Document ID: SEC-2017-0713-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: The Options Clearing Corp.
Posted Date: 2017-05-03T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 84 (Wednesday, May 3, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20645-20648]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-08892]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-80537; File No. SR-OCC-2017-802]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of No Objection To Advance Notice Filing Concerning the Options 
Clearing Corporation's Enhancements to OCC's Stock Loan Programs

April 27, 2017.
    The Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') filed on February 28, 
2017 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') 
advance notice SR-OCC-2017-802 (``Advance Notice'') pursuant to Section 
806(e)(1) of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 
2010 (``Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act'') \1\ and 
Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 \2\ 
(``Exchange Act'') to propose a number of enhancements to its Stock 
Loan/Hedge Program (``Hedge Program'') and Market Loan Program 
(collectively, the ``Stock Loan Programs''). The proposed changes would 
supplement OCC's risk management framework for the Stock Loan Programs 
to provide greater certainty concerning each participant's stock loan 
exposures and to mitigate risks that may arise in the event of a 
clearing member suspension. The Advance Notice was published for 
comment in the Federal Register on April 3, 2017.\3\ The Commission has 
not received any comments on the Advance Notice to date. This 
publication serves as notice of no objection to the Advance Notice.
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    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1). The Financial Stability Oversight 
Council designated OCC a systemically important financial market 
utility (``SIFMU'') on July 18, 2012. See Financial Stability 
Oversight Council 2012 Annual Report, Appendix A, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf. Therefore, OCC is required to comply 
with the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act and file 
advance notices with the Commission.
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-80323 (March 28, 
2017), 82 FR 16260 (April 3, 2017) (File No. SR-OCC-2017-802) 
(``Notice of Filing of Advance Notice''). OCC also filed a proposed 
rule change with the Commission pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act (``Exchange Act'') and Rule 19b-4 
thereunder, seeking approval of changes to its rules necessary to 
implement the Advance Notice. 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) and 17 CFR 
240.19b-4, respectively. The Commission published notice of the 
proposed rule change in the Federal Register and has not received 
any comments on the proposal to date. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-80323 (March 8, 2017), 82 FR 13690 (March 14, 2017) 
(File No. SR-OCC-2017-002).
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I. Background

    OCC operates two Stock Loan Programs--the Hedge Program and Market 
Loan Program--in which a participating clearing member can lend an 
agreed-upon number of shares of eligible stock \4\ to another clearing 
member in exchange for an agreed-upon value of U.S. dollar cash 
collateral and then novate the loan to OCC for clearing.\5\ The Hedge 
Program permits clearing members to bilaterally execute stock loans and 
negotiate collateralization and other terms before submitting such 
stock loans to OCC for novation and clearing.\6\ The Market Loan 
Program is operationally similar to the Hedge Program, but it permits 
clearing members to execute stock loans through a multilateral loan 
market.\7\ In each case, upon completion of the novation process, OCC, 
in its capacity as a central counterparty, guarantees return of (i) 
loaned stock, or that stock's value, to the lending clearing member, 
and (ii) the value of cash collateral to the borrowing clearing 
member.\8\ In addition, OCC makes mark-to-market margin payments on a 
daily basis to ensure stock loans remain fully collateralized.
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    \4\ See OCC Rules 2202 and 2202A (providing that stock loans 
under the Hedge Program and the Market Loan Program, respectively, 
must effect transfer only of ``Eligible Stock,'' as defined in 
Article I of OCC's By-laws). OCC permits clearing members to execute 
stock loans involving 6,191 eligible securities as March 29, 2017, 
available at https://www.theocc.com/webapps/stock loan-eligible-
securities.
    \5\ The Hedge Program is governed by Article XXI of OCC's By-
Laws and Chapter XXII of OCC's Rules. The Market Loan Program is 
governed by Article XXIA of OCC's By-Laws and Chapter XXIIA of OCC's 
Rules. The Commission understands that OCC cleared approximately 10-
15% of the overall U.S.-equities stock loan market through the two 
programs, as of November 2015.
    \6\ The Commission understands that the Hedge Program accounts 
for approximately 95% of cleared stock loan volume at OCC, as of 
November 2015.
    \7\ Automated Equity Finance Markets, Inc. is the sole loan 
market through which clearing members can execute stock loans in the 
Market Loan Program.
    \8\ See OCC Rules 2202(b) and 2202A(b).
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II. Description of the Advance Notice

    OCC's Advance Notice proposes a number of changes to the Stock Loan 
Programs and its Rules governing those Programs.\9\ First, to improve 
trade certainty and transparency concerning clearing member exposures, 
OCC proposes amendments to its rules governing the Stock Loan Programs 
to do the following: (1) Require clearing members to have policies and 
procedures to reconcile stock loan positions each business day; (2) 
state explicitly that the controlling record for stock loan positions 
for margin and other purposes is OCC's ``golden'' record; and (3) 
provide that stock loan positions remain in effect until OCC's records 
reflect stock loan terminations. Second, to mitigate risks that may 
arise in the event of a clearing member suspension, OCC proposes 
amendments to its rules governing the Stock Loan Programs to do the 
following: (1) Provide a two-day trading window in which clearing 
members must execute close-out transactions, also known as ``buy-in'' 
or ``sell-out'' transactions; (2) provide broad authority for OCC to 
use reasonable prices to settle close-out transactions; and (3) permit 
OCC to close out and re-establish the matched-book stock loan positions 
of a suspended Hedge Program clearing member through termination by 
offset and ``re-matching'' with other clearing members. Each of these 
proposals is discussed in more detail below.
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    \9\ For a more detailed description of the specific rule changes 
OCC is proposing, see Notice of Filing of Advance Notice, supra note 
3.
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A. Proposed Measures To Improve Trade Certainty and Transparency

    OCC's Advance Notice proposes three amendments to the rules 
governing its Stock Loan Programs that are intended to improve trade 
certainty and transparency for clearing members and OCC.
1. Daily Reconciliation of Stock Loan Positions
    Clearing members that participate in the Hedge Program and the 
Market Loan Program execute and terminate stock loans on a bilateral 
basis. Following execution or termination of stock loans, OCC requires 
clearing members to promptly report stock loans directly to OCC, or to 
facilitate such reporting to OCC through the Depository Trust 
Corporation (``DTC''), ensuring OCC accepts stock loans for clearing 
and records the novation or termination for margin and other purposes. 
Under the current trade-reporting process, clearing members may fail to 
report (or to have DTC report) stock loans to OCC in a timely manner, 
increasing uncertainty in the novation process and decreasing 
transparency with respect to OCC's stock loan positions and obligations 
as a central counterparty and guarantor. The current process thereby 
presents risk management risks both to OCC and clearing members.

[[Page 20646]]

    To address these risk management risks, OCC proposes to require 
each clearing member to have adequate policies and procedures to 
perform daily reconciliations of stock loan positions against OCC's 
records and to resolve stock loan discrepancies, if any, by 9:30 a.m. 
Central Time the following business day.\10\ These proposed rule 
changes, according to OCC, would improve trade certainty and 
transparency for clearing members participating in the Hedge Program 
and the Market Loan Program and thereby reduce operational and other 
risks for OCC and clearing members.
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    \10\ See Proposed Rule 2205 of the Hedge Program and Proposed 
Rule 2205A of the Market Loan Program.
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2. Controlling Records for Open and Terminated Stock Loan Positions
    To support and supplement the proposed daily reconciliation 
requirements for clearing member participation in the Stock Loan 
Programs, OCC proposes to explicitly state in its rules that OCC's 
stock loan records constitute the controlling records for margin and 
other purposes. Specifically, the proposed rules would specify that 
OCC's records, which OCC refers to as the ``golden copy'' records, 
prevail in the event of a conflict with clearing member records and 
that clearing members must continue to perform on obligations relating 
to open stock loan positions identified in the golden copy records.\11\ 
The proposed rules, according to OCC, support trade certainty and 
transparency in the Hedge and Market Loan Programs.
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    \11\ See Proposed Articles XXI and XXIA of OCC's By-Laws.
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3. Termination Records for Stock Loan Positions
    Finally, to conform OCC's stock loan termination provisions to the 
proposed changes relating to controlling records described above, OCC 
proposes rule changes to clarify that stock loans would be considered 
terminated for margin and other purposes only when OCC's records 
reflect termination of the stock loan.\12\ OCC states that these 
conforming changes also would support trade certainty and transparency 
in the Stock Loan Programs by ensuring consistency among and within the 
different rules applicable to the Stock Loan Programs.
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    \12\ See Proposed Rule 2209 in the Hedge Program and Proposed 
Rule 2209A in the Market Loan Program.
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B. Proposed Measures To Mitigate Stock Loan Risks in the Event of a 
Clearing Member Suspension

    In addition to the proposals intended to improve trade certainty 
and transparency, the Advance Notice also proposes three amendments to 
address certain risks that may arise in the event that OCC suspends a 
clearing member participant in the Stock Loan Programs.
1. Stock Loan Close-Out Timeframe in the Event of a Clearing Member 
Suspension
    Under current Stock Loan Program rules, OCC may seek to close out a 
suspended clearing member's stock loan positions by instructing non-
suspended clearing member counterparties to execute close-out 
transactions within a reasonable period of time.\13\ Although non-
suspended clearing members must be prepared to defend the timeliness of 
close-out transactions under current rules, clearing members are not 
required to execute close-out transactions based on OCC's instructions 
within a specific period of time. Accordingly, if non-suspended 
clearing members execute buy-in or sell-out transactions over an 
extended period of time following OCC's close-out instruction, OCC 
incurs a risk that close-out prices may vary significantly from the 
prices used to mark the stock loan positions to market for margin 
purposes. OCC's credit exposure, in part, depends on the significance 
of these price differences relative to the suspended clearing member's 
available margin resources.
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    \13\ More specifically, Rules 2209(b) and (f) and 2211 of the 
Hedge Program, and Rules 2209A(b) and (c) and 2211A of the Market 
Loan Program require clearing members to execute close-out 
transactions in a ``commercially reasonable manner'' and to be 
prepared to defend the timing, prices, and costs of such 
transactions.
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    To mitigate these risks, OCC proposes to require clearing members 
to execute close-out transactions within a fixed two-day trading window 
in the event of a clearing member suspension. More specifically, OCC 
proposes to require non-suspended clearing members to execute close-out 
transactions by the end of the business day following OCC's instruction 
to close out stock loans with the suspended clearing member. If a non-
suspended clearing member is unable to execute the close-out 
transactions within that two-day timeframe, OCC itself would terminate 
the clearing member's relevant stock loans and effect settlement based 
on the market price of the underlying securities, as determined by OCC. 
According to OCC, the proposed changes are intended to ensure that non-
suspended clearing members execute close-out transactions in a 
timeframe consistent with OCC' s two-day liquidation assumption for 
stock loan margin purposes, which should reduce OCC's credit exposure 
from significant differences between clearing member-effectuated close-
out prices and the prices used to collect mark-to-market payments from 
the suspended clearing member.
2. Reasonable Prices for Stock Loan Close-Out Transactions in the Event 
of a Clearing Member Suspension
    Under current rules, OCC may seek to close out a suspended clearing 
member's stock loan positions by instructing non-suspended clearing 
member counterparties to execute buy-in or sell-out transactions. These 
close-out transactions must be executed in a ``commercially reasonable 
manner.'' \14\ If a borrowing clearing member is suspended and unable 
to return securities under a stock loan, OCC may instruct the lending 
clearing member to execute a ``buy-in'' transaction for the number of 
shares in the stock loan's underlying security that would be necessary 
to return the lending clearing member to its position prior to entering 
into the stock loan with the suspended clearing member. If the lending 
clearing member is suspended and unable to return the value of 
collateral, OCC similarly may instruct the borrowing clearing member to 
execute a ``sell-out'' transaction for the number of shares in the 
underlying security that would be necessary to return the borrowing 
clearing member to its position prior to entering into the stock loan. 
In each case, the non-suspended clearing member's stock loan position 
is terminated and settled based on the price reported for the close-out 
transaction.
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    \14\ Id.
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    To incentivize ``reasonable'' pricing of close-out transactions in 
the event of a clearing member suspension, OCC proposes to provide 
itself authority to withdraw from a clearing member's account the value 
of any difference between clearing member-reported prices and 
``reasonable'' close-out transaction prices, as determined by OCC based 
on an assessment of market conditions at the time of execution.\15\

[[Page 20647]]

This proposed price-substitution authority, according to OCC, would 
incentivize non-suspended clearing members to execute and report close-
out transactions in a commercially reasonable manner.\16\
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    \15\ See Proposed Rule 2211. The proposal provides that a 
clearing member may demonstrate that a close-out transaction was 
executed at a ``reasonable'' price by providing evidence that the 
transaction fell within the underlying stock's trading range on the 
date of execution. Id. To the extent a clearing member impacts the 
market price of an underlying security through close-out 
transactions, OCC, in its discretion, may consider such impact in 
its assessment of market conditions at the time of execution.
    \16\ If the close-out transaction is not executed within the 
two-day period provided in Proposed Rule 2212, however, the stock 
loan would be terminated and settled based on OCC's marking price at 
the end of the period.
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3. Re-Matching in the Event of a Hedge Clearing Member Suspension
    Under OCC's current rules, in the event of a clearing member 
suspension, OCC can fully unwind a suspended Hedge Clearing Member's 
matched-book positions \17\ only if it recalls all borrowed securities 
from specific borrowing clearing members and returns those securities 
to specific lending clearing members. Under current rules, this recall-
and-return process is operationally complex because the nature of these 
unwinds would require OCC to (i) effect transfer of significant numbers 
of securities to significant numbers of non-suspended clearing members; 
and (ii) settle an equal number of payments against final settlement 
prices. Moreover, during this recall-and-return process, the non-
suspended clearing members may experience unexpected imbalances in 
their overall stock loan positions, resulting in increased margin 
requirements or price risks relating to re-execution of the stock loans 
in a potentially distressed market.\18\
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    \17\ See definition of ``Matched-Book Positions'' in Article I 
of OCC's By-laws. A clearing member that maintains a ``matched 
book'' for stock loans generally borrows no more of a specific 
security than it lends to other clearing members in the program. See 
also Notice of Filing of the Advance Notice, supra note 3 at 9.
    \18\ OCC's present margin methodology nets matched-book stock 
loan positions prior to calculating clearing member exposures. Thus, 
a non-suspended clearing member's margin requirements may increase 
on account of the temporary stock loan imbalances resulting from a 
clearing member suspension.
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    To address these operational complexities and the potential 
consequences for both OCC and its clearing members, OCC proposes new 
rules that would permit it to terminate a suspended Hedge Clearing 
Member's matched-book stock loans in the Hedge Program by offset and to 
``re-match'' the positions of the non-suspended counterparties 
according to priorities established by OCC's matching algorithm.\19\ 
According to OCC, re-matching stock loans pursuant to an algorithm 
would facilitate orderly and efficient termination and re-establishment 
of stock loans involving a suspended Hedge Clearing Member, thereby 
mitigating operational and pricing risks that may arise for non-
suspended clearing members during the recall-and-return process.
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    \19\ OCC's matching algorithm would implement priorities in 
OCC's Proposed Rule 2212(d), which establishes an order of 
operations based on the size of stock loan positions and the 
existence of master securities lending agreements between the non-
suspended clearing members.
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III. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Although the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act does 
not specify a standard of review for an advance notice, the stated 
purpose of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act is 
instructive.\20\ The stated purpose of the Payment, Clearing and 
Settlement Supervision Act is to mitigate systemic risk in the 
financial system and promote financial stability by, among other 
things, promoting uniform risk management standards for SIFMUs and 
strengthening the liquidity of SIFMUs.\21\
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    \20\ See 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).
    \21\ Id.
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    Section 805(a)(2) of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement 
Supervision Act \22\ authorizes the Commission to prescribe regulations 
containing risk management standards for the payment, clearing, and 
settlement activities of designated clearing entities engaged in 
designated activities for which the Commission is the supervisory 
agency. Section 805(b) of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement 
Supervision Act \23\ provides the following objectives and principles 
for the Commission's risk management standards prescribed under Section 
805(a):
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    \22\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
    \23\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
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     To promote robust risk management;
     To promote safety and soundness;
     To reduce systemic risks; and
     To support the stability of the broader financial system.
    Section 805(c) provides, in addition, that the Commission's risk 
management standards may address such areas as risk management and 
default policies and procedures, among others areas.\24\
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    \24\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(c)
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    The Commission has adopted risk management standards under Section 
805(a)(2) of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act and 
the Exchange Act (the ``Clearing Agency Rules'').\25\ The Clearing 
Agency Rules require each covered clearing agency, among other things, 
to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures that are reasonably designed to meet certain minimum 
requirements for operations and risk management practices on an ongoing 
basis. As such, it is appropriate for the Commission to review advance 
notices for consistency with the objectives and principles for risk 
management standards described in Section 805(b) of the Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act and the Clearing Agency Rules.
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    \25\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2, 2012) (S7-08-11). 
See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (September 28, 
2016), 81 FR 70786 (October 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) (``Covered Clearing 
Agency Standards''). The Commission established an effective date of 
December 12, 2016, and a compliance date of April 11, 2017, for the 
Covered Clearing Agency Standards. On March 4, 2017, the Commission 
granted covered clearing agencies a temporary exemption from 
compliance with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(ii) and certain requirements in 
Rules 17Ad-22(e)(15)(i) and (ii) until December 31, 2017, subject to 
certain conditions. OCC is a ``covered clearing agency'' as defined 
in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5).
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A. Consistency With Section 805(b) of the Payment, Clearing and 
Settlement Supervision Act

    The Commission believes each proposal in OCC's Advance Notice is 
consistent with promoting robust risk management, promoting safety and 
soundness, reducing systemic risks, and supporting the stability of the 
broader financial system, the stated objectives and principles of 
Section 805(b) of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision 
Act.\26\
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    \26\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
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    First, the Commission believes that OCC's three proposals to 
improve trade certainty and transparency in the Stock Loan Programs are 
consistent with promoting robust risk management. The Commission agrees 
with OCC's analysis that its proposal to require clearing members to 
implement adequate policies and procedures to reconcile stock loan 
positions with OCC's records on a daily basis could promote robust risk 
management by reducing financial and other risks to OCC and clearing 
members. The Commission also believes that OCC's proposal to provide 
explicitly in its rulebook that its stock loan records would prevail in 
the event of a conflict with clearing member records, and that clearing 
members must continue to perform on all stock loan positions reflected 
in OCC's records also promotes robust risk management by encouraging 
clearing members to understand, manage, and promptly report stock loan 
transactions. Finally, the Commission believes that OCC's proposal to 
provide that stock loan positions remain in effect until OCC's records 
reflect stock loan terminations promotes robust risk management by

[[Page 20648]]

emphasizing that OCC's records supersede the records of clearing 
members and further encouraging clearing members to understand, manage, 
and promptly report stock loan transactions. The Commission therefore 
believes these specific proposals are consistent with promoting robust 
risk management.
    Second, the Commission believes that OCC's three proposals to 
mitigate certain risks in the event of a clearing member suspension are 
consistent with promoting robust risk management. The proposal to 
provide a two-day trading window in which clearing members must execute 
close-out transactions, or opt for mandatory settlement, promotes 
robust risk management by requiring non-suspended clearing members to 
complete close-out transactions in a timeframe that is consistent with 
OCC's liquidation assumptions. The proposed alignment of the close-out 
period with OCC's liquidation assumptions reduces the risk that close-
out prices vary too significantly from the prices used to mark the 
suspended clearing member's stock loans to market. OCC's proposed 
price-substitution authority also promotes robust risk management by 
further encouraging non-suspended clearing members to execute close-out 
transactions in a commercially reasonable manner, thereby reducing 
financial risk to OCC. Finally, the proposed rule changes in the Hedge 
Program to permit OCC to terminate and re-establish a suspended 
clearing member's positions through offset and ``re-match'' promotes 
robust risk management by facilitating orderly and efficient 
termination and re-establishment of stock loans involving a suspended 
clearing member, which mitigates operational and pricing risks that may 
arise for OCC and clearing members during the recall-and-return 
process. The Commission therefore believes that these aspects of the 
proposal are consistent with the promotion of robust risk management.
    Based on the conclusions discussed above, the Commission also 
believes that OCC's proposal is consistent with promoting the safety 
and soundness of both OCC and clearing members who participate in the 
Stock Loan Programs. Accordingly, because promoting the safety and 
soundness of both OCC and clearing members who participate in the Stock 
Loan Programs, in turn, both reduces systemic risks that may arise from 
clearing member participation in these programs and supports the 
stability of the broader financial system, the Commission also believes 
that the proposals contained in the Advance Notice are consistent with 
the stated objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act.

B. Consistency With Rules 17Ad-22(e)(13) and (e)(23) Under the Exchange 
Act

    The Commission believes OCC's proposals in the Advance Notice are 
consistent with Covered Clearing Agency Standards, specifically Rules 
(e)(13) and (e)(23) under the Exchange Act.\27\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13) 
under the Exchange Act requires each covered clearing agency to 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to, among other things, ensure it has the authority 
and operational capacity to take timely action to contain losses and 
continue to meet its obligations in the event of a clearing member 
default.\28\ More generally, Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23) under the Exchange Act 
requires covered clearing agencies to establish, implement, maintain, 
and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to, among other 
things, provide for the public disclosure of all relevant rules and 
material procedures, including key aspects of default rules and 
procedures.\29\
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    \27\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(13), and 17 CFR 240.17Ad22(e)(23).
    \28\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(13).
    \29\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23).
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    The Commission believes the proposed changes relating to clearing 
member suspension in OCC's Advance Notice are consistent with Rule 
17Ad-22(e)(13) under the Exchange Act. By proposing a fixed trading 
window in which clearing members must either execute close-out 
transactions relating to a clearing member suspension or opt for OCC-
mandated settlements, OCC is seeking new authority that the Commission 
believes will better ensure that OCC can take timely actions to contain 
suspension-related losses and continue to meet stock loan-related 
obligations in the Stock Loan Programs. The Commission further believes 
that the proposed authority permitting OCC to withdraw the value of any 
difference between the clearing member-reported prices and OCC-
determined close-out prices likewise better ensures that OCC can 
contain suspension-related losses, as clearing members would be further 
incentivized to execute timely close-out transactions at market prices. 
Finally, the Commission believes that the proposal relating to re-
matching-in-suspension better ensures that OCC has authority and 
operational capacity to contain losses and meet obligations to clearing 
members in the Hedge Program, in particular through new rules and 
mechanisms that reduce the operational, credit, and re-execution risks 
attendant to the recall-and-return process. The Commission therefore 
believes OCC's proposal is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13) under 
the Exchange Act.
    The Commission also believes that OCC's proposals are consistent 
with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23) under the Exchange Act. Each aspect of OCC's 
Advance Notice is proposed to be disclosed publicly in OCC's rules 
governing the Stock Loan Programs, including the key suspension-related 
aspects of its rules providing for close-out transaction timeframes, 
new price-substitution authority, and termination and re-matching-in-
suspension. The Commission therefore believes that OCC's proposal is 
consistent with Rules 17Ad-22(e)(23) under the Exchange Act.

IV. Conclusion

    It is therefore noticed, pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(G) of the 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act,\30\ that the 
Commission does not object to Advance Notice (SR-OCC-2017-802) and that 
OCC is authorized to implement the proposed change.
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    \30\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(G).

    By the Commission.
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-08892 Filed 5-2-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P