Document ID: FAA-2009-0609-0001
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Bombardier Model DHC-8-102, DHC-8-103, DHC-8-106, DHC-8-201, and DHC-8-202 Series Airplanes
Posted Date: 2009-07-06T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 127 (Monday, July 6, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 31891-31894]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15810]

 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
 ========================================================================
 

  Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Proposed 
Rules  

[[Page 31891]]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0609; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-037-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model DHC-8-102, DHC-8-103, 
DHC-8-106, DHC-8-201, and DHC-8-202 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 
condition as:

    During a puncture voltage test of the aluminum-loaded paint on 
an in-service DHC-8 aircraft, conducted to validate an SFAR 88 
[Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88] related task, 
Bombardier Aerospace (BA) discovered that the top wing fuel tank 
skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 was painted with a non-aluminized 
enamel coating * * *.
    With this type of paint application, it is possible that, in the 
worst case scenario, a lightning strike could puncture the wing skin 
and create an ignition source in the fuel tank.

    Ignition sources inside fuel tanks, in combination with flammable 
fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss 
of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions that are 
intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 5, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact 
Bombardier, Inc., 400 C[ocirc]te-Vertu Road West, Dorval, Qu[eacute]bec 
H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 514-855-5000; fax 514-855-7401; e-mail 
thd.qseries@aero.bombardier.com; Internet http://www.bombardier.com. 
You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the 
FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is 
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket 
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kyle Williams, Aerospace Engineer, 
Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE-172, FAA, New York Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New 
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7347; fax (516) 794-5531.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2009-0609; 
Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-037-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the aviation 
authority for Canada, has issued Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-
2009-05, dated January 29, 2009 (referred to after this as ``the 
MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The 
MCAI states:

    During a puncture voltage test of the aluminum-loaded paint on 
an in-service DHC-8 aircraft, conducted to validate an SFAR 88 
[Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88] related task, 
Bombardier Aerospace (BA) discovered that the top wing fuel tank 
skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 was painted with a non-aluminized 
enamel coating due to a misinterpretation of the painting 
instructions in the Structural Repair Manual (SRM).
    With this type of paint application, it is possible that, in the 
worst case scenario, a lightning strike could puncture the wing skin 
and create an ignition source in the fuel tank.

    Ignition sources inside fuel tanks, in combination with flammable 
fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss 
of the airplane. Required actions include performing a functional check 
of the dielectric properties of the fuel tank skin for aluminum-loaded 
primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating. For airplanes on which the 
aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating have been 
properly applied, the required actions include restoring the protective 
finish on the areas where the surface finish was removed. For airplanes 
on which the aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating 
have not been applied or have not been properly applied, the required 
actions include stripping the affected wing skin surfaces to bare metal 
and applying alodine coating to those areas,

[[Page 31892]]

performing a detailed visual inspection of the stripped areas for any 
sign of corrosion or deterioration of the protective alodine coating 
and re-applying the protective alodine coating, and painting the 
affected wing skin surfaces with aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-
loaded enamel coating. You may obtain further information by examining 
the MCAI in the AD docket.
    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that 
is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation 
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed 
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that 
all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport 
category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against 
explosion risks.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    Bombardier has issued Service Bulletin 8-57-46, Revision `A,' dated 
February 6, 2009. The actions described in this service information are 
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a Note within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD 
would affect about 22 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that 
it would take about 24 work-hours per product to comply with the basic 
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per 
work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed 
AD on U.S. operators to be $42,240, or $1,920 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

[[Page 31893]]

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly de Havilland, Inc.): Docket No. FAA-2009-
0609; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-037-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by August 5, 2009.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model DHC-8-102, DHC-8-103, 
DHC-8-106, DHC-8-201, and DHC-8-202 series airplanes; certificated 
in any category; serial numbers 003 through 663 inclusive.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57: Wings.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
    During a puncture voltage test of the aluminum-loaded paint on 
an in-service DHC-8 aircraft, conducted to validate an SFAR 88 
[Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88] related task, 
Bombardier Aerospace (BA) discovered that the top wing fuel tank 
skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 was painted with a non-aluminized 
enamel coating due to a misinterpretation of the painting 
instructions in the Structural Repair Manual (SRM).
    With this type of paint application, it is possible that, in the 
worst case scenario, a lightning strike could puncture the wing skin 
and create an ignition source in the fuel tank.

    Ignition sources inside fuel tanks, in combination with 
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and 
consequent loss of the airplane. Required actions include performing 
a functional check of the dielectric properties of the fuel tank 
skin for aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating. 
For airplanes on which the aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-
loaded enamel coating have been properly applied, the required 
actions include restoring the protective finish on the areas where 
the surface finish was removed. For airplanes on which the aluminum-
loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating have not been 
applied or have not been properly applied, the required actions 
include stripping the affected wing skin surfaces to bare metal and 
applying alodine coating to those areas, performing a detailed 
visual inspection of the stripped areas for any sign of corrosion or 
deterioration of the protective alodine coating and re-applying the 
protective alodine coating, and painting the affected wing skin 
surfaces with aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel 
coating.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) For airplanes on which Bombardier Modification 8/0024 has 
not been done: Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, 
perform a functional check of the dielectric properties of the fuel 
tank skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 of the upper and lower wing 
for aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating, in 
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier 
Service Bulletin 8-57-46, Revision `A', dated February 6, 2009.
    (2) For airplanes on which Bombardier Modification 8/0024 has 
been done: Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, 
perform a functional check of the dielectric properties of the fuel 
tank skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 of the upper wing for 
aluminum-loaded primer and aluminum-loaded enamel coating, in 
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier 
Service Bulletin 8-57-46, Revision `A,' dated February 6, 2009.
    (3) If the functional check required by paragraph (f)(1) or 
(f)(2) of this AD indicates that the aluminum-loaded primer and 
aluminum-loaded enamel coating have been properly applied, as 
defined in the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service 
Bulletin 8-57-46, Revision `A,' dated February 6, 2009: Before 
further flight, restore the protective finish on the areas where the 
surface finish was removed for the functional check, in accordance 
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 
8-57-46, Revision `A,' dated February 6, 2009.
    (4) If the functional check required by paragraph (f)(1) or 
(f)(2) of this AD indicates that the aluminum-loaded primer and 
aluminum-loaded enamel coating have not been applied or have not 
been properly applied, as defined in the Accomplishment Instructions 
of Bombardier Service Bulletin 8-57-46, Revision `A,' dated February 
6, 2009: Perform the actions required by paragraphs (f)(4)(i), 
(f)(4)(ii), and (f)(4)(iii) of this AD in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 8-57-46, 
Revision `A,' dated February 6, 2009 (``the service bulletin'').
    (i) Before further flight, strip the affected wing skin surfaces 
to bare metal and apply alodine coating to those areas in accordance 
with the service bulletin.
    (ii) Within 90 flight hours after performing the actions 
required by paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this AD, and thereafter at 
intervals not to exceed 90 flight hours: Perform a detailed visual 
inspection of the stripped areas for any sign of corrosion or 
deterioration of the protective alodine coating, and re-apply the 
protective alodine coating, in accordance with the service bulletin.
    (iii) Within 3 months after performing the actions required by 
paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable: Paint the 
affected wing skin surfaces with aluminum-loaded primer and 
aluminum-loaded enamel coating in accordance with the service 
bulletin.
    (5) Accomplishment of the actions required by paragraph (f)(1) 
or (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable, before the effective date of 
this AD in accordance with Bombardier Service Bulletin 8-57-46, 
dated September 29, 2008, is acceptable for compliance with the 
corresponding requirements of this AD.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1:  This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service 
information as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New 
York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Kyle Williams, Aerospace 
Engineer, Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE-172, FAA, New York 
Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 
Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7347; fax (516) 794-
5531. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the 
AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a 
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. 
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information 
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2009-05, dated 
January 29, 2009, and Bombardier Service Bulletin 8-57-46, Revision 
`A,' dated February 6, 2009, for related information.

[[Page 31894]]

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 25, 2009.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15810 Filed 7-2-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P