Document ID: FAA-2010-0479-0003
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 Airplanes
Posted Date: 2010-10-14T04:00Z

[Federal Register: October 14, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 198)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 63042-63045]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr14oc10-3]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0479; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-220-AD; 
Amendment 39-16472; AD 2010-21-12]
RIN 2120-AA64

 
Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 
0070 and 0100 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing 
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of 
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an 
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
* * * * *
    Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a 
ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused 
damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its 
components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must 
have been present close to the affected brake creating enough 
internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario 
for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) 
brake QD [quick-disconnect] coupling. Further investigation of the 
service experience files at Fokker Services showed that more brake 
fires have occurred on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 
configuration.
* * * * *
The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible brake 
fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land 
the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the 
unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective November 18, 2010.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 18, 
2010.

[[Page 63043]]

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on May 19, 2010 (75 FR 
27961). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:

    During 1995, several reports were received of brake QD [quick-
disconnect] couplings loosened and/or disconnected during operation. 
In a few cases, residual brake pressure was trapped in the affected 
brake, causing asymmetric braking and/or resulting in hot brakes. 
Loosened couplings may cause a hydraulic leak with the risk of a 
brake fire. Investigation revealed that the installation of the 
brake QD couplings must be done with care and that the locking teeth 
on the light alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 70/100 
Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) has been revised to include 
additional information to ensure correct removal and installation of 
the couplings.
    In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100-32-106, recommending the 
introduction of QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel (CRES) 
sleeves that would prevent excessive wear of the locking teeth on 
the light alloy sleeve. In response to more reported cases of 
loosened QD couplings resulting in brake problems, further improved 
QD couplings were introduced in 2001 through SBF100-32-127. These 
couplings increase the reliability of the brake system.
    Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a 
ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused 
damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its 
components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must 
have been present close to the affected brake creating enough 
internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario 
for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) 
brake QD coupling. Further investigation of the service experience 
files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred 
on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration.
    In order to reduce the probability of a fluid fire as described 
in CS (certification specification) 25.863, additional action is 
deemed necessary.
    For the reasons described above, this [European Aviation Safety 
Agency] AD requires repetitive [detailed] inspections [for wear] of 
the affected brake QD couplings and replacement of the QD couplings 
with improved units. Installation of the improved QD couplings 
terminates the repetitive inspections requirements.

The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible brake 
fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land 
the airplane. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI 
in the AD docket.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of 
the cost to the public.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and 
the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences 
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 16 products of U.S. registry. 
We also estimate that it will take about 4 work-hours per product to 
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate 
is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $4,814 per 
product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that 
are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no 
charge for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for 
affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated 
here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the 
U.S. operators to be $82,464, or $5,154 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

[[Page 63044]]

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2010-21-12 Fokker Services B.V.: Amendment 39-16472. Docket No. FAA-
2010-0479; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-220-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective November 
18, 2010.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 
and 0100 airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial 
numbers, with any brake quick-disconnect (QD) coupling having part 
number (P/N) AE70690E, AE70691E, AE99111E, or AE99119E installed.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 32: Landing 
Gear.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:

    During 1995, several reports were received of brake QD couplings 
loosened and/or disconnected during operation. In a few cases, 
residual brake pressure was trapped in the affected brake, causing 
asymmetric braking and/or resulting in hot brakes. Loosened 
couplings may cause a hydraulic leak with the risk of a brake fire. 
Investigation revealed that the installation of the brake QD 
couplings must be done with care and that the locking teeth on the 
light alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 70/100 Aircraft 
Maintenance Manual (AMM) has been revised to include additional 
information to ensure correct removal and installation of the 
couplings.
    In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100-32-106, recommending the 
introduction of QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel (CRES) 
sleeves that would prevent excessive wear of the locking teeth on 
the light alloy sleeve. In response to more reported cases of 
loosened QD couplings resulting in brake problems, further improved 
QD couplings were introduced in 2001 through SBF100-32-127. These 
couplings increase the reliability of the brake system.
    Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a 
ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused 
damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its 
components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must 
have been present close to the affected brake creating enough 
internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario 
for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) 
brake QD coupling. Further investigation of the service experience 
files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred 
on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration.
    In order to reduce the probability of a fluid fire as described 
in CS (certification specification) 25.863, additional action is 
deemed necessary.
    For the reasons described above, this [European Aviation Safety 
Agency] AD requires repetitive [detailed] inspections [for wear] of 
the affected brake QD couplings and replacement of the QD couplings 
with improved units. Installation of the improved QD couplings 
terminates the repetitive inspections requirements.

The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible 
brake fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to 
safely land the airplane.

Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Actions

    (g) Do the following actions.
    (1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, do a 
detailed inspection for wear of the brake QD couplings by measuring 
dimension ``A,'' in accordance with Part 1 of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision 1, 
dated June 29, 2009. Repeat the inspection thereafter at the 
applicable intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as 
required by paragraph (g)(2) of this AD.

                Table 1--Repetitive Inspection Intervals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Repeat the  inspection at
           If dimension ``A'' is--              intervals not to exceed--

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than or equal to 0.76 mm.............  6 months.
Less than 0.76 mm but greater than or equal    3 months.
 to 0.72 mm.
Less than 0.72 mm but greater than or equal    30 days.
 to 0.68 mm.
Less than 0.68 mm but greater than or equal    7 days.
 to 0.61 mm.
Less than 0.61 mm but greater than 0.53 mm...  24 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     (2) If, during any inspection required by paragraph (g)(1) of 
this AD, dimension ``A'' on any brake QD coupling is less than or 
equal to 0.53 mm, before further flight, replace the affected brake 
QD coupling with an improved unit having P/N AE73059E or P/N 
AE73091E, as applicable, in accordance with Part 2 of the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-
156, Revision 1, dated June 29, 2009.
    (3) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, 
replace all remaining brake QD couplings having P/N AE70690E, P/N 
AE70691E, P/N AE99111E, and P/N AE99119E with improved units, in 
accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker 
Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision 1, dated June 29, 2009.
    (4) Installation of brake QD couplings with an improved unit 
having P/N AE73059E or P/N AE73091E at all locations terminates the 
repetitive inspections required by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
    (5) Replacing the brake QD couplings is also acceptable for 
compliance with the corresponding requirements of paragraphs (g)(1), 
(g)(2), and (g)(3) of this AD if done before the effective date of 
this AD, in accordance with any of the service bulletins specified 
in Table 2 of this AD:

[[Page 63045]]

                Table 2--Fokker Credit Service Bulletins
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Fokker Service Bulletins         Revision               Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fokker Performa Service         Original........  July 20, 2001.
 Bulletin SBF100-32-127,
 including Appendix XIV, dated
 February 1, 2006.
Fokker Performa Service         1...............  March 6, 2009.
 Bulletin SBF100-32-127,
 including Appendix XIV, dated
 February 1, 2006.
Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100- Original........  March 6, 2009.
 32-156.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1:  This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service 
information as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom 
Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a 
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. 
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned 
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

    (i) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness 
Directive 2009-0176, dated August 6, 2009; and Fokker Service 
Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision 1, dated June 29, 2009; for related 
information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) You must use Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-156, Revision 
1, dated June 29, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, 
unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 
AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; telephone +31 (0)252-627-350; fax 
+31 (0)252-627-211; e-mail 
technicalservices.fokkerservices@stork.com; Internet http://
www.myfokkerfleetcom.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 29, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-25449 Filed 10-13-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P