Document ID: FAA-2009-1229-0006
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 and 440) Airplanes
Posted Date: 2010-10-14T04:00Z

[Federal Register: October 14, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 198)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 63054-63058]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr14oc10-8]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-1229; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-106-AD; 
Amendment 39-16471; AD 2010-21-11]
RIN 2120-AA64

 
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 
(Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing 
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of 
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an 
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door 
selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid 
Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly 
lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This 
condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent 
damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve. 
Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the 
aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure, 
including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can 
result in an uncommanded NLG retraction and/or uncommanded opening 
of the NLG doors. There have been six cases reported on CL[-]600-
2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at 
the departure gate.
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe 
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective November 18, 2010.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 18, 
2010.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer,

[[Page 63055]]

Airframe and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New 
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7318; fax (516) 794-5531.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on January 5, 2010 (75 
FR 258). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:

    A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door 
selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid 
Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly 
lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This 
condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent 
damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve. 
Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the 
aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure, 
including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can 
result in an uncommanded NLG retraction and/or uncommanded opening 
of the NLG doors. There have been six cases reported on CL[-]600-
2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at 
the departure gate.
    This [Canadian] directive mandates [an inspection of the NLG and 
NLG selector valves to determine the serial number and marking of 
the part and] a check [to determine the torque value and correct 
lockwire installation] of the [affected] NLG and NLG door selector 
valves installed on all aircraft in the Applicability section * * *. 
Depending on the results, replacement, rework and/or additional 
identification of the valves may be required.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD 
docket.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We considered the comments received.

Request for Model Designation Consistency

    Comair, Inc. states that in the NPRM, the Summary, Discussion, and 
paragraph (e), refer to the airplanes as Model ``CL600-2B19'' instead 
of ``CL-600-2B19.''
    From this comment, we infer that Comair, Inc. requests that we 
revise the identified sections of the NPRM for model designation 
consistency. In the Summary, Discussion, and paragraph (e) of this AD, 
we are quoting from Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-19, dated 
April 29, 2009. However, for clarity, we have made the change to ``CL[-
]600-2B19'' in the specified sections of this AD.

Request To Revise Proposed Costs of Compliance

    Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the Costs of Compliance section 
of the NPRM indicates only the number of affected airplanes and does 
not take into consideration that there are two units installed on each 
airplane, making it a total of 1,304 affected components.
    From these statements we infer that Air Wisconsin Airlines is 
requesting that we revise the Costs of Compliance section of the AD to 
include the actual number of affected valves. We agree with Air 
Wisconsin Airlines that the Costs of Compliance needs to be revised to 
include the cost for both the selector valve of the NLG and the door 
selector valve. We have revised the cost of parts to $80 to reflect 2 
valves per product ($40 per valve). For clarification, the term 
``affected product'' in the Costs of Compliance section of this AD 
refers to the affected number of airplanes of U.S. registry.

Request for Credit for Compliance With Bombardier Service Bulletin 
601R-32-090

    Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the problem of the door selector 
valves of the NLG having their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or 
incorrectly torqued during assembly first came to its attention through 
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-090. Air Wisconsin Airlines states 
that Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 3, 2009, was 
issued to supersede Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-090 to expand 
the effectivity of the campaign. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the 
proposed AD should give credit for those valves that have already 
complied with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-090.
    We agree with Air Wisconsin Airlines request to receive credit for 
actions completed in accordance with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-
32-090, Revision B, dated December 12, 2006; and Revision C, dated 
March 3, 2009. We have added new paragraph (f)(4) accordingly.

Request To Revise the Applicability

    Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that we revise the applicability in 
paragraph (c) of the proposed AD to ``NLG and NLG selector valves, P/N 
750006000 (601R75146-1) identified in Bombardier S/B 601R-32-104 dated 
March 3, 2009 when installed on Bombardier * * * Model CL-600-2B19 * * 
* airplanes * * *'' The commenter provides no justification for this 
requested change.
    We disagree with Air Wisconsin Airlines' request to revise the 
applicability in paragraph (c) of this AD. We have determined that 
identifying each airplane by serial number and not by the valve serial 
number is the best way to control the airworthiness of the fleet and to 
ensure compliance with the AD.
    According to general FAA policy, if an unsafe condition results 
from the installation of a particular component in only one particular 
make and model of airplane, the AD should apply to the airplane model, 
not the component. The reason for this is simple: If the AD applies to 
the airplane model equipped with the item, operators of those airplanes 
will be notified directly of the unsafe condition and the action 
required to correct it. While we assume that operators can identify the 
airplane models they operate, they may not be aware of specific items 
installed on the airplanes. Therefore, specifying the airplane models 
in the applicability as the subject of the AD prevents an operator's 
``unknowing failure to comply'' with the AD. We recognize that an 
unsafe condition may exist in an item that is installed in many 
different airplanes. In that case, we consider it impractical to issue 
an AD against each airplane; in fact, many times, the exact models and 
numbers of airplanes on which the item is installed may be unknown. 
Therefore, in those situations, the AD would apply to the item and 
usually indicates that the item is known to be ``installed on, but not 
limited to,'' various airplane models. We have not changed the AD in 
this regard.

Request To Extend the Compliance Time for the Inspection

    Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that we extend the compliance time 
for the inspection in the NPRM. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the 
problem of the door selector valves of the NLG having their end caps 
incorrectly lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly first 
came to its attention in 2003 through Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-
32-090, which affected 645 units. Air Wisconsin Airlines also states 
that Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 3, 2009, 
expanded the effectivity to include 2,126 units. Air Wisconsin Airlines 
states that it has been working on this issue and it has a substantial 
number of valves in compliance, but since this issue has been around 
for almost 7 years without any regulatory influence, the short 
compliance time of within 1,600 flight hours or 18 months after the

[[Page 63056]]

effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, cannot be justified. 
Air Wisconsin Airlines states that a longer compliance window should be 
given considering the number of units affected and the insufficient 
amount of spares available to ensure compliance within the time 
provided by a directive.
    We disagree with Air Wisconsin Airlines' request to extend the 
compliance time for the inspection. In developing an appropriate 
compliance time for the inspection, we considered the safety 
implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for 
the timely accomplishment of the modification. We have determined that 
the compliance time will ensure an acceptable level of safety and allow 
the modification to be done during scheduled maintenance intervals for 
most affected operators. In addition, Bombardier, Inc. recommends a 
compliance time of 1,600 flight hours or 18 months. We have determined 
that an adequate supply of valves is available in order for operators 
to accomplish the required actions within the compliance time specified 
in this AD. However, operators may apply for an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the provisions specified in 
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Requests To Allow Review of Maintenance Records in Lieu of Inspection

    Comair, Inc. and Air Wisconsin Airlines request that a review of 
airplane maintenance records be acceptable in lieu of an inspection to 
determine serial number and identification markings of the selector 
valve. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that a records check is sufficient 
to locate valves requiring inspection.
    We agree with the commenters' request that a review of airplane 
maintenance records is acceptable for determining the serial number and 
identification markings of the selector valve. We have changed 
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD to allow a review of maintenance records in 
lieu of the inspection required by that paragraph.

Request To Clarify Paragraph (f)(2) of the NPRM

    Comair, Inc. proposes revised wording for paragraph (f)(2) of the 
NPRM. The suggested wording clarifies that either the selector valve of 
the NLG or the door selector valve could have certain serial numbers or 
identified markings since paragraph (f)(2) identifies both valves.
    We agree with Comair, Inc. that the suggested wording is more 
accurate. We have revised paragraph (f)(2) of this AD as suggested.

Request To Remove Compliance Time of Before Further Flight From 
Paragraph (f)(3) of the NPRM

    Comair, Inc. and Air Wisconsin Airlines request that the compliance 
time of, ``before further flight,'' be removed from paragraph (f)(3) of 
the NPRM.
    Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the compliance time of ``before 
further flight'' specified in paragraph (f)(3) of the NPRM is not in 
Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-19, dated April 29, 2009, or 
in any of the service information listed in that Canadian AD. Air 
Wisconsin Airlines also states that there does not appear to be enough 
time and available spare parts in order to do the inspections, remove 
all the affected serial numbers which fail the test, and send them to 
the vendor for repair.
    Comair, Inc. states that a compliance time of ``before further 
flight'' seems contrary or restrictive when the actions specified in 
paragraph (f)(1) of the NPRM are done. Comair Inc. states that it has 
already performed a records review and determined which valves have a 
serial number range specified in Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-
104, dated March 3, 2009, and which valves do not have a suffix ``T'' 
or ``SB750006000-1'' marking, as documented on FAA Form 8130-3. Comair, 
Inc. also states that a compliance time of ``before further flight'' 
would require it to ground its airplanes on the effective date of the 
final rule because it has already determined which valves require 
action.
    We partially agree with the commenters. We agree that there could 
be a misunderstanding in reading this AD based on the understanding 
that paragraph (f)(3) of this AD is a stand-alone paragraph. However, 
we disagree with Comair Inc.'s statement that the compliance time of 
``before further flight'' would require Comair Inc. to ground its 
airplanes. The intent of this AD is to permit operators to do the 
identification check within the specified compliance time of ``within 
1,600 flight hours or 18 months after the effective date of this AD, 
whichever occurs first.'' We have revised paragraph (f)(3) of this AD 
for clarity. In addition, operators may apply for an AMOC in accordance 
with the provisions specified in paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.

Request To Eliminate Ink Stamping of the Valve

    Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the requirement in Tactair 
Service Bulletin SB750006000-1, Revision E, dated July 31, 2008 (which 
was referred to in Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 
3, 2009, as an additional source of guidance), includes an instruction 
to ink stamp the service bulletin number on the valve. Air Wisconsin 
states that this action does not provide an added level of safety, and 
that this would only lead to confusion, and a meaningless issue of non-
compliance should the marking ever become eradicated. Air Wisconsin 
also states that it is unnecessary to mark the valve.
    From these statements, we infer that Air Wisconsin Airlines is 
requesting that we revise the AD to eliminate unnecessary part 
markings. We disagree. Valves that are not inked-stamped must be 
inspected to fulfill the requirements of this AD. An ink-stamped valve 
demonstrates that the valve has been inspected and modified. We have 
not made changes to this AD in this regard.

Explanation of Change Made To This AD

    We have revised this AD to identify the legal name of the 
manufacturer as published in the most recent type certificate data 
sheet for the affected airplane models.

 Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data, including the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these 
changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or 
increase the scope of the AD.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences 
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

[[Page 63057]]

Explanation of Change to Costs of Compliance

    Since issuance of the NPRM, we have increased the labor rate used 
in the Costs of Compliance from $80 per work-hour to $85 per work-hour. 
The Costs of Compliance information, below, reflects this increase in 
the specified hourly labor rate.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 652 products of U.S. registry. 
We also estimate that it will take about 1 work-hour per product to 
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate 
is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $80 per product (2 
valves per product/$40 per valve). Where the service information lists 
required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed 
that there will be no charge for these parts. As we do not control 
warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs 
higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the 
cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be $107,580, or $165 per 
product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2010-21-11 Bombardier, Inc.: Amendment 39-16471. Docket No. FAA-
2009-1229; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-106-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective November 
18, 2010.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 
(Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes, serial numbers 7003 and 
subsequent; certificated in any category.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 32: Landing 
Gear.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
    A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door 
selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid 
Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly 
lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This 
condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent 
damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve. 
Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the 
aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure, 
including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can 
result in an uncommanded NLG retraction and/or uncommanded opening 
of the NLG doors. There have been six cases reported on CL[-]600-
2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted in the collapse of the NLG at 
the departure gate.
    This [Canadian] directive mandates [an inspection of the NLG and 
NLG selector valves to determine the serial number and marking of 
the part and] a check [to determine the torque value and correct 
lockwire installation] of the [affected] NLG and NLG door selector 
valves installed on all aircraft in the Applicability section * * *. 
Depending on the results, replacement, rework and/or additional 
identification of the valves may be required.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Within 1,600 flight hours or 18 months after the effective 
date of this AD, whichever occurs first: Do an inspection to 
determine the serial number and identification markings on the 
selector valve of the NLG and the door selector valve of the NLG, in 
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier 
Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated March 3, 2009. A review of 
airplane maintenance records is acceptable in lieu of this 
inspection if the serial number and identification markings of the 
selector valve and the door selector valve can be conclusively 
determined from that review.
    (2) For any airplane having either the selector valve of the NLG 
or the door selector valve of the NLG that have a serial number 
outside the range 0001 through 2126 inclusive, suffix ``T'' 
identification, or ``SB750006000-1'' marking, no further action is 
required for that valve.
    (3) If, during any inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of 
this AD, any selector valve of the NLG or any door selector valve of 
the NLG is found that does not have any serial number or 
identification marking specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD: 
Before further flight after doing the inspection required by 
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, inspect to determine the torque value 
and correct lockwire installation of the valve, and modify (replace, 
rework, or re-identify) the valve, as applicable, in accordance with 
the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-
32-104, dated March 3, 2009.
    (4) For airplanes having part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Tactair 
P/N 750006000), serial

[[Page 63058]]

number 001 thru 0767: Modification of the valve accomplished before 
the effective date of this AD in accordance with Bombardier Service 
Bulletin 601R-32-090, Revision B, dated December 12, 2006; and 
Bombardier Service Bulletin Revision C, dated March 3, 2009; are 
considered acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this 
AD for that valve.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1:  This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service 
information as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New 
York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANE-170, FAA, has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Program 
Manager, Continuing Operational Safety, FAA, New York ACO, 1600 
Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 
228-7300; fax (516) 794-5531. Before using any approved AMOC on any 
airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal 
maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 
as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight 
Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must 
specifically reference this AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned 
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-19, 
dated April 29, 2009; and Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, 
dated March 3, 2009; for related information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-32-104, dated 
March 3, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD 
specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of the service information under 5 U.S.C. 
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Bombardier, Inc., 400 C[ocirc]te-Vertu Road West, Dorval, 
Qu[eacute]bec H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 514-855-5000; fax 514-855-
7401; e-mail thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com; Internet http://
www.bombardier.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 29, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-25458 Filed 10-13-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P