Document ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0616-0017
Agency: epa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Amendments to Regional Consistency Regulations; Final Rule
Posted Date: 2016-08-03T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 149 (Wednesday, August 3, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51102-51114]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-17899]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 56

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0616; FRL-9949-79-OAR]
RIN 2060-AS53

Amendments to Regional Consistency Regulations

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is promulgating 
revisions to its Regional Consistency regulations to more clearly 
address the implications of adverse federal court decisions that result 
from challenges to locally or regionally applicable actions. 
Specifically, the EPA is introducing a narrow procedural exception 
under which an EPA Regional office no longer needs to seek Headquarters 
concurrence to diverge from national policy in geographic areas covered 
by such an adverse court decision. The revisions will help to foster 
overall fairness and predictability regarding the scope and impact of 
judicial decisions under the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act).

DATES: This final rule is effective on September 2, 2016.

ADDRESSES: The EPA has established a docket for this action under 
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0616. All documents in the docket are 
listed on the http://www.regulations.gov Web site. Although listed in 
the index, some information is not publicly available, i.e., 
confidential business information or other information whose disclosure 
is restricted by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted 
material, will be publicly available only in hard copy. Publicly 
available docket materials are available electronically in http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further general information on 
this rulemaking, contact Mr. Greg Nizich, Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (C504-03), 
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711, by phone at (919) 541-3078, or by 
email at Nizich.greg@epa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Regulated entities. The Administrator determined that this action 
is subject to the provisions of CAA section 307(d). See CAA section 
307(d)(1)(V) (the provisions of CAA section 307(d) apply to ``such 
other actions as the Administrator may determine). These are amendments 
to existing regulations and could affect your facility if a CAA-related 
ruling by a federal court affects your operations.

I. General Information

A. Does this action apply to me?

    Entities potentially affected directly by this final rulemaking 
include the EPA and any state/local/tribal governments implementing 
delegated EPA programs. Entities potentially affected indirectly by 
this final rule include owners and operators of sources of air 
emissions that are subject to CAA regulations.

B. Where can I get a copy of this document and other related 
information?

    In addition to being available in the docket, an electronic copy of 
this notice will be posted at: https://www.epa.gov/nsr/nsr-regulatory-actions. Upon publication in the Federal Register, only the published 
version may be considered the final official version of the notice, and 
will govern in the case of any discrepancies between the Federal 
Register published version and any other version.

C. How is this document organized?

    The information presented in this document is organized as follows:

I. General Information
    A. Does this action apply to me?
    B. Where can I get a copy of this document and other related 
information?
    C. How is this document organized?
II. Background for Final Rulemaking
III. Final Revisions to the Regional Consistency Regulations and 
Response to Significant Comments
    A. What are the final revisions to the 40 CFR part 56 Regional 
Consistency regulations?
    B. What is the basis for the EPA's approach?
IV. Environmental Justice Considerations
V. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
    A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and 
Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
    C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
    D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
    E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
    F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With 
Indian Tribal Governments
    G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From 
Environmental Health and Safety Risks
    H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
    I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations
    K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
    L. Judicial Review
VI. Statutory Authority

II. Background for Final Rulemaking

    On August 19, 2015, the EPA proposed revisions to the Regional 
Consistency regulations. The preamble to the proposal provided a 
history of the Regional Consistency regulations, as well as a 
discussion of a recent D.C. Circuit Court decision, National 
Environmental Development Association's Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 
F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014), that led to the EPA's proposed revisions to 
alter the agency's internal process to address court decisions having 
local or regional applicability. See 80 FR 50252-54, August 19, 2015. 
This discussion addressed the basis for the proposed changes and our 
rationale for why we believe the revisions are necessary. This final 
rulemaking notice does not repeat that discussion, but refers 
interested readers to the preamble of the proposed rule for this 
background.
    The 60-day public comment period for the proposed rule was extended 
15 days in response to commenters' requests and closed on November 3, 
2015. In Section III of this document, we briefly summarize the 
revisions and summarize and respond to significant comments.

[[Page 51103]]

III. Final Revisions to the Regional Consistency Regulations and 
Response to Significant Comments

A. What are the final revisions to the 40 CFR part 56 Regional 
Consistency regulations?

    In this action, we are making three specific revisions to the 
general consistency policy reflected in the Regional Consistency 
regulations, 40 CFR part 56, to accommodate the implications of 
judicial decisions addressing locally or regionally applicable actions. 
First, we are revising 40 CFR 56.3 to add a provision to acknowledge an 
exception to the ``policy'' of uniformity to provide that a decision of 
a federal court adverse to the EPA that arises from a challenge to 
locally or regionally applicable actions will not automatically apply 
uniformly nationwide. This ensures that only decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit Court that arise from challenges to ``nationally 
applicable regulations . . . or final action'' will apply uniformly to 
the challenged regulations or action nationwide in all instances.\1\ 
Second, we are revising 40 CFR 56.4 to add a provision to clarify that 
the EPA Headquarters offices' employees will not need to issue 
mechanisms or revise existing mechanisms developed under 40 CFR 56.4(a) 
to address federal court decisions adverse to the EPA arising from 
challenges to ``locally or regionally applicable'' actions. Lastly, we 
are revising 40 CFR 56.5(b) to clarify that EPA Regional offices' 
employees will not need to seek Headquarters office concurrence to 
diverge from national policy or interpretation if such action is 
required by a federal court decision adverse to the EPA arising from 
challenges to locally or regionally applicable actions.\2\
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    \1\ While a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit in cases involving ``nationally applicable'' action 
applies nationwide as a general proposition, the EPA notes that in 
particular cases there may be questions as to the precise contours 
of the decision that applies nationwide. For example, there may be 
questions as to the effect of dicta or other subsidiary analysis in 
the court's decision, or (typically in non-rulemaking contexts) 
questions arising out of the limited nature of the agency action 
under review itself. The EPA believes that specific questions such 
as these are best addressed on a case-by-case basis, and are not 
intended to be addressed in this action.
    \2\ As discussed in Section III.B of this preamble, we are 
revising in this final rule the proposed revisions to 40 CFR 56.5(b) 
in response to public comment.
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B. What is the basis for the EPA's approach?

    In the proposed rule, we explain in detail why the revisions are 
reasonable and consistent with general principles of common law and the 
CAA. See 80 FR 50254. We summarize those discussions in Sections 
III.B.1 through 6 of this document.
1. The Revisions Are Consistent With General Principles of Common Law
a. Summary of the EPA's Position
    As explained more fully in the proposed rule, federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction and only have the authority to hear and 
decide cases granted to them by Congress. A court of appeals generally 
hears appeals from the district courts located within its circuit, and 
the circuit is delineated by the states it contains. As a general 
matter, while an opinion from one circuit court of appeals may be 
persuasive precedent, it is not binding on other courts of appeals. See 
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2001).
    By revising the regulations in part 56 to fully accommodate 
intercircuit nonaquiescence, the EPA is acting consistently with the 
purpose of the federal judicial system by allowing the robust 
percolation of case law through the circuit courts until such time as 
U.S. Supreme Court review is appropriate.\3\ As the U.S. Supreme Court 
has noted, preventing the government from addressing an issue in more 
than one forum ``would substantially thwart the development of 
important questions of law by freezing the first final decision 
rendered on a particular legal issue.'' United States v. Mendoza, 464 
U.S. 154, 160 (1984). In light of this important function, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has sought to preserve government discretion to 
relitigate an issue across different circuits. Id. at 163. Thus, though 
circuit conflict may undermine national uniformity of federal law to 
some degree for some period of time, it also advances the quality of 
decisions interpreting the law over time. See generally Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 446 (7th Cir. 1994) (J. 
Easterbrook, concurring) (agencies and courts balance whether ``it is 
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled'' or ``that 
it be settled right'') (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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    \3\ As discussed in the proposed rule preamble, the revisions 
apply to decisions of the district courts as well as circuit courts. 
80 FR 50258. The jurisdiction of district courts is even more 
limited than that of circuit courts.
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b. Response to Comments
(1) Summary of Comments
    Various commenters stated that intercircuit nonaquiescence is 
inappropriate or bad policy. One commenter stated that the EPA's 
preference for pursuing intercircuit nonacquiescence to promote 
judicial resolution is not the appropriate approach. The commenter said 
that the current Regional Consistency regulations allow for judicial 
appeals, but also ensure uniformity pending the resolution of 
conflicting court opinions. The commenter also noted that it is 
uncertain whether ultimate resolution of circuit splits will ever occur 
under the proposed revisions. The commenters cited to the EPA's 
reference to the U.S. Supreme Court's review of EDF v. Duke, 549 U.S. 
561, 581 (2007) as evidence that the EPA can do what the D.C. Circuit 
advised in NEDACAP, which is to request review of an adverse decision 
and put regulated entities on notice that the EPA disagreed with the 
lower court's decision.
    A couple of commenters noted that some courts, as well as law 
review articles and legal commentary, have taken an unfavorable view of 
the doctrine of intercircuit nonacquiescence. The commenters state that 
the EPA failed to account for the criticisms in its proposal notice. 
They also took the position that the doctrine is particularly ill-
suited for the CAA and its myriad of regulations.
    Another commenter stated that the EPA's proposal to follow 
intercircuit nonacquiescence is an attempt to refuse to adjust policies 
in the face of clear, adverse judicial decisions. The commenter 
suggested that if the EPA disagrees with a court over a matter of 
enormous import, then the issue should either be elevated to the U.S. 
Supreme Court or addressed in rulemaking reviewable by the D.C. 
Circuit.
    One commenter argued that intercircuit nonacquiescence is not the 
only path to judicial resolution. Rather, following an adverse decision 
the EPA could apply a policy change nationwide and allow the various 
circuits courts to review that new interpretation, while maintaining 
consistency in the meantime.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA disagrees with the commenters; the approach advocated by 
these commenters would grant every court unlimited nationwide 
jurisdiction. Rather than being merely persuasive, a decision in one 
circuit thus would become binding precedent in other circuits; such a 
result is inconsistent

[[Page 51104]]

with the court system established by Congress and years of case law. 
Robust review by a variety of courts, to allow for percolation of an 
issue before it reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, leads to a more 
thorough analysis of an issue.
    In response to those commenters who claim the EPA failed to account 
for arguments against intercircuit nonacquiescence, the EPA disagrees. 
The fact that the EPA reaches a different conclusion regarding the 
benefits of intercircuit nonacquiescence does not mean that the EPA has 
failed to consider all sides of the argument. Moreover, as explained 
more fully in Section III.B.2 of this document, the EPA's position 
recognizes the unique aspects of CAA Sec.  307(b) and its specific 
placement of review of nationally applicable regulations and policies 
in the D.C. Circuit.
    The EPA has reviewed the case law and law review articles cited by 
the commenters and notes that some of the commenters appear to confuse 
the concept of intracircuit nonacquiescence, which involves an agency 
not following a court decision even within the circuit which issued the 
decision, and intercircuit nonacquiescence, which involves an agency 
following a court decision in the circuit that issued the decision, but 
not in other circuits. Some of the cases and law review articles cited 
by commenters in support of their arguments against intercircuit 
nonacquiescence involved intracircuit nonacquiescence. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Board, 969 F.2d 1082, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1029 (1993) (involving the intracircuit 
nonacquiescence of the Retirement Board); Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 
1432, 1434 (9th 1983) (involving intracircuit nonacquiescence of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Resources); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. 
Supp. 463 (NE. Ohio 1984) (involving the Secretary of Health and Human 
Resources failure to follow Sixth Circuit precedent); Diller & 
Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of 
Law, 881 Yale L.J. 801 (1990) (analyzing intracircuit nonacquiescence); 
Coen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 
Minn. L. Rev. 1339 (1991) (same).\4\ Upon close reading, many of the 
materials cited by commenters support the EPA's revisions. For example, 
the D.C. Circuit stated that:
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    \4\ Most of the majority or concurring opinions cited by 
commenters in support of their argument against intercircuit 
nonacquiescence were written before the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Mendoza in 1984 and thus did not benefit from the Court's reasoning 
in that case. See, e.g., in May Dep't Stores Co. v. Williamson, 549 
F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1977) (concurring opinion cited); Goodman's 
Furniture Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 561 F.2d 462 (3rd Cir. 
1977) (concurring opinion cited). At least one of the cases cited 
does not appear to involve nonacquiescence whatsoever. Finnegan v. 
Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).

[o]rdinarily, of course, the arguments against intercircuit 
nonacquiescence (which occurs when an agency refuses to apply the 
decision of one circuit to claims that will be reviewed by another 
circuit) are much less compelling than the arguments against 
intracircuit nonacquiescence. Although the decision of one circuit 
deserves respect, we have recognized that ``it need not be taken by 
the Board as the law of the land.'' Givens v. United States R.R. 
Retirement Bd., 720 F.2d 196, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1983). When the Board's 
position is rejected in one circuit, after all, it should have a 
reasonable opportunity to persuade other circuits to reach a 
contrary conclusion. And there is an additional value to letting 
important legal issues ``percolate'' throughout the judicial system, 
so the Supreme Court can have the benefit of different circuit court 
opinions on the same subject. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 
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464 U.S. 154, 160, 78 L. Ed. 2d 379, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).

Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1093. And two legal scholars cited by commenters 
recognize that:

[t]he judicial branch is structured to ensure uniformity and 
stability of legal standards within each regional circuit while 
permitting disuniformity among the circuits . . . . As long as 
parties can discern which circuit law applies to any given conduct, 
the parties can shape their action to conform to legal standards. 
Furthermore, permitting circuits to independently examine issues 
contributes to resolution of important legal questions on a national 
basis. Accordingly, each circuit remains completely free to accept 
or reject the reasoning of other courts of appeals. This mixture of 
uniformity and diversity strikes a balance that permits legal issues 
to receive independent examination by a number of courts, while at 
the same time maintaining a unitary rule of law in any given 
geographic location.

Diller & Morawetz, infra, 881 Yale L.J. at 805 (citations omitted). See 
also, Coen, infra, 775 Minn. L. Rev. at fn. 23 (``The legality of 
intercircuit nonacquiescence is widely accepted.''). Notably, these 
revisions accommodate intercircuit nonacquiescence while rejecting 
intracircuit nonacquiescence by providing that an EPA Regional office 
impacted by an adverse court decision should follow that decision, even 
if that results in an EPA Regional office acting contrary to otherwise 
applicable national policy.

    While some commenters stated that intercircuit nonacquiescence is 
particularly ill-fitted to the CAA because of its myriad of 
regulations, the EPA concludes that it is the vast array of regulations 
which makes these revisions appropriate. A facility may already have to 
track compliance with a variety of CAA regulations, and the revisions 
allow that facility to presume that the national interpretation or 
policy applicable to those regulations will continue to apply to it, 
unless a court with jurisdiction over the facility issues a court 
decision or the EPA undertakes appropriate procedures to change that 
national interpretation or policy. It arguably would be more burdensome 
on regulated entities to track not only the national interpretation of 
all the regulations and policies that apply to their facilities, but 
also all the court decisions across the country regarding those 
regulations or policies. These revisions to the Regional Consistency 
rule are intended to provide, as much as possible, a stable policy 
environment for facilities.
    The approach suggested by one commenter that the EPA could provide 
uniformity by applying an adverse court decision nationally, without 
otherwise changing the underlying national policy or interpretation, is 
not feasible when different circuits issue different interpretations. 
When circuit splits occur, the EPA would have to apply different 
interpretations in the conflicting circuits; the only question is which 
interpretation applies in those circuits that had not ruled on the 
issue. The final revisions to the Regional Consistency regulations 
answer this question by establishing the presumption that the EPA will 
continue to apply the national policy nationwide, except for those 
geographic areas impacted by the adverse decision. However, the 
approaches set forth by commenters fail to address the situation when a 
second court addresses an issue already ruled on by another court, and 
issues a conflicting decision. The EPA's final revisions account for 
this possibility by maintaining national policies nationwide, except in 
those limited geographic areas covered by adverse court decisions. A 
particular advantage of these revisions is that they can be implemented 
in a predictable and straightforward manner regardless of the number of 
lower court decisions or the potential conflicts among those decisions.
    To the extent commenters are concerned that circuit splits would 
never be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, this possibility is not 
caused by, or unique to, the revised Regional Consistency regulations. 
First, as noted in the proposed rule, the U.S. Supreme Court is more 
likely to grant review if such a split between two or more circuits 
occurs. 80 FR 50255. Second,

[[Page 51105]]

when the EPA successfully maintains its position before a court, the 
entity challenging that position may seek further review. Finally, the 
public will still have the option to file a petition with the EPA 
requesting a change in the nationally applicable regulations or policy 
in the event that EPA declines to change national policy in response to 
an adverse ruling in a lower court. Assuming statutory timing and other 
jurisdictional prerequisites are met, the EPA's final response to that 
petition may be challenged in the D.C. Circuit, which is, under the 
CAA, the appropriate venue for obtaining a nationally applicable court 
decision on the national policy. See, e.g., Oljato Chapter of Navajo 
Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
    We disagree with the commenter who stated that the revisions are an 
attempt by the EPA to ignore adverse decisions.\5\ Quite the contrary, 
the final revisions clearly establish a mechanism whereby the EPA 
Regions located in the geographic area(s) covered by an adverse 
decision may and should begin following that decision in those 
geographic areas immediately, without having to seek concurrence from 
Headquarters. The revisions also recognize that the EPA may, as 
appropriate, change national policy in response to an adverse decision. 
But until the EPA undertakes the appropriate process to effectuate that 
change, national policy continues to apply elsewhere nationwide.
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    \5\ The Duke case is more complicated than the commenters 
acknowledge, and is not a clean example of how the EPA can merely 
seek U.S. Supreme Court review of an adverse decision. In fact, the 
EPA did not ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Duke. Rather, the EPA objected to the petition 
for certiorari submitted by environmental petitioners, on the 
grounds that the petitioners had not identified either a square 
circuit court split, or a sufficient reason for U.S. Supreme Court 
review. See Brief of the United States in Opposition (05-548). Only 
once the U.S. Supreme Court granted review, did the EPA successfully 
argue to the Court that the Fourth Circuit's decision was in error.
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2. The Revisions Are Consistent With the CAA Judicial Review Provisions
a. Summary of the EPA's Position
    Revisions ensure that the Regional Consistency regulations are in 
harmony with the CAA's judicial review provisions at section 307(b). 
The ability of the various courts of appeals to hear appeals of 
decisions of the EPA is specifically addressed in the statute. In 1977, 
at the same time it added the directive for the EPA to promulgate what 
would ultimately become the Regional Consistency regulations, Congress 
amended the Act to ensure that the D.C. Circuit Court, and no other 
circuit courts, would review nationally applicable regulations. By 
placing review of nationally applicable decisions in the D.C. Circuit 
Court alone, Congress struck the balance between the countervailing 
values of improved development of the law on the one hand and national 
uniformity on the other. At the same time, Congress left the door open 
to intercircuit conflicts by granting jurisdiction over locally or 
regionally applicable final actions to the regionally-based courts of 
appeal. These revisions maintain the balance that Congress struck in 
CAA section 307(b)(1). There is nothing in the language or intent of 
CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) that trumps the clear statutory directive of CAA 
Sec.  307(b)(1) establishing which courts have jurisdiction over which 
final agency actions.
b. Response to Comments
(1) Summary of Comments
    A few commenters suggested that if the EPA is concerned about local 
court decisions impacting national policy, the EPA should have those 
cases transferred to the D.C. Circuit for decision. The commenters 
stated that CAA Sec.  307(b)(1) requires final actions ``of nationwide 
scope or effect'' be heard by the D.C. Circuit. The commenters 
contended that this provision, in combination with the existing 
Regional Consistency regulations, is enough to ensure fairness and 
uniformity in the application of policies nationwide.
    One commenter stated that intercircuit nonacquiescence is in 
conflict with CAA Sec.  307(b)(1), through which Congress tried to 
prevent the very intercircuit conflicts that the proposed revisions 
will allow. The commenter noted that if locally and regionally 
applicable actions with nationwide scope and effect are properly heard 
by the D.C. Circuit, there should be relatively few situations where a 
circuit court addresses an issue that can create inconsistency in the 
interpretation or implementation of CAA requirements. Another commenter 
contended that CAA Sec.  307(b) does not stand for the proposition that 
the EPA can ignore decisions of non-D.C. Circuit courts simply because 
they arose in the context of a permitting decision. In fact, they 
maintain, CAA Sec.  301 stands for the opposite proposition.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA agrees that CAA Sec.  307(b)(1) requires final actions ``of 
nationwide scope or effect'' be heard by the D.C. Circuit. This may 
include regional rulemaking that the EPA has identified and designated 
as having national scope and effect. However, when the EPA is applying 
regulations of nationwide scope to a particular circumstance, another 
appropriate circuit court should hear that decision of local or 
regional impact.
    We agree with commenters that if the D.C. Circuit were the only 
court to rule on the reasonableness of the EPA's interpretation of its 
national regulations, there would be very little need for intercircuit 
nonacquiescence because the only action being reviewed by the court 
would be the EPA's application of that interpretation to the facts of 
the case. However, sometimes a court other than the D.C. Circuit (or 
U.S. Supreme Court) renders an adverse decision that rejects the EPA's 
interpretation of nationally applicable regulations in a manner that 
could be argued to have general rather than merely case-specific 
implications. This can happen, for example, where the court does not 
merely find that the facts do not support the EPA's application of 
national policy, but instead finds fault with the national policy 
itself. The Sixth Circuit decision in Summit Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. 
EPA, 690 F3d 733 (6th Cir. 2012) is the quintessential example of a 
final action of local or regional application; in the context of 
reviewing that local action, the Sixth Circuit rejected the EPA's 
longstanding interpretation of the applicable national regulations. 
Revisions to the Regional Consistency regulations will minimize, not 
exacerbate, the disruption to the smooth implementation of the CAA 
caused by locally or regionally applicable circuit court decisions by 
limiting their applicability to those areas covered by the circuit 
court, and leaving national policy in place in the rest of the country. 
Parties that agree with the decision of the regional circuit and 
believe it should be followed nationally are, of course, free to 
advocate that position to the EPA (and, if necessary, reviewing courts) 
in specific cases arising in other circuits. Revisions merely make 
clear that EPA will not automatically be bound to follow locally or 
regionally applicable circuit court decisions in cases arising in other 
circuits.
    It would be contrary to the division of responsibility among the 
circuit courts that Congress established in CAA Sec.  307(b) for the 
EPA to eliminate their review by moving any case that could potentially 
affect national policy to the D.C. Circuit. Such an approach also would 
disrupt the timeline for review created by the CAA. Challenges to 
nationally applicable regulations must

[[Page 51106]]

be filed within 60 days of the regulations being published in the 
Federal Register. Treating any challenge to each and every application 
of those regulations as challenges to the underlying regulations that 
must be heard by the D.C. Circuit would either render those challenges 
untimely (to the extent they occur outside the 60-day window) and thus 
require their dismissal, or render the 60-day window superfluous by 
allowing challenges to the regulations any time they are applied. See, 
e.g., Sierra Club de Puerto Rico, et al. v. EPA, 815 F.3d 22 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (dismissing a challenge to a 1980 regulation as untimely because 
the purported after-arising ground involved the mere application of 
that old regulation). Neither result is consistent with the judicial 
review provisions established in CAA Sec.  307(d). In fact, given the 
clear language of Sec.  307(b), it is not clear whether a court would 
transfer a challenge to a decision of local or regional nature to the 
D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Dalton Trucking, Inc. v. United States EPA, 
808 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that the D.C. Circuit was not 
the proper court to hear a challenge to a preemption waiver for 
California because the waiver decision did not have national 
applicability, nor did the EPA make or publish a finding that the 
decision was based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect). 
Finally, sometimes adverse decisions arise in the context of 
enforcement cases, which must be heard in particular district courts, 
and then any appeal must be heard by the circuit court with 
jurisdiction over that district court. Thus, the EPA simply cannot 
ensure that all court decisions potentially involving review of 
national policy are heard in the D.C. Circuit.
    Finally, the EPA is not ignoring decisions of other circuits by 
revising the Regional Consistency regulations. Rather, these revisions 
help to ensure that we are clearly following the applicable law of the 
circuit in the geographic areas covered by the decision. But the EPA 
also is respecting the judicial review provisions of the CAA by 
limiting decisions reviewing locally or regionally applicable actions 
to those locations and regions covered by the circuit court.
3. The Revisions Are Consistent With CAA Section 301
a. Summary of the EPA's Position
    The revisions also are consistent with CAA Sec.  301. As described 
in the proposed rule, Sec.  301(a)(2) requires the EPA Administrator to 
develop regulations to ``assure fairness and uniformity'' of agency 
actions. Notably, there is nothing in the text of CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) 
or its limited legislative history that suggests Congress intended to 
either upset the balance Congress struck when establishing judicial 
review provisions in CAA Sec.  307, or disrupt the general principles 
of common law that have allowed for the percolation of issues up 
through the various circuit courts, as discussed previously. Section 
301(a)(2) of the Act does not specifically address how the agency 
should respond to adverse court decisions.
    In addition, the text of CAA Sec.  301(a)(2)(A) necessitates a 
balance between uniformity and fairness; however, promoting either one 
of these attributes does not always guarantee maximizing the other 
attribute in all circumstances. These revisions would ensure the EPA 
has the flexibility to maintain that balance, as appropriate.
b. Response to Comments
(1) Summary of Comments
    Several commenters maintained that the EPA's proposed amendments to 
the Regional Consistency regulations are inconsistent with the clear 
and unambiguous language of CAA Sec.  301(a)(2). The commenters stated 
that this provision requires the EPA to promulgate rules establishing 
``general applicable procedures and policies for Regional officers and 
employees . . . to follow'' that are designed to ``assure fairness and 
uniformity in the criteria, procedures, and policies'' applied by the 
EPA Regional offices. The commenters contended that the EPA's proposed 
rule codifies an impermissible exception to uniformity in the form of 
intercircuit nonacquiescence.
    A few commenters pointed to the legislative history associated with 
the passage of CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) and noted that Congress clearly 
intended there to be national consistency in implementing core CAA 
programs. One commenter noted that Congress's directive in CAA Sec.  
301 was particularly critical in the prevention of significant 
deterioration (PSD) and new source review (NSR) permitting programs, as 
well as other national standards (e.g., New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS) and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants).
    A few commenters also stated that even if CAA Sec.  301 were 
ambiguous, the EPA's proposed amendments to the Regional Consistency 
regulations are unreasonable. The commenters noted that the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the EPA's Summit memorandum based on the language in 
the EPA regulations, which essentially is exactly the same as the 
statutory language and mandate requiring fairness and uniformity. Thus, 
the commenters concluded, the court has already found that the 
statutory language establishes a national uniformity mandate. One 
commenter additionally noted that the fact that court decisions are not 
expressly addressed by CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) does not create ambiguity; 
the statute requires the EPA to maintain consistency.
    Two commenters noted that the D.C. Circuit has recognized the call 
for uniformity as well in Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1007 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982). One commenter stated that the EPA's reliance on Air 
Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984) in the 
proposal is misplaced because the case involved a different issue. The 
commenter maintained that the case does not support the EPA in ignoring 
the plain language of CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) to promote ``fairness and 
uniformity.'' The commenter noted that the court in Air Pollution 
Control Dist. expressed a ``strong preference to achieve an 
interpretation of the Act which is consistent among the several 
circuits.'' Id. at 1094.
    One commenter stated that the EPA's proposal is inconsistent with 
CAA Sec.  301(a)(1), which provides that the Administrator may delegate 
authority when it is ``necessary or expedient.'' The commenter stated 
that if the Administrator delegates her authority to Regional 
Administrators who make inconsistent decisions, the delegation would 
not be expedient and therefore would violate CAA Sec.  301(a)(1). The 
commenter further maintained that the EPA incorrectly stated in the 
proposal notice that the current Regional Consistency regulations that 
require regional officials to ``seek concurrence'' from Headquarters 
could result in inconsistent policies among Regional offices. Proposal 
at 50258. According to this commenter, this existing mechanism ensures 
consistency and does not condone variation between Regional offices.
    Two commenters argued that the EPA's proposal to incorporate 
intercircuit nonacquiescence into the Regional Consistency regulations 
creates ``irrationality'' in the rulemaking process. The commenters 
argue that by allowing her delegatees (e.g., Regional Administrators) 
to act in an inconsistent manner is tantamount to the Administrator 
acting inconsistently, which is impermissible.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA disagrees with the commenters who state that the revision 
to the Regional Consistency regulations

[[Page 51107]]

is inconsistent with CAA Sec.  301(a)(2). On its face, CAA Sec.  
301(a)(2) does not impose a standalone requirement to attain 
uniformity. While CAA Sec.  301(a)(2)(C) directs the EPA to create 
mechanisms for identifying and standardizing various criteria, there is 
nothing to suggest that such standardization requires exact duplication 
by all EPA Regions in all circumstances, including Regional office 
responses to court decisions.
    As noted earlier, CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) does not specifically discuss 
whether the fairness and uniformity objectives must be applied to all 
court decisions. Instead, the provision requires the EPA to establish 
procedures that apply to its Regional office officials and employees, 
but it does not address whether or how the EPA should address judicial 
decisions in those procedures. Congress also did not include language 
that would expressly prohibit the EPA from promulgating regulations 
that accommodate intercircuit nonacquiescence. To the extent that 
Congress prioritized judicially-created uniformity, this was expressed 
in CAA Sec.  307(b)(1)--which allows for regional divergence among 
circuit courts--not in CAA Sec.  301(a)(2)(A).
    The EPA disagrees with commenters who claim that the amendments to 
the Regional Consistency regulations violate CAA Sec.  301(a)(1). This 
provision provides authority to the Administrator to delegate her 
powers and duties to any EPA officer or employee as ``[s]he may deem 
necessary or expedient.'' This delegation is ``expedient'' if it is 
``suitable for achieving a particular end in a given circumstance'' or 
``characterized by concern with what is opportune.'' Expedient, 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015). Given the immense quantity and 
breadth of tasks assigned to the Administrator through the CAA and 
other statutes the EPA is charged with administering, delegation of the 
Administrator's authorities is both necessary and expedient in many 
circumstances to efficiently protect the environment and public health. 
Further, in amending the Regional Consistency regulations, the EPA is 
introducing only a narrow procedural exception to deal with federal 
court decisions adverse to EPA regarding locally or regionally 
applicable actions that may affect consistent application of national 
programs, policy, and guidance. The EPA does not agree that it is 
``irrational'' for the agency to act differently in different regional 
actions when that difference is necessitated by an adverse local or 
regional court decision, whether the action is taken by the EPA 
Regional Administrators or by the Administrator herself.
    As commenters admit, in NEDACAP, the D.C. Circuit explicitly did 
not address whether the CAA allows the EPA to adopt different standards 
in different circuits. NEDACAP at 1011. While the NEDACAP decision 
relied heavily on the general policy statements contained in 40 CFR 
56.3 of the existing regulations--which broadly endorse the fair and 
uniform application of criteria, policy, and procedures by EPA Regional 
office employees--nothing in those general statements or any other 
provisions of the regulations mandates that the EPA adopt nationwide 
the interpretation of the court that first addresses a legal matter. 
The lack of such a mandate supports the focused revisions in this 
rulemaking that are a natural extension of the agency's existing 
regulations.
    As commenters noted, the D.C. Circuit cited to CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) 
in Kennecott. 684 at 1014, fn. 18. However, this statutory provision 
was not central to the case, so the court's mention of the provision 
was dicta. The D.C. Circuit described the EPA's ability to prescribe in 
advance criteria that states must use in making a specific type of 
determination. The EPA's ability to require states to follow certain 
rules is not in question in this rulemaking. The court also stated that 
establishing criteria to implement a particular CAA program ``on an ad 
hoc incremental basis'' would not amount to ``fairness and uniformity'' 
described in CAA Sec.  301(a)(2). The EPA is not attempting to create 
ad hoc rules on how to implement programs. Rather, in taking this final 
action, the EPA is creating a clear and uniform presumptive approach 
and standard agency process to follow in light of adverse local and 
regional court decisions. This is the opposite of an ad hoc approach.
    As the EPA noted in the proposal notice, Air Pollution Control 
Dist. rejected the claim that CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) establishes a 
substantive standard that requires similar or uniform emission 
limitations for all sources. 739 F.2d 1071, 1085 (6th Cir. 1984). 
Although that case addressed a different issue than the content of this 
rulemaking, specifically whether CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) required the EPA 
to implement similar or uniform emission limitations for each source 
within a particular area, the decision does support the overall concept 
that CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) does not impose a standalone requirement to 
attain uniformity.
    Further, the EPA believes that the quote used by the petitioner in 
that case from page 1094 of the decision has been taken out of context. 
The court made a certain substantive ruling in Air Pollution Control 
District on an issue unrelated to this rulemaking. In making that 
decision, the court was seeking to keep its decision consistent with 
those of other circuit courts. A court's decision to make a holding 
consistent with other courts' prior decisions or to create a circuit 
split is outside the purview of this rulemaking and this agency. It may 
be a factor that weighs into how a court comes to a decision, but does 
not speak to how the agency should treat national policy in light of an 
adverse court decision with regional or local applicability, nor does 
it speak to the issue of whether it is appropriate for the EPA to 
create a narrow exception to the procedure established in the Regional 
Consistency regulations for adverse local and regional court decisions.
    There is nothing in the limited legislative history of CAA Sec.  
301(a)(2) that counsels against the revision the EPA is making through 
this final action. The legislative history quoted by the commenter 
discusses one particular instance of regional inconsistency that, at 
least in part, motivated Congress to implement the regional consistency 
language of CAA Sec.  301(a). This situation, which involved the use of 
different air quality models in different regions for the purpose of 
implementing the PSD permitting program, is far removed from the case 
of an adverse court decision of local or regional scope. Further, the 
legislative history surrounding passage of CAA Sec.  307(b) indicates 
that Congress intended to advance the objective of even and consistent 
national application of certain EPA regulations that are national in 
scope. At the same time, Congress left the door open to intercircuit 
conflicts by granting jurisdiction over locally or regionally 
applicable ``final actions'' to the regionally-based courts of appeals. 
The EPA has found, and commenters have pointed to, nothing in the 
legislative history to suggest that at the same time, Congress intended 
for the Regional Consistency provisions to somehow upset this careful 
balance and require the EPA to apply a locally or regionally applicable 
decision in all EPA Regions in order to maintain consistency.
    The revisions further the overall goal of consistency and clarity 
by specifically identifying the possibility of potential differing 
actions across the EPA Regions, especially where multiple courts have 
already addressed an issue in different ways, and standardizing a 
response that can be followed by all the EPA Regions, such that the EPA 
Regions

[[Page 51108]]

only have to apply local and regional decisions issued by courts in 
those geographic areas over which the court has jurisdiction.
    No commenter has explained in any detail why the NSR, NSPS or 
NESHAP programs are uniquely situated such that it would be 
inappropriate to finalize the narrow exception to the Regional 
Consistency regulations to deal with locally or regionally applicable 
federal court decisions. While some programs (such as NSR and NSPS) 
create national standards and others are administered through EPA-
approved state implementation plans (SIPs), all portions of the CAA are 
federal law and apply nationwide. The explanation for the revisions 
provided in the proposal and final rule preambles apply equally to all 
criteria, procedures, and policies, and the commenter has failed to 
provide a reasoned explanation why certain programs should be 
considered differently. The EPA also notes that it is at times 
impossible to maintain complete consistency in the face of adverse 
court decisions. By revising the regulations, the EPA accommodates the 
possibility that a split in the circuits could preclude the EPA from 
complying with both court decisions at once, as illustrated by the 
following example outlined in the proposal notice. In a case involving 
a permit issued in New York, the Second Circuit upholds the EPA's 
longstanding position and, in doing so, confirms that the EPA's 
interpretation is compelled by the Act under Step One of Chevron. As a 
result, the EPA continues to apply its longstanding interpretation, 
consistent with the Second Circuit's decision, in a permit issued in 
Alabama, an Eleventh Circuit state. In an appeal of that permit, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit holds that not only is the EPA's 
interpretation not compelled by the CAA, it is prohibited by the CAA. 
There are now two court decisions with conflicting Chevron Step One 
holdings--how could the EPA apply both of those decisions uniformly 
across the country? While the U.S. Supreme Court could review the 
issue, it might not. And even if the U.S. Supreme Court eventually 
resolved the conflict, there could be a multi-year period during which 
both decisions would remain applicable case law. See, e.g., discussion 
of Duke in Section 4.b.(2) of this document. This revision acknowledges 
and addresses those instances in which the EPA may not be able to 
comply with two, conflicting decisions at the same time.
4. The Revisions Will Foster Overall Fairness and Predictability
a. Summary of the EPA's Position
    Specifically accommodating intercircuit nonacquiescence in the 
Regional Consistency regulations also fosters fairness and 
predictability in the implementation of the CAA overall. As discussed 
earlier, the revisions ensure that national policy continues to apply 
unless there is an affirmative nationwide and deliberate change in the 
EPA's rules or policies, or an adverse court decision applies only in 
those states/areas within the jurisdiction of that court, with the 
exception of the D.C. Circuit court reviewing final agency actions of 
national applicability. Under the revised Regional Consistency 
regulations, a source subject to the CAA needs to know and follow only 
the law in the circuit where it is located, and the law of the D.C. 
Circuit Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. It would not be required to 
follow every CAA case in every court across the country to ensure 
compliance with the Act. While a source remains free to advocate for a 
change in the agency's national policy based on the results of a 
regional circuit court decision, unless and until the agency agrees to 
make such a change, the national policy will continue to apply except 
in the circuit where the adverse decision was issued.
b. Response to Comments
(1) Summary of Comments
    A few commenters stated that the EPA's proposal, if finalized, 
would harm businesses due to different regulatory requirements applying 
to different facilities based on their location. For example, industry 
argues it will face uneven application and enforcement of CAA 
requirements, and incur increased compliance costs as they try to 
address regulatory ambiguity and confusion. One commenter stated that 
the proposed revisions would not ensure ``fairness'' as required in CAA 
Sec.  301(a)(2). One commenter argued that the proposed revisions will 
have a chilling effect on new projects or improvements. One commenter 
noted that limiting the regulatory amendments to local or regional 
court decisions does not help because many of these decisions actually 
have nationwide impact.
    One commenter cautioned that finalization of the proposed 
amendments to the Regional Consistency regulations will lead to 
increased litigation over venue, since decisions by the D.C. Circuit 
will apply nationwide, while decisions of district courts and other 
circuit courts would not be required to apply nationwide. Multiple 
commenters further noted that the rule change may also lead to 
additional litigation in multiple circuits to expand the impact of a 
single regional or local court decision. The commenters believe this 
will lead to greater burdens on litigants and strains on judicial 
resources.
    One commenter stated that a lack of national uniformity would 
create confusion and implementation issues given that the geographic 
boundaries of the EPA's Regional offices do not match the boundaries of 
the federal circuit courts and that a single EPA Region may have to 
apply two different standards based on court decisions and their 
jurisdictions.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA believes in the overall importance of uniformity and 
fairness in the application of criteria, procedures, and policies 
across the various EPA regions in most instances. As the EPA explained 
when the Regional Consistency regulations were first finalized, the 
``intended effect'' of these regulations was ``to assure fair and 
consistent application of rules, regulations and policy throughout the 
country by assuring that the action of each individual EPA Regional 
office is consistent with one another and national policy'' (45 FR 
85400). These revisions merely identify a specific circumstance under 
which an EPA Regional office no longer needs to seek Headquarters 
concurrence to diverge from national policy, and confirms that national 
policy otherwise continues to apply.
    CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) focuses on promoting fairness and uniformity. 
The EPA believes that predictability is an important element of 
fairness and also a worthwhile objective to achieve in carrying out its 
mission. The changes made to the Regional Consistency regulations 
foster predictability by ensuring that, unless there is an affirmative 
nationwide and deliberate change in the EPA's rules or policies, lower 
court decisions would apply only in those areas within the jurisdiction 
of the lower court, with the exception of the D.C. Circuit Court 
reviewing final agency actions of national applicability, consistent 
with CAA Sec.  307(b)(1). The EPA may choose to initiate a change in 
national policy at any time, including in light of an adverse court 
decision, but the agency is bound to follow appropriate procedures in 
order to do so.
    If the revisions to the Regional Consistency regulations had 
already been in place at the time of the Summit

[[Page 51109]]

decision, a memorandum from EPA Headquarters like the one challenged in 
the NEDACAP decision would not have been necessary because EPA Regions, 
states, and other potentially affected entities would have had 
certainty and predictability regarding the application of such a 
judicial decision--they would have known that this type of permit-
specific, local and regional decision would only apply in the areas 
under the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit (unless and until the 
agency expressly decides to make a change to its national policy after 
consideration of the decision). Accordingly, it would have been clear 
to everyone that the EPA Regions would not be bound to apply the 
findings of the Summit decision in states outside the Sixth Circuit, 
and could continue to apply the longstanding practice that had not been 
successfully challenged in other federal circuit courts in their 
regions or decided nationally by the D.C. Circuit or U.S. Supreme 
Court.
    The EPA acknowledges that under the revisions finalized, some 
facilities may be subject to different regulatory requirements based on 
their location. Some difference in governing rules is inherent in our 
federal judiciary system where district and circuit courts are limited 
to a definitive jurisdiction. The federal judicial system was designed 
to allow numerous, and sometimes conflicting, decisions until such time 
as the U.S. Supreme Court rules on an issue. The structure of the 
federal judicial system also sometimes results in increased litigation, 
as issues are considered by multiple courts. As noted previously, this 
rule simply changes the internal procedure followed by the agency in 
light of an adverse court decision; thus, these revisions, which are 
consistent with the federal judicial system, will not singlehandedly 
lead to increased litigation. One commenter noted that following this 
rulemaking, litigants may wish to challenge the venue of litigation 
more often to try to ensure cases are heard by the D.C. Circuit so that 
judicial outcomes apply nationwide. The EPA believes it is appropriate 
for venue to be challenged if the litigation is not brought in the 
appropriate court according to CAA Sec.  307(b)(1). Under the CAA 
specifically, the drafting of CAA Sec.  307(b) indicates that Congress 
intended to leave the door open to intercircuit conflicts by granting 
jurisdiction over locally or regionally applicable ``final actions'' to 
the regionally-based courts of appeals.
    Further, sometimes court decisions reviewing a regulation or 
statute are reversed on appeal. In other cases, a court decision may 
contain a ruling that arguably calls into question a national rule in 
the context of a source-specific action, which is inconsistent with CAA 
Sec.  307(b)(1), as explained in the proposal notice. When either 
outcome occurs, intercircuit nonacquiescence allows the EPA to limit 
the impact of the court's ruling while it undertakes other actions. For 
example, as outlined in the proposal notice, in Duke, 549 U.S. 561 
(2007), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's implicit 
invalidation of the EPA's regulations in the context of an enforcement 
action. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the court of 
appeals had been too rigid in its insistence that the EPA interpret the 
term ``modification'' in its PSD regulations in the same way that the 
agency interpreted the term under the NSPS program. Id. at 572-577. 
While it is true that the U.S. Supreme Court eventually reversed the 
lower court, there was a 2-year period during which the Fourth 
Circuit's decision remained in place. Under the commenter's proposed 
approach, the EPA arguably would have been required to follow that 
later-reversed Fourth Circuit interpretation of its regulations 
nationwide during that 2-year period, even though the interpretation 
``read those PSD regulations in a way that seems to [the Supreme Court] 
too far a stretch for the language used.'' Id. at 577.
    The EPA disagrees that the amendments made to the Regional 
Consistency regulations are poor public policy. It is generally 
acceptable to apply a circuit court or District Court decision only 
within the jurisdiction of the court. A standard that specifically 
allows for intercircuit nonacquiescence for all CAA decisions other 
than those issued by the D.C. Circuit Court in response to challenges 
of nationwide actions would provide a uniform standard for the EPA's 
application of court decisions that could be anticipated by those who 
implement the regulations and the regulated community.
    The EPA acknowledges that the EPA Regional office boundaries do not 
align with the boundaries of circuit courts. However, the EPA Regional 
offices and Headquarters will endeavor to make clear the states, 
tribes, or local jurisdictions that are impacted by an adverse court 
decision. The EPA notes that, consistent with past practice, in certain 
instances the EPA Regions are already applying different policies 
across their states based on prior court decisions See, e.g., 
discussion of follow on to Sierra Club decision in Section 5.b.(2) of 
this document.
5. The Revisions Are a Reasonable Revision to the 40 CFR part 56 
Regulations and Maintain the EPA's Ability To Exercise Discretion
a. Summary of the EPA's Position
    In the proposed rule, we noted that the Regional Consistency 
regulations already allowed for some variation between the EPA Regional 
offices. Specifically, the original version of 40 CFR 56.5(b) provided 
that regional officials should ``seek concurrence'' from the EPA 
Headquarters with respect to any interpretations of the Act, rule, 
regulation, or guidance that ``may result in inconsistent application 
among the Regional offices.'' Thus, the Regional Consistency 
regulations have always contained a mechanism by which an EPA Regional 
office could diverge from national policy if doing so was required by 
an adverse court decision (i.e., by seeking Headquarters concurrence). 
The revisions simplify the process by establishing the presumption that 
national policy will continue to apply nationwide, but that an EPA 
Regional office impacted by an adverse court decision could diverge 
from that national policy without Headquarters concurrence to the 
extent required by the adverse court decision. In fact, the revisions 
further the overall goals of the existing Regional Consistency 
regulations by specifically identifying the possibility of potential 
differing actions across the EPA regions, especially where multiple 
courts have already addressed an issue in different ways, and 
standardizing a response that can be followed by all the regions, such 
that EPA regions only have to apply local and regional decisions issued 
by courts in those areas over which the court has jurisdiction.
    Nonetheless, as noted previously, the revisions do not hinder the 
EPA's ability to respond to an adverse court decision by revising a 
national policy or interpretation, following appropriate procedures, 
either on the agency's own initiative or in response to a request from 
a regulated entity or other interested party. The EPA recognizes that 
national policy can be influenced by insights and reasoning from 
judicial decisions and these revisions are not an indication that the 
agency will ignore persuasive judicial opinions issued in cases 
involving ``locally or regionally applicable'' actions. Such opinions 
may address issues of nationwide importance and could, in appropriate 
circumstances, lead the agency to adopt new national policy.

[[Page 51110]]

b. Response to Comments
(1) Summary of Comments
    Some commenters stated that there would be no predictability under 
the EPA's proposal. One commenter expressed concern that the EPA 
Regional offices not covered by an adverse decision could choose to 
follow the adverse decision versus national policy. Another commenter 
also noted that the EPA's goal of promoting predictability is 
irrelevant because CAA Sec.  301(a)(2) requires consistency, not 
predictability.
    A couple of commenters stated that the EPA's proposed revision of 
the Regional Consistency regulations goes against 35 plus years of 
implementing the existing regulations. The commenters also argued that 
it is inconsistent with the position the EPA has taken in various 
rulemakings and historic practice, citing statements by a former EPA 
General Counsel.
    Numerous commenters stated that the proposed amendments to the 
Regional Consistency regulations would allow the EPA too much 
discretion in deciding whether certain court decisions will apply on a 
national scale. They stated that there would be no guarantee that 
further judicial review would resolve conflicting decisions, citing to 
currently conflicting decisions on application of the statute of 
limitations to construction permitting as an example. Commenters 
expressed concern that this could lead to the EPA applying arbitrary 
and unspecified factors to determine when judicial decisions will be 
applied nationally. Several commenters suggested that the EPA should 
establish criteria it would use to determine when it will not change 
its national policy and when it will in the face of an adverse court 
decision. Commenters recommended that the EPA withdraw the rule, or, if 
it proceeds, provide clear criteria to identify when intercircuit 
nonacquiescence will be applied.
    One commenter recommended that the Regional Consistency regulations 
only follow intercircuit nonacquiescence (1) Until three circuit courts 
have resolved the legal issue; (2) in circumstances of significant 
importance and impact on protection of human health and the 
environment; and (3) when documented in a written memorandum or 
directive signed by the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air 
with concurrence of the General Counsel. Another commenter recommended 
that the EPA revise the Regional Consistency regulations to state that 
the agency will revisit a national policy whenever a court determines 
that it is arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful. Further, the 
commenter offered that in such circumstances the EPA should consider 
whether to issue guidance clarifying what the EPA's policy will be 
going forward and undertake a rulemaking to effectuate that agency 
policy.
    One commenter suggested that if the EPA does finalize the proposed 
amendments to the Regional Consistency regulations, the EPA should 
retain requirements ``that (1) EPA Headquarters issue or revise 
mechanisms to address federal court decisions of local or regional 
applicability, see 40 CFR 56.4, and (2) the EPA Regional offices seek 
concurrence from the EPA Headquarters to act inconsistently with 
national EPA policy or interpretation if such action is required by a 
federal court decision of local or regional applicability. See CFR 
56.5.'' The commenter indicated these mechanisms promote certainty, 
predictability, and fairness for regulated entities. Another commenter 
suggested that the EPA Regional offices should still be required to 
seek the Office of General Counsel's concurrence when they believe they 
are bound by an adverse court decision which requires them to deviate 
from national policy. A separate commenter expressed concern that the 
proposed revisions would allow a region to deviate from national policy 
without Headquarters concurrence that such deviation was required by a 
court decision.
    A couple of commenters argued that the EPA should allow notice and 
comment on agency determinations that it would depart from these final 
Regional Consistency regulations and apply certain judicial decisions 
more broadly on a case-by-case basis. One commenter recommended that 
``regional consistency determination[s]'' be published in the Federal 
Register. Another commenter stated that the EPA should define 
``fairness'' and ``uniformity'' in the regulations.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA disagrees with the commenters' characterization of this 
action. The final revisions authorize an EPA region to diverge from 
national policy only to the extent that the EPA Region must do so in 
order to act consistently with a decision issued by a federal court 
that has direct jurisdiction over the EPA Region's action. The EPA 
regions outside of that court's jurisdiction would still be required to 
follow national policy or seek Headquarters concurrence to deviate from 
that policy. This is the same procedure established under the original 
Regional Consistency regulations.
    The EPA further disagrees with commenters' statement that these 
final revisions go against the agency's past practice. Following the 
Summit decision, consistent with the Regional Consistency regulations, 
EPA Regions 4 and 5 could have sought Headquarters concurrence to 
deviate from national policy in order to follow the directive of the 
Sixth Circuit. In fact, EPA Region 4 did utilize this provision 
following the Sixth Circuit decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 
299 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2221 (March 28, 
2016), which held that the EPA was not permitted to approve a 
redesignation request without first approving reasonably available 
control measures into the state SIPs. This decision went against the 
EPA's longstanding interpretation that where an area is attaining the 
NAAQS, these measures that are designed to bring areas into attainment 
are ``inapplicable'' under CAA Sec.  107(d)(3)(E)(ii) for purposes of 
evaluating a redesignation. Following that decision, officials in EPA 
Region 4 sought and received concurrence from EPA Headquarters to 
follow the requirements of the Sierra Club decision, which are 
inconsistent with the EPA's national policy, in states falling within 
the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit. See 80 FR 56418 (September 18, 
2015).\6\ If the EPA were to adopt the commenters' position, the agency 
would have to apply the decision of the Sixth Circuit nationwide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Memorandum from Heather Toney, EPA Region 4 Administrator to 
Anna Marie Wood, Director, EPA/OAQPS/AQPD, Regional Consistency 
Concurrence Request--Redesignation Actions in Kentucky and 
Tennessee, July 20, 2015. Docket ID No. EPA-R04-OAR-2014-0031.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, the Regional Consistency regulations have never required 
absolute uniformity between the EPA Regional offices. Rather, the 
Regional Consistency regulations have always acknowledged that certain 
EPA Regions may in some instances act differently from others, and 
these final revisions simply identify and authorize differences in a 
specific limited circumstance--when necessitated by a federal court 
decision reviewing an action of local or regional applicability. 
Accordingly, the EPA does not view finalization of this rule as a 
significant shift in the practical outcomes. Rather, the EPA is 
changing the internal procedure followed by the agency in light of an 
adverse court decision.
    A couple commenters claimed that the revisions to the Regional 
Consistency regulations are inconsistent

[[Page 51111]]

with statements made by a former EPA General Counsel. These comments of 
a former EPA General Counsel were made in the context of a discussion 
of the intracircuit nonacquiescence practices of other agencies, which 
is different from intercircuit nonacquiescence as explained in Section 
III.B.1 of this document. See S. Estreicher & R. Revesz, 
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L. J. 679, 
717 (February 1989) (surveying approaches of other federal agencies 
after describing the intracircuit nonacquiescence policies of the 
Social Security Administration and National Labor Relations Board).
    The EPA considered the suggestions of several commenters to add 
regulatory text defining the parameters under which the agency would be 
required to re-evaluate its national policy following adverse court 
decisions. In response, we note that the EPA carefully reviews each 
adverse court decision. The types of factors advocated by the 
commenters (e.g., the reasoning for the adverse court decision, the 
number of adverse court decisions) generally are factors considered by 
the EPA as it develops its response to any given adverse court 
decision, including any reconsideration of the relevant national policy 
or interpretation. This case-by-case approach is best because it allows 
the EPA to consider the individual merits of each decision and the 
appropriate course of action rather than apply a rigid formula. 
Nonetheless, it would be counterproductive to codify any specific 
parameters in regulatory text that must be applied in any and all 
circumstances.
    We also are not requiring that a Regional office obtain 
Headquarters concurrence regarding whether an adverse court decision 
requires that Regional office to deviate from otherwise applicable 
national policy. A key purpose of the revisions is to establish the 
presumption that national policy remains national policy, and thus the 
Regional offices are already required to follow national policy to the 
extent allowed by an adverse court decision applicable to the Regional 
office's actions. Of course a Regional office is always free to discuss 
the scope of a court decision with Headquarters, but revisions do not 
require a Regional office seek concurrence before acting consistent 
with an adverse court decision applicable to the action being 
undertaken by the Regional office.
    Contrary to the concerns of some commenters, the final revisions 
will not allow the EPA to act arbitrarily in determining how to respond 
to an adverse court decision. Nothing in the final revisions alters the 
requirement that the EPA act in a reasonable, non-arbitrary manner at 
all times. Moreover, the final revisions already provide clear criteria 
regarding when the EPA will apply intercircuit nonacquiescence by 
establishing the presumption that national policy will not change in 
response to any given adverse decision.\7\ In other words, national 
policy will remain unchanged until such time as the agency changes it 
through the appropriate method. That presumption does not provide the 
EPA unlimited discretion, but does retain the discretion to determine 
national policy granted the EPA by Congress through the CAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Except, of course, decisions issued by the D.C. Circuit when 
reviewing rules of national applicability, or the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The public is always free to petition the EPA to change regulations 
and national policy if it believes that the agency is inappropriately 
maintaining national policy in the face of numerous adverse court 
decisions. If a party believes that the EPA's position is no longer 
viable, it may petition the agency to change that position, and the 
party may then seek to challenge the EPA's final response to that 
petition if the party believes the EPA's final response is 
unreasonable, so long as the party meets all the usual statutory and 
jurisprudential requirements for such a challenge. For rules of 
national applicability, such challenges would be, appropriately, in the 
D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Oljato, infra. Thus, the existing system 
already contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that the EPA continues 
to act in a reasonable manner, and additional regulatory text is not 
necessary.
    Thus, as noted earlier, the EPA is not adding regulatory text 
establishing specific parameters or criteria that would govern how the 
agency would act in light of adverse court decisions. Nor is the EPA 
establishing new procedures that would apply if and when the EPA does 
reconsider national policy. As always, if the EPA does revisit national 
policy, it will follow the applicable procedures. For example, if the 
agency is changing regulatory text, it will undertake the appropriate 
notice and comment process. If, however, the EPA is merely issuing an 
interpretive rule without changing the regulations themselves, then 
consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and U.S. Supreme Court 
case law, the EPA is not bound to follow a notice and comment process. 
5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 
(2015).
6. The Revisions Are Otherwise Reasonable
    The EPA received other miscellaneous comments that do not fall 
under the previous discussions, which are responded to in Sections 6.a 
and b.
a. Response to Comments That the EPA Was Under No Obligation To 
Promulgate Revisions to the Regional Consistency Regulations in 
Response to NEDACAP
(1) Summary of Comments
    Several commenters stated that the EPA should withdraw the proposal 
and leave the Regional Consistency regulations in place as currently 
written. A couple of commenters noted that the proposed amendments to 
the Regional Consistency regulations are not necessary because the EPA 
is under no obligation to undertake the rulemaking action. Commenters 
stated that while the EPA purported in the proposal notice to undertake 
the rulemaking in response to the NEDACAP decision, that court did not 
in any way require the EPA to undertake this rulemaking. In fact, the 
court applied the regulations when vacating the EPA's Summit 
memorandum.
    Several commenters stated that the court's suggestion in NEDACAP 
that the EPA could amend the Regional Consistency regulations is not 
equivalent to that court's endorsement of such an approach under CAA 
Sec.  301(a)(2). The commenters note that the D.C. Circuit expressly 
did not rule on ``whether the [Clean Air Act] allows the EPA to adopt 
different standards in different circuits'' in the NEDACAP opinion. 752 
F.3d at 1011. Further, one commenter detailed that in NEDACAP, the D.C. 
Circuit held that the ``fair and uniform'' language of the existing 
Regional Consistency regulations, which is parallel to the language in 
CAA Sec.  301(a)(2), establishes a national regulatory uniformity 
requirement.
    One commenter noted that the EPA has other ways to respond to the 
court's decision in NEDACAP. In an example, the commenter cited the 
EPA's response to conflicting decisions regarding the benzene NESHAP 
and ``federal enforceability.'' The commenters also stated that if the 
EPA stopped ``continuously seeking to expand the reach of its 
regulations through such guidance'' the agency could avoid adverse 
decisions like that in the Sixth Circuit regarding the Summit 
permitting decision.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA has not taken the position that it is required by the D.C. 
Circuit's

[[Page 51112]]

opinion in NEDCAP to undertake revisions to the Regional Consistency 
regulations. We agree that the EPA has discretion in deciding whether 
or not to undertake the revisions being finalized. The EPA also 
recognizes that the court's suggestion that the EPA could revise the 
Regional Consistency regulations is not necessarily a judicial 
endorsement of the specific revisions being finalized, although it is 
unlikely that the court would make such a suggestion if any changes to 
the regulations to address intercircuit nonacquiescence would be in 
conflict with the statute.
    Contrary to statements made by commenters, the EPA does not 
``continuously seek[ ] to expand the reach of its regulations through [ 
] guidance.'' Rather, the EPA issues guidance in an effort to better 
inform the regulated community and the public regarding the 
requirements of CAA regulations.
    For the reasons set forth here and in the proposed rule, these 
revisions to the Regional Consistency regulations are an effective way 
to address the implications of adverse court decisions rendered by 
courts reviewing actions of local or regional applicability. While the 
EPA does have other options available to it, the EPA has determined 
that these revisions to the Regional Consistency regulations most 
effectively address the issue presented by an adverse court decision 
involving an action or local or regional applicability.\8\ The 
revisions also accommodate the EPA's proper and longstanding 
application of the doctrine of intercircuit nonacquiescence in future 
cases, while eliminating the need to undertake lengthy, narrowly 
focused rulemakings or seek review of all lower courts' adverse 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ With respect to the comments referencing the EPA's past 
practice with issuing guidance following conflicting court 
decisions, the examples cited are inapposite. The comment refers to 
the EPA's response to court decisions regarding application of the 
benzene NESHAP, citing U.S. v. Hoescht Celanese Corp., 128 F3d. 216, 
224 (4th Cir. 1997). However this case does not discuss this topic; 
it merely involves one court's opinion on whether a company had fair 
notice of the EPA's interpretation of a regulation. In addition, the 
cited guidance regarding ``federal enforceability'' was not issued 
to reconcile inconsistent circuit court decisions regarding the same 
term. First, the guidance was originally issued before any adverse 
decisions from the D.C. Circuit. Second, the policy laid out in the 
guidance was extended in response to D.C. Circuit decisions 
consistently interpreting the term ``federal enforceability''; first 
decision was cited as the basis for the second and third opinions. 
The only ``inconsistency'' in the decisions was whether the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the underlying rule pending remand or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Response to Miscellaneous Comments
(1) Summary of Miscellaneous Comments
    One commenter contended that the EPA failed to acknowledge the 
difference between an EPA action involving interpretation of a national 
regulation applied to a particular facility and an EPA action 
addressing a SIP provision. In the context of SIP provisions, the 
commenter stated that, ``to the extent not prohibited by the CAA, the 
EPA should (and must) allow inconsistencies in particular SIP 
provisions as between states.''
    Another commenter supported the EPA's proposed addition to CAA 
Sec.  56.5(b) insofar as it will ensure that the EPA Regional offices 
not subject to a court decision will continue to act consistently with 
existing national policy. However, the commenter believes that the 
proposed revision to CAA Sec.  56.5(b) does not clearly accomplish 
this. The commenter contended that the existing and proposed regulatory 
text should be harmonized to make clear that, after an adverse court 
decision issued by a court reviewing a locally or regionally applicable 
action, continued application of national policy by the EPA Regional 
offices that are not subject to that court's jurisdiction does not 
require concurrence from EPA Headquarters, notwithstanding any 
inconsistency with the actions taken by the EPA Region(s) bound by the 
court's decision.
(2) EPA Response
    The EPA agrees with the commenter that states are accorded great 
discretion under CAA Sec.  110 in determining how to meet CAA 
requirements in SIPs. However, states are obligated to develop SIP 
provisions that meet fundamental CAA requirements. The EPA has the 
responsibility to review SIP provisions developed by states to ensure 
that they in fact meet fundamental CAA requirements. The Regional 
Consistency regulations generally establish certain mechanisms with the 
goal of ``identifying, preventing, and resolving regional 
inconsistencies'' (45 FR 85400). For the EPA Headquarters office 
employees, the regulations do this by targeting particular aspects of 
the Act that have the potential to present consistency problems--
including any rule or regulation proposed or promulgated which sets 
forth requirements for the preparation, adoption, and submittal of 
state implementation plans.
    We concur with the comment that the EPA Regional offices not 
covered by an adverse court decision should continue to follow existing 
national policy. We looked at the proposed revisions to 40 CFR 56.5(b), 
as well as the revised language provided by the commenters. We agree 
that the revision to 40 CFR 56.5(b) suggested by the commenter more 
clearly expresses that the exception to seeking Headquarters 
concurrence applies only to the EPA regions that must diverge from 
agency policy due to an adverse court decision with jurisdiction over 
the EPA region's actions. We have thus changed the regulatory text 
accordingly.

IV. Environmental Justice Considerations

    This action finalizes a rule revision that provides procedural 
direction to the EPA Regions and Headquarters offices in implementing 
court decisions of a limited scope (i.e., those having local or 
regional applicability). The EPA did not conduct an environmental 
analysis for this rule because this rule will not directly affect the 
air emissions of particular sources. Because this rule will not 
directly affect the air emissions of particular sources, it does not 
affect the level of protection provided to human health or the 
environment. Therefore, this action will not have potential 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects on minority, low-income or indigenous populations.

V. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and Executive 
Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review

    This action is not a significant regulatory action and was 
therefore not submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
for review.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    This action does not impose any new information collection burden. 
The final rule will not create any new requirements for regulated 
entities, but rather provides procedural direction to the EPA Regions 
and Headquarters offices in implementing national programs potentially 
affected by adverse court decisions of a limited scope (i.e., those 
having local or regional applicability).

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

    I certify that this action will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the RFA. In 
making this determination, the impact of concern is any significant 
adverse economic impact on small entities. An agency may

[[Page 51113]]

certify that a rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities if a rule relieves regulatory 
burden, has no net burden or otherwise has a positive economic effect 
on the small entities subject to the rule. This final rule will not 
impose any requirements directly on small entities. The EPA and any 
state/local governments implementing delegated EPA programs are the 
only entities affected directly by this final rule. Other types of 
small entities are also not directly subject to the requirements of 
this rule.

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)

    This action does not contain any unfunded mandate of $100 million 
or more as described in UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not 
significantly or uniquely affect small governments. The action imposes 
no enforceable duty on any state, local or tribal governments or the 
private sector.

E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have 
substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between 
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government. This final 
rule revises regulations that apply to the EPA, and any delegated 
state/local governments, only, and would not, therefore, affect the 
relationship between the national government and the states or the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government.

F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    This action does not have tribal implications, as specified in 
Executive Order 13175. It will not have substantial direct effects on 
tribal governments, on the relationship between the federal government 
and Indian tribes or on the distribution of power and responsibilities 
between the federal government and Indian tribes, as specified in 
Executive Order 13175. This final rule only provides procedural 
direction to EPA Regions and Headquarters offices in implementing court 
decisions of a limited scope (i.e., those having local or regional 
applicability). Thus, Executive Order 13175 does not apply to this 
action.

G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental 
Health Risks and Safety Risks

    The EPA interprets Executive Order 13045 as applying only to those 
regulatory actions that concern environmental health or safety risks 
that the EPA has reason to believe may disproportionately affect 
children, per the definition of ``covered regulatory action'' in 
section 2-202 of the Executive Order. This action is not subject to 
Executive Order 13045 because it does not directly involve an 
environmental health risk or safety risk.

H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

    This action is not subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, 
May 22, 2001), because it is not a significant regulatory action under 
Executive Order 12866.

I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    This action does not involve technical standards.

J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations

    The EPA believes that this action does not have disproportionately 
high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority 
populations, low-income and/or indigenous peoples, as specified in 
Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).
    The documentation for this decision is contained in Section IV of 
this document titled, ``Environmental Justice Considerations.''

K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

    This action is subject to the CRA, and the EPA will submit a rule 
report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of 
the United States. This action is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 
U.S.C. 804(2).

L. Judicial Review

    Under CAA Sec.  307(b)(1), petitions for judicial review of any 
nationally applicable regulation, or any action the Administrator 
``finds and publishes'' as based on a determination of nationwide scope 
or effect must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit within 60 days of the date the 
promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register. This 
action is nationally applicable, as it revises the rules governing 
procedures regarding regional consistency in 40 CFR part 56. As a 
result, petitions for review of this final action must be filed in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by 
October 3, 2016. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the 
Administrator of this final action does not affect the finality of this 
action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time 
within which a petition for judicial review must be filed, and shall 
not postpone the effectiveness of this action.

VI. Statutory Authority

    The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 301 
of the CAA as amended (42 U.S.C. 7601).

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 56

    Environmental protection, Air pollution control.

    Dated: July 21, 2016.
Gina McCarthy,
Administrator.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, title 40, chapter I, part 
56 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 56--REGIONAL CONSISTENCY

0
1. The authority citation for part 56 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Sec. 301(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act as amended (42 
U.S.C. 7401).

0
2. Section 56.3 is amended by adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec.  56.3  Policy.

* * * * *
    (d) Recognize that only the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and 
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Court that 
arise from challenges to ``nationally applicable regulations . . . or 
final action,'' as discussed in Clean Air Act section 307(b) (42 U.S.C. 
7607(b)), shall apply uniformly, and to provide for exceptions to the 
general policy stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section with 
regard to decisions of the federal courts that arise from challenges to 
``locally or regionally applicable'' actions, as provided in Clean Air 
Act section 307(b) (42 U.S.C. 7607(b)).
* * * * *

0
3. Section 56.4 is amended by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:

Sec.  56.4  Mechanisms for fairness and uniformity--Responsibilities of 
Headquarters employees.

* * * * *
    (c) The Administrator shall not be required to issue new mechanisms 
or revise existing mechanisms developed

[[Page 51114]]

under paragraphs (a) of this section to address the inconsistent 
application of any rule, regulation, or policy that may arise in 
response to the limited jurisdiction of either a federal circuit court 
decision arising from challenges to ``locally or regionally 
applicable'' actions, as provided in Clean Air Act section 307(b) (42 
U.S.C. 7607(b)), or a federal district court decision.
* * * * *

0
4. Section 56.5 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  56.5  Mechanisms for fairness and uniformity--Responsibilities of 
Regional Office employees.

* * * * *
    (b) A responsible official in a Regional office shall seek 
concurrence from the appropriate EPA Headquarters office on any 
interpretation of the Act, or rule, regulation, or program directive 
when such interpretation may result in application of the act or rule, 
regulation, or program directive that is inconsistent with Agency 
policy. However, the responsible official in a Regional office will not 
be required to seek such concurrence from the appropriate EPA 
Headquarters office for actions that may result in inconsistent 
application if such inconsistent application is required in order to 
act in accordance with a federal court decision:
    (1) Issued by a Circuit Court in challenges to ``locally or 
regionally applicable'' actions, as provided in Clean Air Act section 
307(b) (42 U.S.C. 7607(b)), if that circuit court has direct 
jurisdiction over the geographic areas that the Regional office 
official is addressing, or (2) Issued by a district court in a specific 
case if the party the Regional office official is addressing was also a 
party in the case that resulted in the decision.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2016-17899 Filed 8-2-16; 8:45 a.m.]
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