Document ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-2002
Agency: epa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs under the Clean Air Act
Posted Date: 2019-12-19T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 244 (Thursday, December 19, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 69834-69916]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-25974]

[[Page 69833]]

Vol. 84

Thursday,

No. 244

December 19, 2019

Part II

 Environmental Protection Agency

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40 CFR Part 68

 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs 
Under the Clean Air Act; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 244 / Thursday, December 19, 2019 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 69834]]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 68

[EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725; FRL-10002-69-OLEM]
RIN 2050-AG95

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management 
Programs Under the Clean Air Act

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is revising 
regulations that are designed to reduce the risk of accidental releases 
of hazardous chemicals. These regulations are part of the EPA's Risk 
Management Program (RMP), which the Agency established under authority 
in the Clean Air Act and recently amended on January 13, 2017. After a 
process of reconsidering several parts of the 2017 rule, EPA has 
concluded that a better approach is to improve the performance of a 
subset of facilities by achieving greater compliance with RMP 
regulations instead of imposing additional regulatory requirements on 
the larger population of facilities that is generally performing well 
in preventing accidental releases. For this and other reasons, EPA is 
rescinding recent amendments to these regulations that we no longer 
consider reasonable or practicable relating to safer technology and 
alternatives analyses, third-party audits, incident investigations, 
information availability, and several other minor regulatory changes. 
EPA is also modifying regulations relating to local emergency 
coordination, emergency response exercises, and public meetings. In 
addition, the Agency is changing compliance dates for some of these 
provisions.

DATES: This final rule is effective on December 19, 2019.

ADDRESSES: The EPA has established a docket for this action under 
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725. All documents in the docket are 
listed on the http://www.regulations.gov website. Although listed in 
the index, some information is not publicly available, e.g., 
Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other information whose 
disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain other material, such as 
copyrighted material, is not placed on the internet and will be 
publicly available only in hard copy form. Publicly available docket 
materials are available electronically through http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Belke, United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Land and Emergency 
Management, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW (Mail Code 5104A), Washington, DC 
20460; telephone number: (202) 564-8023; email address: 
belke.jim@epa.gov, or: William Noggle, United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Land and Emergency Management, 1200 
Pennsylvania Ave. NW (Mail Code 5104A), Washington, DC 20460; telephone 
number: (202) 566-1306; email address: noggle.william@epa.gov.
    Electronic copies of this document and related news releases are 
available on EPA's website at http://www.epa.gov/rmp. Copies of this 
final rule are also available at http://www.regulations.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Good cause finding. The EPA finds that there 
is good cause under Administrative Procedures Act (APA) section 
553(d)(3) for this rule to become effective on the date of publication 
of this action. Section 553(d)(3) of the APA allows an effective date 
of less than 30 days after publication ``as otherwise provided by the 
agency for good cause found and published with the rule.'' 5 U.S.C. 
553(d)(3). The purpose of the 30-day waiting period prescribed in APA 
section 553(d)(3) is to give affected parties a reasonable time to 
adjust their behavior and prepare before the final rule takes effect. 
Most provisions of this final rule rescind regulatory requirements or 
revise regulatory requirements that sources are not yet required to 
comply with. The rule does not create any new regulatory requirements 
such that affected parties would need time to prepare before the rule 
takes effect. For these reasons, the EPA finds good cause under APA 
section 553(d)(3) for this rule to become effective on the date of 
publication of this action.
    Acronyms and abbreviations. We use multiple acronyms and terms in 
this preamble. While this list may not be exhaustive, to ease the 
reading of this preamble and for reference purposes, the EPA defines 
the following terms and acronyms here:

AAH Air Alliance Houston
ACC American Chemistry Council
BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
CAA Clean Air Act
CAAA Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
CalARP California Accidental Release Prevention
CBI confidential business information
CCC Contra Costa County
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CSB U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CSAG Chemical Safety Advocacy Group
CSISSFRRA Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels 
Regulatory Relief Act
CVI Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DOL Department of Labor
DOT Department of Transportation
EJ environmental justice
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Emergency Planning & Community Right-To-Know Act
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FR Federal Register
ICR information collection request
ICS Incident Command System
ISD inherently safer design
ISO Industrial Safety Ordinance
ISSA inherently safer systems analysis
IST inherently safer technology
LEPC local emergency planning committee
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NAICS North American Industrial Classification System
NESHAP National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NIMS National Incident Management System
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NSI National Security Information
NRC National Response Center
OCA offsite consequences analysis
OLEM Office of Land and Emergency Management
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
PHA process hazard analysis
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
PSI process safety information
PSM Process Safety Management
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RFI request for information
RMP Risk Management Program or risk management plan
RTC Response to Comments
SBAR Small Business Advocacy Review
SBREFA Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
SDS safety data sheet
SSI Sensitive Security Information
STAA safer technology and alternatives analysis
TCPA Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act
TCEQ Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
TQ threshold quantity
TRI Toxic Release Inventory
TURA Toxic Use Reduction Act
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
U.S.C. United States Code

[[Page 69835]]

USCA United States Court of Appeals
US SOC United States Special Operations Command

    Organization of this document. The contents of this preamble are:

I. General Information
    A. What is the Risk Management Program?
    B. Does this action apply to me?
    C. What action is the Agency taking?
    D. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?
    E. What are the incremental costs and benefits of taking this 
action?
    F. What are the procedures for judicial review?
II. Background
    A. Overview of EPA's Risk Management Program Regulations
    B. Events Leading to This Action
    C. EPA's Authority To Reconsider and Revise the 2017 RMP 
Amendments Rule
    D. EPA's Principal Rationale for Final Rule Actions
III. General Comments and Legal Authority
    A. Discussion of Comments on Procedural Requirements
    B. Discussion of Comments on EPA's Substantive Authority Under 
CAA Section 112(r)
    C. Discussion of General Comments on Costs and Benefits
IV. Rescinded Incident Investigation, Third-Party Audit, Safer 
Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA), and Other Prevention 
Program Amendments
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
V. Rescinded and Modified Information Availability Amendments
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
VI. Modified Local Coordination Amendments
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
VII. Modified Exercise Amendments
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
VIII. Revised Emergency Response Contacts Provided in Risk 
Management Plan
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
IX. Revised Compliance Dates
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
X. Corrections to Cross Referenced CFR Sections
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
XI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
    A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and 
Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
    B. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
    D. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
    E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
    F. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
    G. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With 
Indian Tribal Governments
    H. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From 
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
    I. Executive Order 13211: Actions That Significantly Affect 
Energy Supply, Distribution or Use
    J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)
    K. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations
    L. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

I. General Information

A. What is the Risk Management Program?

    The Risk Management Program regulations (40 CFR part 68) aim to 
prevent or minimize the consequences of accidental chemical releases. 
These regulations require facilities that use, manufacture and store 
particular hazardous chemicals to implement management program elements 
that integrate technologies, procedures, and management practices. In 
addition, the RMP rule requires covered sources to submit (to EPA) a 
document summarizing the source's risk management program--called a 
risk management plan (or RMP).

B. Does this action apply to me?

    This rule applies to those facilities (referred to as ``stationary 
sources'' under the CAA) that are subject to the chemical accident 
prevention requirements at 40 CFR part 68. This includes stationary 
sources holding more than a threshold quantity (TQ) of a regulated 
substance in a process. Table 1 provides industrial sectors and the 
associated North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 
codes for entities potentially affected by this action.
    The Agency's goal is to provide a guide for readers to consider 
regarding entities that potentially could be affected by this action. 
However, this action may affect other entities not listed in this 
table. If you have questions regarding the applicability of this action 
to a particular entity, consult the person(s) listed in the 
introductory section of this action under the heading entitled FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

     Table 1--Industrial Sectors and Associated NAICS Codes for Entities Potentially Affected by This Action
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                           Sector                                                 NAICS code
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Administration of Environmental Quality Programs...........  924
Agricultural Chemical Distributors:
    Crop Production........................................  111
    Animal Production and Aquaculture......................  112
    Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry Farm...  115
    Supplies Merchant Wholesalers..........................  42491
Chemical Manufacturing.....................................  325
Chemical and Allied Products Merchant Wholesalers..........  4246
Food Manufacturing.........................................  311
Beverage Manufacturing.....................................  3121
Oil and Gas Extraction.....................................  211
Other \1\..................................................  44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 61, 72
Other manufacturing........................................  313, 326, 327, 33
Other Wholesale:
    Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods....................  423
    Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods.................  424
Paper Manufacturing........................................  322
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing..................  324
Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant Wholesalers......  4247

[[Page 69836]]

 
Utilities..................................................  221
Warehousing and Storage....................................  493
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C. What action is the Agency taking?
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    \1\ For descriptions of NAICS codes, see http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch.
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1. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
    The purpose of this action is to make changes to the Risk 
Management Program regulations (40 CFR part 68) to reduce chemical 
facility accidents without disproportionately increasing compliance 
costs or otherwise imposing regulatory requirements that are not 
reasonable or practicable. This rule addresses issues raised in three 
petitions for EPA to reconsider amendments EPA made to the RMP 
regulations in 2017 and other issues that EPA believed warranted 
reconsideration.
    On January 13, 2017, the EPA issued a final rule (82 FR 4594) 
amending 40 CFR part 68, the chemical accident prevention provisions 
under section 112(r) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)). The 2017 rule 
addressed various aspects of risk management programs, including 
prevention programs at stationary sources, emergency response 
preparedness requirements, information availability, and various other 
changes to clarify and otherwise technically correct the underlying 
rules. This rulemaking is known as the ``Risk Management Program 
Amendments'' or ``RMP Amendments'' rule.
    Prior to the RMP Amendments rule taking effect, EPA received three 
petitions for reconsideration of the rule under CAA section 
307(d)(7)(B), two from industry groups \2\ and one from a group of 
states.\3\ Under that provision, the Administrator is to commence a 
reconsideration proceeding if, in the Administrator's judgement, the 
petitioner raises an objection to a rule that was impracticable to 
raise during the comment period or if the grounds for the objection 
arose after the comment period but within the period for judicial 
review. In either case, to convene a proceeding for reconsideration, 
the Administrator must also conclude that the objection is of central 
relevance to the outcome of the rule.
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    \2\ RMP Coalition's Petition for Reconsideration and Request for 
Agency Stay Pending Reconsideration of Final RMP rule (82 FR 4594, 
January 13, 2017), February 28, 2017. Hogan Lovells US LLP, 
Washington, DC. Document ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0759 and Chemical 
Safety Advocacy Group (CSAG)'s Petition and Reconsideration and Stay 
Request of the Final RMP rule (82 FR 4594, January 13, 2017) March 
13, 2017, Hunton & Williams, San Francisco, CA, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-
0725-0766 and EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0765 (supplemental petition).
    \3\ Petition for Reconsideration and Stay on behalf of States of 
Louisiana, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky with respect to Risk Management Program Final Rule, (82 FR 
4594, January 13, 2017), March 14, 2017. State of Louisiana, 
Department of Justice, Attorney General. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0762.
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    In a letter dated March 13, 2017, the Administrator responded to 
the first of the reconsideration petitions received by announcing the 
convening of a proceeding for reconsideration of the RMP Amendments.\4\ 
As explained in that letter, having considered the objections raised in 
the petition, the Administrator determined that the criteria for 
reconsideration had been met for at least one of the objections. This 
action addresses the issues raised in all three petitions for 
reconsideration, as well as other issues that EPA believed warranted 
reconsideration.
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    \4\ EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0758.
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2. Summary of the Provisions of the Regulatory Action
    The major provisions of this rule include rescinding amendments 
made to the Risk Management Program in 2017 relating to safer 
technology and alternatives analyses, third-party audits, incident 
investigations, information availability, and several other minor 
provisions. EPA is also modifying regulations relating to local 
emergency coordination, emergency response exercises, and public 
meetings after an accident, changing the compliance dates for some of 
these provisions and modifying risk management plan and air permit 
requirements relating to rescinded or modified provisions.
a. Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions
    This action rescinds almost all the requirements added in 2017 to 
the accident prevention program provisions of Subparts C (for Program 2 
processes) and D (for Program 3 processes). EPA is rescinding all 
requirements for third-party compliance audits (Sec. Sec.  68.58, 
68.59, 68.79 and 68.80), safer technology and alternatives analysis 
(STAA) (Sec.  68.67(c)(8)) for facilities with Program 3 regulated 
processes in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and 
coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing) and 
removing the words ``for each covered process'' from the compliance 
audit provisions in Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.79. This action also 
rescinds the requirement in Sec.  68.50(a)(2) for the hazard review to 
include findings from incident investigations. For incident 
investigations (Sec. Sec.  68.60 and 68.81), this action rescinds the 
following requirements added in 2017:

    1. Conducting root cause analysis;
    2. Added data elements for incident investigation reports, 
including a schedule to address recommendations and a 12-month 
completion deadline, and
    3. Investigating any incident resulting in a catastrophic 
release that also results in the affected process being 
decommissioned or destroyed.

    In Sec. Sec.  68.60 and 68.81, EPA is also removing text ``(i.e., 
was a near miss)'' that EPA added in 2017 to describe an incident that 
could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. In Sec.  
68.60, EPA is retaining the term ``report(s)'' instead of replacing 
with the word ``summary(ies)'' and is retaining the requirement for 
Program 2 processes to establish an incident investigation team 
consisting of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved 
and other persons with experience to investigate an incident.
    This action removes the language added to the Program 2 (Sec.  
68.54) and Program 3 (Sec.  68.71) training requirements, which more 
explicitly included supervisors and others involved in operating a 
process. This action also rescinds minor wording changes in Sec.  68.54 
describing employees involved in operating a process. EPA is also 
rescinding the requirement in Sec.  68.65 for the owner or operator to 
keep process safety information up-to-date and the requirement in Sec.  
68.67(c)(2) for the process hazard analysis to address the findings 
from all incident investigations required under Sec.  68.81, as well as 
any other potential failure scenarios. EPA will retain two changes that 
revised the term ``Material Safety Data Sheets'' to ``Safety Data 
Sheets (SDS)'' in Sec. Sec.  68.48 and 68.65.

[[Page 69837]]

    This action rescinds the following definitions in Sec.  68.3: 
Active measures, inherently safer technology or design, passive 
measures, practicability, and procedural measures related to amendments 
to requirements in Sec.  68.67; root cause related to amendments to 
requirements in Sec.  68.60 and Sec.  68.81; and third-party audit 
related to amendments to requirements in Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.79 and 
added in Sec. Sec.  68.59 and 68.80.
b. Emergency Response Provisions
    This action modifies the local emergency response coordination 
amendments by replacing the phrase in Sec.  68.93(b) that requires 
facilities to share information that local emergency planning and 
response organizations identify as relevant to local emergency response 
planning with revised language pertaining to sharing information 
necessary for developing and implementing the local emergency response 
plan.
    EPA is retaining the requirement for owners or operators to provide 
the local emergency planning and response organizations with the 
stationary source's emergency response plan (if one exists), emergency 
action plan, and updated emergency contact information, as well as the 
requirement for the owner or operator to request an opportunity to meet 
with the local emergency planning committee (or equivalent) and/or 
local fire department as appropriate to review and discuss these 
materials. EPA is also incorporating appropriate classified and 
restricted information protections to regulated substance and 
stationary source information required to be provided under Sec.  68.93 
and revising the existing classified information provision of Sec.  
68.210 to incorporate protections for restricted information identical 
to those in Sec.  68.93. Restricted information includes Sensitive 
Security Information (SSI), Protected Critical Infrastructure 
Information (PCII), Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), 
and any other information restricted by Federal statutes or laws.
    This action is modifying the exercise program provisions of Sec.  
68.96(b), by removing the minimum frequency requirement for field 
exercises. EPA is also establishing more flexible scope and 
documentation provisions for both field and tabletop exercises by only 
recommending, and not requiring, items specified for inclusion in 
exercises and exercise evaluation reports, while still requiring 
documentation of both types of exercises. This action retains the 
notification exercise requirement of Sec.  68.96(a) and the provision 
for alternative means of meeting exercise requirements of Sec.  
68.96(c).
c. Public Information Availability Provisions
    This action rescinds the requirements for providing to the public 
upon request, chemical hazard information and access to community 
emergency preparedness information in Sec.  68.210(b) through (d), as 
well as the requirement to provide specific chemical hazard information 
at public meetings required under Sec.  68.210(e).
    This action modifies the requirement in Sec.  68.210(e) [now 
redesignated as Sec.  68.210(b) because former paragraphs (b) through 
(d) are rescinded] for the owner/operator of a stationary source to 
hold a public meeting to provide accident information required under 
Sec.  68.42(b) by only requiring a public meeting following the 
occurrence of a risk management plan (or RMP \5\) reportable accident 
with offsite impacts specified in Sec.  68.42(a) (i.e., known offsite 
deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or 
environmental damage). This is a modification to the RMP Amendments 
rule that required a public meeting after any accident subject to 
reporting under Sec.  68.42, including accidents that resulted in on-
site impacts only.
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    \5\ 40 CFR part 68 is titled, ``Chemical Accident Prevention 
Provisions,'' but is more commonly known as the ``RMP regulation,'' 
the ``RMP rule,'' or the ``Risk Management Program.'' This document 
uses all three terms to refer to 40 CFR part 68. The term ``RMP'' is 
also used to refer to the document required to be submitted under 
subpart F of 40 CFR part 68, the risk management plan. See https://www.epa.gov/rmp for more information on the Risk Management Program.
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    EPA will retain the requirement that public meetings required under 
Sec.  68.210(e) [now redesignated as Sec.  68.210(b)] occur within 90 
days of an accident. EPA will also retain the change to Sec.  68.210(a) 
that added 40 CFR part 1400 as a limitation on RMP availability (part 
1400 addresses restrictions on disclosing RMP offsite consequence 
analysis information under CSISSFRRA),\6\ and the provision for control 
of classified information in Sec.  68.210(f) [now redesignated as Sec.  
68.210(c)], with a modification to address restricted information under 
the provision (e.g., PCII, SSI, and CVI). This action deletes the 
provision for CBI in Sec.  68.210(g), because the only remaining 
information required to be provided at the public meeting is the 
source's five-year accident history, which Sec.  68.151(b)(3) prohibits 
the owner or operator from claiming as CBI.
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    \6\ Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels 
Regulatory Relief Act, Public Law 106-40. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0135.
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d. Risk Management Plan
    This action rescinds requirements to report in the risk management 
plan any information associated with the rescinded provisions of third-
party audits, incident investigation, safer technology and alternatives 
analysis, and information availability to the public (except that 
pertaining to the public meeting requirement now in Sec.  68.210(b)). 
The list of RMP registration information in Sec.  68.151(b)(1) excluded 
from being claimed as CBI, is modified by the final rule to also 
exclude from CBI claims, whether a public meeting was held following an 
RMP accident, pursuant to Sec.  68.210(b). This public meeting 
reporting is to be included in the RMP under Sec.  68.160(b)(21). This 
action also slightly modifies the emergency response contact 
information required by Sec.  68.180(a)(1) to be provided in a 
facility's RMP.
e. Compliance Dates
    This action requires compliance with the revised emergency response 
coordination requirements on the effective date of the final rule. This 
action retains the compliance date for public meetings established in 
the final Amendments rule and therefore requires that the owner or 
operator comply with the revised public meeting requirements following 
any RMP reportable accident with offsite impacts specified in Sec.  
68.42(a) that occurs after March 15, 2021. This action delays the 
rule's compliance dates in Sec.  68.10 and Sec.  68.96 as follows:

    i. Emergency response exercises:
    A. Planning and Scheduling. Owners and operators will be 
required to have exercise plans and schedules meeting the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  68.93 and 68.96 in place by December 19, 
2023;
    B. Notification exercise. Perform first notification exercise by 
December 19, 2024;
    C. Perform first tabletop exercise by December 21, 2026; and
    D. Field exercise. There is no specified deadline to perform the 
first field exercise, other than that established by the owner or 
operator's exercise schedule in coordination with local response 
agencies; and
    ii. Updating risk management plan provisions for the following, 
only for initial RMP submissions or when re-submission or update for 
an existing RMP is required under Sec.  68.190:
    A. Reporting under Sec.  68.160(b)(21) after December 19, 2024, 
whether a public meeting required by Sec.  68.210(b) occurred; and
    B. Reporting after December 19, 2024, emergency response program 
information specified in Sec.  68.180 as revised by the January 13, 
2017 final Amendments rule and this final rule.

    For a detailed review of the changes from the regulatory text 
(which has the

[[Page 69838]]

2017 Amendments rule changes incorporated), EPA has provided a copy of 
40 CFR part 68 with changes shown in redline/strikeout format, which is 
available in the rulemaking docket.\7\
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    \7\ EPA. 40 CFR part 68 Regulatory Text Redline/Strikeout 
Changes for Final RMP Reconsideration Rule.
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D. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?

    The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 
112(r) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)). Each of the portions of the Risk 
Management Program rule we are modifying in this document is based on 
section 112(r) of the CAA. EPA's authority for convening a 
reconsideration proceeding for certain issues is found under CAA 
section 307(d)(7)(B) or 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(B). The Agency's 
procedures in this rulemaking are controlled by CAA section 307(d). 
EPA's authority for convening a reconsideration proceeding for certain 
issues is found under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B) or 42 U.S.C. 
7607(d)(7)(B). A more detailed explanation of these authorities can be 
found in Section II.C. of this preamble, EPA's authority to reconsider 
and revise the RMP Amendments rule.

E. What are the incremental costs and benefits of taking this action?

1. Summary of Potential Cost Savings
    Approximately 12,500 facilities have filed current RMPs with EPA 
and are potentially affected by this action. These facilities range 
from petroleum refineries and large chemical manufacturers to water and 
wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum wholesalers and 
terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage 
facilities with ammonia refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical 
distributors; midstream gas plants; and a limited number of other 
sources, including Federal installations, that use RMP regulated 
substances.
    Table 2 presents the number of facilities according to the RMP 
reporting as of February 2015 by industrial sector and chemical use.

                                Table 2--Number of Affected Facilities by Sector
                                              [As of February 2015]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Total
               Sector                             NAICS codes                facilities        Chemical uses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration of environmental      924.................................           1,923  Use chlorine and
 quality programs (i.e.,                                                                    other chemicals for
 governments).                                                                              treatment.
Agricultural chemical distributors/  111, 112, 115, 42491................           3,667  Store ammonia for
 wholesalers.                                                                               sale; some in NAICS
                                                                                            111 and 115 use
                                                                                            ammonia as a
                                                                                            refrigerant.
Chemical manufacturing.............  325.................................           1,466  Manufacture, process,
                                                                                            store.
Chemical wholesalers...............  4246................................             333  Store for sale.
Food and beverage manufacturing....  311, 312............................           1,476  Use mostly ammonia as
                                                                                            a refrigerant.
Oil and gas extraction.............  211.................................             741  Intermediate
                                                                                            processing (mostly
                                                                                            regulated flammable
                                                                                            substances and
                                                                                            flammable mixtures).
Other..............................  44, 45, 48, 54, 56, 61, 72..........             248  Use chemicals for
                                                                                            wastewater
                                                                                            treatment,
                                                                                            refrigeration, store
                                                                                            chemicals for sale.
Other manufacturing................  313, 326, 327, 33...................             384  Use various chemicals
                                                                                            in manufacturing
                                                                                            process, waste
                                                                                            treatment.
Other wholesale....................  423, 424............................             302  Use (mostly ammonia
                                                                                            as a refrigerant).
Paper manufacturing................  322.................................              70  Use various chemicals
                                                                                            in pulp and paper
                                                                                            manufacturing.
Petroleum and coal products          324.................................             156  Manufacture, process,
 manufacturing.                                                                             store (mostly
                                                                                            regulated flammable
                                                                                            substances and
                                                                                            flammable mixtures).
Petroleum wholesalers..............  4247................................             276  Store for sale
                                                                                            (mostly regulated
                                                                                            flammable substances
                                                                                            and flammable
                                                                                            mixtures).
Utilities..........................  221.................................             343  Use chlorine (mostly
                                                                                            for water
                                                                                            treatment), ammonia
                                                                                            and other chemicals.
Warehousing and storage............  493.................................           1,056  Use mostly ammonia as
                                                                                            a refrigerant.
Water/wastewater Treatment systems.  22131, 22132........................             102  Use chlorine and
                                                                                            other chemicals.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
    Total..........................  ....................................          12,542  .....................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 3 presents a summary of the annualized cost savings estimated 
in the regulatory impact analysis.\8\ In total, EPA estimates 
annualized cost savings of $87.4 million at a 3% discount rate and 
$87.8 million at a 7% discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ A full description of costs and benefits for this rule can 
be found in the Regulatory Impact Analysis--Reconsideration of the 
2017 Amendments to the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: 
Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, section 112(r)(7). 
This document is available in the docket for this rulemaking (Docket 
ID Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725).

               Table 3--Summary of Annualized Cost Savings
                        [Millions, 2015 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Provision                       3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third-party Audits......................           (9.8)           (9.8)
Incident Investigation/Root Cause.......           (1.8)           (1.8)
STAA....................................          (70.0)          (70.0)
Information Availability................           (3.1)           (3.1)
Public Meetings.........................          (0.28)          (0.28)

[[Page 69839]]

 
Rule Familiarization (net)..............           (2.4)           (2.8)
                                         -------------------------------
    Total Cost Savings *................          (87.4)          (87.8)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Values may not sum due to rounding.

    Most of the annual cost savings under this action are due to the 
repeal of the STAA provision (annual savings of $70 million), followed 
by third-party audits (annual savings of $9.8 million), information 
availability (annual savings of $3.1 million), rule familiarization 
(annual net savings of $2.8 million), root-cause incident investigation 
(annual savings of $1.8 million), and public meetings (annual savings 
of $0.28 million).
2. Summary of Potential Benefits and Benefit Reductions
    The January 2017 RMP Amendments rule was estimated to result in a 
variety of benefits from prevention and mitigation of future RMP and 
non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities, avoided catastrophes at RMP 
facilities, and easier access to facility chemical hazard information. 
This final Reconsideration rule will largely retain the revised local 
emergency coordination and exercise provisions of the RMP Amendments 
rule, which convey mitigation benefits. The rescission of the 
prevention program requirements (i.e., third-party audits, incident 
investigation, STAA), will result in a reduction in the magnitude of 
accident prevention benefits that we projected would have accrued under 
the RMP Amendments. As discussed in this notice and supporting 
documents, in developing this final rule, we have received data and 
conducted analyses that call into question whether some of the 
originally projected accident reduction benefits claimed by the Agency 
when promulgating the RMP Amendments would have been likely to occur. 
The rescission of the chemical hazard information availability 
provision will result in a reduction of the information sharing 
benefit, although a portion of this benefit from the RMP Amendments 
rule would still be conveyed by the public meeting, emergency 
coordination and exercise provisions. This action will also convey the 
benefit of improved chemical site security, by modifying previously 
open-ended information sharing provisions of the RMP Amendments rule 
that might have resulted in an increased risk of terrorism against 
regulated sources. See the RIA for additional information on benefits 
and benefit reductions.

F. What are the procedures for judicial review?

    Under CAA section 307(b)(1), judicial review of this final rule is 
available only by filing a petition for review in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the Court) by February 
18, 2020. Under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B), only an objection to this 
final rule that was raised with reasonable specificity during the 
period for public comment can be raised during judicial review.

II. Background

A. Overview of EPA's Risk Management Program Regulations

    EPA's RMP regulations were initially published in two stages. The 
Agency first published the list of regulated substances and TQs in 1994 
(59 FR4478, January 31, 1994) (the ``list rule'').\9\ EPA then 
published the RMP final regulation, containing risk management 
requirements for covered sources, in 1996 (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996) 
(the ``RMP rule'').10 11 Subsequent modifications to the 
list rule and RMP rule were made as discussed in the RMP Amendments 
rule (82 FR 4594, January 13, 2017 at 4600). Prior to development of 
EPA's 1996 RMP rule, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) published its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard in 1992 
(57 FR 6356, February 24, 1992), as required by section 304 of the 1990 
CAAA, using its authority under 29 U.S.C. 653. The OSHA PSM standard 
can be found in 29 CFR 1910.119. The EPA RMP rule and the OSHA PSM 
standard aim to prevent or minimize the consequences of accidental 
chemical releases through implementation of management program elements 
that integrate technologies, procedures, and management practices. In 
addition, the EPA RMP rule requires covered sources to submit (to EPA) 
a document summarizing the source's risk management program--called a 
risk management plan (or RMP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Documents and information related to development of the list 
rule can be found in the EPA docket for the rulemaking, docket 
number A-91-74.
    \10\ Documents and information related to development of the RMP 
rule can be found in EPA docket number A-91-73.
    \11\ 40 CFR part 68 applies to owners and operators of 
stationary sources that have more than a TQ of a regulated substance 
within a process. The regulations do not apply to chemical hazards 
other than listed substances held above a TQ within a regulated 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The EPA's risk management program requirements include the 
following: (1) Conducting a worst-case release scenario analysis, 
alternative release scenario analyses, and a review of accident 
history; (2) coordinating emergency response procedures with local 
response organizations; (3) conducting a hazard assessment; (4) 
documenting a management system; (5) implementing a prevention program 
and an emergency response program; and (6) submitting a risk management 
plan that addresses all aspects of the risk management program for all 
covered processes and chemicals. A process at a source is covered under 
one of three different prevention programs (Program1, Program 2 or 
Program 3) based on the threat posed to the community and the 
environment. Program 1 has minimal requirements and is for processes 
that have not had an accidental release with specified off-site 
consequences in the last five years prior to submission of the source's 
risk management plan, and that have no public receptors within the 
worst-case release scenario vulnerable zone for the process. Program 3 
has the most requirements and applies to processes not eligible for RMP 
Program 1 and covered by the OSHA PSM standard or classified in 
specified industrial sectors.\12\ Program 2 has fewer requirements than 
Program 3 and applies to any process not covered under Programs 1 or 3. 
Programs 2 and

[[Page 69840]]

3 both require a hazard assessment, a prevention program and an 
emergency response program, although Program 2 prevention program 
requirements are less extensive and more streamlined. For example, the 
Program 2 prevention program was intended to cover simpler processes 
located at smaller businesses and does not require the following 
process safety elements: Management of change, pre-startup review, 
contractors, employee participation and hot work permits. The Program 3 
prevention program is fundamentally identical to the OSHA PSM standard 
and designed to cover those processes in the chemical industry. For 
further explanation and comparison of the PSM standard and RMP 
requirements, see the ``Process Safety Management and Risk Management 
Plan Comparison Tool'' published by OSHA and EPA in October 2016.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See ten industry NAICS codes listed at Sec.  68.10(d)(1) 
[redesignated as Sec.  68.10(h)(1) in this final rule] representing 
pulp mills, petroleum refineries, petrochemical manufacturing, 
alkalies and chlorine manufacturing, all other basic inorganic 
chemical manufacturing, cyclic crude and intermediates 
manufacturing, all other basic chemical manufacturing, plastic 
material and resin manufacturing, nitrogenous fertilizer 
manufacturing and pesticide and other agricultural chemicals 
manufacturing.
    \13\ Available at https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/psm_terminology.html. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0922.
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B. Events Leading to This Action

1. 2017 Final Rule
    On January 13, 2017, the EPA issued a final rule amending 40 CFR 
part 68, the chemical accident prevention provisions under section 
112(r) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)) (i.e., the ``RMP Amendments'' 
rule). The RMP Amendments addressed various aspects of risk management 
programs, including prevention programs at stationary sources, 
emergency response preparedness requirements, information availability, 
and various other changes to clarify and otherwise technically correct 
the underlying rules.
a. Accident Prevention Program Requirements
    The RMP Amendments added new accident prevention program provisions 
in 40 CFR 68 Subparts C (for Program 2 processes) and D (for Program 3 
processes), including:
    i. A requirement in Sec.  68.60 and Sec.  68.81 for all facilities 
with Program 2 or 3 processes to conduct a root cause analysis using a 
recognized method as part of an incident investigation of a 
catastrophic release or an incident that could have reasonably resulted 
in a catastrophic release (i.e., a near-miss).
    ii. Requirements in Sec.  68.58 andSec.  68.79 for regulated 
facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes to contract with an 
independent third-party, or assemble an audit team led by an 
independent third-party, to perform a compliance audit after the 
facility has an RMP reportable accident or when an implementing agency 
requires a third-party audit due to conditions at the stationary source 
that could lead to an accidental release of a regulated substance, or 
when a previous third-party audit failed to meet the specified 
competency or independence criteria. Requirements were established in 
new Sec.  68.59 and Sec.  68.80 for third-party auditor competency, 
independence, and responsibilities and for third-party audit reports 
and audit findings response reports.
    iii. A requirement in Sec.  68.67(c)(8) for facilities with Program 
3 regulated processes in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 
(petroleum and coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical 
manufacturing) to conduct a safer technologies and alternatives 
analysis (STAA) as part of their process hazard analysis (PHA).
    The RMP Amendments rule also made several other minor changes to 
the Subparts C and D prevention program requirements.
b. New Emergency Response Requirements
    The RMP Amendments added new emergency response program 
requirements in 40 CFR 68 Subpart E, including:
    i. Requirements for owners or operators of ``responding'' and 
``non-responding'' stationary sources to perform emergency response 
coordination activities under new Sec.  68.93. These activities 
included coordinating response needs at least annually with local 
emergency planning and response organizations, as well as documenting 
these coordination activities.
    ii. Requirements for owners and operators of responding facilities 
to conduct exercises under a new Sec.  68.96--Emergency response 
exercises. Required exercises included annual notification exercises, 
tabletop exercises at least once every three years, and field exercises 
at least once every ten years. Exercises schedules and plans are 
required to be coordinated with local emergency response officials, and 
the owner or operator must also document completed exercises.
    The RMP Amendments also made other minor changes to the emergency 
response provisions of Subpart E.
c. New Information Availability Requirements
    The RMP Amendments added new information availability requirements 
in 40 CFR 68 Subpart H, including:
    i. A requirement for the owner or operator to provide, within 45 
days of receiving a request by any member of the public, specified 
chemical hazard information for all regulated processes. The provision 
requires the owner or operator to provide ongoing notification on a 
company website, social media platforms, or through other publicly 
accessible means that the information is available to the public upon 
request, along with the information elements that may be requested and 
instructions for how to request the information.
    ii. A requirement for the owner or operator of any facility having 
an accident meeting RMP reporting criteria to hold a public meeting 
within 90 days of the accident to provide information about the 
accident to members of the public.
    iii. New provisions in Sec.  68.210 to address classified 
information and confidential business information (CBI) claims for 
information required to be provided to the public.
    The RMP Amendments also made other minor changes to Subpart H.
d. Updated Facility Risk Management Plan Requirements
    Lastly, the RMP Amendments contained a requirement to update a 
facility's risk management plan to reflect information associated with 
new provisions, made other minor changes and technical corrections to 
40 CFR part 68, and established various compliance dates for new 
provisions. For further information on the RMP Amendments, see 82 FR 
4594 (January 13, 2017).
2. Delay-Related Actions and Requests to Reconsider
    On January 26, 2017, the EPA published a final rule delaying the 
effective date of the RMP Amendments from March 14, 2017 to March 21, 
2017, see 82 FR 8499. This revision to the effective date of the RMP 
Amendments was part of an EPA final rule implementing a memorandum 
dated January 20, 2017, from the Assistant to the President and Chief 
of Staff, entitled ``Regulatory Freeze Pending Review.'' This 
memorandum directed the heads of agencies to postpone, until 60 days 
after the date of its issuance, the effective date of rules that were 
published prior to January 20, 2017, but which had not yet become 
effective.
    In a letter dated February 28, 2017, a group known as the ``RMP 
Coalition,'' submitted a petition for reconsideration of the RMP 
Amendments (``RMP Coalition Petition'') as provided for in CAA section 
307(d)(7)(B) (42 U.S.C.7607(d)(7)(B)).\14\ Under that

[[Page 69841]]

provision, the Administrator is to commence a reconsideration 
proceeding if, in the Administrator's judgement, the petitioner raises 
an objection to a rule that was impracticable to raise during the 
comment period or if the grounds for the objection arose after the 
comment period but within the period for judicial review and if the 
objection is of central relevance to the outcome of the rule. The 
Administrator may stay the effective date of the rule for up to three 
months during such a reconsideration. On March 13, 2017, the Chemical 
Safety Advocacy Group (``CSAG'') also submitted a petition (``CSAG 
Petition'') for reconsideration and stay (including a March 14, 2017 
supplement to the CSAG Petition).\15\ On March 14, 2017, the EPA 
received a third petition for reconsideration and stay from the State 
of Louisiana, joined by Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky (the ``States Petition'').\16\ The Petitioners CSAG and 
States also requested that EPA delay the various compliance dates of 
the RMP Amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ RMP Coalition's Petition for Reconsideration and Request 
for Agency Stay Pending Reconsideration of Final RMP rule (82 FR 
4594, January 13, 2017), February 28, 2017. Hogan Lovells US LLP, 
Washington, DC. Document ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0759.
    \15\ Chemical Safety Advocacy Group (CSAG)'s Petition and 
Reconsideration and Stay Request of the Final RMP rule (82 FR 4594, 
January 13, 2017) March 13, 2017, Hunton & Williams, San Francisco, 
CA, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0766 and EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0765 
(supplemental petition).
    \16\ Petition for Reconsideration and Stay on behalf of States 
of Louisiana, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky with respect to Risk Management Program Final Rule, (82 FR 
4594, January 13, 2017), March 14, 2017. State of Louisiana, 
Department of Justice, Attorney General. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0762.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a letter dated March 13, 2017, the Administrator announced the 
convening of a proceeding for reconsideration of the Risk Management 
Program Amendments (a copy of this letter is included in the docket for 
this rule, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725).\17\ As explained in 
that letter, having considered the objections raised in the RMP 
Coalition Petition, the Administrator determined that the criteria for 
reconsideration had been met for at least one of the objections. EPA 
issued a three-month (90-day) administrative stay of the effective date 
of the Risk Management Program Amendments until June 19, 2017 (82 FR 
13968, March 16, 2017). EPA subsequently further delayed the effective 
date of the Risk Management Program Amendments until February 19, 2019, 
via notice and comment rulemaking, referred to herein as the ``Delay 
Rule'' (82 FR 27133, June 14, 2017). The purpose of the Delay Rule was 
to allow EPA to conduct a reconsideration proceeding and to consider 
other issues that may benefit from additional comment. On August 17, 
2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
issued its decision in Air Alliance Houston, et. al., v EPA, 906 F.3d 
1049 (D.C. Cir. 2018), vacating the Delay Rule, and on September 21, 
2018, the Court issued its mandate which made the RMP Amendments rule 
immediately effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0758.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. 2018 RMP Reconsideration Proposed Rule
    EPA published a proposed rulemaking to reconsider the RMP 
Amendments on May 30, 2018 (83 FR 24850). The proposed rule 
(Reconsideration proposal) proposed several changes to the RMP 
Amendments. These included:
    a. Rescinding the accident prevention program provisions of the RMP 
Amendments rule (i.e., third-party audits, STAA, incident investigation 
root cause analysis, and most other minor changes to the prevention 
program).
    b. Rescinding the public information availability provisions to 
provide chemical hazard information, exercise schedules, local 
emergency contacts and community preparedness information to the public 
upon request.
    c. Modifying the public meeting provision by retaining the 
requirement for the facility to provide accident history elements but 
eliminating the requirement to provide ``other relevant chemical hazard 
information'' at the meeting.
    d. Modifying the emergency coordination and exercise provisions of 
the Amendments rule to address security concerns raised by petitioners 
and give more flexibility to regulated facilities in complying with 
these provisions.
    e. Extending compliance dates for modified provisions to provide 
additional time for regulated sources to comply with revised 
provisions. For additional information on the proposed Reconsideration 
rule, see 83 FR 24850, May 30, 2018.
    EPA hosted a public hearing on June 14, 2018 \18\ to provide 
interested parties the opportunity to present data, views or arguments 
concerning the proposed action. EPA received a total of 77,360 public 
comments on the proposed rulemaking. Several public comments were the 
result of various mass mail campaigns and contained numerous copies of 
letters or petition signatures. Approximately 76,355 letters and 
signatures were contained in these several comments, related to 12 
different form letter campaigns. The remaining comments include 987 
submissions with unique content, 13 duplicate submissions, and 5 non-
germane submissions. Included in this count of public submissions are 
written comments and verbal comments from 38 members of the public that 
provided verbal comments at a public hearing on June 14, 2018. 
Discussion of public comments can be found in topics included in this 
final rule and in the Response to Comments document,\19\ available in 
the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See written transcript of public meeting, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-
0725-0985.
    \19\ Response to Comments on the 2018 Proposed Rule (May 30, 
2018; 83 FR 24850) Reconsidering EPA's Risk Management Program 2017 
Amendments Rule (January 13, 2017; 82 FR 4594). This document is 
available in the docket for this rulemaking, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. EPA's Authority To Reconsider and Revise the 2017 RMP Amendments 
Rule

1. Procedural Requirements for Reconsidering RMP Amendments
    Congress granted the EPA the authority for rulemaking on the 
prevention of chemical accidental releases as well as the correction or 
response to such releases in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of CAA section 
112(r)(7). The substantive scope of this authority is discussed in more 
detail in the next section. The EPA has used its authority under CAA 
section 112(r)(7) to issue the RMP Rule (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996), 
the RMP Amendments rule, and this Reconsideration rulemaking.
    When promulgating rules under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A) and (B), the 
EPA must follow the procedures for rulemaking set out in CAA section 
307(d). See CAA sections 112(r)(7)(E) and 307(d)(1)(C). Among other 
things, section 307(d) sets out requirements for the content of 
proposed and final rules, the docket for rulemakings, requirement to 
provide an opportunity for oral testimony on the proposed rulemaking, 
the length of time for comments, and judicial review. Only objections 
raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period may 
be raised during judicial review. Section 307(d) has a provision that 
requires the EPA to convene a reconsideration proceeding when the 
person makes an objection that meets specific criteria set out in

[[Page 69842]]

CAA section307(d)(7)(B). The statute provides:

    If the person raising an objection can demonstrate to the 
Administrator that it was impracticable to raise such objection 
within [the comment period] or if the grounds for such objection 
arose after the period for public comment (but within the time 
period specified for judicial review) and if such objection is of 
central relevance to the outcome of the rule, the Administrator 
shall convene a proceeding for reconsideration of the rule and 
provide the same procedural rights as would have been afforded had 
the information been available at the time the rule was proposed.

    As noted in the previous section, when several parties petitioned 
for reconsideration of the RMP Amendments, the Administrator found that 
at least one objection the petitioners raised met the specific criteria 
for mandatory reconsideration and therefore he convened a proceeding 
for reconsideration under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B). While section 
307(d)(7)(B) sets out criteria for when the Agency must conduct a 
reconsideration, the Agency has the discretion to reopen, revisit, 
amend and revise a rule under the rulemaking authority granted in CAA 
section 112(r)(7) by following the procedures of CAA 307(d) at any 
time, including while it conducts a reconsideration proceeding required 
by CAA section 307(d)(7)(B). In light of the fact that EPA must already 
grant petitioners ``the same procedural rights as would have been 
afforded had the information been available at the time the rule was 
proposed,'' it is efficient to conduct a discretionary amendment 
proceeding simultaneously with the reconsideration proceeding.
    As previously noted, EPA issued a rule delaying the effectiveness 
of the RMP Amendments in 2017 only to have the rule vacated in Air 
Alliance Houston v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Court held 
that EPA could not delay the effective date of provisions of a CAA 
section 112(r)(7) rule beyond three months for the purpose of allowing 
itself a longer period of time to conduct a CAA section 307(d)(7)(B) 
reconsideration. Id. at 1063. The Court also found EPA's action was 
inconsistent with the mandate in CAA section 112(r)(7)(A) that we set 
effective dates that ``assur[e] compliance as expeditiously as 
practicable'' when our delay of effectiveness merely delayed the 
Amendments ``based on speculation about future amendments,'' rather 
than new evidence or a new substantive conclusion regarding preventing 
accidents. Id. at 1065. Finally, the Court found EPA's reasoning to be 
arbitrary and capricious because we failed to explain why the rule 
could not become effective while we conducted our reconsideration, did 
not contradict the previous conclusions about how long was needed for 
compliance, and did not limit delays based on the late finding 
regarding the West Fertilizer incident \20\ to provisions clearly 
implicated by that report. See id. at 1066-69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ On May 11, 2016, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (BATF) announced its conclusion that the fire at the 
West Fertilizer facility was intentionally set. See EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-
0725-0641.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. EPA's Substantive Authority Under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7)
    Congress granted EPA authority for accident prevention rules under 
two provisions in CAA section 112(r)(7). Under subparagraph (A) of CAA 
section 112(r)(7), EPA may set rules addressing the prevention, 
detection, and correction of accidental releases of substances listed 
by EPA by rule (``regulated substances'' listed in the tables in 40 CFR 
68.130). Such rules may include data collection, training, design, 
equipment, work practice, and operational requirements. EPA has 
discretion regarding the effective date (``as determined by the 
Administrator, assuring compliance as expeditiously as practicable'').
    Under subparagraph (B) of CAA section 112(r)(7), Congress 
authorized EPA to develop ``reasonable regulations and appropriate 
guidance'' that provide for the prevention and detection of accidental 
releases and the response to such releases, ``to the greatest extent 
practicable.'' Congress required an initial rulemaking under this 
subparagraph by November 15, 1993. Subparagraph (B) sets out a series 
of mandatory subjects to address, interagency consultation 
requirements, and discretionary provisions that allowed EPA to tailor 
requirements to make them reasonable and practicable. For example, the 
regulations needed to address ``storage, as well as operations'' and 
``emergency response after accidental releases;'' EPA was to use the 
expertise of the Secretaries of Labor and Transportation in 
promulgating the regulations; and EPA had the discretion (``shall, as 
appropriate'') to recognize differences in ``size, operations, 
processes . . . and the voluntary actions'' of regulated sources to 
prevent and respond to accidental releases (CAA section 
112(r)(7)(B)(i)). At a minimum, the regulations had to require 
stationary sources with more than a ``threshold quantity to prepare and 
implement a risk management plan.'' Such plans needed to provide for 
compliance with rule requirements under CAA section 112(r) and include 
a hazard assessment with release scenarios and an accident history, a 
release prevention program, and a response program (CAA section 
112(r)(7)(B)(ii)). Plans were to be registered with EPA and submitted 
to various planning entities (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii)). The rules 
would apply to sources three years after promulgation or three years 
after a substance was first listed for regulation under CAA section 
112(r). (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i)).
    In addition to the direction to use the expertise of the 
Secretaries of Labor and Transportation in subparagraph (B) of CAA 
section 112(r)(7), the statute requires EPA to consult with these 
secretaries when carrying out the authority of CAA section 112(r)(7) 
and to ``coordinate any requirements under [CAA section 112(r)(7)] with 
any requirements established for comparable purposes by'' OSHA. (CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(D)). This consultation and coordination language 
derives from and expands upon provisions on hazard assessments in the 
bill that eventually passed the Senate as its version of the 1990 CAAA, 
section 129(e)(4) of S. 1630. The Senate committee report on this 
language notes that the purpose of the coordination requirement is to 
ensure that ``requirements imposed by both agencies to accomplish the 
same purpose are not unduly burdensome or duplicative.'' Senate Report 
at 244.\21\ The mandate for coordination in the area of safer chemical 
processes was incorporated into the CAA in section 112(r)(7)(D). In the 
same legislation, Congress directed OSHA to promulgate a process safety 
standard that became the PSM standard. See CAAA of 1990 section 304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Report of the Committee 
on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate together with 
Additional and Minority Views to Accompany S. 1630. S. Report No. 
101-228. 101st Congress, 1st Session, December 20, 1989.--``Senate 
Report'' EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0645.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2017 RMP Amendments and this reconsideration rule address the 
following three requirements of the Risk Management Program: Prevention 
programs, emergency response provisions, and information disclosure 
requirements. The prevention program provisions rescinded in this rule 
(third-party auditing, incident investigation, and safer technologies 
and alternatives analysis) address the ``prevention and detection of 
accidental releases.'' The emergency coordination and exercises 
provisions in this rule modify existing provisions that provide for 
``response to such releases by the owners or operators of the sources 
of such releases.'' The

[[Page 69843]]

information disclosure provisions that are rescinded or modified in 
this document are related to the development of ``procedures and 
measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a 
regulated substance in order to protect human health and the 
environment.'' \22\ (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Incident investigation, compliance auditing, and STAA are 
also authorized as release prevention requirements pertaining to 
stationary source ``design, equipment . . . and work practice'' as 
well as ``record-keeping [and] reporting.'' Information disclosure 
is also authorized as ``reporting.'' CAA section 112(r)(7)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In considering whether it is legally permissible for the Agency to 
rescind and/or modify provisions of the RMP Amendments rule while 
continuing to meet EPA's obligations under CAA section 112(r), EPA 
notes that the CAA did not require EPA to promulgate the RMP Amendments 
rule. There are four provisions of CAA section 112(r) that require or 
authorize the Administrator to promulgate regulations. The first two 
relate to the list of regulated substances and their threshold 
quantities. CAA section 112(r)(3) required EPA to promulgate a list of 
at least 100 regulated substances. Section 112(r)(5) required EPA to 
establish, by rule, a threshold quantity for each listed substance. EPA 
met these obligations in 1994 with the publication of the list of 
regulated substances and threshold quantities (59 FR 4493, January 31, 
1994). Section 112(r)(7) contains the other two regulatory provisions. 
Section 112(r)(7)(B) required EPA to publish accidental release 
prevention, detection, and response requirements and guidance. EPA met 
this obligation in 1996 with the publication of the original RMP rule 
(61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996), and associated guidance documents 
published in the late 1990s. The other regulatory promulgation 
provision of section 112(r)(7)--section 112(r)(7)(A)--is permissive. 
Subparagraph (A) authorizes EPA to promulgate regulations but does not 
require it.
    Therefore, EPA had met all of its mandatory duty regulatory 
obligations under section 112(r) prior to promulgating the RMP 
Amendments rule. In promulgating the RMP Amendments rule, EPA took a 
discretionary regulatory action in response to Executive Order 13650, 
``Improving Chemical Safety and Security.'' \23\ We have made 
discretionary amendments to the RMP rule several times without a 
dispute over our authority to issue discretionary amendments. See 64 FR 
964 (January 6, 1999); 64 FR 28696 (May 26, 1999); 69 FR 18819 (April 
9, 2004). As EPA's action in the 2017 RMP Amendments rule was 
discretionary, the Agency may take additional action to rescind or 
modify provisions adopted in the 2017 rule if the Agency finds that it 
is reasonable to do so. The Air Alliance Houston (AAH) decision noted 
that ``EPA retains the authority under Section 7412(r)(7) [CAA section 
112(r)(7)] to substantively amend the programmatic requirements of the 
[2017 RMP Amendments] . . . subject to arbitrary and capricious 
review.'' 906 F.3d at 1066. This rule makes substantive amendments to 
40 CFR part 68. Our action is authorized by both CAA 112(r)(7)(A) and 
(B), as explained herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See 82 FR 4594, January 13, 2017: ``Section 6(c) of 
Executive Order 13650 requires the Administrator of EPA to review 
the chemical hazards covered by the Risk Management Program and 
expand, implement and enforce the Risk Management Program to address 
any additional hazards.''
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D. EPA's Principal Rationale for Final Rule Actions

    The Supreme Court has recognized that agencies may change policy 
when such changes are ``permissible under the statute, . . . there are 
good reasons for [them], and that the agency believes [them] to be 
better'' than prior policies. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis original). As discussed in detail 
below, there are good reasons for the policies adopted in this rule and 
the EPA believes they are better than policies we are rescinding or 
amending.
    In the 2017 RMP Amendments rule, we found that the costs of the 
changes we made were reasonable in comparison to what we called the 
``likely benefits,'' which included non-monetized benefits and some 
unspecified portion of accidents that we did monetize that we believed 
would be prevented. 82 FR 4598 (January 13, 2017). After taking comment 
on the issue of the reasonableness of the burdens and the appropriate 
role of cost in our decision-making, we remain convinced that a more 
reasonable and practicable approach to accident prevention is to 
emphasize case-specific oversight of those facilities that are 
performing poorly over regulatory changes that increase compliance 
costs for the entire regulated community. Such an approach recognizes 
that, because a relatively small number of facilities have accidental 
releases, the Agency can best prevent future accidents by enhancing 
safety measures at the poorest performers, through tailored injunctive 
relief when appropriate, to best suit the circumstances of each case 
rather than imposing broad regulatory requirements that unreasonably 
impose additional burdens on the vast majority of regulated facilities 
that have performed well. We previously labeled this approach as 
``enforcement-led,'' but is better described as ``compliance-driven'' 
because it involves both routine compliance oversight of all facilities 
and more intensive post-accident oversight of weaker performers, 
including requiring additional safety measures as injunctive relief in 
enforcement actions.
    Furthermore, we believe it is better not to impose substantial new 
regulatory requirements on all facilities in the RMP program on the 
basis of information about individual incidents and opinions where 
available, more comprehensive data does not demonstrate the efficacy of 
such a requirement across the board. EPA considered stakeholder input 
that both favored and opposed the rescission of the prevention program 
elements adopted in 2017 and considered data submitted by commenters. 
We also analyzed multiple years of accident history data in the RMP 
database, both nationally and in states and localities with programs 
that contain some or all the elements of the prevention program 
provisions. Based on this assessment, it cannot be established that 
regulatory programs that emphasize inherently safer technologies (IST) 
methods, such as chemical substitution and process redesign, have 
resulted in a reduction in accident rates involving RMP chemicals. This 
evidence suggests that IST regulations would not likely be effective at 
reducing accidents if applied on a national scale.
    We do not dispute that there may be circumstances where the 
prevention program measures we adopted in the RMP Amendments rule are 
effective. However, we believe that many of the sources that would have 
had to conduct STAA and the other 2017 prevention measures already have 
successful prevention programs. The data support the conclusion that 
incorporating STAA into all such programs will not clearly reduce 
accidents (see section IV.C for further discussion of data relating to 
the effectiveness of STAA). Thus, rather than take a rule-driven 
approach that requires an STAA and/or new auditing and investigation 
requirements at all facilities, we have concluded that we can obtain 
accident-prevention benefits at lower cost through implementing and 
enforcing the pre-2017 RMP prevention program rules, and that the 
finalized regulatory changes in 2017 were a less appropriate execution 
of the statutory direction to establish reasonable regulations that 
promote the prevention, detection, and response to accidents to

[[Page 69844]]

the greatest extent practicable than the measures in this final rule. 
Through oversight on a source-specific basis, when we identify a 
facility that is not implementing a successful prevention program, we 
have the ability to seek injunctive relief that includes appropriate 
safety measures. This approach is supported by the observed reduction 
in the rate of RMP-reportable accidents over many years.
    Reconsideration petitioners asserted that EPA failed to 
sufficiently coordinate the changes to the RMP regulations with OSHA, 
and that the regulations as revised by the Amendments rule left 
important gaps and created compliance uncertainties. Our approach in 
the final rule is more consistent with our historic practice to keep 
the EPA and OSHA prevention programs in alignment to the extent we are 
able to do so consistent with each Agency's statutory mission. It is 
plain from the legislative history and text of the statute that the 
interaction of the two programs was a concern of Congress at the time 
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. EPA does not delegate to OSHA or 
assign it primacy in the subject matter. We do not take the position 
that neither agency can act without the other moving in synch. Rather, 
reflecting on the potential burden of the changes adopted in the RMP 
Amendments as well as the lack of data concerning the benefits of the 
rule-driven approach adopted in the Amendments, we believe more work 
with OSHA on the issues being addressed would lead to better accident 
prevention.
    We also believe that it is better to reduce the costs of compliance 
with regulatory requirements, when that is reasonable and practicable 
and has no significant impact on accidental release prevention and 
response. We recognize the terms of the statute allow for many policy 
considerations in deciding what is reasonable and practicable. To the 
extent the statute provides us with the flexibility to reflect the 
considerations in numerous executive orders, the Administrator has 
decided to use his discretion to take actions consistent with those 
executive orders. Of greatest concern to commenters has been executive 
orders issued by President Trump, but the rule also reflects 
consideration of other executive orders that predate this 
Administration. The decision to reduce regulatory burden by eliminating 
many of the prevention program provisions, as well as largely redundant 
information disclosures, is consistent not only with the executive 
orders but also is consistent with what may be considered as reasonable 
and practicable under the statute.
    The final rule also addresses important security concerns that were 
raised in reconsideration petitions and by numerous commenters. We 
granted the RMP Coalition's request for reconsideration of the 2017 
Amendments in part because of the timing of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATF) finding that the West 
Fertilizer incident was caused by a criminal act. In the proposed rule, 
EPA requested additional comment on the import of that finding. See 83 
FR 24870, May 30, 2018. After weighing comments received on this issue, 
we reaffirm our view of the importance of balancing the public's need 
for chemical hazard information with chemical facility security. From 
the beginning of the Risk Management Program, one of its objectives has 
been to improve the availability of information about chemical hazards 
to community members and emergency planners in order to improve 
emergency preparedness. However, the sensitivity of certain information 
elements associated with RMP-regulated facilities has required Congress 
and EPA to strike a balance between a community's right-to-know and 
facility security. The Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and 
Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (CSISSFRRA), Public Law 106-40, recognized 
the need for such a balance by restricting the availability of certain 
information relating to the potential offsite effects of releases while 
also requiring it to be made available under controlled circumstances 
(i.e., dissemination at public meetings and availability in reading 
rooms). EPA's final rule action addresses these issues in similar 
fashion--the final rule makes minor changes to the emergency 
coordination and public meeting provisions of the Amendments to avoid 
potential security risks associated with two open-ended information 
disclosure provisions. EPA does not believe these changes will impede 
the ability of local emergency planners and responders or members of 
the public to obtain necessary information about chemical facility 
hazards.
    There are good reasons to retain the improvements to the emergency 
response provisions adopted in 2017, but with a few changes that make 
these provisions better. The West Fertilizer incident and others showed 
that improvements in the rule's emergency response provisions were 
necessary, and we reaffirm this view with this action. The final rule 
therefore retains the enhanced emergency coordination provisions 
adopted in 2017 with minor changes as described above and below. The 
emergency exercise provisions of the RMP Amendments rule are also 
mostly retained. However, EPA's final rule changes in this area are 
intended to allow facilities and local responders greater time and 
flexibility in meeting the exercise provisions. We believe these 
changes are particularly important in communities with multiple RMP-
regulated facilities, where the RMP Amendments rule's exercise 
provisions could have overburdened local responders with requests to 
participate in exercises.

III. General Comments and Legal Authority

    After EPA solicited public comments, commenters raised numerous 
issues that included discussion on:

    1. Statutory authority and procedural issues;
    2. Costs and benefits of various regulatory provisions;
    3. EPA's rationale for rescinding or modifying various 
regulatory provisions;
    4. Maintaining consistency with the OSHA PSM standard;
    5. Numbers of accidents and accident rates;
    6. Accidents occurring during adverse weather events;
    7. Security concerns regarding accident prevention, emergency 
response coordination and information availability provisions;
    8. Timing and scope of public meetings after an accident;
    9. Information disclosure during local emergency coordination;
    10. Frequency, scope, documentation and other aspects of 
emergency exercises; and
    11. Concerns from communities about the impact of accidents, 
especially those affecting low-income and minority populations.

    We have structured the discussion of comments as they correspond to 
various topics: Statutory authority and procedural issues, accident 
prevention provisions, information availability provisions (including 
public meetings), local emergency coordination, emergency response 
exercises and compliance dates.
    This section focuses on general comments regarding procedural 
aspects of the reconsideration rulemaking, EPA's authority under the 
statute to revise the RMP Amendments and to rescind aspects of that 
rule, and general comments on costs and benefits. Procedural objections 
include claims that EPA violated notice and comment requirements. 
Commenters also identified purported docketing deficiencies, raised 
claims of impermissible bias on the part of various decisionmakers, and 
found fault with EPA's choice to follow various

[[Page 69845]]

executive orders in its decision making. General substantive authority 
issues discussed below include whether EPA may emphasize compliance and 
enforcement rather than new regulations under the CAA, whether EPA has 
the authority to consider costs under CAA section 112(r)(7), whether 
EPA's approach is consistent with the requirement that reasonable 
regulations provide for the preventing and mitigating of accidents ``to 
the greatest extent practicable,'' and whether EPA may rescind 
provisions purportedly related to CSB recommendations. Cost and benefit 
issues include whether the vacatur of the Delay rule should affect 
estimated cost savings, cost impacts to fence line communities, 
accident data submitted by commenters relating to estimated accident 
costs, and other arguments for and against EPA's cost-benefit analysis 
and cost-saving rationale. Some cost/benefit issues that relate to 
specific regulatory provisions are discussed in subsequent sections 
relating to those provisions.

A. Discussion of Comments on Procedural Requirements

1. Claims That EPA Violated Notice-and-Comment Requirements
    Several advocacy groups asserted that EPA failed to consider what 
additional steps were necessary to allow for environmental justice 
communities a ``reasonable period for public participation,'' as 
required by 42 U.S.C. 7607(h). A joint submission from multiple 
advocacy groups argues that EPA's statement that its proposal ``does 
not impose any additional costs on affected communities'' is incorrect 
and arbitrary because EPA's own record highlights the costs for fence-
line communities in the form of deaths, injuries, toxic exposure, and 
other harm related to shelter-in-place and evacuation orders, as well 
as property value and other economic harms. The commenter asserted that 
the CAA requires EPA to provide a reasonable opportunity for an oral 
presentation of data, views, or arguments, and that EPA has failed to 
do so by providing insufficient time to register for the public hearing 
and holding a hearing in one location only. The commenter also 
contended that EPA's justification for not performing any additional 
engagement activities, and not providing any community-based public 
hearings or listening sessions contravenes the statutory requirement 
for a ``reasonable period for public participation,'' and is arbitrary 
and capricious.
    The same commenter contended that EPA did not provide 30 days' 
notice of the public hearing scheduled for June 14, 2018 because the 
notice of hearing was published on May 30, 2018 and CAA 7607(h) 
requires EPA to ``ensure a reasonable period for public participation 
of at least 30 days'' in conjunction with giving interested persons an 
opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or arguments, in 
addition to an opportunity to make written submissions.'' 42 U.S.C. 
7607(d)(5). This commenter noted that because the hearing notice also 
stated that ``[t]he last day to preregister in advance to speak at the 
hearing is June 8, 2018,'' this implied that participants should 
register to ensure they could participate in that hearing and gave 
communities only nine days to do so. This commenter stated that EPA 
refused to hold public hearings elsewhere or to provide a second public 
hearing, despite requests from stakeholders to do so. This commenter 
argued that EPA provided no opportunity for telephone presentation/
participation and agreed to provide a ``listen-only'' phone line. The 
commenter argued that only communities that had been in contact with 
EPA or were checking the EPA website were made aware of this line 
because EPA gave no public notice of the listen-only phone line.
    The commenter also argued that EPA held two rounds of public 
comment and included eight public listening sessions in the first round 
of participation for the RMP Amendments rule, but the Agency's decision 
to hold only a single public hearing (in D.C.) makes this rulemaking 
process inadequate and its proposed action arbitrary. This commenter 
maintains having only one hearing was contrary to EPA's original 
practice on this rule and its own recognition previously that it is 
necessary and important to consider input from the most affected and 
most-exposed community members who live and work near RMP facilities.
    The commenter also contended that EPA refused to give the minimum 
of 30 days' accurate notice even though the REAL ID Act requirements it 
had provided in its initial notice were incorrect, as they stated that 
if a participant had a driver's license from 12 listed states or 
territories, that additional identification would be required to attend 
the hearing. This commenter stated that EPA admitted the public notice 
was incorrect after receiving questions from the public and then 
published on its website, but not in the Federal Register, the 
information that no state residents, and only American Samoa residents, 
would be required to provide an additional form of identification. This 
commenter argues that EPA's failure to provide public notice of this 
error and to delay its hearing or hold a second hearing in response 
renders its process unlawful and arbitrary because REAL ID Act 
requirements pose an additional and disproportionate barrier to 
individuals who do not speak English as their first language and the 
lack of adequate notice by EPA made it impossible for them to 
participate.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. The Agency met the 
statutory requirement to provide a ``reasonable period for public 
participation.'' We believe the initial notice and hearing were 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CAA section 307(d) and other 
relevant rulemaking procedures that apply to this rulemaking. The 
``reasonable period for public participation'' referred to in CAA 
307(h) is the presumptive minimum comment period for a proposed rule 
and not a mandatory minimum period before a public hearing. Regarding 
the commenter's contention that EPA was required to give more than 15-
days' notice prior to the hearing, the Federal Register Act provides 
that a notice of a hearing required by statute ``shall be deemed to 
have been given to all persons'' when the notice is published in the 
Federal Register ``not less than fifteen days'' prior to the date of 
the hearing, ``without prejudice, however, to the effectiveness of a 
notice of less than fifteen days where the shorter period is 
reasonable.'' 44 U.S.C. 1508. The public hearing for the RMP 
Reconsideration Proposal was held on June 14, 2018, 15 days after 
publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal 
Register. Additionally, EPA notes that the date and location of the 
public hearing were fixed in advanced, and web-accessible copies of the 
NPRM were made available to the public a few hours after the 
Administrator's signature on the NPRM on May 17, 2018.
    Another public participation provision of the CAA requires that the 
rulemaking docket must remain open for public comment at least 30 days 
after the last hearing (CAA section 307(d)(5)). The initial close of 
comment period was July 30, 2018 (60 days after notice), and the 
comment period was later extended to August 23, 2018. Therefore, the 
statutory requirement for public participation of at least 30 days was 
met.
    The implication made by the commenter that hearing participants had 
to register by June 8, 2018 in order

[[Page 69846]]

to participate in the hearing is incorrect. The May 30, 2018 Federal 
Register notice (83 FR 24850) for the hearing made clear that pre-
registration was intended to assist EPA and participants to determine 
preferences on speaking time and how they could fit into the hearing 
schedule. The FR notice explained that requests to speak would also be 
taken at the day of the hearing at the registration desk and anyone 
wishing to make a comment as a walk-in registrant would be heard after 
any scheduled speakers. Thus, speakers at the hearing were not required 
to pre-register.
    EPA did decline a request from an advocacy group for additional 
public hearings. EPA believes that holding a public hearing in 
Washington, DC, on June 14, 2018, and the notice announcing the 
hearing, meet the requirements of CAA section 307(d), as well as other 
relevant federal statutes.
    While EPA did provide listening-only telephone participation for 
this hearing, this was beyond what is necessary for compliance with 
proper rulemaking procedure, and EPA did so to facilitate additional 
participation.
    The procedures EPA followed here are consistent with how the Agency 
proceeds in other rulemakings under section 307(d). For example, 
providing fifteen days between publication of an NPRM and a public 
hearing is routine, and holding one hearing at EPA headquarters is also 
not uncommon even when all the affected communities are outside 
Washington.
    The commenter is incorrect that EPA held two rounds of public 
hearings for the Amendments rule, and EPA disagrees that having only 
one hearing for the RMP Reconsideration rule was contrary to EPA's 
original practice on the RMP Amendments rule. EPA had only one public 
hearing on the RMP Amendments rule content, which was held on March 29, 
2016. EPA held another hearing (April 18, 2017) for a separate 
rulemaking on the delay of the effective date for the RMP Amendments 
while the Agency began the reconsideration process for the RMP 
Amendments rule. Therefore, the opportunity to comment on the RMP 
Reconsideration proposed rule was similar to the opportunity to comment 
on the proposal underlying the RMP Amendments.
    The eight public listening sessions to which the commenter refers 
were held prior to EPA proposing the RMP Amendments and were not part 
of the comment period for the Amendments rulemaking. Rather, these 
listening sessions were part of the Agency's input-gathering process 
under Executive Order 13650, which was a broader initiative directing 
the federal government to improve the safety and security of chemical 
facilities and reduce the risks of hazardous chemicals to workers and 
communities.
    EPA disagrees that community members who live and work near RMP 
facilities did not have sufficient opportunity to participate in the 
proposed Reconsideration rule public hearing held on June 14, 2018. 
Holding a hearing in Washington, DC represented a reasonable balance of 
the need to have agency personnel familiar with the rule at the 
hearing, as well as accessibility to representatives of various 
stakeholders. With approximately 12,500 stationary sources in over 
1,000 counties subject to the RMP rule, it would have been impossible 
to conduct hearings in all locales.
    Furthermore, participation in the public hearing for the proposed 
RMP Reconsideration rule was larger (38 speakers) than the public 
hearing held for the proposed RMP Amendments rule (22 speakers) or the 
public hearing for the proposed Delay rule held on April 19, 2017 (28 
speakers). Local and state advocacy and community groups were well 
represented at the Reconsideration rule hearing, numbering 13 of the 38 
speakers. EPA also notes that states that had not previously commented 
on the Amendments rule and that had not sought to implement the RMP 
program through delegation were active in this rulemaking and testified 
during the June 14, 2018 public hearing.
    Regarding the commenter's contention that the REAL ID Act 
requirements posed an additional and disproportionate barrier to 
individuals who do not speak English as their first language, EPA must 
follow these requirements for persons entering Federal buildings. The 
REAL ID Act requirements allow for other types of IDs to be used as 
acceptable alternative forms of identification. Once EPA made further 
inquiries about the ID requirements and discovered that many of the ID 
restrictions for 11 of the 12 states and territories had been removed, 
EPA provided the updated REAL ID Act requirements on the public hearing 
registration web page whose internet address was provided in the FR 
notice to direct potential hearing speakers to pre-register. The number 
of states/territories with restrictions on type of ID accepted were 
less than indicated by the FR notice, so providing valid ID for the 
hearing should not have been problematic. EPA was not contacted by or 
made aware of any potential speakers who were deterred by the REAL ID 
Act requirements.
2. Claims of Omitted Documents in Rulemaking Docket
    A joint comment submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters argued that EPA violated notice- and comment requirements by 
failing to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation in 
the rulemaking by omitting key documents from the public docket, 
including a March 2018 version of the RMP database, query techniques 
used to obtain facility counts from the RMP database, and spreadsheet 
outputs of queries.
    EPA Response: Regarding the commenters' claim that EPA omitted key 
documents from the public docket, EPA disagrees with this claim. EPA 
docketed a November 2017 version of the RMP database that was used to 
obtain facility statistics for the 2014-2016 period on July 11, 2018 
(Docket ID EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0989) and provided it directly to one 
of these commenters a day earlier. EPA also, on a notice of data 
availability published on July 24, 2018,\24\ extended the comment 
period for the proposed rule from July 30 to August 23, 2018, to give 
other members of the public an opportunity to obtain the more recent 
database if they so desired. Furthermore, as EPA explained in the 
notice of data availability for the November 2017 database, because the 
November 2017 database was used mostly for corroboration, we do not 
believe there were fundamental data about sources subject to the RMP 
Rule that could not have been observed in the 2015 database that was 
already in the docket.
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    \24\ 83 FR 34967, July 24, 2018, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to docketing an updated version of the database at the 
request of a commenter, EPA used a March 2018 version of the RMP 
database only to extract accident statistics for the 2014-2016 period, 
which were presented in the RIA. Because EPA used this version of the 
database only for accident information, instead of docketing the entire 
database, EPA docketed an Excel spreadsheet output of accident records 
for 2014-2016 derived from this version of the database prior to 
publishing the proposed rule. See Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0909. 
The accident counts from this spreadsheet were presented in the RIA to 
corroborate the decline in accidents seen in the 2004-2013 period. On 
October 3, 2018, EPA also docketed a spreadsheet containing

[[Page 69847]]

RMP facility accidents that occurred during 2017, extracted from the 
September 2018 version of the RMP database. EPA docketed this 
spreadsheet to corroborate the continued decline in RMP facility 
accidents in 2017 (there were 94 RMP facility accidents reported to EPA 
in 2017). See Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1974.
    EPA also disagrees that it failed to adequately explain query 
techniques used to obtain information from the RMP database. At the 
request of a commenter, EPA held an information session for the 
commenter and other associated commenters on July 26, 2018, where EPA 
demonstrated methods and techniques for querying the RMP database and 
demonstrated how EPA obtained facility, process and accident counts 
from the database.\25\ During that session, commenters noted no errors 
associated with EPA's query methods or results. A record of this 
meeting and a copy of the presented materials were placed in the docket 
on August 6, 2018.\26\ EPA notes that other commenters were able to 
extract information from the docketed database and provide it in their 
public comments without apparent difficulty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ EPA. July 26, 2018. Summary of Meeting between EPA and 
Earthjustice, Union of Concerned Scientists and NY Attorney 
General's Office regarding Analysis of RMP Database. EPA-HQ-OEM-
2015-0725-1463.
    \26\ EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1463.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Claims That Trump Administration Executive Orders Undermined the 
Rulemaking Process
    A joint comment submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters argued that the presence of E.O.s 13771, 13777, and 13783 
\27\ in EPA's decision-making process undermined the integrity of the 
agency rulemaking process and violated the Due Process clause by 
forcing the agency to act with an unalterably closed mind. The 
commenters cited the legal standard established in Air Transp. Ass'n of 
Am., Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., (663 F.3d 476, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2011)), 
asserting that the Executive Orders left EPA with no option but to 
deregulate (or else be forced to promulgate significant deregulatory 
actions elsewhere to balance out the cost), leaving the EPA unwilling 
or unable to rationally consider arguments. The commenters concluded 
that this limitation on EPA's decision-making is antithetical to 
reasoned decision making, making the proposed rule arbitrary and 
capricious and in violation of the Due Process Clause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ E.O. 13771 ``Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs'', January 30, 2017; E.O. 13777 ``Enforcing the Regulatory 
Reform Agenda'', February 24, 2017 and E.O. 13783 ``Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth'', March 28, 2017. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-
0725-0863, -0864, and -0865.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Agency's consideration of 
E.O.s 13771, 13777, and 13783 undermines the integrity of the 
rulemaking process, violates the Due Process Clause, or is otherwise 
unconstitutional, unlawful, or irrational. EPA agrees that the Agency 
may not rely on executive orders as the basis for rulemaking--the 
Agency must have statutory authority to issue regulations, as it does 
in this case. While the action we take is consistent with the executive 
orders as a matter of policy, we have not acted inconsistently with CAA 
section 112(r) and other statutes in this rulemaking, nor have we 
relied on the executive orders as a source of authority to take this 
action. The E.O.s do not supersede any provision of the CAA, and they 
are not the cause or legal basis of EPA's decision to undergo this 
rulemaking or the outcome reached in the final rule. Nevertheless, we 
believe the orders themselves can be seen as identifying reasonable 
concerns about how we implement our underlying authority, much like 
E.O. 13132 (Federalism), E.O. 13175 (Consultation and Coordination with 
Indian Tribal Governments), E.O. 12898 (Federal Actions To Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations), and other E.O.s To the extent the underlying statutes 
allow, we may consider the policies of the E.O.s in determining how to 
reasonably exercise our authority.
    As the proposal notes, E.O.s 13771, 13777, and 13783 all support a 
policy direction of carefully examining the economic burden of 
regulations, which is ``directly relevant to whether the Amendments are 
`practicable' for sources, as that term is used in CAA section 
112(r)(7).'' 83 FR 24871. We have placed greater weight on the lack of 
demonstrable accident prevention benefits than we had at the time of 
promulgating the 2017 RMP Amendments. Id. The accident history analyses 
in the record support the conclusion that the economic burdens of the 
2017 Amendments' prevention provisions were unreasonably 
disproportionate to the accident prevention benefits. While our further 
analysis of the burdens of the rule are in keeping with the themes or 
general direction of the E.O.s, assessing the reasonableness and 
practicability of the 2017 Amendments is consistent with CAA section 
112(r)(7) and would be appropriate regardless of the E.O.s Id.
    The Agency's rationale for rescissions and modifications to the 
Amendments rule is multifaceted--it includes maintaining consistency in 
accident prevention requirements with the OSHA PSM standard, addressing 
security concerns with the Amendments, and reducing unnecessary 
regulations and regulatory costs, consistent with EPA's statutory 
authority. If EPA had relied on these E.O.s without other 
considerations and was acting with an ``unalterably closed mind,'' the 
Agency would have simply rescinded the entire Amendments rule, rather 
than retain significant portions of it. EPA's actions in the final rule 
demonstrate that the Agency carefully and rationally considered public 
comments and arguments. For example, EPA carefully analyzed available 
data relating to the Amendments rule's prevention provisions prior to 
rescinding them, made narrowly-tailored changes to the emergency 
coordination, emergency exercise, and public meeting provisions, and 
carefully considered security and burden concerns prior to rescinding 
the information availability provisions. Further evidence that EPA did 
not approach this rule with an unalterably closed mind can be seen from 
EPA not going forward with various proposed deregulatory revisions as a 
result of comments. For example, while we proposed deletion of the 
requirement to provide information to local emergency planners upon 
request altogether, we finalized an amendment that required sources to 
provide information necessary for the emergency plan upon request.

B. Discussion of Comments on EPA's Substantive Authority Under CAA 
Section 112(r)

    While many commenters agreed that EPA has ample authority to make 
substantive changes to the RMP rules, various other commenters 
suggested that particular provisions of the proposed rulemaking were 
not consistent with or violated CAA section 112(r) or other relevant 
statutes. We address these comments in each relevant section of the 
preamble and in the Response to Comments document,\28\ available in the 
docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ EPA. Response to Comments on the 2018 Proposed Rule 
Reconsidering EPA's Risk Management Program 2017 Amendments Rule. 
This document is available in the docket for this rulemaking.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 69848]]

1. Claims That Prioritizing Compliance With Existing Regulations Over 
Imposing New Requirements Violates CAA
    Several commenters, including advocacy groups and State elected 
officials, stated that EPA's proposal to prioritize enforcement of the 
pre-2017 RMP rule over the additional requirements of the 2017 RMP 
Amendments rule was inconsistent with Congress's mandate in the CAA. 
These commenters stated that the emphasis on compliance oversight 
proposed by EPA violates the statute because the CAA requires EPA to 
promulgate ``regulations'' that provide ``to the greatest extent 
practicable'' for the prevention of chemical disasters. Another 
commenter stated that Congress clearly intended that accident risk be 
minimized at the outset, not only after an accident has occurred, which 
the commenter argued could not be achieved through enforcement alone.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. The relevant 
statutory phrase describing EPA's authority to regulate under CAA 
112(r)(7)(B)(i), authorizes ``reasonable regulations . . . to provide, 
to the greatest extent practicable,'' for the prevention and detection 
of and response to accidental releases of substances listed in 40 CFR 
68.130 (``regulated substances,'' as the phrase is used in CAA 112(r)). 
An interpretation of the statute that does not give meaning to the 
qualifier ``reasonable'' to the authority to regulate ``to the greatest 
extent practicable,'' as the commenters suggest, is not in keeping with 
the structure of the statute. As recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015), ``reasonable 
regulation'' generally involves some sort of examination of the 
benefits and the burdens of a rule.
    EPA recognizes that the ``reasonable regulations'' should promote 
the prevention, detection, and response to accidents to the greatest 
extent practicable, but we must also construe ``practicable'' when 
developing regulations under CAA 112(r)(7)(B). We interpret the term 
practicable to include concepts such as cost-effectiveness of the 
regulatory and implementation approach, as well as the availability of 
relevant technical expertise and resources to the implementing and 
enforcement agencies and the owners and operators who must comply with 
the rule. While the Supreme Court recognized in the Michigan case that 
phrases that ordinarily encompass cost as a consideration may be 
further constrained in specific settings, because of the inclusion of 
the word ``practicable,'' we do not read ``to the greatest extent 
practicable'' to be such a constraint.
    We interpret the CAA to give us the discretion, when assessing 
whether specific provisions (such as the STAA) are in fact ``reasonable 
regulations,'' to consider the prior rule structure and the enforcement 
and implementation program under it, and then determine, based on data 
on accident history required to be collected by the statute, that the 
STAA provision is not reasonable because it targets entire sectors 
rather than the facilities within those sectors that have problematic 
prevention programs.
    The RMP accident data show that over a ten-year period, at least 
90% of the RMP facilities have had no reported accidents, 6% had only 
one accident, and about 2% had two or more accidents. Nearly half of 
the total reportable accidents were from less than 2% of the RMP 
facilities, which reported multiple releases.\29\
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    \29\ EPA. March 9, 2017. Notes and Documentation Related to a 
March 9, 2017 Meeting between the Risk Management Programs (RMP) 
Coalition and EPA regarding a Petition for Reconsideration of the 
RMP Amendments rule (82 FR 4594, January 13, 2017). EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-
0725-0929 and American Chemistry Council public comments, August 17, 
2018. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1628.
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    Given the relatively small number of facilities that have RMP-
reportable accidents, rather than imposing new requirements on all 
facilities that are costly and diffuse in targeting, a better approach 
is to retain the RMP rule as it stood prior to the 2017 RMP Amendments 
rule and improve compliance with that rule in the population of sources 
that are underperforming. This is both reasonable and addresses 
accidents to the greatest extent ``practicable.'' Broad regulatory 
requirements that unnecessarily impose burdens on the vast majority of 
regulated facilities that are performing well are not reasonable 
regulations. Reasonable and practicable prevention, protection, and 
response can be achieved by requiring those facilities that are not 
complying with the RMP rules to improve regulatory compliance through 
injunctive relief in enforcement actions. Such an approach is more 
practicable than the rescinded prevention provisions because EPA can 
tailor relief to best suit the circumstances of the case without unduly 
burdening sources that are implementing effective prevention programs.
2. EPA's Authority To Consider Regulatory Costs
    A few commenters stated that the CAA does not permit EPA to rescind 
provisions of the RMP Amendments rule based on cost. These commenters 
stated that EPA has failed to identify its authority to consider cost 
in its analysis of whether or not to revise the RMP Amendments rule. 
Some commenters argued that the reduction of cost is an unlawful 
consideration and irrelevant because the CAA requires regulation based 
on certain factors, which do not include cost.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. The common 
definitions of the words ``reasonable'' and ``practicable'' permit the 
consideration of cost. Merriam-Webster provides ``not too expensive'' 
as one definition for ``reasonable'' and indicates ``Practicable 
implies that something may be effected by available means or under 
current conditions.'' See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reasonable; https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/practicable. In 
Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that ``reasonable regulation 
ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the 
disadvantages of agency decisions.'' Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 
2707 (2015) (original emphasis). A practicable measure would be one 
that can come to fruition without imposing unreasonable demands. See 
https://thelawdictionary.org/practicable/. Synonyms not only include 
terms like feasible and possible but also viable and workable. See 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/practicable. The lack of a 
specific reference to cost as a statutory factor should not be read to 
prohibit EPA from considering cost when the word ``reasonable'' 
ordinarily requires such consideration and what is ``practicable'' has 
the flexibility to encompass what is workable and not unreasonable. Cf. 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222 (2009) (silence 
regarding cost and other factors, without more, does not prohibit their 
consideration in standard-setting).
    The legislative history of section 112(r) supports this reading. 
The House Energy and Commerce (HE&C) Committee version of the accident 
prevention provisions contained the phrase ``reasonable regulations . . 
. to provide, to the greatest extent practicable, for the prevention 
and detection of accidental releases.'' [House Rep. at 87 (HR 3030 
section 112(m)].\30\

[[Page 69849]]

The HE&C Committee Report explains that its bill would create a program 
to ``prevent and detect accidental releases to the maximum extent 
practicable.'' [House Rep. at 157.] While the reasonable regulations/
greatest extent practicable language was ultimately retained in CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(B)(i), additional language not in the House committee 
version of the accident prevention provisions emerged at various stages 
of Senate and House consideration of the 1990 CAA Amendments that 
clarified that one of the goals of Congress was to have EPA consider 
the burden it would be imposing when it drafted its accident prevention 
Risk Management Program. As noted in the proposed rule preamble (83 FR 
24864-5, May 30, 2018), in discussing the purpose of the coordination 
language of section 112(r)(7)(D), the Senate Committee asked both EPA 
and OSHA to coordinate to ensure the regulations would not be ``unduly 
burdensome.'' Senate Rep. at 244. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, 
Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate 
together with Additional and Minority Views to Accompany S. 1630. S. 
Report No. 101-228. 101st Congress, 1st Session, December 20, 1989. 
EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0645.
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    \30\ CRS. November 1993. A Legislative History of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990 S. Prt. 103-38 Committee Print, Volume II, 
Report accompanying H.R. 3030 (H. Rept. 101-490). Prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) for U.S. Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works. 103d Congress, 1st Session, available 
in the rulemaking docket.
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    Section 112(r)(7)(C) also requires that the regulations be 
consistent with third-party-set standards and recommendations ``to the 
maximum extent practicable,'' and that EPA take into account the 
concerns of small businesses. The Senate Committee report discussion of 
the hazard assessment provisions that are early versions of section 
112(r)(7)(C) show that the Senate was concerned about minimizing the 
burden of its hazard assessment provisions. Senate Rep. at 226-27. In 
the context of the overall requirements for accident prevention 
regulations, it would be difficult to prohibit EPA from considering the 
burdens associated with the regulations authorized by CAA section 
112(r)(7) and still fulfill these portions of the statute. Therefore, 
we believe that an interpretation that allows EPA to consider cost 
issues and other burdens of compliance among the factors in deciding 
what is a reasonable regulation to prevent accidents better fulfills 
the intent of the statute than the position offered by the commenters.
3. Regulations Must Prevent and Mitigate Accidents ``to the Greatest 
Extent Practicable''
    A few commenters stated that the Reconsideration rule is 
inconsistent with CAA requirement that regulations prevent and minimize 
risks from chemical accidents ``to the greatest extent practicable.'' 
One commenter stated that none of EPA's rationales demonstrate the 
legal or rational justification needed for EPA to be able to finalize 
the proposal or satisfy the CAA's requirements to prevent and reduce 
chemical releases. The commenters also stated that EPA may not rely on 
any generalized justification without explaining how or why the 
rationale provides a reasoned explanation for each of EPA's specific 
proposed actions, based on the record. One commenter stated that 
rescinding portions of the Amendments rule based on a rationale that 
accident rates at RMP facilities have declined would be entirely 
inconsistent with the EPA's statutory obligation for an RMP program 
that prevents and mitigates accidents ``to the greatest extent 
practicable.''
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. As discussed 
above, the concept of ``to the greatest extent practicable'' allows for 
EPA to consider burden issues for sources and implementing agencies as 
well as other factors that would lead EPA to consider the rules 
workable and effective at preventing accidents and providing for 
response. For example, imposing the burden of the new STAA assessments 
on whole industry sectors when most individual sources have successful 
accident prevention programs may be less workable and effective, even 
counterproductive for safety, than a compliance-driven alternative if 
the STAA requirement requires a source with an effective prevention 
program to divert resources from implementing another safety measure. 
See Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 232-233 (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (``an absolute prohibition [on the 
consideration of costs and benefits] would bring about irrational 
results . . . in an age of limited resources available to deal with 
grave environmental problems, where too much wasteful expenditure 
devoted to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources 
available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious) 
problems''). In another example discussed below, EPA views a 
requirement for sources to have field exercises at least every 10 years 
to be impracticable because the burden it would impose on many local 
emergency response organizations with multiple RMP-covered facilities 
would discourage the participation of such organizations in the 
exercises; in other words, it would not be workable and effective.
    Moreover, even before considering practicability, the regulations 
must be reasonable. In this rulemaking, EPA has concluded that some of 
the provisions adopted in 2017 are not ``reasonable regulations'' on 
one or more of the following grounds: (1) The requirement has burdens 
that are disproportionate to the accident prevention benefits that can 
be established; (2) the requirement increases the potential for 
chemical disasters through the creation of heightened security risks; 
or (3) the regulation diverges from OSHA's PSM requirements without 
demonstrably improving prevention performance.
    Where a regulation is clearly not reasonable, then we need not 
assess whether it provides protection to the greatest extent 
practicable. However, among those regulatory options that are 
reasonable, the statute directs that EPA provide the greatest level of 
practicable protection in its regulations. We consider the workability, 
effectiveness, and reasonableness of demands on impacted entities when 
assessing if an option is practicable.
    In considering whether regulations are both reasonable and 
practicable, burdens we considered included not only costs to regulated 
entities but also impacts on local emergency response organizations and 
their ability to carry out coordinated planning for response. Benefits 
and disbenefits to impacted entities (e.g., the public, workers, or the 
sources themselves) that we considered include improvements in or 
lessening of incident prevention. These principles drawn from the terms 
``reasonable'' and ``practicable'' guided our decisions on the 
prevention program and other aspects of this rule.
4. Rescinding Provisions Relating to Chemical Safety Board 
Recommendations
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters stated that EPA's failure to acknowledge that it is 
rescinding provisions that responded to rule changes recommended by the 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) based on their review of specific incidents 
also renders the proposed rescissions arbitrary and capricious. The 
commenters cite page 246 of the Amendments RTC document, which states: 
``Several of the amendments respond to CSB's suggested rule changes 
based on their review of specific incidents, which is

[[Page 69850]]

consistent with the structure of CAA 112(r)(6)(C)(ii) and EPA's 
rulemaking authority in CAA 112(r)(7).'' The commenters argued that to 
create a valid regulation, EPA must acknowledge these recommendations, 
citing as an example the investigation recommendations from the Tesoro 
Refinery accident in Anacortes, Washington, and explain how its newly 
proposed regulations will respond to them. Relatedly, the commenters 
argued that the EPA generally failed to consider evidence from experts 
like the CSB on the increased, foreseeable, and preventable health and 
safety threats at chemical facilities.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with this comment. Since the CSB became 
operational, it has been the practice of EPA to respond to individual 
incident investigation reports with letters to the CSB as called for in 
CAA 112(r)(6)(I). In the excerpt from the RMP Amendments rule response 
to comment (RTC) document cited by commenters, EPA uses the term 
``respond'' in the sense of being responsive, rather than constituting 
the Agency's official response as required under CAA 112(r)(6)(I). Our 
response letters did not commit to implement these recommendations in 
full or in part in a rule. EPA therefore disagrees with the assertion 
that we are rescinding provisions that were our required response to 
CSB recommendations. Although the STAA provision of the RMP Amendments 
rule may have been responsive to a CSB recommendation in the sense it 
addresses the same matter raised by the CSB, EPA has reexamined its 
position taken in 2017 and concluded that the STAA requirement is not a 
reasonable regulation because its costs are disproportionate to its 
benefits.
    EPA also disagrees that, as a general matter, the Agency failed to 
consider input from the CSB in the final rule. This preamble and the 
response to comments contain multiple discussions of specific CSB 
investigations and recommendations that EPA has considered as input 
from the CSB along with other public comments on the Reconsideration 
proposal. (See the RTC document for additional responses to public 
comments.) We recognize that the proposed and final RMP Amendments 
contain extensive citations to incident investigation reports of the 
CSB for both factual descriptions of incidents and recommendations 
resulting from investigations. Nevertheless, EPA disagrees that 
rescinding provisions that are based in part on CSB report 
recommendations renders the rescissions arbitrary and capricious. The 
record as a whole as discussed in the Reconsideration proposed and 
final rules and supporting documents explains the basis for changing 
our position on the need for new regulation. EPA's responses to CSB 
recommendations did not commit the Agency to making specific regulatory 
changes, and the Clean Air Act does not require EPA to implement every 
recommendation received from the CSB.
    Among the CSB recommendations issued under CAA 112(r)(6)(C)(ii), 
the one most directly related to the RMP Amendments rule prevention 
provisions is the STAA/IST recommendation from the CSB's investigation 
of the Tesoro Refinery accident in Anacortes, Washington. Our 
statutorily required response to the Tesoro recommendation indicated 
that we would evaluate and determine whether regulatory changes should 
be made.\31\ In the case of the Tesoro Refinery accident, cited by the 
commenter, the CSB recommended that EPA revise 40 CFR part 68 to 
``require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and 
the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible when 
facilities are establishing safeguards for identified process 
hazards.'' The CSB also recommended that EPA ``enforce through the 
Clean Air Act's General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C.Sec.  
7412(r)(1), the use of inherently safer systems analysis and the 
hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible when facilities 
are establishing safeguards for identified process hazards.''
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    \31\ EPA. February 25, 2015. Letter from Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, 
Office of Land and Emergency Management to Rafael Moure-Eraso, 
Ph.D., Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) 
responding to CSB's recommendations on the April 2, 2010 accident at 
Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes. Washington. pp 2 and 5. Available in 
the rulemaking docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Our response to the CSB indicated that EPA would develop an alert 
and voluntary guidance on safer technology and alternatives analysis 
and consider regulatory options. Our response did not commit to 
adoption of the CSB recommendation via rulemaking. Regardless of 
whether EPA's RMP Amendments rule STAA provision addressed the same 
issues as CSB's Tesoro incident recommendations, EPA's more recent 
analysis of data relevant to the 2017 RMP Amendments rule's STAA 
requirement indicates that such requirements have not been effective at 
improving accidental release prevention rates when enacted at the state 
level, while their costs remain high. See sections III.C.2 and 
IV.C.2.c, below. Therefore, notwithstanding any CSB recommendations on 
this subject, EPA's view is that it is not reasonable or practicable to 
impose the 2017 STAA requirement through a generally-applicable 
regulation.

C. Discussion of General Comments on Costs and Benefits

1. Effect of Delay Rule Vacatur on Estimated Costs
    Multiple state elected officials stated that the assumptions 
underlying EPA's estimate of the proposal's costs and benefits are no 
longer accurate since the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the Delay rule in 
Air Alliance Houston et al. v. EPA et al. The commenter stated that the 
proposed rule assumes that the Amendments rule will not go into effect, 
but with the court ruling on the delay, those provisions will go into 
effect, therefore influencing the cost-benefit analysis. An advocacy 
group commented that this assumption directly overlooks numerous 
benefits to the information availability provisions in the Amendments 
rule.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Delay rule vacatur materially 
impacts EPA's estimates in the cost benefit analysis. The Court of 
Appeals issued the AAH decision on August 17, 2108, and the vacatur of 
the RMP Delay rule made the Amendments rule effective on September 21, 
2018. At that time, the only major provision of the Amendments rule 
that required immediate compliance was the emergency coordination 
provision.\32\ All other major provisions of the Amendments rule had 
compliance dates in 2021 or later. By the time of the Delay rule 
vacatur, EPA had already proposed to rescind or modify most of the 
Amendments rule's provisions.
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    \32\ Various other provisions that we have labelled the ``minor 
changes'' also became effective, but the RIA for the 2017 Amendments 
rule did not attribute costs to these provisions and the RIA for 
this final rule attributes no cost savings to those minor changes 
that we rescind in this rule.
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    Our estimates of the cost and benefit impact of this final rule 
reflect reasonable judgments about the behavior of affected entities 
during the reconsideration process, including that period before the 
AAH decision vacated the Delay rule. In the Reconsideration RIA, EPA 
assumed a new cost associated with the labor of becoming familiar with 
the non-rescinded and revised provisions of the 2017 Amendments rule, 
and a cost savings associated with regulated facilities not being 
required to become familiar with the provisions of the 2017 RMP 
Amendments final rule. The emergency coordination provision is not 
rescinded in this rulemaking and therefore rule

[[Page 69851]]

familiarization burden for this provision is accounted for in the 
Reconsideration RIA. With EPA's proposal, regulated facilities could 
reasonably expect that Amendments rule provisions with future 
compliance dates might either be rescinded or modified before the 
original compliance date occurred.\33\ Given this regulatory landscape, 
most sources would reasonably choose to delay complying with or 
preparing to comply with remaining Amendments rule provisions (i.e., 
all major prevention provisions and the information disclosure 
provisions excluding public meetings) except those requiring immediate 
compliance due to the Delay rule vacatur. Therefore, it is reasonable 
for EPA to assume that the Delay rule vacatur has had a de minimis 
impact on EPA's estimates in the cost benefit analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ We also note that, prior to the vacatur of the Delay rule, 
sources had a basis to believe that compliance with the 2017 RMP 
Amendments would not be required so long as the rule had not become 
effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA has acknowledged in the Reconsideration RIA that the 
elimination of the Amendments rule information availability provisions 
will reduce the magnitude of the rule's information disclosure 
benefits. EPA notes, however, that almost all of the information 
elements provided under the Amendments rule were already publicly 
available via other means, so this loss of benefits should be small. 
EPA has decided to rescind the information availability provisions of 
the Amendments to address facility security concerns. In the preamble 
to the proposed Reconsideration rule, EPA stated that ``EPA in the 
final amendments may not have struck the appropriate balance between 
various relevant policy concerns, including information availability, 
community right to know, minimizing facility burden, and minimizing 
information security risks. EPA agrees with petitioners that requiring 
unlimited disclosure of the chemical hazard information elements 
required under the RMP Amendments may create additional policy 
concerns, particularly with regard to the potential security risks 
created by disclosing such information.'' Despite the acknowledgement 
that some of the benefits of the information availability provisions 
will be lost, EPA determined that the rescission of these provisions 
was necessary to more appropriately balance these benefits with 
facility security concerns.
2. Comments Regarding EPA's Cost-Saving Rationale
    Some commenters supported EPA's approach in the proposed 
Reconsideration rule to reducing unnecessary regulations and regulatory 
costs. An industry trade association, supporting the proposed rule, 
stated that the Amendments rule provided no quantifiable benefits 
relative to its high compliance costs. Another commenter stated that 
the proposed rule is necessary because the Amendments would be costly 
to regulated entities and do little to prevent chemical accidents. 
Similarly, two industry trade associations expressed support for EPA's 
reconsideration proposal because the costs of the Amendments rule far 
exceeded the benefits of the rulemaking, and another industry trade 
association stated that while it supports the Reconsideration 
rulemaking, they believe the rulemaking understates the costs and 
overstates the benefits of the Amendments rule. Another industry trade 
association stated that the Amendments rule would substantially 
increase the burdens and costs associated with RMP compliance and would 
not help the cause of process safety. A trade association commented 
that the benefits of the Reconsideration rulemaking are clear, due to 
the heavy cost burden placed on regulated entities in the Amendments 
rule.
    In contrast, other commenters disagreed with EPA's cost-saving 
rationale. An advocacy group and several other commenters stated that 
the proposed rule emphasized industry cost savings over public safety 
and that the costs in the Amendments rule are small when spread across 
thousands of regulated facilities. The advocacy group also stated that 
EPA does not and cannot show that the cost savings to the facilities 
that pose the risk of accidental releases would be greater than the 
foregone benefits to the public and environment that bear the risk.
    Several commenters, including State elected officials and a State 
government, argued that the proposed rescissions in the Reconsideration 
rule are arbitrary and capricious. Multiple State elected officials 
commented that EPA's cost-saving rationale does not provide the ``more 
detailed justification'' necessary for EPA to disregard its previous 
findings to the contrary. An advocacy group argued that a lopsided 
focus on the compliance costs of a regulatory action is arbitrary and 
capricious. Specifically, the commenter stated that EPA's emphasis on 
reducing regulatory burden above the benefits of the protections 
provided by the rule is unreasonable. A joint submission from multiple 
advocacy groups and other commenters stated that EPA's preference to 
avoid cost on industry, while neglecting the health and financial cost 
to communities, prioritizes industry's interest over people and is 
arbitrary and capricious. The commenters also argued that the proposed 
rule and Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) are unlawful and arbitrary 
because EPA failed to meet its own cost-benefit goals of finding that 
the benefits of the Reconsideration rule outweigh the costs, and its 
statements disregarding the benefits of the Amendments rule because of 
uncertainty are unsupported and contradictory to the record. A joint 
submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters stated 
that EPA's adoption of the enforcement-led approach in the proposed 
Reconsideration rule is arbitrary and capricious because the Agency has 
not provided a reasoned explanation for the change or the requisite 
detailed explanation for abandoning its prior findings in the 
Amendments rule that the enforcement-led approach was insufficient. 
This commenter also stated that it would be arbitrary and capricious 
for EPA to proceed with the proposed Reconsideration rule because it 
runs directly counter to the effective and efficient measures that 
several State and local developments represent (referring to the New 
Jersey TCPA, Massachusetts TURA, and CCC ISO regulatory programs), and 
that it would be arbitrary and capricious to proceed with the rule 
without fully evaluating those initiatives. And, for the State and 
local initiatives that EPA had relied upon as a rationale for the 
Amendments rule, the commenters argued that EPA has provided no basis 
to change its opinion that these initiatives demonstrate the need and 
likely benefits of the Amendments rule.
    EPA Response: The Agency has provided a detailed rationale for 
rescission of each of the Amendments rule provisions removed by the 
final rule. Regulatory costs are an important consideration in the 
rescission of some provisions, but EPA's decision also considered other 
factors, including the potential lack of effectiveness of some 
provisions, EPA's ability to obtain the benefits of certain provisions 
without imposing regulatory mandates, the desire for regulatory 
consistency with the OSHA PSM standard, and security risks.
    In the Amendments rule, EPA indicated that ``The 10-year RMP 
baseline suggests that considering only the monetized impacts of RMP

[[Page 69852]]

accidents would mean that the rule's costs may outweigh the portion of 
avoided impacts from improved prevention and mitigation that were 
monetized.'' EPA also noted that the monetized impacts omitted other 
categories of accident impacts, including lost productivity, the costs 
of emergency response, transaction costs, property value impacts in the 
surrounding community, environmental impacts, and the impacts of non-
RMP accidents at RMP facilities and any potential impacts of rare high 
consequence catastrophes. However, EPA had no data on any of these 
additional benefit categories and some of them were speculative, in the 
sense there was an argument that the benefit would exist but no studies 
confirming its existence. For example, EPA is aware of no studies of 
property value impacts in areas surrounding RMP facilities that have 
had accidents, and no studies quantifying the reduction, if any, in 
non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities. Were these benefits sizeable, we 
think the multiple rounds of comments on the RFI, the 2017 Amendments 
rule, and the Reconsideration would have highlighted to us relevant 
studies. Therefore, even prior to initiating the Reconsideration 
proceeding, EPA believed that absent other non-monetized benefits, the 
Amendments rule provisions would need to prevent a large fraction of 
the annual average number of RMP-facility accidents in the 10-year 
baseline in order to be cost effective. (82 FR 4597-8, Jan. 13, 2017).
    EPA now believes that its previous estimate of the benefits of the 
Amendments rule was overly optimistic, for two reasons. First, the 
average number of accidents in the baseline (whose costs were used as a 
proxy for the possible monetized benefits of preventing RMP facility 
accidents), and their impacts, likely overestimates the actual number 
and impact of accidents that will occur under the final Reconsideration 
rule going forward. Over the pre-Amendments rule ten-year baseline, RMP 
facility accidents did not occur at a steady rate but declined in 
frequency. EPA's RIA for the Reconsideration rule shows that from 2004 
through 2016, RMP facility accidents declined at a rate of 
approximately 3.5% per year. The most recent three-years of accident 
data available in the docket show that the number of RMP facility 
accidents in the years 2014-2016 were 128, 113, and 99, respectively. 
While these numbers may increase slightly due to late reporting, they 
indicate that the declining trend in accident frequency seen under the 
pre-Amendments rule continues. Two commenters (ACC and CSAG) presented 
additional analysis showing that the impacts of accidents, as measured 
by deaths, injuries, and property damage, have also declined. While the 
costs of some Amendments rule provisions (e.g., third-party audits, 
root cause analysis) also scale with the number of accidents, and would 
therefore also decline with fewer accidents, most of the costs of the 
Amendments rule were ``fixed'' in that they were imposed on regulated 
facilities whether an accident occurred or not. For example, the 
costliest provision of the Amendments rule--STAA--would have impacted 
all facilities with Program 3 processes in NAICS 322, 324, and 325. 
Also, even for provisions such as root cause analysis or third-party 
audits, that are triggered by an accident, some costs, such as 
investigator training or auditor screening, may occur without any 
accident occurring.
    This means that to have costs that are not disproportionate to 
their benefits, Amendments rule provisions would have needed to prevent 
a greater share of future accidents than previously thought. For 
example, if the future rate of RMP-facility accidents under the pre-
Amendments rule has declined to about 100 accidents per year, and the 
consequences of accidents remain at the level seen during the baseline, 
the Amendments rule would have needed to prevent more than 70% of 
future accidents to be cost effective, absent other non-monetized 
impacts. But since the consequences of accidents have also declined, as 
indicated by commenters' analyses \34\ and corroborated by EPA's own 
analysis,\35\ the Amendments rule would need to prevent an even greater 
share of accidents to not have unreasonable, disproportionate costs.
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    \34\ See American Chemistry Council public comments, August 17, 
2018, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1628, and Chemical Safety Advocacy Group 
public comments, August 23, 2018, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1930.
    \35\ See attachments to EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0929, EPA 
Verification of ACC's RMP Accident Analysis with 2 Tables, March 26, 
2018, and RMP Accident Data 2004-2013, EPA Verification of ACC 
Analysis.
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    However, EPA now believes the Amendments rule was likely to be less 
effective at preventing accidents than the Agency previously believed. 
Prior to its reconsideration of the Amendments, EPA had not attempted 
to quantify the effects of state level regulations that are comparable 
to the Amendments rule's STAA provision. EPA has now conducted a 
detailed analysis of RMP-facility accident rates in New Jersey and 
Massachusetts--two states with long-established state-level regulations 
comparable to the Amendments rule STAA provision--and found that 
accident rates in these states have not improved more than accident 
rates at RMP facilities nationwide under the pre-Amendments rule. In 
fact, the average number of accidents per RMP facility in both states 
have exceeded the national average. Therefore, EPA believes that the 
STAA provision of the Amendments is an unreasonable regulation because 
its costs are disproportionate to its benefits.
    EPA disagrees that its approach to the Reconsideration rule is a 
lopsided focus on costs. As EPA has described above, the Agency 
considered both costs and effectiveness of regulatory provisions, as 
well as other factors. If a regulatory provision is of minimal or no 
effectiveness (e.g., STAA), virtually any cost imposed for its 
implementation would be unjustified. For other prevention provisions of 
the Amendments rescinded under the final rule--third-party audits and 
root cause analysis--these take place after an accident has occurred, 
and the Agency can still obtain their benefits through compliance 
settlement agreements if these are appropriate based on the violation 
alleged, without imposing a broad regulatory mandate. Therefore, the 
Agency is not merely considering the cost savings associated with 
rescinding these provisions, but rather whether those costs are 
disproportionate to any benefits gained, and whether those benefits can 
be obtained more efficiently without a regulatory mandate. 
Additionally, the disproportionality of costs versus benefits is not 
the only rationale that EPA relied upon to rescind the prevention 
program provisions of the Amendments. Rescinding these provisions will 
also bring the RMP prevention program provisions back into alignment 
with the OSHA PSM standard, which will avoid confusion among facilities 
subject to both regulations due to divergent regulatory requirements.
    Regarding the Agency's rescission of the information availability 
provision, while the Agency noted that rescission of this provision 
would reduce regulatory costs, the primary justification for its 
removal was not its cost, but rather the increased security risks 
associated with the provision. As EPA stated in the proposed rule 
preamble, ``EPA now proposes for security reasons to rescind the 
requirements for providing to the public upon request, chemical hazard 
information and access to community emergency preparedness information 
in

[[Page 69853]]

Sec.  68.210 (b) through (d). . . .'' (83 FR at 24859, May 30, 2018) 
(emphasis added). Therefore, the final rule's rescission of this 
provision cannot fairly be described as a lopsided focus on its 
compliance costs.
    EPA also disagrees that the Reconsideration rule avoids cost on 
industry by neglecting the health and financial cost to communities. 
The final rule does not make this tradeoff. Rather, the rule provides 
for streamlining of the RMP Amendments to provide appropriate 
regulatory requirements to address risks from RMP facility processes, 
including security risks from terrorism. The rule also facilitates rule 
implementation by removing potential inconsistencies with the OSHA 
Process Safety Management standard. While EPA indicated that rescinding 
certain provisions of the Amendments rule may result in foregone 
benefits, EPA had no data to demonstrate the benefits of specific 
provisions of the Amendments rule. EPA again notes that the rate of 
accidents at RMP facilities in New Jersey since the enactment of that 
state's TCPA IST provision has declined less than the rate of accidents 
at RMP facilities nationwide, suggesting that the STAA provision of the 
Amendments rule may not have had a significant impact on accident 
prevention. EPA retains the ability to continue to employ such 
prevention measures in enforcement actions as appropriate, which we 
believe can be a more effective way to employ these measures than a 
broad regulatory mandate that may unnecessarily impose burden on many 
regulated facilities. It is also important to note that the 
Reconsideration rule does not eliminate the body of comprehensive RMP 
requirements that existed prior to the Amendments rule. Facilities that 
were previously required to identify and control process hazards, 
implement operating procedures, investigate incidents, and comply with 
the other parts of the pre-Amendments RMP rule are still required to do 
so. The preventive and mitigative effects of these regulatory 
requirements remain in full effect. Under the pre-Amendments rule, the 
rate and consequences of RMP-reportable accidents have reached their 
lowest levels since EPA began collecting these data.\36\
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    \36\ The RIA for the final rule demonstrates that the number of 
accidents in 2016 was lower than for any prior year over the period 
studied for this rule (2004-2016). EPA also compiled a spreadsheet 
containing RMP facility accidents for 2017 to corroborate the 
continued decline in RMP facility accidents (there were 94 RMP 
facility accidents reported to EPA in 2017). See Docket ID: EPA-HQ-
OEM-2015-0725-1974. The complete accident record at RMP facilities 
since 1999 (the year the original RMP regulation went into effect) 
through 2016 is contained within the RMP database (Docket ID EPA-HQ-
OEM-2015-0725-0989). Studies of RMP facility accident data conducted 
by the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania confirm that 
RMP accident totals for all prior years were well above 2016 and 
2017 levels. See, e.g., Kleindorfer, et al., Accident Epidemiology 
and the RMP Rule: Learning from a Decade of Accident History Data 
for the U.S. Chemical Industry, Final Report for Cooperative 
Agreement R[hyphen]83033301 between Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center, The Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania and Office of Emergency Management. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, December 18, 2007, Figure 5.1 (showing number of 
accidents from cohort of RMP facilities that filed in first two 
five-year ``waves'' of RMP submissions). See also sections III.C.2 
and IV.C.2.c, below.
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    EPA disagrees that the proposed rule and RIA are unlawful or 
arbitrary because of any failure to conclude that the benefits of the 
Reconsideration rule exceed its costs. For reasons stated above, EPA 
believes that the costs of the final rule are reasonable in comparison 
to its benefits. In short, EPA believes the benefits of rescinded 
Amendments rule provisions were likely to be lower than previously 
thought, making the costs of the Amendments rule disproportionate to 
its benefits. EPA also disagrees that the Agency's current reliance on 
a compliance-driven approach is arbitrary or that EPA has not provided 
a reasoned explanation for this change in position from the 2017 RMP 
Amendments rule. In EPA's most specific rejection in 2017 of reliance 
on enforcement rather than new regulations, we relied on incident 
discussions in the proposed rule as well as ``lessons learned'' from 
these incidents and our experience to support the 2017 RMP Amendments 
rule.\37\ As EPA has noted above, the Agency's latest analysis has 
demonstrated that RMP facility accidents have declined substantially 
under the pre-Amendments rule and are currently at the lowest levels 
since EPA began collecting these data. This low level of accidents 
diminishes the potential benefits of any additional accident prevention 
regulations, particularly when the benefits of those provisions are in 
doubt (e.g., STAA). It also makes a compliance-driven approach more 
feasible. While EPA cannot inspect every RMP facility every year, the 
Agency performs approximately 300 RMP facility inspections each year 
and prioritizes inspections at facilities that have had accidental 
releases. Therefore, EPA's enforcement resources and posture are 
capable of addressing accident-prone facilities without additional 
broad regulatory mandates. The Agency's choice to use a more surgical 
approach to accident prevention at these facilities is reasonable and 
practicable.
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    \37\ Amendments rule Response to Comments at 246 (``the history 
of implementation of the RMP rule has given EPA sufficient 
experience to support modernizing and improving the underlying RMP 
rule and not simply resort to compliance oversight of the existing 
rule''). Commenters also suggested EPA enforce existing requirements 
rather than issue new rule provisions regarding third-party audits 
and emergency coordination. See 82 FR 4613-144654.
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    EPA disagrees with the commenter's claim that it would be arbitrary 
and capricious for EPA to proceed with the proposed Reconsideration 
rule if it runs counter to State and local regulations. EPA has 
analyzed the state and local regulatory programs that commenters are 
referring to and does not agree that they provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of the Amendments rule. EPA's detailed examination of 
these regulatory programs is described elsewhere in this preamble and 
in the Response to Comments document.
3. Comments Relating to Environmental Justice and Fence-Line 
Communities
a. Proximity of RMP Facilities to EJ Communities
    Many commenters, including multiple form letter campaigns, 
commented on the disproportionate proximity of minority populations, 
low-income populations, and/or indigenous peoples (``environmental 
justice (EJ) communities'') to RMP facilities and emphasized the risk 
posed by RMP facilities to these communities. Several of these 
commenters provided extensive data and descriptions in support of their 
comments. Two advocacy groups cited statistics describing the rates of 
student proximity to RMP vulnerability zones. A few commenters stated 
that the poverty rate near RMP facilities is 50 percent greater than 
the US average, and that the difference is more pronounced for low-
income children of color.
    An advocacy group stated that 15 percent of RMP-regulated 
facilities in New York are located in EJ areas. Another advocacy group 
commented that 600,000 people, or 67% of Louisville residents, live 
within three miles of 23 RMP facilities. The commenter stated that a 
large part of that population is black or Latino. The commenter went on 
to give some history of relaxed regulation, incidents, and the specific 
harms caused by RMP facilities in Louisville, noting especially an 
accident the commenter said was preventable at a Carbide Industries 
facility. An advocacy group stated that communities and individuals 
often live in proximity to RMP facilities unaware of the chemicals 
stored and their potential hazards and may be from different cultural 
communities who may

[[Page 69854]]

have a different way of handling emergencies. This commenter stated 
that EPA should work with states, regions and local government to 
explain to communities what chemicals are present and the dangers 
around them. An advocacy group commented that information could be more 
effectively shared through different channels, like churches.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees that RMP facilities are more likely to be 
located in EJ communities--EPA provided data in both the Amendments 
rulemaking and the Reconsideration proposal that characterize the 
disproportionate proximity of EJ communities to RMP facilities. 
However, neither this information, nor any submitted by commenters, 
allows EPA to more accurately characterize the effects of the 
Reconsideration proposal upon those communities.
    Regarding community members' awareness of facility chemical 
hazards, EPA notes that since the 1986 enactment of EPCRA, facilities 
storing and handling hazardous substances must provide to local 
government emergency officials the identities and quantities of these 
hazardous chemicals through annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory 
reporting and through provision of Safety Data Sheets with the 
chemical, physical and hazardous properties of these chemicals stored 
on-site. The thousands of hazardous substances covered under these 
reporting requirements include the 140 substances regulated under the 
RMP regulations.\38\ The LEPCs established under EPCRA use this 
information to develop community emergency response plans to address 
any accidental releases in the community involving these hazardous 
chemicals. Members of the public are allowed to participate on LEPCs, 
and EPA encourages interested community members to get involved with 
their LEPC or attend LEPC meetings to learn more about the chemical 
hazards in their community and how the community would receive 
notifications and other emergency information when a chemical accident 
occurs. Some local governments may provide information on warning 
systems or emergency procedures on government websites. Community 
members also can request copies of hazardous chemical inventory reports 
and Safety Data sheets from their local LEPC. LEPCs serve as focal 
point in the community for information and discussion about hazardous 
substance emergency planning.
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    \38\ EPA acknowledges that isolated industries, such as mining 
facilities, may not be subject to EPCRA 311 and 312, but in the vast 
majority of cases, RMP facilities will also be subject to the EPCRA 
SDS and inventory provisions.
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b. Costs to Fence-Line Communities
    Many commenters expressed concerns about the costs of the rule to 
fence-line communities. A commenter stated that EPA's cost estimate 
only calculates savings to regulated facilities and there is no attempt 
to estimate the costs of incidents to fence-line communities, emergency 
workers, the facilities' workers, and the public in terms of lost 
lives, injuries, illnesses and property damage. A joint submission from 
multiple advocacy groups and other commenters stated that there are 
significant costs imposed on local communities who live near and around 
chemical facilities. The commenters stated that there can be economic 
impacts to the community due to lost work days, time spent sheltering-
in-place or evacuating, emergency response costs, and general 
disruption in the event of an emergency. A federally elected official 
stated that the proposed rule artificially diminishes the benefits 
associated with protecting EJ communities in order to avoid addressing 
or reducing the risk posed to those communities. An industry trade 
association stated that EPA should be aware that low income and 
minority communities will bear the brunt of the costs of the proposed 
rule. Similarly, an advocacy group stated that while the proposed rule 
would save industry money, it would impose costs on poor communities. 
The commenter provided estimates of the potential costs of chemical 
accidents to local communities and argued that local communities are 
more likely to have to pay these costs with the rescission of the 
Amendments rule. Another commenter stated that the Reconsideration rule 
would cause impacts including fires and toxic releases in 
disproportionately EJ communities. These impacts include health impacts 
to first responders, contamination of community property, and people 
being forced to shelter-in-place. Several commenters described past 
chemical plant accidents and their impacts on nearby communities, 
including explosions, hospitalizations, evacuations, deaths, and fear. 
A group of State elected officials provided an extensive discussion 
with information on the susceptibility of EJ communities to RMP-related 
harm in their States, with incidents and data on the same. A commenter 
stated that EJ populations are disproportionately affected by RMP-
threats, and that past EPA accident calculations did not adequately 
address the impact of accidents to productivity, the environment, 
property values, regional economies, government expenses, and long-term 
health consequences. A group of U.S. Senate members compared EPA's 
projected cost savings of $88 million against the industry's $767 
billion value and argued that this saving does not justify the 
Reconsideration rule's negative impacts to vulnerable communities. 
Similarly, a form letter campaign joined by approximately 35,000 
individuals asserted that the dangers associated with RMP facilities 
fall disproportionately on EJ communities.
    Some commenters stated that EPA failed to follow its own ``Guidance 
on Environmental Justice During the Development of Regulatory Actions'' 
by failing to act on any of the seven recommendations in the guidance, 
despite prompting from community groups. A tribal government and a 
tribal association stated that EPA's statement that the proposed rule 
would not impose any additional costs on affected communities amounted 
to a failure to consider health and safety impacts to EJ communities. A 
form letter campaign joined by approximately 2,500 individuals stated 
that the Reconsideration rule, if finalized, would disproportionately 
impact EJ communities and directly subvert the goals of E.O. 12898. An 
advocacy group discounted EPA's projection that the Reconsideration 
rule will benefit EJ communities, stating that such a claim lacks 
evidentiary support. The group cited a CSB report to assert that, on 
the contrary, evidence showed that removing chemical hazard information 
requirements would work to communities' detriment. The group also 
stated that EPA's claim runs contrary to EJ communities' own statements 
regarding their best interests. A joint submission from multiple 
advocacy groups and other commenters argued that the proposed removal 
of STAA provisions would particularly impact EJ communities. It stated 
that larger and more complex plants that would likely benefit from STAA 
requirements tend to be located in counties with larger African-
American populations.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with the assertion that EPA did not 
attempt to evaluate the costs of incidents to offsite personnel and the 
broader community. In the Amendments rule RIA, EPA qualitatively 
described the benefits of the Amendments rule provisions, including the 
prevention and mitigation of future RMP accidents. EPA considered the 
benefits associated with preventing serious accidents, avoiding direct 
costs such as worker, responder, and public fatalities and

[[Page 69855]]

injuries, public evacuations, public sheltering-in-place, and property 
and environmental damage. The Amendments rule RIA also considered 
indirect costs such as lost productivity due to product damage and 
business interruption, both on-site and off-site, expenditure of 
emergency response resources and attendant transaction costs, and 
reduced offsite property values.
    EPA acknowledges that it was not possible to estimate quantitative 
benefits for the 2017 Amendments rule and that EPA, in the 
Reconsideration rulemaking, remains unable to quantify foregone 
benefits of the rescinded Amendments rule provisions. However, EPA also 
notes that the rate and consequences of RMP-reportable accidents have 
reached their lowest levels since EPA began collecting these data. 
These trends have occurred under the pre-Amendments rule, and EPA 
believes that some benefits of the Amendments rule can be obtained 
through a compliance-driven approach without imposing broad regulatory 
mandates that may unnecessarily burden many facilities.
    EPA disagrees that the Agency failed to adequately consider the 
consequences of the proposed Reconsideration rule on EJ communities or 
follow the Agency's own EJ guidance. EPA has acknowledged the 
disproportionate risks of RMP facilities to EJ communities. The Agency 
has documented its assessment of the EJ effects of the Reconsideration 
rule within the RIA. Within that assessment, EPA identified reduced 
risks to EJ populations from terrorism or related security hazards 
associated with avoiding the open-ended emergency coordination and 
public information availability provisions of the Amendments. We also 
believe that accident risks to surrounding communities are ameliorated 
by the emergency response coordination and public meeting provisions of 
the Reconsideration rule. At the same time, to the extent the 
Amendments rule provisions were effective at reducing risks, there 
would be some increase in risk to EJ communities as a result of 
rescinding some provisions of the Amendments rule. Given a lack of 
data, we have not attempted to quantify the combination of increases of 
risks to EJ communities and decreases of risks to those communities. We 
are therefore presenting those changes as a non-quantified set of risk 
changes, without inaccurately characterizing the net effects. EPA does 
not have the data to make those net calculations, nor have commenters 
provided such data. The rulemaking record does not provide enough 
information for anyone to determine the net risk effects to surrounding 
communities of the Reconsideration rule.
    The Reconsideration rule makes small changes to the existing body 
of RMP regulatory requirements. The rule does not eliminate the 
comprehensive RMP requirements that existed prior to the Amendments 
rule. Facilities that were previously required to identify and control 
process hazards, implement operating procedures, investigate incidents, 
and comply with the other parts of the pre-Amendments RMP rule are 
still required to do so. The preventive and mitigative effects of these 
regulatory requirements remain in full effect. Under the pre-Amendments 
rule, the rate and consequences of RMP-reportable accidents have 
reached their lowest levels since EPA began collecting these data. 
Commenters have provided no data which would allow EPA to measure the 
risks posed by altering requirements for changes to existing audit 
requirements or incident investigations or safer technology analyses. 
Without this information, it is impossible to characterize these 
changes as imposing significant costs upon minority and low-income 
populations.
    Regarding STAA, EPA is unable to gauge how facilities in the three 
affected sectors would have responded to the requirements to assess 
safer technologies for their processes. Under the 2017 Amendments rule 
STAA regulation, these facilities were empowered to make their own 
decisions about what kinds of facility changes might be beneficial. 
Under the Reconsideration rulemaking, those facilities still remain 
empowered to make those decisions. It is therefore unclear what the 
impact of this change, if any, would be on surrounding communities. EPA 
notes that accident data from RMP facilities in New Jersey since the 
enactment of that state's TCPA IST provision show less decline in 
accident rates than RMP facilities nationwide, which had no similar 
provision in place, suggesting that the STAA provision of the 
Amendments rule may not have had a significant impact on accident 
prevention.
c. Comments on Chronic Health and Environmental Impacts to Communities 
Near RMP Facilities
    An advocacy group stated that EJ communities face greater impacts 
in the form of health and environmental consequences from unplanned 
releases from RMP facilities. It provided data from a Union of 
Concerned Scientists study on RMP accidents and their impacts of EJ 
communities. The comment cited increased rates of cancer resulting from 
air pollution as well as heightened rates of respiratory illness. 
Another stated that EJ communities are more likely to be exposed to 
chemical hazards in the form of dermal contact, ingestion, and 
inhalation. Other advocacy groups described the heightened 
vulnerability of EJ communities, stating that they tend to have higher 
rates of pollution and disease, while having less access to health care 
and other resources to deal with chemical hazards. A joint submission 
from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters cited a 51 percent 
elevated rate of acute lymphocytic leukemia in children living along 
the Houston Ship Channel, as well as other increased rates of leukemia 
in the area depending on RMP-proximity. Another advocacy group 
representing EJ communities commented that EPA should consider the 
cumulative impacts of pollution from exposure to multiple chemical 
facility sources. An advocacy group stated that the proposed rule RIA 
fails to consider the externalized social and health costs of 
cumulative exposure associated with RMP facilities. A tribal government 
also stated that the RIA does not attempt to quantify environmental 
impacts beyond human health.
    EPA Response: Regarding commenters' contention of increased rates 
of cancer and respiratory illness resulting from air pollution, the RMP 
rule is not intended to address chemical releases that cause cancer or 
other chronic illnesses \39\--other parts of the CAA (such as the 
NESHAP program) and other environmental laws are intended to address 
such health impacts. EPA is expressly prohibited from listing NAAQS 
pollutants under the RMP rule. Regarding the risk of impacts from 
accidental releases by multiple sources, the analysis supporting the 
RMP rule does not include assessing exposure to specific communities 
from RMP-regulated facilities. Rather, the rule requires regulated 
sources to take preventive and response actions designed to address 
hazards at each facility that may pose

[[Page 69856]]

risks from accidental releases to nearby communities. EPA does not 
believe, and has received no data indicating, that rescinding or 
modifying RMP Amendments rule provisions will increase the risk of 
accidents, whether from individual or multiple sources. EPA notes that 
the data presented in the RIA (chapter 8) indicate that less than 5% of 
the U.S. population is in close proximity to two or more RMP 
facilities. Regarding environmental impacts, in the 2017 Amendments 
rule RIA, EPA qualitatively described the benefits of the Amendments 
rule provisions, including the prevention and mitigation of future RMP 
accidents. EPA considered the benefits associated with preventing 
property and environmental damage. In the Reconsideration rulemaking, 
EPA acknowledges that rescinding some of the Amendments provisions 
could have an impact on the environment. However, given that EPA can 
likely obtain some of the benefits of the rescinded provisions through 
a compliance-driven approach, any such impacts should be small. EPA 
believes that it is not possible to estimate quantitative benefits or 
foregone benefits, including environmental impacts, for the final rule. 
EPA has no data to project the specific impact on accidents made by 
each rule provision.
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    \39\ See Senate Report at 210-11 (new accidental release 
provisions not intended to cover releases ``where the potential 
impact on public health is a measurable increase in the probability 
of death, illness or adverse effect which is normally associated 
with `chronic' exposures over a long period. Episodic releases of 
the latter kind are to be addressed under [the NESHAP authority of] 
section 112.''); 136 Cong. Record 36,058 (Oct. 27, 1990) (Sen. 
Durenberger explaining the air toxic problem of ``accidental, 
catastrophic releases'' as one that ``may cause immediate death or 
injury'').
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4. Comments Relating to Accident Data and Accident Rates
a. Comments Disagreeing With EPA's Characterization of RMP Facility 
Accident Rates
    A labor union argued that EPA's characterization that there is a 
low and declining accident rate at RMP facilities is inaccurate because 
EPA failed to calculate or report any rates. The commenter asserted 
that EPA provided only the number of accidents that have occurred in 
certain years but failed to account for other relevant statistics that 
do not support an assertion of a decline in accident rates at RMP 
facilities. Specifically, the commenter argued that 2013, the most 
recent year for which complete data are available, saw more property 
damage due to RMP events than any year since 2008. Additionally, the 
commenter stated that 2012 saw more injuries and illnesses than any 
other year between 2004 and 2013 and saw more people evacuating or 
sheltering in place than any year since 2005.
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters stated that gaps in EPA's chemical accident data lead EPA to 
underestimate the problems that the Amendments rule was attempting to 
address. Specifically, the commenters argued that EPA's data 
underestimates the problem because it does not include incidents when a 
release occurred that either destroyed or decommissioned a process. 
This commenter also submitted data on all National Response Center 
release reports for calendar years 2016 and 2017 and indicated that 
incidents reported to the National Response Center show additional 
information on contemporaneous reports of hazardous air (and other) 
releases from chemical facilities during and after the 2017 hurricanes. 
A tribal organization also referenced National Response Center release 
reports, indicating that during 2007-2016 the National Response Center 
received reports of 285,867 releases of all kinds averaging 28,587 
reported incidents each year. The commenter indicated that these 
numbers indicate that EPA's estimate of only 150 incidents per year is 
a gross underestimate of the actual number of incidents.
    In contrast, an industry association stated that in the Amendments 
rulemaking, EPA assumed that accident rates would continue in the 
future at the same rate as they had for the previous ten years but 
provided no basis for this assumption. The commenter stated that this 
flawed assumption--in addition to EPA's failure to acknowledge the 
declining accident rate at RMP facilities--led EPA to overstate the 
consequences of RMP accidents as well as the benefits related to the 
2017 RMP Amendments.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with the commenter who stated that EPA 
did not provide accident rates, and EPA continues to maintain that 
there is a low and declining accident rate at RMP facilities. In the 
Reconsideration RIA, EPA provided a summary table of the number of 
accidents from 2004-2016. EPA has also provided additional trend 
analysis of accident data in the Technical Background Document, which 
is available in the rulemaking docket.\40\ EPA noted in Exhibit 3.7 of 
the proposed Reconsideration RIA that the number of accidents per year 
at RMP facilities with reportable impacts had declined over time, 
particularly in the most recent three years of analysis (2014-2016). In 
the proposed Reconsideration RIA, EPA did not provide an analysis of 
the impacts or severity of the accidents in the three years of new data 
analyzed. EPA has now reviewed the accident severity data from 2014-
2016 and concluded that average annual accident severity has declined 
with the number of accidents. Specifically, the average number of 
onsite fatalities at RMP facilities between 2004 and 2013 was 5.8 
deaths per year; however, from 2014 to 2016, the average number of 
onsite fatalities decreased to 4.0 deaths per year. Similarly, RMP 
facilities did not experience an offsite death between 2014 and 2016, 
while one was reported between 2004 and 2013.
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    \40\ EPA. July 18, 2019. Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
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    Concerning property damage, the average annual onsite property 
damage from RMP accidents from 2004 to 2013 was $205.5 million per 
year, while from 2014 to 2016, the annual average decreased to $169.9 
million per year. For offsite property damage, the average offsite 
property damage from RMP accidents increased to an average of $1.7 
million per year between 2014-2016 from $1.1 million per year between 
2004 and 2013. Despite the relatively small increase in offsite damage, 
the overall decrease in property damage and fatalities from RMP 
accidents supports the conclusion that, similar to declining accident 
rates, the severity of accidents at RMP facilities is also declining.
    Concerning data on incidents where a release occurred that either 
destroyed or decommissioned a process, EPA acknowledges that there may 
be some accidents associated with destroyed or decommissioned processes 
that are not reported to the RMP database because facilities were not 
required to report such accidents, under the pre-Amendments 
regulations. However, EPA is not aware of a significant number of 
examples of this occurrence, and commenters have not provided such 
data. Therefore, EPA does not believe that the possible omission of a 
few accidents associated with destroyed or decommissioned processes 
would materially impact the analyses included in the Reconsideration 
RIA and continues to believe that relying on the accident information 
in the RMP database is reasonable and the best source of available 
information.
    Regarding commenters' references to and submission of National 
Response Center (NRC) incident report information, EPA disagrees that 
these data demonstrate that EPA has underestimated the number of RMP-
reportable accidents. Commenters provided no analysis of NRC data to 
substantiate this claim. Incidents reported to the National Response 
Center encompass a far greater range of chemicals and sources than 
accidents reported under the RMP rule. The National Response Center was 
established under the National Oil and

[[Page 69857]]

Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR part 300) and 
operates a 24-hour communications center for federally-mandated 
reporting of incidents involving oil, hazardous substances, nuclear 
material, chemical, biological, radiological, and etiological (i.e., 
infected substances, medical wastes) releases, as well as maritime 
reports of suspicious activity and security breaches within the waters 
of the United States and its territories. The NRC accepts release and 
incident reports required to be reported under numerous statutes, 
including the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Natural 
Gas Pipeline Safety Act, and the Hazardous Materials Transportation 
Act. However, CAA section 112(r) contains no requirement for regulated 
sources to make release reports to the National Response Center. 
Therefore, RMP-reportable releases are not required to be reported to 
the NRC unless the release also triggers reporting under another 
statute. While some RMP-listed substances are also regulated under 
other statutes and may therefore require release reporting to the NRC 
under those statutes if specified conditions are met, not all releases 
of RMP-regulated substances reported to the NRC meet RMP reporting 
criteria. This is because the criteria for reporting an accidental 
release in a facility's RMP are based on meeting consequence criteria 
listed in Sec.  68.42(a), while reporting to the NRC is based on 
different criteria. For example, under CERCLA, releases to the 
environment of listed hazardous substances exceeding specified 
reportable quantities over a 24-hour period are required to be reported 
to the NRC. Under 40 CFR 68.42, such an accidental release would only 
be reported in the RMP accident history if it resulted in specified 
impacts, even if the CERCLA RQ was exceeded.
    The great majority of hazardous chemical releases reported to the 
National Response Center are from sources not regulated under the RMP 
rule (i.e., transportation sources or non-RMP-regulated stationary 
sources), or involve chemicals not listed under the RMP rule. EPA 
analyzed one set of the NRC data \41\ provided by commenters to 
determine the number and types of materials that are reported to the 
NRC. See Appendix F in the Technical Background Document \42\ for a 
characterization of the number and types of materials reported in 
releases to the NRC in 2017. Over 14,000 of the 24,680 NRC release 
reports in 2017 were for oil or oil-related waste and 4,011 of the 
reports were for releases identified by a specific chemical name. Not 
all these chemicals are regulated RMP substances. Other large 
categories of releases included gasoline, fuel oil or liquid petroleum 
fuels (1,854), unknown materials (1,117) and natural gas or petroleum 
gas fuels (770).
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    \41\ EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1963, attachment ``FOIA files 
CY2017.''
    \42\ EPA. July 18, 2019. Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
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    Additionally, for reasons stated above, some releases of RMP-listed 
substances from RMP-regulated facilities that are reported to the NRC 
do not require reporting in a facility's RMP. Lastly, there is no limit 
on who may call and make a report to the NRC--it accepts release 
reports from facility owners and operators, government employees, 
foreign entities, media, and other members of the public--often 
resulting in duplicate release reports being made for a single 
incident. Therefore, the number of releases reported to the National 
Response Center provides no indication of the number, rate, or trend of 
accidental releases subject to reporting under the RMP rule.
    Regarding the effects of declining accidents on the Amendments rule 
baseline, EPA agrees that the average number of accidents in the 
baseline (whose costs were used as a proxy for the maximum possible 
monetized benefits of preventing RMP facility accidents), and their 
impacts, likely overestimates the actual number and impact of accidents 
that will occur under the final Reconsideration rule going forward. In 
the Reconsideration rule RIA, EPA has noted that in the most recent 
years of analysis annual accident data continue to show a decline in 
accident frequency, consistent with the trend over the previous 10-year 
period. EPA noted in the Reconsideration RIA that this decrease would 
result in a decrease in the estimated cost savings of repealing rule 
provisions triggered by reportable accidental releases relative to 
their costs as estimated in the 2017 Amendments rule RIA. EPA also 
noted that the decrease in accidents would also result in a 
commensurate reduction in the benefits of implementing these 
provisions, if they had gone into effect (i.e., both the cost estimate 
for provisions required following an accident and the maximum potential 
benefits of Amendments rule provisions as estimated in the 2017 RMP 
Amendments final rule RIA, would now be understood to have been too 
high). However, because of the net offsetting effect of the change in 
accident frequency on anticipated cost savings and benefit reductions, 
EPA has not adjusted the Amendments rule costs or benefits estimates to 
account for declining accident rates where relied on to calculate the 
cost savings or foregone benefits in the Reconsideration rule.
b. Other Additional Sources of Accident Data
    A private citizen stated that EPA has a good opportunity to collect 
real data on RMP related costs and benefits through OSHA and the 
California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CalARP). The 
commenter suggested that both organizations have recently implemented 
programs with provisions similar to those included in the Amendments 
rule. Another private citizen commented that the CCPS and a number of 
other organizations have monetized the potential costs of chemical 
incidents and the commenter cited several estimates of industrial 
accident costs from various sources. The commenter submitted 
information sourced from CCPS, the RAND Corporation, Marsh & McClennan, 
an insurance industry analysis of hypothetical chlorine spills and 
terrorist attacks on major metropolitan areas, the West Fertilizer 
incident, and the Freedom Industries chemical spill. Based on these 
sources, the commenter stated that the costs of an accident could be 
many times larger than EPA's monetized estimates and should direct EPA 
to maintain the Amendments rule.
    EPA Response: EPA notes that CalARP now requires additional process 
safety measures at California refineries, including requirements to 
adopt inherently safer designs and systems to the greatest extent 
feasible. Many of the new requirements went beyond what was required by 
the Amendments rule. The CalARP regulations, along with companion 
regulations adopted by Cal/OSHA, became effective in October 2017.\43\ 
EPA will consider the CalARP and Cal/OSHA programs moving forward and 
evaluate whether the accident data produced has any useful relevance to 
the RMP program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Cal EPA and CA DIR. August 4, 2017. News Release: New 
Regulations Improve Safety at Oil Refineries. California 
Environmental Protection Agency and California Department of 
Industrial Regulations. https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2017/2017-71.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding a commenter's suggestion that EPA consider additional 
sources of data, EPA acknowledges that many

[[Page 69858]]

sources of data and information exist for estimating the costs of 
incidents, and EPA has evaluated accident data from a number of 
sources, including the RAND Corporation, CCPS, and others. As discussed 
later in this preamble (see section IV) and in the Response to Comments 
document, data collected by CCPS does not appear to significantly 
overlap with RMP reportable accidents, and EPA does not believe that 
the RAND Corporation estimates are applicable to the RMP program. The 
commenter also submitted data from insurance industry analyses of 
hypothetical chlorine spills and terrorist attacks on major 
metropolitan areas, stating that potential RMP accident costs are much 
higher than EPA's estimates. EPA, in its analysis in the Amendments and 
Reconsideration rule RIAs, has evaluated actual reported accident costs 
from RMP facilities, and has not relied on hypothetical analyses. EPA 
believes that it has the best and most accurate available accident data 
for RMP facilities in its RMP database.
    The commenter's submission of accident data from the Marsh & 
McLennan ``100 Largest Losses 1978-2017, Large Property Damage Losses 
in the Hydrocarbon Industry, 28th edition'' includes 100 major 
incidents with property damage losses over $100 million each. EPA 
believes the stated loss amounts in this document overstate damage 
impacts that are associated or could be associated with the RMP 
universe of regulated facilities. For example, the 100 incidents are 
within five categories, refineries (41 incidents), petrochemicals (25 
incidents), gas processing (5 incidents), terminals and distribution (5 
incidents) and upstream (24 incidents). Many of these incidents predate 
the effective date of the original RMP rule, which was June 21, 1999. 
Of the remaining incidents, many occur outside of the United States and 
therefore are not subject to the RMP regulations. Others involve off-
shore oil and gas drilling or production or transportation (barge) 
accidents, which are not covered by the RMP rule. For example, in the 
petrochemicals category, 16 of the 25 incidents occurred before the 
implementation of the original RMP rule and 7 of the remaining 9 
incidents occurred outside the United States. Therefore, the Marsh & 
McLennan property loss data is of limited use, and EPA believes that 
estimating RMP accident costs using data reported in the RMP database 
is more appropriate.
    In regard to the data submitted concerning the costs of the West 
Fertilizer Company incident in 2013, EPA has acknowledged that the 
incident has provided EPA with valuable information and has yielded 
significant lessons; however, EPA does not believe that the incident is 
reflective of RMP facility accident costs because the incident was not 
associated with an RMP covered substance or process. Specifically, the 
West, Texas incident involved a chemical, ammonium nitrate, that is not 
covered by the RMP rule. Additionally, the BATF concluded that the 
incident was the result of an intentional act and not an accident.
    Finally, the commenter's reference to data related to the Freedom 
Industries chemical spill in West Virginia, while important to chemical 
facility safety generally, is not directly relevant to the RMP program. 
The Freedom Industries incident did not involve an RMP substance or an 
RMP-regulated facility.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ CSB. February 2017. Investigation Report-Freedom 
Industries, Inc., January 9, 2014. Report No. 2014-01-I-WV. pp. 28-
30, 81. https://www.csb. gov/freedom-industries-chemical-release-/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Claims That EPA's Cost-Benefit Analysis Should Include Data on Near-
Misses
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters also stated that EPA has not adequately included data on 
near misses in the rulemaking, and without such data, EPA's accident-
rate estimates are severe underestimates of the problem. The commenter 
stated that EPA refuses to collect or consider information on most near 
misses and that EPA's estimates of the harm caused by chemical 
disasters deliberately exclude harms not attributable to the release of 
a regulated substance. The commenter stated that many of near-misses 
include fires, explosions, or other dangerous situations that cause 
immediate harm, in addition to nearly causing the release of an RMP 
chemical. The commenter contended that the EPA definition of 
``accidental release'' which is ``an unanticipated emission of a 
regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the 
ambient air from a stationary source,'' does not include many dangerous 
events including fires and explosions nor other events that do not 
otherwise satisfy the reporting criteria. The commenter argued that 
costs of these events must be considered because such incidents are 
also prevented and mitigated by the Risk Management Program and 
omission of such accidents from the 10-year accident data used in EPA's 
analysis may under-represent the number and magnitude of RMP chemical 
accidents. The commenter cited examples of omitted incidents, such as 
the 2013 West Fertilizer disaster, the 2017 Arkema explosion, and the 
2018 Husky Refinery fire, which the commenter stated caused harm and 
also was a near miss for a hydrogen fluoride release. The commenter 
acknowledged that when estimating costs of the Amendments rule, EPA 
assumed one near miss for each accident, but also recognized that some 
industry publications project much higher ratios of near misses to 
actual releases.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Agency's estimate of the costs 
of accidents is a severe underestimate. First, the Agency treats as an 
accidental release fires and explosions involving regulated substances. 
These events are not near misses, as the commenter suggests. The Agency 
has taken multiple enforcement actions after events involving fires and 
explosions (see, e.g., RTC at section 3.1 regarding Chevron 
settlement). These events are accidental releases. When these events 
result in impacts required to be reported under 40 CFR 68.42, such 
events are included in RMPs. Events like the Arkema Crosby and the West 
Fertilizer incident are not reflected in accident history reporting not 
because they were fires or explosions; these events are not reported 
under 40 CFR 68.42 because the substances involved in the fires and 
explosions were not regulated substances. Second, EPA is gathering the 
type of information on accidents that the statute identified as 
necessary. CAA section 112(r)(7) required the RMP hazard assessment to 
include ``a previous release history of the past 5 years, including the 
size, concentration, and duration of releases.'' Therefore, the EPA's 
regulations track the statutory mandate to gather information on actual 
release events. Also, it would be illogical to base RMP accident cost 
estimates on the number of near misses because near misses represent 
events that did not result in impacts from an accidental release of an 
RMP-regulated substance. Thus, for the Husky Refinery incident, the 
report for the flammable release/explosion of regulated substances 
would capture the actual damages of the incident but not the 
hypothetical costs of any potential HF release that did not occur. In 
any event, EPA does not have data on the number of RMP near-miss 
events. While owners and operators are already required to investigate 
incidents that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release 
under the pre-Amendments rule, and the final rule retains that 
provision, owners and

[[Page 69859]]

operators are not required to report data on near-miss events.
    EPA also notes that the term ``near-miss'' is not well defined. 
While some commenters have collected what they have characterized as 
near-miss data and submitted that information to EPA for this 
rulemaking, much of this information may not represent near-miss 
accidents at RMP-covered processes. Whether or not an incident is a 
near miss event for an RMP-covered process depends on the specific 
circumstances of each incident. Many of the incidents at RMP facilities 
cited by commenters from news reports do not provide enough information 
to conclude that they were near misses that could have involved a 
release of an RMP-covered substance. To qualify as an RMP-reportable 
accident, the accident must involve the accidental release of an RMP-
regulated substance from an RMP-covered process that results in deaths, 
injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or known offsite 
deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or 
environmental damage. Not every incident that occurs at a chemical 
facility constitutes an RMP-reportable accident or near miss. Not every 
release, fire or explosion at an RMP facility necessarily constitutes a 
near miss for an RMP-covered process. Therefore, EPA continues to 
believe it is reasonable that near-miss accident rates are not 
considered in the accident rate analyses. EPA's estimate of one near-
miss per accident was based on the experience of an industry consultant 
and was used to estimate the burden for conducting root-cause analysis 
for investigation of near-misses.
    Regarding harms not attributable to the release of a regulated 
substance, we do not consider these because the Agency can only act 
within the bounds of its CAA authority, which extends the RMP 
provisions under CAA 112(r)(7) only to regulated substances and covered 
processes. Besides being difficult to quantify, accepting the 
commenter's argument would require EPA to include a large universe of 
incident data and speculative harms that would in many cases be 
unrelated to RMP-covered processes, resulting in a vast overestimate of 
the harmful impacts of accidents at RMP-regulated processes.

IV. Rescinded Incident Investigation, Third-Party Audit, Safer 
Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA), and Other Prevention 
Program Amendments

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    In the RMP Amendments rule, EPA added three major provisions to the 
accident prevention program of Subparts C (for Program 2 processes) and 
D (for Program 3 processes). These included:
    (1) A requirement in Sec.  68.60 and Sec.  68.81 for all facilities 
with Program 2 or 3 processes to conduct a root cause analysis using a 
recognized method as part of an incident investigation of a 
catastrophic release or an incident that could have reasonably resulted 
in a catastrophic release (i.e., a near-miss).
    (2) Requirements in Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79 for regulated 
facilities with Program 2 or Program 3 processes to contract with an 
independent third-party, or assemble an audit team led by an 
independent third-party, to perform a compliance audit after the 
facility has an RMP reportable accident or when an implementing agency 
requires a third-party audit due to conditions at the stationary source 
that could lead to an accidental release of a regulated substance, or 
when a previous third-party audit failed to meet the specified 
competency or independence criteria. Requirements were established in 
Sec.  68.59 and Sec.  68.80 for third-party auditor competency, 
independence, and responsibilities and for third-party audit reports 
and audit findings response reports.
    (3) A requirement in Sec.  68.67(c)(8) for facilities with Program 
3 regulated processes in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 
(petroleum and coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical 
manufacturing) to conduct a STAA as part of their process hazard 
analysis (PHA). This required the owner or operator to address safer 
technology and alternative risk management measures applicable to 
eliminating or reducing risk from process hazards; to consider, in the 
following order or preference, inherently safer technologies, passive 
measures, active measures and procedural measures while using any 
combination of risk management measures to achieve the desired risk 
reduction; and to evaluate the practicability of any inherently safer 
technologies and designs considered.
    (4) The RMP Amendments rule also made several other minor changes 
to the Subparts C and D prevention program requirements. These included 
the following:
     Sec.  68.48 Safety information--changed requirement in 
subparagraph (a)(1) to maintain Safety Data Sheets (SDS) in lieu of 
Material Safety Data Sheets.
     Sec.  68.50 Hazard review--added language to existing 
subparagraph (a)(2) to require hazard reviews to include findings from 
incident investigations when identifying opportunities for equipment 
malfunctions or human errors that could cause an accidental release.
     Sec. Sec.  68.54 and 68.71 Training--changed description 
of employee(s) ``operating a process'' to ``involved in operating a 
process'' in Sec.  68.54 paragraphs (a) and (b); and changed 
``operators'' to ``employees involved in operating a process'' in Sec.  
68.54(d). EPA also added paragraph (e) in Sec.  68.54 and paragraph (d) 
in Sec.  68.71 to clarify that employee training requirements also 
apply to supervisors responsible for directing process operations 
(under Sec.  68.54) and supervisors with process operational 
responsibilities (under Sec.  68.71).
     Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.79 Compliance audits--changes to 
paragraph (a) for Program 2 and Program 3 provisions added language to 
clarify that the owner or operator must evaluate compliance with each 
covered process every three years.
     Sec. Sec.  68.60 and 68.81 Incident investigation--made 
the following changes: Revised paragraph (a) in both sections by adding 
clarifying text ``(i.e., was a near miss)'' to describe an incident 
that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release; revised 
paragraph (a) in both sections to require investigation when an 
incident resulting in catastrophic releases also results in the 
affected process being decommissioned or destroyed; added paragraph (c) 
to Sec.  68.60 to require for Program 2 processes, incident 
investigation teams to be established and consist of at least one 
person knowledgeable in the process involved and other persons with 
appropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate and 
analyze the incident; redesignated paragraphs (c) through (f) in Sec.  
68.60 as paragraphs (d) through (g); revised redesignated paragraph (d) 
in Sec.  68.60 and paragraph (d) in Sec.  68.81 to require an incident 
investigation report to be prepared and completed within 12 months of 
the incident, unless the implementing agency approves, in writing, an 
extension of time, and in Sec.  68.60 replaced the word ``summary'' in 
redesignated paragraph (d) with ``report'' and added the word 
``Incident'' before ``investigation'' and replaced the

[[Page 69860]]

word ``summaries'' with ``reports'' in redesignated paragraph (g). The 
following changes were made in both paragraph (d) of Sec.  68.81 and 
redesignated paragraph (d) of Sec.  68.60 to specify additional 
required contents of the investigation report: Revised paragraph (d)(1) 
to include time and location of the incident; revised paragraph (d)(3) 
to require that description of incident be in chronological order, with 
all relevant facts provided; redesignated and revised paragraph (d)(4) 
into paragraph (d)(7) to require that the factors that contributed to 
the incident include the initiating event, direct and indirect 
contributing; added new paragraph (d)(4) to require the name and amount 
of the regulated substance involved in the release (e.g., fire, 
explosion, toxic gas loss of containment) or near miss and the duration 
of the event; added new paragraph (d)(5) to require the consequences, 
if any, of the incident including, but not limited to: Injuries, 
fatalities, the number of people evacuated, the number of people 
sheltered in place, and the impact on the environment; added new 
paragraph (d)(6) to require the emergency response actions taken; and 
redesignated and revised paragraph (d)(5) of Sec.  68.81 and paragraph 
(c)(5) of Sec.  68.60 into paragraphs (d)(8) of both sections to 
require that the investigation recommendations have a schedule for 
being addressed.
     Sec.  68.65 Process safety information--change to 
paragraph (a) to no longer require written process safety information 
to be compiled in accordance with a schedule in Sec.  68.67 and to 
require the owner or operator to keep process safety information up-to-
date; change to Note to paragraph (b) revised the term ``Material 
Safety Data Sheets'' to ``Safety Data Sheets (SDS).''
     Sec.  68.67 Process hazard analysis--change to 
subparagraph (c)(2) added requirement for PHA to address the findings 
from all incident investigations required under Sec.  68.81, as well as 
any other potential failure scenarios.
     Sec.  68.3 Definitions--added definitions for terms active 
measures, inherently safer technology or design, passive measures, 
practicability, and procedural measures related to amendments to 
requirements in Sec.  68.67. Added definition of root cause related to 
amendments to requirements in Sec.  68.60 and Sec.  68.81. Added 
definition for term third-party audit related to amendments to 
requirements in Sec.  68.58 and added Sec.  68.59.
    In the Reconsideration rule, EPA proposed to rescind all of the 
above changes, with the exception of the two changes that would revise 
the term ``Material Safety Data Sheets'' to ``Safety Data Sheets 
(SDS)'' in Sec. Sec.  68.48 and 68.65. This includes deleting the words 
``for each covered process'' from the compliance audit provisions in 
Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79, which apply to RMP Program 2 and Program 
3, respectively.
    In conjunction with the proposed rescinding of prevention program 
changes, EPA proposed to rescind the requirements to report the 
following data elements in the risk management plan: In Sec.  
68.170(i), whether the most recent compliance audit was a third-party 
audit, pursuant to Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.59; in Sec.  68.175(k), 
whether the most recent compliance audit was a third-party audit, 
pursuant to Sec. Sec.  68.79 and 68.80; and in Sec.  68.175(e)(7), 
inherently safer technology or design measures implemented since the 
last PHA, if any, and the technology category (substitution, 
minimization, simplification and/or moderation). In Sec.  68.175(e), 
EPA proposed to rescind the 2017 RMP Amendments rule's deletion of the 
expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA for 
Program 3 facilities. Adding back this requirement would revert 
reporting of the PHA information in the risk management plan to what 
was required prior to the Amendments rule. This would also be 
consistent with the similar Sec.  68.170(e) requirement for Program 2 
facilities to report the expected date of completion of any changes 
resulting from the hazard review, a requirement that was not deleted in 
the RMP Amendments rule. EPA also proposed to rescind the requirement 
in Sec.  68.190(c), that prior to deregistration, the owner or operator 
shall meet applicable reporting and incident investigation requirements 
in accordance with Sec. Sec.  68.42, 68.60 and/or 68.81.
    Alternatively, EPA proposed to rescind all of the above changes, 
except for the following:
     Requirement in Sec.  68.50(a)(2) for the hazard review to 
include findings from incident investigations;
     Retain the term ``report(s)'' in place of the word 
``summary(ies)'' in Sec.  68.60;
     Requirement in Sec.  68.60 for Program 2 processes to 
establish an incident investigation team consisting of at least one 
person knowledgeable in the process involved and other persons with 
experience to investigate an incident;
     Requirements in Sec. Sec.  68.54 and 68.71 for training 
requirements to apply to supervisors responsible for process operations 
and minor wording changes involving the description of employees 
operating a process in Sec.  68.54; and,
     Retain the two changes that would revise the term 
``Material Safety Data Sheets'' to ``Safety Data Sheets (SDS)'' in 
Sec. Sec.  68.48 and 68.65.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    After review and consideration of public comments, EPA is 
rescinding all the prevention program related changes in the Amendments 
rule, while retaining the term ``Safety Data Sheets (SDS)'' in 
Sec. Sec.  68.48 and 68.65, as proposed, with the following 
modifications:
     Retain the term ``report(s)'' in place of the word 
``summary(ies)'' in Sec.  68.60 for Program 2 processes. The term 
``Incident'' before ``investigation reports'' in Amendments rule Sec.  
68.60(g) will also be retained from the Amendments rule because this is 
consistent with the investigation language for Program 3, although the 
proposed Reconsideration rule omitted this term.
     Retain the requirement in Sec.  68.60 for Program 2 
processes to establish an incident investigation team consisting of at 
least one person knowledgeable in the process involved and other 
persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to investigate and 
analyze the incident.
     Retain change to Sec.  68.65(a) for Program 3 processes to 
not require written process safety information to be compiled in 
accordance with a schedule in Sec.  68.67.
    The requirement in Sec.  68.65(a) for Program 3 processes to 
compile written process safety information in accordance with a 
schedule in Sec.  68.67 had been deleted in Amendments rule because it 
appeared to have been adopted from OSHA's PSM PHA completion schedule 
of May 1994 to May 1997; it was not relevant to the RMP rule because 
the compliance date of June 21, 1999 was after OSHA's PSM PHA 
completion schedule. (See 82 FR 4675, January 13, 2017 and 81 FR 13686, 
March 14, 2016). EPA intended to not keep this irrelevant text in Sec.  
68.65(a), but the schedule requirement was included in the regulatory 
text of Sec.  68.65(a) in EPA's reconsideration proposal in error. EPA 
will maintain the Amendments rule's deletion of phrase in Sec.  
68.65(a) that had referenced a schedule in Sec.  68.67.
    To clarify, EPA will not adopt the alternative proposed changes:
     Requirement in Sec.  68.50(a)(2) for the hazard review to 
include findings from incident investigations;
     Deletion of the word ``Incident'' before ``investigation 
summaries'' in Amendments rule Sec.  68.60(g) and
     Training requirements in Sec. Sec.  68.54 and 68.71 to 
apply to supervisors

[[Page 69861]]

responsible for process operations and minor wording changes involving 
the description of employees operating a process in Sec.  68.54.
    EPA is rescinding the requirement in Sec.  68.190(c) regarding 
updates to the risk management plan, that prior to deregistration, the 
owner or operator shall meet applicable reporting and incident 
investigation requirements in accordance with Sec. Sec.  68.42, 68.60 
and/or 68.81. EPA is also rescinding reporting of the following data 
elements in the risk management plan associated with the rescinded 
prevention program requirements of this final rule:
     In Sec.  68.170(i) and 68.175(k), whether the most recent 
compliance audit was a third-party audit; and
     in Sec.  68.175(e)(7), inherently safer technology or 
design measures implemented since the last PHA, if any, and their 
technology category.
    EPA is adding back the pre-Amendments rule requirement in Sec.  
68.175(e) to provide in the RMP the expected date of completion of any 
changes resulting from the PHA for Program 3 facilities. This 
requirement had been deleted by the Amendments rule and was proposed to 
be restored.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Overview of Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    As discussed in section II.D, our approach to this final rule is 
more data-driven than the 2017 final rule, which relied more on 
incident information and opinions. As discussed below in several of the 
comments and responses, the data derived from EPA's RMP database shows 
that accidents are highly concentrated in a few facilities and that 
rule-based state mandates that require examination of STAA, IST, and 
chemical use reduction have not resulted in reducing accidental release 
frequency of or reduced accident impacts from accidental releases from 
processes to which the RMP rule applies. We have examined data and 
statements about the impact of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Harvey on 
accidental releases subject to the RMP rule, but find little or no 
evidence that extreme weather events have, to date, led to incidents 
that would have been prevented had the new prevention provisions added 
in 2017 been in place and had compliance been required prior to these 
events. As explained below, many of the incidents extracted from 
databases maintained by TCEQ and others involved units not subject to 
the RMP regulations (e.g., naturally occurring hydrocarbon storage 
prior to entry to a natural gas processing plant or a petroleum 
refining process unit), regulated substances that are not included in 
threshold calculations (e.g., substances in gasoline storage), and 
substances not subject to the RMP rule (e.g., benzene, carbon 
monoxide). With respect to RMP-regulated substances in RMP covered 
processes, these likely tend to be more carefully managed than 
chemicals that are less inherently hazardous, so it is reasonable to 
expect that other chemicals are more frequently released when held in 
greater quantities in the absence of use reduction programs.
    We find that the observed trend that accidental releases subject to 
the RMP rule have steadily declined over time continues to be valid. 
One implication of the decline in accidental releases is that the 
estimate of 150 accidental releases per year used in calculating the 
cost of accidental releases in the 2017 rule overstates the number of 
recent releases occurring under the RMP rule as it was prior the 2017 
rule changes. With an overstated baseline of accidental releases, a 
higher percentage of accidental release would need to be prevented by 
the measures added in 2017 in order for these provisions to be 
reasonable and practicable (i.e., costs not disproportionate to their 
effectiveness). As noted, there is little evidence that IST-like 
regulatory programs have resulted in improved accidental release 
prevention trends or that recent extreme weather events have resulted 
in more accidental releases.
    With releases declining under the pre-2017 prevention provisions 
and the concentration of releases among a small percentage of sources, 
we maintain the view we expressed in the proposed rule--that a 
compliance oversight approach addressing the small number of facilities 
with inadequate prevention programs can obtain much of the accident 
prevention benefit at a fraction of the cost of a rule-based approach 
that imposes additional prevention program requirements on all 
facilities.
    Moreover, rescinding the prevention program provisions described in 
this section is consistent with our historic practice of keeping 
aligned the RMP prevention provisions that overlap with PSM. This 
coordination approach has the benefit of simplifying compliance for 
affected sources and facilitating program implementation by state and 
local delegated programs. At a minimum, EPA believes it should have a 
better understanding of the direction of the OSHA program before adding 
costly and difficult to implement prevention program provisions to the 
RMP rule.
    While EPA did not justify the additional prevention program 
provisions added by the RMP Amendments rule on the basis of security, 
we considered claims made by some commenters that these provisions, and 
particularly STAA, should be retained because they may reduce security 
risks. However, as explained further below, we maintain the view that 
the pre-2017 prevention provisions already allowed facilities to 
appropriately balance security and safety risks, and reverting to those 
provisions is not inconsistent with other parts of this rule that 
address new security risks created by the emergency response and 
information availability provisions of the 2017 RMP Amendments.
    Below and in the RTC we discuss in more detail the basis for our 
decisions to rescind the prevention program elements described in this 
section.
2. Comments on Rescission of Prevention Program Provisions in General
    While several commenters expressed general support for the 
rescission of the Amendments rule prevention program rescissions, many 
other commenters, including a form letter campaign joined by 
approximately 18,310 individuals, recommended maintaining those 
provisions.
a. Claims That Rescinding Prevention Provisions While Retaining Other 
Provisions Is Inherently Contradictory
    A joint comment submission by multiple advocacy groups argued that 
the proposed Reconsideration rule is inherently contradictory, 
reasoning that it is arbitrary for EPA to recognize that the incident 
data shows a need for certain emergency response coordination and 
public meeting requirements but argue that the same need does not exist 
for the prevention program requirements.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Reconsideration rule is 
inherently contradictory because it retains Amendments rule emergency 
response provisions while rescinding accident prevention provisions. At 
no point in the record for the RMP Amendments rule or the 
Reconsideration rule do we represent that either the pre-Amendments 
prevention program or the addition of STAA, third-party audits, or root 
cause analyses to the prevention programs will prevent all accidental 
releases. There will still be accidents that will need responses with 
or without the prevention program amendments rescinded today. EPA 
believes that much of the accident prevention

[[Page 69862]]

benefits of the Amendments rule prevention provisions can be achieved 
by including injunctive relief, as appropriate, in enforcement actions 
without a broad regulatory mandate that potentially imposes unnecessary 
costs on many facilities. The retention of the Amendments rule's 
emergency response program provisions, with modifications, is not 
inconsistent with this view. We retain many of the RMP Amendments 
emergency response provisions because, regardless of whether we go 
forward with the prevention program changes under the RMP Amendments, 
improvements in the response program provisions are reasonable and 
practicable. We have struck a reasonable balance of measures that will 
provide, to the greatest extent practicable, for preventing accidental 
releases and minimizing the impacts of such releases.
b. Claims That OSHA Coordination Is Not a Reasonable Justification for 
Rescinding Prevention Requirements
    Multiple State elected officials commented that because EPA's 
rationale regarding the need for greater coordination with OSHA does 
not provide a reasonable justification for eliminating the benefits of 
the accident prevention requirements, the proposed rescission would be 
arbitrary and capricious if finalized. These commenters argued that 
greater coordination with OSHA is not a prerequisite to imposing the 
prevention program provisions of the Amendments rule for four reasons: 
(1) Congress did not intend for the OSHA coordination requirement to 
prevent EPA from taking action; (2) EPA did in fact coordinate with 
OSHA throughout the development of the 2017 rule; (3) There is no 
conflict between the accident prevention requirements and OSHA's 
regulations; and (4) EPA should not wait for OSHA to act because, as 
EPA found during the Amendments rulemaking effort, its regulations are 
needed now. A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters made a similar argument that repeal and delay pending a new 
rulemaking by EPA and/or OSHA is arbitrary and capricious.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that EPA's rationale regarding the need 
for greater coordination with OSHA for eliminating accident prevention 
requirements is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Congress 
requires EPA to consult and coordinate with OSHA in order to establish 
coordinated regulatory requirements. As we discussed in section II.C.2, 
above, the Senate committee report on this language notes that the 
purpose of the coordination requirement is to ensure that 
``requirements imposed by both agencies to accomplish the same purpose 
are not unduly burdensome or duplicative.'' Senate Report at 244. The 
proposed Reconsideration rule did not suggest that there was any legal 
requirement to defer to OSHA in rulemaking, rather EPA acknowledged in 
the proposed rule that there is no legal requirement for EPA and OSHA 
to proceed on identical timelines in making changes to the RMP rule and 
PSM standard, and that some divergence between the RMP rule and PSM 
standard may at times be necessary given the agencies' separate 
missions. See 83 FR 24863-64. EPA also indicated, however, that while 
there is no legal bar to EPA proceeding on a separate rulemaking 
schedule or having requirements divergent from the OSHA PSM standard, 
the Amendments rule represented a departure from PSM requirements. 
While EPA's approach to coordination with OSHA under the Amendments 
rule was legally permissible, EPA does not have a record showing 
significant benefits of the added prevention program provisions. 
Without such benefits, EPA believes it is better to take its 
traditional approach of maintaining consistency with OSHA PSM. The 
creation of additional complexity and burden associated with new 
provisions where EPA has not demonstrated any benefit is evidence of 
the new prevention provisions' impracticability and that the rule 
divergence is unreasonable.
    By adding significant new requirements to the accident prevention 
program under the Amendments rule, EPA caused the RMP prevention 
requirements to diverge substantially from the OSHA PSM standard for 
the first time. For example, with the Amendments rule's STAA and third-
party audit provisions, EPA added completely new and complex components 
of the PHA and auditing provisions that are not contained in the PSM 
standard. Such new provisions impose additional compliance and 
oversight burdens that could cause implementation problems. With 
respect to root cause investigations, expert testimony at EPA's public 
hearing indicated that the pre-Amendments RMP rule does not require 
root cause investigation. In requiring EPA to coordinate its rulemaking 
under CAA section 112(r)(7) with OSHA, Congress urged EPA to avoid this 
situation by indicating that the purpose of the coordination 
requirement was to ensure that ``requirements imposed by both agencies 
to accomplish the same purpose are not unduly burdensome or 
duplicative.'' \45\ By rescinding the Amendments rule's changes to the 
accident prevention program, EPA is restoring the pre-Amendments 
consistency between the RMP rule and PSM standard. At a minimum, EPA 
believes it should have a better understanding of the direction of the 
OSHA program before adding costly and difficult to implement prevention 
provisions to the RMP rule.
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    \45\ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Report of the Committee 
on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate together with 
Additional and Minority Views to Accompany S. 1630. S. Report No. 
101-228. 101st Congress, 1st Session, December 20, 1989.--``Senate 
Report'' p. 244. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0645.
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    While coordination meetings and communications certainly occurred, 
Congress did not require consultation and coordination for their own 
sake. Rather, the objective was to establish coordinated regulatory 
requirements and thereby avoid unduly burdensome or duplicative 
requirements. EPA agrees with other commenters who indicated that the 
Amendments rule did not accomplish these objectives. EPA does not have 
a record showing significant benefits of the added prevention program 
provisions. Without such benefits, EPA believes it is better to take 
its traditional approach of maintaining consistency with OSHA PSM. The 
creation of additional complexity and burden associated with new 
provisions where EPA has not demonstrated any benefit is evidence of 
the new prevention provisions' impracticability and that the rule 
divergence is unreasonable.
c. Claims That Rescinding Prevention Provisions Will Contribute to 
Future Chemical Emergencies
    Several commenters were concerned about safety and health issues 
that could result from rescinding the Amendments rule accident 
prevention provisions. Multiple private citizens commented that 
removing the prevention program requirements will contribute to future 
chemical emergencies at RMP facilities. An advocacy group stated that 
the changes to the prevention program in the proposed Reconsideration 
rule would endanger the public and that EPA should learn from 
California's new safety regulation for oil refineries, which includes 
nearly all the provisions that EPA is proposing to remove and was 
informed by the industry's own best engineering and management 
practices developed over the last 20 years. Some advocacy groups stated 
that the prevention program saves lives and

[[Page 69863]]

decreases costs. Multiple State elected officials stated that EPA has 
acknowledged in the proposed rule that the prevention program 
provisions subject to rescission produced a variety of benefits that 
would be reduced if the proposed Reconsideration rule were implemented. 
The commenters recommended that EPA retain the provisions to attempt to 
reduce the number of incidents. One commenter stated that preventative 
measures are not only financially wise, but, as seen in West, Texas, 
are a matter of life and death for the populace and environment around 
chemical industries, as well as for employees of the chemical industry. 
Another commenter stated that EPA's proposed changes will endanger the 
lives of workers and millions of community members and their families 
who live around our nation's chemical facilities. Another commenter 
stated that third-party audits are necessary for profit-based companies 
who can err in favor of profit and that investigating near-misses and 
determining root causes is needed to learn from accidents. This 
commenter stated that the $88 million in savings to industry from 
rescinding parts of the Amendments rule pales in comparison with the $2 
billion in damage, 58 deaths, and nearly 17,000 people injured over the 
last 10 years from RMP accidents and the profits made the by chemical 
industry.
    EPA Response: While EPA anticipated in the final Amendments rule 
that implementation of prevention program elements would result in the 
reduction in frequency and magnitude of damages from releases, EPA was 
unable to quantify what specific damage reductions would occur as a 
result of the prevention elements. EPA notes that the accident rate 
trend shows a continual decrease under the pre-Amendments RMP rule. 
This downward trend is evidence that the prevention elements of the 
pre-Amendments RMP rule are working and that the cost of additional 
prevention requirements may not be necessary. In part because the 
state-specific data on enhanced prevention programs do not show a clear 
benefit from imposing the prevention program amendments broadly, EPA 
does not believe that the additional prevention requirements (i.e. 
third-party audits, STAA, investigation root cause analysis and other 
prevention program changes) add environmental benefits beyond those 
provided by the pre-2017 requirements that are significant enough to 
justify their added costs when imposed by rule rather than on a case-
specific basis. When considering scarce resources, there even may be 
disbenefits from diverting resources towards costly STAA studies at 
those stationary sources that have successful accident prevention 
programs as shown by a record of no accidental releases.
    The West, Texas incident involved a chemical, ammonium nitrate, 
that is not covered by the RMP rule. Investigation of near-misses is 
already required under the pre-Amendments rule, as the regulations 
require investigation of incidents which could reasonably have resulted 
in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance. The $88 million in 
savings projected by EPA is the annualized cost savings for all 
provisions rescinded by the final rule over the ten-year period (2004-
2013) analyzed. These costs did not include the indirect costs of 
facilities choosing to implement safer technologies and alternatives in 
the RMP Amendments, although examples of implementing some safer 
technologies could be very high, such as $500 million to convert a 
hydrogen fluoride alkylation unit to sulfuric acid or $1 billion to 
convert a paper mill from gaseous chlorine bleaching to chlorine 
dioxide. Facilities subject to the STAA requirements were not required 
to implement STAA, and EPA has no data from which to predict how many 
facilities might choose to implement these technologies and what the 
technologies might be.
    Although the annual average quantified damages from accidents over 
the ten-year period were estimated at $274.7 million, EPA was not able 
to quantify how much of this damage could be reduced in the future by 
the Amendments prevention program elements. Based on this estimate of 
the annual cost of accidents, the accident damages would have to be 
reduced by over 30% annually \46\ from the addition of the rescinded 
elements alone just to break even on their costs, unless other 
significant non-quantified benefits are assumed. However, EPA found a 
3.5% average annual decline in RMP accident rate using the RMP data 
from 2004-2016, without the added prevention provisions (See Exhibit 3-
8, Proposed Reconsideration rule RIA), and as commenters have noted, 
the severity of accidents has also declined over the period of study. 
Both trends mean that the annual cost of accidents estimated under the 
Amendments rule was likely too high, and that rescinded Amendments rule 
provisions would have needed to prevent an even larger portion of 
accident damages in order to have benefits that are in proportion to 
their costs.
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    \46\ See Table 3; combined annual cost of Amendments rule STAA, 
third-party audit, root cause analysis and information disclosure 
provisions equal $84.7 million.
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    However, EPA's analysis of RMP accident data in states with state-
level inherent safety or chemical use reduction programs casts doubt on 
the effectiveness of the Amendments rule STAA provision in particular. 
EPA analyzed RMP-facility accident trends in states with regulatory 
programs that require sources to consider inherently safer technology 
(New Jersey) or to reduce toxic chemical use (Massachusetts) to see 
what possible effect these particular provisions had on accident 
rates.\47\ The data on RMP facility accidents in these states indicated 
no discernible reduction in accident frequency or severity associated 
with the state regulatory programs (the effects of state inherent 
safety and toxic use reduction programs is discussed further in section 
IV.C.4, below). In fact, the average number of accidents per RMP 
facility in both states have exceeded the national average. Therefore, 
EPA does not see sufficient evidence to show that the STAA provision of 
the Amendments would reduce RMP facility accident rates enough for the 
provision to be a reasonable regulation; the costs of STAA are 
disproportional to projected benefits. For other prevention provisions 
of the Amendments rescinded under the final rule--third-party audits 
and root cause analysis--these take place after an accident has 
occurred,\48\ and the Agency can still obtain some of their benefits by 
including such measures in enforcement actions, where appropriate, 
through CAA section 113 orders or through settlement, without imposing 
a broad regulatory mandate.
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    \47\ EPA. July 18, 2019. Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7), Section 3.0 Analysis of Accident 
Frequency at RMP Facilities in New Jersey and Massachusetts. 
Available in the rulemaking docket.
    \48\ Removing the ``i.e., near-miss'' language from Sec. Sec.  
68.60 and 68.81 of the 2017 rule does not alter the requirement to 
conduct incident investigations for incidents that could reasonably 
have resulted in a catastrophic release.
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    EPA disagrees that California's new safety regulation for oil 
refineries provides support for retaining Amendments rule prevention 
provisions. This comment refers to the California Accidental Release 
Prevention (CalARP) program, which now requires additional process 
safety measures at 15 California refineries, including requirements to 
adopt inherently safer designs and systems to the greatest extent 
feasible. These regulations became effective in October

[[Page 69864]]

2017.\49\ The new regulations include requirements for safeguard 
protection analysis, hierarchy of hazard control analysis (includes 
analyzing and recommending inherent safety measures and safeguards to 
reduce each hazard to the greatest extent feasible), damage mechanism 
review, incident root cause analysis, process safety culture 
assessment, human factors, corrective action process, effective stop 
work procedures, and process safety performance indicators.\50\ Of 
these new CalARP regulations, EPA's RMP Amendments included only 
provisions comparable to inherently safer design analysis (i.e., the 
Amendments rule STAA requirement) and incident root cause analysis. 
None of the other new CalARP provisions were included in the Amendments 
rule. EPA notes that the very recent establishment of the California 
requirements means that little data bearing on their effectiveness 
exists. Without such data and considering that state-level data from 
New Jersey suggests that an IST regulatory requirement may not result 
in any discernible reduction in accident frequency or severity, the 
fact that California has adopted such provisions is not sufficient 
justification for EPA to include them in the RMP rule. However, EPA 
will consider the CalARP program moving forward and evaluate whether 
any accident data related to the program has useful relevance to the 
RMP rule.
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    \49\ Cal EPA and CA DIR. August 4, 2017. News Release: New 
Regulations Improve Safety at Oil Refineries. California 
Environmental Protection Agency and California Department of 
Industrial Regulations. https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2017/2017-71.pdf.
    \50\ See Program 4 Prevention Program requirements in 19 CCR 
Sec.  2762, specifically section 2762.2.1, 2762.13, 2762.5(e), 
2762.9(e) and (i)(4), 2762.14, 2762.15 and 2762.16(d), (e), (f) and 
(h) at https://www.caloes.ca.gov/FireRescueSite/Documents/CalARP%20Regs%20Title%2019%20Division%202%20Chapter%204.5.pdf.
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d. Claims That Rescinding Prevention Provisions Will Increase Security 
Risks
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters and a State elected official stated that while EPA cites 
national security as a risk of the 2017 Amendments rule and a rationale 
to rescind the information sharing provisions, EPA does not weigh 
security concerns as a reason to retain the prevention measures. The 
commenters stated that there are already security risks at these sites 
due to the chemicals they store. Having a prevention program that makes 
chemical facilities safer by reducing hazards also minimizes risks, 
whether due to intentional acts or accidents. One commenter contended 
that the way to protect communities from terrorism and to advance 
national security is to reduce hazards, by requiring prevention and 
safer technologies alternatives analyses that would make chemical 
facilities safer up front. A State elected official commented that 
because accidents from the three industry sectors subject to STAA 
requirements account for 49% of all RMP reportable accidents, it makes 
economic sense to have them consider potential changes that would 
eliminate the possibility of a release entirely, by making a process 
more tolerant of fault or security breaches.
    These commenters also argued that it is arbitrary and capricious 
for EPA to fail to weigh national security concerns as a reason to 
retain the prevention program provisions. The commenters argued that 
EPA cannot rationally address national security concerns only as a risk 
and not also as a potential benefit. In particular, multiple State 
elected officials commented that the rescission of the STAA requirement 
is arbitrary and capricious because EPA failed to consider the 
potential security benefits from STAA. The commenters stated that this 
is especially true in light of the security concerns cited by EPA as a 
basis for cutting back on chemical hazard information that must be 
shared with local emergency response officials and communities.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Agency failed to properly 
weigh national security concerns during the Reconsideration, or that it 
should have assumed an increase in security risks from rescission of 
the Amendments rule's prevention program provisions. In the Amendments 
rule, EPA did not justify the prevention provisions on the basis of 
decreasing security risks. During development of the Amendments rule 
various commenters stated that the STAA provision could increase, not 
reduce, security risks. Our approach in the final rule was to allow 
facilities to balance security risks among all others, and that the 
STAA provision allowed for ``enough flexibility to consider risk 
management measures to minimize hazards without prescribing an approach 
that could compromise facility security or transfer or increase 
risks.'' 82 FR 4649, January 13, 2017. With or without the STAA and 
other Amendments rule prevention provisions, the rule allows for 
facilities to continue balancing security and safety risks. We continue 
to rely on facilities to balance these risks appropriately. Therefore, 
EPA does not believe that rescinding the STAA and other prevention 
provisions increases security risks. Changes made by EPA to the RMP 
accident prevention program were designed to reduce accidental releases 
and were not specifically undertaken to reduce the risk of releases 
from intentional criminal acts.
    While implementation of some inherently safer technologies could 
reduce risks of release from criminal acts and the root cause incident 
investigation process can be useful in determining whether the cause of 
a release is accidental or intentional, EPA does not believe that 
rescinding the STAA and root cause analysis provisions increases 
security risks beyond those already present. The Amendments rule STAA 
provision did not require implementation of any technologies 
considered, and the pre-Amendments RMP rule already required 
investigating the causes of incidents. Regarding the Amendments rule 
requirements to provide increased availability of chemical hazard 
information to the public and other relevant planning information to 
LEPCs, EPA considered whether these requirements were potentially 
increasing security risks because the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
found that the increased availability of information would increase the 
risk of the misuse of information by criminals or terrorists. 
Therefore, we do not see any inconsistency in our actions or rationale 
by trying to avoid increasing security risks for these requirements.
    EPA also notes that rescinding the Amendments rule prevention 
provisions should not result in increased security risks because of the 
regulatory and legal framework that exists outside of the RMP rule. 
Specifically, addressing security concerns at high-risk chemical 
facilities is covered by other laws and regulations. For example, 
addressing security concerns at high-risk chemical facilities is 
covered by the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), 
managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\51\ The purpose 
of CFATS is to ensure facilities have security measures in place to 
reduce the risks associated with over 300 chemicals of interest and 
prevent them from being exploited in a terrorist attack. CFATS requires 
vulnerability assessments, development of site security plans, and 
implementation of Risk-Based Performance Standards for security of 
chemical facilities. Security risks at drinking water and waste water 
treatment facilities are not covered by CFATS but instead are subject 
to requirements managed by EPA's Water Security Division as authorized 
by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism

[[Page 69865]]

Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, also known as the Bioterrorism 
Act of 2002. Facilities on or adjacent to waters of the U.S. must also 
comply with regulations promulgated under the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act, which requires security vulnerability assessments and 
security plans.\52\
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    \51\ https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards.
    \52\ 33 CFR part 105.
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e. Commenters Disagree That the Accident Record Supports Rescinding 
Prevention Provisions
    A Federal agency, State elected officials, and a joint submission 
for multiple advocacy groups and other commenters stated that they are 
disappointed that EPA has decided to revise the prevention program 
requirements as EPA's own RMP accident data from 2004 through 2013, 
which averages about 150 incidents per year, cited in the 2017 
Amendments rule, supports implementing greater protections and shows 
that there is no basis to undermine or weaken the prevention programs. 
Some of these commenters also cited RMP accident data from 2014-16 and 
a list of reports of accidents at RMP facilities tracked on a web page 
by Earthjustice (now totaling 73) that have occurred since the 
Amendments rule was delayed as evidence that prevention program 
provisions are needed. These commenters argued that harmful accidents 
continue to occur, that over 500 accidents have occurred in the last 5 
years, that he accident dataset is incomplete and does not include 2017 
and 2018 accidents, and that EPA has not demonstrated any significant 
decline in the accident rate.
    An advocacy group expressed disagreement with what they 
characterized as an EPA suggestion in the proposed Reconsideration rule 
that the decline in accidental releases that have already occurred is a 
reason for not requiring additional accident prevention and mitigation 
steps. The commenter stated that this is like arguing that since seat 
belts already save lives, there is no need for air bags even though 
they can save more lives. The commenter reasoned that the fact that 
existing safety measures have lowered accident rates has no bearing on 
whether other feasible measures for further reducing accident risk 
should be adopted.
    An advocacy group also stated that the 2017 RMP database that EPA 
placed into the docket only goes through October 2017 but noted that 
EPA's proposal was not published until May 30, 2018 and claims that EPA 
has drawn data from the 2018 database. The commenter asserts that EPA 
has not given any justification for failing to include the most current 
data it has into the public record and considering it for the current 
proposal.
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters argued that the rescission of the prevention program 
provisions is arbitrary and capricious because EPA's record shows a 
need for them to be at least as strong, if not stronger, than when EPA 
promulgated the Amendments rule. The commenters argued that data show 
that a significant number of accidents are continuing to occur 
frequently and cause serious harm, which the commenters argued makes it 
arbitrary and capricious for EPA to rescind almost all prevention 
measures without enacting an adequate replacement.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. While EPA reported 
in the Amendments rule that RMP accidents averaged about 150 incidents 
per year from 2004-2013, EPA's further analysis during the 
reconsideration process shows that RMP accidents continue to decline 
over time (Reconsideration RIA, Exhibits 3-7 and 3-8) with an average 
annual decline of approximately 3.5%. EPA disagrees that this is not a 
significant decline in the accident rate.
    EPA examined the data compiled by Earthjustice on their website 
from 73 incident reports that occurred between the Amendment's rule 
original effective date of March 14, 2017 and September 21, 2018 when 
US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a mandate to make the 
Amendments effective. The 73 incident reports along with their 
descriptions and result of EPA's review is presented in a Technical 
Background document,\53\ available in the rulemaking docket. The 73 
reports involved a total of 75 incidents, all occurring at RMP 
regulated facilities, except four which are now deregistered. Many (42) 
of these incidents did not involve processes or chemicals that appear 
to be covered by the RMP regulations or there was not enough 
information to judge whether the processes or chemicals were RMP-
covered. Some (14) of the 33 incidents that did involve or could have 
potentially involved covered processes or chemicals were not required 
to be reported as RMP accidents because they did not appear to have any 
reportable impacts. The press reports from which the list of 75 
incidents was compiled did not always contain sufficient information on 
the identity of the chemicals released and the other process 
information needed to ascertain the regulatory status of the process 
involved. Therefore, EPA views this compiled list of incidents as 
having limited usefulness for any analysis for the rulemaking. EPA 
believes that accident data reported by RMP-regulated facilities in 
their RMPs to be the best source of information for counting accidents 
relevant to the RMP regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ EPA. July 18, 2019. Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the RMP accident dataset for 2017 and 2018, the analysis 
for the proposed Reconsideration rule RIA was completed in March 2018 
before the rule was sent for White House Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) review in mid-March. Although EPA had access to the March 
2018 version of the RMP database that had facility submissions through 
the end of February 2018, the dataset of accidents that occurred in 
2017 would not have been complete. Facilities have up to six months 
after a reportable accident occurs to update their RMP submission for 
that accident. Because the RIA analysis was completed in March 2018, 
most 2018 accidents had not occurred yet, much less been reported on, 
so naturally the proposed rule analysis could not use them. Thus, the 
last complete calendar year of RMP accident data available to EPA at 
the time of completing the proposed rule RIA was 2016. As explained in 
Chapter 3 of the proposed rule RIA, EPA found that comparisons of the 
numbers of facilities in the RMP data used in the Amendments rule 
(which used the February 2015 version of the RMP data) with the 
November 2017 version \54\ of the database, revealed that number of RMP 
facilities and processes had experienced minor changes in the more than 
two years between rulemakings (e.g. the number of RMP facilities 
decreased by 1.8% over the time period). As a result, EPA utilized the 
costs estimated for the 2017 RMP Amendments RIA as the baseline set of 
costs to be impacted by the proposed Reconsideration rule (see proposed 
rule RIA at 24).
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    \54\ As explained in the Correction to the Notice of Data 
Availability and Extension of Comment Period for the Proposed Rule 
(83 FR 36837, July 31, 2018), the updated number of RMP facilities 
and processes used in the RIA was extracted from the November 2017 
version of the RMP database, while the 2014-2016 accident data cited 
in the RIA was extracted from a March 2018 version of the RMP 
database. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1423.
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    In October 2018, we provided in the rulemaking docket an extracted 
Excel file containing the RMP accident data for calendar year 2017, in 
the same format that had been provided in the

[[Page 69866]]

rulemaking docket for the 2004-2013, and 2014-2016 RMP accident data. 
These 2017 accident data in the Excel spreadsheet file were extracted 
from a September 2018 version of the RMP database (i.e., which 
contained RMP reports submitted through August 31, 2018). While we did 
not use the 2017 RMP accident data in the RIA or as support for the 
proposed rule (a complete set of accidents for 2017 was not available 
when the RIA was done), we provided this same Excel spreadsheet in the 
docket in order to share the information with interested stakeholders. 
The docketed Excel spreadsheet for 2017 RMP accidents reported through 
August 31, 2018 totaled 94 accidents, which is lower than the total for 
any previously reported year.\55\ However, as noted in RIA, the total 
number of 2017 accidents could increase slightly because a few sources 
may update their accident history information only when their next full 
five-year RMP update occurs, which for some facilities occurs in 2019. 
See the RIA and Response to Comments document for a further explanation 
of this effect. Based on past five-year reporting cycles (that show a 
declining number of reporting entities with reports due on the five-
year anniversary of the original due date and our observation of the 
number of extra incidents reported in resubmitted RMPs on the 
anniversary),\56\ EPA does not expect late accident reporting to 
significantly impact the accident totals for 2014-2017.
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    \55\ See docket item EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1974. Had this data 
shown a significant change in trend, it may have been of central 
relevance to our rulemaking and we would have considered reopening 
the comment period, but, since it was largely confirmatory of past 
trends, we rely on the previously observed trends and not on this 
new information in our decision.
    \56\ See sections 3 and 10 of the Response to Comment document 
(available in the rulemaking docket), 4600 RMP facilities are 
expected to resubmit RMPs in 2019. EPA received over 16,000 RMP 
reports during 1999, approximately 12,000 during 2004, approximately 
8,600 during 2009, and approximately 7,000 during 2014.
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    Regarding one commenter's claim that the fact of declining 
accidents has no bearing on whether other accident prevention measures 
should be adopted, EPA disagrees with this claim and with this 
commenter's claim that EPA's rescission of the Amendments rule's 
accident prevention requirements is akin to not requiring air bags in 
automobiles due to the presence of seat belts. RMP accident prevention 
program measures are not discrete safety devices like air bags and seat 
belts. Rather, they represent a comprehensive system-based approach to 
accident prevention based on each individual facility's analysis of 
process hazards and subsequent implementation of appropriate 
engineering, administrative, and procedural controls to manage those 
hazards. The rule allows for continuous improvement over an iterative 
cycle of hazard analyses and other measures. Under the pre-Amendments 
rule, each individual facility is already required to select the 
appropriate set of risk control measures based on the specific set of 
hazards present at the facility. The fact that since the enactment of 
this regulatory regime, accidents and accident consequences have 
declined substantially and are now at historically low rates suggests 
that this system has been very effective at preventing accidents. The 
historically low accident rate matters because with an already low rate 
of accidents, the maximum potential benefits (i.e., the baseline of 
preventable accidents) that can accrue from additional regulatory 
requirements is also lower, whereas their costs are at least partially 
fixed, and potentially high. For example, EPA's review of available 
data on IST/STAA \57\ provides no clear evidence that the Amendments 
rule STAA requirement would result in further accident reduction, but 
the costs of the requirement are calculable and substantial. For more 
than 90 percent of impacted sources, the STAA provision in particular 
appears to be an impracticable and unreasonable ``do loop'' unlikely to 
improve accident prevention performance while also being a cost, time, 
and focus diversion for sources and their staff. It is reasonable to 
believe that prevention program measures in place prior to 2017 already 
encompassed many of the benefits of the STAA provision. Some facilities 
may already have considered and implemented safer technologies in 
conjunction with their process hazard analysis so subsequent mandates 
under regulatory programs would not have not led to additional 
accidental release prevention. Also, facilities may be using other 
effective accident prevention measures in lieu of IST (i.e. passive, 
active, and administrative controls) so that IST reviews become simply 
a procedural burden rather than a method that identifies more effective 
ways to prevent accidents than those already employed. EPA believes 
that the balance of the considerations discussed above has shifted in 
favor of not imposing broad new regulatory requirements without clear 
evidence of their efficacy, particularly when EPA believes benefits 
similar to those intended by these provisions are obtained by ensuring 
compliance with the pre-Amendments rule's accident prevention 
requirements on a case-specific basis in particular enforcement 
actions. 83 FR 24873, May 30, 2018.
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    \57\ EPA, July 18, 2019, Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). Section 3.0 Analysis of Accident 
Frequency at RMP Facilities in New Jersey and Massachusetts. 
Available in the rulemaking docket.
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    Lastly, EPA disagrees with a commenter's claim that rescission of 
the prevention program provisions of the Amendments rule is arbitrary 
and capricious because the accident record shows a need for the 
Amendments rule prevention provisions. The RMP accident record shows 
that RMP-reportable accidents have declined to the lowest level since 
the origination of the pre-Amendments rule, indicating that the pre-
Amendments prevention program provisions, and EPA's enforcement and 
implementation program, are effective at preventing accidents. It is 
illogical to argue that the ongoing decline in accident frequency to 
unprecedently low levels highlights a need for substantial changes to 
such a successful program.
f. Obtaining Safety Benefits Through Improved Compliance With RMP 
Regulations
    Several commenters supported EPA's proposal to prioritize 
compliance by poor performers over adding regulatory requirements for 
all RMP facilities, indicating that this approach will avoid 
unnecessary burdens on many facilities, is consistent with recent EOs, 
and will focus compliance costs on those facilities that pose the 
greatest risks. Several other commenters disagreed with EPA's emphasis 
on compliance with existing regulations. The commenters emphasized that 
in the 2017 rulemaking EPA stated that enforcement of the existing 
program was not sufficient, and that EPA found a ``regulatory need'' 
for changes to the prevention program. A labor union stated that this 
type of compliance-driven approach would not have prevented serious 
accidents at facilities without a prior history of accidents. In 
addition, an advocacy group stated that during and prior to the West 
Fertilizer incident, EPA and OSHA both had enforcement authority over 
the facility, but neither was able to prevent the disaster. Multiple 
State elected officials commented that the possibility of increased 
enforcement does not justify the proposed rescissions. The commenters 
stated that incidents have occurred at more than a thousand facilities, 
and EPA has not explained how individualized enforcement measures at 
more than a thousand

[[Page 69867]]

facilities can plausibly address such widespread risks and harms. The 
commenters claim that the agency appears to have accepted--without any 
confirming analysis--industry trade association data regarding the 
percentage of facilities at which accidents have occurred.
    EPA Response: As discussed in the proposed rule, the RMP accident 
data (as analyzed by American Chemistry Council (ACC) in its comments 
on the proposed rule) \58\ tend to support the reasonableness of an 
approach to strengthening accident prevention that focuses on achieving 
compliance at problematic facilities rather than broader regulatory 
mandates. ACC's analysis of the RMP accident data for 2004-2013 shows 
that 1,517 reportable accidents occurred at 1,008 facilities. EPA 
verified ACC's analysis prior to proposing to rely on it, and the 
verification analysis was docketed on the date of the proposed 
Reconsideration rule.\59\ ACC submitted as part of its public comments 
on the proposed Reconsideration, an analysis of the RMP accident data 
for 2007-2016 that shows 1,368 accidents occurred at 947 
facilities.\60\ Looking at both analyses overall, ACC's analysis showed 
that fewer than 10% of the 12,500 facilities subject to the RMP rule 
reported any accidental releases, while fewer than 2% of facilities 
that reported multiple releases were responsible for nearly half of 
reportable accidents from all types of facilities. In the chemical 
manufacturing sector only, fewer than 7% of the chemical manufacturers 
had multiple reportable accidents that accounted for about two-thirds 
of all reportable accidents in this sector.
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    \58\ EPA. March 9, 2017. Notes and Documentation Related to a 
March 9, 2017 Meeting between the RMP Coalition and EPA regarding a 
Petition for Reconsideration of the RMP Amendments rule (82 FR 4594, 
January 13, 2017). EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0929 and American Chemistry 
Council public comments, August 17, 2018. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1628.
    \59\ See attachments to EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0929, EPA 
Verification of ACC's RMP Accident Analysis with 2 Tables. March 26, 
2018 and RMP Accident Data 2004-2013 EPA Verification of ACC 
Analysis.
    \60\ EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1628. pp. 14-15.
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    EPA disagrees that it is implausible that an approach that focuses 
on achieving compliance at poor performing facilities can address 
accidental release incidents at RMP facilities. EPA does not claim that 
enforcement will be increased, but that when a facility is not 
implementing a successful prevention program, the enhanced prevention 
program measures reflected in the 2017 RMP Amendments rule (e.g., 
implementing a third-party audit, conducting root cause analysis or 
examining safer technologies) can be applied as part of settlement 
agreements to the extent appropriate based on the violations alleged. 
In addition, it should be noted that EPA inspections and enforcement 
actions are not only taken in response to accidents and releases from 
facilities. EPA routinely performs inspections of RMP-regulated 
facilities throughout the country, and resulting enforcement actions 
address non-compliance at facilities, reducing the likelihood of 
accidents and releases. EPA has previously employed measures such as 
third-party audits and safer technologies in enforcement actions not 
only after reported releases but also after other (non-accident-
related) inspections where such measures were appropriate to address 
potential weaknesses in a source's prevention program. Additionally, 
EPA is currently implementing a National Compliance Initiative under 
CAA section 112(r) with the goal of reducing risks to human health and 
the environment by decreasing the likelihood of chemical accidents.\61\
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    \61\ More information about the National Compliance Initiative 
is available at: https://www.epa.gov/national-compliance-initiative-reducing-accidental-releases-industrial-and-chemical.
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    After considering the burdens and benefits of broadly imposing the 
additional prevention program requirements of the RMP Amendments, and 
in consideration of new emphasis on reducing unnecessary regulations, 
EPA has reexamined more carefully whether the benefits of such 
regulatory provisions are out of proportion to their costs. EPA does 
not contend that focusing on achieving compliance at poor performing 
facilities would replicate the effects of the Amendments rule accident 
prevention provisions, but we believe this approach is more reasonable 
because it more effectively focuses the burden of additional safety 
measures on those facilities where they are most needed instead of 
imposing regulatory mandates across the board that may not be needed to 
prevent accidents at well-performing facilities. Under a compliance-
driven approach, we can obtain accident prevention benefits similar to 
those that we said justified the 2017 RMP Amendments rule at a fraction 
of the burden. As further explained in the Response to Comments 
document,\62\ the Agency took more than 1,000 enforcement actions under 
CAA Section 112(r) between 2014 and 2018. Some of these EPA enforcement 
actions have involved settlement and injunctive relief that applies to 
multiple facilities. Thus, an EPA action may address not only the 
facility that was inspected, but also may require companies to audit 
other facilities owned by them and require complying actions at those 
additional facilities, as needed. In addition, the literature on the 
deterrent effect of enforcement finds that inspections, sanctions or 
increased threats of inspections and sanctions result in improved 
compliance not only at the evaluated or sanctioned facility, but also 
improve performance at other facilities, creating general 
deterrence.\63\
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    \62\ See Response to Comments document, section 3.1.
    \63\ Shimshack, J.P. (2014). The Economics of Environmental 
Monitoring and Enforcement. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 6, 
p. 352. Available in rulemaking docket.
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    Regarding the West Fertilizer explosion and EPA enforcement, 
ammonium nitrate is not currently a substance regulated under the RMP 
regulations. Therefore, the requirements of the 2017 RMP Amendments 
rule would not have applied to the ammonium nitrate (AN) process at 
West Fertilizer even if they had been adopted before the incident at 
that facility. While some benefits of implementing accident prevention 
measures at covered processes can sometimes extend to unregulated 
chemicals and equipment at an RMP facility, this would be most likely 
to occur for unregulated chemicals contained in a covered process or at 
unregulated processes presenting similar hazards. At West Fertilizer, 
the covered process was an anhydrous ammonia storage process, which had 
distinct prevention measures from AN storage.\64\ Therefore, even 
assuming the West Fertilizer incident did not result from criminal 
activity,\65\ we do not believe the prevention provisions of the 2017 
Amendments would likely have prevented the incident. Nevertheless, EPA 
agrees that this incident highlighted the importance of proper 
coordination between facility owners and operators and local 
responders. While the RMP regulations already required facilities to 
coordinate emergency planning and response with

[[Page 69868]]

local officials, EPA has retained the enhanced local coordination and 
response provisions of the Amendments rule, with minor changes, based 
on its experience from inspections and lessons noted from several 
incidents including the West Fertilizer explosion.
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    \64\ In simplest terms, anhydrous ammonia storage typically 
involves storage of ammonia gas in a pressurized metal container, 
with piping and control and safety valves, while AN fertilizer 
storage involves storage of a solid in bulk or packages, in a bin or 
on pallets. The processes have distinct designs, the process hazards 
differ, the mechanical integrity programs for pressurized storage 
and piping and storage of material in bins and pallets are 
dissimilar, and the related training for employees and operating 
procedures have minimal overlap.
    \65\ On May 11, 2016, the BATF announced its conclusion that the 
fire at the West Fertilizer facility was intentionally set. See EPA-
HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0641.
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g. Comments Concerning Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change
    Many commenters stated that EPA should retain the Amendments rule 
prevention provisions because of increased accident risks from severe 
weather, which some commenters indicated were associated with climate 
change. One commenter contended that EPA's proposal inexplicably fails 
to heed lessons learned from the August 2017 disaster at the Arkema 
chemical facility in Crosby, Texas, which was a result of unstable 
peroxides decomposing after losing refrigeration due to local flooding 
from Hurricane Harvey. The commenter stated that the CSB found that the 
facility had not properly assessed the risk posed by increasingly 
severe weather and the PHA for the low temperature warehouses did not 
document any flooding risk. CSB recommended that chemical 
manufacturing, handling or storage facilities perform analyses to 
determine their susceptibility to these extreme weather events and 
evaluate the adequacy of relevant safeguards. Another commenter stated 
that rescinding certain prevention requirements would reduce 
opportunities for facilities to learn about their vulnerabilities to 
severe weather and improve their resiliency. The commenters stated that 
the requirement for program 2 hazard reviews to identify findings from 
incident investigations showing vulnerabilities, the root cause 
analysis requirement, and the STAA requirement, could help a facility 
determine if a release was caused by a vulnerability to severe weather 
and determine if there is safer technology that could reduce severe-
weather impacts on a process. A joint comment submission from multiple 
advocacy groups and other commenters said that the need for maintaining 
the Amendments rule is especially great in communities threatened by a 
``double disaster,'' which happens when chemical facilities fail to 
prepare to prevent and reduce harm from foreseeable hurricanes, floods, 
earthquakes, and severe weather. The commenter provided a detailed case 
study related to Hurricane Harvey in support of this argument. This 
commenter stated that a number of fires, explosions, and chemical 
releases that affected and harmed commenters and their members were 
related to Hurricane Harvey, and that many RMP facilities around 
Houston reported excess air emissions events in the days preceding and 
immediately following Hurricane Harvey's landfall. A report submitted 
by one commenter stated that out of 186 total air emissions events 
reported to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) 
between July 31 and September 7, 2017, 91 events (48.9 percent) were 
Harvey-related, and 134 events (72.0 percent) were in RMP facilities. 
The commenter also stated that a total of 1,473,184 pounds of 37 
contaminants subject to the RMP rule were released in Harvey-related 
incidents, and an additional 5,481,871 pounds not related to Harvey 
were released during reported incidents in the same period. The 
commenters also argued that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA to 
fail to consider the many chemical releases, explosions, and fires that 
occurred in the wake of Hurricane Harvey and the associated lessons 
learned regarding communities near chemical facilities that frequently 
face or are more prone to natural disasters.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Amendments rule provisions 
were necessary because of the increased potential for accidents due to 
extreme weather. EPA examined the data submitted by commenters to 
support a case of increasing RMP facility accidents during extreme 
weather events but could find no examples in those data of RMP-
reportable accidental releases from RMP-covered processes caused by 
extreme weather events. EPA notes that although the Arkema facility in 
Crosby, Texas is an RMP facility, the 2017 accident there did not 
involve the release of any RMP-regulated substances. According to the 
CSB, Arkema did prepare a PHA to comply with the OSHA PSM standard for 
all its processes (including the seven low temperature warehouses 
storing organic peroxides) as a best practice, although only one of its 
organic peroxide storage buildings met the chemical quantity 
requirements for coverage under the OSHA PSM standard. Even though 
Arkema's PHA process hazard analysis for the low temperature warehouses 
did not document any flooding risk, the facility did take precautions 
to protect the organic peroxides that required refrigeration against 
the loss of power, (an identified hazard) although those efforts 
ultimately failed due to unprecedented flood levels.\66\
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    \66\ CSB. May 25, 2018. Investigation Report: Organic Peroxide 
Decomposition, Release and Fire at Arkema Crosby Following Hurricane 
Harvey Flooding. Incident Date: August 31, 2018. U.S. Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. pp: 78-82, 86-87, 98-99. 
https://www.csb.gov/arkema-inc-chemical-plant-fire-/.
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    EPA reviewed the data provided on emissions from specific 
facilities submitted by commenters indicating information on chemical 
releases during adverse weather events (most associated with Hurricane 
Harvey) in order to specifically examine whether there is an increase 
in RMP facility accidents during extreme weather events. While the 
submitted information documented reports of releases, generally the 
releases did not involve regulated substances listed in 40 CFR 68.130 
or did not involve RMP-regulated processes or did not result in RMP-
reportable impacts.
    A list of these documented reports of releases (mostly air 
emissions) from specific facilities cited in comments and reviewed by 
EPA are provided in Table 6 of the Technical Background Document 
(available in the rulemaking docket). Some incidents or release events 
commonly cited in comments or references in comments are not subject to 
the RMP regulation. For example, many of the emissions were from 
floating roof storage tanks containing petroleum products such as crude 
oil or gasoline, which are not covered by the RMP regulation (see 40 
CFR 68.115(b)(2)(ii) and (iii)). Thus, emissions of chemicals from 
these petroleum products are not covered by the RMP regulation 
regardless of whether the facility reports under RMP for other 
processes or if the chemicals emitted are RMP substances. Many of the 
emissions data quantified were not specific to a particular chemical 
and were only noted as pounds of emissions or pounds of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs). Some of the emissions that were specified for 
a particular chemical, such as benzene, organic peroxides, glycerin, 
methanol, methyl tert-butyl ether, and carbon monoxide, are not listed 
RMP substances. Some chemicals that are sent to flares or released from 
flaring in refineries, such as sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxide, may 
not be covered by RMP regulations because the chemical may not exceed a 
threshold quantity in a process. RMP regulations generally do not cover 
off-shore oil and gas drilling, exploration or production 
facilities.\67\ EPA also reviewed RMP accident history reports during 
previous extreme

[[Page 69869]]

weather events, including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and found almost 
no examples of such events resulting in accidental releases from RMP-
covered processes.\68\
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    \67\ Off-shore oil and gas drilling operations are not generally 
covered by the RMP regulations due to either the provision at 40 CFR 
68.10(f), which excludes Outer Continental Shelf sources, or the 
provision at 40 CFR 68.115(b)(2)(iii), which exempts naturally 
occurring hydrocarbon mixtures prior to entry into a natural gas 
processing plant or petroleum refinery.
    \68\ Accident history records during the time frames of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are available in the docketed RMP 
database (EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0989). EPA reviewed accident history 
data for the following periods: August 25-31, 2005 (Hurricane 
Katrina) and September 20-25, 2005 (Hurricane Rita). EPA identified 
one facility--Mississippi Phosphates, that had an ammonia release 
from a flare that was extinguished due to storm surge during 
Hurricane Katrina. The same facility also had an ammonia release 
from a flare that was extinguished due to high winds during 
Hurricane Rita, and from a flare that was shut down in preparation 
for Hurricane Cindy (July 2005). However, no accident impacts were 
reported for any of these releases. Regarding Hurricane Harvey, EPA 
identified one facility--the Chevron Phillips Chemical Company plant 
in Sweeny, Texas--that reported an accidental release from an RMP-
covered process on August 27, 2017 which was during the period that 
Southeastern Texas was being impacted by Hurricane/Tropical Storm 
Harvey. According to the facility's RMP, this incident involved a 
release of 65 pounds of ethylene that caused a fire resulting in 
onsite property damage, but no deaths, injuries, offsite property or 
environmental damage, evacuations, or sheltering-in-place. Based on 
information in the facility's RMP, it is unclear whether the release 
was directly related to the storm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding a commenters reference to air emissions events reported 
to TCEQ during the timeframe of Hurricane Harvey, while the submitted 
information documented reports of chemical releases, generally those 
releases did not involve regulated substances listed in 40 CFR 68.130 
or did not involve RMP-regulated processes or did not result in RMP-
reportable impacts. For example, some of these incidents involved 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) pollutants specifically 
exempted from regulation by 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(3), hazardous air 
pollutants not listed under part 68 such as benzene, and other 
unspecified chemicals.
    As these commenters did not submit TCEQ data directly to EPA, EPA 
conducted a search using TCEQ's website for emissions events occurring 
between August 25, 2017 and September 1, 2017 (i.e., the period 
encompassing Hurricane/Tropical Storm Harvey's impact on Southeast 
Texas), which yielded 93 emissions reports from facilities in Texas. 
EPA did not review all 93 reports but reviewed a sample of 10 emissions 
reports from facilities regulated under the RMP rule. These 10 
emissions reports can be found in Appendix B of the Technical 
Background Document. Of the 10 reports reviewed by EPA, 8 were 
submitted for excess emissions (i.e., emissions above permitted limits) 
from flare stacks, one was submitted for excess emissions from an 
electrostatic precipitator, and one to report volatile compounds 
emitted from a small oil release to secondary containment.
    Releases reported to TCEQ's Air Emissions Event Report Database are 
provided by facilities regulated under the state's air quality rules to 
report releases of certain air pollutants above specified reportable 
quantities. Such reports may represent evidence that a facility has 
emitted pollutants above allowed limits; however, they do not 
necessarily indicate that an RMP-reportable accidental release has 
occurred (i.e., the releases do not result in deaths, injuries, 
property damage, evacuations, or sheltering-in-place). In fact, 
emissions of pollutants from flare stacks of refineries and chemical 
plants during process startups, shutdowns, and upsets may occur as the 
proper functioning of refinery safety systems to prevent catastrophic 
accidental releases. For example, in order to prevent a process upset 
from resulting in a fire or explosion in a refinery process unit, a 
process may be designed to relieve excess gases to the refinery's flare 
system. Such events may cause excess flaring by the refinery, resulting 
in an exceedance of the facility's air permit (and for facilities in 
Texas, requiring a report to the TCEQ Air Emissions Event Report 
Database). However, these reports generally do not indicate that an 
RMP-reportable accident has occurred. In fact, the Senate report on the 
CAA Amendments indicates that ``Accidental releases would not include 
release from vents and releases resulting from process upsets which are 
planned and are designed to prevent catastrophic events . . . These 
``safety'' releases, while not routine, may be authorized and necessary 
and would not cause death, injury or property damage. Releases of this 
type are appropriately subject to regulation under section 112 of the 
Clean Air Act rather than the new section 129 established here.'' \69\
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    \69\ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Report of the Committee 
on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate together with 
Additional and Minority Views to Accompany S. 1630. S. Report No. 
101-228. 101st Congress, 1st Session, December 20, 1989.--``Senate 
Report'' EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0645, pp 210.
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    Commenters presented no information or analysis of TCEQ emissions 
data to demonstrate that the data related to RMP-reportable chemical 
accidents, nor did commenters show that the RMP rule or the specific 
provisions of the Amendments rule rescinded or modified by the 
Reconsideration rule could have prevented these releases. In EPA's 
judgement, none of the TCEQ emissions reports reviewed by EPA 
represented RMP-reportable accidental releases, and it is unlikely that 
the other TCEQ emissions reports discussed by these commenters would 
represent RMP-reportable accidental releases.
    EPA notes that under the pre-Amendments RMP rule, RMP-reportable 
accidents are declining, not increasing, and this trend is an important 
consideration in EPA's decision to rescind Amendments rule 
requirements, as it indicates that the pre-Amendments RMP rule was 
effective in preventing and minimizing the risk of accidents. The pre-
Amendments RMP regulations already required that facilities investigate 
incidents and resolve incident investigation findings, and identify the 
hazards associated with their covered processes and regulated 
substances and the safeguards used or needed to control or mitigate all 
relevant hazards, including among other things, loss of power, flooding 
or hurricanes. Thus, rescinding the Amendments prevention requirements 
would not relieve facilities of their obligation to address these 
hazards, whether or not they arise from the potential for extreme 
weather events.
h. Comments Concerning Costs and Benefits of Amendments Rule Prevention 
Provisions
    Several commenters stated that the costs of repealing the 
Amendments rulemaking greatly exceed the benefits. Some of these 
commenters provided specific cost information or estimates to support 
their claims. One private citizen stated that EPA's estimate of $88 
million per year savings from rescinding Amendments rule provisions was 
more than offset by potential losses of Amendments rule benefits of up 
to $270 million per year, which did not include additional costs such 
as contamination, lost productivity, emergency response, property value 
impacts, and health problems from chemical exposures. The commenter 
also stated that a single incident at the Exxon Mobil Torrance, 
California refinery cost California drivers $2.4 billion--based on 
increased gas prices--and caused macroeconomic losses of $6.9 billion, 
and that these figures do not include facility and community losses 
associated with emergency services, health care, property values, and 
local tax revenue. This commenter also cited a Center for Chemical 
Process Safety document that states ``major industrial incidents cost 
an average of $80 million each'' for property damages alone and losses 
from business interruption ``can amount to four times the property 
damage.'' This commenter noted that these are among other losses to 
life, health, market share,

[[Page 69870]]

reputation, litigation, insurance, investigations, and penalties. An 
advocacy group contended that EPA's justification for repealing the 
root cause and third[hyphen]party audit provisions is inadequate 
because the commenter believes that benefits of these provisions are 
more than likely to outweigh the compliance costs. The commenter argued 
that the [third-party] audit provision would only need to reduce the 
risk of accidents by 3.5% for the costs of that provision to break even 
with the benefits of the rule and the root cause provision would only 
need to reduce the risk of accidents by 0.6% to break even.
    A group of state elected officials maintained that EPA was not able 
to quantify what specific reductions in accident harms would occur as a 
result of implementation of the RMP Amendments but (citing the proposed 
Amendments rule at 81 FR 13642-3) found that they ``would provide 
benefits to potentially affected members of society,'' including 
reducing the probability and severity of chemical accidents. This 
commenter stated that in the RMP Amendments RIA, EPA cited numerous 
direct costs avoided including worker, responder, and public fatalities 
and injuries, public evacuations, public sheltering-in-place, and 
property and environmental damage, and indirect costs avoided, such as 
lost productivity due to product damage and business interruption both 
on-site and off-site, expenditure of emergency response resources and 
attendant transaction costs, and reduced offsite property values. The 
commenter argued that EPA may not ignore these benefits just because 
they are unquantified.
    An advocacy group and a union stated that in the proposed 
Reconsideration rule RIA, EPA states that the agency ``believes the 
benefits and averted costs are large enough to justify the foregone 
benefits.'' However, the commenters stated that the Agency's conclusion 
is unsupported and ignores the significant unquantified benefits of the 
Amendments rule. The commenters stated that EPA's only justification is 
declining accident rates at chemical facilities, which the commenter 
claims is a flawed justification. An advocacy group also stated that 
the burden of the incident investigation root cause provisions is less 
than the identifiable benefits. The commenter stated that through a 
breakeven analysis, EPA can see that the burden provides no 
justification for repeal.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. EPA did not 
project that the prevention benefits of the Amendments rule would be 
$270 million per year. That figure included the average annual 
monetized costs of RMP facility accidents occurring from 2004-2013. The 
Agency did not claim that the prevention program provisions of the 
Amendments rule would prevent all future accidents, and there is no 
reason to expect that this would have occurred.
    The Reconsideration rule does not eliminate any pre-Amendments rule 
RMP requirements, so facilities that were previously responsible for 
implementing the prevention and emergency response program provisions 
of that rule will still be required to comply with those requirements, 
as well as the additional Amendments rule requirements not rescinded by 
the final rule.
    Regarding the cost of the ExxonMobil Torrance, California refinery 
accident, EPA mentioned this accident in the final RMP Amendments RIA 
as an example of the regional impacts that can occur due to 
accidents.\70\ The ExxonMobil Torrance refinery accident occurred in 
February 2015 and was after the ten-year period (2004-2013) for the RMP 
data that were analyzed for the monetized impacts of RMP accidents. 
While EPA did mention avoiding the lost productivity due to such 
accidents as an example of potential additional benefits, EPA had not 
previously reviewed in depth the RAND study that was the source of this 
estimate during development of the Amendments rule, and simply took the 
study's conclusions at face value. EPA has now further reviewed that 
study in detail and does not believe that it demonstrates that EPA's 
estimate of the costs of accidents is too low, or that its conclusions 
can be extrapolated to the nationwide universe of RMP facilities (see 
Section IV.C of this preamble for a further explanation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis--Accidental Release 
Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7), December 16, 2016, pp 89-90. This 
document is available in the rulemaking docket as item number EPA-
HQ-OEM-0725-0734.
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    EPA disagrees that the CCPS estimate of major accident damages is 
representative of the typical cost of RMP facility accidents. The CCPS 
``Business Case for Process Safety'' (p.8) states that ``Property 
damage costs are reduced--In the U.S., major industrial incidents cost 
an average of $80 million each.'' The Amendments RIA (Exhibit 6-5) 
shows that the total costs of property damage for all reportable RMP 
accidents over the 2004-2013 time period analyzed were $2.1 billion for 
on-site damages, and $11.4 million for off-site damages. This averages 
$1.4 million per accident of on-site damages and $0.01 million per 
accident for offsite damages. Since the RMP accident data are self-
reported by regulated sources, they likely represent the owner or 
operator's best estimate of the costs of the accident. CCPS may have 
derived its number from a definition of accident that is different from 
what we require to be reported under the RMP rule. For example, the RMP 
rule requires reporting of accidents that cause ``significant property 
damage on site'' or ``known offsite'' property damage, whereas the CCPS 
document purports to describe ``major industrial accidents.''
    It does not appear that the set of accidents considered in the CCPS 
document has much overlap with RMP reportable accidents. The CCPS data 
on ``major'' industrial accidents are based in part on accidents that 
are not subject to the RMP rule, while the portion that are RMP 
accidents is a very small subset of the full RMP accident database. As 
EPA indicates in the Response to Comments document,\71\ only 4 RMP 
reportable accidents that occurred during 2004-2013 and only one that 
occurred during 2014-2016 caused $80 million or more in onsite property 
damage.
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    \71\ See Response to Comments document, section 9.1.1.
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    EPA disagrees with the commenters that the non-monetized benefits 
discussed in the Amendments rule were ignored in the Reconsideration 
rule. In the Amendments rule RIA, EPA qualitatively described the 
benefits of the Amendments rule provisions, including the prevention 
and mitigation of future RMP accidents. EPA considered the benefits 
associated with preventing serious accidents, avoiding direct costs 
such as worker, responder, and public fatalities and injuries, public 
evacuations, public sheltering-in-place, and property and environmental 
damage. The RIA also considered indirect costs such as lost 
productivity due to product damage and business interruption, both on-
site and off-site, expenditure of emergency response resources and 
attendant transaction costs, and reduced offsite property values. In 
the Reconsideration RIA, EPA acknowledges that the proposed rescission 
of some of the Amendments rule provisions would result in a reduction 
in the magnitude of prevention and information benefits relative to the 
post-Amendments rule baseline. Specifically, Chapter 6 of the 
Reconsideration RIA discussed the qualitative benefits associated with 
the Amendments rule and how they will change in response to the

[[Page 69871]]

Reconsideration rule. However, EPA also notes that the rate and 
consequences of RMP-reportable accidents have reached their lowest 
levels since EPA began collecting these data. These trends have 
occurred under the pre-Amendments rule, and EPA believes that some 
benefits of the Amendments rule can be obtained through a compliance-
driven approach without imposing broad regulatory mandates that may 
unnecessarily burden many facilities.
    With regard to incident investigation root cause analysis 
specifically, EPA did not rely exclusively on a comparison of costs and 
benefits to justify the rescission. We have been unable to make a 
direct connection between the presence or absence of these provisions 
and a number of accidents prevented. However, our decision to rescind 
these provisions does not rest exclusively on costs and benefits. As we 
have noted, in addition to reducing the burden on the regulatory 
community, EPA has decided to rescind the incident investigation root 
cause analysis provision to maintain consistency with the OSHA PSM 
Standard.
3. Comments on Rescission of Incident Investigation Provisions
    Many commenters supported rescinding the Amendments rule incident 
investigation and root cause analysis provisions, for various reasons. 
Some commenters claimed that the Amendments rule lacked adequate 
justification for adding the provisions. Other commenters stated that 
the provisions were too burdensome or would not improve safety. Still 
other commenters stated that the requirements caused conflicts with the 
OSHA PSM standard and should be rescinded to assure continued unity 
with the standard. On the other hand, many other commenters opposed 
rescinding the Amendments rule incident investigation and root cause 
analysis provisions. These commenters also provided various reasons for 
opposing the rescission, which are discussed individually below.
a. Claims That Rescinding Provisions Will Weaken Safety Standards and 
Not Avoid Future Accidents
    A State government agency commented that the rescission of the 
incident investigation provisions would be harmful, as the details 
collected by the incident investigation provisions help facilities to 
understand the causes and consequences of incidents, in turn helping to 
eliminate future incidents. The State government agency also commented 
that specifying that the initiating event, direct and indirect 
contributing factors, and root causes must be included in the factors 
that contributed to the incident is crucial for a thorough incident 
investigation. A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and 
other commenters stated that EPA's own analysis demonstrates that EPA 
should keep and strengthen incident investigation and auditing 
requirements. The commenters stated that a conditional probability 
calculation based on the data in EPA's 2004-2013 accident spreadsheet 
confirms that facilities that have had even one accident are 
significantly more likely to have a second one, which shows the 
importance of retaining all of the improved investigation requirements. 
The commenters stated that, under the RMP rule in existence prior to 
the Amendments rule, EPA's data show that facilities are not learning 
from their mistakes. Additionally, the data show that facilities that 
experience one problem are likely to have additional issues without 
regulatory intervention. Other commenters, including private citizens, 
multiple form letter campaigns joined by approximately 2,275 
individuals, and a labor union stated that incident investigations, 
including root cause analyses, can prevent accidents and should remain 
a part of the RMP program. These commenters stated that a root cause 
analysis is common sense and is critical to determining accountability, 
that the investigations are not a burden on industry, but are necessary 
and obvious solutions to learn how to prevent dangerous mistakes and 
enhance business practices. One commenter stated that root cause 
analysis has resulted in a strong safety record for nuclear facilities. 
Another commenter indicated that the state of California requires root 
cause analysis of accidents and that the analysis increases safety and 
saves companies money.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees that incident investigation with root 
cause analysis is an important method to determine the underlying 
causes of an accident, so that they may be addressed to prevent future 
accidents. However, as noted earlier, many facilities may already use 
root cause analysis for incident investigations. All RMP facilities 
with Program 2 or 3 processes were already required to conduct incident 
investigations that include identification of ``contributing factors,'' 
and EPA's RMP guidance document already encouraged owners and operators 
to identify ``root'' and ``underlying'' causes of incidents. Several 
commenters noted that some facilities already conduct root cause 
analyses as part of their incident investigations and that root cause 
analysis is the modern, industry accepted approach in incident 
investigations. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), based 
upon a survey of its membership and other processing companies, 
observed that companies reported using an average of two or three 
different public domain and proprietary tools methodologies for both 
major and minor incidents, and the most popular methodologies use 
different combinations of investigation tools.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ CCPS. March 2003.Guidelines for Investing Chemical Process 
Incidents, Second Edition, Chapter 4, An Overview of Investigation 
Methodologies. Pp. 44-45. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0251.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA did cite some examples in the Amendments rule of accidents 
where EPA, OSHA or CSB identified ineffective investigations by the 
owner or operator of previous, similar incidents, resulting in a 
failure to address the same causes. We presume that had these previous 
problems or near misses been identified, action would have been taken 
to avoid reoccurrence. However, EPA has not conducted any overall 
analysis of data from RMP accident investigations conducted by 
regulated facilities to determine how well these investigations have 
identified causes and contributing factors.
    EPA acknowledges the commenter's point concerning facilities that 
have more than one accident. However, EPA disagrees that in all cases, 
subsequent accidents are due to a failure to conduct a root cause 
analysis of an earlier accident. In some cases, subsequent accidents 
could be due to a failure to implement incident investigation findings. 
In others, the causes of a subsequent accident could be completely 
unrelated to the causes of an earlier accident. EPA believes that the 
commenter's statement ``a conditional probability calculation based on 
the data in EPA's 2004-2013 accident spreadsheet confirms that 
facilities that have had even one accident are significantly more 
likely to have a second one,'' may mischaracterize the RMP accident 
data. While this observation is true, it fails to consider the 
possibility that subsequent accidents are unrelated to an owner's 
failure to identify a root cause.
    Given the relatively small and declining number of facilities that 
have RMP-reportable accidents, and the concentration of accidents among 
a subset of facilities that have had accidents, EPA believes that 
focusing on

[[Page 69872]]

including injunctive relief as necessary in appropriate enforcement 
actions is a better approach to preventing future accidents than 
imposing broad regulatory requirements. Such an approach will also 
allow EPA to tailor injunctive relief to best suit the circumstances of 
the case. For example, considering that EPA's existing guidance already 
encourages owners and operators to identify the root and underlying 
causes of accidents, EPA may find that a facility's failure to address 
earlier incident investigation findings contributed to a subsequent 
accident, rather than failure to conduct a root cause incident 
investigation. In light of the language of our pre-Amendments rule, our 
guidance and that of CCPS on root cause analysis, and the widespread 
practice of conducting root cause analyses mentioned by commenters, a 
bare ``root cause'' regulatory requirement is unlikely to significantly 
change current practices or reduce accidents as much as a case-by-case 
approach that examines individual source behavior.
    Also, based on its record, EPA does not wish to have the RMP 
incident investigation requirements diverge from those in OSHA's PSM 
standard. EPA does not have a record showing significant benefits of 
the added prevention program provisions. Without such benefits, EPA 
believes it is better to take its traditional approach of maintaining 
consistency with OSHA PSM. The creation of additional complexity and 
burden associated with new provisions where EPA has not demonstrated 
any benefit is evidence of the new prevention provisions' 
impracticability and that the rule divergence is unreasonable. However, 
retaining for Program 2 investigation requirements, the words 
``report'' and ``reports'' in place of ``summary'' and ``summaries'', 
respectively, and the requirement for an incident investigation team 
with at least one person knowledgeable in the process and other persons 
with appropriate investigation experience, does not create any 
inconsistencies with OSHA PSM requirements.
b. Alleged Lack of Justification for Rescission
    An advocacy group stated that there is no cost justification for 
the rescission of the root cause analysis provisions. The commenter 
stated that a break-even analysis demonstrates that the burden provides 
no justification for repeal as the benefits greatly outweigh the costs. 
This commenter argued that because the root cause incident 
investigation provision costs $1.8 million annually and the annual cost 
of facility accidents is $274.5 million, the provision would only need 
to reduce the risk of accidents by 0.6% to break even, which seems well 
within the range of reasonableness to conclude that these provisions 
would be able to provide this level of protection. The group 
recommended that EPA conduct their own breakeven analysis. Similarly, a 
tribal government and a few other commenters stated that the small cost 
associated with root cause investigations are well worth the benefit.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the commenter's break-even 
analysis that it is within the range of reasonableness to conclude the 
``benefits [of the root cause provision] greatly outweigh the costs.'' 
The commenter suggests if the provision prevents at least 0.6% of 
accidental release damages, then it would be cost-beneficial, but 
provides no data to support that assumption about the effectiveness of 
the provision. EPA has not been able to quantify how much benefit in 
accident reduction would be attributed to this specific provision. EPA 
has no data or empirical estimates of the precise impact of each rule 
provision on the probability and magnitude of an accident. The 
accidents themselves have highly variable impacts that are difficult to 
predict. To the extent practicable, EPA's analysis monetizes the costs 
of accident damages to partially estimate the baseline costs that 
should be affected by the final rule.
    This is also complicated by the fact that many facilities may 
already employ root cause analysis techniques and it is difficult to 
estimate how much benefit is to be gained from facilities who are not 
already conducting root cause analysis. In at least some of the 
incidents mentioned in the RMP Amendments proposal, it is arguable that 
a contributing factor in the subsequent incident was either the failure 
to conduct any investigation, or the failure to implement findings from 
an incident investigation, rather than the failure to conduct a root 
cause investigation. EPA is also rescinding the root cause analysis 
provision because we do not wish to have the incident investigation 
requirements diverge from those in OSHA's PSM standard. EPA does not 
have a record showing significant benefits of the added prevention 
program provisions. Without such benefits, EPA believes it is better to 
take its traditional approach of maintaining consistency with OSHA PSM. 
The creation of additional complexity and burden associated with new 
provisions where EPA has not demonstrated any benefit is evidence of 
the new prevention provisions' impracticability and that the rule 
divergence is unreasonable.
c. Other Comments Opposing Rescission of Root Cause Analysis Provision
    A state agency and an advocacy group stated that incident 
investigations should be conducted ``using a recognized method'' as 
standard practice and stated that informal one-on-one interviews with 
supervisors or an investigation committee method are flawed approaches. 
These commenters stated that companies should use a more structured and 
comprehensive team approach to identify root causes with tested data 
analysis tools and methodologies. An industry trade association 
commented that they believe root cause analyses could help determine 
flooding risk for accidents and influence severe weather analyses. The 
commenter also stated that EPA should consider CSB's recommendation 
regarding the 2017 disaster at the Arkema chemical facility in Texas, 
that chemical manufacturing, handling, or storage facilities perform 
analyses to determine their susceptibility to these extreme weather 
events and evaluate the adequacy of relevant safeguards.
    EPA Response: Although EPA is rescinding the specific regulatory 
requirement for root cause analysis, the Agency's existing guidance 
already encouraged owners and operators to determine the root and 
underlying causes of incidents. EPA's guidance also provides pointers 
to recognized investigation methods, such as the CCPS ``Guidelines for 
Investigating Chemical Process Incidents'' and the ``National Fire 
Protection Association Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations.''
    Regarding the use of root cause analysis to determine flooding 
risk, root cause analysis generally is used to identify underlying 
system-related reasons why an incident occurred, and it is therefore 
probably of less utility for determination of flooding risk or for 
investigating events that are clearly caused by extreme weather and are 
not system-related. The issue with extreme weather events is 
recognizing the hazard, its likelihood of occurrence and its severity. 
The RMP regulations already require that facilities identify the 
hazards associated with their processes and regulated substances and 
the safeguards used or needed to control or mitigate all relevant 
hazards, including among other things, loss of power, flooding or 
hurricanes. Thus, rescinding the Amendments prevention requirements and 
in particular the root cause analysis provision would not relieve 
facilities of their obligation to address these hazards.

[[Page 69873]]

d. Rescind ``near miss'' Clarifying Text
    Several commenters stated that the term near miss was confusing and 
supported the proposal to rescind the term. These commenters 
recommended allowing firms the flexibility to determine what 
constitutes an incident that could reasonably have resulted in a 
catastrophic release. Several other commenters stated that in the 
Amendments rule EPA failed to define a near miss and its illustrations 
of near misses created confusion. Other commenters also supported the 
rescission, providing various reasons, including that EPA's earlier 
expansive view of the term was at odds with industry's understanding, 
or that the term could cause facilities to unfairly be subject to 
enforcement, or that EPA's description of the term would intrude on 
OSHA's jurisdiction. An industry trade association stated that, in 
addition to rescinding the near miss text, EPA also needs to clarify 
inaccuracies that were included in the near miss discussion in the 
Amendments rule preamble. Specifically, the commenter argued that EPA 
needed to clarify that some examples EPA included in the Amendments 
rule preamble were not near misses or incidents that could reasonably 
have resulted in a catastrophic release.
    Other commenters opposed the rescission of the near miss text. A 
Federal government agency stated that investigating near misses can 
help prevent more serious and catastrophic incidents from occurring. 
The commenter also stated that because major process accidents are 
generally categorized as ``low probability, high consequence'' 
occurrences, near-miss incident investigations can provide a higher 
number of learning opportunities, providing a more complete data set 
for lessons learned and major process safety enhancements locally, 
within the company, and potentially industry-wide. A State government 
agency stated that to have an effective risk management program, 
facilities must investigate all incidents involving a regulated 
substance, including catastrophic releases, smaller accidental releases 
that are not catastrophic, and near misses. The commenter stated that 
the proposed revision is vague and subjective in that it leaves the 
owner or operator to decide what they will investigate outside of the 
``catastrophic'' incidents, therefore weakening the provision. A State 
agency provided recommended draft text for Sec.  68.81 that would 
require investigation of all accidental releases and near-misses 
(instead of incidents that resulted in or could reasonably have 
resulted in a catastrophic release) and included new definitions of 
``accidental release'' and ``near miss.''
    EPA Response: EPA is deleting the term ``near miss'' that was added 
in the Amendments rule. The term was added in order to further clarify 
those incidents which could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic 
release and are also subject to investigation. However, EPA's lack of 
specificity about what it meant by ``near miss'' contributed to 
confusion about the incident investigation requirement rather than 
clarity. EPA does not have a record showing significant benefits of the 
added prevention program provisions. Without such benefits, EPA 
believes it is better to take its traditional approach of maintaining 
consistency with OSHA PSM. The creation of additional complexity and 
burden associated with new provisions where EPA has not demonstrated 
any benefit is evidence of their impracticability and unreasonableness. 
EPA does not wish to have the incident investigation requirements 
diverge from those in OSHA's PSM standard. Removing the language will 
prevent undue burden in complying with process safety requirements that 
would result from introducing a duplicative requirement for 
investigations. Contrary to some commenters' concerns, the addition of 
the term ``near miss'' in the Amendments rule was not intended to be an 
expansion of the type of incidents that were required to be 
investigated, but a clarification of the incidents which could 
reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release that must be 
investigated. However, even without the term, incidents which could 
reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release continue to require 
incident investigations.
    While EPA did provide examples in the Amendments rule of incidents 
which may be considered near misses (82 FR 4606-7, January 13, 2017), 
EPA did not intend to imply that these examples were always events that 
would require investigation. EPA noted that ``facility owners or 
operators will need to decide which incidents could reasonably have 
resulted in a catastrophic release'' and that ``this will require 
subjective judgement.'' EPA also acknowledged ``that not all excursions 
of process parameters outside control levels or all instances of 
protective device activation should necessarily be considered to be 
near misses'' and ``that activation of protective devices should be 
investigated when the failure of such devices could have reasonably 
resulted in a catastrophic release.'' These situations would have to be 
evaluated to determine if imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
public health and environment could have plausibly resulted if the 
circumstances and been slightly different.
    Regarding making any changes in the definition of a release subject 
to the investigation requirements, EPA had already proposed in the 
Amendments rule to change the definition of ``catastrophic release'' to 
be identical to the description of accidental releases required to be 
reported under the accident history reporting requirements. In the 
final Amendments rule, EPA decided not to make this change after 
reviewing many comments opposing the change and because the proposed 
revision may have inadvertently expanded the definition of incidents 
subject to investigation (see 82 FR at 4603, January 13, 2017). EPA did 
not propose a definition of near-miss in the proposed Amendments rule 
but did consider it. In the final Amendments rule, EPA chose not to 
provide a definition of near-miss because it was too difficult to 
address in a single definition the variety of incidents that may occur 
at RMP facilities that could be near-misses that should be 
investigated. The term near-miss had been added in the proposed rule as 
a term to help clarify and highlight those incidents that could 
reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. The difficulty in 
devising a single regulatory definition supports removing the term as 
it did not accomplish the intended clarification. Based on the 
reasoning given in the Amendments rule, EPA does not agree that any 
changes should be made regarding the catastrophic release definition 
for incident investigation nor should a definition of near-miss be 
added.
e. Requiring Program 2 Investigation Teams To Have at Least One Person 
Knowledgeable in the Process and Other Persons With Investigation 
Experience
    An industry trade association expressed support for EPA's proposal 
to rescind the requirement for program 2 incident investigation teams 
to have at least one person knowledgeable in the process and other 
persons with investigation experience, stating that the team 
requirements are ambiguous and not appropriate for all incident 
investigations. The commenter stated that the team should be tailored 
to the level of incident and given that Program 2 facilities are lower 
risk, the team requirements should not be necessary. Two other 
commenters provided general support for the proposed rescission. On the 
other hand, a Federal agency

[[Page 69874]]

strongly recommended that EPA retain the staffing requirements for 
Program 2 investigation teams. Similarly, a State elected official 
questioned what kind of safety improvements could result from an 
investigation conducted by individuals with no experience with the 
failed process. Another commenter provided general opposition to the 
proposed rescission.
    EPA Response: EPA is retaining the Program 2 requirement in Sec.  
68.60(c) for an incident investigation team to be established and 
consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved 
and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to 
thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. While EPA is 
rescinding other incident investigation requirements so that they do 
not diverge from those in OSHA's PSM standard, retaining the 
investigation team requirements for Program 2 does not create any 
inconsistencies with OSHA PSM requirements. The pre-Amendments rule for 
Program 3 already required an incident investigation team to be 
established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the 
process involved and other persons with appropriate knowledge and 
experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. This 
provision is the same as that required by the OSHA PSM standard. 
Retaining this provision for Program 2 does not make the provision more 
rigorous than Program 3, and EPA agrees with commenters who stated that 
incident investigation teams should always include at least one person 
who is knowledgeable in the process and other persons with 
investigation experience.
f. Other Comments on Incident Investigation Provisions
    Commenters provided other comments relating to the incident 
investigation provisions. A State elected official opposed the 
rescission of the incident report elements added under the Amendments 
rule. A State government agency commented that the rescission of the 
added incident report elements will be detrimental to public safety 
because they would help the company understand the causes and 
consequences of the incident when the incidents are reviewed in the 
future, such as during process hazard analyses. Several commenters 
opposed EPA's proposed rescission of schedules for addressing 
investigation recommendations. A State government agency stated that a 
schedule for addressing recommendations from the incident investigation 
is an important requirement to ensure that recommendations are resolved 
in a timely manner and is necessary as part of the management system 
for all prevention program elements. Similarly, a Federal agency stated 
that EPA should continue to require that investigation reports include 
a schedule to address recommendations by taking appropriate corrective 
action(s) with a 12-month completion deadline. On the other hand, an 
industry trade association expressed support for the rescission of the 
added elements emphasizing that the additional items are not designed 
to meaningfully enhance incident investigations. Another trade 
association supported EPA's proposed rescission of additional report 
requirements, including schedules for addressing investigation 
recommendations, as unnecessary.
    A few commenters supported EPA's proposal to rescind the 12-month 
incident investigation deadline requirement. Two industry trade 
associations supported EPA's proposal, reasoning that mandating a 
completion deadline is detrimental to the focus of the investigative 
team, which should be on completeness. Two industry trade associations 
also commented that the timeframe to complete a thorough incident 
investigation will vary depending on several external factors, 
including the consequences of the release, the complexity of the 
incident, the process or processes involved, the substance released, 
and the investigation team's experience, knowledge, and composition. In 
opposition to EPA's proposal, an industry trade association and a union 
disagreed with rescinding the 12-month deadline, stating that the 
deadline is reasonable to ensure the owner/operator does not let the 
investigation lag indefinitely. In addition, a Federal agency stated 
that EPA should continue to require that investigation reports include 
a schedule to address recommendations by taking appropriate corrective 
action(s) with a 12-month completion deadline.
    A few commenters supported the rescission of the requirement to 
investigate catastrophic releases that result in a decommissioned or 
destroyed process. Alternatively, a few commenters opposed rescinding 
the provision. A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and 
other commenters stated that without investigations of releases that 
resulted in a decommissioned or destroyed process, it would create a 
significant gap in current RMP accident reporting data and would be a 
missed opportunity to improve safety.
    EPA Response: EPA is rescinding all the incident investigation 
report elements added by the Amendments rule, except that EPA will 
retain the words ``report'' and ``reports'' in place of the words 
``summary'' and ``summaries'' in 68.60(d) and (g), respectively, and 
the requirement in 68.60(c) for an incident investigation team to be 
established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the 
process involved and other persons with appropriate knowledge and 
experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. This 
includes rescinding, among others, the requirement to complete an 
incident investigation within 12 months, the requirement to provide a 
schedule for addressing recommendations in the investigation report, 
and the requirement to investigate catastrophic releases that result in 
a decommissioned or destroyed process. EPA does not wish to have the 
incident investigation requirements diverge from those in OSHA's PSM 
standard. EPA does not have a record showing significant benefits of 
the added prevention program provisions. Without such benefits, EPA 
believes it is better to take its traditional approach of maintaining 
consistency with OSHA PSM. The creation of additional complexity and 
burden associated with new provisions where EPA has not demonstrated 
any benefit is evidence of their impracticability and unreasonableness. 
Retaining the previously mentioned Program 2 investigation requirements 
above does not create any inconsistencies with OSHA PSM requirements. 
The pre-Amendments rule already had a requirement for the owner or 
operator to establish a system to promptly address and resolve the 
incident report findings and recommendations, with resolutions and 
corrections to be documented. These requirements remain and the 
rescission of the provision for a schedule for addressing 
recommendations in the investigation report does not negate the 
requirement to promptly address the investigation findings and 
recommendations.
    Regarding investigation of accidents that result in a 
decommissioned or destroyed process, commenters did not identify a 
significant number of release incidents at RMP facilities that had 
resulted in a destroyed or decommissioned process without any RMP 
accident report.\73\ We believe these

[[Page 69875]]

events would tend to be higher profile, with job losses and visibility 
to news organizations and to the communities. EPA is aware of a few 
such incidents (e.g., the June 24, 2005 fire at a Praxair facility in 
St. Louis, Missouri); however the Agency is not aware of a significant 
number of such incidents. The absence of additional examples would lead 
us to conclude that the gap we were addressing in the Amendments exists 
but is not a significant one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ In the list of incidents provided by Earthjustice attached 
to comment EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1969 and subsequently updated, EPA 
noted two incidents that resulted in the facility deregistering from 
the RMP database due to damage from the incident. See EPA. July 18, 
2019, Technical Background Document for Final RMP Reconsideration 
Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 
112(r)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Comments on Rescission of Third-Party Audit Provisions
    Many commenters representing industry supported EPA's proposed 
rescission of the third-party audit provisions. Some of these 
commenters stated that requiring a third-party audit after every 
reportable accident is unwarranted, would result in a misallocation of 
resources, and in cases where EPA believes a third-party audit is 
warranted, the agency already can require a facility to conduct a 
third-party audit as a corrective action under an enforcement 
settlement. Several trade associations stated that the third-party 
audit provisions are duplicative given that facilities are already 
required to be audited every three years. Other commenters stated that 
the Amendments rule provided insufficient evidence that third-party 
audits are more robust and effective than internal compliance audits. 
Many commenters stated that the Amendments rule's requirements for 
auditor competency and independence would make it difficult for 
companies to find and afford qualified auditors, and that EPA provided 
no evidence that internal auditors were insufficiently objective or 
competent to perform audits. Several industry trade associations 
commented that it is false to assume that third parties are more 
capable, credible, and objective than a facility's own audit staff. Two 
industry trade associations stated that EPA lacks authority to impose a 
regulatory requirement for third-party audits.
    In contrast, many other commenters, including multiple form letter 
campaigns joined by approximately 2,275 individuals, opposed EPA's 
proposed rescission of the third-party audit provisions. Many of these 
commenters stated that third-party audits increase accountability. Some 
commenters supported retaining the third-party audit provisions because 
the CSB has found that a company's own internal corporate PSM audits 
can fail to identify systemic process safety deficiencies. An advocacy 
group stated that third-party audits should be maintained because post-
incident audits help facilities pinpoint and eliminate the cause of 
such incidents to prevent future accidental releases. A joint 
submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters stated 
that EPA previously supported and provided a rationale for third-party 
audits in the Amendments rule. A labor union also cited EPA's 
Amendments rule arguments in support of third-party audits and EPA's 
conclusion that ``independent compliance audits will assist stationary 
sources to come fully into compliance with the applicable prevention 
program requirements.'' The commenter stated that they fully believe 
that third-party audits would reduce the frequency and severity of 
accidents at RMP facilities. Another advocacy group stated that third-
party audits are an essential part of the Contra Costa County (CCC), 
California Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO), which the commenter 
described as a nationally-acclaimed chemical release prevention program 
that has reduced both the number and severity of incidents since its 
implementation of the third-party audit program. Other commenters 
stated that the costs of the third-party audit provisions do not 
justify their repeal, and that there is no problem if EPA requires 
third-party audits when OSHA does not.
    EPA Response: EPA believes there can be benefits to third-party 
audits in some instances and has previously described the benefits in 
the Amendments rule. EPA will continue to include third-party audits as 
part of enforcement actions, when appropriate. The Agency's decision to 
rescind the third-party audit requirements is not based on a 
determination that third-party audits are not beneficial or justified 
in certain cases, but to allow for coordination of process safety 
requirements with OSHA before proposing future regulatory changes, and 
to reduce unnecessary regulatory costs and burdens of a broad rule-
based approach to third-party audits rather than a case-by-case 
approach. As discussed in the proposed rule, one area of potential 
divergence between the OSHA PSM standard and the RMP rule under the 
Amendments is in the requirement for third-party audits. EPA noted that 
the August 2016 OSHA SBAR panel report \74\ did not fully support 
third-party audits. Instead the SBAR panel recommended further review 
of the need and benefits of a third-party audit provision in the PSM 
standard. EPA therefore believes that we should not retain and put into 
effect changes to the prevention aspects of the Risk Management Program 
until we have a better understanding of OSHA's plans for changes to the 
PSM standard so that we may move forward in a more coordinated fashion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ OSHA, OMB and SBA. August 1, 2016. Report of the Small 
Business Advocacy Review Panel on OSHA's Potential Revisions to the 
Process Safety Management Standard. Pp. 32-33. U.S. Dept. of Labor 
(DOL), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); U.S. 
DOL Office of the Solicitor (SOL); Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), and U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). EPA-HQ-OEM-
2015-0725-0923.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding commenters' claims that the Amendments rule's auditor 
competency and independence provisions will make it difficult for 
facilities to locate and afford auditors, and that EPA lacks authority 
to impose third-party audit regulatory requirements, these comments 
reiterate similar comments made on the Amendments rule, to which EPA 
already responded in the preamble and Response to Comments document for 
that rule. EPA notes that the rescission of the third-party audit 
requirements is not due to unavailability of auditors, or EPA's lack of 
authority to impose the requirement.
    EPA disagrees that the CCC ISO provides evidence that third-party 
audits are justified on a cost-benefit basis. The CCC ISO includes many 
provisions that are not duplicated in the RMP regulation, and it is 
impossible to disaggregate the effects of individual provisions to 
determine their efficacy. However, the CCC audit program is not a 
third-party audit program comparable to the Amendments rule provision, 
but rather is comprised of inspections and audits that are conducted by 
the regulator (i.e., county inspectors). The CCC Hazardous Materials 
Programs staff was required to audit and inspect all stationary sources 
regulated under the Industrial Safety Ordinance within one year after 
the initial submittal of their Safety Plans. In other words, these were 
enforcement audits, not independent third-party audits comparable to 
those in the Amendments.
5. Comments on Rescission of STAA Provision
    Many commenters representing industry supported EPA's proposed 
rescission of the STAA provision. Some of these commenters argued that 
STAA has limited or no benefit or will even decrease safety. Some 
commenters indicated that the frequency of accidents in New Jersey 
since enactment of the NJ Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) IST 
provision has not

[[Page 69876]]

declined, and that this indicates that the Amendments rule STAA 
provision will cause facilities to incur costs without any accident 
reduction benefits. An industry trade association commented that the 
STAA provision would not reduce accidents, and that the RMP rule's 
existing requirements for management of change and PHAs already provide 
for analysis of alternatives and continuous risk mitigation. Two other 
industry trade associations stated that, in the course of PHAs, plants 
identify risks and address them according to recognized and generally 
accepted good engineering practice. One of these commenters also stated 
that companies implement risk-based analyses in order to reduce risks 
to an acceptable level. Another association argued that the Amendment 
rule's STAA provisions would provide no benefit because industries 
already utilize IST analysis where they determine it feasible. Other 
industry trade associations agreed, stating that IST analyses have been 
adopted as a matter of industry best-practice for years. They argued 
that imposing a regulatory requirement to do so will only result in 
waste. An industry trade association argued that STAA should not be 
generally required of existing facilities, and that a broad STAA 
requirement could only be appropriate when designing new plants, but 
that companies already perform STAA in these circumstances. Many 
associations commented that, at most, STAA should only apply to the 
design of a process and not be part of the PHA. An industry trade 
association representing specialty chemical manufacturers stated that 
its members manufacture specialty chemicals under designs specified in 
Federal regulations, and the tight specifications required by these 
programs limit the beneficial potential of STAA.
    Some industry associations argued that STAA would increase risks. 
An industry trade association commented that STAA requirements, by 
departing from OSHA's PSM requirements, would create an overlapping, 
inconsistent regulatory framework and thereby decrease process safety. 
Another industry trade association predicted that risk shifting and a 
potential increase in overall risk would be a likely result of 
requiring STAA. An association of government agencies commented that 
the efficacy of the STAA requirement would be undermined if there were 
no required analysis for transfer of risk. An industry trade 
association commented that STAA requirements would stifle innovation by 
adding documentation costs to companies already innovating. Another 
commenter agreed, stating that STAA requirements, triggered by minor 
safety changes, could disincentivize the same changes.
    On the other hand, many commenters representing environmental 
advocacy groups, state and tribal governments, and others opposed 
rescission of the Amendments rule STAA requirements. EPA also received 
comments from multiple form letter campaigns joined by approximately 
2,275 individuals expressing opposition to the proposed rescission of 
STAA requirements. These commenters reasoned that if implemented, the 
STAA requirements would help prevent or decrease the impacts of future 
accidents. An advocacy group stated that STAA is the best mechanism 
available for improving plant safety. Another commenter agreed, 
elaborating that IST provides the most robust mechanism for preventing 
accidents by removing, rather than protecting against, hazards. Many 
other commenters wrote similar comments. A tribal government commented 
that numerous recent accidents may have been avoidable with STAA 
regulations. Specifically, the commenter cited the April 2, 2010 
explosion at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington, an August 6, 
2012 accident at the Chevron Refinery in Richmond, CA and CSB's similar 
findings for both incidents that process safety programs at both 
facilities failed to effectively control the hazards before these 
incidents occurred. This commenter noted that the CSB recommended that 
EPA require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and 
the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in 
establishing safeguards for identified process hazards. The commenter 
also referred to other incidents that EPA had cited in support of the 
Amendments rule, stated that they all appear to have been caused by 
management's failure to implement adequate safety management programs, 
and concluded that process safety regulations were unsuccessful at 
preventing these major incidents. Another tribal government also argued 
that STAA provisions should be retained, describing the potential harm 
threatened by a nearby refinery's use of hydrogen fluoride. A private 
citizen commented that recent years have exhibited higher rates of 
reported incidents. The commenter argued that STAA provisions should be 
implemented to help reduce these occurrences. Another commenter stated 
that an expansion of RMP is necessary given the numbers of accidents 
under the RMP requirements in place prior to the Amendments rule. An 
anonymous commenter urged that the STAA provisions be retained, stating 
that nearly 135,000,000 people live in areas potentially impacted by 
3,400 of the highest-risk RMP facilities' worst-case chemical releases. 
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection recommended that 
the Amendment rule's STAA provisions not only be retained but expanded. 
It commented that New Jersey's broad STAA approach, which includes 
safety measures short of redesigning a plant, made ongoing STAA 
requirements beneficial. It cited a study in support of its contention 
that STAA provision can improve safety in older and operational 
facilities.
    EPA Response: When promulgating the Amendments rule, EPA 
anticipated that the STAA provision could be beneficial if facilities 
voluntarily implemented safer technologies in response to their 
analysis. However, EPA had no estimate of how many facilities would 
implement such measures and what the effects of these measures might be 
on the accident rate. EPA has since reviewed the nationwide RMP 
facility accident rate trend through 2016, which shows a continual 
decrease under the pre-Amendments RMP rule. This downward trend is 
evidence that the prevention elements of the pre-Amendments RMP rule 
are working and that the cost of additional prevention requirements may 
not be necessary. In addition, the accident data from RMP facilities in 
New Jersey indicate little or no discernible reduction in accident 
frequency or severity that can be associated with the NJ IST 
requirement to date. While comparing RMP accident data from New Jersey 
facilities to the full RMP database, EPA found that nationwide, the RMP 
accident rate has declined by an average of 4.1% per year from 2008-
2016 (3.5% per year per facility), without the added prevention 
provisions whereas the RMP accident rate in New Jersey declined by only 
approximately 1.7% per year (or 2% per year per facility), with the 
state's IST provision in effect. The downward trend in accident rate 
nationwide could reflect industry efforts in this area that have been 
achieved without prescriptive regulatory provisions. In any case, the 
lack of an apparent additional accident reduction effect of the IST 
provision at the state level over the pre-Amendments EPA program casts 
doubt on whether the STAA provision is reasonable because the added 
costs of the measure are disproportionate to the environmental benefits 
that are likely to be gained beyond those provided by the

[[Page 69877]]

pre-Amendments requirements. Therefore, EPA is rescinding the STAA 
requirement based on the lack of apparent benefits of the provision 
when applied to existing sources across broad sectors, based on EPA's 
review of available data, the apparent effectiveness of pre-Amendments 
accident prevention regulations in reducing accidents over time and a 
desire to keep the Program 3 accident requirements aligned with the 
OSHA PSM standard at this time.
    Regarding commenter's arguments that STAA is only appropriate for 
new processes, should not be incorporated into the PHA, and is 
inappropriate for specialty chemical (i.e., batch toll) manufacturing 
facilities, while EPA's rescission of the Amendments rule requirement 
makes these comments moot, we note that we already addressed these 
comments in the Response to Comments for the Amendments rule,\75\ and 
the Agency continues to disagree with them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ RMP Amendments Response to Comments, pgs. 105, 107-109. 
EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0729.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Concerning commenters' discussion of the potential usefulness of 
STAA in preventing specific incidents, while EPA cited factors in 
specific accidents as support for regulatory changes in the Amendments, 
the Reconsideration rule doesn't contradict those points. Rather, the 
proposed Reconsideration rule noted certain problems with respect to 
the new requirements that on further consideration, we believe can be 
addressed through rescission of the Amendments rule requirements while 
still improving chemical accident prevention and response, and using 
less costly means (e.g., a compliance-driven approach instead of a 
broad regulatory requirement). EPA's objective in making regulatory 
revisions is to make only those changes that are likely to improve 
accident prevention and response while not imposing unreasonable costs.
    EPA agrees that these accidents resulted from the failure by 
management to implement safety management programs, but the Agency does 
not agree with the commenter's conclusion that process safety 
regulations were unsuccessful at preventing them. Rather EPA believes 
it was the failure of these facilities to fully implement the existing 
process safety regulations that led to these incidents. Although CSB 
found that failure to use a more corrosion resistant high-chromium 
steel was a factor in the Tesoro Anacortes and Chevron Richmond 
accidents, and cited it as an example of an inherently safer strategy, 
the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP regulation already 
required process equipment to be fabricated from the proper materials 
of construction and be properly installed, maintained, and replaced to 
prevent failures and accidental releases (see 40 CFR part 68.3). If a 
regulated facility fails to properly implement existing regulatory 
provisions, rather than imposing additional regulatory requirements, 
the appropriate response is for EPA to undertake regulatory 
enforcement, and EPA regularly does so under CAA section 112(r).
    Regarding refineries' use of hydrogen fluoride, EPA notes that the 
Amendments rule STAA provision would not have required any facility to 
implement safer technologies. Thus, while some refineries still use 
hydrogen fluoride, the STAA requirement would not have required them to 
eliminate its use. EPA disagrees with commenters assertions that the 
accident rate is increasing. EPA's analysis of the trend in RMP 
accidents from 2003 through 2016 indicates that RMP facility accidents 
have declined in frequency by approximately 3.5% per year.
a. Costs and Benefits of STAA Provision
    Many commenters provided input on the subject of STAA's potential 
costs and benefits. Comments in support of the rescission often 
emphasized the indirect costs of STAA, while those in opposition often 
addressed environmental, human health, and other unquantifiable 
benefits. Several commenters characterized the Amendments rule's STAA 
provisions as ``open-ended,'' with the potential of causing massive 
costs without justification. One industry trade association stated that 
changing extant processes or plants can have unforeseen costs and 
trigger additional safety evaluations. Another industry trade 
association, citing a 2010 study, commented that STAA during PHA 
revalidation is an inefficient, costly use of resources. A tribal 
government supported the rescission of STAA requirements, stating that 
they may be both cost-prohibitive and detrimental to the environment. 
Another added that STAA would cost more than EPA predicted, as it would 
require hiring and training personnel. An industry trade association 
stated that EPA recognizes STAA could cause indirect costs up to $1 
billion through voluntary company action. Another commenter added that 
STAA requirements would become a paper formality which would especially 
harm small operations, because of the costs of compliance. An industry 
trade organization stated that rescinding the STAA requirement would 
advance the goals of E.O. 13771, 13777, and 13783. A trade association 
indicated that the frequency of accidents in New Jersey since enactment 
of the NJ TCPA IST provision has not declined, and that this indicates 
that the Amendments rule STAA provision will cause facilities to incur 
costs without any accident reduction benefits.
    Other commenters indicated that the costs of the provision were 
reasonable and justified. A State elected official acknowledged other 
comments that argued that the adoption of alternative technologies may 
result in unforeseen consequences and costs. The official, however, 
commented that this element of uncertainty should be explored and 
considered within the context of STAA decision-making. Another State 
elected official cited EPA's conclusion in the Amendments rule that 
``facilities will only incur additional costs beyond the analysis when 
the benefits of the change make adoption of the change reasonable for 
the facility.'' (82 FR at 4644).
    State elected officials argued that experience of the State of New 
Jersey shows that IST regulations are effective, that New Jersey found 
that performing an IST review would not be financially burdensome, and 
that the cost was further justified by the potential to identify 
additional risk reduction measures to protect the public and the 
environment. This commenter argues that even if the number of 
reportable incidents in New Jersey has not decreased after adoption of 
the IST rule, IST could still yield benefits by reducing the impact of 
releases that do occur.
    Other comments in favor of STAA argued that it could be 
economically beneficial in ways other than preventing the direct costs 
of accidents. A private citizen stated that STAA provisions would have 
benefits in terms of reducing cancer rates and other human costs. An 
anonymous commenter added that EPA failed to consider the benefits of 
STAA in its proposed rescission. An anonymous commenter stated that, 
from their experience, environmental regulations resulted in plants 
implementing safer technology on generating units, improving 
operational efficiency and profitability. A private citizen commented 
that STAA provisions may result in economic benefits both by improving 
industry efficiency and by improving the market for safer technology. 
Several commenters cited a publication stating that a single 
significant refinery disaster causes an average of $220 million in

[[Page 69878]]

economic harm,\76\ and one commenter stated that the Chevron Richmond 
accident caused $1.7 billion in damage to California's economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Gonzales, D., Gulden, T., Strong, A. and Hoyle, W. 2016. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Proposed California Oil and Gas Refinery 
Regulations. RR-1421-DIR. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 
www.rand.org/t/RR1421. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0643.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA Response: In the RIA for the Amendments rule, EPA acknowledged 
that considering only the monetized impacts of RMP accidents would mean 
that the rule's costs may outweigh the portion of avoided impacts from 
improved prevention and mitigation that were monetized. The STAA 
provision was estimated to be the costliest provision of the Amendments 
rule, by itself accounting for more than 50% of estimated compliance 
costs. Therefore, in order for the rule's costs to be reasonable (not 
disproportionate to its benefits), this provision must result in 
substantial benefits. In monetizing the costs of RMP-reportable 
accidents, EPA suggested that a substantial portion of those accidents 
would need to be prevented by the Amendments rule provisions in order 
to be justified on a cost-benefit basis. However, in the Amendments 
rule, EPA had not attempted examine the effects of existing state 
(i.e., New Jersey) level IST regulations. For this rulemaking, 
commenters have submitted data and studies that argue on both sides of 
this issue with regard to STAA.\77\ Some commenters have indicated that 
the lack of decline in the frequency of accidents in New Jersey since 
enactment of the NJ TCPA IST provision indicates that there is no 
evidence that the provision has resulted in any reduction in accidents. 
EPA agrees that the NJ accident rate trend does not support the 
effectiveness of its IST provision. EPA notes that RMP facility 
accident data from RMP facilities in New Jersey, which has required RMP 
facilities to evaluate inherently safer technology options since 2008, 
do not show any decline in accidents beyond that occurring in RMP 
facilities nationwide, suggesting that evaluation of safer technologies 
has either already occurred without the rule change, or does not result 
in significant accident reduction. While comparing RMP accident rates 
from New Jersey facilities to the nationwide rate of RMP facility 
accidents, EPA found that the nationwide RMP accident rate has been 
reduced by an average of 4.1% per year from 2008-2016, without the 
added prevention provisions. Regarding the comment that IST could still 
yield benefits by reducing the impact of releases that do occur, EPA 
considered the trend of accident impacts in New Jersey. Since the 
beginning of 2004, RMP-reportable accidents in New Jersey have resulted 
in nine injuries, $23,102,000 in property damage, three offsite 
hospitalizations, and 80 offsite evacuations. Except for one injury, 
all impacts occurred in 2008 or later, after the NJ TCPA IST provision 
became effective. EPA can discern no declining trend in accident 
severity at RMP facilities in New Jersey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See Comments EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-(1481), -(0973), -(1870), 
-(1896), -(1925) and -(1969).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While EPA did state in the Amendments rule that ``facilities will 
only incur additional costs beyond the analysis when the benefits of 
the change make adoption of the change reasonable for the facility,'' 
(82 FR at 4644) and we also stated, ``there is value in requiring 
facilities with extremely hazardous substances to evaluate whether they 
can improve risk management of current hazards through potential 
implementation of ISTs,'' we recognized this value only ``for those 
facilities who have not considered adopting any IST or have only done 
so in limited fashion.'' (82 FR at 4645). EPA also notes that 
facilities would incur costs for doing the analysis whether or not they 
are able to implement IST or other safer technology alternatives that 
would yield benefits. As we have reconsidered the Amendments rule, 
while EPA acknowledges we are not able to quantify how many facilities 
would implement safer technologies and what the effectiveness of 
particular measures might be on reducing the number of accidents, the 
data available from the longest-standing state-level IST regulatory 
provision suggest that such provisions do not have the significant 
impact on accident reduction that would be necessary to justify the 
high costs of these provisions.
    Regarding the potential economic benefits of the STAA provision 
other than accident prevention benefits, most commenters asserted such 
benefits (e.g., reduced cancer risk) without supplying any supporting 
data. Some commenters referred to a RAND Corporation study to support a 
conclusion that EPA had significantly underestimated the costs of 
accidents, and therefore the potential benefits of the STAA provision. 
EPA disagrees that the RAND study can be used to predict the costs of 
accidents at RMP facilities nationwide--see below for EPA's 
explanation.
b. Increased Vulnerability to Terrorism
    Two private citizens reasoned that rescission of STAA provisions 
would result in more facilities remaining vulnerable to terrorist 
attack than if STAA were adopted as-is. Advocacy groups and multiple 
State elected officials pointed to the New Jersey IST requirements as 
explicitly furthering security and anti-terrorism efforts. A joint 
submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters added 
that STAA would help prevent terrorism and mitigate any possible 
attacks.
    EPA Response: These comments are similar to comments EPA addressed 
in section IV.C.2--``Comments on Rescission of Prevention Program 
Provisions in General.'' In short, while some commenters assert that 
the STAA provisions will reduce the risk of terrorism, others argued 
that STAA could increase security risks. EPA received no data to judge 
the relative significance of different security concerns associated 
with this provision. The intent of the STAA provision in the RMP 
Amendments rule was to potentially reduce accidental releases--it was 
not undertaken to reduce the risk of releases from intentional criminal 
acts. For example, the STAA provision applied only to facilities in 
complex manufacturing sectors with high accident rates, and the water 
treatment sector was not required to complete a STAA. While EPA 
acknowledges that implementation of some inherently safer technologies 
could reduce risks of release from criminal acts, EPA does not believe 
that rescinding the STAA provisions increases security risks beyond 
those already present. EPA also notes that the regulatory and legal 
framework outside of CAA section 112(r) (e.g., DHS CFATS regulations) 
minimizes the risk of criminal and terrorist threats against chemical 
facilities.
c. Data on Accident Rates Related to State and County Programs With IST 
or Toxic Use Reduction Requirements
    Several commenters provided input discussing STAA-analogous 
programs in New Jersey and CCC, California. An industry trade 
association stated it discerned no appreciable difference between the 
accident rates in New Jersey and those in other states since New 
Jersey's implementation of the NJ TCPA IST provision. Another industry 
trade association expressed concern for the reliability of evidence 
supporting the efficacy of New Jersey and CCC IST regulations. 
Commenting on the Amendments rule, an industry trade association argued 
that requiring STAA would be arbitrary and capricious because of the 
lack of reliable data. The commenter cast doubt especially on evidence 
on the New Jersey and CCC

[[Page 69879]]

schemes. Another industry trade association argued against the adoption 
of STAA, stating that EPA considered the issue in 1996 and that no new 
data has emerged to justify a departure from its decision from that 
time.
    An advocacy group examined an industry trade association's comment 
that accident rates in New Jersey had increased since IST practices 
were mandated. The advocacy group stated that it was unable to find an 
empirical study of IST's efficacy in New Jersey. The commenter then 
analyzed publicly available accident data, stating that companies which 
refused to implement safer practices accounted for 25% of accidents. 
The commenter described those accidents and their circumstances. A 
State government agency commented that, in the first 85 STAA-analogous 
reports submitted in New Jersey, 45 facilities implemented 205 
measures. These included two water treatment facilities using different 
chemicals. Several State elected officials commented that data on New 
Jersey accidents may be misleading; the number of accidents may have 
remained constant, with their severity reduced by IST. A joint 
submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters provided 
a lengthy exploration of New Jersey's IST regulations and results. It 
examined data and, citing an EPA statement, commented that data cannot 
fully capture efficacy of IST.
    An advocacy group stated that STAA is an accepted industry best 
practice and that the CCC ISO has implemented similar requirements 
without excessive financial burden. A joint submission from multiple 
advocacy groups and other commenters provided a history of safer 
alternative regulation in CCC. It cited a reduction in accident number 
and severity over the last 20 years. The commenters specially addressed 
an accident at a refinery that made CCC adopt ``greatest extent 
feasible language.'' The commenters stated that, since that time, none 
of the most severe classification of accidents occurred and few of any 
classification took place.
    A State government agency cited extensive data on the results of 
Massachusetts' Toxic Use Reduction Act (TURA) program to argue that 
STAA provisions could lead to improvements in plant safety, 
environmental risks, efficiency, and access to international markets. A 
joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters 
provided extensive data on the TURA program, specifically citing that 
toxic waste generation was 66% below 1987 levels and that businesses 
reported improved safety, cost savings, and marketing, as a result of 
the regulation. The commenter included additional data and specific 
examples.
    A State government agency commented that EPA failed to evaluate 
STAA efficacy against recent accidents. A union cited several of its 
own studies to assert the safety benefits of STAA. A joint submission 
from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters asserted that IST 
regulations resulted in net savings for industry, citing a study by the 
RAND Corporation which found that a refinery saves, on average, $220 
million, in quantifiable terms alone, for an accident avoidance, and 
that a single accident at a California refinery caused $1.7 billion in 
damage to California's economy.
    EPA Response: EPA reviewed information submitted by commenters 
relating to IST regulatory provisions in New Jersey and CCC, 
California, and the information relating to the Massachusetts TURA 
program. Regarding the New Jersey TCPA IST provision, EPA discussed 
some comments concerning New Jersey's program earlier in this section. 
EPA found no evidence that the provision has resulted in a reduction in 
either accident frequency or severity at RMP-regulated facilities 
subject to the provision. Using the accident data provided by EPA in 
the rulemaking docket, EPA calculated the average accident rate for RMP 
facilities in New Jersey, plotted the accident data for New Jersey RMP 
facilities from 2008 through 2016, calculated the accident trend using 
a linear regression analysis, and compared these results to the same 
measures for the national set of RMP facilities.\78\ The results show 
that New Jersey RMP facilities were more likely to have RMP-reportable 
accidents than RMP facilities nationally over the period studied. Also, 
while the rate of RMP facility accidents in New Jersey has declined 
since adoption of the TCPA IST provision, that decline is less than 
half as large as the decline in accidents for RMP facilities nationally 
over the same period. New Jersey exhibited a 1.7% annual decline in 
accident frequency, whereas nationally, RMP facilities experienced a 
4.1% decline in accident frequency over the same period. Some 
commenters suggested that the lack of a significant decline in accident 
frequency in New Jersey could be due to a change in the number of RMP 
facilities. However, this is not the case. When the accident frequency 
is normalized by the number of RMP facilities present in each year, the 
results are similar: The normalized accident rate in New Jersey 
declined by approximately 2% per year, whereas the normalized accident 
rate at RMP facilities nationwide declined by 3.3% per year. Regarding 
accident severity, as indicated previously, EPA examined the impacts of 
RMP-reportable accidents in New Jersey over the same period and can 
discern no declining trend in accident severity in New Jersey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ EPA. July 18, 2019, Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). Available in the rulemaking docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA also disagrees that the CCC ISO provides strong evidence that 
IST regulations result in marked decreases in accident rates. While the 
accident trend in CCC is downward since implementation of the ISO, 
there are several reasons to be cautious in interpreting and 
extrapolating the results observed under the CCC ISO to the nationwide 
universe of RMP facilities. The CCC IST provision was adopted in 1998 
and is applicable to a total of six RMP facilities. The City of 
Richmond, California, adopted a similar safety ordinance in 2002, which 
is applicable to two additional RMP facilities. Contra Costa Hazardous 
Materials Programs, a division of Contra Costa Health Services, the 
county health department, oversees both programs. Therefore, the CCC 
and Richmond programs combined apply to a total of only eight RMP 
facilities.
    In addition to the very small number of facilities from which to 
draw such conclusions, EPA notes that the CCC ordinance contained other 
regulatory provisions. Most of these provisions are not features of 
either the Amendments rule or the NJ TCPA and their effects are 
impossible to disaggregate from the inherently safer systems analysis 
(ISSA) provision of the ISO. For example, in addition to requiring 
ISSA, the CCC and Richmond programs require submission of a Safety 
Plan, implementation of a human factors program, implementation of 
expanded management of change provisions (to include management of 
organizational change), root cause analysis investigations for major 
chemical accidents, safety culture assessments, process safety 
performance indicators, safeguard protection analyses, and other 
requirements. Another important difference between the CCC ISO ISSA 
provisions and both the NJ IST provision and the Amendments rule STAA 
provision is that since 2014, the CCC ISO provision has required 
facilities to implement inherently safer systems ``to the greatest 
extent feasible and as soon as

[[Page 69880]]

administratively practicable.'' \79\ Neither the NJ IST nor Amendments 
rule STAA provisions require implementation of IST/STAA measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ CCC Industrial Safety Ordinance, Chapter 450-8--RISK 
MANAGEMENT, paragraph (i)(3), available at: https://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/Chapter-450-8-RISK-MANAGEMENT.pdf. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-
0725-0638.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CCC ISO program is also unique among U.S. chemical safety 
regulatory programs in another important respect. CCC employs several 
full-time engineers to oversee implementation of the ISO at the six 
regulated facilities in the County and the two facilities in Richmond. 
According to reporting by CCC, these engineers have spent thousands of 
hours conducting such oversight each year. In its 2017 Annual Report, 
CCC reported that from 2000 to 2015, it completed five audits/
inspections at each facility subject to the CCC ISO and had initiated a 
sixth round of audit/inspections. CCC also reported that it performed 
seven facility audits from the Fall of 2014 through 2016, and that each 
audit required ``four to five engineers four weeks to perform the on-
site portion of an ISO/CalARP Program audit. The audit process 
encompasses off-site time that includes a quality assurance process, 
working with the facility to address any questions, posting public 
notices, attending a public forum to share audit findings, addressing 
any questions from the public and issuing the final report. The total 
time taken to perform these audits each year was 3,600 hours. 
Approximately one-third of the time was dedicated to the Industrial 
Safety Ordinance, for a total of 1,200 hours.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ CCC Industrial Safety Ordinance RISO Report, Annual 
Performance Review and Evaluation, 2017, pp 10, 18-20. Available in 
the Docket EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As far as the Agency is aware, this level of regulated chemical 
facility oversight is unmatched by any other jurisdiction in the United 
States. It approaches the very high levels of government oversight 
provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's resident inspector 
program,\81\ and the Department of Energy's facility representative 
program,\82\ both of which involve full time inspectors devoted to 
providing continuous oversight at a small number of, or even a single, 
hazardous facility. The experience of these programs demonstrates that 
such levels of government oversight, in conjunction with a rigorous 
safety management program, can prevent serious accidents. But this 
level of oversight is very expensive, and not feasible at facilities 
regulated by the RMP rule on a national basis. Such extensive staffing 
commitments also greatly exceed the per facility level of staffing for 
the operating permits program under CAA title V, and, in contrast to 
CAA 112(r), the operating permits program has a specific funding 
mechanism authorized and required by CAA 502(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1819/ML18197A116.pdf
    \82\ https://www.standards.doe.gov/standards-documents/1000/1063-astd-2017
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Whether it is due to the differing regulatory requirements, 
different levels of government oversight at regulated facilities or the 
small number of regulated facilities subject to the CCC/Richmond ISO 
provisions, the contrast between the accident trends at RMP facilities 
in New Jersey and CCC suggest that the reduction in accident frequency 
in CCC may be due to some factor other than the portion of the ISSA 
provision in the Industrial Safety Ordinance that is analogous to the 
Amendments rule's STAA provision. The NJ TCPA regulates approximately 
ten times the number of RMP facilities that are regulated under the CCC 
ISO. Further, the NJ regulations do not require implementation of 
alternatives considered, contain the other regulatory provisions or 
involve as high a level of oversight as are present in the CCC ISO 
program. Therefore, from the standpoint of comparing the two programs 
to the STAA provision of the Amendments rule, The New Jersey program 
serves as a more valid experiment to predict the results of the STAA 
provision of the Amendments rule (note, however, that the NJ TCPA IST 
provision is still more rigorous than the Amendments rule in that it 
requires facilities to submit the IST review to the State, whereas the 
Amendments rule's STAA provision contains no such requirement). The 
results in New Jersey suggest that such provisions, by themselves, do 
not have the significant effect on accident rates that proponents 
predict. Rather, the accident data from RMP facilities in New Jersey 
indicate little or no discernible reduction in accident frequency or 
severity associated with the NJ IST requirement to date. Therefore, 
whatever beneficial effects such provisions may have, they seem 
unlikely to result in anything close to the reduction in accident 
frequency or severity that would be required to find the benefits of 
STAA in terms of accident prevention and mitigation are not 
disproportionate to the burdens associated with the provision.
    Regarding the Massachusetts TURA program, EPA found no evidence 
that this program has resulted in a reduction in the frequency of RMP 
facility accidents in Massachusetts and disagrees that other results of 
the program (e.g., less use of toxic chemicals) can be extrapolated to 
predict the results of the STAA provision of the Amendments rule. The 
Massachusetts TURA program is not directly analogous to the Amendments 
rule because it is explicitly a toxic chemical use reduction program, 
rather than a program for preventing accidental air releases of RMP-
regulated substances. Under the TURA program, large quantity toxic 
substance users must develop a toxic use reduction plan that examines 
opportunities to reduce toxic chemical use by adopting safer processes 
or inputs, update the plan bi-annually, and submit both an annual toxic 
use report and a summary of the bi-annual toxic use reduction plan to 
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.\83\ The STAA 
provision of the Amendments rule required facilities covered by the 
provision to consider, as part of their process hazard analysis, safer 
technology and alternative risk management measures applicable to 
eliminating or reducing risk from process hazards, and to determine the 
practicability of the inherently safer technologies and designs 
considered. While one option for inherently safer risk management 
measures under the Amendments rule was to minimize the use of regulated 
substances,\84\ the Amendments rule did not explicitly require 
facilities to plan to minimize the use of regulated substances or to 
submit reports to EPA about reductions in their use of regulated 
substances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See: https://www.mass.gov/guides/massdep-toxics-use-reduction-program#-company-requirements-. Available in the 
rulemaking docket.
    \84\ See 82 FR 4629, January 13, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the Massachusetts TURA program is not aimed specifically 
at RMP-regulated facilities, because its list of covered chemicals \85\ 
includes some common industrial chemicals that are also on the RMP-
regulated substance list (e.g., ammonia, chlorine), some RMP facilities 
in Massachusetts are covered under both regulatory programs. EPA 
therefore examined the frequency and trend in accidents at RMP 
facilities in Massachusetts over the period covered by the accident 
record used for the Amendments and Reconsideration rules (2004-2016). 
The TURA program \86\ started in 1989, so presumably any downward 
pressure on accident frequency at RMP facilities due to the TURA 
program would be observable in the accident record for RMP facilities 
in Massachusetts. However, on a per-

[[Page 69881]]

facility basis, Massachusetts RMP facilities were more likely to have 
had an RMP-reportable accident than RMP facilities nationally. EPA 
found little difference between the accident trend at RMP facilities in 
Massachusetts and nationally during the 2004-2016 period.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/06/13/chemlist.xls.
    \86\ https://www.mass.gov/guides/massdep-toxics-use-reduction-program.
    \87\ EPA. July 18, 2019. Technical Background Document for Final 
RMP Reconsideration Rule Risk Management Programs Under the Clean 
Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). Available in the rulemaking docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is reasonable to expect a difference in the trends for TURA's 
overall effectiveness in waste reduction and other efficiencies versus 
its effectiveness as an accident reduction program for RMP-listed 
substances. The chemicals listed under the RMP program are among the 
most dangerous in terms of acute impacts upon accidental release. 
Therefore, users are likely to carefully manage these chemicals for 
their own safety as well as for PSM and RMP compliance. In contrast, 
TURA is much less focused on such chemicals. Therefore, it is likely 
that facilities were less aggressively minimizing release of TURA 
chemicals in general in the absence of TURA than they were in managing 
RMP-listed substances. There likely would be more opportunities for 
reductions in releases of non-RMP-regulated TURA chemicals, including 
chemical substitution, than there would be for RMP substances at the 
same facilities.
    While EPA agrees that reduction in the use of toxic chemicals is a 
laudable goal and minimizing the use of regulated substances remains an 
option for the owner or operator of any RMP facility to consider, 
analysis of state-level RMP accident data from Massachusetts does not 
appear to support the proposition that such regulatory provisions will 
result in significant accident reduction at RMP facilities. Also, the 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 already establishes a method for 
evaluating chemical use reduction at facilities. The Agency does not 
want to replicate these programs under CAA section 112(r).
    Regarding commenters' claims that a study conducted by the RAND 
Corporation \88\ proves that EPA's estimate of the benefits of accident 
prevention is too low, EPA disagrees with these comments. The RAND 
study is not suitable for nationwide extrapolation for several reasons. 
First, virtually all the monetized accident prevention benefits claimed 
in the RAND study are associated with avoiding higher gasoline prices 
in California following refinery accidents, such as the 2015 accident 
at ExxonMobil's Torrance, CA refinery and the 2012 accident at 
Chevron's Richmond refinery. Regarding the ExxonMobil accident, the 
RAND study estimated that this accident cost California consumers more 
than $2.4 billion in higher gasoline prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ Gonzales, D., Gulden, T., Strong, A. and Hoyle, W. 2016. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Proposed California Oil and Gas Refinery 
Regulations. RR-1421-DIR. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 
www.rand.org/t/RR1421. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0643.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A consequence of California's unique gasoline rules is that 
gasoline sold in the state is also produced within the state. According 
to RAND, ``California requires a unique reformulated gasoline blend to 
meet the state's pollution-control requirements. Gasoline made in other 
states to meet other state and federal pollution-control requirements 
does not meet California standards. Consequently, all gasoline consumed 
in California is typically made in the state.'' This greatly increases 
the impact of a California refinery accident on California gasoline 
prices because of the inability to substitute to out-of-state gasoline 
supplies, as gasoline produced out-of-state does not meet California 
regulatory requirements. According to RAND, ExxonMobil was forced to 
import special blends of gasoline from other countries to meet demand 
in California following the accident. In fact, the RAND analysis itself 
shows that the gasoline price effects seen in California following the 
ExxonMobil accident did not extend to areas outside California.
    The RAND study used the IMPLAN input-output model \89\ to estimate 
the price effects of California refinery accidents. IMPLAN utilized 
several simplifying assumptions that are unsuitable for national-scale 
analysis. While input-output models such as IMPLAN will readily yield 
impact estimates, their underlying structure rests on strong 
assumptions that preclude key economic responses that would be expected 
in the case of national level regulation. Input-output models do not 
allow prices, production processes, or technologies to adjust in 
response to a regulatory change. Instead, at best they represent the 
short-term regional response to regulation better than an intermediate 
or longer-term national response. This does not align well with the 
objective of understanding responses to federal regulation. A major 
limitation of using input-output models for policy simulations occurs 
when the policy under consideration must be translated into changes in 
final demand. The models assume that input supplies are unlimited, and 
prices are fixed, suggesting that they are better at representing the 
response of a single region to a small regulatory change not expected 
to affect prices. Input-output models are of limited use for analyzing 
large regulatory changes or the national economy. EPA guidance on 
economic impact analysis cautions against using such models for 
specific quantitative estimates.\90\ The RAND study acknowledges some 
of the drawbacks of using IMPLAN, including that ``it tends to capture 
maximum effects.'' The study also clearly states that IMPLAN is a tool 
used to capture ``the regional macroeconomic impacts of policy 
decisions.'' (Emphasis added.) EPA has additional concerns with the 
RAND study that are explained in the Response to Comments document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See RAND study, pp. 24-26.
    \90\ EPA. Handbook on the Benefits, Costs, and Impacts of Land 
Cleanup and Reuse, EPA-240-R-11-001, October 2011, p. 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In sum, retaining the STAA provision and other new prevention 
provisions of the Amendments rule will not result in the magnitude of 
savings estimated in the RAND study. The unique nature of the 
California gasoline market (discussed above) does not exist elsewhere 
in the United States. Under California law, refineries already are 
required to implement regulatory requirements exceeding Amendments rule 
provisions, so additional benefits of the Amendments rule provisions 
would not be expected to occur as a result of the rule's implementation 
at refineries in California. (See prior discussion of CalARP refinery 
safety regulations in section IV.C)
d. Claims That STAA is Required by CAA
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters stated that EPA is statutorily required to use STAA or an 
alternative because of the Agency's prior determination that such 
requirements are necessary to ``ensure continued public safety 
concerning the operation of chemical facilities in and near 
communities'' \91\ and to satisfy requirements in Sec.  7412(r)(7)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ Amendments rule Response to Comments, pp. 219, 247. EPA-HQ-
OEM-2015-0725-0729
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with the commenter's assertion that EPA 
is statutorily required to use STAA or an alternative because of the 
Agency's prior statements determining that such requirements are 
necessary to ensure continued public safety. In the Amendments rule, 
EPA adopted a requirement for safer technology and alternatives 
analysis for selected industry sectors subject to Program 3

[[Page 69882]]

requirements. Now EPA is rescinding the STAA provision after 
reconsideration based on the lack of apparent benefits of the provision 
when applied to existing sources across broad sectors, based on our 
review of available data, the effectiveness of pre-Amendments accident 
prevention regulations in reducing accidents over time and a desire to 
keep the Program 3 accident requirements aligned with the OSHA PSM 
standard to better fulfill the EPA's coordination requirements pursuant 
to CAA 112(r)(7)(D). Under 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(B), the accident 
prevention provisions have an overriding requirement to be reasonable. 
``Reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the 
advantages and disadvantages of agency decisions.'' Michigan v. EPA, 
135 S. Ct. at 2707 (original emphasis). The legislative history of the 
CAA 112(r) accident prevention program indicates that EPA was to ensure 
the regulations would not be ``unduly burdensome'' (See section III.B--
Discussions of Comments on EPA's Substantive Authority under CAA 
Section 112(r)). Our accident rate analysis shows that costs associated 
with the STAA provision (nearly $70 million annualized) are 
disproportionate to the accident prevention and mitigation benefit 
shown in the state-level data (a benefit that we cannot discern from 
the available data). Therefore, we believe that EPA can consider cost 
issues and other burdens of compliance among the factors considered in 
deciding what is a reasonable regulation to prevent accidents.
e. Claims That Rescission of STAA Provision is Arbitrary and Capricious
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters claimed that EPA's decision to rescind STAA is arbitrary and 
capricious. Citing EPA's proposed Reconsideration rule language about 
the indirect costs of STAA (83 FR at 24872, May 30, 2018--stating that 
such costs could be incurred if facilities take actions based on 
external pressures to implement STAA recommendations regardless of 
whether they are necessary or practical), the commenter argued that EPA 
is proposing to rescind the STAA provision based on speculation that 
third-parties may pressure plants to adopt alternative technologies 
even when adoption is unfeasible or otherwise unwarranted. The 
commenter stated no evidence was available to corroborate this 
consideration and asserted that EPA only discussed these indirect costs 
at the prompting of OMB.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that rescinding the requirement is 
arbitrary or capricious. The Agency is not rescinding the STAA 
provision because third-parties may pressure plants to adopt 
alternative technologies even when adoption is unfeasible or otherwise 
unwarranted. The commenter may have drawn this inaccurate conclusion by 
mistakenly assuming that EPA believes the costs of the STAA provision 
as described in the Amendments rule included indirect costs of 
implementing safer technologies and alternatives. However, while EPA 
discussed such indirect costs in the Amendments rule, EPA was clear 
that the STAA provision did not mandate adoption of any technology, and 
the only cost that could be directly attributed to the requirement were 
the cost of the assessment itself. The cost of the assessment included 
the $70 million annualized cost for performing an STAA and did not 
include any costs of implementation of any safer technology 
alternatives or IST.
    EPA is rescinding the STAA provision after reconsideration based on 
the lack of apparent benefits of the provision when applied to existing 
sources across broad sectors, based on our review of available data, as 
compared to its cost for compliance (i.e., performing an STAA, but not 
implementing any IST), the effectiveness of pre-Amendment accident 
prevention regulations in reducing accidents over time and a desire to 
keep the Program 3 accident requirements aligned with the OSHA PSM 
standard. EPA does not have a record showing significant benefits of 
the added prevention program provisions. Without such benefits, EPA 
believes it is better to take its traditional approach of maintaining 
consistency with OSHA PSM. The creation of additional complexity and 
burden associated with new provisions where EPA has not demonstrated 
any benefit is evidence of their impracticability and unreasonableness.
6. Comments on Other Prevention Program Provisions
a. Remove ``For Each Covered Process'' Language From Compliance Audit 
Provisions
    Multiple commenters supported EPA's proposal to remove the language 
``for each covered process'' from the compliance audit provisions of 
Sec.  68.58(a) and Sec.  68.79(a), stating that reviewing each covered 
process is inefficient and inconsistent with industry auditing 
practice. An industry trade association commented that when using a 
sampling approach, the identification and corrections of concerns in 
one process unit will address those concerns in all other covered 
process units; therefore, an audit of each covered process would be a 
waste of resources and create operational disruptions. A similar 
comment was made by another industry association who recommended EPA 
adopt a regulation allowing for representative sampling of covered 
processes for compliance audits.
    An industry trade association also expressed support for EPA's 
proposal, stating that the requirement was a procedurally defective 
amendment that was made without an opportunity for the regulated 
community to comment on EPA's departure from auditing practice based on 
statistically significant representative sampling. Similarly, an 
industry association stated that EPA failed to conduct a proper cost-
benefit analysis in the Amendments rulemaking when choosing to require 
audits of all covered processes rather than allow for representative 
sampling which is contrary to long-standing accepted auditing practice. 
The commenter stated that maintaining the provision would result in 
significant cost burdens on the regulated community. Several industry 
trade associations also commented that EPA, in the Amendments rule, did 
not justify how the provision would increase facility safety.
    In contrast, other commenters disagreed with removing the language. 
A private citizen indicated that it is necessary to audit every covered 
process. Similarly, a State government agency stated that even though 
EPA is proposing to delete the phrase ``for each covered process,'' all 
covered processes still must be evaluated in the compliance audit as 
the phrase in question is merely a clarification.
    EPA Response: The final rule removes the phrase ``for each covered 
process'' from the compliance audit requirements because it was not 
necessary to add the phrase and removing it will maintain consistency 
with the OSHA PSM standard.\92\ For those facilities with more than one 
covered process, EPA's view that compliance audits must evaluate every 
process every three years does not foreclose the use of 
``representative sampling'' during audits.\93\ At complex facilities 
with multiple processes, audits do not typically involve reviewing 100 
percent

[[Page 69883]]

of records relating to a topic--rather, an auditor should review a 
sample of records sufficient to draw valid conclusions about a source's 
compliance with a particular regulatory provision. At such facilities, 
to audit each process, an auditor may review a process directly, or may 
gain confidence in the compliance of the process through representative 
review of compliance of other processes at the source. CCPS 
``Guidelines for Auditing Process Safety Management Systems, Second 
Edition'' (Wiley, 2011), provides two methods for representative 
sampling that are designed to ensure a compliance audit at a medium to 
large multi-process facility represents all covered processes at the 
facility without sampling records or personnel for every prevention 
program provision at every covered process. The two methods offered by 
CCPS are to either (1) Audit some elements of the prevention program in 
all covered processes and units (CCPS provides an example indicating 
that different subsets of prevention elements are selected for 
different units, such that every element is ultimately audited under 
this approach), or (2) Audit all elements of the prevention program in 
some of the processes and units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ EPA. Response to Comments on the 2016 Proposed Rule 
Amending EPA's Risk Management Program Regulations, December 19, 
2016, pp. 54-55. Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0729.
    \93\ Representative sampling would not apply to the majority of 
regulated facilities because most have only one covered process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency agrees that either of these approaches can produce an 
audit reflecting regulatory compliance for each RMP prevention program 
element at each covered process. However, where an owner or operator 
chooses to perform such a representative sampling approach, under 
either method (or a combination of both methods) they must demonstrate 
that the information audited is truly reflective of regulatory 
compliance for each process at the source. If the owner or operator can 
demonstrate that an audit of an accident prevention provision at one or 
more processes is representative of the owner's compliance with the 
prevention provision at other processes at the source, then a source 
may use the review of that aspect in one process to address and 
evaluate other processes, so long as all prevention requirements are 
evaluated and addressed for all processes at the source either directly 
or by such representative testing every three years. All covered 
processes and units must be in the pool from which the representative 
sample is selected, and any findings of the audit must be addressed, 
and deficiencies corrected at all units. If a facility implements 
representative sampling to satisfy compliance audit requirements for 
multiple processes, the Agency will evaluate whether non-compliance 
with an RMP prevention program element is also evidence of inadequate 
compliance audit procedures.
b. Rescind Requirement To Include Findings From Incident Investigations 
in Hazard Reviews
    Several commenters expressed support for the proposal to rescind 
the requirement to include findings from incident investigations in 
hazard reviews for Program 2 sources. A trade association stated that 
the requirement to include this information in a hazard review is 
essentially a requirement to repackage this information, placing 
burdens on facilities already expending resources on implementing 
findings from the incident investigation, while providing no new 
benefit, arguing that it places an even heavier burden on small 
businesses, which make up a greater percentage of processes subject to 
Program 2 requirements. A few commenters expressed opposition to the 
proposal to rescind the requirement. Multiple State elected officials 
commented that eliminating the requirement for hazard reviews to 
identify findings from incident investigations that show 
vulnerabilities that could cause accidental releases, would weaken 
hazard reviews that evaluate the dangers associated with the regulated 
substances, processes and procedures at a facility.
    EPA Response: Although not rescinding this change in the Program 2 
prevention program requirements would not conflict with the OSHA PSM 
standard, which is equivalent to RMP Program 3, EPA is rescinding the 
provision to keep Program 2 requirements less burdensome than Program 
3, maintaining the pre-Amendments balance of burdens on smaller 
entities. This is in keeping with the design for less rigorous 
requirements and recordkeeping for Program 2 facilities. Pre-Amendments 
Sec.  68.50 (a)(2) hazard review required that the review identify 
opportunities for equipment malfunction and human errors that could 
cause an accidental release. The Amendments rule added the requirement 
to include findings from incident investigations in the hazard review. 
EPA expects that Program 2 facilities are already using incident 
investigations to identify situations that could cause an accidental 
release. Under the pre-Amendments incident investigation requirements, 
Program 2 facilities are required to promptly address and resolve 
investigation findings and recommendations, with resolutions and 
corrective actions documented.
c. Rescind Employee Training Requirements for Supervisors Responsible 
for Process Operations
    A few industry trade associations expressed support for EPA's 
proposed rescission of the requirement to include supervisors 
responsible for process operations under the training requirements. One 
commenter stated that the rescission eliminates any ambiguity regarding 
the number and types of employees who must receive training. The 
commenter stated that without clear guidance regarding the scope of the 
employees covered by the provision, the provision would be difficult 
for owner/operators to implement with certainty. Additionally, an 
industry trade association stated that in the proposed Reconsideration 
rule, EPA mischaracterized the change in the training requirements as a 
minor wording change. The commenter stated that the term supervisor is 
vague and potentially overly broad. The commenter also stated that the 
Amendments rule was a departure from the prior regulations and could 
create ambiguity regarding who EPA intends to be trained. A trade 
industry association stated that the provision is in conflict with the 
OSHA PSM standard and increases costs for facility training. Similarly, 
another industry trade association stated that EPA's use of the phrase, 
``involved in operating a process'' appears to be inconsistent with 
OSHA's interpretation of the PSM standard. The commenter stated that 
EPA intends the phrase to include process engineers and maintenance 
technicians, but that OSHA took the opposite stance and included within 
the class of employees involved in operating a process only ``direct 
hire employees not involved in maintenance.'' (February 24, 1991, 57 FR 
6356). In addition, the commenter indicated that requiring the same 
level of training for supervisors as required for operators is not 
practical or consistent with the approach prior to 2017 under EPA's 
regulations or OSHA's regulations.
    A few commenters expressed opposition to EPA's proposal and 
provided various reasons why EPA should retain the provision. For 
example, a State government agency stated that the proposed rescission 
would decrease safety training. A labor union opposed the rescission of 
the provision, stating that ``training is as important for supervisors, 
maintenance technicians, and control room operators as it is for the 
pilots of commercial airliners.'' The commenter stated that 
implementing the training requirements

[[Page 69884]]

would improve facility safety. Additionally, an advocacy group 
expressed opposition to EPA's proposal to rescind the provision, 
indicating that employees must meet competency criteria before 
operating covered processes.
    EPA Response: The final rule rescinds the language added to the 
Program 2 (Sec.  68.54) and Program 3 (Sec.  68.71) training 
requirements which more explicitly included supervisors and others 
involved in operating a process. However, as EPA noted in the proposed 
Amendments rule, EPA has traditionally interpreted the training 
provisions of Sec. Sec.  68.54 and 68.71 to apply to any worker that is 
involved in operating a process, including supervisors. This is 
consistent with the OSHA definition of employee set forth at 29 CFR 
1910.2(d) (see 81 FR 13686, Monday, March 14, 2016). Although EPA did 
not view the added language as being inconsistent with OSHA PSM, we are 
rescinding the added language to maintain wording consistent with the 
OSHA PSM training requirements in 29 CFR 1910.119(g) and not create 
additional ambiguity or confusion about the type of employees who must 
receive training.
d. Rescind Requirement To Keep Process Safety Information Up-to-Date
    An industry trade association supported EPA's proposal to rescind 
the requirement to keep process safety information (PSI) up-to-date. 
The commenter stated that the provision is likely to result in 
significant costs that EPA has failed to justify as PSI documentation 
for a single RMP-covered facility can easily consist of thousands of 
pages of complex information. In contrast, two commenters opposed EPA's 
proposal to rescind the provision. An advocacy group and Multiple State 
elected officials stated that out-of-date PSI could lead to dangerous 
system errors, and recommended EPA maintain the provision.
    EPA Response: The language explicitly requiring that process safety 
information for Program 3 processes be kept up-to-date has been 
rescinded in the final rule because it is unnecessary. The language 
which is being rescinded in the final rule would only have affected 
Program 3 processes. However, for Program 3 processes, the management 
of change requirements of Sec.  68.75 already addressed changes that 
affect covered processes, and Sec.  68.75(d) already required process 
safety information to be updated when changes covered by the management 
of change provisions result in a change in the process safety 
information. The safety information requirements of Sec.  68.48 for 
Program 2 processes already required the owner or operator to compile 
and maintain up-to-date safety information, and to update safety 
information if a major change occurs.
e. Rescind Requirement To Address Incident Investigation Findings and 
Any Other Potential Failure Scenarios in the PHA
    Several commenters expressed support for the proposal to rescind 
the requirement to address incident investigation findings and any 
other potential failure scenarios in the PHA (Program 3). Two industry 
trade associations stated that facilities believe that requiring 
incident investigation findings to be addressed during the PHA process 
is a duplication of time and effort, increasing the cost of conducting 
a PHA without any corresponding safety benefit. Additionally, an 
industry trade association expressed support for EPA's proposed 
rescission, reasoning that it would avoid inconsistency with the PSM 
standard. The commenter stated that instead of being a complimentary 
policy, the RMP provision creates unnecessary paperwork burdens on 
facilities. Another commenter indicated that as written, the findings 
to be reviewed would include findings from all incident investigations 
for the entire history of the facility, and that the phrase ``as well 
as any other potential failure scenarios'' is inherently vague and 
ambiguous. A few commenters expressed opposition to the proposal to 
rescind the requirement. Multiple State elected officials commented 
that eliminating the requirement that PHAs address the findings from 
all incident investigations, as well as any other potential failure 
scenarios, would weaken hazard reviews that evaluate the dangers 
associated with the regulated substances, processes and procedures at a 
facility.
    EPA Response: The final rule rescinds the requirement to address 
incident investigation findings and any other potential failure 
scenarios in the PHA. While EPA disagrees that the provision was 
inherently vague, EPA is rescinding the provision so that the Program 3 
PHA requirements remain consistent with the OSHA PSM standard, and to 
prevent unduly burdensome or duplicative requirements. EPA does not 
have a record showing significant benefits of the added prevention 
program provisions. Without such benefits, EPA believes it is better to 
take its traditional approach of maintaining consistency with OSHA PSM. 
The creation of additional complexity and burden associated with new 
provisions where EPA has not demonstrated any benefit is evidence of 
the new prevention provisions' impracticability and that the rule 
divergence is unreasonable. We also note that this requirement is 
unnecessary because under section 68.67(c)(2) the PHA must already 
identify ``any previous incident which had a likely potential for 
catastrophic consequences'' and paragraph (c)(4) requires the PHA to 
consider the ``Consequences of failure of engineering and 
administrative controls.'' Therefore, a properly-conducted PHA should 
already consider the findings from previous incident investigations, 
and the rescinded language built in a difference with PSM without 
adding anything to the protectiveness of the RMP rule. The requirement 
will revert back to the pre-Amendments rule language that required the 
PHA to address any previous incident which had a likely potential for 
catastrophic consequences.
f. Rescind Requirement To Report Incident Investigation and Accident 
History Information in the RMP Prior To De-Registration
    An industry trade association commented that they supported the 
proposed rescission of the requirement for reporting incident 
investigation and accident information in the RMP prior to de-
registration and argued that there would be no safety benefit added by 
performing requirements prior to deregistration. An industry trade 
association argued that EPA did not provide quantifiable improvements 
that could result due to implementation of incident investigation 
requirements prior to de-registration.
    EPA Response: EPA is finalizing the rescission of the Amendments 
rule requirement to report incident investigation and accident history 
information prior to de-registering, as this provision would impose 
additional regulatory requirements (i.e., beyond the requirement to de-
register) on sources that are no longer subject to the rule.

V. Rescinded and Modified Information Availability Amendments

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    In the RMP Amendments rule, EPA added several new provisions to 
Sec.  68.210--Availability of information to the public. These 
included:
    (1) A requirement for the owner or operator to provide, upon 
request by any member of the public, specified chemical hazard 
information for all regulated processes, as applicable, including:

[[Page 69885]]

     Names of regulated substances held in a process,
     SDSs for all regulated substances located at the facility,
     Accident history information required to be reported under 
Sec.  68.42,
     Emergency response program information, including whether 
or not the source responds to releases of regulated substances, name 
and phone number of local emergency response organizations, and 
procedures for informing the public and local emergency response 
agencies about accidental releases,
     A list of scheduled exercises required under Sec.  68.96 
(i.e., new emergency exercise provisions of the RMP Amendments rule), 
and; Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC) contact information;
    (2) A requirement for the owner or operator to provide ongoing 
notification on a company website, social media platforms, or through 
other publicly accessible means that the above information is available 
to the public upon request, along with the information elements that 
may be requested and instructions for how to request the information, 
as well as information on where members of the public may access 
information on community preparedness, including shelter-in-place and 
evacuation procedures;
    (3) A requirement for the owner or operator to provide the 
requested chemical hazard information within 45 days of receiving a 
request from any member of the public, and;
    (4) A requirement to hold a public meeting to provide accident 
information required under Sec.  68.42 as well as other relevant 
chemical hazard information, no later than 90 days after any accident 
subject to reporting under Sec.  68.42.
    Additionally, the RMP Amendments rule added provisions to Sec.  
68.210 to address classified information and confidential business 
information (CBI) claims for information required to be provided to the 
public and made a minor change to the existing paragraph (a) RMP 
availability, to add a reference to 40 CFR part 1400 for controlling 
public access to RMPs.
    For security reasons, EPA proposed to rescind the requirements for 
providing to the public upon request, chemical hazard information and 
access to community emergency preparedness information in Sec.  
68.210(b) through (d), as well as rescind the requirement to provide 
other chemical hazard information at public meetings required under 
Sec.  68.210(e). Alternatively, EPA proposed to rescind all of the 
information elements in Sec.  68.210(b) through (d), as well as rescind 
the requirement to provide other chemical hazard information at public 
meetings required under Sec.  68.210(e), except for the requirement in 
Sec.  68.210(b)(5) for the owner or operator to provide a list of 
scheduled exercises required under Sec.  68.96. EPA proposed to retain 
the requirement in Sec.  68.210(e) for the owner/operator of a 
stationary source to hold a public meeting to provide accident 
information required under Sec.  68.42 no later than 90 days after any 
accident subject to reporting under Sec.  68.42 but proposed to clarify 
that the information to be provided is the data listed in Sec.  
68.42(b). This data would be provided for only the most recent 
accident, and not for previous accidents covered by the 5-year accident 
history requirement of Sec.  68.42(a). EPA proposed to retain the 
change to paragraph (a) ``RMP availability'' which added availability 
under 40 CFR part 1400 (which addresses restrictions on disclosing RMP 
offsite consequence analysis under CSISSFRRA).\94\ The provisions for 
classified information in Sec.  68.210(f) were also proposed to be 
retained but were separately proposed to be incorporated into the 
emergency response coordination section of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA proposed to delete the provision for CBI in Sec.  68.210(g), 
because the only remaining provision for public information 
availability in this section (other than the provision for RMP 
availability) would have been the requirement to provide at a public 
meeting, the information required in the source's five-year accident 
history, which Sec.  68.151(b)(3) prohibits the owner or operator from 
claiming as CBI. EPA proposed to rescind the requirements in Sec.  
68.160(b)(21) to report in the risk management plan, the method of 
communication and location of the notification that hazard information 
is available to the public, pursuant to Sec.  68.210(c).

B. Summary of Final Rule

    After review and consideration of public comments, EPA is 
finalizing the information availability related changes, as proposed 
(including rescinding the requirement for the owner or operator to 
provide a list of scheduled exercises required under Sec.  68.96), but 
is modifying the public meeting requirement. The final rule modifies 
the requirement in Sec.  68.210(e) for the owner/operator of a 
stationary source to hold a public meeting to provide accident 
information required under Sec.  68.42(b) by limiting the trigger for 
the requirement to the occurrence of an RMP reportable accident with 
offsite impacts specified in Sec.  68.42(a) (i.e., known offsite 
deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, or 
environmental damage). This is a modification to the RMP Amendments 
rule that required a public meeting after any accident subject to 
reporting under Sec.  68.42, including accidents that resulted in on 
site impacts only. This action rescinds requirements to report in the 
risk management plan, the method of communication and the location of 
the notification that chemical hazard information is available to the 
public, pursuant to Sec.  68.210(c). The final rule retains reporting 
in the RMP, as required by Sec.  68.160(b)(21), whether a public 
meeting was held following an RMP accident, pursuant to Sec.  
68.210(b). Reporting of a public meeting under Sec.  68.160(b)(22) [now 
redesignated as Sec.  68.160(b)(21)], is also added to the list of RMP 
registration information in Sec.  68.151(b)(1) that are excluded from 
being claimed as CBI.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Overview of Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    As noted above, the primary basis for our decisions on rescinding 
or modifying provisions adopted in 2017 regarding information 
availability is our view that the 2017 provisions underweighted 
security concerns in balancing the positive effects of information 
availability on accident prevention and the negative effects on public 
safety from the utility to terrorists and criminals of the newly 
available information and dissemination methods. One important factor 
not discussed or assessed in 2017 when balancing these concerns was the 
utility for terrorists and criminals of consolidating information that 
may otherwise be available publicly and allowing for anonymous access. 
We rely on the findings of DOJ in its report required by CSISSFRRA, 
which found that assembling the otherwise-public data is valuable in 
targeting sources for criminal acts. The report notes that the list of 
factors US Special Operations Command (US SOC) held to be useful in 
targeting vulnerable assets includes response information, information 
on which chemicals are present at a facility, knowledge that there were 
offsite consequences to a chemical release, and other factors. While 
most of the categories of information specified by US SOC are outside 
the OCA information restricted by CSISSFRRA,

[[Page 69886]]

the 2017 provisions would make such information newly and anonymously 
accessible via the web and other means. This anonymous access to 
consolidated information already available, and new mandated 
disclosures, undermines the practicability of the changes made in the 
2017 rule.
    Except for the requirement to hold a public meeting after an 
accidental release having offsite impacts, we have decided to return to 
the public information availability provisions that struck a balance 
between right-to-know and security. This balance allows for access and 
legitimate use of RMP data through multiple means of access. For 
members of the public, such means include viewing RMPs at Federal 
government reading rooms, obtaining RMP information from state or local 
government officials who have obtained RMP data access, or submitting a 
request to EPA under the FOIA (for non-OCA RMP information). Owners and 
operator of regulated facilities may also disclose RMP information for 
their own facilities if they so choose. State and local emergency 
response officials may obtain full access to RMP information by 
submitting a request to EPA.\95\ Nevertheless, we agree that emergency 
responders would benefit from easier access to emergency planning and 
response-related information. We believe that, regardless of the cause 
of the West Fertilizer incident, a major lesson learned is that better 
communication and coordination between emergency responders and 
facilities would improve safety. Annual coordination added by the 2017 
and mostly retained by this final rule should provide this benefit in a 
more secure way than the 2017 provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See 40 CFR Chapter IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In retaining the requirement to hold a public meeting after an 
incident that has offsite impacts, we believe we have focused the 
requirement for such meetings on the events of greatest public 
interest. The public has multiple interests that are materially 
advanced by the information required to be addressed in such meetings. 
In addition, public exchanges of information will improve the quality 
of incident investigations because the public may possess information 
the facility does not, such as information about public impacts. Public 
meetings conveying initial results of incident investigations to the 
extent known are not duplicative of media reports or release reports 
under other requirements, which in the case of CERCLA and EPCRA are 
based on initial knowledge during the first moments of an incident. We 
have limited the information required to be conveyed at meetings to the 
preliminary information that ultimately will be required to be reported 
in the RMP in order to limit the potential for security-sensitive 
information being released at public meetings. Much of this information 
is factual, while the rest is primarily based on the best judgment of 
the owner or operator. With the modifications of the public meeting 
requirement in the final rule, we believe we have struck a reasonable 
and practicable balance of the public's need for information about 
local incidents, the security of the source and the community, and 
other protected interests of the source.
2. Comments on Information Availability Provisions
a. EPA's Security Rationale for Rescinding Information Availability 
Provisions
    Many commenters opposed the Amendments rule's expanded public 
disclosure requirements, arguing that they would create a security 
risk. An industry trade association commented that databases are 
especially vulnerable to terrorist data mining, where an actor could 
shop for especially vulnerable sites. Another trade association agreed, 
stating that Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) regulations and EPCRA 
already provide for information disclosure but, importantly, not the 
kind of unified information source that a bad actor could use to seek 
out the most vulnerable sites. A State government agency commented that 
the Reconsideration rule's rescissions would help protect against 
criminal acts by anonymous readers. An industry trade association 
supported EPA's proposed rescission of the requirements, arguing that 
under the pre-Amendments rule parties with legitimate interests can 
access information through more secure, controlled means. An industry 
trade association cited past comments from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and DHS to express concern that disclosure requirements 
could raise security issues. Another commenter expressed support for 
making chemical hazard information available to emergency response 
personnel, but not the public at large, because of security concerns. 
Another industry trade association stated that while it supported 
efforts to enhance information sharing and collaboration between 
facility owners, LEPCs, first responders, and members of the public, 
this should be done in a manner that balances security and safety 
considerations, and the Agency had not adequately justified the 
information requirements of the Amendments rule. Other commenters also 
opposed disclosing chemical hazard information on the basis of 
confidentiality, the costs of disclosure, the availability of 
information through other means (such as the FOIA and TRI), and 
security risks.
    Other commenters disagreed with the proposed rule's security 
rationales. A private citizen argued that the Amendments rule's 
information provisions would make little difference to terrorists who 
already have access to significant amounts of information. A 
professional engineer commented that the RMP information that would 
remain public under the Reconsideration rule and other legally required 
disclosures would be sufficiently helpful to potential terrorists. He 
stated that enough information is already publicly available to create 
your own worst-case analysis, and that the Reconsideration rule would 
not significantly impact this issue. The commenter stated that relevant 
security concerns depend neither on the Amendments or Reconsideration 
rules, but rather depend on CSISSFRRA, and argued that withholding 
information for security purposes has harmed community planning. A 
tribal government argued that EPA cannot demonstrate any real security 
risk that would be caused or exacerbated by information disclosure. It 
added that past thefts and incidents referenced in the rulemaking were 
not caused by information disclosure. Other commenters also contended 
that there is no connection between terrorist threats and information 
sharing, or that EPA has not made a serious case that terrorist threats 
due to information reporting requirement are substantial, or that the 
claimed security benefits of the proposed rule are substantial. An 
advocacy group cited testimony from a chemical company that, in 
relevant part, involved the company abusing security laws. The company 
testified to doing so in order to hide from the public information 
about a deadly accident at one of their facilities. The group also 
stated that, while EPA provided no evidence of information availability 
abetting terrorist attacks, there is evidence of emergency responders 
struggling to respond to chemical accidents because of a company's 
refusal to share information.
    Other commenters argued that public disclosure could, by improving 
public safety and responsiveness, reduce the threat of terrorism or 
intentional harm. An anonymous commenter stated that information 
availability, and the measures the public can take with information to 
protect themselves, help allay terrorism risks. A joint submission from 
multiple advocacy groups and

[[Page 69887]]

other commenters stated that EPA failed to consider benefits of 
improved information sharing, especially in preventing or mitigating 
terrorist attacks by better preparing first responders and the 
community. The commenters argued that EPA must consider the security 
benefits of information sharing if the agency considers its risks. 
Finally, the commenters noted that, while security breaches have 
resulted in accidents at facilities, these were still accidents--there 
was no terrorist intent in the breaches or an intent to cause a 
chemical release. The group stated that the Congressional Research 
Service estimated the threat of terrorist attacks at chemical 
facilities is low compared with that of accidents. A private citizen 
stated that law and the judiciary generally favor a right-to-know over 
security interests. He stated that efforts to prevent disclosure are 
futile.
    Multiple State elected officials commented that EPA has failed to 
supply a reasoned explanation for rescinding the community information 
sharing requirements included in the Amendments rule. The commenters 
acknowledged the need for the RMP regulations to balance between 
increasing public awareness of chemical hazards and maintaining 
facility security but concluded that the proposal upsets that balance 
by focusing too much on the latter concern without addressing the 
myriad benefits of increased public awareness.
    An advocacy group stated that EPA's rationale for rescinding the 
online notification requirements is arbitrary and capricious. The group 
stated that EPA relied on the redundancy of the measure with the role 
of LEPCs. However, it asserted that LEPC websites are often inadequate, 
making necessary the requirement that facilities provide notification 
of available information.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees that anonymous access to sensitive 
chemical facility hazard information could increase the risk of 
criminal acts and terrorism against regulated facilities, and believes 
the pre-Amendments rule's existing provisions for reading room access 
to RMPs, combined with the remaining Amendments rule information 
availability provisions (i.e., enhanced local coordination requirements 
and public meeting requirements) strike an appropriate balance between 
community right-to-know and security. EPA also now believes requiring 
additional chemical facility hazard and emergency response information 
to be made available to the public imposed unnecessary burdens on 
regulated facilities.
    After further review of the potential security concerns of the 
Amendments rule information availability provisions, EPA believes that 
these concerns have merit. Section 68.205 from the proposed RMP 
Amendments rule listed specific items of information that the owner or 
operator must provide to the LEPC or local emergency response officials 
upon request, but it did not include an open-ended provision requiring 
the owner or operator to provide any other information that local 
responders identify as relevant to local emergency response planning. 
By including such a provision in the final RMP Amendments rule, EPA may 
have inadvertently opened the door to local emergency officials 
requesting and receiving security-sensitive information even beyond the 
specific items included in Sec.  68.205 of the proposed RMP Amendments 
about which petitioners and others had raised concerns. EPA believes 
that the rescission of the chemical hazard information availability 
provisions in Sec.  68.210 will provide security benefits relative to 
the 2017 Amendments rule by eliminating the security concerns created 
by the Amendments rule provisions.
    Another important consideration in EPA's final rule decision is to 
avoid providing anonymous access to consolidated chemical hazard 
information. As EPA indicated in the proposed rule, the combination of 
mandatory disclosure elements as required under the Amendments is 
generally not already available to the public from any single source. 
EPA believes that the consolidation of the required chemical hazard and 
facility information may present a more comprehensive picture of the 
vulnerabilities of a facility than would be apparent from any 
individual element and requiring it to be made more easily available to 
the public from a single source (i.e., the facility itself) could 
increase the risk of a terrorist attack on some facilities. 
Additionally, as State petitioners and other commenters have pointed 
out, the Amendments made no provision for screening requesters of such 
information or for the owners or operators of regulated facilities to 
restrict what information was provided to a requester or to appeal a 
request.
    Regarding commenters' claims that the Amendments rule's information 
provisions would make little difference to terrorists who already have 
access to significant amounts of information, EPA agrees that under the 
final Reconsideration rule, information on most of the individual 
disclosure elements required under the Amendments would still be 
available via other means, such as by visiting a Federal RMP reading 
room, requesting information from an LEPC, or by making a request under 
the FOIA. However, this information would not be available in a 
consolidated form that may readily identify facility vulnerabilities, 
and in each case a requester could be required to identify themselves 
before gaining access to the information. FOIA requests require a name 
and U.S. state or territory address to receive information. Federal 
Reading Rooms require photo identification issued by a Federal, state, 
or local government agency such as a driver's license or passport. 
These requirements to accurately identify the party requesting the 
information may provide a deterrent to those who seek to obtain 
chemical information for a facility for terrorist purposes without 
unduly impeding access to the information by those in the nearby 
community with a right-to-know.
    EPA disagrees with commenters who claim that there are no real 
security risks that would be caused or exacerbated by information 
disclosure, and that the reporting requirements in the information 
availability provisions of the Amendments rule did not create security 
concerns. As a result of the CSISSFRRA (Pub. L. 106-40), the DOJ 
performed an assessment of the increased risk of terrorist or other 
criminal activity associated with posting off-site consequence analysis 
information on the internet. In that assessment, DOJ found that the 
increased availability of information would increase the risk of the 
misuse of information by criminals or terrorists, that criminals and 
terrorists had already sought to target U.S. chemical facilities, and 
that such threats were likely to increase in the future.\96\ With 
respect to OCA information, DOJ found that the assembly of information 
that was otherwise public had value in targeting. See DOJ report at 41. 
Furthermore, the report noted that the US Special Operations Command 
views information about response plans, which would not be OCA data, 
would be of value in target selection. See DOJ Report at 38-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Department of Justice. April 18, 2000. Assessment of the 
Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated 
with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the 
internet. Available in the rulemaking docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding commenters who indicate that public disclosure could, by 
improving public safety and responsiveness, reduce the threat of 
terrorism or intentional harm, EPA believes that this will only be true 
if the disclosure occurs in a manner that

[[Page 69888]]

makes information available for legitimate uses while preventing or 
dissuading access to it for criminal purposes. The final 
Reconsideration rule attempts to strike an appropriate balance between 
these concerns by allowing access to information via controlled means. 
The final rule retains the information availability provisions of the 
pre-Amendments RMP rule, retains a modified form of the Amendments 
rule's public meeting requirement and retains the enhanced local 
coordination requirements of the Amendments rule with minor 
modifications. All of these provisions increased information access 
relative to the pre-Amendments rule, to specific categories of chemical 
hazard information under controlled circumstances. These requirements 
should help ensure that local community members and local responders 
have access to appropriate information about regulated facilities 
without increasing the risk that such information will be used for 
criminal purposes.
    The Agency acknowledges that removing this provision eliminates one 
of several ways to locate and obtain chemical hazard information. For 
example, RMPs are subject to FOIA (except for OCA information) and may 
be reviewed at Federal Reading rooms or through LEPCs. Once a member of 
the public reviewed the RMP, they would already have most of the 
information available under the Amendments rule information 
availability provision. Also, while LEPCs vary in quality, under EPCRA, 
much of this information is required to be reported to them and they 
are required to provide it upon request to members of the public. Those 
other methods remain. Our view is that removing a redundant method of 
access that provides consolidated chemical hazard information is a 
reasonable balance between community access to chemical hazard 
information and security risks.
b. Community Interest in Access to Information
    Some commenters representing industry trade associations expressed 
doubt about the value of information disclosures, especially to lay 
audiences. One doubted that the disclosures would improve community 
responses to accidents. Another noted that chemical hazard information 
is very technical and would be very time-consuming to compile and 
translate into a format appropriate for the public, who may still be 
unable to understand it. A third cautioned that information disclosures 
could cause unnecessary and unjustified alarm in unsophisticated 
parties. An industry trade organization argued that facilities and the 
public are best served by flexibility in public communications, and 
that plants could be trusted to decide when, how, and what information 
to disclose. Another commenter argued that expansive and redundant 
reporting requirements could be counterproductive, allowing important 
information to be lost in the mix. A State elected official stated that 
much of the information required by the Amendments rule to be released, 
such as exercise schedules and emergency response details, does not 
help reduce the risk of accidents.
    Many other commenters, including a form letter campaign joined by 
approximately 415 individuals, expressed general opposition to 
eliminating requirements for facilities to share information with 
communities on hazards at the facility and preparedness procedures. A 
private citizen and advocacy organization stated that emergency 
response agencies and community residents have a right to know where 
dangerous materials exist, and that if the Amendments rule provisions 
had been in place during the Arkema and West Texas incidents, emergency 
responders would have been able to better protect themselves. A Federal 
agency and advocacy group agreed, citing a report on the Chevron 
Refinery Fire. A tribal government commented that the principles of 
EPCRA should be applied to the RMP framework. It added that the public 
should both have access to emergency preparedness information and, upon 
request, chemical hazard information. Some other commenters asserted a 
need for greater information availability so that community members 
know how to react when an accident occurs. An advocacy group commented 
that community members do not know whether, when they hear sirens at 
chemical plants, they are to evacuate or shelter in place. This 
commenter argued that reduced information availability will make it 
more difficult for residents to prepare in case of accidents. An 
anonymous commenter highlighted the importance of access to emergency 
plans and the contact information for local coordination officials in 
planning. Another referenced Flint, MI, as an example of the importance 
of being informed as to health risks in avoiding contamination 
consequences. An advocacy group cited a past EPA statement that 
additional RMP disclosures would likely reduce the number and severity 
of chemical accidents. A private citizen cited a DHS publication, 
stating that providing information to the community helps people 
protect themselves during accidents. Another commenter cited a 2014 
report indicating that 135 million people live within vulnerability 
zones of the highest-risk RMP facilities. The commenter argued that 
this risk, taken with evidence from the Arkema disaster, merits greater 
information disclosure.
    Many commenters argued that reading rooms do not provide a 
realistic avenue for much of the public to access information. A State 
elected official commented that visitors are limited to gathering 
information for a maximum of 10 facilities, once per month, without 
access to copying technology beyond hand-written notes. Even then, the 
commenter claimed, New York Attorney General interns took more than 
three weeks and substantial effort to gain access to reading room 
materials. An anonymous commenter and advocacy group echoed these 
concerns. A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters cited the distance people may have to travel to access a 
reading room and the difficulty the public may have in finding 
necessary information for reading room research such as facility 
identification numbers. The commenters also argued that reading rooms 
presented language and expertise barriers. Another commenter stated 
that her State failed to respond to information requests in a timely 
manner and that members of the public were compelled to seek legal 
counsel to access information. A Federal agency commented that the 
burden of information sharing should rest with facilities to 
affirmatively provide comprehensive information. It stated that the 
public should not have to request such information.
    EPA Response: As EPA indicated in the proposed rule, the 
information elements provided by the Amendments rule's information 
availability requirements were already obtainable by other means.\97\ 
As previously noted, RMPs are accessible through multiple means and 
contain most of the information that would have been provided under the 
Amendments. Once a member of the public obtains a facility's RMP, the 
need to make a request to that facility for the elements contained in 
the RMP would be eliminated, and most other elements provided for in 
the Amendments rule provision are available using the internet or by 
contacting local response agencies. In many cases, such information 
provided through local authorities may be most relevant to a

[[Page 69889]]

member of the public because local authorities will be able to provide 
information within the context of the community emergency plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ See 83 FR 24873-4, May 30, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Amendments rule provision would have allowed anonymous access 
to chemical hazard information in consolidated form that may have 
presented a more comprehensive picture of the vulnerabilities of a 
facility than would be apparent from any individual element. EPA is 
concerned that allowing anonymous access to sensitive chemical facility 
hazard information could potentially increase the risk of criminal acts 
and terrorism against regulated facilities. EPA believes the pre-
Amendments rule's existing provisions for access to RMPs, combined with 
the remaining Amendments rule information availability provisions 
(i.e., enhanced local coordination requirements and public meeting 
requirements as modified by the final rule) strike an appropriate 
balance between community access and security.
    Appropriate public response actions will depend on many factors 
that an individual member of the public is unlikely to be aware of at 
the time of a release, even if the Amendments rule's information 
availability provisions were not rescinded. In the event of an 
emergency at a regulated facility requiring public evacuation or 
sheltering, the community emergency response plan should ultimately 
guide the actions taken by members of the public near the affected 
facility. Local authorities will generally issue appropriate evacuation 
or sheltering orders based on the nature of the release, their 
assessment of potential public impacts, and the provisions of the 
community emergency plan. Under the pre-Amendments rule, owners and 
operators of regulated facilities were already required to coordinate 
response actions with local authorities and ensure the source is 
included in the community emergency response plan, so that local 
authorities, in consultation with the owner or operator, are prepared 
to issue appropriate instructions to members of the community. The 
Reconsideration rule preserves this system and the enhancements made in 
the Amendments rule to make information more available to local 
authorities by requiring annual emergency coordination activities.
    EPA disagrees that the Amendments rule's information availability 
provisions could have had any influence on the Arkema incident. The 
injuries that occurred to first responders at Arkema happened after 
facility personnel and county emergency responders had closely 
coordinated on the response to the emergency. According to the CSB 
investigation report,\98\ at the time of the first responder injuries, 
Arkema had already warned local emergency response authorities about 
the hazards of organic peroxide decomposition and alerted them that 
emergency responders who may be exposed to this material should wear 
personal protective equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus. 
County emergency response authorities had evacuated the facility and 
established a 1.5-mile evacuation zone around the facility. The CSB 
investigation report did not recommend changes to the emergency 
coordination provisions of the RMP rule, or fault Arkema for failing to 
adequately coordinate with local emergency responders. Regarding the 
West Fertilizer incident, EPA believes this incident did highlight the 
need for better communication between regulated facilities and first 
responders, and EPA has therefore retained the enhanced local 
coordination requirements of the Amendments rule, with modifications. 
EPA believes these enhancements, rather than the public information 
availability provisions, will allow community emergency planners and 
first responders the opportunity to better prepare themselves to 
appropriately respond to accidental releases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ To obtain a copy of the Arkema investigation report, see: 
https://www.csb.gov/arkema-inc-chemical-plant-fire-/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Comments on Other Benefits of the Information Availability 
Provisions
    Several commenters argued that greater disclosure requirements 
could, through political and market mechanisms, be beneficial. An 
anonymous commenter stated that access to hazardous chemical 
information would allow residents to more accurately determine whether 
they should allow a facility to be sited near them. Another commenter 
stated that the benefits of economic growth associated with chemical 
plants must be balanced against public health concerns, stating that 
public information provisions can help inform this balance. An 
anonymous commenter stated that the Amendments rule was intended to 
help residents make informed decisions as to where to live and help 
communities determine whether to subject a plant to greater scrutiny. 
An advocacy group cited the RIA, stating information sharing improves 
efficiency of location decisions and property markets. The commenter 
also stated that information sharing helps appropriately allocate 
resources to emergency response preparation. An advocacy group cited 
EPA's TRI program, stating that public information requirements can 
prompt companies to adopt safer practices. Another advocacy group 
described the history of CCC's response to a 2012 refinery accident as 
evidence of the public making use of transparency regulations to effect 
safer practices. A tribal association cited the costs of compliance at 
$4,820 per facility for large facilities and stated that this cost 
would be justified by the benefits of informed community members. An 
industry trade organization disagreed, commenting that the costs of 
establishing a single, streamlined website are high and not outweighed 
by any benefits.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that rescinding the Amendments rule's 
information availability provisions will hinder facility siting 
decisions. Facility siting decisions are generally made by facility 
owners and local governments, who are in the best position to decide 
whether and how chemical facilities will impact economic growth or 
public health in the community. Under the Reconsideration rule, both 
local governments and members of the public will have enhanced access 
to facility hazard information relative to the pre-Amendments rule due 
to the Amendments rule's local coordination and public meeting 
provisions, which the final rule retains in modified form. 
Additionally, members of the public can continue to obtain RMP facility 
information through Federal reading rooms and obtain information 
relevant to emergency preparedness in their community by contacting 
their LEPC or other appropriate emergency planning authorities. The 
Agency disagrees that the information availability requirements of the 
Amendments rule were analogous to the TRI program. The TRI program 
provides information on annual toxic releases from chemical facilities, 
but not on chemical facility hazards in a way that could potentially be 
exploited by criminals or terrorists. EPA is concerned that allowing 
anonymous access to sensitive chemical facility hazard information 
could potentially increase the risk of criminal acts and terrorism 
against regulated facilities. These were the same concerns that led to 
the pre-Amendments rule procedures for public access to RMP OCA 
information under the CSISSFRRA (Pub. L. 106-40). Regarding the 
commenter's concern about public involvement in advocating safer 
refinery practices following the 2012 Chevron

[[Page 69890]]

refinery accident, EPA notes that the Agency has retained a modified 
form of the Amendments rule's public meeting requirement, which will 
require RMP facility owners or operators to hold a public meeting 
following any accident involving the release of a regulated substance 
with offsite impacts. This provision will allow members of the public 
to gain additional information about serious accidents and engage with 
the owner or operator as appropriate. Regarding comments on the costs 
of the information availability provisions, while reducing unnecessary 
regulatory costs was a consideration in EPA's rescission of the 
provisions, EPA's primary rationale is to address security concerns.
3. Comments on Proposed Rescission of CBI Requirements in Sec.  68.210
    A commenter asserted that trade secrets should not be protected 
when secrecy poses a threat to human life. A private citizen stated 
that CBI protections privilege company profits over the health and 
safety of citizens. The commenter added that these can undermine 
emergency response readiness, violating EPA's mandate. An advocacy 
group cited a chemical facility's past testimony as evidence that 
chemical companies use security reasons as excuses to limit information 
disclosures and obfuscate unsafe practices. An industry trade 
association emphasized the necessity that the public know that 
disclosures are limited by CBI and classified information rules.
    EPA Response: EPA is finalizing the proposed deletion of the CBI 
provision in Sec.  68.210 (g), because with the rescission of the 
Amendments rule's information availability requirements and the 
modification of the public meeting requirements, the only remaining 
information required to be provided is the source's five-year accident 
history at the public meeting, and Sec.  68.151(b)(3) prohibits the 
owner or operator from claiming this accident history information as 
CBI.
4. Comments on Public Meeting Requirements
a. Retention of Public Meeting Requirement
    Many commenters opposed retaining the public meeting requirements. 
An industry trade association commented that public meetings are 
sparsely attended and of little value, especially given the proposed 
removal of other required disclosures at the meeting. Two other 
industry trade associations stated that, because they occur after the 
accident and response, public meetings do not materially advance any 
legitimate interest of the EPA. The commenters asserted that public 
meetings instead are only exercises in public shaming. Another industry 
trade association commented that the Amendment rule's meeting 
requirements would be redundant with initial release reporting and 
media reports, which provide the information the community would be 
interested in. An industry trade association commented that facilities 
already hold public meetings, especially under the ACC Responsible Care 
Program, when there is a need for one. Another stated that community 
advisory panels are already sufficient. Another commented that a 
Federal public meeting requirement would be needlessly duplicative with 
those required by State law. A facility commented that there is no need 
for the facility to host a public meeting, and instead a government 
entity should provide information to the community. An industry trade 
association, citing the CAA, stated that LEPCs should bear the 
responsibility of determining whether a public meeting needs be held 
after an accident, and whether the responsible facility should be 
required to attend. An industry trade association stated that the 
Amendment's public meeting requirement was too vague. Another commented 
that public meetings may not work because members of the public may 
protest and disrupt the meeting. An industry trade association stated 
that it will be difficult to discuss an incident when, because of 
litigation of adverse consequences, there will be legal issues 
impinging on the facility's speech.
    Other commenters expressed support for retaining the Amendments 
rule public meeting requirement. A joint submission from multiple 
advocacy groups and other commenters stated that notice of meetings, 
and meetings themselves, are vital to letting the public know that they 
have been exposed to hazards. These commenters also stated that 
meetings should have translators where the local community may need 
them. A private citizen recommended requiring an initial meeting, not 
triggered by an accident, to build connections between the community 
and facility.
    EPA Response: The final rule enacts an option for public meetings 
on which EPA had requested comment. EPA received several public 
comments that supported EPA's proposed option to require public 
meetings only after accidents with offsite impacts. EPA agrees with 
these commenters that incidents with no reportable offsite impacts are 
unlikely to generate much interest from the local community and will 
therefore be sparsely attended. Public meetings after serious accidents 
with offsite impacts, however, are likely to be well attended by the 
public and therefore EPA believes such public meetings should still be 
required. (See further discussion of public meeting criteria in the 
next section: b. Requiring public meetings after accidents meeting 
specified criteria.)
    EPA disagrees that public meetings do not advance any legitimate 
interest of the EPA or that such meetings are intended to be 
``exercises in public shaming.'' Public meetings give the owner or 
operator an opportunity to explain in detail the causes and 
consequences of serious accidents and respond to legitimate public 
concerns about potential health effects or ongoing risks from an 
accident. The public has a substantial interest in knowing what 
happened in an accident that had off-site impacts, why the accident 
happened and what steps the facility is taking to prevent a future 
occurrence, which should protect the public or environment from future 
impacts of releases of hazardous substances. The public's protection 
from the hazards of chemical accidents and ability to participate in 
emergency planning and readiness actions is materially advanced by 
being better informed about the accident, the risks posed and how they 
are being addressed. By meeting with the public, the quality of the 
facility's accident report improves due to the exchange of information, 
such as information regarding further impacts.
    EPA is not requiring owners or operators to provide language 
translators at public meetings or to have initial public meetings not 
associated with reportable accidents with offsite impacts. EPA did not 
propose these provisions in either the Amendments or Reconsideration 
rules. EPA encourages owners or operators to accommodate language 
translation requests during public meetings but is not requiring them 
to do so. Owners or operators are free to hold additional public 
meetings beyond those required under the final rule if they so choose. 
EPA disagrees that public meetings are redundant to initial release 
reporting and media reports. By holding a public meeting up to 90 days 
after an incident, the owner or operator is likely to be able to 
provide more accurate and reliable information than is provided in 
initial notification or media reports. Also, at a public meeting, 
members of the public will have the opportunity to ask follow-up 
questions about the accident, which would not be possible through 
viewing initial notification reports or media reports.

[[Page 69891]]

    EPA disagrees that the final rule's public meeting requirement is 
duplicated in any other law or regulation that is applicable to all RMP 
facilities. However, if a facility conducts a public meeting to comply 
with another law or regulation, or as a result of complying with an 
industry code of practice, such a meeting may be used to comply with 
the final rule's requirement, provided the meeting is held within 90 
days of the accident and provides the information required to be 
reported under Sec.  68.42(a). EPA disagrees that the possibility of a 
meeting being disrupted by protesters or the owner or operator's 
concerns about litigation are good reasons to not require public 
meetings. Public meetings are used in many communities throughout the 
country for a variety of purposes and are rarely disrupted by 
protesters. Owners and operators may take appropriate and lawful 
measures to maintain order and security at public meetings. Regarding 
litigation concerns, the owner or operator already has a regulatory 
duty to disclose the information required under Sec.  68.42(a)--
therefore, discussing this information at a public meeting should not 
increase the owner or operator's vulnerability to litigation. EPA 
disagrees that the government entities such as LEPCs should be 
responsible for holding public meetings concerning RMP facility 
accidents. The owner or operator will have the most accurate and up to 
date information about the accident because of the owner or operator's 
incident investigation. However, a regulated facility may combine their 
post-accident public meeting with an LEPC meeting that is open to the 
public, if the LEPC agrees to such an arrangement. EPA has removed the 
more open-ended requirement to provide ``other relevant chemical hazard 
information'' beyond the information required in 40 CFR 68.42, thus 
making the requirement for disclosure less vague by limiting the 
required content of public meetings to more specific, factual 
information.
b. Requiring Public Meetings After Accidents Meeting Specified Criteria
    Several commenters argued that public meetings should only be 
required for especially serious accidents. A State government agency 
commented that public meeting requirements should be limited to 
reportable incidents with off-site consequences. An industry trade 
association suggested that no public meeting be required when there is 
a shelter-in-place order just as a precaution, if there are no real 
offsite impacts. Another commenter recommended that meetings only be 
required for major accidents, noting that meetings are often sparsely 
attended. Another industry trade association stated that the public is 
unlikely to attend meetings for accidents with few offsite impacts. 
Another industry trade association commented that meetings for onsite-
only incidents engender distrust and could be overly alarming after 
minor accidents. Other commenters supported limiting public meeting 
requirements to accidents with the offsite impacts specified in Sec.  
68.42. The commenters stated that accidents with strictly on-site 
consequences fall exclusively under OSHA's purview. Another commenter 
recommended that meetings only occur upon request by the public or an 
official.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees that incidents with no reportable offsite 
impacts are unlikely to generate much interest from the local community 
and will therefore be sparsely attended. Public meetings after serious 
accidents with offsite impacts, however, are likely to be well attended 
by the public and therefore EPA believes such public meetings should 
still be required. EPA disagrees, however, that shelter-in-place orders 
should not trigger public meetings. Sheltering-in-place is considered 
an offsite impact under Sec.  68.42(a) and therefore, under the final 
rule, a public meeting is required after an accident that results in a 
community shelter-in-place order, even if no other impact occurs. EPA 
also disagrees that accidents with only on-site consequences fall 
exclusively under OSHA's purview. Such accidents involving covered 
processes must still be reported in a source's RMP if they cause any of 
the consequences listed under Sec.  68.42(a). If the accident involved 
a Program 2 or Program 3 process and resulted in, or could reasonably 
have resulted in a catastrophic release, the owner or operator must 
also perform an incident investigation as required under Sec.  68.60 or 
Sec.  68.81.
    EPA did not require public meetings upon request of a member of the 
public (or an official) because such a provision would be difficult to 
implement for many facilities. In order to have a meeting occur within 
90 days of an accident under this approach, EPA would need to establish 
a relatively short time frame for a member of the public to make a 
request, and regulated facilities would therefore have needed to 
provide almost immediate notice to the public to explain how and where 
to submit such a request. If a member of the public submitted a 
request, then the facility would need to provide a second public notice 
that a public meeting would occur, prepare for the meeting, and hold 
the meeting, all within 90 days of the incident. Under the final rule, 
regulated facilities and members of the public will know in advance 
that any accident from a regulated process involving specified offsite 
impacts will automatically trigger a public meeting. The owner or 
operator will only need to provide a single notice to members of the 
public to inform them when and where the meeting will be held. The 
owner or operator will also have a full 90 days to prepare for the 
meeting, as they will not need to await the receipt of a public request 
in order to determine whether or not to hold a meeting.
c. Required Timeframe for Public Meeting
    Many commenters supported longer, more flexible timeframes for 
public meetings. An industry trade association recommended a 180-day 
timeframe, so more information can be gathered for the meeting. Other 
commenters opposed a 90-day timeframe, arguing that they may need more 
time to investigate the accident. An industry trade association 
recommended making the public meeting deadline coincide with the 
requirement to update accident history information in a facility's RMP, 
within 6-months of an accident. Another commenter suggested that timing 
should vary, according to the accident. An industry trade association 
recommended that owners or operators should be able to request time 
extensions for holding a public meeting if an investigation is ongoing. 
A facility, mentioning its positive experience with such an approach, 
suggested, instead of requiring a public meeting in 90 days, a meeting 
with the LEPC and emergency responder community be required within 120 
days.
    Other commenters, including a joint submission from multiple 
advocacy groups and other commenters and an industry trade association 
supported earlier meetings in order to address public health concerns.
    EPA Response: EPA considered both longer and shorter timeframes for 
the public meeting but elected to retain the 90-day timeframe 
established in the Amendments rule. As the pre-Amendments rule already 
contained a requirement for facilities to update their RMP within 6 
months of an accident meeting the reporting criteria of Sec.  68.42, 
EPA considered whether to extend the timeframe to 6 months, as it would 
be more likely that a source would have completed its incident 
investigation by the time a public meeting was held. However, the 
Agency judged that even though in some cases the owner or

[[Page 69892]]

operator's incident investigation may not be complete within 90 days of 
the accident, the owner or operator is likely to know most of the 
elements required to be reported under Sec.  68.42 earlier than 90 days 
after the accident. Of the eleven information elements required to be 
reported in a regulated source's accident history, EPA believes it is 
likely that the owner or operator will know all except perhaps the 
contributing factors to the accident (Sec.  68.42(b)(9)) and 
operational or process changes that resulted from investigation of the 
release (Sec.  68.42(b)(11)). The owner or operator may also lack 
knowledge about the full extent of offsite impacts of the accident 
(Sec.  68.42(b)(8)), and an additional benefit of holding a public 
meeting within 90 days of the event may be that it allows the owner or 
operator to gain additional information about offsite impacts. By 
meeting with the public in advance of needing to report the incident in 
its accident history, the quality of the facility's accident report 
improves due to the exchange of information. In some cases, the owner 
or operator will have completed their incident investigation and will 
know all eleven information elements required to be reported in the 
accident history. Even if the owner or operator's incident 
investigation is incomplete at the time of the public meeting, EPA 
believes holding a meeting as early as reasonably possible is most 
beneficial to the community. The 90-day timeframe should allow the 
owner or operator to share appropriate information about the accident 
with the local community. The facility could discuss the progress of 
the investigation so far and next steps planned. While EPA encourages 
owners and operators to hold public meetings sooner than 90 days after 
an accident if possible, EPA did not establish a shorter timeframe 
because shorter timeframes could make it less likely that the owner or 
operator will have complete information about the incident to present 
at the public meeting, and the Agency also did not want to exacerbate 
logistical challenges for regulated facilities in the immediate 
aftermath of a serious accident, when facility resources may be 
stressed in responding to and recovering from the accident.
d. Limiting Accident Information Discussed at Public Meetings to the 
Most Recent Accident
    An industry trade association expressed support for limiting the 
content of public meetings to the accident at issue rather than 
including the entire 5-year accident history. Other commenters agreed, 
citing security concerns. A joint submission from multiple advocacy 
groups and other commenters disagreed, commenting that accident history 
is useful to understand future risks and what the community may have 
already been exposed to. A tribal government commented that emergency 
personnel should have access to past accident/incident reports, not 
just information about the current incident.
    EPA Response: The final rule requires public meetings to cover only 
the accident at issue and not the full 5-year accident history. While 
EPA agrees that information about other accidents may be useful to 
provide context to the public and encourages the owner or operator to 
provide such additional information if appropriate, the Agency is not 
requiring sources to provide information on older accidents because the 
Agency believes that it would place an additional burden on the source 
to prepare for and present the additional accident information, which 
may or may not be relevant to the most recent accident. Therefore, 
under the final rule, the owner or operator is free to judge what 
additional information beyond that required to be reported under Sec.  
68.42 for the most recent accident should be presented at the public 
meeting. Regarding the comment about emergency personnel having access 
to past accident reports, while this information is not required to be 
presented at public meetings, it can be requested by local emergency 
response authorities at annual coordination meetings required under 
Sec.  68.93. If local authorities can show that such information is 
necessary for developing and implementing the local emergency response 
plan, the owner or operator must provide it to them.
e. Rescission of Providing Other Relevant Chemical Hazard Information 
at Public Meetings
    A State elected official commented that no evidence demonstrates 
that chemical hazard disclosure will increase the risk of a terrorist 
attack or other intentional harm. The commenter specifically stated 
that there is no indication that such disclosures played a role at the 
West Fertilizer explosion. A tribal government opposed the rescission 
and asserted that the community has a right to know what chemicals are 
being used in their community. The commenter added that the information 
that would be provided may be useful to emergency personnel. A joint 
submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters stated 
that EPA's rationale that the language requiring the owner or operator 
to provide other relevant chemical hazard information at public 
meetings ``could be interpreted to be an overly broad requirement'' is 
arbitrary and capricious. The commenters asserted that, if EPA is truly 
concerned about how facilities will interpret this language, it can 
clarify the requirement or provide examples of the types of information 
that would need to be shared. The commenters stated that deleting the 
requirement isn't necessary and deprives communities of information 
that EPA itself determined was valuable for them to know. An industry 
trade association supported rescinding the requirement, citing security 
concerns. Another industry trade association agreed and stated that 
allowing facilities to choose what to disclose would ease their ability 
to comply with the DHS CFATS.
    EPA Response: EPA is finalizing the proposed rescission of the 
Amendments rule requirement for the owner or operator to provide other 
chemical hazard information at public meetings. EPA disagrees that its 
rationale for rescinding this requirement is either arbitrary or 
capricious. EPA is rescinding this requirement for the same reason that 
we are modifying the similar requirement for facilities to share other 
information that local emergency planning and response organizations 
identify as relevant to local emergency response planning in Sec.  
68.93--EPA believes this language is too open ended and could trigger 
requests for security-sensitive information at public meetings. As EPA 
noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the language of the public 
meeting provision requiring the owner or operator to provide other 
information is similar to the Amendments rule requirement for the owner 
or operator to share with local responders other information that 
responders identify as relevant to local emergency response planning, 
which this final rule modifies to require providing other information 
necessary for developing and implementing the local emergency response 
plan. (See discussion later in section VI.C.2.a ``Information 
disclosure during local emergency coordination.'') All three of the 
reconsideration petitioners had security concerns with providing this 
type of information with no screening process for requesters or 
limitations on the use or distribution of information, and EPA believes 
that these legitimate concerns that can reasonably be addressed by 
deleting this language in the public meeting requirement. EPA believes 
deleting the language is better than attempting to narrow it by 
providing specific examples of the types

[[Page 69893]]

of other information that should be shared, because the purpose of the 
public meeting provision is to share information relating to the 
accident that resulted in the meeting, and this information is already 
listed in Sec.  68.42. Any attempt to list additional types of 
information would presuppose that such information would be relevant to 
the accident and not present security risks, but EPA cannot reach such 
a conclusion without knowledge of the specific contents of the other 
information or circumstances of a particular accident.
    EPA disagrees that there is no evidence that increasing information 
disclosure will increase security risks to regulated facilities. As a 
result of CSISSFRRA, the DOJ performed an assessment of the increased 
risk of terrorist or other criminal activity associated with posting 
off-site consequence analysis information on the internet. In that 
assessment, DOJ found that the increased availability of information 
would increase the risk of the misuse of information by criminals or 
terrorists, that criminals and terrorists had already sought to target 
U.S. chemical facilities, and that such threats were likely to increase 
in the future. EPA agrees that the community has a right to know what 
chemicals are being used in their community and that this information 
is useful to emergency personnel. The identity of the chemical involved 
in the accident triggering the public meeting must be disclosed during 
that meeting, as this is required to be reported in the facility's 
accident history under Sec.  68.42(b)(2). However, EPA does not believe 
the owner or operator should be required to discuss other chemical 
hazards during public meetings, because the purpose of the meeting is 
to discuss the recent accident, not to hold a comprehensive discussion 
about all chemical hazards at the source. Both the RMP rule and EPCRA 
provide other means for members of the public to obtain information 
about the chemical hazards present at facilities in their community. 
The final rule also retains the enhanced local coordination provisions 
of the Amendments rule, so local emergency response personnel will have 
more opportunities to meet with the owner or operator beyond post-
accident public meetings. At annual coordination meetings required 
under Sec.  68.93, local emergency response authorities may request 
information about other chemical hazards at the facility, and the owner 
or operator must provide such information to the extent it is necessary 
for developing and implementing the local emergency response plan.
5. Other Comments on Information Availability and Public Meeting 
Provisions
a. Retention of Classified Information Provision in Sec.  68.210
    An industry trade association commented that the rule should make 
clear that classified information limitations still apply to any 
information that would otherwise be required to be disclosed. Another 
industry trade association commented that information limitations 
should be expanded to clearly include information protected by other 
Federal laws, especially Sensitive Security Information (SSI). It 
recommended that new language be added to the rule, protecting CVI, 
SSI, information classified by Federal agencies, and a catchall for all 
other information protected by law. Two industry trade associations 
stated that retaining the classified information provisions will help 
facilities remain in compliance with CFATS.
    EPA Response: In the proposed rule, EPA had proposed to retain the 
Amendments rule's classified information provision within Sec.  68.210. 
The final rule includes a modified version of this provision which 
addresses both classified and restricted information (EPA is making the 
same modification to the classified information provision proposed to 
be added to the emergency coordination provisions in Sec.  68.93). 
Since the original RMP rule was published, DHS has developed new 
categories of security-sensitive information that potentially affect 
some RMP facilities. These include Sensitive Security Information 
(SSI), Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII), and 
Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI). Certain facilities 
regulated under the RMP regulation may possess any or all of these 
categories of information, and EPA agrees with commenters who indicated 
these categories of information should be addressed in the rule. By 
referring to the DHS's restricted information regimes in the final 
rule, EPA intends to make clear that such information should be 
controlled via the applicable laws, regulations, and executive orders. 
EPA's reference to the DHS's regulations does not imply an absolute 
prohibition on the sharing of information controlled under these 
regulations, as some local emergency response officials may be 
authorized to receive SSI, PCII, or CVI. However, EPA expects that 
there will be few cases where local emergency coordination activities 
will require exchanges of such restricted information, and it should 
never be disclosed during public meetings.
    Regarding classified National Security Information (NSI), very few 
RMP-regulated facilities possess such information (i.e., information 
controlled under NSI laws as confidential, secret, or top-secret 
information), and applicable laws prohibit its disclosure to the 
public. Nevertheless, EPA has retained a modified form of the 
classified information provision in the final rule to emphasize the 
importance of adhering to all laws relating to control of NSI, which 
generally prohibit its disclosure to any persons who do not have an 
appropriate clearance for NSI and a need to know the information.
b. Requirement To Provide to Public a List of Scheduled Exercises
    A state agency and two industry trade associations argued that 
disclosing exercise schedules to the public created security risks. One 
of these trade associations also commented that EPA's concern that the 
public could be alarmed by exercises is unfounded, and that facilities 
have hitherto successfully notified the public of drills without 
confusion. Another industry trade association commented that, because 
the public does not participate in emergency response activities, it 
has no significant interest in their details. A tribal government 
commented that the proposal was too vague. The commenter also stated 
that the discussion on this subject provided no reference to potential 
impacts to human health or the environment.
    EPA Response: In the final rule, EPA is not requiring facilities to 
disclose exercise schedules. Although information on upcoming facility 
exercises is the one information element provided under the Amendments 
rule that is not already available from another source, as EPA 
indicated in the proposal, there is no easy way to restrict this 
information to only members of the local public, and wider distribution 
of this information could carry security risks. Most comments received 
by EPA that addressed the issue agreed with EPA's proposal not to 
require disclosure of this information.

VI. Modified Local Coordination Amendments

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    In the RMP Amendments rule, EPA required owners or operators of 
``responding'' and ``non-responding'' stationary sources to perform 
emergency

[[Page 69894]]

response coordination activities required under new Sec.  68.93. These 
activities included coordinating response needs at least annually with 
local emergency planning and response organizations, as well as 
documenting these coordination activities. The RMP Amendments rule 
required coordination to include providing to the local emergency 
planning and response organizations the stationary source's emergency 
response plan (if one exists), emergency action plan, updated emergency 
contact information, and any other information that local responders 
identify as relevant to local emergency response planning. For 
responding stationary sources, coordination must also include 
consulting with local emergency response officials to establish 
appropriate schedules and plans for field and tabletop exercises 
required under Sec.  68.96(b). Owners or operators of responding and 
nonresponding sources are required to request an opportunity to meet 
with the local emergency planning committee (or equivalent) and/or 
local fire department as appropriate to review and discuss these 
materials.
    In the proposed Reconsideration rule, EPA proposed to modify the 
local coordination amendments by deleting the requirement in Sec.  
68.93(b), for the owner or operator to provide other information that 
local responders identify as relevant to local emergency response 
planning. Alternatively, EPA proposed to change this phrase to require 
the owner or operator to provide other information needed for 
developing and implementing the local emergency response plan, which is 
virtually identical to that used in EPCRA Sec.  303(d)(3) [42 U.S.C. 
11003(d)(3)]. Under both alternatives, EPA also proposed to incorporate 
appropriate classified information and CBI protections to regulated 
substance and stationary source information required to be provided 
under Sec.  68.93.
    EPA proposed to retain the requirement in Sec.  68.95(a)(4) for 
responding facilities to update their facility emergency response plans 
to include appropriate changes based on information obtained from 
coordination activities, emergency response exercises, incident 
investigations or other information. In addition, EPA proposed to 
retain the requirement in Sec.  68.95(a)(i) that emergency response 
plan notification procedures must inform appropriate Federal and state 
emergency response agencies, as well as local agencies and the public.
    EPA proposed to retain language in Sec.  68.93(b) referring to 
field and tabletop exercise schedules and plans with a proposal to 
retain some form of field and tabletop exercise requirement. 
Alternatively, in conjunction with an alternative proposal to rescind 
field and tabletop exercise requirements (see section VII. ``Modified 
Exercise Amendments'' below), the Agency also proposed to rescind this 
language.
    EPA did not propose any other changes to the local coordination 
requirements of the RMP Amendments rule. Under either proposed 
alternative described above, the following provisions would have 
remained unchanged: The provisions of paragraph (b) requiring 
coordination to include providing to the local emergency planning and 
response organizations the stationary source's emergency response plan 
if one exists, emergency action plan, and updated emergency contact 
information, as well as the requirement for the owner or operator to 
request an opportunity to meet with the local emergency planning 
committee (or equivalent) and/or local fire department as appropriate 
to review and discuss these materials. For provisions of the RMP 
Amendments that EPA proposed to retain, EPA continued to rely on the 
rationale and responses provided when the Agency promulgated the 
Amendments rule. See 81 FR 13671-74 (proposed RMP Amendments rule), 
March 14, 2016, 82 FR 4653-58 (final RMP Amendments rule), January 13, 
2017.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    After review and consideration of public comments, EPA is 
finalizing the local emergency response coordination requirements 
related changes, as proposed, with some modifications. This rule 
modifies the local emergency response coordination amendments by 
replacing the requirement in Sec.  68.93(b) for the owner or operator 
to provide any other information that local response organizations 
identify as relevant to local emergency response planning with the 
requirement to provide ``other information necessary for developing and 
implementing the local emergency response plan.'' Also, the final rule 
includes a modified form of the proposed provision for protection of 
classified information in Sec.  68.93(d) but does not include the 
proposed CBI provision in Sec.  68.93(e).

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Overview of Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    The modifications we adopt today to the emergency coordination 
requirements of the 2017 rule primarily ensure that the coordination 
occurs in a more secure manner than the 2017 requirements. We have 
substituted the open-ended and somewhat vague ability of emergency 
response organizations to obtain any information ``relevant to'' local 
emergency response planning for a requirement to provide information 
``necessary for'' the development and implantation of the local 
emergency plan. ``Necessary for'' tracks more closely the terms of 
EPCRA 303(d)(3) and 40 CFR 68.95(c) of the pre-2017 RMP rule. We 
slightly expand the applicability of this language to include non-
responding sources subject to RMP Programs 2 and 3 and to sources not 
otherwise subject to EPCRA and retain the 2017 rule's provision that 
allows local emergency response organizations rather than just LEPCs to 
use this EPCRA-like language.
    As commenters pointed out, the EPCRA provision has been 
successfully implemented for many years with no known security 
breaches. While local emergency response organizations that may use 
this authority would include entities other than LEPCs, LEPCs would 
have broader membership than fire and other public safety authorities 
that would be allowed to use the information gathering authority and 
therefore these additional entities present even less of a security 
risk. The provision we adopt is consistent with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and facilitates the functioning of the NIMS 
and the Incident Command System (ICS) by promoting preplanning in 
advance of an incident.
    We have previously noted that US SOC identified response plans as 
important targeting information for criminals or terrorists seeking to 
cause harm to chemical facilities. Therefore, we believe the less open-
ended provision adopted today that mirrors language that has not led to 
known security breaches is a more reasonable and practicable approach 
to emergency coordination than the provision we adopted in 2017.
2. Comments on Local Coordination Provisions
a. Information Disclosure During Local Emergency Coordination
    EPA received various comments on the proposed deletion of the 
requirement to provide any other information that local planning and 
response organizations identify as relevant to local emergency response 
planning during annual coordination activities, and the alternative 
proposed language, which replaces the provision with a requirement for 
the owner or

[[Page 69895]]

operator to provide other information necessary for developing and 
implementing the local emergency response plan. Many commenters, 
including industry trade associations, facilities, and State elected 
officials, expressed support for the proposed deletion of the language, 
commenting that it created an open-ended provision that could allow 
third parties to obtain security-sensitive or classified information 
about highly protected processes, threatening public health and 
heightening national security risks. Some of these commenters also 
provided additional reasons for deleting the phrase, stating that the 
language created an inconsistency with the OSHA PSM standard, that 
LEPCs have no capability to maintain the security of the information, 
that the provision was overly burdensome, and that it is not supported 
by the CAA.
    Many other commenters, including private citizens, advocacy groups, 
and State elected officials, opposed deleting the provision because of 
general concerns about the availability of needed information for 
emergency planners and first responders. An association of government 
agencies commented that first responders should be entitled to all 
information they need to understand the risk of a release and respond. 
The commenter stated that EPA's proposed change to Sec.  68.93(b) 
regarding requests for information is inadequate, short-sighted, and 
suggests that the facility information available in an RMP is 
materially different than the facility information provided under 
EPCRA. The commenter stated that the majority of RMP regulated 
facilities are subject to EPCRA, under provisions of which LEPCs 
routinely receive information from facilities relevant to emergency 
preparedness planning, and there is no evidence that any LEPC or first 
responder organization cavalierly released information obtained from a 
facility obtained under EPCRA or through any other mechanism. This 
commenter and others stated that EPA's proposed alternative language 
for the information disclosure requirement would be acceptable because 
it is virtually identical to the EPCRA language and would allow LEPCs 
and responders to work with regulated facilities to obtain the 
information and cooperation they need. Another commenter stated that 
EPA had failed to justify its proposal to delete the requirement and 
that EPA's attempt to argue that the proposed deletion will result in 
security benefits is erroneous and unjustified. However, this commenter 
also expressed a preference for the proposed alternative language to 
EPA's proposed deletion. An industry trade association also expressed 
support for EPA's proposed alternative language, which it stated would 
address the ambiguous, open-ended nature of the Amendments rule 
language and mirror the [EPCRA] statutory language.
    Other commenters, including advocacy groups and State elected 
officials, expressed opposition to the proposed alternative language, 
reasoning that the alternative language would create the same or 
similar security risks as the language included in the Amendments rule. 
One of these commenters stated that local emergency planning and 
response organizations lack any uniform capability to keep and 
safeguard sensitive chemical hazard information and the proposed 
alternative language does nothing to address this problem. Multiple 
state elected officials commented that EPA did not explain the material 
difference between the proposed alternative language and the existing 
language of Sec.  68.95(c) of the pre-Amendments rule. Another 
commenter stated that EPA incorrectly asserted that the alternative 
provision is consistent with EPCRA. The commenter stated that the 
fundamental distinction is that, under EPCRA, facilities must disclose 
certain information to LEPCs established under 42 U.S.C Sec.  11001, 
whereas the RMP provision would allow or disclosure of information to 
local emergency planning and response organizations, local response 
organizations, and local authorities. The commenter concluded that 
because it is unknown exactly who might be able to access this 
information additional security risks may be created. The commenter 
also expressed concern about the potential burden this could place on 
industry without a specified mechanism for requesting review of 
unreasonable requests. Another trade association opposed the proposed 
alternative and instead recommended that EPA should adopt a rule that 
removes the requirement to submit any classified/confidential 
information and confines the information that would be provided to the 
basic, publicly available information that local responders need to do 
their job effectively. The commenter argued that their suggested 
approach would reduce the burdens on the regulated community and also 
avoid overwhelming the limited resources of the local officials. A 
joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters 
stated that the proposed alternative language would deny first 
responders additional information relevant to their planning activities 
that they cannot already receive pursuant to EPCRA. These commenters 
also stated that EPA has not explained how the proposed alternative 
language would address its finding in the Amendments rule that chemical 
facility information and data-sharing efforts need significant 
improvement and that LEPCs and first responders need more information 
to do their jobs. The commenters also stated that EPA has cited no 
evidence connecting any national security threats to sharing 
information with first responders and that firefighters, EMTs, and 
first responders are trained to protect the public and required to keep 
sensitive information secure.
    EPA Response: In the final rule, EPA is adopting the alternative 
proposed language, which replaces the requirement to provide any other 
information that local planning and response organizations identify as 
relevant to local emergency response planning with the requirement to 
provide other information necessary for developing and implementing the 
local emergency response plan. As EPA explained in the proposed 
rule,\99\ this language is virtually identical to that used in EPCRA 
section 303(d)(3), [42 U.S.C. 11003(d)(3)], and also appears in Sec.  
68.95(c) of the original RMP rule, which applies to facilities with 
Program 2 and Program 3 processes whose employees respond to accidental 
releases of regulated substances. Therefore, because of either the 
EPCRA section 303(d)(3) provision or the provision in Sec.  68.95(c), 
most RMP facilities have long been subject to this requirement and 
applying it to the relatively few RMP facilities that are not already 
subject to it under EPCRA section 303(d)(3) or Sec.  68.95(c) should 
not create any security vulnerabilities. EPA believes that the 
alternative proposed language will address security concerns with the 
Amendments rule provision while still allowing local responders to 
obtain information needed for emergency response planning. EPA notes 
that the final rule language is not open-ended, and restricts other 
information provided to that necessary for developing and implementing 
the local emergency response plan. EPA recognizes that a class of 
information--information that local response organizations deem 
``relevant,'' but which is not ``necessary'' for the emergency plan--
would be unavailable under the amended language adopted today. We view 
the narrowing as a compromise that helps emergency planning but

[[Page 69896]]

removes some information that is unnecessary for the emergency plan but 
which may pose a security risk. EPA is aware of no security 
vulnerabilities associated with language that tracks EPCRA in the past, 
and no commenters provided any such examples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ 83 FR 24866, May 30, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA disagrees that the Agency failed to explain the material 
difference between the language of Sec.  68.95(c) in the pre-Amendments 
rule and the proposed alternative revision to Sec.  68.93(b). While the 
pre-Amendments rule language in 68.95(c) is almost the same as the 
proposed alternative revision to Sec.  68.93(b), its applicability is 
different. As EPA explained in the proposed rule, some RMP facilities 
that are subject to the final rule's requirement to provide other 
information needed for developing the local emergency response plan in 
Sec.  68.93(b) were not already subject to it under either the pre-
Amendments RMP rule provision at Sec.  68.95(c), which applied only to 
responding facilities, or under EPCRA section 303(d)(3), which would 
generally apply only to RMP facilities that hold an EPCRA extremely 
hazardous substance above a threshold planning quantity. Under the 
Amendments and Reconsideration rules, all facilities with Program 2 
and/or Program 3 processes are subject to the emergency response 
coordination requirements of Sec.  68.93, whether or not the source's 
employees will respond to accidental releases of regulated substances. 
Therefore, EPA's inclusion of the alternative proposed language in 
Sec.  68.93(b) applies the requirement to more RMP facilities than were 
subject to it under Sec.  68.95(c) of the pre-Amendments rule.
    EPA disagrees with commenters' claims that additional security 
risks may be created because it is unknown exactly who might be able to 
access information provided during local coordination activities. In 
the proposed rule, EPA specifically asked commenters to explain how the 
alternative language presents new security concerns if it has not 
caused such concerns in relation to its presence in EPCRA section 
303(d)(3) or in Sec.  68.95(c) of the pre-Amendments RMP rule. On this 
issue, one commenter attempted to draw a fundamental distinction 
between the EPCRA requirement, which requires disclosing certain 
information to LEPCs, and the proposed alternative provision, which 
would require disclosure of information to ``local emergency planning 
and response organizations.'' According to this commenter, additional 
security risks may be created because it is unknown exactly who might 
be able to access this information within the broader realm of ``local 
emergency planning and response organizations,'' which would include 
but not be limited to LEPCs. But while it is true that the term ``local 
emergency planning and response organizations'' encompasses LEPCs and 
other organizations, such as fire departments and emergency management 
agencies, LEPCs likely include the most diverse membership of any local 
response organization. If disclosure of other information related to 
development of the local emergency plan to LEPCs has not resulted in 
security risks to date, it is unlikely that disclosing the same 
information to fire departments or emergency management agencies will 
cause such problems. Also, EPA notes again that Sec.  68.95(c) already 
required responding facilities to provide this information to ``local 
emergency response officials,'' a term that includes, but is not 
limited to, LEPCs. Therefore, the Agency believes it is implausible 
that using the previously-existing language of Sec.  68.95(c) within 
Sec.  68.93(b) would create security risks.
    EPA also sees no reason to specify a mechanism for requesting 
review of unreasonable information requests. Since nearly all RMP 
facilities have been subject to this requirement for many years, with 
no such review mechanism in place, and without any apparent problem, 
EPA does not expect the Sec.  68.93 provision to cause any 
proliferation of unreasonable information requests. EPA encourages 
local responders and owners or operators of regulated facilities to 
discuss the need for other emergency planning information and come to a 
reasonable agreement on what additional information, if any, should be 
provided, without the need for intervention by external arbitrators. 
The final rule does not require disclosure of classified information or 
CBI during annual coordination activities--this topic is further 
discussed below.
b. CBI and Classified Information Protections for Local Coordination
    Several commenters agreed with EPA's proposal to include classified 
information and CBI protection provisions in the local coordination 
provisions. An industry trade association commented that EPA needs to 
specifically address SSI and CVI in the provision, not just classified 
information, a term which is too narrow to reflect current information 
protection regimes. Another industry trade association also recommended 
that EPA specifically include SSI, in addition to classified 
information or CBI. Another industry trade association commented that 
the proposed protection only addresses the disclosure of CBI to EPA and 
fails to consider such a disclosure to non-government entities, such as 
LEPCs. The commenter recommended that EPA should revise its CBI and 
classified information disclosure provisions to more clearly articulate 
how covered process facilities may address these concerns. Similarly, 
an industry trade association encouraged EPA to revise the proposed 
revision to identify how a facility can protect CBI or classified 
information potentially subject to a release to a non-governmental 
entity. An industry trade association recommended that the CBI and 
classified information provisions be clarified to provide that public 
version of the specific items identified in the regulation should be 
provided. Specifically, the commenter recommended that EPA clarify that 
regulated entities are under no obligation to provide to LEPCs or other 
emergency responders any information that is not already publicly 
available. An industry trade association encouraged EPA to specify that 
a ``sanitized'' version of requested materials, as referenced in Sec.  
68.93(e), means that companies may redact CBI from information provided 
under this provision.
    Several other commenters indicated that allowing companies to claim 
CBI as a way of avoiding the responsibility to provide emergency 
planners and first responders access to essential information needed to 
respond to a chemical release is not acceptable.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees with commenters who indicated that the 
classified information provision included in the proposed rule was too 
narrow. The final rule's modified form of the proposed rule's 
classified information protection provision should address these 
commenters' concerns regarding information restricted under DHS 
regulations.
    Regarding CBI, EPA is not finalizing the proposed provision of 
Sec.  68.93(e) because under the final rule, the Agency no longer 
believes it is necessary. With the changes EPA has made in the final 
rule--most notably replacing the open-ended requirement to provide any 
other information that local planning and response organizations 
identify as relevant to local emergency response planning with the 
requirement to provide other information needed for developing and 
implementing the local emergency response plan, which replicates 
previously existing rule language from Sec.  68.95(c)--EPA no longer 
sees any need for a CBI provision in this section of the rule.

[[Page 69897]]

    Owners and operators of regulated facilities are not required to 
provide CBI to local response officials. EPA agrees with commenters 
that companies should not claim CBI merely as a way to avoid providing 
essential planning information to local responders, but EPA is not 
aware of any cases where this has occurred, and commenters provided no 
such examples. EPA expects that little, if any, confidential business 
information will be requested during coordination activities conducted 
under Sec.  68.93. However, for information elements such as the names 
of chemicals, where facilities have made valid CBI claims in their RMP 
submission, where those elements are exchanged with local response 
officials during coordination activities, the owner or operator should 
provide the same sanitized information to local response officials that 
they provided to EPA in their RMP submission. For information requested 
by local response officials other than that reported in an RMP, if a 
local response official requests an element of information that the 
owner or operator judges to be CBI, the owner or operator is not 
required to provide the information but is encouraged to provide a non-
confidential version of the information to local response officials 
(i.e., a version with confidential business information redacted) if 
possible.
    The reason that EPA had proposed adding a CBI provision to the 
local coordination provisions of Sec.  68.93 is because the proposed 
Amendments rule had included a CBI provision to cover potential CBI in 
the itemized list of chemical hazard information that EPA proposed to 
require be provided to local emergency response officials upon request 
(see 81 FR 13711, March 14, 2016--proposed new Sec.  68.205--
Availability of information to the LEPC or emergency response 
officials). That list of items included information potentially 
containing CBI beyond the items already contained in an RMP, such as 
compliance audit reports, incident investigation reports, and IST 
information. In the final Amendments rule, EPA did not finalize the 
proposed Sec.  68.205, instead finalizing a provision in Sec.  68.93 
requiring certain information to be provided during coordination 
activities. That information included the stationary source's emergency 
response plan (if one exists); emergency action plan; updated emergency 
contact information, and any other information that local planning and 
response organizations identify as relevant to local emergency response 
planning. In petitions submitted to EPA after publication of the final 
Amendments rule, petitioners objected to inclusion of the requirement 
to provide any other information that local planning and response 
organizations identify as relevant to local emergency response 
planning, noting that this requirement placed no limits on what could 
be requested under the provision, provided no protection for CBI, and 
provided no safeguards for security-sensitive information.\100\ To 
address this concern, in the proposed rule, EPA proposed adding CBI and 
classified information provisions to Sec.  68.93. However, with EPA's 
final rule option to replace the requirement to provide any other 
information that local planning and response organizations identify as 
relevant to local emergency response planning with the requirement to 
provide other information necessary for developing and implementing the 
local emergency response plan, which was already in Sec.  68.95(c), and 
limiting the other specific information elements to be provided during 
coordination activities to emergency planning items that generally do 
not contain CBI, EPA no longer sees any need for a CBI provision in 
subpart E. Emergency coordination information generally is made up of 
information not entitled to CBI protection under RMP subpart G or 
information that would have extremely limited protection under the 
EPCRA trade secret provisions covering EPCRA's emergency planning 
subchapter. Under the final rule, the only information that Subpart E 
had not already required to be available to local response officials is 
information on responding facilities' schedules and plans for field and 
tabletop exercises, which should not require disclosure of any CBI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ See CSAG petition, pp 5 EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0766 and RMP 
Coalition petition, pp 7. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0759.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding classified and restricted information, for the same 
reasons previously explained in section V.C.5.a--``Retention of 
classified information provision in Sec.  68.210'', the final rule 
includes a modified form of the proposed rule's classified information 
provision in Sec.  68.93. As with Sec.  68.210, the new provision in 
Sec.  68.93 addresses both classified information (i.e., NSI) and 
restricted information (i.e., CVI, SSI, and PCII). EPA's reference to 
DHS regulations for restricted information in this section does not 
imply an absolute prohibition on the sharing of such information during 
coordination activities, as some local emergency response officials may 
be authorized to receive SSI, PCII, or CVI. However, EPA expects that 
there will be few cases where local emergency coordination activities 
will require exchanges of such restricted information. Regarding NSI, 
very few RMP-regulated facilities possess such information, and EPA 
does not expect that coordination activities involving facilities that 
possess NSI would typically involve such information. As previously 
stated, laws relating to control of NSI generally prohibit its 
disclosure to any persons who do not have an appropriate clearance for 
NSI and a need to know the information.
c. Conflicts With Other Federal Coordination Requirements
    Most commenters supported EPA's proposal to retain the Amendments 
rule requirement for the owner or operator to annually coordinate with 
local responders and provide emergency response plans, emergency action 
plans, and updated contact information during coordination activities. 
A comment submitted by multiple state elected officials stated that the 
provisions in the proposed Reconsideration rule obliging local 
emergency planning and response organizations to coordinate annually on 
emergency response should be deleted from the final rule and should not 
be retained. The commenter argued that a determination of the necessity 
and effectiveness of emergency response coordination in the post-9/11 
era requires consideration, among other things, of the existing 
incident command structure the Federal government has worked to develop 
through the NIMS, coordinated through the DHS and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. The commenter asserted that when an incident occurs, 
State and local emergency responders operate through an established 
incident command structure. The commenter argued that it is essential 
that when promulgating rules relating to emergency response 
coordination EPA consider the numerous overlapping emergency response 
coordination and preparedness requirements in other regulations and 
statutes. The commenter concluded that the Amendments rule failed to 
adequately consider these other provisions, resulting in the potential 
to create confusion among responders, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of their response efforts in the event of a chemical 
facility accident. Furthermore, the commenter argued that creating an 
uncoordinated overlay to an existing incident command structure would 
result in incident response scenarios rife with potential for confusion 
at the precise time any such confusion could be most hazardous. The 
commenter also

[[Page 69898]]

asserted that duplication of existing incident response and incident 
command structure makes emergency response and the organization of 
incident response less effective. Finally, the commenter stated that 
EPA should not engage in rulemaking to establish separate criteria for 
coordination that only frustrate the broader objective of cohesive and 
effective emergency response and serve to overburden already limited 
State and local emergency response financial resources.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the final rule creates any 
conflict with the NIMS.\101\ The NIMS establishes a set of emergency 
management concepts, principles, and methods with the objective of 
producing a standardized but flexible approach to incident management 
at all levels. EPA supports the NIMS and these objectives and believes 
nothing in the RMP rule conflicts with them--commenters presented no 
evidence or examples of where the RMP emergency response coordination 
provisions were incompatible with the NIMS. For the most part, RMP 
emergency response coordination activities take place outside of the 
context of an actual incident; they are intended to be routine, annual 
activities that involve the sharing of information in advance of any 
incident. However, such sharing can and should include collaborating on 
incident planning, incident command, and incident resource and 
information management. Advanced coordination regarding chemical 
releases facilitates the functioning of the NIMS. During exercises and 
actual incidents, EPA encourages owners and operators and local 
response officials to employ NIMS doctrine, such as use of the ICS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See National Incident Management System, https://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system and National 
Incident Management System Third Edition October 2017, available in 
the rulemaking docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Requirement for More Frequent Coordination Should Be Clarified
    An industry trade association, referring to the requirement for 
coordination to occur at least annually, and more frequently if 
necessary, commented that a determination as to whether more frequent 
coordination is needed should be tied to some objectively knowable 
change in circumstances, and notification to the source must occur.
    EPA Response: EPA intends the ``more frequently if necessary'' 
language to address situations where a significant change in either the 
source or its surrounding community has made information exchanged 
during the most recent coordination activity outdated, or where the 
owner or operator and local response officials judge that additional 
coordination should take place sooner than the next annual meeting or 
more frequently than annually on an ongoing basis. In most cases, 
sources and local authorities may have no need to conduct coordination 
activities more frequently than annually. In others, ``more 
frequently'' may mean a one-time additional coordination activity to 
address a specific change at the source or in the community, whereas in 
still others, the owner or operator and local authorities may elect to 
establish an ongoing schedule for coordination activities that is more 
frequent than annual. EPA's rule leaves flexibility for the source and 
the community to determine when additional coordination is needed.
e. Claims That Rescinding Local Coordination Provisions Is Arbitrary 
and Capricious
    A joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters, and a comment submitted by multiple State elected officials 
stated that EPA's proposal to rescind and weaken emergency coordination 
requirements is arbitrary and capricious. These commenters stated that 
according to the standard established in FCC v. Fox Television, EPA is 
required to provide a more detailed rationale to justify the agency's 
proposed changes when the Agency is contradicting prior fact-finding. 
The commenters concluded that EPA did not provide the requisite more 
detailed rationale.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees with these comments. The final rule 
does not rescind, eliminate, or weaken the Amendments rule's emergency 
coordination requirements. The final rule makes a minor but important 
change to the emergency coordination provisions of the Amendments rule 
in order to not create new security vulnerabilities. In the final rule, 
EPA is adopting the alternative proposed language for local 
coordination, which replaces the requirement to provide any other 
information that local responders identify as relevant to local 
emergency response planning with the requirement to provide other 
information necessary for developing and implementing the local 
emergency response plan. As EPA explained in the proposed rule, this 
requirement is virtually identical to the requirement in Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) section 303(d)(3), [42 
U.S.C. 11003(d)(3)], and also appears in Sec.  68.95(c) of the original 
RMP rule, which applies to facilities with Program 2 and Program 3 
processes whose employees respond to accidental releases of regulated 
substances. Therefore, as a result of either the EPCRA section 
303(d)(3) provision or the provision in Sec.  68.95(c), most RMP 
facilities have long been subject to this requirement, and the Agency 
is applying it in the new requirement to the relatively few RMP 
facilities that are not already subject to it under EPCRA section 
303(d)(3) or Sec.  68.95(c), which should not create any security 
vulnerabilities. We note that the RMP Amendments failed to address, or 
even mention, the importance of information on a facility's and a 
community's emergency response plan as a factor in targeting chemical 
facilities.\102\ An open-ended provision would create new potential 
vulnerabilities. EPA believes that adopting the alternative proposed 
language in the final rule will address security concerns with the 
Amendments rule provision while still allowing local responders to 
obtain information needed for emergency response planning. EPA notes 
that the final rule language is not open-ended, and restricts other 
information provided to that needed for developing and implementing the 
local emergency response plan. EPA disagrees that this rationale is 
arbitrary or capricious--it is a rational and reasonable response to 
addressing legitimate security concerns raised by petitioners and does 
not weaken the emergency coordination provisions of the Amendments 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ Department of Justice. April 18, 2000. Assessment of the 
Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated 
with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the 
internet. pp. 38-39. Available in the rulemaking docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Modified Exercise Amendments

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    In the RMP Amendments rule, EPA added a new section entitled Sec.  
68.96 Emergency response exercises. This section contained several new 
provisions, including:
     Notification exercises: At least once each calendar year, 
the owner or operator of a stationary source with any Program 2 or 
Program 3 process must conduct an exercise of the stationary source's 
emergency response notification mechanisms.
     Owners or operators of responding stationary sources are 
allowed to perform the notification exercise as part of the tabletop 
and field exercises required in new Sec.  68.96(b).
     The owner/operator must maintain a written record of each 
notification

[[Page 69899]]

exercise conducted over the last five years.
     Emergency response exercise program: The owner or operator 
of a responding stationary source must develop and implement an 
exercise program for its emergency response program.
     Exercises must involve facility emergency response 
personnel and, as appropriate, emergency response contractors.
     The emergency response exercise program must include field 
and tabletop exercises involving the simulated accidental release of a 
regulated substance.
     Under the RMP Amendments rule, the owner or operator is 
required to consult with local emergency response officials to 
establish an appropriate frequency for exercises, but at a minimum, the 
owner or operator must hold a tabletop exercise at least once every 
three years, and a field exercise at least once every ten years.
     Field exercises must include tests of procedures to notify 
the public and the appropriate Federal, state, and local emergency 
response agencies about an accidental release; tests of procedures and 
measures for emergency response actions including evacuations and 
medical treatment; tests of communications systems; mobilization of 
facility emergency response personnel, including contractors, as 
appropriate; coordination with local emergency responders; emergency 
response equipment deployment; and any other action identified in the 
emergency response program, as appropriate.
     Tabletop exercises must include discussions of procedures 
to notify the public and the appropriate Federal, state, and local 
emergency response agencies; procedures and measures for emergency 
response including evacuations and medical treatment; identification of 
facility emergency response personnel and/or contractors and their 
responsibilities; coordination with local emergency responders; 
procedures for emergency response equipment deployment; and any other 
action identified in the emergency response plan, as appropriate.
     For both field and tabletop exercises, the RMP Amendments 
rule requires the owner or operator to prepare an evaluation report 
within 90 days of each exercise. The report must include a description 
of the exercise scenario, names and organizations of each participant, 
an evaluation of the exercise results including lessons learned, 
recommendations for improvement or revisions to the emergency response 
exercise program and emergency response program, and a schedule to 
promptly address and resolve recommendations.
     The RMP Amendments rule also contains a provision for 
alternative means of meeting exercise requirements, which allows the 
owner or operator to satisfy the requirement to conduct notification, 
field and/or tabletop exercises through exercises conducted to meet 
other Federal, state or local exercise requirements, or by responding 
to an actual accidental release.
    EPA proposed to modify the exercise program provisions of Sec.  
68.96(b), as requested by state and local response officials, by 
removing the minimum frequency requirement for field exercises and 
establishing more flexible scope and documentation provisions for both 
field and tabletop exercises. Under the proposal, EPA would have 
retained the final RMP Amendments rule requirement for the owner or 
operator to attempt to consult with local response officials to 
establish appropriate frequencies and plans for field and tabletop 
exercises. The minimum frequency for tabletop exercises would have 
remained at three years. However, there would have been no minimum 
frequency specified for field exercises in order to reduce burden on 
regulated facilities and local responders as explained in rationale in 
section IV.D.5. ``Costs of Field and Tabletop Exercises'' in the 
proposed rule. Documentation of both types of exercises would still 
have been required, but the items specified for inclusion in exercises 
and exercise evaluation reports under the RMP Amendments rule would 
have been recommended, and not required. The content of exercise 
evaluation reports would have been left to the reasonable judgement of 
stationary source owners or operators and local emergency response 
officials. As described in the RMP Amendments rule, if local emergency 
response officials declined the owner or operator's request for 
consultation on and/or participation in exercises, the owner or 
operator would have been allowed to unilaterally establish appropriate 
frequencies and plans for the exercises (provided that the frequency 
for tabletop exercises does not exceed three years) and conduct 
exercises without the participation of local emergency response 
officials. Likewise, if local emergency response officials and the 
facility owner or operator cannot agree on the appropriate frequency 
and plan for an exercise, owners and operators must still ensure that 
exercises occur and should establish plans to execute the exercises on 
their own. The RMP Amendments rule does not require local responders to 
participate in any of these activities, nor would the proposed 
Reconsideration rule.
    The proposal would not have altered the notification exercise 
requirement of Sec.  68.96(a) or the provision for alternative means of 
meeting exercise requirements of Sec.  68.96(c). EPA proposed to 
correct an error in Sec.  68.96(b)(2)(i) related to the frequency of 
tabletop exercises by proposing to replace the phrase ``shall conduct a 
field exercise every three years'' with ``shall conduct a tabletop 
exercise every three years.'' For provisions of the RMP Amendments that 
were proposed to be retained, the Agency continued to rely on the 
rationale and responses provided when we promulgated the Amendments. 
See 81 FR 13674-76 (proposed RMP Amendments rule), March 16, 2016 and 
82 FR 4659-67 (final RMP Amendments rule), January 13, 2017. In 
summary, EPA found that exercising an emergency response plan is 
critical to ensure that response personnel understand their roles, that 
local emergency responders are familiar with the hazards at the 
facility, and that the emergency response plan is appropriate and up-to 
date. Exercises also ensure that personnel are properly trained and 
that lessons learned from exercises can be used to identify future 
training needs. Poor emergency response procedures during some recent 
accidents have highlighted the need for facilities to conduct periodic 
emergency response exercises. Other EPA and federal agency programs and 
some state and local regulations require emergency response exercises. 
As an alternative, EPA considered whether to fully rescind the field 
and tabletop exercise provisions of Sec.  68.96(b). Under that 
alternative proposal, EPA would have retained the notification exercise 
provision of Sec.  68.96(a) but revised it and Sec.  68.93(b) to remove 
any reference to tabletop and field exercises, while also modifying the 
provision in Sec.  68.96(c) for alternative means of meeting exercise 
requirements so that it applies only to notification exercises.
    EPA also considered another alternative--to remove the minimum 
frequency requirement for field exercises but retain all remaining 
provisions of the RMP Amendments rule regarding field and tabletop 
exercises, including the RMP Amendments rule requirements for exercise 
scope and documentation.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    After review and consideration of public comments, EPA is 
finalizing the changes to the Amendments rule

[[Page 69900]]

exercise requirements as proposed. This rule modifies the field 
exercise frequency provision in Sec.  68.96(b)(1)(i) to remove the 
minimum frequency for field exercises, retains the required 3-year 
frequency for tabletop exercises in Sec.  68.96(b)(2)(i); recommends, 
but does not prescribe the field and tabletop exercise scope 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  68.96(b)(1)(ii) and 68.96(b)(2)(ii); and 
recommends, but does not prescribe the contents of field and tabletop 
exercise evaluation reports required under Sec.  68.96(b)(3) (the final 
rule retains the Amendments rule requirement for such reports to be 
completed within 90 days of each exercise). As proposed, the final rule 
also corrects an erroneous cross-reference in Sec.  68.96(a) of the 
final Amendments rule. In this section, the final Amendments rule 
required the owner or operator of a stationary source with any Program 
2 or Program 3 process to conduct an exercise of the source's emergency 
response notification mechanisms required ``under Sec.  68.90(a)(2) or 
Sec.  68.95(a)(1)(i), as appropriate.'' However, the final Amendments 
rule did not contain Sec.  68.90(a)(2); this was an incorrect reference 
to the notification mechanism requirement for non-responding 
facilities, which is at Sec.  68.90(b)(3). This error is corrected in 
the final Reconsideration rule. The final rule retains all other 
emergency exercise provisions of the Amendments with no changes.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Overview of Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    We do not rescind or revise the emergency exercise requirements of 
the 2017 rule except for limited modifications noted above and 
discussed below. Except for the provisions we modify in this final 
rule, we reaffirm the basis for the positions we adopted in 2017 as 
stated at the time and as elaborated below and in the Response to 
Comments document. The changes we make today tend to add flexibility 
for both stationary sources as well as local emergency response 
organizations. Specifically, we have removed the requirement for 
sources to conduct field exercises no less frequently than every 10 
years, and we have changed certain requirements for the scope of field 
exercises and after exercise reports to advisory provisions (i.e., 
``shall'' to ``should'').
    These changes should reduce the cost and staffing burden of these 
provisions both for sources and for local emergency response 
organizations. While we have not dollarized the cost savings of these 
changes, we take this approach to be conservative in our estimation of 
the benefit of these changes rather than to say there are no cost 
savings. We believe reducing and managing the burden of these 
provisions is important because, in order to have the emergency 
exercise provisions be most effective, we must structure the provisions 
to facilitate the voluntary participation of local emergency response 
organizations in these exercises. These organizations are neither 
directly regulated under the structure of the statute nor are they 
funded under EPA's budget. In particular, we believe the 10 year 
frequency requirement for field exercises would have been burdensome on 
local emergency response organizations with multiple RMP facilities; 9 
counties have 50 or more RMP facilities. There would be no practicable 
way for these response entities to participate in all the exercises 
within their jurisdiction.
    The approach adopted today allows for flexibility in scheduling 
while retaining the requirement to conduct field exercises. Should 
sources abuse the flexibility in scheduling field exercises to the 
extent that they effectively negate the requirement to conduct a field 
exercise, we reserve the ability to argue that they are in non-
compliance. The frequency modification we adopt, along with scope and 
documentation changes, allow for sources and response organizations to 
tailor the exercise plans reasonably and practicably for source-
specific and community-specific conditions.
2. Comments on Proposed Changes to Exercise Requirements
a. General Comments on Exercise Requirements
    Numerous commenters, including industry trade associations, a 
tribal government, an organization representing local governments, and 
an association of government agencies, supported the changes to the 
exercise requirements in the proposed rule. These commenters generally 
acknowledged the benefits of some level of exercises or emergency 
response training. Commenters described benefits such as promoting 
understanding of roles and responsibilities, assisting owners or 
operators in determining if the emergency response plan is adequate, 
and providing the opportunity to discover shortcomings and incorrect 
assumptions in response plans. These commenters indicated that the 
proposed revisions would provide needed flexibility to allow better 
coordination with local responders and ease the compliance burden on 
regulated facilities and local responders. One industry trade 
association provided additional reasons for allowing increased 
flexibility, including the range of resources available to local 
emergency response providers, the range in types of hazards at 
individual facilities, and different levels of interest by communities 
and local response officials.
    On the other hand, several commenters, including a private citizen, 
a Federal agency, a professional organization, and advocacy groups, 
opposed the proposed changes to the emergency response exercise 
requirements. One commenter stated that implementing the proposed 
changes would reduce the safety of chemical facilities and make them 
more incident prone. Some commenters, including a Federal agency and a 
professional organization, expressed concern that the proposed changes 
would negatively impact the preparedness of emergency responders 
because responders would have less opportunity to practice skills 
needed in an emergency. An advocacy group stated that EPA's proposal to 
weaken the exercise requirements is arbitrary and capricious because 
while the Agency claimed its rationale for the changes was to reduce 
the regulatory burden on regulated facilities and local responders, the 
Agency did not project any cost savings from the change. The commenter 
argued that weakening a requirement that the Agency found had concrete 
benefits, without citing any benefits from the change, is arbitrary and 
capricious. The commenters also stated that EPA's alternative proposal 
to fully rescind the exercise requirements is even more arbitrary that 
the proposed modifications, reasoning that removing or weakening the 
exercise provisions is at odds with EPA's record findings and violates 
the statutory mandate to provide for adequate response to chemical 
disasters.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees with commenters that the exercise 
provisions are important to enhance sources' and communities' ability 
to effectively respond to emergencies. The Agency believes removing the 
minimum exercise frequency requirements for field exercises and 
modifying the exercise scope and documentation requirements as proposed 
will still accomplish this goal while providing more flexibility to 
regulated facilities and local responders to plan and schedule 
exercises and reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens.

[[Page 69901]]

    EPA disagrees that changing the exercise requirements by removing 
the minimum required frequency for field exercises and providing 
increased flexibility for the scope and documentation of field and 
tabletop exercises will make facilities more incident-prone. Emergency 
response exercises are aimed at reducing the consequences of accidents 
that may occur rather than preventing accidents from occurring. 
Therefore, changes to these requirements should have little or no 
effect on a facility's propensity for incidents. EPA also disagrees 
that the changes will result in responders having too few opportunities 
to practice their skills. The Agency believes that regulated facilities 
and local responders are in the best position to determine how much 
practice they need in order to be prepared to effectively respond to 
accidental releases. Under the final rule, EPA has largely retained the 
Amendments rule's exercise provisions, which allow facilities and local 
responders to work together to establish a schedule for emergency 
response exercises that best suits their own circumstances. While the 
final rule removes a required minimum frequency for field exercises, it 
retains the required 3-year minimum frequency for tabletop exercises. 
Therefore, the final rule ensures that regulated facilities and local 
responders will still have regular opportunities to practice their 
skills during lower-intensity tabletop exercises, while allowing 
regulated facilities and local responders to schedule the more 
resource-intensive field exercises at a frequency that best balances 
their need for field response training with the larger drain on 
facility and community resources associated with such exercises.
    EPA disagrees that its decision to remove the required minimum 
frequency for field exercises and make the exercise scope and 
documentation requirements more flexible is arbitrary or capricious or 
violates statutory requirements. The Clean Air Act contains no 
requirement that EPA impose an exercise requirement under section 
112(r), and the pre-Amendments rule contained no such requirement. As 
EPA stated in the proposed Reconsideration rule and RIA, EPA retained 
its Amendments rule estimate of exercise costs ``as a conservative 
approach to estimating exercise costs under this proposal. By removing 
the minimum frequency requirement for field exercises and encouraging 
facilities to conduct joint exercises and using exercises already 
conducted under other requirements to meet the requirements of the RMP 
rule, EPA expects that the total number, and therefore costs, of 
exercises held for compliance with the rule is likely to be lower than 
this estimate.'' \103\ EPA's decision not to project a specific amount 
of cost savings associated with these changes does not imply the Agency 
believes that there will be no actual savings. In eliminating the 
required minimum frequency for field exercises, EPA was particularly 
concerned about the burden of exercises on communities with numerous 
RMP facilities. For example, nine U.S. counties contain over 50 RMP 
facilities.\104\ While not all of these facilities are responding 
facilities that will be required to comply with the emergency field 
exercise requirements, many of them are. If EPA were to maintain a 10-
year minimum frequency requirement for field exercises, local emergency 
responders in these counties, and others with large numbers of RMP 
facilities, may have no practical way to effectively participate in all 
required field exercises conducted by responding RMP facilities in the 
county. While the final rule does not require local responders to 
participate in facility exercises, EPA believes it is in the best 
interest of regulated facilities and their surrounding communities for 
local responders to participate in exercises whenever possible, and 
therefore the Agency does not want to establish a minimum frequency 
requirement that is practically unachievable for some communities, 
particularly those communities with the greatest numbers of regulated 
facilities. EPA also believes that the final rule's modification to the 
exercise documentation requirements will give increased flexibility to 
owners and operators in meeting those requirements, making them easier 
to comply with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ See 83 FR 24874 and proposed rule RIA, pp 48.
    \104\ Based on RMP National Database, Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-
2015-0725-0909. Counties include Harris, Dallas, and Tarrant 
counties in Texas, Los Angeles, Kern, Fresno, and Tulare counties in 
California, Cook county in Illinois, and Maricopa county in Arizona.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Frequency of Field Exercises
    Many commenters, including industry trade associations, facilities, 
and a Tribal government, supported the proposed modification of field 
exercise frequency requirements. These commenters generally stated that 
removing the required minimum frequency for field exercises will 
decrease the cost and burden associated with the exercises.
    Many other commenters, including a Federal agency, a State 
government agency, Tribal governments, a State elected official, 
advocacy groups, industry trade associations, and a professional 
organization, opposed the removal of the minimum frequency for field 
exercises. A State elected official stated that EPA may not lawfully 
revise field exercise frequency requirements until it has additional 
information showing the costs were not accurately reflected in the 
Amendments rule and that the costs outweigh the benefits. A State 
elected official stated that the proposed modification of the minimum 
field exercise frequency would not guarantee the prepared and 
coordinated responses to catastrophic releases necessary to protect 
public health and safety. Several commenters, including Tribal 
governments and an industry trade association supported the 10-year 
minimum exercise frequency provided in the Amendments rule, asserting 
that providing some minimum frequency is important. An advocacy group 
stated that the proposed modification of field exercise frequency 
requirements would hurt the effectiveness of first responders and 
facilities during a disaster. A Federal agency stated that training in 
a classroom or via computer-based training modules is not an effective 
substitute for actual exercises, especially when combined with a 
debrief and lessons learned. The agency expressed concern that removal 
of the field exercise frequency requirement would negatively impact the 
coordination and identification of planning gaps and improvements with 
local response authorities. A State government agency stated that 
without a minimum field exercise frequency, exercises can be considered 
optional. A State government agency expressed that field exercises 
should occur annually to allow hands-on practice and mitigate the 
impacts of turnover. The commenter stated that all personnel should 
participate in exercises, and facilities should invite responding 
agencies to participate (with the understanding that they may not be 
able to every year). The commenter recommended that EPA revise the 
emergency response requirements to be consistent with N.J. Admin. Code 
Sec.  7:31-5.2(b)2. An advocacy group suggested a minimum field 
exercise frequency of every two or three years due to turnover of 
facility employees.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees with commenters who indicate that removing 
the minimum field exercise frequency requirement will reduce the burden 
of exercises on facilities and local responders and provide increased 
flexibility to plan and schedule

[[Page 69902]]

exercises. Staffing capabilities are relevant to whether a requirement 
is practicable.
    EPA disagrees that the Agency must demonstrate that the costs of 
exercises outweigh their benefits in order to revise the exercise 
requirements. This claim is not supported by the CAA, and in any case, 
EPA was unable to quantify the benefits of specific provisions of the 
Amendments rule, so it would not be possible to quantify the change in 
benefits, if any, resulting from the change. EPA is making this change 
because the Agency believes it to be a better and more practicable 
approach toward implementing the field exercise requirement, as it will 
allow facilities and local communities greater flexibility to balance 
the need for responder training with the potentially high costs of 
field exercises, particularly in areas containing many RMP facilities 
and areas where response resources are more limited. EPA has decided to 
leave greater flexibilities for the timing of field exercises based in 
part on our belief that such an approach will, in the absence of 
federal funding, maximize the voluntary participation of local 
emergency responders in field exercises.
    EPA also disagrees that there is any specific minimum exercise 
frequency that can ``guarantee'' prepared and coordinated responses to 
chemical accidents. However, EPA believes that allowing facilities and 
local responders greater flexibility to plan and schedule exercises 
will not harm, and may improve, facility and community preparedness for 
accidents, by allowing facilities and communities to better balance 
training needs with available resources. As indicated above, in 
removing the minimum frequency requirement for field exercises, EPA is 
particularly concerned about the burden of exercises on communities 
with numerous RMP facilities and the Agency does not want to establish 
a minimum frequency requirement that is practically unachievable for 
some communities, particularly those communities with the greatest 
numbers of regulated facilities.
    EPA agrees that training in a classroom or via computer-based 
training modules is not an effective substitute for actual exercises, 
and the final rule therefore retains a requirement for all responding 
facilities with program 2 and/or 3 processes to implement a field 
exercise program. EPA disagrees that field exercises can be considered 
optional under the final rule. All responding facilities are still 
required to perform field exercises. When EPA finalized a 10-year 
minimum frequency requirement for field exercises under the Amendments 
rule, the Agency expressed concern that an important reason for such a 
requirement was to avoid allowing sources to schedule field exercises 
so infrequently that the source practically exempted itself from the 
exercise program requirements.\105\ While the final Reconsideration 
rule no longer eliminates this concern, EPA believes that responding 
sources are unlikely to attempt such an approach. The final rule 
requires responding sources to have developed plans for conducting 
emergency response exercises within 4 years of the final rule (see 
later discussion in section IX. Revised Compliance Dates). If a source 
schedules field exercises at some extremely long periodicity, 
repeatedly cancels or reschedules exercises with no justification, or 
provides no evidence of having implemented a field exercise program, 
EPA can still take appropriate enforcement actions under the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See Amendments rule Response to Comments, pp. 181.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA disagrees that field exercises should be required on an annual, 
biennial, or triennial basis. Requiring field exercises to be held at 
shorter minimum frequencies such as these would significantly increase 
compliance costs and staffing demands for both regulated facilities and 
local responder agencies, which is contrary to one of EPA's main 
objectives in the Reconsideration rule. Such an approach would 
discourage the participation of local emergency responders in field 
exercises, which is voluntary under both the RMP Amendments and this 
Reconsideration. The Agency is retaining the Amendments rule 
requirement for responding facilities to perform tabletop exercises at 
least every three years, and these, along with field exercises, should 
mitigate the knowledge loss associated with employee turnover. 
Responding facilities must invite local response officials to 
participate in both field and tabletop exercises, but the scope of each 
exercise will be decided by the owner or operator, in consultation with 
local response officials. Under the final rule, the number of personnel 
participating in exercises will depend on the exercise scenario, its 
scope, and the resources available to regulated facilities and local 
responders.
c. Frequency of Tabletop Exercises
    Several commenters, including industry trade associations, 
facilities, and a Tribal government, supported the proposed tabletop 
exercise frequency requirements. An industry trade association 
suggested that EPA require tabletop exercises less frequently than 
every three years, suggesting that EPA require responding facilities to 
perform one tabletop exercise between field exercises or base the 
frequency of exercise requirements on a facility's particular 
circumstances (e.g., history of catastrophic releases or RMP 
noncompliance, quantity of regulated chemicals). A State government 
agency expressed that tabletop exercises should occur routinely and 
that once every three years is not sufficient because personnel 
turnover is often more frequent than every three years. An industry 
trade association suggested that EPA allow local responders and 
facilities, especially non-responding facilities, to determine the best 
frequency for tabletop exercises.
    EPA Response: EPA acknowledges commenters' arguments for more or 
less frequent tabletop exercises. However, the final rule retains the 
Amendments rule requirement for tabletop exercise frequency, which 
requires responding facilities with any Program 2 or Program 3 process 
to consult with local response officials to establish an appropriate 
frequency for tabletop exercises but hold such exercises at a minimum 
of at least once every three years. EPA believes that a three-year 
minimum frequency for tabletop exercises, combined with field exercises 
done at a frequency established by the owner or operator in 
consultation with local responders, should ensure that facility 
personnel involved in responding to emergencies receive sufficient 
training in response to accidental releases, without overtaxing the 
resources of facilities and local responders. EPA believes that 
allowing owners and operators to work together with local response 
officials to establish exercise plans, scope, and schedules should 
allow each facility to adapt its exercise program to the particular 
circumstances of the facility.
d. Scope and Documentation Requirements
    Many commenters, including industry trade associations and 
facilities, supported the proposed changes to the exercise scope and 
documentation requirements. An industry trade association stated that 
the proposed changes to exercise and evaluation report scope will 
result in a significant reduction in regulatory burden and will allow 
emergency response personnel to make decisions about the type of 
exercise activities that will yield benefits. A few industry trade 
associations asserted that the proposed evaluation report requirements 
would

[[Page 69903]]

encourage cooperation between facility owners and local emergency 
response officials by allowing them to reach agreement on exercise 
evaluation report content. A few commenters, including industry trade 
associations, stated that the proposed flexibility for exercise scope 
will allow owners and operators to tailor exercises based on each 
facility.
    Other commenters either opposed making the scope of exercises and 
exercise evaluation reports optional or objected to certain recommended 
data elements. A State government agency and an advocacy group opposed 
making the scope of exercises and evaluation reports optional. A State 
government agency stated that ``should'' is inappropriate in a rule and 
asserted that the listed activities are standard and reasonable 
requirements. An industry trade association recommended that the 
proposed items recommended for inclusion in evaluation reports be 
considered for rescission, asserting that owners or operators would not 
be able to set a schedule for report recommendations to external 
participants. An industry trade association recommended that EPA either 
rescind the proposed exercise scope provisions or revise them to 
clarify which emergency response equipment procedures must be tested/
discussed and to clarify the requirement to include in exercises any 
other action identified in the emergency response plan, as appropriate. 
Industry trade associations and an advocacy group opposed the inclusion 
of the names and organizations of each participant as recommended data 
elements, for reasons such as burden on facilities, risks to 
individuals' safety, and providing no perceivable benefit.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees that making the scope and documentation 
provisions non-mandatory will reduce regulatory burden and allow 
emergency response personnel flexibility to decide on an exercise scope 
and exercise documentation that will be most appropriate for the 
facility and community. EPA disagrees that the exercise scope 
provisions should be rescinded, made mandatory, or need greater clarity 
regarding which equipment procedures must be tested or what other 
actions identified in the emergency response plan should be included 
during exercises. EPA's reasons for only recommending the descriptions 
of information for the exercise scope and documentation were explained 
in the proposal--in short, the Agency believes that making the listed 
information discretionary will allow owners and operators to coordinate 
with local responders to design exercises that are most suitable for 
their own situations. EPA disagrees that using ``should'' in a 
regulation is always inappropriate, or that there is a recognized 
standard set of activities that must be completed during all exercises. 
Different facilities use a variety of types of emergency response 
equipment and may have many different actions specified in their 
emergency response plans. EPA cannot anticipate all variants of 
equipment and response procedures that might be appropriately exercised 
by every facility subject to the emergency exercise requirements. 
Therefore, EPA has finalized language which provides general guidelines 
for exercise scope, without mandating specific actions or procedures 
for exercises.
    Regarding whether to include the names and organizations of each 
participant in exercise evaluation reports, EPA disagrees that there is 
no benefit of such information. Under the final rule, the frequency of 
both field and tabletop exercises will mainly be left to the discretion 
of the owner or operator, in collaboration with local response 
officials. In some cases, exercises may occur infrequently, and EPA 
believes that maintaining a written record including, among other 
things, the identification and affiliation of exercise participants 
could be useful in planning future exercises. EPA disagrees that 
collecting this information would be unduly burdensome. Owners and 
operators can collect this information using low-cost methods, such as 
sign-in sheets or registration websites. Local emergency response 
organizations participating in exercises will also likely be able to 
assist the owner or operator in collecting and providing this 
information. Nevertheless, EPA notes that under the final rule, the 
items listed for inclusion in exercise evaluation reports are not 
mandatory but suggested. Therefore, while EPA encourages owners and 
operators to include the names and organizations of exercise 
participants in exercise evaluation reports, they are not required to 
do so. Similarly, while EPA encourages owners and operators to include 
in the report recommendations for improvements or revisions to the 
emergency response exercise program and emergency response program, and 
a schedule to promptly address and resolve recommendations, under the 
final rule it is not mandatory to do so.
e. Retention of Requirement To Consult With Local Response Officials to 
Establish Exercise Frequencies and Plans
    Several commenters, including industry trade associations and a 
local agency, supported retaining the requirement to consult with local 
response officials regarding exercise frequency and planning. An 
industry trade association stated that the requirement to consult with 
local response officials provides flexibility while still requiring 
consultation. Another industry trade association stated that exercises 
are most valuable when all entities mentioned in emergency response 
plans participate in drills, but also asked EPA to recognize in the 
preamble to the final rule that facilities will not be penalized for 
lack of participation by LEPCs or emergency responders in drills. A few 
commenters, including an industry trade association and a State elected 
official, opposed the requirement to consult with local response 
officials regarding exercise frequency and planning. An industry trade 
association stated that power plants should be exempt from this 
requirement due to their limited scheduling flexibility and should be 
allowed to develop their own schedules for field exercises, without 
having to agree on a schedule with local officials. This trade 
association recommended that EPA allow facilities to request from the 
regulatory authority an exemption from coordinating that facility's 
field and tabletop exercises with local response officials, stating 
that an exemption from the requirement to attempt to consult with local 
response officials would allow companies that have not been successful 
in gaining the cooperation of local response officials to suspend their 
efforts. The commenter added that such an exemption could be in 
perpetuity or could be subject to an expiration date. An industry trade 
association stated that the proposed emergency coordination 
requirements, including the requirement to consult on schedules and 
plans for exercises, are duplicative and conflict with other statutes 
and regulations.
    EPA Response: The final rule retains the requirement to consult 
with local response officials to establish appropriate frequencies and 
plans for field and tabletop exercises. EPA disagrees that power plants 
should be exempt from this requirement. EPA acknowledges that some 
facilities, such as power plants and other utilities, may have less 
scheduling flexibility than other facilities. However, EPA believes 
that local response officials should still be involved in planning, 
scheduling, and conducting field and tabletop exercises at such 
facilities whenever possible, as they will likely be key players in the 
event of an actual incident, particularly an incident with

[[Page 69904]]

offsite impacts. By involving local public responders in exercises, 
responders may be able to test or simulate important offsite emergency 
response actions that are usually managed by local public emergency 
response officials, such as community notification, public evacuations, 
and sheltering in place. The final rule's removal of the required 
minimum frequency for field exercises should make it easier for owners 
and operators to schedule field exercises involving local responders. 
While the final rule retains the Amendments rule's 3-year minimum 
frequency requirement for tabletop exercises, it does not require the 
first tabletop exercise to be held until up to seven years after the 
effective date of the final rule (i.e., the final rule requires 
responding sources to have exercise plans and schedules in place within 
four years of the effective date of a final rule (Sec.  68.10(d)), but 
provides an additional three years before the first tabletop exercise 
must actually be completed (Sec.  68.96(b)(2)(i)). EPA believes this 
time frame should give all responding facilities sufficient time to 
consult with local response officials to plan and schedule exercises.
    While the final rule retains the requirement for owners and 
operators to coordinate with local response officials on exercise 
frequencies and plans, and to invite local officials to participate in 
exercises, EPA emphasizes that the final rule does not require local 
responders to participate in any of these activities. EPA understands 
that it may not always be possible for such participation to occur, for 
several reasons. First, owners and operators cannot compel local 
responders to participate in exercises or exercise planning. As EPA has 
previously stated,\106\ in the past some sources have been unable to 
locate local response organizations who are able or willing to be 
involved in exercise activities. EPA also acknowledges that in areas 
with few public response resources or high numbers of responding 
facilities, requests from owners and operators for local responders to 
participate in exercises and exercise planning could overburden local 
response organizations. Therefore, if the owner or operator is unable 
to identify a local emergency response organization with which to 
develop field and tabletop exercise schedules and plans and participate 
in exercises, or the appropriate local response organizations are 
unable or unwilling to participate in these activities, then the owner 
or operator may unilaterally establish appropriate exercise frequencies 
and plans, and if necessary hold exercises without the participation of 
local responders. In such cases, there is no need for the owner or 
operator to request from regulatory authorities an exemption from the 
coordination requirement. The owner or operator should document its 
attempts to consult with local responders and continue to make 
reasonable ongoing efforts to consult with appropriate local public 
response officials for purposes of participation in emergency response 
and exercises coordination and participation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ See Amendments rule RTC, page 185.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, while the final rule requires the owner or operator to 
coordinate with local response officials on exercise schedules and 
plans, this does not mean that the owner or operator must accede to 
every recommendation made by local response officials. In most case, 
EPA expects that owners and operators and local response officials will 
be able to reach agreement on reasonable and practicable schedules and 
plans for field and tabletop exercises. However, in the event of a 
disagreement, it is the owner or operator that must comply with the 
exercise requirement and who therefore must have the final say on 
exercise schedules and plans.
    EPA disagrees that the final rule's exercise requirements are 
duplicative of other exercise requirements or conflict with other 
statutes and regulations. The commenter provided no examples of any 
such conflicts, and there are no other existing exercise requirements 
that apply to all responding RMP facilities. Where exercise 
requirements under other Federal, state, or local laws do apply to 
certain RMP facilities, those facilities may use such exercises to meet 
the exercise requirements of the final rule, provided those exercises 
involve the simulated release of a regulated substance or involve the 
same actions that a regulated facility would take to respond to such a 
release.
f. Retention of Notification Exercise Requirements
    Several commenters, including industry trade associations, a State 
government, a facility, and Tribal governments, supported the 
maintenance of the notification exercise requirements. A Tribal 
government encouraged EPA to require facilities to conduct notification 
exercises on a frequent enough basis to ensure that emergency contact 
information is accurate, and that response resources and capabilities 
are in place. A State government agency recommended that the 
notification exercise requirements be applicable to both non-responding 
and responding facilities. An industry trade association stated that 
all facilities should already be conducting notification exercises 
under current rules, and thus the notification exercise requirements 
are not necessary. The commenter also asserted that EPA's proposal 
added ambiguity to the notification exercise requirement by specifying 
that facilities are to conduct notification exercises ``as 
appropriate,'' and that if EPA retains the requirement, the Agency 
should clarify that it affords facilities the discretion to determine 
the appropriateness of exercises.
    EPA Response: The final rule retains the Amendments rule 
notification exercise requirement, with no changes. Almost all 
commenters agreed with retaining this requirement. The notification 
exercise requirement applies to all facilities (i.e., both responding 
and non-responding facilities) with any Program 2 or Program 3 process. 
EPA disagrees that there is any pre-existing requirement for 
notification exercises that applies to all RMP facilities with Program 
2 or Program 3 processes; however, if a previously existing requirement 
applies to certain facilities, those facilities may use compliance with 
that requirement to comply with the final rule requirement, provided 
the owner or operator maintains a written record of each such 
notification exercise conducted over the last five years, as required 
under Sec.  68.96(a). EPA also disagrees that the proposed rule added 
ambiguity to the notification exercise requirement, or that the meaning 
of the phrase ``as appropriate'' is unclear. Where the rule uses the 
phrase ``as appropriate,'' it clearly refers to the immediately 
preceding regulatory text. The proposed rule requires the owner or 
operator of a stationary source with any Program 2 or Program 3 process 
to conduct an exercise of the stationary source's emergency response 
notification mechanisms required ``under Sec.  68.90(b)(3) or Sec.  
68.95(a)(1)(i), as appropriate.'' Sec.  68.90(b)(3) is the requirement 
for non-responding facilities to have an emergency response 
notification mechanism in place. Sec.  68.95(a)(1)(i) is the 
requirement for responding facilities to have procedures for informing 
the public and Federal, state, and local emergency response agencies 
about accidental releases. Therefore, ``as appropriate'' means that 
non-responding facilities should exercise the mechanism required under 
68.90(b)(3) and responding facilities should exercise the procedures 
required under Sec.  68.95(a)(1)(i).

[[Page 69905]]

g. Comments on Alternative Proposal To Fully Rescind Field and Tabletop 
Exercise Provisions
    Several commenters, including industry trade associations, a local 
agency, multiple State elected officials and a facility, supported the 
alternative to fully rescind field and tabletop exercise provisions. A 
facility and an industry trade association supported the proposed 
alternative because the exercise requirements impose significant 
burdens. An industry trade association supported the alternative, 
reasoning that neither the Amendments rule nor this proposed 
Reconsideration rule provided any documented justification for EPA to 
impose these additional requirements on top of other existing 
regulations. An industry trade association and multiple State elected 
officials asserted that the Amendments rule exercise requirements 
should be removed because they would overburden response organizations 
and facilities. These commenters also stated that EPA should not 
establish its own criteria for notifications and exercises, which are 
unnecessary and potentially inconsistent with existing requirements. 
These commenters stated that the NIMS provides a consistent national 
framework and approach to coordination of emergency preparedness, 
prevention, and response, and notifications and exercises should be 
conducted through this system and consistent with it. These commenters 
also stated that during an incident, operations should be conducted 
through the incident command structure established under NIMS, rather 
than by creating an ``uncoordinated overlay'' to the existing incident 
command structure, as the RMP Amendments rule does.
    Several commenters, including a State elected official, industry 
trade associations, and a Tribal government, opposed the alternative to 
fully rescind field and tabletop exercise provisions. A State elected 
official stated that the alternative would not guarantee the prepared 
and coordinated responses to catastrophic releases necessary to protect 
public health and safety (1633). A State elected official opposed the 
alternative because the commenter stated that EPA has not provided an 
explanation for why previous reasons for rejecting the elimination of 
exercise requirements provided in the Amendments rule are no longer 
valid.
    EPA Response: The final rule does not adopt the alternative 
proposal to fully rescind the field and tabletop exercise provisions. 
While EPA is conscious of the potentially high burdens associated with 
exercises, EPA reaffirms its view that both field and tabletop 
exercises are an important component of an emergency response program. 
EPA believes that the changes made to the exercise provisions in the 
final rule will reduce the burden of exercises on responding facilities 
by allowing facilities greater flexibility in scheduling field 
exercises and determining the scope of and documentation for exercises. 
The additional flexibilities in terms of frequency of field exercises 
and scope of exercises also will lessen the burden on local emergency 
response organizations to participate in exercises; facilitating such 
voluntary participation will make the exercises more effective. EPA 
disagrees that the final rule's requirement for exercises conflicts 
with the NIMS. See section VI. ``Modified Local Coordination 
Amendments'' for a further explanation of why EPA believes that nothing 
in the RMP rule conflicts with the NIMS.
h. Comments on Alternative Proposal To Remove the Minimum Frequency 
Requirement for Field Exercises, but Retain All Remaining RMP 
Amendments Provisions Regarding Field and Tabletop Exercises
    Several industry trade associations opposed the alternative 
proposal to remove the minimum frequency requirement for field 
exercises but retain all remaining provisions of the RMP Amendments 
rule regarding field and tabletop exercises. An industry trade 
association opposed the alternative because it would not allow for 
flexibility in determining the scope of exercises. Another industry 
trade association opposed the alternative because it would not allow 
for flexibility in documentation requirements, stating that if a 
facility is captured in a community response plan, no further 
documentation should be needed. Another industry trade association 
stated that the proposed alternative would decrease facility 
flexibility in planning and conducting exercises.
    EPA Response: The final rule does not adopt the alternative 
proposal to remove the minimum frequency requirement for field 
exercises but retain all remaining provisions of the RMP Amendments 
rule regarding field and tabletop exercises. EPA agrees with commenters 
that stated the alternative would not offer sufficient flexibility to 
schedule and plan exercises. EPA believes the changes made to the 
exercise provisions in the final rule will reduce the burden of 
exercises on responding facilities and local responders by allowing 
facilities and responders greater flexibility in scheduling field 
exercises and in deciding on the scope of and documentation for 
exercises.
i. Meeting Exercise Requirements Through Alternative Means
    Several commenters, including industry trade associations, 
supported retaining the provision allowing for exercise requirements to 
be met through alternative means. An industry trade association 
suggested that EPA clarify that prior exercises that ``substantially 
meet'' the exercise requirements satisfy RMP requirements, such as 
exercises conducted under the National Preparedness for Response 
Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines, stating that such a provision would 
help conserve resources among facilities and oversight agencies. The 
commenter also requested that EPA clarify in the final rule that 
companies can make the determination that an alternative meets the 
requirements of the regulation without prior approval from regulatory 
authorities. An industry trade association suggested that for clarity 
EPA should replace the term ``field exercise'' with one of the three 
types of operations-based exercises described under the Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program: Drills, functional exercises, 
or full-scale exercises.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees that the provision allowing exercise 
requirements to be met through alternative means should be retained, 
and therefore the final rule retains this provision. Exercises 
conducted to satisfy other exercise requirements or conducted 
voluntarily, or an actual response by the source to an accidental 
release, will also satisfy the final rule's exercise requirements if 
they meet the requirements of Sec.  68.96. In order to substantially 
meet the exercise requirements of the final rule, a notification 
exercise must test the mechanisms or procedures the facility has 
established to notify the public and local emergency responders about 
the release of a regulated substance and be documented in a written 
record that is retained for five years. A field or tabletop exercise 
must involve the simulated accidental release of a regulated substance 
or involve the same actions (for a tabletop exercise, discussion of 
actions) that a regulated facility would take to respond to such a 
release. Field and tabletop exercises must also involve facility 
emergency response personnel and emergency response contractors as 
appropriate and include response coordination with local public 
emergency response officials, who would also be invited to

[[Page 69906]]

participate in the exercise. Field and tabletop exercises must also 
include preparation of an evaluation report within 90 days of the 
exercise. The final rule does not require the owner or operator to 
obtain outside approval to determine that an alternative exercise meets 
the requirements of the regulation.
    Exercises conducted under the PREP Guidelines are intended for 
facilities required to comply with the federal oil pollution response 
exercise requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. For such an 
exercise to meet the requirements of the RMP rule, the owner or 
operator must ensure that the exercise includes the items required 
under Sec.  68.96. Since not all of these items (e.g., simulated 
accidental release of an RMP-regulated substance) would be a typical 
feature of an oil spill response exercise, the owner or operator would 
likely need to modify the oil spill response exercise scenario to 
incorporate any required features of Sec.  68.96 that were not already 
included in the scenario.
    EPA disagrees that the Agency should replace the term ``field 
exercise'' with one of the three types of operations-based exercises 
described in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP).\107\ The term field exercise is a general term that indicates 
the exercise involves mobilization of personnel and equipment. In this 
sense, field exercises are analogous to the general category of 
operations-based exercises, and EPA believes any of the three types of 
operations-based exercises described in the HSEEP can potentially meet 
the field exercise requirements of the final rule.
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    \107\ See DHS, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP), April 2013, pp. 2-5, available in the rulemaking docket. 
HSEEP discusses two categories of exercises: Discussion-based 
exercises which include seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and 
games; and Operations-based exercises, which include drills, 
functional exercises and full-scale exercises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

j. Tiered Approach To Exercise Requirements
    An industry trade association recommended that EPA consider a 
tiered approach to exercise requirements so that they apply most 
stringently to the facilities that are at risk for having a 
catastrophic release. The commenter suggested several potential options 
for a tiered approach, including by quantity of ammonia, by industry 
sectors with a history of catastrophic events and/or RMP noncompliance, 
by North American Industrial Classification System codes.
    EPA Response: EPA disagrees that the Agency should adopt a tiered 
approach to exercise requirements that applies more stringent 
requirement to facilities that are at risk for a catastrophic release, 
as demonstrated by larger quantities of regulated substances or a 
history of accidents, etc. EPA did not propose such alternatives. The 
Agency views field and tabletop exercises as important components of an 
emergency response program for all responding stationary sources, 
because they allow these sources to implement their emergency response 
plans under simulated release conditions, test their actual response 
procedures and capabilities, identify potential shortfalls, and take 
corrective action. EPA also continues to believe both field and 
tabletop exercises will provide essential training for facility 
personnel and local responders in responding to accidental releases and 
will ultimately mitigate the effects of such releases at RMP 
facilities. Therefore, in the final rule, EPA is requiring all 
responding stationary sources to perform both field and tabletop 
exercises.
k. Joint Exercises
    An advocacy group disagreed with the elimination of joint exercise 
requirements and associated reporting requirements. An industry trade 
association suggested that EPA consider ways in which exercise 
requirements could be revised to recognize sharing of resources among 
neighboring facilities in conducting exercises.
    EPA Response: The Amendments rule contained no requirement for 
joint exercises, and the final rule does not incorporate one. However, 
in the Response to Comments for the Amendments rule, EPA encouraged 
owners and operators of neighboring RMP facilities to consider planning 
and conducting joint exercises to meet the rule's requirements.\108\ 
EPA reaffirms this view--as commenters have noted, RMP facilities 
participating in mutual aid agreements with other nearby facilities 
already coordinate response actions and resources with those 
facilities, and EPA believes conducting joint exercises among these 
facilities will more accurately simulate their behavior in the event of 
an actual release event, and further enhance the ability of these 
facilities and surrounding communities to effectively respond to 
accidental releases. The benefits of joint exercises can also include 
improved identification and sharing of response resources, enhanced 
training for facility personnel and local responders, improvements in 
facility procedures and practices resulting from information sharing, 
and other benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ See Amendments rule Response to Comments, pp. 189-190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

l. Exercise Evaluation Report Time Frame
    Several industry trade associations requested that EPA extend the 
time required for preparing evaluation reports, asserting that reports 
may take longer than 90 days to document.
    EPA Response: EPA has retained the Amendments rule requirement for 
field and tabletop exercise evaluation reports to be completed within 
90 days. EPA disagrees that this timeframe should be extended to some 
longer period. Unlike incident investigations, where report completion 
may require extensive and time-consuming evidence collection and 
forensic analysis, the basic elements required to be documented in an 
exercise evaluation report should be known relatively quickly after the 
conclusion of the exercise. Also, as the final rule only recommends a 
specific list of items to be included in exercise evaluation reports, 
the owner or operator now has additional flexibility to decide on the 
appropriate contents of exercise reports, and this should make it 
easier to meet the 90-day requirement.

VIII. Revised Emergency Response Contacts Provided in Risk Management 
Plan

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    EPA proposed to modify the emergency response contact information 
required to be provided in a facility's RMP. In Sec.  68.180(a)(1) of 
the RMP Amendments rule, EPA required the owner or operator to provide 
the name, organizational affiliation, phone number, and email address 
of local emergency planning and response organizations with which the 
stationary source last coordinated emergency response efforts. EPA 
proposed to modify this requirement to read: ``Name, phone number, and 
email address of local emergency planning and response organizations . 
. . .'' EPA also proposed to update a CFR paragraph cross-reference in 
this section referring to the emergency response coordination provision 
for Program 1 sources, now in Sec.  68.10(g)(3).

B. Summary of Final Rule

    EPA has finalized these changes as proposed.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

    EPA received relatively few comments on these issues. A few 
industry trade associations stated that

[[Page 69907]]

they supported the proposed change to the reporting of emergency 
contact information as required by Sec.  68.180(a)(1) and argued that 
availability of this information could create an increase of security 
and safety concerns. An industry trade association argued that 
providing information about individuals would put the safety of the 
named individuals at risk. In contrast, a joint submission from 
multiple advocacy groups and other commenters argued that EPA's 
concerns with national security risks were not sufficient to limit 
emergency response organizations' contact information.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees with commenters that the revised language 
alleviates a potential security concern. As EPA stated in the proposed 
rule, this change would clarify that the Agency is only requiring 
reporting of organization-level information about local emergency 
planning and response organizations in a facility's RMP rather than 
information about individual local emergency responders. EPA believes 
there is no benefit to requiring the owner or operator to identify 
specific emergency response personnel in their RMP. To the extent local 
emergency responders need the identity of specific individuals for 
purposes of emergency planning, they can obtain this information during 
annual coordination meetings.

IX. Revised Compliance Dates

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    In the RMP Amendments rule, EPA required compliance with the new 
provisions as follows:
     Required compliance with emergency response coordination 
activities by March 14, 2018;
     Required compliance with the emergency response program 
requirements of Sec.  68.95 within three years of when the owner or 
operator initially determines that the stationary source is subject to 
those requirements;
     Required compliance with other major provisions (i.e., 
third-party compliance audits, root cause analyses and other added 
requirements to incident investigations, STAA, emergency response 
exercises, and information availability provisions), unless otherwise 
stated, by March 15, 2021; and;
     Required the owner or operator to correct or resubmit 
their RMP to reflect new and revised data elements promulgated in the 
RMP Amendments rule by March 14, 2022.
    EPA did not specify compliance dates for the other minor changes to 
the Subpart C and D prevention program requirements. Therefore, under 
the RMP Amendments rule, compliance with these provisions was required 
on the effective date of the RMP Amendments rule. In the RMP 
Reconsideration rule, EPA proposed to extend compliance dates as 
follows:
     For emergency response coordination activities, EPA 
proposed to require compliance by one year after the effective date of 
a final rule.
     For emergency response exercises, EPA proposed to require 
owners and operators to have exercise plans and schedules meeting the 
requirements of Sec.  68.96 in place by four years after the effective 
date of a final rule. EPA also proposed to require owners and operators 
to have completed their first notification drill by five years after 
the effective date of a final rule, and to have completed their first 
tabletop exercise by 7 years after the effective date of a final rule. 
Under this proposal, there would be no specific compliance date 
specified for field exercises, because field exercises would be 
conducted according to a schedule developed by the owner or operator in 
consultation with local emergency responders.
     For corrections or resubmissions of RMPs to reflect 
reporting on new and revised data elements (public meeting information 
and emergency response program and exercises), EPA proposed to require 
compliance by five years after the effective date of a final rule.
     For third-party audits, STAA, root cause analyses and 
other new provisions of the RMP Amendments rule for incident 
investigations and chemical hazard information availability and notice 
of availability of information, as well as other minor changes to the 
Subpart C and D prevention program requirements (except for (1) the two 
changes that would revise the term ``Material Safety Data Sheets'' to 
``Safety Data Sheets (SDS)'' in Sec. Sec.  68.48 and 68.65, (2) the use 
of the term ``report(s)'' in place of the word ``summary(ies)'' in 
Sec.  68.60, and (3) the requirement in Sec.  68.60 for Program 2 
processes to establish an incident investigation team consisting of at 
least one person knowledgeable in the process involved and other 
persons with experience to investigate an incident), EPA proposed to 
rescind these provisions. If the final rule did not rescind these 
provisions, EPA proposed to require compliance with any of these 
provisions that are not rescinded, by four years after the effective 
date of a final rule.
     For the public meeting requirement in Sec.  68.210(b), EPA 
proposed to require compliance by two years after the effective date of 
a final rule.
     EPA proposed to retain the requirement to comply with the 
emergency response program requirements of Sec.  68.95 within three 
years of when the owner or operator initially determines that the 
stationary source is subject to those requirements.
    For provisions of the RMP Amendments that EPA proposed to retain, 
EPA relied on the rationale and responses provided when EPA promulgated 
the Amendments. See 81 FR 13686-91 (proposed RMP Amendments rule), 
March 14, 2016 and 82 FR 4675-80 (final RMP Amendments rule), January 
13, 2017.
    For the emergency coordination requirements, EPA found that one 
year was sufficient to arrange and document coordination activities, 
three years was needed to comply with emergency response program 
requirements once a source determined that those requirements applied, 
and five years was necessary to update risk management plans. Three 
years to develop an emergency response program is necessary for 
facility owners and operators to understand the requirements, arrange 
for emergency response resources and train personnel to respond to an 
accidental release. EPA stated that compliance with emergency 
coordination requirements could require up to one year because some 
facilities who have not been regularly coordinating will need time to 
get familiar with the new requirements, while having some flexibility 
in scheduling and preparing for coordination meetings with local 
emergency response organizations whose resources and time for 
coordination may be limited. EPA also argued that a shorter timeframe 
may be difficult to comply with, especially for RMP sources whose local 
emergency organization has many RMP sources in their jurisdiction who 
are trying to schedule coordination meetings with local responders at 
the same time.
    For the emergency response exercises, EPA proposed a four year 
compliance time for developing exercise plans and schedules, an 
additional year for conducting the first notification exercise, and an 
additional three years for conducting the first tabletop exercise, 
because EPA believed that additional time is necessary for sources to 
understand the new requirements for notification, field and tabletop 
exercises, train facility personnel on how to plan and conduct these 
exercises, coordinate with local responders to plan and schedule 
exercises, and carry out the exercises. Additional time would also 
provide owners and operators with flexibility to

[[Page 69908]]

plan, schedule, and conduct exercises in a manner which is least 
burdensome for facilities and local response agencies. Also, EPA 
planned to publish guidance for emergency response exercises and once 
these materials are complete, owners and operators would need time to 
familiarize themselves with the materials and use them to plan and 
develop their exercises. If local emergency response organizations are 
to be able to participate in the field and tabletop exercises, 
sufficient time is needed to accommodate any time or resource 
limitations local responders might have not only for participating in 
exercises, but for helping to plan them.
    For the public meeting requirement in Sec.  68.210(b), EPA proposed 
to require compliance by two years after the effective date of a final 
rule. The RMP Amendments rule allows four years for compliance for the 
public meeting which was consistent with the compliance date for other 
information to be required to the public by Sec.  68.210. However, EPA 
proposed to remove the requirement to provide to the public the 
chemical hazard information in Sec.  68.210(b), the notice of 
availability of information in Sec.  68.210(c), and the timeframe for 
providing information in Sec.  68.210(d), as well as to remove the 
requirement to provide the chemical hazard information in Sec.  
68.210(b) at the public meeting. The stationary source would only be 
required to provide the chemical accident data elements specified in 
Sec.  68.42(b), data which should already be familiar to the source 
because this information is currently required to be reported in their 
risk management plan. Thus, EPA proposed that two years should be 
enough time for facilities to be prepared to provide the required 
information at a public meeting after an RMP reportable accident.
    With regard to the five-year compliance date for updating RMPs with 
newly-required information, EPA proposed this time frame because EPA 
will need time to revise its RMP submission guidance for any provisions 
finalized and also to revise its risk management plan submission 
system, RMP*eSubmit, to include additional data elements. Sources will 
not be able to update risk management plans until the revised 
RMP*eSubmit system is ready. Also, once the software is ready, some 
additional time is needed to allow sources to update their risk 
management plans while preventing potential problems with thousands of 
sources submitting updated risk management plans on the same day.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    With the exception of the proposed compliance dates for emergency 
response coordination activities and public meetings, EPA is finalizing 
compliance dates as proposed. For the following minor prevention 
provisions that EPA is retaining, the final rule does not extend their 
compliance date, which was the effective date of the Amendments rule:
    (1) The two changes that would revise the term ``Material Safety 
Data Sheets'' to ``Safety Data Sheets (SDS)'' in Sec. Sec.  68.48 and 
68.65,
    (2) the use of the term ``report(s)'' in place of the word 
``summary(ies)'' in Sec.  68.60, and
    (3) the requirement in Sec.  68.60 for Program 2 processes to 
establish an incident investigation team consisting of at least one 
person knowledgeable in the process involved and other persons with 
experience to investigate an incident).
    The compliance date for the revised emergency response coordination 
provisions is set to the final rule effective date, as specified under 
Sec.  68.10(a)(4), which establishes the final rule effective date as 
the default compliance date for any revisions to part 68 unless 
otherwise specified. EPA made this change from the proposed rule 
because of the D.C. Circuit Court vacatur of the RMP Delay Rule, which 
made the emergency coordination provisions from the Amendments rule 
effective on September 21, 2018. Because sources are already required 
to comply with these requirements as a result of the Delay Rule 
vacatur, and no new obligations are created related to emergency 
response coordination activities by the Reconsideration rule, EPA does 
not believe additional time is needed to comply with the revised 
emergency response coordination requirements.
    For public meetings, EPA is retaining the compliance date 
established in the Amendments rule. The Court's vacatur of the Delay 
Rule made the Amendments rule public meeting provision effective with a 
future compliance date of March 15, 2021. As with the revised emergency 
coordination requirements, the final rule creates no new obligations 
relative to the public meeting requirements, and EPA therefore sees no 
reason to further delay this compliance date.
    Regarding the five-year compliance date for updating RMPs with 
newly-required information, the final rule clarifies that applicable 
new information elements associated with public meetings, emergency 
response programs, and emergency response exercises are required to be 
provided in any risk management plan initial submission or update 
required by pre-Amendments regulations to be submitted later than five-
years after the final rule effective date. In other words, newly 
registered sources are not required to provide applicable new 
information elements in their initial risk management plan submission 
for initial submissions made prior to five years beyond the final rule 
effective date, and currently registered sources are not required to 
update and resubmit their plans to provide the applicable new 
information elements until the source reaches its next five-year 
anniversary date or another update trigger specified in Sec.  68.190 
that occurs after five years beyond the final rule effective date. EPA 
notes that when any of these triggers are reached, sources must include 
the new information element in Sec.  68.160(b)(21), indicating whether 
a public meeting has been held, and the completion dates of the most 
recent notification, field and tabletop exercises as required under 
Sec.  68.180, as applicable. EPA added the term ``as applicable'' in 
the emergency response program and exercise reporting compliance date 
provision of Sec.  68.10(f)(4) because the provision refers to Sec.  
68.180(b), which contains requirements that do not apply to all sources 
(e.g., only responding sources with Program 2 or 3 processes are 
required to perform field and tabletop exercises). EPA added ``as 
applicable'' to Sec.  68.10(b) and (d) for the same reason. EPA also 
notes that some sources may not have completed initial tabletop and 
field exercises by the time their RMP is updated following the five-
year compliance date specified in Sec.  68.10(f)--in such cases, these 
dates would not be required to be included in the updated submission. 
Sources may but are not required to update or correct their RMP to add 
applicable new information elements any time after EPA makes this new 
functionality available within EPA's online RMP submission system, 
RMP*eSubmit.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Overview of Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    The final rule is the culmination of a substantive review of the 
provisions promulgated in 2017 and in effect since the AAH mandate 
issued on September 21, 2018. In setting compliance dates for the 
provisions retained from the 2017 rule or modified by this rule, EPA 
has assessed how to achieve compliance as expeditiously as practicable 
with each individual provision. For example, we

[[Page 69909]]

have retained the Amendments rule compliance dates for the emergency 
coordination and public meeting provisions even though we have made 
minor changes because these do not impose additional burden on sources 
for compliance. Sources are already required to comply with the 
Amendments rule's emergency coordination provisions, and compliance 
with the final rule's revised provision can be met on a going-forward 
basis. These are like the minor procedural requirements that the 
legislative history suggests can be quickly met. See Senate Report at 
245. Similarly, the Amendments rule established a compliance date of 
March 15, 2021 for the public meeting provision, and the changes made 
to this provision in the final rule narrow its applicability and do not 
impose any additional compliance burden on sources still subject to it. 
Therefore, EPA sees no reason to further delay the public meeting 
compliance date established under the Amendments rule.
    The most significant change of compliance date and terms of 
compliance involves the dates by which sources must plan and conduct 
emergency exercises. We believe the schedule we adopt today better 
accounts for the burden upon local emergency response organizations for 
voluntarily participating in these exercises. While it is not a mandate 
of the rule to have local responders participate in any of the 
exercises, we believe the most effective drills will involve the 
participation of these entities in source drills. We believe retaining 
a March 15, 2021 compliance date for the provisions of Sec.  68.96 
would overwhelm many local emergency response organizations and 
discourage their participation. This is especially true at the counties 
with multiple facilities subject to the RMP rule, including several 
with more than 50 facilities. The need for local emergency responders 
to voluntarily participate in emergency exercises despite the lack of 
funding and the inability of EPA to compel their participation makes 
this requirement more like the specialized programs that would require 
more time to implement than the pure procedural provisions. See Senate 
Report at 245. We believe the new time frames set compliance dates that 
are as expeditious as practicable for meeting the goals of the 
emergency exercise provisions. Other changes to compliance dates we 
make in the final rule better coordinate information submissions in 
RMPs with the development of the revised content of those submissions. 
Allowing sources to provide new information elements whenever their 
next submission would otherwise have been required will also prevent 
thousands of sources from being required to resubmit RMPs on the same 
date.
2. Comments on Compliance Date for Emergency Response Coordination 
Activities
    An advocacy group argued that emergency response coordination 
activity requirements should not be further delayed. A joint comment 
submission from multiple advocacy groups and other commenters stated 
that further delay of coordination activities conflicted with EPA 
statutory requirements. In contrast, a few industry trade associations 
stated that EPA should provide a longer lead time for compliance of 
emergency response coordination activities to increase flexibility and 
allow for more effective emergency plans.
    EPA Response: The final rule requires compliance with the revised 
emergency response coordination requirements on the effective date of 
the final rule. While EPA disagrees that further delaying compliance 
dates for this requirement would necessarily conflict with statutory 
requirements, EPA made this change from the proposed rule because of 
the D.C. Circuit Court vacatur of the RMP Delay Rule, which made the 
emergency coordination provisions from the Amendments rule effective on 
September 21, 2018. Because sources are already required to comply with 
the Amendments rule coordination requirements, and no new obligations 
are created related to emergency response coordination activities by 
the Reconsideration rule, EPA does not believe additional time is 
needed to comply with the emergency response coordination requirements.
3. Comments on Emergency Response Program Compliance Date
    An industry trade association expressed support for requiring 
compliance with the emergency response program requirements of Sec.  
68.95 within 3 years of when the owner or operator initially determines 
that the stationary source is subject to those requirements.
    EPA Response: EPA agrees with the commenter and did not propose any 
changes to this requirement. The final rule retains the Amendments rule 
requirement for compliance with the emergency response program 
requirements of Sec.  68.95 within 3 years of when the owner or 
operator initially determines that the stationary source is subject to 
those requirements.
4. Comments on Compliance Date for Emergency Response Exercises
    A State government agency expressed opposition to allowing 
facilities seven years from the effective date of the final 
Reconsideration rule to conduct a tabletop exercise, indicating that 
facilities can coordinate with local officials and conduct an initial 
tabletop exercise within three years of the effective date of the rule.
    An industry trade association supported the proposed changes to the 
exercise compliance dates, indicating that it would provide greater 
flexibility to meet the requirements. Another trade association 
supported EPA's proposed requirement to have exercise plans and 
schedules in place within four years of the effective date of the final 
rule but stated that deadlines for the first exercise would be 
established in the exercise schedule developed in consultation with 
local responders. Two industry trade associations questioned whether 
extended compliance times in the proposed Reconsideration Rule were 
necessary given that a response structure existed under EPCRA and the 
OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard. One of 
these trade associations stated that a shorter compliance time of a 
year would be appropriate if cooperation with LEPC was obtained.
    EPA Response: As EPA stated in the proposed rule, we believe that 
additional time is necessary for many sources to understand the new 
requirements for exercises, train personnel, coordinate with local 
responders, and carry out the exercises. Additional time will also 
provide owners and operators with flexibility to plan, schedule, and 
conduct exercises in a manner which is least burdensome for facilities 
and local response agencies. EPA disagrees that either EPCRA or the 
OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard contain 
exercise requirements analogous to those in the final rule.
    While EPA agrees that in some cases, sources will not need four 
years to plan exercises and an additional three years to complete a 
tabletop exercise, EPA remains concerned about requiring exercises to 
be completed sooner, particularly in communities with numerous RMP 
facilities (see section VII. ``Modified Exercise Amendments,'' for 
further discussion of this issue). If EPA requires compliance with 
field and tabletop exercise requirements without providing sufficient 
lead time for compliance, local emergency responders

[[Page 69910]]

in communities with large numbers of RMP facilities may have no 
practical way to effectively participate in tabletop and field 
exercises conducted by responding RMP facilities in the community. 
While the final rule does not require local responders to participate 
in facility exercises, EPA believes it is in the best interest of 
regulated facilities and their surrounding communities for local 
responders to participate in exercises whenever possible, and therefore 
the Agency does not want to establish a compliance time frame that 
overburdens facilities or local responders. Also, EPA plans to publish 
guidance for emergency response exercises and once these materials are 
complete, owners and operators will need time to familiarize themselves 
with the materials and use them to plan and develop their exercises. 
EPA encourages owners and operators and local emergency response 
officials to plan and conduct exercises sooner than required under the 
final rule if facility and community resources are available for the 
exercises.
5. Comments on Compliance Date for Corrections or Resubmissions of RMPs 
for New and Revised Data Elements
    An industry trade association supported EPA's proposal to require 
sources to update their risk management plans by five years after the 
effective date of the final rule.
    EPA Response: The final rule allows sources at least five years 
after the effective date of the final rule to update their risk 
management plans. The final rule makes clear that sources would be 
required to provide applicable new information elements associated with 
revised provisions in any required risk management plan submission made 
later than 5 years after the effective date of the final rule.
6. Comments on Compliance Date for Public Meeting Requirements
    An industry trade association expressed support for EPA's proposed 
compliance date for the public meeting requirements of two years after 
the effective date of a final rule. Another industry trade association 
argued that the deadline for implementing the public meeting 
requirement should be four years after the effective date of the final 
rule.
    EPA Response: In the final rule, EPA is requiring compliance with 
the public meeting requirements for specified accidents that occur 
after March 15, 2021. This means that for any accident with any known 
offsite impacts specified in Sec.  68.42(a) that occurs after March 15, 
2021, the owner or operator must conduct a public meeting within 90 
days of the accident. In the proposed rule, EPA argued that with the 
rescission of the other public information availability requirements of 
the Amendments rule, two years would be enough time for facilities to 
be prepared to provide the required information at a public meeting. 
However, the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in the AAH case placed the 
Amendments rule provision into effect with a compliance date of March 
15, 2021. As the changes made to this provision in the final rule 
narrow its applicability and do not impose any additional compliance 
burden on sources still subject to it, EPA sees no reason to further 
delay the compliance date established under the Amendments rule. 
Sources should still have ample time to prepare to conduct public 
meetings.
7. Other Comments on Compliance Dates
    Many industry trade associations stated that the proposed 
compliance date delays would allow facilities time to evaluate and 
develop strategies to ensure compliance. Similarly, an industry trade 
association argued that the proposed compliance dates were reasonable 
because some requirements of the rule may require consultation with 
third-parties that may have time constraints and limited resources.
    On the other hand, an advocacy group and multiple State elected 
officials argued that EPA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for 
further delaying compliance dates for local emergency coordination, 
emergency response exercises, and public meetings provisions. 
Similarly, a joint submission from multiple advocacy groups and other 
commenters argued that further delay of compliance dates of provisions 
that EPA proposed to retain would be unlawful and arbitrary. A tribal 
government argued that further delay of compliance dates would 
potentially endanger the public, responding emergency personnel, and 
the environment.
    EPA Response: EPA has provided a reasoned explanation for each of 
the compliance dates established in the final rule.
    An indication of EPA's serious consideration of compliance date 
extensions for each remaining provision of the Amendments rule is that 
the final rule does not extend compliance dates for every modified 
Amendments rule provision, and where compliance dates are extended, not 
all of those dates are tolled relative to their original compliance 
date. The Agency has not extended the compliance date of the emergency 
coordination provision or the few minor prevention provisions retained 
in the final rule, as regulated facilities are already required to 
comply with them, and any changes made by EPA do not introduce any new 
compliance obligations. EPA also retained the compliance date for the 
public meeting requirement established in the Amendments rule. Instead 
of tolling the compliance date for this provision, EPA retained the 
Amendments rule's compliance date (March 15, 2021) because of the 
reduced compliance obligation associated with the rescission of the 
other information availability provisions and the narrower scope and 
applicability of the revised public meeting provision under the final 
rule.
    Compliance dates for the exercise provisions were extended because 
EPA made more substantial changes to those provisions, and because the 
Agency remains concerned about the high burden of emergency response 
exercises on both regulated facilities and emergency responders, 
particularly in areas with numerous RMP-regulated facilities. While we 
do not mandate participation of local emergency responders in any of 
the drills, EPA has always viewed as important and encouraged their 
participation. We have concerns about making the requirement overly-
burdensome on their participation. By deferring the date these exercise 
requirements must begin, we give the responders more lead-time to plan 
their participation. Recognizing that the legislative history and the 
AAH decision both emphasize the need for setting compliance dates early 
when changes are simple to implement like small procedural changes, we 
believe that retaining the March 2021 compliance date would interfere 
with obtaining participation of local emergency responders. Deferring 
the compliance date until December 19, 2023, facilitates more effective 
exercises by allowing local response personnel to familiarize 
themselves with facilities, to review EPCRA information from facilities 
and the EPCRA plan for the community, to obtain necessary funding and 
staffing to participate in exercises, all while continuing to perform 
their overall emergency planning and response duties. While it may be 
nominally possible for owners and operators to reach out to local 
responders as had been required by the Amendments rule by March 2021, 
we believe delaying the compliance date for planning and scheduling 
exercises until December 19, 2023, and providing

[[Page 69911]]

additional time for conducting initial notification, tabletop, and 
field exercises, would promote more effective participation of 
emergency responders, and thus is more like the complex steps the 
legislative history suggests may need longer lead-times before 
compliance is required. Therefore, we believe requiring exercise 
schedules and plans to be completed by December 19, 2023, assures 
compliance with the emergency exercise requirement as expeditiously as 
practicable.
    The new information required to be reported in the RMP concerns 
compliance with provisions of the RMP Amendments retained or modified 
in the RMP Reconsideration rule. The compliance date for the new 
information necessarily must follow the compliance dates for the 
substantive changes to the underlying rules. We recognize that some 
requirements, like the emergency coordination requirement, have 
required compliance since the mandate for the AAH decision issued, 
while other requirements in the final rule require compliance in 2021 
or later. While it would be possible to phase in RMP changes to 
coincide with these compliance dates, we note that the RMP is generally 
a periodic report submitted every five years. Rather than requiring 
multiple amended or new RMP reports shortly after the compliance date 
for each new provision, which we believe would be impractical in terms 
of administration, enforcement, and compliance, we are requiring 
sources to comply with the amended RMP information requirements in the 
next RMP required to be submitted later than one year after they must 
comply with the requirement to have completed a plan and schedule under 
the new exercise requirement. This would be at the end of the phase-in 
period for most provisions, and after completion of the initial 
notification exercises for all sources subject to that provision.
    EPA believes this rationale is a reasonable justification for 
extending the compliance dates under the final rule. The extended 
compliance dates do not endanger the public, emergency responders, or 
the environment because in every case they relate to provisions which 
have not yet been implemented, so delaying compliance causes no loss of 
public or environmental protection relative to the pre-Amendments rule, 
which remains fully in effect during the phase-in of the new 
provisions.

X. Corrections to Cross Referenced CFR Sections

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    EPA proposed to correct CFR section numbers that were cross 
referenced in certain sections of the rule because these were changes 
necessitated by addition and re-designation of the paragraphs 
pertaining to compliance dates in Sec.  68.10 in the RMP Amendments 
rule but were overlooked at the time. The addition of a new separate 
compliance date paragraph for public meetings added in the proposed 
Reconsideration rule (now Sec.  68.10(f)), results in old paragraphs 
(f) through (j) being redesignated as (g) through (k). Other 
corrections involve cross references to CFR sections for the compliance 
dates proposed in Sec.  68.96 for the first notification and tabletop 
exercises that were overlooked when updating compliance schedule 
information in Sec.  68.215 (a)(2)(i). References to ``paragraph (b)'' 
and ``paragraph (g)'' in now redesignated paragraphs Sec.  68.10 (h) 
and (i), were not updated in the Amendments or proposed Reconsideration 
rule, so EPA is correcting these references. EPA is also correcting a 
typographical error in the proposed rule that inadvertently deleted 
``or;'' at the end of Sec.  68.215 (a)(2)(i). Table 4 contains a list 
of the corrections.

                       Table 4--Corrections or Changes to Cross Referenced Section Numbers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             In section:                                     Change in section reference:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   68.10........................................................  Sec.   68.10(f) through (j) is now (g)
                                                                       through (k).
Sec.   68.10(h).....................................................  Text ``paragraph (b)'' should be
                                                                       ``paragraph (g)''
                                                                      Text ``paragraph (g)'' should be
                                                                       ``paragraph (i)''
Sec.   68.10(i).....................................................  Text ``paragraph (b)'' should be
                                                                       ``paragraph (g)''
Sec.   68.12(b).....................................................  Sec.   68.10(b) should be Sec.   68.10(g).
Sec.   68.12(b)(4)..................................................  Sec.   68.10(b)(1) should be Sec.
                                                                       68.10(g)(1).
Sec.   68.12(d).....................................................  Sec.   68.10(d) should be Sec.   68.10(i).
Sec.   68.12(c).....................................................  Sec.   68.10(c) should be Sec.   68.10(h).
Sec.   68.96(a).....................................................  Sec.   68.90(a)(2) should be Sec.
                                                                       68.90(b)(3).
Sec.   68.180(a)(1).................................................  Sec.   68.10(f)(3) should be Sec.
                                                                       68.10(g)(3).
Sec.   68.215(a)(2)(i)..............................................  Sec.   68.10(a) should be Sec.   68.10(a)
                                                                       through (f), Sec.   68.96(a) and
                                                                       (b)(2)(i), followed by ``or;''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Summary of Final Rule

    EPA is finalizing all proposed corrections to cross referenced CFR 
section numbers.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

    EPA received no comments on this issue.

XI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

    Additional information about these statutes and Executive Orders 
can be found at https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders.

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and Executive 
Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review

    This action is a significant regulatory action that was submitted 
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. Any changes 
made in response to OMB recommendations have been documented in the 
docket. EPA prepared an analysis of the potential costs and benefits 
associated with this action. This analysis, ``Regulatory Impact 
Analysis: Reconsideration of the 2017 Amendments to the Accidental 
Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 
Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7)'' is available in the docket (Docket 
ID Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725).

B. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs

    This action is an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory action. 
Details on the estimated cost savings of this final rule can be found 
in EPA's analysis of

[[Page 69912]]

the potential costs and benefits associated with this action.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ Regulatory Impact Analysis--Reconsideration of the 2017 
Amendments to the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk 
Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). This 
document is available in the docket for this rulemaking (Docket ID 
Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    The information collection activities in this rule have been 
submitted for approval to the OMB under the PRA. The Information 
Collection Request (ICR) document that the EPA prepared has been 
assigned EPA ICR number 2537.05 and OMB Control No. 2050-0216. You can 
find a copy of the ICR in the docket for this rule, and it is briefly 
summarized here. The information collection requirements are not 
enforceable until OMB approves them.
    On January 13, 2017 (82 FR 4594), EPA published in the Federal 
Register the Risk Management Program Amendments rule (Amendments rule). 
The Amendments rule added several requirements to the RMP rule, 
including several requirements that would impose information collection 
burdens on regulated entities. EPA is now finalizing a rule that 
reconsiders the Amendments rule, including retaining, retaining with 
modification, or rescinding provisions from the Amendments rule 
(Reconsideration rule).
    This ICR addresses the Amendments rule information collection 
requirements impacted by the Reconsideration rule. A summary of how the 
Reconsideration rule impacts the Amendments rule information collection 
requirements is provided in the following table.

 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Amendments rule information collection                         Reconsideration rule action
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Improve information availability (applies to all facilities)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Make certain information related to the risk management program           Rescinded.
 available to the public upon request.
Hold a public meeting within 90 days of an accident subject to reporting  Retained with modification.
 under Sec.   68.42 (i.e., an RMP reportable accident).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  XRevise accident prevention program requirements (applies to P2 and P3 facilities unless otherwise specified)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hire a third-party to conduct the compliance audit after an RMP           Rescinded.
 reportable accident or after an implementing agency determines that
 conditions at the stationary source could lead to an accidental release
 of a regulated substance or identifies problems with the prior third-
 party audit.
Conduct and document a root cause analysis after an RMP reportable        Rescinded.
 accident or a near miss.
Conduct and document a safer technology and alternatives analysis (STAA)  Rescinded.
 for a subset of Program 3 facilities in North American Industrial
 Classification System (NAICS) codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324
 (petroleum and coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical
 manufacturing).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Improve emergency preparedness (applies to P2 and P3 facilities)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meet and coordinate with local responders annually to exchange emergency  Retained with modification.
 response planning information.
Conduct an annual notification drill to verify emergency contact          Retained.
 information.
Responding facilities conduct and document emergency response exercises   Retained with modification.
 including:
A field exercise at least every ten years, and
A tabletop exercise at least every three years.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Respondents/affected entities: Manufacturers, utilities, 
warehouses, wholesalers, food processors, ammonia retailers, and gas 
processors.
    Respondent's obligation to respond: Mandatory (CAA sections 
112(r)(7)(B)(i) and (ii), CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii), 114(c), CAA 
114(a)(1)).
    Estimated number of respondents: 14,280.
    Frequency of response: On occasion.
    Total estimated burden reduction: 1,071,161 hours (per year). 
Burden is defined at 5 CFR 1320.3(b).
    Total estimated cost reduction: $92,078,752 (per year), includes 
$8,259,750 annualized capital or operation & maintenance cost 
reduction.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a 
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers for the 
EPA's regulations in 40 CFR are listed in 40 CFR part 9. When OMB 
approves this ICR, the Agency will announce that approval in the 
Federal Register and publish a technical amendment to 40 CFR part 9 to 
display the OMB control number for the approved information collection 
activities contained in the final rule.

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

    I certify that this action will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the RFA. In 
making this determination, the impact of concern is any significant 
adverse economic impact on small entities. An agency may certify that a 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities if the rule relieves regulatory burden, has no 
net burden or otherwise has a positive economic effect on the small 
entities subject to the rule.
    The final RMP Amendments rule considered a broad range of costs on 
small entities based on facility type. As estimated in the 2017 
Amendments RIA, the provisions in that final rule had quantifiable 
impacts on small entities. This action largely repeals, or retains with 
slight modification, the provisions incurring costs on small entities. 
As a result, EPA expects this action to provide cost savings for all 
facilities, including small entities. Specifically, as explained in 
Unit I.E.1, EPA estimates annualized cost savings of $87.4 million at a 
3% discount rate and $87.8 million at a 7% discount rate.
    The only new costs imposed on small entities would be rule 
familiarization with the final rule, which as discussed further, would 
not exceed 1% of annual revenues for any small entity affected by this 
rule. The final rule affects 5,193 facilities owned by small entities, 
none of which will experience economic burdens in excess of 1% of 
revenues as a result of this rule. This action will

[[Page 69913]]

relieve regulatory burden for all directly regulated small entities. 
The impact of this action on small entities is discussed further in the 
RIA, which is available in the rulemaking docket. We have therefore 
concluded that this action will relieve regulatory burden for all 
directly regulated small entities.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)

    This action does not contain any unfunded mandate as described in 
UMRA, 2 U.S.C 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect 
small governments. The action imposes no enforceable duty on any state, 
local or tribal governments. While the private sector has compliance 
obligations under the RMP regulations, this action is deregulatory, in 
the aggregate, on the private sector.

F. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have 
substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between 
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

G. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    This action has tribal implications. However, it will neither 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on federally recognized 
tribal governments, nor preempt tribal law. There are approximately 260 
RMP facilities located on tribal lands. Tribes could be impacted by the 
final rule either as an owner or operator of an RMP-regulated facility 
or as a tribal government when the tribal government conducts emergency 
response or emergency preparedness activities under EPCRA.
    The EPA consulted with tribal officials under the EPA Policy on 
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes early in the process 
of developing this regulation to permit them to have meaningful and 
timely input into its development. EPA hosted a public hearing on June 
14, 2018 that was open to all interested parties and hosted a total of 
two conference calls for interested tribal representatives on June 25 
and 26, 2018. A summary of each conference call is available in the 
docket for this action.
    As required by section 7(a), the EPA's Tribal Consultation Official 
has certified that the requirements of the executive order have been 
met in a meaningful and timely manner. A copy of the certification is 
included in the docket for this action.

H. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental 
Health Risks and Safety Risks

    This action is not subject to Executive Order 13045 because it is 
not economically significant as defined in Executive Order 12866, and 
because EPA does not believe the environmental health risks or safety 
risks addressed by this action present a disproportionate risk to 
children. This action's health and risk assessments are contained in 
the chapter 9 of the RIA for this rule, available in the docket.

I. Executive Order 13211: Actions That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution or Use

    This action is not a ``significant energy action'' because it is 
not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy. This action is not anticipated to have 
notable impacts on emissions, costs or energy supply decisions for the 
affected electric utility industry.

J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)

    This action does not involve technical standards.

K. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations

    The EPA believes that this action may have disproportionately high 
and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority, low 
income, and/or indigenous peoples as specified in Executive Order 12898 
(59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994). The documentation for this decision is 
contained in chapter 8 of the RIA, a copy of which has been placed in 
the public docket for this action.

L. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

    This action is subject to the CRA and the EPA will submit a rule 
report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of 
the United States. This action is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 
U.S.C. 804(2).

List of Subjects 40 CFR Part 68

    Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure, 
Air pollution control, Chemicals, Hazardous substances, 
Intergovernmental relations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    Dated: November 20, 2019.
Andrew R. Wheeler,
Administrator.
    For the reasons set out in the preamble, title 40, chapter I, part 
68, of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 68--CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 68 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7412(r), 7601(a)(1),7661-7661f.

Sec.  68.3  [Amended]

0
2. Amend Sec.  68.3 by removing the definitions ``Active measures'', 
``Inherently safer technology or design'', ``Passive measures'', 
``Practicability'', ``Procedural measures'', ``Root cause'' and 
``Third-party audit''.
0
3. Amend Sec.  68.10 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a) introductory text, (b), (d), and (e);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (f) through (j) as paragraphs (g) through 
(k);
0
c. Adding new paragraph (f);
0
d. Removing the text ``paragraph (b) or paragraph (d)'' and adding 
``paragraph (g) or paragraph (i)'' in its place in newly redesignated 
paragraph (h); and
0
e. Removing the text ``paragraph (b)'' and adding ``paragraph (g)'' in 
its place in newly redesignated paragraph (i).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:

Sec.  68.10  Applicability.

* * * * *
    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this 
section, an owner or operator of a stationary source that has more than 
a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process, as 
determined under Sec.  68.115, shall comply with the requirements of 
this part no later than the latest of the following dates:
* * * * *
    (b) By March 14, 2018, the owner or operator of a stationary source 
shall comply with the emergency response coordination activities in 
Sec.  68.93, as applicable.
* * * * *
    (d) By December 19, 2023, the owner or operator shall have 
developed plans for conducting emergency response exercises in 
accordance with provisions of Sec.  68.96, as applicable.
    (e) The owner or operator of a stationary source shall comply with 
the public meeting requirement in Sec.  68.210(b) within 90 days of any 
RMP reportable accident at the stationary source with known offsite 
impacts

[[Page 69914]]

specified in Sec.  68.42(a), that occurs after March 15, 2021.
    (f) After December 19, 2024, for any risk management plan initially 
submitted as required by Sec.  68.150(b)(2) or (3) or submitted as an 
update required by Sec.  68.190, the owner or operator shall comply 
with the following risk management plan provisions of subpart G of this 
part:
    (1) Reporting a public meeting after an RMP reportable accident 
under Sec.  68.160(b)(21) as promulgated on December 19, 2019;
    (2) Reporting emergency response program information under Sec.  
68.180(a)(1) as promulgated on December 19, 2019;
    (3) Reporting emergency response program information under Sec.  
68.180(a)(2) and (3) as promulgated on January 13, 2017, as applicable; 
and,
    (4) Reporting emergency response program and exercises information 
under Sec.  68.180(b) as promulgated on January 13, 2017, as 
applicable. The owner or operator shall submit dates of the most recent 
notification, field and tabletop exercises in the risk management plan, 
for exercises completed as required under Sec.  68.96 at the time the 
risk management plan is either submitted under Sec.  68.150(b)(2) or 
(3), or is updated under Sec.  68.190.
* * * * *

Sec.  68.12  [Amended]

0
4. Amend Sec.  68.12:
0
a. By removing the text ``68.10(b)'' and adding ``68.10(g)'' in its 
place in paragraph (b) introductory text;
0
b. By removing the text ``68.10(b)(1)'' and adding ``68.10(g)(1)'' in 
its place in paragraph (b)(4);
0
c. By removing the text ``68.10(c)'' and adding ``68.10(h)'' in its 
place in paragraph (c) introductory text; and
0
d. By removing the text ``68.10(d)'' and adding ``68.10(i)'' in its 
place in paragraph (d) introductory text.

0
5. Amend Sec.  68.50 by revising paragraph (a)(2) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.50  Hazard review.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Opportunities for equipment malfunctions or human errors that 
could cause an accidental release;
* * * * *

0
6. Amend Sec.  68.54 by revising the first sentence in paragraph (a), 
removing the paragraph (b) subject heading, revising the first sentence 
in paragraph (b), revising paragraph (d), and removing paragraph (e).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  68.54  Training.

    (a) The owner or operator shall ensure that each employee presently 
operating a process, and each employee newly assigned to a covered 
process have been trained or tested competent in the operating 
procedures provided in Sec.  68.52 that pertain to their duties. * * *
* * * * *
    (b) Refresher training shall be provided at least every three 
years, and more often if necessary, to each employee operating a 
process to ensure that the employee understands and adheres to the 
current operating procedures of the process. * * *
* * * * *
    (d) The owner or operator shall ensure that operators are trained 
in any updated or new procedures prior to startup of a process after a 
major change.

0
7. Amend Sec.  68.58 by revising paragraph (a) and removing paragraphs 
(f) through (h).
    The revision reads as follows:

Sec.  68.58  Compliance audits.

    (a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated 
compliance with the provisions of this subpart at least every three 
years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under this 
subpart are adequate and are being followed.
* * * * *

Sec.  68.59  [Removed]

0
8. Remove Sec.  68.59.

0
9. Amend Sec.  68.60 by revising paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  68.60  Incident investigation.

    (a) The owner or operator shall investigate each incident which 
resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic 
release.
* * * * *
    (d) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the 
investigation which includes at a minimum:
    (1) Date of incident;
    (2) Date investigation began;
    (3) A description of the incident;
    (4) The factors that contributed to the incident; and,
    (5) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation.
* * * * *

0
10. Amend Sec.  68.65 by revising the first sentence of paragraph (a) 
and revising the note to paragraph (b) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.65  Process safety information.

    (a) The owner or operator shall complete a compilation of written 
process safety information before conducting any process hazard 
analysis required by the rule. * * *
    (b) * * *

    Note to paragraph (b): Safety Data Sheets (SDS) meeting the 
requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1200(g) may be used to comply with this 
requirement to the extent they contain the information required by 
paragraph (b) of this section.

* * * * *

0
11. Amend Sec.  68.67 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (c)(2);
0
b. Adding the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (c)(6);
0
c. Removing ``, and'' and adding a period in its place at the end of 
paragraph (c)(7); and
0
d. Removing paragraph (c)(8).
    The revision reads as follows:

Sec.  68.67  Process hazard analysis.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) The identification of any previous incident which had a likely 
potential for catastrophic consequences;
* * * * *

Sec.  68.71  [Amended]

0
12. Amend Sec.  68.71 by removing paragraph (d).

0
13. Amend Sec.  68.79 by revising paragraph (a) and removing paragraphs 
(f) through (h).
    The revision reads as follows:

Sec.  68.79  Compliance audits.

    (a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated 
compliance with the provisions of this subpart at least every three 
years to verify that procedures and practices developed under this 
subpart are adequate and are being followed.
* * * * *

Sec.  68.80  [Removed]

0
14. Remove Sec.  68.80.

0
15. Amend Sec.  68.81 by revising paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  68.81  Incident investigation.

    (a) The owner or operator shall investigate each incident which 
resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic 
release.
* * * * *
    (d) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the 
investigation which includes at a minimum:
    (1) Date of incident;
    (2) Date investigation began;
    (3) A description of the incident;
    (4) The factors that contributed to the incident; and,
    (5) Any recommendations resulting from the investigation.
* * * * *

[[Page 69915]]

0
16. Amend Sec.  68.93 by revising paragraph (b) and adding paragraph 
(d) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.93  Emergency response coordination activities.

* * * * *
    (b) Coordination shall include providing to the local emergency 
planning and response organizations: The stationary source's emergency 
response plan if one exists; emergency action plan; updated emergency 
contact information; and other information necessary for developing and 
implementing the local emergency response plan. For responding 
stationary sources, coordination shall also include consulting with 
local emergency response officials to establish appropriate schedules 
and plans for field and tabletop exercises required under Sec.  
68.96(b). The owner or operator shall request an opportunity to meet 
with the local emergency planning committee (or equivalent) and/or 
local fire department as appropriate to review and discuss those 
materials.
* * * * *
    (d) Classified and restricted information. The disclosure of 
information classified or restricted by the Department of Defense or 
other Federal agencies or contractors of such agencies shall be 
controlled by applicable laws, regulations, or executive orders 
concerning the release of that classified or restricted information.

0
17. Amend Sec.  68.96 by revising the first sentence of paragraph (a) 
and revising paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii), (b)(2)(i) and (ii), and 
(b)(3) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.96  Emergency response exercises.

    (a) * * * At least once each calendar year, the owner or operator 
of a stationary source with any Program 2 or Program 3 process shall 
conduct an exercise of the stationary source's emergency response 
notification mechanisms required under Sec.  68.90(b)(3) or Sec.  
68.95(a)(1)(i), as appropriate, before December 19, 2024, and annually 
thereafter. * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Frequency. As part of coordination with local emergency 
response officials required by Sec.  68.93, the owner or operator shall 
consult with these officials to establish an appropriate frequency for 
field exercises.
    (ii) Scope. Field exercises shall involve tests of the source's 
emergency response plan, including deployment of emergency response 
personnel and equipment. Field exercises should include: Tests of 
procedures to notify the public and the appropriate Federal, state, and 
local emergency response agencies about an accidental release; tests of 
procedures and measures for emergency response actions including 
evacuations and medical treatment; tests of communications systems; 
mobilization of facility emergency response personnel, including 
contractors, as appropriate; coordination with local emergency 
responders; emergency response equipment deployment; and any other 
action identified in the emergency response program, as appropriate.
    (2) * * *
    (i) Frequency. As part of coordination with local emergency 
response officials required by Sec.  68.93, the owner or operator shall 
consult with these officials to establish an appropriate frequency for 
tabletop exercises, and shall conduct a tabletop exercise before 
December 21, 2026, and at a minimum of at least once every three years 
thereafter.
    (ii) Scope. Tabletop exercises shall involve discussions of the 
source's emergency response plan. The exercise should include 
discussions of: Procedures to notify the public and the appropriate 
Federal, state, and local emergency response agencies; procedures and 
measures for emergency response including evacuations and medical 
treatment; identification of facility emergency response personnel and/
or contractors and their responsibilities; coordination with local 
emergency responders; procedures for emergency response equipment 
deployment; and any other action identified in the emergency response 
plan, as appropriate.
    (3) Documentation. The owner or operator shall prepare an 
evaluation report within 90 days of each field and tabletop exercise. 
The report should include: A description of the exercise scenario; 
names and organizations of each participant; an evaluation of the 
exercise results including lessons learned; recommendations for 
improvement or revisions to the emergency response exercise program and 
emergency response program, and a schedule to promptly address and 
resolve recommendations.
* * * * *

0
18. Amend Sec.  68.151 by revising paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.151  Assertion of claims of confidential business information.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Registration data required by Sec.  68.160(b)(1) through (6), 
(8), (10) through (13), and (21), and NAICS code and Program level of 
the process set forth in Sec.  68.160(b)(7);
* * * * *

0
19. Amend Sec.  68.160 by revising paragraph (b)(21) and removing 
paragraph (b)(22).
    The revision reads as follows:

Sec.  68.160  Registration.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (21) Whether a public meeting has been held following an RMP 
reportable accident, pursuant to Sec.  68.210(b).

0
20. Amend Sec.  68.170 by revising paragraph (i) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.170  Prevention program/Program 2.

* * * * *
    (i) The date of the most recent compliance audit, the expected date 
of completion of any changes resulting from the compliance audit.
* * * * *

0
21. Amend Sec.  68.175 by revising paragraphs (e) introductory text and 
(e)(1), (5), and (6), removing paragraph (e)(7), and revising paragraph 
(k).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  68.175  Prevention program/Program 3.

* * * * *
    (e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the 
technique used.
    (1) The expected date of completion of any changes resulting from 
the PHA;
* * * * *
    (5) Monitoring and detection systems in use; and
    (6) Changes since the last PHA.
* * * * *
    (k) The date of the most recent compliance audit and the expected 
date of completion of any changes resulting from the compliance audit.
* * * * *

0
22. Amend Sec.  68.180 by revising paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.180  Emergency response program and exercises.

    (a) * * *
    (1) Name, phone number and email address of local emergency 
planning and response organizations with which the stationary source 
last coordinated emergency response efforts, pursuant to Sec.  
68.10(g)(3) or Sec.  68.93.
* * * * *

0
23. Amend Sec.  68.190 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:

Sec.  68.190  Updates.

* * * * *
    (c) If a stationary source is no longer subject to this part, the 
owner or operator shall submit a de-registration to

[[Page 69916]]

EPA within six months indicating that the stationary source is no 
longer covered.

0
24. Amend Sec.  68.210 by:
0
a. Removing paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (g);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (e) and (f) as paragraphs (b) and (c); and
0
c. Revising newly redesignated paragraphs (b) and (c).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  68.210  Availability of information to the public.

* * * * *
    (b) Public meetings. The owner or operator of a stationary source 
shall hold a public meeting to provide information required under Sec.  
68.42(b), no later than 90 days after any RMP reportable accident at 
the stationary source with any known offsite impact specified in Sec.  
68.42(a).
    (c) Classified and restricted information. The disclosure of 
information classified or restricted by the Department of Defense or 
other Federal agencies or contractors of such agencies shall be 
controlled by applicable laws, regulations, or executive orders 
concerning the release of that classified or restricted information.

0
25. Amend Sec.  68.215 by revising paragraph (a)(2)(i) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  68.215  Permit content and air permitting authority or designated 
agency requirements.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) A compliance schedule for meeting the requirements of this part 
by the dates provided in Sec. Sec.  68.10(a) through (f) and 68.96(a) 
and (b)(2)(i), or;
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2019-25974 Filed 12-18-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P