Document ID: SEC-2020-0149-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Rule
Title: Risk Mitigation Techniques for Uncleared Security-Based Swaps
Posted Date: 2020-02-04T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 23 (Tuesday, February 4, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 6359-6417]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-27762]

  Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 23 / Tuesday, February 4, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 6359]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 240

[Release No. 34-87782; File No. S7-28-18]
RIN 3235-AL83

Risk Mitigation Techniques for Uncleared Security-Based Swaps

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'' or 
``Commission'') is adopting final rules requiring the application of 
specific risk mitigation techniques to portfolios of uncleared 
security-based swaps. In particular, these final rules establish 
requirements for each registered security-based swap dealer (``SBS 
dealer'') and each registered major security-based swap participant 
(``major SBS participant'') (each SBS dealer and each major SBS 
participant hereafter referred to as an ``SBS Entity'' and together 
referred to as ``SBS Entities'') with respect to, among other things, 
reconciling outstanding security-based swaps with applicable 
counterparties on a periodic basis, engaging in certain forms of 
portfolio compression exercises, as appropriate, and executing written 
security-based swap trading relationship documentation with each of its 
counterparties prior to, or contemporaneously with, executing a 
security-based swap transaction. In addition, the Commission is issuing 
an interpretation addressing the application of the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements to cross-border security-based swap 
activities and is amending its regulations to address the potential 
availability of substituted compliance in connection with those 
requirements. Lastly, the final rules include corresponding amendments 
to the recordkeeping, reporting, and notification requirements 
applicable to SBS Entities.

DATES: 
    Effective Date: These final rules and rule amendments are effective 
April 6, 2020.
    Compliance Date: The compliance date is discussed in Section V of 
this adopting release.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carol McGee, Assistant Director, or 
Andrew Bernstein, Senior Special Counsel, at (202) 551-5870, Office of 
Derivatives Policy, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-8010.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is adopting the following new 
rules:
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.

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           Commission reference                CFR citation (17 CFR)
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934
 (``Exchange Act''): \1\
  Rule 15Fi-3............................  Sec.   240.15Fi-3.
  Rule 15Fi-4............................  Sec.   240.15Fi-4.
  Rule 15Fi-5............................  Sec.   240.15Fi-5.
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    The Commission also is adopting amendments to:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Commission reference                CFR citation (17 CFR)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exchange Act:
  Rule 3a71-6............................  Sec.   240.3a71-6.
  Rule 15Fi-1............................  Sec.   240.15Fi-1.
  Rule 17a-3.............................  Sec.   240.17a-3.
  Rule 17a-4.............................  Sec.   240.17a-4.
  Rule 18a-5.............................  Sec.   240.18a-5.
  Rule 18a-6.............................  Sec.   240.18a-6.
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Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Discussion of Final Rules
    A. Rule 15Fi-3: Portfolio Reconciliation
    1. Scope of the Portfolio Reconciliation Requirements
    2. Rule 15Fi-3(a): Portfolio Reconciliation With Other SBS 
Entities
    3. Rule 15Fi-3(a): Resolution of Discrepancies With Other SBS 
Entities
    4. Rule 15Fi-3(b): Portfolio Reconciliation With Other 
Counterparties
    5. Reporting of Valuation Disputes
    6. Application of Rule 15Fi-3 to Cleared Security-Based Swaps
    B. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    1. Scope of Rule 15Fi-4--Portfolio Compression Exercises
    2. Scope of Rule 15Fi-4--Bilateral Offset
    3. Application of Rule 15Fi-4 to Cleared Security-Based Swaps
    C. Rule 15Fi-5: Trading Relationship Documentation
    1. Scope of Rule 15Fi-5
    2. Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4): Documenting Valuation Methodologies
    3. Rule 15Fi-5(b)(5) and (6): Other Disclosure Requirements
    4. Rule 15Fi-5(c): Audit of Security-Based Swap Trading 
Relationship Documentation
    5. Exceptions to the Trading Relationship Documentation 
Requirements
    D. Amendments to Recordkeeping Rules
III. Cross-Border Application of Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5
    A. Background on the Cross-Border Application of Title VII 
Requirements
    B. Final Cross-Border Interpretation
IV. Availability of Substituted Compliance for Rules 15Fi-3 Through 
15Fi-5
    A. Existing Substituted Compliance Rule
    B. Amendments to Rule 3a71-6
    1. Basis for Substituted Compliance in Connection With the 
Portfolio Reconciliation, Portfolio Compression, and Trading 
Relationship Documentation Requirements
    2. Comparability Criteria, and Consideration of Related 
Requirements
V. Explanation of Dates
    A. Effective Date
    B. Compliance Date
    C. Application to Substituted Compliance
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Summary of Collections of Information
    1. Rule 15Fi-3: Portfolio Reconciliation
    2. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    3. Rule 15Fi-5: Written Trading Relationship Documentation
    4. Amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6: Books and 
Records Requirements
    5. Amendment to Rule 3a71-6: Substituted Compliance
    B. Use of Information
    1. Rule 15Fi-3: Portfolio Reconciliation
    2. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    3. Rule 15Fi-5: Written Trading Relationship Documentation
    4. Amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6: Books and 
Records Requirements
    5. Amendment to Rule 3a71-6: Substituted Compliance
    C. Respondents
    D. Total Annual Recordkeeping Burden
    1. Portfolio Reconciliation Activities Generally
    2. Establishing, Maintaining, and Enforcing Written Policies and 
Procedures
    3. Reporting of Certain Valuation Disputes
    4. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    5. Rule 15Fi-5: Written Trading Relationship Documentation
    6. Amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6: Books and 
Records Requirements
    7. Amendment to Rule 3a71-6: Substituted Compliance
    E. Collection of Information is Mandatory
    F. Confidentiality
VII. Economic Analysis
    A. Broad Economic Considerations
    B. Economic Baseline
    1. Security-Based Swap Market Activity and Participants
    a. Available Data From the Security-Based Swap Market
    b. Affected SBS Entities
    c. Other Market Participants
    d. Outstanding Positions
    2. Current Portfolio Reconciliation Practices
    3. Current Portfolio Compression Practices
    4. Current Trading Relationship Documentation Practices
    C. Economic Costs and Benefits, Including Impact on Efficiency, 
Competition, and Capital Formation
    1. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    a. Broad Market Effects
    b. Substituted Compliance
    2. Portfolio Reconciliation
    a. Requirements
    b. Benefits
    c. Costs
    d. Alternatives
    3. Portfolio Compression
    a. Requirements
    b. Benefits

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    c. Costs
    d. Alternatives
    4. Trading Relationship Documentation
    a. Requirements
    b. Benefits
    c. Costs
    d. Alternatives
    5. Recordkeeping Requirements
    a. Requirements
    b. Benefits
    c. Costs
    d. Alternatives
    6. Cross-Border Application of Rules 15Fi-3 Through 15Fi-5
    a. Requirements
    b. Benefits
    c. Costs
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
IX. Other Matters

I. Background

    Section 15F(i)(1) of the Exchange Act, as added by Section 764(a) 
of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank Act''),\2\ requires each SBS Entity to 
conform with such standards as may be prescribed by the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, that relate to timely and accurate confirmation, 
processing, netting, documentation, and valuation of all security-based 
swaps.\3\ Section 15F(i)(2) of the Exchange Act provides that the 
Commission shall adopt rules governing documentation standards for SBS 
Entities.\4\
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    \2\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Unless otherwise 
indicated, references to ``Title VII'' in this release are to 
Subtitle B of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(i)(1).
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(i)(2).
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    In June 2016, the Commission adopted rules requiring SBS Entities 
to provide trade acknowledgments and to verify those trade 
acknowledgments with their counterparties to security-based swap 
transactions.\5\ At the time, however, the Commission had not proposed 
rules concerning other documentation requirements, such as portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, or trading relationship 
documentation. By contrast, in 2012 the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (``CFTC'') implemented rules setting forth standards for the 
timely and accurate confirmation of swaps, as well as addressing the 
reconciliation and compression of swap portfolios and setting forth 
requirements for documenting the swap trading relationship between swap 
dealers or major swap participants (each swap dealer and each major 
swap participant hereafter referred to as a ``Swap Entity'' and 
together referred to as ``Swap Entities'') and their counterparties.\6\
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    \5\ See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification of Security-Based 
Swap Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 78011 (June 8, 2016), 81 
FR 39807 (June 17, 2016) (``Trade Acknowledgment and Verification 
Adopting Release'').
    \6\ See Confirmation, Portfolio Reconciliation, Portfolio 
Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship Documentation 
Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 FR 
55904 (Sept. 11, 2012) (``CFTC Risk Mitigation Adopting Release''). 
Other jurisdictions, such as the European Commission (``EC'') and 
Republic of Singapore, have implemented similar measures. See 
Commission Delegated Regulation (European Union (EU)) No. 149/2013 
(Dec. 18, 2012) supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory 
technical standards on indirect clearing arrangements, the clearing 
obligation, the public register, access to a trading venue, non-
financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques for over-
the-counter (``OTC'') derivatives contracts not cleared by a central 
counterparty (Feb. 23, 2013), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:052:0011:0024:en:PDF; and Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, Guidelines on Risk Mitigation Requirements 
for Non-Centrally Cleared Over-The-Counter Derivatives Contracts, 
(published on Apr. 25, 2019), available at: https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/guidelines/guidelines-on-risk-mitigation-requirements-for-non-centrally-cleared-otc-derivatives-contracts. Regulatory 
authorities in other jurisdictions (e.g., the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority) have also proposed requirements similar to those adopted 
by the CFTC and the EC. In addition, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators (``CSA'') published a consultation paper in 2016 
proposing a requirement that financial institutions enter into a 
written agreement documenting the material terms and conditions of 
any non-centrally cleared derivative, including standards related to 
the maintenance, review, and contents of that documentation. See CSA 
Consultation Paper 95-401--Margin and Collateral Requirements for 
Non-Centrally Cleared Derivatives (Jul. 7, 2016), available at: 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category9/csa_20160707_95-401_collateral-requirements-cleared-derivatives.pdf.
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    Accordingly, on December 19, 2018, the Commission proposed Rules 
15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5, which would establish requirements 
applicable to SBS Entities addressing, among other things, reconciling 
and compressing portfolios of uncleared security-based swaps and 
executing written trading relationship documentation with each 
counterparty prior to or contemporaneously with executing an uncleared 
security-based swap.\7\ As the Commission explained in the Trade 
Acknowledgement and Verification Adopting Release, the process of 
confirming the terms of a transaction is essential for SBS Entities 
``to effectively measure and manage market and credit risk.'' \8\ In 
particular, ``a backlog of unconfirmed trades could hinder the 
settlement process, particularly if errors go undetected or a 
counterparty disputes the terms of a transaction.'' \9\ Such 
disruptions or breakdowns in the settlement process resulting from 
unconfirmed trades could, in turn, lead to broader market instability 
in the case of a credit event involving a reference entity on which 
many different counterparties have, in the aggregate, a large notional 
outstanding exposure.\10\
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    \7\ See Risk Mitigation Techniques for Uncleared Security-Based 
Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 84861 (Dec. 19, 2018), 84 FR 4614 
(Feb. 15, 2019) (``Proposing Release'').
    \8\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4616 (citing Trade 
Acknowledgement and Verification Adopting Release, 81 FR at 39833).
    \9\ Id.
    \10\ Id.
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    In this regard, portfolio reconciliation addresses many of these 
same issues, but unlike the confirmation process, which occurs at the 
outset of a transaction, reconciliation operates throughout the life of 
the transaction. If a discrepancy is not identified during the trade 
acknowledgement and verification process, such discrepancy could still 
be identified during a subsequent reconciliation exercise. Furthermore, 
even if a security-based swap transaction is accurately confirmed by 
both parties during the trade acknowledgement and verification process, 
reconciliation would help to identify any discrepancies in terms that 
do not remain constant throughout the life of a trade.
    Accordingly, portfolio reconciliation serves as an important 
mechanism for promoting risk mitigation by requiring security-based 
swap counterparties to have established processes for identifying and 
resolving discrepancies involving key terms of their transactions. To 
illustrate this point, if a term necessary for calculating the market 
value of a security-based swap is not accurately confirmed during the 
trade acknowledgment and verification process, due for example to some 
form of systems or human error, that discrepancy could lead to 
complications at various points throughout the life of the transaction, 
which could become particularly problematic if it remains undetected 
until the parties are required to perform on their obligations.\11\ 
Thus, portfolio reconciliation could help to mitigate the possibility 
of a discrepancy unexpectedly affecting performance under the security-
based swap

[[Page 6361]]

transaction by increasing the likelihood that the parties are and 
remain in agreement with respect to all material terms.\12\
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    \11\ See Summary of OTC Commitments, Attachment to the July 31, 
2008 letter from the Operations Management Group to Timothy 
Geithner, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (``FRBNY''), 
available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/markets/2008/CommitmentSummaryTable.pdf (``Positive 
affirmation of trade economics is a key risk mitigation technique 
for OTC derivatives because it assures that each counterparty's risk 
management systems accurately reflect the economic details of trades 
that have not yet been matched.''). Although this specific 
commitment was made in the context of the trade affirmation process, 
we believe that the same basic principle supports the need to 
reconcile terms throughout the life of a trade, even if a term is 
accurately reflected in a firm's system as a result of the 
affirmation process, particularly in the case of terms that do not 
remain constant during the life of a trade.
    \12\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4616.
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    Portfolio reconciliation is especially relevant with respect to 
terms used to perform a valuation of the financial instrument. 
Specifically, unresolved discrepancies regarding the value of a 
security-based swap can lead to, among other things, difficulties in 
the application of any processes that depend on the valuation being 
accurate, such as determining the amount of margin that must be posted 
or collected during the life of a security-based swap transaction. In 
the aggregate, such errors and other complications could result in 
significant uncollateralized exposure in the uncleared security-based 
swap markets (or, alternatively, potentially inefficient 
overcollateralization).\13\
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    \13\ See id.
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    In addition, valuation discrepancies identified during 
reconciliation could help to identify problems with one or both of the 
counterparties' internal valuation systems and models, or possibly even 
with a firm's internal controls. For example, in a report analyzing 
federal assistance to American International Group, Inc. (``AIG'') 
following the events of September 2008, the General Accountability 
Office (``GAO'') noted that in structuring this relief one of the many 
open issues the FRBNY had to address was the number of collateral 
disputes AIG had with its counterparties.\14\ GAO further explained 
that ``[t]o the extent that lower valuations (more CDO value lost) 
produced greater collateral postings, counterparties had an interest in 
seeking lower valuations. Similarly, to the extent that higher 
valuations (less CDO value lost) meant smaller collateral postings, AIG 
had an interest in seeking higher valuations.'' \15\
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    \14\ See GAO, Financial Crisis: Review of Federal Reserve System 
Financial Assistance to American International Group, Inc., GAO-11-
616 (Sept. 2011), available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585560.pdf (``According to information we reviewed, on a 
[collateralized debt obligation (``CDO'')] portfolio of $71 billion 
. . ., AIG and its counterparties had valuation differences totaling 
$4.3 billion. Among a group of 15 counterparties, 9 had valued their 
assets differently than AIG.'').
    \15\ Id. at 82.
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    Portfolio compression is another process that should help SBS 
Entities better manage their outstanding security-based swap 
transactions, albeit in a different way. Portfolio compression 
generally refers to a post-trade processing exercise that allows two or 
more market participants to eliminate redundant derivatives 
transactions within their portfolios in a manner that does not change 
their net exposure. Compression exercises typically take place in 
``cycles,'' whereby each participating counterparty designates 
particular contracts within its portfolio as being eligible for 
compression and specifies its risk tolerances with respect to the 
composition of its derivatives portfolio following completion of the 
cycle.\16\ Following an analysis of the submitted contracts, 
counterparties may be provided with the option of terminating or 
modifying those contracts and replacing them with a smaller number of 
substantially similar contracts. In most cases, the gross notional 
value of the position is reduced, although the counterparty's net 
exposure, represented by the replacement and remaining contracts, 
typically remains the same.\17\
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    \16\ See, e.g., ISDA Study, Interest Rate Swaps Compression: A 
Progress Report, (Feb. 2012), available at: http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDAzMw==/IRS%20compression%20progress%20report%20-%20Feb%202012.pdf.
    \17\ In 2011, the Commission issued an order granting temporary 
exemptions from the requirement to register as a clearing agency 
under Section 17A of the Exchange Act for entities providing certain 
clearing services for security-based swaps including, among other 
things, tear-up and compression services. That order contains 
general descriptions of the portfolio compression process, based on 
discussions between Commission staff and market participants prior 
to the issuance of the exemptive order. See Order Pursuant to 
Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting Temporary 
Exemptions from Clearing Agency Registration Requirements under 
Section 17A(b) of the Exchange Act for Entities Providing Certain 
Clearing Services for Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 
64796 (Jul. 1, 2011), 76 FR 39963 (Jul. 7, 2011) (``Clearing 
Services Exemptive Order'').
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    By reducing the total number of open contracts, portfolio 
compression is intended to help market participants manage their post-
trade risks in a number of important ways. For example, two or more 
counterparties that are active in the OTC derivatives markets might 
have built up positions in the same (or comparable) products that, when 
analyzed at the portfolio level across all applicable counterparties, 
offset each other. Eliminating these offsetting and redundant uncleared 
derivatives transactions through compression--as measured both by the 
number of contracts and the total notional value--reduces a market 
participant's gross exposure to its direct counterparties, including by 
eliminating all exposure to certain counterparties.\18\ Reducing the 
total number of outstanding contracts within a derivatives portfolio 
also provides important operational benefits and efficiencies for 
market participants in that there are fewer open contracts to manage, 
maintain, and settle, resulting in fewer opportunities for processing 
errors, failures, or other problems that could develop throughout the 
lifecycle of a transaction.\19\ Accordingly, the Commission believes 
that the use of portfolio compression by SBS Entities, where 
appropriate (and to the extent that such activity is not already 
occurring), should provide important processing improvements consistent 
with the overall framework of Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act.\20\
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    \18\ See Darrell Duffie, Ada Li, and Theo Lubke, Policy 
Perspectives of OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure, FRBNY Staff 
Report No. 424, dated Jan. 2010, as revised Mar. 2010, available at: 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr424.pdf (``FRBNY 
OTC Derivatives Report'') (``In some types of derivatives that are 
not cleared, major market participants tend to build offsetting 
positions with different counterparties, long with one set of 
counterparties, and short with the others. In many cases, these 
offsetting positions are redundant. They serve no useful business 
purpose and create counterparty risk. Market participants should 
continue to engage in regular market-wide portfolio compression 
exercises in order to eliminate these redundant positions.''). See 
also, John Kiff, et al., Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and 
Policy Options, IMF Working Paper No. 254 (Nov. 2009), available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09254.pdf 
(``Multilateral netting, typically operationalized via `tear-up' or 
`compression' operations that eliminate redundant contracts, reduces 
both individual and system counterparty credit risk.'').
    \19\ See Portfolio compression platform launched to reduce CDS 
operational risk, Hedgeweek (Sept. 8, 2008) (explaining that a 
portfolio compression platform ``reduces operational risk while 
leaving market risk profiles unchanged,'' which is achieved ``by 
terminating existing trades and replacing them with a smaller number 
of new replacement trades that carry the same risk profile and cash 
flows as the initial portfolio but have less capital exposure'').
    \20\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(i).
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    Finally, just as portfolio reconciliation is designed to allow 
counterparties to manage their internal risks by better ensuring 
agreement with respect to the material terms and valuation of the 
transaction (and thereby avoiding complications at various points 
throughout the life of the transaction), requiring each SBS Entity to 
document the terms of the trading relationship with each of its 
counterparties before executing a new security-based swap transaction 
should promote sound collateral and risk management practices by 
enhancing transparency and legal certainty regarding each party's 
rights and obligations under the transaction. This, in turn, should 
help to reduce counterparty credit risk and promote certainty regarding 
the agreed-upon valuation and other material terms of a security-based 
swap.\21\ Having

[[Page 6362]]

adequate written documentation prior to, or contemporaneously with, 
executing a security-based swap should also facilitate the ability of 
the counterparties to engage in portfolio reconciliation in an 
efficient and cost-effective manner.
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    \21\ See, e.g., Sylvie A. Durham, Terminating Derivatives 
Transactions: Risk Mitigation and Close-Out Netting Sec.  8:1 (Nov. 
2010) (``[L]egal contractual provisions are the foundation on which 
the rights and obligations of the parties are based, and sound 
collateral and risk management practices may be ineffective if the 
legal rights of the parties are not clearly set forth.'').
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    In consideration of the above, the Commission proposed new Rules 
15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 under the Exchange Act.\22\ As proposed, 
Rule 15Fi-3 generally would have required SBS Entities, in connection 
with uncleared security-based swaps, to (1) engage in portfolio 
reconciliation with counterparties who are SBS Entities and (2) 
establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that they engage in portfolio 
reconciliation with counterparties who are not SBS Entities. In both 
cases, the frequency of the portfolio reconciliation is based on the 
number of outstanding transactions with the applicable counterparty. In 
addition, proposed Rule 15Fi-4 would have required SBS Entities to 
establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures related 
to periodic bilateral and multilateral compression of uncleared 
security-based swaps, as well as periodic offset of uncleared security-
based swaps. Finally, proposed Rule 15Fi-5 would have established 
certain requirements for SBS Entities related to the use of written 
trading relationship documentation in connection with their uncleared 
security-based swap transactions.
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    \22\ Unless otherwise noted, all references to rules without an 
accompanying statutory reference are to rules adopted under the 
Exchange Act.
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    The Commission is adopting Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5, largely as 
proposed.\23\ In developing this rulemaking, both at proposal and 
adoption, we have consulted and coordinated with the CFTC, the 
prudential regulators,\24\ and foreign regulatory authorities in 
accordance with the consultation mandate of the Dodd-Frank Act.\25\ We 
also have consulted and coordinated with foreign regulatory authorities 
through Commission staff participation in numerous bilateral and 
multilateral discussions with foreign regulatory authorities addressing 
the regulation of OTC derivatives.\26\ Through these multilateral and 
bilateral discussions, and Commission staff's participation in various 
international task forces and working groups, we have gathered 
information about foreign regulatory reform efforts and their effect 
on, and relationship with, the U.S. regulatory regime. The Commission 
has taken, and will continue to take, these discussions into 
consideration in developing rules, forms, and interpretations for 
implementing Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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    \23\ As described in greater detail below, the Commission is 
making three changes to the proposal. First, we are adopting a 
single definition of ``material terms'' for purposes of the 
portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3 that is 
generally consistent with the definition used in the corresponding 
CFTC rule. This is in contrast to the proposed bifurcated 
definition. See infra Section II.A.1. Second, Rule 15Fi-5, unlike in 
the proposal, does not require an SBS Entity's written trading 
relationship documentation to address the allocation of any 
applicable regulatory reporting obligations. See infra Section 
II.C.1. Both of those changes involve provisions that were included 
in the proposal as part of a request for comment on how such 
provisions could potentially help address how a security-based swap 
data repository (``SDR'') may satisfy its obligation to verify the 
terms of each security-based swap with both counterparties to the 
transaction. See Proposing Release at 4633-4635. Finally, the 
Commission is modifying the scope of the exception for uncleared 
security-based swaps in each of Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 to 
include (1) security-based swaps that are, directly or indirectly, 
submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency (as opposed to 
limiting it to security-based swaps that have a clearing agency as a 
direct counterparty) and (2) security-based swaps that are cleared 
by a clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from 
registration by rule or order pursuant to Section 17A of the 
Exchange Act (as opposed to limiting it to security-based swaps 
cleared at a registered clearing agency). See infra Sections II.A.6, 
II.B.3, and II.C.5.
    \24\ For purposes of this statement, the term ``prudential 
regulator'' is defined in Section 1a(39) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (``CEA''), 7 U.S.C. 1a(39), and that definition is incorporated 
by reference into Section 3(a)(74) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(74). Pursuant to that definition, the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (``Federal Reserve Board''), the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (``FDIC''), the Farm Credit Administration, or the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, the ``prudential 
regulators'') is the ``prudential regulator'' of an SBS Entity if 
the entity is directly supervised by that regulator. Separately, we 
are adopting a definition of ``prudential regulator,'' to be used 
for purposes of the new portfolio reconciliation and trading 
relationship documentation requirements. See infra note 73. That new 
definition also references Section 3(a)(74) of the Exchange Act and 
includes the same list of agencies as noted above.
    \25\ Section 712(a)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides in part 
that the Commission shall ``consult and coordinate to the extent 
possible with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
prudential regulators for the purposes of assuring regulatory 
consistency and comparability, to the extent possible.''
    In addition, Section 752(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides, in 
part, that ``[i]n order to promote effective and consistent global 
regulation of swaps and security-based swaps, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
prudential regulators . . . as appropriate, shall consult and 
coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment 
of consistent international standards with respect to the regulation 
(including fees) of swaps.''
    \26\ Staff participates in a number of international standard-
setting bodies and workstreams working on OTC derivatives reforms. 
For example, Commission staff participated in the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions' (``IOSCO'') preparation of a 
report regarding risk mitigation standards for non-centrally cleared 
OTC derivatives. See Risk Mitigation Standards for Non-centrally 
Cleared OTC Derivatives (Jan. 28, 2015), available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD469.pdf. IOSCO developed 
those standards in consultation with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (``BCBS'') and the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures.
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    Finally, the Commission continues to recognize that the CFTC rules 
pertaining to portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and 
written trading relationship documentation have been in effect since 
2012, and that any SBS Entity that also is registered with the CFTC as 
a Swap Entity will already have incurred systems and compliance costs 
in connection with the corresponding CFTC requirements. Accordingly, we 
have endeavored throughout this rulemaking to harmonize the final rules 
with the existing CFTC rules wherever possible. There are, however, a 
very limited number of provisions where we continue to believe it is 
appropriate to diverge from a particular aspect of the CFTC rules. Each 
of those differences is described below, along with an explanation of 
the Commission's reasons for adopting the different approach. To the 
extent that no such substantive difference is described, it is because 
we have not identified any such differences or identified only 
technical differences.

II. Discussion of Final Rules

A. Rule 15Fi-3: Portfolio Reconciliation

1. Scope of the Portfolio Reconciliation Requirements
    As part of adopting Rule 15Fi-3, we also are amending existing Rule 
15Fi-1 to add four new definitions. First, Rule 15Fi-1(l) defines 
``portfolio reconciliation'' to mean any process by which the 
counterparties to one or more uncleared security-based swaps:
     Exchange the material terms of all security-based swaps in 
the security-based swap portfolio between the counterparties;
     Exchange each counterparty's valuation of each security-
based swap in the security-based swap portfolio between the 
counterparties as of the close of business on the immediately preceding 
business day; and
     Resolve any discrepancy in valuations or material 
terms.\27\
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    \27\ The corresponding CFTC definition is in 17 CFR 23.500(i).
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    Second, Rule 15Fi-1(o) defines the term ``security-based swap 
portfolio'' to mean all security-based swaps currently in effect 
between a particular SBS Entity

[[Page 6363]]

and a particular counterparty.\28\ Third, Rule 15Fi-1(q) defines 
``valuation'' to mean the current market value or net present value of 
a security-based swap.\29\ Finally, Rule 15Fi-1(i) defines ``material 
terms'' to mean each term that is required to be reported to a 
registered SDR or the Commission pursuant to 17 CFR 242.901 (Rule 901 
under the Exchange Act); \30\ provided, however, that such definition 
does not include any term that is not relevant to the ongoing rights 
and obligations of the parties and the valuation of the security-based 
swap.\31\
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    \28\ The corresponding CFTC definition is in 17 CFR 23.500(k).
    \29\ The corresponding CFTC definition is in 17 CFR 23.500(m).
    \30\ Rule 901 is part of Regulation SBSR, which governs the 
reporting and publication of security-based swap transaction data. 
See 17 CFR 242.900 to 242.909. Further, Section 3(a)(75) of the 
Exchange Act defines the term ``security-based swap data 
repository'' to mean ``any person that collects and maintains 
information or records with respect to transactions or positions in, 
or the terms and conditions of, security-based swaps entered into by 
third parties for the purpose of providing a centralized 
recordkeeping facility for security-based swaps.'' See 15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(75).
    \31\ The corresponding CFTC definition is in 17 CFR 23.500(g).
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    These definitions are intended to establish the scope of the 
portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3, including by (1) 
defining ``portfolio reconciliation,'' (2) defining the two categories 
of information that must be exchanged during a reconciliation (i.e., 
the ``valuation'' and ``material terms'' of each relevant security-
based swap), and (3) identifying the specific transactions that are 
included in a ``security-based swap portfolio'' between an SBS Entity 
and each of its counterparties. Moreover, for consistency with the 
corresponding CFTC rules applicable to Swap Entities, these four 
definitions are substantively identical to the CFTC's corresponding 
definitions, which we continue to believe are appropriately scoped for 
purposes of Rule 15Fi-3.\32\
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    \32\ Because of differences between the Commission's and CFTC's 
security-based swap and swap data reporting rules, the application 
of the definition of ``material terms'' in Rule 15Fi-1(i) may differ 
from the application of the corresponding CFTC definition. However, 
in order to make the two definitions as substantively identical in 
their application as possible, Rule 15Fi-1(i), as adopted, excludes 
from that definition ``any term that is not relevant to the ongoing 
rights and obligations of the parties and the valuation of the 
security-based swap.'' See also infra notes 51-52 (describing the 
Commission's recently issued policy statement on compliance with 
Regulation SBSR).
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    The Commission received no comments on the proposed definitions of 
``portfolio reconciliation,'' ``security-based swap portfolio,'' and 
``valuation,'' each of which we are adopting as proposed. However, the 
two comment letters we received both raised concerns with the proposed 
definition of ``material terms.'' \33\ That proposed definition was 
bifurcated, and depended on whether the relevant security-based swap 
transaction had already been included in a security-based swap 
portfolio and reconciled pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fi-3.\34\ With 
respect to any security-based swap that had not yet been reconciled as 
part of a security-based swap portfolio, the proposed definition of 
``material terms'' included each term that is required to be reported 
to a registered SDR pursuant to Rule 901 under the Exchange Act.\35\ 
With respect to all other security-based swaps within a security-based 
swap portfolio, the proposed definition of ``material terms'' continued 
to be based on the reporting requirements in Rule 901, but excluded any 
term not relevant to the ongoing rights and obligations of the parties 
and the valuation of the security-based swap.
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    \33\ See Letter dated April 16, 2019, from Steven Kennedy, 
Global Head of Public Policy, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (``ISDA'') and Kyle Brandon, Managing 
Director, Head of Derivatives Policy, the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA'') (``ISDA/SIFMA Letter''); 
see also Letter dated April 16, 2019, from Katherine Delp, Executive 
Director, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (``DTCC''), in 
conjunction with its swap data repository, and Kara Dutta, General 
Counsel, ICE Trade Vault (``DTCC/ICE Trade Vault Letter'').
    \34\ See Proposing Release at 4617-4618.
    \35\ Rule 901 (17 CFR 242.901) is part of Regulation SBSR, which 
governs the reporting to registered SDRs of security-based swap data 
and public dissemination by registered SDRs of a subset of that 
data. See 17 CFR 242.900 to 242.909.
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    In contrast to the proposed definition of ``material terms,'' the 
CFTC's corresponding definition is not bifurcated and contains a list 
of 24 data fields that are excluded from the definition (and therefore 
excluded from the portfolio reconciliation requirements in CFTC Rule 
Sec.  23.502) for all purposes. Those excluded fields include, among 
others: (1) The status of either counterparty as a swap dealer, major 
swap participant, financial entity, or U.S. person; (2) an indication 
that the swap will be allocated and certain information regarding the 
agent and the original swap; (3) an indication that the swap is a 
multi-asset swap and a further indication of its primary and secondary 
asset class; (4) an indication that the swap is a mixed swap and the 
identification of any non-CFTC registered swap data repository to which 
it is also reported (if applicable); (5) the block trade indicator, 
execution timestamp, and timestamp for submission to a swap data 
repository; (6) the clearing indicator and clearing venue; and (7) 
certain information regarding the application of the end user exception 
from mandatory clearing.\36\ When the CFTC amended its definition of 
``material terms'' in 2016, it explained that ``the removal of these 
terms from reconciliations would alleviate the burden of resolving 
discrepancies in terms of a swap that are not relevant to the ongoing 
rights and obligations of the parties and the valuation of the swap 
without impairing the [CFTC]'s regulatory mission.'' \37\
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    \36\ See 17 CFR 23.500(g).
    \37\ See Definitions of ``Portfolio Reconciliation'' and 
``Material Terms'' for Purposes of Swap Portfolio Reconciliation, 81 
FR 27309 (May 6, 2016).
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    The Commission continues to believe that the data set submitted to 
an SDR under Rule 901 is an appropriate starting point for determining 
which terms should be reconciled pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3. This approach 
is consistent with the one taken by the CFTC, which also defines 
``material terms'' by reference to the information required to be 
reported to a swap data repository, and reflects our continued belief 
that one of the fundamental goals of the portfolio reconciliation 
process is to help ensure that both counterparties to a security-based 
swap are in agreement on all of the terms necessary for developing a 
comprehensive understanding of each of their rights and obligations 
under the security-based swap, and that they remain in such agreement 
throughout the life of the transaction.\38\ To further that objective, 
``portfolio reconciliation'' has been defined in part to include the 
exchange of the ``material terms'' of all security-based swaps in the 
security-based swap portfolio between the counterparties. Similarly, in 
adopting Regulation SBSR, the Commission explained that the Title VII 
regulatory reporting requirement ``is designed to allow the Commission 
and other relevant authorities to have access to comprehensive 
information about security-based swap activity in registered SDRs.'' 
\39\ The Commission therefore remains of the view that the terms that 
must be reported to an SDR under Regulation SBSR are a good proxy for 
identifying the ``material terms'' that should be subject to the 
portfolio reconciliation requirements.
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    \38\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4618.
    \39\ See Regulation SBSR--Reporting and Dissemination of 
Security-Based Swap Information; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release 
No. 74244 (Feb. 11, 2015), 80 FR 14563, 14646 (Mar. 19, 2015) 
(``Regulation SBSR Adopting Release'').
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    The Commission also continues to believe that basing the definition 
of ``material terms'' on what is required to be reported to an SDR 
provides certainty for SBS Entities regarding what

[[Page 6364]]

information must be reconciled, which should in turn reduce the burdens 
on those entities without lessening the benefits of the rule (which are 
described earlier in this section and in the Economic Analysis section 
below).\40\ Such an approach also is designed to allow affected 
counterparties to leverage the same systems used for SDR reporting for 
purposes of the portfolio reconciliation requirements, should such 
synergies exist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See also Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4618.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the proposed bifurcated definition of ``material 
terms,'' such approach was part of a broader request for comment that 
the Commission included in the Proposing Release to identify ways to 
potentially resolve an issue previously identified in connection with 
the rules applicable to the registration and ongoing regulation of 
SDRs.\41\ Specifically, the proposed definition was intended to help 
establish a basis by which registered SDRs could potentially comply 
with the requirement in Section 13(n)(5)(B) of the Exchange Act and 17 
CFR 240.13n-4(b)(3) (Rule 13n-4(b)(3)) thereunder that they ``confirm 
with both counterparties to the security-based swap the accuracy of the 
data that was submitted.'' \42\
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    \41\ For a more detailed discussion of this issue, including the 
concerns raised by SDRs as to the difficulty of requiring them to 
reach out to counterparties who are not their members to verify 
accuracy of the data, see Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4633-35.
    \42\ See 15 U.S.C. 78m(n)(5) and Rule 13n-4(b)(3). The 
Commission also included a provision in proposed Rule 15Fi-5(b)(1) 
that was intended to serve the same purpose. See infra note 110-113 
and accompanying text. Further, the Commission requested comment on 
whether those two aspects of the proposal could provide a sufficient 
basis, in whole or in part, for an SDR to assess whether it can 
reasonably rely on a SBS Entity's verification of transaction data 
as the basis to meet the verification requirements. See Proposing 
Release, 84 FR at 4635.
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    In their joint comment letter, ISDA and SIFMA expressed strong 
reservations to that proposed definition, noting that portfolio 
reconciliation and trade reporting are two different processes 
involving different systems and third party vendors, and that expanding 
the reconciliation process to include non-economic data fields would 
require the two associations' members to incur significant operational 
and technological development costs and time, with no tangible benefit 
for an SBS Entity's risk mitigation activity.\43\ Those commenters also 
posited that requiring reconciliation of non-economic terms for 
initial, but not subsequent, reconciliations would require further 
operational and technological development to manage the portfolio 
reconciliation process over the course of certain security-based swap 
life-cycle events, and would impose on SBS Entities the ongoing burden 
of maintaining three processes for portfolio reconciliation, one to 
comply with the CFTC's rules, one for any security-based swap that has 
not yet been included in a portfolio reconciliation, and one for all 
other security-based swaps.\44\
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    \43\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \44\ Id. ISDA and SIFMA also questioned ``the suitability of 
this proposed shift in regulatory responsibility'' and noted that 
counterparties that are not members of the SDR may also not be 
involved in meaningful portfolio reconciliation processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The DTCC and ICE Trade Vault expressed general support for 
leveraging certain aspects of the proposed rules (including the 
proposed bifurcated definition of ``material terms'') as a possible way 
of resolving, at least in part, the SDR verification issue, but 
suggested that those provisions would not provide SDRs with the 
regulatory certainty necessary to rely on an SBS Entity's submission to 
satisfy the SDR's verification obligation under Section 13(n)(5)(B) and 
Rule 13n-4(b)(3).\45\ DTCC and ICE Trade Vault also noted their belief 
that evaluating an SBS Entity for these purposes goes beyond the SDR's 
proper role to store and report data, which would impose a burden on 
the resources of an SDR outside the statutory requirements.\46\ 
Accordingly, those commenters concluded, reliance on the submissions by 
or on behalf of an SBS Entity to provide the definitive report of a 
given security-based swap is not a complete solution to the SDR 
verification issue, regardless of whether the SBS Entity was subject to 
a requirement that it initially reconcile with its counterparty all of 
the terms required to be reported to the SDR.\47\
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    \45\ See DTCC/ICE Trade Vault Letter.
    \46\ See id.
    \47\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an alternative to the approach set out in the Proposing Release, 
DTCC and ICE Trade Vault requested that the Commission address the 
issue through interpretive guidance or exemptive relief and make clear 
that (1) the relief is permanent and (2) the scope of the relief is 
broad enough to cover all submissions to the SDR not covered under an 
approach applicable only to SBS Entity submissions.\48\ DTCC and ICE 
Trade Vault did not, however, provide any additional information or 
potential conditions to support their suggested approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See id.
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    After careful review and consideration of the comments received and 
upon further consideration, the Commission is adopting a single, non-
bifurcated definition of ``material terms'' that better aligns with the 
CFTC's corresponding definition. Specifically, and as described above, 
Rule 15Fi-1(i) defines ``material terms'' to include each term that is 
required to be reported to a registered SDR or the Commission pursuant 
to Rule 901 under the Exchange Act; provided, however, that such 
definition does not include any term that is not relevant to the 
ongoing rights and obligations of the parties and the valuation of the 
security-based swap. In light of the comments we received, which 
indicated that the costs and burdens imposed on SBS Entities of 
implementing the proposed bifurcated approach were not justified in 
light of what commenters viewed as an incomplete and partial solution 
to the SDR verification issue (absent the Commission providing 
interpretive guidance or exemptive relief), the Commission believes 
that it is appropriate and less burdensome for SBS Entities to 
harmonize the definition of ``material terms'' in Rule 15Fi-1(i) with 
the corresponding CFTC definition by not adopting the proposed 
bifurcated approach.\49\
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    \49\ As described above, DTCC and ICE requested that the 
Commission address the issue of SDR verification through 
interpretive guidance or exemptive relief. This release focuses on 
specific documentation requirements related to risk mitigation 
techniques. And while the Commission is not addressing the SDR 
verification issue in this release, it may do so at a future date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to expressing their opposition to the proposed 
bifurcated approach to the definition of ``material terms,'' ISDA and 
SIFMA also requested that the Commission (1) align its trade reporting 
rules with those of the CFTC and (2) prescribe an enumerated list of 
the ``terms that are not relevant to the ongoing rights and obligations 
of the parties,'' and thus do not need to be reconciled in any 
portfolio reconciliation process required by Rule 15Fi-3.\50\ The 
Commission has carefully considered these comments and has determined 
not to make either of the two requested changes to the definition. The 
Commission believes that the comment about aligning the two agencies' 
trade reporting rules is outside the scope of this rulemaking because, 
although Rule 15Fi-3 references the reporting rules in order to 
identify the terms that must be reconciled, the purpose of this 
rulemaking is not to amend the underlying reporting requirements 
themselves.\51\
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    \50\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \51\ In addition, in a separate release adopting rules that 
address the cross-border application of certain security-based swap 
requirements the Commission also has issued a policy statement 
regarding compliance with the rules for SDRs and Regulation SBSR 
(``Regulation SBSR/SDR Policy Statement''). See Rule Amendments and 
Guidance Addressing Cross-Border Application of Certain Security-
Based Swap Requirements. Exchange Act Release No. 87780 (Dec. 18, 
2019) (``Cross-Border Amendments Adopting Release''). That policy 
statement, which will be in effect for four years following the 
first compliance date for Regulation SBSR, states that certain 
specified actions with respect to the security-based swap reporting 
rules will not provide a basis for a Commission enforcement action. 
For example, one of the identified fact patterns includes a 
situation where a person with a duty to report a data element of a 
security-based swap transaction, as required by any provision of 
Rules 901(c)(2)-(7) and 901(d) of Regulation SBSR, does not report 
that data element because the CFTC's swap reporting rules in force 
at the time of the transaction do not require that data element to 
be reported. See id. During the pendency of the Regulation SBSR/SDR 
Policy Statement, SBS Entities that elect to follow the CFTC's swap 
reporting rules pursuant to the Regulation SBSR/SDR Policy Statement 
also may look to the CFTC's reporting requirements with respect to 
which terms are the ``material terms'' for purposes of complying 
with the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3.

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[[Page 6365]]

    Moreover, although the Commission understands that there may be 
benefits of providing an enumerated list of terms that are ``not 
relevant to the ongoing rights and obligations of the parties and the 
valuation of the security-based swap,'' we also note that Rule 901 of 
Regulation SBSR, unlike the CFTC's swap data reporting rules, does not 
contain a list of required data fields, but rather a requirement 
setting forth broad categories of information that must be reported to 
an SDR (or the Commission). Because Rule 901 is used to identify the 
data elements that are considered to be ``material terms'' for purposes 
of the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3, the 
application of the CFTC's portfolio reconciliation rules may differ 
from the application of Rule 15Fi-3 due to differences in the operation 
of the underlying reporting rules, as described above.\52\ However, 
although the Commission is not providing a definitive list of excluded 
data fields because of the underlying differences between Regulation 
SBSR and the CFTC's swap data reporting rules, we would consider the 
information required to be reported to an SDR pursuant to Rule 901 of 
Regulation SBSR that corresponds to the 24 excluded fields in CFTC Rule 
Sec.  23.500(g) to be not relevant to the ongoing rights and 
obligations of the parties and the valuation of the security-based 
swap, and therefore such information may appropriately be excluded from 
the definition of ``material terms'' in Rule 15Fi-1(i) for purposes of 
the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3.\53\
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    \52\ However, the Commission's position in the Regulation SBSR/
SDR Policy Statement could, by addressing compliance with certain 
aspects of the CFTC's swap reporting rules (in lieu of Regulation 
SBSR) for a period of four years following the compliance date for 
SBSR, further alleviate any potential differences between Rule 15Fi-
3 and CFTC Sec.  23.502 that may flow from differences between the 
two agencies' Title VII data reporting rules. For example, to the 
extent that an SBS Entity reports security-based swap data to an SDR 
based on the data fields set forth in CFTC's swap data reporting 
rules in 17 CFR part 45, such SBS Entity would be able to identify 
the exact data fields that may be excluded from the definition of 
``material terms'' in Rule 15Fi-1(i), and therefore not subject to 
the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3. See id.
    \53\ See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that in 
2016 when the CFTC adopted amendments to Rule Sec.  23.500(g) to 
exclude the 24 specific fields from the definition of ``material 
terms,'' it described such terms as being ``not relevant to the 
ongoing rights and obligations of the parties and the valuation of 
the swap.'').
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2. Rule 15Fi-3(a): Portfolio Reconciliation With Other SBS Entities
    The particular portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3 
that apply to a specific security-based swap portfolio will depend on 
the type of counterparty with which the SBS Entity transacts. For 
transactions between two SBS Entities, Rule 15Fi-3(a) requires the two 
sides to engage in portfolio reconciliation at frequencies that are 
based on the size of the security-based swap portfolio between the two 
parties, expressed in ranges (or tiers). Under this tiered approach, if 
the two SBS Entity counterparties maintain a security-based swap 
portfolio that includes 500 or more security-based swaps, portfolio 
reconciliation will need to occur once each business day for as long as 
the portfolio exceeds this threshold. If a security-based swap 
portfolio between two SBS Entities includes more than 50 but fewer than 
500 security-based swaps on any business day during a week, portfolio 
reconciliation will be required to occur on a weekly basis. For a 
security-based swap portfolio between two SBS Entities that includes no 
more than 50 security-based swaps at any time during the calendar 
quarter, portfolio reconciliation will be required on a quarterly 
basis.\54\
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    \54\ For the avoidance of doubt, if a security-based swap 
portfolio between two SBS Entity counterparties crosses from one 
threshold to another, both sides would be required to comply with 
the relevant frequency requirements of Rule 15Fi-3(a) as of the date 
the threshold is crossed. For example, if two SBS Entities that have 
long maintained a portfolio of 50 or fewer security-based swaps (and 
accordingly reconcile on a quarterly basis) exceed the 50 
transaction threshold, the two sides would become subject to the 
weekly reconciliation requirement as of the first day that the 
portfolio exceeds 50 security-based swaps (or the daily 
reconciliation requirement if the portfolio increases to 500 or more 
security-based swaps). By contrast, if two SBS Entities that 
maintain a security-based swap portfolio of more than 500 
transactions subsequently fall below that threshold, they could 
begin reconciling on a weekly basis as of the first business day 
after the date on which they were able to verify that their 
security-based swap portfolio has fallen below 500 transactions.
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    For the reasons noted in the Proposing Release, the Commission 
continues to believe that the tiering of obligations, whereby the 
frequency of the portfolio reconciliation is based on the number of 
outstanding transactions with the applicable counterparty, represents a 
reasonable attempt to calibrate the costs to the benefits expected from 
reconciling a person's security-based swap portfolio at regular 
intervals.\55\ Moreover, the CFTC has adopted rules that utilize 
identical levels as Rule 15Fi-3(a), and the adoption by the Commission 
of different thresholds could lead to additional costs and other 
inefficiencies for SBS Entities that are also registered with the CFTC 
as Swap Entities.\56\
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    \55\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4619.
    \56\ When it adopted the same numerical thresholds in 2012, the 
CFTC noted that the requirement to reconcile portfolios with 500 or 
more swaps on a daily basis was consistent with the commitments made 
by the OTC Derivatives Steering Group's 14 major dealers (``G-14 
dealers'') in December 2008 as well as international regulatory 
efforts underway at the time of the CFTC's release. See CFTC Risk 
Mitigation Adopting Release, 77 FR at 55928, nn. 35 and 36. See also 
Summary of OTC Commitments, Attachment to the June 2, 2009 letter 
from G-14 dealers and certain buy-side participants to William C. 
Dudley, President, FRBNY, available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/markets/2009/060209table.pdf 
(committing, ``[b]y June 30, 2009, [to] execute daily collateralized 
portfolio reconciliations for collateralized portfolios in excess of 
500 trades between [Operations Management Group] dealers as detailed 
in the December 31, 2008 Collateral Update letter''). See also 
Attachment to the Mar. 31, 2011 letter from the G-14 dealers and 
certain buy-side participants to William C. Dudley, President, 
FRBNY, available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/markets/2011/SCL0331.pdf (``We commit to reduce the 
threshold for routine portfolio reconciliation of collateralized 
portfolios from those exceeding 1,000 transactions to those 
exceeding 500 transactions starting June 30, 2011. These portfolios 
will be reconciled at least monthly.'') (internal citation omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the requirements regarding the frequency of the 
reconciliation, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(1) also requires SBS Entities to agree 
in writing with each of their counterparties on the terms of the 
portfolio reconciliation including, if applicable, agreement on the 
selection of any third party service provider who may be performing the 
reconciliation.\57\ In practice, an SBS

[[Page 6366]]

Entity could satisfy such requirement by including the terms governing 
the portfolio reconciliation process in the written security-based swap 
trading relationship documentation that the SBS Entity executes with 
its counterparty pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5, as opposed to agreeing with 
the counterparty on the terms of the reconciliation on a transaction-
by-transaction basis, which is likely to be significantly more 
burdensome.\58\ This practice should help to ensure that portfolio 
reconciliation begins without delay after execution of the transaction 
and is designed to minimize the number of disagreements regarding the 
portfolio reconciliation process itself.
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    \57\ Rule 15Fi-3(a)(2) provides that portfolio reconciliation 
may be performed either on a bilateral basis by the counterparties 
or by a third party selected by the counterparties in accordance 
with paragraph (a)(1) of the rule. The Commission notes that CFTC 
Rule Sec.  23.502(a)(2), which is analogous to Rule 15Fi-3(a)(2), 
uses the term ``qualified third party.'' When it adopted that 
provision in 2012, the CFTC explained that it ``expects that parties 
will determine if the third-party is qualified based on their own 
policies.'' See CFTC Risk Mitigation Release, 77 FR at 55929. In 
addition, the CFTC's portfolio reconciliation requirements for 
transactions between Swap Entities and counterparties that are not 
Swap Entities do not require the relevant third party to be 
``qualified'' and, instead, provide that ``[t]he portfolio 
reconciliation may be performed on a bilateral basis by the 
counterparties or by one or more third parties selected by the 
counterparties.'' See 17 CFR 23.502(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Commission has decided not to refer to a 
``qualified third party'' and, instead, uses the term ``third party 
selected by the counterparties'' for purposes of Rule 15Fi-3(a)(2). 
We believe that it is sufficient for our purposes to refer solely to 
the fact that a third party has been selected.
    \58\ Specifically, once the two parties have agreed in writing 
on the terms of the portfolio reconciliation for the first time, the 
requirement could then be satisfied in connection with any new 
security-based swap transaction executed by the two sides merely by 
agreeing in writing to abide by the existing agreement regarding the 
reconciliation process.
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    Finally, the definition of ``business day'' for purposes of Rule 
15Fi-3 (regardless of the status of the counterparty) includes ``any 
day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.'' This definition, 
which the Commission adopted in 2016 in connection with the trade 
acknowledgement and verification requirements in Rule 15Fi-2, is not 
being amended in this rulemaking.\59\ As explained in the Proposing 
Release, we believe that the existing definition of ``business day'' 
has the benefit of providing market participants with the flexibility 
to determine the holidays that are ``legal holidays'' for purposes of 
the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3, which should 
be particularly useful given the cross-border nature of the OTC 
derivatives market.\60\
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    \59\ Upon the effective date of these final rules, the 
definition of ``business day'' currently in Rule 15Fi-1(a) will be 
renumbered as Rule 15Fi-1(b).
    \60\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4619 (describing the 
rationale for relying on the existing definition of ``business day'' 
in Rule 15Fi-1 (as opposed to proposing a separate definition for 
purposes of the portfolio reconciliation requirements) and comparing 
that existing definition with the corresponding CFTC definition of 
``business day'' in 17 CFR 1.3). As a reminder, SBS entities are 
required to agree in writing with each of their counterparties on 
the terms of the portfolio reconciliation pursuant to Rule 15Fi-
3(a)(1) (in the case of security-based swap portfolios with other 
SBS Entities) and Rule 15Fi-3(b)(1) (in the case of security-based 
swap portfolios with all other counterparties).
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3. Rule 15Fi-3(a): Resolution of Discrepancies With Other SBS Entities
    Rule 15Fi-3(a) also requires each SBS Entity to take additional 
actions in the event of a discrepancy with a counterparty that is an 
SBS Entity. Specifically, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(4) requires the two SBS Entity 
counterparties to resolve immediately any discrepancy in a material 
term, whether identified directly as part of the portfolio 
reconciliation or otherwise. For the reasons discussed in the Proposing 
Release, we continue to believe that this timeframe is appropriate 
given the ongoing nature of security-based swap transactions, as well 
as the potential for disagreements between the counterparties regarding 
the terms of a transaction to compound over the course of the security-
based swap transaction.\61\
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    \61\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4619-20.
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    Also, and recognizing that valuation discrepancies could be 
particularly difficult to resolve in a short period of time, Rule 15Fi-
3(a)(5) requires SBS Entities to have policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to resolve a valuation discrepancy no later than 
five business days from the date that it was discovered, which we 
believe to be both a reasonable and appropriate amount of time to 
resolve such discrepancies. As a condition to this requirement, 
however, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5) requires that each SBS Entity establish, 
maintain, and follow written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to identify how it will comply with any variation margin 
requirements under Section 15F(e) of the Exchange Act \62\ and any 
related regulations pending resolution of the valuation discrepancy. 
Although we understand the need to provide counterparties with 
sufficient time to resolve valuation discrepancies, as reflected in the 
five business day period provided to resolve them, we also believe it 
to be important for those counterparties to take reasonable steps 
during the pendency of the resolution to ensure that they are 
continuing to manage their credit risk to each other by way of 
exchanging variation margin.
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    \62\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e).
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    Further, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5) provides that for purposes of the 
requirement to resolve a valuation discrepancy within five business 
days of it being identified, a difference between the lower valuation 
and the higher valuation of less than 10% of the higher valuation need 
not be deemed a discrepancy. This 10% threshold would apply on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis and not on a portfolio level. As 
discussed in greater detail in the Proposing Release, the Commission 
believes that this buffer is designed to focus the internal resources 
of both counterparties on the largest discrepancies.\63\ At the same 
time, however, the Commission believes that, in most cases, prudent 
risk mitigation of a firm's security-based swap portfolio and proper 
governance over an entity's operations would involve ensuring that, at 
least to a certain degree, most valuation discrepancies are ultimately 
resolved.
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    \63\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4620. For the avoidance of 
doubt, an SBS Entity that identifies a valuation discrepancy in 
excess of 10% would be in compliance with Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5) if it 
resolves such discrepancy to a level below 10%, even if the entire 
discrepancy is not completely eliminated. For example, an SBS Entity 
would not be required to reduce an 11% valuation discrepancy down to 
zero. Similarly, an SBS Entity with a 9% valuation discrepancy would 
already be below the 10% threshold and would have no further 
obligations under Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5).
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4. Rule 15Fi-3(b): Portfolio Reconciliation With Other Counterparties
    Rule 15Fi-3(b) establishes reconciliation requirements for 
security-based swap portfolios between an SBS Entity and a counterparty 
that is not an SBS Entity. Although there is some broad similarity 
between Rule 15Fi-3(b) and the rules applicable to security-based swap 
portfolios between two SBS Entities, we have taken a more streamlined 
approach with respect to security-based swaps with non-SBS Entity 
counterparties, similar to the CFTC's approach.\64\
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    \64\ For additional discussion of the Commission's rationale for 
applying a more streamlined set of requirements in the case of a 
security-based swap portfolio between an SBS Entity and a non-SBS 
Entity counterparty, see Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4620.
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    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3(b), each SBS Entity is required to 
establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that it engages in portfolio 
reconciliation with non-SBS Entity counterparties as set forth in the 
rule.\65\ This policies and procedures requirement is in contrast to 
Rule 15Fi-3(a), which expressly requires portfolio reconciliation with 
respect to

[[Page 6367]]

transactions where both counterparties are SBS Entities. The policies 
and procedures required by Rule 15Fi-3(b) will need to provide that the 
portfolio reconciliation be performed no less frequently than: (1) Once 
each calendar quarter for each security-based swap portfolio that 
includes more than 100 security-based swaps at any time during the 
calendar quarter and (2) once annually for each security-based swap 
portfolio that includes no more than 100 security-based swaps at any 
time during the calendar year. For the reasons noted in the Proposing 
Release, the Commission continues to believe that basing the required 
frequency of the portfolio reconciliation on the number of outstanding 
transactions with the applicable counterparty represents a reasonable 
attempt to calibrate the costs and benefits of reconciling a person's 
security-based swap portfolio at regular intervals.\66\
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    \65\ Rule 15Fi-3(b) contains a slight deviation from 
corresponding CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(b) to eliminate language that 
we believe to be redundant. We do not intend for such clarification 
to signify any substantive differences between Rule 15Fi-3(b) and 
CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(b).
    \66\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4620. Also, and similar to 
the provisions governing portfolio reconciliation between two SBS 
Entities, the CFTC has adopted rules with identical thresholds and 
frequencies, and any divergence from those thresholds could lead to 
additional costs and other inefficiencies for SBS Entities that are 
also registered with the CFTC as Swap Entities. See supra note 56 
(discussing how the CFTC arrived at setting the numerical thresholds 
for the requirement to engage in portfolio reconciliation as between 
two Swap Entities.).
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    In addition, paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 15Fi-3 requires that the 
applicable policies and procedures be reasonably designed to ensure 
that each SBS Entity agrees in writing with each of its non-SBS Entity 
counterparties on the terms of the portfolio reconciliation including, 
if applicable, agreement on the selection of any third party service 
provider who may be performing the reconciliation. Paragraph (b)(2) 
provides that the portfolio reconciliation may be performed on a 
bilateral basis by the counterparties or by one or more third parties 
selected by the counterparties. To the extent that the counterparties 
elect to use a third party to provide these services, the policies and 
procedures should be reasonably designed to ensure that the SBS Entity 
and its counterparty agree on the selection of that third party in 
writing in accordance with the requirements set forth in Rule 15Fi-
3(b)(1).\67\
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    \67\ As noted in the discussion of the corresponding provision 
in Rule 15Fi-3(a)(1), an SBS Entity could in practice satisfy such 
requirement by including the terms governing the portfolio 
reconciliation process in the written security-based swap trading 
relationship documentation that it executes with its counterparty, 
which, pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5, will need to be executed prior to, 
or contemporaneously with, the two parties executing any new 
security-based swap transaction. In addition, once the two parties 
have agreed in writing on the terms of the portfolio reconciliation 
for the first time, the requirement could then be satisfied in 
connection with any new security-based swap transaction executed by 
the two sides merely by agreeing in writing to abide by the existing 
agreement regarding the reconciliation process. See supra notes 57 
and 58 and accompanying text.
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    Finally, Rule 15Fi-3(b)(4) requires each SBS Entity to establish, 
maintain, and follow written procedures reasonably designed to resolve 
any discrepancies in the valuation or a material term of each security-
based swap identified as part of a portfolio reconciliation or 
otherwise with a non-SBS Entity counterparty in a timely fashion.\68\ 
We are not providing a fixed definition of ``timely fashion'' in the 
context of resolving discrepancies with counterparties who are not SBS 
Entities because such counterparties may vary considerably in terms of 
their size, sophistication, and background. Although it may be possible 
to resolve most valuation discrepancies with large hedge funds and 
pension funds within the five-business-day period applicable to 
transactions between two SBS Entities, that timeframe may be much more 
challenging with respect to transactions with smaller buy-side 
firms.\69\
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    \68\ Similar to the requirement for security-based swap 
portfolios between two SBS Entities, Rule 15Fi-3(b)(4) provides that 
a difference between the lower valuation and the higher valuation of 
less than 10% of the higher valuation need not be deemed a 
discrepancy. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the 
10% threshold in the context of Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5)).
    \69\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4621.
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5. Reporting of Valuation Disputes
    Rule 15Fi-3(c) requires each SBS Entity to promptly notify the 
Commission of any security-based swap valuation dispute in excess of 
$20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency), at either the 
transaction or portfolio level,\70\ if not resolved within: (1) Three 
business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty that is an SBS 
Entity; or (2) five business days, if the dispute is with a 
counterparty that is not an SBS Entity.\71\ Such notification must be 
in a form and manner acceptable to the Commission,\72\ and must be sent 
to any applicable prudential regulator (i.e., in the case of any SBS 
Entity that is also a bank).\73\
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    \70\ The language ``at either the transaction or portfolio 
level'' is not included in CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(c), which is the 
corresponding requirement applicable to Swap Entities. The specific 
requirements as to the operation of CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(c) are 
contained in the rules of the National Futures Association 
(``NFA''), which the CFTC has authorized to, among other things, 
receive and review notices of reportable swap valuation disputes. 
See Performance of Certain Functions by the National Futures 
Association Related to Notices of Swap Valuation Disputes Filed by 
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 3390 (Jan. 21, 
2016).
    \71\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4621 (discussing the 
rationale for this notification provision, particularly as it 
relates to the potential risks to the counterparties of a security-
based swap that could result from a lack of agreement on its 
valuation).
    \72\ As explained in the Proposing Release, the requirement that 
the notice be provided ``in a form and manner acceptable to the 
Commission'' is intended to provide SBS Entities with flexibility to 
determine the most efficient and cost-effective means of making such 
submissions, so long as it is deemed to be acceptable by the 
Commission. See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4621, n. 47 and 
accompanying text. At the same time, however, we also understand 
that SBS Entities may prefer to have more specific direction as to 
how to report these disputes to the Commission (and any applicable 
prudential regulator). Accordingly, we requested comment on whether 
we should establish a specific process for how SBS Entities would 
need to provide notices of valuation disputes to the Commission 
pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fi-3(c). We received no comments on this 
aspect of the proposal, which we are adopting without modification.
    \73\ Additionally, the Commission is amending existing Rule 
15Fi-1 to add the term ``prudential regulator,'' which includes the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the FDIC, the Farm Credit Association, and the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, as applicable to the specific type of SBS 
Entity. This definition, which is numbered as Rule 15Fi-1(m), has 
the same meaning given to the term in Section 3(a)(74) of the 
Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(74).
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    We also note that the CFTC has adopted a nearly identical 
requirement with the same $20,000,000 threshold and timeframes, and 
that adoption of the Commission of different requirements could lead to 
additional costs and other inefficiencies for SBS Entities that are 
also registered with the CFTC as Swap Entities.\74\ When the CFTC 
adopted this requirement, it explained that ``the $20,000,000 
materiality threshold for reporting is sufficiently high to eliminate 
unnecessary `noise' from over-reporting, but not so high as to 
eliminate reporting that the [CFTC] may find of regulatory value, such 
as a large number of relatively small disputes that in aggregate could 
provide the [CFTC] with information regarding a widespread market 
disruption.'' \75\ We continue to concur with that justification, and

[[Page 6368]]

believe that these notifications could assist the Commission in 
identifying potential issues with respect to an SBS Entity's internal 
valuation methodology.\76\
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    \74\ See CFTC Risk Mitigation Adopting Release, 77 FR at 55914.
    \75\ Id. The CFTC has a nearly identical requirement in its Rule 
Sec.  23.502(c), except that it also requires Swap Entities to send 
such notices to the Commission when the dispute involves a swap that 
is also a security-based swap agreement, of which a material term is 
based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or 
any group or index of securities, or any interest therein. See 17 
CFR 23.502(c) (citing the inclusion of security-based swap 
agreements in the definition of ``swap'' in 7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(v)). 
Because there is no corresponding inclusion of ``swap agreements'' 
in the definition of ``security-based swap agreement'' in Section 
3(a)(68) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)), Rule 15Fi-3(c) does 
not contain a requirement to provide notices of any security-based 
swap valuation disputes to the CFTC.
    \76\ We are not providing a fixed definition of the term 
``promptly'' in the context of when the SBS Entity would need to 
provide the Commission of an applicable security-based swap 
valuation dispute. Although we would expect that SBS Entities would 
be able to provide these notices to the Commission as soon as the 
disputes exceed the applicable timeframes (e.g., the beginning of 
fourth business day in the case of a dispute between two SBS 
Entities), we also understand that some notices may take longer to 
prepare, such as in cases when the counterparties are unable to 
agree even on the size of the dispute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, in the Proposing Release, the Commission summarized the 
NFA Interpretive Notice entitled, ``NFA Interpretive Notice to 
Compliance Rule 2-49: Swap Valuation Dispute Filing Requirements'' 
(``NFA Interpretive Notice to Rule 2-49''), and requested comment on 
whether any aspects of that notice should be incorporated directly into 
proposed Rule 15Fi-3(c).\77\ Among other things, that interpretive 
notice describes the types of disputes that would trigger a notice 
requirement as well as requirements related to the timing and frequency 
for providing notices of valuation disputes.\78\ In their letter, ISDA 
and SIFMA suggested that incorporating NFA Interpretive Notice to Rule 
2-49 into Rule 15Fi-3 could become problematic should the NFA update or 
revise its guidance in the future, such that it would create 
discrepancies between the two sets of requirements.\79\ ISDA and SIFMA 
instead requested that the Commission put in place a process to ensure 
that any NFA guidance applicable to Swap Entities with respect to the 
CFTC's portfolio reconciliation requirements should also automatically 
apply to SBS Entities with respect to the Commission's requirements in 
Rule 15Fi-3(c), even when such NFA guidance is updated or changed.\80\
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    \77\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4621-22 (summarizing the 
NFA Interpretive Notice to Rule 2-49). The NFA notice is available 
at: https://www.nfa.futures.org/rulebook/rules.aspx?Section=9&RuleID=9072.
    \78\ See id.
    \79\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \80\ See id.
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    After careful review and consideration, the Commission has 
determined to incorporate one aspect of NFA Interpretive Guidance to 
Rule 2-49 into Rule 15Fi-3(c). Specifically, we have modified the rule 
to provide that SBS Entities are required to notify the Commission, in 
a form and manner acceptable to the Commission, and any applicable 
prudential regulator, if the amount of any security-based swap 
valuation dispute that was the subject of a previous notice increases 
or decreases by more than $20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other 
currency), at either the transaction or portfolio level. Such amended 
notice shall be provided to the Commission and any applicable 
prudential regulator no later than the last business day of the 
calendar month in which the applicable security-based swap valuation 
dispute increases or decreases by the applicable dispute amount.\81\ 
This change, which is consistent with NFA Interpretive Guidance to Rule 
2-49,\82\ is intended to clarify that SBS Entities are not required to 
file the same notice of a valuation dispute for each day the dispute 
remains outstanding after the initial three- or five-business day 
requirement, while also helping to ensure that the Commission is made 
aware of significant changes to existing valuation disputes using the 
same increments that Swap Entities are required to use when amending 
swap valuation dispute notices pursuant to CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(c) 
(as administered by the NFA).\83\
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    \81\ The NFA requires amendments from Swap Entities to be filed 
on the 15th (or the following business day if the 15th is a weekend 
or holiday) and last business day of each month. To the extent that 
an SBS Entity that also is registered with the CFTC as a Swap Entity 
has existing systems in place to send out amendments on both the 
15th (or the following business day if the 15th is a weekend or 
holiday) and last business day of each month, the earlier filing 
would of course satisfy the requirements of Rule 15Fi-3(c).
    \82\ Specifically, NFA Interpretive Guidance to Rule 2-49 
provides that ``[Swap Entities] should not file a daily notice of a 
previously reported dispute even if the valuation dispute amount 
changes. [Swap Entities] are required, however, to notify NFA of 
certain changes to the dispute amount on the 15th (or the following 
business day if the 15th is a weekend or holiday) and last business 
day of each month by amending any previously filed notice where the 
dispute amount has increased in $20 million incremental bands. For 
example, if a [Swap Entity] files a notice of a $30 million dispute, 
an amended notice updating the dispute amount is required if that 
dispute increases to $40 million or more and each subsequent $20 
million increment (i.e., dispute amount increases to $60 million or 
more, $80 million or more, etc.). [Swap Entities] are also required 
to amend a previously filed notice to update the dispute amount if 
the amount decreases at these $20 million increments. The 
determination of whether an amended notice is required is based on 
the dispute amount on the reporting date.''
    \83\ Among other things, NFA Interpretive Notice to Rule 2-49 
requires Swap Entities to file termination notices of disputes that 
are no longer reportable under CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(c) on the 15th 
(or the following business day if the 15th is a weekend or holiday) 
and the last business day of the month based on the dispute amount 
on the reporting date. See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4621-22 
(summarizing NFA Interpretive Notice to Rule 2-49). In addition, the 
NFA issued another notice, entitled ``Effective date of Interpretive 
Notice to NFA Compliance Rule 2-49: Swap Valuation Dispute Filing 
Requirement'' which, among other things, requires that all swap 
valuation disputes include: (1) The swap dealer's NFA ID and legal 
entity identifier (``LEI''), (2) the dispute reportable date, (3) 
the dispute type, (4) the dispute termination date, (5) the 
receiver/payer, (6) the disputed amount, in U.S. Dollars (``USD''), 
(7) the counterparty name, and (8) counterparty LEI or Privacy Law 
Identifier. For initial and variation margin disputes, the swap 
dealer is also required to provide (1) the unique swap identifier, 
(2) the base currency notional amount, (3) the base currency code, 
(4) the notional value USD equivalent, (5) the asset type, and (6) 
the product type. For disputes where no collateral is exchange, NFA 
Interpretive Notice to Rule 2-49 also requires Swap Entities to 
include in the notice the credit support annex/netting agreement ID. 
See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4622, n. 57 (describing NFA Notice 
to Members I-17-30, which incorporates NFA Notice to Members I-17-
30).
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    The Commission has not incorporated any other provision of NFA 
Interpretive Guidance to Rule 2-49 into Rule 15Fi-3(c) in order to 
provide SBS Entities with the flexibility to submit the required 
information to the Commission in a manner that is most efficient for 
each SBS Entity.\84\ Finally, the Commission is not including in Rule 
15Fi-3(c) a process to ensure that the NFA's guidance for Swap Entities 
would also apply to the requirements in Rule 15Fi-3(c) for SBS 
Entities, as requested by commenters. The Commission recognizes that 
subsequent revisions to the NFA's guidance could potentially result in 
divergences between the application of the Commission's requirements 
regarding notices of valuation disputes and the corresponding CFTC 
requirements (as administered by NFA). However, to the extent that 
future changes to the NFA's requirements create divergences between 
Rule 15Fi-3(c) and application of CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(c), market 
participants are encouraged to contact Commission staff to discuss such 
divergences.
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    \84\ As a general matter, we believe it likely that a notice 
provided to the Commission with respect to a security-based swap 
valuation dispute that is compliant with NFA Interpretive Guidance 
to Rule 2-49 (but for the fact that such notice pertains to a 
security-based swap) would also be compliant with 17 CFR 240.15F-
5(c) (Rule 15F-5(c)). SBS Entities that have questions about using a 
system designed to accommodate the NFA guidance to comply with Rule 
15Fi-5(c) are encouraged to contact Commission staff to discuss such 
questions.
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6. Application of Rule 15Fi-3 to Cleared Security-Based Swaps
    As proposed, the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 
15Fi-3 would not have applied to a ``clearing transaction'' which, 
pursuant to existing Rule 15Fi-1(c), is defined as a security-based 
swap that has a clearing agency as a direct counterparty.\85\ As the

[[Page 6369]]

Commission explained in the Proposing Release, the exception reflected 
the Commission's belief that the function of reconciling the terms of 
cleared trades is more appropriately addressed by the rules governing a 
clearing agency's risk management practices, as well as by the 
documentation governing the relationship between a clearing agency and 
its members.
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    \85\ Under existing Rule 15Fi-1(b) (which is renumbered as Rule 
15Fi-1(c) under these final rules), the term ``clearing agency'' 
means a clearing agency registered with the Commission pursuant to 
Section 17A of the Exchange Act and that provides central 
counterparty services for security-based swap transactions.
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    We did, however, request comment on whether the scope of the 
exception for cleared security-based swaps should be modified, such as 
by including transactions that are cleared at a clearing agency that is 
not registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 17A of the 
Exchange Act, whether because of an applicable exemption from 
registration or because the Exchange Act does not cover the activities 
of the clearing agency. For example, security-based swaps cleared at a 
foreign clearing agency that is not registered with the Commission 
would not be deemed to be ``cleared'' for these purposes, and would 
therefore be subject to Rule 15Fi-3. In their comment letter, ISDA and 
SIFMA expressed broad general support for expanding the scope of the 
transactions considered to be cleared for purposes of this exception, 
and stated that they would consider such a change to be a 
clarification, and not a deviation from the corresponding CFTC 
rules.\86\
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    \86\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter. Although ISDA and SIFMA made this 
comment solely in connection with the portfolio compression 
requirements in Rule 15Fi-4, we view this issue as applying equally 
to the portfolio reconciliation requirements in Rule 15Fi-3 and the 
trading relationship documentation requirements in Rule 15Fi-5. As a 
result, the discussion that follows, including the change we are 
making to the scope of the clearing transactions subject to the 
clearing exception, applies to all three new rules.
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    After careful review and consideration of the comments received and 
upon further consideration, the Commission is making two changes to 
Rule 15Fi-3(d). First, we are expanding the exception to include not 
only security-based swaps that have a clearing agency as a direct 
counterparty, but also those that are, directly or indirectly, 
submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency. As the Commission 
explained when it adopted the trade acknowledgment and verification 
requirements, under the agency model of clearing, cleared security-
based swap transactions are new transactions created to replace a 
bilateral transaction that was submitted to, and has been accepted for 
clearing by, a clearing agency. Upon acceptance for clearing, the 
clearing agency becomes the new direct counterparty to each of the 
counterparties of the original bilateral transaction. Therefore, these 
transactions (known colloquially as the ``beta'' and ``gamma'') 
effectively mirror the original bilateral transaction (known as the 
``alpha'') that was extinguished in the process of acceptance for 
clearing.\87\
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    \87\ See Trade Acknowledgement and Verification Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 39820-21. In that release, the Commission also 
noted that if both direct counterparties to the alpha transaction 
are members of the clearing agency, the direct counterparties would 
submit the transaction to the clearing agency directly and the 
resulting beta transaction would be between the clearing agency and 
one clearing member, and the gamma transaction would be between the 
clearing agency and the other clearing member. However, if the 
direct counterparties to the alpha transaction are a clearing member 
and a non-clearing member (a ``customer''), the customer's side of 
the trade would be submitted for clearing by a clearing member 
acting on behalf of the customer. When the clearing agency accepts 
the alpha transaction for clearing, one of the resulting 
transactions--in this case, assume the beta transaction--would be 
between the clearing agency and the customer, with the customer's 
clearing member acting as guarantor for the customer's trade. The 
other resulting transaction--the gamma transaction--would be between 
the clearing agency and the clearing member that was a direct 
counterparty to the alpha transaction. See id. (citing Regulation 
SBSR Adopting Release, 80 FR 14563 at n. 292).
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    By virtue of relying on the current definition of ``clearing 
transaction,'' which applies to the trade acknowledgment and 
verification requirements in existing Rule 15Fi-2, the proposed 
exception in Rule 15Fi-3(d) would have applied only to the ``beta'' and 
``gamma'' transactions, and not to the original bilateral transaction 
(i.e., the ``alpha''). Although the obligation to reconcile the 
original bilateral security-based swap transaction would no longer 
exist as soon as the transaction is novated to the clearing agency, the 
Commission nevertheless believes that requiring the initial transaction 
to be reconciled during the period between trade execution and novation 
would be inconsistent with the approach taken by both the CFTC in its 
portfolio reconciliation rules and by the Commission in 17 CFR 240.18a-
3 (Rule 18a-3), which sets forth the uncleared security-based swap 
margin requirements for non-bank SBS Entities, and in 17 CFR 240.18a-4 
(Rule 18a-4), which sets forth the segregation requirements for certain 
SBS dealers.\88\
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    \88\ Rule 18a-3(b)(5) defines ``non-cleared security-based 
swap'' as a security-based swap that is not, directly or indirectly, 
submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency registered pursuant to 
section 17A of the [Exchange] Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or by a clearing 
agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or 
order pursuant to section 17A of the [Exchange] Act (15 U.S.C. 
78q1). See 17 CFR 240.18a-3(b)(5). Similarly, Rule 18a-4(a)(1) 
defines ``cleared security-based swap'' as ``a security-based swap 
that is, directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a 
clearing agency registered with the Commission pursuant to section 
17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1).'' See 17 CFR 240.18a-4(a)(1).
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    For the reasons set forth above, the Commission is revising the 
exception in Rule 15Fi-3(d) such that it includes those original 
``alpha'' security-based swap transactions. This modification is 
reflective of the fact that the original transaction, once submitted to 
and cleared by a clearing agency, no longer exists. In addition, the 
exception also will apply to security-based swap transactions cleared 
by a clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from registration 
by rule or order pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act (in 
addition to transactions cleared by a registered clearing agency). We 
are making this change in response to commenters, as well as to better 
align the operation of Rule 15Fi-3 with CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502 and the 
Commission's security-based swap margin requirements in Rule 18a-3.\89\ 
Accordingly, Rule 15Fi-3(d) provides an exception from the portfolio 
reconciliation requirements for any security-based swap that is, 
directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency 
registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a clearing 
agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or 
order pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act.\90\ Finally, the 
Commission believes that the justifications for modifying the clearing 
exception in Rule 15Fi-3 apply equally to the portfolio compression 
requirements in Rule 15Fi-4 and to the trading relationship 
documentation requirements in Rule 15Fi-5, and we

[[Page 6370]]

have made corresponding revisions to both of those rules.\91\
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    \89\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for 
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap 
Participants and Capital and Segregation Requirements for Broker-
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 86175 (June 21, 2019), 84 FR 
43872, 43919 (Aug. 22, 2019) (``Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Adopting Release'') (``[t]he language regarding exemption from 
registration was added to the final rule to align the definition 
more closely with the definitions used in the margin rules of the 
CFTC and prudential regulators.'').
    \90\ These revisions have been incorporated directly into the 
operative exception in Rule 15Fi-3(d), which no longer cross-
references to the existing definition of ``clearing transaction'' in 
Rule 15Fi-1(d) (re-numbered from paragraph (c)). In addition, we 
have amended the existing definition of ``clearing agency'' in Rule 
15Fi-1(c) (re-numbered from paragraph (b)) to provide that it 
applies only to the trade acknowledgement and verification 
requirements in Rule 15Fi-2. That modification was necessary because 
the trade acknowledgement and verification requirements in Rule 
15Fi-2 contain an exception only for security-based swap 
transactions cleared by a registered clearing agency, and not for 
those transactions cleared by an exempted clearing agency (in 
contrast to the clearing exceptions from the requirements in Rules 
15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5).
    \91\ See infra Sections II.B.3 and II.C.5.
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B. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression

1. Scope of Rule 15Fi-4--Portfolio Compression Exercises
    For purposes of Rule 15Fi-4, the phrase ``portfolio compression 
exercise'' generally refers to an exercise by which security-based swap 
counterparties wholly terminate or change the notional value of some or 
all of the security-based swaps submitted by the counterparties for 
inclusion in the portfolio compression exercise and, depending on the 
methodology employed, replace the terminated security-based swaps with 
other security-based swaps whose combined notional value (or some other 
measure of risk) is less than the combined notional value (or some 
other measure of risk) of the terminated security-based swaps in the 
exercise.\92\ In order to incorporate that concept into these final 
rules, we are amending existing Rule 15Fi-1 to incorporate definitions 
for both ``bilateral portfolio compression exercise'' \93\ and 
``multilateral portfolio compression exercise.'' \94\ These two 
definitions are nearly identical, with the sole difference being that 
the former applies to a portfolio compression exercise that includes 
only two security-based swap counterparties, while the latter applies 
to a portfolio compression exercise that includes more than two 
security-based swap counterparties.\95\
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    \92\ The corresponding CFTC rule is 17 CFR 23.503. The structure 
of the CFTC rule, including the subsections, mirrors the structure 
of Rule 15Fi-4.
    \93\ The corresponding CFTC definition is in 17 CFR 23.500(b).
    \94\ The corresponding CFTC definition is in 17 CFR 23.500(h).
    \95\ As noted below in Section I.C.4, Rule 15Fi-4 is applicable 
only to uncleared security-based swaps.
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    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-4(a)(2) and (3), SBS Entities are required to 
establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures for 
periodically engaging in both bilateral portfolio compression exercises 
and multilateral portfolio compression exercises, in each case when 
appropriate, with any counterparties that are SBS Entities. To the 
extent that an SBS Entity transacts with a counterparty that is not an 
SBS Entity, Rule 15Fi-4(b) provides that the policies and procedures 
required under the rule will need to provide that portfolio compression 
exercises occur when appropriate and only to the extent requested by 
any such counterparty.\96\
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    \96\ As we noted in discussing the portfolio reconciliation 
requirements in Rule 15Fi-3, the Commission believes it appropriate 
to impose more prescriptive requirements in cases where both 
entities are subject to the SEC's requirements for registered 
entities.
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    The definitions of ``bilateral portfolio compression exercise'' and 
``multilateral portfolio compression exercise'' are designed to be 
sufficiently broad as to provide market participants with maximum 
flexibility when complying with Rule 15Fi-4, while also retaining the 
key elements necessary to achieve the important risk-reducing benefits 
discussed throughout this release--namely the reduction of counterparty 
and operational risk achieved by terminating offsetting security-based 
swap transactions. Accordingly, with one exception, the rule does not 
include specific requirements as to the contents of the policies and 
procedures created to comply with these rules.\97\ In addition, for 
consistency with the rules applicable to Swap Entities, these 
definitions are substantively identical to the CFTC's corresponding 
definitions, which we continue to believe are appropriately scoped for 
purposes of Rule 15Fi-4.
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    \97\ The one exception to this statement is the requirement in 
Rules 15Fi-4(a)(2) and (a)(3) that such policies and procedures 
address the evaluation of portfolio compression exercises that are 
initiated, offered, or sponsored by any third party. The Commission 
believes that the decision of which party to use (or not use) to 
conduct a compression exercise is of critical importance to the 
overall determination of whether to participate in compression. 
Although the Commission takes no position with respect to the type 
or identity of the party used to conduct a compression exercise, we 
recognize that a number of parties are currently offering such 
services, including third-party vendors and some self-regulatory 
organizations (e.g., clearing agencies). The Commission also 
understands that there may be some instances where compression could 
be performed without the use of a third-party service provider.
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    The Commission recognizes that a decision to engage in a process 
that could ultimately result in the termination or modification of 
existing contracts, and the potential entry into new ones, should be 
made in accordance with policies and procedures that are tailored to 
the specific risks and operations of the relevant SBS Entity. Such 
policies and procedures should, in the Commission's view, be permitted 
to take into account the specific risk tolerances of the regulated 
entity, including with respect to such areas as operational, funding, 
liquidity, and credit risk, and also reflect the possibility that firms 
may have legitimate business reasons for maintaining certain offsetting 
security-based swap positions, even if in theory they could be 
compressed.
    For example, the Commission understands that an SBS Entity might be 
unable to participate in a particular portfolio compression exercise 
that could result in it transacting with certain counterparties (e.g., 
because a counterparty poses an unacceptable level of credit risk), or 
in certain types of transactions. To the extent that such limitations 
exist and are reflected in the policies and procedures required 
pursuant to Rules 15Fi-4(a) and (b), an SBS Entity will be in 
compliance with those rules so long as it follows those policies and 
procedures, even if it determines not to engage in a particular 
compression exercise.
    Further, in comparing Rules 15Fi-4(a) and (b) with the analogous 
rules adopted by the CFTC, we note three main differences, the first 
two of which we believe to be minor and technical in nature. First, 
CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503(a)(3)(i) requires that any policies and 
procedures related to multilateral portfolio compression address, among 
other things, participation in all multilateral portfolio compression 
exercises required by CFTC regulation or order. Although the Commission 
would expect that any comprehensive policy or procedure would, as a 
matter of course, reflect any applicable laws and regulations expressly 
mandating participation in certain types of portfolio compression 
exercises, there is no comparable requirement in Rule 15Fi-4(a)(3).
    Second, CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503(a)(3)(ii) requires that any policies 
and procedures related to multilateral portfolio compression exercises 
evaluate, among other things, any services that are initiated, offered, 
or sponsored by any third party.\98\ The CFTC did not, however, include 
such a requirement in the corresponding provision related to policies 
and procedures addressing bilateral portfolio compression 
exercises.\99\ Although the inclusion of a specific requirement in the 
rule should not be interpreted as creating an exhaustive list of what 
we would expect SBS Entities to include in their policies and 
procedures, we understand that bilateral portfolio compression services 
are currently being offered by third-party vendors. Evaluating those 
services would seem to be a natural part of the process of broadly 
analyzing the applicability of bilateral compression in general. 
Therefore, we have included a similar requirement in both Rules 15Fi-
4(a)(2) (policies and procedures regarding bilateral compression) and 
15Fi-4(a)(3) (policies and procedures regarding multilateral 
compression).\100\
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    \98\ See 17 CFR 23.503(a)(3)(ii).
    \99\ See 17 CFR 23.503(a)(2).
    \100\ The Commission received no comments on this particular 
issue.

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[[Page 6371]]

    Third, CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503(b), which is the corresponding CFTC 
compression rule applicable to transactions with counterparties that 
are not Swap Entities, does not contain the caveat that the compression 
or offset covered by the applicable policies and procedures would only 
need to occur ``when appropriate.'' By contrast, Rule 15Fi-4(b) does 
contain such qualifier. In their comment letter, ISDA and SIFMA 
expressed support for this approach, which we are adopting today as 
proposed, and also requested that the Commission clarify in the final 
rule that SBS Entities can always determine whether it is appropriate 
to engage in such activity.\101\ Despite this divergence from the 
approach previously adopted by the CFTC, we continue to be believe it 
prudent to allow an SBS Entity to engage in bilateral offset or 
compression exercises (to the extent requested by its non-SBS Entity 
counterparty) only in circumstances when doing so was appropriate for 
the SBS Entity in light of the particular facts and circumstances 
involved. However, as we stated in the Proposing Release, the 
discretion we intended to provide SBS Entities in connection with this 
requirement should not be used by an SBS Entity arbitrarily not to 
honor the request by its counterparty to engage in portfolio 
compression.\102\
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    \101\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \102\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4625, n.70.
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    Finally, ISDA and SIFMA raised questions about the impact of Rule 
15Fi-4 on existing counterparty documentation, noting that ``the 
industry has a strong interest in not having to address any deviations 
regarding the portfolio compression process (or other substantive areas 
covered by industry standard documentation intended to achieve 
compliance with CFTC swap rules) as this may trigger more detailed 
review, explanation and negotiation between relevant counterparties, 
which will be challenging, costly and time consuming without 
commensurate benefit to regulatory oversight.'' Those commenters 
further requested that, to the extent any differences remain between 
the Commission's and CFTC's portfolio compression rules, the Commission 
should allow, on an on-going basis, firms that qualify as both SBS 
Entities and Swap Entities to comply with Rule 15Fi-4 by complying with 
CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503 without any further conditions. The Commission 
has carefully considered this comment and has concluded that such 
action should not be necessary as we believe that any SBS Entity that 
is in compliance with CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503 as it exists at this time 
also will be in compliance with Rule 15Fi-4. As the Commission 
previously stated, we believe that any differences between Rule 15Fi-4 
and CFTC Sec.  23.503 are either technical in nature or provide SBS 
Entities with greater flexibility as compared to Swap Entities (e.g., 
the inclusion of the phrase ``when appropriate'' in Rule 15Fi-4(b)).
2. Scope of Rule 15Fi-4--Bilateral Offset
    As we previously noted, the Commission does not believe it prudent 
to suggest a preference as to the use of any particular type of 
compression, or as to the type or identity of the party conducting the 
exercise. Instead, we have crafted broad definitions of the terms 
``bilateral portfolio compression exercise'' and ``multilateral 
portfolio compression exercise'' in Rules 15Fi-1(a) and 15Fi-1(j), 
respectively. In addition, the Commission recognizes that there may be 
other ways for market participants to reduce the size of their 
derivatives portfolios that may not be considered to be ``portfolio 
compression exercises'' for purposes of those two definitions.
    In light of those considerations, Rule 15Fi-4(a)(1) requires each 
SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written policies and 
procedures for terminating each ``fully offsetting security-based 
swap'' that it maintains with another SBS Entity in a timely fashion, 
when appropriate.\103\ To the extent that an SBS Entity transacts with 
a counterparty that is not an SBS Entity, the requirements of Rule 
15Fi-4(b) are identical to those in Rule 15Fi-4(a)(1), except that the 
required policies and procedures only need to address engaging in 
bilateral offset when appropriate and to the extent requested by the 
counterparty. The Commission believes that by not adopting prescriptive 
requirements as to the form of bilateral offset that would need to be 
reflected in an SBS Entity's policies and procedures, the rules 
regarding bilateral offset allow the counterparties flexibility in the 
manner in which they undertake to reduce the size of their security-
based swap portfolios in light of each counterparty's unique risks and 
operations.
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    \103\ The Commission also is amending existing Rule 15Fi-1 to 
add, as paragraph (h), the term ``fully offsetting security-based 
swaps,'' which is defined as ``security-based swaps of equivalent 
terms where no net cash flow would be owed to either counterparty 
after the offset of payment obligations thereunder.'' For 
consistency with the rules applicable to Swap Entities, this 
definition is substantively identical to the CFTC's corresponding 
definition in 17 CFR 23.500(f), which we continue to believe is 
appropriately scoped for purposes of Rule 15Fi-4.
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    The rules regarding bilateral offset also have been designed to 
reflect the Commission's understanding that firms may have legitimate 
business reasons for maintaining fully offsetting security-based swap 
transactions that otherwise could be terminated. As such, Rules 15Fi-
4(a)(1) and (b) require a firm's policies and procedures to address the 
termination of fully offsetting security-based swaps only ``when 
appropriate.''
    Finally, for purposes of Rule 15Fi-4(a)(1), the Commission expects 
to generally consider an SBS Entity to have terminated each fully 
offsetting security-based swap in a ``timely fashion'' so long as (1) 
termination of the offsetting security-based swaps occurs within a 
period that is reasonable in light of the circumstances of each 
particular transaction and (2) the relevant SBS Entity is otherwise in 
compliance with its policies and procedures regarding bilateral offset.
3. Application of Rule 15Fi-4 to Cleared Security-Based Swaps
    As proposed, the portfolio compression requirements in Rule 15Fi-4 
would not have applied to a ``clearing transaction'' which, pursuant to 
existing Rule 15Fi-1(c), is defined as a security-based swap that has a 
clearing agency as a direct counterparty.\104\ Notwithstanding this 
provision, the Commission understands that portfolio compression is not 
limited to uncleared swaps and that compression services may be offered 
either by a clearing agency itself or by a third-party vendor that 
works collaboratively with the clearing agency.\105\ Although the 
Commission recognizes the risk-reducing benefits that could be realized 
through the compression of cleared security-based swaps, we nonetheless 
believe that the issue of whether and when compression should occur 
within a clearing agency is best addressed by the rules governing the 
clearing agency's risk management practices, as well as by the 
documentation governing the

[[Page 6372]]

relationship between the clearing agency and its members.\106\
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    \104\ See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
    \105\ Notwithstanding the applicability of the requirements of 
Rule 15Fi-4, the Commission reminds any third parties performing 
compression or offset services to keep in mind any potential 
requirements under other provisions of the securities laws. For 
example, the Commission has stated that the provision of tear-up and 
compression services for security-based swaps would qualify these 
participants as clearing agencies and therefore trigger the 
statutory requirement to register as clearing agencies pursuant to 
Section 17A of the Exchange Act, absent exemptive relief (which the 
Commission provided on a conditional temporary basis in July 2011). 
See Clearing Services Exemptive Order, 76 FR at 39964.
    \106\ The corresponding CFTC rule is 17 CFR 23.503(c).
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    Accordingly, Rule 15Fi-4(c) provides an exception from the 
portfolio compression requirements for any security-based swap that is, 
directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency 
registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a clearing 
agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or 
order pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act. This exception has 
been modified from the proposal, as described in detail in Section 
II.A.6.

C. Rule 15Fi-5: Trading Relationship Documentation

1. Scope of Rule 15Fi-5
    In light of the important risk mitigating factors described in 
Section I of this release, the Commission is adopting Rule 15Fi-5, 
which establishes certain requirements for SBS Entities related to the 
use of written trading relationship documentation in connection with 
their security-based swap transactions.\107\ Specifically, Rule 15Fi-
5(a)(2) requires each SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that it 
executes written security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
with each of its counterparties prior to, or contemporaneously with, 
executing a security-based swap with any counterparty.\108\ The rule 
further requires that the policies and procedures required thereunder 
be approved in writing by a senior officer of the SBS Entity, and that 
a record of the approval be retained.\109\
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    \107\ The corresponding CFTC rule is 17 CFR 23.504. The 
structure of the CFTC rule, including the subsections, mirrors the 
structure of Rule 15Fi-5.
    \108\ Among other exceptions discussed below in Section II.C.5, 
Rule 15Fi-5 does not apply to security-based swap that is directly 
or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency 
registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a 
clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from registration 
by rule or order pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act.
    \109\ For purposes of this requirement, the Commission views the 
term ``senior officer'' as covering only the most senior executives 
in the organization, such as a firm's chief executive officer, chief 
financial officer, chief legal officer, chief compliance officer, 
president, or other person at a similar level. This approach is 
similar to how the Commission has previously interpreted the term in 
the context of other requirements applicable to SBS Entities. See 
Registration Process for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major 
Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 75611 
(Aug. 5, 2015), 80 FR 48964, 48968 n. 29 (Aug.14, 2015) (``SBS 
Entity Registration Adopting Release''). By contrast, CFTC Rule 
Sec.  23.504 uses the term ``senior management,'' which is not 
further defined in either CFTC Rules Sec.  23.500 or Sec.  23.504. 
We view this difference as a clarification and do not believe that 
it represents a substantive difference between the two sets of 
rules.
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    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5(b)(1), the security-based swap trading 
relationship documentation subject to the policies and procedures 
requirement in Rule 15Fi-5(a)(2) must be in writing. Such documentation 
also must include all terms governing the trading relationship between 
the SBS Entity and its counterparty, including, without limitation, 
terms addressing payment obligations, netting of payments, events of 
default or other termination events, calculation and netting of 
obligations upon termination, transfer of rights and obligations, 
governing law, valuation, and dispute resolution.
    As proposed, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(1) also would have required that the 
applicable policies and procedures provide that the trading 
relationship documentation include terms governing ``applicable 
regulatory reporting obligations (including pursuant to Regulation 
SBSR).'' CFTC Rule Sec.  23.504 does not contain a comparable 
provision. Nevertheless, the Commission included this requirement in 
the proposal as a means to potentially help address the SDR 
verification issue that is discussed in detail in Section II.A.1 above 
and Section I.E. of the Proposing Release.\110\
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    \110\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4633-35. The Commission 
stated its view that clarifying the counterparties' reporting 
arrangements in advance of a transaction generally should prove 
beneficial to the OTC derivatives market due to the importance of 
ensuring that a security-based swap transaction is reported 
accurately and in a timely manner.
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    In their comment letter, ISDA and SIFMA expressed their view that 
trading relationship documentation, such as ISDA Master Agreements, 
including amendments effectuated by protocol or otherwise, are not the 
appropriate place to memorialize regulatory reporting obligations and 
should not address reporting obligations that go beyond what is 
required under Regulation SBSR.\111\ ISDA and SIFMA also stated that 
the proposed documentation requirement would have essentially mirrored 
the reporting requirements in Regulation SBSR, including the reporting 
hierarchy established by that rule, which would be duplicative, 
burdensome and impose additional costs on SBS Entities, and that such 
requirement also may not address the underlying SDR verification 
issue.\112\
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    \111\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \112\ See id. In particular, ISDA and SIFMA noted that the 
proposed requirement could force institutions to ``re-paper.'' or 
enter into new documentation with clients, where there is potential 
for security-based swap reporting obligations to arise.
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    The Commission has carefully considered these comments and has 
modified Rule 15Fi-5(b)(1), such that the required policies and 
procedures no longer need to be reasonably designed to ensure that the 
trading relationship documentation include terms governing applicable 
regulatory reporting obligations. In particular, the comments we 
received indicated that the inclusion of the proposed requirement would 
not serve as a basis for potentially addressing the SDR verification 
issue, and that such requirement would introduce additional burdens on 
SBS Entities, which commenters asserted were not justified in light of 
the fact that the expected benefits the Commission referred to in the 
Proposing Release were already addressed by other requirements, namely 
in certain aspects of Regulation SBSR.\113\
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    \113\ See id. For example, ISDA and SIFMA stated that 
``Regulation SBSR establishes which parties to the trade have a 
reporting obligation without the need for any further contractual 
agreement among the parties.'' As such, requiring that an SBS 
Entity's trading relationship documentation include terms governing 
applicable regulatory reporting obligations would be both redundant 
with, and an expansion of, the requirements in Regulation SBSR.
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    In addition, pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5(b)(2), all trade 
acknowledgements and verifications of security-based swap transactions 
required under Rule 15Fi-2 will be deemed to be security-based swap 
trading relationship documentation, as they often may contain one or 
more terms contemplated by the policies and procedures required by Rule 
15Fi-5. Further, the Commission understands that in some transactions, 
the parties may choose to document their trading relationship by using 
a stand-alone ``long-form confirmation'' that includes all of the terms 
governing the relationship. Rule 15Fi-5 is not intended to interfere 
with this practice. Accordingly, we believe that the use of a ``long-
form confirmation'' would comply with Rule 15Fi-5 so long as such 
document is: (1) In written form and includes all of the elements of 
the trading relationship required under the rule (whether by 
incorporating them by reference from a standard master agreement or by 
expressly restating them in the confirmation) and (2) executed prior 
to, or contemporaneously with, the execution of each relevant security-
based swap.
    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5(b)(3), the policies and procedures required 
by Rule 15Fi-5(a)(2) also need to provide that the security-based swap 
trading relationship documentation include credit support arrangements. 
Such credit support arrangements must

[[Page 6373]]

contain, in accordance with applicable requirements under regulations 
adopted by the Commission or any prudential regulators,\114\ and 
without limitation, the following:
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    \114\ See supra note 73.
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     initial and variation margin requirements, if any;
     types of assets that may be used as margin and asset 
valuation haircuts, if any;
     investment and re-hypothecation terms for assets used as 
margin for uncleared security-based swaps, if any; and
     custodial arrangements for margin assets, including 
whether margin assets are to be segregated with an independent third 
party, in accordance with the notice requirement in Section 3E(f)(1)(A) 
of the Exchange Act (and either 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(p)(4)(i) (Rule 15c3-
3(p)(4)(i)) or Rule 18a-4(d)(1) thereunder, as applicable), if 
any.\115\
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    \115\ See 15 U.S.C. 78c-5(f). Consistent with the Commission's 
goal of ensuring that these final rules are harmonized with the 
corresponding CFTC requirements wherever possible, the requirements 
in Rule 15Fi-5(b)(3) are identical to CFTC Rule Sec.  23.504(b)(3), 
other than a cross-reference in the latter to CFTC Rule part 701 
which, among other things, requires that a Swap Entity notify its 
counterparty to an uncleared swap transaction that the counterparty 
has the right to require that any initial margin the counterparty 
provides in connection with such transaction be segregated in 
accordance with the CFTC's segregation requirements. On March 28, 
2019, the CFTC amended certain parts of Rule part 701, including by 
modifying the timing requirements applicable to the required 
notices. See Segregation of Assets Held as Collateral in Uncleared 
Swap Transactions, 84 FR 12894 (Apr. 3, 2019). In addition, the 
Commission has made technical edits to Rule 15Fi-5(b)(3) to 
incorporate the applicable pinpoint citation in Section 3E(f)(1)(a) 
of the Exchange Act and to reference the specific rules the 
Commission recently adopted pursuant to that statutory authority.
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    As the Commission has previously explained, ensuring that uncleared 
OTC derivatives transactions are appropriately collateralized was one 
of the key elements of the Title VII reforms.\116\ Accordingly, 
requiring that an SBS Entity's policies and procedures be reasonably 
designed to ensure that the counterparties clearly document the 
applicable processes and requirements for calculating and exchanging 
margin in connection with a security-based swap transaction is an 
important step in achieving this broader regulatory objective.\117\
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    \116\ See supra Section I.
    \117\ Also in furtherance of harmonizing these final rules with 
the corresponding CFTC requirements, we note that in adopting Title 
VII capital, margin, and segregation requirements in June 2019, the 
Commission crafted certain margin requirements, including rules 
regarding third-party custodian and netting or collateral 
agreements, such that existing agreements with counterparties 
entered into for purposes of the corresponding CFTC documentation 
rules will be sufficient for purposes of the Commission's margin 
rules, if the agreements meet the requirements of the applicable 
Commission rules. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Adopting 
Release, 84 FR at 43894, 43909, and 43928, n. 570. Nevertheless, the 
Commission encourages registrants or potential registrants who have 
concerns regarding the need to revise their existing documentation 
solely due to the operation of Rule 15Fi-5 to consult with the staff 
of the Commission.
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    At the same time, however, the Commission notes that the 
requirement in Rule 15Fi-5(b)(3) is intended to be complementary to, 
and not conflict with, our existing margin requirements, particularly 
Rule 18a-3. That rule, which the Commission adopted in June 2019, 
prescribes margin requirements for non-bank SBS Entities with respect 
to uncleared security-based swaps. Although Rule 18a-3 does not contain 
specific margin documentation requirements, paragraphs (c)(4) and (5) 
contain requirements related to the use of collateral and netting 
agreements.\118\ Rule 18a-3 also contains an exception to the 
requirement to collect initial margin when the initial margin amount 
plus all other credit exposures resulting from uncleared swaps and 
security-based swaps of the SBS Entity and its affiliates with the 
counterparty and its affiliates does not exceed $50 million. 
Recognizing that counterparties may need time after breaching that $50 
million threshold to execute agreements to address the posting of 
initial margin, the rule also permits an SBS Entity to defer collecting 
initial margin from a counterparty for two months after the month in 
which the counterparty does not qualify for the $50 million threshold 
exception for the first time.\119\ Accordingly, the Commission is 
confirming that an SBS Entity that is not collecting initial margin 
from a counterparty pursuant to the exception in Rule 18a-
3(c)(1)(iii)(H) (including the one-time two-month deferral period after 
breaching the $50 million threshold) would not be required to have a 
collateral agreement or a netting agreement in place, solely with 
respect to the collection of initial margin, for purposes of both Rule 
18a-3 and Rule 15Fi-5(b)(3).\120\
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    \118\ See 17 CFR 240.18a-3(c)(4) and (5). See also Capital, 
Margin, and Segregation Adopting Release, 84 FR at 43909, n. 334.
    \119\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Adopting Release, 84 
FR at 43926.
    \120\ By contrast, the uncleared swap margin rules adopted by 
the CFTC and the prudential regulators do contain specific margin 
documentation requirements. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Adopting Release, 84 FR at 43909, n. 335. However, CFTC staff issued 
an advisory on July 9, 2019 clarifying that the CFTC's margin rules 
do not require documentation governing the posting, collection and 
custody of initial margin until the initial margin threshold amount 
exceeds $50 million. See CFTC Letter No. 19-16 (Jul. 9, 2019), 
available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7960-19. 
Similarly, the prudential regulators recently proposed amendments to 
their margin rules for uncleared swaps and security-based swaps 
that, among other things, would clarify that covered entities 
subject to those rules are not required to execute initial margin 
trading documentation with a counterparty prior to the time they are 
required to collect or post initial margin pursuant to the rule. See 
Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 84 FR 
59970, 59977 (Nov. 7, 2019). Finally, BCBS and IOSCO issued a 
statement on March 5, 2019, also clarifying their recommended view 
that documentation should not be required if the bilateral initial 
margin amount does not exceed [euro]50 million, and further noting 
that ``[i]t is expected, however, that covered entities will act 
diligently when their exposures approach the threshold to ensure 
that the relevant arrangements needed are in place if the threshold 
is exceeded.'' See BCBS/IOSCO statement on the final implementation 
phases of the Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared 
derivatives (Mar. 5, 2019), available at: https://www.bis.org/press/p190305a.htm.
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2. Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4): Documenting Valuation Methodologies
    As discussed in Section I, ensuring that security-based swaps are 
accurately valued throughout the duration of a contract should play an 
important role in protecting the integrity of the OTC derivatives 
market, both at the level of an individual participant and systemically 
across the broader financial market.\121\ Accordingly, Rule 15Fi-
5(b)(4) requires that the applicable policies and procedures provide 
that the relevant swap trading relationship documentation between 
certain types of counterparties include written documentation in which 
the parties agree on the process, which may include any agreed upon 
methods, procedures, rules, and inputs, for determining the value of 
each security-based swap at any time from execution to the termination, 
maturity, or expiration of such security-based swap for the purposes of 
complying with the margin requirements under Section 15F(e) of the 
Exchange Act (and applicable regulations),\122\ and the risk management 
requirements under Section 15F(j) of the Exchange Act (and applicable 
regulations).\123\ To the maximum extent practicable, such valuations 
need to be based on recently executed transactions, valuations

[[Page 6374]]

provided by independent third parties, or other objective criteria.
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    \121\ See id.
    \122\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e). For the avoidance of doubt, the 
requirements in Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4) are intended to facilitate 
agreement between an SBS Entity and its counterparty as to how they 
will determine the value of a security-based swap in order to, among 
other things, comply with the margin requirements promulgated by 
either the Commission or, with respect to an SBS Entity that is a 
bank, the applicable prudential regulator. These requirements are 
not intended in any way to supersede those underlying margin 
requirements.
    \123\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(j).
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    The requirements in Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4) regarding valuation 
methodology apply to security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation entered into between: (1) Two SBS Entities; (2) an SBS 
Entity and a ``financial counterparty;'' and (3) an SBS Entity and any 
other counterparty, if requested by such counterparty. Accordingly, we 
are also revising proposed Rule 15Fi-1 to add, as paragraph (g), a 
definition of ``financial counterparty,'' which includes any 
counterparty that is not an SBS Entity and that is one of the 
following:
     A swap dealer;
     a major swap participant;
     a commodity pool as defined in Section 1a(10) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(10));
     a private fund as defined in Section 202(a)(29) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a));
     an employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and 
(32) of Section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002); and
     a person predominantly engaged in activities that are in 
the business of banking or, in activities that are financial in nature, 
as defined in Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 
U.S.C. 1843k).\124\
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    \124\ The corresponding definition in CFTC Rule Sec.  23.500(e) 
is referred to as a ``financial entity.'' We replaced the word 
``entity'' with ``counterparty'' to avoid any confusion due to the 
fact that there are other definitions of ``financial entity'' within 
the Exchange Act and its implementing regulations. For example, term 
``financial entity'' is used in Section 3C(g) of the Exchange Act 
for purposes of the statutory exception to the mandatory clearing 
requirement in Title VII. See 15 U.S.C. 78c-3(g)(3). Similarly, 
there is a definition of ``financial entity'' in Rule 3a67-6 under 
the Exchange Act, which is used for one of the tests for determining 
a person's status under the definition of ``major security-based 
swap participant'' in Section 3(a)(67) of the Exchange Act. See 15 
U.S.C. 78. Other than the different titles, we do not believe that 
there are any substantive differences between the CFTC's definition 
of ``financial entity'' and the definition of ``financial 
counterparty'' in Rule 15Fi-1(g).
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    Further, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4)(ii) is intended to help ensure that the 
required valuation documentation between SBS Entities and their 
counterparties contains sufficient guidance and information in the 
event of a problem with determining the value of a security-based swap. 
Specifically, the documentation required by the applicable policies and 
procedures must include either: (1) Alternative methods for determining 
the value of the security-based swap for the purposes of complying with 
Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4) in the event of the unavailability or other failure 
of any input required to value the security-based swap for such 
purposes; or (2) a valuation dispute resolution process by which the 
value of the security-based swap shall be determined for the purposes 
of complying with the rule.
    To the extent that the prescribed valuation documentation needs to 
be updated, revised, or otherwise modified, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4)(iv) 
provides that the parties may agree on changes or procedures for 
modifying or amending such documentation at any time.\125\ Finally, 
because valuation data and methodologies often include, or may be based 
on, private information, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4)(iii) makes clear that an SBS 
Entity is not required to disclose to the counterparty confidential, 
proprietary information about any model it may use to value a security-
based swap.
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    \125\ The text of CFTC Rule Sec.  23.504(b)(4)(iv), which is the 
corresponding subsection under CFTC rules, provides that ``[t]he 
parties may agree on changes or procedures for modifying or amending 
the documentation required by this paragraph at any time.'' Rule 
15Fi-5(b)(4)(iv) does not contain the phrase ``required by this 
paragraph.'' We view this to be solely a technical change and do not 
intend for it to represent a substantive deviation from the 
corresponding CFTC rule. Rather, the difference is intended to avoid 
any suggestion that the parties could amend the underlying 
requirements contained in Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4).
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3. Rule 15Fi-5(b)(5) and (6): Other Disclosure Requirements
    Rule 15Fi-5 also requires that the policies and procedures 
governing the applicable trading relationship documentation require an 
SBS Entity and its counterparty to disclose to each other certain 
information regarding their legal and bankruptcy status, and to include 
a statement regarding the status of a security-based swap if accepted 
for clearing by a central counterparty (``CCP''). The first requirement 
relates to whether the SBS Entity or its counterparty is subject to a 
particular legal regime in the event of its failure, such as FDIC 
receivership for banks or orderly liquidation for certain financial 
companies that meet the requirements set forth in Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act.\126\ As background, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides 
for an alternative insolvency regime for the ``orderly liquidation'' of 
large financial companies,\127\ including broker-dealers, that meet 
specified criteria (each a ``covered financial company'') as set forth 
in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.\128\ If the covered financial 
company is (1) a broker or dealer and (2) a member of the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (``SIPC''), such ``covered broker or 
dealer'' would be placed into an orderly liquidation proceeding with 
the FDIC appointed as receiver.\129\ Because this orderly liquidation 
process, which was modeled on the receivership process used for failed 
banks, is different from the liquidation regimes established under the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 \130\ or by the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code,\131\ the Commission believes it to be appropriate to 
require counterparties to a security-based swap transaction to disclose 
to each other whether this alternative regime may potentially apply in 
the event of an insolvency.
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    \126\ See 12 U.S.C. 5382; 12 U.S.C. 5383.
    \127\ The term ``financial company'' is defined in 12 U.S.C. 
5381(a)(11) to include any company (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 
5381(a)(5)) that--
    (A) is incorporated or organized under any provision of Federal 
law or the laws of any State;
    (B) is--
    (i) a bank holding company (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1841(a));
    (ii) a nonbank financial company supervised by the Federal 
Reserve Board;
    (iii) any company that is predominantly engaged in activities 
that the Federal Reserve Board has determined are financial in 
nature or incidental thereto for purposes of 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) 
(other than a company described in clause (i) or (ii)); or
    (iv) any subsidiary of any company described in any of clauses 
(i) through (iii) that is predominantly engaged in activities that 
the Federal Reserve Board has determined are financial in nature or 
incidental thereto for purposes of 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (other than a 
subsidiary that is an insured depository institution or an insurance 
company); and
    (C) is not a Farm Credit System institution chartered under and 
subject to the provisions of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, as amended 
(12 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.), a governmental entity, or a regulated 
entity, as defined under 12 U.S.C. 4502(20).
    \128\ Section 203 of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth the process 
for designating a financial company as a ``covered financial 
company.'' In the case of a broker-dealer, or when a financial 
company's largest U.S. subsidiary is a broker-dealer, Section 
203(a)(1)(B) provides that the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Commission (in each case subject to the approval of a two-thirds 
majority of each agency's members), in consultation with the FDIC, 
may, either on their own initiative or at the request of the 
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury (``Secretary''), issue a written 
orderly liquidation recommendation to the Secretary. See 12 U.S.C. 
5383(a). Section 203(b) requires the Secretary (after consultation 
with the President) to take action on the recommendation upon an 
affirmative determination that, among other things, the failure of a 
financial company would have serious adverse effects on financial 
stability in the United States and that taking action under the 
orderly liquidation authority with respect to that company would 
avoid or mitigate such adverse effects. See 12 U.S.C. 5383(b).
    \129\ See 12 U.S.C. 5384. Section 205(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
requires the FDIC, as the appointed receiver for any covered broker 
or dealer, to appoint SIPC as trustee for the liquidation. See 12 
U.S.C. 5385(a).
    \130\ 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.
    \131\ 11 U.S.C. 101 et seq.
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    Accordingly, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(5) sets out that each SBS Entity's 
policies and procedures must require that security-based swap trading 
relationship documentation contain a statement as to whether it or its 
counterparty is an

[[Page 6375]]

insured depository institution or financial company. Further, the 
documentation also must contain a statement that the orderly 
liquidation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act \132\ may limit the rights of the parties under their 
trading relationship documentation should either party be deemed a 
``covered financial company'' or is otherwise subject to having the 
FDIC appointed as a receiver. The documentation further needs to state 
that such limitations relate to the right of the non-covered party to 
terminate, liquidate, or net any security-based swap by reason of the 
appointment of the FDIC as receiver, notwithstanding the agreement of 
the parties in the security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation, and that the FDIC may have certain rights to transfer 
security-based swaps of the covered party. Finally, the policies and 
procedures must require that the trading relationship documentation 
contain an agreement between the SBS Entity and its counterparty to 
provide notice if either it or its counterparty becomes or ceases to be 
an insured depository institution or a financial company.\133\
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    \132\ 12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq.
    \133\ Specifically, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(5) requires that an SBS 
Entity's policies and procedures require that the applicable 
security-based swap trading relationship documentation contain:
     A statement of whether the SBS Entity is an insured 
depository institution (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813) or a financial 
company (as defined in Section 201(a)(11) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 
U.S.C. 5381(a)(11));
     A statement of whether the counterparty is an insured 
depository institution or financial company;
     A statement that in the event either the SBS Entity or 
its counterparty becomes a covered financial company (as defined in 
12 U.S.C. 5381(a)(8)) or is an insured depository institution for 
which the FDIC has been appointed as a receiver (the ``covered 
party''), certain limitations under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
or the Federal Deposit Insurance Act may apply to the right of the 
non-covered party to terminate, liquidate, or net any security-based 
swap by reason of the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, 
notwithstanding the agreement of the parties in the security-based 
swap trading relationship documentation, and that the FDIC may have 
certain rights to transfer security-based swaps of the covered party 
under Section 210(c)(9)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 
5390(c)(9)(A), or 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(9)(A); and
     An agreement between the SBS Entity and its 
counterparty to provide notice if either it or its counterparty 
becomes or ceases to be an insured depository institution or a 
financial company.
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    Second, pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5(b)(6), the security-based swap 
trading relationship documentation subject to the policies and 
procedures requirement in Rule 15Fi-5(a)(2) must include certain 
information regarding the status of a security-based swap accepted for 
clearing by a clearing agency. Specifically, such documentation must 
contain a notice that, upon acceptance of a security-based swap by a 
clearing agency:
     The original security-based swap is extinguished;
     The original security-based swap is replaced by equal and 
opposite security-based swaps with the clearing agency; and
     All terms of the security-based swap shall conform to the 
product specifications of the cleared security-based swap established 
under the clearing agency's rules.
    The Commission believes that such disclosure provides important 
information to counterparties regarding the effects of clearing a trade 
at a clearing agency and clarifies the status of the contract following 
its acceptance and novation at the clearing agency.
4. Rule 15Fi-5(c): Audit of Security-Based Swap Trading Relationship 
Documentation
    Rule 15Fi-5(c) requires each SBS Entity to have an independent 
auditor conduct periodic audits sufficient to identify any material 
weakness in its documentation policies and procedures required by the 
rule. In addition, a record of the results of each audit must be 
retained for a period of three years after the conclusion of the 
audit.\134\ The Commission believes that requiring periodic audits of a 
firm's security-based swap trading relationship documentation is 
consistent with sound risk mitigation practices and is designed to 
reduce the prevalence of discrepancies during the course of these 
transactions. This requirement differs slightly from CFTC Rule Sec.  
23.504(c), which references an independent ``internal or external'' 
auditor.\135\
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    \134\ The three year holding period for these records is 
contained in the applicable recordkeeping, reporting, and 
notification requirements for SBS Entities, as opposed to in Rule 
15Fi-5(c) itself.
    \135\ See 17 CFR 23.504(c).
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    In their comment letter, ISDA and SIFMA asked the Commission to 
clarify that the required auditor can be ``internal or external'' as is 
the case in the CFTC rule.\136\ As we stated in the Proposing Release, 
the Commission has experience overseeing accounting and auditing 
standards in other contexts, particularly as related to certain 
disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws.\137\ We also 
explained in the Proposing Release that, in those contexts, an internal 
auditor typically reports to the management of the applicable entity, 
which would be inconsistent with the Commission's auditor independence 
rules.\138\ Accordingly, we have determined not to modify Rule 15Fi-
5(c) in the manner requested by the commenters because it appears that 
an internal auditor would not typically be independent as contemplated 
in the Commission's auditor independence rules. However, and as noted 
in the Proposing Release, we also are not necessarily foreclosing the 
possibility that there could be alternative structures to the typical 
``internal'' auditor employment relationship that, if structured 
properly, could be consistent with the Commission's auditor 
independence rules.\139\
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    \136\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \137\ See Proposing Release, 84 at 4630 (referencing See 17 CFR 
210.2-01(c)(2) (Rule 2-01(c)(2) of Regulation S-X) (Employment 
Relationships)).
    \138\ See id.
    \139\ See Proposing Release, 84 at 4630 n. 105. In the request 
for comment on this issue, we also asked commenters to identify and 
describe such potential structures. We did not receive any 
information responsive to that request.
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5. Exceptions to the Trading Relationship Documentation Requirements
    Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1) contains three different exceptions from the 
basic requirement that each SBS Entity establish, maintain, and follow 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that it 
executes written security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
with each of its counterparties prior to, or contemporaneously with, 
executing a security-based swap with any counterparty. First, Rule 
15Fi-5(a)(1)(i) provides an exception for security-based swaps executed 
prior to the date on which an SBS Entity is required to be in 
compliance with the documentation rule. Although the Commission 
recognizes the significant risk mitigation benefits associated with 
ensuring that all transactions are supported by comprehensive and 
accurate documentation, we also understand that it may be impractical 
to require SBS Entities to have policies and procedures to bring 
existing transactions into compliance with these rules, particularly 
when weighing any potential benefits of doing so against the potential 
costs.\140\ Accordingly, we believe that those transactions should be

[[Page 6376]]

excepted from the documentation requirements.\141\
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    \140\ When the CFTC adopted a similar exception in 2012, it 
acknowledged the views of commenters that applying CFTC Rule Sec.  
23.504 retroactively to existing swaps would be time consuming and 
costly for Swap Entities due to them needing to make amendments to 
existing documentation. See CFTC Risk Mitigation Adopting Release, 
77 FR at 55950.
    \141\ As discussed in detail in Section II.F.1 of this release, 
the Commission also is amending Rules 17a-4 and 18a-6 under the 
Exchange Act to, among other things, require SBS Entities to retain 
all security-based swap trading relationship documentation with 
counterparties required to be created under Rule 15Fi-5. Because 
security-based swaps executed prior to the compliance date for Rule 
15Fi-5 would be exempt from the underlying documentation 
requirement, any trading relationship documentation voluntarily 
entered into in respect of those transactions would not be deemed to 
have been created pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5.
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    To the extent that an SBS Entity maintains an existing security-
based swap portfolio with a counterparty that pre-dates the compliance 
date, Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(i) provides an exception from the documentation 
requirements only with respect to those existing transactions. This 
means that the SBS Entity would not be in violation of Rule 15Fi-5 
solely as a result of having policies and procedures that do not 
require such SBS Entity to have executed written security-based swap 
trading relationship documentation with any counterparty with respect 
to those existing transactions, or if the existing documentation that 
it maintains with the counterparty does not otherwise comply with the 
requirements of the rule. However, if the SBS Entity enters into new 
security-based swap transactions with that same counterparty, the 
exception would not apply to those new transactions, even if 
noncompliant trading relationship documentation already existed. Under 
those circumstances, the SBS Entity's policies and procedures will need 
to be reasonably designed to ensure that the existing documentation 
complies with the rule before using it as the basis to enter into any 
new security-based swaps with that counterparty.
    Second, Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(ii) provides an exception for any 
security-based swap that is, directly or indirectly, submitted to and 
cleared by a clearing agency registered pursuant to Section 17A of the 
Exchange Act or by a clearing agency that the Commission has exempted 
from registration by rule or order pursuant to Section 17A of the 
Exchange Act.\142\ We included this exception in recognition of the 
fact that, once a security-based swap is cleared, the transaction is 
governed primarily by the terms of the agreements in effect between the 
clearing member and the clearing agency (as well as between the 
clearing member and its customer, if applicable). This exception has 
been modified from the proposal, as described in detail in Section 
II.A.6.
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    \142\ See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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    Finally, Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii) provides an exception for security-
based swaps executed anonymously on a national securities exchange or a 
security-based swap execution facility (``SB SEF''), provided that:
     Such security-based swaps are intended to be cleared and 
are actually submitted for clearing to a clearing agency;
     All terms of such security-based swaps conform to the 
rules of the clearing agency; and
     Upon acceptance of such security-based swap by the 
clearing agency: (1) The original security-based swap is extinguished; 
(2) the original security-based swap is replaced by equal and opposite 
security-based swaps with the clearing agency; and (3) all terms of the 
security-based swap shall conform to the product specifications of the 
cleared security-based swap established under the clearing agency's 
rules.
    The exception in Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii) is intended to recognize 
the fact that the documentation requirements may be largely impossible 
to comply with in the context of cleared anonymous transactions 
because, by definition, the parties to these transactions would not 
know the identity their counterparties. Therefore, trading relationship 
documentation with any such counterparty would be unnecessary and 
impractical.
    The exception provided for in Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii) is limited--
and therefore distinguishable from the exception for cleared security-
based swap transactions--in one important respect to account for 
instances where a transaction is not accepted for clearing following 
its submission. For example, an SBS Entity may enter into a security-
based swap transaction on an anonymous basis on a national securities 
exchange or an SB SEF, fully intending for the transaction to be 
submitted to, and cleared by, a clearing agency. In some cases, the 
transaction may be rejected by the clearing agency for reasons which 
the SBS Entity did not know prior to its submission, such as possible 
operational or clerical errors or if one of the clearing members 
unintentionally exceeded its clearing limits. If a bilateral 
transaction continues to exist between the two counterparties (who 
would no longer be unknown to each other), written trading relationship 
documentation governing that transaction might not exist between them.
    The Commission believes that under those circumstances the 
objectives of Rule 15Fi-5 would not be satisfied if the SBS Entity and 
its counterparty did not ultimately have written agreement on the terms 
of the remaining security-based swap transaction. At the same time, 
however, because the transaction was initially entered into on an 
anonymous basis, the two sides might need additional time to agree to 
the terms of the trading relationship documentation, particularly if 
they previously had not engaged in any other transactions. Accordingly, 
if an SBS Entity that is relying on the exception in Rule 15Fi-
5(a)(1)(iii) subsequently receives notice that the relevant security-
based swap transaction has not been accepted for clearing by a clearing 
agency, the rule requires that the SBS Entity be in compliance with the 
requirements of Rule 15Fi-5 in all respects promptly after receipt of 
such notice (if a security-based swap continues to exist between the 
two counterparties after it has been rejected by the clearing 
agency).\143\
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    \143\ The provisions in Rule 15Fi-5(a)(iii) to account for 
cleared anonymous transactions that are submitted for clearing, but 
ultimately not accepted, are not included in CFTC Rule Sec.  23.504. 
We have included this provision to account for situations when an 
SBS Entity could be otherwise deemed to be not in compliance with 
Rule 15Fi-5 due to a transaction being rejected for clearing for 
reasons which the SBS Entity did not know prior to when the 
transaction was submitted to the clearing agency.
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    Whether a contract that has not been accepted for clearing by a 
clearing agency continues to exist may depend on the rules of the 
particular SB SEF, national securities exchange, or clearing agency, or 
the agreement of the counterparties. If the end result is that a 
security-based swap continues to exist despite being rejected by the 
clearing agency, then the policies and procedures would need to require 
that the SBS Entity be in compliance with the requirements of Rule 
15Fi-5 with respect to that transaction. If the rejection from clearing 
results in a termination or voiding of the original security-based 
swap, then there is no security-based swap for which it is necessary to 
comply with Rule 15Fi-5.
    Similarly, ISDA and SIFMA requested that the exception in Rule 
15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii) be expanded to include all ``intended to be cleared'' 
(``ITBC'') security-based swaps, consistent with CFTC Staff Letter 13-
70, issued in 2013.\144\ That no-action letter addresses the treatment 
of trading relationship documentation requirements in CFTC Rule Sec.  
23.504 and a number of specified provisions of the CFTC's business 
conduct standards in the context of ITBC swaps, which CFTC staff 
defined as swaps that (i) are of a type accepted for clearing by a 
derivatives clearing organizations (``DCO''), and (ii) are

[[Page 6377]]

intended to be submitted for clearing contemporaneously with 
execution.\145\
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    \144\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \145\ See Swaps Intended to be Cleared CFTC Letter No. 13-70, 
No-Action Relief: Swaps Intended to be Cleared (Nov. 15, 2013), 
available at: https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-70.pdf. The position in 
CFTC Staff Letter 13-70 applies to four specific fact patterns set 
forth in the letter. Those fact patterns differ based on certain 
variables, including, among other things, (1) whether the Swap 
Entity knows the identity of its counterparty prior to execution of 
the swap, (2) whether the ITBC swap is executed on or subject to the 
rules of a swap execution facility or a designated contract market, 
(3) whether the ITBC swap is of a type that was not being accepted 
for clearing by a DCO as of the date of the letter, (4) whether the 
ITBC swap is subject to a mandatory trading determination, and (5) 
whether the Swap Entity ensures that both parties submit the ITBC 
swap for clearing as quickly after execution as would be 
technologically practicable if fully automated systems were used. 
CFTC Staff Letter 13-70 also requires as conditions to all four 
scenarios that (i) the Swap Entity is either a clearing member of 
the DCO to which the ITBC swap will be submitted, or has entered 
into an agreement with a clearing member of such DCO for clearing of 
swaps of the same type as the ITBC swap; and (ii) the Swap Entity 
does not require the counterparty or its clearing FCM to enter into 
a breakage agreement or similar agreement as a condition to 
executing the ITBC swap.
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    After careful review and consideration of these comments, the 
Commission has determined not to modify Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii) to take 
into account CFTC Staff Letter 13-70. Because a number of variables 
included in CFTC Staff Letter 13-70 relate to aspects of Title VII that 
the Commission has not yet addressed, we believe that it would be 
premature to incorporate the exceptions contained in that letter into 
Rule 15Fi-5 at this time. For example, and as described above, certain 
of the fact patterns identified in the CFTC letter depend on whether 
the relevant swap is subject to a CFTC mandatory clearing 
determination. As the Commission has not yet made any such mandatory 
clearing determinations, we do not yet have a factual basis for 
assessing whether and to what extent a comparable condition should be 
reflected in Rule 15Fi-5.
    Finally, the Commission recognizes that because the definition of 
``security-based swap execution facility'' in Rule 15Fi-1(n) only 
includes an SB SEF that is registered with the Commission pursuant to 
section 3D of the Exchange Act, the exemption provided in Rule 15Fi-
5(a)(1)(iii) will not be available to SBS Entities until such time as 
the Commission has finalized its SB SEF registration rules.\146\ The 
Commission also has granted temporary exemptions from the registration 
requirements for SB SEFs and from certain disclosure requirements in 
Section 3D(c) of the Exchange Act (``SB SEF Exemptions'').\147\ The SB 
SEF Exemptions will expire on the earliest compliance date set forth in 
any of the final rules regarding registration of SB SEFs.\148\ 
Accordingly, the Commission is taking the position that until such time 
as an SB SEF is required to register with the Commission, an SBS Entity 
may comply with the exemption from the trading relationship 
documentation requirements, as provided for in Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii), 
by executing a security-based swap on a trading platform that would be 
required to be registered with the Commission as an SB SEF, but for the 
relief provided by the SBS Exemptions.\149\
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    \146\ In February 2011, the Commission proposed rules providing 
for the registration and other requirements applicable to SB SEFs. 
See Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution 
Facilities, Exchange Act Release No. 63825 (Feb. 2, 2011), 76 FR 
10948 (Feb. 28, 2011). The Commission has not yet adopted these 
rules.
    \147\ See Temporary Exemptions and Other Temporary Relief, 
Together with Information on Compliance Dates for New Provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Applicable to Security-Based 
Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 64678 (June 15, 2011), 76 FR 36287, 
36292-93, 36306 (June 22, 2011).
    \148\ See id.
    \149\ Of course, to rely on this Commission position, the SBS 
Entity also would need to ensure that it remains in compliance with 
the other requirements of Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(iii), such as the 
requirement that the transaction be executed anonymously and that it 
be intended to be cleared and actually submitted for clearing.
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D. Amendments to Recordkeeping Rules

    The Commission also is amending the recordkeeping, reporting, and 
notification requirements applicable to SBS Entities. With these 
amendments, SBS Entities will be required to make and keep current 
information relevant to each portfolio reconciliation and portfolio 
compression exercise in which it participates, and to retain a record 
of each valuation dispute notification required pursuant to Rule 15Fi-
3(c), all security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
required to be created under Rule 15Fi-5, a record of the results of 
each audit of the SBS Entity's security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation policies and procedures, as required pursuant to Rule 
15Fi-5(c), and each policy and procedure created pursuant to Rules 
15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5.
    Specifically, the Commission is amending: (1) Existing Rule 17a-3 
under the Exchange Act, which applies to SBS Entities that are also 
registered with the Commission as broker-dealers under Section 15(b) of 
the Exchange Act (``broker-dealer SBS Entities''), and (2) Rule 18a-5 
under the Exchange Act, which applies to SBS Entities that are not also 
registered with the Commission as broker-dealers under Section 15(b) of 
the Exchange Act (``stand-alone and bank SBS Entities''). As amended, 
these rules require each SBS Entity to make and keep current records of 
each security-based swap portfolio reconciliation, whether conducted 
pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3 or otherwise,\150\ a copy of each valuation 
dispute notification required to be provided to the Commission pursuant 
to Rule 15Fi-3(c),\151\ and a record of each bilateral offset and each 
bilateral portfolio compression exercise or multilateral portfolio 
compression exercise in which it participates, whether conducted 
pursuant to Rule 15Fi-4 or otherwise.\152\
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    \150\ See Rules 17a-3(a)(31)(i), 18a-5(a)(18)(i), and 18a-
5(b)(14)(i).
    \151\ See Rules 17a-3(a)(31)(ii), 18a-5(a)(18)(ii), and 18a-
5(b)(14)(ii).
    \152\ See Rules 17a-3(a)(31)(iii), 18a-5(a)(18)(iii), and 18a-
5(b)(14)(iii).
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    With respect to the reconciliation requirement, the amendments 
require that these records include the dates of the security-based swap 
portfolio reconciliation, the number of portfolio reconciliation 
discrepancies, the number of security-based swap valuation disputes 
(including the time-to-resolution of each valuation dispute and the age 
of outstanding valuation disputes, categorized by transaction and 
counterparty), and the name of the third-party entity performing the 
security-based swap portfolio reconciliation, if any.\153\ With respect 
to the valuation notification requirement, the amended rules require 
the retention of each notification required to be provided to the 
Commission pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3(c).\154\ With respect to 
compression, the rules will now require that these records include the 
dates of the offset or compression, the security-based swaps included 
in the offset or compression, the identity of the counterparties 
participating in the offset or compression, the results of the 
compression, and the name of the third-party entity performing the 
offset or compression, if any.\155\ The Commission believes that 
requiring SBS Entities to make and retain such records will, among 
other things, promote compliance with Rules 15Fi-3 and 15Fi-4, assist 
SBS Entities in the event that they need to resolve problems that 
relate to a previous reconciliation or compression, and assist 
Commission examiners in reviewing compliance with those rules.
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    \153\ See Rules 17a-3(a)(31)(i) and 18a-5(a)(18)(i) and 
(b)(14)(i).
    \154\ See Rules 17a-3(a)(31)(ii) and 18a-5(a)(18)(ii) and 
(b)(14)(ii).
    \155\ See Rules 17a-3(a)(31)(iii) and 18a-5(a)(18)(iii) and 
(b)(14)(iii).

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[[Page 6378]]

    In addition, the Commission is amending (1) Rule 17a-4 under the 
Exchange Act, which requires each applicable broker-dealer, including 
broker-dealer SBS Entities, to preserve certain records if the broker-
dealer makes or receives the type of record and (2) Rule 18a-6 under 
the Exchange Act, which imposes parallel preservation requirements on 
stand-alone and bank SBS Entities. In particular, the amendments to 
Rules 17a-4 and 18a-6 require SBS Entities to retain certain of the 
records required to be made and kept under Rules 17a-3 and 18a-5, as 
amended, for at least three years, the first two years in an easily 
accessible place.\156\ Those amended rules also require each SBS Entity 
to retain the following:
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    \156\ See Rules 17a-4(b)(1) and 18a-6(b)(1)(i) and (b)(2)(i).
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     The written policies and procedures required pursuant to 
Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 until three years after termination of 
the use of the policies and procedures; \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See Rules 17a-4(e)(11) and 18a-6(d)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     each written agreement with counterparties on the terms of 
portfolio reconciliation with those counterparties, as required to be 
created under Rules 15Fi-3(a)(1) and (b)(1) until three years after the 
termination of the agreement and all transactions governed thereby; 
\158\
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    \158\ See Rules 17a-4(e)(12)(i) and 18a-6(d)(5)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
with counterparties required to be created under Rule 15Fi-5, until 
three years after the termination of such documentation and all 
transactions governed thereby; \159\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See Rules 17a-4(e)(12)(ii) and 18a-6(d)(5)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     a record of the results of each audit required to be 
performed pursuant to Rule 15Fi-5(c) until three years after the 
completion of the audit.\160\
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    \160\ See Rules 17a-4(e)(12)(iii) and 18a-6(d)(5)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that requiring the retention of the above 
records in accordance with the applicable rules will help ensure that 
those records are retained in a manner that would allow them to be 
readily accessible for Commission examiners.
    Finally, in June 2019, the Commission adopted 17 CFR 240.18a-10 
(Rule 18a-10), which established an alternative compliance mechanism 
for certain SBS dealers.\161\ As originally adopted, Rule 18a-10 
permits SBS dealers to elect to comply with the CFTC's capital, margin, 
and segregation requirements in lieu of complying with the Commission's 
capital, margin, and segregation requirements of 17 CFR 240.18a-1 (Rule 
18a-1) and Rules 18a-3 and 18a-4, subject to certain conditions. The 
Commission recently amended Rule 18a-10 to permit firms that will 
operate under Rule 18a-10 to elect to also comply with the CFTC's 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements in lieu of complying with 
Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6 and 17 CFR 240.18a-7, 240.18a-8, and 240.18a-9 
(Rules 18a-7, 18a-8, and 18a-9).\162\ Accordingly, SBS dealers that 
satisfy the conditions of Rule 18a-10 and that elect to comply with the 
CFTC's recordkeeping and reporting requirements will be able to comply 
with Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6, as amended by the final rules to 
incorporate records related to Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5.
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    \161\ See 17 CFR 240.18a-10. Among other things, the SBS dealer 
must (1) be registered with the Commission as a stand-alone SBS 
dealer (i.e., not also registered with the Commission as a broker-
dealer or an OTC derivatives dealer), (2) be registered with the 
CFTC as a swap dealer, and (3) not exceed certain thresholds with 
respect to its outstanding security-based swap positions. Those 
thresholds are designed to limit the availability of the alternative 
compliance mechanism to firms whose security-based swaps business is 
not a significant part of the security-based swap market and that 
are predominately engaged in a swaps business as compared to a 
security-based swaps business. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Adopting Release, 84 FR at 43943-46.
    \162\ See Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Security-
Based Swap Dealers, Major Security-Based Swap Participants, and 
Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 87005 (Sept. 19, 2019), 84 
FR 68550 (Dec. 16, 2019) (``Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting 
Release'').
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III. Cross-Border Application of Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5

A. Background on the Cross-Border Application of Title VII Requirements

    In 2013, the Commission proposed rules and interpretive guidance to 
address the cross-border application of Title VII, including 
requirements applicable to SBS Entities.\163\ In that proposal, the 
Commission preliminarily interpreted the Title VII requirements 
associated with registration to apply generally to the activities of 
registered entities.\164\ In reaching that preliminary conclusion, the 
Commission did not concur with the views of certain commenters that the 
Title VII requirements should not apply to the foreign security-based 
swap activities of registered entities, stating that such a view could 
be difficult to reconcile with, among other things, the statutory 
language describing the requirements applicable to SBSDs.\165\
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    \163\ See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-
Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to 
the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 69490 (May 1, 
2013), 78 FR 30968 (May 23, 2013) (``Cross-Border Proposing 
Release'') (discussing joint rulemaking to further define various 
Title VII terms).
    \164\ See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 39825, n.191 (citing Cross-Border Proposing 
Release, 78 FR at 30986).
    \165\ See Cross-Border Proposing Release, 78 FR at 30986. The 
Proposing Release also contains a more detailed background 
discussion of the Commission's taxonomy for classifying requirements 
under Section 15F of the Exchange Act as applying at either the 
transaction-level or at the entity-level. See Proposing Release, 84 
FR at 4636-4637 (citing Cross-Border Proposing Release, 78 FR at 
31009-10).
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    Although the Cross-Border Proposing Release preliminarily 
identified the trade acknowledgment and verification rules as entity-
level requirements, it did not propose a cross-border interpretation 
with respect to the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, 
and trading relationship documentation requirements.\166\ Consequently, 
and consistent with the approach in both the Cross-Border Proposing 
Release and the Trade Acknowledgement and Verification Adopting 
Release, the Commission proposed that the portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and trading relationship documentation 
requirements in Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5 should be treated as 
entity-level requirements.\167\
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    \166\ See Cross-Border Proposing Release, 78 FR at 31013. The 
Commission subsequently adopted its proposed cross-border 
interpretation of the trade acknowledgment and verification rules as 
entity-level requirements in connection with adopting those 
underlying rules in 2016. See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification 
Adopting Release, 81 FR at 39826.
    \167\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4637.
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B. Final Cross-Border Interpretation

    The Commission received no comments on its proposed cross-border 
interpretation in the Proposing Release. Accordingly, the Commission 
concludes that it is treating the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression, and trading relationship documentation requirements in 
Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5 as entity-level requirements that apply to 
an SBS Entity's entire security-based swap business without exception, 
including in connection with any security-based swap business it 
conducts with foreign counterparties.
    As we explained in the Proposing Release, the requirements 
referenced above play an important role in addressing risks to the SBS 
Entity as a whole, including risks related to the entity's safety and 
soundness. As we have noted throughout this release in connection with 
describing each of the new rules, requiring SBS Entities and their 
counterparties to identify and resolve discrepancies involving key 
terms of their security-based swap transactions is a key consideration

[[Page 6379]]

underpinning both the portfolio reconciliation and trading relationship 
documentation requirements, and serves as an important mechanism for 
encouraging SBS Entities and their counterparties to better manage 
their internal risks.\168\ Similarly, portfolio compression is intended 
to help SBS Entities and their counterparties and their counterparties 
manage their post-trade risks associated with security-based swap 
transactions in a number of important ways, including by eliminating 
redundant uncleared transactions (as measured both by the number of 
contracts and total notional value) and potentially reducing a market 
participant's credit risk to its direct counterparties, including by 
eliminating all outstanding transactions with some counterparties, 
without affecting the market participant's overall economic 
position.\169\
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    \168\ See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
    \169\ See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the alternative, not requiring an SBS Entity to take steps to 
manage its internal risk using portfolio reconciliation, compression, 
or standards governing trading relationship documentation could be 
expected to contribute to operational risk and legal uncertainty 
throughout the firm's entire security-based swap business, affecting 
the entity's business as a whole, and not merely specific security-
based swap transactions. For example, as we have previously noted, 
inaccurate or incomplete trading relationship documentation could lead 
to, among other things, a collateral dispute between the counterparties 
to a security-based swap transaction. The larger the dispute, even if 
confined to a single counterparty, the greater the risk that an SBS 
Entity could experience liquidity problems on a firmwide basis.
    Moreover, to the extent that these risks affect the safety and 
soundness of the SBS Entity, they also may affect the firm's 
counterparties and the functioning of the broader security-based swap 
market. Continuing with the previous example, if a collateral dispute 
with a foreign counterparty creates liquidity issues throughout an SBS 
Entity, the firm could experience difficulty making payments or posting 
collateral to its other counterparties, which may include U.S. persons. 
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that it is appropriate to apply 
the requirements in Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 to the entirety of 
an SBS Entity's security-based swap business.\170\
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    \170\ We recognize that the CFTC has taken a different position 
with regard to corresponding requirements pursuant to the CEA, 
classifying them as what the CFTC has termed ``Category A'' 
transaction-level requirements. See CFTC Interpretive Guidance and 
Policy Statement Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 
78 FR 45292, 45334 (Jul. 26, 2013).
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IV. Availability of Substituted Compliance for Rules 15Fi-3 Through 
15Fi-5

A. Existing Substituted Compliance Rule

    In 2013, the Commission proposed to make substituted compliance 
potentially available in connection with the requirements applicable to 
foreign SBS dealers pursuant to Section 15F of the Exchange Act, other 
than the registration requirements applicable to dealers.\171\ Because 
the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading 
relationship documentation requirements being adopted are grounded in 
Section 15F, substituted compliance generally would have been available 
for those requirements pursuant to the 2013 proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ See Cross-Border Proposing Release, 78 FR at 30968, 31085.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission subsequently adopted Rule 3a71-6, which provides 
that substituted compliance is available with respect to the 
Commission's business conduct requirements, and (rather than addressing 
all requirements under Section 15F of the Exchange Act) reserved the 
issue as to whether substituted compliance also would be available in 
connection with other requirements under that section.\172\ Rule 3a71-6 
was subsequently amended to provide SBS Entities with the potential to 
avail themselves of substituted compliance with respect to the 
following Title VII requirements: (1) Trade acknowledgment and 
verification,\173\ (2) capital and margin,\174\ and (3) recordkeeping 
and reporting.\175\
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    \172\ See Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap 
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Release No. 
77617 (Apr. 14, 2016), 81 FR 29960 (``Business Conduct Standards 
Adopting Release''). See also Cross-Border Proposing Release, 78 FR 
at 31088, 31207-08 (Rule 3a71-6 was proposed as Rule 3a71-5).
    \173\ See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 39827-28.
    \174\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Adopting Release, 84 
FR at 43948-57.
    \175\ See Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR at 
68597-99.
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B. Amendments to Rule 3a71-6

    In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to further amend 
Rule 3a71-6 to provide SBS Entities that are not U.S. persons (as 
defined in 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4) (Rule 3a71-3(a)(4) of the Exchange 
Act)) with the potential to avail themselves of substituted compliance 
to satisfy the Title VII portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression, and trading relationship documentation requirements.\176\ 
In their comment letter, ISDA and SIFMA agreed with the proposed 
outcomes-based approach to substituted compliance, as opposed to 
issuing comparability determinations based on a line-by-line review of 
the foreign requirements.\177\ ISDA and SIFMA also suggested that the 
Commission should, in essence, not diverge from any comparability 
determination previously made by the CFTC with respect to the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements.\178\ As noted previously, the Commission 
has endeavored to harmonize these rules with the corresponding CFTC 
rules wherever possible, which should make divergence with respect to 
an outcomes-based comparability analysis of the rules highly unlikely. 
Substituted compliance, however, involves additional considerations and 
arrangements, particularly with respect to supervisory and enforcement 
cooperation.\179\ We are therefore adopting the amendments to Rule 
3a71-6, as proposed. Accordingly, Rule 3a71-6(d)(7) provides foreign 
SBS Entities \180\

[[Page 6380]]

with the potential to utilize substituted compliance with comparable 
foreign requirements to satisfy Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act and 
Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 thereunder.\181\
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    \176\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4638. We did not propose 
rules making substituted compliance available specifically with 
respect to the amendments to Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6, which specify 
the recordkeeping and reporting requirements applicable to SBS 
Entities. This is because the Commission has also adopted amendments 
to Rule 3a71-6 with respect to Title VII recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements in connection with adopting those underlying 
provisions. See Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR 
68597-99. Accordingly, to the extent that substituted compliance is 
made available with respect to those rules, we would anticipate that 
any determination made with respect to the comparability of the 
foreign financial regulatory system would address all aspects of the 
Commission recordkeeping and reporting requirements for SBS Entities 
including the amendments we are adopting with respect to the 
portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading 
relationship document requirements.
    \177\ See ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
    \178\ See id.
    \179\ See 17 CFR 240.3a71-6(a)(2)(i) and (ii).
    \180\ In the Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, the 
Commission stated that Rule 3a71-6 provides that substituted 
compliance is potentially available in connection with the business 
conduct requirements for registered major SBS participants as well 
as for registered SBS dealers. The Commission further explained that 
such decision reflects the fact that the business conduct standards 
apply to registered major SBS participants as well as to registered 
SBS dealers, and recognizes that the market efficiency goals that 
underpin substituted compliance also can apply when substituted 
compliance is granted to registered major SBS participants. See 
Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, 81 FR at 30076. This 
same reasoning applies with respect to the Commission's portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements and Rule 3a71-6, as amended, provides 
that substituted compliance is also potentially available to foreign 
major SBS participants (in addition to foreign SBS dealers) with 
respect to Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act and Rules 15Fi-3, 
15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5, as applicable.
    \181\ In the Proposing Release, these requirements would have 
been designated as paragraph (d)(3) of Rule 3a71-6. Because of 
subsequent amendments to that rule, however, the provision 
applicable to the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, 
and trading relationship documentation requirements is now being 
adopted as paragraph (d)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In amending Rule 3a71-6, the Commission concludes that the 
principles associated with substituted compliance for the business 
conduct, trade acknowledgment and verification, capital and margin, and 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements in large part similarly apply 
to the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading 
relationship documentation requirements.\182\ Accordingly, except as 
discussed below, the revised substituted compliance rule applies to 
Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act and Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 
thereunder in the same manner as it applies to the business conduct, 
trade acknowledgment and verification, capital and margin, and 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ The discussions in the Business Conduct Standards Adopting 
Release, including those regarding consideration of supervisory and 
enforcement practices (see Business Conduct Standards Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 30079), regarding certain multi-jurisdictional 
issues (see id. at 30079-80), and regarding application procedures 
(see id. at 30080-81) are applicable to the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements.
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1. Basis for Substituted Compliance in Connection With the Portfolio 
Reconciliation, Portfolio Compression, and Trading Relationship 
Documentation Requirements
    In light of the global nature of the security-based swap market and 
the prevalence of cross-border transactions within that market, there 
is the potential that the application of the Title VII portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements may lead to requirements that are 
duplicative of, or in conflict with, applicable foreign requirements, 
even when the two sets of requirements implement similar goals and lead 
to similar results. Those results have the potential to disrupt 
existing business relationships and, more generally, to reduce 
competition and market efficiency.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ See generally Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, 
81 FR at 30073-74 (addressing the basis for making substituted 
compliance available in the context of the business conduct 
requirements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address those effects, the Commission concludes that under 
certain circumstances it is appropriate to allow the possibility of 
substituted compliance, whereby foreign SBS Entities may satisfy 
Section 15F of the Exchange Act and the portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and trading relationship documentation 
requirements in Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5, respectively, by 
complying with the comparable foreign requirements. Allowing for the 
possibility of substituted compliance in this manner may be expected to 
help achieve the benefits of those particular risk mitigation 
requirements--helping to curb legal uncertainty and reduce credit and 
operational risk for participants in security-based swap transactions 
and in the broader market--in a way that helps avoid regulatory 
conflict and minimizes duplication, thereby promoting market 
efficiency, enhancing competition, and contributing to the overall 
functioning of the global security-based swap market. Accordingly, Rule 
3a71-6 is amended to identify the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression, and trading relationship documentation requirements of 
Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act and Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 
thereunder as being eligible for substituted compliance.\184\
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    \184\ See paragraph (d) of Rule 3a71-6, as adopted. Paragraph 
(a)(1) of the rule provides that the Commission may, conditionally 
or unconditionally, by order, make a determination with respect to a 
foreign financial regulatory system that compliance with specified 
requirements under the foreign financial system by an SBS dealer 
and/or by a registered major SBS swap participant, or class thereof, 
may satisfy the corresponding requirements identified in paragraph 
(d) of the rule that would otherwise apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comparability Criteria, and Consideration of Related Requirements
    The Commission will endeavor to take a holistic approach in 
determining the comparability of foreign requirements for substituted 
compliance purposes, focusing on regulatory outcomes as a whole, rather 
than on requirement-by-requirement similarity.\185\ The Commission's 
comparability assessments associated with Section 15F(i) and Rules 
15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 thereunder accordingly will consider 
whether, in the Commission's view, the foreign regulatory system 
achieves regulatory outcomes that are comparable to the regulatory 
outcomes associated with those Exchange Act requirements. However, 
paragraph (a)(2)(i) of Rule 3a71-6 provides that the Commission's 
substituted compliance determination will take into account factors 
that the Commission determines appropriate, such as, for example, the 
scope and objectives of the relevant foreign regulatory requirements 
(taking into account the applicable criteria set forth in paragraph (d) 
of the rule, which sets forth the list of requirements eligible for 
substituted compliance), as well as the effectiveness of the 
supervisory compliance program administered, and the enforcement 
authority exercised, by a foreign financial regulatory authority or 
authorities in such system to support its oversight of such foreign 
security-based swap entity (or class thereof) or of the activities of 
such security-based swap entity (or class thereof).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, 81 FR at 
30078-79. See also Trade Acknowledgment and Verification Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 39828.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of these considerations, paragraph (d)(7) of Rule 3a71-6 
states that prior to making a substituted compliance determination in 
connection with the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, 
and trading relationship documentation requirements, the Commission 
intends to consider whether the requirements of the foreign financial 
regulatory system, the duties imposed by the foreign financial 
regulatory system, and the information that is required to be provided 
to counterparties pursuant to the requirements of the foreign financial 
regulatory system, are comparable to those required pursuant to the 
applicable provisions under the Exchange Act.
    In reviewing applications, the Commission may determine to conduct 
its comparability analyses regarding the portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and trading relationship documentation 
requirements in conjunction with comparability analyses regarding other 
Exchange Act requirements that, like the requirements in these final 
rules, promote risk mitigation in connection with SBS Entities. 
Accordingly, depending on the applicable facts and circumstances, the 
comparability assessment associated with the portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and trading relationship documentation 
requirements may constitute part of a broader assessment of Exchange 
Act risk mitigation requirements, and the applicable comparability 
decisions may be made at the level of those risk mitigation 
requirements as a whole.

[[Page 6381]]

V. Explanation of Dates

A. Effective Date

    These final rules will be effective 60 days after the date of this 
release's publication in the Federal Register.

B. Compliance Date

    The compliance date for the final rules, other than the amendments 
to Rule 3a71-6 (as discussed below), will be the same as the compliance 
date for the registration of SBS Entities (the ``Registration 
Compliance Date'').\186\ Specifically, the Registration Compliance Date 
will be 18 months after the effective date of the final rules set forth 
in the Cross-Border Amendments Adopting Release.\187\ The Commission 
believes that this compliance date should allow sufficient time for SBS 
Entities to prepare for and come into compliance with the new portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements.
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    \186\ See Cross-Border Amendments Adopting Release, supra note 
51 Moreover, the Registration Compliance Date also will be the 
compliance date for: (1) Nonbank SBS Entity capital and margin 
requirements; (2) SBS Entity participant segregation requirements; 
(3) SBS Entity participant business conduct and chief compliance 
officer requirements; (4) SBS Entity trade acknowledgement and 
verification requirements; and SBS Entity recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Adopting Release, 84 FR at 43954; Business Conduct Standards 
Adopting Release, 81 FR at 30081-82; Trade Acknowledgment and 
Verification Adopting Release, 81 FR at 39828-29; and Recordkeeping 
and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR at 68600-01.
    \187\ As explained in the Cross-Border Amendments Adopting 
Release, the effective date of those final rules will be the later 
of March 1, 2020, or 60 days following publication of the Cross-
Border Amendments Adopting Release in the Federal Register. See 
Cross-Border Amendments Adopting Release, supra note 51.
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    In addition, these final rules are in many respects intended to 
complement and work in coordination with other Title VII requirements 
for which compliance will also be required as of the Registration 
Compliance Date. For example, Rules 15Fi-3 (portfolio reconciliation) 
and 15Fi-5 (written trading relationship documentation) both contain 
requirements that are intended to help ensure that the counterparties 
to a security-based swap agree on the methodology for determining the 
valuation of the security-based swap and for detecting and resolving 
any discrepancies with respect to that valuation, if necessary. As we 
noted in Section I, the valuation of an uncleared security-based swap 
is critical for determining, among other things, the amount of margin 
that would be required to be collected from the security-based swap 
counterparty and for calculating potential capital charges applicable 
to the SBS Entity. We also discussed in Section I the relationship 
between the Title VII trade acknowledgment and verification process and 
the portfolio reconciliation process. Further, these final rules 
supplement the recordkeeping and reporting requirements for security-
based swaps that the Commission adopted in September 2019, which also 
use the Registration Compliance Date. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes it to be both practical and efficient to require SBS Entities 
to begin complying with the rules we are adopting in this release on 
the same date on which compliance with those other rules will be 
required.

C. Application to Substituted Compliance

    For the amendments to Rule 3a71-6, the Commission is adopting an 
effective date of 60 days following publication in the Federal 
Register.\188\ There will be no separate compliance date in connection 
with that rule amendment, as the rule does not impose obligations upon 
Swap Entities. Rather, those amendments provide foreign SBS Entities 
with the potential to utilize substituted compliance with comparable 
foreign requirements to satisfy Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act and 
new Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ The Commission has taken a similar approach in connection 
with other recent amendments to Rule 3a71-6. See, e.g., 
Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR at 68602.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SBS Entities will not be required to comply with the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements until they are registered, and the 
registration requirement for those entities will not be triggered until 
a number of regulatory benchmarks have been met. In practice, the 
Commission recognizes that if the requirements of a foreign regime are 
comparable to the corresponding Title VII requirements, and the other 
prerequisites to substituted compliance also have been satisfied, then 
it may be appropriate to permit an SBS Entity to rely on substituted 
compliance commencing at the time that entity is registered with the 
Commission. Accordingly, and to alleviate any concerns that the 
compliance date could be before substituted compliance determinations 
are made, the Commission would consider substituted compliance requests 
that are submitted prior to the compliance date for the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements.

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the final rules and rule amendments being 
adopted in this release contain new or modified ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\189\ The Commission submitted these 
collections of information to OMB for review in accordance with the 
PRA.\190\ The Commission did not receive any comments on the PRA 
estimates included in the Proposing Release. However, the Commission's 
earlier PRA assessments have been revised solely with respect to the 
number of respondents that we expect to be registered with both the 
Commission and the CFTC, as discussed below. An agency may not conduct 
or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of 
information unless it displays a currently valid control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \190\ See 44 U.S.C. 3507(d); see also 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 impose new 
collection of information requirements. The title of these new 
collections of information is, collectively, ``Rules 15Fi-3--15Fi-5--
Risk Mitigation Techniques for Uncleared Security-Based Swaps.'' OMB 
has not yet assigned a control number to these new collections of 
information. In addition, the amendments to Rules 3a71-6, 17a-3, 17a-4, 
18a-5, and 18a-6 modify already-existing collection of information 
requirements. The titles and control numbers for these collections of 
information are as follows:
    (1) Rule 17a-3--Records to be made by certain brokers and dealers 
(OMB control number 3235-0033);
    (2) Rule 17a-4--Records to be preserved by certain brokers and 
dealers (OMB control number 3235-0279);
    (3) Rule 18a-5--Records to be made by certain security-based swap 
dealers and major security-based swap participants (OMB control number 
3235-0745);
    (4) Rule 18a-6--Records to be preserved by certain security-based 
swap dealers and major security-based swap participants (OMB control 
number 3235-0751); and
    (5) Rule 3a71-6--Substituted Compliance for Foreign Security-Based 
Swap Dealers (OMB control number 3235-0715).

[[Page 6382]]

A. Summary of Collections of Information

1. Rule 15Fi-3: Portfolio Reconciliation
    Rule 15Fi-3 generally requires SBS Entities to (1) engage in 
periodic portfolio reconciliation activities with counterparties who 
are also SBS Entities, and (2) establish, maintain, and follow written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that they engage 
in periodic portfolio reconciliation with counterparties who are not 
SBS Entities.\191\ Among other things, Rule 15Fi-3 specifies the 
requirements applicable to an SBS Entity for purposes of engaging in 
portfolio reconciliation with either type of counterparty (as well as 
the applicable definitions), with regard to (1) the information that 
the two sides are required to exchange as part of the reconciliation 
process,\192\ (2) the frequency by which an SBS Entity is required to 
reconcile its security-based swap portfolios with its 
counterparties,\193\ (3) the required policies and procedures 
specifying the means and timeframes by which an SBS Entity is required 
to resolve discrepancies with respect to either the valuation or a 
material term of a security-based swap,\194\ and (4) the requirement 
that an SBS Entity agree in writing with each of its counterparties on 
the terms of the portfolio reconciliation, including agreement of the 
selection of any third-party service provider.\195\ Finally, Rule 15Fi-
3(c) requires an SBS Entity to promptly notify the Commission of any 
security-based swap valuation dispute in excess of $20,000,000 (or its 
equivalent in any other currency) if not resolved within: (1) Three 
business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty that is an SBS 
Entity; or (2) five business days, if the dispute is with a 
counterparty that is not an SBS Entity.\196\
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    \191\ Rule 15Fi-3 does not apply to any security-based swap that 
has a clearing agency as a direct counterparty.
    \192\ See supra Section II.B.1.
    \193\ See supra Sections II.B.2 and II.B.4.
    \194\ See supra Sections II.B.3 and II.B.4.
    \195\ See supra Sections II.B.2 and II.B.4.
    \196\ See supra Section II.B.5. Rule 15Fi-3(c) also requires SBS 
Entities to notify the Commission, in a form and manner acceptable 
to the Commission, and any applicable prudential regulator, if the 
amount of any security-based swap valuation dispute that was the 
subject of a previous notice increases or decreases by more than 
$20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency), at either the 
transaction or portfolio level. Each amended notice is required to 
be provided to the Commission and any applicable prudential 
regulator no later than the last business day of the calendar month 
in which the applicable security-based swap valuation dispute 
increases or decreases by the applicable dispute amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    Rule 15Fi-4 requires SBS Entities to establish, maintain, and 
follow written policies and procedures related to bilateral offsetting 
of security-based swaps, and periodic bilateral and multilateral 
compression exercises. Specifically, Rules 15Fi-4(a)(2) and (3) 
requires each SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written 
policies and procedures for periodically engaging in both bilateral 
portfolio compression exercises and multilateral portfolio compression 
exercises, in each case when appropriate, with each counterparty that 
is an SBS Entity.\197\ Similarly, Rule 15Fi-4(a)(1) requires each SBS 
Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written policies and 
procedures for terminating each ``fully offsetting security-based 
swap'' that it maintains with another SBS Entity in a timely fashion, 
when appropriate.\198\ To the extent that an SBS Entity transacts with 
a counterparty that is not an SBS Entity, Rule 15Fi-4(b) provides that 
such policies and procedures will only need to address terminating each 
``fully offsetting security-based swap'' or engaging in a bilateral or 
multilateral portfolio compression exercise, when appropriate and to 
the extent requested by any such counterparty.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See supra Section II.C.1.
    \198\ See supra Section II.C.2.
    \199\ See supra Section II.C.1 and II.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Rule 15Fi-5: Written Trading Relationship Documentation
    Rule 15Fi-5 requires that each SBS Entity to establish, maintain, 
and follow written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
ensure that it executes written trading relationship documentation with 
each of its counterparties, subject to certain exceptions, prior to, or 
contemporaneously with, executing a security-based swap transaction, in 
each case in the manner as provided for in the rule.\200\ The rule also 
requires that the trading relationship documentation include (1) credit 
support arrangements addressing certain specified items related to, 
among other things, margin haircuts, and custody of margin assets \201\ 
and (2) agreements regarding the means by which the counterparties 
would determine the value of each security-based swap.\202\ Rule 15Fi-5 
also contains requirements for SBS Entities and their counterparties to 
disclose to each other certain information regarding their legal and 
bankruptcy status, and to include a statement regarding the status of a 
security-based swap if accepted for clearing by a CCP.\203\ Finally, 
the rule requires each SBS Entity to have an independent auditor 
conduct periodic audits sufficient to identify any material weakness in 
its documentation policies and procedures required by the rule.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See supra Section II.C.1. Rule 15Fi-5 also requires that 
the security-based swap trading relationship documentation address, 
among other things, terms addressing payment obligations, netting of 
payments, events of default or other termination events, calculation 
and netting of obligations upon termination, transfer of rights and 
obligations, governing law, valuation and dispute resolution.
    \201\ See id.
    \202\ See supra Section II.C.2.
    \203\ See supra Section II.C.3.
    \204\ See supra Section I.D.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6: Books and 
Records Requirements
    Rule 17a-3 requires a broker-dealer to make and keep current 
certain records and Rule 17a-4 requires a broker-dealer to preserve 
certain records if it makes or receives them.\205\ The Commission is 
amending these existing rules to account for the security-based swap 
risk mitigation activities of broker-dealers, including broker-dealer 
SBS Entities, by requiring the making and preserving of any required 
records regarding portfolio reconciliation, bilateral offsets, 
bilateral or multilateral portfolio compression, valuation disputes, 
and written trading relationship documentation. With respect to stand-
alone SBS Entities, the Commission is amending Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6--
which the Commission adopted in September of this year and are 
themselves modeled on Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4--to account for these same 
risk mitigation requirements.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
    \206\ See supra Section I.F.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Amendment to Rule 3a71-6: Substituted Compliance
    The amendment to Rule 3a71-6 permits non-U.S. SBS Entities to 
comply with the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and 
written trading relationship documentation requirements by following 
the comparable regulatory requirements of a foreign financial 
regulatory system. Specifically, the amendment adds Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-
4, and 15Fi-5 to the list of Commission requirements eligible for a 
substituted compliance determination and sets forth the standard by 
which the Commission would make such a determination.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ See supra Sections IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 6383]]

B. Use of Information

1. Rule 15Fi-3: Portfolio Reconciliation
    As previously noted, the Commission believes that the information 
shared by counterparties to a security-based swap transaction 
periodically during the portfolio reconciliation process, as 
contemplated by Rule 15Fi-3, will play an important role in assisting 
those counterparties in identifying and resolving discrepancies 
involving key terms of their transactions on an ongoing basis. This 
information also should allow those counterparties to improve their 
management of internal risks related to the enforcement of their rights 
and the performance of their obligations under a security-based swap. 
For example, the information obtained and provided in the course of 
portfolio reconciliation should help ensure that the counterparties to 
a security-based swap are and remain in agreement with respect to all 
material terms throughout the life of the transaction, thereby 
mitigating the possibility that a discrepancy could unexpectedly affect 
either side's ability to perform any or all of its obligations under 
the contract, including those obligations related to the posting of 
collateral. Moreover, requiring SBS Entities to agree in writing with 
each of their counterparties on the terms of the portfolio 
reconciliation (including, if applicable, agreement on the selection of 
any third party service provider who may be performing the 
reconciliation) should help to minimize any discrepancies regarding the 
portfolio reconciliation process itself, thereby ensuring that it 
operates in as efficient and cost-effective means possible. Finally, 
the requirement to report certain unresolved valuation disputes to the 
Commission should assist the Commission in identifying potential issues 
with respect to an SBS Entity's internal valuation methodology and also 
could serve as an indication of a widespread market disruption in cases 
where the Commission receives a large number of such notices from 
multiple firms.
2. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    As previously discussed, the Commission believes that Rule 15Fi-4 
will help market participants by eliminating redundant uncleared 
derivatives contracts, thereby potentially reducing a market 
participant's credit risk to its direct counterparties, including by 
eliminating all outstanding contracts with some counterparties, without 
affecting the market participant's overall economic position. In 
addition, we believe that the collection of information should lead to 
processing improvements for market participants, as envisioned by 
Section 15F(i) of the Exchange Act, by virtue of the fact that both SBS 
Entities and their counterparties should ultimately have fewer trades 
to manage, maintain, and settle, resulting in fewer opportunities for 
processing errors, failures, or other problems that could develop 
throughout the lifecycle of a transaction.
3. Rule 15Fi-5: Written Trading Relationship Documentation
    The Commission believes that the information required to be 
contained in the written trading relationship documentation pursuant to 
Rule 15Fi-5 should help ensure that each SBS Entity mitigates risk with 
respect to its security-based swap portfolio by, among other things, 
enhancing clarity and legal certainty from the outset of a transaction 
regarding each party's rights and obligations. This outcome should help 
to reduce exposure to, among other things, counterparty credit risk and 
promote agreement regarding the proper valuation and other material 
terms of a security-based swap.
4. Amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6: Books and 
Records Requirements
    The Commission expects that the information contained in the 
records required to be made and kept pursuant to the amendments to 
Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6 would be used to assist the 
Commission in its oversight of SBS Entities. In addition, records 
regarding portfolio reconciliation, bilateral offsets, bilateral or 
multilateral portfolio compression, valuation disputes, and written 
trading relationship documentation should help to provide SBS Entities 
and their counterparties to security-based swaps with an ability to 
identify and resolve discrepancies involving key terms of their 
transactions on an ongoing basis, allowing for better management of 
internal risks related to performance of obligations, valuation, margin 
obligations, internal valuation systems and models, or internal 
controls.
5. Amendment to Rule 3a71-6: Substituted Compliance
    Under the amendment to Rule 3a71-6 under the Exchange Act, the 
Commission would use the information collected to evaluate requests for 
substituted compliance with respect to the portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and written trading relationship documentation 
requirements applicable to SBS Entities.

C. Respondents

    The Commission estimated the number of respondents in the Proposing 
Release. The Commission received no comment on these estimates. 
However, the Commission is updating the number of SBS Entities that we 
estimate to be dually-registered with the CFTC as Swap Entities in 
order to be consistent with the most recent estimates used in other 
Commission rulemakings.\208\ Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5, and the 
amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6 apply only to SBS 
Entities, each of which will be registered with the Commission. 
Consistent with prior releases, the Commission estimates that 50 or 
fewer entities ultimately may be required to register with the 
Commission as SBS dealers.\209\ We also previously estimated that the 
number of major SBS participants likely will be five or fewer and, in 
actuality, may be zero.\210\ The Commission continues to believe that 
these estimates are appropriate. Thus, the Commission believes that 
approximately 55 entities will be required to register with the 
Commission under either category, and will therefore be subject to 
Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ See Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR at 
68607-09.
    \209\ See id. See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation Adopting 
Release, 84 FR at 43960; Trade Acknowledgement and Verification 
Adopting Release, 81 FR at 39830; and SBS Entity Registration 
Adopting Release, 80 FR at 48990.
    \210\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposing Release, the Commission estimated that of the 55 
entities that may register with the Commission as SBS Entities, 
approximately 35 will be dually-registered with the CFTC as Swap 
Entities.\211\ In a more recent release, however, the Commission 
updated that estimate, such that we now believe that approximately 20 
SBS Entities will also be registered with the CFTC as Swap 
Entities.\212\ Accordingly, we are using the updated number for 
calculating the burdens pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4643.
    \212\ See Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR at 
68607-09. This figure includes 19 SBS dealers and one major SBS 
participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to the requirements under Rule 3a71-6, as amended, 
requests for a substituted compliance determination with respect to the 
portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and written trading 
relationship documentation requirements may be filed by foreign 
financial regulatory authorities, or by non-U.S. SBS Entities. 
Consistent with prior estimates, the

[[Page 6384]]

Commission expects that there are approximately 22 non-U.S. entities 
that may register with the Commission as SBS dealers, out of 
approximately 50 total entities that may register as SBS dealers.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ See Cross-Border Application Proposing Release, 84 FR at 
24253. See also Recordkeeping and Reporting Adopting Release, 84 FR 
at 68607-09; and Capital, Margin, and Segregation Adopting Release, 
84 FR at 43960-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Potentially, all such non-U.S. SBS dealers, or some subset thereof, 
may seek to rely on a substituted compliance determination in 
connection with these portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, 
and written trading relationship documentation requirements.\214\ In 
practice, however, the Commission expects that the greater portion of 
any such requests will be submitted by foreign financial regulatory 
authorities, given their expertise in connection with the relevant 
substantive requirements, especially in connection with their 
supervisory and enforcement oversight with regard to SBS dealers and 
their activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ As previously noted, the Commission further believes that 
there may up to five major SBS participants. See supra note 210 and 
accompanying text. It is possible that some subset of those entities 
will be non-U.S. major SBS participants that will seek to rely on 
substituted compliance in connection with the applicable portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and written trading 
relationship documentation requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Total Annual Recordkeeping Burden

1. Portfolio Reconciliation Activities Generally
    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3(a), the approximately 55 respondent SBS 
Entities will be required to reconcile security-based swap portfolios 
with other SBS Entities on a daily, weekly, or quarterly basis, 
depending upon the size of the portfolio. For purposes of this 
requirement, the Commission estimates that each SBS Entity will engage 
in security-based swap transactions with approximately one-third of the 
other 54 SBS Entities, meaning that an SBS Entity will maintain 
security-based swap portfolios with approximately 18 SBS Entities. Of 
this total, we believe that, on average, two SBS Entity counterparty 
portfolios will require daily reconciliation (i.e., a portfolio 
consisting of 500 or more uncleared security-based swaps), four SBS 
Entity counterparty portfolios will require weekly reconciliation 
(i.e., a portfolio of more than 50 but fewer than 500 uncleared 
security-based swaps), and the remaining 12 SBS Entity counterparty 
portfolios will require quarterly reconciliation (i.e., a portfolio of 
no more than 50 uncleared security-based swaps).\215\ The Commission 
therefore estimates that each SBS Entity will engage in an average of 
760 portfolio reconciliations with other SBS Entities per year.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ These estimates are consistent with those used by the CFTC 
in connection with its portfolio reconciliation rule. See 
Confirmation, Portfolio Reconciliation, and Portfolio Compression 
Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 75 FR 
81519, 81528 (Dec. 28, 2010).
    \216\ This estimate uses 252 business days for purposes of the 
daily portfolio reconciliation requirement, which is consistent with 
the definition of ``business day'' in Rule 15Fi-1(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that each portfolio reconciliation is 
likely to be conducted through an automated process.\217\ As a result, 
we believe that each reconciliation will require an average of 30 
minutes to complete in total (which is the combined estimate for both 
counterparties), regardless of the size of the security-based swap 
portfolio with the applicable counterparty.\218\ Using these figures, 
the Commission estimates that compliance with Rule 15Fi-3(a), as it 
relates to engaging in portfolio reconciliation with other SBS 
Entities, will impose an average annual burden of approximately 190 
hours per year on each of the respondent 55 SBS Entities, for an 
estimated average annual burden of 10,450 hours in the aggregate. These 
calculations are summarized in PRA Table 1, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ The Commission recognizes that some respondents may choose 
to engage a third-party vendor to conduct portfolio reconciliations. 
For simplicity, however, the Commission's burden estimate is based 
upon SBS Entities conducting these activities internally, without 
the use of third-party vendors. The Commission requested, but did 
not receive, comment on this approach, including regarding the 
likelihood and cost of using third-party providers. Accordingly, we 
are using the same estimates as included in the proposal. See 
Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4642, n. 176.
    \218\ Because the 30 minute estimate is for the entire 
reconciliation process, without respect to how that time is 
allocated between the two parties, to avoid double-counting we have 
divided it by one-half in the context of security-based swap 
portfolios between two SBS Entities, resulting in an estimate of 15 
minutes per reconciliation per counterparty for those portfolios.

                  PRA Table 1--Rule 15i-3(a): Portfolio Reconciliations With Other SBS Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   Hourly burden
   Number of counterparties per  respondent     Number of annual reconciliations        per        Total annual
                                                                                  reconciliation  burden (hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 (>=500 transactions)........................  252 (daily).....................             .25             126
4 (>50<500 transactions)......................  52 (weekly).....................             .25              52
12 (<=50 transactions)........................  4 (quarterly)...................             .25              12
                                                                                                 ---------------
    Total per respondent......................  ................................  ..............             190
                                                                                                 ---------------
        Total Aggregate Annual Burden for all   ................................  ..............          10,450
         55 respondents.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, Rule 15Fi-3(b) requires each SBS Entity to establish, 
maintain, and follow written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to ensure that it engages in portfolio reconciliation for all 
security-based swaps (other than security-based swaps that will be 
cleared by a clearing agency) in which its counterparty is not an SBS 
Entity.\219\ In calculating the burden of performing the portfolio 
reconciliations required by these policies and procedures, the 
Commission estimates that (1) there are currently 13,082 market 
participants in security-based swaps who will not be required to 
register as SBS Entities,\220\ and (2) each SBS Entity will have an 
average of approximately 350 of these non-SBS Entity market 
participants as

[[Page 6385]]

counterparties.\221\ Further, the Commission believes that 
reconciliations with these parties will be conducted on a quarterly 
basis for 10% of these portfolios (i.e., portfolios with more than 100 
uncleared security-based swaps), and on an annual basis for the 
remaining 90% of these portfolios (i.e., portfolios that do not involve 
100 or more uncleared security-based swaps).\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ The Commission's estimate for the hourly burden for 
preparing these policies and procedures is discussed below.
    \220\ In the Economic Analysis, the Commission estimates that 
there are approximately 13,137 market participants in the security-
based swap market. See infra Section VI.B.1.c (Table 2). Subtracting 
the estimated 55 SBS Entities from this figure results in an 
estimated 13,082 non-SBS Entities.
    \221\ This estimate is based upon the assumption that each non-
SBS Entity market participant will do business with, on average, 
between one or two SBS Entities and is calculated as follows: 
((13,082 non-SBS Entity market participants/55 SBS Entities) x 1.5 
SBS Entities per non-SBS market participants) = approximately 350 
non-SBS Entity counterparties per SBS Entity.
    \222\ Accordingly, of the estimated 350 security-based swap 
portfolios that an SBS Entity maintains with non-SBS Entities, 90% 
(or 315) will require only one portfolio reconciliation each year, 
and 10% (or 35) will require quarterly portfolio reconciliations, 
resulting in a total of 455 portfolio reconciliations per SBS Entity 
per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission further estimates that each portfolio reconciliation 
between an SBS Entity and a non-SBS Entity will require an average of 
30 minutes to complete (which is the combined estimate for both 
counterparties).\223\ Using these figures, the Commission estimates 
that compliance with Rule 15Fi-3(b), as it relates to conducting 
portfolio reconciliations with non-SBS Entities, will impose an annual 
hourly burden of approximately 227.5 hours per SBS Entity, for an 
estimated average annual burden of approximately 12,512.5 hours in the 
aggregate for all 55 SBS Entity respondents. These calculations are 
summarized in PRA Table 2, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ This figure is identical to the estimate used for 
reconciliations between two SBS Entities (before dividing by one-
half to avoid double-counting) and is consistent with the estimate 
used by the CFTC, which used an estimate of six minutes (or .10 
hours) in connection with its portfolio reconciliation requirements. 
See supra notes 215 and 218 and accompanying text.

                     Table 2 -Rule 15i-3(b): Portfolio Reconciliations With Non-SBS Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   Hourly burden
    Number of counterparties per respondent     Number of annual reconciliations        per        Total annual
                                                                                  reconciliation  burden (hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
35 (>100 transactions)........................  4 (quarterly)...................              .5              70
315 (<=100 transactions)......................  1 (annual)......................              .5           157.5
                                                                                                 ---------------
    Total per respondent......................  ................................  ..............           227.5
                                                                                                 ---------------
        Total Aggregate Annual Burden for all   ................................  ..............        12,512.5
         55 respondents.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Establishing, Maintaining, and Enforcing Written Policies and 
Procedures
    Rule 15Fi-3 also contains policies and procedures requirements 
applicable to SBS Entities in connection with engaging in portfolio 
reconciliation with both SBS Entities and other counterparties. As 
previously noted, the Commission estimates that of the estimated 55 
persons that may register with the Commission as SBS Entities, 
approximately 20 will be dually-registered with the CFTC as Swap 
Entities.\224\ In addition, the CFTC's adopted final rules on portfolio 
reconciliation written policies and procedures are substantively 
identical to those in Rule 15Fi-3. Accordingly, these 20 dually-
registered entities are already required to establish, maintain, and 
follow written policies and procedures as they relate to the 
reconciliation of their swap portfolios, and these policies and 
procedures would be expected to be largely consistent with those that 
would be required with respect to their security-based swap portfolios. 
Assuming that these existing policies and procedures would simply need 
to be amended to apply to security-based swap transactions pursuant to 
Rule 15Fi-3, we estimate that the initial burden of revising these 
policies and procedures would be one hour per respondent, for an 
estimated one-time initial burden of 20 hours in the aggregate. With 
respect to the remaining 35 SBS Entities that will not be dually-
registered with the CFTC, the Commission estimates, based on prior 
estimates in earlier Dodd-Frank rulemakings, that these policies and 
procedures would require an average of 80 hours per non-dually-
registered respondent to initially prepare and implement, for an 
estimated one-time initial burden of 2,800 hours in the aggregate.\225\ 
Once these policies and procedures are established, the Commission 
estimates that it will take an average of 40 hours annually to revise 
and maintain these policies and procedures per respondent (including 
both dually-registered and non-dually-registered SBS Entities),\226\ 
for an estimated average annual burden of 2,200 hours in the aggregate 
for all 55 respondents.\227\
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    \224\ See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
    \225\ This estimate is based on Commission staff discussions 
with market participants and is calculated as follows: [((Compliance 
Attorney at 40 hours) + (Director of Compliance at 20 hours) + 
(Deputy General Counsel at 20 hours))] = 80 hours per SBS Entity. 
See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification Adopting Release, 81 FR at 
39831, n. 242.
    \226\ Although dually-registered SBS Entities would technically 
need to revise and maintain their policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance with both the Commission's and CFTC's rules, we have 
decided to conservatively assume that all of the estimated hours 
would be incurred in connection with compliance with the collection 
of information associated with Rule 15Fi-3.
    \227\ This estimate is based on Commission staff discussions 
with market participants and is calculated as follows: [((Compliance 
Attorney at 20 hours) + (Director of Compliance at 10 hours) + 
(General Counsel at 10 hours))] = 40 hours per SBS Entity. See Trade 
Acknowledgment and Verification Adopting Release, 81 FR at 39831, n. 
243.
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3. Reporting of Certain Valuation Disputes
    Rule 15Fi-3(c) requires each SBS Entity to promptly notify the 
Commission (and any applicable prudential regulator for an SBS Entity 
that is also a bank), in a form and manner acceptable to the 
Commission, of any security-based swap valuation dispute in excess of 
$20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency) if not resolved 
within a prescribed time period. As previously noted, we crafted the 
rule in this way to provide SBS Entities with flexibility to determine 
the most efficient and cost-effective form and manner of making such 
submissions, so long as it is deemed to be acceptable by the 
Commission.\228\ Accordingly, we would expect there to be only a 
minimal, if any, initial burden of designing a system for submitting 
these notices. We also believe that the associated ongoing hourly 
burden of preparing and submitting such notices would be minimal. In 
addition, until

[[Page 6386]]

SBS Entities are registered with the Commission, it is difficult for us 
to determine the typical number of valuation disputes meeting the 
applicable thresholds that SBS Entities would be required to submit on 
an annual basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ See supra note 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15Fi-3(c) also requires SBS Entities to notify the Commission, 
in a form and manner acceptable to the Commission, and any applicable 
prudential regulator, if the amount of any security-based swap 
valuation dispute that was the subject of a previous notice increases 
or decreases by more than $20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other 
currency), at either the transaction or portfolio level. Such amended 
notice shall be provided to the Commission, and any applicable 
prudential regulator, no later than the last business day of the 
calendar month in which the applicable security-based swap valuation 
dispute increases or decreases by the applicable dispute amount. 
Although the Commission believes that the time required to submit 
amendments to existing notices will be minimal, and likely included in 
the 24 hour estimate that we used in the Proposing Release (which was 
used by the CFTC when it first proposed a similar requirement),\229\ we 
are conservatively increasing that estimate by 25% to account for the 
submission of amended notices. As such, we estimate that each SBS 
Entities will spend on average of 30 hours each year complying with 
this requirement, for an estimated average annual burden of 1,650 hours 
in the aggregate for all 55 respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ See Swap Trading Relationship Documentation Requirements 
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 FR 6715, 6723 (Feb. 
8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Combining all of the estimated burdens described above, the 
Commission estimates that Rule 15Fi-3 will impose an estimated one-time 
initial burden of 2,899 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities to 
prepare new written policies and procedures or to bring existing ones 
into compliance. The Commission also estimates that Rule 15Fi-3 will 
impose an estimated ongoing burden of 26,812.5 hours each year in the 
aggregate for all SBS Entities, which is composed of (1) an estimated 
annual burden of 10,450 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities to 
engage in portfolio reconciliation with SBS Entities; (2) an estimated 
annual burden of 12,512.5 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities 
to engage in portfolio reconciliation with non-SBS Entities; (3) an 
estimated annual burden of 2,200 hours in the aggregate for all SBS 
Entities to revise and maintain the written policies and procedures 
required pursuant to the rule; and (4) an estimated annual burden of 
1,650 hours for all SBS Entities to report certain large valuation 
disputes to the Commission and any applicable prudential 
regulator.\230\ These calculations are summarized in PRA Tables 3 and 
4, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ Rule 15Fi-3(a)(1) and (b)(1) also require an SBS Entity to 
agree in writing with each of its counterparties on the terms of the 
portfolio reconciliation including, if applicable, agreement on the 
selection of any third party service provider who may be performing 
the reconciliation. The Commission expects SBS Entities to undertake 
this agreement as part of the written trading relationship 
documentation each is required to enter into with its counterparties 
as a result of Rule 15Fi-5. Thus, the estimate here does not account 
for this burden, which is instead assumed to form part of the burden 
of complying with Rule 15Fi-5.

        PRA Table 3--Rule 15Fi-3: Total Estimated Initial Burdens
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Total one-time
               Requirement                 Hourly burden  burden (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preparation of New Written Policies and                1              20
 Procedures (20 dual SEC-CFTC
 registrants)...........................
Preparation of New Written Policies and               80           2,800
 Procedures (35 SEC-only registrants)...
                                         -------------------------------
    Total Aggregate One-Time Burden for   ..............     2,820 hours
     all 55 respondents.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

           PRA Table 4--Rule 15Fi-3: Summary of Annual Burdens
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Aggregate
                                                           hourly burden
                       Requirement                            (all 55
                                                           respondents)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Portfolio Reconciliations with Other SBS Entities.......          10,450
Portfolio Reconciliations with Non-SBS Entities.........        12,512.5
Revise and Maintain Written Policies and Procedures.....           2,200
Prepare and Submit Notices of Valuation Disputes >$20              1,650
 million................................................
                                                         ---------------
    Total Aggregate Annual Burden for all 55 respondents        26,812.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Rule 15Fi-4: Portfolio Compression
    As noted above, the Commission continues to believe that of the 
estimated 55 persons that may register with the Commission as SBS 
Entities, approximately 20 will be dually-registered with the CFTC as 
Swap Entities. In addition, and as we previously noted, the 
requirements in CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503 are, other than as expressly 
described above in Section II.B, substantively identical to Rule 15Fi-
4. Accordingly, these 20 entities are already required to establish, 
maintain, and follow relevant written policies and procedures related 
to bilateral offsets and portfolio compression exercises involving 
their swap portfolios, and these policies and procedures would be 
expected to be largely consistent with those that would be required 
with respect to their security-based swap portfolios. Assuming that 
these existing policies and procedures would need to be amended to 
apply to security-based swap transactions, we estimate that the initial 
burden of revising these policies and procedures would be one hour per 
respondent, for an estimated one-time initial burden of 20 hours in the 
aggregate.
    With respect to the remaining 35 SBS Entities that are not dually-
registered with the CFTC, the Commission estimates, based on prior 
estimates in earlier Dodd-Frank rulemakings, that these policies and 
procedures would require an average of 80 hours per non-dually-
registered respondent to initially prepare and implement, for an 
estimated average annual burden of 2,800 hours in the aggregate.\231\ 
Once these policies and procedures are established, the Commission 
estimates that it will take an average of 40 hours annually to revise 
and maintain these policies and procedures per respondent (including 
both dually-registered and non-dually-registered SBS Entities), for an 
estimated average annual burden of 2,200 hours in the aggregate for all 
55 respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ See supra note 225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the respondents will incur additional hourly burdens 
as they undertake bilateral offsets and portfolio compression exercises 
consistent with these written policies and procedures.

[[Page 6387]]

As noted above the Commission estimates that each of the 55 estimated 
SBS Entities will be counterparty to an average of 18 other SBS 
Entities and 350 non-SBS Entities, for a total of 368 counterparties. 
For purposes of conducting bilateral offsets and portfolio compression 
exercises, the Commission estimates that (1) each SBS Entity will have 
an average of one set of security-based swaps that are eligible for 
annual bilateral offset with each of these 368 counterparties, (2) each 
SBS Entity will conduct an annual bilateral compression exercise with 
one-third, or six of its 18 SBS Entity counterparties, (3) each SBS 
Entity will conduct an annual bilateral compression exercise with each 
of its 350 non-SBS Entity counterparties, and (4) each SBS Entity will 
engage in multilateral compression exercises at an average rate of 12 
exercises per year.
    The Commission believes that each bilateral offset and portfolio 
compression exercise is likely to be conducted through an automated 
process. As a result, we believe that (1) each bilateral offset will 
require on average five minutes of respondent time to complete with 
each of the 350 non-SBS Entity counterparties, (2) each bilateral 
offset will require on average 2.5 minutes of respondent time to 
complete with each of the 18 SBS Entity counterparties,\232\ (3) each 
bilateral compression will require an average of 15 minutes of 
respondent time to complete with each of the 350 non-SBS Entity 
counterparties, (4) each bilateral compression will require an average 
of 7.5 minutes with each of the six SBS Entity counterparties,\233\ and 
(5) each multilateral compression exercise will require an average of 
30 minutes of respondent time to complete 12 times annually. In each of 
those hourly burdens, the figure used is the combined estimate for both 
counterparties. Based on these estimates, the Commission estimates the 
average annual hourly burden for these activities at 124.16 hours per 
respondent, an estimated average annual burden of 6,828.8 hours in the 
aggregate. These calculations are summarized in PRA Table 5, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ Similar to our estimates in the context of the portfolio 
reconciliation requirements, because the five minute estimate is for 
the entire bilateral offset process, without respect to how that 
time is allocated between the two parties, to avoid double-counting 
we have divided it by one-half in the context of security-based swap 
portfolios between two SBS Entities, resulting in an estimate of 2.5 
minutes per bilateral offset for those portfolios.
    \233\ Again, we have divided the 15 minute estimate to complete 
the bilateral compression exercise by one-half in the context of 
security-based swap portfolios between two SBS Entities, resulting 
in an estimate of 7.5 minutes per bilateral compression for those 
portfolios.

                              PRA Table 5--Portfolio Compression With All Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Number of
              Type of exercise                   Number of          annual       Hourly burden     Total annual
                                              counterparties      exercises       per exercise        burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bilateral Offset (w/non-SBS Entities)......               350                1            .0833            29.16
Bilateral Offset (w/SBS Entities)..........                18                1            .0417              .75
Bilateral Compression (w/non SBS-Entities).               350                1              .25             87.5
Bilateral Compression (w/SBS Entities).....                 6                1             .125              .75
Multilateral Compression...................               N/A               12               .5                6
    Total per respondent...................  ................  ...............  ...............           124.16
                                                                                                ----------------
    Total Aggregate Annual Burden for all    ................  ...............  ...............          6,828.8
     55 respondents........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Combining all of the estimated burdens described above, the 
Commission estimates that Rule 15Fi-4 will impose an estimated one-time 
initial burden of 2,899 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities to 
prepare new written policies and procedures or to bring existing ones 
into compliance. The Commission also estimates that Rule 15Fi-4 will 
impose an estimated ongoing burden of 9,028.8 hours each year in the 
aggregate for all SBS Entities, which is composed of (1) an estimated 
annual burden of 1,603.8 hours in the aggregate to conduct bilateral 
offsets with non-SBS Entities; (2) an estimated annual burden of 41.25 
hours in the aggregate to conduct bilateral offsets with SBS Entities; 
(3) an estimated annual burden of 4,812.5 hours in the aggregate to 
participate in bilateral compression exercises with non-SBS Entities; 
(4) an estimated annual burden of 41.25 hours in the aggregate to 
participate in bilateral compression exercises with SBS Entities; (5) 
an estimated annual burden of 330 hours in the aggregate to participate 
in multilateral compression exercises; and (6) an estimated annual 
burden of 2,200 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities to revise 
and maintain written policies and procedures. These calculations are 
summarized in PRA Tables 6 and 7, below.

        PRA Table 6--Rule 15Fi-4: Total Estimated Initial Burden
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Total one-time
                Activity                   Hourly burden  burden (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preparation of New Written Policies and                1              20
 Procedures (20 dual SEC-CFTC
 registrants)...........................
Preparation of New Written Policies and               80           2,800
 Procedures (35 SEC-only registrants)...
                                                         ---------------
    Total Aggregate One-Time Burden for   ..............           2,820
     all 55 respondents.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 6388]]

           PRA Table 7--Rule 15Fi-3: Summary of Annual Burdens
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Aggregate
                                                           hourly burden
                       Requirement                            (all 55
                                                           respondents)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bilateral Offsets with non-SBS Entities.................          1603.8
Bilateral Offsets with SBS Entities.....................           41.25
Bilateral Compression with non-SBS Entities.............         4,812.5
Bilateral Compression with SBS Entities.................           41.25
Multilateral Compression................................             330
Revise and Maintain Written Policies and Procedures.....           2,200
                                                         ---------------
Total Aggregate Annual Burden for all 55 respondents....          9028.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Rule 15Fi-5: Written Trading Relationship Documentation
    As previously noted, the Commission estimates that each SBS Entity 
will have 18 SBS Entity counterparties and 350 non-SBS Entity 
counterparties, for a total of 368 counterparties per SBS Entity. For 
the purposes of the underlying documentation requirements, and based on 
staff discussions with market participants, the Commission understands 
that many SBS Entities already have in place industry-standard written 
trading relationship documentation that is likely to contain many of 
the elements required by Rule 15Fi-5. With this in mind, the Commission 
estimates that (1) the initial burden per respondent to negotiate and 
draft written trading relationship documentation with non-SBS Entities 
that is compliant with Rule 15Fi-5 will be approximately 30 hours 
(which is the combined estimate for both counterparties), and (2) the 
initial burden per respondent to negotiate and draft written trading 
relationship documentation with SBS Entities that is compliant with 
Rule 15Fi-5 will be approximately 15 hours.\234\ These estimates are 
averages, and both account for the fact that some SBS Entities may lack 
appropriate documentation in certain respects and will need to enter 
into new documentation with counterparties, while in other cases 
existing documentation will need only to be modified to be brought into 
compliance. The Commission's estimates are further based on an 
assumption that, in each case, the written documentation will always 
include the valuation agreements set forth in Rule 15Fi-5(b)(4), 
notwithstanding the fact that the rule only requires this information 
in certain circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ As was the case in calculating the PRA estimates for the 
portfolio reconciliation and portfolio compression requirements, 
because the 30 hours estimate is for the entire process of 
negotiating and executing written trading relationship 
documentation, without respect to how that time is allocated between 
the two parties, to avoid double-counting we have divided it by one-
half in the context of counterparties that are also SBS Entities, 
resulting in an estimate of 15 hours to negotiate and execute such 
documentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on these estimates and assumptions, the Commission believes 
that the requirement to prepare written relationship documentation in 
accordance with Rule 15Fi-5 will result in an estimated one-time 
initial burden of 9,540 hours for each of the 55 SBS Entity 
respondents, for an estimated average one-time burden of 524,700 hours 
in the aggregate. The Commission also believes that there will be 
little need to modify the written trading relationship documentation on 
an ongoing basis once it is in place, and therefore is not estimating 
any additional annual hourly burden for ongoing modifications.
    As noted above, the Commission continues to believe that of the 
estimated 55 persons that may register with the Commission as SBS 
Entities, approximately 20 will be dually-registered with the CFTC as 
Swap Entities. In addition, and as we previously noted, the 
requirements in CFTC Rule Sec.  23.504 are, other than as expressly 
described above in Section I.C, substantively identical to those 
contained in Rule 15Fi-5. Accordingly, these 20 entities are already 
required to establish, maintain, and follow relevant written policies 
as they relate to the execution of written trading relationship 
documentation involving their swap portfolios, and these policies and 
procedures would be expected to be largely consistent with those that 
would be required with respect to their security-based swap portfolios. 
Assuming that these existing policies and procedures would simply need 
to be amended to apply to security-based swap transactions, we estimate 
that the average initial burden of revising these policies and 
procedures would be one hour per respondent, for an estimated one-time 
burden of 20 hours in the aggregate.
    With respect to the remaining 35 SBS Entities that are not dually-
registered with the CFTC, the Commission estimates, based on prior 
estimates in earlier Dodd-Frank rulemakings, that these policies and 
procedures would require an average of 80 hours per non-dually-
registered respondent to initially prepare and implement, for an 
estimated average annual burden of 2,800 hours in the aggregate.\235\ 
Once these policies and procedures are established, the Commission 
estimates that it will take an average of 40 hours annually to revise 
and maintain these policies and procedures per respondent (including 
both dually-registered and non-dually-registered SBS Entities), for an 
estimated average annual burden of 2,200 hours in the aggregate for all 
55 respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ See supra note 225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to having an independent auditor conduct the required 
periodic audit of written trading relationship documentation and the 
requirement to retain a record of each such audit, the Commission 
estimates that it will take an average of 10 hours to audit an SBS 
Entity's documentation with each of its 368 counterparties, for a total 
of 3,680 hours per SBS Entity, or 202,400 hours for all 55 SBS Entity 
respondents.
    Combining all of the estimated burdens described above, the 
Commission estimates that Rule 15Fi-5 will impose an estimated one-time 
initial burden of 595,170 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities, 
which consists of (1) 2,820 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities 
to prepare new written policies and procedures or to bring existing 
ones into compliance, (2) 577,500 hours in the aggregate for SBS 
Entities to negotiate and execute trading relationship documentation 
with 350 non-SBS Entity counterparties, and (3) 14,850 hours in the 
aggregate for SBS Entities to negotiate and execute trading 
relationship documentation with 18 SBS Entity counterparties. The 
Commission also estimates that Rule 15Fi-5 will impose an estimated 
ongoing burden of 204,600 hours each year in the aggregate for all SBS 
Entities, which is composed of: (1) An estimated annual burden of 2,200 
hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities to revise and maintain 
written policies and procedures and (2) an estimated annual burden of 
202,400 hours in the aggregate for all SBS Entities to conduct the 
required periodic audits. These calculations are summarized in PRA 
Tables 8 and 9, below.

[[Page 6389]]

        PRA Table 8--Rule 15Fi-5: Total Estimated Initial Burdens
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Total one-time
                Activity                   Hourly burden  burden (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preparation of New Written Policies and                1              20
 Procedures (20 dual SEC-CFTC
 registrants)...........................
Preparation of New Written Policies and               80           2,800
 Procedures (35 SEC-only registrants)...
Negotiate and Execute Trading                         30         577,500
 Relationship Documentation with 350 non-
 SBS Entities (all 55 respondents)......
Negotiate and Execute Trading                         15          14,850
 Relationship Documentation with 18 SBS
 Entities (all 55 respondents)..........
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
    Total Aggregate One-Time Burden for   ..............         595,170
     all 55 respondents.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

           PRA Table 9--Rule 15Fi-3: Summary of Annual Burdens
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Aggregate
                                                           hourly burden
                       Requirement                            (all 55
                                                           respondents)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Audit of Written Trading Relationship Documentation.....         202,400
Revise and Maintain Written Policies and Procedures.....           2,200
                                                         ---------------
    Total Aggregate Annual Burden for all 55 respondents         204,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6: Books and 
Records Requirements
    The amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6 will impose 
collection of information requirements that result in initial and 
annual time burdens for SBS Entities. The amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 
18a-5 require three additional types of records to be made and kept 
current by SBS Entities--records regarding portfolio reconciliations, 
valuation disputes, and portfolio compressions. Because the burden to 
make these records is accounted for in the PRA estimates for Rules 
15Fi-3 and 15Fi-4, the burden imposed by these new requirements relates 
only to the requirement in Rules 17a-4 and 18a-6 to maintain and 
preserve a written record of these tasks, as well as the additional 
requirements in those provisions to maintain and preserve records of 
policies and procedures required by Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5, 
and written agreements with counterparties regarding the terms of 
portfolio reconciliation. The Commission estimates that these 
recordkeeping requirements will impose an initial burden of 60 hours 
per firm for updating the applicable policies and systems required to 
account for capturing the additional records made pursuant to Rule 
15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5, and an ongoing annual burden of 75 hours per 
firm for maintaining such records as well as to make additional updates 
to the applicable recordkeeping policies and systems to account for the 
new rules. As noted previously, the Commission estimates that there are 
55 SBS Entity respondents, for a total average initial annual burden 
for all respondents of 3,300 hours and a total ongoing average annual 
burden of 4,125 hours.
7. Amendment to Rule 3a71-6: Substituted Compliance
    The amendment to Rule 3a71-6 requires the submission of certain 
information to the Commission to the extent SBS Entities elect to 
request a substituted compliance determination with respect to the 
proposed portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and written 
trading relationship documentation requirements. The Commission expects 
that registered SBS Entities will seek to rely on substituted 
compliance upon registration, and that it is likely that the majority 
of such requests will be made during the first year following the 
effective date. Requests will not be necessary with regard to 
applicable rules and regulations of a foreign financial regulatory 
system that have previously been the subject of a substituted 
compliance determination in connection with the applicable rules.
    The Commission expects that the great majority of substituted 
compliance applications will be submitted by foreign authorities, and 
that very few substituted compliance requests will come from SBS 
Entities. For purposes of this assessment, the Commission estimates 
that three such SBS Entities will submit such an application.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, 81 FR at 
30097, n. 1582.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has previously estimated that the paperwork burden 
associated with making each such substituted compliance request would 
be approximately 80 hours of in-house counsel time, plus $80,000 for 
the services of outside professionals (based on 200 hours of outside 
time x $400 per hour).\237\ The Commission is currently of the belief 
that this prior estimate is sufficient to cover a combined substituted 
compliance request that also seeks a determination for the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and written trading relationship 
documentation requirements. This estimate results in an aggregate total 
of 240 internal hours, plus $240,000 for outside services. Therefore, 
the Commission estimates that the total paperwork burden incurred by 
such entities associated with preparing and submitting a request for a 
substituted compliance determination in connection with the portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and written trading relationship 
documentation requirements will be approximately 240 hours per 
applicant, plus $240,000 for the services of outside professionals for 
all three requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ See Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, 81 FR at 
30097, n. 1583.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory

    Each collection of information for Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-
5, and for the amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6 is a 
mandatory collection of information. With respect to the amendment to 
Rule 3a71-6, the application for substituted compliance is mandatory 
for all foreign financial regulatory authorities or SBS Entities that 
seek a substituted compliance determination.

F. Confidentiality

    Rule 15Fi-3(c) requires an SBS Entity to promptly notify the 
Commission of any security-based swap valuation dispute in excess of 
$20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency) if not resolved 
within: (1) Three business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty 
that is an SBS Entity; or (2) five business days, if the dispute is 
with a counterparty that is not an SBS Entity. The rule also requires 
SBS Entities to notify the Commission, in a form and manner acceptable 
to the Commission, and any applicable prudential regulator, if the 
amount of any security-based swap valuation dispute that was the 
subject of a previous notice increases or decreases by more than 
$20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency), at either the 
transaction or portfolio level.

[[Page 6390]]

These amendments are required to be provided to the Commission, and any 
applicable prudential regulator, no later than the last business day of 
the calendar month in which the applicable security-based swap 
valuation dispute increases or decreases by the applicable dispute 
amount. We requested comment as to whether the initial notices should 
be submitted to the Commission on a confidential basis, but did not 
receive any comments in response to this request. Accordingly, the 
Commission has not modified Rule 15Fi-3(c) to provide for these notices 
(either the initial notice or any amendments) to be submitted on a 
confidential basis. No other information is required to be submitted 
directly to the Commission under Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5, or 
under the amendments to Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5, and 18a-6. To the 
extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant 
to this collection of information that is otherwise not publicly 
available, including in connection with examinations or investigations, 
the SBS Entity can request the confidential treatment of the 
information.\238\ If such a confidential treatment request is made, the 
Commission anticipates that it will keep the information confidential, 
subject to the provisions of applicable law.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See 17 CFR 200.83.
    \239\ See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing 
the public availability of information obtained by the Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to the amendments to Rule 3a71-6, the Commission 
generally will make requests for a substituted compliance determination 
public, subject to requests for confidential treatment being submitted 
pursuant to any applicable provisions governing confidentiality under 
the Exchange Act.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ See 17 CFR 200.83; 17 CFR 240.24b-2; see also Application 
of ``Security-Based Swap Dealer'' and ``Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant'' Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap 
Activities, Exchange Act Release No. 72472 (June 25, 2014), 79 FR 
47278, 47359 (Aug. 12, 2014) (``Cross-Border Adopting Release'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Economic Analysis

    The Commission is sensitive to the economic effects of its rules, 
including the costs and benefits and the effects of its rules on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Section 3(f) \241\ of 
the Exchange Act requires the Commission, whenever it engages in 
rulemaking pursuant to the Exchange Act and is required to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest, also to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, 
whether the action would promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. In addition, Section 23(a)(2) \242\ of the Exchange Act 
requires the Commission, when promulgating rules under the Exchange 
Act, to consider the impact such rules would have on competition. 
Section 23(a)(2) also provides that the Commission shall not adopt any 
rule which would impose a burden on competition that is not necessary 
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \242\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
    \243\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Broad Economic Considerations

    Unlike some other types of securities transactions, a security-
based swap typically gives rise to ongoing obligations between 
transaction counterparties during the life of the transaction, 
including payments contingent on specific events, such as a corporate 
default or a change in the price of an underlying reference asset 
(e.g., changes in price to the floating leg of a total return swap). 
Consequently, certain risk mitigation techniques, such as engaging in 
portfolio reconciliation at periodic intervals, exercising 
opportunities for portfolio compression, and ensuring that the terms of 
a transaction are fully documented, are important practices for 
assisting SBS Entities in effectively measuring and managing market and 
credit risk.
    Credit risk refers to the probability of a financial loss due to a 
counterparty to a transaction failing to fulfill its financial 
obligations. In order to manage credit risk in the security-based swap 
context properly, a market participant should know the identity of each 
of its counterparties, the details of the obligations of each 
counterparty in each transaction into which the two have entered, and 
the value of those obligations (including for purposes of calculating 
margin or measuring outstanding exposure for risk management). The 
greater the number of counterparties and transactions, the complexity 
of those transactions, and the value of the outstanding obligations, 
the more important it becomes for each counterparty to have well-
documented credit risk management policies.
    The risks of the counterparties' failure to manage credit risk 
adequately may not become apparent until the onset of a financial 
crisis. Such a crisis occurred in the fall of 2008, when certain events 
threatened to freeze U.S. and global credit markets. The severity of 
that crisis has been partially attributed to poor risk management 
practices of financial firms and flawed supervisory oversight for 
certain financial institutions.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ See Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation 
of Financial Institutions, at 3-4, IMF Policy Paper (Feb. 4, 2009), 
available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020409.pdf; 
see also Sewall Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2011), available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html?_r=1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Shortcomings in credit risk management and documentation may be 
unobservable to counterparties and other market participants until a 
crisis occurs as it did in 2008; thus some benefits of compliance will 
accrue to the financial system as a whole while the ongoing direct 
costs are borne by the institution. If firms do not fully internalize 
the benefits of risk management, then they may underinvest. For 
example, shortcomings in documentation were reported to have created 
significant problems during the financial crisis that immediately 
preceded passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in connection with efforts by 
Barclays PLC to take over a portion of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s 
derivatives trades.\245\ Shortcomings in the documentation of portfolio 
valuation methods and reconciliation of portfolio values were also 
exposed when, during bankruptcy proceedings, counterparties' valuations 
differed by hundreds of millions of dollars from the value of those 
same positions on the bankrupt entity's books.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ See Linda Sandler, Lehman Derivatives Records a `Mess,' 
Barclays Executive Says, Bloomberg (Aug. 30, 2010), available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-30/lehman-derivatives-records-a-mess-barclays-executive-says.
    \246\ See Satyajit Das, In the Matter of Lehman Brothers, 59 
Wilmott 20-29 (May 2012). Disagreement over CDO valuation between 
AIG and its counterparties was also an issue around the same time. 
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Among other things, effective risk management requires the 
existence of sound documentation, periodic reconciliation of 
portfolios, rigorously tested valuation methodologies, and sound 
collateralization practices.\247\ More broadly, the President's Working 
Group on Financial Policy (``PWG'') noted shortcomings in the OTC 
derivatives market as a whole during the financial crisis that 
immediately preceded passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. The PWG identified 
the need for an improved integrated operational structure supporting 
OTC derivatives, specifically highlighting the need for an

[[Page 6391]]

enhanced ability to manage counterparty risk through ``netting and 
collateral agreements by promoting portfolio reconciliation and 
accurate valuation of trades.'' \248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Lehman Brothers' Bankruptcy: 
Lessons learned for the survivors, Informational presentation for 
clients, (Aug. 2009), at 12-24, available at: https://www.pwc.com/jg/en/events/lessons-learned-for-the-survivors.pdf.
    \248\ See The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, 
Policy Statements on Financial Market Developments, (Mar. 2008) 
(``PWG Report''), available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rules are designed to ensure that SBS Entities implement 
certain risk mitigation techniques by engaging in periodic portfolio 
reconciliation, maintaining policies and procedures for engaging in 
certain forms of portfolio compression exercises with each of their 
counterparties, and maintaining policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to ensure that they execute written trading relationship 
documentation with each of their counterparties prior to executing a 
security-based swap transaction. These rules also will set minimum 
standards with respect to identifying the matters that must be 
addressed in the security-based swap trading documentation, and outline 
certain requirements related to the resolution of discrepancies, 
particularly those involving differences in the valuation of security-
based swaps.\249\ In adopting these rules, the Commission believes that 
they will promote effective risk management practices by security-based 
swap market participants in a number of important ways, which are 
discussed in greater detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ The rules also (1) address the potential availability of 
substituted compliance in connection with those portfolio 
reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading relationship 
documentation requirements and (2) require SBS Entities to make and 
keep records demonstrating compliance with the new risk mitigation 
requirements (which are reflected as amendments to the Commission's 
recently adopted security-based swap recordkeeping rules).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that, where possible, it has attempted to 
quantify the costs, benefits, and effects on efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation expected to result from adopting these rules. In 
certain cases, however, the Commission is unable to quantify the 
economic effects. Crucially, many of the relevant economic effects, 
such as improved risk management and the value of Commission 
enforcement and oversight, are inherently difficult to quantify. In 
other cases, we lack the information necessary to provide reasonable 
estimates. For example, we lack data on prices charged by certain 
third-party service providers, current trading relationship 
documentation practices for entities and transactions not already 
subject to similar rules from other regulators, the fraction of 
outstanding positions that when reconciled will result in a dispute and 
the costs incurred by the participants in resolving the dispute. To the 
best of our knowledge, no such data is publicly available. Where the 
Commission is unable to quantify the economic effects, the discussion 
is qualitative in nature and includes, where possible, descriptions of 
the direction of these effects.

B. Economic Baseline

    To assess the economic impact of the risk mitigation rules 
described in this release, the Commission is using as a baseline the 
security-based swap market as it exists at the time of this release, 
including applicable rules that have already been adopted, and 
excluding rules that have been proposed but not yet finalized. The 
analysis includes the statutory and regulatory provisions that 
currently govern the security-based swap market pursuant to the Dodd-
Frank Act, as well as rules adopted in, among others, the Business 
Conduct Standards Adopting Release,\250\ the Trade Acknowledgment and 
Verification Adopting Release,\251\ the Capital, Margin, and 
Segregation Adopting Release,\252\ and the Recordkeeping and Reporting 
Adopting Release.\253\ Moreover, because participants in the security-
based swap market may also operate in other markets, particularly the 
swaps market, we have considered both the direct and indirect impact of 
rules that have been adopted by other regulators (e.g., the CFTC as 
well as foreign regulatory bodies) in formulating the baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ See supra note 172.
    \251\ See supra note 5.
    \252\ See supra note 89. See also supra note 161 and associated 
text.
    \253\ See supra note 162 and Section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the overall Title VII regulatory framework will have 
consequences for the ways in which security-based swaps are transacted 
which, in turn, will affect the activities addressed by these rules. 
For example, the rules being adopted generally do not apply to 
security-based swaps cleared through a registered clearing agency. 
Therefore, the scope of future mandatory clearing requirements may 
affect the overall level of security-based swap activity subject to the 
final rules being adopted, as well as the overall costs borne by SBS 
Entities.
1. Security-Based Swap Market Activity and Participants
a. Available Data From the Security-Based Swap Market
    The Commission's understanding of the market is informed, in part, 
by available data on security-based swap transactions, though the 
Commission acknowledges that limitations in the data limit the extent 
to which it is possible to quantitatively characterize the market. 
Since this data does not cover the entire market, the Commission has 
analyzed market activity using a sample of transactions that includes 
only certain segments of the market. The Commission believes, however, 
that the data underlying this analysis provides reasonably 
comprehensive information regarding single-name credit default swap 
(``CDS'') transactions and the composition of the participants in the 
single-name CDS market.
    Specifically, the analysis of the state of the current security-
based swap market is based on data obtained from the DTCC Derivatives 
Repository Limited Trade Information Warehouse (``DTCC-TIW''), 
especially data regarding the activity of market participants in the 
single-name CDS market during the period from 2006 to 2017.\254\ 
Although the definition of ``security-based swap'' is not limited to 
single-name CDS,\255\ single-name CDS contracts make up a majority of 
security-based swaps, and we believe that the single-name CDS data is 
sufficiently representative of the market to inform our analysis of the 
current security-based swap market. According to data published by the 
Bank for International Settlements (``BIS''), the global notional 
amount outstanding in single-name CDS was approximately $4.6 
trillion,\256\ in multi-name index CDS was approximately $4.4 trillion, 
and in multi-name, non-index CDS was approximately $343 billion.\257\ 
The total

[[Page 6392]]

gross market value outstanding in single-name CDS was approximately 
$130 billion, and in multi-name CDS instruments was approximately $174 
billion.\258\ The global notional amount outstanding in equity forwards 
and swaps as of December 2017 was $3.21 trillion, with total gross 
market value of $197 billion.\259\
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    \254\ In prior releases, the Commission has examined data for 
other time periods. For example, in the Business Conduct Standards 
Adopting Release, the Commission presented an analysis of TIW data 
for November 2006 through December 2014. While the exact numbers of 
various groups of transacting agents and account holders in that 
analysis differ from the figures reported in this section (for a 
longer time period), we do not observe significant structural 
differences in market participation. Compare 81 FR at 30102 (Tables 
1 and 2) with Tables 1 and 2 below.
    \255\ While other repositories may collect data on transactions 
in total return swaps on equity and debt, we do not currently have 
access to such data for these products (or other products that are 
security-based swaps). Additionally, the Commission explains below 
that data related to single-name CDS provides reasonably 
comprehensive information for the purpose of this analysis.
    \256\ The global notional amount outstanding represents the 
total face amount used to calculate payments under outstanding 
contracts. The gross market value is the cost of replacing all open 
contracts at current market prices.
    \257\ See BIS, Semi-annual OTC derivatives statistics at 
December 2017, Table 10.1, available at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/d10_1.pdf (last accessed September 24, 2019).
    \258\ See id.
    \259\ These totals include swaps and security-based swaps, as 
well as products that are excluded from the definition of ``swap,'' 
such as certain equity forwards. See OTC, Equity-Linked Derivatives 
Statistics, Table D8, available at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/d8.pdf (last accessed September 24, 2019). For the purposes of this 
analysis, the Commission assumes that multi-name index CDS are not 
narrow-based index CDS and therefore, do not fall within the 
security-based swap definition. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(68)(A). See 
also Further Definition of ``Swap,'' ``Security-Based Swap,'' and 
``Security-Based Swap Agreement''; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap 
Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48208. The Commission also assumes 
that all instruments reported as equity forwards and swaps are 
security-based swaps, potentially resulting in underestimation of 
the proportion of the security-based swap market represented by 
single-name CDS. Therefore, when measured on the basis of gross 
notional outstanding single-name CDS contracts appear to constitute 
roughly 59% of the security-based swap market. Although the BIS data 
reflects the global OTC derivatives market, and not just the U.S. 
market, the Commission has no reason to believe that these ratios 
differ significantly in the U.S. market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission further notes that the data available from TIW does 
not encompass those CDS transactions that both: (i) Do not involve U.S. 
counterparties; \260\ and (ii) are based on non-U.S. reference 
entities. Notwithstanding this limitation, the TIW single-name CDS data 
should provide sufficient information to permit the Commission to 
identify the types of market participants active in the security-based 
swap market and the general pattern of dealing within that market.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ Following publication of the Warehouse Trust Guidance on 
CDS data access, TIW surveyed market participants, asking for the 
physical address associated with each of their accounts (i.e., where 
the account is organized as a legal entity). This physical address 
is designated the registered office location by TIW. When an account 
reports a registered office location, we have assumed that the 
registered office location reflects the place of domicile for the 
fund or account. When an account does not report a registered office 
location, we have assumed that the settlement country reported by 
the investment adviser or parent entity to the fund or account is 
the place of domicile. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, the 
Commission has classified accounts as ``U.S. counterparties'' when 
they have reported a registered office location in the United 
States. The Commission notes, however, that this classification is 
not necessarily identical in all cases to the definition of U.S. 
person under Rule 3a71-3(a)(4).
    \261\ The challenges the Commission faces in estimating measures 
of current market activity stem, in part, from the absence of 
comprehensive reporting requirements for security-based swap market 
participants. The Commission has adopted rules regarding trade 
reporting, data elements, and public reporting for security-based 
swaps that are designed to, when fully implemented, provide the 
Commission with additional measures of market activity that will 
allow us to better understand and monitor activity in the security-
based swap market. See Regulation SBSR Adopting Release, 81 FR at 
53545.
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b. Affected SBS Entities
    Final SBS Entity registration rules have been adopted, but 
compliance is not yet required. Therefore, we do not have data on the 
actual number of SBS Entities that will register with the Commission, 
or the number of persons associated with registered SBS Entities. The 
Commission has elsewhere estimated that up to 50 entities may register 
with the Commission as security-based swap dealers, and up to five 
additional entities may register as major security-based swap 
participants.\262\ These estimates remain unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See, e.g., Registration Adopting Release, 80 FR at 49000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Firms that act as dealers play a central role in the security-based 
swap market. Based on an analysis of 2017 single-name CDS data in TIW, 
accounts of those firms that are likely to exceed the security-based 
swap dealer de minimis thresholds, and thereby trigger the requirement 
to register as SBS dealers intermediated transactions with a gross 
notional amount of approximately $2.9 trillion. Approximately 55% of 
that figure is intermediated by the top five dealer accounts.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ The Commission staff analysis of DTCC Derivatives 
Repository Limited Trade Information Warehouse transaction records 
indicates that approximately 99% of single-name CDS price-forming 
transactions in 2017 involved an ISDA-recognized dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dealers transact with hundreds or thousands of counterparties. 
Approximately 21% of accounts of firms expected to register as SBS 
dealers and observable in TIW have entered into security-based swaps 
with over 1,000 unique counterparty accounts as of year-end 2017.\264\ 
Another 25% of these accounts transacted with 500 to 1,000 unique 
counterparty accounts; 29% transacted with 100 to 500 unique accounts; 
and 25% of these accounts intermediated security-based swaps with fewer 
than 100 unique counterparties in 2017. The median dealer account 
transacted with 495 unique accounts (with an average of approximately 
570 unique accounts). Non-dealer counterparties transacted almost 
exclusively with these dealers. The median non-dealer counterparty 
transacted with two dealer accounts (with an average of approximately 
three dealer accounts) in 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Many dealer entities and financial groups transact through 
numerous accounts. Given that individual accounts may transact with 
hundreds of counterparties, the Commission may infer that entities 
and financial groups may transact with at least as many 
counterparties as the largest of their accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Other Market Participants
    In addition to dealers, thousands of other participants appear as 
counterparties to security-based swap contracts in our sample, and 
include, but are not limited to, investment companies, pension funds, 
private funds, sovereign entities, and industrial companies. We observe 
that most non-dealer users of security-based swaps do not engage 
directly in the trading of swaps, but trade through banks, investment 
advisers, or other types of firms acting as dealers or agents. Based on 
an analysis of the counterparties to trades reported to the TIW, there 
are 2,110 entities engaged directly in trading between November 2006 
and December 2017.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ These 2,110 entities, which are presented in more detail 
in Table 1, infra, include all DTCC-defined ``firms'' shown in TIW 
as transaction counterparties that report at least one transaction 
to TIW as of December 2017. The staff in the Division of Economic 
and Risk Analysis classified these firms, which are shown as 
transaction counterparties, by machine matching names to known 
third-party databases and by manual classification. See, e.g., 
Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected With a Non-U.S. Person's 
Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by 
Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or 
Office of an Agent; Security-Based Swap Dealer De Minimis Exception, 
Exchange Act Release No. 77104 (Feb. 10, 2016) 81 FR 8598, 8602 n.43 
(Feb. 19, 2016). Manual classification was based in part on searches 
of the EDGAR and Bloomberg databases, the SEC's Investment Adviser 
Public Disclosure database, and a firm's public website or the 
public website of the account represented by a firm. The staff also 
referred to ISDA protocol adherence letters available on the ISDA 
website.

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[[Page 6393]]

    As shown in Table 1 below, close to three-quarters of these 
entities (DTCC-defined ``firms'' shown in TIW, which we refer to here 
as ``transacting agents'') were identified as investment advisers, of 
which approximately 40% (about 30% of all transacting agents) were 
registered as investment advisers under the Advisers Act.\266\ Although 
investment advisers are the vast majority of transacting agents, the 
transactions they executed account for only 12.8% of all single-name 
CDS trading activity reported to the TIW, measured by the number of 
transaction-sides (each transaction has two transaction sides, i.e., 
two transaction counterparties). The vast majority of transactions 
(83.3%) measured by the number of transaction-sides were executed by 
ISDA-recognized dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ See 15 U.S.C. 80b1-80b21. Transacting agents participate 
directly in the security-based swap market, without relying on an 
intermediary, on behalf of principals. For example, a university 
endowment may hold a position in a security-based swap that is 
established by an investment adviser that transacts on the 
endowment's behalf. In this case, the university endowment is a 
principal that uses the investment adviser as its transacting agent.

 Table 1--The Number of Transacting Agents by Counterparty Type and the Fraction of Total Trading Activity, From
                   November 2006 Through December 2017, Represented by Each Counterparty Type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Transaction
                       Transacting agents                             Number          Percent        share (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investment Advisers.............................................           1,635            77.5            12.8
--SEC registered................................................             658            31.2             8.6
Banks...........................................................             262            12.4             3.4
Pension Funds...................................................              29             1.4             0.1
Insurance Companies.............................................              42             2.0             0.2
ISDA-Recognized Dealers \267\...................................              17             0.8            83.3
Other...........................................................             125             5.9             0.2
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................           2,110           100.0             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Principal holders of CDS risk exposure are represented by 
``accounts'' in the TIW.\268\ The staff's analysis of these accounts in 
TIW shows that the 2,110 transacting agents classified in Table 1 
represent 13,137 principal risk holders. Table 2, below, classifies 
these principal risk holders by their counterparty type and whether 
they are represented by a registered or unregistered investment 
adviser.\269\ For instance, banks in Table 1 allocated transactions 
across 349 accounts, of which 20 were represented by investment 
advisers. In the remaining instances, banks traded for their own 
accounts. Meanwhile, ISDA-recognized dealers in Table 1 allocated 
transactions across 91 accounts. Private funds are the largest type of 
account holders that we were able to classify, and although not 
verified through a recognized database, most of the funds we were not 
able to classify appear to be private funds.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ For the purpose of this analysis, the ISDA-recognized 
dealers are those identified by ISDA as belonging to the G14 or G16 
dealer group during the period: JP Morgan Chase NA (and Bear 
Stearns), Morgan Stanley, Bank of America NA (and Merrill Lynch), 
Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, UBS, 
Credit Suisse AG, RBS Group, BNP Paribas, HSBC Bank, Lehman 
Brothers, Soci[eacute]t[eacute] G[eacute]n[eacute]rale, Credit 
Agricole, Wells Fargo and Nomura. See, e.g., https://www.isda.org/a/5eiDE/isda-operations-survey-2010.pdf.
    \268\ ``Accounts'' as defined in the TIW context are not 
equivalent to ``accounts'' in the definition of ``U.S. person'' 
provided by Rule 3a71-3(a)(4)(i)(C) under the Exchange Act. They 
also do not necessarily represent separate legal persons. One entity 
or legal person may have multiple accounts. For example, a bank may 
have one DTCC account for its U.S. headquarters and one DTCC account 
for one of its foreign branches.
    \269\ Unregistered investment advisers include all investment 
advisers not registered under the Investment Advisers Act and may 
include investment advisers registered with a state or a foreign 
authority as well as investment advisers that are exempt reporting 
advisers under Section 203(l) or 203(m) of the Investment Advisers 
Act.
    \270\ For the purposes of this discussion, ``private fund'' 
encompasses various unregistered pooled investment vehicles, 
including hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital 
funds. There remain over 5,800 DTCC accounts unclassified by type. 
Although unclassified, each account was manually reviewed to verify 
that it was not likely to be a special entity within the meaning of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and instead was likely to be an entity such as a 
corporation, an insurance company, or a bank.

    Table 2--The Number and Percentage of Account Holders--by Type--Who Participate in the Security-Based Swap Market Through a Registered Investment
                Adviser, an Unregistered Investment Adviser, or Directly as a Transacting Agent, From November 2006 Through December 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Account holders by type                                             Number      Represented by a
                                                                              registered investment
                                                                                     adviser
                                                                   Represented by an
                                                                unregistered investment
                                                                        adviser
                                                                    Participant is
                                                                transacting agent \271\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Private Funds................................................        3,857        1,973          51%        1,859          48%           25           1%
DFA Special Entities.........................................        1,319        1,262          96%           37           3%           20           2%
Registered Investment Companies..............................        1,159        1,082          93%           73           6%            4           0%
Banks (non-ISDA-recognized dealers)..........................          349           20           6%            8           2%          321          92%
Insurance Companies..........................................          301          196          65%           34          11%           71          24%
ISDA-Recognized Dealers......................................           91            0           0%            0           0%           91         100%
Foreign Sovereigns...........................................           83           63          76%            3           4%           17          20%
Non-Financial Corporations...................................           75           52          69%            4           5%           19          25%
Finance Companies............................................           20           11          55%            0           0%            9          45%
Other/Unclassified...........................................        5,883        3,745          64%        1,887          32%          251           4%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All..........................................................       13,137        8,404          64%        3,905          30%          828           6%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 6394]]

d. Outstanding Positions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ This column reflects the number of participants who are 
also trading for their own accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Our analysis here focuses on outstanding positions in single-name 
CDS. As we have previously noted, although the definition of a 
security-based swap is not limited to single-name CDS, we believe that 
the single-name CDS data is sufficiently representative of the market 
and therefore can directly inform the analysis of the state of the 
current security-based swap market.\272\ In 2017, there were 1,534,753 
single-name CDS transactions reported to DTCC-TIW, of which 1,036,155 
were transactions with a clearing agency as a counterparty.\273\ 
Currently, security-based swap transactions are generally negotiated 
and executed bilaterally, typically with a dealer as one of the 
counterparties. Indeed, based on our analysis of DTCC-TIW data for 
2017, more than 99% of single-name CDS transactions have an ISDA-
recognized dealer as a counterparty, and 31% of transactions are 
between two ISDA-recognized dealers.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ While other repositories may collect data on transactions 
in total return swaps on equity and debt, we do not currently have 
access to such data for these products (or other products that are 
security-based swaps). In the Cross-Border Proposing Release, we 
explained that we believed that data related to single-name CDS was 
reasonable for purposes of this analysis; such transactions appear 
to constitute roughly 82% of the security-based swap market as 
measured on a notional basis. See Cross-Border Proposing Release, 78 
FR at 31120, n. 1301. None of the commenters to that release 
disputed these assumptions, and we therefore continue to believe 
that, although the BIS data reflect the global OTC derivatives 
market, and not just the U.S. market, these ratios are an adequate 
representation of the U.S. market.
    Also consistent with our approach in that release, with the 
exception of the analysis regarding the degree of overlap between 
participation in the single-name CDS market and the index CDS market 
(cross-market activity), our analysis below does not include data 
regarding index CDS (including CDS based on narrow-based security 
indices) as we do not currently have sufficient information to 
identify the relative volumes of index CDS that are either swaps or 
security-based swaps.
    \273\ For the purposes of this analysis, we estimate there were 
approximately 1.53 million single-name CDS transactions in 2017, of 
which approximately 1.04 million were transactions with a clearing 
agency as a counterparty. In addition to CDS, security-based swap 
products include equity swaps, such as total return swaps on single 
names and swaps based on narrow-based security indices. The 
Commission currently lacks comprehensive data on equity swaps, 
including data on transaction volumes and notional amounts. While 
there were more than 1.53 million security-based swap transactions 
in 2017, we do not currently have sufficient information to 
precisely identify the number of transactions beyond those that were 
single-name CDS. However, while recognizing that average notional 
transaction amounts for equity and multi-name CDS may differ from 
average notional transaction amounts for CDS, our estimate (using 
data from 2015) that single-name CDS constitute roughly 82% of the 
security-based swap market implies that there were approximately 
337,000 security-based swap transactions in 2017 in addition to the 
approximately 1.53 million single-name CDS transactions we identify 
in the DTCC-TIW data, or 1.87 million total security-based swap 
transactions. Note that our estimate that single-name CDS 
constitutes roughly 82% of the security-based swap market is based 
on notional transaction amounts rather than transaction counts; in 
using this figure to estimate the total number of security-based 
swap transactions, we have assumed that the average notional amount 
is the same across single-name CDS, multi-name CDS, and equity 
swaps.
    \274\ For the purpose of this analysis, the reference to ``ISDA-
recognized dealers'' means those dealers identified by ISDA as 
belonging to the G14 or G16 dealer group during the period. This 
group includes: JP Morgan Chase NA (and Bear Stearns), Morgan 
Stanley, Bank of America NA (and Merrill Lynch), Goldman Sachs, 
Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, UBS, Credit Suisse 
AG, RBS Group, BNP Paribas, HSBC Bank, Lehman Brothers, 
Soci[eacute]t[eacute] G[eacute]n[eacute]rale, Credit Agricole, Wells 
Fargo and Nomura. See, e.g., https://www.isda.org/a/5eiDE/isda-operations-survey-2010.pdf. See also Aldasoro, Inaki, and Torsten 
Ehlers, 2018, The Credit Default Swap Market: What a Difference a 
Decade Makes, BIS Quarterly Review June 2018, Graph 2, available at: 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1806b.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of December 30, 2017 there were 360,473 outstanding positions 
(with a gross notional value of $4.196 trillion) in single-name 
corporate CDS of which 252,108 positions ($2.095 trillion) did not 
include a CCP as one of the counterparties. Of the 252,108 positions, 
158,674 positions ($1.383 trillion) were between two market 
participants the Commission expects will register as SBS Entities, 
based on an analysis of DTCC-TIW data.\275\ In addition, 90,559 
positions ($0.684 trillion) were between an expected SBS Entity and a 
market participant not expected to register as an SBS Entity and 2,875 
($0.028 trillion) were between two participants not expected to 
register as SBS Entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ See supra Section VI.C for current estimates of the number 
of SBS Entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If transactions are examined instead, there were 383,212 price-
forming transactions in calendar-year 2017 (with an aggregate gross 
trade size of $5.304 trillion) in single-name corporate CDS of which 
175,600 transactions ($4.321 trillion) did not include a CCP as one of 
the counterparties. Of those 175,660 transactions, 75,119 transactions 
($1.695 trillion) were between two expected SBS Entities, 99,370 
transactions ($2.245 trillion) were between an expected SBS Entity and 
a participant not expected to register, and 1,171 transactions ($0.382 
trillion) were between two participants not expected to register as SBS 
Entities.
    Further analysis of the data reveals that of the 24 expected SBS 
Entities with outstanding positions as of December 30, 2017, 10 are not 
U.S. persons and may be subject to similar requirements as those being 
adopted here by foreign regulators. We note that the data available to 
us from DTCC-TIW does not encompass those CDS positions that both: (i) 
Do not involve U.S. counterparties; \276\ and (ii) are based on non-
U.S. reference entities. Notwithstanding this limitation, we believe 
that the DTCC-TIW data provides sufficient information to identify the 
types of market participants active in the security-based swap market 
and the general pattern of transactions within that market.\277\ We 
find that of the outstanding positions on December 30, 2017, 317,854 
positions ($1.661 trillion) include at least one expected SBS Entity, 
3,037 ($0.018 trillion) are between non-U.S. domiciled expected SBS 
Entities and 60,948 ($0.489 trillion) are between a non-U.S., domiciled 
expected SBS Entity and a participant not expected to register as an 
SBS Entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ We note that DTCC-TIW's determinations as to the domicile 
of a counterparty or reference entity may not reflect our definition 
of ``U.S. person'' in all cases. Our definition of ``U.S. person'' 
follows the definition used in the Commission's June 2014 release 
where it, among other things, adopted rules and guidance regarding 
the application of the certain Title VII definitions in the cross-
border context. See Cross-Border Adopting Release, 79 FR at 47303.
    \277\ The challenges we face in estimating measures of current 
market activity stems, in part, from the absence of comprehensive 
reporting requirements for security-based swap market participants. 
The Commission has adopted rules regarding trade reporting, data 
elements, and public reporting for security-based swaps that are 
designed to, when fully implemented, provide us with appropriate 
measures of market activity . See Regulation SBSR Adopting Release, 
80 FR at 14699-700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Current Portfolio Reconciliation Practices
    While the Commission does not have data on current portfolio 
reconciliation practices of security-based swap market 
participants,\278\ certain market participants we expect will register 
as SBS Entities are already subject to similar requirements from other 
regulators. In particular, those entities that are registered with the 
CFTC as

[[Page 6395]]

Swap Entities are also subject to CFTC rules on portfolio 
reconciliation. These rules require Swap Entities to reconcile their 
swap portfolios with one another and to provide counterparties who are 
not registered as Swap Entities with regular opportunities for 
portfolio reconciliation.\279\ The Commission has reviewed these rules 
and believes that, other than as expressly noted above in Section II.A, 
they are substantively identical to these final rules.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ Although the Commission does not have information on the 
number of valuation discrepancies between counterparties in SBS 
markets, a June 2017 survey on dealer financing noted that two-
fifths of survey respondents reported that the volume of valuation 
disputes increased somewhat over the September 2016 to June 2017 
period. Small net fractions of dealers responded that the volume, 
duration, and persistence of mark and collateral disputes had 
increased in OTC derivatives, especially in foreign exchange and 
interest rate contracts. Three-fifths of dealers responded that, on 
average, it takes more than two days but less than a week to resolve 
a mark and collateral dispute on VM. One-third indicated two days or 
fewer. See Yesol Huh, Division of Research and Statistics, Federal 
Reserve Board, The June 2017 Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on 
Dealer Financing Terms, available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/scoos/files/scoos_201706.pdf.
    \279\ See 17 CFR 23.502 (Portfolio reconciliation).
    \280\ See, e.g., supra Section II.A for a discussion of 
similarities and differences in approach to the definition of 
material terms that must be reconciled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, SBS Entities that are domiciled outside of the U.S. may be 
subject to similar requirements of regulators from their home 
jurisdiction. For example, entities subject to Chapter VII, Article 13 
of EU Regulation No 149/2013 already must comply with portfolio 
reconciliation requirements similar to those in the adopted rules. The 
EU regulations require all counterparties to agree on arrangements 
under which portfolios shall be reconciled before entering into an OTC 
derivative contract. Furthermore, the frequency of portfolio 
reconciliation under those regulations depends on both whether either 
counterparty is a ``financial counterparty'' or a ``non-financial 
counterparty'' (each as defined in European regulations), and the 
number of outstanding contracts between the two counterparties.
    In addition to regulations that may apply to certain SBS Entities 
that are either dually registered with the CFTC as Swap Entities or 
subject to similar portfolio reconciliation rules in other 
jurisdictions, portfolio reconciliation forms a part of current market 
practices. In particular, ISDA publishes a set of ``best practices'' 
for its members for the OTC derivatives collateral process that 
addresses, among other things, portfolio reconciliation of non-cleared 
OTC derivatives.\281\ These ``best practices'' include written 
agreement between counterparties as to the terms of the reconciliation 
and reconciliation tolerances, and also while acknowledging both the 
CFTC and EU rules pertaining to portfolio reconciliation, provide best 
practices that augment existing rules.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ See ISDA, 2013 Interim Updated Best Practices for the OTC 
Derivatives Collateral Process, Best Practices 10.1-10.6 (Oct. 23, 
2013), available at: https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NjA3NQ==/2013%20ISDA%20Best%20Practices%20for%20the%20OTC%20Derivatives%20Collateral%20Process%20-%20FINAL.pdf (``ISDA Collateral Best 
Practices'').
    \282\ The ISDA Collateral Best Practices include citations to 
both the CFTC and EU portfolio reconciliation rules and notes that 
while broadly similar do include some differences. ISDA states that 
the ``best practices'' are intended to augment those rules by 
addressing points of practical significance that are not directly 
regulated. See ISDA Collateral Best Practices, pages 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Current Portfolio Compression Practices
    While the Commission does not have data on current portfolio 
compression practices of security-based swap market participants, 
certain SBS Entities are already subject to similar compression 
requirements in other contexts similar to the situation involving 
portfolio reconciliation. Specifically, SBS Entities that are also 
registered with the CFTC as Swap Entities are subject to CFTC rules on 
portfolio compression. As discussed above, the Commission has reviewed 
those rules and believes that they are, other than as expressly noted 
above in Section II.B, substantively identical to these final rules.
    Further, SBS Entities that are domiciled outside of the U.S. may be 
subject to similar requirements from regulators in their home 
jurisdiction. For example, entities subject to Chapter VII, Article 14 
of EU Regulation No 149/2013 already must comply with portfolio 
compression requirements. Under these requirements any entity that has 
500 or more non-cleared OTC derivative contracts with any one 
counterparty must have procedures in place to regularly (at least twice 
a year) analyze the possibility of conducting a portfolio compression 
exercise in order to reduce their counterparty credit risk and engage 
in such a portfolio compression exercise. The EU regulations differ 
from the rules being adopted in a few important ways, including their 
application to all OTC derivative positions, not just security-based 
swaps, as well as the minimum frequency of compression exercises. 
Moreover, both financial and non-financial counterparties are required 
under the EU regulations to ensure that they are able to provide ``a 
reasonable and valid explanation to the relevant competent authority 
for concluding that a portfolio compression exercise is not 
appropriate.''
    In addition to regulations that may apply to certain SBS Entities 
that are either dually registered with the CFTC as Swap Entities or 
subject to similar portfolio compression rules in other jurisdictions, 
portfolio compression forms a part of current market practices. The 
ISDA Collateral Best Practices also includes a best practice that 
addresses portfolio compression, explaining that trades that are 
subject to industry-wide trade-reducing events should be removed from 
the portfolio on the day the trade-reducing event occurs and that this 
should be in agreement with governing documentation for the applicable 
risk reducing process. \283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ See ISDA Collateral Best Practices, supra note 281, Best 
Practice 8.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although we lack data on current portfolio compression practices of 
individual SBS market participants, the importance of portfolio 
compression is illustrated by the scope of its use among security-based 
swap market participants.\284\ In March 2010, DTCC explicitly 
attributed the reduction in the gross notional value of the credit 
derivatives in its warehouse to industry supported portfolio 
compression.\285\ Using data from TriOptima, the BIS reports CDS 
portfolio compression rates as high as 25% of notional outstanding in 
the first half of 2008.\286\ Compression volumes fell steadily over the 
following years due, in part, to falling transaction volumes and the 
rise of central clearing.\287\ TriOptima, as well as other firms, 
continue to offer compression services, and the Commission believes 
that the fact that market participants continue to find it worthwhile 
to pay for such services lends support to the argument that market 
participants view portfolio compression as a valuable tool.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ The data available to the Commission with respect to 
portfolio compression does not allow for enumeration of the actual 
participants which participate in such practices; however, 
inferences regarding the scope can be drawn from the magnitude of 
the reduction in the gross notional value of the credit derivatives.
    \285\ See DTCC Press Release, DTCC Trade Information Warehouse 
Completes Record Year Processing OTC Credit Derivatives, (Mar. 11, 
2010). Notably, beginning in August 2008, ISDA encouraged 
compression exercises for CDS by selecting the service provider and 
defining the terms of service.
    \286\ See Aldasoro, Inaki, and Torsten Ehlers, 2018, The Credit 
Default Swap Market: What a Difference a Decade Makes, BIS Quarterly 
Review June 2018, Graph 1 panel 2 and accompanying text, available 
at: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1806b.pdf. In March of 2010, 
the staff of the FRBNY estimated that since 2008 nearly $50 trillion 
gross notional of CDS positions has been eliminated through 
portfolio compression. See FRBNY OTC Derivatives Report, supra note 
18.
    \287\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The chart below illustrates the opportunities for portfolio 
compression between 2010 and 2017 for single-name security-based 
swaps.\288\ As the gap between gross and net notional values widens, 
the opportunities for portfolio compression increase. Over our 
reference period, however, the difference between gross and net 
notional values has declined. For

[[Page 6396]]

instance, in 2010, the percentage, which captures the ratio of net to 
gross notional value, was 11.0%, but this number has been gradually 
increasing through December 30, 2018 when it was 15.2%. Smaller ratios 
indicate greater opportunities for portfolio compression; however, as 
shown in the chart below, based on changes in gross and net notional 
value over time, unexploited opportunities for compression are 
diminishing.\289\
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    \288\ The chart below includes only gross and net notional of 
single-name security-based swaps. The inclusion of index security-
based swaps could expand potential compression opportunities 
available to SBS Entities.
    \289\ The result is likely driven by banks and securities firms. 
See Aldasoro, Inaki, and Torsten Ehlers, 2018, supra note 286, Graph 
5.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR04FE20.000

    It is possible that market participants may already be taking 
advantage of portfolio compression opportunities. However, the 
Commission does not infer that the entirety of the reduction in the gap 
between gross and net notional values is due to portfolio compression 
exercises. Other plausible explanations for the reduction in the gross 
notional value of security-based swaps include both fewer and/or 
smaller new transactions, expiration of existing positions without 
rollover into new positions, and loss or consolidation of market 
participants throughout time. Due to limitations of the data available 
to the Commission, it is infeasible to distinguish the overall effect 
of portfolio compression exercises on the reduction in the gross 
notional value of the security-based swap market from the alternative 
explanations presented above.
4. Current Trading Relationship Documentation Practices
    Memorializing the specific terms of the security-based swap trading 
relationship and security-based swap transactions between 
counterparties is prudent business practice and, in fact, many market 
participants already use standardized documentation. Examination of the 
use of ISDA Master Agreements (the measure of trading relationship 
documentation available to the Commission in the data provided by DTCC-
TIW) shows that the percentage of transactions with these agreements 
declines from 78.2% in 2008 to 34.1% in 2017, with the peak occurring 
in 2010 (96.1%). However, as trading relationship documentation may be 
different when the counterparty is a CCP, an analysis of documentation 
on aggregate security-based swap transactions (both cleared and 
uncleared) may be misleading. With the introduction of ICE Clear Credit 
in 2009, the percentage of cleared transactions has increased over 
time, thus a seemingly more relevant measure to look at is the 
frequency of use of ISDA Master Agreements for uncleared transactions. 
Approximately 99% of all uncleared transactions are reported (by DTCC-
TIW) as using trading relationship documentation (in the form of ISDA 
Master Agreements) in 2017 compared to 78.2% in 2008. Accordingly, the 
Commission generally believes that many, if not most, market 
participants currently execute and maintain trading relationship 
documentation of the type required by the adopted rules in the ordinary 
course of their businesses, including documentation that contains 
several of the terms that will be required by the adopted rules.

[[Page 6397]]

    Finally, and similar to the discussion regarding the reconciliation 
and compression, SBS Entities that are also registered with the CFTC as 
Swap Entities are subject to CFTC rules requiring the use of trading 
relationship documentation. As discussed above, the Commission has 
reviewed those rules and believes that they are, other than as 
expressly noted above in Section II.C, substantively identical to these 
final rules.

C. Economic Costs and Benefits, Including Impact on Efficiency, 
Competition, and Capital Formation

    In this section we first discuss the expected effects of the rules 
being adopted on efficiency, competition, and capital formation, 
focusing particularly on the risk mitigation benefits that stem from 
the use of portfolio reconciliation, expanding opportunities for 
portfolio compression, and improvements in documentation. We then turn 
our discussion to additional costs and benefits, including compliance 
costs and alternatives considered of these rules.
1. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    Risk mitigation rules have the potential to affect efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation in the security-based swap market, 
primarily through a reduction in operational, market, and credit risks 
that accompany outstanding security-based swap positions. In addition, 
the substituted compliance framework may provide additional effects 
that are distinct from the broader market impacts that are described 
below. As with the benefits and costs, we believe that several of the 
effects described below only occur to the extent that current market 
practices do not already conform to the rules being adopted.
a. Broad Market Effects
    In the adopting release for final rules requiring SBS Entities to 
provide trade acknowledgments and to verify those trade acknowledgments 
with their counterparties to security-based swap transactions, the 
Commission explained the importance of confirming trades in a timely 
manner, noting that confirmation of the terms of a transaction is 
essential for SBS Entities ``to effectively measure and manage market 
and credit risk.'' \290\ In this regard, portfolio reconciliation 
addresses many of these same issues, but unlike the confirmation 
process, which occurs at the outset of a transaction, reconciliation 
operates throughout the life of the transaction.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ See Trade Acknowledgment and Verification Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 39833.
    \291\ See supra Section II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Failure to periodically conduct portfolio reconciliation may cause 
errors and disputes over the terms of a transaction that may exist to 
go undetected, leading to errors in measurement and management of 
market and credit risks associated with particular transactions. More 
generally, timely portfolio reconciliation will provide counterparties 
with accurate information that will enable them to evaluate their own 
risk exposure in a timely manner. Efficient and cost-effective risk 
management may conserve resources and free up capital that can be 
deployed in other asset classes, promoting risk-sharing and efficient 
capital allocation. In addition, cost-effective risk management may 
reduce the overall costs of financial intermediation, allowing market 
participants to increase lending and other capital formation 
activities.
    Similarly, periodic portfolio reconciliation and improved standards 
for transaction documentation may contribute to broader market 
stability, particularly during periods of distress. Disagreement as to 
one or more material terms of a transaction or inadequate documentation 
could hinder timely and efficient settlement of security-based swap 
transactions, particularly in the case of a credit event on a reference 
entity on which many different counterparties have, in the aggregate, a 
large notional outstanding exposure. During periods of financial 
distress, uncertainty about terms, value, and documentation of 
outstanding transactions could contribute to liquidity and cash 
shortfalls that threaten the stability of the financial system. Thus, 
to the extent that the final rules being adopted reduce uncertainty 
about outstanding transactions, we expect reduced risk of uncertainty 
about the credit risk of potential counterparties, particularly during 
a financial crisis.
    Finally, to the extent that portfolio reconciliation requirements 
differ from current market practices, these rules have the potential to 
affect competition across multiple dimensions. If the costs of 
portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and complying with 
transaction documentation rules for security-based swap transactions 
are largely fixed (i.e., the costs come from establishing 
infrastructure and systems necessary to perform portfolio 
reconciliation and portfolio compression and comply with documentation 
requirements) rather than varying with the number of transactions or 
positions outstanding, smaller dealers intermediating a smaller number 
of trades may have a larger burden placed on them; larger dealers, on 
the other hand, may be able to spread the costs over a greater number 
of trades or positions, with a lower average cost per trade or position 
of complying with these rules. Similarly, the costs of establishing an 
infrastructure to comply with these requirements may create a barrier 
to entry for market participants wishing to establish a SBS dealer 
business.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ The Commission does not expect that this effect will 
extend to major SBS participants, which are by definition the 
largest non-dealer participants in the security-based swap market. 
As described in the economic baseline, out of more than 4,000 
security-based swap market participants, we expect at most five to 
register as major SBS participants. These entities maintain 
substantial positions in security-based swaps, as defined in the 
Intermediary Definitions Adopting Release, and the Commission 
expects these entities have sufficient resources and infrastructure 
to comply with portfolio reconciliation and documentation 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Substituted Compliance
    As discussed above, if the Commission has made a positive 
substituted compliance determination with respect to a particular 
foreign regulatory regime, SBS Entities operating in that jurisdiction 
may be able to satisfy their Title VII risk mitigation requirements by 
complying with similar requirements of the foreign financial regulatory 
system. Substituted compliance would be available only for SBS Entities 
who are not U.S. persons.
    The Commission is amending its rules to make substituted compliance 
potentially available to the portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression, and trading relationship documentation requirements in 
order to minimize the likelihood that SBS dealers are subjected to 
potentially duplicative or conflicting regulation. The Commission 
believes that duplicative regulations that achieve comparable 
regulatory outcomes increase the compliance burdens on market 
participants without corresponding increases in benefits. By decreasing 
the compliance burden for foreign SBS dealers active in the U.S. 
market, the availability of substituted compliance could encourage 
foreign firms' participation in the U.S. market, increasing the ability 
of U.S. firms to access global liquidity, and reducing the likelihood 
that liquidity would fragment along jurisdictional lines. Such 
participation and access to liquidity might result in increased 
competition between both U.S. and foreign

[[Page 6398]]

intermediaries without compromising the regulatory benefits intended by 
the applicable risk mitigation rules.
2. Portfolio Reconciliation
    Disputes related to confirming the terms of a swap, as well as swap 
valuation disputes, have long been recognized as a significant problem 
in the OTC derivatives market. The Commission believes that the ability 
to determine definitively the value of a security-based swap at any 
given time is an important component of many of the OTC derivatives 
market reforms contained in the Dodd-Frank Act and is a component of 
sound risk management practices.\293\ Security-based swap valuation is 
also crucial for determining capital and margin requirements applicable 
to SBS Entities and therefore plays a primary role in risk mitigation 
for uncleared security-based swaps. Portfolio reconciliation is 
considered an effective means of identifying and resolving these 
disputes at a time and in a manner that will be least disruptive to the 
counterparties and the broader financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \293\ See ISDA Collateral Best Practices, supra note 281, 
Section 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Parties may dispute valuations of thinly traded security-based 
swaps where there is not agreement on valuation methodologies or the 
source for formula inputs. Many of these security-based swaps are 
thinly traded either because of their limited liquidity or because they 
are simply too customized to have comparable counterparts in the 
market. As many of these security-based swaps are valued by dealers 
internally by ``marking-to-model,'' their counterparties may dispute 
the inputs and methodologies used in the model. As uncleared security-
based swaps are bilateral, privately negotiated contracts, on-going 
security-based swap valuation for purposes of initial and variation 
margin calculation and security-based swap terminations or novations, 
also has been largely a process of on-going negotiation between the 
parties. The effects of an inability to agree on the value of a 
security-based swap became especially acute during the financial crisis 
that immediately preceded passage of the Dodd-Frank Act when there was 
widespread failure of the market inputs needed to value many security-
based swaps.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ The lack of liquidity in markets for mortgage-backed 
securities led to wide disparities in the valuation of CDS 
referencing mortgage-backed securities (especially collateralized 
debt obligations). Such wide disparities led to large collateral 
calls from dealers on AIG, hastening its downfall. See CBS News, 
``Calling AIG? Internal Docs Reveal Company Silent About Dozens of 
Collateral Calls,'' June 23, 2009, available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/23/cbsnews_investigates/main5106672.shtml. See also Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the 
United States, Chapter 8, available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Requirements
    The Commission is adopting rules that generally will require each 
SBS Entity (1) to engage in portfolio reconciliation with 
counterparties who are also SBS Entities at periodic intervals, the 
length of which is based on the number of outstanding transactions with 
the counterparty and (2) to establish, maintain, and follow written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that it engages 
in portfolio reconciliation with counterparties who are not SBS 
Entities, also at periodic intervals, the length of which is based on 
the number of outstanding transactions with the counterparty.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3(d), the new requirements regarding 
portfolio reconciliation would not apply to a clearing transaction 
(i.e., a security-based swap that is, directly or indirectly, 
submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency registered pursuant to 
Section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or by a clearing agency 
that the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or 
order). See supra Section II.A.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is adopting rules that vary the portfolio 
reconciliation requirement based on the particular type of counterparty 
with which the SBS Entity transacts. For transactions between two SBS 
Entities, the rules require the two sides to engage in portfolio 
reconciliation at frequencies that are based on the size of the 
security-based swap portfolio between the two parties.\296\ In addition 
to the requirements regarding the frequency of the reconciliation, Rule 
15Fi-3(a)(1) requires SBS Entities to agree in writing with each of 
their SBS Entity counterparties on the terms of the portfolio 
reconciliation including, if applicable, agreement on the selection of 
any third party service provider who may be performing the 
reconciliation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \296\ See Rule 15Fi-3(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that the two SBS Entities identify a discrepancy, the 
rule requires the parties to take certain steps. First, Rule 15Fi-
3(a)(4) requires the two sides to resolve immediately any discrepancy 
in a material term, whether identified directly as part of the 
portfolio reconciliation or otherwise. Second, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5) 
requires each SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to resolve any discrepancy 
in a valuation identified as part of a portfolio reconciliation or 
otherwise as soon as possible, but in any event within five business 
days after the date on which the discrepancy is first identified. As a 
condition to this requirement, however, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5) requires each 
SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to identify how the SBS Entity will 
comply with any variation margin requirements under Section 15F(e) of 
the Exchange Act \297\ and any related regulations pending resolution 
of the valuation discrepancy. Finally, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5) clarifies that 
for purposes of the requirement to resolve valuation discrepancies 
within five business days of being identified, a difference between the 
lower valuation and the higher valuation of less than 10% of the higher 
valuation need not be deemed a discrepancy.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e).
    \298\ This 10% threshold would apply on a transaction-by-
transaction basis, and not on a portfolio level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Separately, with respect to transactions between an SBS Entity and 
a counterparty that is not an SBS Entity, Rule 15Fi-3(b) requires each 
SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that it engages in portfolio 
reconciliation as set forth in the rule.\299\ This policies and 
procedures requirement is in contrast to Rule 15Fi-3(a), which 
expressly requires portfolio reconciliation with respect to 
transactions where both counterparties are SBS Entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ See Rule 15Fi-3(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15Fi-3(b) contains a number of requirements regarding the 
contents of the policies and procedures required therein, as they 
relate to reconciliation with non-SBS Entities, which are largely 
consistent with the requirements imposed directly on the parties under 
Rule 15Fi-3(a). Specifically, Rule 15Fi-3(b)(3) provides that such 
policies and procedures must require that the portfolio reconciliation 
be performed no less frequently than: (1) Once each calendar quarter 
for each security-based swap portfolio that includes more than 100 
security-based swaps at any time during the calendar quarter and (2) 
once annually for each security-based swap portfolio that includes no 
more than 100 security-based swaps at any time during the calendar 
year.
    In addition, Rule 15Fi-3(b)(4) requires each SBS Entity to 
establish, maintain, and follow written procedures reasonably designed 
to resolve within five business days any discrepancies in the valuation 
or a material term of each

[[Page 6399]]

security-based swap identified as part of a portfolio reconciliation or 
otherwise with a counterparty that is not an SBS Entity.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ Similar to the requirement in paragraph (a) of the rule 
for portfolio reconciliation with counterparties that are either SBS 
dealers or major SBS participants, Rule 15Fi-3(b)(4) provides that a 
difference between the lower valuation and the higher valuation of 
less than 10% of the higher valuation need not be deemed a 
discrepancy for purposes of that paragraph. See supra note 63 and 
accompanying text (discussing the 10% threshold in the context of 
Rule 15Fi-3(a)(5)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, Rule 15Fi-3(c) requires each SBS Entity to promptly notify 
the Commission of any security-based swap valuation dispute in excess 
of $20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency) if not 
resolved within:
     Three business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty 
that is an SBS Entity, or
     five business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty 
that is not an SBS Entity.
    Such notification is required to be in a form and manner acceptable 
to the Commission, and is also required to be sent to any applicable 
prudential regulator (i.e., for any SBS Entity that is also a bank, to 
its bank regulator). SBS Entities are also required to notify the 
Commission, in a form and manner acceptable to the Commission, and any 
applicable prudential regulator, if the amount of any security-based 
swap valuation dispute that was the subject of a previous notice 
increases or decreases by more than $20,000,000 (or its equivalent in 
any other currency), at either the transaction or portfolio level.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \301\ See supra Section II.A.5. Each amended notice is required 
to be provided to the Commission and any applicable prudential 
regulator no later than the last business day of the calendar month 
in which the applicable security-based swap valuation dispute 
increases or decreases by the applicable dispute amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the security-based swap market to operate efficiently and to 
reduce credit and operational risk between counterparties, the 
Commission believes that, although the frequency of portfolio 
reconciliation depends on the number of positions with a counterparty, 
reconciliation should occur by position because terms may vary across 
positions with the same counterparty. By identifying and managing 
mismatches in key economic terms and valuation for individual 
transactions across an entire portfolio, these rules are intended to 
require a process in which risk between counterparties can be 
identified and reduced.
b. Benefits
    Reconciliation is beneficial not only to the parties involved but 
also to the market as a whole. By identifying and managing disputed key 
economic terms or valuation for each transaction across a portfolio, an 
entity's counterparty credit risk and operational risk can be 
diminished. By requiring a systematic reconciliation process, as well 
as policies and procedures related to portfolio reconciliation between 
counterparties, SBS Entities will be able to better identify and 
correct problems in a timely manner in their post-execution processes 
(including confirmation) in order to reduce the number of disputes and 
improve the integrity and efficiency of their internal processes. 
Accordingly, expanding the universe of participants subject to the 
reconciliation requirements can help to reduce the risk bilateral 
markets may pose to the broader financial system.
    As discussed above, because shortcomings in credit risk management 
and documentation may only become evident during a crisis, some 
benefits of portfolio reconciliation will accrue to the financial 
system as a whole while the ongoing direct costs are borne by the 
individual market participant. Therefore, in the absence of these 
rules, the level and frequency of portfolio reconciliation chosen by 
individual market participants may be less than what would be desired 
by all market participants in order to properly manage risks to the 
financial system.
    In addition, the Commission believes that the tiering of 
obligations, whereby the frequency of the portfolio reconciliation is 
based on the number of outstanding transactions with the applicable 
counterparty, represents a reasonable attempt to calibrate the costs to 
the benefits expected from reconciling a person's security-based swap 
portfolio at regular intervals. In this respect, those benefits are 
expected to rise for larger--and often more complex--portfolios that 
may represent a greater potential for loss than a smaller, less complex 
portfolio.
    The Commission believes that, given the expected benefits of making 
the frequency of portfolio reconciliation a function of the size of a 
portfolio with a particular counterparty, setting the frequency of 
reconciliation identical to that adopted by the CFTC will provide 
additional benefit for SBS Entities that are also registered with the 
CFTC as Swap Entities. In particular, harmonizing the frequency of 
reconciliation for swaps and SBS should reduce implementation cost and 
reduce operational complexity.
    Similarly, the Commission notes that the EC has adopted portfolio 
reconciliation requirements for the EU that are similar to those being 
adopted by the Commission in this release. The Commission believes that 
aligning its portfolio reconciliation requirements with those in other 
major security-based swap markets will benefit SBS Entities by avoiding 
the imposition of disparate compliance and operational policies and 
procedures.
    Moreover, Rule 15Fi-3(a)(2) provides that portfolio reconciliation 
may be performed either on a bilateral basis by the counterparties or 
by a third party selected by the counterparties in accordance with 
paragraph (a)(1) of the rule. Under this approach, the process for 
selecting a third-party service provider--or the actual identity of the 
service provider--should be included in the written agreement between 
the two sides setting forth the terms of the portfolio reconciliation 
process.
    In the absence of periodic portfolio reconciliation, if the 
counterparties to a security-based swap transaction are not in 
agreement with respect to each of the terms of the transaction that may 
affect each party's rights and obligations, any such difference could 
lead to complications at various points throughout the trade.\302\ 
These discrepancies could be exacerbated if they remain undetected 
until such times as the parties become obligated to perform on their 
requirements under the contract. Such discrepancies could be 
particularly problematic if they are discovered during a period of 
financial stress for the market participant.\303\ Thus, portfolio 
reconciliation may help to mitigate the possibility of a discrepancy 
unexpectedly affecting performance by ensuring that the parties are and 
remain in agreement with respect to all of the material terms of the 
security-based swap transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ See supra note 11.
    \303\ See supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regular reconciliation of all portfolios is a process to reduce 
counterparty credit exposure and operational risk and help prevent 
disputes from arising. The rule should promote market integrity and 
reduce risk by establishing procedures that will promote legal 
certainty concerning security-based swap transactions, assist with the 
early resolution of valuation disputes, reduce operational risk, and 
increase operational efficiency.
    The rules being adopted may have differential benefits for smaller 
market participants. Smaller market participants may not have the 
bargaining power necessary to compel larger counterparties to 
coordinate on portfolio reconciliation. Since SBS Entities, absent a 
mandate, are likely to focus risk management resources on

[[Page 6400]]

larger counterparties, the ability of smaller counterparties to require 
the necessary cooperation from their counterparties who are SBS 
Entities will be improved. Reduced uncertainty concerning material 
terms and valuation methodologies could reduce the risks to these 
smaller participants for using SBS for hedging market risk to which 
they may be exposed.
    Portfolio reconciliation is particularly relevant with respect to 
terms related to the valuation of the instrument. Unresolved 
discrepancies regarding the value of a security-based swap can lead to, 
among other things, active disputes between counterparties with respect 
to the amount of margin that must be posted or collected, as well as 
errors and other complications that may result in significant 
uncollateralized exposure in the uncleared security-based swap markets 
(or alternately, potentially inefficient overcollateralization). 
Accordingly, the Commission believes that requiring counterparties to 
clearly document the applicable processes and requirements for 
calculating and exchanging margin in connection with a security-based 
swap transaction is an important step in achieving this broader 
regulatory objective.
    The notification requirement of Rule 15Fi-3(c) will provide the 
Commission with information about disagreements over position values 
between counterparties. Valuation is one of the most fundamental 
elements for determining the economic rights and obligations of each of 
the counterparties to a security-based swap transaction. For example, 
market participants manage credit risks to their counterparties by 
exchanging margin with each other in an amount determined using the 
value of the underlying security-based swap. If those valuations are 
not accurate for any reason, such as human or system errors, problems 
with the valuation methodology, or an issue affecting the timeliness of 
the calculation, that error could result in one of the counterparties 
having an uncollateralized credit exposure and a potential for loss in 
the event of a default. We therefore expect that the notification 
requirement could assist the Commission in anticipating potential 
valuation problems that could ultimately lead to market disruption, and 
in identifying potential issues with respect to an SBS Entity's 
internal valuation methodology. As noted above, the CFTC has adopted a 
nearly identical requirement with the same $20,000,000 threshold, and 
the Commission believes that divergence from that requirement could 
lead to additional costs for SBS Entities that are also registered with 
the CFTC as Swap Entities.\304\ Finally, as discussed above, the 
Commission believes reconciliation may provide indirect benefits by 
improving the accuracy of SDR data.\305\ As described above in Section 
II.A, the information that SBS Entities will initially be required to 
reconcile with their counterparties will include each term that is 
required to be reported to a registered SDR under Rule 901 under the 
Exchange Act.\306\
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    \304\ See supra Section II.A.
    \305\ See SDR Adopting Release, 80 FR at 14528-48, for a 
discussion of the expected economic benefits accurate SBS data held 
at SDRs.
    \306\ See Rule 15Fi-1(i)(1) (referencing 17 CFR 242.901).
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c. Costs
    The portfolio reconciliation rules in Rule 15Fi-3 are similar to 
the corresponding CFTC rules for Swap Entities. As a result, the one-
time costs to develop, test, and implement new procedures and 
technology that may be required in order to be compliant with the rules 
being adopted are mitigated by the fact that many SBS Entities also are 
likely to be Swap Entities. These dually registered entities are likely 
to be familiar with these general requirements and have the 
infrastructure in place to comply with similar rules that apply to 
their swap business.
    SBS Entities that are not also CFTC-regulated Swap Entities and 
that do not currently use an electronic platform or vendor service to 
conduct portfolio reconciliation will need to expend significant time 
and resources to modify the necessary systems to comply with Rule 15Fi-
3. Even those SBS Entities that do use electronic platforms or vendors 
services may find it necessary to make significant adjustments to 
comply with the rules. The Commission estimates a one-time upfront cost 
of approximately $5-10 million for an SBS Entity that is not also a 
Swap Entity.\307\ Although the Commission does not currently have cost 
data for either reconciliation performed in-house or by third-party 
service providers, and therefore cannot quantify these costs, the 
Commission believes that the ongoing portfolio reconciliation cost 
would likely be a function of portfolio size and the availability of 
third party service providers.
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    \307\ This estimate is based on an estimate supplied by ISDA to 
the CFTC in response to their proposed portfolio reconciliation 
rule. See CFTC Risk Mitigation Adopting Release, 77 FR at 55952-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, when commenting on the CFTC's then-proposed portfolio 
reconciliation rule, a third party provider of multilateral compression 
services stated that a large number of Swap Entities were already 
regularly reconciling their portfolios with each other and with other 
entities and that the increased frequency and inclusion of smaller 
portfolios as was being proposed by the CFTC should prove no obstacle 
to such entities.\308\ If SBS Entities have similar business practices, 
then this comment suggests start-up and on-going portfolio 
reconciliation costs could be small. In addition, and as discussed 
above, portfolio reconciliation generally forms a part of current 
market practices and is included in a set of best practices published 
by ISDA.\309\ Taken together, this information suggests that the 
upfront costs for building new systems to comply with Rule 15Fi-3 are 
not likely to be as high as indicated above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \308\ See Letter from Per Sj[ouml]berg, Executive Vice 
President, TriOptima AB to the CFTC, dated Feb. 28, 2011 at 2, 
available at: http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=30562&SearchText.
    \309\ See supra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
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    The Commission believes that certain costs will arise despite the 
fact that an SBS Entity also may be registered with the CFTC as a Swap 
Entity, and therefore subject to similar rules already adopted by the 
CFTC. Such costs may include (i) increased costs to account for 
possible differences between the SEC and CFTC related to the terms 
considered to be material for purposes of the reconciliation 
requirement; (ii) the additional resources necessary to design, 
compose, and implement the required policies and procedures; (iii) the 
additional resources needed to comply with the dispute resolution 
timeframes; and (iv) the compilation and maintenance of applicable 
records. These costs, however, are by nature specific to each entity's 
internal operations; absent specific information from commenters, the 
Commission cannot provide reasonable estimations regarding the 
resources needed to comply.
    The rule also requires SBS Entities to agree in writing with each 
of their counterparties on the terms of the portfolio reconciliation 
including, if applicable, agreement on the selection of any third party 
service provider who may be performing the reconciliation. Accordingly, 
each counterparty to a SBS Entity subject to these rules will incur an 
upfront cost in implementing this requirement, particularly since the 
Commission will expect that such terms be agreed to in writing prior 
to, or contemporaneously with, the two parties executing any new 
security-based swap transaction. These costs would be mitigated if, 
once the parties

[[Page 6401]]

have agreed in writing on the terms of the portfolio reconciliation for 
the first time, the two sides comply with this requirement for 
subsequent transactions by merely agreeing in writing to abide by the 
existing agreement regarding the reconciliation process. This practice 
could help to ensure that portfolio reconciliation begins without delay 
after execution of the transaction and is designed to minimize the 
number of disagreements regarding the portfolio reconciliation process 
itself.
    The Commission estimates that of the 55 market participants we 
expect to register as SBS Entities, approximately 20 will be dually-
registered with the CFTC and may already have automated portfolio 
reconciliation systems in place.\310\ Thus, for these entities, the 
costs associated with modifying these existing systems to account for 
security-based swap reconciliations is expected to be minimal. For the 
remaining 35 SBS Entities which are not expected be dually-registered 
with the CFTC, the anticipated personnel costs \311\ associated with 
setting up an automated portfolio reconciliation system per SBS Entity 
is $63,150, or $2,210,250 in aggregate.\312\ The Commission believes 
that these costs will be a component of the upfront cost estimate of 
$5-10 million discussed above.\313\ For each SBS Entity, we anticipate 
that approximately 190 hours per year will be required for 
reconciliation or a total of 10,450 hours across the 55 SBS 
Entities.\314\ With respect to reconciliations with non-SBS 
counterparties, the Commission estimates that an additional 227.5 hours 
per SBS Entity, or 12,512.5 hours in aggregate will be needed for 
automated portfolio reconciliation with these counterparties.\315\
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    \310\ In the Proposing Release, the Commission estimated that of 
the 55 entities that may register with the Commission as SBS 
Entities, approximately 35 will be dually-registered with the CFTC 
as Swap Entities. In a more recent release, however, the Commission 
updated that estimate, such that we now believe that approximately 
20 SBS Entities will also be registered with the CFTC as Swap 
Entities. See supra Section VI.C and references therein. 
Accordingly, we are using the updated number for calculating the 
burdens pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5.
    \311\ The hourly rates for internal professionals used 
throughout Sections VII.C.2.c, VII.C.3.c, and VII.C.4.c of the 
release are taken from SIFMA's Management & Professional Earnings in 
the Securities Industry 2013, modified to account for an 1800-hour 
work-year and inflation, and multiplied by 5.35 to account for 
bonuses, firm size, employee benefits, and overhead. The hourly 
rates have been modified from the proposal to account for inflation 
over the period.
    \312\ This estimate is based on the following: [(Sr. Programmer 
(80 hours) x $337 per hour) + (Sr. Systems Analyst (80 hours) x $289 
per hour) + (Compliance Manager (10 hours) x $315 per hour) + 
(Director of Compliance (5 hours) x $496 per hour) + (Compliance 
Attorney (20 hours) x $372 per hour)] = $63,150 per SBS Entity, or 
($63,150 x 35 SBS Entities) = $2,210,250 in aggregate.
    \313\ See supra note 307 and associated text.
    \314\ Each SBS Entity is anticipated to have counterparty 
relationships with approximately one-third of the other SBS market 
participants (\1/3\ x 55 = 18.333), which is rounded to 18 
participants. Of those counterparty relationships, two are expected 
to have portfolios in excess of 500 positions, which would need to 
be reconciled daily (252 trading days per year), four would have 
between 50 and 500 positions, which would need to be reconciled 
weekly (52 weeks per year), and the remaining 12 would have less 
than 50 positions, which would need to be reconciled quarterly (four 
times per year). The Commission estimates that each portfolio 
reconciliation would require 30 minutes, 15 minutes per 
counterparty, through an automated system, thus the total 
anticipated reconciliation time would be [(2 counterparties x 252 
trading days x 0.25 hours) + (4 counterparties x 52 weeks x 0.25 
hours) + (12 counterparties x 4 quarters x 0.25 hours)] = 190 hours 
per SBS Entity, or (190 x 55 SBS Entities) = 10,450 hours in 
aggregate. See Section VI.D.1.
    \315\ There are anticipated to be 13,137 total SBS 
counterparties, of which 55 are registered SBS Entities, leaving 
13,082 non-SBS market participants. See supra note 220. The 
Commission estimates that each SBS Entity will transact with 
approximately 350 of these non-registered participants. Of those 350 
counterparties, 35 are expected to have portfolio positions in 
excess of 100 positions, which would require quarterly 
reconciliations, while the remaining 315 are expected to have 
positions of less than 100 security-based swaps, and therefore, 
would require annual reconciliation. The Commission estimates that 
each portfolio reconciliation would require 30 minutes through an 
automated system, thus the total anticipated reconciliation time 
would be [(35 counterparties x 4 quarters x 0.5 hours) + (315 
counterparties x 1 time per year x 0.5 hours)] = 227.5 hours per SBS 
Entity, or (227.5 x 55 SBS Entities) = 12,512.5 hours in aggregate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission further estimates that the development and 
implementation of written policies and procedures as required under 
Rule 15Fi-3 will impose an initial cost of $1,302,135.\316\ Of the 
total 55 SBS Entities that would be subject to Rule 15Fi-3, 20 are 
estimated to be dually-registered with the CFTC, and are anticipated to 
already have policies and procedures in place with respect to 
reconciliation. The expected additional time to revise the existing 
policies and procedures for these SBS Entities is expected to be one 
hour per SBS Entity, for a cumulative 20 hours, costing $461.75 per SBS 
Entity or $9,235 in aggregate.\317\ For the remaining 35 SBS Entities, 
the Commission estimates that it will take approximately 80 hours per 
entity to establish the written policies and procedures. The costs for 
these SBS Entities will be $1,292,900, or $36,940 per SBS Entity.\318\ 
Once established, the Commission estimates that it will cost SBS 
Entities approximately $1,015,850 or $18,470 per SBS Entity to revise 
and maintain these policies and procedures.\319\ Resolution of 
valuation discrepancies can be labor intensive. One objective of the 
rule being adopted is to reduce the incidence of valuation 
discrepancies through the periodic reconciliations between security-
based swap counterparties. It is unlikely, however, that the rule will 
completely eliminate disputes related to valuation. The Commission 
lacks data on the fraction of positions that, when reconciled, will 
result in a dispute as well as the costs likely to be incurred 
resolving those disputes, and is therefore unable to quantify these 
costs. However, the Commission recognizes that the costs associated 
with resolution of these disputes is likely to be higher than costs for 
reconciliations in which disputes do not arise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \316\ This figure has been updated from that in the proposing 
release due to the updated estimate of the number of SBS Entities 
that will be dually registered with the CFTC and updates to hourly 
rates to account for inflation over the period. See supra note 310 
and supra note 311.
    \317\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (30 minutes) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance 
(15 minutes) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (15 
minutes) at $607 per hour)] = $461.75 per hour per SBS Entity or 
($461.75 per hour x 20 SBS dually-registered Entities) = $9,235.
    \318\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (40 hours) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance (20 
hours) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (20 hours) at 
$607 per hour)] = $36,940 per SBS Entity or ($36,940 x 35 SBS 
Entities that are not dually-registered) = $1,292,900 in aggregate.
    \319\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (20 hours) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance (10 
hours) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (10 hours) at 
$607 per hour)] = $18,470 per SBS Entity or ($18,470 x 55 SBS 
Entities) = $1,015,850 in aggregate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the Commission believes that these costs may be mitigated 
by only requiring counterparties to address differences in valuation 
greater than 10%. These costs of reconciliation may be further 
mitigated by agreement between the counterparties to use a third party 
service provider to assist in resolving valuation discrepancies. 
Reconciliation of other terms is likely to be less costly as the terms 
of the agreement are unlikely to change over the life of the contract.
    The 10% threshold was designed to both identify large deviations in 
valuations between SBS Entities, while not requiring those entities to 
devote significant effort to resolving minor valuation disputes. 
Further, this threshold is identical to that already adopted by the 
CFTC.\320\ The Commission notes, however, that this 10% threshold is at 
the transaction level, rather than the entity level. While 
discrepancies could be random in nature, the risk exists that one

[[Page 6402]]

counterparty could have systemic issues in valuation across its entire 
portfolio, thereby leading to discrepancies in valuation with one or 
several counterparties and throughout the portfolio. For example, if an 
entity's valuation model consistently undervalued each of its security-
based swap positions by 9%, in aggregate, the overall level of risk 
could be substantial, even though it would not trigger a discrepancy 
event as currently defined by the 10% transaction level threshold. 
Further, since the Commission estimates that approximately 20 of the 
expected 55 SBS Entities are likely to be dually-registered with the 
CFTC and active in swap and security-based swap markets, these 
participants are likely to face higher costs when regulations differ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \320\ See 17 CFR 23.502 (portfolio reconciliation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The costs of resolving valuation disputes are expected to be 
mitigated, because the reconciliation requirements are expected to 
prevent disputes from arising in the first instance through the regular 
comparison of material terms and valuations. The Commission believes 
that by requiring SBS Entities to reach agreement with certain 
counterparties on the methods and inputs for valuation of each 
security-based swap, as required in connection with the trading 
relationship documentation requirements in Rule 15Fi-5, the overall 
framework of these rules should assist SBS Entities in resolving 
valuation disputes within five business days. In addition, the 
Commission estimates that SBS Entities will spend an average of 30 
hours per year to comply with the notification requirement of Rule 
15Fi-3(c) costing $11,160 per SBS Entity or $613,800 in aggregate.\321\
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    \321\ The estimate is based on the following: [Compliance 
Attorney (30 hours) at $372 per hour] = $11,160 per entity x 55 SBS 
entities = $613,800. This estimate is larger than that provided in 
the proposal because of the increase in the estimate of the number 
of hours to file notices and amendments. See supra Section VI.D.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, portfolio reconciliation costs are also mitigated by virtue 
of the fact that cleared security-based swaps are not within the scope 
of the requirements of these rules. The Commission believes that CCPs 
establish settlement prices for each cleared security-based swap every 
business day for margining purposes and this process is more 
appropriately addressed by rules governing a clearing agency's risk 
management practices.\322\ Because a large part of the security-based 
swap portfolios of SBS Entities may consist of cleared security-based 
swaps to which the reconciliation requirements will not apply, the 
sizes of the bilateral, uncleared portfolios (to which the requirement 
would apply) may be limited.\323\
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    \322\ See supra Section II.A.
    \323\ Currently, there is no regulatory requirement in the 
United States to clear security-based swaps. As of December 2015, 
approximately 56% of the total volume of new trade activity in 
single-name security-based swap products had been cleared through 
ICE Clear Credit. Further, approximately 79% of index CDS 
transactions were centrally cleared as of December 2015 (see https://www.isda.org/a/kVDDE/swapsinfo-q4-2015-review-final.pdf); 
therefore, single-name security-based swaps potentially could be 
cleared at a similar rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Alternatives
    The rule being adopted creates a specific definition of ``material 
terms'' for purposes of determining what discrepancies must be resolved 
in connection with the portfolio reconciliation which includes each 
term required to be reported to an SDR, or the Commission pursuant to 
Rule 901 under the Exchange Act \324\ provided, however, that such 
definition does not include any term that is not relevant to the 
ongoing rights and obligations of the parties and the valuation of the 
security-based swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \324\ See supra note 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's definition of ``material terms'' in the rule 
proposal was bifurcated, and depended on whether the relevant security-
based swap transaction had already been included in a security-based 
swap portfolio and reconciled pursuant to proposed Rule 15Fi-3.\325\ 
With respect to any security-based swap that has not yet been 
reconciled as part of a security-based swap portfolio, ``material 
terms'' would have been defined to mean each term that is required to 
be reported to a registered SDR pursuant to Rule 901 under the Exchange 
Act.\326\ With respect to all other security-based swaps within a 
security-based swap portfolio, the definition of ``material terms'' 
would have continued to be based on the reporting requirements in Rule 
901, but would exclude any term that is not relevant to the ongoing 
rights and obligations of the parties and the valuation of the 
security-based swap. As discussed above, both of the comment letters 
received raised concerns with the proposed definition of ``material 
terms.'' \327\ In particular, commenters expressed the opinion that the 
proposed bifurcated approach would raise operational and technical 
issues that would be costly to resolve with no tangible benefit for an 
SBS Entity's risk mitigation activity.
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    \325\ See Proposing Release at 4617-4618.
    \326\ Rule 901 (17 CFR 242.901) is part of Regulation SBSR, 
which governs the reporting to registered SDRs of security-based 
swap data and public dissemination by registered SDRs of a subset of 
that data. See 17 CFR 242.900 to 242.909.
    \327\ See supra Section II.A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, after careful review and consideration of these 
comments, the Commission modified its definition of ``material terms'' 
to more closely align with the CFTC's corresponding definition. 
Commenters indicated that the costs and burdens imposed on SBS Entities 
of implementing the proposed bifurcated approach were not justified in 
light of what commenters viewed as an incomplete and partial solution 
to the SDR verification issue. In light of these comments, the 
Commission believes it appropriate and less burdensome for SBS Entities 
to harmonize the definition of ``material terms'' in Rule 15Fi-1(i) 
with the corresponding CFTC definition by not adopting the proposed 
bifurcated approach.\328\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also considered not providing a specific definition 
of ``material terms'' and allowing SBS Entities discretion in 
determining those terms that are relevant to the ongoing rights or 
obligations of the parties or affect the valuation of the security-
based swap. The Commission concluded that the data required to be 
submitted to an SDR in connection with regulatory reporting 
requirements is an appropriate measure for determining which terms 
should be reconciled pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3. The Commission also 
believes that tying the definition of ``material terms'' to reporting 
requirements to an SDR could reduce the burdens on some SBS Entities by 
potentially allowing them to leverage the same electronic systems used 
for SDR reporting for purposes of the portfolio reconciliation 
requirements.
    The portfolio size breakpoints and frequencies are consistent with 
those adopted by the CFTC for Swap Entities and are therefore likely to 
be familiar to those entities that are registered as both an SBS Entity 
and a Swap Entity. These are also the breakpoints adopted by the EC. 
Further, the Commission believes that alternative breakpoints based on 
the number of transactions which deviate from those adopted by the CFTC 
and the EC would likely impose additional costs on SBS Entities without 
any corresponding increases in material benefits to those participants.
    Although the notion of breakpoints based on number of transactions 
previously has been accepted by the CFTC and other regulatory agencies, 
the Commission notes that breakpoints based on alternative measures 
could be considered. In particular, breakpoints for reconciliation 
could be categorized

[[Page 6403]]

by either gross (or net) notional amounts of positions or the current 
market value of positions, and identified as levels or scaled by some 
measure such as the aggregate notional value of the market (for gross 
or net notional values) or the assets of the SBS Entity (if market 
values are used instead). Although the number of security-based swaps 
between counterparties is easy to capture, it may actually be 
misleading with respect to the complexity or magnitude of the risk 
between counterparties.
    For instance, say two counterparties have over 500 transactions 
between them, but the average value of each transaction is only $5 
million notional value. The total exposure between the two 
counterparties would only be $2.5 billion, but this portfolio would 
need to be reconciled daily due to the number of transactions. If, on 
the other hand, two counterparties have only 40 transactions, but the 
average value of each transaction is $1 billion notional value, the 
overall exposure would be $40 billion (16 times greater exposure than 
the 500 transaction counterparties), but this portfolio would only be 
reconciled quarterly. Basing breakpoints on some measure other than the 
number of transactions may enable SBS Entities to better assess the 
overall level of counterparty credit risk as well as operational risk 
associated with their security-based swap portfolios. Setting aside 
these concerns, the Commission believes that breakpoints based on the 
number of transactions is likely to capture the complexity of SBS 
Entities' portfolios, and that reconciliations based on this dimension 
are likely to identify discrepancies in a timely manner. Further, given 
that the Commission estimates that approximately 20 of the expected 55 
SBS Entities are likely to be dually-registered with the CFTC and 
active in both swap and security-based swap markets, this alternative 
could potentially impose additional costs due to differences in 
regulatory requirements.
    The Commission has also considered alternatives to the requirement 
that valuation discrepancies exceeding 10% must be resolved within five 
business days. The 10% threshold is consistent with the rule adopted by 
the CFTC for Swap Entities and, as a result, is likely to be familiar 
to those entities that are registered as both an SBS Entity and a Swap 
Entity. The Commission believes that the 10% threshold is high enough 
to prevent market participants from incurring costs to resolve small 
valuation differences that would have only a small effect on margin or 
other risk management practices, yet low enough to prevent difference 
in valuation from resulting in significant miscalculations in risk 
management.
    As noted above, there are potential economic costs that could 
accrue to counterparties related to both the 10% threshold and the five 
business day resolution window. An alternative (albeit supplementary) 
approach would be an additional requirement of a valuation threshold 
related to the overall portfolio discrepancies, in aggregate and/or 
with individual counterparties. For instance, if the aggregate 
portfolio has valuation discrepancies of 5% or 10%, this could trigger 
a discrepancy event, even if the individual transaction-level 
discrepancies fall below the prescribed threshold as documented 
currently in the rule. Relatedly, while the five business day window is 
narrow enough to potentially stem valuations from deviating for 
extended periods of time while still providing a horizon in which 
parties can work through their valuation disputes, entities can face 
significant counterparty risk over seemingly short-term horizons. For 
relatively stable valuation disputes in which the value does not 
continue to deviate further from the agreed-upon level, then a five 
business day window is likely to be sufficient; however, a more 
compressed alternative horizon could be invoked when the discrepancies 
in value continue to widen between counterparties. The Commission 
believes that the five business day horizon is sufficient and serves as 
an upper-bound by which time market participants should have addressed 
and corrected any material discrepancies that arose during 
reconciliation. Moreover, this approach is consistent with requirements 
from other regulators, and given the Commission's estimates on SBS 
Entities that are likely to be dually-registered with the CFTC, any 
differences in regulation would likely impose additional costs to those 
entities.
    Finally, Rule 15Fi-3(c) will require each SBS Entity to promptly 
notify the Commission of any security-based swap valuation dispute in 
excess of $20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency) if not 
resolved within:
     Three business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty 
that is an SBS Entity, or
     five business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty 
that is not an SBS Entity.
    Such notification will be required to be in a form and manner 
acceptable to the Commission, and will also be required to be sent to 
any applicable prudential regulator (i.e., for any SBS Entity that is 
also a bank, to its bank regulator). SBS Entities are also required to 
promptly notify the Commission, in a form and manner acceptable to the 
Commission, and any applicable prudential regulator, if the amount of 
any security-based swap valuation dispute that was the subject of a 
previous notice increases or decreases by more than $20,000,000 (or its 
equivalent in any other currency), at either the transaction or 
portfolio level.\329\
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    \329\ See supra Section II.A.5. Each amended notice is required 
to be provided to the Commission and any applicable prudential 
regulator no later than the last business day of the calendar month 
in which the applicable security-based swap valuation dispute 
increases or decreases by the applicable dispute amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has considered as an alternative, requiring SBS 
Entities to make and keep records of valuation discrepancies that 
exceed $20,000,000 rather than requiring that they be reported to the 
Commission. The Commission concluded that the benefit of receiving an 
early warning of potential problems before they surfaced though an 
ordinary course of review of books and records justifies any additional 
cost imposed on SBS entities.
    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-3(d), the new requirements regarding 
portfolio reconciliation will not apply to a security-based swap that 
is, directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing 
agency registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a 
clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by 
rule or order pursuant to Section 17A.\330\ The Commission modified the 
proposed exception for cleared security-based swaps so that it now 
applies to the initial bilateral transaction between the original 
counterparties (in addition to the resulting transactions between those 
counterparties and the clearing agency once the original transaction 
has been novated) and to permit the exception to be used when the 
clearing agency has been exempted from registration pursuant to Section 
17A of the Exchange Act.\331\ The Commission modified the exception in 
this manner in response to comments received, as well as to be 
consistent with the Commission's margin requirements for security-based 
swap transactions and the approach taken by the CFTC,\332\

[[Page 6404]]

which should reduce implementation and compliance costs.
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    \330\ See supra Section II.A.6.
    \331\ See id.
    \332\ Specifically, CFTC Rule Sec.  23.502(c) provides that 
``[n]othing in this section shall apply to a swap that is cleared by 
a derivatives clearing organization.'' 17 CFR 23.502(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has considered as an alternative, allowing a SBS 
Entity to be deemed in compliance with certain rules regarding 
portfolio reconciliation if the SBS Entity is also registered as a swap 
dealer or major swap participant with the CFTC and is in compliance 
with the corresponding CFTC portfolio reconciliation rules. The 
Commission concluded that differences between its rules and rules 
adopted by the CFTC may provide certain benefits to SBS Entities and 
other market participants that would not be available under a rule that 
was identical to the corresponding CFTC rule. For example, the 
requirement in the rule that each term required to be reported to a 
registered SDR under Rule 901 must be reconciled may facilitate the 
verification of transaction data by SDRs, which could address concerns 
raised by market participants and data repositories. Such benefits 
could be unavailable under such an approach given that CFTC portfolio 
reconciliation rules do not require all of this information to be 
reconciled.\333\
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    \333\ See supra Section II.A for a discussion of the proposed 
reconciliation rules and the verification of transaction data by 
SDRs. See also supra note 57 for a discussion of differences between 
CFTC and Commission requirements concerning third party 
reconciliation.
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3. Portfolio Compression
    Portfolio compression is an important post-trade processing 
mechanism that can be an effective and efficient tool for the 
management of risk by security-based swap market participants. 
Portfolio compression is a mechanism whereby directionally opposite 
transactions with substantially similar terms among two or more 
counterparties are terminated and, if any exposure remains, replaced 
with a smaller number of transactions of decreased notional value in an 
effort to reduce the risk, cost, and inefficiency of maintaining 
offsetting transactions on the counterparties' books. Because portfolio 
compression participants are permitted to establish their own credit, 
market, and cash payment risk tolerances and to establish their own 
mark-to-market values for the transactions to be compressed, the 
process does not alter the risk profiles of the individual participants 
beyond a level acceptable to the participant. Portfolio compression is 
commonly acknowledged as a useful risk management tool.\334\
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    \334\ See http://www2.isda.org/news/isda-publishes-paper-highlighting-achievements-in-portfolio-compression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Requirements
    The Commission is adopting rules and providing interpretations that 
generally will require each SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and 
follow written policies and procedures for engaging in certain forms of 
portfolio compression exercises with each of its counterparties. 
Depending on the number of counterparties, the portfolio compression 
exercise would be defined as either a ``bilateral portfolio compression 
exercise'' or as a ``multilateral portfolio compression exercise.''
    Under Rule 15Fi-4(a), SBS Entities are required to establish, 
maintain, and follow written policies and procedures for periodically 
engaging in both bilateral portfolio compression exercises and 
multilateral portfolio compression exercises, when appropriate, with 
each counterparty that is also an SBS Entity.\335\ For transactions 
with non-SBS Entities, the policies and procedures required under the 
rule will require only that portfolio compression exercise would have 
to occur when appropriate and only if requested by any such 
counterparty.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ See Rules 15Fi-4(a)(2) and (3).
    \336\ See Rule 15Fi-4(b).
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b. Benefits
    As a mechanism for post-trade management of risk in security-based 
swaps, portfolio compression provides benefits not only to the 
counterparties in each transaction but also to the markets as a whole. 
A portfolio compression exercise permits firms to identify instances in 
which directionally opposite transactions with similar terms can be 
terminated or replaced, with a smaller number of transactions with 
decreased notional value, reducing the overall risk, cost, and 
inefficiencies associated with maintaining offsetting transactions. As 
such, portfolio compression is recognized as an important risk 
management tool.\337\ By expanding the universe of participants 
required to maintain portfolio compression policies and procedures, 
credit risk in the uncleared security-based swaps market can be reduced 
and may provide benefits to the entire financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ For example, in 2008, the PWG identified frequent 
portfolio compression of outstanding trades as a key policy 
objective in the effort to strengthen the OTC derivatives market 
infrastructure. See PWG Report, supra note 248. Similarly, the 2010 
staff report issued by the FRBNY outlined policy perspectives on OTC 
derivatives infrastructure and identified trade compression as an 
element of strong risk management and recommended that market 
participants engage in regular, market-wide portfolio compression 
exercises. See FRBNY OTC Derivatives Report, supra note 18. Since 
the years immediately following the 2008 financial crisis, 
compression outside of CCPs has been somewhat less common and has 
declined substantially from its 2008 peak. See supra note 286.
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    Further, the termination of redundant security-based swap 
transactions through the portfolio compression process is likely to 
result in the potential reduction of both counterparty and operational 
risk at the SBS Entity level. The use of portfolio compression also 
could reduce the overall level of bilateral risk exposures, while 
leaving the net positions of market participants unaltered, thereby 
improving operational efficiency. Improvements in operational 
efficiency may arise due to fewer overall positions for each entity, a 
reduction in carried margin and variation margin calculations, and 
fewer (and potentially less frequent) portfolio reconciliations. This 
would also reduce the number of bilateral positions that would have to 
be resolved in the event of insolvency of a market participant. These 
reductions in risk and improvements in operational efficiency of SBS 
Entities could benefit the financial system as a whole, thereby 
potentially increasing the number of market participants as well as 
improving liquidity.
    Although the costs of participating in portfolio reconciliation are 
fully internalized by each counterparty, the potential benefits, 
particularly for multilateral compression exercises, increase with the 
number of counterparties that participate. Under Rule 15Fi-4(a), SBS 
Entities are required to establish, maintain, and follow written 
policies and procedures for periodically engaging in both bilateral 
portfolio compression exercises and multilateral portfolio compression 
exercises, in each case when appropriate, with counterparties that also 
are an SBS Entities.\338\ To the extent that an SBS Entity transacts 
with a counterparties that are not SBS Entities, the policies and 
procedures required under the rule require only that portfolio 
compression exercises occur when appropriate and only if requested by 
any such counterparty. In the absence of these rules, some 
counterparties may not participate in compression activities reducing 
the potential benefits available to other counterparties and the 
financial system generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ See supra Section II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in the economic baseline, the emergence of third-party 
vendors has provided portfolio compression services for security-based 
swaps. SBS Entities may be able to continue to benefit from the 
services of these third-

[[Page 6405]]

party vendors to provide additional portfolio compression opportunities 
for these firms.
    These rules provide flexibility to security-based swap market 
participants with respect to portfolio compression. The Commission 
believes that by not adopting prescriptive requirements, an SBS Entity 
can allow its counterparties flexibility in the manner in which they 
reduce the size of their security-based swap portfolios in light of 
each counterparty's unique risks and operations. Moreover, the rules 
regarding bilateral offset have been designed to reflect the 
understanding by the Commission that firms may have legitimate economic 
and business reasons for maintaining fully offsetting security-based 
swap transactions. For example, certain portfolio compression exercises 
could result in adverse credit exposures to certain counterparties. The 
results of a particular multilateral compression exercise may result in 
a credit exposure to a particular counterparty that exceeds credit 
exposure limits for that counterparty.
    Thus, the Commission believes that the policies and procedures 
should be flexible enough to allow an SBS Entity to take the most 
appropriate course of action with respect to managing its risks, while 
at the same time, encouraging SBS Entities to consider the risk 
mitigation possibilities of portfolio compression in a non-arbitrary 
manner and consistent with the purposes of Section 15F(i) of the 
Exchange Act. As such, Rules 15Fi-4(a)(1) and (b) require a firm's 
policies and procedures to address the termination of fully offsetting 
security-based swaps only ``when appropriate.''
    Finally, the Commission notes that both the CFTC and the EC have 
adopted portfolio compression requirements that are substantially 
similar to those being adopted by the Commission in this release.\339\ 
By closely aligning portfolio compression requirements through 
consultation with the CFTC and European authorities, the Commission 
believes that SBS Entities will benefit from a largely unitary 
regulatory regime that does not require separate compliance and 
operational policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Costs
    SBS Entities will necessarily have to design, compose, and 
implement policies and procedures to regularly evaluate compression 
opportunities with their counterparties as well as those opportunities 
offered by third parties. However, the Commission believes that given 
the large risk management benefits available from the regular 
compression of offsetting trades--benefits including reduced risk and 
enhanced operational efficiency-- SBS Entities already undertake 
regular portfolio compression exercises. For this reason and those 
discussed below, the Commission believes that the relevant costs will 
primarily be the creation of policies and procedures.
    The greater the level of standardization in security-based swaps, 
the less costly it becomes to identify compression opportunities. In 
April 2009, ISDA announced the implementation of the 2009 ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Determinations Committees and Auction Settlement CDS 
Protocol, known colloquially in the industry as the ``Big Bang 
Protocol,'' which introduced a number of documentation changes to help 
standardize single-name CDS contracts.\340\ Among these changes were 
the introduction of standard coupon rates and standard effective dates. 
Following the standardization of single-name CDS, compression in this 
market segment increased.\341\ As that standardization continues, we 
expect that the cost of identifying appropriate compression 
opportunities should continue to fall. Using single-name corporate CDS 
data from DTCC-TIW discussed above, we find the percentage of new 
trades in North American Single-Name Corporate that have standardized 
coupons has risen from 95.2% in 2012 to 99.8% in 2017. The reduction in 
the number of roll-dates from four to two in order to both improve 
liquidity as well as to align with updates to CDS indices \342\ also 
may result in increased standardization and therefore may reduce the 
costs of identifying compression opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ See Press Release, ISDA Announces Successful 
Implementation of `Big Bang' CDS Protocol; Determinations Committees 
and Auction Settlement Changes Take Effect (Apr. 8, 2009), available 
at: https://www.isda.org/a/XS6EE/ISDA-Announces-Successful-Implementation-of-%E2%80%98Big-Bang%E2%80%99-CDS-Protocol-Determinations-Committees-and-Auction-Settlement-Changes-Take-Effect.docx.
    \341\ See Nicholas Vause, Counterparty risk and contract volumes 
in the credit default swap market, BIS Quarterly Review (Dec. 2010), 
available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1012g.pdf. 
(``TriOptima became the first company to offer CDS portfolio 
compression when it extended its TriReduce service from interest 
rate swaps to the CDS market in 2005. In the CDS market, TriReduce 
has compressed mainly portfolios of CDS indices and index tranches, 
but single names have accounted for an increasing share of its 
compression volumes since standardisation in 2009.'').
    \342\ See http://www2.isda.org/asset-classes/credit-derivatives/single-name-cds-roll/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that the development and implementation of 
written policies and procedures as required by Rule 15Fi-4 will impose 
an initial cost of $1,302,135 in aggregate.\343\ Of the 55 market 
participants the Commission expects will register as SBS Entities and 
be subject to Rule 15Fi-4, the Commission estimates that approximately 
20 of these market participants are registered with the CFTC, and are 
anticipated to already have policies and procedures in place with 
respect to portfolio compression. The expected additional time to 
revise the existing policies and procedures for these SBS Entities is 
expected to be one hour per SBS Entity, for a cumulative 20 hours, 
costing $461.75 per SBS Entity or $9,235 in aggregate.\344\ For the 
remaining 35 SBS Entities, the Commission estimates that it will take 
approximately 80 hours per entity to establish the written policies and 
procedures. The costs for these SBS Entities will be $1,292,900, or 
$36,940 per SBS Entity.\345\ Once established, the Commission estimates 
that it will cost SBS Entities approximately $1,015,850 or $18,470 per 
SBS Entity to revise and maintain these policies and procedures.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \343\ This figure has been updated from that in the Proposing 
Release due to the updated estimate of the number of SBS Entities 
that will be dually registered with the CFTC and updates to hourly 
rates to account for inflation over the period. See supra note 310 
and supra note 311.
    \344\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (30 minutes) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance 
(15 minutes) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (15 
minutes) at $607 per hour)] = $461.75 per hour per SBS Entity or 
($461.75 per hour x 20 SBS dually-registered Entities) = $9,235.
    \345\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (40 hours) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance (20 
hours) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (20 hours) at 
$607 per hour)] = $36,940 per SBS Entity or ($36,940 x 20 SBS 
Entities that are not dually-registered) = $1,292,900.
    \346\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (20 hours) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance (10 
hours) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (10 hours) at 
$607 per hour)] = $18,470 per SBS Entity or ($18,470 x 55 SBS 
Entities) = $1,015,850 in aggregate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission further estimates that an SBS Entity will devote 
approximately 124.16 hours per year for portfolio offsets and 
compression exercises (6,828.8 aggregate hours), a substantial portion 
of which will be automated, and some of which may be handled by third-
party vendors.\347\

[[Page 6406]]

Similar to our discussion for portfolio reconciliation (Section 
VII.C.2.c), the Commission expects that the costs of implementing 
portfolio compression exercises through an automated process will be 
minimal for those SBS Entities that are dually-registered with the 
CFTC, as many of those systems will already be in place. With respect 
to the remaining 35 SBS Entities that are not dually-registered, the 
Commission anticipates that any cost associated with implementing the 
portfolio reconciliation system may also account for the portfolio 
compression exercises that may periodically take place; therefore, the 
overall costs of portfolio compression systems should be minimal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ The Commission estimates that each SBS Entity will 
transact with approximately 368 counterparties (18 SBS Entities and 
350 non-SBS market participants). It is estimated that approximately 
one offset per year will take place between counterparties and it is 
expected to take five minutes to complete, for a total number of 
hours of (2.5/60 x 18 + 5/60*350) or 29.91 hours per year per SBS 
Entity. Further, each SBS Entity is expected to conduct six 
bilateral compressions with SBS Entities and 350 bilateral 
compressions with non-SBS counterparties, each taking 15 minutes for 
total hours of [(7.5/60 x 6) + (15/60 x 350)] = 88.25 hours. Lastly, 
each SBS Entity is anticipated to complete 12 multilateral 
compressions each year, each taking 30 minutes for a total of 6 
hours. Total time for each SBS Entity for portfolio compression 
exercises is estimated to be (29.91 + 88.25 + 6) = 124.16 hours, or 
6828.8 hours (124.16 hours x 55 SBS Entities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In terms of quantification of the costs of compression, the 
Commission also notes that that there are a number of third-party 
vendors that provide compression services, and some of these providers 
may charge fees based on results achieved (such as number of swaps or 
security-based swaps compressed). Assuming that third-party vendors 
charge a fee directly related to the outcome of the compression 
exercise (as opposed to a fixed fee in whole or some portion thereof 
for portfolio compression activities), the direct costs of portfolio 
compression by third-party vendors would therefore likely be directly 
related to the economic benefits of reduced counterparty and 
operational risk realized through the compression exercises. The 
Commission does not currently have pricing data for third-party service 
providers that offer portfolio compression services and so is unable to 
quantify the costs to market participants who make use of these 
services.
    Many non-SBS Entities typically trade only in small volumes and on 
one side of a particular security-based swap, to create a synthetic 
position in the underlying asset or to hedge another position, for 
example. Such one-sided market positions reduce the opportunities to 
engage in periodic compression cycles. For SBS Entities that do not 
currently participate in compression cycles, there could be costs to 
modify the participant's risk systems and connectivity enhancements 
that would allow for sharing the necessary information required to 
identify compression opportunities and for the booking and processing 
of a large volume of security-based swaps in a short time period. 
Multilateral compression cycles are typically managed with automated 
tools to support tear-up and new trade creation that end-users usually 
do not possess, and the costs of obtaining such tools cannot be 
justified by the benefits. The rule does not require market 
participants to engage in mandatory compression cycles, but only to 
establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures for 
engaging in certain forms of portfolio compression exercises.
d. Alternatives
    The adopted rule requires that SBS Entities establish, maintain, 
and follow written policies and procedures as they relate to certain 
forms of portfolio compression exercises with each of its 
counterparties. As such, the Commission did not mandate the specific 
contents of the policies and procedures created to comply with these 
rules.\348\ However, a number of more specific requirements for 
portfolio compression could be included. For example, the current rule 
as adopted only requires policies and procedures that address 
compression to the extent requested by the counterparty rather than a 
more prescriptive requirement.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \348\ There is one exception to this statement. See supra note 
97.
    \349\ See supra Section II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-4, SBS Entities are required ``periodically'' 
to examine the possibility for whether portfolio compression exercises 
can take place. While this provides flexibility to the counterparties 
in terms of the frequency with which rebalancing would have to be 
explored, it leaves open the possibility that market participants will 
suboptimally select the frequency with which portfolio compression 
exercises can occur, which could impose externalities on SBS 
counterparties as well as the financial system as a whole. As an 
alternative, the Commission considered requiring a minimum frequency of 
analysis of portfolio compression exercises. For instance, at least 
twice a year, SBS Entities could conduct an analysis of the possibility 
of a portfolio compression exercise in order to reduce their 
counterparty credit risk and engage in such a portfolio compression 
exercise, similar to those adopted by the EC.\350\ Given that portfolio 
compression has been identified to be a valuable and important tool for 
risk management, it is likely that many SBS Entities already have in 
place policies and procedures for periodic evaluation of compression 
possibilities, thus imposing a minimum standard could be burdensome and 
costly for firms to implement with little if any corresponding benefit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ See EU Regulation 149/2013, art. 14, 2013 O.J. 11, 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Relatedly, the frequency with which SBS Entities evaluate their 
prospects for portfolio compression opportunities could be related to 
the number of transactions between counterparties (as is required for 
portfolio reconciliation by Rule 15Fi-3). For instance, if 
counterparties have portfolios in excess of 500 transactions, an 
analysis of portfolio compression could be conducted quarterly, while 
for SBS Entities with portfolios between 50 and 500 transactions, 
portfolio compression exercises could be explored twice a year. For 
counterparties with fewer than 50 transactions between them (or for 
portfolios with non-SBS Entities), portfolio compression exercises 
could be simply ``periodically.'' This would allow counterparties to 
assess the counterparty credit risk at frequencies aligned with the 
complexities of their portfolios without incurring substantive 
additional costs of this increase in periodic evaluation of portfolio 
compression opportunities. The Commission considered the costs and 
benefits to market participants of imposing policies and procedures 
related to portfolio compression based on the number of transactions 
between counterparties. However, it is likely that market participants 
expected to register as SBS Entities already have policies and 
procedures in place to evaluate portfolio compression opportunities 
with counterparties, and requiring alterations to these policies could 
be costly for these entities without corresponding benefits.
    Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-4(c), the new requirements regarding 
portfolio compression will not apply to a security-based swap that is, 
directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency 
registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a clearing 
agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or 
order pursuant to Section 17A.\351\ The Commission modified the 
proposed exception for cleared security-based swaps so that it now 
applies to the initial bilateral transaction between the original 
counterparties (in addition to the resulting transactions between those 
counterparties and the clearing agency

[[Page 6407]]

once the original transaction has been novated) and to permit the 
exception to be used when the clearing agency has been exempted from 
registration pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act.\352\ The 
Commission modified the exception in this manner in response to 
comments received, as well as to be consistent with the Commission's 
margin requirements for security-based swap transactions and the 
approach taken by the CFTC,\353\ which should reduce implementation and 
compliance costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ See supra Section II.B.3.
    \352\ See id.
    \353\ Specifically, CFTC Rule Sec.  23.503(c) provides that 
``[n]othing in this section shall apply to a swap that is cleared by 
a derivatives clearing organization.'' 17 CFR 23.503(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has considered as an alternative, allowing an SBS 
Entity to be deemed in compliance with certain rules regarding 
portfolio compression if the SBS Entity is also registered as a swap 
dealer or major swap participant with the CFTC and is in compliance 
with the corresponding CFTC portfolio compression rules. The Commission 
concluded that, as a practical matter, the rules are nearly equivalent, 
suggesting that any additional compliance cost arising from differences 
in these rules for an entity that is registered with both the CFTC and 
the Commission should be small. The Commission believes that the 
differences that do exist (such as the adopted rule providing that 
requested compression by an entity that is not a security-based swap 
dealer or major security-based swap participant need only be conducted 
if appropriate) \354\ may provide marginal benefits to SBS market 
participants (such as by preventing portfolio compression that is not 
appropriate given the particular circumstances of the trade and the 
counterparties to that trade).\355\
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    \354\ See supra Section II.B.1.
    \355\ The corresponding CFTC compression rule applicable to 
transactions with counterparties that are not Swap Entities does not 
contain the caveat that any form of compression or offset covered by 
the applicable policies and procedures would only need to occur 
``when appropriate.'' See supra Section II.B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Trading Relationship Documentation
    OTC derivatives market participants typically have relied on the 
use of industry standard legal documentation, including master netting 
agreements, definitions, schedules, and confirmations, to document 
their security-based swap trading relationships. This industry standard 
documentation offers a framework for documenting the transactions 
between counterparties for OTC derivatives products.\356\ The standard 
documentation is designed to set forth the legal, trading, and credit 
relationship between the parties and to facilitate netting of 
transactions in the event that parties have to close-out their position 
with one another or determine credit exposure for margin and collateral 
management. Notwithstanding the standardization of such documentation, 
some or all of the terms of the master agreement and other documents 
are subject to negotiation and modification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \356\ One commonly used form of the industry standard 
documentation is the ISDA Master Agreement and related definitions, 
schedules, and confirmations specific to particular asset classes. 
As noted in Section VI.B.4, over 99% of uncleared security-based 
swap transactions use an ISDA Master Agreement as reported in DTCC-
TIW.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Requirements
    The Commission is adopting rules and interpretations that generally 
will require each SBS Entity to establish, maintain, and follow written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that it executes 
written trading relationship documentation with its counterparties 
prior to, or contemporaneously with, executing a security-based swap. 
The security-based swap trading relationship documentation is required 
to be in writing and to include all material terms governing the 
trading relationship between counterparties.
    Further, the rules being adopted will also require that the 
security-based swap trading relationship documentation include credit 
support arrangements.\357\ One of the key elements of Title VII reforms 
was to ensure that uncleared OTC derivatives were appropriately 
collateralized, thus the documentation of processes for calculating and 
exchanging margin in connection with security-based swaps helps to 
achieve the broader regulatory objective.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \357\ See supra Section II.C.
    \358\ 15 U.S.C. 78c-5(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rules also will establish minimum standards with respect to 
identifying the matters that must be addressed in the security-based 
swap trading documentation, and outline certain requirements related to 
the resolution of discrepancies, particularly those involving 
differences in the valuation of security-based swaps. In the event that 
discrepancies in valuation arise, the rule requires that counterparties 
must provide documentation for either an alternative method for 
determining value of the security-based swap or documentation on the 
resolution process for such disputes.
    The rule also requires that counterparties to the security-based 
swap provide information on their legal status, particularly in the 
event of liquidation, as well as to provide certain information of a 
security-based swap accepted for clearing by a clearing agency, in 
order to reduce any potential confusion regarding the status of the 
trade following its acceptance and novation at the clearing agency. 
Lastly, Rule 15Fi-5 requires a periodic independent audit to identify 
any material deficiencies in the trading relationship documentation 
policies and procedures.
b. Benefits
    Inadequate or incomplete documentation of open security-based swap 
transactions could, in some cases, result in collateral and legal 
disputes between the two counterparties, thereby exposing both sides to 
significant counterparty credit risk. By way of contrast, adequate 
documentation between counterparties offers a framework for 
establishing the trading relationship between the parties from the 
outset of the transaction, which should minimize both the number and 
magnitude of potential disputes.
    Further, having policies and procedures regarding trading 
relationship documentation in place is important for all aspects of the 
transaction, the valuation of the transaction and how it affects margin 
requirements on an on-going basis is critical for managing both 
counterparty credit as well as operational risk. Pursuant to Rule 15Fi-
5, counterparties are required to provide information on the valuation 
methods, procedures, rules, and inputs (within limits so as to not 
reveal private information regarding proprietary valuation models), 
while further stipulating that either alternative valuation methods or 
valuation discrepancy resolutions are detailed in the trading 
relationship documentation. These benefits are both complemented by, 
and accrue to, the portfolio reconciliation process contemplated by 
Rule 15Fi-3. That is, comprehensive and accurate documentation of a 
transaction may contribute to a smoother reconciliation process by 
reducing the possibility of discrepancies; and any discrepancies that 
may still arise could subsequently be identified and resolved through 
reconciliation.
    As discussed above, because shortcomings in credit risk management 
and documentation may only become evident during a crisis, some 
benefits of

[[Page 6408]]

complying with these rules will accrue to the financial system as a 
whole while the ongoing direct costs are borne by the individual market 
participant. Therefore, in the absence of these rules, trading 
relationship documentation practices employed by individual market 
participants may be less thorough than would be desired by all market 
participants in order to properly manage risks to the financial system. 
However, the widespread use of standard documentation mitigates both 
the potential benefit and costs of the rules being adopted.
c. Costs
    Market participants will likely incur ongoing costs associated with 
the rules concerning trading relationship documentation. Market 
participants will have to (1) negotiate and document all terms of each 
trading relationship; (2) design, compose, and implement policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure the execution of security-
based swap trading relationship documentation, including valuation 
documentation; (3) obtain documentation from counterparties who are 
claiming the end user exception to clearing; and (4) periodically audit 
documentation and keep records and/or make reports as required under 
these rules.
    The Commission estimates that the initial burden to negotiate and 
draft trading relationship documentation will be $4,666,103 per SBS 
Entity, or $256,635,638 in aggregate across the 55 SBS Entities.\359\ 
The Commission further estimates that the development and 
implementation of written policies and procedures as required under 
Rule 15Fi-5 will impose an initial cost of $1,302,135 in 
aggregate.\360\ Of the total 55 SBS Entities as expected by the 
Commission that would be subject to Rule 15Fi-5, 20 are anticipated to 
be registered concurrently with the CFTC, and are anticipated to 
already have policies and procedures in place with respect to 
relationship documentation. The expected additional time to revise the 
existing policies and procedures for these Entities is expected to be 
one hour per Entity, for a cumulative 20 hours, costing $461.75 per 
Entity or $9,235 in aggregate.\361\ For the remaining 35 SBS Entities, 
the Commission estimates that it will take approximately 80 hours per 
entity to establish the written policies and procedures. The costs for 
these SBS Entities will be $1,292,900, or $36,940 per SBS Entity.\362\ 
Once established, the Commission estimates that it will cost SBS 
Entities approximately $1,015,850 or $18,470 per SBS Entity to revise 
and maintain these policies and procedures.\363\ Lastly, Rule 15Fi-5 
requires periodic independent audits of the trading relationship 
documentation. The Commission estimates that the costs associated with 
these audits will be $853,760 per SBS Entity, or $46,956,800 in 
aggregate.\364\
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    \359\ Each SBS Entity is anticipated to be counterparty to 18 
other SBS Entities and 350 non-SBS market participants, for a total 
of 368 counterparties. The initial negotiation and draft in expected 
to take 15 hours per counterparty that is a SBS entity and 30 hours 
per counterparty for all other counterparties. See Section VI.D.5. 
The estimation is as follows: [((Compliance Manager (15 hours) x 
$315) + (Director of Compliance (7.5 hours) x $496) + (Deputy 
General Counsel (7.5 hours) x $607)) x 350 counterparties] + 
[((Compliance Manager (7.5 hours) x $315) + (Director of Compliance 
(3.75 hours) x $496) + (Deputy General Counsel (3.75 hours) x $607)) 
x 18 SBS entity counterparties] = $4,666,102.50 per SBS Entity, or 
($4,666,102.50 x 55 SBS Entities) = $256,635,637.50 in aggregate.
    This figure has been updated from that in the Proposing Release 
due to the updated estimate of the number of SBS Entities that will 
be dually registered with the CFTC and updates to hourly rates to 
account for inflation over the period. See supra note 310 and supra 
note 311.
    \360\ Id.
    \361\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (30 minutes) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance 
(15 minutes) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (15 
minutes) at $607 per hour)] = $461.75 per hour per SBS Entity or 
($461.75 per hour x 20 SBS dually-registered Entities) = $9,235.
    \362\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (40 hours) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance (20 
hours) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (20 hours) at 
$607 per hour)] = $36,940 per SBS Entity or ($36,940 x 35 SBS 
Entities that are not dually-registered) = $1,292,900 in aggregate.
    \363\ The estimate is based on the following: [((Compliance 
Attorney (20 hours) at $372 per hour) + ((Director of Compliance (10 
hours) at $496 per hour) + ((Deputy General Counsel (10 hours) at 
$607 per hour)] = $18,470 per SBS Entity or ($18,470 x 55 SBS 
Entities) = $1,015,850 in aggregate.
    \364\ The estimate is based on the following: [368 
counterparties x 10 hours per Audit x Auditor ($232 per hour)] = 
$853,760 per SBS Entity, or ($853,760 x 55 SBS Entities) = 
$46,956,800 in aggregate.
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    Memorializing the specific terms of the security-based swap trading 
relationship and security-based swap transactions between 
counterparties is prudent business practice and, in fact, many market 
participants already use standardized documentation.\365\ Accordingly, 
the Commission believes that many, if not most, market participants 
that are expected to register as SBS Entities currently execute and 
maintain trading relationship documentation of the type required by 
these rules in the ordinary course of their businesses, including 
documentation that contains several of the terms that will be required 
by these rules. Thus, the hour and dollar burdens associated with the 
security-based swap trading relationship documentation requirements may 
be limited to amending existing documentation to expressly include any 
additional terms required by the rules. In addition the Commission 
anticipates that standardized security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation will eventually incorporate changes that may be necessary 
to comply with many of the requirements of this rule reducing the cost 
to individual security-based swap market participants.\366\
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    \365\ As noted in Section VII.B.4, as of 2017, the DTCC-TIW data 
shows that over 99% of SBS Entities use the ISDA Master Agreement.
    \366\ In response to prior Dodd Frank Act related regulatory 
requirements, ISDA in partnership with third party providers, has 
created technology-based solutions enabling counterparties to modify 
OTC derivatives related documentation quickly and efficiently. See 
http://www2.isda.org/dodd-frank-documentation-initiative/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15Fi-5 also includes certain exceptions that are intended to 
mitigate costs incurred by market participants while preserving the 
risk mitigating benefits of thorough trading relationship documents. 
First, the rule will provide an exception for security-based swaps 
executed prior to the date on which the SBS Entity is required to be in 
compliance with the trading relationship documentation rule, as it may 
be costly and impractical to require SBS Entities to bring existing 
transactions into compliance with these rules. The Commission notes 
that this exception may increase the likelihood of disputes in 
valuation with respect to such transactions, which will be subject to 
the portfolio reconciliation requirement of Rule 15Fi-3 even though 
they are not subject to the documentation requirements of Rule 15Fi-5. 
Such disputes could be costly to resolve and may lead to greater 
uncertainty with respect to counterparty credit risk.
    The rule further provides exceptions for any security-based swap 
that is, directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing 
agency registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a 
clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by 
rule or order pursuant to Section 17A. Once a security is cleared, the 
transaction is primarily governed by the terms of the agreement between 
clearing member and the clearing agency. Lastly, the rule will provide 
an exception for security-based swaps executed anonymously on a 
national securities exchange or an SB SEF, provided that these 
security-based swaps are intended to be cleared and are actually 
submitted for clearing to a clearing agency that provides CCP services. 
This exception is intended to

[[Page 6409]]

recognize that documentation requirements may be nearly impossible to 
fulfill within the context of cleared anonymous transactions.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ The exception with respect to security-based swap 
transactions on national exchanges or SB SEF is limited. See Section 
II.C for a complete discussion of those limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Alternatives
    As proposed, Rule 15Fi-5(b)(1) would have required that the trading 
relationship documentation also include terms governing ``applicable 
regulatory reporting obligations (including pursuant to Regulation 
SBSR).'' ISDA and SIFMA noted that the particular documentation 
requirement would have essentially mirrored the reporting requirements 
in Regulation SBSR, including the reporting hierarchy established by 
that rule, which would be duplicative, burdensome and impose additional 
costs on SBS Entities, and that also may not address the underlying SDR 
verification issue.\368\ Accordingly, the Commission has carefully 
considered these comments and has modified Rule 15Fi-5(b)(1), such that 
it no longer requires that the trading relationship documentation 
include terms governing applicable regulatory reporting obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \368\ See supra Section II.C.1. See also ISDA/SIFMA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has evaluated reasonable alternatives to the rules 
on trading relationship documentation. One alternative would be that 
all SBS Entities are required to adhere to an industry-accepted 
standard form of trading documentation, instead of establishing 
policies and procedures related to documentation. It is unlikely that 
this alternative would materially alter the primary benefits of the 
rule, namely that of reducing disputes over documentation that could 
lead to increased counterparty risk, but could increase overall 
compliance costs without analogous increases in benefits, due to 
reduced operational flexibility.
    Further, the rule requires that SBS Entities undertake a periodic, 
independent audit to identify material weaknesses in its documentation 
policies and procedures. As adopted, there is flexibility on behalf of 
the SBS Entity as to how and when those audits occur. Alternatively, 
the Commission has considered limiting to only external auditors and 
requiring a once per year audit of trading relationship documentation. 
Although this alternative would not materially amend the primary 
benefits related to the audit of SBS Entities' policies and procedures 
related to trading relationship documentation, the Commission 
anticipates that this alternative could increase compliance costs by 
reducing operational flexibility.
    Rule 15Fi-5(a)(1)(ii) provides an exception to the trading 
relationship documentation requirements for any security-based swap 
that is, directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing 
agency registered pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act or by a 
clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by 
rule or order pursuant to Section 17A.\369\ The Commission modified the 
proposed exception for cleared security-based swaps so that it now 
applies the initial bilateral transaction between the original 
counterparties (in addition to the resulting transactions between those 
counterparties and the clearing agency once the original transaction 
has been novated) and to permit the exception to be used when the 
clearing agency has been exempted from registration pursuant to Section 
17A of the Exchange Act.\370\ The Commission modified the exception in 
this manner in response to comments received, as well as to be 
consistent with the Commission's margin requirements for security-based 
swap transactions and the approach taken by the CFTC,\371\ which should 
reduce implementation and compliance costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \369\ See supra Section II.C.5.
    \370\ See id.
    \371\ Specifically, CFTC Rule Sec.  23.504(a)(1)(iii) excludes 
from the written trading relationship documentation requirements 
``swaps cleared by a derivatives clearing organization.'' 17 CFR 
23.504(a)(1)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has considered as an alternative, allowing an SBS 
Entity to be deemed in compliance with certain rules regarding trading 
relationship documentation if the SBS Entity is also registered as a 
swap dealer or major swap participant with the CFTC and is in 
compliance with the corresponding CFTC trading relationship 
documentation rules. The Commission concluded that, as a practical 
matter, the rules are nearly equivalent, suggesting that any additional 
compliance cost arising from differences in these rules for an entity 
that is registered with both the CFTC and the Commission should be 
small. The Commission believes that differences that do exist are 
necessary and appropriate. For example, to the extent that a 
transaction entered into on an anonymous basis on a national securities 
exchange or SB SEF that is then rejected for clearing but continues to 
exist, the Commission believes that the counterparties to the ongoing 
security-based swap should have in place a written agreement on the 
terms of that transaction.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \372\ See supra Section II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Recordkeeping Requirements
    The Commission is also adopting rules that will modify existing 
Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4, as well as recently adopted Rules 18a-5 and 18a-
6 for the recordkeeping and reporting requirements applicable to SBS 
Entities. The amendments will involve requiring each SBS Entity to make 
and keep current information relevant to portfolio reconciliation and 
portfolio compression exercises and to retain all security-based swap 
trading relationship documentation required to be created under Rule 
15Fi-5, as well as each policy and procedure created pursuant to Rules 
15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5.
a. Requirements
    The Commission is amending Rule 17a-3 (which applies to SBS 
Entities that are also registered with the Commission as broker-
dealers) and recently adopted Rule 18a-5 (which applies to SBS Entities 
that are not registered with the Commission as broker-dealers). Under 
these amendments, each SBS Entity will be required to make and keep 
records of each security-based swap portfolio reconciliation and 
portfolio compression exercise, which is believed to promote compliance 
with Rules 15Fi-3 and 15Fi-4 as well as support SBS Entities in the 
event that disputes arise in relation to previous reconciliations or 
compressions. The amendments will also require that SBS Entities make 
and keep records of valuation disputes in excess of $20 million if not 
resolved within three (for SBS Entities) or five (for non-SBS 
counterparties) days.
    The Commission also is amending Rule 17a-4 (which applies to SBS 
Entities that are also registered with the Commission as broker-
dealers) and recently adopted Rule 18a-6 (which applies to SBS Entities 
that are not registered with the Commission as broker-dealers), which 
address record retention. All records made and kept under the 
amendments to Rule 17a-3 and recently adopted Rule 18a-5 will need to 
be retained for at least three years. Further, all policies and 
procedures related to Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5, all written 
agreements between counterparties on terms of portfolio reconciliation, 
and all security-based swap trading relationship documentation with 
counterparties will need to be retained until at least three years 
following the termination of said

[[Page 6410]]

policies and procedures and/or documentation.
b. Benefits
    In proposing these requirements, the Commission considered the 
potential benefits of improving the oversight, transparency, and 
documentation of security-based swap activities. The amendments to 
Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4, and recently adopted Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6 are 
intended to facilitate oversight of SBS Entities, thus the benefits 
associated with the amendments related to recordkeeping are beneficial 
not only to the SBS Entities, but also are expected to facilitate 
regulatory oversight.
    Requiring retention of records related to portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and trading relationship documentation for a 
minimum of three years provides SBS Entities with a well-established 
track record should disputes about terms of the security-based swap 
arise. The benefits of these amendments, to the extent that they 
enhance existing practice, could reduce both counterparty credit risk 
as well as operational risk for the SBS Entities. Further, the 
amendments are expected to facilitate examinations by the Commission of 
SBS Entities.
c. Costs
    The Commission also recognizes that there will be costs associated 
with the new rules and rule amendments. These include the costs of 
creating procedures to ensure that records are kept as required and the 
costs associated with ongoing record maintenance. As the recordkeeping 
requirements are being adopted as amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 
and recently adopted Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6, the incremental costs of 
compliance from these amendments is likely to be minimal.
    Rules 15Fi-3, 15Fi-4, and 15Fi-5 require that SBS Entities 
establish and maintain written policies and procedures related to 
portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression exercises, and trading 
relationship documentation. Further, SBS Entities are already required 
to comply with the retention of written policies and procedures with 
respect to Rule 15Fi-2 related to trade acknowledgement and 
verification, and should have recordkeeping systems previously 
instituted. Therefore, only minor modifications will need to be made in 
order to make the systems compliant with the amendments regarding 
recordkeeping requirements for portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression exercises, and trading relationship documentation.
    Generally, the Commission does not expect the amendments to Rules 
17a-3 and 17a-4, and recently adopted Rules 18a-5 and 18a-6 to create 
material burdens for registrants, although as noted above the 
Commission does expect that there will be incremental costs related to 
complying with the rule amendments.\373\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ See supra Section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Alternatives
    The Commission has considered reasonable alternatives to the 
adopted amendments. In particular, the costs and benefits associated 
with the required recordkeeping horizon have been evaluated. Shorter 
horizons (of less than three years) would lessen the overall 
recordkeeping burden by reducing the retention requirements and 
corresponding storage of records. However, as it may take time for 
disputes, particularly in the event of liquidations to be fully 
settled, shorter horizons may lead to the elimination of relevant 
records prior to resolution. On the other hand, longer horizons for 
maintaining records could be costly with respect to storage and system 
requirements. However, longer record preservation would reduce the 
likelihood that historical records are unavailable if needed at some 
point in the future.
    Rule 15Fi-5(c) requires each SBS Entity to have an independent 
auditor conduct periodic audits sufficient to identify any material 
weakness in it documentation policies and procedures required by the 
rule. The Commission considered using the same requirement as that 
required by the CFTC that the audit be conducted by an independent 
internal or external auditor. The Commission chose not to follow this 
approach because in its experience overseeing accounting and auditing 
standards in the context of certain disclosure requirements under the 
federal securities laws, an internal auditor typically reports to the 
management of the applicable entity, which by definition would not 
satisfy the test for auditor independence under any existing statutory 
or regulatory provision that the Commission administers.\374\ However, 
because the rule would still encompass any auditor, whether external or 
internal, that is in fact independent, the Commission believes that the 
practical differences between the Commission's rule and the 
corresponding CFTC rule are negligible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \374\ See supra Section II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Cross-Border Application of Rules 15Fi-3 Through 15Fi-5.
    In early 2016, the Commission adopted Rule 3a71-6 under the 
Exchange Act, which determined that non-U.S. SBS Entities could satisfy 
certain requirements of Section 15F by complying with comparable 
regulatory requirements of a foreign financial regulatory system.\375\ 
At the time the substituted compliance rule was initially adopted, it 
applied solely to business conduct standards; however, Rule 3a71-6 was 
amended in the Trade Acknowledgement and Verification Adopting Release 
to provide foreign SBS Entities with the potential to rely on 
substituted compliance to satisfy Title VII trade confirmation 
requirements.\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \375\ See Business Conduct Standards Adopting Release, 81 FR at 
30074.
    \376\ See Trade Acknowledgement and Verification Adopting 
Release, 81 FR at 39827-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Requirements
    The Commission is further amending Rule 3a71-6 to allow non-U.S. 
SBS Entities to potentially be able to satisfy through substituted 
compliance the Title VII portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression, and trading relationship documentation requirements in 
Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5. The Commission has determined that the 
principles previously set forth in the Business Conduct Standards 
Adopting Release and the Trade Acknowledgement and Verification 
Adopting Release with respect to substituted compliance should in large 
part similarly pertain to the reconciliation, compression, and 
documentation requirements in these rules.
b. Benefits
    The Commission is adopting amendments to Rule 3a71-6 to permit 
consideration of substituted compliance in order to reduce the 
probability that SBS Entities are subject to potentially duplicative or 
conflicting regulation. Market participants that face duplicative 
regulatory regimes are likely to attain comparable regulatory outcomes, 
but at a cost of increased compliance burdens without an analogous 
increase in benefits. The availability of substituted compliance could 
decrease the compliance burden for non-U.S. SBS Entities, particularly 
as it pertains to portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and 
trading relationship documentation. Allowing for the possibility of 
substituted compliance may help achieve the risk mitigation 
requirements set forth in Rules 15Fi-3

[[Page 6411]]

through 15Fi-5, in particular as it reduces legal uncertainty, 
counterparty credit risk exposure, and operational risk for market 
participants.
    Further, the Commission anticipates broader market implications of 
substituted compliance, namely an increase in foreign SBS dealers' 
activity in the U.S. market, the expansion of access by both U.S. and 
foreign SBS Entities to global liquidity, and a reduction in the 
possibility of liquidity fragmentation along jurisdictional lines. The 
availability of substituted compliance for non-U.S. SBS Entities also 
could promote market efficiency, while enhancing competition in U.S. 
markets. Increased participation and access to liquidity is likely to 
improve efficiencies related to hedging and risk sharing, while 
simultaneously increasing competition between domestic and foreign SBS 
Entities.
c. Costs
    The Commission believes that the availability of substituted 
compliance for portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and 
trading relationship documentation will not substantially alter the 
benefits intended by Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi-5. In particular, it is 
expected that the availability of substituted compliance will not 
detract from the risk mitigation benefits that stem from periodic 
portfolio reconciliation, as well as policies and procedures regarding 
portfolio compression exercises and trading relationship documentation.
    To the extent that substituted compliance reduces duplicative 
compliance costs, non-U.S. SBS Entities entering into transactions in 
which substituted compliance is available may incur lower overall costs 
associated with portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and 
documentation exercises with their counterparties than they would 
otherwise incur without the option of substituted compliance 
availability, either because a non-U.S. SBS Entity may have already 
implemented foreign regulatory requirements which have been deemed 
comparable by the Commission, or because security-based swap 
counterparties eligible for substituted compliance do not need to 
duplicate compliance with two sets of comparable requirements.
    A substituted compliance request can be made either by a foreign 
regulatory jurisdiction on behalf of its market participants, or by the 
registered market participant itself.\377\ The decision to request 
substituted compliance is voluntary, and therefore, to the extent that 
requests are made by individual market participants, such participants 
would request substituted compliance only if compliance with foreign 
regulatory requirements was less costly, in their own assessment, than 
compliance with both the foreign regulatory regime and the relevant 
Title VII requirements, including portfolio reconciliation, portfolio 
compression, and trading relationship documentation requirements. Even 
after a substituted compliance determination is made, market 
participants would only choose substituted compliance for portfolio 
reconciliation, compression, and documentation requirements if the 
benefits that they expect to receive from transacting in the U.S. 
markets exceed the costs that they expect to bear for doing so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \377\ See Cross-Border Adopting Release, 79 FR at 47277.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (``RFA'') \378\ requires the 
Commission, in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those 
rules on small entities. Section 603(a) \379\ of the Administrative 
Procedure Act,\380\ as amended by the RFA, the Commission certified in 
the Proposing Release that new Rules 15Fi-3 through 15Fi, and the 
proposed amendments to Rules 3a71-6, 15Fi-1, 17a-3, 17a-4, 18a-5 and 
18a-6 would not have a significant economic impact on any ``small 
entity'' \381\ for purposes of the RFA.\382\ The Commission received no 
comments on its certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \378\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \379\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \380\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
    \381\ Although Section 601(b) of the RFA defines the term 
``small entity,'' the statute permits agencies to formulate their 
own definitions. The Commission has adopted definitions for the term 
``small entity'' for the purposes of Commission rulemaking in 
accordance with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this 
rulemaking, are set forth in 17 CFR 240.0-10 (``Rule 0-10''). See 
Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Exchange Act 
Release No. 18451 (Jan. 28, 1982), 47 FR 5215 (Feb. 4, 1982).
    \382\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4670-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of Commission rulemaking in connection with the 
RFA,\383\ a small entity includes: (1) When used with reference to an 
``issuer'' or a ``person,'' other than an investment company, an 
``issuer'' or ``person'' that, on the last day of its most recent 
fiscal year, had total assets of $5 million or less; \384\ or (2) a 
broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus subordinated 
liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year 
as of which its audited financial statements were prepared pursuant to 
Rule 17a-5(d) under the Exchange Act,\385\ or, if not required to file 
such statements, a broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus 
subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the last day of the 
preceding fiscal year (or in the time that it has been in business, if 
shorter); and is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural 
person) that is not a small business or small organization.\386\ Under 
the standards adopted by the Small Business Administration, small 
entities in the finance and insurance industry include the following: 
(i) For entities engaged in credit intermediation and related 
activities, entities with $175 million or less in assets; \387\ (ii) 
for entities engaged in non-depository credit intermediation and 
certain other activities, entities with $7 million or less in annual 
receipts; \388\ (iii) for entities engaged in financial investments and 
related activities, entities with $7 million or less in annual 
receipts; \389\ (iv) for insurance carriers and entities engaged in 
related activities, entities with $7 million or less in annual 
receipts; \390\ and (v) for funds, trusts, and other financial 
vehicles, entities with $7 million or less in annual receipts.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \383\ Although Section 601(b) of the RFA defines the term 
``small entity,'' the statute permits agencies to formulate their 
own definitions. The Commission has adopted definitions for the term 
``small entity'' for the purposes of Commission rulemaking in 
accordance with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this 
rulemaking, are set forth in Rule 0-10 under the Exchange Act, 17 
CFR 240.0-10. See Exchange Act Release No. 18451 (Jan., 28, 1982), 
47 FR 5215 (Feb., 4, 1982) (File No. AS-305)
    \384\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(a).
    \385\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(d).
    \386\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(c).
    \387\ See 13 CFR 121.201 (Subsector 522).
    \388\ See id. at Subsector 522.
    \389\ See id. at Subsector 523.
    \390\ See id. at Subsector 524.
    \391\ See id. at Subsector 525.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to SBS Entities, based on feedback from market 
participants and our information about the security-based swap markets, 
and consistent with our position in prior Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings, 
the Commission continues to believe that (1) the types of entities that 
will engage in more than a de minimis amount of dealing activity 
involving security-based swaps--which generally would be large 
financial institutions--would not be ``small entities'' for purposes of 
the RFA and (2) the types of entities that may have security-based swap 
positions above the level required to be ``major security-based swap 
participants'' would not be

[[Page 6412]]

``small entities'' for purposes of the RFA.\392\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \392\ See Proposing Release, 84 FR at 4670; SBS Entity 
Registration Adopting Release, 80 FR at 49013; SBS Books and Records 
Proposing Release, 79 FR at 25296-97 and n.1441; Intermediary 
Definitions Adopting Release, 77 FR at 30743. See also Sections V 
(Paperwork Reduction Act) and VI (Economic Analysis) (discussing, 
among other things, the economic impact, including the estimated 
compliance costs and burdens, of the amendments).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the foregoing reasons, the Commission certifies that Rules 
15Fi-3 through 15Fi, and the amendments to Rules 3a71-6, 15Fi-1, 17a-3, 
17a-4, 18a-5 and 18a-6 will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities for the purposes of the RFA.

IX. Other Matters

    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act,\393\ the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs has designated these rules as a 
``major rule,'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \393\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If any of the provisions of these final rules, or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or application of such 
provisions to other persons or circumstances that can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application.

Statutory Basis

    Pursuant to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., as amended, 
and particularly sections 3(b), 15F, 17, and 23(a) (15 U.S.C. 78c(b), 
78o-10, 78q, 78w(a), and 78mm), the Commission is amending Sec. Sec.  
240.3a71-6, 240.15Fi-1, 240.17a-3, 240.17a-4, 240.18a-5, and 240.18a-6 
and adopting Sec. Sec.  240.15Fi-3, 240.15Fi-4, and 240.15Fi-5 under 
the Exchange Act.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 240

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities, Security-
based swaps, Security-based swap dealers, Major security-based swap 
participants.

Text of the Amendments

    In accordance with the foregoing, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is amending title 17, chapter II of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
1. The general authority citation for part 240 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78o-4, 
78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll, 78mm, 
80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 et 
seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 
1350; Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112-
106, sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *

0
2. Section 240.3a71-6 is amended by adding paragraph (d)(7) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  240.3a71-6  Substituted compliance for security-based swap 
dealers and major security-based swap participants.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (7) Portfolio reconciliation, portfolio compression, and trading 
relationship documentation requirements. The portfolio reconciliation, 
portfolio compression, and trading relationship documentation 
requirements of section 15F(i) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(i)) and 
Sec. Sec.  240.15Fi-3 through 240.15Fi-5; provided, however, that prior 
to making such a substituted compliance determination the Commission 
intends to consider whether the requirements of the foreign financial 
regulatory system for engaging in portfolio reconciliation and 
portfolio compression and for executing trading relationship 
documentation with counterparties, the duties imposed by the foreign 
financial regulatory system, and the information that is required to be 
provided to counterparties pursuant to the requirements of the foreign 
financial regulatory system, are comparable to those required pursuant 
to the applicable provisions arising under the Act and its rules and 
regulations.

0
3. Revise Sec.  240.15Fi-1 to read as follows:

Sec.  240.15Fi-1  Definitions.

    For the purposes of Sec. Sec.  240.15Fi-1 through 240.15Fi-5:
    (a) The term bilateral portfolio compression exercise means an 
exercise by which two security-based swap counterparties wholly 
terminate or change the notional value of some or all of the security-
based swaps submitted by the counterparties for inclusion in the 
portfolio compression exercise and, depending on the methodology 
employed, replace the terminated security-based swaps with other 
security-based swaps whose combined notional value (or some other 
measure of risk) is less than the combined notional value (or some 
other measure of risk) of the terminated security-based swaps in the 
exercise.
    (b) The term business day means any day other than a Saturday, 
Sunday, or legal holiday.
    (c) Solely for purposes of Sec.  240.15Fi-2, the term clearing 
agency means a clearing agency as defined in section 3(a)(23) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(23)) that is 
registered pursuant to section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) and provides central counterparty services for 
security-based swap transactions.
    (d) The term clearing transaction means a security-based swap that 
has a clearing agency as a direct counterparty.
    (e) The term day of execution means the calendar day of the 
counterparty to the security-based swap transaction that ends the 
latest, provided that if a security-based swap transaction is:
    (1) Entered into after 4:00 p.m. in the place of a counterparty; or
    (2) Entered into on a day that is not a business day in the place 
of a counterparty, then such security-based swap transaction shall be 
deemed to have been entered into by that counterparty on the 
immediately succeeding business day of that counterparty, and the day 
of execution shall be determined with reference to such business day.
    (f) The term execution means the point at which the counterparties 
become irrevocably bound to a transaction under applicable law.
    (g) The term financial counterparty means a counterparty that is 
not a security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap 
participant and that is one of the following:
    (1) A swap dealer;
    (2) A major swap participant;
    (3) A commodity pool as defined in section 1a(10) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(10));
    (4) A private fund as defined in section 202(a)(29) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a));
    (5) An employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and (32) 
of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 
U.S.C. 1002); and
    (6) A person predominantly engaged in activities that are in the 
business of banking, or in activities that are financial in nature, as 
defined in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 
U.S.C. 1843k).
    (h) The term fully offsetting security-based swaps means security-
based swaps of equivalent terms where no net cash flow would be owed to 
either counterparty after the offset of payment obligations thereunder.

[[Page 6413]]

    (i) The term material terms means each term that is required to be 
reported to a registered security-based swap data repository or the 
Commission pursuant to Sec.  242.901 of this chapter; provided, 
however, that such definition does not include any term that is not 
relevant to the ongoing rights and obligations of the parties and the 
valuation of the security-based swap.
    (j) The term multilateral portfolio compression exercise means an 
exercise by which multiple security-based swap counterparties wholly 
terminate or change the notional value of some or all of the security-
based swaps submitted by the counterparties for inclusion in the 
portfolio compression exercise and, depending on the methodology 
employed, replace the terminated security-based swaps with other 
security-based swaps whose combined notional value (or some other 
measure of risk) is less than the combined notional value (or some 
other measure of risk) of the terminated security-based swaps in the 
exercise.
    (k) The term national securities exchange means an exchange as 
defined in section 3(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78c(a)(1)) that is registered pursuant to section 6 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78f).
    (l) The term portfolio reconciliation means any process by which 
the counterparties to one or more security-based swaps:
    (1) Exchange the material terms of all security-based swaps in the 
security-based swap portfolio between the counterparties;
    (2) Exchange each counterparty's valuation of each security-based 
swap in the security-based swap portfolio between the counterparties as 
of the close of business on the immediately preceding business day; and
    (3) Resolve any discrepancy in valuations or material terms.
    (m) The term prudential regulator has the meaning given to the term 
in section 3(a)(74) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(74)) and includes the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
the Farm Credit Association, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as 
applicable to the security-based swap dealer or major security-based 
swap participant.
    (n) The term security-based swap execution facility means a 
security-based swap execution facility as defined in section 3(a)(77) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(77)) that is 
registered pursuant to section 3D of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c-4).
    (o) The term security-based swap portfolio means all security-based 
swaps currently in effect between a particular security-based swap 
dealer or major security-based swap participant and a particular 
counterparty.
    (p) The term trade acknowledgment means a written or electronic 
record of a security-based swap transaction sent by one counterparty of 
the security-based swap transaction to the other.
    (q) The term valuation means the current market value or net 
present value of a security-based swap.
    (r) The term verification means the process by which a trade 
acknowledgment has been manually, electronically, or by some other 
legally equivalent means, signed by the receiving counterparty.

0
4. Section 240.15Fi-3 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  240.15Fi-3  Security-based swap portfolio reconciliation.

    (a) Security-based swaps with security-based swap dealers or major 
security-based swap participants. Each security-based swap dealer and 
major security-based swap participant shall engage in portfolio 
reconciliation as follows for all security-based swaps in which its 
counterparty is also a security-based swap dealer or major security-
based swap participant.
    (1) Each security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant shall agree in writing with each of its counterparties on 
the terms of the portfolio reconciliation including, if applicable, 
agreement on the selection of any third party service provider who may 
be performing the portfolio reconciliation.
    (2) The portfolio reconciliation may be performed on a bilateral 
basis by the counterparties or by a third party selected by the 
counterparties in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
    (3) The portfolio reconciliation shall be performed no less 
frequently than:
    (i) Once each business day for each security-based swap portfolio 
that includes 500 or more security-based swaps;
    (ii) Once each week for each security-based swap portfolio that 
includes more than 50 but fewer than 500 security-based swaps on any 
business day during the week; and
    (iii) Once each calendar quarter for each security-based swap 
portfolio that includes no more than 50 security-based swaps at any 
time during the calendar quarter.
    (4) Each security-based swap dealer and major security-based swap 
participant shall resolve immediately any discrepancy in a material 
term of a security-based swap identified as part of a portfolio 
reconciliation or otherwise.
    (5) Each security-based swap dealer and major security-based swap 
participant shall establish, maintain, and follow written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to resolve any discrepancy in a 
valuation identified as part of a portfolio reconciliation or otherwise 
as soon as possible, but in any event within five business days after 
the date on which the discrepancy is first identified, provided that 
the security-based swap dealer and major security-based swap 
participant establishes, maintains, and follows written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to identify how the security-based swap 
dealer or major security-based swap participant will comply with any 
variation margin requirements under section 15F(e) of the Act (15 
U.S.C. 78o-10(e)) and Sec.  240.18a-3 (and any subsequent regulations 
promulgated pursuant to section 15F(e) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-
10(e))) pending resolution of the discrepancy in valuation. For 
purposes of this paragraph (a)(5), a difference between the lower 
valuation and the higher valuation of less than 10 percent of the 
higher valuation need not be deemed a discrepancy.
    (b) Security-based swaps with entities other than security-based 
swap dealers or major security-based swap participants. Each security-
based swap dealer and major security-based swap participant shall 
establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that it engages in portfolio 
reconciliation for all security-based swaps in which its counterparty 
is neither a security-based swap dealer nor a major security-based swap 
participant as follows.
    (1) Each security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant shall agree in writing with each of its counterparties on 
the terms of the portfolio reconciliation including, if applicable, 
agreement on the selection of any third party service provider who may 
be performing the reconciliation.
    (2) The portfolio reconciliation may be performed on a bilateral 
basis by the counterparties or by one or more third parties selected by 
the counterparties in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
    (3) The portfolio reconciliation will be required to be performed 
no less frequently than:

[[Page 6414]]

    (i) Once each calendar quarter for each security-based swap 
portfolio that includes more than 100 security-based swaps at any time 
during the calendar quarter; and
    (ii) Once annually for each security-based swap portfolio that 
includes no more than 100 security-based swaps at any time during the 
calendar year.
    (4) Each security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant shall establish, maintain, and follow written procedures 
reasonably designed to resolve any discrepancies in the valuation or 
material terms of each security-based swap identified as part of a 
portfolio reconciliation or otherwise with a counterparty that is 
neither a security-based swap dealer nor major security-based swap 
participant in a timely fashion. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(4), 
a difference between the lower valuation and the higher valuation of 
less than 10 percent of the higher valuation need not be deemed a 
discrepancy.
    (c) Reporting of security-based swap valuation disputes--(1) Notice 
requirement. Each security-based swap dealer and major security-based 
swap participant shall promptly notify the Commission, in a form and 
manner acceptable to the Commission, and any applicable prudential 
regulator of any security-based swap valuation dispute in excess of 
$20,000,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency), at either the 
transaction or portfolio level, if not resolved within:
    (i) Three business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty that 
is a security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant; or
    (ii) Five business days, if the dispute is with a counterparty that 
is not a security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant.
    (2) Amendments. Each security-based swap dealer and major security-
based swap participant shall notify the Commission, in a form and 
manner acceptable to the Commission, and any applicable prudential 
regulator, if the amount of any security-based swap valuation dispute 
that was the subject of a previous notice made pursuant to paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section increases or decreases by more than $20,000,000 
(or its equivalent in any other currency), at either the transaction or 
portfolio level. Such amended notice shall be provided to the 
Commission and any applicable prudential regulator no later than the 
last business day of the calendar month in which the applicable 
security-based swap valuation dispute increases or decreases by the 
applicable dispute amount.
    (d) Reconciliation of cleared security-based swaps. Nothing in this 
section shall apply to any security-based swap that is, directly or 
indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency registered 
pursuant to section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or by a clearing 
agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or 
order pursuant to section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1).

0
5. Section 240.15Fi-4 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  240.15Fi-4  Security-based swap portfolio compression.

    (a) Portfolio compression with security-based swap dealers and 
major security-based swap participants--(1) Bilateral offset. Each 
security-based swap dealer and major security-based swap participant 
shall establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures 
for terminating each fully offsetting security-based swap between a 
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant and 
another security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant in a timely fashion, when appropriate.
    (2) Bilateral compression. Each security-based swap dealer and 
major security-based swap participant shall establish, maintain, and 
follow written policies and procedures for periodically engaging in 
bilateral portfolio compression exercises, when appropriate, with each 
counterparty that is also a security-based swap dealer or major 
security-based swap participant. Such policies and procedures shall 
address, among other things, the evaluation of bilateral portfolio 
compression exercises that are initiated, offered, or sponsored by any 
third party.
    (3) Multilateral compression. Each security-based swap dealer and 
major security-based swap participant shall establish, maintain, and 
follow written policies and procedures for periodically engaging in 
multilateral portfolio compression exercises, when appropriate, with 
each counterparty that is also a security-based swap dealer or major 
security-based swap participant. Such policies and procedures shall 
address, among other things, the evaluation of multilateral portfolio 
compression exercises that are initiated, offered, or sponsored by any 
third party.
    (b) Portfolio compression with counterparties other than security-
based swap dealers and major security-based swap participants. Each 
security-based swap dealer and major security-based swap participant 
shall establish, maintain, and follow written policies and procedures 
for periodically terminating fully offsetting security-based swaps and 
for engaging in bilateral or multilateral portfolio compression 
exercises with respect to security-based swaps in which its 
counterparty is an entity other than a security-based swap dealer or 
major security-based swap participant, when appropriate and to the 
extent requested by any such counterparty.
    (c) Portfolio compression of cleared security-based swaps. Nothing 
in this section shall apply to any security-based swap that is, 
directly or indirectly, submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency 
registered pursuant to section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or by a 
clearing agency that the Commission has exempted from registration by 
rule or order pursuant to section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1).

0
6. Section 240.15Fi-5 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  240.15Fi-5   Security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation.

    (a) Scope--(1) Applicability. The requirements of this section 
shall not apply to:
    (i) Security-based swaps executed prior to the date on which a 
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant is 
required to be in compliance with this section;
    (ii) Any security-based swap that is, directly or indirectly, 
submitted to and cleared by a clearing agency registered pursuant to 
section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or by a clearing agency that 
the Commission has exempted from registration by rule or order pursuant 
to section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1); and
    (iii) Security-based swaps executed anonymously on a national 
securities exchange or a security-based swap execution facility, 
Provided that:
    (A) Such security-based swaps are intended to be cleared and are 
actually submitted for clearing to a clearing agency;
    (B) All terms of such security-based swaps conform to the rules of 
the clearing agency; and
    (C) Upon acceptance of such security-based swap by the clearing 
agency:
    (1) The original security-based swap is extinguished;
    (2) The original security-based swap is replaced by equal and 
opposite security-based swaps with the clearing agency; and
    (3) All terms of the security-based swap shall conform to the 
product specifications of the cleared security-based swap established 
under the clearing agency's rules; and Provided further, That if a 
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap

[[Page 6415]]

participant receives notice that a security-based swap transaction has 
not been accepted for clearing by a clearing agency, the security-based 
swap dealer or major security-based swap participant shall be required 
to comply with the requirements of this section in all respects 
promptly after receipt of such notice.
    (2) Policies and procedures. Each security-based swap dealer and 
major security-based swap participant shall establish, maintain, and 
follow written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that the security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant executes written security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation with its counterparty that complies with the requirements 
of this section. The policies and procedures shall be approved in 
writing by a senior officer of the security-based swap dealer or major 
security-based swap participant, and a record of the approval shall be 
retained. Other than trade acknowledgements and verifications of 
security-based swap transactions under Sec.  240.15Fi-2, the security-
based swap trading relationship documentation shall be executed prior 
to, or contemporaneously with, executing a security-based swap with any 
counterparty.
    (b) Security-based swap trading relationship documentation. (1) The 
security-based swap trading relationship documentation shall be in 
writing and shall include all terms governing the trading relationship 
between the security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant and its counterparty, including, without limitation, terms 
addressing payment obligations, netting of payments, events of default 
or other termination events, calculation and netting of obligations 
upon termination, transfer of rights and obligations, governing law, 
valuation, and dispute resolution.
    (2) The security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
shall include all trade acknowledgements and verifications of security-
based swap transactions under Sec.  240.15Fi-2.
    (3) The security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
shall include credit support arrangements, which shall contain, in 
accordance with applicable requirements under Commission regulations or 
regulations adopted by prudential regulators and without limitation, 
the following:
    (i) Initial and variation margin requirements, if any;
    (ii) Types of assets that may be used as margin and asset valuation 
haircuts, if any;
    (iii) Investment and re-hypothecation terms for assets used as 
margin for uncleared security-based swaps, if any; and
    (iv) Custodial arrangements for margin assets, including whether 
margin assets are to be segregated with an independent third party, in 
accordance with the notice requirement in section 3E(f)(1)(A) of the 
Act (15 U.S.C. 78c-5(f)(1)(A)) (and either Sec.  240.15c3-3(p)(4)(i) or 
Sec.  240.18a-4(d)(1) thereunder, as applicable), if any.
    (4)(i) The security-based swap trading relationship documentation 
between security-based swap dealers, between major security-based swap 
participants, between a security-based swap dealer and major security-
based swap participant, between a security-based swap dealer or major 
security-based swap participant and a financial counterparty, and, if 
requested by any other counterparty, between a security-based swap 
dealer or major security-based swap participant and such counterparty, 
shall include written documentation in which the parties agree on the 
process, which may include any agreed upon methods, procedures, rules, 
and inputs, for determining the value of each security-based swap at 
any time from execution to the termination, maturity, or expiration of 
such security-based swap for the purposes of complying with the margin 
requirements under section 15F(e) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e)) and 
Sec.  240.18a-3 (and any subsequent regulations promulgated pursuant to 
section 15F(e) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e))), and the risk 
management requirements under section 15F(j) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-
10(j)) of the Act and Sec.  240.15Fh-3(h)(2)(iii)(I) (and any 
subsequent regulations promulgated pursuant to section 15F(j) of the 
Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-10(j))). To the maximum extent practicable, the 
valuation of each security-based swap shall be based on recently 
executed transactions, valuations provided by independent third 
parties, or other objective criteria.
    (ii) Such documentation shall include either:
    (A) Alternative methods for determining the value of the security-
based swap for the purposes of complying with this paragraph (b)(4) in 
the event of the unavailability or other failure of any input required 
to value the security-based swap for such purposes; or
    (B) A valuation dispute resolution process by which the value of 
the security-based swap shall be determined for the purposes of 
complying with this paragraph (b)(4).
    (iii) A security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap 
participant is not required to disclose to the counterparty 
confidential, proprietary information about any model it may use to 
value a security-based swap.
    (iv) The parties may agree on changes or procedures for modifying 
or amending the documentation at any time.
    (5) The security-based swap trading relationship documentation of a 
security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant 
shall include the following:
    (i) A statement of whether the security-based swap dealer or major 
security-based swap participant is an insured depository institution 
(as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813) or a financial company (as defined in 
section 201(a)(11) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 5381(a)(11));
    (ii) A statement of whether the counterparty is an insured 
depository institution or financial company;
    (iii) A statement that in the event either the security-based swap 
dealer or major security-based swap participant or its counterparty 
becomes a covered financial company (as defined in section 201(a)(8) of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 
U.S.C. 5381(a)(8)) or is an insured depository institution for which 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has been appointed as 
a receiver (the ``covered party''), certain limitations under Title II 
of the Dodd-Frank Act or the Federal Deposit Insurance Act may apply to 
the right of the non-covered party to terminate, liquidate, or net any 
security-based swap by reason of the appointment of the FDIC as 
receiver, notwithstanding the agreement of the parties in the security-
based swap trading relationship documentation, and that the FDIC may 
have certain rights to transfer security-based swaps of the covered 
party under section 210(c)(9)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(9)(A), or 12 U.S.C. 
1821(e)(9)(A); and
    (iv) An agreement between the security-based swap dealer or major 
security-based swap participant and its counterparty to provide notice 
if either it or its counterparty becomes or ceases to be an insured 
depository institution or a financial company.
    (6) The security-based swap trading relationship documentation of 
each security-based swap dealer and major security-based swap 
participant shall contain a notice that, upon acceptance of a security-
based swap by a clearing agency:

[[Page 6416]]

    (i) The original security-based swap is extinguished;
    (ii) The original security-based swap is replaced by equal and 
opposite security-based swaps with the clearing agency; and
    (iii) All terms of the security-based swap shall conform to the 
product specifications of the cleared security-based swap established 
under the clearing agency's rules.
    (c) Audit of security-based swap trading relationship 
documentation. Each security-based swap dealer and major security-based 
swap participant shall have an independent auditor conduct periodic 
audits sufficient to identify any material weakness in its 
documentation policies and procedures required by this section. A 
record of the results of each audit shall be retained.

0
7. Section 240.17a-3 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(31) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  240.17a-3  Records to be made by certain exchange members, 
brokers and dealers.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (31)(i) A record of each security-based swap portfolio 
reconciliation, whether conducted pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-3 or 
otherwise, including the dates of the security-based swap portfolio 
reconciliation, the number of portfolio reconciliation discrepancies, 
the number of security-based swap valuation disputes (including the 
time-to-resolution of each valuation dispute and the age of outstanding 
valuation disputes, categorized by transaction and counterparty), and 
the name of the third-party entity performing the security-based swap 
portfolio reconciliation, if any.
    (ii) A copy of each notification required to be provided to the 
Commission pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-3(c).
    (iii) A record of each bilateral offset and each bilateral 
portfolio compression exercise or multilateral portfolio compression 
exercise in which it participates, whether conducted pursuant to Sec.  
240.15Fi-4 or otherwise, including the dates of the offset or 
compression, the security-based swaps included in the offset or 
compression, the identity of the counterparties participating in the 
offset or compression, the results of the compression, and the name of 
the third-party entity performing the offset or compression, if any.
* * * * *

0
8. Section 240.17a-4 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(1) and adding 
paragraphs (e)(11) and (12) to read as follows:

Sec.  240.17a-4  Records to be preserved by certain exchange members, 
brokers and dealers.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) All records required to be made pursuant to Sec.  240.17a-
3(a)(4), (6) through (11), (16), (18) through (20), and (25) through 
(31), and analogous records created pursuant to Sec.  240.17a-3(e).
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (11) The written policies and procedures required pursuant to 
Sec. Sec.  240.15Fi-3, 240.15Fi-4, and 240.15Fi-5 until three years 
after termination of the use of the policies and procedures.
    (12)(i) Each written agreement with counterparties on the terms of 
portfolio reconciliation with those counterparties as required to be 
created under Sec.  240.15Fi-3(a)(1) and (b)(1) until three years after 
the termination of the agreement and all transactions governed thereby.
    (ii) Security-based swap trading relationship documentation with 
counterparties required to be created under Sec.  240.15Fi-5 until 
three years after the termination of such documentation and all 
transactions governed thereby.
    (iii) A record of the results of each audit required to be 
performed pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-5(c) until three years after the 
conclusion of the audit.
* * * * *

0
9. Section 240.18a-5 is amended by adding paragraphs (a)(18) and 
(b)(14) to read as follows:

Sec.  240.18a-5  Records to be made by certain security-based swap 
dealers and major security-based swap participants.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (18)(i) A record of each security-based swap portfolio 
reconciliation, whether conducted pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-3 or 
otherwise, including the dates of the security-based swap portfolio 
reconciliation, the number of portfolio reconciliation discrepancies, 
the number of security-based swap valuation disputes (including the 
time-to-resolution of each valuation dispute and the age of outstanding 
valuation disputes, categorized by transaction and counterparty), and 
the name of the third-party entity performing the security-based swap 
portfolio reconciliation, if any.
    (ii) A copy of each notification required to be provided to the 
Commission pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-3(c).
    (iii) A record of each bilateral offset and each bilateral 
portfolio compression exercise or multilateral portfolio compression 
exercise in which it participates, whether conducted pursuant to Sec.  
240.15Fi-4 or otherwise, including the dates of the offset or 
compression, the security-based swaps included in the offset or 
compression, the identity of the counterparties participating in the 
offset or compression, the results of the compression, and the name of 
the third-party entity performing the offset or compression, if any.
    (b) * * *
    (14)(i) A record of each security-based swap portfolio 
reconciliation, whether conducted pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-3 or 
otherwise, including the dates of the security-based swap portfolio 
reconciliation, the number of portfolio reconciliation discrepancies, 
the number of security-based swap valuation disputes (including the 
time-to-resolution of each valuation dispute and the age of outstanding 
valuation disputes, categorized by transaction and counterparty), and 
the name of the third-party entity performing the security-based swap 
portfolio reconciliation, if any.
    (ii) A copy of each notification required to be provided to the 
Commission pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-3(c).
    (iii) A record of each bilateral offset and each bilateral 
portfolio compression exercise or multilateral portfolio compression 
exercise in which it participates, whether conducted pursuant to Sec.  
240.15Fi-4 or otherwise, including the dates of the offset or 
compression, the security-based swaps included in the offset or 
compression, the identity of the counterparties participating in the 
offset or compression, the results of the compression, and the name of 
the third-party entity performing the offset or compression, if any.
* * * * *

0
10. Section 240.18a-6 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and 
(b)(2)(i) and adding paragraphs (d)(4) and (5) to read as follows:

Sec.  240.18a-6   Records to be preserved by certain security-based 
swap dealers and major security-based swap participants.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) All records required to be made pursuant to Sec.  240.18a-
5(a)(5) through (9) and (12) through (18).
* * * * *
    (2) * * *

[[Page 6417]]

    (i) All records required to be made pursuant to Sec.  240.18a-
5(b)(4) through (7) and (9) through (14).
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (4) The written policies and procedures required pursuant to 
Sec. Sec.  240.15Fi-3, 240.15Fi-4, and 240.15Fi-5 until three years 
after termination of the use of the policies and procedures.
    (5)(i) Each written agreement with counterparties on the terms of 
portfolio reconciliation with those counterparties as required to be 
created under Sec.  240.15Fi-3(a)(1) and (b)(1) until three years after 
the termination of the agreement and all transactions governed thereby.
    (ii) Security-based swap trading relationship documentation with 
counterparties required to be created under Sec.  240.15Fi-5 until 
three years after the termination of such documentation and all 
transactions governed thereby.
    (iii) A record of the results of each audit required to be 
performed pursuant to Sec.  240.15Fi-5(c) until three years after the 
conclusion of the audit.
* * * * *

    Dated: December 18, 2019.

    By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-27762 Filed 2-3-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P