Document ID: FERC-2007-1325-0002
Agency: ferc
Document Type: Rule
Title: Blanket Authorization Under FPA Section 203
Posted Date: 2008-02-29T05:00Z

[Federal Register: February 29, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 41)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 11003-11013]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr29fe08-12]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 33

[Docket No. RM07-21-000; Order No. 708]

 
Blanket Authorization Under FPA Section 203

Issued February 21, 2008.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is 
amending its regulations pursuant to section 203 of the Federal Power 
Act (FPA) to provide for additional blanket authorizations under FPA 
section 203(a)(1). These blanket authorizations will facilitate 
investment in the electric utility industry and, at the same time, 
ensure that public utility customers are adequately protected from any 
adverse effects of such transactions.

DATES: Effective Date: This Final Rule will become effective March 31, 
2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Carla Urquhart (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8496
Roshini Thayaparan (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6857
David Hunger (Technical Information), Office of Energy Market 
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, 
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8148
Andrew P. Mosier, Jr. (Technical Information), Office of Energy Market 
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, 
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6274

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G. 
Kelly, Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff

    1. On July 20, 2007, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking \1\ to provide for an additional blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act (FPA).\2\ After receiving 
comments in response to the Blanket Authorization NOPR, the Commission 
amends Part 33 of the Commission's regulations to add five blanket 
authorizations under section 203(a)(1). In addition, this Final Rule 
provides certain clarifications regarding the existing blanket 
authorizations under section 203. Further, this Final Rule clarifies 
the definitions of the terms ``affiliate'' and ``captive customers.'' 
These blanket authorizations and clarifications will facilitate 
investment in the electric utility industry and, at the same time, 
ensure that public utility customers are adequately protected from any 
adverse effects of such transactions.
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    \1\ Blanket Authorization Under FPA Section 203, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 72 FR 41640 (July 31, 2007), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. ] 32,619 (2007) (Blanket Authorization NOPR).
    \2\ 16 U.S.C. 824b.
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I. Background

    2. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 \3\ expanded the scope of the 
corporate transactions subject to the Commission's review under section 
203 of the FPA. Among other things, amended section 203: (1) Expands 
the Commission's review authority to include authority over certain 
holding company mergers and acquisitions, as well as certain public 
utility acquisitions of generating facilities; (2) requires that, prior 
to approving a disposition under section 203, the Commission must 
determine that the transaction would not result in inappropriate cross-
subsidization of non-utility affiliates or the pledge or encumbrance of 
utility assets; \4\ and (3) imposes statutory deadlines for acting on 
mergers and other jurisdictional transactions.
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    \3\ Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 1289, 119 Stat. 
594, 982-83 (2005) (EPAct 2005).
    \4\ Section 203(a)(4) is not an absolute prohibition on the 
cross-subsidization of a non-utility associate company or the pledge 
or encumbrance of utility assets for the benefit of an associate 
company. If the Commission determines that the cross-subsidization, 
pledge or encumbrance will be consistent with the public interest, 
the action may be permitted.
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    3. Through the Order No. 669 rulemaking proceeding, the Commission 
promulgated regulations adopting certain modifications to 18 CFR 2.26 
and Part 33 to implement amended section 203.\5\ The Commission also 
provided blanket authorizations for certain transactions subject to 
section 203. These blanket authorizations were crafted to ensure that 
there is no harm to captive customers of franchised public utilities, 
but sought to accommodate investments in the electric utility industry 
and market liquidity. Some commenters in the rulemaking proceeding 
argued that the Commission should have granted additional blanket 
authorizations that would benefit the marketplace and not harm 
customers. Other commenters argued that the Commission should adopt 
additional generic rules to guard against inappropriate cross-
subsidization associated with the mergers. Yet other commenters argued 
that the Commission should modify its competitive analysis for mergers, 
which has been in place for 10 years. The Commission stated that it 
would reevaluate these and other issues at a technical conference on 
the Commission's section 203 regulations as well as certain issues 
raised in the Order No. 667 rulemaking proceeding implementing the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 (PUHCA 2005).\6\
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    \5\ Transactions Subject to FPA Section 203, Order No. 669, 71 
FR 1348 (Jan. 6, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,200 (2005), order 
on reh'g, Order No. 669-A, 71 FR 28422 (May 16, 2006), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. ] 31,214 (2006), order on reh'g, Order No. 669-B, 71 FR 42579 
(July 27, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,225 (2006).
    \6\ EPAct 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 1261, et seq., 119 Stat. 594, 
972-78 (2005) (PUHCA 2005). See also Repeal of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935 and Enactment of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 2005, Order No. 667, 70 FR 75592 (Dec. 20, 
2005), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,197 (2005), order on reh'g, Order 
No. 667-A, 71 FR 28446 (May 16, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,213, 
order on reh'g, Order No. 667-B, 71 FR 42750 (July 28, 2006), FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,224 (2006), order on reh'g, Order No. 667-C, 72 
FR 8277 (Feb. 26, 2007), 118 FERC ] 61,133 (2007). These issues 
included matters related to inappropriate cross-subsidization and 
pledges or encumbrance of utility assets, whether our current merger 
policy should be revised, and whether additional exemptions, 
different reporting requirements, or other regulatory action (under 
PUHCA 2005 or the FPA or Natural Gas Act (NGA)) needed to be 
considered.
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    4. On December 7, 2006, the Commission held a technical conference 
(December 7 Technical Conference) to discuss several of the issues that 
arose in the Order No. 667 and Order No. 669 rulemaking proceedings. 
The December 7 Technical Conference discussed a range of topics. The 
first panel discussed whether there are additional actions, under the 
FPA or the NGA, that the Commission should take to supplement the 
protections against cross-subsidization that were implemented in the 
Order No. 667 and Order No. 669 rulemaking proceedings. The second 
panel discussed whether,

[[Page 11004]]

and if so how, the Commission should modify its Cash Management Rule 
\7\ in light of PUHCA 2005 and whether the Commission should codify 
specific safeguards that must be adopted for cash management programs 
and money pool agreements and transactions. The third panel discussed 
whether modifications to the specific exemptions, waivers and blanket 
authorizations set forth in the Order No. 667 and Order No. 669 
rulemaking proceedings are warranted. Post-technical conference 
comments were accepted.
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    \7\ Regulation of Cash Management Practices, Order No. 634, 68 
FR 40500 (July 8, 2003), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,145, revised, 
Order No. 634-A, 68 FR 61993 (Oct. 31, 2003), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 
31,152 (2003) (Cash Management Rule).
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    5. On March 8, 2007, the Commission held a second technical 
conference (March 8 Technical Conference) to discuss whether the 
Commission's section 203 policy should be revised and, in particular, 
whether the Commission's Appendix A merger analysis is sufficient to 
identify market power concerns in today's electric industry market 
environment. The first panel discussed whether the Appendix A analysis 
is appropriate to analyze a merger's effect on competition, given the 
changes that have occurred in the industry (e.g., the development of 
Regional Transmission Organizations) and statutory changes (e.g., as a 
result of the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
\8\ and new authorities given to the Commission in EPAct 2005 \9\). The 
second panel assessed the factors the Commission uses in reviewing 
mergers and the coordination between the Commission and other agencies 
(including state commissions) with merger review responsibility.
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    \8\ 16 U.S.C. 79a et seq. (PUHCA 1935). EPAct 2005 repealed 
PUHCA 1935. EPAct 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, 1263.
    \9\ These include new authorities through amended FPA section 
203 as well as PUHCA 2005.
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    6. On July 20, 2007, the Commission took three actions based on the 
Commission's experience implementing amended FPA section 203 and PUHCA 
2005, as well as the record from the Commission's December 7 and March 
8 Technical Conferences regarding section 203 and PUCHA 2005. In this 
docket, the Commission issued the Blanket Authorization NOPR, proposing 
an additional blanket authorization for certain dispositions of 
jurisdictional facilities under FPA section 203(a)(1) and seeking 
comment on additional blanket authorizations under section 203. In 
addition, in separate proceedings, the Commission issued a policy 
statement providing additional guidance regarding the Commission's 
section 203 authority \10\ and a notice of proposed rulemaking 
proposing to codify restrictions on affiliate transactions between 
franchised public utilities with captive customers and their market-
regulated power sales affiliates or non-utility affiliates.\11\
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    \10\ FPA Section 203 Supplemental Policy Statement, 72 FR 42277 
(Aug. 2, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,253 (2007) (Supplemental 
Policy Statement), order on clarification and reconsideration, 122 
FERC ] 61,157 (2008).
    \11\ Cross-Subsidization Restrictions on Affiliate Transactions, 
72 FR 41644 (July 31, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,618 (2007) 
(Affiliate Transactions NOPR); see Cross-Subsidization Restrictions 
on Affiliate Transactions, Order No. 707 122 FERC ] 61,155 (2008) 
(Affiliate Transactions Final Rule).
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II. Blanket Authorization NOPR

    7. In the Blanket Authorization NOPR, based on the record from the 
technical conferences (including both oral and written comments) and 
the Commission's experience under amended section 203 to date, the 
Commission proposed to provide for a limited blanket authorization to 
public utilities under section 203(a)(1). Under this limited blanket 
authorization, a public utility would be pre-authorized to dispose of 
less than 10 percent of its voting securities to a public utility 
holding company but only if, after the disposition, the holding company 
and any of its associate or affiliate companies in aggregate will own 
less than 10 percent of the outstanding voting interests of that public 
utility. The proposed limited blanket authorization would work in 
conjunction with the blanket authorization granted to holding companies 
under section 203(a)(2) in 18 CFR 33.1(c)(2)(ii).\12\ The Commission 
noted that this proposed blanket authorization would not entirely 
parallel the section 203(a)(2) authorization since the section 
203(a)(2) authorization does not contain the ``in aggregate'' 
limitation. However, the Commission stated that this limitation would 
provide better protection against possible transfer of control of a 
public utility. The Commission sought comment on this limitation.
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    \12\ The section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization states that any 
holding company in a holding company system that includes a 
transmitting utility or an electric utility may purchase, acquire, 
or take ``[a]ny voting security in a transmitting utility, an 
electric utility company, or a holding company in a holding company 
system that includes a transmitting utility or an electric utility 
company if, after the acquisition, the holding company will own less 
than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities.'' 18 CFR 
33.1(c)(2)(ii). Because a ``transmitting utility'' or ``electric 
utility company'' may also be a ``public utility'' as defined in the 
FPA, the public utility may need to obtain separate authorization 
for the same transaction under FPA section 203(a)(1), which requires 
authorization for public utilities to dispose of jurisdictional 
facilities.
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    8. The Commission stated that the disposition of such limited 
voting interests (less than 10 percent), with the proposed ``in 
aggregate'' restriction and the existing reporting requirements 
applicable to holding companies,\13\ will not harm competition or 
captive customers. Moreover, the Commission stated this 10 percent 
threshold is consistent with the definition of ``holding company'' 
under section 1262(8)(A) of PUHCA 2005. Under that definition, any 
company that has the power to vote 10 percent or more of the securities 
of a public utility company (or a holding company of a public utility 
company) triggers holding company status and thus is presumed to raise 
sufficient concerns about controlling influence over a subsidiary 
public utility that regulatory oversight is needed. The Commission also 
found the 10 percent threshold to be consistent with the blanket 
authorization granted under section 203(a)(2) in the Order No. 669 
rulemaking proceeding, under which holding companies are pre-authorized 
to acquire up to 9.99 percent of voting securities of a public utility.
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    \13\ See, e.g., 18 CFR 33.1(c)(4) (requiring the filing of 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, 
and Form 13F, if applicable); 18 CFR 35.42(a) (effective September 
18, 2007, the effective date of Market-Based Rates For Wholesale 
Sales Of Electric Energy, Capacity And Ancillary Services By Public 
Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 FR 39903 (July 20, 2007), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. ] 31,252 (2007)) (requiring a notification of any change in 
status that would reflect a departure from the characteristics the 
Commission relied upon in granting market-based rate authority); 18 
CFR 366.4(a) (requiring Form FERC-65 (notification of holding 
company status)).
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    9. The Commission further noted that, as part of the existing 
``parallel'' blanket authorization under section 203(a)(2), the 
Commission already requires the holding company to provide to the 
Commission copies of any Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G and Form 13F at the 
same time and on the same basis, as filed with the SEC in connection 
with any securities purchased, acquired or taken pursuant to the 
blanket authorization under section 203(a)(2) provided in Sec.  
33.1(c)(2) of the Commission's regulations.\14\ Any person is required 
to file a Schedule 13 notification with the SEC of an acquisition of 
beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class of equity 
securities.\15\ Importantly, a Schedule 13G filer must acquire the 
subject securities ``in the ordinary course of his business and not 
with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the 
control of the issuer,

[[Page 11005]]

nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having 
such purpose or effect'' over entities whose securities it holds.\16\ 
Because the Commission already receives these filings from the holding 
company, the Commission proposed not to require additional reporting on 
the part of individual public utilities to duplicate the reporting of 
information we are already getting about the same transaction. However, 
the Commission sought comment on whether any additional reporting by 
the public utility should be required.
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    \14\ 18 CFR 33.1(c)(4).
    \15\ 17 CFR 240.13d-1(a).
    \16\ 17 CFR 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i).
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    10. The Commission also sought comment on whether blanket 
authorizations under section 203(a)(1) should be provided for the 
transfer of securities by a public utility to a holding company granted 
a blanket authorization under section 203(a)(2) in 18 CFR 
33.1(c)(8),\17\ 33.1(c)(9),\18\ and 33.1(c)(10).\19\ In addition, the 
Commission sought comment on whether it should grant a generic blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(1) for the acquisition or 
disposition of a jurisdictional contract where neither the acquirer nor 
transferor has captive customers and the contract does not convey 
control over the operation of a generation or transmission facility.
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    \17\ 18 CFR 33.1(c)(8) (granting a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(2) to a person that is a holding company solely with 
respect to one or more exempt wholesale generators (EWGs), foreign 
utility companies (FUCOs), or qualifying facilities (QFs) to acquire 
the securities of additional EWGs, FUCOs, or QFs).
    \18\ 18 CFR 33.1(c)(9) (granting a conditional blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(2) to a holding company, or a 
subsidiary of that company, that is regulated by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank or by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, under the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 as amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999).
    \19\ 18 CFR 33.1(c)(10) (granting a limited blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(2) to a holding company, or a 
subsidiary of that company, for the acquisition of securities of a 
public utility or a holding company that includes a public utility 
for purposes of underwriting activities or hedging transactions).
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III. Procedural Matters

    11. The Blanket Authorization NOPR invited comments on the proposed 
regulations. Comments on the Blanket Authorization NOPR were filed by: 
American Public Power Association and National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association (APPA/NRECA); Edison Electric Institute (EEI); 
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA); Entergy Services, Inc. 
(Entergy); Financial Institutions Energy Group (the Financial Group); 
Mirant Corporation (Mirant); Modesto Irrigation District (Modesto); and 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Oklahoma Commission).

IV. Discussion

    12. This Final Rule adopts the proposal in the Blanket 
Authorization NOPR to pre-authorize a public utility to dispose of less 
than 10 percent of its voting securities to a public utility holding 
company if, after the disposition, the holding company and any 
associate or affiliate companies in aggregate will own less than 10 
percent of the outstanding voting interests of that public utility. 
Based on comments to the Blanket Authorization NOPR, this Final Rule 
also provides four additional blanket authorizations under section 
203(a)(1). First, a public utility is granted a blanket authorization 
under section 203(a)(1) to transfer its outstanding voting securities 
to any holding company granted blanket authorization in Sec.  
33.1(c)(8) if, after the transfer, the holding company and any of its 
associate or affiliate companies in aggregate will own less than 10 
percent of the outstanding voting interests of such public utility. 
Second, a public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) to transfer its outstanding voting securities to any 
holding company granted blanket authorization in Sec.  33.1(c)(9). 
Third, a public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) to transfer its outstanding voting securities to any 
holding company granted blanket authorization in Sec.  33.1(c)(10). 
Fourth, a public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) for the acquisition or disposition of a 
jurisdictional contract where neither the acquirer nor transferor has 
captive customers or owns or provides transmission service over 
jurisdictional transmission facilities, the contract does not convey 
control over the operation of a generation or transmission facility, 
the parties to the transaction are neither affiliates nor associate 
companies, and the acquirer is a public utility. In addition, this 
Final Rule provides certain clarifications regarding the existing 
blanket authorizations under section 203. Finally, this Final Rule 
clarifies the definitions of the terms ``affiliate'' and ``captive 
customers.''

A. Proposed Blanket Authorizations

1. Scope of the Proposed Blanket Authorization
a. Comments
    13. APPA/NRECA, Mirant and the Oklahoma Commission support the 
limited blanket authorization as proposed by the Commission. The 
Oklahoma Commission states that the rule would allow utilities to 
expedite business ventures, but warns that the Commission should use 
terms in their plain and ordinary meanings to reduce any potential 
ambiguity. It also recommends that the Commission consider language 
that would allow state commissions to continue to receive notices of 
any investigations of regulated public utility companies.
    14. In the Blanket Authorization NOPR, the Commission asked for 
comments on the ``in aggregate'' limitation. APPA/NRECA support the 
proposed aggregate ownership limitation, stating that it is needed to 
help prevent the transfer of control of public utilities. They argue 
that omitting the ``in aggregate'' limitation would allow a public 
utility to sell less than 10 percent of its voting securities in 
successive transfers to each of several affiliates or associate 
companies (or even the same entity). APPA/NRECA further argues that 
omitting the ``in aggregate'' limitation is not in the public interest 
because, absent a case-by-case review, the Commission has no basis for 
a finding that an indirect transfer of control of a public utility's 
generation or transmission facilities to a single entity or to several 
affiliated entities will not harm competition, captive customers, or 
transmission customers.
    15. Mirant also supports the limited blanket authorization with the 
``in aggregate'' limitation. It states that while this does not 
completely parallel the blanket authorization granted in Order No. 669, 
it is comparable enough to remedy the problem that exists when one 
party must seek Commission review of the transaction.
    16. EEI and the Financial Group support the blanket authorization 
with certain clarifications and recommendations. Specifically, the 
Financial Group argues that the proposed less than 10 percent blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(1) should be expanded to include all 
acquirers, not just holding companies. It asserts that if a disposition 
of less than 10 percent of a public utility's voting securities to a 
holding company raises no concerns with respect to control, markets, or 
captive customers, then a disposition of less than 10 percent of a 
public utility's voting securities to an entity that is not a holding 
company should also raise no concerns. The Financial Group states that, 
in the case of a disposition of less than 10 percent of the voting 
securities of a public utility, the interest being disposed of does not 
convey control and cannot harm markets or captive customers, so the 
status of the acquirer--as a holding company, public utility, or an 
entity

[[Page 11006]]

that is neither--should be irrelevant. It argues that requiring a 
public utility to seek approval under section 203(a)(1) when disposing 
of less than 10 percent of its voting securities to a non-holding 
company would not serve any regulatory purpose, and adds needless costs 
and delays to transactions that do not raise section 203 concerns.
    17. Similarly, EEI argues that the Commission should not limit its 
proposed section 203(a)(1) blanket authorization to the entities 
described in 18 CFR 33.1(c)(2)(ii). EEI states that Sec.  
33.1(c)(2)(ii) only covers acquisitions by holding companies of 
securities of a transmitting utility, electric utility company, or 
holding company in a holding company system with such utilities. This, 
EEI argues, excludes a broader class of public utilities as well as 
non-holding company acquirers. It contends that the Commission would 
reduce the regulatory burden and encourage investment without causing 
harm ``by extending the new blanket authorization to cover 
jurisdictional transfers of securities from the broader class of 
`public utilities' to `any person' without the constraints contained in 
[Sec. ] 33.1(c)(2)(ii).'' \20\
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    \20\ EEI Comments at 8.
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    18. As an additional matter, the Financial Group recommends that 
the Commission clarify that the aggregate limitation only applies to 
companies in a holding company system that are 10 percent or more owned 
by the holding company or its subsidiaries. It argues that this should 
be clarified by eliminating the reference to ``affiliate'' altogether 
in the proposed definition. In the alternative, the Financial Group 
argues that the Commission clarify that the term does not refer to the 
PUHCA 2005 definition of affiliate, but rather to an entity that 
controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another 
entity (where control is rebuttably presumed to mean a voting interest 
of 10 percent or more).
b. Commission Determination
    19. We will adopt the proposed blanket authorization without 
modification. We will retain the ``in aggregate'' limitation so that, 
after a disposition of a public utility's securities under the proposed 
blanket authorization, the acquiring holding company and any associate 
or affiliate companies ``in aggregate'' would own less than 10 percent 
of the outstanding voting interests of that the public utility. As 
commenters point out, the limitation helps to prevent a public utility 
from transferring less than 10 percent of its voting securities in 
successive transfers to each of several affiliate or associate 
companies (or even the same entity), and thereby transferring control.
    20. We deny the Financial Group's and EEI's requests to expand the 
blanket authorization to cover not only public utility dispositions of 
securities to holding companies but also public utility dispositions of 
securities to ``any persons.'' This request would expand the blanket 
authorization proposed in the existing NOPR beyond its original intent, 
which was to ensure that transactions qualifying under the section 
203(a)(2) blanket authorization would not have to seek approval under 
section 203(a)(1).\21\ In addition, limiting the blanket authorization 
to holding companies allows the Commission to monitor these 
dispositions for possible changes of control even when they fall under 
the 10 percent threshold because of holding companies' preexisting 
reporting requirements.\22\ If we were to expand the blanket 
authorization to ``any person,'' we would need to establish appropriate 
reporting requirements so that we could monitor transfers to non-
holding companies. This is important because, as we explained in the 
Supplemental Policy Statement, although there is a presumption that 
less than 10 percent of a utility's shares will not result in a change 
of control, this presumption is rebuttable. In some instances, the 
transfer of less than 10 percent of voting shares may constitute a 
transfer of control.\23\ Accordingly, at this time we decline to expand 
the proposed generic blanket authorization as requested EEI and the 
Financial Group. However, we recognize that it could reduce regulatory 
burdens and encourage investment to allow transfers of securities not 
only to holding companies but to other ``persons'' and that such 
transfers will not harm competition or customers as long as there is 
sufficient ability to monitor possible changes in control of public 
utilities. Therefore, the Commission is willing to consider such 
blanket authorizations on a case-by-case basis if applicants can 
propose sufficient reporting requirements to allow adequate monitoring 
of possible changes in control and assure us that captive customers are 
adequately protected.
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    \21\ See Blanket Authorization NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 
32,619 at P 9-11.
    \22\ See, e.g., 18 CFR 366.4; 18 CFR 366.23; 18 CFR parts 367-
68.
    \23\ See Supplemental Policy Statement, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 
31,253 at n.48.
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    21. We will also deny the Financial Group's suggestion to eliminate 
the term ``affiliate'' from the proposed blanket authorization. 
However, we clarify that the term affiliate for purposes of the blanket 
authorization does not refer to the PUHCA 2005 definition of affiliate, 
but rather, to the definition we adopt in the Affiliate Transactions 
Final Rule issued concurrently with this Final Rule. As discussed in 
the Affiliate Transactions Final Rule, we find it appropriate to 
explicitly incorporate the PUHCA 1935 definition of affiliate for 
EWGs.\24\ We also adopt the PUHCA 1935 definition of affiliate for non-
EWGs, but with adjustments to reflect our previously used 10 percent 
voting interest threshold for non-EWGs and to eliminate certain 
language not applicable or necessary in the context of the FPA.\25\ 
Accordingly, this definition applies for purposes of the blanket 
authorizations adopted under section 203.
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    \24\ 16 U.S.C. 824m.
    \25\ See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., 72 FERC ] 
61,082, at 61,436-37 (1995).
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    22. Finally, with regard to the Oklahoma Commission's request for 
language that would allow state commissions to continue to receive 
notices of investigations of regulated public utilities, we note that 
it previously has not been the practice of the Office of Enforcement to 
inform state commissions of investigations that it is conducting.
    Section 1b.9 of our regulations requires that all investigative 
proceedings shall be treated as non-public by the Commission and its 
staff except to the extent that the Commission authorizes public 
disclosure, the matter is made a matter of public record during an 
adjudicatory proceeding, or disclosure is required under the Freedom of 
Information Act.\26\ The Commission concludes that the disclosure of 
such information could impede the willingness of market participants to 
self-report and otherwise cooperate in investigations. As such, we 
decline to grant the Oklahoma Commission's request.\27\
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    \26\ 18 CFR 1b.9.
    \27\ Our determination on this issue is also stated in the 
concurrently-issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket Nos. 
AD07-7-000 and RM07-19-000 (Wholesale Competition in Regions with 
Organized Electric Markets) with regard to releasing information to 
state commissions on referrals by market monitoring units to the 
Commission for investigation.
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2. Reconciling the Proposed Blanket Authorization With the Presumption 
Provided in the Supplemental Policy Statement
a. Comments
    23. Both the Financial Group and EEI question whether the blanket 
authorization is necessary in light of the

[[Page 11007]]

Supplemental Policy Statement that creates a presumption of no transfer 
of control for security transfers of under 10 percent of a company's 
securities. They state that absent such a change in control, the 
Commission has indicated that a sale of securities is not a transaction 
subject to section 203(a)(1) jurisdiction. If that is the case, EEI 
questions why there should be a blanket authorization covering security 
transfers of up to 10 percent from utility companies to holding 
companies.
    24. EEI also states that it assumes that the proposed blanket 
authorization is meant to supplement and not modify other blanket 
authorizations and clarifications so, for example, the new 
authorization would apply as to securities transfers only in excess of 
$10 million.
    25. Mirant contends that, absent the Blanket Authorization NOPR, no 
pre-approval would be required from the Commission for a public utility 
to transfer up to 10 percent of voting securities, though it recognizes 
the ``possibility'' that there is a presumption that control could be 
exercised over the management or policies of the public utility. 
Accordingly, it states that the Commission should adopt the proposed 
blanket authorization to remove the presumption that exists in the 
Supplemental Policy Statement with respect to transfers of voting 
securities from a public utility to a public utility holding company. 
It further contends that the proposed blanket authorization will remove 
the inconsistency in the filing requirements between holding companies 
and public utilities.
b. Commission Determination
    26. The Commission provided guidance in the Supplemental Policy 
Statement that a transfer of less than 10 percent would be rebuttably 
presumed not to be a transfer of control in order to assist applicants 
in determining the need for prior authorization under section 203, not 
to define the scope or limit of our jurisdiction. We agree with 
commenters that if there is no change in control of a public utility as 
a result of the transfer of a public utility's securities, then the 
public utility has not ``otherwise disposed'' of its jurisdictional 
facilities under section 203(a)(1)(A) and no Commission authorization 
is required. However, as the Commission stressed in the Supplemental 
Policy Statement, we cannot make an ex ante determination regarding 
what is control for purposes of the Commission's section 203 analysis 
absent facts of a specific case. The circumstances that convey control 
vary depending on a variety of factors, including the transaction 
structure, the nature of voting rights and/or contractual rights and 
obligations conveyed in the transaction. Because of the possibility 
that transfers of up to 10 percent could result in a change in control, 
the rebuttable presumption in the Supplemental Policy Statement and the 
blanket authorization should help eliminate uncertainties. Moreover, we 
view the ``in aggregate'' limitation in the blanket authorization as 
important to ensure that companies do not circumvent section 
203(a)(1)(A) through multiple dispositions of less than 10 percent.
    27. In response to EEI, we clarify that the new blanket 
authorization in this Final Rule is meant to supplement and not modify 
other blanket authorizations and clarifications in the Order No. 669 
series. We also clarify that, consistent with the statute, it applies 
only to section 203(a)(1)(A) transfers of securities of a value in 
excess of $10 million.
3. Reporting Requirement
    28. In the Blanket Authorization NOPR, the Commission sought 
comment on whether, in association with the proposed blanket 
authorization, additional reporting by the public utility should be 
required.
a. Comments
    29. Most commenters, including EEI, the Financial Group, Mirant, 
and the Oklahoma Commission argue that the Commission should not impose 
a reporting requirement associated with the proposed blanket 
authorization. These commenters contend that no additional reporting 
obligation is required because the relevant information will be 
submitted by the holding company that is acquiring the securities.
    30. EEI argues that if the Commission expands the proposed blanket 
authorization to cover jurisdictional transfer of securities by public 
utilities to other entities, the Commission may wish to impose a 
counterpart to the 18 CFR 33.1(c)(4) holding company reporting 
requirement on the public utility, but should do so only for those 
transactions not already covered by Sec.  33.1(c)(4).
    31. The Oklahoma Commission also argues that additional reporting 
is not needed. However, the Oklahoma Commission proposes that the 
relevant state commission be notified of additional reviews or requests 
about individual public utilities' current acquisition information. The 
Oklahoma Commission also urges the Commission to add language that 
states that section 203 does not preempt applicable state law 
concerning reporting requirements, which would further protect the 
interest and authority of state commissions.
    32. In contrast, APPA/NRECA argue that the Commission should 
require a public utility to report on all dispositions of its 
securities undertaken pursuant to the blanket authorization. APPA/NRECA 
argue that the reporting burden is minimal and that the Commission 
should not have to (and, in fact, may not be able to) piece together 
this information from existing reports.
b. Commission Determination
    33. We will not require additional reporting requirements at this 
time. In the Blanket Authorization NOPR, the Commission proposed not to 
impose additional reporting requirements because existing regulations 
require the submission of schedules and forms that are also provided to 
the SEC.\28\ While we agree with APPA/NRECA that additional reporting 
requirements might provide greater efficiency to the Commission, at 
this time we believe the potential reporting burden on public utilities 
outweighs the possible efficiency gains.
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    \28\ For example, the Commission already requires the holding 
company to provide to the Commission copies of any Schedule 13D, 
Schedule 13G and Form 13F, at the same time and on the same basis, 
as filed with the SEC in connection with securities purchased, 
acquired or taken pursuant to the blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(2) provided in Sec.  33.1(c)(2) of the Commission's 
regulations. 18 CFR 33.1(c)(4).
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    34. We clarify, as requested by the Oklahoma Commission, that 
section 203 does not preempt applicable state law concerning reporting 
requirements. With regard to the Oklahoma Commission's request that 
state commissions be notified of additional reviews or requests about 
individual public utilities' current acquisition information, to the 
extent that such reviews or requests relate to an investigation, they 
are subject to the Commission's rules governing investigations as 
described supra. However, if the reviews or requests are made as the 
result of a public inquiry, such notification may be made. For example, 
the Commission's Division of Audits in the Office of Enforcement has 
provided notice of public final audit reports of jurisdictional 
companies to affected states. We continue to encourage our audits staff 
to continue this practice.

[[Page 11008]]

B. Expansion of the Proposed Blanket Authorization

1. Blanket Authorization to ``Parallel'' Those Granted Under Section 
203(a)(2)
a. Comments
    35. The Blanket Authorization NOPR also requested comments on 
whether the proposed blanket authorization under section 203(a)(1) 
should be extended to the transfer of securities by a public utility to 
a holding company granted a blanket authorization: (1) Sec.  33.1(c)(8) 
for a person that is a holding company solely with respect to owning 
one or more EWGs, FUCOs, or QFs to acquire the securities of additional 
EWGs, FUCOs, or QFs; (2) Sec.  33.1(c)(9) for a bank holding company or 
subsidiary that is regulated by the Federal Reserve Board or 
Comptroller of the Currency to acquire and hold an unlimited amount of 
the securities of holding companies that include a transmitting utility 
or an electric utility company if such acquisitions and holdings are in 
the normal course of business and the securities are held for certain 
identified purposes \29\; and (3) Sec.  33.1(c)(10) for a holding 
company or subsidiary to acquire public utility or holding company 
securities for underwriting or hedging purposes under certain 
conditions.\30\
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    \29\ The securities must be held: (i) As a fiduciary; (ii) as 
principal for derivatives hedging purposes incidental to the 
business of banking and it commits not to vote such securities to 
the extent they exceed 10 percent of the outstanding shares; (iii) 
as collateral for a loan; or (iv) solely for purposes of liquidation 
and in connection with a loan previously contracted for and owned 
beneficially for a period of not more than two years, with the 
following conditions and reporting requirement: The holding does not 
confer a right to control, positively or negatively, through debt 
covenants or any other means, the operation or management of the 
public utility or public utility holding company, except as to 
customary creditors' rights or as provided under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code; and the parent holding company files with the 
Commission on a public basis and within 45 days of the close of each 
calendar quarter, both its total holdings and its holdings as 
principal, each by class, unless the holdings within a class are 
less than one percent of outstanding shares, irrespective of the 
capacity in which they were held. 18 CFR 33.1(c)(9).
    \30\ For purposes of conducting underwriting activities, the 
blanket authorization is subject to the condition that holdings that 
the holding company or its subsidiary are unable to sell or 
otherwise dispose of within 45 days are to be treated as holdings as 
principal and thus subject to a limitation of 10 percent of the 
stock of any class unless the holding company or its subsidiary has 
within that period filed an application under FPA section 203 to 
retain the securities and has undertaken not to vote the securities 
during the pendency of such application; and the parent holding 
company files with the Commission on a public basis and within 45 
days of the close of each calendar quarter, both its total holdings 
and its holdings as principal, each by class, unless the holdings 
within a class are less than one percent of outstanding shares, 
irrespective of the capacity in which they were held. For purposes 
of engaging in hedging transactions, the blanket authorization is 
subject to the condition that if such holdings are 10 percent or 
more of the voting securities of a given class, the holding company 
or its subsidiary shall not vote such holdings to the extent that 
they are 10 percent or more. 18 CFR 33.1(c)(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. EEI, the Financial Group and Mirant support extension of the 
blanket authorizations. They generally argue that if holding company 
acquisitions authorized by Sec.  33.1(c)(8), (c)(9) and (c)(10) pose no 
concern warranting Commission review, counterpart public utility 
transfers subject to the same constraints should also pose no concern. 
They also argue that there is no benefit to the acquiring entity under 
a blanket authorization under section 203(a)(2) unless there is a 
reciprocal blanket authorization under section 203(a)(1).
    37. In addition, the Financial Group recommends that the Sec.  
33.1(c)(8) blanket authorization be extended to companies that will 
become holding companies only after the transaction has been 
consummated (e.g., special purpose vehicles that are created to acquire 
and hold the jurisdictional assets of another company) in order for 
those companies to take advantage of the blanket. The Financial Group 
also argues that the proposed blanket authorization under section 
203(a)(1) should be extended so that a public utility can transfer an 
unlimited amount of its securities to any entity that will acquire and 
hold such securities for the four purposes enumerated in Sec.  
33.1(c)(9). It asserts that the Commission has previously found in the 
section 203(a)(2) context that these types of transactions cannot harm 
competition or captive customers because the securities are being 
transferred for reasons other than to exercise control over the public 
utility. Thus, it argues, these transactions do not constitute a change 
in control over a public utility, which is the core focus of section 
203(a)(1). Similarly, with regard to Sec.  33.1(c)(10), the Financial 
Group argues that the proposed blanket authorization under section 
203(a)(1) should be extended to a public utility transferring its 
securities to any entity.
    38. APPA/NRECA argue against granting a parallel blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(1) for a public utility to transfer 
securities of EWGs, FUCOs or QFs (to parallel Sec.  33.1(c)(8)) or to 
transfer securities to a non-bank holding company or its subsidiary for 
purposes of engaging in hedging transactions (to parallel Sec.  
33.1(c)(10)). They argue that preauthorizing an EWG or QF that is a 
public utility to transfer all or any part of its securities to a 
holding company would enable a public utility to transfer control of 
its generation facilities to a holding company that already controls 
another public utility without Commission scrutiny of the transaction 
for competitive harm.
    39. Regarding the proposal for a section 203(a)(1) blanket 
authorization to parallel Sec.  33.1(c)(10), APPA/NRECA state that 
there is no basis for finding that transactions covered by this blanket 
are consistent with the public interest even with the 10 percent voting 
limitation imposed on the holding company.\31\ Further, they state that 
``hedging transactions'' are not defined in the regulations or in the 
NOPR, and there is no requirement that the acquiring company be in some 
business other than the utility, power or energy business, and thus no 
assurance that the hedging transaction is only incidental to the 
holding company's main business.\32\ They recommend that, however, if 
the Commission were to grant a further blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1), it should contain a 10 percent ``in aggregate'' 
limitation.
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    \31\ Under Sec.  33.1(c)(10)(ii), a holding company or its 
subsidiaries that acquire 10 percent or more of the voting 
securities of a public utility or a holding company for hedging 
transactions are limited to voting less than 10 percent of those 
securities.
    \32\ APPA/NRECA note that these problems already exist in the 
context of the blanket authorization under section 203(a)(2) 
provided in 18 CFR 3.1(c)(10)(ii).
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b. Commission Determination
    40. We will adopt the proposal to extend a blanket authorization 
under section 203(a)(1) to a public utility in circumstances where a 
holding company qualifies for, and the exercise of the blanket 
authorization is for the purpose of facilitating the transactions 
authorized under the Sec.  33.1(c)(8), 33.1(c)(9) or a 33.1(c)(10) 
blanket authorization under section 203(a)(2).
    41. As to the blanket authorization to parallel Sec.  33.1(c)(8), 
we will require that the transfer of securities by a public utility to 
a holding company under that blanket be subject to the 10 percent ``in 
aggregate'' limitation as in the proposed limited blanket authorization 
described above. We recognize that the blanket authorization we adopt 
in this Final Rule to facilitate transactions undertaken by holding 
companies under Sec.  33.1(c)(8) does not precisely parallel the 
section 203(a)(2) authorization since the section 203(a)(2) 
authorization does not include the ``in aggregate'' limitation. 
However, we believe this limitation will provide better protection 
against possible transfer of control of a public utility and the 
acquisition of generation market power by the

[[Page 11009]]

acquiring holding company without Commission approval.
    42. The Financial Group's request to extend the proposed section 
203(a)(1) blanket to public utilities transferring securities to 
entities that will become holding companies only after the transaction 
has been consummated is moot because, as discussed above, the 
``parallel'' 33.1(c)(8) blanket is restricted to cases where, after the 
transfer, the holding company and any of its associate or affiliate 
companies in aggregate will own less than 10 percent of the outstanding 
voting interests of such public utility. Therefore, the scenario 
presented by the Financial Group would not occur because an entity that 
was not previously a holding company could not become a holding company 
as a result of a transaction whereby the acquiring entity is limited to 
owning less than 10 percent of the shares of the public utility.\33\
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    \33\ Transfers of securities that result in the acquiring 
company holding less than 10 percent of the outstanding voting 
shares of a public utility would have the presumption of not being a 
change in control and, therefore, not requiring section 203(a)(1) 
authorization. See Supplemental Policy Statement, FERC Stats. & 
Regs. ] 31,253 at P 57.
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    43. As to the request for a blanket authorization under section 
203(a)(1) to parallel that granted under section 203(a)(2) in Sec.  
33.1(c)(9), we note that that authorization under section 203(a)(2) 
applies only to acquisitions by bank holding companies or subsidiaries 
that are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board or Comptroller of the 
Currency (banks) of the securities of holding companies that include 
transmitting utilities and electric utility companies if such 
acquisitions and holdings are in the normal course of the acquiring 
bank's business and are held for certain purposes. In some cases the 
entity whose securities are acquired by the bank would have an 
obligation under section 203(a)(1) to seek Commission review before 
disposing of its securities. Typically, these cases would occur when 
the disposing holding company is a public utility and is also the 
issuer of the securities being acquired by the bank for those limited 
circumstances set forth in Sec.  33.1(c)(9). As stated in Order No. 
669-A, entities that are subject to the regulatory oversight of the 
Federal Reserve Bank or the Comptroller of the Currency ``are likely to 
be significantly constrained in their use of those securities so as to 
not affect regulation, rates or competition under the FPA.'' \34\ 
Further, the Commission conditioned the authorization such that the 
holding of the securities does not confer a right to control the 
utility operation or management and required a quarterly reporting on 
the securities so held by the bank. Accordingly, we will adopt the 
proposal to extend the section 203(a)(1) blanket to a disposing holding 
company that is also a public utility. Because the entities eligible 
for the Sec.  33.1(c)(9) blanket authorization are already subject to 
numerous conditions and reporting requirements, we do not believe 
additional conditions are required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Order No. 669-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 31,214 at P 124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. With respect to the Financial Group's request that the section 
203(a)(1) blanket authorization be extended so that a public utility 
can transfer an unlimited amount of its securities to any entity that 
will acquire and hold such securities for the four enumerated purposes 
in Sec.  33.1(c)(9), we cannot be assured that protections such as 
those that are in place for entities that are subject to the regulatory 
oversight of the Federal Reserve Bank or the Comptroller of the 
Currency would apply to entities that are not subject to such 
regulatory oversight. Therefore, we will continue to evaluate requests 
for blanket authorizations for entities that are not subject to 
regulatory oversight by the Federal Reserve Bank or the Comptroller of 
the Currency to acquire public utility securities, and for a public 
utility to transfer securities to such entities, on a case-by-case 
basis when such authorizations are needed.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See Morgan Stanley, 121 FERC ] 61,060 (2007), clarified by, 
122 FERC ]61,094 (2008); The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 121 FERC ] 
61,059 (2007), clarified by, 122 FERC ] 61,005 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. As to the request for a blanket authorization under section 
203(a)(1) to facilitate the transactions authorized under Sec.  
33.1(c)(10), we grant an unlimited authorization for facilitating such 
transactions under section 203(a)(1). In granting the blanket 
authorization for the transactions for hedging purposes under section 
203(a)(2), the Commission limited the voting ability of the entity 
acquiring the securities. If the amount held is 10 percent or more of 
the relevant class, the acquiring entity is limited to voting less than 
10 percent of those securities. This existing condition on the party 
acquiring the securities for hedging purposes should be adequate to 
ensure that any disposing entity facilitating such transactions and 
requiring authorization under section 203(a)(1) does not affect a 
disposition or change in control of the issuer of the public utility 
securities.\36\
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    \36\ Order No. 669-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,214 at P 132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Blanket Authorization as to Certain Jurisdictional Contracts
    46. In the Blanket Authorization NOPR, the Commission sought 
comment as to whether the Commission should grant a blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(1) for the acquisition or 
disposition of a jurisdictional contract where neither the acquirer nor 
transferor has captive customers and the contract does not convey 
control over the operation of a generation or transmission facility.
a. Comments
    47. The Commission received comments from: APPA/NRECA and Modesto 
(referred to herein as Customers); EEI, EPSA and Mirant (referred to 
herein as Sellers); and the Financial Group. Customers oppose the 
blanket authorization, Sellers support it, and the Financial Group not 
only supports it, but proposes expanding the blanket authorization.
    48. Customers argue that the proposal would not protect 
transmission customers against cross-subsidization in the same way that 
captive wholesale and retail power customers are protected. They 
therefore propose narrowing the blanket authorization to cases where 
``neither the acquirer nor the transferor has captive customers or owns 
or provides transmission service over Commission-jurisdictional 
facilities.'' \37\ They also argue that, even if revised to include the 
situation where neither the acquirer nor the transferor has captive 
customers or owns or provides transmission service over jurisdictional 
transmission facilities, allowing an entity such as a power marketer or 
independent power producer to transfer its book of jurisdictional power 
sales contracts at any time and without the purchaser's consent (which 
may or may not be expressly in the contract) would leave the purchaser 
with no recourse other than a section 206 complaint and the burden of 
proof and costs associated therewith. They maintain that purchasers 
under the jurisdictional contract, even if not ``captive'' may be a 
load-serving entity dependent on the contract for a reliable power 
supply or to meet regulatory or contractual obligations. They also 
maintain that a purchaser would have no say in the type of entity to 
whom a seller would transfer contracts, creating the possibility that 
the entity may not be a suitable counterparty based upon factors such 
as creditworthiness or other financial criteria, or inexperience in

[[Page 11010]]

administering the functions contemplated in the subject contract. Some 
Customers suggest that transfers may result in problems similar to the 
mortgage-loan business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ APPA/NRECA Comments at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    49. Sellers support the blanket authorization provided that it 
focuses only on transactions within the Commission's jurisdiction under 
section 203, and would supplement and not override or otherwise limit 
the proposed blanket authorization to parallel Sec.  33.1(c)(2)(ii) or 
existing blanket authorizations. Sellers argue that with the stated 
constraints, the acquisition or disposition should pose no competitive 
or rate concerns or impacts on customers that would warrant case-by-
case approval because: (1) The transfer of a wholesale power contract 
which does not provide for the control of generation or transmission 
cannot affect horizontal or vertical market power; (2) the transfer of 
a wholesale power contract to a party that does not have captive 
customers cannot affect the rates of captive customers (and therefore 
has no rate or cross-subsidization impacts); and (3) the transfer of a 
wholesale power contract does not affect the Commission's ability to 
regulate the contract or the parties to the transaction. Sellers assert 
that there is no regulatory purpose served by requiring section 203 
approval for these transactions and states that it is unaware of a 
single instance where significant issues have been raised with respect 
to requests for approval of wholesale power contracts of this type. 
Further, Sellers argue that requiring pre-authorization in this 
circumstance results in delays and costs.
    50. The Financial Group also supports the additional blanket 
authorization. In addition, it suggests that the blanket authorization 
not be limited to cases where the transferor also does not have captive 
customers. The Financial Group argues that where a transferor has 
captive customers, the issue is whether the transferor would be 
transferring the contract at a below-market price, thereby depriving 
its captive customers of the full value of the contract. However, where 
the transacting parties are not affiliates, it should be assumed that 
the transferor would seek market price, regardless of whether or not it 
has captive customers. Accordingly, it proposes the following addition 
to Sec.  33.1(c): ``Any public utility is granted a blanket 
authorization under section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act to 
dispose of, transfer, or acquire a contract for the sale of electric 
energy in interstate commerce where the contract does not convey 
control over the operation of a generation or transmission facility, 
the transferor and acquirer are not affiliated, and the acquirer does 
not have captive customers.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Financial Group Comments at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Commission Determination
    51. We adopt the proposed blanket authorization with modifications 
to address commenters' concerns. We agree with Sellers that the 
transfer of a wholesale power contract which does not provide for the 
control of generation or transmission cannot affect horizontal or 
vertical market power. We also agree that, with the modification 
proposed by APPA/NRECA, the transfer of a wholesale power contract from 
one party that does not have captive customers or owns or provides 
transmission service over jurisdictional transmission facilities to 
another party that also does not have captive customers or owns or 
provides transmission service over jurisdictional transmission 
facilities cannot affect the rates of captive customers or transmission 
customers (and therefore has no rate or cross-subsidization impacts). 
However, in at least one case involving a transfer from one affiliated 
company to another, significant issues were raised with respect to 
requests for section 203 approval of wholesale power contracts of this 
type.\39\ Such transactions do not have the market discipline that is 
present in arm's-length negotiations between unaffiliated parties. 
Finally, Sellers' argument that the transfer of a wholesale power 
contract would not affect the Commission's ability to regulate the 
contract or the parties to the transaction ignores the possibility of 
the contract being transferred to a non-jurisdictional entity, in which 
case the Commission could lose the ability to regulate the contract or 
parties to the contract. Therefore, we will adopt the blanket 
authorization proposed in the Blanket Authorization NOPR, narrowing the 
blanket to apply in cases where neither the acquirer nor the transferor 
has captive customers or owns or provides transmission service over 
jurisdictional transmission facilities, and adding the following 
language to the end of the proposed blanket authorization: the parties 
to the transaction are neither associate nor affiliate companies, and 
the acquirer is a public utility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Mirant Corp., 111 FERC ] 61,425 (2005). Pursuant to its 
bankruptcy reorganization, Mirant transferred power agreements with 
PEPCO to a newly-formed entity within the corporate family.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    52. Customers argue that granting a blanket authorization for the 
transfer of such jurisdictional contracts without the purchaser's 
consent (which may or may not be expressly in the contract) would 
result in the purchaser having no say in the type of entity to whom a 
seller would transfer contracts, thus leaving the purchaser with no 
recourse other than a section 206 complaint and the burden of proof and 
costs associated therewith. We do not find that argument compelling 
because a section 203 proceeding is unlikely to be the forum for a 
purchaser to protect its interest under a contractual arrangement. The 
Commission has stated that contractual provisions are beyond the scope 
of a section 203 proceeding.\40\ Based on our experience, as discussed 
above, the transfer of such contracts, with the additional conditions 
on the purchaser and acquirer of the contracts also discussed above, 
would not adversely affect competition, rates or regulation, and would 
not result in cross-subsidization, and therefore would be consistent 
with the public interest. Moreover, whether the contracts were being 
transferred pursuant to a blanket authorization or an individual 
section 203 authorization, purchasers would be able to protect their 
interests by exercising any relevant contractual provisions and, if 
necessary, by filing a section 206 complaint. Thus, granting the 
blanket authorization does not adversely affect a purchaser's ability 
to protect its interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See, e.g., American Electric Power Service Corporation, 107 
FERC ] 61,209, at P 17 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    53. We decline to adopt the Financial Group's proposal to expand 
the blanket authorization to cover cases where the transferor does have 
captive customers but the acquirer does not. We agree with the 
Financial Group that, presumably, the transferor would seek market 
price regardless of whether or not it has captive customers. However, 
captive customers of the transferor would not necessarily receive the 
benefit from such transactions and could be faced with paying higher 
rates due to increased costs for replacement power.

C. New Requests for Clarification and/or Blanket Authorizations

1. Blanket Authorization Under Section 203(a)(1) for Public Utility 
Sales of Non-Voting Securities
a. Comments
    54. EEI argues that the Commission should disclaim jurisdiction 
under section 203(a)(1) over public utility sales of non-voting 
securities. EEI argues that such an authorization would parallel the 
authorization in 18 CFR 33.1(c)(2)(i) for holding companies to acquire 
non-voting securities, if the acquisition does not transfer control.

[[Page 11011]]

b. Commission Determination
    55. We agree that if a non-voting security does not convey control, 
its transfer is not jurisdictional under the ``or otherwise dispose'' 
provision in section 203(a)(1)(A).\41\ As the Commission stated in the 
Supplemental Policy Statement, and has recently held in case-specific 
requests for blanket authorizations under section 203(a)(1),\42\ 
transactions that do not transfer control of a public utility or 
jurisdictional facilities do not fall within the ``otherwise dispose'' 
language of section 203(a)(1)(A) and thus do not require approval under 
section 203(a)(1)(A).\43\ If a non-voting security conveys control 
(e.g., through veto rights or some other means), our requirements 
regarding transfers of control apply.
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    \41\ We note that the situation is different under section 
203(a)(2). Jurisdiction over acquisitions of securities under 
section 203(a)(2) attaches whether or not there is a transfer of 
control if the acquisition is over $10 million.
    \42\ Supplemental Policy Statement, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,253 
at P 37; see, e.g., Legg Mason, Inc., 121 FERC ] 61,061, at P 18 
(2007).
    \43\ This does not affect a public utility's responsibilities 
under sections 203(a)(1)(C) or 203(a)(1)(D), which apply to public 
utilities' acquisitions of public utility securities and generating 
facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Clarification Regarding a Public Utility's Transfer of Securities to 
Its Holding Companies
a. Comments
    56. EEI argues that the Commission should clarify that a public 
utility that is a subsidiary of a holding company may transfer its own 
securities to that holding company without a separate authorization as 
a counterpart to the 18 CFR 33.1(c)(2)(iii) authorization for holding 
companies to acquire such securities. EEI argues that because the 
holding company acquisition of such securities (which is inherently 
part of what it means to be a holding company) can result in no change 
of control, the Commission lacks jurisdiction.
b. Commission Determination
    57. We find that a public utility that is the subsidiary of a 
single holding company may transfer its own securities to that holding 
company without a separate authorization under section 203(a)(2) for 
holding companies to acquire such securities. Where a single holding 
company system already has control of a subsidiary public utility, the 
transfer of securities from that public utility to the holding company 
would not be a change in control.\44\
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    \44\ Our determination here does not affect any separate 
requirement that the public utility may have under section 204 of 
the FPA regarding the issuance of securities. 16 U.S.C. 824c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Clarification Regarding the Internal Corporate Reorganization 
Blanket Authorization
a. Comments
    58. EEI asks the Commission to discuss and/or revise the internal 
corporate reorganization blanket authorization under 18 CFR 33.1(c)(6) 
\45\ to clarify that non-traditional public utilities with market-based 
rates should not be considered traditional public utilities merely by 
ownership of incidental transmission facilities.\46\
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    \45\ This is a blanket authorization under both sections 
203(a)(1) and section 203(a)(2) for internal corporation 
reorganizations that do not result in the reorganization of a 
traditional public utility that has captive customers or that owns 
or provides transmission service over jurisdictional transmission 
facilities, and that do not present cross-subsidization issues. 18 
CFR 33.1(c)(6).
    \46\ EEI notes that it is not proposing to expand the blanket 
authorization for internal corporate reorganizations to cover the 
transfer of assets from one non-traditional public utility 
subsidiary to another, as such proposal was rejected in the 
Supplemental Policy Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    59. EEI states that while the Commission has clarified that the 
blanket authorization in 18 CFR 33.1(c)(6) allows ``upstream'' 
reorganizations of ``non-traditional public utilities,'' the blanket 
authorization does not allow the reorganization of a traditional public 
utility. EEI states that to qualify as a non-traditional public utility 
under the language of Sec.  33.1(c)(6), the entity may not ``own or 
provide transmission service over jurisdictional transmission 
facilities.''
    60. According to EEI, because many non-traditional utilities, 
including EWGs and others with market-based rates, own some incidental 
jurisdictional transmission facilities (e.g., step-up transformers), 
the blanket authorization rule for internal corporate reorganizations 
may unnecessarily restrict the reorganization of what otherwise would 
clearly be a non-traditional public utility. EEI argues that ownership 
of step-up transformers or other incidental transmission facilities 
should not change the fact that case-by-case approval by the Commission 
is unnecessary for the reorganization of such otherwise non-traditional 
utilities with no captive customers and whose reorganization would pose 
no cross-subsidization issues and would not change the ultimate control 
of the entities.
b. Commission Determination
    61. We grant EEI's request for clarification. The term 
``traditional public utility,'' as used in the Order No. 669 rulemaking 
proceeding was taken from prior Commission orders where the term was 
used to refer to utilities with franchised service territories.\47\ In 
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking prior to issuance of Order No. 669, 
the Commission further noted that, ``[i]n the context of considering 
cross-subsidization or affiliate abuse concerns associated with power 
transactions between public utility affiliates, the Commission has 
differentiated between utility activities and non-utility activities 
according to whether they were being conducted by a public utility with 
captive wholesale or retail customers served under cost-based rates 
(sometimes described as a `traditional public utility').'' \48\ In 
Order No. 669, the Commission continued to implicitly define 
traditional utility as a public utility with wholesale or retail 
customers served under cost-based regulation.\49\ Thus, EWGs and other 
utilities that do not have franchised service territories are not 
considered to be ``traditional public utilities'' in the first 
instance, and therefore, their ownership of merely incidental 
transmission facilities does not make such a utility a traditional 
public utility by virtue of its ownership of those facilities.
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    \47\ See, e.g., Sierra Pacific Power Co., 95 FERC ] 61,193, at 
61,178-79 (2001).
    \48\ Transactions Subject to FPA Section 203, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,589, at P 43 (2005). In Order 
No. 669, the Commission continued to define ``traditional public 
utility'' as those with wholesale or retail customers served under 
cost-based regulation. Order No. 669, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,200 
at P 169.
    \49\ Order No. 669, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,200 at P 169.
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D. Clarification of the Definition of ``Captive Customer''

    62. In considering the comments in this docket, in response to the 
Affiliate Transactions NOPR and on rehearing of the Market-Based Rate 
Final Rule, and in reviewing the use of the definition of captive 
customers in our other rules, we believe it appropriate to modify the 
definition of captive customers to make explicit what was only implicit 
in our earlier rules--that the definition is intended to apply to 
customers served by a franchised public utility under cost-based 
regulation. Accordingly, the Commission will revise the definition of 
captive customers in 18 CFR 33.1(b)(5) to mean any wholesale or retail 
electric energy customers served by a franchised public utility under 
cost-based regulation.

V. Information Collection Statement

    63. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) regulations require 
that OMB approve certain information collection and data retention

[[Page 11012]]

requirements imposed by agency rules.\50\ The information collection 
requirements in this Final Rule are identified under the Commission's 
data collection, FERC-519, ``Applications Under Federal Power Act 
Section 203.'' Under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995,\51\ the reporting requirements in this rulemaking will be 
submitted to OMB for review.
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    \50\ 5 CFR 1320.
    \51\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
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    64. The ``public protection'' provisions of the Paperwork Reduction 
of 1995 require each agency to display a currently valid control number 
and inform respondents that a response is not required unless the 
information collection displays a valid OMB control number on each 
information collection or provides a justification as to why the 
information collection control number cannot be displayed. In the case 
of information collections published in regulations, the control number 
is to be published in the Federal Register.
    Public Reporting Burden: As the Commission stated in the Blanket 
Authorization NOPR, the regulations should have a minimal impact on the 
current reporting burden associated with an individual application, as 
they do not substantially change the filing requirements with which 
section 203 applicants must currently comply. Further, the Commission 
does not expect the total number of section 203 applications under 
amended section 203 to increase, but rather expects the total number of 
section 203 applications to decrease. This is because the regulations 
provide categories of jurisdictional transactions for which the 
Commission would not require applications seeking before-the-fact 
approval. This would reduce the burden on the electric industry because 
it will reduce the number of applications that need to be made to the 
Commission. The Commission received eight comments on the Blanket 
Authorization NOPR and no entity specifically addressed the 
Commission's information collection statement.
    The Commission is submitting a copy of this Final Rule to OMB for 
review and approval. In their notice of November 28, 2007, OMB took no 
action on the Blanket Authorization NOPR, instead deferring their 
approval until review of the Final Rule.
    Title: FERC-519, ``Application Under the Federal Power Act, Section 
203.''
    Action: Revised Collection.
    OMB Control No: 1902-0082.
    The applicant will not be penalized for failure to respond to this 
information collection unless the information collection displays a 
valid OMB control number or the Commission has provided justification 
as to why the control number should not be displayed.
    Respondents: Businesses or other for profit.
    Frequency of Responses: N/A.
    Necessity of the Information: This Final Rule codifies limited 
blanket authorizations under FPA section 203(a)(1), providing for 
categories of jurisdictional transactions under section 203(a)(1) for 
which the Commission would not require applications seeking before-the-
fact approval.
    Internal Review: The Commission has conducted an internal review of 
the public reporting burden associated with the collection of 
information and assured itself, by means of internal review, that there 
is specific, objective support for its information burden estimate.
    65. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 
First Street, NE., Washington, DC, 20426 [Attention: Michael Miller, 
Office of the Executive Director, Phone (202) 502-8415, fax (202) 273-
0873, e-mail: michael.miller@ferc.gov]. Comments on the requirements of 
the Final Rule may also be sent to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 
20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, fax (202) 395-7285, e-mail oira_submission@omb.eop.gov].

VI. Environmental Analysis

    66. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\52\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this 
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment.\53\ The Final Rule is categorically excluded as it 
``do[es] not substantially change the effect of legislation or 
regulations being amended'' and addresses actions under section 
203.\54\ Accordingly, no environmental assessment is necessary and none 
has been prepared in this Final Rule.
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    \52\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & 
Regs., Regulations Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
    \53\ 18 CFR 380.4.
    \54\ See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(16).
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VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    67. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \55\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of Final Rules that will have 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.\56\ However, the RFA does not define ``significant'' or 
``substantial.'' Instead, the RFA leaves it up to an agency to 
determine the effect of its regulations on small entities.
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    \55\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
    \56\ The RFA definition of ``small entity'' refers to the 
definition provided in the Small Business Act, which defines a 
``small business concern'' as a business that is independently owned 
and operated and that is not dominant in its field of operation. 15 
U.S.C. 632. The Small Business Size Standards component of the North 
American Industry Classification System defines a small electric 
utility as one that, including its affiliates, is primarily engaged 
in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric 
energy for sale and whose total electric output for the preceding 
fiscal year did not exceed 4 million MWh. 13 CFR 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    68. Most filing companies regulated by the Commission do not fall 
within the RFA's definition of small entity.\57\ Moreover, as noted 
above, this Final Rule codifies blanket authorizations under FPA 
section 203(a)(1), providing for categories of jurisdictional 
transactions under section 203(a)(1) for which the Commission would not 
require before-the-fact approval. Thus, filing requirements are reduced 
by the rule. Therefore, the Commission certifies that the Final Rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. As a result, no regulatory flexibility analysis is 
required.
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    \57\ 5 U.S.C. 601(3), citing to section 3 of the Small Business 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 632. Section 3 of the Small Business Act defines a 
``small-business concern'' as a business which is independently 
owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of 
operation.
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VIII. Document Availability

    69. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's 
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington DC 20426.
    70. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is 
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on 
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or 
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket 
number excluding the last three

[[Page 11013]]

digits of this document in the docket number field.
    71. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web 
site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-502-
6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at 
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

IX. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    72. These regulations are effective March 31, 2008. The Commission 
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a 
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 33

    Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Securities.

    By the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends Part 33, 
Chapter I, Title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, to read as follows:

PART 33--APPLICATIONS UNDER FEDERAL POWER ACT SECTION 203.

0
1. The authority citation for part 33 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 
U.S.C. 7101-7352; Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.

0
2. In Sec.  33.1, paragraph (b)(5) is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  33.1  Applicability, definitions, and blanket authorizations.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) For purposes of this part, the term captive customers means any 
wholesale or retail electric energy customers served by a franchised 
public utility under cost-based regulation.

0
3. In Sec.  33.1, paragraphs (c)(12) through (c)(15) are added to read 
as follows:

Sec.  33.1  Applicability, definitions, and blanket authorizations.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (12) A public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act to transfer its outstanding 
voting securities to any holding company granted blanket authorizations 
in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section if, after the transfer, the 
holding company and any of its associate or affiliate companies in 
aggregate will own less than 10 percent of the outstanding voting 
interests of such public utility.
    (13) A public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act to transfer its outstanding 
voting securities to any holding company granted blanket authorization 
in paragraph (c)(8) of this section if, after the transfer, the holding 
company and any of its associate or affiliate companies in aggregate 
will own less than 10 percent of the outstanding voting interests of 
such public utility.
    (14) A public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act to transfer its outstanding 
voting securities to any holding company granted blanket authorization 
in paragraph (c)(9) of this section.
    (15) A public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act to transfer its outstanding 
voting securities to any holding company granted blanket authorization 
in paragraph (c)(10) of this section.
    (16) A public utility is granted a blanket authorization under 
section 203(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act for the acquisition or 
disposition of a jurisdictional contract where neither the acquirer nor 
transferor has captive customers or owns or provides transmission 
service over jurisdictional transmission facilities, the contract does 
not convey control over the operation of a generation or transmission 
facility, the parties to the transaction are neither associate nor 
affiliate companies, and the acquirer is a public utility.

 [FR Doc. E8-3812 Filed 2-28-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P