Document ID: FRA-2009-0031-0247
Agency: fra
Document Type: Notice
Title: Safety Advisory: Addressing Unintended Train Brake Release
Posted Date: 2022-12-29T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 249 (Thursday, December 29, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 80256-80257]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-28336]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Safety Advisory 2022-02; Addressing Unintended Train Brake 
Release

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2022-02 to make the rail 
industry aware of a recent issue encountered by a train crew that 
experienced an unintended brake release of a train's automatic air 
brakes while stopped at a signal, and to recommend steps addressing the 
unintended release of train air brakes.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Fairbanks, Staff Director, Motive 
Power & Equipment Division, Office of Railroad Infrastructure and 
Mechanical, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 
telephone: (202) 493-6322, email: [email protected].
    Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to 
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws, 
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety 
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to 
bind the public in any way. This document does not revise or replace 
any previously issued guidance.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On June 22, 2022, during a significant thunderstorm, a crew 
consisting of a locomotive engineer and conductor operated a 
conventionally powered, intermodal train with 3 head-end locomotives, 
47 loaded cars, and 6 empty cars, totaling 9,204 feet in length and 
7,392 tons in weight. The engineer stopped the train on a downhill 
grade of 0.9-1.18% near the signal governing the train's movement, set 
the train's air brakes at approximately 12 pounds, and

[[Page 80257]]

fully set the locomotive consist's independent brakes. After being 
stopped for approximately 3 hours, the engineer and conductor, located 
in the lead locomotive cab, observed the train roll towards the signal 
interlocking displaying a stop indication. This train experienced an 
unintended automatic brake release. The locomotive consist's 
independent brakes remained fully applied but due to the grade, tonnage 
and wet rail could not solely hold the train without the automatic air 
brakes also being applied.
    At that time, an opposing train on the same track was preparing to 
cross through the interlocking in front of the rolling train. The 
locomotive engineer of the rolling train applied full-service airbrakes 
and full dynamic braking but was not satisfied that the brakes were 
working effectively or fast enough. The conductor operated the 
emergency brake valve and stopped the train short of the signal and the 
train that was preparing to cross through the interlocking.
    The crew then contacted the dispatcher and railroad management to 
report the unintended brake release and the conductor set a sufficient 
number of car handbrakes to hold the train on the grade.
    FRA's investigation of the rolling train's event recorder, positive 
train control (PTC) system, and engine data logs, revealed: the PTC 
system had operated properly and would have initiated an emergency 
brake application upon reaching the signal; the Trip Optimizer was off; 
and the lead locomotive and consist did not cause the unintended brake 
release. Instead, FRA determined that, after approximately three hours 
with the air brakes set, the air pressure slowly bled down from some of 
the cars' auxiliary reservoirs, likely causing localized brake 
releases.\1\ The initiation of the brake release would enable the 
accelerated release functionality by taking some air from the emergency 
brake reservoirs and directing it back into the brake pipe resulting in 
a substantial number of adjacent car brakes releasing. Potentially 
contributing factors causing the train's unintended movement included 
the downhill grade, wet rail, and the train's tonnage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ FRA notes this type of prolonged pressure release would 
likely not be identified during a periodic single car air brake 
test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to the potential for air brake system leaks, FRA prohibits 
unattended trains from depending solely on air brakes to hold 
equipment.\2\ While the aforementioned rolling train was attended, it 
nevertheless engaged in an unintended movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 49 CFR 232.103(n)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on FRA's review of this incident, and its awareness of other 
train incidents involving an unintended air brake release under similar 
circumstances, FRA believes operating guidance is warranted to help 
reduce the likelihood of similar unintended air brake releases, and 
therefore makes the following recommendations.

Recommendations

    1. Train crews should not expect a service rate or emergency brake 
application to indefinitely maintain application of a train's air 
brakes.
    2. If a train is stopped with air brakes set, and the train begins 
moving, the crew should immediately apply the emergency brake. After 
the train is stopped, the crew should set a sufficient number of 
handbrakes to secure the train from further unintended movement before 
releasing the brakes and recharging the train's air brake system.
    3. Each railroad should adopt and implement an air brake procedure 
consistent with Recommendations 1 and 2 that addresses unintended brake 
releases.
    4. Each railroad should have an operating supervisor conduct a 
face-to-face meeting with each locomotive engineer and conductor to 
explain and reinforce the contents of this advisory.
    FRA may modify Safety Advisory 2022-02, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the 
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2022-28336 Filed 12-28-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P