Document ID: FAA-2011-1026-0001
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Special Conditions: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76D Helicopter, Search and Rescue Automatic Flight Control System Installation
Posted Date: 2014-12-18T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 243 (Thursday, December 18, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 75423-75428]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29594]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 29

[Docket No.FAA-2011-1026; Special Conditions No. 29-036-SC]

Special Conditions: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) 
Model S-76D Helicopter, Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight 
Control System (AFCS) Installation

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

[[Page 75424]]

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Sikorsky Model S-
76D helicopter. This model of helicopter, as modified by Sikorsky, will 
have novel or unusual design features associated with installing an 
optional SAR AFCS. The applicable airworthiness standards do not 
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design 
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety 
standards the Administrator considers necessary to show a level of 
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness 
standards.

DATES: This action is effective on Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model 
S-76D on December 9, 2014.
    We must receive your comments by February 17, 2015.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2014-1026 
using any of the following methods:
    [ssquf] Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
    [ssquf] Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590-0001.
    [ssquf] Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver comments to the ``Mail'' 
address between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.
    [ssquf] Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to http://regulations.gov, including any personal information 
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web 
site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments 
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual 
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can 
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: You can read the background documents or comments received 
at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for 
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room @12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mitchell Soth, FAA, Rotorcraft 
Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group, ASW-111, Rotorcraft 
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 
Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5104; email mitch.soth@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

    The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the 
notice and comment period previously and has been derived without 
substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that 
prior public comment would result in a significant change from the 
substance contained herein. Further, a delay in the effective date of 
these special conditions would significantly delay issuance of the 
design approval and thus delivery of the helicopter, which is imminent. 
Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment 
are unnecessary, impracticable, and contrary to the public interest, 
and finds good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon 
issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to 
submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior 
opportunities for comment.

Comments Invited

    We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by 
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for 
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do 
so without incurring additional expense or delay. We may change these 
special conditions based on the comments we receive.

Background and Discussion

    On January 13, 2014, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation applied for a 
change to Type Certificate (TC) No. H1NE to install an optional SAR 
AFCS in the Model S-76D helicopter. The S-76D is a transport category 
helicopter certificated to Category A and Category B requirements, and 
instrument flight certificated under the requirements of Appendix B to 
14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29-52.
    There is a need to use dedicated AFCS upper modes, in which a fully 
coupled autopilot provides operational SAR profiles, for SAR operations 
conducted over water in offshore areas clear of obstructions. The SAR 
modes enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully coupled maneuvers, to 
include predefined search patterns during cruise flight, and to 
transition from cruise flight to a stabilized hover and departure 
(transition from hover to cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also includes an 
auxiliary crew control that allows another crewmember (such as a hoist 
operator) to have limited authority to control the helicopter's 
longitudinal and lateral position during hover operations.
    Flight operations conducted over water at night may have an 
extremely limited visual horizon with little visual reference to the 
surface even when conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions. 
Consequently, the certification requirements for SAR modes are 
considered equivalent to operating under Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions, and therefore must meet the criteria in Appendix B to 14 
CFR part 29. While this Appendix prescribes airworthiness criteria for 
instrument flight, it does not consider operations below instrument 
flight minimum speed (VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow 
for coupled operations at low speed, all-azimuth flight to zero 
airspeed (hover).
    Since SAR operations have traditionally been a public use mission, 
the use of SAR modes in civil operations requires special airworthiness 
standards (special conditions) to maintain a level of safety consistent 
with Category B and Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) certification. In this 
regard, 14 CFR part 29 lacks adequate airworthiness standards for AFCS 
SAR mode certification to include flight characteristics, performance, 
and installed equipment and systems. These special conditions do not 
require guaranteed departure from a hover following an engine failure. 
Therefore, designs that apply these special conditions are prohibited 
from conducting external load operations requiring one engine 
inoperative hover capability. In addition, these special conditions do 
not address the 14 CFR 29.865 requirements for the carriage of human 
external cargo.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, Sikorsky must show that the 
S-76D model helicopter, as changed, continues to meet either the 
applicable provisions of the regulations incorporated by reference in 
TC No.

[[Page 75425]]

H1NE or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application 
for the change, depending on the significance of the change as defined 
by 14 CFR 21.101. The regulations incorporated by reference in the TC 
are commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' 
The regulations incorporated by reference in H1NE are as follows:
    (a) 14 CFR 29.391, 29.561(b)(c), 29.625, 29.671, 29.785, 29.967, 
29.973 at amendment 29-0.
    (b) 14 CFR 29.927 at 29-3.
    (c) 14 CFR 29.307 at amendment 29-4 (all but main rotor and tail 
blades).
    (d) 14 CFR 29.787, 29.865 at amendment 29-12 (does not meet the 29-
43 requirements for Human External Cargo).
    (e) 14 CFR 29.908 at amendment 29-13.
    (f) 14 CFR 29.1309 at amendment 29-14 (all but new avionics, AFCS, 
and Electrical Power Generation and Distribution System).
    (g) 14 CFR 29.571 at amendment 29-20 (all but main and tail rotor 
blades only).
    (h) 14 CFR 29.1 at amendment 29-21.
    (i) 14 CFR 29.923(c)-(o), 29.963, 29.975 at amendment 29-26.
    (j) 14 CFR 29.561(c) at amendment 29-29 (for engine installation 
only).
    (k) 14 CFR 29.923(a)(b1)(b3) at amendment 29-34.
    (l) 14 CFR part 29 through Amendment 29-52 as follows: 29.2, 29.21, 
29.25, 29.27, 29.29, 29.31, 29.33, 29.45, 29.49, 29.51, 29.53, 29.55, 
29.59, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62, 29.63, 29.64, 29.65, 29.67, 29.71, 29.73, 
29.75, 29.77, 29.79, 29.81, 29.83, 29.85, 29.87, 29.141, 29.143, 
29.151, 29.161, 29.171, 29.173, 29.175, 29.177, 29.181, 29.231, 29.235, 
29.239, 29.241, 29.251, 29.301, 29.303, 29.305, 29.307 (main and tail 
rotor blades only), 29.309, 29.321, 29.337, 29.339, 29.341, 29.351, 
29.361, 29.395, 29.397, 29.399, 29.401, 29.403, 49.411, 29.413, 29.471, 
29.473, 29.475, 29.477, 29.479, 29.481, 29.483, 29.485, 29.493, 29.547, 
29.549, 29.551, 29.561(a)(d), 29.563, 29.571 (main and tail rotor 
blades only), 29.601, 29.602, 29.603, 29.605, 29.607, 29.609, 29.610, 
29.611, 29.613, 29.619, 29.621, 29.623, 29.629, 29.653, 29.659, 29.661, 
29.663, 29.672, 29.673, 29.674, 29.675, 29.681, 29.683, 29.685, 29.687, 
29.691, 29.695, 29.723, 29.725, 29.727, 29.729, 29.731, 29.733, 29.735, 
29.771, 29.773, 29.775, 29.777, 29.779, 29.783, 29.801, 29.803, 29.805, 
29.807, 29.809, 29.811, 29.812(a)(c)(d)(e)(f), 29.813(c)(2), 29.831, 
29.851, 29.853, 29.855, 29.861, 29.863, 29.871, 29.873, 29.877, 29.901, 
29.903, 29.907, 29.917, 29.921, 29.931, 29.939, 29.951, 29.953, 29.954, 
29.955, 29.959, 29.961, 29.965, 29.969, 29.971, 29.977, 29.993, 29.995, 
29.997, 29.999, 29.1011, 29.1013, 29.1015, 29.1017, 29.1019, 29.1021, 
29.1023, 29.1027, 29.1041, 29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 29.1049, 29.1091, 
29.1093, 29.1103, 29.1121, 29.1123, 29.1141, 29.1143, 29.1145, 29.1151, 
29.1163, 29.1165, 29.1181, 29.1183, 29.1185, 29.1187, 29.1189, 29.1191, 
29.1193, 29.1194, 29.1195, 29.1197, 29.1199, 29.1201, 29.1203, 29.1301, 
19.1303, 29.1305, 29.1307, 29.1309 (new avionics, AFCS, and Electrical 
Power Generation and Distribution System only), 29.1317, 29.1321, 
29.1322, 29.1323, 29.1325, 29.1327, 29.1329, 29.1331, 29.1333, 29.1335, 
29.1337, 29.1351, 29.1353, 29.1355, 29.1357, 29.1359, 29.1363, 29.1381, 
29.1383, 29.1385, 29.1387, 29.1389, 29.1391, 29.1393, 29.1395, 29.1397, 
29.1401. 29.1411, 29.1413, 29.1415, 29.1431, 29.1435, 29.1457, 29.1459, 
29.1461, 29.1501, 29.1503, 29.1505, 29.1509, 29.1517, 29.1519, 29.1521, 
29.1523, 29.1525, 29.1527, 29.1529, 29.1541, 29.1543, 29.1545, 29.1547, 
29.1549, 29.1551, 29.1553, 29.1555, 29.1557, 29.1559, 29.1561, 29.1565, 
29.1581, 29.1583, 29.1585, 29.1587, 29.1589, A29.1, A29.2, A29.3, 
A29.4, B29.1, B29.2, B29.3, B29.4, B29.5, B29.6, B29.7, B29.8, B29.9, 
C29.1, E29.1.
    (m) 14 CFR part 29 Not Adopted: 29.427, 29.497, 29.501, 29.505, 
59.511, 29.519, 29.521, 29.562, 29.631, 29.679, 29.737, 29.751, 29.753, 
29.755, 29.757, 29.812(b), 29.815, 29.833, 29.859, 29.935, 29.952, 
29.957, 29.979, 29.991, 29.1001, 29.1025, 29.1101, 29.1105, 29.1107, 
29.1109, 29.1125, 29.1142, 29.1147, 29.1157, 29.1159, 29.1399, 29.1419, 
29.1433, 29.1439, 29.1522, D29.1.
    (m) 14 CFR part 36 through Amendment 36-28 as follows: 36.801, 
36.803, 36.805, H36.1-H36.305.
    (n) Special Conditions No. 29-004-SC (Docket No. SW004), dated June 
17, 1998.
    (o) Equivalent Level of Safety Findings:
    (1) Number TD1509BO-R-S-1 for 14 CFR 29.1401(d) at amendment 29-11; 
Anticollision light system installed in accordance with Sikorsky 
Drawing 33776-92603.
    (2) Number AT01847BO-R-P-1 for 14 CFR 29.1305 at amendment 29-40 
and 14 CFR 29.1549 at amendment 29-34; Use of a Power Limit Indicator 
(PLI) as the primary means for indicating/setting power.
    (p) Ditching: If emergency floatation gear, P/N 33776-92709, is 
installed, then compliance has also been shown to Amendment 29-52 of 
29.563, 29.801(b), (c), (d) and (e) and 29.807(b) and (d). For 
overwater operations, compliance with the operating rules and 29.1411, 
29.1415, and 26.1561 must be shown.

 Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions

    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the Sikorsky Model S-76D because of a 
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed 
under Sec.  21.16.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec.  11.19, under 
Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under 
Sec.  21.101.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the TC for that model be amended later to 
include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual 
design feature, or should any other model already included on the same 
TC be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, 
the special conditions would also apply to the other model.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Sikorsky Model S-76D will incorporate the following novel or 
unusual design features.
    The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes, 
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a 
hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFSC 
coupled SAR functions include:
    (a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
    (b) Ground speed hold.
    (c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the 
navigation computer.
    (d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over 
which the helicopter has flown.
    (e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
    (f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the 
navigation computer.
    (g) Monitor the preselected hover height with automatic increase in 
collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum height.
    These SAR modes are intended to be used over large bodies of water 
in areas clear of obstructions. Further, use of the modes that 
transition down from cruise to hover will include operation at 
airspeeds below VMINI.
    The SAR system only entails navigation, flight control, and coupled 
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The system does not include 
additional equipment that may be required for over

[[Page 75426]]

water flight or external loads to meet other operational requirements.

Applicability

    These special conditions apply to the Sikorsky Model S-76D 
helicopter. Should Sikorsky apply at a later date for a change to the 
type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel 
or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that 
model as well under the provisions of Sec.  21.101(d).

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model (i.e., S-76D) of helicopter. It is not a rule of general 
applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-
76D helicopters when the optional Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic 
Flight Control System (AFCS) is installed.
    In addition to the 14 CFR part 29 certification requirements for 
helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B), the following additional 
requirements must be met for certification of the SAR AFCS:
    (a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled SAR flight modes must provide:
    (1) Safe and controlled flight in three axes (lateral and 
longitudinal position/speed and height/vertical speed) at all airspeeds 
from instrument flight minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover within the 
maximum demonstrated wind envelope.
    (2) Automatic transition to the helicopter instrument flight 
(Appendix B) envelope as part of the normal SAR mode sequencing.
    (3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around mode that safely interrupts any 
other coupled mode and automatically transitions the helicopter to the 
instrument flight (Appendix B) envelope.
    (4) A means to prevent unintended flight below a safe minimum 
height. Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height is 
acceptable provided the alerting requirements in paragraph (b)(7)(i) of 
these Special Conditions alert the pilot of this descent below safe 
minimum height.
    (b) SAR Mode System Architecture. To support the integrity of the 
SAR modes, the following system architecture is required:
    (1) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS 
when any of the automatic piloting modes are engaged, so full authority 
digital engine control power limitations, such as torque and 
temperature, are not exceeded.
    (2) A system providing the aircraft height above the surface and 
final pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel in a 
position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and 
usable by any pilot at their station.
    (3) A system providing the aircraft heading and the pilot-selected 
heading at a location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable 
to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot 
at their station.
    (4) A system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral ground 
speeds and the pilot-selected longitudinal and lateral ground speeds 
when used by the AFCS in the flight envelope where airspeed indications 
become unreliable. This information must be presented at a location on 
the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that is 
plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their station.
    (5) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic 
piloting modes are engaged or transitioning from one mode to another.
    (6) A system that monitors for flight guidance deviations and 
failures and contains an alerting function that provides the flight 
crew with enough information to take appropriate corrective action.
    (7) An alerting system that provides visual or aural alerts, or 
both, to the flight crew under any of the following conditions:
    (i) When the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is 
reached.
    (ii) When a SAR mode system malfunction occurs.
    (iii) When the AFCS changes modes automatically from one SAR mode 
to another. For normal transitions from one SAR mode to another, a 
single visual or aural alert may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or 
a mode having a time-critical component, the flight crew alerting 
system must activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take 
timely and appropriate action. The alerting system means must be 
designed to alert the flight crew in order to minimize crew errors that 
could create an additional hazard.
    (8) The SAR system hoist operator control is considered a flight 
control with limited authority and must comply with the following:
    (i) The hoist operator control must be designed and located to 
provide for convenient operation and to prevent confusion and 
inadvertent operation.
    (ii) The helicopter must be safely controllable by the hoist 
operator control throughout the range of that control.
    (iii) The hoist operator control may not interfere with the safe 
operation of the helicopter.
    (iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls must be able to smoothly 
override the limited control authority of the hoist operator control, 
without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without 
the danger of exceeding any other limitation because of the override.
    (9) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of 
its failure. The occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent 
continued safe flight and landing must be extremely improbable. For any 
failure condition of the AFCS which is not shown to be extremely 
improbable:
    (i) The helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of 
continued safe flight without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 
strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control 
system must be evaluated.
    (ii) The AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous 
deviation in the flight path or produce hazardous loads on the 
helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a malfunction or 
failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period 
of time. Where multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction 
conditions must be evaluated in sequence unless their occurrence is 
shown to be improbable.
    (10) A functional hazard assessment and a system safety assessment 
must address the failure conditions associated with SAR operations.
    (i) For SAR catastrophic failure conditions, changes may be 
required to the following:
    (A) System architecture.
    (B) Software and complex electronic hardware design assurance 
levels.
    (C) High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) test levels.
    (D) Instructions for continued airworthiness.
    (ii) The assessments must consider all the systems required for SAR 
operations, including the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for 
example, radio altimeter), and primary flight displays. Electrical and 
electronic

[[Page 75427]]

systems with SAR catastrophic failure conditions (for example, AFCS) 
must comply with the Sec.  29.1317(a)(4) HIRF requirements.
    (c) SAR Mode Performance Requirements.
    (1) The SAR modes must be demonstrated for the requested flight 
envelope, including the following minimum sea-state and wind 
conditions:
    (i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), considering 
both short and long swells. This is in addition to the Sea State 
demonstrated in reference to the airframe's ditching capability.
    (ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind, 17 knots for all other azimuths.
    (2) The selected hover height and hover velocity must be captured 
(including the transition from one captured mode to another captured 
mode) accurately and smoothly and not exhibit any significant overshoot 
or oscillation.
    (3) The minimum use height (MUH) for the SAR modes must be no more 
than the maximum loss of height following any single failure or any 
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, plus an 
additional margin of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is the minimum 
height at which any SAR AFCS mode may be engaged.
    (4) The SAR mode system must be usable up to the maximum certified 
gross weight of the aircraft or to the lower of the following weights:
    (i) Maximum emergency flotation weight.
    (ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground Effect (OGE) weight.
    (iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
    (d) Flight Characteristics.
    (1) The basic aircraft must meet all of the 14 CFR part 29 
airworthiness criteria for helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B).
    (2) For SAR mode coupled flight below VMINI, at the 
maximum demonstrated winds, the helicopter must be able to maintain any 
required flight condition and make a smooth transition from any flight 
condition to any other flight condition without requiring exceptional 
piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without exceeding the limit 
load factor. This requirement also includes aircraft control through 
the hoist operator's control.
    (3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below VMINI, the 
following requirements of Appendix B to part 29 must be met and will be 
used as an extension to the IFR certification envelope of the basic 
aircraft:
    (i) Static Longitudinal Stability: the requirements of paragraph IV 
of Appendix B are not applicable.
    (ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: The requirements of 
paragraph V of Appendix B are not applicable.
    (iii) Dynamic Stability: The requirements of paragraph VI of 
Appendix B are replaced with the following two paragraphs:
    (A) Any oscillation must be damped and any aperiodic response must 
not double in amplitude in less than 10 seconds. This requirement must 
also be met with degraded upper modes of the AFCS. An ``upper mode'' is 
a mode that utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to provide an 
operational SAR profile.
    (B) After any upset, the AFCS must return the aircraft to the last 
commanded position within 10 seconds or less.
    (4) With any of the upper modes of the AFCS engaged, the pilot must 
be able to manually recover the aircraft and transition to the normal 
(Appendix B) IFR flight profile envelope without exceptional skill, 
alertness, or strength.
    (e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Information.
    The following performance information must be provided in the 
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS). OEI performance information 
and emergency procedures, providing the maximum weight that will 
provide a safe landing (or ditching) or the ability to fly away 
following failure of the critical engine in a hover. The maximum weight 
must be presented as a function of the hover height for the temperature 
and pressure altitude range requested for certification. The effects of 
wind must be reflected in the hover performance information. These OEI 
performance requirements do not replace performance requirements that 
may be needed to comply with the airworthiness or operational standards 
(Sec.  29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external loads or human external 
cargo.
    (f) RFMS.
    (1) The RFMS must contain, at a minimum:
    (i) Limitations necessary for safe operation of the SAR system, 
including:
    (A) Minimum crew requirements. No fewer than 2 pilots, except for 
approved external load operations that will also require a hoist 
operator.
    (B) Maximum SAR weight as determined by the lower of the SAR Mode 
performance requirement of paragraph (c)(4) of these Special Conditions 
or the aircraft performance information provided by paragraph (e) of 
these Special Conditions.
    (C) Maximum demonstrated sea state conditions for ditching 
compliance.
    (D) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH, 
as determined in paragraph (c)(3) of these Special Conditions.
    (E) The prohibition of external load operations requiring OEI hover 
capability.
    (ii) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR 
system (including operation of the hoist operator control), with AFCS 
failure modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.
    (iii) Performance information:
    (A) OEI performance and height-loss.
    (B) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous and 
time-limited power ratings.
    (C) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in flight test.
    (D) Information and/or advisory information concerning operations 
in a heavy salt spray environment, including any airframe or power 
effects as a result of salt encrustation.
    (g) Flight Demonstration.
    (1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight 
demonstration of all the coupled SAR modes is required.
    (2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled 
maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a 
pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft 
to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed 
of at least the best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
    (3) For any failure condition of the SAR system not shown to be 
extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth 
transition from one flight mode to another without exceptional piloting 
skill, alertness, or strength.
    (4) Failure conditions that are not shown to be extremely 
improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight 
testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal 
pilot recovery times are acceptable:
    (i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover 
modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
    (ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.
    (5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation at the low-speed 
and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations. 
Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions, 
particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must 
include a single or a combination of failures (such as erroneous data 
from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and

[[Page 75428]]

altitude sensors) that are not shown to be extremely improbable.
    (6) The flight demonstration must include the following 
environmental conditions:
    (i) Swell into wind.
    (ii) Swell and wind from different directions.
    (iii) Cross swell.
    (iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).
    (7) The flight demonstration must also evaluate OEI procedures from 
hover while hoisting an external load.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 9, 2014.
Lance T. Gant,
Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2014-29594 Filed 12-17-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P