Document ID: EPA-HQ-OW-2003-0002-0056
Agency: epa
Document Type: Supporting & Related Material
Title: 
Posted Date: 2003-03-12T05:00Z

Westlaw
Download
Summary
Report
for
DITTHAVONG,
KHOU
424539
Monday,
July
08,
2002
07:
41:
04
Central
(
C)
2002.
Copyright
is
not
claimed
as
to
any
part
of
the
original
work
prepared
by
a
U.
S.
government
officer
or
employee
as
part
of
that
person's
official
duties.
All
rights
reserved.
No
part
of
a
Westlaw
transmission
may
be
copied,
downloaded,
stored
in
a
retrieval
system,
further
transmitted
or
otherwise
reproduced,
stored,
disseminated,
transferred
or
used,
in
any
form
or
by
any
means,
except
as
permitted
in
the
Westlaw
Subscriber
Agreement,
the
Additional
Terms
Governing
Internet
Access
to
Westlaw
or
by
West's
prior
written
agreement.
Each
reproduction
of
any
part
of
a
Westlaw
transmission
must
contain
notice
of
West's
copyright
as
follows:
"
Copr.
(
C)
2002
West
Group.
No
claim
to
orig.
U.
S.
govt.
works."
Registered
in
U.
S.
Patent
and
Trademark
Office
and
used
herein
under
license:
KeyCite,
Westlaw
and
WIN.
WIN
Natural
Language
is
protected
by
U.
S.
Patent
Nos.
5,265,065,
5,418,948
and
5,488,725.

Request
Created
Date/
Time:
Monday,
July
08,
2002
07:
40:
00
Central
Client
Identifier:
KHOUANE
DITTHAVONG
DataBase:
SCT
Citation
Text:
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Print
Command:
Current
document,
Complete
result
Lines:
835
Lines
Charged:
835
Documents:
1
Documents
Charged:
0
Images:
1
Images
Charged:
1
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
2
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States
KUMHO
TIRE
COMPANY,
LTD.,
et
al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Patrick
CARMICHAEL,
etc.,
et
al.

No.
97­
1709.

Argued
Dec.
7,
1998.
Decided
March
23,
1999.

Plaintiffs
brought
products
liability
action
against
tire
manufacturer
and
tire
distributor
for
injuries
sustained
when
right
rear
tire
on
vehicle
failed.
The
United
States
District
Court
for
the
Southern
District
of
Alabama,
No.
93­
0860­
CB­
S,
923
F.
Supp.
1514,
Charles
R.
Butler,
J.,
granted
summary
judgment
for
defendants,
and
plaintiffs
appealed.
The
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Eleventh
Circuit,
131
F.
3d
1433,
reversed
and
remanded.
Defendants
filed
application
for
writ
of
certiorari.
The
Supreme
Court,
Justice
Breyer,
held
that:
(
1)
Daubert's
"
gatekeeping"
obligation,
requiring
an
inquiry
into
both
relevance
and
reliability,
applies
not
only
to
"
scientific"
testimony,
but
to
all
expert
testimony;
(
2)
when
assessing
reliability
of
engineering
expert's
testimony,
trial
court
may
consider
the
Daubert
factors
to
the
extent
relevant;
and
(
3)
trial
court
did
not
abuse
its
discretion
in
its
application
of
Daubert
to
exclude
tire
failure
analyst's
expert
testimony
that
particular
tire
failed
due
to
manufacturing
or
design
defect.

Reversed.

Justice
Scalia
filed
concurring
opinion
in
which
Justice
O'Connor
and
Justice
Thomas
joined.

Justice
Stevens
filed
opinion
concurring
in
part
and
dissenting
in
part.

West
Headnotes
[
1]
Evidence
508
157k508
Most
Cited
Cases
[
1]
Evidence
555.2
157k555.2
Most
Cited
Cases
Daubert's
"
gatekeeping"
obligation,
requiring
an
inquiry
into
both
relevance
and
reliability,
applies
not
only
to
"
scientific"
testimony,
but
to
all
expert
testimony.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rule
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.

[
2]
Evidence
555.2
157k555.2
Most
Cited
Cases
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
3
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
When
assessing
the
reliability
of
an
engineering
expert's
testimony,
the
trial
court
may
consider
the
Daubert
factors
to
the
extent
relevant,
which
will
depend
upon
the
nature
of
the
issue,
the
expert's
particular
expertise,
and
the
subject
of
his
testimony.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rule
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.

[
3]
Evidence
508
157k508
Most
Cited
Cases
[
3]
Evidence
555.2
157k555.2
Most
Cited
Cases
Objective
of
Daubert's
"
gatekeeping"
requirement
is
to
ensure
the
reliability
and
relevancy
of
expert
testimony;
it
is
to
make
certain
that
an
expert,
whether
basing
testimony
upon
professional
studies
or
personal
experience,
employs
in
the
courtroom
the
same
level
of
intellectual
rigor
that
characterizes
the
practice
of
an
expert
in
the
relevant
field.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rule
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.

[
4]
Evidence
555.2
157k555.2
Most
Cited
Cases
Trial
court
should
consider
the
specific
factors
identified
in
Daubert
where
they
are
reasonable
measures
of
the
reliability
of
expert
testimony.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rule
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.

[
5]
Federal
Courts
823
170Bk823
Most
Cited
Cases
Court
of
Appeals
is
to
apply
an
abuse­
of­
discretion
standard
when
it
reviews
a
trial
court's
decision
to
admit
or
exclude
expert
testimony,
and
when
it
reviews
the
trial
court's
decisions
about
how
to
determine
reliability
as
to
its
ultimate
conclusion.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rule
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.

[
6]
Evidence
546
157k546
Most
Cited
Cases
Whether
Daubert's
specific
factors
are,
or
are
not,
reasonable
measures
of
expert's
reliability
in
a
particular
case
is
a
matter
that
the
law
grants
the
trial
judge
broad
latitude
to
determine.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rules
102,
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.

[
7]
Evidence
555.5
157k555.5
Most
Cited
Cases
Trial
court
did
not
abuse
its
discretion
in
its
application
of
Daubert
to
exclude
tire
failure
analyst's
expert
testimony
that
particular
tire
failed
due
to
manufacturing
or
design
defect,
on
grounds
that
methodology
employed
by
analyst
in
analyzing
the
data
obtained
in
his
visual
and
tactile
examination
of
tire
in
question
was
unreliable,
even
though
court
did
not
doubt
analyst's
qualification
as
expert,
where
there
was
no
evidence
that
other
experts
in
the
industry
used
analyst's
particular
approach
with
regard
visual
and
tactile
examinations
of
tires,
analyst's
own
testimony
cast
doubt
upon
reliability
of
both
his
theory
and
his
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
4
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
proposition
about
significance
of
visual
inspection
of
tire
in
question,
and
tire
bore
some
of
marks
that
analyst
said
indicated
abuse,
rather
than
defect.
Fed.
Rules
Evid.
Rule
702,
28
U.
S.
C.
A.
**
1169
Syllabus
[
FN*]

FN*
The
syllabus
constitutes
no
part
of
the
opinion
of
the
Court
but
has
been
prepared
by
the
Reporter
of
Decisions
for
the
convenience
of
the
reader.
See
United
States
v.
Detroit
Timber
&
Lumber
Co.,
200
U.
S.
321,
337,
26
S.
Ct.
282,
50
L.
Ed.
499.

When
a
tire
on
the
vehicle
driven
by
Patrick
Carmichael
blew
out
and
the
vehicle
overturned,
one
passenger
died
and
the
others
were
injured.
The
survivors
and
the
decedent's
representative,
respondents
here,
brought
this
diversity
suit
against
the
tire's
maker
and
its
distributor
(
collectively
Kumho
Tire),
claiming
that
the
tire
that
failed
was
defective.
They
rested
their
case
in
significant
part
upon
the
depositions
of
a
tire
failure
analyst,
Dennis
Carlson,
Jr.,
who
intended
to
testify
that,
in
his
expert
opinion,
a
defect
in
the
tire's
manufacture
or
design
caused
the
blowout.
That
opinion
was
based
upon
a
visual
and
tactile
inspection
of
the
tire
and
upon
the
theory
that
in
the
absence
of
at
least
two
of
four
specific,
physical
symptoms
indicating
tire
abuse,
the
tire
failure
of
the
sort
that
occurred
here
was
caused
by
a
defect.
Kumho
Tire
moved
to
exclude
Carlson's
testimony
on
the
ground
that
his
methodology
failed
to
satisfy
Federal
Rule
of
Evidence
702,
which
says:
"
If
scientific,
technical,
or
other
specialized
knowledge
will
assist
the
trier
of
fact
...,
a
witness
qualified
as
an
expert
...
may
testify
thereto
in
the
form
of
an
opinion."
Granting
the
motion
(
and
entering
summary
judgment
for
the
defendants),
the
District
Court
acknowledged
that
it
should
act
as
a
reliability
"
gatekeeper"
under
Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,
509
U.
S.
579,
589,
113
S.
Ct.
2786,
125
L.
Ed.
2d
469,
in
which
this
Court
held
that
Rule
702
imposes
a
special
obligation
upon
a
trial
judge
to
ensure
that
scientific
testimony
is
not
only
relevant,
but
reliable.
The
court
noted
that
Daubert
discussed
four
factors­­
testing,
peer
review,
error
rates,
and
"
acceptability"
in
the
relevant
scientific
community­­
which
might
prove
helpful
in
determining
the
reliability
of
a
particular
scientific
theory
or
technique,
id.,
at
593­
594,
113
S.
Ct.
2786,
and
found
that
those
factors
argued
against
the
reliability
of
Carlson's
methodology.
On
the
plaintiffs'
motion
for
reconsideration,
the
court
agreed
that
Daubert
should
be
applied
flexibly,
that
its
four
factors
were
simply
illustrative,
and
that
other
factors
could
argue
in
favor
of
admissibility.
However,
the
court
affirmed
its
earlier
order
because
it
found
insufficient
indications
of
the
reliability
of
Carlson's
methodology.
In
reversing,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
held
that
the
District
Court
had
erred
as
a
matter
of
law
in
applying
Daubert.
Believing
that
Daubert
was
limited
to
the
scientific
context,
*
138
the
court
held
that
the
Daubert
factors
did
not
apply
to
Carlson's
testimony,
which
it
characterized
as
skill
or
experience
based.

Held:

1.
The
Daubert
factors
may
apply
to
the
testimony
of
engineers
and
other
experts
who
are
not
scientists.
Pp.
1174­
1176.

(
a)
The
Daubert
"
gatekeeping"
obligation
applies
not
only
to
"
scientific"
testimony,
but
to
all
expert
testimony.
Rule
702
does
not
distinguish
between
"
scientific"
knowledge
and
"
technical"
or
"
other
specialized"
knowledge,
but
makes
clear
that
any
such
knowledge
might
become
the
subject
of
expert
testimony.
It
is
the
Rule's
word
"
knowledge,"
not
the
words
(
like
"
scientific")
that
modify
that
word,
that
establishes
a
standard
of
evidentiary
reliability.
509
U.
S.,
at
589­
590,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Daubert
referred
only
to
"
scientific"
knowledge
because
that
was
the
nature
of
the
expertise
there
at
issue.
Id.,
at
590,
n.
8,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Neither
is
the
evidentiary
rationale
underlying
Daubert's
"
gatekeeping"
determination
limited
to
"
scientific"
knowledge.
Rules
702
and
703
grant
all
expert
witnesses,
not
just
"
scientific"
ones,
testimonial
latitude
unavailable
to
other
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
5
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
witnesses
on
the
assumption
that
the
expert's
opinion
will
have
a
reliable
basis
in
the
knowledge
and
experience
of
his
discipline.
Id.,
at
592,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Finally,
it
would
prove
difficult,
if
not
impossible,
for
judges
to
administer
evidentiary
rules
under
which
a
"
gatekeeping"
obligation
depended
upon
a
distinction
between
"
scientific"
knowledge
and
"
technical"
or
"
other
specialized"
knowledge,
since
there
is
no
clear
line
dividing
the
one
from
the
others
and
no
convincing
need
to
make
such
distinctions.
Pp.
1174­
1175.

**
1170
(
b)
A
trial
judge
determining
the
admissibility
of
an
engineering
expert's
testimony
may
consider
one
or
more
of
the
specific
Daubert
factors.
The
emphasis
on
the
word
"
may"
reflects
Daubert's
description
of
the
Rule
702
inquiry
as
"
a
flexible
one."
509
U.
S.,
at
594,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
The
Daubert
factors
do
not
constitute
a
definitive
checklist
or
test,
id.,
at
593,
113
S.
Ct.
2786,
and
the
gatekeeping
inquiry
must
be
tied
to
the
particular
facts,
id.,
at
591,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Those
factors
may
or
may
not
be
pertinent
in
assessing
reliability,
depending
on
the
nature
of
the
issue,
the
expert's
particular
expertise,
and
the
subject
of
his
testimony.
Some
of
those
factors
may
be
helpful
in
evaluating
the
reliability
even
of
experience­
based
expert
testimony,
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
erred
insofar
as
it
ruled
those
factors
out
in
such
cases.
In
determining
whether
particular
expert
testimony
is
reliable,
the
trial
court
should
consider
the
specific
Daubert
factors
where
they
are
reasonable
measures
of
reliability.
Pp.
1175­
1176.

(
c)
A
court
of
appeals
must
apply
an
abuse­
of­
discretion
standard
when
it
reviews
a
trial
court's
decision
to
admit
or
exclude
expert
*
139
testimony.
General
Electric
Co.
v.
Joiner,
522
U.
S.
136,
138­
139,
118
S.
Ct.
512,
139
L.
Ed.
2d
508.
That
standard
applies
as
much
to
the
trial
court's
decisions
about
how
to
determine
reliability
as
to
its
ultimate
conclusion.
Thus,
whether
Daubert's
specific
factors
are,
or
are
not,
reasonable
measures
of
reliability
in
a
particular
case
is
a
matter
that
the
law
grants
the
trial
judge
broad
latitude
to
determine.
See
id.,
at
143,
118
S.
Ct.
512.
The
Eleventh
Circuit
erred
insofar
as
it
held
to
the
contrary.
P.
1176.

2.
Application
of
the
foregoing
standards
demonstrates
that
the
District
Court's
decision
not
to
admit
Carlson's
expert
testimony
was
lawful.
The
District
Court
did
not
question
Carlson's
qualifications,
but
excluded
his
testimony
because
it
initially
doubted
his
methodology
and
then
found
it
unreliable
after
examining
the
transcript
in
some
detail
and
considering
respondents'
defense
of
it.
The
doubts
that
triggered
the
court's
initial
inquiry
were
reasonable,
as
was
the
court's
ultimate
conclusion
that
Carlson
could
not
reliably
determine
the
cause
of
the
failure
of
the
tire
in
question.
The
question
was
not
the
reliability
of
Carlson's
methodology
in
general,
but
rather
whether
he
could
reliably
determine
the
cause
of
failure
of
the
particular
tire
at
issue.
That
tire,
Carlson
conceded,
had
traveled
far
enough
so
that
some
of
the
tread
had
been
worn
bald,
it
should
have
been
taken
out
of
service,
it
had
been
repaired
(
inadequately)
for
punctures,
and
it
bore
some
of
the
very
marks
that
he
said
indicated,
not
a
defect,
but
abuse.
Moreover,
Carlson's
own
testimony
cast
considerable
doubt
upon
the
reliability
of
both
his
theory
about
the
need
for
at
least
two
signs
of
abuse
and
his
proposition
about
the
significance
of
visual
inspection
in
this
case.
Respondents
stress
that
other
tire
failure
experts,
like
Carlson,
rely
on
visual
and
tactile
examinations
of
tires.
But
there
is
no
indication
in
the
record
that
other
experts
in
the
industry
use
Carlson's
particular
approach
or
that
tire
experts
normally
make
the
very
fine
distinctions
necessary
to
support
his
conclusions,
nor
are
there
references
to
articles
or
papers
that
validate
his
approach.
Respondents'
argument
that
the
District
Court
too
rigidly
applied
Daubert
might
have
had
some
validity
with
respect
to
the
court's
initial
opinion,
but
fails
because
the
court,
on
reconsideration,
recognized
that
the
relevant
reliability
inquiry
should
be
"
flexible,"
and
ultimately
based
its
decision
upon
Carlson's
failure
to
satisfy
either
Daubert's
factors
or
any
other
set
of
reasonable
reliability
criteria.
Pp.
1176­
1179.

131
F.
3d
1433,
reversed.
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
6
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
BREYER,
J.,
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court,
Parts
I
and
II
of
which
were
unanimous,
and
Part
III
of
which
was
joined
by
REHNQUIST,
C.
J.,
and
O'CONNOR,
SCALIA,
KENNEDY,
SOUTER,
THOMAS,
**
1171
and
GINSBURG,
*
140
JJ.
SCALIA,
J.,
filed
a
concurring
opinion,
in
which
O'CONNOR
and
THOMAS,
JJ.,
joined,
post,
p.
1179.
STEVENS,
J.,
filed
an
opinion
concurring
in
part
and
dissenting
in
part,
post,
p.
1179.

Joseph
H.
Babington,
Mobile,
AL,
for
petitioners.

Jeffrey
P.
Minear,
Washington,
DC,
for
the
United
States
as
amicus
curiae,
by
special
leave
of
the
court.

Sidney
W.
Jackson,
for
respondents.

For
U.
S.
Supreme
Court
Briefs
See:

1998
WL
541944
(
Pet.
Brief)

1998
WL
734422
(
Resp.
Brief)

1998
WL
802059
(
Reply.
Brief)

1998
WL
541842
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541945
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541947
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541948
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541950
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541969
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541970
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541971
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
541973
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
545899
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
596787
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
713448
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
734430
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
734433
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
734434
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
739321
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
762012
(
Amicus.
Brief)

1998
WL
762013
(
Amicus.
Brief)

For
Transcript
of
Oral
Argument
See:
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
7
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
1998
WL
842179
(
U.
S.
Oral.
Arg.)

*
141
Justice
BREYER
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court.

In
Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,
509
U.
S.
579,
113
S.
Ct.
2786,
125
L.
Ed.
2d
469
(
1993),
this
Court
focused
upon
the
admissibility
of
scientific
expert
testimony.
It
pointed
out
that
such
testimony
is
admissible
only
if
it
is
both
relevant
and
reliable.
And
it
held
that
the
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence
"
assign
to
the
trial
judge
the
task
of
ensuring
that
an
expert's
testimony
both
rests
on
a
reliable
foundation
and
is
relevant
to
the
task
at
hand."
Id.,
at
597,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
The
Court
also
discussed
certain
more
specific
factors,
such
as
testing,
peer
review,
error
rates,
and
"
acceptability"
in
the
relevant
scientific
community,
some
or
all
of
which
might
prove
helpful
in
determining
the
reliability
of
a
particular
scientific
"
theory
or
technique."
Id.,
at
593­
594,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.

This
case
requires
us
to
decide
how
Daubert
applies
to
the
testimony
of
engineers
and
other
experts
who
are
not
scientists.
We
conclude
that
Daubert's
general
holding­­
setting
forth
the
trial
judge's
general
"
gatekeeping"
obligation­­
applies
not
only
to
testimony
based
on
"
scientific"
knowledge,
but
also
to
testimony
based
on
"
technical"
and
"
other
specialized"
knowledge.
See
Fed.
Rule
Evid.
702.
We
also
conclude
that
a
trial
court
may
consider
one
or
more
of
the
more
specific
factors
that
Daubert
mentioned
when
doing
so
will
help
determine
that
testimony's
reliability.
But,
as
the
Court
stated
in
Daubert,
the
test
of
reliability
is
"
flexible,"
and
Daubert's
list
of
specific
factors
neither
necessarily
nor
exclusively
applies
to
all
experts
or
in
every
case.
*
142
Rather,
the
law
grants
a
district
court
the
same
broad
latitude
when
it
decides
how
to
determine
reliability
as
it
enjoys
in
respect
to
its
ultimate
reliability
determination.
See
General
Electric
Co.
v.
Joiner,
522
U.
S.
136,
143,
118
S.
Ct.
512,
139
L.
Ed.
2d
508
(
1997)
(
courts
of
appeals
are
to
apply
"
abuse
of
discretion"
standard
when
reviewing
district
court's
reliability
determination).
Applying
these
standards,
we
determine
that
the
District
Court's
decision
in
this
case­­
not
to
admit
certain
expert
testimony­­
was
within
its
discretion
and
therefore
lawful.

I
On
July
6,
1993,
the
right
rear
tire
of
a
minivan
driven
by
Patrick
Carmichael
blew
out.
In
the
accident
that
followed,
one
of
the
passengers
died,
and
others
were
severely
injured.
In
October
1993,
the
Carmichaels
brought
this
diversity
suit
against
the
tire's
maker
and
its
distributor,
whom
we
refer
to
collectively
as
Kumho
Tire,
claiming
that
the
tire
was
defective.
The
plaintiffs
rested
their
case
in
significant
part
upon
deposition
testimony
provided
by
an
expert
in
tire
failure
analysis,
Dennis
Carlson,
Jr.,
who
intended
to
testify
in
support
of
their
conclusion.

Carlson's
depositions
relied
upon
certain
features
of
tire
technology
that
are
not
in
dispute.
A
steel­
belted
radial
tire
like
the
Carmichaels'
is
made
up
of
a
"
carcass"
containing
many
layers
of
flexible
cords,
called
"
plies,"
along
which
(
between
the
cords
and
the
outer
tread)
are
laid
steel
strips
called
"
belts."
Steel
wire
loops,
called
"
beads,"
hold
the
cords
together
at
the
plies'
bottom
edges.
An
outer
layer,
called
the
"
tread,"
encases
the
carcass,
and
the
entire
tire
is
bound
together
in
rubber,
through
the
application
of
heat
and
various
chemicals.
See
generally,
e.
g.,
J.
Dixon,
Tires,
Suspension
and
Handling
68­
72
(
2d
ed.
1996).
The
bead
of
the
tire
sits
upon
a
"
bead
seat,"
which
is
part
of
the
wheel
assembly.
That
assembly
contains
a
"
rim
flange,"
which
extends
over
the
bead
and
rests
against
the
side
of
the
*
143
tire.
See
M.
Mavrigian,
Performance
Wheels
&
Tires
81,
83
(
1998)
(
illustrations).
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
8
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
**
1172
Carlson's
testimony
also
accepted
certain
background
facts
about
the
tire
in
question.
He
assumed
that
before
the
blowout
the
tire
had
traveled
far.
(
The
tire
was
made
in
1988
and
had
been
installed
some
time
before
the
Carmichaels
bought
the
used
minivan
in
March
1993;
the
Carmichaels
had
driven
the
van
approximately
7,000
additional
miles
in
the
two
months
they
had
owned
it.)
Carlson
noted
that
the
tire's
tread
depth,
which
was
11/
32
of
an
inch
when
new,
App.
242,
had
been
worn
down
to
depths
that
ranged
from
3/
32
of
an
inch
along
some
parts
of
the
tire,
to
nothing
at
all
along
others.
Id.,
at
287.
He
conceded
that
the
tire
tread
had
at
least
two
punctures
which
had
been
inadequately
repaired.
Id.,
at
258­
261,
322.

Despite
the
tire's
age
and
history,
Carlson
concluded
that
a
defect
in
its
manufacture
or
design
caused
the
blowout.
He
rested
this
conclusion
in
part
upon
three
premises
which,
*
144
for
present
purposes,
we
must
assume
are
not
in
dispute:
First,
a
tire's
carcass
should
stay
bound
to
the
inner
side
of
the
tread
for
a
significant
period
of
time
after
its
tread
depth
has
worn
away.
Id.,
at
208­
209.
Second,
the
tread
of
the
tire
at
issue
had
separated
from
its
inner
steel­
belted
carcass
prior
to
the
accident.
Id.,
at
336.
Third,
this
"
separation"
caused
the
blowout.
Ibid.

Carlson's
conclusion
that
a
defect
caused
the
separation,
however,
rested
upon
certain
other
propositions,
several
of
which
the
defendants
strongly
dispute.
First,
Carlson
said
that
if
a
separation
is
not
caused
by
a
certain
kind
of
tire
misuse
called
"
overdeflection"
(
which
consists
of
underinflating
the
tire
or
causing
it
to
carry
too
much
weight,
thereby
generating
heat
that
can
undo
the
chemical
tread/
carcass
bond),
then,
ordinarily,
its
cause
is
a
tire
defect.
Id.,
at
193­
195,
277­
278.
Second,
he
said
that
if
a
tire
has
been
subject
to
sufficient
overdeflection
to
cause
a
separation,
it
should
reveal
certain
physical
symptoms.
These
symptoms
include
(
a)
tread
wear
on
the
tire's
shoulder
that
is
greater
than
the
tread
wear
along
the
tire's
center,
id.,
at
211;
(
b)
signs
of
a
"
bead
groove,"
where
the
beads
have
been
pushed
too
hard
against
the
bead
seat
on
the
inside
of
the
tire's
rim,
id.,
at
196­
197;
(
c)
sidewalls
of
the
tire
with
physical
signs
of
deterioration,
such
as
discoloration,
id.,
at
212;
and/
or
(
d)
marks
on
the
tire's
rim
flange,
id.,
at
219­
220.
Third,
Carlson
said
that
where
he
does
not
find
at
least
two
of
the
four
physical
signs
just
mentioned
(
and
presumably
where
there
is
no
reason
to
suspect
a
less
common
cause
of
separation),
he
concludes
that
a
manufacturing
or
design
defect
caused
the
separation.
Id.,
at
223­
224.

Carlson
added
that
he
had
inspected
the
tire
in
question.
He
conceded
that
the
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
9
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
tire
to
a
limited
degree
showed
greater
wear
on
**
1173
the
shoulder
than
in
the
center,
some
signs
of
"
bead
groove,"
some
discoloration,
a
few
marks
on
the
rim
flange,
and
inadequately
filled
puncture
holes
(
which
can
also
cause
heat
that
might
lead
to
separation).
Id.,
at
256­
257,
258­
*
145
261,
277,
303­
304,
308.
But,
in
each
instance,
he
testified
that
the
symptoms
were
not
significant,
and
he
explained
why
he
believed
that
they
did
not
reveal
overdeflection.
For
example,
the
extra
shoulder
wear,
he
said,
appeared
primarily
on
one
shoulder,
whereas
an
overdeflected
tire
would
reveal
equally
abnormal
wear
on
both
shoulders.
Id.,
at
277.
Carlson
concluded
that
the
tire
did
not
bear
at
least
two
of
the
four
overdeflection
symptoms,
nor
was
there
any
less
obvious
cause
of
separation;
and
since
neither
overdeflection
nor
the
punctures
caused
the
blowout,
a
defect
must
have
done
so.

Kumho
Tire
moved
the
District
Court
to
exclude
Carlson's
testimony
on
the
ground
that
his
methodology
failed
Rule
702'
s
reliability
requirement.
The
court
agreed
with
Kumho
that
it
should
act
as
a
Daubert­
type
reliability
"
gatekeeper,"
even
though
one
might
consider
Carlson's
testimony
as
"
technical,"
rather
than
"
scientific."
See
Carmichael
v.
Samyang
Tires,
Inc.,
923
F.
Supp.
1514,
1521­
1522
(
S.
D.
Ala.
1996).
The
court
then
examined
Carlson's
methodology
in
light
of
the
reliability­
related
factors
that
Daubert
mentioned,
such
as
a
theory's
testability,
whether
it
"
has
been
a
subject
of
peer
review
or
publication,"
the
"
known
or
potential
rate
of
error,"
and
the
"
degree
of
acceptance
...
within
the
relevant
scientific
community."
923
F.
Supp.,
at
1520
(
citing
Daubert,
509
U.
S.,
at
589­
595,
113
S.
Ct.
2786).
The
District
Court
found
that
all
those
factors
argued
against
the
reliability
of
Carlson's
methods,
and
it
granted
the
motion
to
exclude
the
testimony
(
as
well
as
the
defendants'
accompanying
motion
for
summary
judgment).

The
plaintiffs,
arguing
that
the
court's
application
of
the
Daubert
factors
was
too
"
inflexible,"
asked
for
reconsideration.
And
the
court
granted
that
motion.
Carmichael
v.
Samyang
Tires,
Inc.,
Civ.
Action
No.
93­
0860­
CB­
S
(
S.
D.
Ala.,
June
5,
1996),
App.
to
Pet.
for
Cert.
1c.
After
reconsidering
the
matter,
the
court
agreed
with
the
plaintiffs
that
Daubert
should
be
applied
flexibly,
that
its
four
factors
were
*
146
simply
illustrative,
and
that
other
factors
could
argue
in
favor
of
admissibility.
It
conceded
that
there
may
be
widespread
acceptance
of
a
"
visualinspection
method"
for
some
relevant
purposes.
But
the
court
found
insufficient
indications
of
the
reliability
of
"
the
component
of
Carlson's
tire
failure
analysis
which
most
concerned
the
Court,
namely,
the
methodology
employed
by
the
expert
in
analyzing
the
data
obtained
in
the
visual
inspection,
and
the
scientific
basis,
if
any,
for
such
an
analysis."
Id.,
at
6c.
It
consequently
affirmed
its
earlier
order
declaring
Carlson's
testimony
inadmissible
and
granting
the
defendants'
motion
for
summary
judgment.

The
Eleventh
Circuit
reversed.
See
Carmichael
v.
Samyang
Tire,
Inc.,
131
F.
3d
1433
(
1997).
It
"
review[
ed]
...
de
novo
"
the
"
district
court's
legal
decision
to
apply
Daubert."
Id.,
at
1435.
It
noted
that
"
the
Supreme
Court
in
Daubert
explicitly
limited
its
holding
to
cover
only
the
'
scientific
context,'
"
adding
that
"
a
Daubert
analysis"
applies
only
where
an
expert
relies
"
on
the
application
of
scientific
principles,"
rather
than
"
on
skill­
or
experience­
based
observation."
Id.,
at
1435­
1436.
It
concluded
that
Carlson's
testimony,
which
it
viewed
as
relying
on
experience,
"
falls
outside
the
scope
of
Daubert,"
that
"
the
district
court
erred
as
a
matter
of
law
by
applying
Daubert
in
this
case,"
and
that
the
case
must
be
remanded
for
further
(
non­
Daubert­
type)
consideration
under
Rule
702.
131
F.
3d,
at
1436.

Kumho
Tire
petitioned
for
certiorari,
asking
us
to
determine
whether
a
trial
court
"
may"
consider
Daubert's
specific
"
factors"
when
determining
the
"
admissibility
of
an
engineering
expert's
testimony."
Pet.
for
Cert.
i.
We
granted
certiorari
in
light
of
uncertainty
among
the
lower
courts
about
whether,
or
how,
Daubert
applies
to
expert
testimony
that
might
be
characterized
as
based
not
upon
"
scientific"
knowledge,
but
rather
upon
"
technical"
or
"
other
specialized"
*
147
knowledge.
Fed.
Rule
Evid.
702;
compare,
e.
g.,
Watkins
v.
Telsmith,
Inc.,
121
F.
3d
984,
990­
991
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
10
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
(
C.
A.
5
1997),
with,
e.
g.,
**
1174Compton
v.
Subaru
of
America,
Inc.,
82
F.
3d
1513,
1518­
1519
(
C.
A.
10),
cert.
denied,
519
U.
S.
1042,
117
S.
Ct.
611,
136
L.
Ed.
2d
536
(
1996).

II
A
[
1]
In
Daubert,
this
Court
held
that
Federal
Rule
of
Evidence
702
imposes
a
special
obligation
upon
a
trial
judge
to
"
ensure
that
any
and
all
scientific
testimony
...
is
not
only
relevant,
but
reliable."
509
U.
S.,
at
589,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
The
initial
question
before
us
is
whether
this
basic
gatekeeping
obligation
applies
only
to
"
scientific"
testimony
or
to
all
expert
testimony.
We,
like
the
parties,
believe
that
it
applies
to
all
expert
testimony.
See
Brief
for
Petitioners
19;
Brief
for
Respondents
17.

For
one
thing,
Rule
702
itself
says:
"
If
scientific,
technical,
or
other
specialized
knowledge
will
assist
the
trier
of
fact
to
understand
the
evidence
or
to
determine
a
fact
in
issue,
a
witness
qualified
as
an
expert
by
knowledge,
skill,
experience,
training,
or
education,
may
testify
thereto
in
the
form
of
an
opinion
or
otherwise."
This
language
makes
no
relevant
distinction
between
"
scientific"
knowledge
and
"
technical"
or
"
other
specialized"
knowledge.
It
makes
clear
that
any
such
knowledge
might
become
the
subject
of
expert
testimony.
In
Daubert,
the
Court
specified
that
it
is
the
Rule's
word
"
knowledge,"
not
the
words
(
like
"
scientific")
that
modify
that
word,
that
"
establishes
a
standard
of
evidentiary
reliability."
509
U.
S.,
at
589­
590,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Hence,
as
a
matter
of
language,
the
Rule
applies
its
reliability
standard
to
all
"
scientific,"
"
technical,"
or
"
other
specialized"
matters
within
its
scope.
We
concede
that
the
Court
in
Daubert
referred
only
to
"
scientific"
knowledge.
But
as
the
Court
there
said,
it
referred
to
"
scientific"*
148
testimony
"
because
that
[
wa]
s
the
nature
of
the
expertise"
at
issue.
Id.,
at
590,
n.
8,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.

Neither
is
the
evidentiary
rationale
that
underlay
the
Court's
basic
Daubert
"
gatekeeping"
determination
limited
to
"
scientific"
knowledge.
Daubert
pointed
out
that
Federal
Rules
702
and
703
grant
expert
witnesses
testimonial
latitude
unavailable
to
other
witnesses
on
the
"
assumption
that
the
expert's
opinion
will
have
a
reliable
basis
in
the
knowledge
and
experience
of
his
discipline."
Id.,
at
592,
113
S.
Ct.
2786
(
pointing
out
that
experts
may
testify
to
opinions,
including
those
that
are
not
based
on
firsthand
knowledge
or
observation).
The
Rules
grant
that
latitude
to
all
experts,
not
just
to
"
scientific"
ones.

Finally,
it
would
prove
difficult,
if
not
impossible,
for
judges
to
administer
evidentiary
rules
under
which
a
gatekeeping
obligation
depended
upon
a
distinction
between
"
scientific"
knowledge
and
"
technical"
or
"
other
specialized"
knowledge.
There
is
no
clear
line
that
divides
the
one
from
the
others.
Disciplines
such
as
engineering
rest
upon
scientific
knowledge.
Pure
scientific
theory
itself
may
depend
for
its
development
upon
observation
and
properly
engineered
machinery.
And
conceptual
efforts
to
distinguish
the
two
are
unlikely
to
produce
clear
legal
lines
capable
of
application
in
particular
cases.
Cf.
Brief
for
National
Academy
of
Engineering
as
Amicus
Curiae
9
(
scientist
seeks
to
understand
nature
while
the
engineer
seeks
nature's
modification);
Brief
for
Rubber
Manufacturers
Association
as
Amicus
Curiae
14­
16
(
engineering,
as
an
"
'
applied
science,'
"
relies
on
"
scientific
reasoning
and
methodology");
Brief
for
John
Allen
et
al.
as
Amici
Curiae
6
(
engineering
relies
upon
"
scientific
knowledge
and
methods").

Neither
is
there
a
convincing
need
to
make
such
distinctions.
Experts
of
all
kinds
tie
observations
to
conclusions
through
the
use
of
what
Judge
Learned
Hand
called
"
general
truths
derived
from
...
specialized
experience."
Hand,
Historical
and
Practical
Considerations
Regarding
Expert
Testimony,
*
149
15
Harv.
L.
Rev.
40,
54
(
1901).
And
whether
the
specific
expert
testimony
focuses
upon
specialized
observations,
the
specialized
translation
of
those
observations
into
theory,
a
specialized
theory
itself,
or
the
application
of
such
a
theory
in
a
particular
case,
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
11
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
the
expert's
testimony
often
will
rest
"
upon
an
experience
confessedly
foreign
in
kind
to
[
the
jury's]
own."
Ibid.
The
trial
judge's
effort
to
assure
that
the
specialized
testimony
is
reliable
and
relevant
can
help
the
jury
evaluate
**
1175
that
foreign
experience,
whether
the
testimony
reflects
scientific,
technical,
or
other
specialized
knowledge.

We
conclude
that
Daubert's
general
principles
apply
to
the
expert
matters
described
in
Rule
702.
The
Rule,
in
respect
to
all
such
matters,
"
establishes
a
standard
of
evidentiary
reliability."
509
U.
S.,
at
590,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
It
"
requires
a
valid
...
connection
to
the
pertinent
inquiry
as
a
precondition
to
admissibility."
Id.,
at
592,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
And
where
such
testimony's
factual
basis,
data,
principles,
methods,
or
their
application
are
called
sufficiently
into
question,
see
Part
III,
infra,
the
trial
judge
must
determine
whether
the
testimony
has
"
a
reliable
basis
in
the
knowledge
and
experience
of
[
the
relevant]
discipline."
509
U.
S.,
at
592,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.

B
Petitioners
ask
more
specifically
whether
a
trial
judge
determining
the
"
admissibility
of
an
engineering
expert's
testimony"
may
consider
several
more
specific
factors
that
Daubert
said
might
"
bear
on"
a
judge's
gatekeeping
determination.
Brief
for
Petitioners
i.
These
factors
include:
­­
Whether
a
"
theory
or
technique
...
can
be
(
and
has
been)
tested";
­­
Whether
it
"
has
been
subjected
to
peer
review
and
publication";
­­
Whether,
in
respect
to
a
particular
technique,
there
is
a
high
"
known
or
potential
rate
of
error"
and
whether
there
are
"
standards
controlling
the
technique's
operation";
and
*
150
­­
Whether
the
theory
or
technique
enjoys
"
'
general
acceptance'
"
within
a
"
'
relevant
scientific
community.'
"
509
U.
S.,
at
592­
594,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Emphasizing
the
word
"
may"
in
the
question,
we
answer
that
question
yes.

[
2]
Engineering
testimony
rests
upon
scientific
foundations,
the
reliability
of
which
will
be
at
issue
in
some
cases.
See,
e.
g.,
Brief
for
Stephen
N.
Bobo
et
al.
as
Amici
Curiae
23
(
stressing
the
scientific
bases
of
engineering
disciplines).
In
other
cases,
the
relevant
reliability
concerns
may
focus
upon
personal
knowledge
or
experience.
As
the
Solicitor
General
points
out,
there
are
many
different
kinds
of
experts,
and
many
different
kinds
of
expertise.
See
Brief
for
United
States
as
Amicus
Curiae
18­
19,
and
n.
5
(
citing
cases
involving
experts
in
drug
terms,
handwriting
analysis,
criminal
modus
operandi,
land
valuation,
agricultural
practices,
railroad
procedures,
attorney's
fee
valuation,
and
others).
Our
emphasis
on
the
word
"
may"
thus
reflects
Daubert's
description
of
the
Rule
702
inquiry
as
"
a
flexible
one."
509
U.
S.,
at
594,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
Daubert
makes
clear
that
the
factors
it
mentions
do
not
constitute
a
"
definitive
checklist
or
test."
Id.,
at
593,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
And
Daubert
adds
that
the
gatekeeping
inquiry
must
be
"
'
tied
to
the
facts'
"
of
a
particular
"
case."
Id.,
at
591,
113
S.
Ct.
2786
(
quoting
United
States
v.
Downing,
753
F.
2d
1224,
1242
(
C.
A.
3
1985)).
We
agree
with
the
Solicitor
General
that
"[
t]
he
factors
identified
in
Daubert
may
or
may
not
be
pertinent
in
assessing
reliability,
depending
on
the
nature
of
the
issue,
the
expert's
particular
expertise,
and
the
subject
of
his
testimony."
Brief
for
United
States
as
Amicus
Curiae
19.
The
conclusion,
in
our
view,
is
that
we
can
neither
rule
out,
nor
rule
in,
for
all
cases
and
for
all
time
the
applicability
of
the
factors
mentioned
in
Daubert,
nor
can
we
now
do
so
for
subsets
of
cases
categorized
by
category
of
expert
or
by
kind
of
evidence.
Too
much
depends
upon
the
particular
circumstances
of
the
particular
case
at
issue.

*
151
Daubert
itself
is
not
to
the
contrary.
It
made
clear
that
its
list
of
factors
was
meant
to
be
helpful,
not
definitive.
Indeed,
those
factors
do
not
all
necessarily
apply
even
in
every
instance
in
which
the
reliability
of
scientific
testimony
is
challenged.
It
might
not
be
surprising
in
a
particular
case,
for
example,
that
a
claim
made
by
a
scientific
witness
has
never
been
the
subject
of
peer
review,
for
the
particular
application
at
issue
may
never
previously
have
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
12
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
interested
any
scientist.
Nor,
on
the
other
hand,
does
the
presence
of
Daubert's
general
acceptance
factor
help
show
that
an
expert's
testimony
is
reliable
where
the
discipline
itself
lacks
reliability,
as,
for
example,
do
theories
grounded
in
any
so­
called
generally
accepted
principles
of
astrology
or
necromancy.

**
1176
At
the
same
time,
and
contrary
to
the
Court
of
Appeals'
view,
some
of
Daubert's
questions
can
help
to
evaluate
the
reliability
even
of
experience­
based
testimony.
In
certain
cases,
it
will
be
appropriate
for
the
trial
judge
to
ask,
for
example,
how
often
an
engineering
expert's
experience­
based
methodology
has
produced
erroneous
results,
or
whether
such
a
method
is
generally
accepted
in
the
relevant
engineering
community.
Likewise,
it
will
at
times
be
useful
to
ask
even
of
a
witness
whose
expertise
is
based
purely
on
experience,
say,
a
perfume
tester
able
to
distinguish
among
140
odors
at
a
sniff,
whether
his
preparation
is
of
a
kind
that
others
in
the
field
would
recognize
as
acceptable.

We
must
therefore
disagree
with
the
Eleventh
Circuit's
holding
that
a
trial
judge
may
ask
questions
of
the
sort
Daubert
mentioned
only
where
an
expert
"
relies
on
the
application
of
scientific
principles,"
but
not
where
an
expert
relies
"
on
skill­
or
experience­
based
observation."
131
F.
3d,
at
1435.
We
do
not
believe
that
Rule
702
creates
a
schematism
that
segregates
expertise
by
type
while
mapping
certain
kinds
of
questions
to
certain
kinds
of
experts.
Life
and
the
legal
cases
that
it
generates
are
too
complex
to
warrant
so
definitive
a
match.

[
3][
4]
*
152
To
say
this
is
not
to
deny
the
importance
of
Daubert's
gatekeeping
requirement.
The
objective
of
that
requirement
is
to
ensure
the
reliability
and
relevancy
of
expert
testimony.
It
is
to
make
certain
that
an
expert,
whether
basing
testimony
upon
professional
studies
or
personal
experience,
employs
in
the
courtroom
the
same
level
of
intellectual
rigor
that
characterizes
the
practice
of
an
expert
in
the
relevant
field.
Nor
do
we
deny
that,
as
stated
in
Daubert,
the
particular
questions
that
it
mentioned
will
often
be
appropriate
for
use
in
determining
the
reliability
of
challenged
expert
testimony.
Rather,
we
conclude
that
the
trial
judge
must
have
considerable
leeway
in
deciding
in
a
particular
case
how
to
go
about
determining
whether
particular
expert
testimony
is
reliable.
That
is
to
say,
a
trial
court
should
consider
the
specific
factors
identified
in
Daubert
where
they
are
reasonable
measures
of
the
reliability
of
expert
testimony.

C
[
5][
6]
The
trial
court
must
have
the
same
kind
of
latitude
in
deciding
how
to
test
an
expert's
reliability,
and
to
decide
whether
or
when
special
briefing
or
other
proceedings
are
needed
to
investigate
reliability,
as
it
enjoys
when
it
decides
whether
or
not
that
expert's
relevant
testimony
is
reliable.
Our
opinion
in
Joiner
makes
clear
that
a
court
of
appeals
is
to
apply
an
abuse­
of­
discretion
standard
when
it
"
review[
s]
a
trial
court's
decision
to
admit
or
exclude
expert
testimony."
522
U.
S.,
at
138­
139,
118
S.
Ct.
512.
That
standard
applies
as
much
to
the
trial
court's
decisions
about
how
to
determine
reliability
as
to
its
ultimate
conclusion.
Otherwise,
the
trial
judge
would
lack
the
discretionary
authority
needed
both
to
avoid
unnecessary
"
reliability"
proceedings
in
ordinary
cases
where
the
reliability
of
an
expert's
methods
is
properly
taken
for
granted,
and
to
require
appropriate
proceedings
in
the
less
usual
or
more
complex
cases
where
cause
for
questioning
the
expert's
reliability
arises.
Indeed,
the
Rules
seek
to
avoid
"
unjustifiable
expense
and
delay"
as
part
of
their
search
for
*
153
"
truth"
and
the
"
jus[
t]
determin[
ation]"
of
proceedings.
Fed.
Rule
Evid.
102.
Thus,
whether
Daubert's
specific
factors
are,
or
are
not,
reasonable
measures
of
reliability
in
a
particular
case
is
a
matter
that
the
law
grants
the
trial
judge
broad
latitude
to
determine.
See
Joiner,
supra,
at
143,
118
S.
Ct.
512.
And
the
Eleventh
Circuit
erred
insofar
as
it
held
to
the
contrary.

III
[
7]
We
further
explain
the
way
in
which
a
trial
judge
"
may"
consider
Daubert's
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
13
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
factors
by
applying
these
considerations
to
the
case
at
hand,
a
matter
that
has
been
briefed
exhaustively
by
the
parties
and
their
19
amici.
The
District
Court
did
not
doubt
Carlson's
qualifications,
which
included
a
masters
degree
in
mechanical
engineering,
10
years'
work
at
Michelin
America,
Inc.,
and
testimony
as
a
tire
failure
consultant
in
other
tort
cases.
Rather,
it
excluded
the
testimony
because,
despite
those
qualifications,
it
initially
**
1177
doubted,
and
then
found
unreliable,
"
the
methodology
employed
by
the
expert
in
analyzing
the
data
obtained
in
the
visual
inspection,
and
the
scientific
basis,
if
any,
for
such
an
analysis."
Civ.
Action
No.
93­
0860­
CB­
S
(
S.
D.
Ala.,
June
5,
1996),
App.
to
Pet.
for
Cert.
6c.
After
examining
the
transcript
in
"
some
detail,"
923
F.
Supp.,
at
1518­
1519,
n.
4,
and
after
considering
respondents'
defense
of
Carlson's
methodology,
the
District
Court
determined
that
Carlson's
testimony
was
not
reliable.
It
fell
outside
the
range
where
experts
might
reasonably
differ,
and
where
the
jury
must
decide
among
the
conflicting
views
of
different
experts,
even
though
the
evidence
is
"
shaky."
Daubert,
509
U.
S.,
at
596,
113
S.
Ct.
2786.
In
our
view,
the
doubts
that
triggered
the
District
Court's
initial
inquiry
here
were
reasonable,
as
was
the
court's
ultimate
conclusion.

For
one
thing,
and
contrary
to
respondents'
suggestion,
the
specific
issue
before
the
court
was
not
the
reasonableness
in
general
of
a
tire
expert's
use
of
a
visual
and
tactile
inspection
to
determine
whether
overdeflection
had
caused
*
154
the
tire's
tread
to
separate
from
its
steel­
belted
carcass.
Rather,
it
was
the
reasonableness
of
using
such
an
approach,
along
with
Carlson's
particular
method
of
analyzing
the
data
thereby
obtained,
to
draw
a
conclusion
regarding
the
particular
matter
to
which
the
expert
testimony
was
directly
relevant.
That
matter
concerned
the
likelihood
that
a
defect
in
the
tire
at
issue
caused
its
tread
to
separate
from
its
carcass.
The
tire
in
question,
the
expert
conceded,
had
traveled
far
enough
so
that
some
of
the
tread
had
been
worn
bald;
it
should
have
been
taken
out
of
service;
it
had
been
repaired
(
inadequately)
for
punctures;
and
it
bore
some
of
the
very
marks
that
the
expert
said
indicated,
not
a
defect,
but
abuse
through
overdeflection.
See
supra,
at
1172;
App.
293­
294.
The
relevant
issue
was
whether
the
expert
could
reliably
determine
the
cause
of
this
tire's
separation.

Nor
was
the
basis
for
Carlson's
conclusion
simply
the
general
theory
that,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
of
abuse,
a
defect
will
normally
have
caused
a
tire's
separation.
Rather,
the
expert
employed
a
more
specific
theory
to
establish
the
existence
(
or
absence)
of
such
abuse.
Carlson
testified
precisely
that
in
the
absence
of
at
least
two
of
four
signs
of
abuse
(
proportionately
greater
tread
wear
on
the
shoulder;
signs
of
grooves
caused
by
the
beads;
discolored
sidewalls;
marks
on
the
rim
flange),
he
concludes
that
a
defect
caused
the
separation.
And
his
analysis
depended
upon
acceptance
of
a
further
implicit
proposition,
namely,
that
his
visual
and
tactile
inspection
could
determine
that
the
tire
before
him
had
not
been
abused
despite
some
evidence
of
the
presence
of
the
very
signs
for
which
he
looked
(
and
two
punctures).

For
another
thing,
the
transcripts
of
Carlson's
depositions
support
both
the
trial
court's
initial
uncertainty
and
its
final
conclusion.
Those
transcripts
cast
considerable
doubt
upon
the
reliability
of
both
the
explicit
theory
(
about
the
need
for
two
signs
of
abuse)
and
the
implicit
proposition
(
about
the
significance
of
visual
inspection
in
this
case).
Among
other
things,
the
expert
could
not
say
whether
the
tire
had
traveled
*
155
more
than
10,
or
20,
or
30,
or
40,
or
50
thousand
miles,
adding
that
6,000
miles
was
"
about
how
far"
he
could
"
say
with
any
certainty."
Id.,
at
265.
The
court
could
reasonably
have
wondered
about
the
reliability
of
a
method
of
visual
and
tactile
inspection
sufficiently
precise
to
ascertain
with
some
certainty
the
abuse­
related
significance
of
minute
shoulder/
center
relative
tread
wear
differences,
but
insufficiently
precise
to
tell
"
with
any
certainty"
from
the
tread
wear
whether
a
tire
had
traveled
less
than
10,000
or
more
than
50,000
miles.
And
these
concerns
might
have
been
augmented
by
Carlson's
repeated
reliance
on
the
"
subjective[
ness]"
of
his
mode
of
analysis
in
response
to
questions
seeking
specific
information
regarding
how
he
could
differentiate
between
a
tire
that
actually
had
been
overdeflected
and
a
tire
that
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
14
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
merely
looked
as
though
it
had
been.
Id.,
at
222,
224­
225,
285­
286.
They
would
have
been
further
augmented
by
the
fact
that
Carlson
said
he
had
inspected
the
tire
itself
for
the
first
time
the
morning
of
his
first
deposition,
and
then
only
for
a
few
hours.
(
His
initial
conclusions
were
based
on
photographs.)
Id.,
at
180.

**
1178
Moreover,
prior
to
his
first
deposition,
Carlson
had
issued
a
signed
report
in
which
he
concluded
that
the
tire
had
"
not
been
...
overloaded
or
underinflated,"
not
because
of
the
absence
of
"
two
of
four"
signs
of
abuse,
but
simply
because
"
the
rim
flange
impressions
...
were
normal."
Id.,
at
335­
336.
That
report
also
said
that
the
"
tread
depth
remaining
was
3/
32
inch,"
id.,
at
336,
though
the
opposing
expert's
(
apparently
undisputed)
measurements
indicate
that
the
tread
depth
taken
at
various
positions
around
the
tire
actually
ranged
from
.5/
32
of
an
inch
to
4/
32
of
an
inch,
with
the
tire
apparently
showing
greater
wear
along
both
shoulders
than
along
the
center,
id.,
at
432­
433.

Further,
in
respect
to
one
sign
of
abuse,
bead
grooving,
the
expert
seemed
to
deny
the
sufficiency
of
his
own
simple
visual­
inspection
methodology.
He
testified
that
most
tires
have
some
bead
groove
pattern,
that
where
there
is
reason
*
156
to
suspect
an
abnormal
bead
groove
he
would
ideally
"
look
at
a
lot
of
[
similar]
tires"
to
know
the
grooving's
significance,
and
that
he
had
not
looked
at
many
tires
similar
to
the
one
at
issue.
Id.,
at
212­
213,
214,
217.

Finally,
the
court,
after
looking
for
a
defense
of
Carlson's
methodology
as
applied
in
these
circumstances,
found
no
convincing
defense.
Rather,
it
found
(
1)
that
"
none"
of
the
Daubert
factors,
including
that
of
"
general
acceptance"
in
the
relevant
expert
community,
indicated
that
Carlson's
testimony
was
reliable,
923
F.
Supp.,
at
1521;
(
2)
that
its
own
analysis
"
revealed
no
countervailing
factors
operating
in
favor
of
admissibility
which
could
outweigh
those
identified
in
Daubert,"
App.
to
Pet.
for
Cert.
4c;
and
(
3)
that
the
"
parties
identified
no
such
factors
in
their
briefs,"
ibid.
For
these
three
reasons
taken
together,
it
concluded
that
Carlson's
testimony
was
unreliable.

Respondents
now
argue
to
us,
as
they
did
to
the
District
Court,
that
a
method
of
tire
failure
analysis
that
employs
a
visual/
tactile
inspection
is
a
reliable
method,
and
they
point
both
to
its
use
by
other
experts
and
to
Carlson's
long
experience
working
for
Michelin
as
sufficient
indication
that
that
is
so.
But
no
one
denies
that
an
expert
might
draw
a
conclusion
from
a
set
of
observations
based
on
extensive
and
specialized
experience.
Nor
does
anyone
deny
that,
as
a
general
matter,
tire
abuse
may
often
be
identified
by
qualified
experts
through
visual
or
tactile
inspection
of
the
tire.
See
Affidavit
of
H.
R.
Baumgardner
1­
2,
cited
in
Brief
for
National
Academy
of
Forensic
Engineers
as
Amicus
Curiae
16
(
Tire
engineers
rely
on
visual
examination
and
process
of
elimination
to
analyze
experimental
test
tires).
As
we
said
before,
supra,
at
1977,
the
question
before
the
trial
court
was
specific,
not
general.
The
trial
court
had
to
decide
whether
this
particular
expert
had
sufficient
specialized
knowledge
to
assist
the
jurors
"
in
deciding
the
particular
issues
in
the
case."
4
J.
McLaughlin,
Weinstein's
Federal
Evidence
¶
702.05[
1],
p.
702­
33
(
2d
ed.
1998);
see
also
Advisory
*
157
Committee's
Note
on
Proposed
Fed.
Rule
Evid.
702,
Preliminary
Draft
of
Proposed
Amendments
to
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
and
Evidence:
Request
for
Comment
126
(
1998)
(
stressing
that
district
courts
must
"
scrutinize"
whether
the
"
principles
and
methods"
employed
by
an
expert
"
have
been
properly
applied
to
the
facts
of
the
case").

The
particular
issue
in
this
case
concerned
the
use
of
Carlson's
two­
factor
test
and
his
related
use
of
visual/
tactile
inspection
to
draw
conclusions
on
the
basis
of
what
seemed
small
observational
differences.
We
have
found
no
indication
in
the
record
that
other
experts
in
the
industry
use
Carlson's
two­
factor
test
or
that
tire
experts
such
as
Carlson
normally
make
the
very
fine
distinctions
about,
say,
the
symmetry
of
comparatively
greater
shoulder
tread
wear
that
were
necessary,
on
Carlson's
own
theory,
to
support
his
conclusions.
Nor,
despite
the
prevalence
of
tire
testing,
does
anyone
refer
to
any
articles
or
papers
that
validate
Carlson's
approach.
Cf.
Bobo,
Tire
Flaws
and
Separations,
in
Mechanics
of
Pneumatic
Tires
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
15
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
636­
637
(
S.
Clark
ed.
1981);
C.
Schnuth,
R.
Fuller,
G.
Follen,
G.
Gold,
&
J.
Smith,
Compression
Grooving
and
Rim
Flange
Abrasion
as
Indicators
of
Over­
Deflected
Operating
Conditions
in
Tires,
presented
to
Rubber
Division
of
the
American
Chemical
Society,
Oct.
21­
24,
1997;
J.
Walter
&
R.
Kiminecz,
Bead
**
1179
Contact
Pressure
Measurements
at
the
Tire­
Rim
Interface,
presented
to
the
Society
of
Automotive
Engineers,
Inc.,
Feb.
24­
28,
1975.
Indeed,
no
one
has
argued
that
Carlson
himself,
were
he
still
working
for
Michelin,
would
have
concluded
in
a
report
to
his
employer
that
a
similar
tire
was
similarly
defective
on
grounds
identical
to
those
upon
which
he
rested
his
conclusion
here.
Of
course,
Carlson
himself
claimed
that
his
method
was
accurate,
but,
as
we
pointed
out
in
Joiner,
"
nothing
in
either
Daubert
or
the
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence
requires
a
district
court
to
admit
opinion
evidence
that
is
connected
to
existing
data
only
by
the
ipse
dixit
of
the
expert."
522
U.
S.,
at
146,
118
S.
Ct.
512.

*
158
Respondents
additionally
argue
that
the
District
Court
too
rigidly
applied
Daubert's
criteria.
They
read
its
opinion
to
hold
that
a
failure
to
satisfy
any
one
of
those
criteria
automatically
renders
expert
testimony
inadmissible.
The
District
Court's
initial
opinion
might
have
been
vulnerable
to
a
form
of
this
argument.
There,
the
court,
after
rejecting
respondents'
claim
that
Carlson's
testimony
was
"
exempted
from
Daubert­
style
scrutiny"
because
it
was
"
technical
analysis"
rather
than
"
scientific
evidence,"
simply
added
that
"
none
of
the
four
admissibility
criteria
outlined
by
the
Daubert
court
are
satisfied."
923
F.
Supp.,
at
1521.
Subsequently,
however,
the
court
granted
respondents'
motion
for
reconsideration.
It
then
explicitly
recognized
that
the
relevant
reliability
inquiry
"
should
be
'
flexible,'
"
that
its
"
'
overarching
subject
[
should
be]
...
validity'
and
reliability,"
and
that
"
Daubert
was
intended
neither
to
be
exhaustive
nor
to
apply
in
every
case."
App.
to
Pet.
for
Cert.
4c
(
quoting
Daubert,
509
U.
S.,
at
594­
595,
113
S.
Ct.
2786).
And
the
court
ultimately
based
its
decision
upon
Carlson's
failure
to
satisfy
either
Daubert's
factors
or
any
other
set
of
reasonable
reliability
criteria.
In
light
of
the
record
as
developed
by
the
parties,
that
conclusion
was
within
the
District
Court's
lawful
discretion.

In
sum,
Rule
702
grants
the
district
judge
the
discretionary
authority,
reviewable
for
its
abuse,
to
determine
reliability
in
light
of
the
particular
facts
and
circumstances
of
the
particular
case.
The
District
Court
did
not
abuse
its
discretionary
authority
in
this
case.
Hence,
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
Reversed.

Justice
SCALIA,
with
whom
Justice
O'CONNOR
and
Justice
THOMAS
join,
concurring.

I
join
the
opinion
of
the
Court,
which
makes
clear
that
the
discretion
it
endorses­
­
trial­
court
discretion
in
choosing
the
manner
of
testing
expert
reliability­­
is
not
discretion
to
*
159
abandon
the
gatekeeping
function.
I
think
it
worth
adding
that
it
is
not
discretion
to
perform
the
function
inadequately.
Rather,
it
is
discretion
to
choose
among
reasonable
means
of
excluding
expertise
that
is
fausse
and
science
that
is
junky.
Though,
as
the
Court
makes
clear
today,
the
Daubert
factors
are
not
holy
writ,
in
a
particular
case
the
failure
to
apply
one
or
another
of
them
may
be
unreasonable,
and
hence
an
abuse
of
discretion.

Justice
STEVENS,
concurring
in
part
and
dissenting
in
part.

The
only
question
that
we
granted
certiorari
to
decide
is
whether
a
trial
judge
"[
m]
ay
...
consider
the
four
factors
set
out
by
this
Court
in
Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,
509
U.
S.
579,
113
S.
Ct.
2786,
125
L.
Ed.
2d
469
(
1993),
in
a
Rule
702
analysis
of
admissibility
of
an
engineering
expert's
testimony."
Pet.
for
119
S.
Ct.
1167
Page
16
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
(
Cite
as:
526
U.
S.
137,
119
S.
Ct.
1167)

Copr.
©
West
2002
No
Claim
to
Orig.
U.
S.
Govt.
Works
Cert.
i.
That
question
is
fully
and
correctly
answered
in
Parts
I
and
II
of
the
Court's
opinion,
which
I
join.

Part
III
answers
the
quite
different
question
whether
the
trial
judge
abused
his
discretion
when
he
excluded
the
testimony
of
Dennis
Carlson.
Because
a
proper
answer
to
that
question
requires
a
study
of
the
record
that
can
be
performed
more
efficiently
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
than
by
the
nine
Members
of
this
Court,
I
would
remand
the
case
to
the
Eleventh
Circuit
to
perform
that
task.
There
are,
of
course,
exceptions
to
most
rules,
but
I
firmly
believe
that
it
is
neither
fair
to
litigants
nor
good
practice
for
this
Court
to
reach
out
to
decide
questions
not
raised
by
the
certiorari
petition.
See
General
Electric
Co.
v.
Joiner,
522
U.
S.
136,
150­
151,
118
S.
Ct.
512,
139
L.
Ed.
2d
508
(
1997)
**
1180
(
STEVENS,
J.,
concurring
in
part
and
dissenting
in
part).

Accordingly,
while
I
do
not
feel
qualified
to
disagree
with
the
well­
reasoned
factual
analysis
in
Part
III
of
the
Court's
opinion,
I
do
not
join
that
Part,
and
I
respectfully
dissent
from
the
Court's
disposition
of
the
case.

119
S.
Ct.
1167,
526
U.
S.
137,
143
L.
Ed.
2d
238,
67
USLW
4179,
50
U.
S.
P.
Q.
2d
1177,
29
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
20,638,
50
Fed.
R.
Evid.
Serv.
1373,
Prod.
Liab.
Rep.
(
CCH)
P
15,470,
99
Cal.
Daily
Op.
Serv.
2059,
1999
Daily
Journal
D.
A.
R.
2645,
12
Fla.
L.
Weekly
Fed.
S
141
END
OF
DOCUMENT