking agencies released a 2017 policy statement 
with respect to foreign excluded funds.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \298\ See id.
    \299\ See Statement regarding Treatment of Certain Foreign Funds 
under the Rules Implementing Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company 
Act supra note 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three major areas of the 2013 final rule--proprietary trading 
restrictions, covered fund restrictions, and compliance requirements--
are relevant to establishing an economic baseline. First, with respect 
to proprietary trading restrictions, the features of the existing 
regulatory framework relevant to the baseline of this economic analysis

[[Page 33523]]

include definitions of ``trading account'' and ``trading desk;'' 
requirements for permissible underwriting, market making, and risk-
mitigating hedging activities; the liquidity management exclusion; 
treatment of error-related trades; restrictions on transactions between 
foreign banking entities and their U.S.-dealer affiliates; and the 
compliance and metrics-reporting requirements for dealers affiliated 
with banking entities. The potential that a RIC or a BDC would be 
treated as a banking entity where the fund's sponsor is a banking 
entity and holds 25% of more of the RIC or BDC's voting securities 
after a seeding period also forms part of our baseline.
    Second, with respect to the restrictions on covered funds, the 
features of the existing regulatory framework under the 2013 final rule 
relevant to the baseline include the definition of the term ``covered 
fund;'' restrictions on a banking entity's relationships with covered 
funds; and restrictions on underwriting, market making, and hedging 
with covered funds.
    Third, with respect to compliance, relevant requirements include 
the 2013 final rule's compliance program requirements, including those 
under Sec.  __.20 and Appendix B, as well as recordkeeping and 
reporting of metrics under Appendix A.
    The 2013 final rule differentiates banking entities on the basis of 
certain monetary thresholds, including the size of consolidated trading 
assets and liabilities of their parent company. More specifically, U.S. 
banking entities that have, together with affiliates and subsidiaries, 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) the average gross sum of which (on 
a worldwide consolidated basis) over the previous consecutive four 
quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of the four prior 
calendar quarters, equals $10 billion or more are currently subject to 
reporting requirements of Appendix A of the 2013 final rule. Entities 
below this threshold do not need to comply with Appendix A. 
Additionally, banking entities with total consolidated assets of $10 
billion or less as reported on December 31 of the previous 2 calendar 
years that engage in covered activities qualify for the simplified 
compliance regime, and banking entities that have $50 billion or more 
in total consolidated assets and banking entities with over $10 billion 
in consolidated trading assets and liabilities are currently subject to 
the requirement to adopt an enhanced compliance program pursuant to 
Appendix B.
    In the sections that follow we discuss rule provisions currently in 
effect, how each proposed amendment changes regulatory requirements, 
and the anticipated costs and benefits of the proposed amendments.
b. Affected Participants
    The SEC-regulated entities directly affected by the proposed 
amendments include broker-dealers, security-based swap dealers, and 
investment advisers.
i. Broker-Dealers \300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ Data sources included Reporting Form FR Y-9C data for 
domestic holding companies on a consolidated basis and Report of 
Condition and Income data for banks regulated by the Board, FDIC, 
and OCC as of Q3 2017. Broker-dealer bank affiliations were obtained 
from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's 
(FFIEC) National Information Center (NIC). Broker-dealer assets and 
holdings were obtained from FOCUS Report data for Q3 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the 2013 final rule, some of the largest SEC-regulated 
broker-dealers are banking entities. Table 1 reports the number, total 
assets, and holdings of broker-dealers by the broker-dealer's bank 
affiliation.
    While the 3,658 domestic broker-dealers that are not affiliated 
with holding companies greatly outnumber the 138 banking entity broker-
dealers subject to the 2013 final rule, these banking entity broker-
dealers dominate non-banking entity broker-dealers in terms of total 
assets (74% of total broker-dealer assets) and aggregate holdings (72% 
of total broker-dealer holdings).

                        Table 1--Broker-Dealer Count, Assets, and Holdings by Affiliation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Holdings
           Broker-dealer affiliation                Number       Total assets,  Holdings, $mln   (alternative),
                                                                   $mln 301           302           $mln 303
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected bank broker-dealers \304\............             138       3,039,337         724,706           536,555
Other bank broker-dealers \305\...............             124         125,595          12,312             5,582
Non-bank broker-dealers.......................           3,658         929,240         270,876           151,516
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.....................................           3,920       4,094,172       1,007,894           693,653
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some of the changes being proposed to the 2013 final rule 
differentiate banking entities on the basis of their consolidated 
trading assets and liabilities.\306\ Table 2 reports the distribution 
of broker-dealer banking entities' counts, assets, and holdings by 
consolidated trading assets and liabilities of the (top-level) parent 
firm. We estimate that 89 broker-dealer affiliates of firms with less 
than $10 billion in consolidated trading assets and liabilities account 
for 7% of bank-affiliated broker-dealer assets and 5% of holdings (or 
3% using the alternative measure of holdings). These figures may 
overestimate or underestimate the number of affected broker-dealers as 
they may include broker-dealers that do not engage in various types of 
covered trading activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \301\ Broker-dealer total assets are based on FOCUS report data 
for ``Total Assets.''
    \302\ Broker-dealer holdings are based on FOCUS report data for 
securities and spot commodities owned at market value, including 
bankers' acceptances, certificates of deposit and commercial paper, 
state and municipal government obligations, corporate obligations, 
stocks and warrants, options, arbitrage, other securities, U.S. and 
Canadian government obligations, and spot commodities.
    \303\ This alternative measure excludes U.S. and Canadian 
government obligations and spot commodities.
    \304\ This category includes all banking entity broker-dealers 
except those affiliated with banks that have consolidated total 
assets less than or equal to $10 billion and trading assets and 
liabilities less than or equal to 5% of total assets, and those for 
which bank trading asset and liability data was not available.
    \305\ This category includes all banking entity broker-dealers 
affiliated with firms that have consolidated total assets less than 
or equal to $10 billion and trading assets and liabilities less than 
or equal to 5% of total assets, as well as banking entity broker-
dealers for which bank trading asset and liability data was not 
available.
    \306\ See, e.g., 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(d)(1).

[[Page 33524]]

              Table 2--Broker-Dealer Counts, Assets, and Holdings by Consolidated Trading Assets and Liabilities of the Banking Entity 307
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               Total                                              Holdings
 Consolidated trading assets and liabilities 308     Number     Percentage    assets,     Percentage   Holdings,    Percentage   (altern.),   Percentage
                                                                                $mln                      $mln                      $mln
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>=50bln.........................................           29           21    2,215,295           73      554,125           76      492,017           92
25bln-50bln.....................................            8            6      417,099           14       76,865           11       21,083            4
10bln-25bln.....................................           12            9      184,591            6       58,232            8        7,494            1
5bln-10bln......................................           24           17      145,151            5       23,321            3       10,527            2
1bln-5bln.......................................           23           17        9,756            0        3,628            1        1,795            0
<=1bln..........................................           42           30       67,446            2        8,534            1        3,638            1
                                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................          138          100    3,039,338          100      724,705          100      536,554          100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Security-Based Swap Dealers
    The proposed amendments may also affect bank-affiliated SBSDs. As 
compliance with SBSD registration requirements is not yet required, 
there are currently no registered SBSDs. However, the SEC has 
previously estimated that as many as 50 entities may potentially 
register as security-based swap dealers and that as many as 16 of these 
entities may already be SEC-registered broker-dealers.\309\ Given our 
analysis of DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited Trade Information 
Warehouse (``TIW'') transaction and positions data on single-name 
credit-default swaps, we preliminarily believe that all entities that 
may register with the SEC as SBSDs are bank-affiliated firms, including 
those that are SEC-registered broker-dealers. Therefore, we 
preliminarily estimate that, in addition to the bank-affiliated SBSDs 
that are already registered as broker-dealers and included in the 
discussion above, as many as 34 other bank-affiliated SBSDs may be 
affected by the proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ This analysis excludes SEC-registered broker-dealers 
affiliated with firms that have consolidated total assets less than 
or equal to $10 billion and trading assets and liabilities less than 
or equal to 5% of total assets, as well as firms for which bank 
trading asset and liability data was not available.
    \308\ Consolidated trading assets and liabilities are estimated 
using information reported in form Y-9C data. These estimates 
exclude from the definition of consolidated trading assets and 
liabilities Treasury securities--we subtract from the sum of total 
trading assets and liabilities reported in items BHCK3545 and 
BHCK3547 trading assets that are U.S. Treasury securities as 
reported in item BHCK3531 and calculate average trading assets and 
liabilities using 2016Q4 through 2017Q3 data. However, our estimates 
do not exclude agency securities as such information is not 
otherwise available. Thus, these figures may overestimate or 
underestimate the number of affected bank affiliated broker-dealers. 
We also note that we do not have data on worldwide consolidated 
trading assets and liabilities of foreign banking entities with 
which some SEC registrants are affiliated, and consolidated trading 
assets and liabilities for such foreign banking entities are 
calculated based on their U.S. operations. Thus, the figures may 
overestimate or underestimate the number of affected bank affiliated 
broker-dealers.
    \309\ See SBSD and MSP Registration Release, supra note 284.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Importantly, capital and other substantive requirements for SBSDs 
under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act have not yet been adopted. We 
recognize that firms may choose to move security-based swap trading 
activity into (or out of) an affiliated bank or an affiliated broker-
dealer instead of registering as a standalone SBSD, if bank or broker-
dealer capital and other regulatory requirements are less (or more) 
costly than those that may be imposed on SBSDs under Title VII. As a 
result, the above figures may overestimate or underestimate the number 
of SBSDs that are not broker-dealers and that may become SEC-registered 
entities that would be affected by the proposed amendments. 
Quantitative cost estimates are provided separately for affected 
broker-dealers and potential SBSDs.
iii. Private Funds and Private Fund Advisers \310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \310\ These estimates are calculated from Form ADV data as of 
March 31, 2018. We define an investment adviser as a ``private fund 
adviser'' if it indicates that it is an adviser to any private fund 
on Form ADV Item 7.B. We define an investment adviser as a ``banking 
entity RIA'' if it indicates on Form ADV Item 6.A.(7) that it is 
actively engaged in business as a bank, or it indicates on Form ADV 
Item 7.A.(8) that it has a ``related person'' that is a banking or 
thrift institution. For purposes of Form ADV, a ``related person'' 
is any advisory affiliate and any person that is under common 
control with the adviser. We recognize that the definition of 
``control'' for purposes of Form ADV, which is used in identifying 
related persons on the form, differs from the definition of 
``control'' under the BHC Act. In addition, this analysis does not 
exclude SEC-registered investment advisers affiliated with banks 
that have consolidated total assets less than or equal to $10 
billion and trading assets and liabilities less than or equal to 5% 
of total assets. Thus, these figures may overestimate or 
underestimate the number of banking entity RIAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this section, we focus on RIAs advising private funds. Using 
Form ADV data, Table 3 reports the number of RIAs advising private 
funds by fund type, as those types are defined in Form ADV. Table 4 
reports the number and gross assets of private funds advised by RIAs 
and separately reports these statistics for banking entity RIAs. As can 
be seen from Table 3, the two largest categories of private funds 
advised by RIAs are hedge funds and private equity funds.
    Banking entity RIAs advise a total of 4,250 private funds with 
approximately $2 trillion in gross assets. Using Form ADV data, we 
observe that banking entity RIAs' gross private fund assets under 
management is concentrated in hedge funds and private equity funds. We 
estimate on the basis of this data that banking entity RIAs advise 947 
hedge funds with approximately $616 billion in gross assets and 1,282 
private equity funds with approximately $350 billion in assets. While 
banking entity RIAs are subject to all of section 13's restrictions, 
because RIAs do not typically engage in proprietary trading, we 
preliminarily believe that they will not be impacted by the proposed 
amendments related to proprietary trading.

  Table 3--SEC-Registered Investment Advisers Advising Private Funds by
                              Fund Type 311
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Banking entity
                Fund type                     All RIA           RIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hedge Funds.............................           2,691             173
Private Equity Funds....................           1,538              90

[[Page 33525]]

 
Real Estate Funds.......................             486              56
Securitized Asset Funds.................             222              43
Venture Capital Funds...................             173              16
Liquidity Funds.........................              46               7
Other Private Funds.....................           1,043             148
                                         -------------------------------
    Total Private Fund Advisers.........           4,660             308
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Table 4--The Number and Gross Assets of Private Funds Advised by SEC-Registered Investment Advisers 312
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Number of private funds           Gross assets, $bln
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fund type                                     Banking entity                  Banking entity
                                                      All RIA           RIA           All RIA           RIA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hedge Funds.....................................          10,329             947           7,081             616
Private Equity Funds............................          13,588           1,282           2,919             350
Real Estate Funds...............................           3,252             323             564              84
Securitized Asset Funds.........................           1,707             360             562             120
Liquidity Funds.................................           1,073              29             109             190
Venture Capital Funds...........................              76              42             291               2
Other Private Funds.............................           4,337           1,268           1,568             689
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Private Funds.........................          34,359           4,250          13,093           2,052
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Banking entity RIAs advise a total of 4,250 private funds with 
approximately $2 trillion in gross assets. Using Form ADV data, we 
observe that banking entity RIAs' gross private fund assets under 
management is concentrated in hedge funds and private equity funds. We 
estimate on the basis of this data that banking entity RIAs advise 947 
hedge funds with approximately $616 billion in gross assets and 1,282 
private equity funds with approximately $350 billion in assets. While 
banking entity RIAs are subject to all of section 13's restrictions, 
because RIAs do not typically engage in proprietary trading, we 
preliminarily believe that they will not be impacted by the proposed 
amendments related to proprietary trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \311\ This table includes only the advisers that list private 
funds on Section 7.B.(1) of Form ADV. The number of advisers in the 
``Any Private Fund'' row is not the sum of the rows that follow 
since an adviser may advise multiple types of private funds. Each 
listed private fund type (e.g., real estate fund, liquidity fund) is 
defined in Form ADV, and those definitions are the same for purposes 
of the SEC's Form PF.
    \312\ Gross assets include uncalled capital commitments on Form 
ADV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Registered Investment Companies
    Based on SEC filings and public data, we estimate that, as of 
January 2018, there were approximately 15,500 RICs \313\ and 100 BDCs. 
Although RICs and BDCs are generally not banking entities themselves 
subject to the 2013 final rule, they may be indirectly affected by the 
2013 final rule and the proposed amendments to the extent that their 
advisers are banking entities. For instance, banking entity RIAs or 
their affiliates may reduce their level of investment in the funds they 
advise, or potentially close these funds, to avoid these funds becoming 
banking entities themselves. As discussed in more detail in section 
III.A, however, the Agencies have made clear that nothing in the 
proposal would modify the application of the staff FAQs discussed 
above, and the Agencies will not treat RICs (or FPFs) that meet the 
conditions included in the applicable staff FAQs as banking entities or 
attribute their activities and investments to the banking entity that 
sponsors the fund or otherwise may control the fund under the 
circumstances set forth in the FAQs. In addition, and also as discussed 
in more detail in section III.A, to accommodate the pendency of the 
proposal, for an additional period of one year until July 21, 2019, the 
Agencies will not treat qualifying foreign excluded funds that meet the 
conditions included in the policy statement discussed above as banking 
entities or attribute their activities and investments to the banking 
entity that sponsors the fund or otherwise may control the fund under 
the circumstances set forth in the policy statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ For the purposes of this analysis, the term RIC refers to 
the fund or series, not the legal entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Economic Effects
a. Treatment of Entities Based on the Size of Trading Assets and 
Liabilities
i. Costs and Benefits
    The proposal categorizes banking entities into three groups on the 
basis of the size of their trading activity: (1) Banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities, (2) banking entities with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities, and (3) banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities. Banking entities with 
significant trading assets and liabilities are defined as those that 
have, together with affiliates and subsidiaries, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) the average gross sum of which over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, equaling or exceeding $10 
billion.\314\ Banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities are defined as those that have, together with affiliates 
and subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding

[[Page 33526]]

trading assets and liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed 
by the United States or any agency of the United States) the average 
gross sum of which over the previous consecutive four quarters, as 
measured as of the last day of each of the four previous calendar 
quarters, is less than $1 billion. Finally, banking entities with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities are defined as those that are 
neither banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities nor banking entities with limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ With respect to a banking entity that is a foreign banking 
organization or a subsidiary of a foreign banking organization, this 
threshold for having significant trading assets and liabilities 
would apply based on the trading assets and liabilities of the 
combined U.S. operations, including all subsidiaries, affiliates, 
branches and agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We further refer to SEC-registered broker-dealer, investment 
adviser, and SBSD affiliates of banking entities with significant 
trading assets and liabilities as ``Group A'' entities, to affiliates 
of banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities as 
``Group B'' entities, and to affiliates of banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities as ``Group C'' entities.
    Under the proposed amendments, Group A entities would be required 
to comply with a streamlined but comprehensive version of the 2013 
final rule's compliance program requirements, as discussed below. Group 
B entities would be subject to reduced requirements and an even more 
tailored approach in light of their smaller and less complex trading 
activities. The burdens are further reduced for Group C entities, for 
which the proposed rule establishes presumed compliance, which can be 
rebutted by the Agencies. We discuss the economic effects of each of 
the substantive amendments on these groups of entities in the sections 
that follow.
    This economic analysis is focused on the expected economic effects 
of the proposed amendments on SEC registrants. Table 2 in the economic 
baseline quantifies broker-dealer activity by gross trading assets and 
liabilities of banking entities they are affiliated with. We estimate 
that there are approximately 89 broker-dealers affiliated with firms 
that have less than $10 billion in consolidated trading assets and 
liabilities (Group B and Group C broker-dealers). Group B and Group C 
broker-dealers account for approximately 7% of assets and 5% (or 3% on 
the basis on the alternative measure of holdings) of total bank broker-
dealer holdings.
    The primary effects of the proposed amendments for SEC registrants 
are reduced compliance burdens for Group B and Group C entities, as 
discussed in more detail in later sections. To the extent that the 
compliance costs of Group B and Group C entities are currently passed 
along to customers and counterparties, some of the cost reductions for 
these entities associated with the proposed amendments may flow through 
to counterparties and clients in the form of reduced transaction costs 
or a greater willingness to engage in activity, including 
intermediation that facilitates risk-sharing.
    The proposed $10 billion threshold would leave firms with moderate 
trading assets and liabilities with reduced compliance program 
requirements and more tailored supervision. The proposed $1 billion 
threshold would leave firms with limited trading assets and liabilities 
presumed compliant with all proprietary trading and covered fund 
activity prohibitions. We note that, from above, Group B and Group C 
broker-dealers currently account for only 3% to 5% of total bank 
broker-dealer holdings. To the extent that holdings reflect risk 
exposure resulting from trading activity, current trading activity by 
Group B and Group C entities may represent lower risks than the risks 
posed by covered trading of Group A entities.
    We recognize that some Group B and Group C entities that currently 
exhibit low levels of trading activity because of the costs of 
compliance may respond to the proposed amendments by increasing their 
trading assets and liabilities while still remaining under the $10 
billion and $1 billion thresholds at the holding company level. 
Increases in aggregate risk-taking by Group B and Group C entities may 
be magnified if trading activity becomes more highly correlated among 
such entities, or dampened if trading activity becomes less correlated 
among such entities. Since it is difficult to estimate the number of 
Group B and Group C entities that may increase their risk-taking and 
the degree to which their trading activity would be correlated, the 
implications of this effect for aggregate risk-taking and capital 
market activity are unclear.
    Such shifts in risk-taking may have two competing effects. On the 
one hand, if Group B and Group C entities are able to bear risk at a 
lower cost than their customers, increased risk-taking could promote 
secondary market trading activity and capital formation in primary 
markets, and increase access to capital for issuers. On the other hand, 
depending on the risk-taking incentives of Group B and Group C firms, 
increased risk-taking may result in increased moral hazard and market 
fragility, could exacerbate conflicts of interest between banking 
entities and their customers, and could ultimately negatively impact 
issuers and investors. However, we note that the proposed amendments 
are focused on tailoring the compliance regime based on the amount of 
covered activity engaged in by each banking entity, and all banking 
entities would still be subject to the prohibitions related to such 
covered activities. Thus, the magnitude of increased moral hazard, 
market fragility, and the severity of conflicts of interest effects may 
be attenuated.
    In response to the proposed amendments, trading activity that was 
once consolidated within a small number of unaffiliated banking 
entities may become fragmented among a larger number of unaffiliated 
banking entities that each ``manage down'' their trading books under 
the $10 billion and $1 billion trading asset and liability thresholds 
to enjoy reduced hedging compliance and documentation requirements and 
a less costly compliance and reporting regime described in sections 
V.D.3.c, V.D.3.d, and V.D.3.i. The extent to which banking entities may 
seek to manage down their trading books will likely depend on the size 
and complexity of each banking entity's trading activities and 
organizational structure, along with those of its affiliated entities, 
as well as forms of potential restructuring and the magnitude of 
expected compliance savings from such restructuring relative to the 
cost of restructuring. We anticipate that the incentives to manage the 
trading book under the $10 billion and $1 billion thresholds may be 
strongest for those holding companies that are just above the 
thresholds. Such management of the trading book may reduce the size of 
trading activity of some banking entities and reduce the number of 
banking entities subject to more stringent hedging, compliance, and 
reporting requirements. At the same time, to the degree that the 
proposed amendments incentivize banking entities to have smaller 
trading books, they may mitigate moral hazard and reduce market impacts 
from the failure of a given banking entity.
ii. Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    The 2013 final rule currently imposes compliance burdens that may 
be particularly significant for smaller market participants. Moreover, 
such compliance burdens may be passed along to counterparties and 
customers in the form of higher costs, reduced capital formation, or a 
reduced willingness to transact. For example, one commenter estimated 
that the funding cost for an average non-financial firm may have 
increased by as much as $30 million after the 2013 final

[[Page 33527]]

rule's implementation.\315\ At the same time, and as discussed above in 
section V.D.1, the SEC continues to recognize that the 2013 final rule 
may have yielded important qualitative benefits, such as reducing moral 
hazard and potential incentive conflicts that could be posed by certain 
types of proprietary trading by dealers, and enhancing oversight and 
supervision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \315\ See supra note 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On one hand, as a result of the proposed amendments, Group B and 
Group C entities might enjoy a competitive advantage relative to 
similarly situated Group A and Group B entities respectively. As noted, 
firms that are close to the $10 billion threshold may actively manage 
their trading book to avoid triggering stricter requirements, and some 
firms above the threshold may seek to manage down the trading activity 
to qualify for streamlined treatment under the proposed amendments. As 
a result, the proposed amendments may result in greater competition 
between Group B and Group A entities around the $10 billion threshold, 
and similarly, between Group B and Group C entities around the $1 
billion threshold. On the other hand, to the extent that Group B and 
Group C entities increase risk-taking as they compete with Group A and 
Group B entities, respectively, investors may demand additional 
compensation for bearing financial risk. A higher required rate of 
return and higher cost of capital could therefore offset potential 
competitive advantages for Group B and Group C entities.
    We recognize that cost savings to Group B and Group C entities 
related to the reduced hedging documentation requirements and 
compliance requirements described in sections V.D.3.d and V.D.3.i may 
be partially or fully passed along to clients and counterparties. To 
the extent that hedging documentation and compliance requirements for 
Group B and Group C entities are currently resulting in a reduced 
willingness to make markets or underwrite placements, the proposed 
amendments may facilitate trading activity and risk-sharing, as well as 
capital formation and reduced costs of access to capital. Crucially, 
the proposed amendments do not eliminate substantive prohibitions under 
the 2013 final rule but create a simplified compliance regime for 
entities affiliated with firms without significant trading assets and 
liabilities. Thus, the 2013 final rule's restrictions on proprietary 
trading and covered funds activities will continue to apply to all 
affected entities, including Group B and Group C entities.
iii. Alternatives
    The Agencies could have taken alternative approaches. For example, 
the proposed rule could have used other values for thresholds for total 
consolidated trading assets and liabilities in the definition of 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities. As noted in 
the discussion of the economic baseline, using different thresholds 
would affect the scope of application of the hedging documentation, 
compliance program and metrics-reporting requirements by changing the 
number and size of affected dealers. For instance, using a $1 billion 
or a $5 billion threshold in a definition of significant trading assets 
and liabilities would scope a larger number of entities into Group A, 
as compared to the proposed $10 billion threshold, thereby subjecting a 
larger share of the dealer and investment adviser industries to six-
pillar compliance obligations. However, we continue to recognize that 
trading activity is heavily concentrated in the right tail of the 
distribution, and using a lower threshold would not significantly 
increase the volume of trading assets and liabilities scoped into the 
Group A regime. For example, Table 2 shows that 65 broker-dealers 
affiliated with banking entities that have less than $5 billion in 
consolidated trading assets and liabilities and are subject to section 
13 of the BHC Act as amended by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
and Consumer Protection Act account for only 2.5% of bank-affiliated 
broker-dealer assets and between 1.7% and 1% of holdings. 
Alternatively, 42 broker-dealer affiliates of firms that have less than 
$1 billion in consolidated trading assets and liabilities and are 
subject to section 13 of the BHC Act account for only 2% of bank-
affiliated broker-dealer assets and 1% of holdings. At the same time, 
with a lower threshold, more banking entities would face higher 
compliance burdens and related costs.
    The Agencies also could have proposed a percentage-based threshold 
for determining whether a banking entity has significant trading assets 
and liabilities. For example, the proposed amendment could have relied 
exclusively on threshold where banking entities are considered to be 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities if the firm's 
total consolidated trading assets and liabilities are above a certain 
percentage (for example, 10% or 25%) of the firm's total consolidated 
assets. Under this alternative, a greater number of entities may 
benefit from lower compliance costs and a streamlined regime for Group 
B entities. However, under this approach, even firms in the extreme 
right tail of the trading asset distribution could be considered 
without significant trading assets and liabilities if they are also in 
the extreme right tail of the total assets distribution. Thus, without 
placing an additional limit on total assets within such regime, 
entities with the largest trading books may be scoped into the Group B 
regime if they also have a sufficiently large amount of total 
consolidated assets, while entities with significantly smaller trading 
books could be categorized as Group A entities if they have fewer 
assets overall.
    Alternatively, the Agencies could have relied on a threshold based 
on total assets. However, a threshold based on total assets may not be 
as meaningful as a threshold based on trading assets and liabilities 
being proposed here when considered in the context of section 13 of the 
BHC Act. A threshold based on total assets would scope in entities 
based merely on their balance sheet size, even though they may have 
little or no trading activity, notwithstanding the fact that the moral 
hazard and conflicts of interest that section 13 of the BHC Act are 
intended to address are more likely to arise out of such trading 
activity (and not necessarily from the banking entity size, as measured 
by total consolidated assets). However, it is possible that losses on 
small trading portfolios can be amplified through their effect on non-
trading assets held by a firm. To that extent, a threshold based on 
total assets may be useful in potentially capturing both direct and 
indirect losses that originate from trading activity of a holding 
company.
    The Agencies also could have based the thresholds on the level of 
total revenues from permitted trading activities. To the extent that 
revenues could be a proxy for the structure of a banking entity's 
business and the focus of its operations, this alternative may apply 
more stringent compliance requirements to those entities profiting the 
most from covered activities. However, revenues from trading activity 
fluctuate over time, rising during economic booms and deteriorating 
during crises and liquidity freezes. As a result, under the 
alternative, a banking entity that is scoped in the regulatory regime 
during normal times may be scoped out during the time of market stress 
due to a decrease in the revenues from permitted activities. That is, 
under such alternative, the weakest compliance regime may be applied to 
banking entities with the largest trading books in times of acute 
market stress, when the performance of trading desks is deteriorating 
and the underlying

[[Page 33528]]

requirements of the 2013 final rule may be the most valuable.
    Finally, the Agencies could have excluded from the definition of 
entities with significant trading assets and liabilities those entities 
that may be affiliated with a firm with over $10 billion in 
consolidated trading assets and liabilities but that are operated 
separately and independently from its affiliates and that have total 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) under $10 billion. We do not have 
data on the number of dealers that are operated ``separately and 
independently'' from affiliated entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities. However, as shown in Table 5, this alternative 
could decrease the scope of application of the Group A regime.

 Table 5--Broker-Dealer Assets and Holdings by Gross Trading Asset and Liability Threshold of Affiliated Banking
                                                    Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Holdings
              Type of broker-dealer                   Number       Total assets      Holdings        (altern.)
                                                                      ($mln)          ($mln)          ($mln)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holdings >=$10bln and affiliated with firms with              14       2,538,656         668,283         515,443
 gross trading assets and liabilities >=$10bln..
Holdings <$10bln and affiliated with firms with               35         278,329          20,940           5,152
 gross trading assets and liabilities >=$10bln..
Affiliated with firms with gross trading assets               89         222,352          35,483          15,960
 and liabilities <$10bln \316\..................
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................             138       3,039,337         724,706         536,555
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This alternative would increase the number of entities able to 
avail themselves of the reduced compliance, documentation and metrics-
reporting requirements, potentially resulting in cost reductions 
flowing through to customers and counterparties. At the same time, this 
alternative would permit greater risk-taking by entities affiliated 
with firms that have gross trading assets and liabilities in excess of 
$10 billion. In addition, it could encourage such firms to fragment 
their trading activity, for instance, across multiple dealers, and 
operate them ``separately and independently,'' thereby relieving such 
firms of the requirement to comply with the hedging, compliance, and 
reporting regime of the 2013 final rule. This alternative may, 
therefore, reduce the regulatory oversight and compliance benefits of 
the full hedging, documentation, reporting, and compliance requirements 
for Group A banking entities. The feasibility and costs of such 
fragmentation would depend, in part, on organizational complexity of a 
firm's trading activity, the architecture of trading systems, the 
location and skillsets of personnel across various dealers affiliated 
with such entities, and current inter-affiliate hedging and risk 
mitigation practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \316\ This category excludes SEC-registered broker-dealers 
affiliated with banks that have consolidated total assets less than 
or equal to $10 billion and trading assets and liabilities less than 
or equal to 5% of total assets, as well as firms for which bank 
trading asset and liability data was not available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Proprietary Trading
i. Trading Account

A. Costs and Benefits

    Under the 2013 final rule, proprietary trading is defined as 
engaging as principal for the ``trading account'' of a banking 
entity.\317\ Thus, the definition of the trading account effectively 
determines the trading activity that falls within the scope of the 2013 
final rule prohibitions and the compliance regime associated with such 
activity. The current definition of trading account has three prongs, 
including the registered dealer prong. As discussed elsewhere in this 
Supplementary Information, the proposed amendments introduce certain 
changes to the trading account test. However, the proposal does not 
remove or modify the registered dealer prong. As a result, the proposed 
definition of ``trading account'' would continue to automatically 
include transactions in financial instruments by a registered dealer, 
swap dealer, or security-based swap dealer, if the purchase or sale is 
made in connection with the activity that requires the entity to be 
registered as such.\318\ Thus, most (if not substantially all) trading 
activity by SEC-registered dealers should continue to be captured by 
the ``trading account'' of a banking entity, notwithstanding any of the 
changes made to the definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \317\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b).
    \318\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(b)(1)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize the possibility that some market participants may 
engage in transaction activity that does not trigger a dealer 
registration requirement. Under the baseline, such activity would be 
scoped into the ``trading account'' definition by the short-term prong 
and the rebuttable presumption by virtue of the fact that most 
transactions by a dealer are likely to be indicative of short-term 
intent as noted in the 2013 final rule.\319\ We preliminarily believe 
that, under the proposal, such trading would likely be included in the 
trading account definition under the new prong on the basis of 
accounting treatment in reference to whether a financial instrument (as 
defined in the 2013 final rule and unchanged by the proposal) is 
recorded at fair value on a recurring basis under applicable accounting 
standards. In addition, persons engaging in the type and volume of 
activity that would be scoped in under the proposed accounting prong 
are likely engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for 
their own account as part of regular business, which would trigger 
broker-dealer (depending on the volume of activity) or SBSD 
registration requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \319\ See 79 FR at 5549 (``The Agencies believe the scope of the 
dealer prong is appropriate because, as noted in the proposal, 
positions held by a registered dealer in connection with its dealing 
activity are generally held for sale to customers upon request or 
otherwise support the firm's trading activities (e.g., by hedging 
its dealing positions), which is indicative of short term 
intent.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that the proposed amendments increase (or decrease) 
the scope of trading activity that falls under the proprietary trading 
prohibitions of the 2013 final rule, the amendments would increase (or 
decrease) the economic costs, benefits, and tradeoffs outlined in 
section V.D.1. However, we preliminarily believe that the largest share 
of dealing activity subject to SEC oversight is already captured by the 
registered dealer prong and that the

[[Page 33529]]

economic effects of the proposed amendments to the definition of the 
trading account on SEC-registered entities may be de minimis. 
Therefore, we do not estimate any additional reporting costs for SEC 
registrants.
    The Agencies also propose to include a reservation of authority 
allowing for determination, on a case-by-case basis, with appropriate 
notice and response procedures, that any purchase or sale of one or 
more financial instruments by a banking entity for which it is the 
primary financial regulatory agency either ``is'' or ``is not'' for the 
trading account. While the Agencies recognize that the use of objective 
factors to define proprietary trading is intended to provide bright 
lines that simplify compliance, the Agencies also recognize that this 
approach may, in some circumstances, produce results that are either 
underinclusive or overinclusive with respect to the definition of 
proprietary trading. The proposed reservation of authority may add 
uncertainty for banking entities about whether a particular transaction 
could be deemed as a proprietary trade by the regulating agency, which 
may affect the banking entity's decision to engage in transactions that 
are currently not included in the definition of the trading account. As 
discussed in section V.B,\320\ notice and response procedures related 
to the reservation of authority provision may cost as much as $20,319 
for SEC-registered broker-dealers, and $5,006 for entities that may 
choose to register with the SEC as SBSDs.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \320\ For the purposes of the burden estimates in this release, 
we are assuming the cost of $409 per hour for an attorney, from 
SIFMA's ``Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities 
Industry 2013,'' modified to account for an 1800-hour work year and 
multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee 
benefits, and overhead, and adjusted for inflation.
    \321\ We preliminarily believe that the burden reduction for 
SEC-regulated entities will be a fraction of the burden reduction 
for the holding company as a whole. We estimate the ratio on the 
basis of the fraction of total assets of broker-dealer affiliates of 
banking entities relative to the total consolidated assets of parent 
holding companies at approximately 0.18. To the extent that 
compliance burdens represent a fixed cost that does not scale with 
assets, or if the role and compliance burdens of entities that may 
register with the SEC as SBSDs may differ from those of broker-
dealers, these figures may overestimate or underestimate compliance 
cost reductions for SEC-registered entities. Reporting burden for 
broker-dealers: 2 Hours per firm per year x 0.18 weight x (Attorney 
at $409 per hour) x 138 firms = $20,319. Reporting burden for 
entities that may register as SBSDs: 2 hours per firm per year x 
0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 34 firms = $5,006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Alternatives

Specific Activities
    The Agencies could have taken the approach of excluding specific 
trading activities from the scope of the proprietary trading 
prohibitions. For example, the Agencies could exclude transactions in 
derivatives on government securities, transactions in foreign sovereign 
debt and derivatives on foreign sovereign debt, and transactions 
executed by SEC-registered dealers on behalf of their asset management 
customers.
    The 2013 final rule exempts all trading in domestic government 
obligations and trading in foreign government obligations under certain 
conditions; however, derivatives referencing such obligations-including 
derivatives portfolios that can replicate the payoffs and risks of such 
government obligations-are not exempted. Therefore, existing 
requirements reduce the flexibility of banking entities to engage in 
asset-liability management and treat two groups of financial 
instruments that have similar risks and payoffs differently. Excluding 
derivatives transactions on government obligations from the trading 
account definition could reduce costs to market participants and 
provide greater flexibility in their asset-liability management. This 
alternative could also result in increased volume of trading in markets 
for derivatives on government obligations, such as Treasury futures. We 
recognize, nonetheless, that derivatives portfolios that reference an 
obligation, including Treasuries, can be structured to magnify the 
economic exposure to fluctuations in the price of the reference 
obligation. Moreover, derivatives transactions involve counterparty 
credit risk not present in transactions in reference obligations 
themselves. Since the alternative would exclude all derivatives 
transactions on government obligations, and not just those that are 
intended to mitigate risk, this alternative could permit banking 
entities to increase their exposure to counterparty, interest rate, and 
liquidity risk.
Length of the Holding Period
    In addition, the current registered dealer prong does not condition 
the trading account definition for registered dealers on the length of 
the holding period. This is because, as noted in the 2013 final rule, 
positions held by a registered dealer in connection with its dealing 
activity are generally held for sale to customers upon request or 
otherwise support the firm's trading activities (e.g., by hedging its 
dealing positions), which is indicative of short term intent.\322\ As 
an alternative, the Agencies could have modified the registered dealer 
prong of the trading account definition to include only ``near-term 
trading,'' e.g., positions held for less than 60, 90, or 120 days. This 
alternative would likely narrow the scope of application of the 
substantive proprietary trading prohibitions to a smaller portion of a 
banking entity's activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ 79 FR at 5549.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under this alternative, dealers affiliated with banking entities 
would be able to amass large trading positions at the ``near-term 
definition'' boundary (e.g., for 61, 91, or 121 days) to take advantage 
of a directional market view, to profit from mispricing in an 
instrument, or to collect a liquidity premium in a particular 
instrument. This may significantly increase risk-taking and moral 
hazard in the activities of dealers affiliated with banking entities. 
However, as this alternative could stimulate an increase in potentially 
impermissible proprietary trading by these dealers, the volume of 
trading activity in certain instruments and liquidity in certain 
markets may increase.
    We also note that the temporal thresholds necessary to implement 
such a ``short-term'' trading alternative would be difficult to 
quantify and may have to vary by product, asset class, and aggregate 
market conditions, among other factors. For instance, the markets for 
large cap equities and investment grade corporate bonds have different 
structures, types of participants, latency of trading, and liquidity 
levels. Therefore, an appropriate horizon for ``short-term'' positions 
will likely vary across these markets. Similarly, the ability to 
transact quickly differs under strong macroeconomic conditions and in 
times of stress. A meaningful implementation of this alternative would 
likely require calibrating and recalibrating complex thresholds to 
exempt non-near-term proprietary trading and so could introduce 
additional uncertainty and increase the compliance burdens on SEC-
regulated banking entities.
``Trading Desk'' Definition
    The definition of ``trading desk'' is an important component of the 
implementation of the 2013 final rule in that certain requirements, 
such as those applicable to the underwriting and market-making 
exemptions, and the metrics-reporting requirements apply at the level 
of the trading desk. Under the current requirements, a trading desk is 
defined as the smallest discrete unit of organization of a banking 
entity that purchases or sells financial instruments for the trading 
account of the banking

[[Page 33530]]

entity or an affiliate thereof. The 2013 final rule recognizes that 
underwriting and market-making activities are essential financial 
services that facilitate capital formation and promote liquidity, and 
that metrics reporting may facilitate the SEC oversight of banking 
entities. The application of these rules at the trading desk level may 
facilitate monitoring and review of compliance with the underwriting 
and market-making exemptions and allow for better identification of the 
aggregate trading volume that must be reviewed for consistency with the 
underwriting, market making, and metrics-reporting requirements.
    At the same time, some market participants have noted that the 
trading desk designation under the 2013 final rule may be unduly 
burdensome and costly and may have engendered inefficient fragmentation 
of trading activity. For example, some market participants report an 
average of 95 trading desks engaged in permitted activities.\323\ Since 
under the 2013 final rule metrics reporting is required at the trading 
desk level, such fragmentation may result in operational inefficiencies 
and decentralized compliance programs, with some participants currently 
reporting as many as 5,000,000 data points per entity per filing.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \323\ See supra note 18.
    \324\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies are requesting comment on whether the trading desk 
definition should be amended to refer to a less granular ``business 
unit'' or a ``unit designed to establish efficient trading for a market 
sector.'' This approach would allow a trading desk to be defined on the 
basis of the same criteria that are used to establish trading desks for 
other operational, management, and compliance purposes, which typically 
depend on the type of trading activity, asset class, product line 
offered, and individual banking entity structure and internal 
compliance policies and procedures. For example, the Agencies could 
define the trading desk as a unit of organization of a banking entity 
that engages in purchasing or selling of financial instruments for the 
trading account of the banking entity or an affiliate thereof that is 
structured by a banking entity to establish efficient trading for a 
market sector, organized to ensure appropriate setting, monitoring, and 
review of trading and hedging limits, and characterized by a clearly 
defined unit of personnel. This would provide banking entities greater 
flexibility in determining their own optimal organizational structure 
and allow banking entities organized with various degrees of complexity 
to reflect their organizational structure in the trading desk 
definition. This alternative could reduce operational costs from 
fragmentation of trading activity and compliance program requirements, 
as well as enable more streamlined metrics reporting.
    On the other hand, under this alternative, a banking entity may be 
able to aggregate impermissible proprietary trading with permissible 
activity (e.g., underwriting, market making, or hedging) into the same 
trading desk and consequently take speculative positions under the 
guise of permitted activities. To the extent that this alternative 
would allow banking entities to use a highly aggregated definition of a 
trading desk, it may increase moral hazard and the risks that the 
prohibitions of section 13 of the BHC Act aim to address. The SEC does 
not have data on operating and compliance costs because of the 
fragmentation incurred by SEC-regulated banking entities, or data on 
the organizational complexity of such dealers, and the extent of 
variation therein.
ii. Liquidity Management Exclusion
    Liquidity management serves an important purpose in ensuring 
banking entities have sufficient resources to meet their short-term 
operational needs. Under the 2013 final rule, certain activities 
related to liquidity management are excluded from the scope of the 
proprietary trading prohibition under some conditions.\325\ The current 
exclusion covers any purchase or sale of a security by a banking entity 
for the purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan that meets a number of requirements. 
Moreover, current rules require that the financial instruments 
purchased and sold as part of a liquidity management plan be highly 
liquid and not reasonably expected to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \325\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies recognize that the liquidity management exclusion may 
be narrow and that the trading account definition may scope in routine 
asset-liability management and commercial-banking related activities 
that trigger the rebuttable presumption or the market-risk capital 
prong. Accordingly, the Agencies are proposing to expand the liquidity 
management exclusion. Specifically, the proposed amendments would 
broaden the liquidity management exclusion such that it would apply not 
only to securities, but also to foreign exchange forwards and foreign 
exchange swaps (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act), and to 
physically settled cross-currency swaps.
    Under the proposed amendment, SEC-regulated banking entities would 
face lower burdens and enjoy greater flexibility in currency-risk 
management as part of their overall liquidity management plans. To the 
degree that the 2013 final rule may be restricting liquidity-risk 
management by banking entities, and to the extent that these effects 
impact their trading activity, the proposed amendment could facilitate 
more efficient risk management, greater secondary market activity, and 
more capital formation in primary markets. However, in the absence of 
other conditions governing reliance on the liquidity management 
exclusion, this flexibility may also lead to currency derivatives 
exposures, including potentially very large exposures, being scoped out 
of the trading account definition and the ensuing substantive 
prohibitions of the 2013 final rule. In addition, some entities may 
seek to rely on this exclusion while engaging in speculative currency 
trading, which may increase their risk-taking and moral hazard and 
reduce the effectiveness of regulatory oversight. While the proposed 
amendment broadens the set of instruments that banking entities may use 
to manage liquidity, the proposed reservation of authority would 
provide the Agencies with the ability to determine whether a particular 
purchase or sale of a financial instrument by a banking entity either 
is or is not for the trading account.
iii. Error Trades
    The 2013 final rule excludes from the proprietary trading 
prohibition certain ``clearing activities'' by banking entities that 
are members of clearing agencies, derivatives clearing organizations, 
or designated financial market utilities. Specifically, such clearing 
activities are defined to include, among others, any purchase or sale 
necessary to correct error trades made by, or on behalf of, customers 
with respect to customer transactions that are cleared, provided the 
purchase or sale is conducted in accordance with certain regulations, 
rules, or procedures. However, the current exclusion for error trades 
is applicable only to clearing members with respect to cleared customer 
transactions.\326\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.3(e)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments would exclude trading errors and subsequent 
correcting transactions from the definition of proprietary trading. The

[[Page 33531]]

proposed amendments primarily impact SEC-registered dealers that are 
not clearing members with respect to all customer trades and dealers 
that are clearing members with respect to customer trades that are not 
cleared. Table 6 reports information about broker-dealer count, assets, 
and holdings, by affiliation and clearing type.

                       Table 6--Broker-Dealer Assets and Holdings by Clearing Status \327\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Holdings
 Broker-dealers subject to section 13 of the BHC      Number       Total assets      Holdings        (altern.)
                       Act                                            ($mln)          ($mln)          ($mln)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clear/carry.....................................              56       3,002,341         720,863         533,100
Other...........................................              82          36,996           3,843           3,455
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................             138       3,039,337         724,706         536,555
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since correcting error trades by or on behalf of customers is not 
conducted for the purpose of profiting from short-term price movements, 
this amendment is likely to facilitate valuable customer-facing 
activities. As discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, 
the Agencies believe that banking entities should monitor and manage 
their error trade account because doing so would help prevent personnel 
from using these accounts for the purpose of evading the 2013 final 
rule. We preliminarily believe that existing requirements and SEC 
oversight would be sufficient to deter participants from using the 
error trade exclusion to obfuscate impermissible proprietary trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \327\ Broker-dealers clearing and/or carrying customer accounts 
are identified using FOCUS filings. Broadly, broker-dealers that are 
clearing or carrying firms directly carry customer accounts, 
maintain custody of the assets, and clear trades. Other broker-
dealers may accept customer orders but do not maintain custody of 
assets. See, e.g., Clearing Firms FAQ, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/faq-clearing-firms-faq. This analysis 
excludes SEC-registered broker-dealers affiliated with banks that 
have consolidated total assets less than or equal to $10 billion and 
trading assets and liabilities less than or equal to 5% of total 
assets, as well as firms for which bank trading asset and liability 
data was not available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Permitted Underwriting and Market Making
i. Regulatory Baseline
    Underwriting and market making are customer-oriented financial 
services that are essential to capital formation and market liquidity, 
and the risks and profit sources related to these activities are 
distinct from those related to impermissible proprietary trading. 
Therefore, the 2013 final rule contains exemptions for underwriting and 
market making-related activities.
    Under the 2013 final rule, all banking entities with covered 
activities must satisfy five requirements with respect to their 
underwriting activities to qualify for the underwriting exemption.\328\ 
First, the banking entity must act as an underwriter for a distribution 
of securities, and the trading desk's underwriting position must be 
related to such distribution.\329\ Second, the amount and type of the 
securities in the trading desk's underwriting position must be designed 
not to exceed RENTD, and reasonable efforts must be made to sell or 
otherwise reduce the underwriting position within a reasonable period, 
taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market 
for the relevant type of security.\330\ Third, the banking entity must 
establish and implement, maintain, and enforce an internal compliance 
system that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking entity's 
compliance with the requirements. The compliance program must include 
the list of the products, instruments, or exposures each trading desk 
may purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities, 
as well as the limits for each trading desk, based on the nature and 
amount of the trading desk's underwriting activities, including RENTD 
limits.\331\ Fourth, the compensation arrangements of persons engaged 
in underwriting must be designed to not reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading.\332\ Fifth, the banking entity must be 
appropriately licensed or registered to perform underwriting 
activities.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (a).
    \329\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (a)(2)(i).
    \330\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (a)(2)(ii).
    \331\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (a)(2)(iii).
    \332\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (a)(2)(iv).
    \333\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (a)(2)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the current baseline, all banking entities with covered 
activities must satisfy six requirements with respect to their market-
making activities to qualify for the market-making exemption.\334\ 
First, the trading desk responsible for the market-making activities 
must routinely stand ready to purchase and sell the financial 
instruments in which it is making markets and must be willing and 
available to quote, purchase, and sell, or otherwise enter into long 
and short positions in these types of financial instruments for its own 
account in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout market 
cycles.\335\ Second, the trading desks' market-maker inventory must be 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, RENTD.\336\ Third, the 
banking entity must establish, implement, and enforce an internal 
compliance program, reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the 
requirements. This compliance program must include, among other things, 
limits for each trading desk that address RENTD.\337\ Fourth, the 
banking entity must ensure that any violations of risk limits are 
promptly corrected. Fifth, the compensation arrangements of persons 
engaged in market making must be designed so as to not reward or 
incentivize prohibited proprietary trading. Finally, the banking entity 
must be appropriately licensed or registered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \334\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (b).
    \335\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (b)(2)(i).
    \336\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (b)(2)(ii).
    \337\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (b)(2)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also note that, under the baseline, an organizational unit or a 
trading desk of another banking entity that has consolidated trading 
assets and liabilities of $50 billion or more is generally not 
considered a client, customer, or counterparty for the purposes of the 
RENTD requirement.\338\ Thus, such demand does not contribute to RENTD 
unless such demand is affected through an anonymous trading facility or 
unless the trading desk documents how and why the organizational unit 
of said large banking entity should be treated as a client, customer, 
or counterparty. To the extent that such documentation requirements 
increase the cost of intermediating interdealer transactions, this 
current requirement may impact the volume and cost of interdealer 
trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.4 (b)(3)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies understand that current compliance with the RENTD

[[Page 33532]]

requirements under both the underwriting and market-making exemptions 
creates ambiguity for some market participants, is over-reliant on 
historical demand, and necessitates an accurate calibration of RENTD 
for different asset classes, time periods, and market conditions.\339\ 
Since forecasting future customer demand involves uncertainty, 
particularly in less liquid and more volatile instruments and products, 
banking entity affiliated dealers may face uncertainty about the 
ability to rely on the underwriting and market-making exemptions. This 
uncertainty can reduce a banking entity's willingness to engage in 
principal transactions with customers,\340\ which, along with reducing 
profits, can adversely impact the volume of transactions intermediated 
by banking entities. To the extent that non-banking entities do not 
step in to intermediate trades that do not occur as a result of the 
RENTD requirement,\341\ and to the extent that technological advances 
do not allow customers to trade against other customers,\342\ thereby 
shortening dealer intermediation chains, counterparties of affected 
banking entities may have difficulty transacting in some market 
segments.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ See supra note 18.
    \340\ For instance, Bessembinder et al. (2017) shows that 
dealers have shrunk their intraday capital commitment, measured as 
the absolute difference between their daily accumulated buy volume 
and sell volume. Similarly, the FRB's ``Staff Q2 2017 Report on 
Corporate Bond Market Liquidity'' (available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/bond-market-liquidity-report-2017Q2.pdf) shows a steep decline in broker-dealer holdings of 
corporate and foreign bonds between 2007 and 2009 and a gradual 
decline in 2012 onwards.
    While some research suggests the decline in dealer inventories 
is attributable to the 2013 final rule (e.g., Bessembinder et al. 
(2017)), other studies show that inventory declines in fixed income 
markets occurred in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis 
and coincided with a drastic decline in profitability of trading 
desks during the crisis (e.g., Access to Capital and Market 
Liquidity, supra note 106, Figure 34). It is difficult to clearly 
distinguish the causal effects of the various provisions of section 
13 of the BHC Act from the influence of other confounding factors, 
such as crisis-related changes in dealer risk aversion and declines 
in profitability of trading, macroeconomic conditions, the evolution 
of market structure and new technology, and other factors.
    \341\ See supra note 290.
    \342\ See, e.g., Access to Capital and Market Liquidity supra 
note 106, Part IV.C.4 (describing corporate bond activity on 
electronic venues).
    \343\ We are not aware of any data that allows us to quantify 
the impacts of individual provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act on 
dealer inventories or market liquidity. The evidence on the impacts 
of section 13 on various measures of corporate bond, credit default 
swap (CDS), and bond fund liquidity is sensitive to the choice of 
market, measure, time period, and empirical methodology. For a 
literature review, see, e.g., Access to Capital and Market Liquidity 
supra note 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Costs and Benefits
    Under the proposal, Group A and Group B entities with covered 
activities would be presumed compliant with the RENTD requirements of 
the underwriting and market-making exemptions if the banking entity 
establishes and implements, maintains, and enforces internally set risk 
limits. These risk limits would be subject to regulatory review and 
oversight on an ongoing basis, which would include an assessment of 
whether the limits are designed not to exceed RENTD. For Group A 
entities, these limits are required to be established within the 
entity's compliance program. Under the proposed amendment, Group B 
entities would not be required to establish a separate compliance 
program for underwriting and market-making requirements, including the 
risk limits for RENTD. However, in order to be presumed compliant with 
the underwriting and market-making exemptions, Group B entities must 
establish and comply with the RENTD limits. We note that Group B 
entities seeking to rely on the presumption of compliance would still 
be required to comply with the RENTD requirements, even though they 
would not be required to design a specific underwriting or market-
making compliance program. Under the proposed amendments, Group C 
banking entities would be presumed compliant with requirements of 
subpart B and subpart C of the rule, including with respect to the 
reliance on the underwriting and market-making exemptions, without 
reference to their internal RENTD limits. In addition, under the 
proposal, Group A entities relying on internal risk limits for market-
making RENTD requirements must promptly reduce the risk exposure when 
the risk limit is exceeded.
    The proposed amendments may provide SEC-registered banking entities 
with more flexibility and certainty in conducting permissible 
underwriting and market making-related activities. The proposed 
presumption allows the reliance on internally-set risk limits in 
accordance with a banking entity's risk management function that may 
already be used to meet other regulatory requirements, such as 
obligations under the SEC and FINRA capital and liquidity rules,\344\ 
so long as these limits meet the requirements under the proposed 
amendment. Therefore, the proposed amendment may prevent unnecessary 
duplication of risk-management compliance procedures for the purposes 
of complying with multiple regulations and may reduce compliance costs 
for SEC-regulated banking entities. To the extent that the uncertainty 
and compliance burdens related to the RENTD requirements are currently 
impeding otherwise profitable permissible underwriting and market 
making by dealers, the proposed amendments may increase banking 
entities' profits and the volume of dealer intermediation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed regulatory oversight of the internally-set risk limits 
may result in new compliance burdens for SEC registrants, potentially 
offsetting the cost-reducing effects of other proposed amendments to 
the compliance with the underwriting and market-making exemptions. 
However, if banking entities are permitted to rely on internal risk 
limits to meet the RENTD requirement, Agency oversight of internal risk 
limits for the purposes of compliance with the proposed rule may help 
support the benefits and costs of the substantive prohibitions of 
section 13 of the BHC Act. Additionally, the costs of the prompt notice 
requirement for exceeding the risk limits will depend on a given 
entity's trading activity and on its design of internal risk limits, 
which are likely to reflect, among other factors, the entity's 
respective business model, organizational structure, profitability and 
volume of trading activity. As a result, we cannot estimate these costs 
with any degree of certainty.
    The overall economic effect of these amendments will depend on the 
amount and profitability of economic activity that currently does not 
occur because of the uncertainty surrounding the RENTD requirement 
compared to the potential costs of establishing and maintaining 
internal risk limits, and uncertainty related to validation that these 
limits would meet the requirements under the proposed amendments. We do 
not have data on the volume of trading activity that does not occur 
because of uncertainty and costs surrounding the RENTD requirement, or 
data on the profitability of such trading activity for banking 
entities. To the best of our knowledge, no such data is publicly 
available.
    To the extent that internal risk limits may be designed to exceed 
the actual RENTD, introducing the proposed presumption may also 
increase risk-taking by banking entity dealers. As a result, under the 
proposed amendments, some entities may be able to maintain positions 
that are larger than RENTD and, thus, increase their risk-taking. This 
type of activity could increase moral hazard and reduce the economic 
effects of section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing rules. 
However, to

[[Page 33533]]

mitigate this effect, the Agencies are proposing that the internally 
set risk limits that would be used to establish the presumption of 
compliance would be subject to ongoing regulatory assessments as to 
whether they are designed not to exceed RENTD.
    We note that the proposed amendments tailor regulatory relief for 
smaller banking entities for both the underwriting and market-making 
exemptions. More specifically, the threshold for the reduced 
requirements is based on trading assets and liabilities for both 
exemptions. We also recognize that the nature, profit sources, and 
risks of underwriting and market-making activities differ. For example, 
underwriting may involve pricing, book building, and placement of 
securities with investors, whereas market making centers on 
intermediation of trading activity.
    In that regard, the Agencies could have proposed an approach, under 
which underwriting and market-making requirements are tailored to 
banking entities on the basis of different thresholds. For example, the 
Agencies could have instead relied on the trading assets and 
liabilities threshold for market-making compliance (as proposed), but 
applied a different threshold for underwriting compliance, on the basis 
of the volume or profitability of past underwriting activity. This 
alternative would have tailored the compliance requirements for SEC-
regulated banking entities with respect to underwriting activities. 
However, the volume and profitability of underwriting activity is 
highly cyclical and is likely to decline in weak macroeconomic 
conditions. As a result, under the alternative, SEC-regulated banking 
entities would face lower compliance obligations with respect to 
underwriting activity during times of economic stress when covered 
trading activity related to underwriting may pose the highest risk of 
loss.
iii. Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    As discussed above, these proposed amendments may reduce the costs 
of relying on the underwriting and market-making exemptions, which may 
facilitate the activities related to these exemptions. The evolution in 
market structure in some asset classes (e.g., equities) has transformed 
the role of traditional dealers vis-[agrave]-vis other participants, 
particularly as it relates to high-frequency trading and electronic 
platforms. However, dealers continue to play a central role in less 
liquid markets, such as corporate bond and over-the-counter derivatives 
markets. While it is difficult to establish causality, corporate bond 
dealers, particularly bank-affiliated dealers, have, on aggregate, 
significantly reduced their capital commitment post-crisis--a finding 
that is consistent with a reduction in liquidity provision in corporate 
bonds due to the 2013 final rule.\345\ In addition, corporate bond 
dealers may have shifted from trading in a principal capacity to agency 
trading.\346\ To the extent that this change cannot be explained by 
enhanced ability of dealers to manage corporate bond inventory, 
electronic trading, post-crisis changes in dealer risk tolerance and 
macro factors (effects which themselves need not be fully independent 
of the effect of section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 final rule), 
such effects may point to a reduced supply of liquidity by dealers. 
Moreover, corporate bond dealers decrease liquidity provision in times 
of stress in general (e.g., during a financial crisis) \347\ and after 
the 2013 final rule in particular (under a few isolated stressed 
selling conditions, some evidence shows greater price impact from 
trading activity).\348\ In dealer-centric single-name CDS markets, 
interdealer trade activity, trade sizes, quoting activity, and quoted 
spreads for illiquid underliers have deteriorated since 2010, but 
dealer-customer activity and various trading activity metrics have 
remained stable.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \345\ See, e.g., Staff Q2 2017 Report on Corporate Bond Market 
Liquidity supra note 340; see also Bessembinder et al. (2017).
    \346\ Dealers can trade as agents, matching customer buys to 
customer sells, or as principals, absorbing customer buys and 
customer sells into inventory and committing the necessary capital.
    \347\ Dealers provide less liquidity to clients and peripheral 
dealers during stress times; during the peak of the crisis core 
dealers charged higher spreads to peripheral dealers and clients but 
lower spreads to dealers with whom they had strong ties. See Di 
Maggio, Kermani, and Song, 2017, ``The Value of Trading 
Relationships in Turbulent Times.'' Journal of Financial Economics 
124(2), 266-284; see also Choi and Shachar, 2013, ``Did Liquidity 
Providers Become Liquidity Seekers?'' New York Fed Staff Report No. 
650, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr650.pdf.
    \348\ See Bao et al. (2017); Anderson and Stulz (2017).
    \349\ For a literature review and data, see Access to Capital 
and Market Liquidity supra note 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because of the methodological challenges described earlier in this 
analysis, we cannot quantify potential effects of the 2013 final rule 
in general, and the RENTD, underwriting, and market-making provisions 
of the 2013 final rule in particular, on capital formation and market 
liquidity. We also recognize that these provisions may not be currently 
affecting all securities markets, asset classes, and products 
uniformly. If, because of uncertainty and the costs of relying on 
market-making and hedging exemptions, dealers are limiting their 
market-making and hedging activity in certain products, the proposed 
amendments may facilitate market making. Because secondary market 
liquidity can influence the willingness to invest in primary markets, 
and access to these markets can enable market participants to mitigate 
undesirable risk exposures, the amendments may increase trading 
activity and capital formation in some segments of the market.
    While the statute and the 2013 final rule, including as proposed to 
be amended, prohibit banking entities from engaging in proprietary 
trading, some trading desks may attempt to use certain elements of the 
proposed RENTD amendments to circumvent those restrictions. This may 
reduce the economic benefits and costs of the 2013 final rule outlined 
in section V.D.1. We continue to recognize that proprietary trading by 
banking entities may give rise to moral hazard, economic inefficiency 
because of implicitly subsidized risk-taking, and market fragility, and 
may increase conflicts of interest between banking entities and their 
customers. An analysis of the effects of the 2013 final rule in 
general, and the specific amendments being proposed here in particular, 
on moral hazard, risk-taking, systemic risk, and conflicts of interest 
described above, faces the same methodological challenges discussed in 
section V.D.1. and in this section. In addition, existing qualitative 
analysis and quantitative estimates of moral hazard, risk-taking 
incentives resulting from deposit insurance and implicit bailout 
guarantees, and systemic risk implications of proprietary trading, 
centers on banking entities that are not SEC registrants.\350\ However, 
we

[[Page 33534]]

continue to recognize that the effects of the proposed amendments on 
bank entity risk-taking and conflicts of interest may flow through to 
SEC-registered dealers and investment advisers affiliated with banks 
and bank holding companies and may impact securities markets. As 
suggested by academic evidence, the presence and magnitude of 
spillovers across different types of financial institutions vary over 
time and may be more significant in times of stress.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ For a literature review, see, e.g., Benoit et al. (2017). 
Some examples include:
     A large proportion of the variation in bank market-to-
book ratios over time may be due to changes in the value of 
government guarantees. See Atkeson et al. (2018).
     Moral hazard resulting from idiosyncratic and targeted 
bailouts may make the economy significantly more exposed to 
financial crises, while moral hazard effects may be limited if 
bailouts are systemic and broad based. See Bianchi (2016); see also 
Kelly et al. (2016).
     Deposit insurance and financial safety nets increased 
bank risk-taking and measures of systemic fragility in the run-up to 
the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis itself, 
deposit insurance reduced bank risk and systemic stability. See 
Anginer et al. (2014).
     Short-term capital market funding may increase bank 
fragility. See Beltratti and Stulz (2012).
     Implicit bailout guarantees for the financial sector as 
a whole are priced in spreads on index put options far more than 
those on put options of individual banks. See, e.g., Kelly et al. 
(2016).
     Other research used CDS data to measure the value of 
government bailouts to bondholders and stockholders of large 
financial firms during the global financial crisis. See Veronesi and 
Zingales (2010).
    \351\ See, e.g., Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon, 2012, 
Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the 
Finance and Insurance Sectors, Journal of Financial Economics 
104(3), 535-559; see also Alam, Fuss, and Gropp, 2014, Spillover 
Effects Among Financial Institutions: A State-Dependent Sensitivity 
Value at Risk Approach (SDSVar). Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 49(3), 575-598; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016, 
CoVar, American Economic Review 106(7), 1705-1741.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where the proposed amendments increase the scope of permissible 
activities or decrease the risk of detection of proprietary trading, 
their impact on informational efficiency stems from a balance of two 
effects. On the one hand, where banking entities' proprietary trading 
strategies are based on superior analysis and prediction models, their 
reduced ability to trade on such information may make securities 
markets less informationally efficient. While such proprietary trading 
strategies can be executed by broker-dealers unaffiliated with banking 
entities and unaffected by the prohibitions on proprietary trading, 
their ability to do so may be constrained by their limited access to 
capital and a lack of scale needed to profit from such strategies. On 
the other hand, if superior information is obtained by an entity from 
its customer-facing activities and as a result of conflicts of 
interest, proprietary trading may make customers less willing to 
transact with banks or participate in securities markets.
iv. Loan-Related Swaps
    The Agencies are requesting comment on the treatment of swaps 
entered into with a customer in connection with a loan provided to the 
customer. Specifically, loan-related swaps are transactions between a 
banking entity and a loan customer that are directly related to the 
terms of the customer's loan. The Agencies understand that such swaps 
may be considered financial instruments triggering proprietary trading 
prohibitions of the 2013 final rule. As a result, a banking entity 
would need to rely on an applicable exclusion from the definition of 
proprietary trading or an exemption in the implementing regulations in 
order for this activity to be permissible.
    Accordingly, the Agencies are requesting comment on whether loan-
related swaps should be permitted under the market-making exemption if 
the banking entity stands ready to make a market in both directions 
whenever a customer makes an appropriate request, but in practice 
primarily makes a market in the swaps only in one direction. The 
Agencies are also requesting comment on whether it would be appropriate 
to exclude loan-related swaps from the definition of proprietary 
trading for some banking entities or to permit the activity pursuant to 
an exemption from the prohibition on proprietary trading other than 
market making.
    Addressing the treatment of loan-related swaps may benefit banking 
entities that are currently unsure as to their ability to engage in 
loan-related swaps pursuant to the existing market-making exemption. 
Legal certainty in this space may increase the willingness of banking 
entities to accommodate customer demand for such loans and increase 
certainty that such activity would not trigger the proprietary trading 
prohibition. To the degree that the back-to-back offsetting purchases 
and sales of derivatives are not immediate, and to the extent that such 
transactions are not cleared and involve counterparty risk, this may 
also increase risk-taking by banking entities. To the extent that the 
proposed guidance was to increase the scope of permissible proprietary 
trading activity, such activity would implicate the economic tradeoffs 
of the proprietary trading prohibitions of the 2013 final rule 
discussed in section V.D.1.
d. Permitted Risk-Mitigating Hedging
i. Regulatory Baseline
    Under the baseline, certain risk-mitigating hedging activities may 
be exempt from the restriction on proprietary trading under the risk-
mitigating hedging exemption. To make use of this exemption, the 2013 
final rule requires all banking entities to comply with a comprehensive 
and multi-faceted set of requirements, including: (1) The establishment 
and implementation, and maintenance of an internal compliance program; 
(2) satisfaction of various criteria for hedging activities; and (3) 
the existence of compensation arrangements for persons performing risk-
mitigating hedging activities that are designed not to reward or 
incentivize prohibited proprietary trading. In addition, certain 
activities under the hedging exemption are subject to documentation 
requirements.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \352\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, 2013 final rule requires that a banking entity 
seeking to rely on the risk-mitigating hedging exemption must 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce an internal compliance 
program that is reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of the rule. Such a compliance program must include 
reasonably designed written policies and procedures regarding the 
positions, techniques, and strategies that may be used for hedging, 
including documentation indicating what positions, contracts, or other 
holdings a particular trading desk may use in its risk-mitigating 
hedging activities, as well as position and aging limits with respect 
to such positions, contracts, or other holdings. The compliance program 
also must provide for internal controls and ongoing monitoring, 
management, and authorization procedures, including relevant escalation 
procedures. In addition, the 2013 final rule requires that all banking 
entities, as part of their compliance program, must conduct analysis, 
including correlation analysis, and independent testing designed to 
ensure that the positions, techniques, and strategies that may be used 
for hedging are designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate 
and demonstrably reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risk(s) being hedged.
    The 2013 final rule does not require a banking entity to prove 
correlation mathematically--rather, the nature and extent of the 
correlation analysis should be dependent on the facts and circumstances 
of the hedge and the underlying risks targeted. Moreover, if 
correlation cannot be demonstrated, the analysis needs to state the 
reason and explain how the proposed hedging position, technique, or 
strategy is designed to reduce or significantly mitigate risk and how 
that reduction or mitigation can be demonstrated without 
correlation.\353\ Some market participants have argued that the 
inability to perform correlation analysis, for instance, for non-
trading assets such as mortgage servicing assets, can add as much as 2% 
of the asset value to the cost of hedging.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \353\ See 79 FR at 5631.
    \354\ See supra note 18.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 33535]]

    To qualify for the risk-mitigating hedging exemption, the hedging 
activity, both at inception and at the time of any adjustment to the 
hedging activity, must be designed to reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate and demonstrably reduce or significantly mitigate one or more 
specific identifiable risks.\355\ Hedging activities also must not give 
rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any significant new or 
additional risk that is not itself hedged contemporaneously. 
Additionally, the hedging activity must be subject to continuing 
review, monitoring, and management by the banking entity, including 
ongoing recalibration of the hedging activity to ensure that the 
hedging activity satisfies the requirements for the exemption and does 
not constitute prohibited proprietary trading. Lastly, the compensation 
arrangements of persons performing risk-mitigating hedging activities 
must be designed so as to not reward or incentivize prohibited 
proprietary trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \355\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(b)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the 2013 final rule requires banking entities to document 
and retain information related to the purchase or sale of hedging 
instruments that are either (1) established by a trading desk that is 
different from the trading desk establishing or responsible for the 
risks being hedged; (2) established by the specific trading desk 
establishing or responsible for the risks being hedged but that are 
effected through means not specifically identified in the trading desks 
written policies and procedures; or (3) established to hedge aggregate 
positions across two or more trading desks. \356\ The documentation 
must include the specific identifiable risks being hedged, the specific 
risk-mitigating strategy that is being implemented, and the trading 
desk that is establishing and responsible for the hedge. These records 
must be retained for a period of not less than 5 years in a form that 
allows them to be promptly produced if requested.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \356\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(c)(1).
    \357\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.5(c)(3); see also 2013 final 
rule Sec.  __.20(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, the 
Agencies recognize that, in some circumstances, it may be difficult to 
know with sufficient certainty whether a potential hedging activity 
will continue to demonstrably reduce or significantly mitigate an 
identifiable risk after it is implemented. Unforeseeable changes in 
market conditions and other factors could reduce or eliminate the 
intended risk-mitigating impact of the hedging activity, making it 
difficult for a banking entity to comply with the continuous 
requirement that the hedging activity demonstrably reduce or 
significantly mitigate specific, identifiable risks. In such cases, a 
banking entity may choose not to enter into a hedge out of concern that 
it may not be able to effectively comply with the continuing 
requirement to demonstrate risk mitigation.
    We also recognize that SEC-regulated entities may engage in both 
static and dynamic hedging at the portfolio (and not at the 
transaction) level and monitor and reevaluate aggregate portfolio risk 
exposures on an ongoing basis, rather than the risk exposure of 
individual transactions. Dynamic hedging may be particularly common 
among dealers with large derivative portfolios, especially when the 
values of these portfolios are nonlinear functions of the prices of the 
underlying assets (e.g., gamma hedging of options). The rules currently 
in effect permit dynamic hedging, but require the banking entity to 
document and support its decisions regarding individual hedging 
transactions, strategies, and techniques for ongoing activity in the 
same manner as for its initial activities, rather than the hedging 
decisions regarding a portfolio as a whole.
ii. Costs and Benefits
    As discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, the 
Agencies recognize that hedging is an essential tool for risk 
mitigation and can enhance a banking entity's provision of client-
facing services, such as market making and underwriting, as well as 
facilitate financial stability. In recognition of the role that this 
activity plays as part of a banking entity's overall operations, the 
Agencies have proposed a number of changes that are intended to 
streamline and clarify the current exemption for risk-mitigating 
hedging activities.
    The first proposed amendment concerns the ``demonstrability'' 
requirement of the risk-mitigating hedging exemption. Specifically, the 
Agencies propose to eliminate the requirement that the risk-mitigating 
hedging activity must demonstrably reduce or otherwise significantly 
mitigate one or more specific identifiable risks at the inception of 
the hedge. Additionally, the demonstrability requirement would also be 
removed from the requirement to continually review, monitor, and manage 
the banking entity's existing hedging activity. We also note that 
banking entities would continue to be subject to the requirement that 
the risk-mitigating hedging activity be designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable risks, as 
well as to the requirement that the hedging activity be subject to 
continuing review, monitoring and management by the banking entity to 
confirm that such activity is designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks that develop 
over time from the risk-mitigating hedging.
    The removal of the demonstrability requirement is expected to 
benefit banking entity dealers, as it would decrease uncertainty about 
the ability to rely on the risk-mitigating hedging exemption and may 
reduce the compliance costs of engaging in permitted hedging 
activities. While this aspect of the proposal may alleviate compliance 
burdens related to risk management and potentially facilitate greater 
trading activity and liquidity provision by bank-affiliated dealers, it 
could also enable dealers to accumulate large proprietary positions 
through adjustments (or lack thereof) to otherwise permissible hedging 
portfolios. Therefore, we recognize that the proposed amendment could 
increase moral hazard risks related to proprietary trading by allowing 
dealers to take positions that are economically equivalent to positions 
they could have taken in the absence of the 2013 final rule.
    The second proposed amendment to the risk-mitigating hedging 
exemption is the removal of the requirement to perform the correlation 
analysis. The Agencies recognize that a correlation analysis based on 
returns may be prohibitively complex for some asset classes, and that a 
correlation coefficient may not always serve as a meaningful or 
predictive risk metric. While we recognize that, in some instances, 
correlation analysis of past returns may be helpful in evaluating 
whether a hedging transaction was effective in offsetting the risks 
intended to be mitigated, correlation analysis may not be an effective 
tool for such evaluation in other instances. For example, correlation 
across assets and asset classes evolves over time and may exhibit jumps 
at times of idiosyncratic or systematic stress. Additionally, the 
hedging activity, even if properly designed to reduce risk, may not be 
practicable if costly delays or compliance complexities result from a 
requirement to undertake a correlation analysis. Thus, the removal of 
the correlation analysis requirement may provide dealers with greater 
flexibility in selecting and executing risk-

[[Page 33536]]

mitigating hedging activities. However, we also recognize that the 
removal of the correlation analysis requirement may result in tradeoffs 
discussed above. To the extent that some banking entities may be able 
to engage in speculative proprietary trading activities while relying 
on the risk-mitigating hedging exemption, the proposed amendment may 
potentially increase moral hazard and conflicts of interest between 
banking entities and their customers, notwithstanding the fact that a 
potential increase in permitted risk-mitigating hedging may increase 
capital formation and trading activity by banking entities.
    The third proposed amendment simplifies the requirements of the 
risk-mitigating hedging exemption for Group B banking entities (i.e., 
those with moderate trading assets and liabilities). The proposed 
amendment would remove the requirement to have a specific risk-
mitigating hedging compliance program, as well as the documentation 
requirements and certain hedging activity requirements for Group B 
entities.\358\ As a result, these dealers would be subject to two key 
hedging activity requirements: (1) That a hedging transaction must be 
designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more 
specific, identifiable risks; and (2) that a hedging transaction is 
subject, as appropriate, to ongoing review, monitoring, and management 
by the banking entity that requires recalibration of the hedging 
activity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the requirements 
on an ongoing basis and is not prohibited proprietary trading. Under 
the proposed amendments, Group C banking entities are presumed 
compliant with subpart B and subpart C of the proposed rule, including 
with respect to the reliance on the hedging exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \358\ Group C banking entities (i.e., those with limited trading 
assets and liabilities) also would not be subject to these express 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, the 
Agencies recognize that banking entities without significant trading 
assets and liabilities are less likely to engage in large and/or 
complicated trading activities and hedging strategies. We continue to 
recognize that compliance with the 2013 final rule may impose 
disproportionate costs on banking entities without significant trading 
assets and liabilities. Therefore, the proposed amendment would benefit 
Group B and Group C entities, as it would reduce the costs of relying 
on the hedging exemption and, thus, engaging in hedging activities. To 
the extent that the removal of these requirements may reduce the costs 
of risk-mitigating hedging activity, Group B and Group C entities may 
increase their intermediation activity while also growing their trading 
assets and liabilities.
    The fourth proposed amendment reduces documentation requirements 
for Group A entities. In particular, the proposal removes the 
documentation requirements for some financial instruments used for 
hedging. More specifically, the instrument would not be subject to the 
documentation requirement if: (1) It is identified on a written list of 
pre-approved financial instruments commonly used by the trading desk 
for the specific type of hedging activity; and (2) at the time the 
financial instrument is purchased or sold the hedging activity 
(including the purchase or sale of the financial instrument) complies 
with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the trading desk 
purchasing or selling the financial instrument for hedging activities 
undertaken for one or more other trading desks. The SEC lacks 
information or data that would allow us to quantify the magnitude of 
the expected cost reductions, as the prevalence of hedging activities 
depends on each registrant's organizational structure, business model, 
and complexity of risk exposures. However, the SEC preliminarily 
believes that the flexibility to choose between providing documentation 
regarding risk-mitigating hedging transactions and establishing hedging 
limits for pre-approved instruments may be beneficial for Group A 
entities, as it will allow these entities to tailor their compliance 
regime to their specific organizational structure and existing policies 
and procedures. Finally, in section V.B, the Agencies estimate burden 
reductions per firm from the proposed amendments. The proposed 
amendments to Sec.  __.5(c) will result in ongoing cost savings 
estimated at $203,191 for SEC-registered broker-dealers.\359\ 
Additionally, the proposed amendments will result in lower ongoing 
costs for potential SBSD registrants relative to the costs that they 
would incur under the current regime if they were to choose to register 
with the SEC--this cost reduction is estimated to reach up to 
$50,062.\360\ However, we recognize that compliance with SBSD 
registration requirements is not yet required and that there are 
currently no registered SBSDs. Similarly, the proposed amendments may 
also reduce initial set-up costs related to Sec.  __.5(c) by $101,596 
for SEC-registered broker-dealers and up to $25,031 for entities that 
may choose to register with the SEC as SBSDs.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \359\ Recordkeeping burden reduction for broker-dealers: 20 
hours per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 138 
firms = $203,191. Recordkeeping burden reduction for entities that 
may register as SBSDs: 20 hours per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney 
at $409 per hour) x 34 firms = $50,062.
    \360\ Recordkeeping burden reduction for entities that may 
register as SBSDs: 20 hours per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney at 
$409 per hour) x 34 firms = $50,062.
    \361\ Initial set-up burden reduction for broker-dealers: 10 
hours per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 138 
firms = $101,596. Initial set-up burden reduction for entities that 
may register as SBSDs: 10 hours per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney 
at $409 per hour) x 34 firms = $25,031.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed hedging amendment eliminates all hedging-specific 
compliance program requirements including correlation analysis, 
documentation requirements, and some hedging activity requirements for 
Group B entities. The proposed amendments eliminate only some of the 
compliance program requirements for Group A entities and provide a 
documentation requirement exemption for some hedging activity of these 
entities. Since the fixed costs of relying on such exemptions may be 
more significant for entities with smaller trading books, the proposed 
hedging amendment may permit Group B entities just below the $10 
billion threshold to more effectively compete with Group A entities 
just above the threshold.
    The proposed hedging amendments may also impact the volume of 
hedging activity and capital formation. To the extent that some 
registrants currently experience significant compliance costs related 
to the hedging exemption, these costs may constrain the amount of risk-
mitigating hedging they currently engage in. The ability to hedge 
underlying risks at a low cost can facilitate the willingness of SEC-
regulated entities to commit capital and take on underlying risk 
exposures. Because the proposed amendments would reduce costs of 
relying on the hedging exemption, these entities may become more 
incentivized to engage in risk-mitigating hedging activity, which may 
in turn contribute to greater capital formation.
e. Trading Outside the United States
i. Baseline
    Under the 2013 final rule, a foreign banking entity that has a 
branch, agency, or subsidiary located in the United States (and is not 
itself located in the United States) is subject to the

[[Page 33537]]

proprietary trading prohibitions and related compliance requirements 
unless it meets five criteria.\362\ First, a branch, agency, or 
subsidiary of a foreign banking organization that is located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any state may not engage as principal in the purchase or sale of 
financial instruments (including any personnel that arrange, negotiate, 
or execute a purchase or sale). Second, the banking entity (including 
relevant personnel) that makes the decision to engage in the 
transaction must not be located in the United States or organized under 
the laws of the United States or of any state. Third, the transaction, 
including any transaction arising from risk-mitigating hedging related 
to the transaction, must not be accounted for as principal directly or 
on a consolidated basis by any branch or affiliate that is located in 
the United States or organized under the laws of the United States or 
of any state. Fourth, no financing for the transaction can be provided 
by any branch or affiliate of a foreign banking entity that is located 
in the United States or organized under the laws of the United States 
or of any state (the ``financing prong''). Fifth, the transaction must 
generally not be conducted with or through any U.S. entity (the 
``counterparty prong''), unless: (1) No personnel of a U.S. entity that 
are located in the United States are involved in the arrangement, 
negotiation, or execution of such transaction; (2) the transaction is 
with an unaffiliated U.S. market intermediary acting as principal and 
is promptly cleared and settled through a central counterparty; or (3) 
the transaction is executed through an unaffiliated U.S. market 
intermediary acting as agent, conducted anonymously through an exchange 
or similar trading facility, and is promptly cleared and settled 
through a central counterparty.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \362\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.6(e).
    \363\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.6(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, the 
Agencies recognize that foreign banking entities seeking to rely on the 
exemption for trading outside the United States face a complex set of 
compliance requirements that may result in implementation 
inefficiencies. In particular, the application of the financing prong 
may be challenging because of the fungibility of some forms of 
financing. In addition, the Agencies recognize that satisfying the 
counterparty prong is burdensome for foreign banking entities and may 
have led some foreign banking entities to reduce the range of 
counterparties with which they engage in trading activity.
ii. Costs and Benefits
    The proposed amendments remove the financing and counterparty 
prongs.
    Under the proposed rule, financing for the transaction relying on 
the foreign trading exemption can be provided by U.S. branches or 
affiliates of foreign banking entities, including SEC-registered 
dealers. Foreign banking entities may benefit from the proposed 
amendments and enjoy greater flexibility in financing their transaction 
activity. However, some of the economic exposure and risks of 
proprietary trading by foreign banking entities would flow not just to 
the foreign banking entities, but to U.S.-located entities financing 
the transactions, e.g., through margin loans. While SEC-registered 
banking entity dealers financing the transactions of foreign entities 
are themselves subject to the substantive requirements of the 2013 
final rule, SEC-registered dealers that are not banking entities under 
the BHC Act are not. The proposal retains the requirement that the 
transactions of a foreign banking entity, including any hedging trades, 
are not to be accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated 
basis by any U.S. branch or affiliate.
    In addition, the proposed amendment removes the counterparty prong 
and its corresponding clearing and anonymous exchange requirements. 
Currently, a foreign banking entity may transact with or through U.S. 
counterparties if the trades are conducted anonymously on an exchange 
(for trades executed by a counterparty acting as an agent) and cleared 
and settled through a clearing agency or derivatives clearing 
organization acting as a central counterparty (for trades executed by a 
counterparty acting as either an agent or principal). As a result, the 
proposed amendments would make it easier for foreign banking entities 
to transact with or through U.S. counterparties. To the extent that 
foreign banking entities are currently passing along compliance burdens 
to their U.S. counterparties, or are unwilling to intermediate or 
engage in certain transactions with or through U.S. counterparties, the 
proposed amendments may reduce transaction costs for U.S. 
counterparties and may increase the volume of trading activity between 
U.S. counterparties and foreign banking entities.
    We note that, even when a foreign banking entity engages in 
proprietary trading through a U.S. dealer, the principal risk of the 
foreign banking entities' position is consolidated to the foreign 
banking entity. While such trades expose the counterparty to risks 
related to the transaction, such risks born by U.S. counterparties 
likely depend on both the identity of the counterparty and the nature 
of the instrument and terms of trading position. Moreover, concerns 
about moral hazard and the volume of risk-taking by U.S. banking 
entities may be less relevant for foreign banking entities. The current 
requirement that foreign banking entities transact with U.S. 
counterparties through unaffiliated dealers steers trading business to 
unaffiliated U.S. dealers but does not necessarily reduce moral hazard 
in the U.S. financial system.
iii. Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    The proposed amendments would likely narrow the scope of 
transaction activity and banking entities to which the substantive 
prohibitions of the 2013 final rule apply. As a result, the amendments 
may reduce the effects on efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation of the implementing rules currently in place. The proposed 
amendments reflect consideration of the potentially inefficient 
restructuring undergone by foreign banking entities after the 2013 
final rule came into effect and enhanced access to securities markets 
by U.S. market participants on the one hand,\364\ and, advancing the 
objectives of the 2013 final rule as discussed above on the other.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \364\ For instance, a commenter has stated that at least seven 
international banks have terminated or transferred existing 
transactions with U.S. counterparties in order to comply with the 
foreign trading exemption and to avoid compliance costs of relying 
on alternative exemptions or exclusions. See supra note 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Allowing foreign banking entities to be financed by U.S.-dealer 
affiliates and to transact with U.S. counterparties off exchange and 
without clearing the trades, may reduce costs of non-U.S. banking 
entities' activity in the United States and with U.S. counterparties. 
These costs may currently represent barriers to entry for foreign 
banking entities that contemplate engaging in trading and other 
transaction activity using a U.S. affiliate's financing and trading 
with U.S. counterparties off exchange. To that extent, the proposed 
amendments may provide incentives for foreign banking entities that 
currently receive financing from non-U.S. affiliates to move financing 
to U.S. dealer affiliates, and incentives for foreign banking entities 
that currently transact through or with U.S. counterparties via 
anonymous exchanges and clearing agencies to

[[Page 33538]]

transact through or with U.S. counterparties outside of anonymous 
exchanges and clearing. As a result, the number of banking entities 
engaging in securities trading in U.S. markets may increase, which may 
enhance the incorporation of new information into prices. However, the 
amendments may result in a shift in securities trading activity away 
from U.S. banking entities to foreign banking entities that are not 
comparably regulated. Thus, the amendments may reduce the benefits and 
costs of the 2013 final rule discussed in section V.D.1.
    The proposed amendments may increase market entry as they will 
decrease the need for foreign banking entities to rely only on a narrow 
set of unaffiliated market intermediaries for the purposes of avoiding 
the compliance costs associated with the 2013 final rule. Additionally, 
the proposed amendments may increase operational efficiency of trading 
activity by foreign banking entities in the United States, which may 
decrease costs to market participants and may increase the level of 
market participation by U.S-dealer affiliates of foreign banking 
entities.
    The proposed amendments would also affect competition among banking 
entities. These amendments may introduce competitive disparities 
between U.S. and foreign banking entities. Under the proposed 
amendments, foreign banking entities would enjoy a greater degree of 
flexibility in financing proprietary trading and transacting through or 
with U.S. counterparties. At the same time, U.S. banking entities would 
not be able to engage in proprietary trading and would be subject to 
the substantive prohibitions of section 13 of the BHC Act. To the 
extent that banking entities at the holding company level may be able 
to reorganize and move their business to a foreign jurisdiction, some 
U.S. banking entity holding companies may exit from the U.S. regulatory 
regime. However, under sections 4(c)(9) and 4(c)(13) of the Banking 
Act, domestic entities would have to conduct the majority of their 
business outside the United States to become eligible for the 
exemption. In addition, certain changes in control of banks and bank 
holding companies require supervisory approval. Hence, the feasibility 
and magnitude of such regulatory arbitrage remain unclear.
    To the extent that foreign banking entities currently engage in 
cleared and anonymous transactions through or with U.S. counterparties 
because of the existing counterparty prong but would have chosen not to 
do so otherwise, the proposed approach may reduce the amount of cleared 
transactions and the trading volume in anonymous markets. This may 
reduce opportunities for risk-sharing among market participants and 
increase idiosyncratic counterparty risk born by U.S. and foreign 
counterparties.
    At the same time, the proposed amendments may increase the 
availability of liquidity and reduce transaction costs for market 
participants seeking to trade in U.S. securities markets. To the extent 
that non-U.S. banking entities will face lower costs of transacting 
with U.S. counterparties, it may become easier for U.S. banking 
entities or customers to find a transaction counterparty that would be 
willing to engage in, for instance, hedging transactions. To that 
extent, U.S. market participants accessing securities markets to hedge 
financial and commercial risks may increase their hedging activity and 
assume a more efficient amount of risk. The potential consequences of 
relocation of non-U.S. banking entity activity to the United States on 
liquidity and risk sharing would be most concentrated in those asset 
classes and market segments where activity is most constrained by 
current requirements.
f. Metrics Reporting
i. Regulatory Baseline
    The regulatory baseline against which we are assessing proposed 
amendments includes requirements for banking entities with consolidated 
trading assets and liabilities above $10 billion to record and report 
certain quantitative measurements for each trading desk engaged in 
covered trading.\365\ The metrics-reporting requirements currently in 
place were intended to facilitate monitoring of patterns in covered 
trading activities and to identify activities that may warrant further 
review for compliance with the restrictions on proprietary trading of 
section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \365\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(d) and Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the quantitative measurements reported under the 
baseline were intended to assist banking entities and the SEC in 
achieving the following: A better understanding of the scope, type, and 
profile of covered trading activities; identification of covered 
trading activities that warrant further review or examination by the 
banking entity to verify compliance with the rule's proprietary trading 
restrictions; evaluation of whether the covered trading activities of 
trading desks engaged in permitted activities are consistent with the 
provisions of the permitted activity exemptions; evaluation of whether 
the covered trading activities of trading desks that are engaged in 
permitted trading activities (i.e., underwriting and market making-
related activity, risk-mitigating hedging, or trading in certain 
government obligations) are consistent with the requirement that such 
activity not result, directly or indirectly, in a material exposure to 
high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies; identification of the 
profile of particular covered trading activities of the banking entity, 
and its individual trading desks, to help establish the appropriate 
frequency and scope of the SEC's examinations of such activity; and the 
assessment and addressing of the risks associated with the banking 
entity's covered trading activities.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \366\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20 and Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the regulatory baseline, dealers affiliated with banking 
entities that have less than $10 billion in consolidated trading assets 
and liabilities are not subject to the 2013 final rule's metrics 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Group A entities (i.e., SEC 
registrants affiliated with banking entities that have more than $10 
billion in consolidated trading assets and liabilities) are required to 
record and report the following quantitative measurements for each 
trading day and for each trading desk engaged in covered trading 
activities: (i) Risk and Position Limits and Usage; (ii) Risk Factor 
Sensitivities; (iii) Value-at-Risk and Stress Value-at-Risk; (iv) 
Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution; (v) Inventory Turnover; (vi) 
Inventory Aging; and (vii) Customer-Facing Trade Ratio.
    Currently, Group A entities affiliated with banking entities that 
have less than $50 billion in consolidated trading assets and 
liabilities are required to report metrics for each quarter within 30 
days of the end of that quarter. In contrast, Group A entities 
affiliated with banking entities with total trading assets and 
liabilities equal to or above $50 billion are required to report 
metrics more frequently--each month within 10 days of the end of that 
month.\367\ Table 2 quantifies the number and trading book of SEC-
registered broker-dealers affiliated with firms above and below the $10 
billion and $50 billion thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Costs and Benefits
    We understand that the current metrics reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements may involve large compliance costs. For instance, the

[[Page 33539]]

average cost of collecting and filing metrics subject to the reporting 
requirements may be as high as $2 million per year per participant, and 
market participants may submit an average of over 5 million data points 
in each filing.\368\ One firm reported incurring approximately $3 
million in costs associated with the build out of new IT infrastructure 
and system enhancements, and estimated that this IT infrastructure will 
require at least $250,000 in maintenance and operating costs year-to-
year. \369\ In addition, the same firm estimated costs related to 
compliance consultants assisting with the construction of a 2013 final 
rule compliance regime at $3 million.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \368\ See supra note 18.
    \369\ Id.
    \370\ To the extent that costs related to compliance consulting 
include both costs of metrics reporting and related systems, as well 
as costs related to other compliance requirements under the 2013 
final rule, we cannot estimate the firm's all-in metrics reporting 
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments streamline the metrics reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, eliminating or adding particular metrics on 
the basis of regulatory experience with the data and providing some 
entities with additional reporting time. Broadly, metrics reporting 
provides information for regulatory oversight and supervision but 
presents compliance burdens for registrants. The balance of these 
effects turns on the value of different metrics in evaluating covered 
trading activity for compliance with the rule, as well as their 
usefulness for risk assessment and general supervision. We discuss 
these effects with respect to each proposed amendment in the sections 
that follow.

A. Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden for SEC-Regulated Banking 
Entities

    In section V.B, the Agencies estimate that extending the reporting 
period for banking entities with $50 billion or more in trading assets 
and liabilities from10 days to 20 days after the end of each calendar 
month may decrease the initial setup cost by $85,399 and ongoing annual 
reporting cost by $358,677 for broker-dealers, as well as initial setup 
cost decrease of up to $100,123 and ongoing reporting costs decrease of 
up to $420,517 for SBSDs that choose to register with the SEC.\371\ In 
addition, the change to the reporting period for banking entities with 
$50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities may result in 
ongoing annual recordkeeping cost savings of $76,859 for broker-dealers 
and up to $90,111 for SBSDs.\372\ These figures reflect the estimated 
burden reductions net of any new systems costs imposed by the proposed 
amendments and discussed in greater detail in the section that follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \371\ Initial setup cost reduction for broker-dealers: 40 hours 
per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 29 firms = 
$85,399. Initial setup cost reduction for entities that may register 
as SBSDs: 40 hours per firm x 0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per 
hour) x 34 firms= $100,123. Ongoing reporting cost reduction for 
broker-dealers: 14 hours per response x 12 responses per year x 0.18 
weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 29 firms= $358,677. Ongoing 
reporting cost reduction for SBSDs: 14 hours per response x 12 
responses per year x 0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 34 
firms = $420,517. The estimate for SBSDs assumes that all 34 SBSDs 
have more than $50 billion in trading assets and liabilities.
    \372\ Ongoing recordkeeping cost reduction for broker-dealers: 3 
hours per response x 12 responses per year x 0.18 weight x (Attorney 
at $409 per hour) x 29 firms = $76,859. Ongoing recordkeeping cost 
reduction for SBSDs: 3 hours per response x 12 responses per year x 
0.18 weight x (Attorney at $409 per hour) x 34 firms = $90,111. The 
estimate for SBSDs assumes that all 34 have more than $50 billion in 
trading assets and liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments generate both costs (from new reporting 
requirements) and savings (from limitations to the scope of certain 
metrics and reduced analytical burden). To the extent that the costs of 
compliance with the existing metrics requirements have a significant 
fixed cost component and may be sunk, the potential cost savings of the 
proposed amendments may be reduced. The SEC recognizes that while these 
amendments will reduce the aggregate metrics reporting and 
recordkeeping burden across all types of banking entities, the 
allocation of these costs and benefits may differ across banking entity 
types. For example, one of the proposed amendments replaces the 
Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics with 
Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics, and limits the scope of 
these metrics to trading desks engaged in market-making and 
underwriting activities. Because SEC-registered dealers are routinely 
engaged in market-making and underwriting activities, we preliminarily 
expect that a greater share of the costs associated with the Positions 
and Transaction Volumes metrics, such as the costs associated with 
tagging intra-company and inter-affiliate transactions for purposes of 
the Transaction Volumes metric, may fall on SEC-regulated entities, 
while a greater share of the savings, such as the savings associated 
with the elimination of this reporting requirement for desks engaged 
solely in risk-mitigating hedging activities, may be allocated to non-
SEC-regulated banking entities.
    The SEC preliminarily believes reporters will need to modify 
existing systems to comply with the proposed amendments.\373\ On the 
basis of its experience in similar rulemakings, the SEC believes that 
the costs necessary to modify existing systems used to comply with the 
proposed metrics reporting and recordkeeping amendments \374\ would 
depend on the particular structure and activities of each SEC-regulated 
banking entity's trading desks.\375\ In order to allocate the estimated 
aggregate costs across the various proposed amendments, we make several 
assumptions about the relative costs of the proposed amendments, as 
described below. These assumptions are based on the SEC's experience 
with reporters, as well as the SEC's preliminary belief that the most 
significant component of the estimated costs will be the initial 
implementation cost for the new reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ In addition, SEC-regulated banking entities may incur 
costs associated with reporting metrics in accordance with the XML 
Schema published on each Agency's website. We discuss these costs 
below.
    \374\ We believe that affiliated SEC-regulated banking entities 
will collaborate with one another to take advantage of efficiencies 
that may exist and have factored that assumption into our analysis.
    \375\ This estimate also includes personnel costs associated 
with preparing the proposed narrative statement. These cost 
estimates are based, in part, on staff experience, as well as 
consideration of recent estimates of the one-time and ongoing 
systems costs associated with other SEC rulemakings. See, e.g., 
Regulation SBSR--Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap 
Information, Exchange Act Release No. 78321 (July 14, 2016), 81 FR 
53546, 53629 (Aug. 12, 2016) (estimating the one-time costs for 
trade execution platforms and registered clearing agencies to 
develop transaction processing systems and report transaction-level 
information to swap data repositories); see also Trade 
Acknowledgment and Verification of Security-Based Swap Transactions, 
Exchange Act Release No. 78011 (June 8, 2016), 81 FR 39807, 39839 
(June 17, 2016) (estimating the one-time costs for registered 
security-based swap dealers and major participants to develop 
internal order and trade management systems to electronically 
process transactions and send trade acknowledgments).
    Although the substance and content of systems associated with 
reporting transaction-level information to swap data repositories 
and derivatives counterparties would be different from the substance 
and content of systems associated with reporting quantitative 
measurements of covered trading activity, the costs associated with 
the proposed amendments, like the costs associated with the 
referenced security-based swap rules, would entail gathering and 
maintaining transaction-level information, and planning, coding, 
testing, and installing relevant system modifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The primary systems-related costs of approximately $120,000 to 
$130,000, estimated at the level of the reporter, will come from: (i) 
Personnel costs associated with preparing the written Narrative 
Statement for a single reporter that is not already providing this 
information ($11,000); (ii) costs related to providing data in relation 
to the Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics that is more granular 
than is

[[Page 33540]]

currently required for the Inventory Turnover and Customer Facing Trade 
Ratio metrics ($8,000); (iii) systems costs related to reporting intra-
company and inter-affiliate transactions under the Positions and 
Transaction Volumes metrics ($7,000); (iv) initial implementation costs 
for the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information metric 
($26,000); (v) ongoing costs related to the Quantitative Measurements 
Identifying Information metric ($3,000); (vi) one-time costs of 
establishing and implementing systems in accordance with the XML Schema 
($75,000). As discussed above, we preliminarily believe that the net 
burden savings estimated in section V.B and monetized in the previous 
section reflect these new systems costs, as well as gross cost savings 
from the proposed amendments. We discuss these costs, as well as 
potential benefits of the proposed amendments, in greater detail below.
    The SEC further considered how to assess the costs of the proposed 
rule for SEC-regulated banking entities. The metrics costs are 
generally estimated at the holding company level for 17 reporters.\376\ 
We then allocate these costs to the affiliated SEC-regulated banking 
entity.\377\ We preliminarily believe that estimating the cost savings 
of the proposal at the individual registrant level would be 
inconsistent with our understanding of how these entities are complying 
with the current metrics reporting requirement. Specifically, we 
anticipate that SEC-regulated banking entities within the same 
corporate group will collaborate with one another to comply with the 
proposed amendments, to take advantage of efficiencies of scale. 
Further, we note that individual SEC-regulated banking entities may 
vary in the scope and type of activity they conduct and that not all 
entities within an organization subject to Appendix A engage in the 
types of covered trading activity for which metrics must be reported. 
Thus, to the extent that metrics compliance occurs at the holding 
company level, estimating costs at the registrant level may overstate 
the magnitude of the costs and cost savings for SEC-regulated entities 
from the proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \376\ The SEC currently receives metrics from 19 entities, 
including two reporters that are below $10 billion in trading assets 
and liabilities, and two reporters that belong to the same holding 
company. Since voluntary reporters are not constrained by the 
requirements of the proposed amendment, they are not reflected in 
our cost estimates. In addition, we believe that the additional 
systems costs estimated here will be incurred at the holding company 
level and scope in the trading activity of all SEC-registered 
banking entity affiliates.
    \377\ See supra note 321.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We considered an alternative approach to estimating costs of the 
proposed metrics amendments--specifically, doing so at the trading desk 
level. We anticipate that individual trading desks and their personnel 
may not be directly involved in complying with the full scope of the 
proposed amendments. For example, the Quantitative Measurements 
Identifying Information and the Narrative Statement must be prepared 
and reported collectively for all relevant trading desks. We also 
expect that trading desks within the same holding company could share 
systems to implement many of the proposed amendments to the 
quantitative measurements. Thus, a cost estimate at the trading desk 
level may not be an accurate proxy of the costs of the proposed 
amendments to SEC-regulated banking entities. Hence, such an analytical 
approach is likely to overestimate the total cost savings of the 
proposed amendments to SEC-regulated entities.

B. Elimination, Replacement, and Streamlining of Certain Metrics

    The proposed amendments replace the Inventory Aging metric with a 
Securities Inventory Aging metric and eliminate the Inventory Aging 
metric for derivatives. In addition, the proposed amendments remove the 
requirement to establish and report limits on Stressed Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) at the trading desk level, replace the Customer-Facing Trade 
Ratio metric with a new Transaction Volumes metric, replace Inventory 
Turnover with a new Positions metric (reflecting both securities and 
derivatives positions), streamline valuation of metrics calculations 
for comparability, limit certain metrics to market-making and 
underwriting desks, modify instructions for metrics reporting, 
including with respect to profit and loss attribution, and remove 
metrics that can be calculated from other reported measurements.
    In general, the key economic tradeoff from metrics reporting is 
between compliance burdens, which may be particularly significant for 
smaller Group A entities, and the amount and usefulness of information 
provided for regulatory oversight of the 2013 final rule, as well as 
for general supervision and oversight. The proposed limitation of 
certain metrics to market-making and underwriting desks, elimination of 
the inventory aging metric, and removal of the Stressed VaR risk limit 
requirements may reduce burdens related to reporting and recordkeeping 
for Group A entities. As proprietary trading activity is inherently 
difficult to distinguish from permitted market making, risk-mitigating 
hedging, or underwriting activity, certain metrics may provide 
additional information that is useful for regulatory oversight. 
However, eliminating inventory turnover and Stressed VaR metrics should 
not reduce the benefits of metrics reporting, as, these metrics do not 
enable a clear identification of prohibited proprietary trading or 
exempt market-making, risk-mitigating hedging, or underwriting 
activities.
    The proposed amendments replace the Inventory Turnover metric with 
the Positions quantitative measurement and replace the Customer-Facing 
Trade Ratio metric with the Transaction Volumes quantitative 
measurement. The Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio 
metrics are ratios that measure the turnover of a trading desk's 
inventory and compare the transactions involving customers and non-
customers of the trading desk, respectively. The proposed Positions and 
Transaction Volumes metrics would provide information about risk 
exposure and trading activity at a more granular level. Specifically, 
the proposed rule requires that banking entities provide the relevant 
Agency with the underlying data used to calculate the ratios for each 
trading day, rather than providing more aggregated data over 30-, 60-, 
and 90-day calculation periods. By providing more granular data, the 
proposed Positions metric, in conjunction with the proposed Transaction 
Volumes metric, is expected to provide the SEC with the flexibility to 
calculate inventory turnover ratios and customer-facing trade ratios 
over any period of time, including a single trading day, allowing the 
use of the calculation method we find most effective for monitoring and 
understanding trading activity.
    In addition, the new Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics will 
distinguish between securities and derivatives positions, unlike the 
Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics. The 
proposed Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics would require a 
banking entity to separately report the value of securities positions 
and the value of derivatives positions. While the current Inventory 
Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics require banking 
entities to use different methodologies for valuing securities 
positions and derivatives positions because of differences between 
these asset classes, these metrics currently require banking entities 
to aggregate

[[Page 33541]]

such values for reporting purposes. By combining separate and distinct 
valuation types (e.g., market value and notional value), the Inventory 
Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics are currently 
providing less meaningful information than was intended. Therefore, 
requiring banking entities to disaggregate the value of securities 
positions and the value of derivatives positions for reporting purposes 
may enhance the usability of this information.
    In addition to requiring separate reporting of the value of 
securities positions and the value of derivatives positions, the 
proposed rule would also streamline valuation method requirements for 
different product types. We understand that certain valuation 
methodologies currently required by the Inventory Turnover and the 
Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics may not be otherwise used by 
banking entities (e.g., for internal monitoring or external reporting 
purposes). Furthermore, current requirements result in information 
being aggregated and furnished to the SEC in non-comparable units. 
Therefore, the proposed requirement to report notional and market value 
for all derivatives positions may further enhance the usability of the 
information provided in the Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics.
    Moreover, the valuation methods required under the proposed rule 
are intended to be more consistent with our understanding of how 
banking entities value securities and derivatives positions in other 
contexts, such as internal monitoring or external reporting purposes, 
which may allow them to leverage existing systems and reduce ongoing 
costs relatively to the costs of current reporting requirements. While 
a banking entity may incur one-time costs in modifying how it values 
certain positions for purposes of metrics reporting, we do not expect 
such systems costs to be significant, particularly if the banking 
entity is able to use the systems it currently has in place for 
purposes of metrics reporting to value positions consistent with the 
proposed rule.
    Notably, the SEC does not anticipate that requiring banking 
entities to provide more granular data in the Positions and Transaction 
Volumes metrics will significantly alter the costs associated with the 
current Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics. The 
Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics are based on the same 
underlying data regarding the trading activity of a trading desk as the 
Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics, so we 
expect that banking entities already keep records of these data and 
have systems in place that collect these data. However, the SEC 
anticipates that reporting more granular information in the Positions 
and Transaction Volumes metrics may result in costs of $24,480.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \378\ The SEC anticipates that costs associated with the more 
granular reporting in the Positions and Transaction Volumes metrics 
will be $8,000 per affiliated group of SEC-regulated banking 
entities. ($8,000 x 17 reporters x 0.18 SEC-registered banking 
entity weight) = $24,480.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio, the proposed 
Transaction Volumes metric would require banking entities to identify 
the value and the number of transactions a trading desk conducts with 
customers and non-customers. However, the proposed Transaction Volumes 
metric would add two additional categories of counterparties to capture 
the value and number of internal transactions a trading desk conducts. 
These include transactions booked within the same banking entity 
(intra-company) and those booked with an affiliated banking entity 
(inter-affiliate). These additional categories of information should 
facilitate better classification of internal transactions, which may 
assist the SEC in evaluating whether the trading desk's activities are 
consistent with the requirements of the exemptions for underwriting or 
market making-related activity. The SEC estimates that modifying the 
current requirements of the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio to require SEC-
regulated banking entities to further categorize trading desk 
transactions may impose additional systems costs related to tagging 
internal transactions and maintaining associated records valued at 
$21,420.\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \379\ The SEC estimates that the additional costs associated 
with categorizing transactions under the Transaction Volumes metric 
will be $7,000 per reporter. ($7,000 x 17 reporters x 0.18 SEC-
registered banking entity weight) = $21,420.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we anticipate that the proposed Positions and 
Transaction Volumes metrics may reduce costs compared to the current 
reporting requirements by limiting the scope of trading desks that must 
provide the position- and trade-based data that is currently required 
by the Inventory Turnover and Customer-Facing Trade Ratio metrics. 
Under the 2013 final rule, banking entities are required to calculate 
and report the Inventory Turnover and the Customer-Facing Trade Ratio 
metrics for all trading desks engaged in covered trading activity. The 
proposal would limit the scope of trading desks for which a banking 
entity would be required to calculate and report the Positions and 
Transaction Volumes metrics to only those trading desks engaged in 
market making-related activity or underwriting activity. As noted 
above, we do not expect SEC-regulated banking entities to realize the 
same amount of cost savings as other banking entities would with 
respect to this aspect of the proposed rule, since SEC-regulated 
banking entities are the entities that typically engage in market 
making-related and underwriting activities.

C. New Qualitative Information: Trading Desk, Narrative Statement, and 
Descriptive Information

    The proposed amendments require banking entities to provide 
additional information. Specifically, the proposal requires entities to 
provide: (1) Desk level qualitative information about the types of 
financial instruments the desk uses and covered trading activity the 
desk conducts, and about the legal entities into which the trading desk 
books trades; (2) a narrative describing changes in calculation 
methods, trading desk structure, or trading desk strategies; (3) 
descriptive information about reported metrics, including information 
uniquely identifying and describing risk measurements and identifying 
the relationships of these measurements within a trading desk and 
across trading desks.

D. Trading Desk Information and Narrative Statement

    As recognized in Appendix A of the 2013 final rule, the 
effectiveness of particular quantitative measurements may differ 
depending on the profile of a particular trading desk, including the 
types of instruments traded and trading activities and strategies.\380\ 
Thus, the additional qualitative information the Agencies propose to 
collect in the Trading Desk Information provision may facilitate SEC 
review and analysis of covered trading activities and reported metrics. 
For instance, the proposed trading desk description may help the SEC 
assess the risks associated with a given activity and establish the 
appropriate frequency and scope of examination of such activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \380\ See 79 FR at 5798.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies are also proposing to require banking entities to 
provide a Narrative Statement that describes any changes in calculation 
methods used, a description of and reasons for changes in the trading 
desk structure or trading desk strategies, and when any such change 
occurred. The Narrative Statement must also include any information the 
banking entity views as

[[Page 33542]]

relevant for assessing the information reported, such as further 
description of calculation methods used. If a banking entity does not 
have any information to report in the Narrative Statement, it must 
submit an electronic document stating that it does not have any 
information to report. The Narrative Statement will provide banking 
entities with an opportunity to describe and explain unusual aspects of 
the data or modifications that may have occurred since the last 
submission, which may facilitate better evaluation of the reported 
data.
    The SEC anticipates that the proposed Trading Desk Information and 
Narrative Statement may enhance the efficiency of data review by 
regulators. Having access to both quantitative data and qualitative 
information for trading desks in each submission may allow the SEC to 
consider the specifics of each trading desk's activities during the 
reporting period, which may facilitate our ability to monitor patterns 
in the quantitative measurements.
    We note that all the SEC-regulated entities that currently report 
Appendix A metrics are also currently providing certain elements of the 
proposed Trading Desk Information to the SEC. Therefore, we 
preliminarily believe that the costs of gathering the relevant Trading 
Desk Information as well as the benefits of this requirement may be de 
minimis.
    The costs associated with preparing the Narrative Statement will 
depend on the extent to which a banking entity modifies its calculation 
methods, makes changes to a trading desk's structure or trading 
strategies, or otherwise has additional information that it views as 
relevant for assessing the information reported. Preparation of a 
Narrative Statement is expected to be a more manual process involving a 
written description of pertinent issues. However, all but one SEC 
reporter already provides a narrative with every submission. Thus, the 
proposed Narrative Statement requirement is expected to result in 
ongoing personnel and monitoring costs of only $1,980.\381\ Since only 
one SEC reporter is likely to be affected by this amendment, we believe 
the benefits of the requirement will be de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \381\ The SEC estimates that costs associated with the proposed 
Narrative Statement will be $11,000 per affiliated group of SEC-
regulated banking entities. ($11,000 x 1 reporter x 0.18 entity) = 
$1,980.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information

    The Agencies are proposing to require banking entities to report a 
Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule, a Risk Factor 
Sensitivities Information Schedule, a Risk Factor Attribution Schedule, 
a Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule, and a Risk Factor 
Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference Schedule. This additional 
information may improve our understanding of how reported limits and 
risk factors relate to each other for one or more trading desks, both 
within the same reporting period and across reporting periods. The SEC 
preliminarily believes that, while these new reporting elements may 
increase compliance costs for banking entities, the information 
contained in the reports may allow for more meaningful interpretation 
of quantitative metrics data.
    Banking entities will incur certain initial implementation costs to 
develop these schedules of information, including costs associated with 
developing unique identifiers for all limits, risk factor 
sensitivities, and risk factor or other factor attributions used by the 
banking entity and brief descriptions of all such limits, 
sensitivities, and factors. This will include personnel costs to 
prepare the descriptions and systems costs to collect and maintain the 
relevant information for each schedule. The SEC estimates initial 
implementation costs associated with the proposed Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information at $79,560.\382\ There will also 
likely be ongoing maintenance costs associated with updating and 
storing the information schedules and ongoing monitoring costs to 
ensure that the information schedules continue to accurately describe 
the banking entity's reported limits, sensitivities, and factors over 
time. However, since this information is not expected to change 
significantly from reporting period to reporting period, banking 
entities should be able to routinize the preparation of these 
information schedules to minimize or mitigate ongoing costs. We 
estimate the proposed Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information 
will result in $9,180 of ongoing costs.\383\ To limit burdens 
associated with reporting the identifying and descriptive information 
covered by the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, the 
proposed rule requires a banking entity to report this information in 
the relevant information schedule for the entire banking entity rather 
than for each trading desk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \382\ The SEC estimates that the costs associated with the 
initial implementation of the Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information will be $26,000 per affiliated group of SEC-regulated 
banking entities. ($26,000 x 17 reporters x 0.18 entity weight) = 
$79,560.
    \383\ The SEC estimates that the ongoing costs associated with 
the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information will be $3,000 
per affiliated group of SEC-regulated banking entities per year. 
($3,000 x 17 reporters x 0.18 entity weight) = $9,180.
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F. XML Format

    The Agencies are proposing to require banking entities to submit 
the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information, and each applicable quantitative measurement in accordance 
with the XML Schema specified and published on the relevant Agency's 
website.\384\ The metrics are not currently required to be reported in 
a structured format, and banking entities are currently reporting 
quantitative measurement data electronically. On the basis of 
discussions with metrics reporters, most of these entities indicated a 
familiarity with XML, and further, several indicated that they use XML 
internally for other reporting purposes. In addition, we note that 
banks currently submit quarterly Reports of Condition and Income 
(``Call Reports'') to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (``FFIEC'') Central Data Repository in eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language (``XBRL'') format, an XML-based reporting language, 
so they are generally familiar with the processes and technology for 
submitting regulatory reports in a structured data format. We believe 
that familiarity with these practices at the bank level will facilitate 
the implementation of these practices for affiliated SEC registrants. 
Furthermore, FINRA requires its member broker-dealers to file their 
FOCUS Reports in a structured format through its eFOCUS system.\385\ 
The eFOCUS system permits broker-dealers to import the FOCUS Report 
data into a filing using an Excel, XML, or text file. Therefore, the 
SEC preliminarily believes that all SEC-registered dealers covered by 
the metrics reporting and recordkeeping requirements have experience 
applying the XML format to their data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \384\ XML is an open standard, meaning that it is a 
technological standard that is widely available to the public at no 
cost. XML is also widely used across the industry.
    \385\ For example, FINRA members commonly use FINRA's Web EFT 
system, which requires that all data be submitted in XML. See Web 
EFT Schema Documentation and Schema Files, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/web-crd/web-eft-schema-documentation-and-schema-files; see also Disclosure of Order Handling Information, 
Exchange Act Release No. 78309 (July 13, 2016), 81 FR 49431, 49499 
(July 27, 2016). Information about FINRA's eFOCUS system is 
available at http://www.finra.org/industry/focus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Reporting metrics and other information in XML allows data to be

[[Page 33543]]

tagged, which in turn identifies the content of the underlying 
information. The data then becomes instantly machine-readable through 
the use of standard software. Requiring banking entities to submit the 
metrics in accordance with the XML Schema would enhance the ability to 
process and analyze the data. Once the data is in a structured format, 
it can easily be organized for viewing, manipulation, and analysis 
through the use of commonly used software tools and applications. 
Structured data allows users to discern patterns from large quantities 
of information much more easily than unstructured data. Structured data 
also facilitates users' abilities to dynamically search, aggregate, and 
compare information across submissions, whether within a banking 
entity, across multiple banking entities, or across multiple date 
ranges. The data supplied in a structured format could help the SEC 
identify outliers or trends that could warrant further investigation.
    The XML Schema would also incorporate certain validations to help 
ensure consistent formatting among all reports--in other words, it 
would help ensure data quality. The validations are restrictions placed 
on the formatting for each data element so that data is presented 
comparably. Requiring banking entities to report using the XML Schema 
may help ensure timely access to the data in a format that is already 
consistent and comparable for automated machine-processing and 
analysis. However, these validations are not designed to ensure the 
underlying accuracy of the data. Any reports provided by banking 
entities under the proposed requirement would have to comply with these 
validations that are incorporated within the XML Schema; otherwise the 
reports would not be considered to have been provided using the XML 
Schema specified and published on the SEC's website.
    Specifying the format in which banking entities must report 
information may help the Agencies ensure that we receive consistently 
comparable information in an efficient manner across banking entities. 
The costs associated with providing XML data lie in the specialized 
software or services required to make the submission and the time 
required to map the required data elements to the requisite taxonomy. 
In addition to enhanced viewing, manipulation, and analysis, the 
benefits associated with providing XML data lie in the enhanced 
validation tools that minimize the likelihood that data are reported 
with errors. Therefore, subsequent reporting periods may require fewer 
resources, relative to both initial reporting periods and the current 
reporting process.
    We expect that the requirement to submit the Narrative Statement 
electronically will result in minimal information systems costs, as 
banking entities already have systems in place to submit information to 
the SEC electronically. However, the SEC recognizes that, as a result 
of the proposed amendments, banking entities will be required to 
establish and implement systems in accordance with the XML Schema that 
will result in one-time costs \386\ of approximately $75,000 per 
holding company banking entity, on average, for an expected aggregate 
one-time cost of approximately $229,500.\387\ Because we expect that 
XML reporting will result in a more efficient submission process, 
including validation of submissions, we anticipate that some of the 
implementation costs may be partially offset, over time, by these 
greater efficiencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \386\ These cost estimates are based in part on the SEC's recent 
estimates of the one-time systems costs associated with the proposed 
requirement that security-based swap data repositories (``SDRs'') 
make transaction-level security-based swap data available to the SEC 
in Financial products Markup Language (``FpML'') and Financial 
Information eXchange Markup Language (``FIXML''). See Establishing 
the Form and Manner with which Security-Based Swap Data Repositories 
Must Make Security-Based Swap Data Available to the Commission, 
Exchange Act Release No. 76624 (Dec. 11, 2015), 80 FR 79757 (Dec. 
23, 2015) (``SBS Taxonomy rule proposing release''). The SBS 
Taxonomy rule proposing release estimates a one-time cost per SDR of 
$127,000. Although the substance of reporting associated with the 
metrics is different from the information collected and made 
available by SDRs, the SEC expects similar costs to apply to the 
implementation of XML for the reporting metrics. In particular, on 
the basis of its experience with similar structured data reporting 
requirements in other contexts (e.g., the SBS Taxonomy rule), the 
SEC expects that systems engineering fixed costs will represent the 
bulk of the costs related to the XML requirement. Among other 
things, the proposed SBS Taxonomy rule would require SDRs to make 
available to the SEC in a specific format (in this case, FpML or 
FIXML) transaction-level data that they are already required to 
provide. Similarly, the proposed metrics amendments would require 
banking entities to produce in XML metrics reports that they are 
already required (or will be required) to provide. However, our 
estimate is reduced to account for the fact that registered broker-
dealers already provide eFOCUS reports to FINRA in XML and, 
therefore, must have the requisite systems in place. Our cost 
estimates include responsibilities for modifications of information 
technology systems to an attorney, a compliance Manager, a 
programmer analyst, and a senior business analyst and 
responsibilities for policies and procedures to an attorney, a 
compliance Manager, a senior systems analyst, and an operations 
specialist.
    \387\ The SEC computes total costs as follows: $75,000 x 17 
reporters x 0.18 entity weight = $229,500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Extended Time To Report

    The proposed changes also extend the time to report metrics for 
different groups of filers. Because processes enabling reporting under 
tight deadlines may generally be costlier, we anticipate that the 
amended reporting requirements may marginally reduce compliance costs, 
particularly for filers with less sophisticated data and trading 
infrastructure. In addition, the amendments may result in fewer 
resubmissions by filers. To a limited extent, the proposed amendment 
may reduce the timeliness of data received from dealers, making 
supervision less agile. However, the SEC will continue to have access 
to quantitative metrics and related information through the standard 
examination and review process and existing recordkeeping requirements.
iii. Competition, Efficiency, and Capital Formation
    Under the proposed amendments, Group A entities would incur lower 
costs of compliance with metrics-reporting requirements. To the extent 
that these compliance burdens may be significant for some Group A 
entities, and since Group B entities are not subject to any metrics 
requirements, smaller Group A entities around the threshold may become 
more competitive with Group B entities. Since metrics are reported only 
to the Agencies and are not publicly disseminated, this amendment does 
not change the scope of information available to investors. As such, we 
do not anticipate effects on informational efficiency to be 
significant. To the extent that some Group A entities are currently 
experiencing significant metrics-reporting costs and partially or fully 
passing them along to customers in the form of reduced access to 
capital or higher cost of capital, the proposed amendments may reduce 
costs of and increase access to capital. However, as estimated cost 
savings from the proposed amendments are small, we do not anticipate a 
substantial increase in access to capital as a result of the proposed 
amendments to metrics reporting requirements.
iv. Alternatives
    The Agencies could have taken alternative approaches. First, the 
Agencies could keep the metrics being reported unchanged but increase 
or decrease the trading activity thresholds used to determine metrics 
recordkeeping and reporting by filers and the frequency of such 
reporting. For instance, the $10 billion trading activity threshold for 
quarterly reporting could be replaced by the $25 billion threshold. As 
shown in Table 2, we estimate that this alternative would affect 12 
bank-

[[Page 33544]]

affiliated SEC-registered broker-dealers. Under the alternative, these 
dealers would no longer be required to keep or report metrics, enjoying 
lower compliance burdens. However, the alternative reduces the amount 
and frequency of quantitative data available for regulatory oversight 
of banking entities. Similarly, lowering the recordkeeping and 
reporting thresholds would increase the scope of application of the 
metrics reporting requirement, increasing accompanying recordkeeping 
and reporting obligations as well as potential oversight and 
supervision benefits. However, we continue to recognize that while 
metrics being reported under the 2013 final rule do not allow a clear 
delineation of proprietary trading and market-making or hedging 
activities, they may be used to flag risks and enhance general 
supervision, as well as demonstrate prudent risk management.
    In addition, the Agencies could have proposed eliminating the VaR 
requirement. Both VaR and Stressed VaR are based on firm-wide activity, 
and VaR limits may not be routinely used by banking entities to manage 
and control risk-taking activities at the desk level. The alternative 
would remove from Appendix A the requirement for VaR limits because 
such limits may not be meaningful at the trading desk level. This 
alternative may reduce the burden of reporting and compliance costs 
without necessarily reducing the effectiveness of regulatory oversight 
by the SEC.
    The Agencies have also considered eliminating all quantitative 
metrics recordkeeping and reporting requirements under Appendix A of 
the 2013 final rule. This alternative would reduce the amount of data 
produced and transmitted to the Agencies. Appendix A metrics enable 
regulators to have a more complete picture of risk-taking and profit 
and loss attribution for supervised entities. However, the metric 
reporting regime is costly, and banking entities currently subject to 
the 2013 final rule and SEC oversight are also subject to other 
compliance and reporting requirements unrelated to the 2013 final rule, 
as well as the standard examination and review process. It is not clear 
that the Appendix A metrics are superior to internal quantitative risk 
measurements or other data (such as metrics in the FOCUS reports) 
reported by SEC registered broker-dealers in describing risk exposures 
and profitability of various activities by SEC registrants. Crucially, 
Appendix A metrics, such as VaR, dealer inventory, transaction volume, 
and profit and loss attribution, do not delineate a prohibited 
proprietary trade and a permitted market making, underwriting or 
hedging trade, particularly when executed in highly illiquid products 
and times of stress. Moreover, reporters' flexibility in defining the 
metrics may reduce their comparability. We recognize that while 
Appendix A metrics do not allow a clear identification of proprietary 
trading by SEC registrants, they may be used to flag risks and enhance 
general supervision, as well as demonstrate prudent risk management.
g. Covered Funds
    Section 13 of the BHC Act generally prohibits banking entities from 
acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having 
certain relationships with covered funds, subject to certain 
exemptions.\388\ The SEC's economic analysis concerns the potential 
costs, benefits, and effects on efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation of the proposed covered fund amendments for four groups of 
market participants. First, the proposed amendments may impact SEC-
registered investment advisers that are banking entities, including 
those that sponsor or advise covered funds and those that do not, as 
well as SEC-registered investment advisers that are not banking 
entities that sponsor or advise covered funds and compete with banking 
entity RIAs. Second, the proposed amendments affect the ability of 
bank-affiliated dealers to underwrite, make markets, or engage in risk-
mitigating hedging transactions involving covered funds. Third, the 
proposed amendments impact private funds, including those funds scoped 
in or out of the covered fund provisions of the 2013 final rule, as 
well as private funds competing with such funds. Fourth, to the extent 
that the proposed amendments impact efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation in covered funds or underlying securities, investors 
in and sponsors of covered funds and underlying securities may be 
affected as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \388\ See 12 U.S.C. 1851.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in greater detail below, the primary economic tradeoff 
posed by the proposed amendments to the covered fund provisions and 
other potential changes to these provisions on which the Agencies seek 
comment is the tradeoff between enhanced competition and capital 
formation in covered funds and the potential moral hazard and related 
financial risks posed by fund investments. To the extent that the 
current covered fund provisions limit fund formation, the proposed 
amendments and other amendments on which the Agencies seek comment 
could reduce long-term compliance costs and increase revenues for 
banking entities, and, as a result, increase capital formation. We are 
currently not aware of any information or data about the extent to 
which the covered fund provisions of the 2013 final rule are inhibiting 
capital formation in funds. Therefore, the bulk of the analysis below 
is necessarily qualitative.
i. Definition of ``Covered Fund''
Regulatory Baseline
    The definition of ``covered fund'' impacts the scope of the 
substantive prohibitions on banking entities' acquiring or retaining an 
ownership interest in, sponsoring, and having certain relationships 
with covered funds. The covered fund provisions of the 2013 final rule 
may reduce the ability and incentives of banking entities to bail out 
affiliated funds to mitigate reputational risk; limit conflicts of 
interest with clients, customers, and counterparties; and reduce the 
ability of banking entities to engage in proprietary trading indirectly 
through funds. The 2013 final rule defines covered funds as issuers 
that would be investment companies but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) 
of the Investment Company Act and then excludes specific types of 
entities from the definition. The definition also includes certain 
commodity pools as well as certain foreign funds, but only with respect 
to a U.S. banking entity that sponsors or invests in the foreign fund. 
Funds that rely on the exclusions in sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act are covered funds unless an exemption from the 
covered fund definition is available; generally, funds that rely on 
other exclusions in the Investment Company Act, such as real estate and 
mortgage funds that rely on the exclusion in section 3(c)(5)(C), are 
not covered funds under the 2013 final rule.
    The broad definition of covered funds above encompasses many 
different types of vehicles, and the 2013 final rule excludes some of 
them from the definition of a covered fund.\389\ The excluded fund 
types relevant to the baseline are funds regulated under the Investment 
Company Act, that is, RICs and BDCs. Seeding vehicles for these funds 
are also excluded from the covered fund definition during their seeding 
period.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \389\ The exclusions from the covered fund definition are set 
forth in Sec.  __.10(c) of the 2013 final rule.
    \390\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.10(c)(12).

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[[Page 33545]]

Scope of the Covered Fund Definition: Costs and Benefits
    The Agencies are requesting comment on potential modifications to 
the covered fund definition. For instance, with respect to the foreign 
public funds exclusion, the Agencies are requesting comment as to 
whether to remove the condition that, for a foreign public fund 
sponsored by a U.S. banking entity, the fund's ownership interests are 
sold predominantly to persons other than the sponsoring banking entity, 
affiliates of the issuer and the sponsoring banking entity, and 
employees and directors of such entities. As another example, the 
Agencies are requesting comment as to whether to revise the exclusion 
to focus on the qualification of the fund in foreign jurisdictions and 
markets as eligible for retail sales, without including requirements 
related to the manner in which the fund's interests are sold, or to 
tailor the exclusion's use of the defined term ``distribution'' to 
address instances in which a fund's ownership interests generally are 
sold to retail investors in secondary market transactions, as with 
foreign exchange-traded funds. The Agencies are also requesting comment 
on excluding other funds, such as family wealth vehicles, from the 
scope of the covered fund definition. The Agencies are requesting 
comment on modifying the loan securitization exclusion to permit 
limited holdings of debt securities and synthetic instruments in 
addition to loans. As a final example, the Agencies are requesting 
comment on revising the covered fund definition to provide an exclusion 
focused on the characteristics of an entity rather than only whether it 
would be an investment company but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of 
the Investment Company Act or would otherwise come within the covered 
fund base definition.
    Broadly, such modifications to the existing covered fund definition 
and additional exclusions would reduce the number and types of funds 
that are impacted by the 2013 final rule. Hence, these alternatives may 
decrease both the economic benefits and the economic costs of the 2013 
final rule's covered fund provisions, as discussed further below.
    Form ADV data is not always sufficiently granular to allow us to 
estimate the number of funds and fund advisers affected by the 
different modifications to the covered fund definition on which the 
Agencies are seeking comment. However, Table 3 and Table 4 in the 
economic baseline quantify the number and asset size of private funds 
advised by banking entity RIAs by the type of private fund they advise, 
as those fund types are defined in Form ADV. These fund types include 
hedge funds, private equity funds, real estate funds, securitized asset 
funds, venture capital funds, liquidity, and other private funds.
    The Agencies are requesting comment on whether to tailor the 
covered funds definition by using a characteristics-based exclusion. 
For instance, the Agencies are requesting comment on whether the 
covered fund definition should exclude funds that are not hedge funds 
or private equity funds, as defined in Form PF. This would exclude 
other types of funds from the covered fund definition (such as venture 
capital, real estate, securitized asset, liquidity, and all other 
private funds, as those terms are defined in Form PF).
    Using Form ADV data, we preliminarily estimate that approximately 
173 banking entity RIAs advise hedge funds and 90 banking entity RIAs 
advise private equity funds.\391\ As can be seen from Table 3 in the 
economic baseline, 43 banking entity RIAs advise securitized asset 
funds. Table 4 shows that banking entity RIAs advise 360 securitized 
asset funds with $120 billion in gross assets. Another 56 banking 
entity RIAs advise real estate funds, and banking entity RIAs advise 
323 real estate funds with $84 billion in gross assets. Venture capital 
funds are advised by only 16 banking entity RIAs, and all 42 venture 
capital funds advised by RIAs have on aggregate approximately $2 
billion in gross assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \391\ As noted in the economic baseline, a single RIA may advise 
multiple types of funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, the covered 
fund provisions of the 2013 final rule may limit the ability of banking 
entities to engage in trading through covered funds in circumvention of 
the proprietary trading prohibition, reduce bank incentives to bailout 
their covered funds, and mitigate conflicts of interest between banking 
entities and its clients, customers, or counterparties. However, the 
covered fund definition in the implementing rules is broad, and some 
have argued that the rules currently in place may limit the ability of 
banking entities to conduct traditional asset management activities and 
to promote capital formation. The Agencies recognize that the covered 
fund provisions of the implementing rules, as currently in effect, may 
impose significant costs on some entities. The Agencies also understand 
that the breadth of the covered fund definition requires market 
participants to review hundreds of thousands of issuers, and 
potentially more, to determine if the issuers are covered funds as 
defined in the 2013 final rule. We understand that this has included a 
review of hundreds of thousands of CUSIPs issued by common types of 
securitizations for covered fund status.\392\ The need to perform an 
in-depth analysis and make covered funds determinations across such a 
large scope of entities involves costs and may adversely affect the 
willingness of banking entities to own, sponsor, and have relationships 
with covered funds and financial instruments that may be covered funds. 
Moreover, the 2013 final rule's limitations on banking entities' 
investment in covered funds may be more significant for covered funds 
that are typically small in size, with potentially more negative 
spillover effects on capital formation in underlying securities.\393\
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    \392\ See supra note 18.
    \393\ We understand that, for instance, the median venture 
capital fund size in some locations is approximately $15 million. 
One fund may have lost as much as $50 million dollars in investment 
because of the prohibitions of section 13 of the BHC Act and 
implementing regulations. See supra note 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The potential modifications to the covered fund definition on which 
the Agencies are seeking comment would reduce further the scope of 
funds that need to be analyzed for covered fund status or would 
simplify this analysis and would enable banking entities to own, 
sponsor, and have relationships with certain groups of funds that are 
currently defined as a covered fund. Accordingly, these potential 
modifications may reduce costs of banking entity ownership, 
sponsorship, and transactions with certain private funds, may promote 
greater capital formation in, and competition among such funds, and may 
improve access to capital for issuers of underlying debt or equity. 
They may also benefit banking entity dealers through higher profits or 
more underwriting business. Reducing the covered fund restrictions by 
further tailoring the covered fund definition may encourage more 
launches of funds that are excluded from the definition, increasing 
capital formation and, possibly, competition in those types of funds. 
If competition increases the quality of funds available to investors or 
reduces the fees they are charged, investors in funds may benefit.
    We do not observe the amount of capital formation in different 
types of covered funds or underlying equity and debt securities that 
does not occur because of the 2013 final rule. Because of the prolonged 
and overlapping implementation timeline of various

[[Page 33546]]

post-crisis reforms and because market participants restructured their 
trading and covered funds activities in anticipation of the 
implementing rules being effective, we cannot measure the 
counterfactual levels of capital formation and liquidity that would 
have been observed after the financial crisis, absent the covered fund 
provisions currently in place. Similarly, we cannot establish whether 
competition in covered funds is adversely affected by the covered fund 
definition currently in effect. We solicit any information, 
particularly quantitative data, that would allow us to estimate the 
magnitudes of the potential costs and benefits of the covered fund 
provisions on banking entity-affiliated broker-dealers and investment 
advisers advising the different types of funds discussed above and any 
effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation in different 
types of funds and their underlying securities.
ii. Covered Funds: Underwriting, Market Making, and Risk-Mitigating 
Hedging Regulatory Baseline
    Under the baseline, as described above, the 2013 final rule 
provides for market-making and hedging exemptions to the prohibition on 
proprietary trading. However, the 2013 final rule places tighter 
restrictions on the amount of underwriting, market making, and hedging 
a banking entity can engage in when those transactions involve covered 
funds. For underwriting and market-making transactions in covered 
funds, if the banking entity sponsors or advises a covered fund, or 
acts in any of the other capacities specified in Sec.  __.11(c)(2) of 
the 2013 final rule, then any ownership interests acquired or retained 
by the banking entity and its affiliates in connection with 
underwriting and market making-related activities for that particular 
covered fund must be included in the per-fund and aggregate covered 
fund investment limits in Sec.  __.12 of the 2013 final rule and 
subject to the capital deduction provided in Sec.  __.12(d) of the 2013 
final rule.\394\ Additionally, a banking entity's aggregate investment 
in all covered funds is limited to 3 percent of a banking entity's tier 
1 capital, and all banking entities must include ownership interests 
acquired or retained in connection with underwriting and market making-
related activities for purposes of this calculation.\395\ Moreover, 
hedging transactions in a covered fund are only permitted if the 
transaction mitigates risks associated with the compensation of a 
banking entity employee or an affiliate that provides advisory or other 
services to the covered fund.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \394\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.12(a)(2)(ii); see also Sec.  
__.11(c)(2).
    \395\ 2013 final rule Sec.  __.12(a)(2)(iii); see also Sec.  
__.11(c)(3).
    \396\ 2013 final rule Sec.  __.13(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs and Benefits
    The increased requirements imposed on SEC-registered dealers' 
transactions in covered funds relative to other securities mean that a 
dealer may not be able to make markets in a covered fund or may be 
limited in its ability to do so, even if the dealer may be able to make 
markets in the underlying securities owned by the covered fund or 
securities that are otherwise similar to the covered fund. The 
Agencies' proposed changes would provide banking entities greater 
flexibility in underwriting and market making in covered fund 
interests. Specifically, as discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary 
Information, for a covered fund that the banking entity does not 
organize or offer pursuant to Sec.  __.11(a) or (b) of the 2013 final 
rule, the proposal would remove the requirement that the banking entity 
include, for purposes of the aggregate fund limits and capital 
deduction, the value of any ownership interests of the covered fund 
acquired or retained in connection with underwriting or market making-
related activities. Under the proposed amendments, these limits, as 
well as the per fund limit, would only apply to a covered fund that the 
banking entity organizes or offers and in which the banking entity 
retains an ownership interest pursuant to Sec.  __.11(a) or (b) of the 
2013 final rule.
    The proposed amendment aligns the requirements for underwriting and 
market making with respect to ownership interests in covered funds that 
the banking entity does not organize or offer, with requirements for 
engaging in these activities with respect to other financial 
instruments. We understand that the 2013 final rule's restrictions on 
underwriting and making-related activities involving covered funds 
impose costs on banking entities and may constrain their underwriting 
and market making in covered funds. Under the proposed amendments, 
banking entities would be able to engage in potentially profitable 
market making and underwriting in covered funds they do not organize or 
offer without the per-fund and aggregate limits and capital deductions. 
SEC-registered banking entities are expected to benefit from this 
amendment to the extent they profit from underwriting and market-making 
activities in such covered funds. In addition, these benefits may, at 
least partially, flow through to funds and fund investors. 
Specifically, banking entities may become more willing and able to 
underwrite and make markets in covered funds, and provide investors 
with more readily available economic exposure to the returns and risks 
of certain covered funds.
    We recognize that ownership interests in covered funds expose 
owners to the risks related to covered funds. It is possible that 
covered fund ownership interests acquired or retained by a banking 
entity acting as an underwriter or engaged in market making-related 
activities may lead to losses for banking entities. However, we 
recognize that the risks of market making or underwriting of covered 
funds are substantively similar to the risks of market making or 
underwriting of otherwise comparable securities. Therefore, the same 
general tradeoffs discussed in section V.D.3.c of this Supplementary 
Information between potential benefits for capital formation and 
liquidity and potential costs related to moral hazard and market 
fragility apply to banking entities' underwriting and market-making 
activities involving covered funds and other types of securities.
    Banking entities are also currently unable to retain ownership 
interests in covered funds as part of routine risk-mitigating hedging. 
These restrictions may currently be limiting banking entities' ability 
to hedge the risks of fund-linked derivatives through shares of covered 
funds referenced by fund-linked products. The Agencies recognized that, 
as a result of this approach, banking entities may no longer be able to 
participate in offering certain customer facilitating products relating 
to covered funds. The Agencies recognized that increased use of 
ownership interests in covered funds could result in exposure to 
greater risk.\397\ Moreover, banking entities' transactions in fund-
linked products that reference covered funds with customers can expose 
a banking entity to risk in cases where a customer fails to perform, 
transforming the banking entity's covered fund hedge of the customer 
trade into an unhedged, and potentially illiquid, position in the 
covered fund (unless and until the banking entity takes action to hedge 
this exposure and bears the corresponding costs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \397\ 79 FR at 5737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal expands the scope of permissible risk-mitigating 
hedging with covered funds. Specifically, under the proposal, in 
addition to being able to

[[Page 33547]]

acquire or retain an ownership interest in a covered fund as a risk-
mitigating hedge with respect to certain compensation agreements as 
permitted under the 2013 final rule, the banking entity would also be 
able to acquire or retain an ownership interest in a covered fund when 
acting as an intermediary on behalf of a non-banking entity customer to 
facilitate exposure by the customer to the profits and losses of the 
covered fund.
    The proposal is likely to benefit banking entities and their 
customers, as well as advisers of covered funds. The proposed 
amendments increase the ability of banking entities to facilitate 
customer-facing transactions while hedging their own risk exposure. As 
a result, this amendment may increase banking entity intermediation and 
provide customers with easier access to the risks and returns of 
covered funds. To the degree that banking entities' investments in 
covered funds to hedge customer-facing transactions may facilitate 
their engagement in customer-facing trades, customers of banking 
entities may benefit from greater availability of financial instruments 
providing exposure to covered funds and related intermediation. Access 
to covered funds may be particularly valuable when private capital 
plays an increasingly important role in U.S. capital markets and firm 
financing.
    We also recognize that the proposed amendments may increase risks 
to banking entities. For instance, when a banking entity enters into a 
transaction with a customer that provides exposure to the profits and 
losses of a covered fund to a customer, even when such exposure is 
hedged, the banking entity may suffer losses if a customer fails to 
perform and fund investments are illiquid and decline in value. 
However, such counterparty default risk is present in any principal 
transaction in illiquid financial instruments, including when 
facilitating customer trades in the securities in which covered funds 
invest, as well as in market-making and underwriting activities. We 
note that, under the proposal, risk-mitigating hedging transactions 
involving covered funds would be conducted consistent with the 
requirements of the 2013 final rule, as modified by the proposal, 
including the requirements with respect to risk-mitigating hedging 
transactions. For example, such exposures would be subject to required 
risk limits and policies and procedures and would have to be 
appropriately monitored and risk managed. Therefore, it is not clear 
that hedging or customer facilitation in covered funds would pose a 
greater risk to banking entities than hedging or customer facilitation 
in similar securities that is permissible under the 2013 final rule.
Alternatives
    An alternative would be to provide greater flexibility for 
underwriting, market making, and risk-mitigating hedging transactions 
involving covered fund interests. Specifically, the Agencies could 
consider eliminating the per-fund limit, aggregate fund limit, and 
capital deduction for a banking entity acting as an underwriter or 
engaged in market making-related activities with respect to a covered 
fund that the banking entity organizes and offers. The Agencies also 
could have proposed amending the 2013 final rule to provide that, in 
addition to the proposed amendment, banking entities should be 
permitted to acquire or retain ownership interests in covered funds as 
risk-mitigating hedging transactions where the acquisition or retention 
meets the requirements of Sec.  __.5 of the 2013 final rule, as 
modified by the proposal. If the Agencies made all of these changes, 
this would provide dealers the same level of flexibility in 
underwriting, making markets in, or hedging with, covered funds as 
applied to these activities with respect to all other types of 
financial instruments, including the underlying financial instruments 
owned by the same covered funds.
    Compliance with current rules for covered funds imposes costs on 
banking entities. To the extent that, under the baseline, such costs 
prevent dealer subsidiaries of banking entities from making markets in 
or underwriting certain financial instruments, the alternative would 
enable them to engage in potentially profitable market making in, 
underwriting, and hedging with, covered funds. Banking entity dealers 
could benefit from this alternative, to the extent they profit from 
underwriting and market-making activities in covered funds and to the 
extent that investing in covered funds to hedge a banking entity's 
exposure in transactions such as total return swaps reduce their risk 
profile.
    The benefits of this alternative may also flow through to funds, 
investors, and customers. Under the alternative, banking entities would 
enjoy greater flexibility in transacting in covered funds with 
customers and in hedging banking entities' exposure with covered funds. 
As a result, banking entities may become more willing and able to 
underwrite and market products linked to covered funds and to provide 
customers with an economic interest in the profits and losses of 
covered funds. This may increase investor access to the returns and 
risks of private funds, which may be particularly valuable when issuers 
are increasingly relying on private capital and delaying public 
offerings. Finally, the increased ability of banking entities to 
transact in covered funds under the alternative may increase market 
quality for covered funds that are traded.
    We continue to recognize that transactions in covered funds--
including transactions with customers, and holdings of ownership 
interests in covered funds related to underwriting, market making, or 
hedging activities--necessarily involve the risk of losses. However, 
the risks of market making, underwriting, or hedging by banking 
entities of financial instruments underlying the covered fund, or 
financial instruments or securities that are otherwise similar to 
covered funds, are substantively similar. Therefore, the same tradeoffs 
discussed in section V.D.3.c in this Supplementary Information between 
potential benefits to capital formation and liquidity and potential 
costs related to moral hazard and market fragility apply to both 
banking entity interests from underwriting and market making in 
financial instruments and underwriting and market making in covered 
funds. It is not clear that the existence of a legal and management 
structure of a covered fund per se changes the economic risk exposure 
of banking entities, and, thus, the capital formation and other 
tradeoffs discussed above. We note that the alternative would simply 
involve a consistent treatment of financial instruments and funds as it 
pertains to underwriting, market making, and hedging activities. 
However, as discussed above in section V.D.1 of this Supplementary 
Information, some of the effects of the 2013 final rule's provisions 
are difficult to evaluate outside of economic downturns, and we are 
unable to measure the amount of capital formation or liquidity in 
covered funds or underlying products that does not occur because of the 
existing treatment of underwriting, market making, and hedging using 
covered funds.
iii. Restrictions on Relationships Between Banking Entities and Covered 
Funds Regulatory Baseline
    Under the baseline, banking entities are limited in the types of 
transactions they are able to engage in with covered funds with which 
they have certain relationships. Banking entities that serve in certain 
capacities with respect to a covered fund, such as the fund's 
investment manager, adviser, or sponsor, are prohibited from engaging 
in

[[Page 33548]]

a ``covered transaction,'' as defined in section 23A of the FR Act, 
with the covered fund.\398\ This prohibits transactions such as loans, 
guarantees, securities lending, and derivatives transactions that cause 
the banking entity to have credit exposure to the affiliate. However, 
the 2013 final rule exempts from the prohibition any prime brokerage 
transaction with a covered fund in which a covered fund managed, 
sponsored, or advised by a banking entity has taken an ownership 
interest (a ``second-tier fund''). Therefore, banking entities with a 
relationship to a covered fund can engage in prime brokerage 
transactions (that are covered transactions) only with second-tier 
funds and not with all covered funds.\399\
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    \398\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.14(a).
    \399\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.14(c).
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Costs and Benefits
    The Agencies request comments on whether the Agencies should amend 
Sec.  __.14 of the 2013 final rule to incorporate the exemptions under 
section 23A of the FR Act and the Board's Regulation W, such as 
intraday extensions of credit that facilitate settlement.\400\ As a 
result of the restrictions on covered transactions in the 2013 final 
rule, some banking entities may be outsourcing the provision of routine 
services to sponsored funds, such as custody and clearing services, to 
outside providers. We recognize that outsourcing such activities may 
adversely affect customer relationships, increase costs, and decrease 
operational efficiency for banking entities and covered funds. The 
changes on which the Agencies seek comment would provide banking 
entities greater flexibility to provide these and other services 
directly to covered funds. If being able to provide custody, clearing, 
and other services to sponsored funds reduces the costs of these 
services, fund advisers and, indirectly, fund investors, may benefit 
from incorporating the exemptions. We note that most direct benefits 
are likely to accrue to banking entity advisers to covered funds that 
are currently relying on third-party service providers as a result of 
the requirements of the 2013 final rule.
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    \400\ The Agencies also are requesting comment as to whether the 
definition of ``prime brokerage transaction'' under the proposal is 
appropriate and, if not, what definition would be appropriate and 
which transactions should be included in the definition. The costs, 
benefits, and other implications of expansions to the definition of 
``prime brokerage transaction'' would generally be similar to those 
associated with the potential changes to Sec.  __.14 discussed in 
this section, except that they likely would be less significant 
because the statute permits prime brokerage transactions only with 
second-tier funds and does not extend to covered funds more 
generally.
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    These changes would increase banking entities' ability to engage in 
custody, clearing, and other transactions with their covered funds and 
benefit banking entities that are currently unable to engage in 
otherwise profitable or efficient activities with covered funds they 
own or advise. Moreover, this could enhance operational efficiency and 
reduce costs incurred by covered funds, which are currently unable to 
rely on their affiliated banking entity for custody, clearing, and 
other transactions. Conversely, to the extent that this approach 
increases transactions between a banking entity and related covered 
funds, banking entities could incur any risks associated with these 
transactions, recognizing that the transactions would be subject to the 
limitations in section 23A of the FR Act and the Board's Regulation W, 
as well as Sec.  __.14(b) of the 2013 final rule and other applicable 
laws.
iv. Covered Fund Activities and Investments Outside of the United 
States Regulatory Baseline
    Under the 2013 final rule, foreign banking entities can acquire or 
retain an ownership interest in, or act as sponsor to, a covered fund, 
so long as those activities and investments occur solely outside the 
United States, no ownership interest in such fund is offered for sale 
or sold to a resident of the United States (the ``marketing 
restriction''), and certain other conditions are met. An activity or 
investment occurs solely outside of the United States if (1) the 
banking entity is not itself, and is not controlled directly or 
indirectly by, a banking entity that is located in the United States or 
established under the laws of the United States or of any state; (2) 
the banking entity (and relevant personnel) that makes the decision to 
acquire or retain the ownership interest or act as sponsor to the 
covered fund is not located in the United States or organized under the 
laws of the United States or of any state; (3) the investment or 
sponsorship, including any risk-mitigating hedging transaction related 
to an ownership interest, is not accounted for as principal by any U.S. 
branch or affiliate; and (4) no financing is provided, directly or 
indirectly, by any U.S. branch or affiliate. In addition, the staffs of 
the Agencies issued FAQs concerning the requirement that no ownership 
interest in such fund is offered for sale or sold to a resident of the 
United States.
Costs and Benefits
    The proposed amendments remove the financing prong of the foreign 
funds exemption and codify the FAQs regarding marketing of foreign 
funds to U.S. residents.\401\ Thus, under the proposed amendments, 
foreign banking entities would be able to acquire or retain ownership 
interests in and sponsor covered funds with financing provided directly 
or indirectly by U.S. branches and affiliates, including SEC-registered 
dealers. The costs, benefits, and effects on efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation of this amendment generally parallel those of the 
removal of the financing prong with respect to trading activity outside 
the United States in section V.D.3.e of this Supplementary Information.
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    \401\ We understand that market participants have adjusted their 
activity in reliance on the FAQs regarding the marketing 
restriction. Hence, we preliminarily believe that the economic 
effects of the proposed amendment to reflect the position expressed 
in the staffs' FAQs are likely to be de minimis and we focus this 
discussion on the proposed removal of the financing prong.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Foreign banking entities may benefit from the proposed amendments 
and enjoy greater flexibility in financing their covered fund activity. 
Allowing foreign banking entities to obtain financing of covered fund 
transactions from U.S.-dealer affiliates may reduce costs of foreign 
banking entity activity in covered funds. The amendment may decrease 
the need for foreign banking entities to rely on foreign dealer 
affiliates solely for the purposes of avoiding the compliance costs and 
prohibitions of the 2013 final rule. This may increase operational 
efficiency of covered fund activity by foreign banking entities. To the 
extent that costs of compliance with the foreign fund exemption may 
currently represent barriers to entry for foreign banking entities' 
covered fund activities, the proposed amendment may increase foreign 
banking entities' sponsorship and financing of covered funds.
    The economic exposure and risks of foreign banking entities' 
covered funds activities may be incurred not just by the foreign 
banking entities, but by U.S. entities financing the covered fund 
ownership interests, e.g., through margin loans covering particular 
transactions. However, the proposal retains the requirement that the 
investment or sponsorship, including any related hedging, is not 
accounted for as principal by any U.S. branch or affiliate. We continue 
to note that moral hazard risks and concerns about the volume of U.S. 
banking entity risk-taking are less relevant when the covered fund 
activity is conducted by,

[[Page 33549]]

and the risk consolidates to, foreign banking entities.
    Competitive effects of this amendment may differ from the proposed 
amendment regarding trading activity outside of the United States. 
Under the proposed amendment to the foreign fund exemption, foreign 
banking entities will enjoy a greater degree of flexibility and 
potentially lower costs of financing covered fund transactions outside 
of the United States. Because the 2013 final rule's exemption for 
covered funds activities solely outside of the United States is 
available only to foreign banking entities, the proposed amendments may 
reduce costs for some foreign banking entities but need not affect the 
competitive standing of U.S. banking entities relative to foreign 
banking entities with respect to covered funds activities in the United 
States.
h. Definition of Banking Entity
    As discussed elsewhere in this Supplementary Information, staffs of 
the Agencies have responded to questions raised regarding the potential 
treatment of RICs as banking entities as a result of a sponsor's seed 
investment, as well as issues related to FPFs and foreign excluded 
funds. The Agencies are continuing to consider the issues raised by the 
interaction between the 2013 final rule's definitions of the terms 
``banking entity'' and ``covered fund,'' including the issues addressed 
by the Agencies' staffs and the Federal banking agencies discussed 
above. Accordingly, the Agencies have made clear that nothing in the 
proposal would modify the application of the staffs' FAQs discussed 
above, and the Agencies will not treat RICs or FPFs that meet the 
conditions included in the applicable staff FAQs as banking entities or 
attribute their activities and investments to the banking entity that 
sponsors the fund or otherwise may control the fund under the 
circumstances set forth in the FAQs. In addition, to accommodate the 
pendency of the proposal, for an additional period of one year until 
July 21, 2019, the Agencies will not treat qualifying foreign excluded 
funds that meet the conditions included in the policy statement 
discussed above as banking entities or attribute their activities and 
investments to the banking entity that sponsors the fund or otherwise 
may control the fund under the circumstances set forth in the policy 
statement. This section focuses on the seeding of RICs, because they 
are registered with the SEC (and applies to BDCs as well, which are 
regulated by the SEC). To the extent that the same considerations 
generally apply to the seeding of FPFs, the analysis below may be 
relevant for the seeding of these funds as well.\402\
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    \402\ This section does not focus on foreign excluded funds. The 
information the SEC collects on Form ADV does not allow the SEC to 
estimate the number of SEC-registered investment advisers that 
advise foreign excluded funds. For example, Form ADV does not 
require advisers with a principal office and place of business 
outside the United States to provide information on Schedule D of 
Part 1A with respect to any private fund that, during the last 
fiscal year, was not a U.S. person, was not offered in the United 
States, and was not beneficially owned by any U.S. person. Because 
foreign excluded funds are organized and offered outside of the 
United States by foreign banking entities, however, many foreign 
excluded funds may be advised by foreign banks or other foreign 
affiliates or subsidiaries that are not SEC-registered investment 
advisers. Therefore, we preliminarily believe that the proposal and 
any further modifications to the 2013 final rule on which the 
Agencies seek comment would likely primarily impact foreign 
activities of foreign banking entities and funds outside of the 
SEC's regulatory oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAQ issued by the staffs related to seeding RICs and FPFs 
observed that the preamble to the 2013 final rule recognized that a 
banking entity may own a significant portion of the shares of a RIC or 
FPF during a brief period during which the banking entity is testing 
the fund's investment strategy, establishing a track record of the 
fund's performance for marketing purposes, and attempting to distribute 
the fund's shares. The FAQ recognizes that the length of a seeding 
period can vary and therefore provides an example of 3 years, the 
maximum period of time that could be permitted under certain conditions 
for seeding a covered fund under the 2013 final rule, without setting 
any maximum prescribed period for a RIC or FPF seeding period. The 
Agencies are seeking comment on whether this guidance has been 
effective, including questions as to whether the Agencies should 
specify a maximum period of time for a seeding period or, conversely, 
whether the current approach of not prescribing a fixed period of time 
for a seeding period is more effective in providing flexibility for 
funds that may need more time to develop a track record without having 
to specify a particular time period that will be appropriate for all 
funds.
    The SEC understands that RICs (and FPFs) commonly require some time 
to establish a performance track necessary to market the fund 
effectively to third-party investors. Some funds will need a 3-year 
performance track record, and sometimes longer, to be distributed 
through certain intermediaries or to attract sufficient investor 
interest. For example, the SEC understands that some funds might need a 
5-year track record to be distributed effectively.
    On the one hand, providing a fixed period of time beyond which a 
seeding period for a RIC cannot extend would provide banking entities 
with greater certainty, which may incentivize banking entities to form 
new funds. On the other hand, the current approach of not prescribing a 
fixed period of time for a seeding period for a RIC may provide 
flexibility for funds that need more time to develop a track record. 
This approach would recognize that banking entities may be able to 
quickly reduce a seed investment in some RICs but not in others. 
However, the lack of certainty about the length of permissible seeding 
period could disincentivize a banking entity from sponsoring a RIC.
    Another potential approach, on which the Agencies seek comment, 
would be to specify a fixed period of time for a seeding period while 
also permitting a banking entity to hold an investment beyond this 
fixed period if the banking entity complies with additional conditions, 
such as documentation of the business need for the sponsor's continued 
investment. This may provide benefits by providing more certainty to 
banking entities, while providing for the ability to exceed a fixed 
seeding period in appropriate circumstances.
    In addition, longer seeding periods for RICs and FPFs extend the 
period of time during which a banking entity may be subject to the 
risks associated with the seed investment. We note, however, that RICs 
are subject to all of the requirements under the Investment Company 
Act, and the exclusion for FPFs is designed to identify foreign funds 
that are sufficiently similar to RICs such that it is appropriate to 
exclude these foreign funds from the covered fund definition. 
Therefore, although section 13 and the 2013 final rule under certain 
conditions permit a seeding period of up to 3 years for covered funds 
(which are not subject to substantive SEC regulation and are the target 
of section 13's restrictions), longer seeding periods for RICs and FPFs 
may not raise the same concerns.
i. Compliance Program
i. Regulatory Baseline
    The 2013 final rule emphasized the importance of a strong 
compliance program and sought to tailor the compliance program to the 
size of banking entities and the size of their trading activity. The 
Agencies believed it was necessary to balance compliance burdens posed 
on smaller banking entities with specificity and rigor necessary for 
large and complex banking organizations facing high compliance risks. 
As a result, the current compliance regime is progressively

[[Page 33550]]

more stringent with the size of covered activities and/or balance sheet 
of banking entities.
    Under the 2013 final rule, all banking entities with covered 
activities must develop and maintain a compliance program that is 
reasonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with section 13 of 
the BHC Act and the implementing regulations. The terms, scope, and 
detail of the compliance program depend on the types, size, scope, and 
complexity of activities and business structure of the banking 
entity.\403\ Under the 2013 final rule, banking entities with total 
consolidated assets of less than $10 billion as reported on December 31 
of the 2 previous calendar years face a simplified compliance program: 
Such entities are able to incorporate compliance with the 2013 final 
rule into their regular compliance policies and procedures by 
reference, adjusting as appropriate given the entities' activities, 
size, scope, and complexity.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \403\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(a).
    \404\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(f). Note that if an entity 
does not have any covered activities, it is not required to 
establish a compliance program until it begins to engage in covered 
activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All other banking entities with covered activities are, at a 
minimum, required to implement a six-pillar compliance program. The six 
pillars include: (1) Written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to document, describe, monitor and limit proprietary trading 
and covered fund activities and investments for compliance; (2) a 
system of internal controls reasonably designed to monitor compliance; 
(3) a management framework that clearly delineates responsibility and 
accountability for compliance, including management review of trading 
limits, strategies, hedging activities, investments, and incentive 
compensation; (4) independent testing and audit of the effectiveness of 
the compliance program; (5) training for personnel to effectively 
implement and enforce the compliance program; and (6) recordkeeping 
sufficient to demonstrate compliance.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \405\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, under the 2013 final rule, banking entities with 
covered activities that do not qualify as those with modest activity 
(total consolidated assets in excess of $10 billion) and that either 
are subject to the reporting requirements of Appendix A or have more 
than $50 billion in gross consolidated total assets are required to 
comply with the enhanced minimum standards for compliance programs that 
are specified in Appendix B of the 2013 final rule.\406\ That is, 
Appendix B scopes in (1) all banking entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities; and (2) banking entities with covered activity 
that have more than $50 billion in gross consolidated total assets, 
regardless of whether or not these banking entities have significant 
trading assets and liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \406\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(c) and Appendix B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described in greater detail elsewhere in the Supplementary 
Information, Appendix B requires the compliance program to (1) be 
reasonably designed to supervise the permitted trading and covered fund 
activities and investments, identify and monitor the risks of those 
activities and potential areas of noncompliance, and prevent prohibited 
activities and investments; (2) establish and enforce appropriate 
limits on the covered activities and investments, including limits on 
the size, scope, complexity, and risks of the individual activities or 
investments consistent with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC 
Act and the 2013 final rule; (3) subject the compliance program to 
periodic independent review and testing and ensure the entity's 
internal audit, compliance, and internal control functions are 
effective and independent; (4) make senior management and others 
accountable for the effective implementation of the compliance program, 
and ensure that the chief executive officer and board of directors 
review the program; and (5) facilitate supervision and examination by 
the Agencies.
    Additionally, under the 2013 final rule, any banking entity that 
has more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets as reported in 
the previous 2 calendar years shall maintain additional records in 
relation to covered funds. In particular, a banking entity must 
document the exclusions or exemptions relied on by each fund sponsored 
by the banking entity (including all subsidiaries and affiliates) in 
determining that such fund is not a covered fund, including 
documentation that supports such determination; for each seeding 
vehicle that will become a registered investment company or SEC-
regulated business development company, a written plan documenting the 
banking entity's determination that the seeding vehicle will become a 
registered investment company or SEC-regulated business development 
company, the period of time during which the vehicle will operate as a 
seeding vehicle, and the banking entity's plan to market the vehicle to 
third-party investors and convert it into a registered investment 
company or SEC-regulated business development company within the time 
period specified.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \407\ See 2013 final rule Sec.  __.20(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies recognize that the scope and breadth of the compliance 
obligations impose significant costs on banking entities, which may be 
particularly impactful for smaller entities. For example, some 
commenters estimate that banking entities may have added as many as 
2,500 pages of policies, procedures, mandates, and controls per 
institution for the purposes of compliance with the 2013 final rule, 
which need to be monitored and updated on an ongoing basis.\408\ 
Moreover, some banking entities may spend, on average, more than 10,000 
hours on training each year.\409\ In terms of ongoing costs, some 
banking entities may have 15 regularly meeting committees and forums, 
with as many as 50 participants per institution dedicated to compliance 
with the 2013 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \408\ See supra note 18.
    \409\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current compliance regime and related burdens may reduce the 
profitability of covered activities by dealers and investment advisers 
affiliated with banking entities and may be passed along to customers 
or clients in the form of reduced provision of services or higher 
service costs. Moreover, the Agencies recognize that the extensive 
compliance program under the 2013 final rule may detract resources of 
banking entities and their compliance departments and supervisors from 
other routine compliance matters, risk management, and supervision. 
Finally, prescriptive compliance requirements may not optimally reflect 
the organizational structures, governance mechanisms, or risk 
management practices of complex, innovative, and global banking 
entities.
ii. Costs and Benefits
    The proposed amendments are expected to lower compliance burdens in 
two ways. First, the proposed amendments increase flexibility in 
complying with the 2013 final rule for banking entities without 
significant trading assets and liabilities, which may reduce compliance 
costs for these entities. Second, the proposed amendments streamline 
the compliance program for large banking entities. To the extent that 
current requirements are duplicative and maintaining both an enhanced 
compliance program and regular compliance systems is

[[Page 33551]]

inefficient, large entities may benefit from the proposed amendments. 
Specifically, the proposed amendments introduce four main changes to 
the compliance program requirements of the 2013 final rule.
    First, Group C entities would be subject to presumed compliance 
with proprietary trading and covered fund prohibitions. Specifically, 
the rebuttable presumption of compliance would apply to all holding 
companies with less than $1 billion in combined total of consolidated 
trading assets and trading liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States). We preliminarily estimate that 
approximately 42 broker-dealers would be able to avail themselves of 
the rebuttable presumption and would not have to apply the 2013 final 
rule's compliance program requirements. The presumed compliance 
standard proposed for Group C entities may benefit entities with very 
low levels of trading activity by providing additional compliance 
flexibility. While this may increase the risks of non-compliance, the 
proposed amendments do not waive the proprietary trading and covered 
fund prohibitions of the 2013 final rule for such entities.
    Second, the threshold for a simplified compliance program would be 
based on a banking entity's consolidated trading assets and liabilities 
instead of its total assets. The Agencies recognize that existing 
compliance program requirements may burden entities that engage in 
little covered trading activity but have larger total assets. The 
proposed amendment may reduce costs for banking entities that have more 
than $10 billion in total assets but do not have significant trading 
activity. Since the volume of consolidated trading assets and 
liabilities is likely less than the size of the firm's balance sheet, 
this amendment would scope in more holding companies--and consequently 
SEC-registered dealers and investment advisers affiliated with them--
into the simplified compliance program regime.
    Third, under the proposed amendments covered fund recordkeeping 
requirements apply to banking entities with significant trading assets 
and liabilities, rather than to banking entities with over $10 billion 
in total assets. As discussed above, the Agencies expect that the 
covered funds activities of banking entities without significant 
trading assets and liabilities may generally be smaller in scale and 
less complex than those of banking entities with significant trading 
assets and liabilities. Thus, the value of additional documentation 
requirements for banking entities without significant trading assets 
and liabilities may be lower. The proposal reflects these 
considerations and may reduce the costs associated with these covered 
funds recordkeeping requirements by reducing the number of banking 
entities subject to these requirements.\410\ We note that entities with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities would still be required to 
comply with all the covered fund provisions, and the proposal simply 
eliminates recordkeeping for the purposes of demonstrating compliance. 
While, in general, the removal of such recordkeeping requirements may 
reduce the effectiveness of regulatory oversight, we preliminarily 
believe that SEC oversight of registered dealers and investment 
advisers of covered funds may not be adversely affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \410\ We do not have the information necessary to quantify the 
current costs of compliance programs specific to banking entity 
RIAs. Thus, we do not allocate cost savings from monetized PRA 
burdens to banking entity RIAs from the proposed Appendix B 
amendments. To the degree that some banking entity RIAs may be 
complying using compliance resources and systems independent of the 
affiliated holding company or affiliates and subsidiaries, we may be 
underestimating the cost savings from the proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, with an exception for the CEO attestation, the requirements 
in Appendix B of the 2013 final rule would be removed. The Agencies 
understand that compliance with Appendix B required entities to develop 
and administer an enhanced compliance program that may not be tailored 
to the business model or risks of specific institutions. Further, some 
banking entities have established as many as 500 controls related to 
Appendix B obligations, some of which may be duplicating existing 
policies and procedures designed as part of prudential safety and 
soundness.\411\ The removal of Appendix B requirements will affect all 
Group A banking entities and Group B and Group C banking entities that 
have total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. We estimate that 
there are 100 broker-dealers that may experience reduced compliance 
costs as a result of this amendment. The removal of the Appendix B 
requirements may significantly reduce the number and complexity of the 
compliance requirements such entities are subject to. Given the size of 
affected holding companies, a stringent compliance regime may reduce 
compliance risks related to the substantive prohibition of the 2013 
final rule. However, Group A and Group B entities will continue to be 
required to establish and maintain a compliance program under Sec.  
__.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \411\ See supra note 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the proposed amendment would require all Group A and Group 
B entities to comply with the CEO attestation requirement. Under the 
2013 final rule, banking entities with $50 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets, banking entities with over $10 billion in 
consolidated trading assets and liabilities, and those banking entities 
that an Agency has notified in writing are subject to the CEO 
attestation requirement.\412\ We estimate that currently as many as 100 
banking entity broker-dealers are required to comply with the CEO 
attestation requirement. Based on the counts in Table 2, we estimate 
that the proposed amendment will reduce this number to approximately 96 
entities. However, we recognize that entities have flexibility to 
comply with the attestation requirement, including providing it at the 
SEC-registrant or at the holding-company level. For example, in 2017 
the SEC received a total of 57 attestations, including those from 
registrants and holding companies. While the proposed amendment may 
slightly decrease the number of affected broker-dealers because of this 
flexibility in compliance, the effects on compliance burdens for SEC 
registrants, if any, are unclear.
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    \412\ As a baseline matter, the CEO is currently required to 
annually attest that the banking entity has in place processes to 
establish, maintain, enforce, review, test, and modify the 
compliance program established pursuant to Appendix B in a manner 
reasonably designed to achieve compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and the 2013 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an alternative, the Agencies could have proposed amending the 
2013 final rule by requiring CEO attestations for all Group A entities 
only if they have over $50 billion in total assets; removing the CEO 
attestation requirement; or allowing other senior officers, such as the 
chief compliance officer (CCO), to provide the requisite attestation 
for some or all affected banking entities. The Agencies recognize that 
the CEO attestation process is costly and that some banking entities 
may spend more than 1,700 hours on the CEO attestation process and that 
the elimination of this requirement may reduce time dedicated towards 
the compliance program by as much as 10%.\413\ The Agencies also 
recognize that allowing other senior officers to provide the 
attestation would provide beneficial flexibility to banking entities 
with different business models, organizational structures, delegation 
of duties, and internal reporting and oversight lines. In addition, as 
the

[[Page 33552]]

Agencies have discussed in other contexts,\414\ certification and 
attestation requirements may increase CEO liability when the CEO 
executes the required attestation. If CEOs of banking entities are risk 
averse, they may require additional liability insurance, higher 
compensation or lower incentive pay as a fraction of overall 
compensation. However, liability related to the attestation may also 
serve as a disciplining mechanism by incentivizing compliance and may 
reduce risk-taking by banking entities. We also note that the covered 
activities of larger and more complex banking entities with higher 
volumes of trading activity may involve more significant moral hazard 
and conflicts of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \413\ See supra note 18.
    \414\ See, e.g., Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based 
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange 
Act Release No. 77617 (Apr. 13, 2016), 81 FR 29960, 30128 (May 24, 
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agencies also recognize that CEO attestation may be costly for 
foreign banking entities. For example, one foreign firm reported that 
it organizes and manages a global controls sub-certification process 
that takes 6 months to complete and involves over 400 staff (including 
over 260 outside the United States) in order for the CEO to sign and 
deliver the annual attestation.\415\ As an alternative, the Agencies 
could have proposed exempting foreign banking entities from the CEO 
attestation requirement. Currently, the requirement covers only the 
U.S. operations of a foreign banking entity and not its foreign 
operations. Similar to the analysis of the proposed amendment to 
trading outside the United States, this alternative may decrease 
compliance costs and increase trading activity by foreign banking 
entities in the United States, but result in losses in market share and 
profitability for U.S. banking entities that would remain subject to 
the attestation requirement and would be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage as a result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \415\ See supra note 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As can be seen from section V.B, the Agencies do not estimate any 
recordkeeping or reporting burden reductions related to compliance 
requirements in Sec.  __.20(b) of the final rule. The proposed removal 
of Appendix B requirements will result in ongoing annual cost savings 
estimated as $8,098,200 for registered broker-dealers and as up to 
$2,753,388 for entities that may choose to register as SBSDs.\416\ In 
addition, the removal of Appendix B requirements may result in initial 
cost savings estimated as $24,294,600 for registered broker-dealers, 
and up to $8,260,164 for entities that may choose to register as 
SBSDs.\417\ As can be seen from section V.B, the Agencies do not 
estimate any recordkeeping or reporting burden reductions related to 
proposed presumed compliance amendment in Sec.  __.20(f)(2) of the 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \416\ Cost reduction for broker-dealers: 1,100 hours per firm x 
0.18 dealer weight x 100 broker-dealers x (Attorney at $409 per 
hour) = $8,098,200. Cost reductions for entities that may register 
as SBSDs may be as high as: 1,100 hours per firm x 0.18 dealer 
weight x 34 firms x (Attorney at $409 per hour) = $2,753,388. The 
estimate for SBSDs assumes that all 34 SBSDs would be subject to 
Appendix B requirements, and may over-estimate the cost savings.
    \417\ Initial set-up cost reduction for broker-dealers: 3,300 
hours per firm x 0.18 dealer weight x 100 broker-dealers x (Attorney 
at $409 per hour) = $24,294,600. Cost reductions for entities that 
may register as SBSDs may be as high as: 3,300 hours per firm x 0.18 
dealer weight x 34 firms x (Attorney at $409 per hour) = $8,260,164. 
The estimate for SBSDs assumes that all 34 SBSDs would be subject to 
Appendix B requirements, and may over-estimate the cost savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Competition, Efficiency, and Capital Formation
    Under the proposed amendments, both Group A and Group B entities 
will enjoy reduced compliance program requirements and Group C will be 
presumed compliant with prohibitions of sections B and C of the 
proposed rule. To the extent that compliance program requirements for 
Group B entities are less costly, Group A entities close to the 
threshold may choose to manage down their trading book such that they 
would qualify for the simplified compliance program, resulting in more 
competition among entities that are close to the threshold. Similarly, 
the proposed amendment may incentivize Group B entities close to the 
threshold to rebalance their trading book and qualify for the presumed 
compliance treatment of Group C entities. Such management of the 
trading book may reduce the risk of each individual banking entity and 
may decrease moral hazard addressed by the 2013 final rule. We note 
that entities are likely to weigh potential cost savings related to 
lighter compliance requirements for Group B and Group C entities 
against the costs of reducing trading activity below the $10 billion 
and $1 billion thresholds. Therefore, this competition effect may be 
particularly significant for Group A entities that are close to the $10 
billion threshold and for Group B entities that are close to the $1 
billion threshold.
    Since the compliance requirements do not impact the scope of 
information available to investors, we do not anticipate effects on 
informational efficiency to be significant. To the extent that some 
dealers are experiencing large compliance costs and partially or fully 
passing them along to customers in the form of reduced access to 
capital or higher cost of capital, the amendment may reduce costs of 
and increase access to capital.
4. Request for Comment
    The SEC is requesting comment regarding the economic analysis set 
forth here. To the extent possible, the SEC requests that market 
participants and other commenters provide supporting data and analysis 
with respect to the benefits, costs, and effects on competition, 
efficiency, and capital formation of adopting the proposed amendments 
or any reasonable alternatives. In addition, the SEC asks commenters to 
consider the following questions:
    Question SEC-1. What additional qualitative or quantitative 
information should the SEC consider as part of the baseline for its 
economic analysis of the proposed amendments?
    Question SEC-2. What additional considerations can the SEC use to 
estimate the costs and benefits of implementing the proposed amendments 
for SEC-regulated banking entities?
    Question SEC-3. Is it likely that certain cost savings associated 
with the proposed rule will not be recognized by SEC-regulated banking 
entities because of the nature of their activities or because of new 
costs the proposal would impose on these activities? Why or why not? 
Are there other benefits or costs associated with the proposed rule 
that will impact SEC-regulated banking entities differently than other 
types of banking entities?
    Question SEC-4. Has the SEC considered all relevant aspects of the 
proposed amendments? Are the estimated costs of the proposed rule for 
SEC-regulated banking entities reasonable? If not, please explain in 
detail why the cost estimates should be higher or lower than those 
provided. Have we accurately described the benefits of the proposed 
rule? Why or why not? Please identify any other benefits associated 
with the proposed rule in detail. Please identify any costs associated 
with the proposed rule that we have not identified.

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 44

    Banks, Banking, Compensation, Credit, Derivatives, Government 
securities, Insurance, Investments, National banks, Penalties, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Risk, Risk retention, 
Securities, Trusts and trustees.

[[Page 33553]]

12 CFR Part 248

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Conflict of 
interests, Credit, Foreign banking, Government securities, Holding 
companies, Insurance, Insurance companies, Investments, Penalties, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities, State nonmember 
banks, State savings associations, Trusts and trustees

12 CFR Part 351

    Banks, Banking, Capital, Compensation, Conflicts of interest, 
Credit, Derivatives, Government securities, Insurance, Insurance 
companies, Investments, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Risk, Risk retention, Securities, Trusts and trustees

17 CFR Part 75

    Banks, Banking, Compensation, Credit, Derivatives, Federal branches 
and agencies, Federal savings associations, Government securities, 
Hedge funds, Insurance, Investments, National banks, Penalties, 
Proprietary trading, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Risk, 
Risk retention, Securities, Swap dealers, Trusts and trustees, Volcker 
rule.

17 CFR Part 255

    Banks, Brokers, Dealers, Investment advisers, Recordkeeping, 
Reporting, Securities.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Chapter I

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the Common Preamble, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency proposes to amend chapter I of Title 12, 
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 44--PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN INTERESTS IN AND 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH COVERED FUNDS

0
 1. The authority citation for part 44 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 7 U.S.C. 27 et seq., 12 U.S.C. 1, 24, 92a, 93a, 161, 
1461, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1467a, 1813(q), 1818, 1851, 3101, 3102, 
3108, 5412.

0
 2. Section 44.2 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  44.2  Definitions.

    Unless otherwise specified, for purposes of this part:
    (a) Affiliate has the same meaning as in section 2(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(k)).
    (b) Applicable accounting standards means U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles, or such other accounting standards applicable to 
a banking entity that the OCC determines are appropriate and that the 
banking entity uses in the ordinary course of its business in preparing 
its consolidated financial statements.
    (c) Bank holding company has the same meaning as in section 2 of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841).
    (d) Banking entity. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of 
this section, banking entity means:
    (i) Any insured depository institution;
    (ii) Any company that controls an insured depository institution;
    (iii) Any company that is treated as a bank holding company for 
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 
U.S.C. 3106); and
    (iv) Any affiliate or subsidiary of any entity described in 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.
    (2) Banking entity does not include:
    (i) A covered fund that is not itself a banking entity under 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section;
    (ii) A portfolio company held under the authority contained in 
section 4(k)(4)(H) or (I) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(H), 
(I)), or any portfolio concern, as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, that is 
controlled by a small business investment company, as defined in 
section 103(3) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 
662), so long as the portfolio company or portfolio concern is not 
itself a banking entity under paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of 
this section; or
    (iii) The FDIC acting in its corporate capacity or as conservator 
or receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
    (e) Board means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
    (f) CFTC means the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    (g) Dealer has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(5) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5)).
    (h) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3(c) 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (i) Derivative. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2) of this 
section, derivative means:
    (i) Any swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68));
    (ii) Any purchase or sale of a commodity, that is not an excluded 
commodity, for deferred shipment or delivery that is intended to be 
physically settled;
    (iii) Any foreign exchange forward (as that term is defined in 
section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)) or 
foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined in section 1a(25) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25));
    (iv) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency 
described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(C)(i));
    (v) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other 
than foreign currency described in section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D)(i)); and
    (vi) Any transaction authorized under section 19 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 23(a) or (b));
    (2) A derivative does not include:
    (i) Any consumer, commercial, or other agreement, contract, or 
transaction that the CFTC and SEC have further defined by joint 
regulation, interpretation, guidance, or other action as not within the 
definition of swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68)); or
    (ii) Any identified banking product, as defined in section 402(b) 
of the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. 27(b)), 
that is subject to section 403(a) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    (j) Employee includes a member of the immediate family of the 
employee.
    (k) Exchange Act means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    (l) Excluded commodity has the same meaning as in section 1a(19) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(19)).
    (m) FDIC means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    (n) Federal banking agencies means the Board, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.
    (o) Foreign banking organization has the same meaning as in section 
211.21(o) of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21(o)), but does not 
include a foreign bank, as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)), that is 
organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the United States

[[Page 33554]]

Virgin Islands, or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (p) Foreign insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, 
or a similar official or agency, of any country other than the United 
States that is engaged in the supervision of insurance companies under 
foreign insurance law.
    (q) General account means all of the assets of an insurance company 
except those allocated to one or more separate accounts.
    (r) Insurance company means a company that is organized as an 
insurance company, primarily and predominantly engaged in writing 
insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by insurance companies, 
subject to supervision as such by a state insurance regulator or a 
foreign insurance regulator, and not operated for the purpose of 
evading the provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1851).
    (s) Insured depository institution has the same meaning as in 
section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)), 
but does not include an insured depository institution that is 
described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(D)).
    (t) Limited trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to a 
banking entity, that:
    (1) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) the average gross sum of which over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1,000,000,000; and
    (2) The OCC has not determined pursuant to Sec.  44.20(g) or (h) of 
this part that the banking entity should not be treated as having 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (u) Loan means any loan, lease, extension of credit, or secured or 
unsecured receivable that is not a security or derivative.
    (v) Moderate trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to 
a banking entity, that the banking entity does not have significant 
trading assets and liabilities or limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
    (w) Primary financial regulatory agency has the same meaning as in 
section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5301(12)).
    (x) Purchase includes any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise 
acquire. For security futures products, purchase includes any contract, 
agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect to a 
commodity future, purchase includes any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, purchase 
includes the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled maturity 
date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance of, or 
extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as the 
context may require.
    (y) Qualifying foreign banking organization means a foreign banking 
organization that qualifies as such under section 211.23(a), (c) or (e) 
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.23(a), (c), or (e)).
    (z) SEC means the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (aa) Sale and sell each include any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of. For security futures products, such terms include any 
contract, agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect 
to a commodity future, such terms include any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, such 
terms include the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled 
maturity date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance 
of, or extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as 
the context may require.
    (bb) Security has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(10) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10)).
    (cc) Security-based swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 
3(a)(71) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
    (dd) Security future has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(55) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(55)).
    (ee) Separate account means an account established and maintained 
by an insurance company in connection with one or more insurance 
contracts to hold assets that are legally segregated from the insurance 
company's other assets, under which income, gains, and losses, whether 
or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in 
accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against 
such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the 
insurance company.
    (ff) Significant trading assets and liabilities.--(1) Significant 
trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to a banking entity, 
that:
    (i) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities the average gross sum of 
which over the previous consecutive four quarters, as measured as of 
the last day of each of the four previous calendar quarters, equals or 
exceeds $10,000,000,000; or
    (ii) The OCC has determined pursuant to Sec.  44.20(h) of this part 
that the banking entity should be treated as having significant trading 
assets and liabilities.
    (2) With respect to a banking entity other than a banking entity 
described in paragraph (3), trading assets and liabilities for purposes 
of this paragraph (ff) means trading assets and liabilities (excluding 
trading assets and liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed 
by the United States or any agency of the United States) on a worldwide 
consolidated basis.
    (3)(i) With respect to a banking entity that is a foreign banking 
organization or a subsidiary of a foreign banking organization, trading 
assets and liabilities for purposes of this paragraph (ff) means the 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) of the combined U.S. operations of 
the top-tier foreign banking organization (including all subsidiaries, 
affiliates, branches, and agencies of the foreign banking organization 
operating, located, or organized in the United States).
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (ff)(3)(i) of this section, a U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary of a banking entity is located in the 
United States; however, the foreign bank that operates or controls that 
branch, agency, or subsidiary is not considered to be located in the 
United States solely by virtue of operating or controlling the U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary.
    (gg) State means any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States 
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (hh) Subsidiary has the same meaning as in section 2(d) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(d)).
    (ii) State insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, or 
a similar official or agency, of a State that is engaged in the 
supervision of insurance companies under State insurance law.
    (jj) Swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 1(a)(49) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(49)).
0
3. Section 44.3 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as paragraphs (d) through 
(f);
0
c. Adding a new paragraph (c);

[[Page 33555]]

0
d. Revising paragraph (e)(3) and adding paragraph (e)(10);
0
e. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) through (f)(13) as paragraphs (f)(6) 
through (f)(14) and adding new paragraph (f)(5); and
0
f. Adding paragraph (g).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  44.3  Prohibition on proprietary trading.

* * * * *
    (b) Definition of trading account. Trading account means any 
account that is used by a banking entity to:
    (1)(i) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are 
both market risk capital rule covered positions and trading positions 
(or hedges of other market risk capital rule covered positions), if the 
banking entity, or any affiliate of the banking entity, is an insured 
depository institution, bank holding company, or savings and loan 
holding company, and calculates risk-based capital ratios under the 
market risk capital rule; or
    (ii) With respect to a banking entity that is not, and is not 
controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is, located 
in or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, 
purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are subject to 
capital requirements under a market risk framework established by the 
home-country supervisor that is consistent with the market risk 
framework published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as 
amended from time to time.
    (2) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments for any 
purpose, if the banking entity:
    (i) Is licensed or registered, or is required to be licensed or 
registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such; or
    (ii) Is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent 
the instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities 
of such business; or
    (3) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments, with 
respect to a financial instrument that is recorded at fair value on a 
recurring basis under applicable accounting standards.
    (c) Presumption of compliance. (1)(i) Each trading desk that does 
not purchase or sell financial instruments for a trading account 
defined in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section may calculate 
the net gain or net loss on the trading desk's portfolio of financial 
instruments each business day, reflecting realized and unrealized gains 
and losses since the previous business day, based on the banking 
entity's fair value for such financial instruments.
    (ii) If the sum of the absolute values of the daily net gain and 
loss figures determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
section for the preceding 90-calendar-day period does not exceed $25 
million, the activities of the trading desk shall be presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (2) The OCC may rebut the presumption of compliance in paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this section by providing written notice to the banking 
entity that the OCC has determined that one or more of the banking 
entity's activities violates the prohibitions under subpart B.
    (3) If a trading desk operating pursuant to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of 
this section exceeds the $25 million threshold in that paragraph at any 
point, the banking entity shall, in accordance with any policies and 
procedures adopted by the OCC:
    (i) Promptly notify the OCC;
    (ii) Demonstrate that the trading desk's purchases and sales of 
financial instruments comply with subpart B; and
    (iii) Demonstrate, with respect to the trading desk, how the 
banking entity will maintain compliance with subpart B on an ongoing 
basis.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) Any purchase or sale of a security, foreign exchange forward 
(as that term is defined in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)), foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined 
in section 1a(25) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25)), or 
physically-settled cross-currency swap, by a banking entity for the 
purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan of the banking entity that, with respect to 
such financial instruments:
    (i) Specifically contemplates and authorizes the particular 
financial instruments to be used for liquidity management purposes, the 
amount, types, and risks of these financial instruments that are 
consistent with liquidity management, and the liquidity circumstances 
in which the particular financial instruments may or must be used;
    (ii) Requires that any purchase or sale of financial instruments 
contemplated and authorized by the plan be principally for the purpose 
of managing the liquidity of the banking entity, and not for the 
purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from actual or expected 
short-term price movements, realizing short-term arbitrage profits, or 
hedging a position taken for such short-term purposes;
    (iii) Requires that any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes be highly liquid and limited to financial 
instruments the market, credit, and other risks of which the banking 
entity does not reasonably expect to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements;
    (iv) Limits any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes, together with any other instruments 
purchased or sold for such purposes, to an amount that is consistent 
with the banking entity's near-term funding needs, including deviations 
from normal operations of the banking entity or any affiliate thereof, 
as estimated and documented pursuant to methods specified in the plan;
    (v) Includes written policies and procedures, internal controls, 
analysis, and independent testing to ensure that the purchase and sale 
of financial instruments that are not permitted under Sec. Sec.  
44.6(a) or (b) of this subpart are for the purpose of liquidity 
management and in accordance with the liquidity management plan 
described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section; and
    (vi) Is consistent with the OCC's supervisory requirements, 
guidance, and expectations regarding liquidity management;
* * * * *
    (10) Any purchase (or sale) of one or more financial instruments 
that was made in error by a banking entity in the course of conducting 
a permitted or excluded activity or is a subsequent transaction to 
correct such an error, and the erroneously purchased (or sold) 
financial instrument is promptly transferred to a separately-managed 
trade error account for disposition.
    (f) * * *
    (5) Cross-currency swap means a swap in which one party exchanges 
with another party principal and interest rate payments in one currency 
for principal and interest rate payments in another currency, and the 
exchange of principal occurs on the date the swap is entered into, with 
a reversal of the exchange of principal at a later date that is agreed 
upon when the swap is entered into.
* * * * *
    (g) Reservation of Authority: (1) The OCC may determine, on a case-
by-case basis, that a purchase or sale of one or

[[Page 33556]]

more financial instruments by a banking entity either is or is not for 
the trading account as defined at 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    (2) Notice and Response Procedures.--(i) Notice. When the OCC 
determines that the purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments is for the trading account under paragraph (g)(1) of this 
section, the OCC will notify the banking entity in writing of the 
determination and provide an explanation of the determination.
    (ii) Response. (A) The banking entity may respond to any or all 
items in the notice. The response should include any matters that the 
banking entity would have the OCC consider in deciding whether the 
purchase or sale is for the trading account. The response must be in 
writing and delivered to the designated OCC official within 30 days 
after the date on which the banking entity received the notice. The OCC 
may shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the OCC, the 
activities or condition of the banking entity so requires, provided 
that the banking entity is informed promptly of the new time period, or 
with the consent of the banking entity. In its discretion, the OCC may 
extend the time period for good cause.
    (B) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the OCC shall constitute a waiver of any objections 
to the OCC's determination.
    (iii) After the close of banking entity's response period, the OCC 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the OCC's determination that the purchase or sale of one or more 
financial instruments is for the trading account. The banking entity 
will be notified of the decision in writing. The notice will include an 
explanation of the decision.
0
4. Section 44.4 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(2);
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(8);
0
c. Revising paragraph (b)(2);
0
d. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
e. In paragraph (b)(5) removing ``inventory'' wherever it appears and 
adding ``positions'' in its place; and
0
f. Adding a new paragraph (b)(6).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  44.4   Permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The underwriting activities of a banking entity 
are permitted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity is acting as an underwriter for a 
distribution of securities and the trading desk's underwriting position 
is related to such distribution;
    (ii) (A) The amount and type of the securities in the trading 
desk's underwriting position are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market 
for the relevant type of security, and
    (B) Reasonable efforts are made to sell or otherwise reduce the 
underwriting position within a reasonable period, taking into account 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant type 
of security;
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The products, instruments or exposures each trading desk may 
purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities;
    (B) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section;
    (C) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (D) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis of the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s), and independent 
review of such demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (a) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (v) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in the 
activity described in this paragraph (a) in accordance with applicable 
law.
* * * * *
    (8) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.--(i) Risk limits. (A) A 
banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii)(A) of this section with respect to the purchase or sale of a 
financial instrument if the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (8)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's underwriting activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risk of its underwriting position;
    (2) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
underwriting position; and
    (3) Period of time a security may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the OCC on an ongoing basis. Any review of such 
limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed not 
to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the OCC (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and (B) 
any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by the OCC.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the OCC if the OCC 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The OCC will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
    (b) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The market making-related activities of a banking 
entity are permitted under paragraph (b)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The trading desk that establishes and manages the financial 
exposure routinely stands ready to purchase and sell one or more types 
of financial instruments related to its financial exposure and is 
willing and available to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise enter 
into long and short positions in those types of financial instruments 
for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout

[[Page 33557]]

market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant types of financial instruments;
    (ii) The trading desk's market-making related activities are 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant types 
of financial instrument(s).
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The financial instruments each trading desk stands ready to 
purchase and sell in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this 
section;
    (B) The actions the trading desk will take to demonstrably reduce 
or otherwise significantly mitigate promptly the risks of its financial 
exposure consistent with the limits required under paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section; the products, instruments, and 
exposures each trading desk may use for risk management purposes; the 
techniques and strategies each trading desk may use to manage the risks 
of its market making-related activities and positions; and the process, 
strategies, and personnel responsible for ensuring that the actions 
taken by the trading desk to mitigate these risks are and continue to 
be effective;
    (C) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section;
    (D) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (E) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis that the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s) is consistent with 
the requirements of this paragraph (b), and independent review of such 
demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, to the extent that any limit identified 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section is exceeded, the 
trading desk takes action to bring the trading desk into compliance 
with the limits as promptly as possible after the limit is exceeded;
    (v) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (b) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (vi) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
activity described in this paragraph (b) in accordance with applicable 
law.
    (3) * * *
    (i) A trading desk or other organizational unit of another banking 
entity is not a client, customer, or counterparty of the trading desk 
if that other entity has trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion 
or more as measured in accordance with the methodology described in 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  44.2 of this part, unless:
* * * * *
    (6) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.
    (i) Risk limits.
    (A) A banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section with respect to the purchase or 
sale of a financial instrument if the banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (6)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's market making-related activities, on 
the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risks of its market-maker positions;
    (2) Amount, types, and risks of the products, instruments, and 
exposures the trading desk may use for risk management purposes;
    (3) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
financial exposure; and
    (4) Period of time a financial instrument may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the OCC on an ongoing basis. Any review of such 
limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed not 
to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the OCC (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and (B) 
any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by the OCC.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the OCC if the OCC 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The OCC will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
0
5. Section 44.5 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) 
introductory text and adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:

Sec.  44.5   Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities.

* * * * *
    (b) Requirements.
    (1) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
has significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted under 
paragraph (a) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program required by subpart D of 
this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking entity's 
compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures regarding 
the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used for hedging, 
including documentation indicating what positions, contracts or other 
holdings a particular trading desk may use in its risk-mitigating 
hedging activities, as well as position and aging limits with respect 
to such positions, contracts or other holdings;
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (C) The conduct of analysis and independent testing designed to 
ensure that the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used 
for hedging may reasonably be expected to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risk(s) being hedged;
    (ii) The risk-mitigating hedging activity:
    (A) Is conducted in accordance with the written policies, 
procedures, and

[[Page 33558]]

internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section;
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity that:
    (1) Is consistent with the written hedging policies and procedures 
required under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
    (2) Is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risks that develop over time from the risk-
mitigating hedging activities undertaken under this section and the 
underlying positions, contracts, and other holdings of the banking 
entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the underlying and 
hedging positions, contracts and other holdings of the banking entity 
and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (3) Requires ongoing recalibration of the hedging activity by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (iii) The compensation arrangements of persons performing risk-
mitigating hedging activities are designed not to reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (2) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
does not have significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted 
under paragraph (a) of this section only if the risk-mitigating hedging 
activity:
    (i) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (ii) Is subject, as appropriate, to ongoing recalibration by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (c) * * * (1) A banking entity that has significant trading assets 
and liabilities must comply with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) 
and (3) of this section, unless the requirements of paragraph (c)(4) of 
this section are met, with respect to any purchase or sale of financial 
instruments made in reliance on this section for risk-mitigating 
hedging purposes that is:
* * * * *
    (4) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section 
do not apply to the purchase or sale of a financial instrument 
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section if:
    (i) The financial instrument purchased or sold is identified on a 
written list of pre-approved financial instruments that are commonly 
used by the trading desk for the specific type of hedging activity for 
which the financial instrument is being purchased or sold; and
    (ii) At the time the financial instrument is purchased or sold, the 
hedging activity (including the purchase or sale of the financial 
instrument) complies with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the 
trading desk purchasing or selling the financial instrument for hedging 
activities undertaken for one or more other trading desks. The hedging 
limits shall be appropriate for the:
    (A) Size, types, and risks of the hedging activities commonly 
undertaken by the trading desk;
    (B) Financial instruments purchased and sold for hedging activities 
by the trading desk; and
    (C) Levels and duration of the risk exposures being hedged.
0
6. Section 44.6 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(3) and removing 
paragraph (e)(6) to read as follows:

Sec.  44.6   Other permitted proprietary trading activities.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) A purchase or sale by a banking entity is permitted for 
purposes of this paragraph (e) if:
    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including relevant personnel) is not located in the United States 
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.
* * * * *

Sec.  44.10  [Amended]

0
7. Section 44.10 is amended by:
0
a. In paragraph (c)(8)(i)(A) removing ``Sec.  44.2(s)'' and adding 
``Sec.  44.2(u)'' in its place;
0
b. Removing paragraph (d)(1);
0
c. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(2) through (d)(10) as paragraphs (d)(1) 
through (d)(9);
0
d. In paragraph (d)(5)(i)(G) revising the reference to ``(d)(6)(i)(A)'' 
to read ``(d)(5)(i)(A)''; and
0
e. In paragraph (d)(9) revising the reference to ``(d)(9)'' to read 
``(d)(8)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)(A)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)(A)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)''.
0
8. Section 44.11 is amended by revising paragraph (c) as follows:

Sec.  44.11  Permitted organizing and offering, underwriting, and 
market making with respect to a covered fund.

* * * * *
    (c) Underwriting and market making in ownership interests of a 
covered fund. The prohibition contained in Sec.  44.10(a) of this 
subpart does not apply to a banking entity's underwriting activities or 
market making-related activities involving a covered fund so long as:
    (1) Those activities are conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Sec.  44.4(a) or Sec.  44.4(b) of subpart B, 
respectively; and
    (2) With respect to any banking entity (or any affiliate thereof) 
that: Acts as a sponsor, investment adviser or commodity trading 
advisor to a particular covered fund or otherwise acquires and retains 
an ownership interest in such covered fund in reliance on paragraph (a) 
of this section; or acquires and retains an ownership interest in such 
covered fund and is

[[Page 33559]]

either a securitizer, as that term is used in section 15G(a)(3) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11(a)(3)), or is acquiring and retaining an 
ownership interest in such covered fund in compliance with section 15G 
of that Act (15 U.S.C.78o-11) and the implementing regulations issued 
thereunder each as permitted by paragraph (b) of this section, then in 
each such case any ownership interests acquired or retained by the 
banking entity and its affiliates in connection with underwriting and 
market making related activities for that particular covered fund are 
included in the calculation of ownership interests permitted to be held 
by the banking entity and its affiliates under the limitations of Sec.  
44.12(a)(2)(ii); Sec.  44.12(a)(2)(iii), and Sec.  44.12(d) of this 
subpart.

Sec.  44.12  [Amended]

0
9. Section 44.12 is amended by:
0
a. In paragraphs (c)(1) and (d) removing ``Sec.  44.10(d)(6)(ii)'' and 
adding ``Sec.  44.10(d)(5)(ii)'' in its place;
0
b. Removing paragraph (e)(2)(vii); and
0
c. Redesignating the second instance of paragraph (e)(2)(vi) as 
paragraph (e)(2)(vii).
0
10. Section 44.13 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(3) and 
removing paragraph (b)(4)(iv) to read as follows:

Sec.  44.13  Other permitted covered fund activities and investments.

    (a) Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities. (1) The 
prohibition contained in Sec.  44.10(a) of this subpart does not apply 
with respect to an ownership interest in a covered fund acquired or 
retained by a banking entity that is designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks to the banking 
entity in connection with:
    (i) A compensation arrangement with an employee of the banking 
entity or an affiliate thereof that directly provides investment 
advisory, commodity trading advisory or other services to the covered 
fund; or
    (ii) A position taken by the banking entity when acting as 
intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund.
    (2) Requirements. The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity are permitted under this paragraph (a) only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program in accordance with subpart 
D of this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking 
entity's compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures; and
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (ii) The acquisition or retention of the ownership interest:
    (A) Is made in accordance with the written policies, procedures, 
and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedge, is designed to reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks arising:
    (1) Out of a transaction conducted solely to accommodate a specific 
customer request with respect to the covered fund; or
    (2) In connection with the compensation arrangement with the 
employee that directly provides investment advisory, commodity trading 
advisory, or other services to the covered fund;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section; and
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity.
    (iii) With respect to risk-mitigating hedging activity conducted 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i), the compensation arrangement relates 
solely to the covered fund in which the banking entity or any affiliate 
has acquired an ownership interest pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) and 
such compensation arrangement provides that any losses incurred by the 
banking entity on such ownership interest will be offset by 
corresponding decreases in amounts payable under such compensation 
arrangement.
    (b) * * *
    (3) An ownership interest in a covered fund is not offered for sale 
or sold to a resident of the United States for purposes of paragraph 
(b)(1)(iii) of this section only if it is not sold and has not been 
sold pursuant to an offering that targets residents of the United 
States in which the banking entity or any affiliate of the banking 
entity participates. If the banking entity or an affiliate sponsors or 
serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, investment 
adviser, commodity pool operator or commodity trading advisor to a 
covered fund, then the banking entity or affiliate will be deemed for 
purposes of this paragraph (b)(3) to participate in any offer or sale 
by the covered fund of ownership interests in the covered fund.
* * * * *
0
11. Section 44.14 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) as 
follows:

Sec.  44.14   Limitations on relationships with a covered fund.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (B) The chief executive officer (or equivalent officer) of the 
banking entity certifies in writing annually no later than March 31 to 
the OCC (with a duty to update the certification if the information in 
the certification materially changes) that the banking entity does not, 
directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the 
obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any covered fund 
in which such covered fund invests; and
* * * * *
0
12. Section 44.20 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (b);
0
c. Revising paragraph (c);
0
d. Revising paragraph (d);
0
e. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (e);
0
f. Revising paragraph (f)(2); and
0
g. Adding new paragraphs (g) and (h).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  44.20  Program for compliance; reporting.

    (a) Program requirement. Each banking entity (other than a banking 
entity with limited trading assets and liabilities) shall develop and 
provide for the continued administration of a compliance program 
reasonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the 
prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered fund 
activities and investments set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and 
this part. The terms, scope, and detail of the compliance program shall 
be appropriate for the types, size, scope, and complexity of activities 
and business structure of the banking entity.
    (b) Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. With respect to a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the compliance program required by paragraph 
(a) of this section, at a minimum, shall include:
* * * * *
    (c) CEO attestation.
    (1) The CEO of a banking entity described in paragraph (2) must, 
based on a review by the CEO of the banking entity, attest in writing 
to the OCC, each year no later than March 31, that the banking entity 
has in place processes

[[Page 33560]]

reasonably designed to achieve compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and this part. In the case of a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign 
banking entity, the attestation may be provided for the entire U.S. 
operations of the foreign banking entity by the senior management 
officer of the U.S. operations of the foreign banking entity who is 
located in the United States.
    (2) The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) apply to a banking entity 
if:
    (i) The banking entity does not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The OCC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the requirements contained in paragraph (c)(1).
    (d) Reporting requirements under the Appendix to this part. (1) A 
banking entity engaged in proprietary trading activity permitted under 
subpart B shall comply with the reporting requirements described in the 
Appendix, if:
    (i) The banking entity has significant trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The OCC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the reporting requirements contained in the Appendix.
    (2) Frequency of reporting: Unless the OCC notifies the banking 
entity in writing that it must report on a different basis, a banking 
entity with $50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities (as 
calculated in accordance with the methodology described in the 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  44.2 of this part of this part) shall report the information 
required by the Appendix for each calendar month within 20 days of the 
end of each calendar month. Any other banking entity subject to the 
Appendix shall report the information required by the Appendix for each 
calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of that calendar quarter 
unless the OCC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
report on a different basis.
    (e) Additional documentation for covered funds. A banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities shall maintain records 
that include:
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) Banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. 
A banking entity with moderate trading assets and liabilities may 
satisfy the requirements of this section by including in its existing 
compliance policies and procedures appropriate references to the 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and this part and adjustments 
as appropriate given the activities, size, scope, and complexity of the 
banking entity.
    (g) Rebuttable presumption of compliance for banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Rebuttable presumption. Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, a banking entity with limited trading assets and liabilities 
shall be presumed to be compliant with subpart B and subpart C and 
shall have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with this part on an 
ongoing basis.
    (2) Rebuttal of presumption. (i) If upon examination or audit, the 
OCC determines that the banking entity has engaged in proprietary 
trading or covered fund activities that are otherwise prohibited under 
subpart B or subpart C, the OCC may require the banking entity to be 
treated under this part as if it did not have limited trading assets 
and liabilities.
    (ii) Notice and Response Procedures. (A) Notice. The OCC will 
notify the banking entity in writing of any determination pursuant to 
paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section to rebut the presumption described 
in this paragraph (g) and will provide an explanation of the 
determination.
    (B) Response. (1) The banking entity may respond to any or all 
items in the notice described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii)(A) of this 
section. The response should include any matters that the banking 
entity would have the OCC consider in deciding whether the banking 
entity has engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund activities 
prohibited under subpart B or subpart C. The response must be in 
writing and delivered to the designated OCC official within 30 days 
after the date on which the banking entity received the notice. The OCC 
may shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the OCC, the 
activities or condition of the banking entity so requires, provided 
that the banking entity is informed promptly of the new time period, or 
with the consent of the banking entity. In its discretion, the OCC may 
extend the time period for good cause.
    (2) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the OCC shall constitute a waiver of any objections 
to the OCC's determination.
    (C) After the close of banking entity's response period, the OCC 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the OCC's determination that banking entity has engaged in proprietary 
trading or covered fund activities prohibited under subpart B or 
subpart C. The banking entity will be notified of the decision in 
writing. The notice will include an explanation of the decision.
    (h) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this part, the OCC retains its authority to require a banking entity 
without significant trading assets and liabilities to apply any 
requirements of this part that would otherwise apply if the banking 
entity had significant or moderate trading assets and liabilities if 
the OCC determines that the size or complexity of the banking entity's 
trading or investment activities, or the risk of evasion of subpart B 
or subpart C, does not warrant a presumption of compliance under 
paragraph (g) of this section or treatment as a banking entity with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities, as applicable.
0
13. Remove Appendix A and Appendix B to Part 44 and add Appendix to 
Part 44--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for Covered Trading 
Activities

Appendix to Part 44--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for 
Covered Trading Activities

I. Purpose

    a. This appendix sets forth reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements that certain banking entities must satisfy in 
connection with the restrictions on proprietary trading set forth in 
subpart B (``proprietary trading restrictions''). Pursuant to Sec.  
44.20(d), this appendix applies to a banking entity that, together 
with its affiliates and subsidiaries, has significant trading assets 
and liabilities. These entities are required to (i) furnish periodic 
reports to the OCC regarding a variety of quantitative measurements 
of their covered trading activities, which vary depending on the 
scope and size of covered trading activities, and (ii) create and 
maintain records documenting the preparation and content of these 
reports. The requirements of this appendix must be incorporated into 
the banking entity's internal compliance program under Sec.  44.20.
    b. The purpose of this appendix is to assist banking entities 
and the OCC in:
    (i) Better understanding and evaluating the scope, type, and 
profile of the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (ii) Monitoring the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (iii) Identifying covered trading activities that warrant 
further review or examination by the banking entity to verify 
compliance with the proprietary trading restrictions;
    (iv) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of 
trading desks engaged in market making-related activities subject to 
Sec.  44.4(b) are consistent with the requirements governing 
permitted market making-related activities;
    (v) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of trading 
desks that are engaged in permitted trading activity subject to 
Sec. Sec.  44.4, 44.5, or 44.6(a)-(b) (i.e., underwriting and market 
making-related related activity, risk-mitigating hedging, or trading 
in certain

[[Page 33561]]

government obligations) are consistent with the requirement that 
such activity not result, directly or indirectly, in a material 
exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies;
    (vi) Identifying the profile of particular covered trading 
activities of the banking entity, and the individual trading desks 
of the banking entity, to help establish the appropriate frequency 
and scope of examination by the OCC of such activities; and
    (vii) Assessing and addressing the risks associated with the 
banking entity's covered trading activities.
    c. Information that must be furnished pursuant to this appendix 
is not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the 
identification of permissible or impermissible activities.
    d. In addition to the quantitative measurements required in this 
appendix, a banking entity may need to develop and implement other 
quantitative measurements in order to effectively monitor its 
covered trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and this part and to have an effective compliance program, as 
required by Sec.  44.20. The effectiveness of particular 
quantitative measurements may differ based on the profile of the 
banking entity's businesses in general and, more specifically, of 
the particular trading desk, including types of instruments traded, 
trading activities and strategies, and history and experience (e.g., 
whether the trading desk is an established, successful market maker 
or a new entrant to a competitive market). In all cases, banking 
entities must ensure that they have robust measures in place to 
identify and monitor the risks taken in their trading activities, to 
ensure that the activities are within risk tolerances established by 
the banking entity, and to monitor and examine for compliance with 
the proprietary trading restrictions in this part.
    e. On an ongoing basis, banking entities must carefully monitor, 
review, and evaluate all furnished quantitative measurements, as 
well as any others that they choose to utilize in order to maintain 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. All 
measurement results that indicate a heightened risk of impermissible 
proprietary trading, including with respect to otherwise-permitted 
activities under Sec. Sec.  44.4 through 44.6(a)-(b), or that result 
in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading 
strategies, must be escalated within the banking entity for review, 
further analysis, explanation to the OCC, and remediation, where 
appropriate. The quantitative measurements discussed in this 
appendix should be helpful to banking entities in identifying and 
managing the risks related to their covered trading activities.

II. Definitions

    The terms used in this appendix have the same meanings as set 
forth in Sec. Sec.  44.2 and 44.3. In addition, for purposes of this 
appendix, the following definitions apply:
    Applicability identifies the trading desks for which a banking 
entity is required to calculate and report a particular quantitative 
measurement based on the type of covered trading activity conducted 
by the trading desk.
    Calculation period means the period of time for which a 
particular quantitative measurement must be calculated.
    Comprehensive profit and loss means the net profit or loss of a 
trading desk's material sources of trading revenue over a specific 
period of time, including, for example, any increase or decrease in 
the market value of a trading desk's holdings, dividend income, and 
interest income and expense.
    Covered trading activity means trading conducted by a trading 
desk under Sec. Sec.  44.4, 44.5, 44.6(a), or 44.6(b). A banking 
entity may include in its covered trading activity trading conducted 
under Sec. Sec.  44.3(e), 44.6(c), 44.6(d), or 44.6(e).
    Measurement frequency means the frequency with which a 
particular quantitative metric must be calculated and recorded.
    Trading day means a calendar day on which a trading desk is open 
for trading.

III. Reporting and Recordkeeping

a. Scope of Required Reporting

    1. Quantitative measurements. Each banking entity made subject 
to this appendix by Sec.  44.20 must furnish the following 
quantitative measurements, as applicable, for each trading desk of 
the banking entity engaged in covered trading activities and 
calculate these quantitative measurements in accordance with this 
appendix:
    i. Risk and Position Limits and Usage;
    ii. Risk Factor Sensitivities;
    iii. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk;
    iv Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution;
    v. Positions;
    vi. Transaction Volumes; and
    vii. Securities Inventory Aging.
    2. Trading desk information. Each banking entity made subject to 
this appendix by Sec.  44.20 must provide certain descriptive 
information, as further described in this appendix, regarding each 
trading desk engaged in covered trading activities.
    3. Quantitative measurements identifying information. Each 
banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  44.20 must 
provide certain identifying and descriptive information, as further 
described in this appendix, regarding its quantitative measurements.
    4. Narrative statement. Each banking entity made subject to this 
appendix by Sec.  44.20 must provide a separate narrative statement, 
as further described in this appendix.
    5. File identifying information. Each banking entity made 
subject to this appendix by Sec.  44.20 must provide file 
identifying information in each submission to the OCC pursuant to 
this appendix, including the name of the banking entity, the RSSD ID 
assigned to the top-tier banking entity by the Board, and 
identification of the reporting period and creation date and time.

b. Trading Desk Information

    1. Each banking entity must provide descriptive information 
regarding each trading desk engaged in covered trading activities, 
including:
    i. Name of the trading desk used internally by the banking 
entity and a unique identification label for the trading desk;
    ii. Identification of each type of covered trading activity in 
which the trading desk is engaged;
    iii. Brief description of the general strategy of the trading 
desk;
    iv. A list of the types of financial instruments and other 
products purchased and sold by the trading desk; an indication of 
which of these are the main financial instruments or products 
purchased and sold by the trading desk; and, for trading desks 
engaged in market making-related activities under Sec.  44.4(b), 
specification of whether each type of financial instrument is 
included in market-maker positions or not included in market-maker 
positions. In addition, indicate whether the trading desk is 
including in its quantitative measurements products excluded from 
the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  44.3(d)(2) 
and, if so, identify such products;
    v. Identification by complete name of each legal entity that 
serves as a booking entity for covered trading activities conducted 
by the trading desk; and indication of which of the identified legal 
entities are the main booking entities for covered trading 
activities of the trading desk;
    vi. For each legal entity that serves as a booking entity for 
covered trading activities, specification of any of the following 
applicable entity types for that legal entity:
    A. National bank, Federal branch or Federal agency of a foreign 
bank, Federal savings association, Federal savings bank;
    B. State nonmember bank, foreign bank having an insured branch, 
State savings association;
    C. U.S.-registered broker-dealer, U.S.-registered security-based 
swap dealer, U.S.-registered major security-based swap participant;
    D. Swap dealer, major swap participant, derivatives clearing 
organization, futures commission merchant, commodity pool operator, 
commodity trading advisor, introducing broker, floor trader, retail 
foreign exchange dealer;
    E. State member bank;
    F. Bank holding company, savings and loan holding company;
    G. Foreign banking organization as defined in 12 CFR 211.21(o);
    H. Uninsured State-licensed branch or agency of a foreign bank; 
or
    I. Other entity type not listed above, including a subsidiary of 
a legal entity described above where the subsidiary itself is not an 
entity type listed above;
    vii. Indication of whether each calendar date is a trading day 
or not a trading day for the trading desk; and
    viii. Currency reported and daily currency conversion rate.

c. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information

    1. Each banking entity must provide the following information 
regarding the quantitative measurements:
    i. A Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each limit

[[Page 33562]]

reported pursuant to the Risk and Position Limits and Usage 
quantitative measurement, including the name of the limit, a unique 
identification label for the limit, a description of the limit, 
whether the limit is intraday or end-of-day, the unit of measurement 
for the limit, whether the limit measures risk on a net or gross 
basis, and the type of limit;
    ii. A Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor sensitivity reported pursuant to the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
sensitivity, a unique identification label for the sensitivity, a 
description of the sensitivity, and the sensitivity's risk factor 
change unit;
    iii. A Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor attribution reported pursuant to the Comprehensive Profit and 
Loss Attribution quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
risk factor or other factor, a unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor, a description of the risk factor or 
other factor, and the risk factor or other factor's change unit;
    iv. A Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule that cross-
references, by unique identification label, limits identified in the 
Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule to associated risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule; and
    v. A Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference 
Schedule that cross-references, by unique identification label, risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule to associated risk factor attributions 
identified in the Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule.

d. Narrative Statement

    1. Each banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  
44.20 must submit in a separate electronic document a Narrative 
Statement to the OCC describing any changes in calculation methods 
used, a description of and reasons for changes in the banking 
entity's trading desk structure or trading desk strategies, and when 
any such change occurred. The Narrative Statement must include any 
information the banking entity views as relevant for assessing the 
information reported, such as further description of calculation 
methods used.
    2. If a banking entity does not have any information to report 
in a Narrative Statement, the banking entity must submit an 
electronic document stating that it does not have any information to 
report in a Narrative Statement.

e. Frequency and Method of Required Calculation and Reporting

    A banking entity must calculate any applicable quantitative 
measurement for each trading day. A banking entity must report the 
Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and each applicable 
quantitative measurement electronically to the OCC on the reporting 
schedule established in Sec.  44.20 unless otherwise requested by 
the OCC. A banking entity must report the Trading Desk Information, 
the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, and each 
applicable quantitative measurement to the OCC in accordance with 
the XML Schema specified and published on the OCC's website.

f. Recordkeeping

    A banking entity must, for any quantitative measurement 
furnished to the OCC pursuant to this appendix and Sec.  44.20(d), 
create and maintain records documenting the preparation and content 
of these reports, as well as such information as is necessary to 
permit the OCC to verify the accuracy of such reports, for a period 
of five years from the end of the calendar year for which the 
measurement was taken. A banking entity must retain the Narrative 
Statement, the Trading Desk Information, and the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information for a period of five years from 
the end of the calendar year for which the information was reported 
to the OCC.

IV. Quantitative Measurements

a. Risk-Management Measurements

1. Risk and Position Limits and Usage

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk and Position 
Limits are the constraints that define the amount of risk that a 
trading desk is permitted to take at a point in time, as defined by 
the banking entity for a specific trading desk. Usage represents the 
value of the trading desk's risk or positions that are accounted for 
by the current activity of the desk. Risk and position limits and 
their usage are key risk management tools used to control and 
monitor risk taking and include, but are not limited to, the limits 
set out in Sec.  44.4 and Sec.  44.5. A number of the metrics that 
are described below, including ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and 
``Value-at-Risk,'' relate to a trading desk's risk and position 
limits and are useful in evaluating and setting these limits in the 
broader context of the trading desk's overall activities, 
particularly for the market making activities under Sec.  44.4(b) 
and hedging activity under Sec.  44.5. Accordingly, the limits 
required under Sec.  44.4(b)(2)(iii) and Sec.  44.5(b)(1)(i)(A) must 
meet the applicable requirements under Sec.  44.4(b)(2)(iii) and 
Sec.  44.5(b)(1)(i)(A) and also must include appropriate metrics for 
the trading desk limits including, at a minimum, the ``Risk Factor 
Sensitivities'' and ``Value-at-Risk'' metrics except to the extent 
any of the ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' or ``Value-at-Risk'' 
metrics are demonstrably ineffective for measuring and monitoring 
the risks of a trading desk based on the types of positions traded 
by, and risk exposures of, that desk.
    A. A banking entity must provide the following information for 
each limit reported pursuant to this quantitative measurement: The 
unique identification label for the limit reported in the Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedule, the limit size (distinguishing 
between an upper and a lower limit), and the value of usage of the 
limit.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

2. Risk Factor Sensitivities

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk Factor 
Sensitivities are changes in a trading desk's Comprehensive Profit 
and Loss that are expected to occur in the event of a change in one 
or more underlying variables that are significant sources of the 
trading desk's profitability and risk. A banking entity must report 
the risk factor sensitivities that are monitored and managed as part 
of the trading desk's overall risk management policy. Reported risk 
factor sensitivities must be sufficiently granular to account for a 
preponderance of the expected price variation in the trading desk's 
holdings. A banking entity must provide the following information 
for each sensitivity that is reported pursuant to this quantitative 
measurement: The unique identification label for the risk factor 
sensitivity listed in the Risk Factor Sensitivities Information 
Schedule, the change in risk factor used to determine the risk 
factor sensitivity, and the aggregate change in value across all 
positions of the desk given the change in risk factor.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

3. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Value-at-Risk 
(``VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of future financial loss in 
the value of a trading desk's aggregated positions at the ninety-
nine percent confidence level over a one-day period, based on 
current market conditions. For purposes of this appendix, Stressed 
Value-at-Risk (``Stressed VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of 
future financial loss in the value of a trading desk's aggregated 
positions at the ninety-nine percent confidence level over a one-day 
period, based on market conditions during a period of significant 
financial stress.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: For VaR, all trading desks engaged in covered 
trading activities. For Stressed VaR, all trading desks engaged in 
covered trading activities, except trading desks whose covered 
trading activity is conducted exclusively to hedge products excluded 
from the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  
44.3(d)(2).

b. Source-of-Revenue Measurements

1. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss Attribution is an analysis that attributes the daily 
fluctuation in the value of a trading desk's positions to various 
sources. First, the daily profit and loss of the aggregated 
positions is divided into three categories: (i) Profit and loss 
attributable to a trading desk's existing positions that were also 
positions held by the trading desk as of the end of the prior day 
(``existing positions''); (ii) profit and loss attributable to new 
positions resulting from the current day's trading activity (``new 
positions''); and (iii) residual profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically

[[Page 33563]]

attributed to existing positions or new positions. The sum of (i), 
(ii), and (iii) must equal the trading desk's comprehensive profit 
and loss at each point in time.
    A. The comprehensive profit and loss associated with existing 
positions must reflect changes in the value of these positions on 
the applicable day.
    The comprehensive profit and loss from existing positions must 
be further attributed, as applicable, to changes in (i) the specific 
risk factors and other factors that are monitored and managed as 
part of the trading desk's overall risk management policies and 
procedures; and (ii) any other applicable elements, such as cash 
flows, carry, changes in reserves, and the correction, cancellation, 
or exercise of a trade.
    B. For the attribution of comprehensive profit and loss from 
existing positions to specific risk factors and other factors, a 
banking entity must provide the following information for the 
factors that explain the preponderance of the profit or loss changes 
due to risk factor changes: The unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor listed in the Risk Factor Attribution 
Information Schedule, and the profit or loss due to the risk factor 
or other factor change.
    C. The comprehensive profit and loss attributed to new positions 
must reflect commissions and fee income or expense and market gains 
or losses associated with transactions executed on the applicable 
day. New positions include purchases and sales of financial 
instruments and other assets/liabilities and negotiated amendments 
to existing positions. The comprehensive profit and loss from new 
positions may be reported in the aggregate and does not need to be 
further attributed to specific sources.
    D. The portion of comprehensive profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to known sources must be allocated to a 
residual category identified as an unexplained portion of the 
comprehensive profit and loss. Significant unexplained profit and 
loss must be escalated for further investigation and analysis.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

c. Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging 
Measurements

1. Positions

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Positions is the 
value of securities and derivatives positions managed by the trading 
desk. For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, do not 
include in the Positions calculation for ``securities'' those 
securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined 
under subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \418\ A banking entity must 
separately report the trading desk's market value of long securities 
positions, market value of short securities positions, market value 
of derivatives receivables, market value of derivatives payables, 
notional value of derivatives receivables, and notional value of 
derivatives payables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \418\ See Sec. Sec.  44.2(i), (bb). For example, under this 
part, a security-based swap is both a ``security'' and a 
``derivative.'' For purposes of the Positions quantitative 
measurement, security-based swaps are reported as derivatives rather 
than securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  44.4(a) 
or Sec.  44.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

2. Transaction Volumes

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Transaction 
Volumes measures four exclusive categories of covered trading 
activity conducted by a trading desk. A banking entity is required 
to report the value and number of security and derivative 
transactions conducted by the trading desk with: (i) Customers, 
excluding internal transactions; (ii) non-customers, excluding 
internal transactions; (iii) trading desks and other organizational 
units where the transaction is booked in the same banking entity; 
and (iv) trading desks and other organizational units where the 
transaction is booked into an affiliated banking entity. For 
securities, value means gross market value. For derivatives, value 
means gross notional value. For purposes of calculating the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, do not include in the 
Transaction Volumes calculation for ``securities'' those securities 
that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined under 
subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \419\ Further, for purposes of the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, a customer of a 
trading desk that relies on Sec.  44.4(a) to conduct underwriting 
activity is a market participant identified in Sec.  44.4(a)(7), and 
a customer of a trading desk that relies on Sec.  44.4(b) to conduct 
market making-related activity is a market participant identified in 
Sec.  44.4(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \419\ See Sec. Sec.  44.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  44.4(a) 
or Sec.  44.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

3. Securities Inventory Aging

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Securities 
Inventory Aging generally describes a schedule of the market value 
of the trading desk's securities positions and the amount of time 
that those securities positions have been held. Securities Inventory 
Aging must measure the age profile of a trading desk's securities 
positions for the following periods: 0-30 calendar days; 31-60 
calendar days; 61-90 calendar days; 91-180 calendar days; 181-360 
calendar days; and greater than 360 calendar days. Securities 
Inventory Aging includes two schedules, a security asset-aging 
schedule, and a security liability-aging schedule. For purposes of 
the Securities Inventory Aging quantitative measurement, do not 
include securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are 
defined under subpart A.\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ See Sec. Sec.  44.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  44.4(a) 
or Sec.  44.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making 
related activity, respectively.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

12 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the Common Preamble the Board proposes 
to amend chapter II of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
follows:

PART 248--PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN INTERESTS IN AND 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH COVERED FUNDS (REGULATION VV)

0
14. The authority citation for part 248 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1851, 12 U.S.C. 221 et seq., 12 U.S.C. 
1818, 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq., and 12 U.S.C. 3103 et seq.

Subpart A--Authority and Definitions

0
15. Section 248.2 is revised as follows:

Sec.  248.2   Definitions.

    Unless otherwise specified, for purposes of this part:
    (a) Affiliate has the same meaning as in section 2(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(k)).
    (b) Applicable accounting standards means U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles, or such other accounting standards applicable to 
a banking entity that the [Agency] determines are appropriate and that 
the banking entity uses in the ordinary course of its business in 
preparing its consolidated financial statements.
    (c) Bank holding company has the same meaning as in section 2 of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841).
    (d) Banking entity. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of 
this section, banking entity means:
    (i) Any insured depository institution;
    (ii) Any company that controls an insured depository institution;
    (iii) Any company that is treated as a bank holding company for 
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 
U.S.C. 3106); and
    (iv) Any affiliate or subsidiary of any entity described in 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.
    (2) Banking entity does not include:
    (i) A covered fund that is not itself a banking entity under 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section;
    (ii) A portfolio company held under the authority contained in 
section

[[Page 33564]]

4(k)(4)(H) or (I) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(H), (I)), or any 
portfolio concern, as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, that is controlled 
by a small business investment company, as defined in section 103(3) of 
the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 662), so long as 
the portfolio company or portfolio concern is not itself a banking 
entity under paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section; or
    (iii) The FDIC acting in its corporate capacity or as conservator 
or receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
    (e) Board means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
    (f) CFTC means the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    (g) Dealer has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(5) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5)).
    (h) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3(c) 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (i) Derivative. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2) of this 
section, derivative means:
    (i) Any swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68));
    (ii) Any purchase or sale of a commodity, that is not an excluded 
commodity, for deferred shipment or delivery that is intended to be 
physically settled;
    (iii) Any foreign exchange forward (as that term is defined in 
section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)) or 
foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined in section 1a(25) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25));
    (iv) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency 
described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(C)(i));
    (v) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other 
than foreign currency described in section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D)(i)); and
    (vi) Any transaction authorized under section 19 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 23(a) or (b));
    (2) A derivative does not include:
    (i) Any consumer, commercial, or other agreement, contract, or 
transaction that the CFTC and SEC have further defined by joint 
regulation, interpretation, guidance, or other action as not within the 
definition of swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68)); or
    (ii) Any identified banking product, as defined in section 402(b) 
of the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. 27(b)), 
that is subject to section 403(a) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    (j) Employee includes a member of the immediate family of the 
employee.
    (k) Exchange Act means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    (l) Excluded commodity has the same meaning as in section 1a(19) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(19)).
    (m) FDIC means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    (n) Federal banking agencies means the Board, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.
    (o) Foreign banking organization has the same meaning as in section 
211.21(o) of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21(o)), but does not 
include a foreign bank, as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)), that is 
organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, or the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (p) Foreign insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, 
or a similar official or agency, of any country other than the United 
States that is engaged in the supervision of insurance companies under 
foreign insurance law.
    (q) General account means all of the assets of an insurance company 
except those allocated to one or more separate accounts.
    (r) Insurance company means a company that is organized as an 
insurance company, primarily and predominantly engaged in writing 
insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by insurance companies, 
subject to supervision as such by a state insurance regulator or a 
foreign insurance regulator, and not operated for the purpose of 
evading the provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1851).
    (s) Insured depository institution has the same meaning as in 
section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)), 
but does not include an insured depository institution that is 
described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(D)).
    (t) Limited trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to a 
banking entity, that:
    (1) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) the average gross sum of which over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1,000,000,000; and
    (2) The Board has not determined pursuant to Sec.  248.20(g) or (h) 
of this part that the banking entity should not be treated as having 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (u) Loan means any loan, lease, extension of credit, or secured or 
unsecured receivable that is not a security or derivative.
    (v) Moderate trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to 
a banking entity, that the banking entity does not have significant 
trading assets and liabilities or limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
    (w) Primary financial regulatory agency has the same meaning as in 
section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5301(12)).
    (x) Purchase includes any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise 
acquire. For security futures products, purchase includes any contract, 
agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect to a 
commodity future, purchase includes any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, purchase 
includes the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled maturity 
date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance of, or 
extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as the 
context may require.
    (y) Qualifying foreign banking organization means a foreign banking 
organization that qualifies as such under section 211.23(a), (c) or (e) 
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.23(a), (c), or (e)).
    (z) SEC means the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (aa) Sale and sell each include any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of. For security futures products, such terms include any 
contract, agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect 
to a commodity future, such terms include any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, such 
terms include the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled 
maturity date), assignment, exchange, or similar

[[Page 33565]]

transfer or conveyance of, or extinguishing of rights or obligations 
under, a derivative, as the context may require.
    (bb) Security has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(10) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10)).
    (cc) Security-based swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 
3(a)(71) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
    (dd) Security future has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(55) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(55)).
    (ee) Separate account means an account established and maintained 
by an insurance company in connection with one or more insurance 
contracts to hold assets that are legally segregated from the insurance 
company's other assets, under which income, gains, and losses, whether 
or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in 
accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against 
such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the 
insurance company.
    (ff) Significant trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Significant trading assets and liabilities means, with respect 
to a banking entity, that:
    (i) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities the average gross sum of 
which over the previous consecutive four quarters, as measured as of 
the last day of each of the four previous calendar quarters, equals or 
exceeds $10,000,000,000; or
    (ii) The Board has determined pursuant to Sec.  248.20(h) of this 
part that the banking entity should be treated as having significant 
trading assets and liabilities.
    (2) With respect to a banking entity other than a banking entity 
described in paragraph (3), trading assets and liabilities for purposes 
of this paragraph (ff) means trading assets and liabilities (excluding 
trading assets and liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed 
by the United States or any agency of the United States) on a worldwide 
consolidated basis.
    (3)(i) With respect to a banking entity that is a foreign banking 
organization or a subsidiary of a foreign banking organization, trading 
assets and liabilities for purposes of this paragraph (ff) means the 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) of the combined U.S. operations of 
the top-tier foreign banking organization (including all subsidiaries, 
affiliates, branches, and agencies of the foreign banking organization 
operating, located, or organized in the United States).
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (ff)(3)(i) of this section, a U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary of a banking entity is located in the 
United States; however, the foreign bank that operates or controls that 
branch, agency, or subsidiary is not considered to be located in the 
United States solely by virtue of operating or controlling the U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary.
    (gg) State means any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States 
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (hh) Subsidiary has the same meaning as in section 2(d) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(d)).
    (ii) State insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, or 
a similar official or agency, of a State that is engaged in the 
supervision of insurance companies under State insurance law.
    (jj) Swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 1(a)(49) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(49)).

Subpart B--Proprietary Trading

0
16. Amend Sec.  248.3 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as paragraphs (d) through 
(f);
0
c. Adding a new paragraph (c);
0
d. Revising paragraph (e)(3);
0
e. Adding paragraph (e)(10);
0
f. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) through (f)(13) as paragraphs (f)(6) 
through (f)(14);
0
g. Adding a new paragraph (f)(5); and
0
h. Adding a new paragraph (g).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  248.3   Prohibition on proprietary trading.

* * * * *
    (b) Definition of trading account. Trading account means any 
account that is used by a banking entity to:
    (1)(i) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are 
both market risk capital rule covered positions and trading positions 
(or hedges of other market risk capital rule covered positions), if the 
banking entity, or any affiliate of the banking entity, is an insured 
depository institution, bank holding company, or savings and loan 
holding company, and calculates risk-based capital ratios under the 
market risk capital rule; or
    (ii) With respect to a banking entity that is not, and is not 
controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is, located 
in or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, 
purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are subject to 
capital requirements under a market risk framework established by the 
home-country supervisor that is consistent with the market risk 
framework published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as 
amended from time to time.
    (2) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments for any 
purpose, if the banking entity:
    (i) Is licensed or registered, or is required to be licensed or 
registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such; or
    (ii) Is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent 
the instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities 
of such business; or
    (3) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments, with 
respect to a financial instrument that is recorded at fair value on a 
recurring basis under applicable accounting standards.
    (c) Presumption of compliance. (1)(i) Each trading desk that does 
not purchase or sell financial instruments for a trading account 
defined in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section may calculate 
the net gain or net loss on the trading desk's portfolio of financial 
instruments each business day, reflecting realized and unrealized gains 
and losses since the previous business day, based on the banking 
entity's fair value for such financial instruments.
    (ii) If the sum of the absolute values of the daily net gain and 
loss figures determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
section for the preceding 90-calendar-day period does not exceed $25 
million, the activities of the trading desk shall be presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (2) The Board may rebut the presumption of compliance in paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this section by providing written notice to the banking 
entity that the Board has determined that one or more of the banking 
entity's activities violates the prohibitions under subpart B.
    (3) If a trading desk operating pursuant to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of 
this section exceeds the $25 million threshold in that paragraph at any 
point, the banking entity shall, in accordance

[[Page 33566]]

with any policies and procedures adopted by the Board:
    (i) Promptly notify the Board;
    (ii) Demonstrate that the trading desk's purchases and sales of 
financial instruments comply with subpart B; and
    (iii) Demonstrate, with respect to the trading desk, how the 
banking entity will maintain compliance with subpart B on an ongoing 
basis.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) Any purchase or sale of a security, foreign exchange forward 
(as that term is defined in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)), foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined 
in section 1a(25) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25)), or 
physically-settled cross-currency swap, by a banking entity for the 
purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan of the banking entity that, with respect to 
such financial instruments:
    (i) Specifically contemplates and authorizes the particular 
financial instruments to be used for liquidity management purposes, the 
amount, types, and risks of these financial instruments that are 
consistent with liquidity management, and the liquidity circumstances 
in which the particular financial instruments may or must be used;
    (ii) Requires that any purchase or sale of financial instruments 
contemplated and authorized by the plan be principally for the purpose 
of managing the liquidity of the banking entity, and not for the 
purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from actual or expected 
short-term price movements, realizing short-term arbitrage profits, or 
hedging a position taken for such short-term purposes;
    (iii) Requires that any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes be highly liquid and limited to financial 
instruments the market, credit, and other risks of which the banking 
entity does not reasonably expect to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements;
    (iv) Limits any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes, together with any other instruments 
purchased or sold for such purposes, to an amount that is consistent 
with the banking entity's near-term funding needs, including deviations 
from normal operations of the banking entity or any affiliate thereof, 
as estimated and documented pursuant to methods specified in the plan;
    (v) Includes written policies and procedures, internal controls, 
analysis, and independent testing to ensure that the purchase and sale 
of financial instruments that are not permitted under Sec. Sec.  
248.6(a) or (b) of this subpart are for the purpose of liquidity 
management and in accordance with the liquidity management plan 
described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section; and
    (vi) Is consistent with the Board's supervisory requirements, 
guidance, and expectations regarding liquidity management;
* * * * *
    (10) Any purchase (or sale) of one or more financial instruments 
that was made in error by a banking entity in the course of conducting 
a permitted or excluded activity or is a subsequent transaction to 
correct such an error, and the erroneously purchased (or sold) 
financial instrument is promptly transferred to a separately-managed 
trade error account for disposition.
    (f) * * *
    (5) Cross-currency swap means a swap in which one party exchanges 
with another party principal and interest rate payments in one currency 
for principal and interest rate payments in another currency, and the 
exchange of principal occurs on the date the swap is entered into, with 
a reversal of the exchange of principal at a later date that is agreed 
upon when the swap is entered into.
* * * * *
    (g) Reservation of Authority: (1) The Board may determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, that a purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments by a banking entity either is or is not for the trading 
account as defined at 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    (2) Notice and Response Procedures.
    (i) Notice. When the Board determines that the purchase or sale of 
one or more financial instruments is for the trading account under 
paragraph (g)(1) of this section, the Board will notify the banking 
entity in writing of the determination and provide an explanation of 
the determination.
    (ii) Response.
    (A) The banking entity may respond to any or all items in the 
notice. The response should include any matters that the banking entity 
would have the Boardconsider in deciding whether the purchase or sale 
is for the trading account. The response must be in writing and 
delivered to the designated Board official within 30 days after the 
date on which the banking entity received the notice. The Board may 
shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the Board, the 
activities or condition of the banking entity so requires, provided 
that the banking entity is informed promptly of the new time period, or 
with the consent of the banking entity. In its discretion, the Board 
may extend the time period for good cause.
    (B) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the Board shall constitute a waiver of any 
objections to the Board's determination.
    (iii) After the close of banking entity's response period, the 
Board will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response 
and other information concerning the banking entity, whether to 
maintain the Board's determination that the purchase or sale of one or 
more financial instruments is for the trading account. The banking 
entity will be notified of the decision in writing. The notice will 
include an explanation of the decision.
0
17. Section 248.4 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(2);
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(8);
0
c. Revising paragraph (b)(2);
0
d. Revising the introductory language of paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
e. In paragraph (b)(5) revising the references to ``inventory'' to read 
``positions''; and
0
f. Adding a new paragraph (b)(6).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  248.4   Permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The underwriting activities of a banking entity 
are permitted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity is acting as an underwriter for a 
distribution of securities and the trading desk's underwriting position 
is related to such distribution;
    (ii)(A) The amount and type of the securities in the trading desk's 
underwriting position are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market 
for the relevant type of security, and (B) reasonable efforts are made 
to sell or otherwise reduce the underwriting position within a 
reasonable period, taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant type of security;
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to

[[Page 33567]]

ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The products, instruments or exposures each trading desk may 
purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities;
    (B) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section;
    (C) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (D) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis of the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s), and independent 
review of such demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (a) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (v) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in the 
activity described in this paragraph (a) in accordance with applicable 
law.
* * * * *
    (8) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.--(i) Risk limits. (A) A 
banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii)(A) of this section with respect to the purchase or sale of a 
financial instrument if the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (8)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's underwriting activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risk of its underwriting position;
    (2) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
underwriting position; and
    (3) Period of time a security may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the Board on an ongoing basis. Any review of 
such limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed 
not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the Board (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and 
(B) any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case 
in the form and manner as directed by the Board.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the Board if the Board 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The Board will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
    (b) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The market making-related activities of a banking 
entity are permitted under paragraph (b)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The trading desk that establishes and manages the financial 
exposure routinely stands ready to purchase and sell one or more types 
of financial instruments related to its financial exposure and is 
willing and available to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise enter 
into long and short positions in those types of financial instruments 
for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout 
market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant types of financial instruments;
    (ii) The trading desk's market-making related activities are 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant types 
of financial instrument(s).
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The financial instruments each trading desk stands ready to 
purchase and sell in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this 
section;
    (B) The actions the trading desk will take to demonstrably reduce 
or otherwise significantly mitigate promptly the risks of its financial 
exposure consistent with the limits required under paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section; the products, instruments, and 
exposures each trading desk may use for risk management purposes; the 
techniques and strategies each trading desk may use to manage the risks 
of its market making-related activities and positions; and the process, 
strategies, and personnel responsible for ensuring that the actions 
taken by the trading desk to mitigate these risks are and continue to 
be effective;
    (C) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section;
    (D) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (E) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis that the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s) is consistent with 
the requirements of this paragraph (b), and independent review of such 
demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, to the extent that any limit identified 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section is exceeded, the 
trading desk takes action to bring the trading desk into compliance 
with the limits as promptly as possible after the limit is exceeded;
    (v) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (b) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (vi) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
activity described in this paragraph (b) in accordance with applicable 
law.
    (3) * * *
    (i) A trading desk or other organizational unit of another banking 
entity is not a client, customer, or counterparty of the trading desk 
if that other entity has trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion 
or more as measured in accordance with the methodology described in 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  248.2 of this part, unless:
* * * * *

[[Page 33568]]

    (6) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.
    (i) Risk limits.
    (A) A banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section with respect to the purchase or 
sale of a financial instrument if the banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (6)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's market making-related activities, on 
the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risks of its market-maker positions;
    (2) Amount, types, and risks of the products, instruments, and 
exposures the trading desk may use for risk management purposes;
    (3) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
financial exposure; and
    (4) Period of time a financial instrument may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the Board on an ongoing basis. Any review of 
such limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed 
not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the Board (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and 
(B) any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case 
in the form and manner as directed by the Board.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the Board if the Board 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The Board will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
0
18. Amend Sec.  248.5 by revising paragraph (b), the introductory text 
of paragraph (c)(1); and adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:

Sec.  248.5   Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities.

* * * * *
    (b) Requirements.
    (1) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
has significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted under 
paragraph (a) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program required by subpart D of 
this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking entity's 
compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures regarding 
the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used for hedging, 
including documentation indicating what positions, contracts or other 
holdings a particular trading desk may use in its risk-mitigating 
hedging activities, as well as position and aging limits with respect 
to such positions, contracts or other holdings;
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (C) The conduct of analysis and independent testing designed to 
ensure that the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used 
for hedging may reasonably be expected to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risk(s) being hedged;
    (ii) The risk-mitigating hedging activity:
    (A) Is conducted in accordance with the written policies, 
procedures, and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section;
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity that:
    (1) Is consistent with the written hedging policies and procedures 
required under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
    (2) Is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risks that develop over time from the risk-
mitigating hedging activities undertaken under this section and the 
underlying positions, contracts, and other holdings of the banking 
entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the underlying and 
hedging positions, contracts and other holdings of the banking entity 
and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (3) Requires ongoing recalibration of the hedging activity by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (iii) The compensation arrangements of persons performing risk-
mitigating hedging activities are designed not to reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (2) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
does not have significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted 
under paragraph (a) of this section only if the risk-mitigating hedging 
activity:
    (i) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (ii) Is subject, as appropriate, to ongoing recalibration by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (c) * * * (1) A banking entity that has significant trading assets 
and liabilities must comply with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) 
and (3) of this section, unless the requirements of paragraph (c)(4) of 
this section are met, with respect to any purchase or sale of financial 
instruments made in reliance

[[Page 33569]]

on this section for risk-mitigating hedging purposes that is:
* * * * *
    (4) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section 
do not apply to the purchase or sale of a financial instrument 
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section if:
    (i) The financial instrument purchased or sold is identified on a 
written list of pre-approved financial instruments that are commonly 
used by the trading desk for the specific type of hedging activity for 
which the financial instrument is being purchased or sold; and
    (ii) At the time the financial instrument is purchased or sold, the 
hedging activity (including the purchase or sale of the financial 
instrument) complies with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the 
trading desk purchasing or selling the financial instrument for hedging 
activities undertaken for one or more other trading desks. The hedging 
limits shall be appropriate for the:
    (A) Size, types, and risks of the hedging activities commonly 
undertaken by the trading desk;
    (B) Financial instruments purchased and sold for hedging activities 
by the trading desk; and
    (C) Levels and duration of the risk exposures being hedged.
0
19. Amend Sec.  248.6 by revising paragraph (e)(3) and removing 
paragraph (e)(6) to read as follows:

Sec.  248.6   Other permitted proprietary trading activities.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) A purchase or sale by a banking entity is permitted for 
purposes of this paragraph (e) if:
    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including relevant personnel) is not located in the United States 
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.
* * * * *

Subpart C--Covered Funds Activities and Investments

Sec.  248.10  [Amended]

0
20. Section 248.10 is amended by:
0
a. In paragraph (c)(8)(i)(A) revising the reference to ``Sec.  
248.2(s)'' to read ``Sec.  248.2(u)'';
0
b. Removing paragraph (d)(1);
0
c. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(2) through (d)(10) as paragraphs (d)(1) 
through (d)(9);
0
d. In paragraph (d)(5)(i)(G) revising the reference to ``(d)(6)(i)(A)'' 
to read ``(d)(5)(i)(A)''; and
0
e. In paragraph (d)(9) revising the reference to ``(d)(9)'' to read 
``(d)(8)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)(A)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)(A)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)''
0
21. Section 248.11 is amended by revising paragraph (c) as follows:

Sec.  248.11  Permitted organizing and offering, underwriting, and 
market making with respect to a covered fund.

* * * * *
    (c) Underwriting and market making in ownership interests of a 
covered fund. The prohibition contained in Sec.  248.10(a) of this 
subpart does not apply to a banking entity's underwriting activities or 
market making-related activities involving a covered fund so long as:
    (1) Those activities are conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Sec.  248.4(a) or Sec.  248.4(b) of subpart B, 
respectively; and
    (2) With respect to any banking entity (or any affiliate thereof) 
that: Acts as a sponsor, investment adviser or commodity trading 
advisor to a particular covered fund or otherwise acquires and retains 
an ownership interest in such covered fund in reliance on paragraph (a) 
of this section; or acquires and retains an ownership interest in such 
covered fund and is either a securitizer, as that term is used in 
section 15G(a)(3) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11(a)(3)), or is 
acquiring and retaining an ownership interest in such covered fund in 
compliance with section 15G of that Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11) and the 
implementing regulations issued thereunder each as permitted by 
paragraph (b) of this section, then in each such case any ownership 
interests acquired or retained by the banking entity and its affiliates 
in connection with underwriting and market making related activities 
for that particular covered fund are included in the calculation of 
ownership interests permitted to be held by the banking entity and its 
affiliates under the limitations of Sec.  248.12(a)(2)(ii); Sec.  
248.12(a)(2)(iii), and Sec.  248.12(d) of this subpart.

Sec.  248.12  (Amended)

0
22. Section 248.12 is amended by
0
a. In paragraphs (c)(1) and (d) removing the references to ``Sec.  
248.10(d)(6)(ii)'' and replacing with ``Sec.  248.10(d)(5)(ii)'';
0
b. Removing paragraph (e)(2)(vii); and
0
c. Redesignating the second instance of paragraph (e)(2)(vi) as 
paragraph (e)(2)(vii).
0
23. Section 248.13 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(3) and 
removing paragraph (b)(4)(iv) to read as follows:

Sec.  248.13   Other permitted covered fund activities and investments.

    (a) Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities. (1) The 
prohibition contained in Sec.  248.10(a) of this subpart does not apply 
with respect to an ownership interest in a covered fund acquired or 
retained by a banking entity that is designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks to the banking 
entity in connection with:
    (i) A compensation arrangement with an employee of the banking 
entity or an affiliate thereof that directly provides investment 
advisory, commodity trading advisory or other services to the covered 
fund; or
    (ii) A position taken by the banking entity when acting as 
intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund.
    (2) Requirements. The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity are permitted under this paragraph (a) only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program in accordance with subpart 
D of this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking 
entity's compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures; and
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (ii) The acquisition or retention of the ownership interest:
    (A) Is made in accordance with the written policies, procedures, 
and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedge, is designed to reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks arising (1) out of a transaction conducted solely to accommodate 
a specific customer request with respect to the covered fund

[[Page 33570]]

or (2) in connection with the compensation arrangement with the 
employee that directly provides investment advisory, commodity trading 
advisory, or other services to the covered fund;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section; and
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity.
    (iii) With respect to risk-mitigating hedging activity conducted 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i), the compensation arrangement relates 
solely to the covered fund in which the banking entity or any affiliate 
has acquired an ownership interest pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) and 
such compensation arrangement provides that any losses incurred by the 
banking entity on such ownership interest will be offset by 
corresponding decreases in amounts payable under such compensation 
arrangement.
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) An ownership interest in a covered fund is not offered for sale 
or sold to a resident of the United States for purposes of paragraph 
(b)(1)(iii) of this section only if it is not sold and has not been 
sold pursuant to an offering that targets residents of the United 
States in which the banking entity or any affiliate of the banking 
entity participates. If the banking entity or an affiliate sponsors or 
serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, investment 
adviser, commodity pool operator or commodity trading advisor to a 
covered fund, then the banking entity or affiliate will be deemed for 
purposes of this paragraph (b)(3) to participate in any offer or sale 
by the covered fund of ownership interests in the covered fund.
* * * * *
0
24. Section 248.14 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) as 
follows:

Sec.  248.14  Limitations on relationships with a covered fund.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (B) The chief executive officer (or equivalent officer) of the 
banking entity certifies in writing annually no later than March 31 to 
the Board (with a duty to update the certification if the information 
in the certification materially changes) that the banking entity does 
not, directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the 
obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any covered fund 
in which such covered fund invests; and
* * * * *

Subpart D--Compliance Program Requirement; Violations

0
25. Section 248.20 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising the introductory language of paragraph (b);
0
c. Revising paragraph (c);
0
d. Revising paragraph (d);
0
e. Revising the introductory language of paragraph (e);
0
f. Revising paragraph (f)(2); and
0
g. Adding new paragraphs (g) and (h).
    The revisions are as follows:

Sec.  248.20  Program for compliance; reporting.

    (a) Program requirement. Each banking entity (other than a banking 
entity with limited trading assets and liabilities) shall develop and 
provide for the continued administration of a compliance program 
reasonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the 
prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered fund 
activities and investments set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and 
this part. The terms, scope, and detail of the compliance program shall 
be appropriate for the types, size, scope, and complexity of activities 
and business structure of the banking entity.
    (b) Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. With respect to a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the compliance program required by paragraph 
(a) of this section, at a minimum, shall include:
* * * * *
    (c) CEO attestation. (1) The CEO of a banking entity described in 
paragraph (2) must, based on a review by the CEO of the banking entity, 
attest in writing to the Board, each year no later than March 31, that 
the banking entity has in place processes reasonably designed to 
achieve compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. In the 
case of a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign banking entity, the 
attestation may be provided for the entire U.S. operations of the 
foreign banking entity by the senior management officer of the U.S. 
operations of the foreign banking entity who is located in the United 
States.
    (2) The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) of this section apply to a 
banking entity if:
    (i) The banking entity does not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The Board notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the requirements contained in paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
    (d) Reporting requirements under the Appendix to this part. (1) A 
banking entity engaged in proprietary trading activity permitted under 
subpart B shall comply with the reporting requirements described in the 
Appendix, if:
    (i) The banking entity has significant trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The Board notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the reporting requirements contained in the Appendix.
    (2) Frequency of reporting. Unless the Board notifies the banking 
entity in writing that it must report on a different basis, a banking 
entity with $50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities (as 
calculated in accordance with the methodology described in the 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  248.2 of this part of this part) shall report the information 
required by the Appendix for each calendar month within 20 days of the 
end of each calendar month. Any other banking entity subject to the 
Appendix shall report the information required by the Appendix for each 
calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of that calendar quarter 
unless the Board notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
report on a different basis.
    (e) Additional documentation for covered funds. A banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities shall maintain records 
that include:
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) Banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. 
A banking entity with moderate trading assets and liabilities may 
satisfy the requirements of this section by including in its existing 
compliance policies and procedures appropriate references to the 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and this part and adjustments 
as appropriate given the activities, size, scope, and complexity of the 
banking entity.
    (g) Rebuttable presumption of compliance for banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Rebuttable presumption. Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, a banking entity with limited trading assets and liabilities 
shall be presumed to be compliant with subpart B and subpart C and 
shall have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with this part on an 
ongoing basis.
    (2) Rebuttal of presumption. (i) If upon examination or audit, the 
Board determines that the banking entity has engaged in proprietary 
trading or

[[Page 33571]]

covered fund activities that are otherwise prohibited under subpart B 
or subpart C, the Board may require the banking entity to be treated 
under this part as if it did not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
    (ii) Notice and Response Procedures.
    (A) Notice. The Board will notify the banking entity in writing of 
any determination pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section to 
rebut the presumption described in this paragraph (g) and will provide 
an explanation of the determination.
    (B) Response. (1) The banking entity may respond to any or all 
items in the notice described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii)(A) of this 
section. The response should include any matters that the banking 
entity would have the Board consider in deciding whether the banking 
entity has engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund activities 
prohibited under subpart B or subpart C. The response must be in 
writing and delivered to the designated Board official within 30 days 
after the date on which the banking entity received the notice. The 
Board may shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the Board, 
the activities or condition of the banking entity so requires, provided 
that the banking entity is informed promptly of the new time period, or 
with the consent of the banking entity. In its discretion, the Board 
may extend the time period for good cause.
    (2) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the Board shall constitute a waiver of any 
objections to the Board's determination.
    (C) After the close of banking entity's response period, the Board 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the Board's determination that banking entity has engaged in 
proprietary trading or covered fund activities prohibited under subpart 
B or subpart C. The banking entity will be notified of the decision in 
writing. The notice will include an explanation of the decision.
    (h) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this part, the Board retains its authority to require a banking 
entity without significant trading assets and liabilities to apply any 
requirements of this part that would otherwise apply if the banking 
entity had significant or moderate trading assets and liabilities if 
the Board determines that the size or complexity of the banking 
entity's trading or investment activities, or the risk of evasion of 
subpart B or subpart C, does not warrant a presumption of compliance 
under paragraph (g) of this section or treatment as a banking entity 
with moderate trading assets and liabilities, as applicable.
0
26. Remove Appendix A and Appendix B to Part 248 and add Appendix to 
Part 248--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for Covered Trading 
Activities to read as follows:

Appendix to Part 248--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for 
Covered Trading Activities

I. Purpose

    a. This appendix sets forth reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements that certain banking entities must satisfy in 
connection with the restrictions on proprietary trading set forth in 
subpart B (``proprietary trading restrictions''). Pursuant to Sec.  
248.20(d), this appendix applies to a banking entity that, together 
with its affiliates and subsidiaries, has significant trading assets 
and liabilities. These entities are required to (i) furnish periodic 
reports to the Board regarding a variety of quantitative 
measurements of their covered trading activities, which vary 
depending on the scope and size of covered trading activities, and 
(ii) create and maintain records documenting the preparation and 
content of these reports. The requirements of this appendix must be 
incorporated into the banking entity's internal compliance program 
under Sec.  248.20.
    b. The purpose of this appendix is to assist banking entities 
and the Board in:
    (i) Better understanding and evaluating the scope, type, and 
profile of the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (ii) Monitoring the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (iii) Identifying covered trading activities that warrant 
further review or examination by the banking entity to verify 
compliance with the proprietary trading restrictions;
    (iv) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of 
trading desks engaged in market making-related activities subject to 
Sec.  248.4(b) are consistent with the requirements governing 
permitted market making-related activities;
    (v) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of trading 
desks that are engaged in permitted trading activity subject to 
Sec. Sec.  248.4; 248.5, or 248.6(a)-(b) (i.e., underwriting and 
market making-related related activity, risk-mitigating hedging, or 
trading in certain government obligations) are consistent with the 
requirement that such activity not result, directly or indirectly, 
in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading 
strategies;
    (vi) Identifying the profile of particular covered trading 
activities of the banking entity, and the individual trading desks 
of the banking entity, to help establish the appropriate frequency 
and scope of examination by the Board of such activities; and
    (vii) Assessing and addressing the risks associated with the 
banking entity's covered trading activities.
    c. Information that must be furnished pursuant to this appendix 
is not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the 
identification of permissible or impermissible activities.
    d. In addition to the quantitative measurements required in this 
appendix, a banking entity may need to develop and implement other 
quantitative measurements in order to effectively monitor its 
covered trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and this part and to have an effective compliance program, as 
required by Sec.  248.20. The effectiveness of particular 
quantitative measurements may differ based on the profile of the 
banking entity's businesses in general and, more specifically, of 
the particular trading desk, including types of instruments traded, 
trading activities and strategies, and history and experience (e.g., 
whether the trading desk is an established, successful market maker 
or a new entrant to a competitive market). In all cases, banking 
entities must ensure that they have robust measures in place to 
identify and monitor the risks taken in their trading activities, to 
ensure that the activities are within risk tolerances established by 
the banking entity, and to monitor and examine for compliance with 
the proprietary trading restrictions in this part.
    e. On an ongoing basis, banking entities must carefully monitor, 
review, and evaluate all furnished quantitative measurements, as 
well as any others that they choose to utilize in order to maintain 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. All 
measurement results that indicate a heightened risk of impermissible 
proprietary trading, including with respect to otherwise-permitted 
activities under Sec. Sec.  248.4 through 248.6(a)-(b), or that 
result in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk 
trading strategies, must be escalated within the banking entity for 
review, further analysis, explanation to the Board, and remediation, 
where appropriate. The quantitative measurements discussed in this 
appendix should be helpful to banking entities in identifying and 
managing the risks related to their covered trading activities.

II. Definitions

    The terms used in this appendix have the same meanings as set 
forth in Sec. Sec.  248.2 and 248.3. In addition, for purposes of 
this appendix, the following definitions apply:
    Applicability identifies the trading desks for which a banking 
entity is required to calculate and report a particular quantitative 
measurement based on the type of covered trading activity conducted 
by the trading desk.
    Calculation period means the period of time for which a 
particular quantitative measurement must be calculated.
    Comprehensive profit and loss means the net profit or loss of a 
trading desk's material sources of trading revenue over a specific 
period of time, including, for example, any increase or decrease in 
the market value of a trading desk's holdings, dividend income, and 
interest income and expense.
    Covered trading activity means trading conducted by a trading 
desk under Sec. Sec.  248.4, 248.5, 248.6(a), or 248.6(b). A banking 
entity

[[Page 33572]]

may include in its covered trading activity trading conducted under 
Sec. Sec.  248.3(e), 248.6(c), 248.6(d), or 248.6(e).
    Measurement frequency means the frequency with which a 
particular quantitative metric must be calculated and recorded.
    Trading day means a calendar day on which a trading desk is open 
for trading.

III. Reporting and Recordkeeping

a. Scope of Required Reporting

    1. Quantitative measurements. Each banking entity made subject 
to this appendix by Sec.  248.20 must furnish the following 
quantitative measurements, as applicable, for each trading desk of 
the banking entity engaged in covered trading activities and 
calculate these quantitative measurements in accordance with this 
appendix:
    i. Risk and Position Limits and Usage;
    ii. Risk Factor Sensitivities;
    iii. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk;
    iv. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution;
    v. Positions;
    vi. Transaction Volumes; and
    vii. Securities Inventory Aging.
    2. Trading desk information. Each banking entity made subject to 
this appendix by Sec.  __.20 must provide certain descriptive 
information, as further described in this appendix, regarding each 
trading desk engaged in covered trading activities. Quantitative 
measurements identifying information. Each banking entity made 
subject to this appendix by Sec.  248.20 must provide certain 
identifying and descriptive information, as further described in 
this appendix, regarding its quantitative measurements.
    4. Narrative statement. Each banking entity made subject to this 
appendix by Sec.  248.20 must provide a separate narrative 
statement, as further described in this appendix.
    5. File identifying information. Each banking entity made 
subject to this appendix by Sec.  248.20 must provide file 
identifying information in each submission to the Board pursuant to 
this appendix, including the name of the banking entity, the RSSD ID 
assigned to the top-tier banking entity by the Board, and 
identification of the reporting period and creation date and time.

b. Trading Desk Information

    1. Each banking entity must provide descriptive information 
regarding each trading desk engaged in covered trading activities, 
including:
    i. Name of the trading desk used internally by the banking 
entity and a unique identification label for the trading desk;
    ii. Identification of each type of covered trading activity in 
which the trading desk is engaged;
    iii. Brief description of the general strategy of the trading 
desk;
    iv. A list of the types of financial instruments and other 
products purchased and sold by the trading desk; an indication of 
which of these are the main financial instruments or products 
purchased and sold by the trading desk; and, for trading desks 
engaged in market making-related activities under Sec.  248.4(b), 
specification of whether each type of financial instrument is 
included in market-maker positions or not included in market-maker 
positions. In addition, indicate whether the trading desk is 
including in its quantitative measurements products excluded from 
the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  248.3(d)(2) 
and, if so, identify such products;
    v. Identification by complete name of each legal entity that 
serves as a booking entity for covered trading activities conducted 
by the trading desk; and indication of which of the identified legal 
entities are the main booking entities for covered trading 
activities of the trading desk;
    vi. For each legal entity that serves as a booking entity for 
covered trading activities, specification of any of the following 
applicable entity types for that legal entity:
    A. National bank, Federal branch or Federal agency of a foreign 
bank, Federal savings association, Federal savings bank;
    B. State nonmember bank, foreign bank having an insured branch, 
State savings association;
    C. U.S.-registered broker-dealer, U.S.-registered security-based 
swap dealer, U.S.-registered major security-based swap participant;
    D. Swap dealer, major swap participant, derivatives clearing 
organization, futures commission merchant, commodity pool operator, 
commodity trading advisor, introducing broker, floor trader, retail 
foreign exchange dealer;
    E. State member bank;
    F. Bank holding company, savings and loan holding company;
    G. Foreign banking organization as defined in 12 CFR 211.21(o);
    H. Uninsured State-licensed branch or agency of a foreign bank; 
or
    I. Other entity type not listed above, including a subsidiary of 
a legal entity described above where the subsidiary itself is not an 
entity type listed above;
    2. Indication of whether each calendar date is a trading day or 
not a trading day for the trading desk; and
    3. Currency reported and daily currency conversion rate.

c. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information

    1. Each banking entity must provide the following information 
regarding the quantitative measurements:
    i. A Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each limit reported 
pursuant to the Risk and Position Limits and Usage quantitative 
measurement, including the name of the limit, a unique 
identification label for the limit, a description of the limit, 
whether the limit is intraday or end-of-day, the unit of measurement 
for the limit, whether the limit measures risk on a net or gross 
basis, and the type of limit;
    ii. A Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor sensitivity reported pursuant to the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
sensitivity, a unique identification label for the sensitivity, a 
description of the sensitivity, and the sensitivity's risk factor 
change unit;
    iii. A Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor attribution reported pursuant to the Comprehensive Profit and 
Loss Attribution quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
risk factor or other factor, a unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor, a description of the risk factor or 
other factor, and the risk factor or other factor's change unit;
    iv. A Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule that cross-
references, by unique identification label, limits identified in the 
Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule to associated risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule; and
    v. A Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference 
Schedule that cross-references, by unique identification label, risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule to associated risk factor attributions 
identified in the Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule.

d. Narrative Statement

    Each banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  
248.20 must submit in a separate electronic document a Narrative 
Statement to the Board describing any changes in calculation methods 
used, a description of and reasons for changes in the banking 
entity's trading desk structure or trading desk strategies, and when 
any such change occurred. The Narrative Statement must include any 
information the banking entity views as relevant for assessing the 
information reported, such as further description of calculation 
methods used.
    If a banking entity does not have any information to report in a 
Narrative Statement, the banking entity must submit an electronic 
document stating that it does not have any information to report in 
a Narrative Statement.

e. Frequency and Method of Required Calculation and Reporting

    A banking entity must calculate any applicable quantitative 
measurement for each trading day. A banking entity must report the 
Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and each applicable 
quantitative measurement electronically to the Board on the 
reporting schedule established in Sec.  __.20 unless otherwise 
requested by the Board. A banking entity must report the Trading 
Desk Information, the Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information, and each applicable quantitative measurement to the 
Board in accordance with the XML Schema specified and published on 
the Board's website.

f. Recordkeeping

    A banking entity must, for any quantitative measurement 
furnished to the Board pursuant to this appendix and Sec.  
248.20(d), create and maintain records documenting the preparation 
and content of these reports, as

[[Page 33573]]

well as such information as is necessary to permit the Board to 
verify the accuracy of such reports, for a period of five years from 
the end of the calendar year for which the measurement was taken. A 
banking entity must retain the Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk 
Information, and the Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information for a period of five years from the end of the calendar 
year for which the information was reported to the Board.

IV. Quantitative Measurements

a. Risk-Management Measurements

1. Risk and Position Limits and Usage

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk and Position 
Limits are the constraints that define the amount of risk that a 
trading desk is permitted to take at a point in time, as defined by 
the banking entity for a specific trading desk. Usage represents the 
value of the trading desk's risk or positions that are accounted for 
by the current activity of the desk. Risk and position limits and 
their usage are key risk management tools used to control and 
monitor risk taking and include, but are not limited to, the limits 
set out in Sec.  248.4 and Sec.  248.5. A number of the metrics that 
are described below, including ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and 
``Value-at-Risk,'' relate to a trading desk's risk and position 
limits and are useful in evaluating and setting these limits in the 
broader context of the trading desk's overall activities, 
particularly for the market making activities under Sec.  248.4(b) 
and hedging activity under Sec.  248.5. Accordingly, the limits 
required under Sec.  248.4(b)(2)(iii) and Sec.  248.5(b)(1)(i)(A) 
must meet the applicable requirements under Sec.  248.4(b)(2)(iii) 
and Sec.  248.5(b)(1)(i)(A) and also must include appropriate 
metrics for the trading desk limits including, at a minimum, the 
``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and ``Value-at-Risk'' metrics except 
to the extent any of the ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' or ``Value-
at-Risk'' metrics are demonstrably ineffective for measuring and 
monitoring the risks of a trading desk based on the types of 
positions traded by, and risk exposures of, that desk.
    A. A banking entity must provide the following information for 
each limit reported pursuant to this quantitative measurement: The 
unique identification label for the limit reported in the Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedule, the limit size (distinguishing 
between an upper and a lower limit), and the value of usage of the 
limit.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

2. Risk Factor Sensitivities

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk Factor 
Sensitivities are changes in a trading desk's Comprehensive Profit 
and Loss that are expected to occur in the event of a change in one 
or more underlying variables that are significant sources of the 
trading desk's profitability and risk. A banking entity must report 
the risk factor sensitivities that are monitored and managed as part 
of the trading desk's overall risk management policy. Reported risk 
factor sensitivities must be sufficiently granular to account for a 
preponderance of the expected price variation in the trading desk's 
holdings. A banking entity must provide the following information 
for each sensitivity that is reported pursuant to this quantitative 
measurement: The unique identification label for the risk factor 
sensitivity listed in the Risk Factor Sensitivities Information 
Schedule, the change in risk factor used to determine the risk 
factor sensitivity, and the aggregate change in value across all 
positions of the desk given the change in risk factor.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

3. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Value-at-Risk 
(``VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of future financial loss in 
the value of a trading desk's aggregated positions at the ninety-
nine percent confidence level over a one-day period, based on 
current market conditions. For purposes of this appendix, Stressed 
Value-at-Risk (``Stressed VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of 
future financial loss in the value of a trading desk's aggregated 
positions at the ninety-nine percent confidence level over a one-day 
period, based on market conditions during a period of significant 
financial stress.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: For VaR, all trading desks engaged in covered 
trading activities. For Stressed VaR, all trading desks engaged in 
covered trading activities, except trading desks whose covered 
trading activity is conducted exclusively to hedge products excluded 
from the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  
248.3(d)(2).

b. Source-of-Revenue Measurements

1. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss Attribution is an analysis that attributes the daily 
fluctuation in the value of a trading desk's positions to various 
sources. First, the daily profit and loss of the aggregated 
positions is divided into three categories: (i) Profit and loss 
attributable to a trading desk's existing positions that were also 
positions held by the trading desk as of the end of the prior day 
(``existing positions''); (ii) profit and loss attributable to new 
positions resulting from the current day's trading activity (``new 
positions''); and (iii) residual profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to existing positions or new positions. The 
sum of (i), (ii), and (iii) must equal the trading desk's 
comprehensive profit and loss at each point in time.
    A. The comprehensive profit and loss associated with existing 
positions must reflect changes in the value of these positions on 
the applicable day.
    The comprehensive profit and loss from existing positions must 
be further attributed, as applicable, to changes in (i) the specific 
risk factors and other factors that are monitored and managed as 
part of the trading desk's overall risk management policies and 
procedures; and (ii) any other applicable elements, such as cash 
flows, carry, changes in reserves, and the correction, cancellation, 
or exercise of a trade.
    B. For the attribution of comprehensive profit and loss from 
existing positions to specific risk factors and other factors, a 
banking entity must provide the following information for the 
factors that explain the preponderance of the profit or loss changes 
due to risk factor changes: The unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor listed in the Risk Factor Attribution 
Information Schedule, and the profit or loss due to the risk factor 
or other factor change.
    C. The comprehensive profit and loss attributed to new positions 
must reflect commissions and fee income or expense and market gains 
or losses associated with transactions executed on the applicable 
day. New positions include purchases and sales of financial 
instruments and other assets/liabilities and negotiated amendments 
to existing positions. The comprehensive profit and loss from new 
positions may be reported in the aggregate and does not need to be 
further attributed to specific sources.
    D. The portion of comprehensive profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to known sources must be allocated to a 
residual category identified as an unexplained portion of the 
comprehensive profit and loss. Significant unexplained profit and 
loss must be escalated for further investigation and analysis.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

c. Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging 
Measurements

1. Positions

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Positions is the 
value of securities and derivatives positions managed by the trading 
desk. For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, do not 
include in the Positions calculation for ``securities'' those 
securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined 
under subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \421\ A banking entity must 
separately report the trading desk's market value of long securities 
positions, market value of short securities positions, market value 
of derivatives receivables, market value of derivatives payables, 
notional value of derivatives receivables, and notional value of 
derivatives payables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \421\ See Sec. Sec.  248.2(i), (bb). For example, under this 
part, a security-based swap is both a ``security'' and a 
``derivative.'' For purposes of the Positions quantitative 
measurement, security-based swaps are reported as derivatives rather 
than securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  248.4(a) 
or Sec.  248.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

2. Transaction Volumes

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Transaction 
Volumes measures four exclusive categories of covered trading

[[Page 33574]]

activity conducted by a trading desk. A banking entity is required 
to report the value and number of security and derivative 
transactions conducted by the trading desk with: (i) Customers, 
excluding internal transactions; (ii) non-customers, excluding 
internal transactions; (iii) trading desks and other organizational 
units where the transaction is booked in the same banking entity; 
and (iv) trading desks and other organizational units where the 
transaction is booked into an affiliated banking entity. For 
securities, value means gross market value. For derivatives, value 
means gross notional value. For purposes of calculating the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, do not include in the 
Transaction Volumes calculation for ``securities'' those securities 
that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined under 
subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \422\ Further, for purposes of the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, a customer of a 
trading desk that relies on Sec.  248.4(a) to conduct underwriting 
activity is a market participant identified in Sec.  248.4(a)(7), 
and a customer of a trading desk that relies on Sec.  248.4(b) to 
conduct market making-related activity is a market participant 
identified in Sec.  248.4(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \422\ See Sec. Sec.  248.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  248.4(a) 
or Sec.  248.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

3. Securities Inventory Aging

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Securities 
Inventory Aging generally describes a schedule of the market value 
of the trading desk's securities positions and the amount of time 
that those securities positions have been held. Securities Inventory 
Aging must measure the age profile of a trading desk's securities 
positions for the following periods: 0-30 Calendar days; 31-60 
calendar days; 61-90 calendar days; 91-180 calendar days; 181-360 
calendar days; and greater than 360 calendar days. Securities 
Inventory Aging includes two schedules, a security asset-aging 
schedule, and a security liability-aging schedule. For purposes of 
the Securities Inventory Aging quantitative measurement, do not 
include securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are 
defined under subpart A.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \423\ See Sec. Sec.  248.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  248.4(a) 
or Sec.  248.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making 
related activity, respectively.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Chapter III

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the Common Preamble, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation proposes to amend chapter III of Title 
12, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 351--PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN INTERESTS IN AND 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH COVERED FUNDS

0
27. The authority citation for Part 351 continues to read as follows:

     Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1851; 1811 et seq.; 3101 et seq.; and 
5412.

0
28. Revise Sec.  351.2 to read as follows:

Sec.  351.2  Definitions.

    Unless otherwise specified, for purposes of this part:
    (a) Affiliate has the same meaning as in section 2(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(k)).
    (b) Applicable accounting standards means U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles, or such other accounting standards applicable to 
a banking entity that the [Agency] determines are appropriate and that 
the banking entity uses in the ordinary course of its business in 
preparing its consolidated financial statements.
    (c) Bank holding company has the same meaning as in section 2 of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841).
    (d) Banking entity. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of 
this section, banking entity means:
    (i) Any insured depository institution;
    (ii) Any company that controls an insured depository institution;
    (iii) Any company that is treated as a bank holding company for 
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 
U.S.C. 3106); and
    (iv) Any affiliate or subsidiary of any entity described in 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.
    (2) Banking entity does not include:
    (i) A covered fund that is not itself a banking entity under 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section;
    (ii) A portfolio company held under the authority contained in 
section 4(k)(4)(H) or (I) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(H), 
(I)), or any portfolio concern, as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, that is 
controlled by a small business investment company, as defined in 
section 103(3) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 
662), so long as the portfolio company or portfolio concern is not 
itself a banking entity under paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of 
this section; or
    (iii) The FDIC acting in its corporate capacity or as conservator 
or receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
    (e) Board means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
    (f) CFTC means the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    (g) Dealer has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(5) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5)).
    (h) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3(c) 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (i) Derivative. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2) of this 
section, derivative means:
    (i) Any swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68));
    (ii) Any purchase or sale of a commodity, that is not an excluded 
commodity, for deferred shipment or delivery that is intended to be 
physically settled;
    (iii) Any foreign exchange forward (as that term is defined in 
section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)) or 
foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined in section 1a(25) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25));
    (iv) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency 
described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(C)(i));
    (v) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other 
than foreign currency described in section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D)(i)); and
    (vi) Any transaction authorized under section 19 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 23(a) or (b));
    (2) A derivative does not include:
    (i) Any consumer, commercial, or other agreement, contract, or 
transaction that the CFTC and SEC have further defined by joint 
regulation, interpretation, guidance, or other action as not within the 
definition of swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68)); or
    (ii) Any identified banking product, as defined in section 402(b) 
of the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. 27(b)), 
that is subject to section 403(a) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    (j) Employee includes a member of the immediate family of the 
employee.
    (k) Exchange Act means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    (l) Excluded commodity has the same meaning as in section 1a(19) of 
the

[[Page 33575]]

Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(19)).
    (m) FDIC means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    (n) Federal banking agencies means the Board, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.
    (o) Foreign banking organization has the same meaning as in section 
211.21(o) of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21(o)), but does not 
include a foreign bank, as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)), that is 
organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, or the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (p) Foreign insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, 
or a similar official or agency, of any country other than the United 
States that is engaged in the supervision of insurance companies under 
foreign insurance law.
    (q) General account means all of the assets of an insurance company 
except those allocated to one or more separate accounts.
    (r) Insurance company means a company that is organized as an 
insurance company, primarily and predominantly engaged in writing 
insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by insurance companies, 
subject to supervision as such by a state insurance regulator or a 
foreign insurance regulator, and not operated for the purpose of 
evading the provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1851).
    (s) Insured depository institution has the same meaning as in 
section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)), 
but does not include an insured depository institution that is 
described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(D)).
    (t) Limited trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to a 
banking entity, that:
    (1) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) the average gross sum of which over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1,000,000,000; and
    (2) The FDIC has not determined pursuant to Sec.  351.20(g) or (h) 
of this part that the banking entity should not be treated as having 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (u) Loan means any loan, lease, extension of credit, or secured or 
unsecured receivable that is not a security or derivative.
    (v) Moderate trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to 
a banking entity, that the banking entity does not have significant 
trading assets and liabilities or limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
    (w) Primary financial regulatory agency has the same meaning as in 
section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5301(12)).
    (x) Purchase includes any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise 
acquire. For security futures products, purchase includes any contract, 
agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect to a 
commodity future, purchase includes any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, purchase 
includes the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled maturity 
date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance of, or 
extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as the 
context may require.
    (y) Qualifying foreign banking organization means a foreign banking 
organization that qualifies as such under section 211.23(a), (c) or (e) 
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.23(a), (c), or (e)).
    (z) SEC means the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (aa) Sale and sell each include any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of. For security futures products, such terms include any 
contract, agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect 
to a commodity future, such terms include any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, such 
terms include the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled 
maturity date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance 
of, or extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as 
the context may require.
    (bb) Security has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(10) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10)).
    (cc) Security-based swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 
3(a)(71) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
    (dd) Security future has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(55) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(55)).
    (ee) Separate account means an account established and maintained 
by an insurance company in connection with one or more insurance 
contracts to hold assets that are legally segregated from the insurance 
company's other assets, under which income, gains, and losses, whether 
or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in 
accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against 
such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the 
insurance company.
    (ff) Significant trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Significant trading assets and liabilities means, with respect 
to a banking entity, that:
    (i) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities the average gross sum of 
which over the previous consecutive four quarters, as measured as of 
the last day of each of the four previous calendar quarters, equals or 
exceeds $10,000,000,000; or
    (ii) The FDIC has determined pursuant to Sec.  351.20(h) of this 
part that the banking entity should be treated as having significant 
trading assets and liabilities.
    (2) With respect to a banking entity other than a banking entity 
described in paragraph (3), trading assets and liabilities for purposes 
of this paragraph (ff) means trading assets and liabilities (excluding 
trading assets and liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed 
by the United States or any agency of the United States) on a worldwide 
consolidated basis.
    (3)(i) With respect to a banking entity that is a foreign banking 
organization or a subsidiary of a foreign banking organization, trading 
assets and liabilities for purposes of this paragraph (ff) means the 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) of the combined U.S. operations of 
the top-tier foreign banking organization (including all subsidiaries, 
affiliates, branches, and agencies of the foreign banking organization 
operating, located, or organized in the United States).
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (ff)(3)(i) of this section, a U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary of a banking entity is located in the 
United States; however, the foreign bank that operates or controls that 
branch, agency, or subsidiary is not considered to be located in the 
United States solely by virtue of operating or controlling the U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary.
    (gg) State means any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States 
Virgin Islands, and the

[[Page 33576]]

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (hh) Subsidiary has the same meaning as in section 2(d) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(d)).
    (ii) State insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, or 
a similar official or agency, of a State that is engaged in the 
supervision of insurance companies under State insurance law.
    (jj) Swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 1(a)(49) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(49)).
0
29. Amend Sec.  351.3 by:
0
 a. Revising paragraph (b);
0
 b. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as paragraphs (d) through 
(f);
0
 c. Adding a new paragraph (c);
0
 d. Revising paragraph (e)(3);
0
 e. Adding paragraph (e)(10);
0
f. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) through (f)(13) as paragraphs (f)(6) 
through (f)(14);
0
 g. Adding a new paragraph (f)(5); and
0
h. Adding paragraph (g).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  351.3   Prohibition on proprietary trading.

* * * * *
    (b) Definition of trading account. Trading account means any 
account that is used by a banking entity to:
    (1)(i) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are 
both market risk capital rule covered positions and trading positions 
(or hedges of other market risk capital rule covered positions), if the 
banking entity, or any affiliate of the banking entity, is an insured 
depository institution, bank holding company, or savings and loan 
holding company, and calculates risk-based capital ratios under the 
market risk capital rule; or
    (ii) With respect to a banking entity that is not, and is not 
controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is, located 
in or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, 
purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are subject to 
capital requirements under a market risk framework established by the 
home-country supervisor that is consistent with the market risk 
framework published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as 
amended from time to time.
    (2) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments for any 
purpose, if the banking entity:
    (i) Is licensed or registered, or is required to be licensed or 
registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such; or
    (ii) Is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent 
the instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities 
of such business; or
    (3) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments, with 
respect to a financial instrument that is recorded at fair value on a 
recurring basis under applicable accounting standards.
    (c) Presumption of compliance. (1)(i) Each trading desk that does 
not purchase or sell financial instruments for a trading account 
defined in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section may calculate 
the net gain or net loss on the trading desk's portfolio of financial 
instruments each business day, reflecting realized and unrealized gains 
and losses since the previous business day, based on the banking 
entity's fair value for such financial instruments.
    (ii) If the sum of the absolute values of the daily net gain and 
loss figures determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
section for the preceding 90-calendar-day period does not exceed $25 
million, the activities of the trading desk shall be presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (2) The FDIC may rebut the presumption of compliance in paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this section by providing written notice to the banking 
entity that the FDIC has determined that one or more of the banking 
entity's activities violates the prohibitions under subpart B.
    (3) If a trading desk operating pursuant to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of 
this section exceeds the $25 million threshold in that paragraph at any 
point, the banking entity shall, in accordance with any policies and 
procedures adopted by the FDIC:
    (i) Promptly notify the FDIC;
    (ii) Demonstrate that the trading desk's purchases and sales of 
financial instruments comply with subpart B; and
    (iii) Demonstrate, with respect to the trading desk, how the 
banking entity will maintain compliance with subpart B on an ongoing 
basis.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) Any purchase or sale of a security, foreign exchange forward 
(as that term is defined in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)), foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined 
in section 1a(25) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25)), or 
physically-settled cross-currency swap, by a banking entity for the 
purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan of the banking entity that, with respect to 
such financial instruments:
    (i) Specifically contemplates and authorizes the particular 
financial instruments to be used for liquidity management purposes, the 
amount, types, and risks of these financial instruments that are 
consistent with liquidity management, and the liquidity circumstances 
in which the particular financial instruments may or must be used;
    (ii) Requires that any purchase or sale of financial instruments 
contemplated and authorized by the plan be principally for the purpose 
of managing the liquidity of the banking entity, and not for the 
purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from actual or expected 
short-term price movements, realizing short-term arbitrage profits, or 
hedging a position taken for such short-term purposes;
    (iii) Requires that any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes be highly liquid and limited to financial 
instruments the market, credit, and other risks of which the banking 
entity does not reasonably expect to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements;
    (iv) Limits any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes, together with any other instruments 
purchased or sold for such purposes, to an amount that is consistent 
with the banking entity's near-term funding needs, including deviations 
from normal operations of the banking entity or any affiliate thereof, 
as estimated and documented pursuant to methods specified in the plan;
    (v) Includes written policies and procedures, internal controls, 
analysis, and independent testing to ensure that the purchase and sale 
of financial instruments that are not permitted under Sec. Sec.  
351.6(a) or (b) of this subpart are for the purpose of liquidity 
management and in accordance with the liquidity management plan 
described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section; and
    (vi) Is consistent with the FDIC's supervisory requirements, 
guidance, and expectations regarding liquidity management;
* * * * *
    (10) Any purchase (or sale) of one or more financial instruments 
that was made in error by a banking entity in the course of conducting 
a permitted or excluded activity or is a subsequent

[[Page 33577]]

transaction to correct such an error, and the erroneously purchased (or 
sold) financial instrument is promptly transferred to a separately-
managed trade error account for disposition.
    (f) * * *
    (5) Cross-currency swap means a swap in which one party exchanges 
with another party principal and interest rate payments in one currency 
for principal and interest rate payments in another currency, and the 
exchange of principal occurs on the date the swap is entered into, with 
a reversal of the exchange of principal at a later date that is agreed 
upon when the swap is entered into.
* * * * *
    (g) Reservation of Authority: (1) The FDIC may determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, that a purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments by a banking entity either is or is not for the trading 
account as defined at 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    (2) Notice and Response Procedures.
    (i) Notice. When the FDIC determines that the purchase or sale of 
one or more financial instruments is for the trading account under 
paragraph (g)(1) of this section, the [Agency] will notify the banking 
entity in writing of the determination and provide an explanation of 
the determination.
    (ii) Response.
    (A) The banking entity may respond to any or all items in the 
notice. The response should include any matters that the banking entity 
would have the FDIC consider in deciding whether the purchase or sale 
is for the trading account. The response must be in writing and 
delivered to the designated FDIC official within 30 days after the date 
on which the banking entity received the notice. The FDIC may shorten 
the time period when, in the opinion of the FDIC, the activities or 
condition of the banking entity so requires, provided that the banking 
entity is informed promptly of the new time period, or with the consent 
of the banking entity. In its discretion, the FDIC may extend the time 
period for good cause.
    (B) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the FDIC shall constitute a waiver of any 
objections to the FDIC's determination.
    (iii) After the close of banking entity's response period, the FDIC 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the FDIC's determination that the purchase or sale of one or more 
financial instruments is for the trading account. The banking entity 
will be notified of the decision in writing. The notice will include an 
explanation of the decision.
0
30. Amend Sec.  351.4 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(2);
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(8);
0
c. Revising paragraph (b)(2);
0
d. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
e. In paragraph (b)(5) removing ``inventory'' wherever it appears and 
adding ``positions'' in its place; and
0
f. Adding paragraph (b)(6).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  351.4  Permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The underwriting activities of a banking entity 
are permitted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity is acting as an underwriter for a 
distribution of securities and the trading desk's underwriting position 
is related to such distribution;
    (ii)(A) The amount and type of the securities in the trading desk's 
underwriting position are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market 
for the relevant type of security, and
    (B) reasonable efforts are made to sell or otherwise reduce the 
underwriting position within a reasonable period, taking into account 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant type 
of security;
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The products, instruments or exposures each trading desk may 
purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities;
    (B) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section;
    (C) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (D) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis of the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s), and independent 
review of such demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (a) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (v) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in the 
activity described in this paragraph (a) in accordance with applicable 
law.
* * * * *
    (8) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.
    (i) Risk limits.
    (A) A banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A) of this section with respect to the purchase or 
sale of a financial instrument if the banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (8)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's underwriting activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risk of its underwriting position;
    (2) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
underwriting position; and
    (3) Period of time a security may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the FDIC on an ongoing basis. Any review of 
such limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed 
not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the FDIC (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and (B) 
any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by the FDIC.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the FDIC if the FDIC 
determines, based on all

[[Page 33578]]

relevant facts and circumstances, that a trading desk is engaging in 
activity that is not based on the reasonably expected near term demands 
of clients, customers, or counterparties. The FDIC will provide notice 
of any such determination to the banking entity in writing.
    (b) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The market making-related activities of a banking 
entity are permitted under paragraph (b)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The trading desk that establishes and manages the financial 
exposure routinely stands ready to purchase and sell one or more types 
of financial instruments related to its financial exposure and is 
willing and available to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise enter 
into long and short positions in those types of financial instruments 
for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout 
market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant types of financial instruments;
    (ii) The trading desk's market-making related activities are 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant types 
of financial instrument(s).
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The financial instruments each trading desk stands ready to 
purchase and sell in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this 
section;
    (B) The actions the trading desk will take to demonstrably reduce 
or otherwise significantly mitigate promptly the risks of its financial 
exposure consistent with the limits required under paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section; the products, instruments, and 
exposures each trading desk may use for risk management purposes; the 
techniques and strategies each trading desk may use to manage the risks 
of its market making-related activities and positions; and the process, 
strategies, and personnel responsible for ensuring that the actions 
taken by the trading desk to mitigate these risks are and continue to 
be effective;
    (C) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section;
    (D) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (E) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis that the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s) is consistent with 
the requirements of this paragraph (b), and independent review of such 
demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, to the extent that any limit identified 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section is exceeded, the 
trading desk takes action to bring the trading desk into compliance 
with the limits as promptly as possible after the limit is exceeded;
    (v) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (b) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (vi) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
activity described in paragraph (b) of this section in accordance with 
applicable law.
    (3) * * *
    (i) A trading desk or other organizational unit of another banking 
entity is not a client, customer, or counterparty of the trading desk 
if that other entity has trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion 
or more as measured in accordance with the methodology described in 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  351.2 of this part, unless:
* * * * *
    (6) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.--(i) Risk limits. (A) A 
banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of paragraph 
(b)(2)(ii) of this section with respect to the purchase or sale of a 
financial instrument if the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (6)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's market making-related activities, on 
the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risks of its market-maker positions;
    (2) Amount, types, and risks of the products, instruments, and 
exposures the trading desk may use for risk management purposes;
    (3) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
financial exposure; and
    (4) Period of time a financial instrument may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the FDIC on an ongoing basis. Any review of 
such limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed 
not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the FDIC (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and (B) 
any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by the FDIC.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the FDIC if the FDIC 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The FDIC will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
0
31. Amend Sec.  351.5 by revising paragraph (b), the introductory text 
of paragraph (c)(1), and adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:

Sec.  351.5   Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities.

* * * * *
    (b) Requirements. (1) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity that has significant trading assets and liabilities are 
permitted under paragraph (a) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program required by subpart D of 
this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking entity's 
compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures regarding 
the positions, techniques and strategies that

[[Page 33579]]

may be used for hedging, including documentation indicating what 
positions, contracts or other holdings a particular trading desk may 
use in its risk-mitigating hedging activities, as well as position and 
aging limits with respect to such positions, contracts or other 
holdings;
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (C) The conduct of analysis and independent testing designed to 
ensure that the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used 
for hedging may reasonably be expected to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risk(s) being hedged;
    (ii) The risk-mitigating hedging activity:
    (A) Is conducted in accordance with the written policies, 
procedures, and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section;
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity that:
    (1) Is consistent with the written hedging policies and procedures 
required under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
    (2) Is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risks that develop over time from the risk-
mitigating hedging activities undertaken under this section and the 
underlying positions, contracts, and other holdings of the banking 
entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the underlying and 
hedging positions, contracts and other holdings of the banking entity 
and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (3) Requires ongoing recalibration of the hedging activity by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (iii) The compensation arrangements of persons performing risk-
mitigating hedging activities are designed not to reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (2) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
does not have significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted 
under paragraph (a) of this section only if the risk-mitigating hedging 
activity:
    (i) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (ii) Is subject, as appropriate, to ongoing recalibration by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (c) * * * (1) A banking entity that has significant trading assets 
and liabilities must comply with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) 
and (3) of this section, unless the requirements of paragraph (c)(4) of 
this section are met, with respect to any purchase or sale of financial 
instruments made in reliance on this section for risk-mitigating 
hedging purposes that is:
* * * * *
    (4) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section 
do not apply to the purchase or sale of a financial instrument 
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section if:
    (i) The financial instrument purchased or sold is identified on a 
written list of pre-approved financial instruments that are commonly 
used by the trading desk for the specific type of hedging activity for 
which the financial instrument is being purchased or sold; and
    (ii) At the time the financial instrument is purchased or sold, the 
hedging activity (including the purchase or sale of the financial 
instrument) complies with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the 
trading desk purchasing or selling the financial instrument for hedging 
activities undertaken for one or more other trading desks. The hedging 
limits shall be appropriate for the:
    (A) Size, types, and risks of the hedging activities commonly 
undertaken by the trading desk;
    (B) Financial instruments purchased and sold for hedging activities 
by the trading desk; and
    (C) Levels and duration of the risk exposures being hedged.
0
32. Amend Sec.  351.6 by revising paragraph (e)(3), and removing 
paragraph (e)(6) to read as follows:

Sec.  351.6   Other permitted proprietary trading activities.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) A purchase or sale by a banking entity is permitted for 
purposes of this paragraph (e) if:
    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including relevant personnel) is not located in the United States 
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.
* * * * *

Sec.  351.10  [Amended]

0
33. Amend Sec.  351.10 by:
0
a. In paragraph (c)(8)(i)(A) removing Sec.  351.2(s)'' and adding Sec.  
351.2(u)'' in its place;
0
 b. Removing paragraph (d)(1);
0
c. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(2) through (d)(10) as paragraphs (d)(1) 
through (d)(9);
0
 d. In paragraph (d)(5)(i)(G) revising the reference to 
``(d)(6)(i)(A)'' to read ``(d)(5)(i)(A)''; and
0
e. In paragraph (d)(9) revising the reference to ``(d)(9)'' to read 
``(d)(8)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)(A)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)(A)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)''.
0
34. Amend Sec.  351. by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:

[[Page 33580]]

Sec.  351.11   Permitted organizing and offering, underwriting, and 
market making with respect to a covered fund.

* * * * *
    (c) Underwriting and market making in ownership interests of a 
covered fund. The prohibition contained in Sec.  351.10(a) of this 
subpart does not apply to a banking entity's underwriting activities or 
market making-related activities involving a covered fund so long as:
    (1) Those activities are conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Sec.  351.4(a) or Sec.  351.4(b) of subpart B, 
respectively; and
    (2) With respect to any banking entity (or any affiliate thereof) 
that: Acts as a sponsor, investment adviser or commodity trading 
advisor to a particular covered fund or otherwise acquires and retains 
an ownership interest in such covered fund in reliance on paragraph (a) 
of this section; or acquires and retains an ownership interest in such 
covered fund and is either a securitizer, as that term is used in 
section 15G(a)(3) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11(a)(3)), or is 
acquiring and retaining an ownership interest in such covered fund in 
compliance with section 15G of that Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11) and the 
implementing regulations issued thereunder each as permitted by 
paragraph (b) of this section, then in each such case any ownership 
interests acquired or retained by the banking entity and its affiliates 
in connection with underwriting and market making related activities 
for that particular covered fund are included in the calculation of 
ownership interests permitted to be held by the banking entity and its 
affiliates under the limitations of Sec.  351.12(a)(2)(ii); Sec.  
351.12(a)(2)(iii), and Sec.  351.12(d) of this subpart.

Sec.  351.12  [Amended]

0
35. Amend Sec.  351.12 by:
0
a. In paragraphs (c)(1) and (d) removing ``Sec.  351.10(d)(6)(ii)'' to 
adding ``Sec.  351.10(d)(5)(ii)'' in its place;
0
b. Removing paragraph (e)(2)(vii); and
0
c. Redesignating the second instance of paragraph (e)(2)(vi) as 
paragraph (e)(2)(vii).

Sec.  351.13  [Amended]

0
36. Amend Sec.  351.13 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(3) and 
removing paragraph (b)(4)(iv) to read as follows:

Sec.  351.13   Other permitted covered fund activities and investments.

    (a) Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities. (1) The 
prohibition contained in Sec.  351.10(a) of this subpart does not apply 
with respect to an ownership interest in a covered fund acquired or 
retained by a banking entity that is designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks to the banking 
entity in connection with:
    (i) A compensation arrangement with an employee of the banking 
entity or an affiliate thereof that directly provides investment 
advisory, commodity trading advisory or other services to the covered 
fund; or
    (ii) A position taken by the banking entity when acting as 
intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund.
    (2) Requirements. The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity are permitted under this paragraph (a) only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program in accordance with subpart 
D of this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking 
entity's compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures; and
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (ii) The acquisition or retention of the ownership interest:
    (A) Is made in accordance with the written policies, procedures, 
and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedge, is designed to reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks arising:
    (1) out of a transaction conducted solely to accommodate a specific 
customer request with respect to the covered fund; or
    (2) in connection with the compensation arrangement with the 
employee that directly provides investment advisory, commodity trading 
advisory, or other services to the covered fund;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section; and
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity.
    (iii) With respect to risk-mitigating hedging activity conducted 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i), the compensation arrangement relates 
solely to the covered fund in which the banking entity or any affiliate 
has acquired an ownership interest pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) and 
such compensation arrangement provides that any losses incurred by the 
banking entity on such ownership interest will be offset by 
corresponding decreases in amounts payable under such compensation 
arrangement.
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) An ownership interest in a covered fund is not offered for sale 
or sold to a resident of the United States for purposes of paragraph 
(b)(1)(iii) of this section only if it is not sold and has not been 
sold pursuant to an offering that targets residents of the United 
States in which the banking entity or any affiliate of the banking 
entity participates. If the banking entity or an affiliate sponsors or 
serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, investment 
adviser, commodity pool operator or commodity trading advisor to a 
covered fund, then the banking entity or affiliate will be deemed for 
purposes of this paragraph (b)(3) to participate in any offer or sale 
by the covered fund of ownership interests in the covered fund.
* * * * *
0
37. Section 351.14 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) as 
follows:

Sec.  351.14   Limitations on relationships with a covered fund.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (B) The chief executive officer (or equivalent officer) of the 
banking entity certifies in writing annually no later than March 31 to 
the FDIC (with a duty to update the certification if the information in 
the certification materially changes) that the banking entity does not, 
directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the 
obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any covered fund 
in which such covered fund invests; and
* * * * *
0
38. Section 351.20 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising the introductory language of paragraph (b);
0
c. Revising paragraph (c);
0
d. Revising paragraph (d);
0
e. Revising the introductory language of paragraph (e);
0
f. Revising paragraph (f)(2); and
0
g. Adding new paragraphs (g) and (h).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  351.20   Program for compliance; reporting.

    (a) Program requirement. Each banking entity (other than a banking 
entity with limited trading assets and

[[Page 33581]]

liabilities) shall develop and provide for the continued administration 
of a compliance program reasonably designed to ensure and monitor 
compliance with the prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary 
trading and covered fund activities and investments set forth in 
section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. The terms, scope, and detail 
of the compliance program shall be appropriate for the types, size, 
scope, and complexity of activities and business structure of the 
banking entity.
    (b) Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. With respect to a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the compliance program required by paragraph 
(a) of this section, at a minimum, shall include:
* * * * *
    (c) CEO attestation.
    (1) The CEO of a banking entity described in paragraph (2) must, 
based on a review by the CEO of the banking entity, attest in writing 
to the FDIC, each year no later than March 31, that the banking entity 
has in place processes reasonably designed to achieve compliance with 
section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. In the case of a U.S. branch 
or agency of a foreign banking entity, the attestation may be provided 
for the entire U.S. operations of the foreign banking entity by the 
senior management officer of the U.S. operations of the foreign banking 
entity who is located in the United States.
    (2) The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) apply to a banking entity 
if:
    (i) The banking entity does not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The FDIC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the requirements contained in paragraph (c)(1).
    (d) Reporting requirements under the Appendix to this part. (1) A 
banking entity engaged in proprietary trading activity permitted under 
subpart B shall comply with the reporting requirements described in the 
Appendix, if:
    (i) The banking entity has significant trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The FDIC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the reporting requirements contained in the Appendix.
    (2) Frequency of reporting: Unless the FDIC notifies the banking 
entity in writing that it must report on a different basis, a banking 
entity with $50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities (as 
calculated in accordance with the methodology described in the 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  351.2 of this part of this part) shall report the information 
required by the Appendix for each calendar month within 20 days of the 
end of each calendar month. Any other banking entity subject to the 
Appendix shall report the information required by the Appendix for each 
calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of that calendar quarter 
unless the FDIC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
report on a different basis.
    (e) Additional documentation for covered funds. A banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities shall maintain records 
that include:
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) Banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. 
A banking entity with moderate trading assets and liabilities may 
satisfy the requirements of this section by including in its existing 
compliance policies and procedures appropriate references to the 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and this part and adjustments 
as appropriate given the activities, size, scope, and complexity of the 
banking entity.
    (g) Rebuttable presumption of compliance for banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Rebuttable presumption. Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, a banking entity with limited trading assets and liabilities 
shall be presumed to be compliant with subpart B and subpart C and 
shall have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with this part on an 
ongoing basis.
    (2) Rebuttal of presumption.
    (i) If upon examination or audit, the FDIC determines that the 
banking entity has engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund 
activities that are otherwise prohibited under subpart B or subpart C, 
the FDIC may require the banking entity to be treated under this part 
as if it did not have limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (ii) Notice and Response Procedures.
    (A) Notice. The FDIC will notify the banking entity in writing of 
any determination pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section to 
rebut the presumption described in this paragraph (g) and will provide 
an explanation of the determination.
    (B) Response.
    (1) The banking entity may respond to any or all items in the 
notice described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii)(A) of this section. The 
response should include any matters that the banking entity would have 
the FDIC consider in deciding whether the banking entity has engaged in 
proprietary trading or covered fund activities prohibited under subpart 
B or subpart C. The response must be in writing and delivered to the 
designated FDIC official within 30 days after the date on which the 
banking entity received the notice. The FDIC may shorten the time 
period when, in the opinion of the FDIC, the activities or condition of 
the banking entity so requires, provided that the banking entity is 
informed promptly of the new time period, or with the consent of the 
banking entity. In its discretion, the FDIC may extend the time period 
for good cause.
    (2) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the FDIC shall constitute a waiver of any 
objections to the FDIC's determination.
    (C) After the close of banking entity's response period, the FDIC 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the FDIC's determination that banking entity has engaged in proprietary 
trading or covered fund activities prohibited under subpart B or 
subpart C. The banking entity will be notified of the decision in 
writing. The notice will include an explanation of the decision.
    (h) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this part, the FDIC retains its authority to require a banking 
entity without significant trading assets and liabilities to apply any 
requirements of this part that would otherwise apply if the banking 
entity had significant or moderate trading assets and liabilities if 
the FDIC determines that the size or complexity of the banking entity's 
trading or investment activities, or the risk of evasion of subpart B 
or subpart C, does not warrant a presumption of compliance under 
paragraph (g) of this section or treatment as a banking entity with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities, as applicable.
0
39. Remove Appendix A and Appendix B to Part 351 and add Appendix to 
Part 351--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for Covered Trading 
Activities to read as follows:

Appendix to Part 351--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for 
Covered Trading Activities

I. Purpose

    a. This appendix sets forth reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements that certain banking entities must satisfy in 
connection with the restrictions on proprietary trading set forth in 
subpart B (``proprietary trading restrictions''). Pursuant to Sec.  
351.20(d), this appendix applies to a banking entity that, together 
with its affiliates and subsidiaries,

[[Page 33582]]

has significant trading assets and liabilities. These entities are 
required to (i) furnish periodic reports to the FDIC regarding a 
variety of quantitative measurements of their covered trading 
activities, which vary depending on the scope and size of covered 
trading activities, and (ii) create and maintain records documenting 
the preparation and content of these reports. The requirements of 
this appendix must be incorporated into the banking entity's 
internal compliance program under Sec.  351.20.
    b. The purpose of this appendix is to assist banking entities 
and the FDIC in:
    (i) Better understanding and evaluating the scope, type, and 
profile of the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (ii) Monitoring the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (iii) Identifying covered trading activities that warrant 
further review or examination by the banking entity to verify 
compliance with the proprietary trading restrictions;
    (iv) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of 
trading desks engaged in market making-related activities subject to 
Sec.  351.4(b) are consistent with the requirements governing 
permitted market making-related activities;
    (v) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of trading 
desks that are engaged in permitted trading activity subject to 
Sec. Sec.  351.4, 351.5, or 351.6(a)-(b) (i.e., underwriting and 
market making-related related activity, risk-mitigating hedging, or 
trading in certain government obligations) are consistent with the 
requirement that such activity not result, directly or indirectly, 
in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading 
strategies;
    (vi) Identifying the profile of particular covered trading 
activities of the banking entity, and the individual trading desks 
of the banking entity, to help establish the appropriate frequency 
and scope of examination by the FDIC of such activities; and
    (vii) Assessing and addressing the risks associated with the 
banking entity's covered trading activities.
    c. Information that must be furnished pursuant to this appendix 
is not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the 
identification of permissible or impermissible activities.
    d. In addition to the quantitative measurements required in this 
appendix, a banking entity may need to develop and implement other 
quantitative measurements in order to effectively monitor its 
covered trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and this part and to have an effective compliance program, as 
required by Sec.  351.20. The effectiveness of particular 
quantitative measurements may differ based on the profile of the 
banking entity's businesses in general and, more specifically, of 
the particular trading desk, including types of instruments traded, 
trading activities and strategies, and history and experience (e.g., 
whether the trading desk is an established, successful market maker 
or a new entrant to a competitive market). In all cases, banking 
entities must ensure that they have robust measures in place to 
identify and monitor the risks taken in their trading activities, to 
ensure that the activities are within risk tolerances established by 
the banking entity, and to monitor and examine for compliance with 
the proprietary trading restrictions in this part.
    e. On an ongoing basis, banking entities must carefully monitor, 
review, and evaluate all furnished quantitative measurements, as 
well as any others that they choose to utilize in order to maintain 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. All 
measurement results that indicate a heightened risk of impermissible 
proprietary trading, including with respect to otherwise-permitted 
activities under Sec. Sec.  351.4 through 351.6(a)-(b), or that 
result in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk 
trading strategies, must be escalated within the banking entity for 
review, further analysis, explanation to the FDIC, and remediation, 
where appropriate. The quantitative measurements discussed in this 
appendix should be helpful to banking entities in identifying and 
managing the risks related to their covered trading activities.

II. Definitions

    The terms used in this appendix have the same meanings as set 
forth in Sec. Sec.  351.2 and 351.3. In addition, for purposes of 
this appendix, the following definitions apply:
    Applicability identifies the trading desks for which a banking 
entity is required to calculate and report a particular quantitative 
measurement based on the type of covered trading activity conducted 
by the trading desk.
    Calculation period means the period of time for which a 
particular quantitative measurement must be calculated.
    Comprehensive profit and loss means the net profit or loss of a 
trading desk's material sources of trading revenue over a specific 
period of time, including, for example, any increase or decrease in 
the market value of a trading desk's holdings, dividend income, and 
interest income and expense.
    Covered trading activity means trading conducted by a trading 
desk under Sec. Sec.  351.4, 351.5, 351.6(a), or 351.6(b). A banking 
entity may include in its covered trading activity trading conducted 
under Sec. Sec.  351.3(e), 351.6(c), 351.6(d), or 351.6(e).
    Measurement frequency means the frequency with which a 
particular quantitative metric must be calculated and recorded.
    Trading day means a calendar day on which a trading desk is open 
for trading.

III. Reporting and Recordkeeping

a. Scope of Required Reporting

    1. Quantitative measurements. Each banking entity made subject 
to this appendix by Sec.  351.20 must furnish the following 
quantitative measurements, as applicable, for each trading desk of 
the banking entity engaged in covered trading activities and 
calculate these quantitative measurements in accordance with this 
appendix:
    i. Risk and Position Limits and Usage;
    ii. Risk Factor Sensitivities;
    iii. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk;
    iv. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution;
    v. Positions;
    vi. Transaction Volumes; and
    vii. Securities Inventory Aging.
    2. Trading desk information. Each banking entity made subject to 
this appendix by Sec.  351.20 must provide certain descriptive 
information, as further described in this appendix, regarding each 
trading desk engaged in covered trading activities.
    3. Quantitative measurements identifying information. Each 
banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  351.20 must 
provide certain identifying and descriptive information, as further 
described in this appendix, regarding its quantitative measurements.
    4. Narrative statement. Each banking entity made subject to this 
appendix by Sec.  351.20 must provide a separate narrative 
statement, as further described in this appendix.
    5. File identifying information. Each banking entity made 
subject to this appendix by Sec.  351.20 must provide file 
identifying information in each submission to the FDIC pursuant to 
this appendix, including the name of the banking entity, the RSSD ID 
assigned to the top-tier banking entity by the Board, and 
identification of the reporting period and creation date and time.

b. Trading Desk Information

    Each banking entity must provide descriptive information 
regarding each trading desk engaged in covered trading activities, 
including:
    1. Name of the trading desk used internally by the banking 
entity and a unique identification label for the trading desk;
    2. Identification of each type of covered trading activity in 
which the trading desk is engaged;
    3. Brief description of the general strategy of the trading 
desk;
    4. A list of the types of financial instruments and other 
products purchased and sold by the trading desk; an indication of 
which of these are the main financial instruments or products 
purchased and sold by the trading desk; and, for trading desks 
engaged in market making-related activities under Sec.  351.4(b), 
specification of whether each type of financial instrument is 
included in market-maker positions or not included in market-maker 
positions. In addition, indicate whether the trading desk is 
including in its quantitative measurements products excluded from 
the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  351.3(d)(2) 
and, if so, identify such products;
    5. Identification by complete name of each legal entity that 
serves as a booking entity for covered trading activities conducted 
by the trading desk; and indication of which of the identified legal 
entities are the main booking entities for covered trading 
activities of the trading desk;
    6. For each legal entity that serves as a booking entity for 
covered trading activities, specification of any of the following 
applicable entity types for that legal entity:
    i. National bank, Federal branch or Federal agency of a foreign 
bank, Federal savings association, Federal savings bank;
    ii. State nonmember bank, foreign bank having an insured branch, 
State savings association;

[[Page 33583]]

    iii. U.S.-registered broker-dealer, U.S.-registered security-
based swap dealer, U.S.-registered major security-based swap 
participant;
    iv. Swap dealer, major swap participant, derivatives clearing 
organization, futures commission merchant, commodity pool operator, 
commodity trading advisor, introducing broker, floor trader, retail 
foreign exchange dealer;
    v. State member bank;
    vi. Bank holding company, savings and loan holding company;
    vii. Foreign banking organization as defined in 12 CFR 
211.21(o);
    viii. Uninsured State-licensed branch or agency of a foreign 
bank; or
    ix. Other entity type not listed above, including a subsidiary 
of a legal entity described above where the subsidiary itself is not 
an entity type listed above;
    7. Indication of whether each calendar date is a trading day or 
not a trading day for the trading desk; and
    8. Currency reported and daily currency conversion rate.

c. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information

    Each banking entity must provide the following information 
regarding the quantitative measurements:
    1. A Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each limit reported 
pursuant to the Risk and Position Limits and Usage quantitative 
measurement, including the name of the limit, a unique 
identification label for the limit, a description of the limit, 
whether the limit is intraday or end-of-day, the unit of measurement 
for the limit, whether the limit measures risk on a net or gross 
basis, and the type of limit;
    2. A Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor sensitivity reported pursuant to the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
sensitivity, a unique identification label for the sensitivity, a 
description of the sensitivity, and the sensitivity's risk factor 
change unit;
    3. A Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each risk factor 
attribution reported pursuant to the Comprehensive Profit and Loss 
Attribution quantitative measurement, including the name of the risk 
factor or other factor, a unique identification label for the risk 
factor or other factor, a description of the risk factor or other 
factor, and the risk factor or other factor's change unit;
    4. A Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule that cross-
references, by unique identification label, limits identified in the 
Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule to associated risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule; and
    5. A Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference 
Schedule that cross-references, by unique identification label, risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule to associated risk factor attributions 
identified in the Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule.

d. Narrative Statement

    Each banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  
351.20 must submit in a separate electronic document a Narrative 
Statement to the FDIC describing any changes in calculation methods 
used, a description of and reasons for changes in the banking 
entity's trading desk structure or trading desk strategies, and when 
any such change occurred. The Narrative Statement must include any 
information the banking entity views as relevant for assessing the 
information reported, such as further description of calculation 
methods used.
    If a banking entity does not have any information to report in a 
Narrative Statement, the banking entity must submit an electronic 
document stating that it does not have any information to report in 
a Narrative Statement.

e. Frequency and Method of Required Calculation and Reporting

    A banking entity must calculate any applicable quantitative 
measurement for each trading day. A banking entity must report the 
Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and each applicable 
quantitative measurement electronically to the FDIC on the reporting 
schedule established in Sec.  351.20 unless otherwise requested by 
the FDIC. A banking entity must report the Trading Desk Information, 
the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, and each 
applicable quantitative measurement to the FDIC in accordance with 
the XML Schema specified and published on the FDIC's website.

f. Recordkeeping

    A banking entity must, for any quantitative measurement 
furnished to the FDIC pursuant to this appendix and Sec.  351.20(d), 
create and maintain records documenting the preparation and content 
of these reports, as well as such information as is necessary to 
permit the FDIC to verify the accuracy of such reports, for a period 
of five years from the end of the calendar year for which the 
measurement was taken. A banking entity must retain the Narrative 
Statement, the Trading Desk Information, and the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information for a period of five years from 
the end of the calendar year for which the information was reported 
to the FDIC.

IV. Quantitative Measurements

a. Risk-Management Measurements

1. Risk and Position Limits and Usage

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk and Position 
Limits are the constraints that define the amount of risk that a 
trading desk is permitted to take at a point in time, as defined by 
the banking entity for a specific trading desk. Usage represents the 
value of the trading desk's risk or positions that are accounted for 
by the current activity of the desk. Risk and position limits and 
their usage are key risk management tools used to control and 
monitor risk taking and include, but are not limited to, the limits 
set out in Sec.  351.4 and Sec.  351.5. A number of the metrics that 
are described below, including ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and 
``Value-at-Risk,'' relate to a trading desk's risk and position 
limits and are useful in evaluating and setting these limits in the 
broader context of the trading desk's overall activities, 
particularly for the market making activities under Sec.  351.4(b) 
and hedging activity under Sec.  351.5. Accordingly, the limits 
required under Sec.  351.4(b)(2)(iii) and Sec.  351.5(b)(1)(i)(A) 
must meet the applicable requirements under Sec.  351.4(b)(2)(iii) 
and Sec.  351.5(b)(1)(i)(A) and also must include appropriate 
metrics for the trading desk limits including, at a minimum, the 
``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and ``Value-at-Risk'' metrics except 
to the extent any of the ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' or ``Value-
at-Risk'' metrics are demonstrably ineffective for measuring and 
monitoring the risks of a trading desk based on the types of 
positions traded by, and risk exposures of, that desk.
    A. A banking entity must provide the following information for 
each limit reported pursuant to this quantitative measurement: The 
unique identification label for the limit reported in the Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedule, the limit size (distinguishing 
between an upper and a lower limit), and the value of usage of the 
limit.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

2. Risk Factor Sensitivities

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk Factor 
Sensitivities are changes in a trading desk's Comprehensive Profit 
and Loss that are expected to occur in the event of a change in one 
or more underlying variables that are significant sources of the 
trading desk's profitability and risk. A banking entity must report 
the risk factor sensitivities that are monitored and managed as part 
of the trading desk's overall risk management policy. Reported risk 
factor sensitivities must be sufficiently granular to account for a 
preponderance of the expected price variation in the trading desk's 
holdings. A banking entity must provide the following information 
for each sensitivity that is reported pursuant to this quantitative 
measurement: The unique identification label for the risk factor 
sensitivity listed in the Risk Factor Sensitivities Information 
Schedule, the change in risk factor used to determine the risk 
factor sensitivity, and the aggregate change in value across all 
positions of the desk given the change in risk factor.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

3. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Value-at-Risk 
(``VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of future financial loss in 
the value of a trading desk's aggregated positions at the ninety-
nine percent confidence level over a one-day period, based on 
current market conditions. For purposes of this appendix, Stressed

[[Page 33584]]

Value-at-Risk (``Stressed VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of 
future financial loss in the value of a trading desk's aggregated 
positions at the ninety-nine percent confidence level over a one-day 
period, based on market conditions during a period of significant 
financial stress.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: For VaR, all trading desks engaged in covered 
trading activities. For Stressed VaR, all trading desks engaged in 
covered trading activities, except trading desks whose covered 
trading activity is conducted exclusively to hedge products excluded 
from the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  
__.3(d)(2).

b. Source-of-Revenue Measurements

1. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss Attribution is an analysis that attributes the daily 
fluctuation in the value of a trading desk's positions to various 
sources. First, the daily profit and loss of the aggregated 
positions is divided into three categories: (i) Profit and loss 
attributable to a trading desk's existing positions that were also 
positions held by the trading desk as of the end of the prior day 
(``existing positions''); (ii) profit and loss attributable to new 
positions resulting from the current day's trading activity (``new 
positions''); and (iii) residual profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to existing positions or new positions. The 
sum of (i), (ii), and (iii) must equal the trading desk's 
comprehensive profit and loss at each point in time.
    A. The comprehensive profit and loss associated with existing 
positions must reflect changes in the value of these positions on 
the applicable day.
    The comprehensive profit and loss from existing positions must 
be further attributed, as applicable, to changes in (i) the specific 
risk factors and other factors that are monitored and managed as 
part of the trading desk's overall risk management policies and 
procedures; and (ii) any other applicable elements, such as cash 
flows, carry, changes in reserves, and the correction, cancellation, 
or exercise of a trade.
    B. For the attribution of comprehensive profit and loss from 
existing positions to specific risk factors and other factors, a 
banking entity must provide the following information for the 
factors that explain the preponderance of the profit or loss changes 
due to risk factor changes: The unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor listed in the Risk Factor Attribution 
Information Schedule, and the profit or loss due to the risk factor 
or other factor change.
    C. The comprehensive profit and loss attributed to new positions 
must reflect commissions and fee income or expense and market gains 
or losses associated with transactions executed on the applicable 
day. New positions include purchases and sales of financial 
instruments and other assets/liabilities and negotiated amendments 
to existing positions. The comprehensive profit and loss from new 
positions may be reported in the aggregate and does not need to be 
further attributed to specific sources.
    D. The portion of comprehensive profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to known sources must be allocated to a 
residual category identified as an unexplained portion of the 
comprehensive profit and loss. Significant unexplained profit and 
loss must be escalated for further investigation and analysis.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

c. Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging 
Measurements

1. Positions

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Positions is the 
value of securities and derivatives positions managed by the trading 
desk. For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, do not 
include in the Positions calculation for ``securities'' those 
securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined 
under subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \1\ A banking entity must separately 
report the trading desk's market value of long securities positions, 
market value of short securities positions, market value of 
derivatives receivables, market value of derivatives payables, 
notional value of derivatives receivables, and notional value of 
derivatives payables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Sec. Sec.  351.2(i), (bb). For example, under this part, 
a security-based swap is both a ``security'' and a ``derivative.'' 
For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, security-
based swaps are reported as derivatives rather than securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  351.4(a) 
or Sec.  351.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

2. Transaction Volumes

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Transaction 
Volumes measures four exclusive categories of covered trading 
activity conducted by a trading desk. A banking entity is required 
to report the value and number of security and derivative 
transactions conducted by the trading desk with: (i) Customers, 
excluding internal transactions; (ii) non-customers, excluding 
internal transactions; (iii) trading desks and other organizational 
units where the transaction is booked in the same banking entity; 
and (iv) trading desks and other organizational units where the 
transaction is booked into an affiliated banking entity. For 
securities, value means gross market value. For derivatives, value 
means gross notional value. For purposes of calculating the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, do not include in the 
Transaction Volumes calculation for ``securities'' those securities 
that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined under 
subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \2\ Further, for purposes of the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, a customer of a 
trading desk that relies on Sec.  351.4(a) to conduct underwriting 
activity is a market participant identified in Sec.  351.4(a)(7), 
and a customer of a trading desk that relies on Sec.  351.4(b) to 
conduct market making-related activity is a market participant 
identified in Sec.  351.4(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ See Sec. Sec.  351.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  351.4(a) 
or Sec.  351.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

3. Securities Inventory Aging

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Securities 
Inventory Aging generally describes a schedule of the market value 
of the trading desk's securities positions and the amount of time 
that those securities positions have been held. Securities Inventory 
Aging must measure the age profile of a trading desk's securities 
positions for the following periods: 0-30 calendar days; 31-60 
calendar days; 61-90 calendar days; 91-180 calendar days; 181-360 
calendar days; and greater than 360 calendar days. Securities 
Inventory Aging includes two schedules, a security asset-aging 
schedule, and a security liability-aging schedule. For purposes of 
the Securities Inventory Aging quantitative measurement, do not 
include securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are 
defined under subpart A.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See Sec. Sec.  351.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  351.4(a) 
or Sec.  351.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making 
related activity, respectively.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the Common Preamble, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission proposes to amend Part 255 to chapter II of 
Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 255--PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN INTERESTS IN AND 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH COVERED FUNDS

0
40. The authority for part 255 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1851
0
41. Revise Sec.  255.2 to read as follows:

Sec.  255.2  Definitions.

    Unless otherwise specified, for purposes of this part:
    (a) Affiliate has the same meaning as in section 2(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(k)).
    (b) Applicable accounting standards means U.S. generally accepted

[[Page 33585]]

accounting principles, or such other accounting standards applicable to 
a banking entity that the SEC determines are appropriate and that the 
banking entity uses in the ordinary course of its business in preparing 
its consolidated financial statements.
    (c) Bank holding company has the same meaning as in section 2 of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841).
    (d) Banking entity. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of 
this section, banking entity means:
    (i) Any insured depository institution;
    (ii) Any company that controls an insured depository institution;
    (iii) Any company that is treated as a bank holding company for 
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 
U.S.C. 3106); and
    (iv) Any affiliate or subsidiary of any entity described in 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.
    (2) Banking entity does not include:
    (i) A covered fund that is not itself a banking entity under 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section;
    (ii) A portfolio company held under the authority contained in 
section 4(k)(4)(H) or (I) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(H), 
(I)), or any portfolio concern, as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, that is 
controlled by a small business investment company, as defined in 
section 103(3) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 
662), so long as the portfolio company or portfolio concern is not 
itself a banking entity under paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of 
this section; or
    (iii) The FDIC acting in its corporate capacity or as conservator 
or receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
    (e) Board means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
    (f) CFTC means the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    (g) Dealer has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(5) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5)).
    (h) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3(c) 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (i) Derivative. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2) of this 
section, derivative means:
    (i) Any swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68));
    (ii) Any purchase or sale of a commodity, that is not an excluded 
commodity, for deferred shipment or delivery that is intended to be 
physically settled;
    (iii) Any foreign exchange forward (as that term is defined in 
section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)) or 
foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined in section 1a(25) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25));
    (iv) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency 
described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(C)(i));
    (v) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other 
than foreign currency described in section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D)(i)); and
    (vi) Any transaction authorized under section 19 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 23(a) or (b));
    (2) A derivative does not include:
    (i) Any consumer, commercial, or other agreement, contract, or 
transaction that the CFTC and SEC have further defined by joint 
regulation, interpretation, guidance, or other action as not within the 
definition of swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68)); or
    (ii) Any identified banking product, as defined in section 402(b) 
of the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. 27(b)), 
that is subject to section 403(a) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    (j) Employee includes a member of the immediate family of the 
employee.
    (k) Exchange Act means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    (l) Excluded commodity has the same meaning as in section 1a(19) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(19)).
    (m) FDIC means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    (n) Federal banking agencies means the Board, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.
    (o) Foreign banking organization has the same meaning as in section 
211.21(o) of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21(o)), but does not 
include a foreign bank, as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)), that is 
organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, or the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (p) Foreign insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, 
or a similar official or agency, of any country other than the United 
States that is engaged in the supervision of insurance companies under 
foreign insurance law.
    (q) General account means all of the assets of an insurance company 
except those allocated to one or more separate accounts.
    (r) Insurance company means a company that is organized as an 
insurance company, primarily and predominantly engaged in writing 
insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by insurance companies, 
subject to supervision as such by a state insurance regulator or a 
foreign insurance regulator, and not operated for the purpose of 
evading the provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1851).
    (s) Insured depository institution has the same meaning as in 
section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)), 
but does not include an insured depository institution that is 
described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(D)).
    (t) Limited trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to a 
banking entity, that:
    (1) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) the average gross sum of which over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1,000,000,000; and
    (2) The SEC has not determined pursuant to Sec.  255.20(g) or (h) 
of this part that the banking entity should not be treated as having 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (u) Loan means any loan, lease, extension of credit, or secured or 
unsecured receivable that is not a security or derivative.
    (v) Moderate trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to 
a banking entity, that the banking entity does not have significant 
trading assets and liabilities or limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
    (w) Primary financial regulatory agency has the same meaning as in 
section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5301(12)).
    (x) Purchase includes any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise 
acquire. For security futures products, purchase includes any contract, 
agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect to a 
commodity future, purchase includes any contract, agreement, or

[[Page 33586]]

transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, purchase 
includes the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled maturity 
date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance of, or 
extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as the 
context may require.
    (y) Qualifying foreign banking organization means a foreign banking 
organization that qualifies as such under section 211.23(a), (c) or (e) 
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.23(a), (c), or (e)).
    (z) SEC means the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (aa) Sale and sell each include any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of. For security futures products, such terms include any 
contract, agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect 
to a commodity future, such terms include any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, such 
terms include the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled 
maturity date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance 
of, or extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as 
the context may require.
    (bb) Security has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(10) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10)).
    (cc) Security-based swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 
3(a)(71) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
    (dd) Security future has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(55) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(55)).
    (ee) Separate account means an account established and maintained 
by an insurance company in connection with one or more insurance 
contracts to hold assets that are legally segregated from the insurance 
company's other assets, under which income, gains, and losses, whether 
or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in 
accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against 
such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the 
insurance company.
    (ff) Significant trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Significant trading assets and liabilities means, with respect 
to a banking entity, that:
    (i) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities the average gross sum of 
which over the previous consecutive four quarters, as measured as of 
the last day of each of the four previous calendar quarters, equals or 
exceeds $10,000,000,000; or
    (ii) The SEC has determined pursuant to Sec.  255.20(h) of this 
part that the banking entity should be treated as having significant 
trading assets and liabilities.
    (2) With respect to a banking entity other than a banking entity 
described in paragraph (3), trading assets and liabilities for purposes 
of this paragraph (ff) means trading assets and liabilities (excluding 
trading assets and liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed 
by the United States or any agency of the United States) on a worldwide 
consolidated basis.
    (3)(i) With respect to a banking entity that is a foreign banking 
organization or a subsidiary of a foreign banking organization, trading 
assets and liabilities for purposes of this paragraph (ff) means the 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) of the combined U.S. operations of 
the top-tier foreign banking organization (including all subsidiaries, 
affiliates, branches, and agencies of the foreign banking organization 
operating, located, or organized in the United States).
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (ff)(3)(i) of this section, a U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary of a banking entity is located in the 
United States; however, the foreign bank that operates or controls that 
branch, agency, or subsidiary is not considered to be located in the 
United States solely by virtue of operating or controlling the U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary.
    (gg) State means any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States 
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (hh) Subsidiary has the same meaning as in section 2(d) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(d)).
    (ii) State insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, or 
a similar official or agency, of a State that is engaged in the 
supervision of insurance companies under State insurance law.
    (jj) Swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 1(a)(49) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(49)).
0
42. Amend Sec.  255.3 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as paragraphs (d) through 
(f);
0
c. Adding a new paragraph (c);
0
d. Revising paragraph (e)(3);
0
e. Adding paragraph (e)(10);
0
f. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) through (f)(13) as paragraphs (f)(6) 
through (f)(14);
0
g. Adding a new paragraph (f)(5); and
0
h. Adding paragraph (g).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  255.3  Prohibition on proprietary trading.

* * * * *
    (b) Definition of trading account. Trading account means any 
account that is used by a banking entity to:
    (1)(i) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are 
both market risk capital rule covered positions and trading positions 
(or hedges of other market risk capital rule covered positions), if the 
banking entity, or any affiliate of the banking entity, is an insured 
depository institution, bank holding company, or savings and loan 
holding company, and calculates risk-based capital ratios under the 
market risk capital rule; or
    (ii) With respect to a banking entity that is not, and is not 
controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is, located 
in or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, 
purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are subject to 
capital requirements under a market risk framework established by the 
home-country supervisor that is consistent with the market risk 
framework published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as 
amended from time to time.
    (2) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments for any 
purpose, if the banking entity:
    (i) Is licensed or registered, or is required to be licensed or 
registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such; or
    (ii) Is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent 
the instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities 
of such business; or
    (3) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments, with 
respect to a financial instrument that is recorded at fair value on a 
recurring basis under applicable accounting standards.
    (c) Presumption of compliance. (1)(i) Each trading desk that does 
not purchase or sell financial instruments for a trading account 
defined in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section may calculate 
the net gain or net loss on the trading desk's portfolio of financial 
instruments each business day,

[[Page 33587]]

reflecting realized and unrealized gains and losses since the previous 
business day, based on the banking entity's fair value for such 
financial instruments.
    (ii) If the sum of the absolute values of the daily net gain and 
loss figures determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
section for the preceding 90-calendar-day period does not exceed $25 
million, the activities of the trading desk shall be presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (2) The SEC may rebut the presumption of compliance in paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this section by providing written notice to the banking 
entity that the SEC has determined that one or more of the banking 
entity's activities violates the prohibitions under subpart B.
    (3) If a trading desk operating pursuant to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of 
this section exceeds the $25 million threshold in that paragraph at any 
point, the banking entity shall, in accordance with any policies and 
procedures adopted by the SEC:
    (i) Promptly notify the SEC;
    (ii) Demonstrate that the trading desk's purchases and sales of 
financial instruments comply with subpart B; and
    (iii) Demonstrate, with respect to the trading desk, how the 
banking entity will maintain compliance with subpart B on an ongoing 
basis.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) Any purchase or sale of a security, foreign exchange forward 
(as that term is defined in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)), foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined 
in section 1a(25) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25)), or 
physically-settled cross-currency swap, by a banking entity for the 
purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan of the banking entity that, with respect to 
such financial instruments:
    (i) Specifically contemplates and authorizes the particular 
financial instruments to be used for liquidity management purposes, the 
amount, types, and risks of these financial instruments that are 
consistent with liquidity management, and the liquidity circumstances 
in which the particular financial instruments may or must be used;
    (ii) Requires that any purchase or sale of financial instruments 
contemplated and authorized by the plan be principally for the purpose 
of managing the liquidity of the banking entity, and not for the 
purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from actual or expected 
short-term price movements, realizing short-term arbitrage profits, or 
hedging a position taken for such short-term purposes;
    (iii) Requires that any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes be highly liquid and limited to financial 
instruments the market, credit, and other risks of which the banking 
entity does not reasonably expect to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements;
    (iv) Limits any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes, together with any other instruments 
purchased or sold for such purposes, to an amount that is consistent 
with the banking entity's near-term funding needs, including deviations 
from normal operations of the banking entity or any affiliate thereof, 
as estimated and documented pursuant to methods specified in the plan;
    (v) Includes written policies and procedures, internal controls, 
analysis, and independent testing to ensure that the purchase and sale 
of financial instruments that are not permitted under Sec. Sec.  
255.6(a) or (b) of this subpart are for the purpose of liquidity 
management and in accordance with the liquidity management plan 
described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section; and
    (vi) Is consistent with the SEC's supervisory requirements, 
guidance, and expectations regarding liquidity management;
* * * * *
    (10) Any purchase (or sale) of one or more financial instruments 
that was made in error by a banking entity in the course of conducting 
a permitted or excluded activity or is a subsequent transaction to 
correct such an error, and the erroneously purchased (or sold) 
financial instrument is promptly transferred to a separately-managed 
trade error account for disposition.
    (f) * * *
    (5) Cross-currency swap means a swap in which one party exchanges 
with another party principal and interest rate payments in one currency 
for principal and interest rate payments in another currency, and the 
exchange of principal occurs on the date the swap is entered into, with 
a reversal of the exchange of principal at a later date that is agreed 
upon when the swap is entered into.
* * * * *
    (g) Reservation of Authority: (1) The SEC may determine, on a case-
by-case basis, that a purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments by a banking entity either is or is not for the trading 
account as defined at 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    (2) Notice and Response Procedures. (i) Notice. When the SEC 
determines that the purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments is for the trading account under paragraph (g)(1) of this 
section, the SEC will notify the banking entity in writing of the 
determination and provide an explanation of the determination.
    (ii) Response. (A) The banking entity may respond to any or all 
items in the notice. The response should include any matters that the 
banking entity would have the SEC consider in deciding whether the 
purchase or sale is for the trading account. The response must be in 
writing and delivered to the designated SEC official within 30 days 
after the date on which the banking entity received the notice. The SEC 
may shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the SEC, the 
activities or condition of the banking entity so requires, provided 
that the banking entity is informed promptly of the new time period, or 
with the consent of the banking entity. In its discretion, the SEC may 
extend the time period for good cause.
    (B) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the SEC shall constitute a waiver of any objections 
to the SEC's determination.
    (iii) After the close of banking entity's response period, the SEC 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the SEC's determination that the purchase or sale of one or more 
financial instruments is for the trading account. The banking entity 
will be notified of the decision in writing. The notice will include an 
explanation of the decision.
0
43. Amend Sec.  255.4 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(2);
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(8);
0
c. Revising paragraph (b)(2);
0
d. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
e. In paragraph (b)(5) removing the references to ``inventory'' and 
replacing them with ``positions''; and
0
f. Adding paragraph (b)(6).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  255.4   Permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The underwriting activities of a banking entity 
are permitted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity is acting as an underwriter for a 
distribution of

[[Page 33588]]

securities and the trading desk's underwriting position is related to 
such distribution;
    (ii) (A) The amount and type of the securities in the trading 
desk's underwriting position are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market 
for the relevant type of security, and (B) reasonable efforts are made 
to sell or otherwise reduce the underwriting position within a 
reasonable period, taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant type of security;
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The products, instruments or exposures each trading desk may 
purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities;
    (B) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section;
    (C) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (D) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis of the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s), and independent 
review of such demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (a) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (v) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in the 
activity described in this paragraph (a) in accordance with applicable 
law.
* * * * *
    (8) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.
    (i) Risk limits.
    (A) A banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A) of this section with respect to the purchase or 
sale of a financial instrument if the banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (8)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's underwriting activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risk of its underwriting position;
    (2) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
underwriting position; and
    (3) Period of time a security may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the SEC on an ongoing basis. Any review of such 
limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed not 
to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the SEC (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and (B) 
any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by the SEC.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the SEC if the SEC 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The SEC will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
    (b) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The market making-related activities of a banking 
entity are permitted under paragraph (b)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The trading desk that establishes and manages the financial 
exposure routinely stands ready to purchase and sell one or more types 
of financial instruments related to its financial exposure and is 
willing and available to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise enter 
into long and short positions in those types of financial instruments 
for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout 
market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant types of financial instruments;
    (ii) The trading desk's market-making related activities are 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant types 
of financial instrument(s).
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The financial instruments each trading desk stands ready to 
purchase and sell in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this 
section;
    (B) The actions the trading desk will take to demonstrably reduce 
or otherwise significantly mitigate promptly the risks of its financial 
exposure consistent with the limits required under paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section; the products, instruments, and 
exposures each trading desk may use for risk management purposes; the 
techniques and strategies each trading desk may use to manage the risks 
of its market making-related activities and positions; and the process, 
strategies, and personnel responsible for ensuring that the actions 
taken by the trading desk to mitigate these risks are and continue to 
be effective;
    (C) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section;
    (D) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (E) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis that the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s) is consistent with 
the requirements of this paragraph (b), and independent review of such 
demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, to the extent that any limit identified 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section is exceeded, the 
trading desk takes action to bring the trading desk into compliance 
with the

[[Page 33589]]

limits as promptly as possible after the limit is exceeded;
    (v) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (b) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (vi) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
activity described in this paragraph (b) in accordance with applicable 
law.
    (3) * * *
    (i) A trading desk or other organizational unit of another banking 
entity is not a client, customer, or counterparty of the trading desk 
if that other entity has trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion 
or more as measured in accordance with the methodology described in 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  255.2 of this part, unless:
* * * * *
    (6) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.
    (i) Risk limits.
    (A) A banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section with respect to the purchase or 
sale of a financial instrument if the banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (6)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's market making-related activities, on 
the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risks of its market-maker positions;
    (2) Amount, types, and risks of the products, instruments, and 
exposures the trading desk may use for risk management purposes;
    (3) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
financial exposure; and
    (4) Period of time a financial instrument may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the SEC on an ongoing basis. Any review of such 
limits will include assessment of whether the limits are designed not 
to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of clients, 
customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the SEC (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded and (B) 
any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each case in 
the form and manner as directed by the SEC.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the SEC if the SEC 
determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, that a 
trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The SEC will provide notice of any such determination 
to the banking entity in writing.
0
45. Amend Sec.  255.5 by revising paragraph (b), the introductory text 
of paragraph (c)(1), and adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:

Sec.  255.5   Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities.

* * * * *
    (b) Requirements.
    (1) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
has significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted under 
paragraph (a) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program required by subpart D of 
this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking entity's 
compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures regarding 
the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used for hedging, 
including documentation indicating what positions, contracts or other 
holdings a particular trading desk may use in its risk-mitigating 
hedging activities, as well as position and aging limits with respect 
to such positions, contracts or other holdings;
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (C) The conduct of analysis and independent testing designed to 
ensure that the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used 
for hedging may reasonably be expected to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risk(s) being hedged;
    (ii) The risk-mitigating hedging activity:
    (A) Is conducted in accordance with the written policies, 
procedures, and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section;
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity that:
    (1) Is consistent with the written hedging policies and procedures 
required under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
    (2) Is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risks that develop over time from the risk-
mitigating hedging activities undertaken under this section and the 
underlying positions, contracts, and other holdings of the banking 
entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the underlying and 
hedging positions, contracts and other holdings of the banking entity 
and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (3) Requires ongoing recalibration of the hedging activity by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (iii) The compensation arrangements of persons performing risk-
mitigating hedging activities are designed not to reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (2) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
does not have significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted 
under paragraph (a) of this section only if the risk-mitigating hedging 
activity:
    (i) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to

[[Page 33590]]

identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of the banking 
entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the identified 
underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other holdings and the 
risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (ii) Is subject, as appropriate, to ongoing recalibration by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (c) * * * (1) A banking entity that has significant trading assets 
and liabilities must comply with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) 
and (3) of this section, unless the requirements of paragraph (c)(4) of 
this section are met, with respect to any purchase or sale of financial 
instruments made in reliance on this section for risk-mitigating 
hedging purposes that is:
* * * * *
    (4) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section 
do not apply to the purchase or sale of a financial instrument 
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section if:
    (i) The financial instrument purchased or sold is identified on a 
written list of pre-approved financial instruments that are commonly 
used by the trading desk for the specific type of hedging activity for 
which the financial instrument is being purchased or sold; and
    (ii) At the time the financial instrument is purchased or sold, the 
hedging activity (including the purchase or sale of the financial 
instrument) complies with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the 
trading desk purchasing or selling the financial instrument for hedging 
activities undertaken for one or more other trading desks. The hedging 
limits shall be appropriate for the:
    (A) Size, types, and risks of the hedging activities commonly 
undertaken by the trading desk;
    (B) Financial instruments purchased and sold for hedging activities 
by the trading desk; and
    (C) Levels and duration of the risk exposures being hedged.
0
46. Amend Sec.  255.6 by revising paragraph (e)(3), and removing 
paragraph (e)(6) to read as follows:

Sec.  255.6   Other permitted proprietary trading activities.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) A purchase or sale by a banking entity is permitted for 
purposes of this paragraph (e) if:
    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including relevant personnel) is not located in the United States 
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.
* * * * *

Sec.  255.10  [Amended]

0
47. Amend Sec.  255.10 by:
0
a. In paragraph (c)(8)(i)(A) revising the reference to ``Sec.  
255.2(s)'' to read ``Sec.  255.2(u)'';
0
b. Removing paragraph (d)(1);
0
c. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(2) through (d)(10) as paragraphs (d)(1) 
through (d)(9);
0
d. In paragraph (d)(5)(i)(G) revising the reference to ``(d)(6)(i)(A)'' 
to read ``(d)(5)(i)(A)''; and
0
e. In paragraph (d)(9) revising the reference to ``(d)(9)'' to read 
``(d)(8)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)(A)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)(A)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)''.
0
48. Amend Sec.  255.11 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:

Sec.  255.11   Permitted organizing and offering, underwriting, and 
market making with respect to a covered fund.

* * * * *
    (c) Underwriting and market making in ownership interests of a 
covered fund. The prohibition contained in Sec.  255.10(a) of this 
subpart does not apply to a banking entity's underwriting activities or 
market making-related activities involving a covered fund so long as:
    (1) Those activities are conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Sec.  255.4(a) or Sec.  255.4(b) of subpart B, 
respectively; and
    (2) With respect to any banking entity (or any affiliate thereof) 
that: Acts as a sponsor, investment adviser or commodity trading 
advisor to a particular covered fund or otherwise acquires and retains 
an ownership interest in such covered fund in reliance on paragraph (a) 
of this section; or acquires and retains an ownership interest in such 
covered fund and is either a securitizer, as that term is used in 
section 15G(a)(3) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11(a)(3)), or is 
acquiring and retaining an ownership interest in such covered fund in 
compliance with section 15G of that Act (15 U.S.C.78o-11) and the 
implementing regulations issued thereunder each as permitted by 
paragraph (b) of this section, then in each such case any ownership 
interests acquired or retained by the banking entity and its affiliates 
in connection with underwriting and market making related activities 
for that particular covered fund are included in the calculation of 
ownership interests permitted to be held by the banking entity and its 
affiliates under the limitations of Sec.  255.12(a)(2)(ii); Sec.  
255.12(a)(2)(iii), and Sec.  255.12(d) of this subpart.4

Sec.  255.12  [Amended]

0
49. Amend Sec.  255.12 by:
0
a. In paragraphs (c)(1) and (d) revising the references to ``Sec.  
255.10(d)(6)(ii)'' to read ``Sec.  255.10(d)(5)(ii)'';
0
b. Removing paragraph (e)(2)(vii); and
0
c. Redesignating the second instance of paragraph (e)(2)(vi) as 
paragraph (e)(2)(vii).
0
50. Amend Sec.  255.13 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(3), and 
removing paragraph (b)(4)(iv) to read as follows:

Sec.  255.13   Other permitted covered fund activities and investments.

    (a) Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities. (1) The 
prohibition contained in Sec.  255.10(a) of this subpart does not apply 
with respect to an ownership interest in a covered fund acquired or 
retained by a banking entity that is designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks to the banking 
entity in connection with:
    (i) A compensation arrangement with an employee of the banking 
entity or an affiliate thereof that directly provides investment 
advisory, commodity trading advisory or other services to the covered 
fund; or
    (ii) A position taken by the banking entity when acting as 
intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund.
    (2) Requirements. The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity are permitted under this paragraph (a) only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program in accordance with subpart 
D of this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking 
entity's compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures; and

[[Page 33591]]

    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (ii) The acquisition or retention of the ownership interest:
    (A) Is made in accordance with the written policies, procedures, 
and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedge, is designed to reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks arising (1) out of a transaction conducted solely to accommodate 
a specific customer request with respect to the covered fund or (2) in 
connection with the compensation arrangement with the employee that 
directly provides investment advisory, commodity trading advisory, or 
other services to the covered fund;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section; and
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity.
    (iii) With respect to risk-mitigating hedging activity conducted 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i), the compensation arrangement relates 
solely to the covered fund in which the banking entity or any affiliate 
has acquired an ownership interest pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) and 
such compensation arrangement provides that any losses incurred by the 
banking entity on such ownership interest will be offset by 
corresponding decreases in amounts payable under such compensation 
arrangement.
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) An ownership interest in a covered fund is not offered for sale 
or sold to a resident of the United States for purposes of paragraph 
(b)(1)(iii) of this section only if it is not sold and has not been 
sold pursuant to an offering that targets residents of the United 
States in which the banking entity or any affiliate of the banking 
entity participates. If the banking entity or an affiliate sponsors or 
serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, investment 
adviser, commodity pool operator or commodity trading advisor to a 
covered fund, then the banking entity or affiliate will be deemed for 
purposes of this paragraph (b)(3) to participate in any offer or sale 
by the covered fund of ownership interests in the covered fund.
* * * * *
0
51. Amend Sec.  255.14 by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) as follows:

Sec.  255.14   Limitations on relationships with a covered fund.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (B) The chief executive officer (or equivalent officer) of the 
banking entity certifies in writing annually no later than March 31 to 
the SEC (with a duty to update the certification if the information in 
the certification materially changes) that the banking entity does not, 
directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the 
obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any covered fund 
in which such covered fund invests; and
* * * * *
0
52. Amend Sec.  255.20 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f)(2);
0
b. Revising the introductory text of paragraphs (b) and (e);
0
c. Adding new paragraphs (g) and (h).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  255.20   Program for compliance; reporting.

* * * * *
    (a) Program requirement. Each banking entity (other than a banking 
entity with limited trading assets and liabilities) shall develop and 
provide for the continued administration of a compliance program 
reasonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the 
prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered fund 
activities and investments set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and 
this part. The terms, scope, and detail of the compliance program shall 
be appropriate for the types, size, scope, and complexity of activities 
and business structure of the banking entity.
    (b) Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. With respect to a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the compliance program required by paragraph 
(a) of this section, at a minimum, shall include:
* * * * *
    (c) CEO attestation.
    (1) The CEO of a banking entity described in paragraph (2) must, 
based on a review by the CEO of the banking entity, attest in writing 
to the SEC, each year no later than March 31, that the banking entity 
has in place processes reasonably designed to achieve compliance with 
section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. In the case of a U.S. branch 
or agency of a foreign banking entity, the attestation may be provided 
for the entire U.S. operations of the foreign banking entity by the 
senior management officer of the U.S. operations of the foreign banking 
entity who is located in the United States.
    (2) The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) apply to a banking entity 
if:
    (i) The banking entity does not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The SEC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the requirements contained in paragraph (c)(1).
    (d) Reporting requirements under the Appendix to this part. (1) A 
banking entity engaged in proprietary trading activity permitted under 
subpart B shall comply with the reporting requirements described in the 
Appendix, if:
    (i) The banking entity has significant trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The SEC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must 
satisfy the reporting requirements contained in the Appendix.
    (2) Frequency of reporting: Unless the SEC notifies the banking 
entity in writing that it must report on a different basis, a banking 
entity with $50 billion or more in trading assets and liabilities (as 
calculated in accordance with the methodology described in the 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  255.2 of this part) shall report the information required by 
the Appendix for each calendar month within 20 days of the end of each 
calendar month. Any other banking entity subject to the Appendix shall 
report the information required by the Appendix for each calendar 
quarter within 30 days of the end of that calendar quarter unless the 
SEC notifies the banking entity in writing that it must report on a 
different basis.
    (e) Additional documentation for covered funds. A banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities shall maintain records 
that include:
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) Banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. 
A banking entity with moderate trading assets and liabilities may 
satisfy the requirements of this section by including in its existing 
compliance policies and procedures appropriate references to the 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and this part and adjustments 
as appropriate given the activities, size, scope, and complexity of the 
banking entity.
    (g) Rebuttable presumption of compliance for banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Rebuttable presumption. Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, a banking entity with limited trading assets and liabilities 
shall be presumed to be compliant with subpart B and

[[Page 33592]]

subpart C and shall have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with 
this part on an ongoing basis.
    (2) Rebuttal of presumption.
    (i) If upon examination or audit, the SEC determines that the 
banking entity has engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund 
activities that are otherwise prohibited under subpart B or subpart C, 
the SEC may require the banking entity to be treated under this part as 
if it did not have limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (ii) Notice and Response Procedures.
    (A) Notice. The SEC will notify the banking entity in writing of 
any determination pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section to 
rebut the presumption described in this paragraph (g) and will provide 
an explanation of the determination.
    (B) Response.
    (I) The banking entity may respond to any or all items in the 
notice described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii)(A) of this section. The 
response should include any matters that the banking entity would have 
the SEC consider in deciding whether the banking entity has engaged in 
proprietary trading or covered fund activities prohibited under subpart 
B or subpart C. The response must be in writing and delivered to the 
designated SEC official within 30 days after the date on which the 
banking entity received the notice. The SEC may shorten the time period 
when, in the opinion of the SEC, the activities or condition of the 
banking entity so requires, provided that the banking entity is 
informed promptly of the new time period, or with the consent of the 
banking entity. In its discretion, the SEC may extend the time period 
for good cause.
    (II) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the SEC shall constitute a waiver of any objections 
to the SEC's determination.
    (C) After the close of banking entity's response period, the SEC 
will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's response and 
other information concerning the banking entity, whether to maintain 
the SEC's determination that banking entity has engaged in proprietary 
trading or covered fund activities prohibited under subpart B or 
subpart C. The banking entity will be notified of the decision in 
writing. The notice will include an explanation of the decision.
    (h) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this part, the SEC retains its authority to require a banking entity 
without significant trading assets and liabilities to apply any 
requirements of this part that would otherwise apply if the banking 
entity had significant or moderate trading assets and liabilities if 
the SEC determines that the size or complexity of the banking entity's 
trading or investment activities, or the risk of evasion of subpart B 
or subpart C, does not warrant a presumption of compliance under 
paragraph (g) of this section or treatment as a banking entity with 
moderate trading assets and liabilities, as applicable.
0
53. Remove Appendix A and Appendix B to part 255 and add Appendix to 
Part 255--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for Covered Trading 
Activities to read as follows:

Appendix to Part 255--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for 
Covered Trading Activities

I. Purpose

    a. This appendix sets forth reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements that certain banking entities must satisfy in 
connection with the restrictions on proprietary trading set forth in 
subpart B (``proprietary trading restrictions''). Pursuant to Sec.  
255.20(d), this appendix applies to a banking entity that, together 
with its affiliates and subsidiaries, has significant trading assets 
and liabilities. These entities are required to (i) furnish periodic 
reports to the SEC regarding a variety of quantitative measurements 
of their covered trading activities, which vary depending on the 
scope and size of covered trading activities, and (ii) create and 
maintain records documenting the preparation and content of these 
reports. The requirements of this appendix must be incorporated into 
the banking entity's internal compliance program under Sec.  255.20.
    b. The purpose of this appendix is to assist banking entities 
and the SEC in:
    (i) Better understanding and evaluating the scope, type, and 
profile of the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (ii) Monitoring the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (iii) Identifying covered trading activities that warrant 
further review or examination by the banking entity to verify 
compliance with the proprietary trading restrictions;
    (iv) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of 
trading desks engaged in market making-related activities subject to 
Sec.  255.4(b) are consistent with the requirements governing 
permitted market making-related activities;
    (v) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of trading 
desks that are engaged in permitted trading activity subject to 
Sec. Sec.  255.4, 255.5, or 255.6(a)-(b) (i.e., underwriting and 
market making-related related activity, risk-mitigating hedging, or 
trading in certain government obligations) are consistent with the 
requirement that such activity not result, directly or indirectly, 
in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading 
strategies;
    (vi) Identifying the profile of particular covered trading 
activities of the banking entity, and the individual trading desks 
of the banking entity, to help establish the appropriate frequency 
and scope of examination by the SEC of such activities; and
    (vii) Assessing and addressing the risks associated with the 
banking entity's covered trading activities.
    c. Information that must be furnished pursuant to this appendix 
is not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the 
identification of permissible or impermissible activities.
    d. In addition to the quantitative measurements required in this 
appendix, a banking entity may need to develop and implement other 
quantitative measurements in order to effectively monitor its 
covered trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and this part and to have an effective compliance program, as 
required by Sec.  255.20. The effectiveness of particular 
quantitative measurements may differ based on the profile of the 
banking entity's businesses in general and, more specifically, of 
the particular trading desk, including types of instruments traded, 
trading activities and strategies, and history and experience (e.g., 
whether the trading desk is an established, successful market maker 
or a new entrant to a competitive market). In all cases, banking 
entities must ensure that they have robust measures in place to 
identify and monitor the risks taken in their trading activities, to 
ensure that the activities are within risk tolerances established by 
the banking entity, and to monitor and examine for compliance with 
the proprietary trading restrictions in this part.
    e. On an ongoing basis, banking entities must carefully monitor, 
review, and evaluate all furnished quantitative measurements, as 
well as any others that they choose to utilize in order to maintain 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. All 
measurement results that indicate a heightened risk of impermissible 
proprietary trading, including with respect to otherwise-permitted 
activities under Sec. Sec.  255.4 through 255.6(a)-(b), or that 
result in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk 
trading strategies, must be escalated within the banking entity for 
review, further analysis, explanation to the SEC, and remediation, 
where appropriate. The quantitative measurements discussed in this 
appendix should be helpful to banking entities in identifying and 
managing the risks related to their covered trading activities.

II. Definitions

    The terms used in this appendix have the same meanings as set 
forth in Sec. Sec.  255.2 and 255.3. In addition, for purposes of 
this appendix, the following definitions apply:
    Applicability identifies the trading desks for which a banking 
entity is required to calculate and report a particular quantitative 
measurement based on the type of covered trading activity conducted 
by the trading desk.
    Calculation period means the period of time for which a 
particular quantitative measurement must be calculated.
    Comprehensive profit and loss means the net profit or loss of a 
trading desk's material

[[Page 33593]]

sources of trading revenue over a specific period of time, 
including, for example, any increase or decrease in the market value 
of a trading desk's holdings, dividend income, and interest income 
and expense.
    Covered trading activity means trading conducted by a trading 
desk under Sec. Sec.  255.4, 255.5, 255.6(a), or 255.6(b). A banking 
entity may include in its covered trading activity trading conducted 
under Sec. Sec.  255.3(e), 255.6(c), 255.6(d), or 255.6(e).
    Measurement frequency means the frequency with which a 
particular quantitative metric must be calculated and recorded.
    Trading day means a calendar day on which a trading desk is open 
for trading.

III. Reporting and Recordkeeping

a. Scope of Required Reporting

    1. Quantitative measurements. Each banking entity made subject 
to this appendix by Sec.  255.20 must furnish the following 
quantitative measurements, as applicable, for each trading desk of 
the banking entity engaged in covered trading activities and 
calculate these quantitative measurements in accordance with this 
appendix:
    i. Risk and Position Limits and Usage;
    ii. Risk Factor Sensitivities;
    iii. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk;
    iv. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution;
    v. Positions;
    vi. Transaction Volumes; and
    vii. Securities Inventory Aging.
    2. Trading desk information. Each banking entity made subject to 
this appendix by Sec.  255.20 must provide certain descriptive 
information, as further described in this appendix, regarding each 
trading desk engaged in covered trading activities.
    3. Quantitative measurements identifying information. Each 
banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  255.20 must 
provide certain identifying and descriptive information, as further 
described in this appendix, regarding its quantitative measurements.
    4. Narrative statement. Each banking entity made subject to this 
appendix by Sec.  255.20 must provide a separate narrative 
statement, as further described in this appendix.
    5. File identifying information. Each banking entity made 
subject to this appendix by Sec.  255.20 must provide file 
identifying information in each submission to the SEC pursuant to 
this appendix, including the name of the banking entity, the RSSD ID 
assigned to the top-tier banking entity by the Board, and 
identification of the reporting period and creation date and time.

b. Trading Desk Information

    Each banking entity must provide descriptive information 
regarding each trading desk engaged in covered trading activities, 
including:
    1. Name of the trading desk used internally by the banking 
entity and a unique identification label for the trading desk;
    2. Identification of each type of covered trading activity in 
which the trading desk is engaged;
    3. Brief description of the general strategy of the trading 
desk;
    4. A list of the types of financial instruments and other 
products purchased and sold by the trading desk; an indication of 
which of these are the main financial instruments or products 
purchased and sold by the trading desk; and, for trading desks 
engaged in market making-related activities under Sec.  255.4(b), 
specification of whether each type of financial instrument is 
included in market-maker positions or not included in market-maker 
positions. In addition, indicate whether the trading desk is 
including in its quantitative measurements products excluded from 
the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  255.3(d)(2) 
and, if so, identify such products;
    5. Identification by complete name of each legal entity that 
serves as a booking entity for covered trading activities conducted 
by the trading desk; and indication of which of the identified legal 
entities are the main booking entities for covered trading 
activities of the trading desk;
    6. For each legal entity that serves as a booking entity for 
covered trading activities, specification of any of the following 
applicable entity types for that legal entity:
    i. National bank, Federal branch or Federal agency of a foreign 
bank, Federal savings association, Federal savings bank;
    ii. State nonmember bank, foreign bank having an insured branch, 
State savings association;
    iii. U.S.-registered broker-dealer, U.S.-registered security-
based swap dealer, U.S.-registered major security-based swap 
participant;
    iv. Swap dealer, major swap participant, derivatives clearing 
organization, futures commission merchant, commodity pool operator, 
commodity trading advisor, introducing broker, floor trader, retail 
foreign exchange dealer;
    v. State member bank;
    vi. Bank holding company, savings and loan holding company;
    vii. Foreign banking organization as defined in 12 CFR 
211.21(o);
    viii. Uninsured State-licensed branch or agency of a foreign 
bank; or
    ix. Other entity type not listed above, including a subsidiary 
of a legal entity described above where the subsidiary itself is not 
an entity type listed above;
    7. Indication of whether each calendar date is a trading day or 
not a trading day for the trading desk; and
    8. Currency reported and daily currency conversion rate.

c. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information

    Each banking entity must provide the following information 
regarding the quantitative measurements:
    1. A Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each limit reported 
pursuant to the Risk and Position Limits and Usage quantitative 
measurement, including the name of the limit, a unique 
identification label for the limit, a description of the limit, 
whether the limit is intraday or end-of-day, the unit of measurement 
for the limit, whether the limit measures risk on a net or gross 
basis, and the type of limit;
    2. A Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor sensitivity reported pursuant to the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
sensitivity, a unique identification label for the sensitivity, a 
description of the sensitivity, and the sensitivity's risk factor 
change unit;
    3. A Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each risk factor 
attribution reported pursuant to the Comprehensive Profit and Loss 
Attribution quantitative measurement, including the name of the risk 
factor or other factor, a unique identification label for the risk 
factor or other factor, a description of the risk factor or other 
factor, and the risk factor or other factor's change unit;
    4. A Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule that cross-
references, by unique identification label, limits identified in the 
Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule to associated risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule; and
    5. A Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference 
Schedule that cross-references, by unique identification label, risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule to associated risk factor attributions 
identified in the Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule.

d. Narrative Statement

    Each banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  
255.20 must submit in a separate electronic document a Narrative 
Statement to the SEC describing any changes in calculation methods 
used, a description of and reasons for changes in the banking 
entity's trading desk structure or trading desk strategies, and when 
any such change occurred. The Narrative Statement must include any 
information the banking entity views as relevant for assessing the 
information reported, such as further description of calculation 
methods used.
    If a banking entity does not have any information to report in a 
Narrative Statement, the banking entity must submit an electronic 
document stating that it does not have any information to report in 
a Narrative Statement.

e. Frequency and Method of Required Calculation and Reporting

    A banking entity must calculate any applicable quantitative 
measurement for each trading day. A banking entity must report the 
Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and each applicable 
quantitative measurement electronically to the SEC on the reporting 
schedule established in Sec.  255.20 unless otherwise requested by 
the SEC. A banking entity must report the Trading Desk Information, 
the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information, and each 
applicable quantitative measurement to the SEC in accordance with 
the XML Schema specified and published on the SEC's website.

[[Page 33594]]

f. Recordkeeping

    A banking entity must, for any quantitative measurement 
furnished to the SEC pursuant to this appendix and Sec.  255.20(d), 
create and maintain records documenting the preparation and content 
of these reports, as well as such information as is necessary to 
permit the SEC to verify the accuracy of such reports, for a period 
of five years from the end of the calendar year for which the 
measurement was taken. A banking entity must retain the Narrative 
Statement, the Trading Desk Information, and the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information for a period of five years from 
the end of the calendar year for which the information was reported 
to the SEC.

IV. Quantitative Measurements

a. Risk-Management Measurements

1. Risk and Position Limits and Usage

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk and Position 
Limits are the constraints that define the amount of risk that a 
trading desk is permitted to take at a point in time, as defined by 
the banking entity for a specific trading desk. Usage represents the 
value of the trading desk's risk or positions that are accounted for 
by the current activity of the desk. Risk and position limits and 
their usage are key risk management tools used to control and 
monitor risk taking and include, but are not limited to, the limits 
set out in Sec.  255.4 and Sec.  255.5. A number of the metrics that 
are described below, including ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and 
``Value-at-Risk,'' relate to a trading desk's risk and position 
limits and are useful in evaluating and setting these limits in the 
broader context of the trading desk's overall activities, 
particularly for the market making activities under Sec.  255.4(b) 
and hedging activity under Sec.  255.5. Accordingly, the limits 
required under Sec.  255.4(b)(2)(iii) and Sec.  255.5(b)(1)(i)(A) 
must meet the applicable requirements under Sec.  255.4(b)(2)(iii) 
and Sec.  255.5(b)(1)(i)(A) and also must include appropriate 
metrics for the trading desk limits including, at a minimum, the 
``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and ``Value-at-Risk'' metrics except 
to the extent any of the ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' or ``Value-
at-Risk'' metrics are demonstrably ineffective for measuring and 
monitoring the risks of a trading desk based on the types of 
positions traded by, and risk exposures of, that desk.
    A. A banking entity must provide the following information for 
each limit reported pursuant to this quantitative measurement: The 
unique identification label for the limit reported in the Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedule, the limit size (distinguishing 
between an upper and a lower limit), and the value of usage of the 
limit.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

2. Risk Factor Sensitivities

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk Factor 
Sensitivities are changes in a trading desk's Comprehensive Profit 
and Loss that are expected to occur in the event of a change in one 
or more underlying variables that are significant sources of the 
trading desk's profitability and risk. A banking entity must report 
the risk factor sensitivities that are monitored and managed as part 
of the trading desk's overall risk management policy. Reported risk 
factor sensitivities must be sufficiently granular to account for a 
preponderance of the expected price variation in the trading desk's 
holdings. A banking entity must provide the following information 
for each sensitivity that is reported pursuant to this quantitative 
measurement: The unique identification label for the risk factor 
sensitivity listed in the Risk Factor Sensitivities Information 
Schedule, the change in risk factor used to determine the risk 
factor sensitivity, and the aggregate change in value across all 
positions of the desk given the change in risk factor.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

3. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Value-at-Risk 
(``VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of future financial loss in 
the value of a trading desk's aggregated positions at the ninety-
nine percent confidence level over a one-day period, based on 
current market conditions. For purposes of this appendix, Stressed 
Value-at-Risk (``Stressed VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of 
future financial loss in the value of a trading desk's aggregated 
positions at the ninety-nine percent confidence level over a one-day 
period, based on market conditions during a period of significant 
financial stress.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: For VaR, all trading desks engaged in covered 
trading activities. For Stressed VaR, all trading desks engaged in 
covered trading activities, except trading desks whose covered 
trading activity is conducted exclusively to hedge products excluded 
from the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  
255.3(d)(2).

b. Source-of-Revenue Measurements

1. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss Attribution is an analysis that attributes the daily 
fluctuation in the value of a trading desk's positions to various 
sources. First, the daily profit and loss of the aggregated 
positions is divided into three categories: (i) Profit and loss 
attributable to a trading desk's existing positions that were also 
positions held by the trading desk as of the end of the prior day 
(``existing positions''); (ii) profit and loss attributable to new 
positions resulting from the current day's trading activity (``new 
positions''); and (iii) residual profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to existing positions or new positions. The 
sum of (i), (ii), and (iii) must equal the trading desk's 
comprehensive profit and loss at each point in time.
    A. The comprehensive profit and loss associated with existing 
positions must reflect changes in the value of these positions on 
the applicable day.
    The comprehensive profit and loss from existing positions must 
be further attributed, as applicable, to changes in (i) the specific 
risk factors and other factors that are monitored and managed as 
part of the trading desk's overall risk management policies and 
procedures; and (ii) any other applicable elements, such as cash 
flows, carry, changes in reserves, and the correction, cancellation, 
or exercise of a trade.
    B. For the attribution of comprehensive profit and loss from 
existing positions to specific risk factors and other factors, a 
banking entity must provide the following information for the 
factors that explain the preponderance of the profit or loss changes 
due to risk factor changes: The unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor listed in the Risk Factor Attribution 
Information Schedule, and the profit or loss due to the risk factor 
or other factor change.
    C. The comprehensive profit and loss attributed to new positions 
must reflect commissions and fee income or expense and market gains 
or losses associated with transactions executed on the applicable 
day. New positions include purchases and sales of financial 
instruments and other assets/liabilities and negotiated amendments 
to existing positions. The comprehensive profit and loss from new 
positions may be reported in the aggregate and does not need to be 
further attributed to specific sources.
    D. The portion of comprehensive profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to known sources must be allocated to a 
residual category identified as an unexplained portion of the 
comprehensive profit and loss. Significant unexplained profit and 
loss must be escalated for further investigation and analysis.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

c. Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging 
Measurements

1. Positions

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Positions is the 
value of securities and derivatives positions managed by the trading 
desk. For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, do not 
include in the Positions calculation for ``securities'' those 
securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined 
under subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \1\ A banking entity must separately 
report the trading desk's market value of long securities positions, 
market value of short securities positions, market value of 
derivatives receivables, market value of derivatives payables, 
notional value of derivatives receivables, and notional value of 
derivatives payables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Sec. Sec.  255.2(i), (bb). For example, under this part, 
a security-based swap is both a ``security'' and a ``derivative.'' 
For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, security-
based swaps are reported as derivatives rather than securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  255.4(a) 
or Sec.  255.4(b) to conduct

[[Page 33595]]

underwriting activity or market-making-related activity, 
respectively.

2. Transaction Volumes

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Transaction 
Volumes measures four exclusive categories of covered trading 
activity conducted by a trading desk. A banking entity is required 
to report the value and number of security and derivative 
transactions conducted by the trading desk with: (i) Customers, 
excluding internal transactions; (ii) non-customers, excluding 
internal transactions; (iii) trading desks and other organizational 
units where the transaction is booked in the same banking entity; 
and (iv) trading desks and other organizational units where the 
transaction is booked into an affiliated banking entity. For 
securities, value means gross market value. For derivatives, value 
means gross notional value. For purposes of calculating the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, do not include in the 
Transaction Volumes calculation for ``securities'' those securities 
that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined under 
subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \2\ Further, for purposes of the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, a customer of a 
trading desk that relies on Sec.  255.4(a) to conduct underwriting 
activity is a market participant identified in Sec.  255.4(a)(7), 
and a customer of a trading desk that relies on Sec.  255.4(b) to 
conduct market making-related activity is a market participant 
identified in Sec.  255.4(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ See Sec. Sec.  255.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  255.4(a) 
or Sec.  255.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

3. Securities Inventory Aging

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Securities 
Inventory Aging generally describes a schedule of the market value 
of the trading desk's securities positions and the amount of time 
that those securities positions have been held. Securities Inventory 
Aging must measure the age profile of a trading desk's securities 
positions for the following periods: 0-30 Calendar days; 31-60 
calendar days; 61-90 calendar days; 91-180 calendar days; 181-360 
calendar days; and greater than 360 calendar days. Securities 
Inventory Aging includes two schedules, a security asset-aging 
schedule, and a security liability-aging schedule. For purposes of 
the Securities Inventory Aging quantitative measurement, do not 
include securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are 
defined under subpart A.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See Sec. Sec.  255.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  255.4(a) 
or Sec.  255.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making 
related activity, respectively.

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Chapter I

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the Common Preamble, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission proposes to amend Part 75 to chapter I of 
Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 75--PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN INTERESTS IN AND 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH COVERED FUNDS

0
54. The authority for part 75 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1851.
0
55. Revise Sec.  75.2 to read as follows:

Sec.  75.2  Definitions.

    Unless otherwise specified, for purposes of this part:
    (a) Affiliate has the same meaning as in section 2(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(k)).
    (b) Applicable accounting standards means U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles, or such other accounting standards applicable to 
a banking entity that the Commission determines are appropriate and 
that the banking entity uses in the ordinary course of its business in 
preparing its consolidated financial statements.
    (c) Bank holding company has the same meaning as in section 2 of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841).
    (d) Banking entity. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of 
this section, banking entity means:
    (i) Any insured depository institution;
    (ii) Any company that controls an insured depository institution;
    (iii) Any company that is treated as a bank holding company for 
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 
U.S.C. 3106); and
    (iv) Any affiliate or subsidiary of any entity described in 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.
    (2) Banking entity does not include:
    (i) A covered fund that is not itself a banking entity under 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section;
    (ii) A portfolio company held under the authority contained in 
section 4(k)(4)(H) or (I) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(H), 
(I)), or any portfolio concern, as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, that is 
controlled by a small business investment company, as defined in 
section 103(3) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 
662), so long as the portfolio company or portfolio concern is not 
itself a banking entity under paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of 
this section; or
    (iii) The FDIC acting in its corporate capacity or as conservator 
or receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
    (e) Board means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
    (f) CFTC means the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    (g) Dealer has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(5) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5)).
    (h) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3(c) 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (i) Derivative. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2) of this 
section, derivative means:
    (i) Any swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68));
    (ii) Any purchase or sale of a commodity, that is not an excluded 
commodity, for deferred shipment or delivery that is intended to be 
physically settled;
    (iii) Any foreign exchange forward (as that term is defined in 
section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)) or 
foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined in section 1a(25) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25));
    (iv) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency 
described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(C)(i));
    (v) Any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other 
than foreign currency described in section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D)(i)); and
    (vi) Any transaction authorized under section 19 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 23(a) or (b));
    (2) A derivative does not include:
    (i) Any consumer, commercial, or other agreement, contract, or 
transaction that the CFTC and SEC have further defined by joint 
regulation, interpretation, guidance, or other action as not within the 
definition of swap, as that term is defined in section 1a(47) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)), or security-based swap, as 
that term is defined in section 3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(68)); or
    (ii) Any identified banking product, as defined in section 402(b) 
of the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000

[[Page 33596]]

(7 U.S.C. 27(b)), that is subject to section 403(a) of that Act (7 
U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    (j) Employee includes a member of the immediate family of the 
employee.
    (k) Exchange Act means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    (l) Excluded commodity has the same meaning as in section 1a(19) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(19)).
    (m) FDIC means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    (n) Federal banking agencies means the Board, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.
    (o) Foreign banking organization has the same meaning as in section 
211.21(o) of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21(o)), but does not 
include a foreign bank, as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)), that is 
organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, or the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (p) Foreign insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, 
or a similar official or agency, of any country other than the United 
States that is engaged in the supervision of insurance companies under 
foreign insurance law.
    (q) General account means all of the assets of an insurance company 
except those allocated to one or more separate accounts.
    (r) Insurance company means a company that is organized as an 
insurance company, primarily and predominantly engaged in writing 
insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by insurance companies, 
subject to supervision as such by a state insurance regulator or a 
foreign insurance regulator, and not operated for the purpose of 
evading the provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1851).
    (s) Insured depository institution has the same meaning as in 
section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)), 
but does not include an insured depository institution that is 
described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(D)).
    (t) Limited trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to a 
banking entity, that:
    (1) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, trading assets and 
liabilities (excluding trading assets and liabilities involving 
obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any agency of the 
United States) the average gross sum of which over the previous 
consecutive four quarters, as measured as of the last day of each of 
the four previous calendar quarters, is less than $1,000,000,000; and
    (2) The Commission has not determined pursuant to Sec.  75.20(g) or 
(h) of this part that the banking entity should not be treated as 
having limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (u) Loan means any loan, lease, extension of credit, or secured or 
unsecured receivable that is not a security or derivative.
    (v) Moderate trading assets and liabilities means, with respect to 
a banking entity, that the banking entity does not have significant 
trading assets and liabilities or limited trading assets and 
liabilities.
    (w) Primary financial regulatory agency has the same meaning as in 
section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5301(12)).
    (x) Purchase includes any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise 
acquire. For security futures products, purchase includes any contract, 
agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect to a 
commodity future, purchase includes any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, purchase 
includes the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled maturity 
date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance of, or 
extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as the 
context may require.
    (y) Qualifying foreign banking organization means a foreign banking 
organization that qualifies as such under section 211.23(a), (c) or (e) 
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.23(a), (c), or (e)).
    (z) SEC means the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (aa) Sale and sell each include any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of. For security futures products, such terms include any 
contract, agreement, or transaction for future delivery. With respect 
to a commodity future, such terms include any contract, agreement, or 
transaction for future delivery. With respect to a derivative, such 
terms include the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled 
maturity date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance 
of, or extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a derivative, as 
the context may require.
    (bb) Security has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(10) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10)).
    (cc) Security-based swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 
3(a)(71) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71)).
    (dd) Security future has the meaning specified in section 3(a)(55) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(55)).
    (ee) Separate account means an account established and maintained 
by an insurance company in connection with one or more insurance 
contracts to hold assets that are legally segregated from the insurance 
company's other assets, under which income, gains, and losses, whether 
or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in 
accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against 
such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the 
insurance company.
    (ff) Significant trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Significant trading assets and liabilities means, with respect 
to a banking entity, that:
    (i) The banking entity has, together with its affiliates and 
subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities the average gross sum of 
which over the previous consecutive four quarters, as measured as of 
the last day of each of the four previous calendar quarters, equals or 
exceeds $10,000,000,000; or
    (ii) The Commission has determined pursuant to Sec.  75.20(h) of 
this part that the banking entity should be treated as having 
significant trading assets and liabilities.
    (2) With respect to a banking entity other than a banking entity 
described in paragraph (3), trading assets and liabilities for purposes 
of this paragraph (ff) means trading assets and liabilities (excluding 
trading assets and liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed 
by the United States or any agency of the United States) on a worldwide 
consolidated basis.
    (3)(i) With respect to a banking entity that is a foreign banking 
organization or a subsidiary of a foreign banking organization, trading 
assets and liabilities for purposes of this paragraph (ff) means the 
trading assets and liabilities (excluding trading assets and 
liabilities involving obligations of or guaranteed by the United States 
or any agency of the United States) of the combined U.S. operations of 
the top-tier foreign banking organization (including all subsidiaries, 
affiliates, branches, and agencies of the foreign banking organization 
operating, located, or organized in the United States).
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (ff)(3)(i) of this section, a U.S. 
branch, agency, or subsidiary of a banking entity is located in the 
United States; however, the foreign bank that operates or controls that 
branch, agency, or subsidiary is not

[[Page 33597]]

considered to be located in the United States solely by virtue of 
operating or controlling the U.S. branch, agency, or subsidiary.
    (gg) State means any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States 
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    (hh) Subsidiary has the same meaning as in section 2(d) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(d)).
    (ii) State insurance regulator means the insurance commissioner, or 
a similar official or agency, of a State that is engaged in the 
supervision of insurance companies under State insurance law.
    (jj) Swap dealer has the same meaning as in section 1(a)(49) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(49)).
0
56. Amend Sec.  75.3 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as paragraphs (d) through 
(f);
0
c. Adding a new paragraph (c);
0
d. Revising paragraph (e)(3);
0
e. Adding paragraph (e)(10);
0
f. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(5) through (f)(13) as paragraphs (f)(6) 
through (f)(14);
0
g. Adding a new paragraph (f)(5); and
0
h. Adding paragraph (g).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  75.3   Prohibition on proprietary trading.

* * * * *
    (b) Definition of trading account. Trading account means any 
account that is used by a banking entity to:
    (1)(i) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are 
both market risk capital rule covered positions and trading positions 
(or hedges of other market risk capital rule covered positions), if the 
banking entity, or any affiliate of the banking entity, is an insured 
depository institution, bank holding company, or savings and loan 
holding company, and calculates risk-based capital ratios under the 
market risk capital rule; or
    (ii) With respect to a banking entity that is not, and is not 
controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is, located 
in or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, 
purchase or sell one or more financial instruments that are subject to 
capital requirements under a market risk framework established by the 
home-country supervisor that is consistent with the market risk 
framework published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as 
amended from time to time.
    (2) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments for any 
purpose, if the banking entity:
    (i) Is licensed or registered, or is required to be licensed or 
registered, to engage in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer, to the extent the instrument is purchased 
or sold in connection with the activities that require the banking 
entity to be licensed or registered as such; or
    (ii) Is engaged in the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or 
security-based swap dealer outside of the United States, to the extent 
the instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities 
of such business; or
    (3) Purchase or sell one or more financial instruments, with 
respect to a financial instrument that is recorded at fair value on a 
recurring basis under applicable accounting standards.
    (c) Presumption of compliance. (1)(i) Each trading desk that does 
not purchase or sell financial instruments for a trading account 
defined in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section may calculate 
the net gain or net loss on the trading desk's portfolio of financial 
instruments each business day, reflecting realized and unrealized gains 
and losses since the previous business day, based on the banking 
entity's fair value for such financial instruments.
    (ii) If the sum of the absolute values of the daily net gain and 
loss figures determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
section for the preceding 90-calendar-day period does not exceed $25 
million, the activities of the trading desk shall be presumed to be in 
compliance with the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (2) The Commission may rebut the presumption of compliance in 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section by providing written notice to the 
banking entity that the Commission has determined that one or more of 
the banking entity's activities violates the prohibitions under subpart 
B.
    (3) If a trading desk operating pursuant to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of 
this section exceeds the $25 million threshold in that paragraph at any 
point, the banking entity shall, in accordance with any policies and 
procedures adopted by the Commission:
    (i) Promptly notify the Commission;
    (ii) Demonstrate that the trading desk's purchases and sales of 
financial instruments comply with subpart B; and
    (iii) Demonstrate, with respect to the trading desk, how the 
banking entity will maintain compliance with subpart B on an ongoing 
basis.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) Any purchase or sale of a security, foreign exchange forward 
(as that term is defined in section 1a(24) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(24)), foreign exchange swap (as that term is defined 
in section 1a(25) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(25)), or 
physically-settled cross-currency swap, by a banking entity for the 
purpose of liquidity management in accordance with a documented 
liquidity management plan of the banking entity that, with respect to 
such financial instruments:
    (i) Specifically contemplates and authorizes the particular 
financial instruments to be used for liquidity management purposes, the 
amount, types, and risks of these financial instruments that are 
consistent with liquidity management, and the liquidity circumstances 
in which the particular financial instruments may or must be used;
    (ii) Requires that any purchase or sale of financial instruments 
contemplated and authorized by the plan be principally for the purpose 
of managing the liquidity of the banking entity, and not for the 
purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from actual or expected 
short-term price movements, realizing short-term arbitrage profits, or 
hedging a position taken for such short-term purposes;
    (iii) Requires that any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes be highly liquid and limited to financial 
instruments the market, credit, and other risks of which the banking 
entity does not reasonably expect to give rise to appreciable profits 
or losses as a result of short-term price movements;
    (iv) Limits any financial instruments purchased or sold for 
liquidity management purposes, together with any other instruments 
purchased or sold for such purposes, to an amount that is consistent 
with the banking entity's near-term funding needs, including deviations 
from normal operations of the banking entity or any affiliate thereof, 
as estimated and documented pursuant to methods specified in the plan;
    (v) Includes written policies and procedures, internal controls, 
analysis, and independent testing to ensure that the purchase and sale 
of financial instruments that are not permitted under Sec. Sec.  
75.6(a) or (b) of this subpart are for the purpose of liquidity 
management and in accordance with the liquidity management plan 
described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section; and
    (vi) Is consistent with the Commission's supervisory requirements, 
guidance, and

[[Page 33598]]

expectations regarding liquidity management;
* * * * *
    (10) Any purchase (or sale) of one or more financial instruments 
that was made in error by a banking entity in the course of conducting 
a permitted or excluded activity or is a subsequent transaction to 
correct such an error, and the erroneously purchased (or sold) 
financial instrument is promptly transferred to a separately-managed 
trade error account for disposition.
    (f) * * *
    (5) Cross-currency swap means a swap in which one party exchanges 
with another party principal and interest rate payments in one currency 
for principal and interest rate payments in another currency, and the 
exchange of principal occurs on the date the swap is entered into, with 
a reversal of the exchange of principal at a later date that is agreed 
upon when the swap is entered into.
* * * * *
    (g) Reservation of Authority: (1) The Commission may determine, on 
a case-by-case basis, that a purchase or sale of one or more financial 
instruments by a banking entity either is or is not for the trading 
account as defined at 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(6).
    (2) Notice and Response Procedures.--(i) Notice. When the 
Commission determines that the purchase or sale of one or more 
financial instruments is for the trading account under paragraph (g)(1) 
of this section, the Commission will notify the banking entity in 
writing of the determination and provide an explanation of the 
determination.
    (ii) Response. (A) The banking entity may respond to any or all 
items in the notice. The response should include any matters that the 
banking entity would have the Commission consider in deciding whether 
the purchase or sale is for the trading account. The response must be 
in writing and delivered to the designated Commission official within 
30 days after the date on which the banking entity received the notice. 
The Commission may shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the 
Commission, the activities or condition of the banking entity so 
requires, provided that the banking entity is informed promptly of the 
new time period, or with the consent of the banking entity. In its 
discretion, the Commission may extend the time period for good cause.
    (B) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the Commission shall constitute a waiver of any 
objections to the Commission's determination.
    (iii) After the close of banking entity's response period, the 
Commission will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's 
response and other information concerning the banking entity, whether 
to maintain the Commission's determination that the purchase or sale of 
one or more financial instruments is for the trading account. The 
banking entity will be notified of the decision in writing. The notice 
will include an explanation of the decision.
0
57. Amend Sec.  75.4 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(2);
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(8);
0
c. Revising paragraph (b)(2);
0
d. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
e. In paragraph (b)(5) revising the references to ``inventory'' to read 
``positions''; and
0
f. Adding paragraph (b)(6).
    The revisions and additions to read as follows:

Sec.  75.4   Permitted underwriting and market making-related 
activities.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The underwriting activities of a banking entity 
are permitted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The banking entity is acting as an underwriter for a 
distribution of securities and the trading desk's underwriting position 
is related to such distribution;
    (ii)(A) The amount and type of the securities in the trading desk's 
underwriting position are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, 
taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market 
for the relevant type of security, and (B) reasonable efforts are made 
to sell or otherwise reduce the underwriting position within a 
reasonable period, taking into account the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant type of security;
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis, and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The products, instruments or exposures each trading desk may 
purchase, sell, or manage as part of its underwriting activities;
    (B) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section;
    (C) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (D) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis of the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s), and independent 
review of such demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (a) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (v) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in the 
activity described in this paragraph (a) in accordance with applicable 
law.
* * * * *
    (8) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.
    (i) Risk limits.
    (A) A banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A) of this section with respect to the purchase or 
sale of a financial instrument if the banking entity has established 
and implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i)(B) and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (8)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's underwriting activities, on the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risk of its underwriting position;
    (2) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
underwriting position; and
    (3) Period of time a security may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the Commission on an ongoing basis. Any review 
of such limits will include assessment of whether the limits are 
designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of 
clients, customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(8)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the Commission (A) to the extent that any

[[Page 33599]]

limit is exceeded and (B) any temporary or permanent increase to any 
limit(s), in each case in the form and manner as directed by the 
Commission.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(a)(8)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the Commission if the 
Commission determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, 
that a trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The Commission will provide notice of any such 
determination to the banking entity in writing.
    (b) * * *
    (2) Requirements. The market making-related activities of a banking 
entity are permitted under paragraph (b)(1) of this section only if:
    (i) The trading desk that establishes and manages the financial 
exposure routinely stands ready to purchase and sell one or more types 
of financial instruments related to its financial exposure and is 
willing and available to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise enter 
into long and short positions in those types of financial instruments 
for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout 
market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, maturity, and 
depth of the market for the relevant types of financial instruments;
    (ii) The trading desk's market-making related activities are 
designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on 
the liquidity, maturity, and depth of the market for the relevant types 
of financial instrument(s).
    (iii) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces an internal compliance program 
required by subpart D of this part that is reasonably designed to 
ensure the banking entity's compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section, including reasonably designed written 
policies and procedures, internal controls, analysis and independent 
testing identifying and addressing:
    (A) The financial instruments each trading desk stands ready to 
purchase and sell in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this 
section;
    (B) The actions the trading desk will take to demonstrably reduce 
or otherwise significantly mitigate promptly the risks of its financial 
exposure consistent with the limits required under paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section; the products, instruments, and 
exposures each trading desk may use for risk management purposes; the 
techniques and strategies each trading desk may use to manage the risks 
of its market making-related activities and positions; and the process, 
strategies, and personnel responsible for ensuring that the actions 
taken by the trading desk to mitigate these risks are and continue to 
be effective;
    (C) Limits for each trading desk, in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section;
    (D) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring and analysis of each 
trading desk's compliance with its limits; and
    (E) Authorization procedures, including escalation procedures that 
require review and approval of any trade that would exceed a trading 
desk's limit(s), demonstrable analysis that the basis for any temporary 
or permanent increase to a trading desk's limit(s) is consistent with 
the requirements of this paragraph (b), and independent review of such 
demonstrable analysis and approval;
    (iv) In the case of a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, to the extent that any limit identified 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(C) of this section is exceeded, the 
trading desk takes action to bring the trading desk into compliance 
with the limits as promptly as possible after the limit is exceeded;
    (v) The compensation arrangements of persons performing the 
activities described in this paragraph (b) are designed not to reward 
or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (vi) The banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in 
activity described in this paragraph (b) in accordance with applicable 
law.
    (3) * * *
    (i) A trading desk or other organizational unit of another banking 
entity is not a client, customer, or counterparty of the trading desk 
if that other entity has trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion 
or more as measured in accordance with the methodology described in 
definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' contained 
in Sec.  75.2 of this part, unless:
* * * * *
    (6) Rebuttable presumption of compliance.--(i) Risk limits. (A) A 
banking entity shall be presumed to meet the requirements of paragraph 
(b)(2)(ii) of this section with respect to the purchase or sale of a 
financial instrument if the banking entity has established and 
implements, maintains, and enforces the limits described in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i)(B) of this section and does not exceed such limits.
    (B) The presumption described in paragraph (6)(i)(A) of this 
section shall be available with respect to limits for each trading desk 
that are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, based on the nature 
and amount of the trading desk's market making-related activities, on 
the:
    (1) Amount, types, and risks of its market-maker positions;
    (2) Amount, types, and risks of the products, instruments, and 
exposures the trading desk may use for risk management purposes;
    (3) Level of exposures to relevant risk factors arising from its 
financial exposure; and
    (4) Period of time a financial instrument may be held.
    (ii) Supervisory review and oversight. The limits described in 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section shall be subject to supervisory 
review and oversight by the Commission on an ongoing basis. Any review 
of such limits will include assessment of whether the limits are 
designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term demands of 
clients, customers, or counterparties.
    (iii) Reporting. With respect to any limit identified pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, a banking entity shall promptly 
report to the Commission (A) to the extent that any limit is exceeded 
and (B) any temporary or permanent increase to any limit(s), in each 
case in the form and manner as directed by the Commission.
    (iv) Rebutting the presumption. The presumption in paragraph 
(b)(6)(i) of this section may be rebutted by the Commission if the 
Commission determines, based on all relevant facts and circumstances, 
that a trading desk is engaging in activity that is not based on the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or 
counterparties. The Commission will provide notice of any such 
determination to the banking entity in writing.
0
 58. Amend Sec.  75.5 by revising paragraph (b), the introductory text 
of paragraph (c)(1), and adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:

Sec.  75.5   Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities.

* * * * *
    (b) Requirements. (1) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity that has significant trading assets and liabilities are 
permitted under paragraph (a) of this section only if:

[[Page 33600]]

    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program required by subpart D of 
this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking entity's 
compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures regarding 
the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used for hedging, 
including documentation indicating what positions, contracts or other 
holdings a particular trading desk may use in its risk-mitigating 
hedging activities, as well as position and aging limits with respect 
to such positions, contracts or other holdings;
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (C) The conduct of analysis and independent testing designed to 
ensure that the positions, techniques and strategies that may be used 
for hedging may reasonably be expected to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risk(s) being hedged;
    (ii) The risk-mitigating hedging activity:
    (A) Is conducted in accordance with the written policies, 
procedures, and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section;
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity that:
    (1) Is consistent with the written hedging policies and procedures 
required under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
    (2) Is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate the 
specific, identifiable risks that develop over time from the risk-
mitigating hedging activities undertaken under this section and the 
underlying positions, contracts, and other holdings of the banking 
entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the underlying and 
hedging positions, contracts and other holdings of the banking entity 
and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (3) Requires ongoing recalibration of the hedging activity by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading; and
    (iii) The compensation arrangements of persons performing risk-
mitigating hedging activities are designed not to reward or incentivize 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (2) The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a banking entity that 
does not have significant trading assets and liabilities are permitted 
under paragraph (a) of this section only if the risk-mitigating hedging 
activity:
    (i) At the inception of the hedging activity, including, without 
limitation, any adjustments to the hedging activity, is designed to 
reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, 
identifiable risks, including market risk, counterparty or other credit 
risk, currency or foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity 
price risk, basis risk, or similar risks, arising in connection with 
and related to identified positions, contracts, or other holdings of 
the banking entity, based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
identified underlying and hedging positions, contracts or other 
holdings and the risks and liquidity thereof; and
    (ii) Is subject, as appropriate, to ongoing recalibration by the 
banking entity to ensure that the hedging activity satisfies the 
requirements set out in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and is not 
prohibited proprietary trading.
    (c) * * * (1) A banking entity that has significant trading assets 
and liabilities must comply with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) 
and (3) of this section, unless the requirements of paragraph (c)(4) of 
this section are met, with respect to any purchase or sale of financial 
instruments made in reliance on this section for risk-mitigating 
hedging purposes that is:
* * * * *
    (4) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section 
do not apply to the purchase or sale of a financial instrument 
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section if:
    (i) The financial instrument purchased or sold is identified on a 
written list of pre-approved financial instruments that are commonly 
used by the trading desk for the specific type of hedging activity for 
which the financial instrument is being purchased or sold; and
    (ii) At the time the financial instrument is purchased or sold, the 
hedging activity (including the purchase or sale of the financial 
instrument) complies with written, pre-approved hedging limits for the 
trading desk purchasing or selling the financial instrument for hedging 
activities undertaken for one or more other trading desks. The hedging 
limits shall be appropriate for the:
    (A) Size, types, and risks of the hedging activities commonly 
undertaken by the trading desk;
    (B) Financial instruments purchased and sold for hedging activities 
by the trading desk; and
    (C) Levels and duration of the risk exposures being hedged.
0
59. Amend Sec.  75.6 by revising paragraph (e)(3) and removing 
paragraph (e)(6) to read as follows:

Sec.  75.6   Other permitted proprietary trading activities.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) A purchase or sale by a banking entity is permitted for 
purposes of this paragraph (e) if:
    (i) The banking entity engaging as principal in the purchase or 
sale (including relevant personnel) is not located in the United States 
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State;
    (ii) The banking entity (including relevant personnel) that makes 
the decision to purchase or sell as principal is not located in the 
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or of 
any State; and
    (iii) The purchase or sale, including any transaction arising from 
risk-mitigating hedging related to the instruments purchased or sold, 
is not accounted for as principal directly or on a consolidated basis 
by any branch or affiliate that is located in the United States or 
organized under the laws of the United States or of any State.
* * * * *

Sec.  75.10  [Amended]

0
60. Amend Sec.  75.10 by:
0
a. In paragraph (c)(8)(i)(A) revising the reference to ``Sec.  
75.2(s)'' to read ``Sec.  75.2(u)'';
0
b. Removing paragraph (d)(1);
0
c. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(2) through (d)(10) as paragraphs (d)(1) 
through (d)(9);
0
d. In paragraph (d)(5)(i)(G) revising the reference to ``(d)(6)(i)(A)'' 
to read ``(d)(5)(i)(A)''; and

[[Page 33601]]

0
e. In paragraph (d)(9) revising the reference to ``(d)(9)'' to read 
``(d)(8)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)(A)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)(A)'' and the reference to ``(d)(10)(i)'' to read 
``(d)(9)(i)''.
0
61. Amend Sec.  75.11 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:

Sec.  75.11   Permitted organizing and offering, underwriting, and 
market making with respect to a covered fund.

* * * * *
    (c) Underwriting and market making in ownership interests of a 
covered fund. The prohibition contained in Sec.  75.10(a) of this 
subpart does not apply to a banking entity's underwriting activities or 
market making-related activities involving a covered fund so long as:
    (1) Those activities are conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Sec.  75.4(a) or Sec.  75.4(b) of subpart B, 
respectively; and
    (2) With respect to any banking entity (or any affiliate thereof) 
that: Acts as a sponsor, investment adviser or commodity trading 
advisor to a particular covered fund or otherwise acquires and retains 
an ownership interest in such covered fund in reliance on paragraph (a) 
of this section; or acquires and retains an ownership interest in such 
covered fund and is either a securitizer, as that term is used in 
section 15G(a)(3) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11(a)(3)), or is 
acquiring and retaining an ownership interest in such covered fund in 
compliance with section 15G of that Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-11) and the 
implementing regulations issued thereunder each as permitted by 
paragraph (b) of this section, then in each such case any ownership 
interests acquired or retained by the banking entity and its affiliates 
in connection with underwriting and market making related activities 
for that particular covered fund are included in the calculation of 
ownership interests permitted to be held by the banking entity and its 
affiliates under the limitations of Sec.  75.12(a)(2)(ii); Sec.  
75.12(a)(2)(iii), and Sec.  75.12(d) of this subpart.

Sec.  75.12  [Amended]

0
62. In subpart C, section 75.12 is amended by:
0
a. In paragraphs (c)(1) and (d) revising the references to ``Sec.  
75.10(d)(6)(ii)'' to read ``Sec.  75.10(d)(5)(ii)'';
0
b. Removing paragraph (e)(2)(vii); and
0
c. Redesignating the second instance of paragraph (e)(2)(vi) as 
paragraph (e)(2)(vii).
0
63. Amend Sec.  75.13 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(3) and 
removing (b)(4)(iv) to read as follows:

Sec.  75.13  Other permitted covered fund activities and investments.

    (a) Permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities. (1) The 
prohibition contained in Sec.  75.10(a) of this subpart does not apply 
with respect to an ownership interest in a covered fund acquired or 
retained by a banking entity that is designed to reduce or otherwise 
significantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks to the banking 
entity in connection with:
    (i) A compensation arrangement with an employee of the banking 
entity or an affiliate thereof that directly provides investment 
advisory, commodity trading advisory or other services to the covered 
fund; or
    (ii) A position taken by the banking entity when acting as 
intermediary on behalf of a customer that is not itself a banking 
entity to facilitate the exposure by the customer to the profits and 
losses of the covered fund.
    (2) Requirements. The risk-mitigating hedging activities of a 
banking entity are permitted under this paragraph (a) only if:
    (i) The banking entity has established and implements, maintains 
and enforces an internal compliance program in accordance with subpart 
D of this part that is reasonably designed to ensure the banking 
entity's compliance with the requirements of this section, including:
    (A) Reasonably designed written policies and procedures; and
    (B) Internal controls and ongoing monitoring, management, and 
authorization procedures, including relevant escalation procedures; and
    (ii) The acquisition or retention of the ownership interest:
    (A) Is made in accordance with the written policies, procedures, 
and internal controls required under this section;
    (B) At the inception of the hedge, is designed to reduce or 
otherwise significantly mitigate one or more specific, identifiable 
risks arising (1) out of a transaction conducted solely to accommodate 
a specific customer request with respect to the covered fund or (2) in 
connection with the compensation arrangement with the employee that 
directly provides investment advisory, commodity trading advisory, or 
other services to the covered fund;
    (C) Does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to any 
significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged 
contemporaneously in accordance with this section; and
    (D) Is subject to continuing review, monitoring and management by 
the banking entity.
    (iii) With respect to risk-mitigating hedging activity conducted 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i), the compensation arrangement relates 
solely to the covered fund in which the banking entity or any affiliate 
has acquired an ownership interest pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) and 
such compensation arrangement provides that any losses incurred by the 
banking entity on such ownership interest will be offset by 
corresponding decreases in amounts payable under such compensation 
arrangement.
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) An ownership interest in a covered fund is not offered for sale 
or sold to a resident of the United States for purposes of paragraph 
(b)(1)(iii) of this section only if it is not sold and has not been 
sold pursuant to an offering that targets residents of the United 
States in which the banking entity or any affiliate of the banking 
entity participates. If the banking entity or an affiliate sponsors or 
serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager, investment 
adviser, commodity pool operator or commodity trading advisor to a 
covered fund, then the banking entity or affiliate will be deemed for 
purposes of this paragraph (b)(3) to participate in any offer or sale 
by the covered fund of ownership interests in the covered fund.
* * * * *
0
64. Amend Sec.  75.14 by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) as follows:

Sec.  75.14   Limitations on relationships with a covered fund.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (B) The chief executive officer (or equivalent officer) of the 
banking entity certifies in writing annually no later than March 31 to 
the Commission (with a duty to update the certification if the 
information in the certification materially changes) that the banking 
entity does not, directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or 
otherwise insure the obligations or performance of the covered fund or 
of any covered fund in which such covered fund invests; and
* * * * *
0
65. Amend Sec.  75.20 by:
0
 a. Revising paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f)(2);
0
b. Revising the introductory text of paragraphs (b) and (e)
0
c. Adding paragraphs (g) and (h).
    The revisions amd additions to read as follows:

Sec.  75.20   Program for compliance; reporting.

    (a) Program requirement. Each banking entity (other than a banking

[[Page 33602]]

entity with limited trading assets and liabilities) shall develop and 
provide for the continued administration of a compliance program 
reasonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the 
prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered fund 
activities and investments set forth in section 13 of the BHC Act and 
this part. The terms, scope, and detail of the compliance program shall 
be appropriate for the types, size, scope, and complexity of activities 
and business structure of the banking entity.
    (b) Banking entities with significant trading assets and 
liabilities. With respect to a banking entity with significant trading 
assets and liabilities, the compliance program required by paragraph 
(a) of this section, at a minimum, shall include:
* * * * *
    (c) CEO attestation.
    (1) The CEO of a banking entity described in paragraph (2) must, 
based on a review by the CEO of the banking entity, attest in writing 
to the Commission, each year no later than March 31, that the banking 
entity has in place processes reasonably designed to achieve compliance 
with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. In the case of a U.S. 
branch or agency of a foreign banking entity, the attestation may be 
provided for the entire U.S. operations of the foreign banking entity 
by the senior management officer of the U.S. operations of the foreign 
banking entity who is located in the United States.
    (2) The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) apply to a banking entity 
if:
    (i) The banking entity does not have limited trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The Commission notifies the banking entity in writing that it 
must satisfy the requirements contained in paragraph (c)(1).
    (d) Reporting requirements under the Appendix to this part. (1) A 
banking entity engaged in proprietary trading activity permitted under 
subpart B shall comply with the reporting requirements described in the 
Appendix, if:
    (i) The banking entity has significant trading assets and 
liabilities; or
    (ii) The Commission notifies the banking entity in writing that it 
must satisfy the reporting requirements contained in the Appendix.
    (2) Frequency of reporting: Unless the Commission notifies the 
banking entity in writing that it must report on a different basis, a 
banking entity with $50 billion or more in trading assets and 
liabilities (as calculated in accordance with the methodology described 
in the definition of ``significant trading assets and liabilities'' 
contained in Sec.  75.2 of this part of this part) shall report the 
information required by the Appendix for each calendar month within 20 
days of the end of each calendar month. Any other banking entity 
subject to the Appendix shall report the information required by the 
Appendix for each calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of that 
calendar quarter unless the Commission notifies the banking entity in 
writing that it must report on a different basis.
    (e) Additional documentation for covered funds. A banking entity 
with significant trading assets and liabilities shall maintain records 
that include:
* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) Banking entities with moderate trading assets and liabilities. 
A banking entity with moderate trading assets and liabilities may 
satisfy the requirements of this section by including in its existing 
compliance policies and procedures appropriate references to the 
requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and this part and adjustments 
as appropriate given the activities, size, scope, and complexity of the 
banking entity.
    (g) Rebuttable presumption of compliance for banking entities with 
limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (1) Rebuttable presumption. Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, a banking entity with limited trading assets and liabilities 
shall be presumed to be compliant with subpart B and subpart C and 
shall have no obligation to demonstrate compliance with this part on an 
ongoing basis.
    (2) Rebuttal of presumption.
    (i) If upon examination or audit, the Commission determines that 
the banking entity has engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund 
activities that are otherwise prohibited under subpart B or subpart C, 
the Commission may require the banking entity to be treated under this 
part as if it did not have limited trading assets and liabilities.
    (ii) Notice and Response Procedures.
    (A) Notice. The Commission will notify the banking entity in 
writing of any determination pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this 
section to rebut the presumption described in this paragraph (g) and 
will provide an explanation of the determination.
    (B) Response.
    (I) The banking entity may respond to any or all items in the 
notice described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii)(A) of this section. The 
response should include any matters that the banking entity would have 
the Commission consider in deciding whether the banking entity has 
engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund activities prohibited 
under subpart B or subpart C. The response must be in writing and 
delivered to the designated Commission official within 30 days after 
the date on which the banking entity received the notice. The 
Commission may shorten the time period when, in the opinion of the 
Commission, the activities or condition of the banking entity so 
requires, provided that the banking entity is informed promptly of the 
new time period, or with the consent of the banking entity. In its 
discretion, the Commission may extend the time period for good cause.
    (II) Failure to respond within 30 days or such other time period as 
may be specified by the Commission shall constitute a waiver of any 
objections to the Commission's determination.
    (C) After the close of banking entity's response period, the 
Commission will decide, based on a review of the banking entity's 
response and other information concerning the banking entity, whether 
to maintain the Commission's determination that banking entity has 
engaged in proprietary trading or covered fund activities prohibited 
under subpart B or subpart C. The banking entity will be notified of 
the decision in writing. The notice will include an explanation of the 
decision.
    (h) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this part, the Commission retains its authority to require a banking 
entity without significant trading assets and liabilities to apply any 
requirements of this part that would otherwise apply if the banking 
entity had significant or moderate trading assets and liabilities if 
the Commission determines that the size or complexity of the banking 
entity's trading or investment activities, or the risk of evasion of 
subpart B or subpart C, does not warrant a presumption of compliance 
under paragraph (g) of this section or treatment as a banking entity 
with moderate trading assets and liabilities, as applicable.
0
66. Revise the Appendix to Part 75 to read as follows:

Appendix to Part 75--Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for 
Covered Trading Activities

I. Purpose

    a. This appendix sets forth reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements that certain banking entities must satisfy in 
connection with the restrictions on proprietary trading set forth in 
subpart B (``proprietary trading restrictions''). Pursuant to Sec.  
75.20(d), this appendix applies to a banking entity that, together 
with its affiliates and subsidiaries, has significant trading assets 
and liabilities.

[[Page 33603]]

These entities are required to (i) furnish periodic reports to the 
Commission regarding a variety of quantitative measurements of their 
covered trading activities, which vary depending on the scope and 
size of covered trading activities, and (ii) create and maintain 
records documenting the preparation and content of these reports. 
The requirements of this appendix must be incorporated into the 
banking entity's internal compliance program under Sec.  75.20.
    b. The purpose of this appendix is to assist banking entities 
and the Commission in:
    (i) Better understanding and evaluating the scope, type, and 
profile of the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (ii) Monitoring the banking entity's covered trading activities;
    (iii) Identifying covered trading activities that warrant 
further review or examination by the banking entity to verify 
compliance with the proprietary trading restrictions;
    (iv) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of 
trading desks engaged in market making-related activities subject to 
Sec.  75.4(b) are consistent with the requirements governing 
permitted market making-related activities;
    (v) Evaluating whether the covered trading activities of trading 
desks that are engaged in permitted trading activity subject to 
Sec. Sec.  75.4, 75.5, or 75.6(a)-(b) (i.e., underwriting and market 
making-related related activity, risk-mitigating hedging, or trading 
in certain government obligations) are consistent with the 
requirement that such activity not result, directly or indirectly, 
in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading 
strategies;
    (vi) Identifying the profile of particular covered trading 
activities of the banking entity, and the individual trading desks 
of the banking entity, to help establish the appropriate frequency 
and scope of examination by the Commission of such activities; and
    (vii) Assessing and addressing the risks associated with the 
banking entity's covered trading activities.
    c. Information that must be furnished pursuant to this appendix 
is not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the 
identification of permissible or impermissible activities.
    d. In addition to the quantitative measurements required in this 
appendix, a banking entity may need to develop and implement other 
quantitative measurements in order to effectively monitor its 
covered trading activities for compliance with section 13 of the BHC 
Act and this part and to have an effective compliance program, as 
required by Sec.  75.20. The effectiveness of particular 
quantitative measurements may differ based on the profile of the 
banking entity's businesses in general and, more specifically, of 
the particular trading desk, including types of instruments traded, 
trading activities and strategies, and history and experience (e.g., 
whether the trading desk is an established, successful market maker 
or a new entrant to a competitive market). In all cases, banking 
entities must ensure that they have robust measures in place to 
identify and monitor the risks taken in their trading activities, to 
ensure that the activities are within risk tolerances established by 
the banking entity, and to monitor and examine for compliance with 
the proprietary trading restrictions in this part.
    e. On an ongoing basis, banking entities must carefully monitor, 
review, and evaluate all furnished quantitative measurements, as 
well as any others that they choose to utilize in order to maintain 
compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and this part. All 
measurement results that indicate a heightened risk of impermissible 
proprietary trading, including with respect to otherwise-permitted 
activities under Sec. Sec.  75.4 through 75.6(a)-(b), or that result 
in a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading 
strategies, must be escalated within the banking entity for review, 
further analysis, explanation to the Commission, and remediation, 
where appropriate. The quantitative measurements discussed in this 
appendix should be helpful to banking entities in identifying and 
managing the risks related to their covered trading activities.

II. Definitions

    The terms used in this appendix have the same meanings as set 
forth in Sec. Sec.  75.2 and 75.3. In addition, for purposes of this 
appendix, the following definitions apply:
    Applicability identifies the trading desks for which a banking 
entity is required to calculate and report a particular quantitative 
measurement based on the type of covered trading activity conducted 
by the trading desk.
    Calculation period means the period of time for which a 
particular quantitative measurement must be calculated.
    Comprehensive profit and loss means the net profit or loss of a 
trading desk's material sources of trading revenue over a specific 
period of time, including, for example, any increase or decrease in 
the market value of a trading desk's holdings, dividend income, and 
interest income and expense.
    Covered trading activity means trading conducted by a trading 
desk under Sec. Sec.  75.4, 75.5, 75.6(a), or 75.6(b). A banking 
entity may include in its covered trading activity trading conducted 
under Sec. Sec.  75.3(e), 75.6(c), 75.6(d), or 75.6(e).
    Measurement frequency means the frequency with which a 
particular quantitative metric must be calculated and recorded.
    Trading day means a calendar day on which a trading desk is open 
for trading.

III. Reporting and Recordkeeping

a. Scope of Required Reporting

    1. Quantitative measurements. Each banking entity made subject 
to this appendix by Sec.  75.20 must furnish the following 
quantitative measurements, as applicable, for each trading desk of 
the banking entity engaged in covered trading activities and 
calculate these quantitative measurements in accordance with this 
appendix:
    i. Risk and Position Limits and Usage;
    ii. Risk Factor Sensitivities;
    iii. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk;
    iv. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution;
    v. Positions;
    vi. Transaction Volumes; and
    vii. Securities Inventory Aging.
    2. Trading desk information. Each banking entity made subject to 
this appendix by Sec.  75.20 must provide certain descriptive 
information, as further described in this appendix, regarding each 
trading desk engaged in covered trading activities.
    3. Quantitative measurements identifying information. Each 
banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  75.20 must 
provide certain identifying and descriptive information, as further 
described in this appendix, regarding its quantitative measurements.
    4. Narrative statement. Each banking entity made subject to this 
appendix by Sec.  75.20 must provide a separate narrative statement, 
as further described in this appendix.
    5. File identifying information. Each banking entity made 
subject to this appendix by Sec.  75.20 must provide file 
identifying information in each submission to the Commission 
pursuant to this appendix, including the name of the banking entity, 
the RSSD ID assigned to the top-tier banking entity by the Board, 
and identification of the reporting period and creation date and 
time.

b. Trading Desk Information

    1. Each banking entity must provide descriptive information 
regarding each trading desk engaged in covered trading activities, 
including:
    i. Name of the trading desk used internally by the banking 
entity and a unique identification label for the trading desk;
    ii. Identification of each type of covered trading activity in 
which the trading desk is engaged;
    iii. Brief description of the general strategy of the trading 
desk;
    iv. A list of the types of financial instruments and other 
products purchased and sold by the trading desk; an indication of 
which of these are the main financial instruments or products 
purchased and sold by the trading desk; and, for trading desks 
engaged in market making-related activities under Sec.  75.4(b), 
specification of whether each type of financial instrument is 
included in market-maker positions or not included in market-maker 
positions. In addition, indicate whether the trading desk is 
including in its quantitative measurements products excluded from 
the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  75.3(d)(2) 
and, if so, identify such products;
    v. Identification by complete name of each legal entity that 
serves as a booking entity for covered trading activities conducted 
by the trading desk; and indication of which of the identified legal 
entities are the main booking entities for covered trading 
activities of the trading desk;
    vii. For each legal entity that serves as a booking entity for 
covered trading activities, specification of any of the following 
applicable entity types for that legal entity:
    A. National bank, Federal branch or Federal agency of a foreign 
bank, Federal savings association, Federal savings bank;
    B. State nonmember bank, foreign bank having an insured branch, 
State savings association;
    C. U.S.-registered broker-dealer, U.S.-registered security-based 
swap dealer, U.S.-

[[Page 33604]]

registered major security-based swap participant;
    D. Swap dealer, major swap participant, derivatives clearing 
organization, futures commission merchant, commodity pool operator, 
commodity trading advisor, introducing broker, floor trader, retail 
foreign exchange dealer;
    E. State member bank;
    F. Bank holding company, savings and loan holding company;
    G. Foreign banking organization as defined in 12 CFR 211.21(o);
    H. Uninsured State-licensed branch or agency of a foreign bank; 
or
    I. Other entity type not listed above, including a subsidiary of 
a legal entity described above where the subsidiary itself is not an 
entity type listed above;
    2. Indication of whether each calendar date is a trading day or 
not a trading day for the trading desk; and
    3. Currency reported and daily currency conversion rate.

c. Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information

    Each banking entity must provide the following information 
regarding the quantitative measurements:
    1. A Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each limit reported 
pursuant to the Risk and Position Limits and Usage quantitative 
measurement, including the name of the limit, a unique 
identification label for the limit, a description of the limit, 
whether the limit is intraday or end-of-day, the unit of measurement 
for the limit, whether the limit measures risk on a net or gross 
basis, and the type of limit;
    2. A Risk Factor Sensitivities Information Schedule that 
provides identifying and descriptive information for each risk 
factor sensitivity reported pursuant to the Risk Factor 
Sensitivities quantitative measurement, including the name of the 
sensitivity, a unique identification label for the sensitivity, a 
description of the sensitivity, and the sensitivity's risk factor 
change unit;
    3. A Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule that provides 
identifying and descriptive information for each risk factor 
attribution reported pursuant to the Comprehensive Profit and Loss 
Attribution quantitative measurement, including the name of the risk 
factor or other factor, a unique identification label for the risk 
factor or other factor, a description of the risk factor or other 
factor, and the risk factor or other factor's change unit;
    4. A Limit/Sensitivity Cross-Reference Schedule that cross-
references, by unique identification label, limits identified in the 
Risk and Position Limits Information Schedule to associated risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule; and
    5. A Risk Factor Sensitivity/Attribution Cross-Reference 
Schedule that cross-references, by unique identification label, risk 
factor sensitivities identified in the Risk Factor Sensitivities 
Information Schedule to associated risk factor attributions 
identified in the Risk Factor Attribution Information Schedule.

d. Narrative Statement

    Each banking entity made subject to this appendix by Sec.  75.20 
must submit in a separate electronic document a Narrative Statement 
to the Commission describing any changes in calculation methods 
used, a description of and reasons for changes in the banking 
entity's trading desk structure or trading desk strategies, and when 
any such change occurred. The Narrative Statement must include any 
information the banking entity views as relevant for assessing the 
information reported, such as further description of calculation 
methods used. If a banking entity does not have any information to 
report in a Narrative Statement, the banking entity must submit an 
electronic document stating that it does not have any information to 
report in a Narrative Statement.

e. Frequency and Method of Required Calculation and Reporting

    A banking entity must calculate any applicable quantitative 
measurement for each trading day. A banking entity must report the 
Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative 
Measurements Identifying Information, and each applicable 
quantitative measurement electronically to the Commission on the 
reporting schedule established in Sec.  75.20 unless otherwise 
requested by the Commission. A banking entity must report the 
Trading Desk Information, the Quantitative Measurements Identifying 
Information, and each applicable quantitative measurement to the 
Commission in accordance with the XML Schema specified and published 
on the Commission's website.

f. Recordkeeping

    A banking entity must, for any quantitative measurement 
furnished to the Commission pursuant to this appendix and Sec.  
75.20(d), create and maintain records documenting the preparation 
and content of these reports, as well as such information as is 
necessary to permit the Commission to verify the accuracy of such 
reports, for a period of five years from the end of the calendar 
year for which the measurement was taken. A banking entity must 
retain the Narrative Statement, the Trading Desk Information, and 
the Quantitative Measurements Identifying Information for a period 
of five years from the end of the calendar year for which the 
information was reported to the Commission.

IV. Quantitative Measurements

a. Risk-Management Measurements

1. Risk and Position Limits and Usage

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk and Position 
Limits are the constraints that define the amount of risk that a 
trading desk is permitted to take at a point in time, as defined by 
the banking entity for a specific trading desk. Usage represents the 
value of the trading desk's risk or positions that are accounted for 
by the current activity of the desk. Risk and position limits and 
their usage are key risk management tools used to control and 
monitor risk taking and include, but are not limited to, the limits 
set out in Sec.  75.4 and Sec.  75.5. A number of the metrics that 
are described below, including ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' and 
``Value-at-Risk,'' relate to a trading desk's risk and position 
limits and are useful in evaluating and setting these limits in the 
broader context of the trading desk's overall activities, 
particularly for the market making activities under Sec.  75.4(b) 
and hedging activity under Sec.  75.5. Accordingly, the limits 
required under Sec.  75.4(b)(2)(iii) and Sec.  75.5(b)(1)(i)(A) must 
meet the applicable requirements under Sec.  75.4(b)(2)(iii) and 
Sec.  75.5(b)(1)(i)(A) and also must include appropriate metrics for 
the trading desk limits including, at a minimum, the ``Risk Factor 
Sensitivities'' and ``Value-at-Risk'' metrics except to the extent 
any of the ``Risk Factor Sensitivities'' or ``Value-at-Risk'' 
metrics are demonstrably ineffective for measuring and monitoring 
the risks of a trading desk based on the types of positions traded 
by, and risk exposures of, that desk.
    A. A banking entity must provide the following information for 
each limit reported pursuant to this quantitative measurement: the 
unique identification label for the limit reported in the Risk and 
Position Limits Information Schedule, the limit size (distinguishing 
between an upper and a lower limit), and the value of usage of the 
limit.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

2. Risk Factor Sensitivities

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Risk Factor 
Sensitivities are changes in a trading desk's Comprehensive Profit 
and Loss that are expected to occur in the event of a change in one 
or more underlying variables that are significant sources of the 
trading desk's profitability and risk. A banking entity must report 
the risk factor sensitivities that are monitored and managed as part 
of the trading desk's overall risk management policy. Reported risk 
factor sensitivities must be sufficiently granular to account for a 
preponderance of the expected price variation in the trading desk's 
holdings. A banking entity must provide the following information 
for each sensitivity that is reported pursuant to this quantitative 
measurement: The unique identification label for the risk factor 
sensitivity listed in the Risk Factor Sensitivities Information 
Schedule, the change in risk factor used to determine the risk 
factor sensitivity, and the aggregate change in value across all 
positions of the desk given the change in risk factor.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

3. Value-at-Risk and Stressed Value-at-Risk

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Value-at-Risk 
(``VaR'') is the measurement of the risk of future financial loss in 
the value of a trading desk's aggregated positions at the ninety-
nine percent confidence level over a one-day period, based on 
current market conditions. For purposes of this appendix, Stressed 
Value-at-Risk (``Stressed VaR'') is the

[[Page 33605]]

measurement of the risk of future financial loss in the value of a 
trading desk's aggregated positions at the ninety-nine percent 
confidence level over a one-day period, based on market conditions 
during a period of significant financial stress.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: For VaR, all trading desks engaged in covered 
trading activities. For Stressed VaR, all trading desks engaged in 
covered trading activities, except trading desks whose covered 
trading activity is conducted exclusively to hedge products excluded 
from the definition of ``financial instrument'' under Sec.  
75.3(d)(2).

b. Source-of-Revenue Measurements

1. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss Attribution is an analysis that attributes the daily 
fluctuation in the value of a trading desk's positions to various 
sources. First, the daily profit and loss of the aggregated 
positions is divided into three categories: (i) Profit and loss 
attributable to a trading desk's existing positions that were also 
positions held by the trading desk as of the end of the prior day 
(``existing positions''); (ii) profit and loss attributable to new 
positions resulting from the current day's trading activity (``new 
positions''); and (iii) residual profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to existing positions or new positions. The 
sum of (i), (ii), and (iii) must equal the trading desk's 
comprehensive profit and loss at each point in time.
    A. The comprehensive profit and loss associated with existing 
positions must reflect changes in the value of these positions on 
the applicable day. The comprehensive profit and loss from existing 
positions must be further attributed, as applicable, to changes in 
(i) the specific risk factors and other factors that are monitored 
and managed as part of the trading desk's overall risk management 
policies and procedures; and (ii) any other applicable elements, 
such as cash flows, carry, changes in reserves, and the correction, 
cancellation, or exercise of a trade.
    B. For the attribution of comprehensive profit and loss from 
existing positions to specific risk factors and other factors, a 
banking entity must provide the following information for the 
factors that explain the preponderance of the profit or loss changes 
due to risk factor changes: the unique identification label for the 
risk factor or other factor listed in the Risk Factor Attribution 
Information Schedule, and the profit or loss due to the risk factor 
or other factor change.
    C. The comprehensive profit and loss attributed to new positions 
must reflect commissions and fee income or expense and market gains 
or losses associated with transactions executed on the applicable 
day. New positions include purchases and sales of financial 
instruments and other assets/liabilities and negotiated amendments 
to existing positions. The comprehensive profit and loss from new 
positions may be reported in the aggregate and does not need to be 
further attributed to specific sources.
    D. The portion of comprehensive profit and loss that cannot be 
specifically attributed to known sources must be allocated to a 
residual category identified as an unexplained portion of the 
comprehensive profit and loss. Significant unexplained profit and 
loss must be escalated for further investigation and analysis.
    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks engaged in covered trading 
activities.

c. Positions, Transaction Volumes, and Securities Inventory Aging 
Measurements

1. Positions

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Positions is the 
value of securities and derivatives positions managed by the trading 
desk. For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, do not 
include in the Positions calculation for ``securities'' those 
securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined 
under subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \1\ A banking entity must separately 
report the trading desk's market value of long securities positions, 
market value of short securities positions, market value of 
derivatives receivables, market value of derivatives payables, 
notional value of derivatives receivables, and notional value of 
derivatives payables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Sec. Sec.  75.2(i), (bb). For example, under this part, 
a security-based swap is both a ``security'' and a ``derivative.'' 
For purposes of the Positions quantitative measurement, security-
based swaps are reported as derivatives rather than securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  75.4(a) 
or Sec.  75.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

2. Transaction Volumes

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Transaction 
Volumes measures four exclusive categories of covered trading 
activity conducted by a trading desk. A banking entity is required 
to report the value and number of security and derivative 
transactions conducted by the trading desk with: (i) Customers, 
excluding internal transactions; (ii) non-customers, excluding 
internal transactions; (iii) trading desks and other organizational 
units where the transaction is booked in the same banking entity; 
and (iv) trading desks and other organizational units where the 
transaction is booked into an affiliated banking entity. For 
securities, value means gross market value. For derivatives, value 
means gross notional value. For purposes of calculating the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, do not include in the 
Transaction Volumes calculation for ``securities'' those securities 
that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are defined under 
subpart A; instead, report those securities that are also 
derivatives as ``derivatives.'' \2\ Further, for purposes of the 
Transaction Volumes quantitative measurement, a customer of a 
trading desk that relies on Sec.  75.4(a) to conduct underwriting 
activity is a market participant identified in Sec.  75.4(a)(7), and 
a customer of a trading desk that relies on Sec.  75.4(b) to conduct 
market making-related activity is a market participant identified in 
Sec.  75.4(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ See Sec. Sec.  75.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  75.4(a) 
or Sec.  75.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making-
related activity, respectively.

3. Securities Inventory Aging

    i. Description: For purposes of this appendix, Securities 
Inventory Aging generally describes a schedule of the market value 
of the trading desk's securities positions and the amount of time 
that those securities positions have been held. Securities Inventory 
Aging must measure the age profile of a trading desk's securities 
positions for the following periods: 0-30 calendar days; 31-60 
calendar days; 61-90 calendar days; 91-180 calendar days; 181-360 
calendar days; and greater than 360 calendar days. Securities 
Inventory Aging includes two schedules, a security asset-aging 
schedule, and a security liability-aging schedule. For purposes of 
the Securities Inventory Aging quantitative measurement, do not 
include securities that are also ``derivatives,'' as those terms are 
defined under subpart A.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See Sec. Sec.  75.2(i), (bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ii. Calculation Period: One trading day.
    iii. Measurement Frequency: Daily.
    iv. Applicability: All trading desks that rely on Sec.  75.4(a) 
or Sec.  75.4(b) to conduct underwriting activity or market-making 
related activity, respectively.

    Dated: May 31, 2018.
Joseph M. Otting,
Comptroller of the Currency.
    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, May 30, 2018.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
    Dated at Washington, DC, on May 31, 2018.

    By order of the Board of Directors.
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Valerie Jean Best,
Assistant Executive Secretary.

    By the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    Dated: June 5, 2018.
Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 11, 2018, by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission.
Robert Sidman,
Deputy Secretary of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
[FR Doc. 2018-13502 Filed 7-16-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4810-33-P; 6210-01-P; 6714-01-P; 8011-01-P; 6351-01-P