Document ID: SEC-2019-1143-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
Posted Date: 2019-08-09T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 154 (Friday, August 9, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39646-39681]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-17047]

[[Page 39645]]

Vol. 84

Friday,

No. 154

August 9, 2019

Part III

Securities and Exchange Commission

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Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; 
Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend and Restate the 
MSRB's August 2, 2012 Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of 
Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 154 / Friday, August 9, 2019 / 
Notices  

[[Page 39646]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-86572; File No. SR-MSRB-2019-10]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend and Restate 
the MSRB's August 2, 2012 Interpretive Notice Concerning the 
Application of Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities

August 5, 2019.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act'' or ``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice 
is hereby given that on August 1, 2019 the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board (``MSRB'') filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as 
described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared 
by the MSRB. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The MSRB filed with the Commission a proposed rule change (the 
``proposed rule change'') to amend and restate the MSRB's August 2, 
2012 interpretive notice concerning the application of MSRB Rule G-17 
to underwriters of municipal securities (the ``2012 Interpretive 
Notice'').\3\ The proposed rule change seeks to update the 2012 
Interpretive Notice in light of its implementation in the market since 
its first adoption and current market practices.
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    \3\ The 2012 Interpretive Notice was approved by the SEC on May 
4, 2012 and became effective on August 2, 2012. See Release No. 34-
66927 (May 4, 2012); 77 FR 27509 (May 10, 2012) (File No. SR-MSRB-
2011-09); and MSRB Notice 2012-25 (May 7, 2012). The 2012 
Interpretive Notice is available here.
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    Following the approval of the proposed rule change, the MSRB will 
publish a regulatory notice within 90 days of the publication of 
approval in the Federal Register (the 2012 Interpretive Notice, so 
amended by the proposed rule change, is referred to herein as the 
``Revised Interpretive Notice''), and such notice shall specify the 
compliance date for the amendments described in the proposed rule 
change, which in any case shall be not less than 90 days, nor more than 
one year, following the date of the notice establishing such compliance 
date. Until such compliance date, the current version of the 2012 
Interpretive Notice would remain in effect with respect to underwriting 
relationships commenced prior to the compliance date, at which time 
underwriters would then be subject to the Revised Interpretive Notice 
for all of their underwriting relationships beginning on or after that 
date. The 2012 Interpretive Notice would be superseded by the Revised 
Interpretive Notice as of such compliance date. Similarly, and as 
further described herein, the MSRB's implementation guidance dated July 
18, 2012 concerning the 2012 Interpretive Notice (the ``Implementation 
Guidance'') \4\ and the regulatory guidance dated March 25, 2013 
answering certain frequently asked questions regarding the 2012 
Interpretive Notice (the ``FAQs'') \5\ would be withdrawn as of such 
compliance date.
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    \4\ See MSRB Notice 2012-38 (July 18, 2012).
    \5\ See MSRB Notice 2013-08 (Mar. 25, 2013).
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    The text of the proposed rule change is available on the MSRB's 
website at www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/SEC-Filings/2019-Filings.aspx, at the MSRB's principal office, and at the Commission's 
Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the MSRB included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The MSRB has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections 
A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose

I. Background

    Rule G-17 requires that, in the conduct of municipal securities 
activities, brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers 
(collectively, ``dealers'') deal fairly with all persons, including 
municipal entity issuers, and not engage in any deceptive, dishonest or 
unfair practice. The 2012 Interpretive Notice describes certain fair 
dealing obligations dealers owe to issuers in the course of their 
underwriting relationships, and promotes fair dealing in the municipal 
securities market by, among other things, prescribing the delivery of 
written disclosures to issuers regarding the nature of their 
underwriting relationships, compensation and other conflicts, and the 
risks associated with certain recommended municipal security 
transactions in negotiated offerings. Beyond these matters, the 2012 
Interpretive Notice also describes an underwriter's obligation to: Have 
a reasonable basis for the representations it makes, and other material 
information it provides, to an issuer in order to ensure that such 
representations are accurate and not misleading; purchase securities 
from the issuer at a fair and reasonable price, taking into 
consideration all relevant factors, including the best judgment of the 
underwriter as to the fair market value of the issue at the time of 
pricing; honor the issuer's rules for retail order periods by, among 
other things, not accepting or placing orders that do not satisfy the 
issuer's definition of ``retail;'' and avoid certain lavish gifts and 
entertainment.\6\
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    \6\ As further described therein, the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
provides that, except where otherwise noted, the obligations 
described are only applicable to negotiated offerings and do not 
apply to selling group members.
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II. Proposed Rule Change

    In response to informal feedback from market participants regarding 
their experience with the 2012 Interpretive Notice and, particularly, 
the effectiveness of the disclosures and related requirements, the MSRB 
initiated a retrospective review of the 2012 Interpretive Notice and 
published a request for comment on June 5, 2018 (the ``Concept 
Proposal'').\7\ The Concept Proposal requested feedback on whether 
amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice should be considered to help 
ensure that it continues to achieve its intended purpose and reflects 
the current state of the municipal securities market. The MSRB received 
five comment letters in response to the Concept Proposal, all of which 
supported the retrospective review and suggested modifications to the 
2012 Interpretive Notice.\8\ The feedback

[[Page 39647]]

received formed the foundation for a subsequent request for comment 
published on November 16, 2018 (the ``Request for Comment'').\9\ The 
MSRB received five comment letters in response to the Request for 
Comment.\10\ Following review of the comments, the MSRB conducted 
additional outreach with various market participants. The feedback 
received and follow-up conversations formed the basis for the proposed 
rule change.
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    \7\ MSRB Notice 2018-10 (June 5, 2018) (i.e., the Concept 
Proposal).
    \8\ See Letters from: Mike Nicholas, Chief Executive Officer, 
Bond Dealers of America (BDA), dated August 6, 2018 (``BDA Letter 
I''); Emily S. Brock, Director, Federal Liaison Center, Government 
Finance Officers Association (GFOA), dated August 6, 2018 (``GFOA 
Letter I''); Susan Gaffney, Executive Director, National Association 
of Municipal Advisors (NAMA), dated August 6, 2018 (``NAMA Letter 
I''); Leslie M. Norwood, Managing Director and Associate General 
Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA), dated August 6, 2018 (``SIFMA Letter I''); and J. Ben 
Watkins III, Director, State of Florida, Division of Bond Finance of 
the State Board of Administration (``Florida Division of Bond 
Finance''), dated August 8, 2018 (``Florida Division of Bond Finance 
Letter'').
    \9\ See MSRB Notice 2018-29 (November 16, 2018) (i.e., the 
Request for Comment).
    \10\ See Letters from: Mike Nicholas, Chief Executive Officer, 
BDA, dated January 15, 2019 (``BDA Letter II''); Emily S. Brock, 
Director, Federal Liaison Center, GFOA, dated January 15, 2019 
(``GFOA Letter II''); Susan Gaffney, Executive Director, NAMA, dated 
January 15, 2019 (``NAMA Letter II''); Leslie M. Norwood, Managing 
Director and Associate General Counsel, SIFMA, dated January 15, 
2019 (``SIFMA Letter II''); and City of San Diego (unsigned and 
undated) (``City of San Diego Letter'').
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    In general, the comment letters observed that the disclosures under 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice had become too voluminous in length and 
boilerplate in nature. Commenters generally stated that the length and 
nature of the disclosures both created a significant burden for dealers 
and also made it difficult for issuers to assess which conflicts, 
risks, and other matters were most significant. As more fully discussed 
below in the MSRB's summary of comments, commenters also addressed the 
following major topics--the redundancy of certain disclosures received 
by an issuer, particularly if an issuer frequently goes to market and/
or a syndicate is formed in a particular offering; the benefits of 
separately identifying certain categories of disclosures; the standard 
applicable to determine whether an underwriter has made a 
recommendation to an issuer of a particular municipal securities 
financing; what potential material conflicts of interest must be 
disclosed by an underwriter; whether an underwriter must disclose the 
conflicts of other parties involved with the transaction; underwriter 
communications regarding the issuer's engagement of a municipal 
advisor; what an underwriter may rely upon to substantiate an issuer's 
receipt of a disclosure; and various other clarifications and revisions 
to the 2012 Interpretive Notice that would promote market efficiency 
and reduce the regulatory burden on underwriters, while not diminishing 
the protections afforded to municipal entity issuers.
    The amendments in the proposed rule change are intended to update 
and streamline certain obligations specified in the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice and, thereby, benefit issuers and underwriters alike by reducing 
the burdens associated with those obligations, including the obligation 
of underwriters to make, and the burden on issuers to acknowledge and 
review, written disclosures that itemize risks and conflicts that are 
unlikely to materialize during the course of a transaction, not unique 
to a given transaction or a particular underwriter where a syndicate is 
formed, and/or otherwise duplicative.

A. Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation 
Guidance, and the FAQs Into the Revised Interpretive Notice and Related 
Revisions

    The proposed rule change would integrate the substantive concepts 
from the Implementation Guidance \11\ and the FAQs \12\ into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice and, thereby, would consolidate the 
Implementation Guidance, FAQs, and the Revised Interpretive Notice into 
a single publication. Except as described herein, the proposed rule 
change would incorporate the substantive content of the Implementation 
Guidance and FAQs without material revision. Along with the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, assuming approval of the proposed rule change, the 
Implementation Guidance and FAQs would be withdrawn as of the 
compliance date of the Revised Interpretive Notice. The proposed 
technical revisions are necessary to conform or supplement the 
statements from the Implementation Guidance and FAQs into the Revised 
Interpretive Notice.\13\ Unless otherwise expressly stated herein, the 
MSRB's conforming edits are only intended to promote consistency of 
language and otherwise are not intended to substantively alter the 
understanding and implementation of these existing fair dealing 
concepts.
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    \11\ Published on July 18, 2012, the Implementation Guidance was 
intended to assist dealers in revising their written supervisory 
procedures in accordance with their fair practice obligations under 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice.
    \12\ Published on March 25, 2013, the FAQs answered certain 
frequently asked questions regarding operational matters pertaining 
to the 2012 Interpretive Notice.
    \13\ The MSRB notes that the Implementation Guidance and FAQs 
were issued in distinct formats--i.e., in a list of bulleted 
statements and frequently asked questions, respectively--from the 
format of the 2012 Interpretive Notice and, consequently, in many 
instances cannot be simply copied-and-pasted into the proposed 
format of the Revised Interpretive Notice without conforming 
revisions. Similarly, the proposed rule change incorporates newly 
defined terms and other modified substantive concepts (e.g., 
assigning the fair dealing obligation to provide the standard 
disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures to syndicate 
managers, as further described herein), which require tailoring 
edits to appropriately integrate the existing concepts of the 
Implementation Guidance and FAQs into the Revised Interpretive 
Notice. Thus, the MSRB is proposing to make conforming technical 
revisions of a non-substantive, drafting nature when integrating the 
existing language of the Implementation Guidance and FAQs into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice (referred to hereinafter as, 
``conforming edits''). The MSRB has identified in the discussion 
below when it has proposed such conforming edits and also provided 
the proposed language of the Revised Interpretive Notice in relevant 
part for ease of comparison.
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i. Incorporate Statements Regarding the Applicability of the Revised 
Interpretive Notice to the Continuous Offering of Municipal Fund 
Securities
    As presently stated in the Implementation Guidance, no type of 
underwriting is wholly excluded from the application of the 2012 
Interpretive Notice. The Implementation Guidance makes clear that the 
2012 Interpretive Notice applies not only to primary offerings of new 
issues of municipal bonds and notes by an underwriter, but also to a 
dealer serving as primary distributor (but not to dealers serving 
solely as selling dealers) in a continuous offering of municipal fund 
securities, such as interests in 529 savings plans.\14\ The proposed 
rule change would incorporate this language into the Revised 
Interpretive Notice as stated in the Implementation Guidance with one 
addition. More specifically, the proposed rule change would add a 
reference to Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) programs \15\ as 
another example of a continuous offering of municipal fund securities. 
In relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would read, ``[t]his 
notice applies not only to a primary offering of a new issue of 
municipal securities by an underwriter, but also to a dealer serving as 
primary distributor (but not to dealers serving solely as selling 
dealers) in a continuous offering of municipal fund securities, such as 
interests in 529 savings plans and Achieving a Better Life Experience 
(ABLE) programs.''
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    \14\ As a general matter, a 529 savings plan is a tax-advantaged 
qualified tuition program established by a state, or an agency, or 
instrumentality of a state, designed to encourage families to save 
for a child's future education expenses.
    \15\ As a general matter, an ABLE program is a tax-advantaged 
savings account established by a state, or an agency, or 
instrumentality of a state, designed to allow eligible individuals 
and their families to save on a tax-deferred basis for qualified 
disability expenses.

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[[Page 39648]]

ii. Incorporate Statements Regarding the Applicability of the Revised 
Interpretive Notice to a Primary Offering That Is Placed With Investors 
by a Placement Agent
    As presently stated in the Implementation Guidance, no type of 
underwriting is wholly excluded from the application of the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, including certain private placement activities. In 
relevant part, the Implementation Guidance states:

    In a private placement where a dealer acting as placement agent 
takes on a true agency role with the issuer and does not take a 
principal position (including not taking a `riskless principal' 
position) in the securities being placed, the disclosure relating to 
an `arm's length' relationship would be inapplicable and may be 
omitted due to the agent-principal relationship between the dealer 
and issuer that normally gives rise to state law obligations--
whether termed as a fiduciary or other obligation of trust. . . . As 
described [in the Implementation Guidance], in a private placement 
where a dealer acts as a true placement agent, the disclosure 
relating to fiduciary duty would be inapplicable and may be omitted 
due to the existence of similar state law obligations. . . . In many 
private placements, as well as in certain other types of new issue 
offerings, no official statement may be produced, so that to the 
extent that such an offering occurs without the production of an 
official statement, the dealer would not be required to disclose its 
role with regard to the review of an official statement.

In a footnote to this language, the Implementation Guidance further 
states:

    In certain other contexts, depending on the specific facts and 
circumstances, a dealer acting as an underwriter or primary 
distributor may take on, either through an agency arrangement or 
other purposeful understanding, a fiduciary relationship with the 
issuer. In such cases, it would also be appropriate for the 
underwriter to omit disclosures inapplicable as a result of such 
relationship. Dealers exercising an option to omit such disclosure 
should understand that they are effectively acknowledging the 
existence of a fiduciary responsibility on behalf of the issuer.

The proposed rule change would incorporate these concepts from the 
Implementation Guidance into the Revised Interpretive Notice with 
conforming edits and the omission of certain language. It also would 
incorporate a supplemental concept regarding how a dealer's activities 
as a placement agent may interact with the Commission's registration 
and record-keeping requirements for municipal advisors.\16\
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    \16\ See Registration of Municipal Advisors, Release No. 34-
70462 (September 20, 2013), 78 FR 67467 (hereinafter, the ``MA Rule 
Adopting Release'') (November 12, 2013) (available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-70462.pdf); see also note 18 infra 
and related text.
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    In terms of the conforming edits, the proposed rule change would 
not word-for-word integrate the existing text that, ``. . . in a 
private placement where a dealer acts as a true placement agent, the 
disclosure relating to a fiduciary duty would be inapplicable and may 
be omitted due to the existence of similar state law obligations.'' In 
light of the other amendments proposed herein, the proposed rule change 
would revise and supplement the existing text with the following 
conforming edits that, ``it would also be appropriate for an 
underwriter to omit those disclosures inapplicable as a result of such 
relationship and the existence of any analogous legal obligations under 
other law, such as certain fiduciary duties existing pursuant to 
applicable state law'' (emphasis added). The MSRB believes that the 
guidance provided by this revised and supplemented language is 
substantively equivalent to the concept articulated by the omitted 
statement.
    Additionally, the proposed rule change would omit the final 
sentence from the footnote of the Implementation Guidance stating that, 
``[d]ealers exercising an option to omit such disclosure should 
understand that they are effectively acknowledging the existence of a 
fiduciary responsibility on behalf of the issuer.'' The MSRB believes 
that this statement is substantively redundant with the statements that 
precede it and, ultimately, may create more confusion than it would 
resolve, as its inclusion in the Revised Interpretive Notice might be 
interpreted to bind underwriters into a binary scenario of either: (1) 
Including the relevant disclosure(s) and, thereby, communicating the 
lack of a fiduciary duty to an issuer client, or (2) omitting the 
relevant disclosure(s) and, thereby, ``effectively acknowledging'' the 
existence of a fiduciary duty to an issuer client. At bottom, an 
underwriter has a fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17 to not engage 
in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice when interacting with a 
municipal entity client in the course of an underwriting relationship, 
which requires the underwriter to accurately, honestly, and fairly 
describe its services and the scope of its relationship with the 
municipal entity. This overarching fair dealing obligation requires an 
underwriter to include, omit, and/or supplement the relevant fiduciary 
disclosures as necessary to meet its fair dealing obligations in light 
of the particular facts and circumstances of a given transaction. 
Consequently, the exclusion of this statement from the proposed rule 
change is not intended to diminish this overarching fair dealing 
obligation, but, rather, eliminate a potentially confusing and 
redundant statement.
    The Revised Interpretive Notice in relevant part would provide:

    In a private placement where a dealer acting as placement agent 
takes on a true agency role with the issuer and does not take a 
principal position (including not taking a `riskless principal' 
position) in the securities being placed, the disclosure relating to 
an `arm's length' relationship would be inapplicable and may be 
omitted due to the agent-principal relationship between the dealer 
and issuer that commonly gives rise to other duties as a matter of 
common law or another statutory or regulatory regime--whether termed 
as a fiduciary or other obligation of trust. . . . In certain other 
contexts, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, a 
dealer acting as an underwriter or primary distributor may take on, 
either through an agency arrangement or other purposeful 
understanding, such a fiduciary relationship with the issuer. In 
such cases, it would also be appropriate for an underwriter to omit 
those disclosures inapplicable as a result of such relationship and 
the existence of any analogous legal obligations under other law, 
such as certain fiduciary duties existing pursuant to applicable 
state law.

    In addition, the proposed rule change would update the 2012 
Interpretive Notice by incorporating supplemental language into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice intended to harmonize it with the 
Commission's adoption of its permanent rules regarding the registration 
and record-keeping requirements applicable to municipal advisors, and 
related exclusions and exceptions, which went into effect after the 
effective date of the 2012 Interpretive Notice.\17\ The Revised 
Interpretive Notice would also incorporate language regarding the 
application of the exclusion from the definition of ``municipal 
advisor'' applicable to dealers acting as underwriters pursuant to 
Exchange Act Rule 15Ba1-1(d)(2)(i) \18\ and the

[[Page 39649]]

application of this underwriter exclusion to a dealer's placement agent 
activities. In relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would 
state:
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    \17\ See Final MA Adopting Release (citation and link at note 16 
supra).
    \18\ See Final MA Rule Adopting Release, 78 FR at 67515-67516 
(stating: ``The Commission does not believe that the underwriter 
exclusion should be limited to a particular type of underwriting or 
a particular type of offering. Therefore, if a registered broker-
dealer, acting as a placement agent, performs municipal advisory 
activities that otherwise would be considered within the scope of 
the underwriting of a particular issuance of municipal securities as 
discussed [therein], the broker-dealer would not have to register as 
a municipal advisor.''); see also the Final MA Rule Adopting 
Release, 78 FR at 67513-67514 (discussing activities within and 
outside the scope of serving as an underwriter of a particular 
issuance of municipal securities for purposes of the underwriter 
exclusion).

    A dealer acting as a placement agent in the primary offering of 
a new issuance of municipal securities should also consider how the 
scope of its activities may interact with the registration and 
record-keeping requirements for municipal advisors adopted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the `Commission') under Section 
15B of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-4), including the application 
of the exclusion from the definition of `municipal advisor' 
applicable to a dealer acting as an underwriter pursuant to Exchange 
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Act Rule 15Ba1-1(d)(2)(i).

The MSRB believes that the guidance provided by this harmonizing 
language is in keeping with the existing references included in the 
2012 Interpretive Notice and its guidance regarding the existence of 
other relevant or similar legal obligations that could have a bearing 
on an underwriter's fair dealing obligations under Rule G-17.
iii. Incorporate Statements Regarding Negotiated Offerings and Defining 
Negotiated and Competitive Offerings for Purposes of the Revised 
Interpretive Notice
    By its terms, and as presently stated in the Implementation 
Guidance, the 2012 Interpretive Notice applies primarily to negotiated 
offerings of municipal securities, with many of its provisions not 
applicable to competitive offerings. The Implementation Guidance 
clarifies what constitutes a negotiated offering for purposes of the 
2012 Interpretive Notice, stating that:

    The MSRB has always viewed competitive offerings narrowly to 
mean new issues sold by the issuer to the underwriter on the basis 
of the lowest price bid by potential underwriters--that is, the fact 
that an issuer publishes a request for proposals and potential 
underwriters compete to be selected based on their professional 
qualifications, experience, financing ideas, and other subjective 
factors would not be viewed as representing a competitive offering 
for purposes of the Notice. In light of this meaning of the term 
`competitive underwriting,' it should be clear that, although most 
of the examples relating to misrepresentations and fairness of 
financial aspects of an offering consist of situations that would 
only arise in a negotiated offering, Rule G-17 should not be viewed 
as allowing an underwriter in a competitive underwriting to make 
misrepresentations to the issuer or to act unfairly in regard to the 
financial aspects of the new issue.

The proposed rule change would incorporate this language into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice as stated in the Implementation Guidance. 
In relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would read:

    The MSRB has always viewed competitive offerings narrowly to 
mean new issues sold by the issuer to the underwriter on the basis 
of the lowest price bid by potential underwriters--that is, the fact 
that an issuer publishes a request for proposals and potential 
underwriters compete to be selected based on their professional 
qualifications, experience, financing ideas, and other subjective 
factors would not be viewed as representing a competitive offering 
for purposes of this notice. In light of this meaning of the term 
`competitive underwriting,' it should be clear that, although most 
of the examples relating to misrepresentations and fairness of 
financial aspects of an offering consist of situations that would 
only arise in a negotiated offering, Rule G-17 should not be viewed 
as allowing an underwriter in a competitive underwriting to make 
misrepresentations to the issuer or to act unfairly in regard to the 
financial aspects of the new issue.
iv. Incorporate Statements Regarding the Applicability of the Revised 
Interpretive Notice to Persons Other Than Issuers of Municipal 
Securities and Update the Definition of Municipal Entities
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice outlines the duties that a dealer owes 
to an issuer of municipal securities when the dealer underwrites a new 
issuance. As explained in the Implementation Guidance, the 2012 
Interpretive Notice ``does not set out the underwriter's fair dealing 
obligations to other parties involved with a municipal securities 
financing, including a conduit borrower.'' As discussed further 
below,\19\ the MSRB sought feedback in the Concept Release and Request 
for Proposal regarding whether the 2012 Interpretive Notice should be 
amended to incorporate specifics regarding how an underwriter must 
fulfill its obligations to a conduit borrower. Ultimately, the MSRB 
decided not to incorporate such an amendment in the proposed rule 
change for the reasons discussed further herein, including that the 
issues presented by the relationship between underwriters and conduit 
borrowers are sufficiently distinct to merit their own full 
consideration in separate guidance. Accordingly, the proposed rule 
change would incorporate the language from the Implementation Guidance 
into the Revised Interpretive Notice with conforming edits, stating 
``[t]his notice does not set out the underwriter's fair-practice duties 
to other parties to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit 
borrowers).''
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    \19\ Relatedly, the comments received by the MSRB regarding the 
incorporation of this language are discussed further below in the 
MSRB's summary of comments. See related discussion under Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Disclosures 
to Conduit Borrowers and related notes 137 et. seq. infra; see also 
Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Disclosures to Conduit Borrowers and related note 228.
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    The proposed rule change would also update the definition of 
``municipal entity'' as used in the 2012 Interpretive Notice. In 
relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would read, ``. . . the 
term `municipal entity' is used as defined by Section 15B(e)(8) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the `Exchange Act'), 17 CFR 240.15Ba1-
1(g), and other rules and regulations thereunder.'' This revision would 
harmonize the Revised Interpretive Notice with the Final MA Rules and 
MSRB Rule G-42.\20\ The MSRB believes this revision to be non-
substantive.
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    \20\ See Rule G-42(f)(vi) (`` `Municipal entity' shall, for 
purposes of [Rule G-42], have the same meaning as in Section 
15B(e)(8) of the Act, 17 CFR 240.15Ba1-1(g) and other rules and 
regulations thereunder.'').
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v. Incorporate Statements Regarding Underwriters' Discouragement of the 
Engagement of a Municipal Advisor
    The Implementation Guidance further clarifies the scope of the 
prohibition included in the 2012 Interpretive Notice, affirming that an 
underwriter must not recommend that the issuer not retain a municipal 
advisor. The prior guidance states that ``an underwriter may not 
discourage an issuer from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply 
that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because the 
underwriter can provide the same services that a municipal advisor 
would.'' The proposed rule change would incorporate this language into 
the Revised Interpretive Notice as stated in the Implementation 
Guidance with conforming edits.\21\ In relevant part, the Revised 
Interpretive Notice would provide:
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    \21\ Relatedly, the comments received by the MSRB regarding the 
incorporation of this language are discussed further below in the 
MSRB's summary of comments. See related discussion under Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Underwriter 
Discouragement of Use of Municipal Advisor; Addition of a New 
Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement of Municipal Advisors 
and related notes 134 et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Inclusion of 
Existing Language Regarding the Discouragement of an Issuer's 
Engagement of a Municipal Advisor and Incorporation of a New 
Standard Disclosure Regarding the Issuer's Choice to Engage a 
Municipal Advisor and related notes 201 et. seq. infra.

    Underwriters also must not recommend issuers not retain a 
municipal advisor. Accordingly, underwriters may not discourage 
issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply that the 
hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant

[[Page 39650]]

because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide 
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the services that a municipal advisor would.

The MSRB believes this revision to be a non-substantive incorporation 
of existing guidance. The comments the MSRB received in response to 
this change are discussed herein in the MSRB's summary of comments.\22\
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    \22\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Underwriter Discouragement of 
Use of Municipal Advisor and under Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Request for Comment--Inclusion of Existing Language 
Regarding the Discouragement of an Issuer's Engagement of a 
Municipal Advisor and Incorporation of a New Standard Disclosure 
Regarding the Issuer's Choice to Engage a Municipal Advisor and 
related notes 201 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi. Incorporate Statements Regarding Third-Party Payments
    The Implementation Guidance clarifies the obligation of 
underwriters to disclose certain third-party payments, as well as other 
payments, values or credits received by an underwriter. More 
specifically, the 2012 Implementation Guidance states, ``[t]he third-
party payments to which the disclosure requirement under the [2012 
Interpretive Notice] would apply are those that give rise to actual or 
potential conflicts of interest and typically would not apply to third-
party arrangements for products and services of the type that are 
routinely entered into in the normal course of business, so long as any 
specific routine arrangement does not give rise to an actual or 
potential conflict of interest.'' The Implementation Guidance further 
states that, ``[e]ven though . . . the [2012 Interpretive Notice] 
specifically requires disclosure of the existence of any incentives for 
the underwriter to recommend a complex municipal securities financing 
or any other conflicts of interest associated with such recommendation, 
the specific requirement with respect to complex financings does not 
obviate the requirement to disclose the existence of payments, values, 
or credits received by the underwriter or of other material conflicts 
of interest in connection with any negotiated underwriting, whether it 
be complex or routine.''
    The proposed rule change would incorporate this language into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice as stated in the Implementation Guidance 
with the following exception and conforming edits. The proposed rule 
change omits the statements from the 2012 Implementation Guidance that 
the disclosure, ``. . . typically would not apply to third-party 
arrangements for products and services of the type that are routinely 
entered into in the normal course of business, so long as any specific 
routine arrangement does not give rise to an actual or potential 
conflict of interest.'' The MSRB views this language to be redundant 
with the prior language regarding the applicability of the disclosure 
to only those third-party payments that give rise to actual material 
conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest. 
Consequently, the MSRB views the omission of this text as non-
substantive. Thus, with this omission and the conforming edits, the 
Revised Interpretive Notice would read in relevant part:

    The third-party payments to which the disclosure standard would 
apply are those that give rise to actual material conflicts of 
interest or potential material conflicts of interest only. . . . The 
specific standard with respect to complex financings does not 
obviate a dealer's fair dealing obligation to disclose the existence 
of payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter or of 
other material conflicts of interest in connection with any 
negotiated underwriting, whether it be complex or routine.
vii. Incorporate Statements Regarding the Need for Each Underwriter in 
a Syndicate To Deliver Dealer-Specific Conflicts of Interest When 
Applicable
    The FAQs clarify what disclosures may be effected by a syndicate 
manager on behalf of co-managing underwriters in the syndicate. As 
stated in the FAQs:

    In general, disclosures of dealer-specific conflicts of interest 
cannot be satisfied by disclosures made by the syndicate manager 
because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must 
be prepared by each dealer. However, nothing in the [2012 
Interpretive Notice] or [Implementation Guidance] would preclude a 
syndicate manager from delivering each of the dealer-specific 
conflicts to the issuer as part of a single package of disclosures. 
. . . The [2012 Interpretive Notice] does not require an underwriter 
to notify an issuer if it has determined that it does not have an 
actual or potential conflict of interest subject to disclosure. 
However, underwriters are reminded that the obligation to disclose 
actual or potential conflicts of interest includes conflicts arising 
after the time of engagement with the issuer, as [further noted in 
the FAQs].

    Despite certain other amendments discussed herein that would 
require the syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures and 
transaction-specific disclosures where a syndicate is formed, these 
statements regarding the dealer-specific disclosures in the FAQs would 
remain true and accurate under the Revised Interpretive Notice. 
Accordingly, the proposed rule change would incorporate this language 
into the Revised Interpretive Notice as stated in the FAQs with 
conforming edits, including the technical clarification that such 
disclosures apply to ``actual material conflicts of interest'' and 
``potential material conflicts of interest'' in order to make the 
statements consistent with related amendments in the proposed rule 
change.\23\ In relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would 
read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The MSRB notes that the proposed rule change would preserve 
existing language from the 2012 Interpretive Notice that the 
syndicate manager may deliver the dealer-specific disclosures of the 
other syndicate members in a single package, but the MSRB views this 
simply as a permissive function of delivery rather than an 
obligation to craft adequate disclosures on the part of other 
parties.

    In general, dealer-specific disclosures for one dealer cannot be 
satisfied by disclosures made by another dealer (e.g., the syndicate 
manager) because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, 
and must be prepared by each dealer. However, a syndicate manager 
may deliver each of the dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer as 
part of a single package of disclosures, as long as it is clear to 
which dealer each disclosure is attributed. An underwriter in the 
syndicate is not required to notify an issuer if it has determined 
that it does not have any dealer-specific disclosures to make. 
However, the obligation to provide dealer-specific disclosures 
includes material conflicts of interest arising after the time of 
engagement with the issuer, as noted [therein].
viii. Incorporate Statements Regarding the Timing for the Delivery of 
Certain Disclosures
    The Implementation Guidance and FAQs clarify the timing for the 
delivery of the disclosures under the 2012 Interpretive Notice. More 
specifically, the Implementation Guidance states that, ``[n]ot all 
transactions proceed along the same timeline or pathway and on rare 
occasions precise compliance with some of the timeframes set out in the 
[2012 Interpretive Notice] may not be feasible.'' It further states:

    The timeframes set out in the [2012 Interpretive Notice] should 
be viewed in light of the overarching goals of Rule G-17 and the 
purposes that required disclosures are intended to serve as 
described in the [2012 Interpretive Notice]. . . . That is, the 
issuer (i) has clarity throughout all substantive stages of a 
financing regarding the roles of its professionals, (ii) is aware of 
conflicts of interest promptly after they arise and well before it 
effectively becomes fully committed (either formally or due to 
having already expended substantial time and effort) to completing 
the transaction with the underwriter, and (iii) has the information 
required to be disclosed with sufficient time to take such 
information into consideration before making certain key decisions 
on the financing.

[[Page 39651]]

On this particular point, the Implementation Guidance concludes by 
stating that, ``. . . the timeframes set out in the [2012 Interpretive 
Notice] are not intended to establish hair-trigger tripwires resulting 
in technical rule violations so long as underwriters act in substantial 
compliance with such timeframes and have met the key objectives for 
providing such disclosures under the [2012 Interpretive Notice].''
    The FAQs provide that certain disclosures be made at different 
points in a transaction. More specifically, the FAQs specify that:
     The underwriter's disclosure regarding the arm's length 
nature of the relationship must be disclosed ``at the earliest stage of 
the relationship, generally at or before a response to a request for 
proposals or promotional materials are delivered to an issuer;''
     the other role disclosures and disclosures regarding the 
underwriter's compensation must be disclosed ``[a]t or before the time 
the underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting 
services;''
     those dealer-specific conflicts of interest known at the 
time of the engagement must be disclosed ``[a]t or before the time the 
dealer has been engaged to serve as underwriter'' in the case of a sole 
underwriter or syndicate manager where a syndicate has been formed;
     a co-managing underwriter joining a syndicate must 
disclose any dealer-specific conflicts of interest known at that time 
concurrent with the formation of the syndicate or upon the co-managing 
underwriter joining an already-formed syndicate;
     those dealer-specific conflicts of interest discovered or 
arising after being engaged as an underwriter must be disclosed ``as 
soon as practicable after [being] discovered and with sufficient time 
for the issuer to evaluate the conflict and its implications;''
     any conflicts arising in connection with a recommendation 
of a complex municipal securities financing must be disclosed 
``[b]efore the execution of a commitment by the issuer (which may 
include a bond purchase agreement) relating to such recommendation, and 
with sufficient time to allow the issuer to evaluate the conflict and 
its implication;''
     the disclosures regarding the material aspects of a 
routine financing must be disclosed ``[b]efore the execution of a 
commitment by the issuer (which may include a bond purchase agreement) 
relating to the financing, and with sufficient time to allow the issuer 
to evaluate the features of the financing;'' and
     the disclosures regarding the material financial risks and 
characteristics of a complex financing must be disclosed ``[b]efore the 
execution of a commitment by the issuer (which may include a bond 
purchase agreement) relating to the financing, and with sufficient time 
to allow the issuer to evaluate the features of the financing.''
    The proposed rule change would incorporate these timeline concepts 
from the Implementation Guidance and FAQs into the Revised Interpretive 
Notice with certain conforming edits (e.g., by utilizing the Revised 
Interpretive Notice's defined terms of ``standard disclosure'', 
``dealer-specific disclosures,'' and ``transaction-specific 
disclosures'').
    The proposed rule change would also incorporate clarifying language 
regarding the intent of these timelines. More specifically, the intent 
that the timelines are defined to ensure that underwriters act promptly 
to deliver disclosures in light of all the relevant facts and 
circumstances, but are not ``intended to establish strict, hair-trigger 
tripwires resulting in mere technical rule violations.'' \24\ In 
relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Relatedly, the comments received by the MSRB regarding the 
incorporation of this language are discussed further below in the 
MSRB's summary of comments. See related discussion under Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Consolidating 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation Guidance, and the 
FAQs into a Single Interpretive Notice--Modification of 
Implementation Guidance's Language Regarding the ``No Hair-Trigger'' 
and related note 95 and Summary of Comments Received in Response to 
the Request for Comment--Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, 
the Implementation Guidance, and the FAQs into a Single Interpretive 
Notice--Reincorporation of the ``No Hair-Trigger'' Language from the 
Implementation Guidance and related notes 157 et. seq. infra.

    The MSRB acknowledges that not all transactions proceed along 
the same timeline or pathway. The timeframes expressed herein should 
be viewed in light of the overarching goals of Rule G -17 and the 
purposes that the disclosures are intended to serve as further 
described in this notice. The various timeframes set out in this 
notice are not intended to establish strict, hair-trigger tripwires 
resulting in mere technical rule violations, so long as an 
underwriter acts in substantial compliance with such timeframes and 
meets the key objectives for providing disclosure under the notice. 
Nevertheless, an underwriter's fair dealing obligation to an issuer 
of municipal securities in particular facts and circumstances may 
demand prompt adherence to the timelines set out in this notice. 
Stated differently, if an underwriter does not timely deliver a 
disclosure and, as a result, the issuer: (i) Does not have clarity 
throughout all substantive stages of a financing regarding the roles 
of its professionals, (ii) is not aware of conflicts of interest 
promptly after they arise and well before the issuer effectively 
becomes fully committed--either formally (e.g., through execution of 
a contract) or informally (e.g., due to having already expended 
substantial time and effort)--to completing the transaction with the 
underwriter, and/or (iii) does not have the information required to 
be disclosed with sufficient time to take such information into 
consideration and, thereby, to make an informed decision about the 
key decisions on the financing, then the underwriter generally will 
have violated its fair-dealing obligations under Rule G -17, absent 
other mitigating facts and circumstances.
ix. Incorporate Statements Regarding Whether Underwriters May Rely on 
Certain Representations of Issuer Officials
    The FAQs clarify the circumstances under which an underwriter may 
rely on the representations of issuer officials, stating:

    Absent red flags, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a 
written representation from an issuer official in, among other 
things, the issuer's request for proposals that he or she has the 
ability to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter. 
Moreover, the underwriter may reasonably rely on a written statement 
from such person that he or she is not a party to a disclosed 
conflict.

The proposed rule change would incorporate this language from the FAQs 
into the Revised Interpretive Notice with clarifying language regarding 
the relevance of facts discovered during the course of an underwriter's 
due diligence, including diligence related to the transaction generally 
or pursuant to an underwriter's own determination of whether it has any 
actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts 
of interest. Specifically, the Revised Interpretive Notice supplements 
the existing statement from the FAQs with the following text:

    The reasonableness of an underwriter's reliance on such a 
written statement will depend on all the relevant facts and 
circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the 
underwriter's due diligence in regards to the transaction generally 
or in determining whether the underwriter itself has any actual 
material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of 
interest that must be disclosed.

This statement is intended to clarify that if an underwriter becomes 
aware of a fact through the normal course of its diligence that would 
lead it to doubt a representation of an issuer official, such 
information may rise to the level of a red flag that would not allow 
the underwriter to reasonably rely on the written representation.

[[Page 39652]]

x. Incorporate Statements Regarding an Underwriter Having a Reasonable 
Basis for Its Representations and Other Material Information Provided 
to Issuers
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice states that underwriters must ``have a 
reasonable basis for representations and other material information 
provided to issuers'' and clarifies that the obligation ``extends to 
the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material information 
being provided.'' The Implementation Guidance further contextualizes 
this reasonable basis standard, stating:

    The less certain an underwriter is of the validity of underlying 
assumptions, the more cautious it should be in using such 
assumptions and the more important it will be that the underwriter 
disclose to the issuer the degree and nature of any uncertainties 
arising from the potential for such assumptions not being valid. . . 
. If an underwriter is uncomfortable having an issuer rely on any 
statements made or information provided to such issuer, it should 
refrain from making the statement or providing the information, or 
should provide any appropriate disclosures or other information that 
would allow the issuer to adequately assess the reliability of the 
statement or information. . . . As a general matter, a response to a 
request for proposal should not be treated as merely a sales pitch 
without regulatory consequence, but instead should be treated with 
full seriousness that issuers have the expectation that 
representations made in such responses are true and accurate. . . . 
Underwriters should be careful to distinguish statements made to 
issuers that represent opinion rather than factual information and 
to ensure that the issuer is aware of this distinction.

    The proposed rule change would incorporate this language from the 
Implementation Guidance into the Revised Interpretive Notice with 
conforming edits and the following exception.\25\ The proposed rule 
change omits the statements from the 2012 Implementation Guidance that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Relatedly, the comments received by the MSRB regarding the 
incorporation of this language are discussed further below in the 
MSRB's summary of comments. See related discussion under Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Consolidating 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation Guidance, and the 
FAQs into a Single Interpretive Notice--General Comments Encouraging 
the Consolidation of the Implementation Guidance, and the FAQs and 
related notes 91 et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Request for Comment--Consolidating the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, the Implementation Guidance, and the FAQs into 
a Single Interpretive Notice--Inclusion of Language Regarding a 
Reasonable Basis for Underwriter Representations related note 155 
infra.

    The less certain an underwriter is of the validity of underlying 
assumptions, the more cautious it should be in using such 
assumptions and the more important it will be that the underwriter 
disclose to the issuer the degree and nature of any uncertainties 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
arising from the potential for such assumptions not being valid.

The MSRB views this statement to be potentially confusing and likely 
redundant with the preceding statement regarding the need for an 
underwriter to have a reasonable basis for its assumptions underlying 
any material information being provided to an issuer. Accordingly, the 
MSRB views the omission of this text as non-substantive. In relevant 
part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would read as follows:

    The need for underwriters to have a reasonable basis for 
representations and other material information provided to issuers 
extends to the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material 
information being provided. If an underwriter would not rely on any 
statements made or information provided for its own purposes, it 
should refrain from making the statement or providing the 
information to the issuer, or should provide any appropriate 
disclosures or other information that would allow the issuer to 
adequately assess the reliability of the statement or information 
before relying upon it. Further, underwriters should be careful to 
distinguish statements made to issuers that represent opinion rather 
than factual information and to ensure that the issuer is aware of 
this distinction.
xi. Incorporate Statements Regarding Whether a Particular Recommended 
Financing Structure or Product Is Complex
    The 2012 Implementation Guidance describes a complex municipal 
securities financing as ``a new issue financing that is structured in a 
unique, atypical, or otherwise complex manner that issuer personnel 
responsible for the issuance of municipal securities would not be well 
positioned to fully understand or to assess the implications of a 
financing in its totality.'' The Implementation Guidance clarifies 
that, ``[u]nderwriters must make reasonable judgments regarding whether 
a particular recommended financing structure or product is complex, 
understanding that the simple fact that a structure or product has 
become relatively common in the market does not automatically result in 
it being viewed as not complex.'' The 2012 Interpretive Notice then 
provides a non-exclusive, illustrative list of examples of new issue 
structures that constitute a complex municipal securities financing, 
inclusive of variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs); financings 
involving derivatives (such as swaps); and financings in which the 
interest rate is benchmarked to an index that is commonly used in the 
municipal marketplace (e.g., LIBOR or SIFMA), which may be complex to 
an issuer that does not understand the components of that index or its 
possible interaction with other indexes.
    The proposed rule change would incorporate this language from the 
Implementation Guidance into the Revised Interpretive Notice with 
conforming edits and an update to the illustrative, non-exclusive list 
of interest rate benchmarks to include the Secured Overnight Financing 
Rate (SOFR).\26\ The MSRB believes this edit is a necessary update to 
ensure that the Revised Interpretive Notice would reflect current 
market practices. In relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice 
would read as follows, ``[e]xamples of complex municipal securities 
financings include, but are not limited to, variable rate demand 
obligations (VRDOs), financings involving derivatives (such as swaps), 
and financings in which interest rates are benchmarked to an index 
(such as LIBOR, SIFMA, or SOFR).'' The Revised Interpretive Notice 
would also incorporate the following footnote to this language:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ SOFR is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and is based on a broad measure of the cost of borrowing cash 
overnight collateralized by U.S. Treasury securities in the 
repurchase agreement market. SOFR was chosen by the Alternative 
Reference Rates Committee (``ARRC'') as the rate that represents 
best practice for use in certain new USD derivatives and other 
financial contracts, representing the ARRC's preferred alternative 
to USD LIBOR. See http://www.msrb.org/EducationCenter/Municipal-Market/About/Market/Market-Indicators.aspx.

    Respectively, the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (i.e., 
`LIBOR'), the SIFMA Municipal Swap Index (i.e., `SIFMA'), and 
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (`SOFR'). The MSRB notes that its 
references to LIBOR, SIFMA, and SOFR are illustrative only and non-
exclusive. Any financings involving a benchmark interest rate index 
may be complex, particularly if an issuer is unlikely to fully 
understand the components of that index, its material risks, or its 
possible interaction with other indexes.
xii. Incorporate Statements Regarding the Specificity of Disclosures
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice provides that an underwriter of a 
negotiated issue that recommends a complex municipal securities 
transaction or product to an issuer has an obligation to disclose all 
financial material risks known to the underwriter and reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of the disclosure, financial characteristics, 
incentives, and conflicts of interest regarding the transaction or 
product. The Implementation Guidance clarified the scope of this 
obligation, stating:

    The disclosures concerning a complex municipal securities 
financing must address the specific elements of the financing, 
rather than being general in nature. . . . An

[[Page 39653]]

underwriter cannot satisfy this requirement by providing an issuer a 
single document setting out general descriptions of the various 
complex municipal securities financing structures or products it may 
recommend from time to time to its various issuer clients that would 
effectively require issuer personnel to discover which disclosures 
apply to a particular recommendation and to the particular 
circumstances of that issuer. . . An underwriter can create, in 
advance, individualized descriptions, with appropriate levels of 
detail, of the material financial characteristics and risks for each 
of the various complex municipal securities financing structures or 
products (including any typical variations) it may recommend from 
time to time to its various issuer clients, with such standardized 
descriptions serving as the base for more particularized disclosure 
for the specific complex financing the underwriter is recommending 
to a particular issuer. The underwriter could incorporate, to the 
extent applicable, any refinements to the base description needed to 
fully describe the material financial features and risks unique to 
that financing.

    The Implementation Guidance further states that ``[p]age after page 
of complex legal jargon in small print would not satisfy this 
requirement'' and that ``[u]nderwriters should be able to leverage such 
materials for purposes of assisting issuers to more efficiently prepare 
disclosures to the public included in official statements in a manner 
that promotes more consistent marketplace disclosure of a particular 
financing type from issue to issue, and also should be able to leverage 
the materials for internal training and risk management purposes.'' The 
Implementation Guidance also clarifies that ``[n]ot all negotiated 
offerings involve a recommendation by the underwriter, such as where an 
underwriter merely executes a transaction already structured by the 
issuer or its financial advisor.'' The proposed rule change would 
incorporate this language from the Implementation Guidance into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice with conforming edits and the following 
exception.
    In terms of the exception, the proposed rule change omits the 
statement regarding how such materials might assist issuers. 
Accordingly, in relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would 
simply read, ``[u]nderwriters should be able to leverage such materials 
for internal training and risk management purposes.'' The MSRB views 
this statement as unnecessary and so its deletion is non-substantive 
for purposes of the Revised Interpretive Notice.
xiii. Incorporate Statements Regarding Profit Sharing Arrangements
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice states that, ``[a]rrangements between 
the underwriter and an investor purchasing new issue securities from 
the underwriter according to which profits realized from the resale by 
such investor of the securities are directly or indirectly split or 
otherwise shared with the underwriter also would, depending on the 
facts and circumstances (including in particular if such resale occurs 
reasonably close in time to the original sale by the underwriter to the 
investor), constitute a violation of the underwriter's fair dealing 
obligation under Rule G-17.'' The Implementation Guidance further 
clarifies that:

    Underwriters should be mindful that, depending on the facts and 
circumstances, such an arrangement may be inferred from a purposeful 
but not otherwise justified pattern of transactions or other course 
of action without the existence of a formal written agreement. . . . 
An underwriter should carefully consider whether any such 
arrangement, regardless of whether it constitutes a violation of 
MSRB Rule G-25(c) precluding a dealer from directly or indirectly 
sharing in the profits or losses of a transaction in municipal 
securities with or for a customer, may evidence a potential failure 
of the underwriter's duty with regard to new issue pricing [as 
further described in the Implementation Guidance].

The proposed rule change would incorporate this concept into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice as stated in the Implementation Guidance, 
which reads, in relevant part, ``[u]nderwriters should be mindful that, 
depending on the facts and circumstances, such an arrangement may be 
inferred from a purposeful but not otherwise justified pattern of 
transactions or other course of action, even without the existence of a 
formal written agreement.''

B. Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures

    The proposed rule change would define certain categories of 
underwriter disclosures and assign the responsibility for the delivery 
of certain disclosures to the syndicate manager in circumstances where 
a syndicate is formed, as further described below.
i. Define Certain Categories of Underwriter Disclosures
    The proposed rule change would define the following terms in order 
to delineate a dealer's various fair dealing obligations under the 
Revised Interpretive Notice: ``standard disclosures'' as collectively 
referring to the disclosures concerning the role of an underwriter \27\ 
and an underwriter's compensation; \28\ ``dealer-specific disclosures'' 
as collectively referring to the disclosures concerning an 
underwriter's actual material conflicts of interest and potential 
material conflicts of interest; and ``transaction-specific 
disclosures'' as collectively referring to the disclosures concerning 
the material aspects of financing structures that the underwriter 
recommends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, these disclosures 
currently state: (i) Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rule G-17 
requires an underwriter to deal fairly at all times with both 
municipal issuers and investors; (ii) the underwriter's primary role 
is to purchase securities with a view to distribution in an arm's-
length commercial transaction with the issuer and it has financial 
and other interests that differ from those of the issuer; (iii) 
unlike municipal advisors, underwriters do not have a fiduciary duty 
to the issuer under the federal securities laws and are, therefore, 
not required by federal law to act in the best interests of the 
issuer without regard to their own financial or other interests; 
(iv) the underwriter has a duty to purchase securities from the 
issuer at a fair and reasonable price, but must balance that duty 
with its duty to sell municipal securities to investors at prices 
that are fair and reasonable; and (v) the underwriter will review 
the official statement for the issuer's securities in accordance 
with, and as part of, its responsibilities to investors under the 
federal securities laws, as applied to the facts and circumstances 
of the transaction. The proposed rule change incorporates one 
additional disclosure into the Revised Interpretive Notice, that the 
issuer may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with 
a fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer's interests in the 
transaction. See related discussion under Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Underwriter 
Discouragement of Use of Municipal Advisor; Addition of a New 
Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement of Municipal Advisors 
and related notes 134 et. seq. infra., and Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Inclusion of 
Existing Language Regarding the Discouragement of an Issuer's 
Engagement of a Municipal Advisor and Incorporation of a New 
Standard Disclosure Regarding the Issuer's Choice to Engage a 
Municipal Advisor and related notes 201 et. seq. infra.
    \28\ Under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, an underwriter must 
disclose to an issuer whether its underwriting compensation will be 
contingent on the closing of a transaction. It must also disclose 
that compensation that is contingent on the closing of a transaction 
or the size of a transaction presents a conflict of interest, 
because it may cause the underwriter to recommend a transaction that 
it is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of the transaction 
be larger than is necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Assign the Syndicate Manager the Exclusive Responsibility for the 
Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice states that a syndicate manager is 
permitted, but not required, to make the standard disclosures and the 
transaction-specific disclosures on behalf of the other underwriters in 
the syndicate. The amendments in the proposed rule change would 
obligate only the

[[Page 39654]]

syndicate manager \29\ of a syndicate--or sole underwriter, as the case 
may be--to make the standard disclosures and transaction-specific 
disclosures and eliminates any obligation of other co-managing 
underwriters in the syndicate to make the standard disclosures and 
transaction-specific disclosures. By eliminating the obligation of such 
other syndicate members to deliver the standard disclosures and 
transaction-specific disclosures upon the formation of the syndicate, 
the syndicate manager would no longer be delivering the disclosures 
``on behalf of'' any other syndicate members, and such other syndicate 
members would be under no obligation to ensure the delivery of such 
disclosures on their behalf.\30\ As further described in the MSRB's 
summary of comments,\31\ the MSRB believes that this proposed change 
will result in issuers receiving fewer duplicative boilerplate 
disclosures, because a syndicate member will not be obligated to 
deliver its own disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ For purposes of the proposed rule change, the term 
``syndicate manager'' refers to the lead manager, senior manager, or 
bookrunning manager of the syndicate. In circumstances where an 
underwriting syndicate is formed, the proposed rule change would 
clarify that the syndicate manager is obligated to make the standard 
disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures. In the event that 
there are joint-bookrunning senior managers, the proposed rule 
change would state that only one of the joint-bookrunning senior 
managers would be obligated under the Revised Interpretive Notice to 
make the standard disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures. 
Unless otherwise agreed to, such as pursuant to an agreement among 
underwriters, the joint-bookrunning senior manager responsible for 
maintaining the order book of the syndicate would be solely 
responsible for providing the standard disclosures and transaction-
specific disclosures under the Revised Interpretive Notice. 
Notwithstanding the obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the 
standard disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures under the 
Revised Interpretive Notice, nothing in the Revised Interpretive 
Notice would prohibit an underwriter from making a disclosure in 
order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory 
obligation.
    \30\ In light of, and consistent with, these obligations placed 
on the syndicate manager, only the syndicate manager must maintain 
and preserve records of the applicable disclosures it delivers in 
accordance with MSRB rules.
    \31\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Syndicate Manager Responsibility for the 
Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures and notes 
102 et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments Received in Response to 
the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of 
Disclosures--Syndicate Manager Responsibility for the Standard 
Disclosures and Transaction--Specific Disclosures and notes 169 et. 
seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposed rule change provides that any disclosures 
delivered by a syndicate manager prior to or concurrent with the 
formation of a syndicate would not need to be identified as delivered 
in the capacity of the syndicate manager or otherwise redelivered ``on 
behalf'' of the syndicate. It would suffice for purposes of the 
proposed rule change that an underwriter--later syndicate manager--has 
delivered the standard disclosures and/or transaction-specific 
disclosures to the issuer regardless of whether a syndicate may form or 
has already been formed in the course of the transaction.\32\
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    \32\ For the avoidance of any doubt, the proposed change would 
apply to all applicable timeframes for the development of a 
syndicate, including situations when an underwriter--later syndicate 
manager--has previously delivered the disclosures prior to the 
formation of the syndicate and also when a syndicate manager 
delivers the disclosures concurrent with or after the formation of 
the syndicate.
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    Each member of the syndicate would remain responsible for ensuring 
the delivery of any dealer-specific disclosures if, but only if, such 
syndicate member had actual material conflicts of interest or potential 
material conflicts of interest that must be disclosed. The MSRB 
continues to believe that the obligation for each underwriter to 
deliver dealer-specific disclosures is warranted because such 
disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must be tailored to 
each underwriter's unique circumstances.\33\ As currently stated in the 
2012 Interpretive Notice, if an underwriter does not have any actual 
material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of 
interest, the proposed rule change would not require the underwriter to 
deliver an affirmative written statement to the issuer regarding the 
absence of such dealer-specific conflicts, but the underwriter is 
permitted to do so.
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    \33\ As currently stated in the 2012 Interpretive Notice and 
Implementation Guidance, nothing in the Revised Interpretive Notice 
would preclude--or require--a syndicate manager from delivering each 
of the dealer-specific conflicts to the issuer as part of a single 
package of disclosures, if the syndicate manager and other co-
managing underwriters of the syndicate so agreed.
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iii. Require the Separate Identification of the Standard Disclosures
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently permits the delivery of 
omnibus disclosure documents, in which the standard disclosures need 
not be separately identified from the transaction-specific disclosures 
and dealer-specific disclosures. The proposed rule change would require 
the separate identification and formatting of the standard disclosures 
(i.e., disclosures concerning the role of the underwriter and the 
underwriter's compensation) from the transaction-specific disclosure 
and the dealer-specific disclosures. For example, when providing the 
various disclosures in the same document, an underwriter would be 
required to clearly identify the standard disclosures and separate them 
from the other disclosures (e.g., by placing the standard disclosures 
in an appendix or attachment).
iv. Clarify the Meaning of ``Recommendation'' for Purposes of 
Disclosures Related to Complex Municipal Securities Financings
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice provides that an underwriter in a 
negotiated offering that recommends a complex municipal securities 
financing to an issuer must disclose the material financial 
characteristics of the complex municipal securities financing, as well 
as the material financial risks of the financing that are known to the 
underwriter and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the disclosure (a 
``complex municipal securities financing disclosure''). Accordingly, as 
stated in the Implementation Guidance, the requirement to provide a 
complex municipal securities financing disclosure is triggered if--the 
new issue is sold in a negotiated offering; the new issue is a complex 
municipal securities financing; and such financing was recommended by 
the underwriter. These aspects of the 2012 Interpretive Notice would 
remain applicable under the Revised Interpretive Notice.
    However, the 2012 Interpretive Notice does not define the term 
``recommendation'' for purposes of this requirement. As further 
described in the MSRB's summary of comments,\34\ the MSRB believes it 
is important to provide this clarification to facilitate dealer 
compliance with the proposed rule change. The proposed rule change 
would clarify that a communication by an underwriter is a 
``recommendation'' that triggers the obligation to deliver a complex 
municipal securities financing disclosure if--given its content, 
context, and manner of presentation--the communication reasonably would 
be viewed as a call to action to engage in a complex municipal 
securities financing or reasonably would influence an issuer to engage 
in a particular complex municipal securities financing.\35\ For the 
reasons described in

[[Page 39655]]

the MSRB's summary of comments below,\36\ the MSRB considered, and 
ultimately determined not to, adopt the standard that has been 
developed for purposes of municipal advisor recommendations under Rule 
G-42, on the duties of non-solicitor municipal advisors.\37\
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    \34\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Clarification of the Meaning of 
``Recommendation'' and related notes 131 et. seq. infra., and 
Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Guidance Regarding Meaning of ``Recommendation'' and 
related notes 219 et. seq. infra.
    \35\ In proposing this change the MSRB draws upon, by analogy, 
the analysis applicable to dealers making recommendations to 
customers under MSRB Rule G-19, on the suitability of 
recommendations and transactions. While Rule G-19 does not apply to 
the recommendations made by underwriters to issuers in connection 
with new issues of municipal securities for the reasons discussed 
below, the Revised Interpretive Notice draws, by analogy, on the 
analysis of when a dealer has made recommendation under Rule G-19. 
As discussed in existing MSRB guidance, this analysis under Rule G-
19 is informed by the related suitability standard promulgated by 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). More 
specifically, when proposed amendments to Rule G-19 were approved in 
March 2014, the MSRB noted that ``[g]iven the extensive interpretive 
guidance surrounding FINRA Rule 2111 [on suitability] and the 
impracticality and inefficiency of republishing each iteration of 
that guidance, substantively similar provisions of Rule G-19 will be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with FINRA's interpretations of 
Rule 2111.'' See Release No. 34-71665; 77 FR 14321 (March 7, 2014) 
(File No. SR-MSRB-2013-07) (Mar. 7, 2014) and MSRB Regulatory Notice 
2014-07 (March 2014). FINRA's suitability guidance has long provided 
that the determination of whether a ``recommendation'' has been made 
is an objective rather subjective inquiry. See FINRA Notice to 
Members 01-23 (March 2001). In guidance relating to FINRA Rules 2090 
and 2011, FINRA reiterated this prior guidance, stating that an 
important factor in this inquiry ``is whether--given its content, 
context and manner of presentation--a particular communication from 
a firm or associated person to a customer reasonably would be viewed 
as a suggestion that the customer take action or refrain from taking 
action regarding a security or investment strategy.'' See FINRA 
Regulatory Notice 11-02 (Know Your Customer and Suitability) 
(January 2011). Rule G-19 in this situation does not directly apply 
to a recommendation made by an underwriter to an issuer in 
transactions involving the sale by the issuer of a new issue of its 
securities, because, by its terms, Rule G-19 governs recommendations 
to ``customers,'' and MSRB Rule D-9 provides that an issuer is not a 
``customer'' within the meaning of that rule in the case of a sale 
by it of a new issue of its securities. See MSRB Rule D-9 (available 
here) and related interpretive guidance (available here).
    \36\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Clarification of the Meaning of 
``Recommendation'' and related notes 131 et. seq. infra., and 
Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Guidance Regarding Meaning of ``Recommendation'' and 
related notes 219 et. seq. infra.
    \37\ See FAQs Regarding MSRB Rule G-42 and Making 
Recommendations (June 2018) (hereinafter, the ``G-42 FAQs'').
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v. Establish a ``Reasonably Likely'' Standard for Disclosure of 
Potential Material Conflicts of Interest
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently requires the underwriter to 
disclose to the issuer any actual material conflicts of interest and 
any potential material conflicts of interest. As described in the 
Implementation Guidance, the requirement to provide such disclosure is 
triggered if: The new issue is sold in a negotiated underwriting; the 
matter to be disclosed represents a conflict of interest, either in 
reality or potentially; and any such actual or potential conflict of 
interest is material. These aspects of the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
would remain applicable under the Revised Interpretive Notice. However, 
the proposed rule change provides that an underwriter's potential 
material conflict of interest must be disclosed as part of the dealer-
specific disclosures if, but only if, the potential material conflict 
of interest is ``reasonably likely'' to mature into an actual material 
conflict of interest during the course of that specific transaction. 
This revision would narrow the dealer-specific disclosures currently 
required under the 2012 Interpretive Notice from all potential material 
conflicts to those potential material conflicts that meet this more 
focused standard.
    As further described below in the MSRB's summary of comments, the 
MSRB believes this amendment will benefit issuers and underwriters 
alike by reducing the volume of disclosure that must to be provided to 
those conflicts that are most concrete and probable.\38\ Underwriters 
will benefit from this change by no longer having to draft and deliver 
longer disclosures that identify and describe remote or hypothetical 
conflicts that are unlikely to materialize during the course of a given 
transaction. The MSRB believes that issuers will also benefit from this 
change because they will no longer have to review and analyze such 
longer-form disclosures, which will allow them to focus their time and 
other resources to the consideration of those material conflicts that 
are present, or reasonably likely to be present, during the course of 
the transaction, and, thereby, not expend time and resources discerning 
likely dealer conflicts from unlikely conflicts, or otherwise 
evaluating potential material conflicts that are not reasonably likely 
to materialize during the course of the transaction.
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    \38\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Disclosure of Potential Material 
Conflicts of Interest and related notes 98 et. seq. infra, and see 
also Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--
Disclosure of Potential Material Conflicts of Interest and related 
notes 161 et. seq. infra.
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    Additionally, the proposed rule change will not diminish an 
underwriter's fair dealing obligation to update, or otherwise 
supplement, its dealer-specific disclosures in circumstances when a 
previously undisclosed potential conflict of interest later ripens into 
an actual material conflict of interest. Thus, the MSRB believes that 
the proposed rule change does not compromise municipal entity 
protection, because municipal entity issuers would continue to receive 
timely information about all material conflicts of interest that ripen 
during the course of a transaction. More specifically, at or before the 
time an underwriter is engaged, issuers would continue to receive a 
dealer-specific disclosure describing any actual material conflicts of 
interest that are present at that time and any potential material 
conflicts of interest that, based on the reasonable judgement of the 
dealer at that time, are likely to mature into an actual material 
conflict of interest--assuming there are any such actual material 
conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest.\39\ 
Thereafter, an underwriter's fair dealing obligation would continue to 
require it to deliver an updated or supplemental dealer-specific 
disclosure for any actual material conflict of interest or potential 
material conflict of interest that has not been previously disclosed to 
the issuer and arising after the triggering of the initial dealer-
specific disclosure.\40\
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    \39\ In the absence of any such actual material conflict of 
interest or potential material conflict of interest, an underwriter 
would not have a fair dealing obligation under the Revised 
Interpretive Notice to disclose the absence of such a conflict, but 
may choose to provide an affirmative written statement regarding the 
absence of such conflicts at its discretion (e.g., for the benefit 
of establishing a written record of such absence).
    \40\ For example, the 2012 Interpretive Notice states: ``. . . a 
conflict may not be present until an underwriter has recommended a 
particular financing. In that case, the disclosure must be provided 
in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the 
underwriter to allow the official to evaluate the recommendation, as 
described below under `Required Disclosures to Issuers.' '' This 
concept would remain applicable under the Revised Interpretive 
Notice.
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vi. Clarify That Underwriters Are Not Obligated To Provide Written 
Disclosure of Conflicts of Other Parties
    As outlined above, the 2012 Interpretive Notice requires 
underwriters to provide issuers with certain standard disclosures, 
dealer-specific disclosures, and transaction-specific disclosures, when 
and if applicable. By their respective definitions, the standard 
disclosures cover generic conflicts of interest that could apply to any 
underwriter in any underwriting; the dealer-specific disclosures are 
the actual material conflicts of interest and potential material 
conflicts of interest generally unique to a specific underwriter; and

[[Page 39656]]

the transaction-specific disclosures relate to the specific financing 
structure recommended by an underwriter. None of the requirements in 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice prescribe that the underwriter must 
provide the issuer with written disclosures on the part of any other 
transaction participants, including issuer personnel, but does not 
expressly state this fact. In response to the concern of a commenter 
more fully described in the MSRB's summary of comments below,\41\ the 
MSRB believes that this express clarification is warranted to avoid 
potential misinterpretation of the disclosure requirements of the 
proposed rule change. Accordingly, the proposed rule change would 
expressly state that underwriters are not required to make any written 
disclosures on the part of issuer personnel or any other parties to the 
transaction as part of the standard disclosures, dealer-specific 
disclosures, or the transaction-specific disclosures.
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    \41\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification that Underwriters Are Not 
Obligated to Provide Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other 
Parties and related note 114, and Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification that Underwriters Are Not 
Obligated to Provide Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other 
Parties and related notes 194 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Clarify That Disclosures Must Be ``Clear and Concise''
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently requires disclosures to be 
``designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such 
disclosures and their implications for the issuer.'' The proposed rule 
change would clarify that an underwriter's disclosures must be 
delivered in a ``clear and concise'' manner, which the MSRB believes is 
consistent with, and substantially equivalent to, the standard 
currently articulated in the 2012 Interpretive Notice. Nevertheless, in 
response to the concern of commenters more fully described in the 
MSRB's summary of comments below, the MSRB believes that this 
clarification is warranted to provide further guidance to all 
stakeholders regarding the accessibility and readability of an 
underwriter's disclosures.
viii. Update the Definition of Municipal Entity
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently provides a definition of 
``municipal entity'' that references Section 15B(e)(8) under the 
Exchange Act.\42\ Notably, the 2012 Interpretive Notice does not 
reference the definition of municipal entity under Exchange Act Rule 
15Ba1-1, because the 2012 Interpretive Notice was issued prior to the 
effectiveness of the Commission's permanent registration regime for 
``municipal advisors'' pursuant to the amendments to Section 15B of the 
Exchange Act effectuated by Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act \43\ (collectively, the ``Final MA 
Rules''), including Exchange Act Rule 15Ba1-1.\44\ Exchange Act Rule 
15Ba1-1 defines a ``municipal entity'' to mean: ``any State, political 
subdivision of a State, or municipal corporate instrumentality of a 
State or of a political subdivision of a State, including--(1) Any 
agency, authority, or instrumentality of the State, political 
subdivision, or municipal corporate instrumentality; (2) Any plan, 
program, or pool of assets sponsored or established by the State, 
political subdivision, or municipal corporate instrumentality or any 
agency, authority, or instrumentality thereof; and (3) Any other issuer 
of municipal securities.'' \45\ Relatedly, Rule G-42 includes this same 
reference to the definition of municipal entity as used in the Final MA 
Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The 2012 Interpretive Notice states: ``The term `municipal 
entity' is defined by Section 15B(e)(8) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the `Exchange Act') to mean: `any State, political 
subdivision of a State, or municipal corporate instrumentality of a 
State, including--(A) any agency, authority, or instrumentality of 
the State, political subdivision, or municipal corporate 
instrumentality; (B) any plan, program, or pool of assets sponsored 
or established by the State, political subdivision, or municipal 
corporate instrumentality or any agency, authority, or 
instrumentality thereof; and (C) any other issuer of municipal 
securities.' ''
    \43\ Public Law 111-203 Sec.  975, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    \44\ See Registration of Municipal Advisors, Release No. 34-
70462 (September 20, 2013), 78 FR 67467 (hereinafter, the ``MA Rule 
Adopting Release'') (November 12, 2013) (available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-70462.pdf).
    \45\ See Exchange Act Rule 15Ba1-1(g).
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    In light of the Commission's definition contained in the Final MA 
Rules and the MSRB's definition of ``municipal entity'' as used under 
Rule G-42, the proposed rule change would incorporate a specific 
reference to this rule definition, in addition to the general statutory 
definition, to avoid any confusion about the scope of the Revised 
Interpretive Notice and to promote harmonization with the Final MA 
Rules and Rule G-42. In relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice 
would read, ``. . . the term `municipal entity' is used as defined by 
Section 15B(e)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the `Exchange 
Act'), 17 CFR 240.15Ba1-1(g), and other rules and regulations 
thereunder.''

C. Require an Additional Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement 
of Municipal Advisors

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently requires an underwriter to 
make five discrete statements regarding the underwriter's role as part 
of the standard disclosures, including a disclosure that, ``unlike a 
municipal advisor, the underwriter does not have a fiduciary duty to 
the issuer under the federal securities laws and is, therefore, not 
required by federal law to act in the best interest of the issuer 
without regard to its own or other interests.'' \46\ The proposed rule 
change would incorporate a new standard disclosure that ``the issuer 
may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a 
fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer's interests in the 
transaction.'' As a standard disclosure, this additional disclosure 
would be subject to the same principles for its timing as the other 
similar standard disclosures (i.e., at or before the time the 
underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting services) and 
separate delivery as the other standard disclosures (i.e., separately 
identified when provided with the transaction-specific disclosures and/
or dealer-specific disclosures). In response to the concern of 
commenters more fully described in the MSRB's summary of comments 
below,\47\ the MSRB believes that this additional disclosure will 
further clarify the distinctions between an underwriter--who is subject 
to a duty of fair dealing when providing advice regarding the issuance 
of municipal securities to municipal entities--and a municipal 
advisor--who is subject to a federal statutory fiduciary duty when 
providing advice regarding the issuance of municipal securities to 
municipal entities--and, thereby, promotes the protection of municipal 
entity issuers in accordance with the MSRB's statutory mandate at a 
relatively minimal burden to underwriters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See note 27 supra for the other four disclosures currently 
required under the 2012 Interpretive Notice.
    \47\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Underwriter Discouragement of 
Use of Municipal Advisor; Addition of a New Standard Disclosure 
Regarding the Engagement of Municipal Advisors and related notes 134 
et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments Received in Response to the 
Request for Comment--Inclusion of Existing Language Regarding the 
Discouragement of an Issuer's Engagement of a Municipal Advisor and 
Incorporation of a New Standard Disclosure Regarding the Issuer's 
Choice to Engage a Municipal Advisor and related notes 201 et. seq. 
infra.

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[[Page 39657]]

D. Permit Email Read Receipt To Serve as Issuer Acknowledgement

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently requires underwriters to 
attempt to receive written acknowledgement of receipt by the official 
of the issuer other than by evidence of automatic email receipt. The 
proposed rule change would permit an email read receipt to serve as the 
issuer's acknowledgement under the Revised Interpretive Notice.\48\ The 
proposed rule change would define the term ``email read receipt'' to 
mean ``an automatic response generated by a recipient issuer official 
confirming that an email has been opened.'' The proposed rule change 
would also clarify that, ``[w]hile an email read receipt may generally 
be an acceptable form of an issuer's written acknowledgement under this 
notice, an underwriter, may not rely on such an email read receipt as 
an issuer's written acknowledgement where such reliance is unreasonable 
under all of the facts and circumstances, such as where the underwriter 
is on notice that the issuer official to whom the email is addressed 
has not in fact received or opened the email.''
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    \48\ While an email read receipt would serve as acknowledgement 
of disclosures delivered for purposes of an underwriter's fair 
dealing obligations under the Revised Interpretive Notice, the MSRB 
does not intend to create any implication or inference that an email 
read receipt may serve as an acknowledgment for any other regulatory 
purposes.
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    In response to the concern of commenters more fully described in 
the MSRB's summary of comments below,\49\ the MSRB believes that this 
amendment will ease the burden of the acknowledgement requirement on 
underwriters and issuers alike, as both issuer and underwriter 
commentators indicated that an underwriter's fair dealing obligation to 
obtain a written acknowledgement, as currently defined under the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, creates burdens without offsetting benefits.\50\ 
The MSRB believes that underwriters would benefit from this change by 
being able to more efficiently obtain issuer acknowledgement of the 
disclosures electronically through the automated process of an email 
system, while issuers that desire to provide such acknowledgement to an 
underwriter can similarly take advantage of the efficiency of the email 
system to electronically reply to an underwriter's electronic request. 
At the same time, under the Revised Interpretive Notice, issuers would 
still have the choice not to provide acknowledgement to an underwriter 
in this manner by opting not to send an email read receipt in response 
to the underwriter's email communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Email Read Receipt as Issuer 
Acknowledgement and related notes 125 et. seq. infra., and Summary 
of Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Email 
Read Receipt as Issuer Acknowledgement and related notes 213 et. 
seq. infra.
    \50\ See, e.g., SIFMA Letter I, at p. 17 (``SIFMA and its 
members strongly believe that the issuer's acknowledgement of 
receipt of disclosures do not provide any benefit, create 
significant burdens and should be eliminated'').
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    Moreover, the MSRB believes that this proposed change will not 
compromise issuer protection, because, like any other form of 
acknowledgement under the Revised Interpretive Notice, the proposed 
rule change would require the email read receipt to come from an issuer 
official that is not party to a conflict, based on the underwriter's 
knowledge, and either has been specifically identified by the issuer to 
receive such disclosure communications or, in the absence of such 
specific identification, is an issuer official who the underwriter 
reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract 
with the underwriter. Similarly, the proposed rule change would provide 
that an underwriter may not rely on an email read receipt as the 
issuer's written acknowledgement when such reliance is unreasonable 
under all of the facts and circumstances. Accordingly, the proposed 
change will not compromise issuer protection because an underwriter 
still must meet the overarching fair dealing obligation of Rule G-17 
when relying on an email read receipt, and, thus, an underwriter cannot 
reasonably rely on email read receipts as written acknowledgement when 
the particular facts and circumstances indicate that doing so would be 
deceptive, dishonest, or unfair, as in the case where an underwriter is 
on notice that the issuer official to whom the email is addressed has 
not in fact received or opened the email.
2. Statutory Basis
    The MSRB believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with 
Section 15B(b)(2) of the Act,\51\ which provides that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ 15.U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2).

    The Board shall propose and adopt rules to effect the purposes 
of this title with respect to transactions in municipal securities 
effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers and 
advice provided to or on behalf of municipal entities or obligated 
persons by brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, and 
municipal advisors with respect to municipal financial products, the 
issuance of municipal securities, and solicitations of municipal 
entities or obligated persons undertaken by brokers, dealers, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
municipal securities dealers, and municipal advisors.

Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Act \52\ provides that the MSRB's rules 
shall:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2)(C).

. . . be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to 
foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in 
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect 
to, and facilitating transactions in municipal securities and 
municipal financial products, to remove impediments to and perfect 
the mechanism of a free and open market in municipal securities and 
municipal financial products, and, in general, to protect investors, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
municipal entities, obligated persons, and the public interest.

The proposed rule change is consistent with Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the 
Exchange Act \53\ because it will protect issuers of municipal 
securities from fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market, and 
promote just and equitable principles of trade, and promote the 
protection of municipal entities, for the reasons set forth below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 15.U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Defining the Various Categories of Underwriter Disclosures and 
Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation 
Guidance, and the FAQs Into the Revised Interpretive Notice

    The proposed rule change would promote just and equitable 
principles of trade and remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism 
of a free and open market through its amendment of the 2012 
Interpretive Notice to define the various categories of underwriter 
disclosures and through the incorporation of the content of the 
Implementation Guidance and FAQs. These amendments promote equitable 
principles of trade and the removal of impediments to and perfection of 
the mechanism of a free and open market by allowing underwriters to 
reference and review a single consolidated document with uniform terms 
under Rule G-17, which facilitates the efficient determination of any 
applicable fair dealing obligations and, thereby, allows for more 
efficient and less burdensome compliance. At the same time, this 
amendment does not compromise issuer protection, because these 
amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice are primarily of a technical 
nature that do not alter the substance of the information delivered to 
issuers of municipal securities.

[[Page 39658]]

B. Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures

i. Assign the Syndicate Manager the Exclusive Responsibility for the 
Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures
    The proposed rule change would promote just and equitable 
principles of trade and remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism 
of a free and open market by amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice to 
obligate only the syndicate manager--or the sole underwriter, as the 
case may be--to deliver the standard disclosures and transaction-
specific disclosures, and eliminating the concept that the disclosures 
must be provided ``on behalf of'' any other members of the syndicate. 
This would remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free 
and open market by eliminating certain redundant and generic 
disclosures currently delivered by underwriters to issuers that provide 
little, if any, novel informational benefits to issuers, but do create 
non-trivial compliance and record-keeping burdens on underwriters. The 
amendment will also promote the goal of protecting municipal entity 
issuers because issuers will be able to more efficiently evaluate the 
information contained in the disclosures they do receive, rather than 
having to differentiate generic and duplicative disclosures from 
disclosures that are more particularized to the facts and circumstances 
of the transaction.
ii. Require the Separate Identification of the Standard Disclosures
    The proposed rule change would prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
acts and practices and promote the protection of municipal entity 
issuers by amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice to require the 
separate identification and formatting of the standard disclosures by 
underwriters. This would prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices and promote the protection of municipal entity issuers 
because issuers will be able to more efficiently differentiate an 
underwriter's dealer-specific disclosures and transaction-specific 
disclosures from an underwriter's standard disclosures, and, thereby, 
more efficiently evaluate those disclosures that are unique to a given 
underwriting firm and transaction type from those that are more generic 
and common to all underwriting relationships.
iii. Clarify the Meaning of ``Recommendation'' for Purposes of 
Disclosures Related to Complex Municipal Securities Financings
    The proposed rule change would promote just and equitable 
principles of trade and remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism 
of a free and open market by amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice to 
define the analysis applicable to when an underwriter has made a 
recommendation triggering the obligation to deliver complex municipal 
securities financing disclosures. The 2012 Interpretive Notice does not 
currently define what constitutes a ``recommendation'' for these 
purposes. The absence of a definition creates a burden for underwriters 
to appropriately interpret and operationalize the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice. Clarifying the applicable definition would eliminate any legal 
ambiguity under the Revised Interpretive Notice regarding the 
applicable standard for determining when a recommendation of a complex 
municipal securities financing has been made. For similar reasons, the 
proposed change will promote just and equitable principles of trade by 
clarifying the circumstances when underwriters must provide these 
particularized transaction-specific disclosures to issuers, which will 
reduce the compliance burden for all dealers who act as underwriters.
iv. Establish a ``Reasonably Likely'' Standard for Disclosure of 
Potential Material Conflicts of Interest
    The proposed rule change would remove impediments to and perfect 
the mechanism of a free and open market by amending the 2012 
Interpretive Notice to more narrowly define which potential material 
conflicts of interest must be disclosed by underwriters. The 
disclosures regarding remote and unlikely conflicts provide little, if 
any, actionable informational benefits to issuers, but do create non-
trivial compliance and record-keeping burdens on underwriters. The 
proposed rule change would prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices and also promote the protection of municipal entity issuers 
by facilitating issuers' ability to more efficiently evaluate and 
consider those potential material conflicts of interest that are most 
concrete and probable, rather than having to differentiate likely 
material conflicts of interest from a longer inventory of conflicts 
that includes remote material conflicts of interest that are 
hypothetical and unlikely to materialize during the course of the 
transaction.
    As further described below in the MSRB's summary of comments, the 
MSRB believes this amendment will benefit market participants by 
reducing the volume of disclosure that must be provided to those 
conflicts that are most concrete and probable.\54\ Moreover, the MSRB 
believes that the proposed rule change does not compromise municipal 
entity protection, and may in fact bolster issuer protection, by 
providing more focused and actionable information to issuers. The MSRB 
believes that issuers will benefit from this change because they will 
no longer have to review and analyze longer-form disclosures discussing 
potential material conflicts of interest that are not reasonably likely 
to materialize during the course of the transaction. Streamlining the 
disclosures in this way will allow issuers to focus their time and 
other resources to the consideration of those material conflicts that 
are currently present and/or reasonably likely to be present during the 
course of the transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures and related notes 96 et. seq. infra, and 
Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures and 
related notes 159 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the proposed rule change will not diminish an 
underwriter's fair dealing obligation to update, or otherwise 
supplement, its dealer-specific disclosures in circumstances when a 
previously undisclosed potential conflict of interest later ripens into 
an actual material conflict of interest.\55\ An underwriter must 
provide disclosure to the issuer regarding the actual presence of a 
material conflict that arises during the course of the transaction in 
accordance with the following timelines:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ The FAQs presently state that dealer-specific conflicts of 
interest ``discovered or arising after engagement'' must be 
disclosed ``[a]s soon as practicable after discovered and with 
sufficient time for the issuer to evaluate the conflict and its 
implication.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     If an actual material conflict of interest is present at 
the time the underwriter is engaged, then the underwriter must disclose 
the conflict at or before the time the underwriter is so engaged.
     If a conflict of interest does not rise to the level of an 
actual material conflict of interest at the time of the underwriter's 
initial engagement, but is reasonably likely to mature into an actual 
material conflict of interest during the course of the transaction

[[Page 39659]]

between the issuer and the underwriter, then the underwriter must 
disclose the conflict as a potential material conflict of interest at 
or before the time the underwriter is so engaged.
     If the material conflict of interest is not present at the 
time of the underwriter's initial engagement, and the underwriter 
reasonably determines at that time that a conflict of interest is not 
likely to mature into an actual material conflict of interest during 
the course of the transaction, then the underwriter would not have a 
fair dealing obligation under this notice to disclose the conflict upon 
its engagement. But, for example, if that same undisclosed conflict 
later ripened into an actual material conflict of interest during the 
course of the transaction, then the underwriter would continue to have 
a fair dealing obligation under the Revised Interpretive Notice to 
disclose the conflict as soon as practicable after it arises or upon 
its discovery by the dealer.
    In this regard, the Revised Interpretive Notice would not diminish 
the amount of information provided to an issuer about the presence of 
any actual material conflicts of interest as compared to the 2012 
Interpretive Notice. It may only change the timing by which certain of 
those conflicts of interest are first disclosed to an issuer.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ As an illustration of this point, in the factual scenario 
discussed in the last bullet above, an underwriter may have 
identified the conflict as a potential material conflict of interest 
under the terms of the 2012 Interpretive Notice's broader disclosure 
standard, which requires an underwriter to disclose any potential 
material conflict of interest, not just those that are reasonably 
likely. Consequently, under the terms of the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice, the underwriter may have incorporated the conflict into its 
initial dealer-specific disclosure as a potential conflict and so 
delivered notice of the conflict to the issuer at or before the time 
of the underwriting engagement.
    Under the proposed rule change, the same conflict would still be 
disclosed to the issuer, but the timing of its initial disclosure to 
the issuer could be delayed until no later than the conflict 
ripening into an actual material conflict of interest. In such a 
scenario, an issuer would receive notice of such a conflict at a 
potentially later date into the transaction under the Revised 
Interpretive Notice than under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, and, 
correspondingly, the amount of time an issuer would have to analyze 
and react to such a conflict would be abridged as a result. However, 
by knowing such conflicts are concrete and non-hypothetical, an 
issuer may not need as much time to act to analyze and resolve any 
such conflict. Moreover, the MSRB believes that differing timing 
outcomes exemplified by this scenario described in the last bullet 
above, in actuality, would occur relatively infrequently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the degree that the Revised Interpretive Notice does result in a 
change in timing, the MSRB believes that the proposed rule change 
provides more actionable information to issuers regarding such 
conflicts, even if at a potentially later date, and, thereby, any 
detriment to issuers in regard to timing under the Revised Interpretive 
Notice generally would be positively offset in terms of issuers' 
increased informational certainty. While issuers may have less time to 
act in such scenarios, issuers would have the benefit of knowing that 
the conflicts being disclosed are more concrete and non-hypothetical.
    Thus, the MSRB believes that the proposed rule change does not 
compromise municipal entity protection, and may in fact bolster issuer 
protection, by providing more actionable information to issuers, 
because issuers would continue to receive timely information about all 
material conflicts of interest that are present during the course of 
the transaction, and, more importantly, the revised standard eliminates 
some of the uncertainty regarding how an issuer should evaluate an 
underwriter's conflicts disclosure. Specifically, if the underwriter 
provides a material conflict disclosure to an issuer, then, under the 
Revised Interpretive Notice, the issuer is certain that the material 
conflict is actually present and/or reasonably likely to be present 
during the course of the transaction, rather than a mere hypothetical 
potential conflict. Thereby, issuers will benefit by not expending time 
and resources in distinguishing likely dealer conflicts from unlikely 
conflicts, or otherwise evaluating potential material conflicts of 
interest that are not reasonably likely to materialize during the 
course of the transaction.
v. Clarify That Underwriters Are Not Obligated To Provide Written 
Disclosures Regarding the Conflicts of Other Parties to the Transaction
    The proposed rule change would remove impediments to and perfect 
the mechanism of a free and open market by amending the 2012 
Interpretive Notice to clarify that underwriters are not obligated to 
provide written disclosures regarding the conflicts of issuer personnel 
or other parties to the transaction as part of the standard 
disclosures, dealer-specific disclosures, or the transaction-specific 
disclosures. The 2012 Interpretive Notice does not expressly state this 
fact, although the MSRB understands that the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
by its terms was not intended to create such a burden of written 
disclosure. Accordingly, the amendments providing this technical 
clarification in the Revised Interpretive Notice would reduce ambiguity 
regarding the nature of disclosures to be made under the 2012 
Interpretive Notice and, thereby, reduce the burden on dealers that may 
be operating with such ambiguity.
vi. Clarify That Disclosures Must Be Clear and Concise
    The proposed rule change would remove impediments to and perfect 
the mechanism of a free and open market by amending the 2012 
Interpretive Notice to clarify that disclosures must be made in a clear 
and concise manner. These amendments promote equitable principles of 
trade and the removal of impediments to and perfection of the mechanism 
of a free and open market by granting underwriters clarity regarding 
the standard by which the disclosures will be evaluated. The 2012 
Interpretive Notice does not currently express this standard by its 
terms, although the MSRB understands that this standard is consistent 
with the 2012 Interpretive Notice. Accordingly, providing this 
technical clarification in the Revised Interpretive Notice would reduce 
ambiguity regarding the application of the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
and, thereby, reduce the burden on dealers that may be operating with 
such ambiguity.

C. Require an Additional Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement 
of Municipal Advisors

    The proposed rule change would prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
acts and practices and promote the protection of municipal entity 
issuers by amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice to require 
underwriters to incorporate a new standard disclosure that ``the issuer 
may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a 
fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer's interests in the 
transaction.'' This proposed change would augment current disclosures 
by further emphasizing to an issuer the arm's-length, commercial nature 
of the underwriting relationship and expressly informing the issuer 
that it may obtain the advice of a municipal advisor, who serves as a 
fiduciary to the issuer, rather than relying solely upon the advice of 
an underwriter, who may have commercial interests that differ from the 
issuer's best interests.

D. Permit Email Read Receipt To Serve as Issuer Acknowledgement

    Finally, the proposed rule change would remove impediments to and 
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market, and facilitate 
transactions in municipal securities, by amending the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice under Rule G-17 to permit an email read receipt to serve as the 
issuer's acknowledgement

[[Page 39660]]

of receipt of the applicable disclosures. For purposes of the Revised 
Interpretive Notice, the term ``email read receipt'' would mean an 
automatic response generated by a recipient issuer official confirming 
that an email has been opened. This amendment would remove impediments 
to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market by improving the 
efficiency of the disclosure process by allowing underwriters to seek, 
and issuers to provide, acknowledgement electronically through the 
built-in, automatic process of an email system. In those instances 
where a municipal entity is familiar with an underwriter's disclosures, 
because, for example, it frequently utilizes the underwriter in the 
sale of its municipal securities, the issuer can choose to affirm an 
email read receipt to provide electronic acknowledgement of receipt of 
the underwriter's disclosures, rather than taking the additional time 
to recognize such receipt by, for example, returning a signature 
execution of a hard copy acknowledgement.\57\ This potential for 
increased efficiency and added flexibility removes impediments to and 
perfects the mechanism of a free and open market, and facilitates 
transactions in municipal securities, by flexibly permitting 
underwriters and issuers to utilize additional electronic methods to 
seek and provide, respectively, acknowledgements in a less-burdensome 
manner.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ The MSRB understands that personnel of certain frequent 
issuers may desire more flexible methods to provide acknowledgment 
of receipt. See, e.g., NAMA Letter I, at p. 2 (``Issuers currently 
acknowledge receiving disclosures from underwriters. This practice 
should continue, and should allow for issuers to execute 
acknowledgment as they see fit.'').
    \58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, an email read receipt enables an issuer to respond to an 
underwriter's request for an acknowledgement that more efficiently 
ensures the issuer is only providing an acknowledgement of receipt, 
rather than agreeing to legal terms beyond receipt confirmation. The 
MSRB understands that issuers can be hesitant to provide a signature 
acknowledgement to a hard-copy receipt of disclosures out of an 
abundance of caution that providing such a signature may be an 
execution of legal terms beyond the acknowledgement of receipt, and, 
relatedly, issuers oftentimes seek legal counsel before providing a 
signature acknowledgement in such circumstances to ensure that the 
execution of an underwriter disclosure does not legally bind them to 
any terms. Allowing for an email read receipt to constitute 
acknowledgement may help alleviate issuer concerns in such 
circumstances and, thereby, save issuers from spending the time and 
resources to more fully evaluate whether a hard copy execution of an 
underwriter disclosure may legally commit an issuer to more than just a 
mere acknowledgement of having received a disclosure. Accordingly, the 
proposed rule change would eliminate the need for underwriters to 
repeatedly request a hard-copy, signature execution of an 
acknowledgement from an issuer in such circumstances where the issuer 
has determined not to provide such a hard-copy execution, but will 
provide an email read receipt, and also would eliminate the need for 
issuers to respond to such repeated underwriter requests for hard-copy 
acknowledgements.\59\ This potential reduction in issuer and 
underwriter burdens removes impediments to and perfects the mechanism 
of a free and open market, and facilitates transactions in municipal 
securities, by enabling the more efficient execution of municipal 
securities transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The FAQs provide that, ``[i]f an authorized issuer official 
agrees to proceed with the underwriting after receipt of the 
disclosures but will not provide a written acknowledgment, an 
underwriter must document specifically why it was unable to obtain 
such written acknowledgment.'' The MSRB understands that some 
underwriters will repeatedly ask for an issuer's acknowledgement, 
despite having been told no such acknowledgement will be provided, 
in order to comply with this guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, the MSRB believes that this proposed amendment 
would not compromise municipal entity issuer protection, because 
underwriters would be required under the Revised Interpretive Notice to 
attempt to receive written acknowledgement by an official identified as 
the issuer's primary contact for the receipt of such disclosures. Thus, 
under the Revised Interpretive Notice, if an underwriter wanted to rely 
on an email read receipt as written acknowledgement, then the 
underwriter would have a fair dealing obligation to receive the email 
read receipt from a specific official identified as the issuer's 
primary contact for the receipt of such disclosures. In the absence of 
such an issuer's designation of a primary contact, the underwriter 
would have a fair dealing obligation to receive an email read receipt 
from an issuer official that the underwriter reasonably believes has 
authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter. 
Moreover, the Revised Interpretive Notice would not permit an 
underwriter to rely on an email read receipt as an issuer's 
acknowledgement where such reliance is unreasonable under all of the 
facts and circumstances, such as where the underwriter is on notice 
that the issuer official to whom the email is addressed has not in fact 
received or opened the email.
    The electronic delivery of the disclosures to such an official in 
either scenario (i.e., in a scenario in which an issuer has identified 
a specific primary contact, or in the alternative scenario in which no 
such identification has been made by an issuer, and, so, the 
underwriter must make a reasonable determination about an issuer 
official with the requisite authority) ensures that the issuer's 
decision of whether to provide acknowledgement by means of an email 
read receipt is made by an official with the authority and ability to 
make such decisions on the issuer's behalf. Stated differently, not any 
email read receipt will suffice under the Revised Interpretive Notice, 
as the proposed rule change would permit an email read receipt only 
from certain issuer officials to satisfy an underwriter's fair dealing 
obligation.
    In proposing this change to the acknowledgement requirement, the 
MSRB notes that Rule G-42, which was adopted subsequent to the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, does not require an acknowledgement from an issuer 
or obligated person client of the client's receipt of the applicable 
conflict and disciplinary event disclosures under Rule G-42(b), nor in 
the case of disclosures required to be made by a municipal advisor who 
has given inadvertent advice under Supplementary Material. 07 to Rule 
G-42, so long as the municipal advisor has a reasonable belief that the 
documentation was in fact received by the client.\60\ In view of the 
MSRB's experience with disclosures under Rule G-42, where no client 
acknowledgement is expressly required, the MSRB believes that it is 
appropriate,\61\ and consistent with the protection of issuers, to 
adopt a revised acknowledgement standard as part of the Revised 
Interpretive Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See Exchange Act Release No. 34-76753 (December 23, 2015), 
80 FR 81614, at 81617 note 18 (December 30, 2015) (``While no 
acknowledgement from the client of its receipt of the documentation 
would be required, the MSRB notes that a municipal advisor must, as 
part of the duty of care it owes its client, reasonably believe that 
the documentation was received by its client.'').
    \61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the MSRB believes that this proposed amendment would 
not compromise municipal entity issuer protection because recipients of 
such an automatic email read receipt request would still have the 
option to not

[[Page 39661]]

provide this form of acknowledgement. Thus, if an issuer official did 
not desire to provide such an email read receipt, for whatever reason, 
then the underwriter would continue to have the obligation to seek 
acknowledgement by other means in order to document why it was unable 
to obtain such acknowledgement, as currently required under the 2012 
Interpretive Notice.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act requires that MSRB rules 
not be designed to impose any burden on competition not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.\62\ The 
MSRB has considered the economic impact of the proposed rule change, 
including a comparison to reasonable alternative regulatory 
approaches.\63\ The MSRB does not believe that the proposed rule change 
would impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2)(C).
    \63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB's proposed amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice are 
intended to update and streamline certain obligations specified in the 
2012 Interpretive Notice and, thereby, benefit issuers and underwriters 
alike by reducing the burdens associated with those obligations, 
including the obligation of underwriters to make, and the burden on 
issuers to acknowledge and review, written disclosures that are 
duplicative, itemize risks and conflicts that are unlikely to 
materialize during the course of a transaction, and/or are not unique 
to a particular transaction or underwriting engagement. The MSRB 
believes that the overall impact of the proposed rule change will 
improve market practices, better protect issuers, and reduce the 
burdens on market participants.
    Based on the feedback of some market participants, the 2012 
Interpretative Notice has created unintended consequences in the 
market. For example, certain market participants, including issuers and 
underwriters, have indicated their belief that the disclosure 
obligations specified in the 2012 Interpretive Notice have led to the 
delivery of voluminous disclosures with mostly boilerplate information. 
Similarly, market participants have indicated that the disclosure 
obligations specified in the 2012 Interpretive Notice place a 
significant burden on underwriters to draft and deliver disclosures 
that are dense and otherwise difficult or inefficient for issuers to 
utilize in making informed decisions about the issuance of municipal 
securities, and also inadvertently bury disclosures of important 
conflicts and risks. Commenters also stated that the duplicative nature 
of some disclosures unnecessarily increases the overall volume of 
disclosures and, equally important, increases the likelihood that an 
issuer will receive similar information in a non-uniform or redundant 
manner, which makes it more difficult for an issuer to evaluate the 
information included in the disclosures it receives.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures and related notes 96 et. seq. infra; see 
also Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures and 
related notes 159 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB believes the proposed rule change is necessary to update 
and streamline the burdens placed on market participants and to 
increase the efficiency of certain market practices, such as enhancing 
the ability of issuers to efficiently and properly evaluate the risks 
associated with a given transaction, and, thereby, improving the 
protection of issuers. The MSRB further believes that the proposed rule 
change will provide clarity to underwriters regarding the scope of 
their regulatory obligations to municipal entity issuers by expressly 
affirming and defining certain significant concepts in the Revised 
Interpretive Notice.
Identifying and Evaluating Reasonable Alternative Regulatory Approaches
    The MSRB has assessed alternative approaches to amend the 2012 
Interpretative Notice and has determined that the respective amendments 
in the proposed rule change are superior to these alternatives.
    To clarify the nature, timing, and manner of disclosures of 
conflicts of interest, the MSRB considered strictly limiting the 
dealer-specific disclosures required under the Revised Interpretive 
Notice to only an underwriter's actual material conflicts of interest 
(rather than an underwriter's actual material conflicts of interest and 
potential material conflicts of interest, as prescribed in the proposed 
rule change).\65\ Eliminating the requirement for an underwriter to 
make disclosures regarding its potential material conflicts of interest 
would reduce the overall regulatory burden on dealers, but also delay 
the timing of disclosures regarding material conflicts of interest that 
are known at the outset of the engagement as being likely to 
materialize during the course of the transaction until such time as the 
conflicts in fact arise and, thereby, compromise certain protections 
currently afforded to issuers under the 2012 Interpretive Notice.\66\ 
Accordingly, the MSRB determined that such an alternative was inferior 
and did not incorporate this alternative regulatory approach into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Disclosure of Potential Material 
Conflicts of Interest and related notes 98 et. seq. infra, and 
Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--
Disclosure of Potential Material Conflicts of Interest and related 
notes 161 et. seq. infra.
    \66\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Issuer Opt-Out and Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Issuer 
Opt-Out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB also considered amending the 2012 Interpretative Notice to 
permit issuers to opt out of receiving certain disclosures required 
under the 2012 Interpretive Notice. The 2012 Interpretive Notice does 
not provide such an opt-out process and, as a result, underwriters are 
generally required to deliver the applicable disclosures to an issuer 
regardless of an issuer's preference in this regard. The MSRB declined 
to incorporate this alternative regulatory approach into the Revised 
Interpretive Notice, because it was concerned that it may increase the 
likelihood that an issuer who has opted-out of certain disclosures may 
not receive all the information necessary to evaluate a given 
underwriting relationship and/or transaction structure.\67\ Based on 
certain comments it received, the MSRB is persuaded that the risks 
associated with such an opt-out concept outweigh the potential 
benefits.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Id.
    \68\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB also considered amending the 2012 Interpretative Notice to 
incorporate the meaning of ``recommendation'' under Rule G-42, on 
duties of non-solicitor municipal advisors, which describes a two-prong 
analysis for determining whether advice is a recommendation for 
purposes of that rule (a ``G-42 Recommendation''). The relevant 
guidance under Rule G-42 provides the following two-prong analysis for 
such a G-42 Recommendation:

    First, the [municipal advisor's] advice must exhibit a call to 
action to proceed with a

[[Page 39662]]

municipal financial product or an issuance of municipal securities 
and second, the [municipal advisor's] advice must be specific as to 
what municipal financial product or issuance of municipal securities 
the municipal advisor is advising the [municipal entity client or 
obligated person client] to proceed with.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ G-42 FAQs, at p. 2 (note 37 supra).

However, as discussed in more detail below, the MSRB declined to 
incorporate this G-42 Recommendation standard into the Revised 
Interpretive Notice, because of the likelihood that issuers may receive 
less disclosures on the risks associated with complex municipal 
securities financings under this standard.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification of the 
Meaning of ``Recommendation''; see also Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification of the Meaning of 
``Recommendation'' and Summary of Comments Received in Response to 
the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of 
Disclosures--Clarification of the Meaning of ``Recommendation''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB considered amending the 2012 Interpretative Notice to 
eliminate all requirements regarding an issuer's acknowledgement of 
receipt of the disclosures. However, the MSRB believes that such an 
alternative approach would eliminate an important issuer protection and 
increase overall risks in the market without significant offsetting 
benefits.\71\ Instead, to reduce the burden on underwriters and issuers 
alike, the proposed rule change incorporates into the Revised 
Interpretive Notice the concept that an underwriter may substantiate 
its delivery of a required disclosure by an email read receipt.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Email Read Receipt as Issuer 
Acknowledgement and related notes 125 et. seq. infra, and Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Email Read 
Receipt as Issuer Acknowledgement and related notes 213 et. seq. 
infra.
    \72\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB also considered amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice to 
only obligate the syndicate manager, rather than each underwriter in 
the syndicate, to make the dealer-specific disclosures. The 2012 
Interpretive Notice currently requires each underwriter to deliver such 
disclosures. The MSRB declined to incorporate this alternative 
regulatory approach into the Revised Interpretive Notice, because the 
elimination of this requirement would mean that issuers would no longer 
receive the benefit of this disclosure from each underwriter in the 
syndicate and the omission of this unique and tailored information 
would eliminate an issuer protection without a significant offsetting 
benefit to the market.
    Lastly, the MSRB considered amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
to create different disclosure tiers based on the particular 
characteristics of an issuer, such as the issuer's size, knowledge, 
issuance frequency, or experience of issuer personnel. At this time, 
the MSRB believes that there are significant drawbacks to such an 
approach that outweigh possible benefits, including the ongoing costs 
and difficulties of ensuring that a given issuer remained in an 
appropriate disclosure tier and whether such tiers could be adequately 
drawn in a definitive fashion that would reduce regulatory burdens 
without harming overall issuer protection. Accordingly, the MSRB 
declined to incorporate this alternative regulatory approach into the 
Revised Interpretive Notice.
Assessing the Benefits and Costs of the Proposed Rule Change
    The MSRB's regulation of the municipal securities market is 
designed to protect investors, municipal entities, obligated persons, 
and the public interest by promoting a fair and efficient municipal 
securities market. The proposed rule change is intended, in part, to 
reduce burdens on underwriters without decreasing benefits to municipal 
entity issuers or otherwise diminishing municipal entity issuer 
protections. The MSRB's analysis below shows that the proposed 
amendments accomplish this objective. For the purpose of this analysis, 
the baseline is the current 2012 Interpretative Notice.

A. Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation 
Guidance, and the FAQs Into the Revised Interpretive Notice

    Since this is primarily a technical change from the 2012 
Interpretative Notice, the MSRB does not believe there are any 
significant costs relevant to market participants. However, the MSRB 
believes that incorporating the Implementation Guidance and FAQs into 
the Revised Interpretive Notice will promote more efficient dealer 
compliance in that dealers will only have to reference a single 
regulatory notice in the future, rather than three separate notices.

B. Amending Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures

i. Define Certain Categories of Underwriter Disclosures
    The MSRB believes the added definitions of standard disclosures, 
transaction-specific disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures in 
the proposed rule change would clarify the categories of disclosures 
and assist underwriters with their compliance with certain new 
standards in the Revised Interpretive Notice. The MSRB does not believe 
there is any associated cost to underwriters as a result of these 
changes, as the changes are more in the nature of a technical 
amendment.
ii. Assign the Syndicate Manager the Exclusive Responsibility for the 
Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures
    At present, the 2012 Interpretative Notice allows, but does not 
require, a syndicate manager to make the standard disclosures and 
transaction-specific disclosures on behalf of the other syndicate 
members. The MSRB understands that in accordance with current market 
practices, the syndicate manager rarely, if ever, provides disclosures 
for the other syndicate members, and, so, issuers typically receive 
separate disclosures from other underwriters in the syndicate.
    The Revised Interpretive Notice would require the syndicate manager 
(or the sole underwriter as the case may be) to provide the standard 
disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures, and eliminate the 
obligation for the other syndicate members to make these 
disclosures.\73\ The MSRB believes this amendment will alleviate 
certain burdens associated with the duplication of disclosures where 
there is a syndicate. The MSRB further believes that this amendment 
will reduce the likelihood of issuers receiving duplicative standard 
disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures in potentially 
inconsistent manners. Ultimately, the MSRB believes such a requirement 
would simplify issuers' review of standard disclosures and transaction-
specific disclosures and allow them to more closely analyze any dealer-
specific disclosures that may be received. The MSRB also believes that 
this amendment will make the process

[[Page 39663]]

procedurally easier for dealers participating in an underwriting 
syndicate, because they only have a fair dealing obligation under the 
Revised Interpretive Notice to deliver their dealer-specific 
disclosures, if any existed, and would have no obligation to deliver 
the standard disclosures or transaction-specific disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Assign the Syndicate 
Manager the Exclusive Responsibility for the Standard Disclosures 
and Transaction-Specific Disclosures; see also Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, 
Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Syndicate Manager Responsibility 
for Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures and 
related notes 102 et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Syndicate Manager Responsibility for 
Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures and 
related notes 169 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Require the Separate Identification of the Standard Disclosures
    The proposed rule change would create a new requirement for 
underwriters that, when providing the various disclosures in the same 
document, an underwriter would have to clearly identify the standard 
disclosures. The MSRB believes this amendment will help prevent the 
disclosures regarding underwriter conflicts and transaction risks from 
being disclosed within other more boilerplate information.\74\ The MSRB 
believes that the benefits of this amended requirement will be to 
provide clarity to issuers; diminish certain information asymmetries 
between underwriters and issuers; \75\ reduce the burden of disclosure 
for syndicate members; and make it easier for issuers to assess the 
conflicts of interest and risks associated with a given transaction. 
The costs to dealers for clearly identifying and separating the 
standard disclosures from the dealer-specific and transaction-specific 
disclosures should be minimal, and the MSRB believes that the benefits 
would outweigh the costs.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Require the Separate 
Identification of the Standard Disclosures; see also Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the 
Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Require the Separate 
Identification of the Standard Disclosures and Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the 
Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Require the Separate 
Identification of the Standard Disclosures.
    \75\ In economics, information asymmetry refers to transactions 
where one party has more or better information than the other.
    \76\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Require the Separate 
Identification of the Standard Disclosures; see also Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the 
Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Require the Separate 
Identification of the Standard Disclosures and Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the 
Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Require the Separate 
Identification of the Standard Disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Clarify the Meaning of ``Recommendation'' for Purposes of 
Disclosures Related to Complex Municipal Securities Financings
    The 2012 Interpretative Notice requires an underwriter to make 
transaction-specific disclosures to the issuer based on the transaction 
or financing structure it recommends and the level of knowledge and 
experience of the issuer with that type of transaction or financing 
structure. In relevant part, the 2012 Interpretive Notice states:

    The level of disclosure required may vary according to the 
issuer's knowledge or experience with the proposed financing 
structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks 
of the recommended financing, and financial ability to bear the 
risks of the recommended financing, in each case based on the 
reasonable belief of the underwriter. In all events, the underwriter 
must disclose any incentives for the underwriter to recommend the 
complex municipal securities financing and other associated 
conflicts of interest.

    The proposed rule change would clarify what constitutes a 
recommendation by adopting a definition for ``recommendation'' from 
analogous dealer guidance from Rule G-19.\77\ As discussed further 
below, the MSRB believes many underwriters are already familiar with 
the practical application of this language,\78\ and, as a result, the 
MSRB believes there would be no major implicit or explicit costs 
associated with the clarification of recommendation, as the MSRB 
believes the volume of the disclosures generally would remain the same. 
However, underwriters should experience the benefit of more efficient 
regulatory compliance by having an expressly defined standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Clarify the Meaning 
of Recommendation for Purposes of Disclosures Related to Complex 
Municipal Securities Financings; see also Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Clarification of the 
Meaning of ``Recommendation'' and related notes 131 et. seq. infra, 
and Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Guidance Regarding Meaning of ``Recommendation'' and 
related notes 219 et. seq. infra. As further discussed herein, the 
proposed rule change would clarify that a communication by an 
underwriter is a ``recommendation'' that triggers the obligation to 
deliver a complex municipal securities financing disclosure if--
given its content, context, and manner of presentation--the 
communication reasonably would be viewed as a call to action to 
engage in a complex municipal securities financing or reasonably 
would influence an issuer to engage in a particular complex 
municipal securities financing.
    \78\ Id. In the absence of an express standard in the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, it is likely that at least some underwriters 
are already applying a form of this standard in determining whether 
a ``recommendation'' has been made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Establish a ``Reasonably Likely'' Standard for Disclosure of 
Potential Material Conflicts of Interest
    The 2012 Interpretative Notice requires each underwriter to 
disclose any potential material conflict of interest. The proposed rule 
change would amend the 2012 Interpretive Notice to require an 
underwriter to disclose any potential material conflict of interest 
that is reasonably likely to mature into an actual material conflict of 
interest during the course of that specific transaction.\79\ Potential 
material conflicts of interest that are not reasonably likely (or do 
not have such a significant probability) to mature into an actual 
material conflict of interest during the transaction between the issuer 
and the underwriter are not required to be disclosed to the issuer at 
the outset of the engagement. The MSRB believes that a given potential 
material conflict of interest may have various chances of ripening into 
an actual material conflict of interest and, at a general level, can 
reflect a low likelihood, moderate likelihood, or high likelihood of 
occurring at any given point in time. The proposed rule change should 
reduce the length and complexity of a dealer's initial dealer-specific 
disclosures, as the MSRB understands that underwriters presently are 
inclined to disclose a potential material conflict of interest to an 
issuer as part of its dealer-specific disclosures even when such 
conflict is not reasonably likely to mature into an actual material 
conflict of interest during the course of the transaction because there 
is some remote likelihood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Establish a 
Reasonably Likely Standard for Disclosure of Potential Material 
Conflicts of Interest; see also Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, and 
Manner of Disclosures--Disclosure of Potential Material Conflicts of 
Interest and related notes 98 et. seq. infra, and Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Disclosure of 
Potential Material Conflicts of Interest and related notes 161 et. 
seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB acknowledges that one potential cost to issuers of this 
proposed change would be the lost opportunity to evaluate potential 
material conflicts of interest that, according to the reasonable 
judgement of the dealer, are not likely to mature into an actual 
material conflict of interest. Consequently, there is a chance that the 
proposed change would hinder the issuer's ability to conduct a full 
risk assessment,

[[Page 39664]]

particularly around the decision of whether to engage a particular 
underwriter for a given transaction.\80\
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    \80\ For example, if a potential material conflict of interest 
is first omitted from the dealer-specific disclosures--because the 
dealer correctly deems the risk to be possible, but not reasonably 
likely--and the conflict of interest, in actuality, has a higher 
likelihood and, ultimately, ripens into an actual material conflict 
of interest during the course of the transaction, then the dealer 
would still be required to timely disclose the conflict of interest 
when it ripens into an actual material conflict. However, the 
failure to disclose this possible conflict of interest at the first 
delivery of the dealer-specific disclosures, as currently required 
under the 2012 Interpretative Notice, may result in an inadequate 
due diligence performed by the issuer on the underwriter due to the 
information asymmetry between the issuer and the underwriter. See 
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, the MSRB believes the benefits of the proposed change 
outweigh its potential costs, as this change will both reduce the 
burden placed on underwriters and also reduce the volume of disclosures 
received by issuers, while continuing to ensure that issuers are 
notified in writing of relevant conflicts of interest, and, thereby, 
promoting the protection of issuers by facilitating the ability of 
issuers to more efficiently evaluate and consider those potential 
material conflicts of interest that are most concrete and probable. 
Issuers would not have to review potential material conflicts of 
interest that are not reasonably likely to ripen during the course of 
the transaction. When there are too many disclosures, it is possible 
that an issuer's ability to make a comprehensive and efficient 
assessment of the disclosures is diminished. With the proposed rule 
change, issuers should be able to discern which conflicts of interest 
present actual material risks or material risks that are reasonably 
likely to actually develop during the course of the transaction, 
therefore reducing asymmetric information between the underwriters and 
issuers. Relatedly, excluding potential material conflicts of interest 
that are unlikely to occur would create initial/upfront costs to 
underwriters since underwriters would have to amend their policies and 
procedures to specify what constitutes a ``reasonably likely'' 
potential material conflict of interest, though the MSRB believes that 
such costs would be minor and are justified by offsetting benefits.
vi. Clarify That Underwriters Are Not Obligated To Provide Written 
Disclosure of Conflicts of Other Parties
    None of the requirements in the 2012 Interpretative Notice require 
the underwriter to provide the issuer with disclosures on the part of 
any other transaction participants, including issuer personnel. 
However, the MSRB received comments requesting clarification on this 
point,\81\ and the proposed rule change would provide a clarification 
that underwriters are not required to make any disclosures on the part 
of issuer personnel or any other parties to the transaction. This 
clarification should reduce the burden on firms that were mistakenly 
under the impression that underwriters are required to disclose the 
conflicts of other transaction participants, as well as provide clarity 
to regulatory authorities examining and enforcing MSRB rules. Assuming 
underwriters are already compliant with the 2012 Interpretative Notice, 
there are no implicit or explicit economic benefits or costs associated 
with the clarification in the proposed rule change. To the degree that 
regulators may be inappropriately interpreting and applying the 2012 
Interpretative Notice in connection with examination and enforcement 
proceedings, regulators and underwriters will benefit from the 
clarification in that it should reduce the amount of time spent on such 
activity.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification that Underwriters Are Not 
Obligated to Provide Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other 
Parties and related note 114 and Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification that Underwriters Are Not 
Obligated to Provide Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other 
Parties and related notes 194 et. seq. infra.
    \82\ SIFMA expressed concern that ``regulators conflate 
conflicts of interest.'' See SIFMA Letter I, at p. 7 note 15 (``We 
also note that, in some cases, it appears that regulators conflate 
conflicts of interest that might exist on the part of other parties 
to a financing, including in particular conflicts on the part of 
issuer personnel, with conflicts on the part of the underwriter, and 
therefore regulators appear to expect that the conflicts disclosure 
under the [2012 Interpretive Notice] should include these conflicts 
of other parties. SIFMA and its members request that the MSRB 
clarify that the [2012 Interpretive Notice] does not require the 
underwriter to disclose conflicts on the part of parties other than 
the underwriter.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Clarify That Disclosures Must Be ``Clear and Concise''
    Assuming underwriters are already compliant with the requirements 
under the 2012 Interpretative Notice, the MSRB believes there are no 
implicit or explicit economic benefits or costs associated with not 
amending the statement from the 2012 Interpretive Notice that 
``disclosures must be made in a manner designed to make clear to such 
officials the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications 
to the issuer'' \83\ and amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice to 
further clarify that, consistent with the existing language, 
disclosures must be drafted in a ``clear and concise manner.'' \84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Clarify that 
Disclosures Must Be Clear and Concise; see also Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, 
Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Clarity of Disclosures and 
related notes 117 et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment - Amending the Nature, 
Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Clarity of Disclosures and 
related notes 196 et. seq. infra.
    \84\ As indicated by one commenter, this standard should 
minimize any re-drafting of existing disclosure templates. See SIFMA 
Letter II, at p. 6 (stating a clear and concise standard ``is in 
line with the MSRB's disclosure principles as well as the goals of 
the retrospective review'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Require an Additional Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement 
of Municipal Advisors

    The 2012 Interpretative Notice prohibits an underwriter from 
recommending that an issuer not retain a municipal advisor. By 
supplementing this language with the requirement that underwriters 
affirmatively state in their standard disclosures that ``the issuer may 
choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary 
obligation to represent the issuer's interests in the transaction,'' 
the proposed rule change would further promote an issuer's 
understanding of the distinct roles of an underwriter and a municipal 
advisor.\85\ Moreover, the MSRB believes that coupling this amendment 
with the incorporation of the existing language from the Implementation 
Guidance will promote issuer protection in the market by further 
ensuring that issuers are able to more freely evaluate their potential 
engagements with municipal advisors without undue bias.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Require 
an Additional Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement of 
Municipal Advisors; see also Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Concept Proposal--Underwriter Discouragement of Use 
of Municipal Advisor; Addition of a New Standard Disclosure 
Regarding the Engagement of Municipal Advisors and related notes 134 
et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments Received in Response to the 
Request for Comment--Inclusion of Existing Language Regarding the 
Discouragement of an Issuer's Engagement of a Municipal Advisor and 
Incorporation of a New Standard Disclosure Regarding the Issuer's 
Choice to Engage a Municipal Advisor and related notes 201 et. seq. 
infra.
    \86\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The possible benefits of this proposed change are demonstrated by a 
study from 2006, showing that an issuer's use of a financial advisor in 
the municipal bond issuance process reduces underwriter gross spreads, 
provides statistically significant borrowing costs savings, and lower 
reoffering yields.\87\

[[Page 39665]]

The results of the study are consistent with the interpretation that 
the monitoring and information asymmetry reduction roles of financial 
advisors potentially reduce the perceived risk for issuers. Another 
study from 2010 found lower interest costs with municipal issues using 
financial advisors, and the interest cost savings were significantly 
large especially for more opaque and complex issues.\88\ Given that an 
underwriter does not have the same fiduciary responsibility of a 
municipal advisor, the MSRB believes that clarifying the distinct roles 
of underwriters and municipal advisors should continue to improve 
market practices and further ensure that an issuer's decision to engage 
a municipal advisor is made without undue interference, which may 
obscure the issuer's overall evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
municipal advisory services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ Vijayakumar Jayaraman and Kenneth N. Daniels, ``The Role 
and Impact of Financial Advisors in the Market for Municipal 
Bonds,'' Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006. After 
investigating how using a financial advisor affects the interest 
costs of issuers, Vijayakumar and Daniels, find that a financial 
advisor significantly reduces municipal bond interest rates, 
reoffering yields, and underwriters' gross spreads.
    \88\ Allen, Arthur and Donna Dudney, ``Does the Quality of 
Financial Advice Affect Prices?'' The Financial Review 45, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As to the potential costs of compliance, underwriters would have to 
affirmatively state in their standard disclosures that an issuer may 
choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary 
obligation to represent the issuer's interests in the transaction. 
Therefore, underwriters would incur additional cost associated with 
revising their policies and procedures (a one-time upfront cost) and 
delivering the statement in their standard disclosures during a 
transaction. Beyond this update to their standard disclosures and any 
related updates to their policies and procedures, the MSRB does not 
believe there will be any further ongoing implementation costs to 
underwriters.

D. Permit Email Read Receipt To Serve as Issuer Acknowledgement

    Currently, the 2012 Interpretative Notice requires underwriters to 
attempt to receive written acknowledgement of receipt of the 
disclosures by an official of the issuer. The proposed rule change 
would allow for an email read receipt to serve as an 
acknowledgement.\89\ The MSRB believes that the acknowledgement 
requirement continues to have value to ensure that issuers receive the 
disclosures. Allowing for an email read receipt to constitute written 
acknowledgement should reduce burdens on underwriters (including 
syndicate managers, when there is a syndicate) and on issuers, in that 
underwriters and issuers will no longer be required to follow up with 
written acknowledgements when such receipt is utilized. Nevertheless, 
underwriters should expect minor initial upfront costs (which are 
optional) associated with the implementation of the use of email read 
receipts, and related compliance, supervisory, training, and record-
keeping procedures. However, the MSRB believes that the benefits 
associated with the reduced burden of spending time to obtain written 
acknowledgement would accrue over time and should exceed the initial 
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See related discussion under Proposed Rule Change--Permit 
Email Read Receipt to Serve as Issuer Acknowledgement; see also 
related discussion under Summary of Comments Received in Response to 
the Concept Proposal--Email Read Receipt as Issuer Acknowledgement 
and related notes 125 et. seq. infra, and Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Email Read Receipt 
as Issuer Acknowledgement and related notes 213 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Effect on Competition, Efficiency and Capital Formation
    The MSRB believes that the proposed amendments to the 2012 
Interpretative Notice as reflected in the Revised Interpretive Notice 
should improve the municipal securities market's operational efficiency 
by promoting consistency in underwriters' disclosures to issuers and 
promoting greater transparency. At present, the MSRB is unable to 
quantitatively evaluate the magnitude of the efficiency gains or the 
cost of compliance with the new requirements, but believes the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Additionally, the MSRB believes that the proposed 
rule change should also reduce confusion and risk to both underwriters 
and issuers; reduce information asymmetry between underwriters and 
issuers; and allow issuers to make more informed financing decisions. 
Therefore, the proposed amendments to the 2012 Interpretative Notice 
would improve capital formation. Finally, since the proposed rule 
change would be applicable to all underwriters, it would not have a 
negative impact on market competition.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
    The MSRB published the Concept Proposal on June 5, 2018 and 
published the Request for Comment on November 16, 2018. The Concept 
Proposal sought public comment on various aspects of the 2012 
Interpretive Notice, including the benefits and burdens of the 2012 
Interpretive Notice at a general level, and how the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice might be amended to ensure that it continues to achieve its 
intended purpose in light of current practices in the municipal 
securities market.
    The Request for Comment incorporated the comments received on the 
Concept Proposal by providing specific amendments to the text of the 
2012 Interpretive Notice. Additionally, through a series of questions, 
the MSRB sought more specific feedback from market participants in the 
Request for Comment regarding how the 2012 Interpretive Notice might be 
improved to remove unnecessary burdens on market participants, while at 
the same time ensuring that it continues to achieve its intended 
purpose.
    The following discussion summarizes the comments received in 
response to the Concept Proposal and the Request for Comment and sets 
forth the MSRB's responses thereto. The discussion does not provide 
specific responses for every comment, as, for example, when the MSRB 
only received a high-level general comment on a topic area. Comments to 
the Concept Proposal are discussed first and comments to the Request 
for Comment are discussed in the immediately following section. The 
summary includes cross-references from the discussion of the Concept 
Proposal to the discussion of the Request for Comment, and vice versa, 
in order to identify the discussion of comments received on the same or 
similar topics for ease of review. For topics that were incorporated 
into the Concept Proposal, but subsequently not incorporated into the 
Request for Comment, the discussion below incorporates a footnote 
statement indicating that no further discussion of the topic is 
included in the summary of comments to the Request for Comment, along 
with a brief summary discussion of any significant comments received to 
the Request for Comment.

I. Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Concept Proposal

    The MSRB received five comment letters in response to the Concept 
Proposal.\90\ Each of the commenters generally indicated their support 
of the retrospective review of the 2012 Interpretive Notice as outlined 
in the Concept Proposal and each had specific suggestions on how the 
2012 Interpretive Notice could be improved, as discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See note 8 supra.

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[[Page 39666]]

A. Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation 
Guidance, and the FAQs Into a Single Interpretive Notice

i. General Comments Encouraging the Consolidation of the Implementation 
Guidance and the FAQs
    SIFMA's response to the Concept Proposal stated that, if the MSRB 
were to amend the 2012 Interpretive Notice, ``. . . it would be 
critical to incorporate or otherwise preserve the guidance included in 
the Implementation Guidance and FAQs, with any modifications 
appropriate in light of the changes to the [2012 Interpretive 
Notice].'' \91\ SIFMA further elaborated on this request, indicating 
that the Implementation Guidance provides a ``deeper understanding'' of 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice and that the FAQs provide important 
guidance in ``response to questions raised by underwriters based on 
their experience with initial implementation'' of the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice.\92\ No other commenters on the Concept Proposal addressed this 
issue.\93\ In response to SIFMA's comments, the MSRB proposed to 
incorporate the substance of the Implementation Guidance and FAQs into 
the Request for Comment, along with certain conforming edits and 
supplemental modifications to address other proposed amendments.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 4.
    \92\ Id., at pp. 3-4.
    \93\ It should be noted that the MSRB did not seek specific 
comment on this topic in the Concept Proposal.
    \94\ As further discussed herein, the MSRB ultimately chose to 
incorporate these amendments into the proposed rule change. This 
general concept of incorporating the substantive language of the 
Implementation Guidance and FAQs into the Revised Interpretive 
Notice is not discussed again under the Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment, but the MSRB does provide a 
summary of comments received in response to the incorporation of 
particular concepts and language from the Implementation Guidance 
and FAQs (e.g., comments regarding whether the no-hair trigger 
language should be incorporated into the Revised Interpretive 
Notice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Modification of Implementation Guidance's Language Regarding the 
``No Hair-Trigger''
    As stated above, the Implementation Guidance provides the following 
regarding the timing and delivery of disclosures under the 2012 
Interpretive Notice:

    The timeframes set out in the Notice should be viewed in light 
of the overarching goals of Rule G-17 and the purposes that required 
disclosures are intended to serve as described in the [2012 
Interpretive Notice]. That is, the issuer (i) has clarity throughout 
all substantive stages of a financing regarding the roles of its 
professionals, (ii) is aware of conflicts of interest promptly after 
they arise and well before it effectively becomes fully committed 
(either formally or due to having already expended substantial time 
and effort) to completing the transaction with the underwriter, and 
(iii) has the information required to be disclosed with sufficient 
time to take such information into consideration before making 
certain key decisions on the financing. Thus, the timeframes set out 
in the [2012 Interpretive Notice] are not intended to establish 
hair-trigger tripwires resulting in technical rule violations so 
long as underwriters act in substantial compliance with such 
timeframes and have met the key objectives for providing such 
disclosures under the [2012 Interpretive Notice].

    SIFMA's comment letter on the Concept Proposal urged the MSRB to 
reconfirm this language, stating SIFMA's belief that the language is a 
critical acknowledgement of the market reality that transactions rarely 
proceed on uniform timelines. Like the incorporation of the other 
language from the Implementation Guidance and FAQs described above, the 
MSRB agrees that this language provides an important supplementary 
gloss to the language of the 2012 Interpretive Notice. However, the 
MSRB believed at the time that it drafted the Request for Comment that 
it was worthwhile to propose certain modifications to this language in 
order to solicit additional input regarding the practical effects of 
the language in the market and, in particular, its practical impact on 
dealer compliance. Accordingly, the MSRB incorporated modified language 
in the Request for Comment by omitting its final sentence (i.e., 
deleting the statement that, ``. . . the timeframes set out in the 
[2012 Interpretive Notice] are not intended to establish hair-trigger 
tripwires resulting in technical rule violations so long as 
underwriters act in substantial compliance with such timeframes and 
have met the key objectives for providing such disclosures under the 
[2012 Interpretive Notice].''). In effect, the Request for Comment 
proposed withdrawing this particular language of the Implementation 
Guidance.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ The proposed rule change reincorporates this language with 
certain revisions, as further discussed herein. See related 
discussion under Summary of Comments Received in Response to the 
Request for Comment--Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the 
Implementation Guidance, and the FAQs into a Single Interpretive 
Notice--Reincorporation of the ``No Hair-Trigger'' Language from the 
Implementation Guidance and related notes 157 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures

    Each of the five commenters on the Concept Proposal offered 
improvements to the nature, timing, and manner of disclosures required 
under the 2012 Interpretive Notice. At a more general level, several 
commenters shared the view that the municipal securities market would 
benefit from reducing the volume and ``boilerplate'' nature of the 
disclosures required under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, as there was a 
shared belief among these commenters that the level of disclosure 
required by the 2012 Interpretive Notice, in many respects, overly 
burdened underwriters and issuers alike without any offsetting 
benefits.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ In this regard, GFOA commented that the disclosures 
currently required ``are often boilerplate and cumbersome.'' GFOA 
Letter I, at p. 1. NAMA similarly commented that ``disclosures are 
buried within lengthy documents that contain hypothetical potential 
conflicts and risks.'' NAMA Letter I, at p. 1. Similarly, SIFMA 
encouraged the MSRB to ``be cognizant of the substantial compliance 
burden on underwriters and complaints expressed by some issuers 
regarding excessive documentation resulting from the [2012 
Interpretive Notice]'' and ``more precisely define the content of 
and the process for providing the disclosures required by the [2012 
Interpretive Notice].'' SIFMA Letter I, at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Disclosures Concerning the Contingent Nature of Underwriting 
Compensation
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice requires underwriters to disclose the 
contingent nature of their underwriting compensation. The Concept 
Proposal requested feedback on this topic. SIFMA commented that 
disclosures concerning the contingent nature of underwriting 
compensation should be eliminated, because contingent underwriting 
compensation effectively is a universal practice. In response, the MSRB 
incorporated a proposed amendment into the Request for Comment that 
would require the disclosure concerning the contingent nature of 
underwriting compensation to be incorporated into an underwriter's 
standard disclosures, in acknowledgement of the fact that contingent 
compensation is a nearly-universal practice, yet continues to present 
an inherent conflict of interest. The Request for Comment clarified, 
however, that if a dealer were to underwrite an issuer's offering with 
an alternative compensation structure, the dealer would need to both 
indicate in its transaction-specific disclosures that the information 
included in its standard disclosure on underwriter compensation does 
not apply and also explain the alternative compensation structure as 
part of its transaction-specific disclosures, to the extent that such 
alternative compensation structure also presents a conflict of 
interest.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change did not incorporate 
this amendment to the 2012 Interpretive Notice, as further discussed 
herein. See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Disclosures Concerning the Contingent 
Nature of Underwriting Compensation and related notes 159 et. seq. 
infra.

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[[Page 39667]]

ii. Disclosure of Potential Material Conflicts of Interest
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice requires an underwriter to disclose 
certain actual material conflicts of interest and potential material 
conflicts of interest (i.e., the dealer-specific disclosures), 
including certain conflicts regarding payments received from third 
parties, profit-sharing arrangements with investors, credit default 
swap activities, and/or incentives related to the recommendation of a 
complex municipal securities financing. Several commenters to the 
Concept Proposal suggested that the dealer-specific disclosures, as 
currently required, cause underwriters to deliver overly voluminous 
disclosures, which do not differentiate the most concrete and probable 
material conflicts from those that are merely possible.
    From the dealer perspective, SIFMA stated its belief that ``issuers 
in many cases are receiving excessive amounts of disclosures of 
potential and often remote conflicts that are of little or no practical 
relevance to issuers or the particular issuances and would benefit from 
more focused disclosure on conflicts that actually matter to them.'' 
\98\ BDA concurred, stating its belief that ``one of the factors that 
contributes to the length and complexity of Rule G-17 Disclosures is 
that underwriters disclose all potential conflicts of interests instead 
of known, actual conflicts of interests.'' \99\ Similarly, GFOA stated 
that ``the documents are full of non-material potential disclosures 
where key material disclosures are not highlighted nor flagged, and in 
many cases buried in the information provided.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 7.
    \99\ BDA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \100\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on these comments, the MSRB proposed an amendment to the 2012 
Interpretive Notice in the Request for Comment clarifying that a dealer 
would have a fair obligation to disclose a potential material conflict 
of interest if, but only if, it is ``reasonably foreseeable'' that such 
a conflict would mature into an actual material conflict of interest 
during the course of a specific transaction between the issuer and the 
underwriter. The MSRB believed that the revision would preserve the 
requirement that issuers continue to receive disclosures regarding 
potential material conflicts of interest, while narrowing the amount of 
potential material conflicts to eliminate the need for those 
disclosures that are highly remote and generally unlikely to ripen into 
actual material conflicts of interest.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change incorporates a 
version of this concept, but refined to a ``reasonably likely'' 
standard, rather than a ``reasonably foreseeable'' standard, as 
further discussed herein. See related discussion under Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending 
the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Disclosure of 
Potential Material Conflicts of Interest and notes 161 et. seq. 
infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Syndicate Manager Responsibility for the Standard Disclosures and 
Transaction-Specific Disclosures
    Under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, a syndicate manager may make 
the standard disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures on behalf 
of other syndicate members. The Concept Proposal requested feedback on 
how often this option has been utilized and whether such option was 
effective. The MSRB received four specific comments in response. BDA 
commented that large, frequent issuers receive so many disclosures 
because co-managers of a syndicate do not exercise their ability to 
collectively make the required disclosures in this manner and, further, 
recommended that the MSRB amend the 2012 Interpretive Notice to provide 
that ``co-managers have no requirement to deliver any Rule G-17 
disclosures except for the circumstance where the co-manager has a 
discrete conflict of interest that materially impacts its engagement 
with the issuer.'' \102\ The Florida Division of Bond Finance also 
recognized the issue of duplication when there is a syndicate,\103\ and 
NAMA stated its belief that syndicate members should not be allowed to 
provide boilerplate disclosures when they are provided by the syndicate 
manager.\104\ Finally, SIFMA noted that dealers do not consistently 
utilize the option of having a syndicate manager make the standard and 
transaction-specific disclosures on behalf of other co-managing 
underwriters in the syndicate, and suggested that this may be the 
result because it is procedurally easier for a co-managing underwriter 
to provide these disclosures when delivering their dealer-specific 
disclosures, or because it may be more difficult or risky from a 
compliance perspective to rely on the syndicate manager.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ BDA Letter I, at pp. 2-3.
    \103\ Florida Division of Bond Finance Letter (stating ``such 
disclosures are duplicative when multiple underwriters are involved 
in the same transaction'').
    \104\ NAMA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \105\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 14 (``One reason this may be the 
case is that each syndicate member is obligated to provide its own 
disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of interest, and it is 
often procedurally easier to combine role disclosures and conflicts 
disclosures into a single document. Another reason may be that a 
particular underwriter has determined not to rely on another firm's 
actions to meet the underwriter's own regulatory obligations, or 
only permits such reliance upon confirmation that the syndicate 
manager has provided the required disclosure and has found that 
providing its own disclosure may be administratively easier than 
obtaining confirmation of the syndicate manager's disclosure.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the stated positions of these commenters that disclosures 
provided by co-managing underwriters in a syndicate often are 
duplicative and, therefore, voluminous, the MSRB incorporated a 
proposed amendment into the Request for Comment requiring, rather than 
permitting, the standard disclosures and transaction-specific 
disclosures to be made by a syndicate manager on behalf of the 
syndicate. The MSRB believed that such a revision would promote market 
efficiency by reducing the amount of duplicative disclosures that 
underwriters in a syndicate must deliver and, consequently, the number 
of duplicative disclosures that an issuer must acknowledge and 
review.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change incorporates a 
version of this concept, but with certain refinements, as further 
discussed herein. See related discussion under Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the 
Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Syndicate Manager 
Responsibility for the Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific 
Disclosures and notes 169 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Alternative to the Transaction-by-Transaction Delivery of the 
Disclosures Proposed in the Request for Comment
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently requires underwriters to 
provide issuers all of the disclosures on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. In response to the Concept Proposal, SIFMA suggested an 
alternative manner of providing the required disclosures to address the 
issues of volume and duplication, and to reduce the burdens on both 
dealers and issuers. Specifically, SIFMA proposed that, when an 
underwriter engages in one or more negotiated underwritings with a 
particular issuer, the underwriter would be able to fulfill its 
disclosure requirements with respect to an offering by reference to, or 
by reconfirming to the issuer, its disclosures provided in the previous 
12 months (e.g., disclosures provided in connection with a prior 
offering during such period or provided on an annual basis in 
anticipation of serving as underwriter

[[Page 39668]]

on offerings during the next 12 months).\107\ Under this construct, 
SIFMA explained that the underwriter would be required to provide any 
new disclosures or changes to previously disclosed information when 
they arise. SIFMA recommended that this manner of providing disclosures 
would be a permissible alternative and that an underwriter could 
continue to provide its disclosures on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. Relatedly, and as previously mentioned, GFOA indicated in its 
response to the Concept Proposal that providing non-material or 
boilerplate disclosures annually might improve the disclosure 
process.\108\ NAMA's response to the Concept Proposal stated its belief 
that it would be difficult to make disclosures on an annual basis 
without the need for supplementary material throughout the year and, 
therefore, commented that the easiest manner of disclosure delivery is 
to leave the relevant portions of the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 10-11.
    \108\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB was persuaded by SIFMA's suggestion to allow for an 
alternative to a transaction-by-transaction approach to disclosure, but 
also thought that NAMA's concern about the need to allow for updates 
and other supplementary material merited incorporation into any such 
alternative approach. Accordingly, the MSRB incorporated proposed 
amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice in the Request for Comment 
that would have permitted standard disclosures to be furnished to an 
issuer one time and then subsequently referenced and reconfirmed in 
future offerings, unless the issuer requests that the standard 
disclosures be made on a transaction-by-transaction basis.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ The Request for Comment further clarified that, if the 
original standard disclosure needed to be amended, the syndicate 
manager would be permitted to deliver such amended standard 
disclosures. Similarly, in cases where such syndicate members may, 
themselves, subsequently be syndicate managers or sole underwriters, 
the Request for Comment would have allowed them to reference and 
reconfirm prior disclosures made on their behalf. Ultimately, the 
proposed rule change does not incorporate a version of this concept 
for the reasons discussed herein. See related discussion under 
Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for 
Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--
Alternative to the Transaction-by-Transaction Delivery of the 
Disclosures as Proposed in the Request for Comment and related notes 
183 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Separate Identification of the Standard Disclosures
    The Concept Proposal asked for general feedback on alternative 
approaches for the delivery of the disclosures required under the 2012 
Interpretive Notice. Among other comments discussed herein, GFOA 
suggested that the MSRB emphasize the current obligation within the 
2012 Interpretive Notice requiring underwriters to identify generic or 
boilerplate disclosures.\110\ Similarly, NAMA stated that the MSRB 
should ``ensure that underwriters provide material transaction risks 
and conflicts disclosures in a manner that is easily identifiable by 
the issuer (including various members of the issuing entity's internal 
finance team and governing body),'' \111\ and the Florida Division of 
Bond Finance stated that ``the disclosures provided to issuers are 
boilerplate, and may inadvertently bury disclosures of specific 
conflicts and risks within pages of nonmaterial information and 
legalese.'' \112\ Accordingly, the MSRB incorporated a requirement in 
the Request for Comment that would have required clear identification 
of each category of disclosures and separated them by placing the 
standard disclosures in an appendix or attachment. The MSRB suggested 
that such a change would allow issuers to discern and focus on the 
disclosures most important to them.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \111\ NAMA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \112\ Florida Division of Bond Finance Letter.
    \113\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change incorporates a 
version of this concept, as further discussed herein. See related 
discussion under Summary of Comments Received in Response to the 
Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of 
Disclosures--Separate Identification of the Standard Disclosures and 
related notes 189 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi. Clarification That Underwriters Are Not Obligated To Provide 
Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other Parties
    As previously stated, the 2012 Interpretive Notice requires 
underwriters to provide issuers with the standard, dealer-specific, and 
transaction-specific disclosures. In its response to the Concept 
Proposal, SIFMA commented that, in some cases, it appears that other 
regulators conflate conflicts of interest that might exist on the part 
of other parties to a financing, including, in particular, conflicts of 
issuer personnel,\114\ and, therefore, those other regulators appear to 
expect that the conflicts disclosure under the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
should include these conflicts of interest of other parties. SIFMA 
requested clarification on this point.\115\ In response, the MSRB 
incorporated a proposed amendment in the Request for Comment that 
explicitly stated that ``underwriters are not required to make any 
disclosures on the part of issuer personnel or any other parties to the 
transaction.'' \116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ See SIFMA Letter I, at p. 7 note 15 (``We also note that, 
in some cases, it appears that regulators conflate conflicts of 
interest that might exist on the part of other parties to a 
financing, including in particular conflicts on the part of issuer 
personnel, with conflicts on the part of the underwriter, and 
therefore regulators appear to expect that the conflicts disclosure 
under the [2012 Interpretive Notice] should include these conflicts 
of other parties. SIFMA and its members request that the MSRB 
clarify that the [2012 Interpretive Notice] does not require the 
underwriter to disclose conflicts on the part of parties other than 
the underwriter.'').
    \115\ Id.
    \116\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change incorporates a 
version of this concept, but with certain refinements, as further 
discussed herein. See related discussion under Summary of Comments 
Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the 
Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification that 
Underwriters Are Not Obligated to Provide Written Disclosure of 
Conflicts of Other Parties and related notes 194 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Clarity of Disclosures
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice requires that disclosures be made in a 
manner designed to make clear to an issuer official the subject matter 
of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer. In their 
comments to the Concept Proposal, GFOA encouraged the MSRB to require 
the disclosures be provided in a ``plain English'' manner,\117\ and 
NAMA indicated that the disclosures should be presented in a straight-
forward manner.\118\ Believing that the standard for the manner of 
disclosures currently in the 2012 Interpretive Notice are consistent 
and substantially similar to GFOA's proposed ``plain English'' 
standard, the MSRB proposed amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
in the Request for Comment that explicitly clarified that the 
disclosures be drafted in plain English.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \118\ NAMA Letter I, at p. 2 (stating, ``. . . information 
should be presented in a straight forward manner, with other general 
disclosures presented separately from the statements and discussions 
of material transaction risks and conflicts disclosures (including 
[the] statement that the underwriter does not have a fiduciary duty 
to the issuer)'').
    \119\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarity of Disclosures and related notes 
196 et seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

viii. Disclosures Regarding Third-Party Marketing Arrangements
    SIFMA's comment letter on the Concept Proposal encouraged the MSRB 
to eliminate the dealer-specific disclosures regarding third-party 
marketing arrangements, stating that ``we do not believe that the 
conflicts disclosure requirement under the 2012

[[Page 39669]]

Guidance is the appropriate mechanism for ensuring that issuers 
understand the participation of such third-parties.'' \120\ SIFMA 
argued that these disclosure requirements should be eliminated because 
``the use of retail distribution agreements is not an activity 
involving suspicious payments to a third party and does not increase 
costs to issuers; rather, it simply passes on a discounted rate to a 
motivated dealer, which is commonly available to dealers after the 
bonds have become free to trade in any event, notwithstanding any 
agreement.'' \121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 8.
    \121\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB chose not to incorporate this amendment into the Request 
for Comment and did not incorporate any such amendment into the 
proposed rule change. While the MSRB agrees with SIFMA's point that 
third-party marketing agreements are not inherently ``suspicious'' 
activity, the MSRB believes that such agreements could create material 
conflicts of interest and that there may be circumstances in which an 
issuer would not or could not have certain dealers participate in the 
underwriting in such capacity. For example, an issuer may be subject to 
jurisdictional requirements that could dictate the participation or 
non-participation of certain dealers, or an issuer may have a 
preference to not involve certain dealers in their offering due to 
reputational concerns. The MSRB believes that it remains important for 
underwriters to disclose this information to issuers and, accordingly, 
did not propose any such changes in the Request for Comment and is not 
proposing any such change to this aspect of the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice in the proposed rule change.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ This concept is not discussed again under the Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment. The MSRB 
did not receive any further significant comments on this concept 
subsequent to the Request for Comment other than SIFMA's reiteration 
that these disclosures should be eliminated. SIFMA Letter II, at pp. 
4-5, note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ix. Disclosures Regarding Credit Default Swaps
    The 2012 Interpretive Notice specifically references an 
underwriter's engagement in certain credit default swap activities as a 
potential material conflict of interest that would require disclosure 
to the issuer. Similar to its request that the MSRB eliminate the 
disclosure requirements regarding third-party marketing arrangements, 
SIFMA also requested that the MSRB eliminate this specific reference to 
credit default swaps. SIFMA noted that dealer use of, and participation 
in, credit default swaps has significantly decreased since the 
financial crisis and the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, and, as a result, in SIFMA's view, the 
reference is no longer as relevant.\123\ The MSRB believes that, even 
if credit default swaps are less prevalent in the municipal securities 
market, the possibility for underwriters to issue or purchase credit 
default swaps for which the reference is the issuer remains. The MSRB 
believes that it remains important for underwriters to disclose this 
information to issuers and, accordingly, did not propose any such 
changes in the Request for Comment and is not proposing any such change 
to this aspect of the 2012 Interpretive Notice in the proposed rule 
change.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ SIFMA Letter I, pp. 8-9.
    \124\ Given that the MSRB did not incorporate this particular 
concept into the proposed rule change, this concept is not discussed 
again under the Summary of Comments Received in Response to the 
Request for Comment. The MSRB did not receive any further 
significant comments on this concept subsequent to the Request for 
Comment other than SIFMA's reiteration that these disclosures should 
be eliminated. SIFMA Letter II, at pp. 4-5, note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Email Read Receipt as Issuer Acknowledgement

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice requires underwriters to attempt to 
receive written acknowledgement of receipt of the disclosures by an 
official of the issuer (other than by automatic email receipt). If the 
official of the issuer agrees to proceed with the underwriting 
engagement after receipt of the disclosures but will not provide 
written acknowledgement of receipt, the underwriter may proceed with 
the engagement after documenting with specificity why it was unable to 
obtain such written acknowledgement during the course of the 
engagement.
    In its response to the Concept Proposal, SIFMA commented that this 
requirement creates a significant burden for underwriters with no 
corresponding benefit to issuers.\125\ SIFMA encouraged the MSRB to 
eliminate the acknowledgement requirement.\126\ To address this issue, 
SIFMA recommended that receipt of an email return receipt should be 
conclusive proof of delivery if other transaction documentation has 
also been provided to the same email address.\127\ GFOA did not comment 
on this issue of changing the form or type of acknowledgement, but did 
indicate that frequent issuers are burdened by the acknowledgement 
requirement in that they must ``tackle and acknowledge the paperwork'' 
many times.\128\ NAMA stated its belief that the acknowledgement 
requirement should remain in place, but provide greater flexibility to 
allow ``issuers to execute acknowledgements as they see fit.'' \129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 13 (stating, ``. . . we believe the 
requirement for the underwriter to attempt to receive an issuer 
acknowledgment and the efforts to document cases where the issuer 
does not provide such acknowledgment create a significant degree of 
non-productive work on the part of underwriter personnel and provide 
no value to the issuer, but often produce unwanted follow-up 
inquiries from the underwriter'').
    \126\ Id.
    \127\ Id.
    \128\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 2. Relatedly, GFOA's comments to the 
Concept Proposal also stated that certain ``boilerplate 
disclosures'' could be provided on an annual basis for frequent 
issuers, indicating that a more flexible approach to the 
acknowledgement of at least boilerplate disclosures could alleviate 
burdens on such issuers. Id.
    \129\ NAMA Letter I, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on such comments, the MSRB proposed in the Request for 
Comment to retain the acknowledgement requirement, but allow for email 
delivery of the disclosures to the official of the issuer identified as 
the primary contact for the issuer and provide that an automatic email 
receipt confirming electronic delivery of the applicable disclosures 
may be a means to satisfy the acknowledgement requirement.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ The proposed rule change incorporates a version of this 
concept, but with certain refinements that would distinguish email 
read receipts--which would be permitted to serve as acknowledgement 
under the Revised Interpretive Notice--from email delivery 
receipts--which would not be permitted to serve as acknowledgement 
under the Revised Interpretive Notice, but may be used to evidence 
the timing of such disclosures--all as further discussed herein. See 
related discussion under Summary of Comments Received in Response to 
the Request for Comment--Email Read Receipt as Issuer 
Acknowledgement and related notes 213 et seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Clarification of the Meaning of ``Recommendation''

    Under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, whether an underwriter must 
make the transaction-specific disclosures, as well as the type of 
transaction-specific disclosures it must deliver, depends on whether 
the underwriter recommends certain financing structures to the issuer. 
In its response to the Concept Proposal, SIFMA requested clarification 
as to whether the MSRB's guidance on the meaning of ``recommendation'' 
under Rule G-42, on duties of non-solicitor municipal advisors, 
describing a two-prong analysis for determining whether advice is a 
recommendation for purposes of that rule (i.e., a G-42 Recommendation) 
applies when determining whether an underwriter has recommended a 
complex municipal securities financing.\131\ More specifically, the 
relevant guidance under Rule G-42 provides the following

[[Page 39670]]

two-prong analysis for a G-42 Recommendation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 9.

    First, the [municipal advisor's] advice must exhibit a call to 
action to proceed with a municipal financial product or an issuance 
of municipal securities and second, the [municipal advisor's] advice 
must be specific as to what municipal financial product or issuance 
of municipal securities the municipal advisor is advising the 
[municipal entity client or obligated person client] to proceed 
with.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ G-42 FAQs, at p. 2 (note 39 supra).

    Persuaded by SIFMA's request for clarification on this point, the 
MSRB proposed an amendment to the 2012 Interpretive Notice in the 
Request for Comment clarifying that ``[f]or purposes of determining 
when an underwriter recommends a financing structure, the MSRB's 
guidance on the meaning of `recommendation' under Rule G-42, on duties 
of non-solicitor municipal advisors is applicable'' and seeking further 
input on this issue.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change does define the term 
``recommendation,'' but not in relation to the interpretive guidance 
issued under Rule G-42 as first proposed in the Concept Proposal, as 
further described herein. See Summary of Comments Received in 
Response to the Request for Comment--Guidance Regarding Meaning of 
``Recommendation'' and related notes 219 et seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Underwriter Discouragement of Use of Municipal Advisor; Addition of 
a New Standard Disclosure Regarding the Engagement of Municipal 
Advisors

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice currently states that ``[t]he 
underwriter must not recommend that the issuer not retain a municipal 
advisor.'' In their responses to the Concept Proposal, both GFOA and 
NAMA commented that this language should be strengthened by requiring 
the underwriter to affirmatively state that the issuer may hire a 
municipal advisor and by stating that the underwriter take no action to 
discourage or deter the use of a municipal advisor. More specifically, 
GFOA's comment asked the MSRB to amend the 2012 Interpretive Notice to 
require underwriters to ``affirmatively state'' both that ``issuers may 
choose to hire a municipal advisor to represent their interests in a 
transaction'' and also that underwriters are ``to take no actions to 
discourage issuers from engaging a municipal advisor.'' \134\ 
Similarly, NAMA asked that the MSRB amend the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
to include a statement that: ``[t]he underwriter may not make direct or 
indirect statements to the issuer that the issuer not hire a municipal 
advisor or otherwise make statements to deter the use of a municipal 
advisor or blur the distinction between the underwriting and municipal 
advisor functions and/or duties.'' \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 3.
    \135\ NAMA Letter I, at p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB attempted to address NAMA's and GFOA's comments to the 
Concept Proposal by incorporating existing language from the 
Implementation Guidance, as described above, which states that ``an 
underwriter may not discourage an issuer from using a municipal advisor 
or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be 
redundant because the underwriter can provide the same services that a 
municipal advisor would.'' The MSRB believed that, as a practical 
matter, this would address the concerns of NAMA and GFOA.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ Ultimately, the proposed rule change does incorporate 
these concepts, but also incorporates a new standard disclosure 
regarding an issuer's choice to engage a municipal advisor, as 
further discussed herein. See related discussion under Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment--Inclusion 
of Existing Language Regarding the Discouragement of an Issuer's 
Engagement of a Municipal Advisor and Incorporation of a New 
Standard Disclosure Regarding the Issuer's Choice to Engage a 
Municipal Advisor and related notes 201 et seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Disclosures to Conduit Borrowers

    As discussed above, the 2012 Interpretive Notice specifies 
underwriters' fair-dealing obligations to issuers, but does not apply 
specific requirements to underwriters dealing with conduit borrowers. 
At the same time, the Implementation Guidance expressly acknowledges 
that underwriters must deal fairly with all persons, including conduit 
borrowers, and that a dealer's fair-dealing obligations to a conduit 
borrower depends on the specifics of the dealer's relationship with the 
borrower and other facts and circumstances specific to the engagement.
    The Concept Proposal requested feedback on whether the MSRB should 
extend the requirements enumerated in the 2012 Interpretive Notice to 
underwriters' fair dealing obligations with conduit borrowers. 
Providing this feedback, GFOA stated in its comment letter on the 
Concept Proposal its belief that the MSRB should make clear that the 
information in the disclosures would best be utilized if it was sent to 
the party making decisions about the issuance and liable for the debt, 
which it indicated is the conduit borrower in most cases.\137\ SIFMA 
indicated in its response to the Concept Proposal that it is common, 
but not universal, for underwriters to provide a conduit borrower with 
a copy of the disclosures provided to the conduit issuer.\138\ SIFMA, 
otherwise, did not comment on whether that common practice should be 
required under Rule G-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \138\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although it may be common practice by some underwriters, the MSRB, 
at this time, does not believe the 2012 Guidance should be amended to 
extend the obligations contained therein to underwriters' dealings with 
conduit borrowers. The MSRB understands that the level of engagement 
between underwriters and conduit borrowers is not consistent across the 
market, such that, in some circumstances, the underwriter(s) works 
directly with the conduit borrower to build the deal team and structure 
a financing prior to enlisting a conduit issuer to facilitate the 
transaction, while, in others, the underwriter(s) are engaged by the 
conduit issuer and subsequently connected to a conduit borrower seeking 
financing. The MSRB declined to address these issues in the Request for 
Comment--and continues to decline to incorporate such obligations into 
the proposed rule change--because the issues presented by the 
relationship between underwriters and conduit borrowers are unique 
enough to merit their own full consideration apart from this 
retrospective review.\139\ Accordingly, the MSRB may consider this 
issue of the fair dealing obligations underwriters owe to conduit 
borrowers at a later date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ This concept is not discussed again under the Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment. The MSRB 
did receive one comment from SIFMA on this concept in response to 
the Request for Comment, which stated SIFMA's belief that the 
Revised Interpretive Notice should not require disclosures to 
conduit borrowers. SIFMA Letter II, at pp. 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Tiered Disclosure Requirements Based on Issuer Characteristics

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice applies to underwriters in their 
dealings with all issuers in the same manner. The Concept Proposal 
posed the question whether there should be different disclosure 
obligations for different classes of issuers. In response, the Florida 
Division of Bond Finance stated that a ``one size fits all'' approach 
is not effective and that issuers could benefit from underwriters 
tailoring such disclosures based on issuer size and 
sophistication.\140\ Similarly, SIFMA noted in its response to the 
Concept Proposal that the size of the issuer may have some bearing on 
issuer sophistication, but that it is most appropriate to focus on the 
knowledge, expertise, and experience of the issuer

[[Page 39671]]

personnel, as well as the issuer's engagement of the advice of an 
independent registered municipal advisor (``IRMA'').\141\ Relatedly, 
BDA commented that the disclosure obligations of the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice should not apply if an issuer has an IRMA with respect to the 
same aspects of an issuance of municipal securities.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ Florida Division of Bond Finance Letter.
    \141\ SIFMA Letter I, at p. 12 (In terms of factoring in the 
engagement of an IRMA, SIFMA stated that, ``. . . if the issuer is 
relying on the advice of a municipal advisor that meets the 
independent registered municipal advisor exemption . . . and the 
underwriter invokes the IRMA exemption to the SEC's registration 
rule for municipal advisors,'' the underwriter should be able to 
factor this into its analysis regarding the appropriate level of 
disclosure.).
    \142\ BDA Letter I, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    BDA's response to the Concept Proposal further stated that its 
belief that there should not be different obligations for different 
types of issuers for two reasons. First, because even the personnel of 
large issuers that frequently issue municipal securities ``change 
regularly'' and so continue to need the disclosures; and, second, 
because the uniform requirement allows for a ``consistent, standard 
process for dealers.'' \143\ In their responses to the Concept 
Proposal, NAMA indicated that it does not support the varying of 
underwriters' responsibilities for different issuers,\144\ and GFOA 
stated its belief that the wide variety of issuers would make it nearly 
impossible to develop ways to modify the 2012 Guidance for some issuers 
but not others.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ BDA letter I, at p. 1.
    \144\ NAMA Letter I, at pp. 1-2.
    \145\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB does not believe there is an obvious, appropriate 
methodology for classifying issuers in a manner that would advance the 
policies underlying the 2012 Interpretive Notice or that would 
materially relieve burdens for underwriters or issuers, and requiring 
different disclosure standards for different issuers may have 
unintended consequences that compromise issuer protections. In light of 
these considerations, the MSRB did not propose any classification of, 
and varied disclosure requirements for, issuers in the Request for 
Comment, nor is it proposing to do so in the proposed rule change.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ This concept is not discussed again under the Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment. The MSRB 
did receive a comment on this concept in response to the Request for 
Comment. SIFMA reiterated that tiered disclosure requirements may be 
beneficial issuers and underwriters. SIFMA Letter II, at p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the more specific topic of SIFMA's and BDA's comments regarding 
the IRMA exemption, the MSRB believes that the issuer's retention of an 
IRMA and the underwriter's corresponding invocation of the IRMA 
exemption should not relieve the underwriter from the obligations to 
provide disclosures. The MSRB believes that many of the disclosures are 
so fundamental that they should not be optional and that issuers should 
always have the benefit of receiving them. For example, even if an IRMA 
assists an issuer in understanding the role and responsibilities of the 
underwriter, the MSRB believes that an underwriter should still be 
required to make the representations regarding its role in the 
transaction. For transaction-specific disclosures, the MSRB does not 
believe that an issuer's retention of an IRMA should obviate the need 
to provide transaction-specific disclosure--particularly, disclosures 
regarding complex municipal securities financings--because the 
transaction-specific disclosures would continue to serve the crucial 
purpose of highlighting important risks for an issuer to discuss with 
its municipal advisor. However, in response to SIFMA's and BDA's 
comments, the Request for Comment incorporated the concepts that the 
level of transaction-specific disclosures can vary over time and, among 
other factors, an underwriter may consider the issuer's retention of an 
IRMA when assessing the issuer's level of knowledge and experience with 
a given type of transaction.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment--Tiered Disclosure 
Requirements Based on Issuer Characteristics and related note 229 
infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Issuer Opt-Out

    Under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, all issuers receive the 
disclosures required to be provided by underwriters and they may not 
opt out. In response to a specific inquiry in the Concept Proposal, 
GFOA opposed the concept of an issuer opt-out, while SIFMA argued that 
issuers should have the choice to not receive the standard disclosures 
in a written election based on their knowledge, expertise, experience, 
and financial ability, upon which underwriters should be permitted to 
conclusively rely. The MSRB believes that it is important for issuers 
to receive or have access to the disclosures for all of their 
negotiated transactions and that it has addressed many of commenters 
concerns regarding the need for an issuer opt-out through other 
proposed amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice. Accordingly, the 
MSRB did not incorporate such an opt-out concept into the Request for 
Comment, nor is it proposing to do so in the proposed rule change.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment--Issuer Opt-Out and related 
note 231 infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Evaluating Issuer Sophistication and the Delivery of the 
Transaction-Specific Disclosures

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice provides that, absent unusual 
circumstances or features, the typical fixed rate offering may be 
presumed to be well understood by issuer personnel, which may obviate 
the need for an underwriter to provide a disclosure on the material 
aspects of a fixed rate financing when the underwriter recommends such 
a structure in connection with a negotiated offering. Conversely, the 
2012 Interpretive Notice allows for a variance in the level of 
disclosure required for complex municipal securities financings based 
on the reasonable belief of the underwriter regarding: The issuer's 
knowledge or experience with the proposed financing structure or 
similar structures; the issuer's capability of evaluating the risks of 
the recommended financing; and the issuer's financial ability to bear 
the risks of the recommended financing.
    SIFMA's comment letter on the Concept Proposal stated its belief 
that all transaction-specific disclosures, for negotiated offerings of 
fixed rate and complex municipal securities financings, should be 
triggered by the same standard, which would create the possibility that 
an underwriter need not provide disclosures about the material aspects 
of a complex municipal securities financing if it reasonably believes 
that the issuer has sufficient knowledge or experience with the 
proposed financing structure. The MSRB acknowledges that the rationale 
espoused by SIFMA is conceptually consistent with the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice and that it is possible for certain issuers to develop a level 
of knowledge and experience with certain complex municipal securities 
financings that would diminish the need for the disclosures related to 
the structure of such financings. However, the MSRB believes that the 
inherent nature of such unique and atypical financings requires a 
higher standard for the protection of issuers. Specifically, the MSRB 
believes that the risk of an underwriter inaccurately determining that 
such transaction-specific disclosures are not necessary is too great. 
The possible harms of an issuer's inability to understand the structure 
of a complex municipal securities financing and

[[Page 39672]]

corresponding risks are very difficult to remedy after the transaction. 
Accordingly, the MSRB did not incorporate such a concept into the 
Request for Comment, nor is it proposing to do so in the proposed rule 
change.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Request for Comment--Tiered Disclosure 
Requirements Based on Issuer Characteristics and related note 229 
infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. EMMA as a Tool for Disclosures

    The 2012 Interpretive Notice requires underwriters to deliver in 
writing the required disclosures. In response to a question in the 
Concept Proposal on whether EMMA could or should be used as a tool to 
improve the utility of disclosures and the process for providing them 
to issuers, there was agreement among the commenters that responded to 
this question that EMMA was not an appropriate vehicle for the 
disclosures. Specifically, GFOA indicated in its response to the 
Concept Proposal that the use of EMMA could cause underwriters to 
provide even more boilerplate disclosures and that underwriters may be 
concerned about investor use of the information.\150\ In their 
responses to the Concept Proposal, SIFMA stated that using EMMA would 
not be appropriate in light of the information disclosed,\151\ and NAMA 
stated that it would undermine the purpose of the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice by requiring issuers to have to seek out the disclosures instead 
of receiving them directly.\152\ Accordingly, the MSRB did not 
incorporate such a concept into the Request for Comment, nor is it 
proposing to do so in the proposed rule change.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 3.
    \151\ SIFMA Letter I, at pp. 8, 19-20.
    \152\ NAMA Letter I, at p. 2.
    \153\ This concept is not discussed again under the Summary of 
Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment. The MSRB 
did receive a specific comment on this concept from NAMA, which was 
supportive of not using EMMA as a means to satisfy the G-17 
requirement. NAMA Letter II, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Summary of Comments Received in Response to the Request for Comment

    The MSRB received five comment letters in response to the Request 
for Comment.\154\ Each of the commenters generally indicated their 
support of the retrospective review of the 2012 Interpretive Notice as 
outlined in the Request for Comment and each had specific suggestions 
on how the proposed amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice 
incorporated into the Request for Comment could be improved, as 
discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ See note 10 supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Consolidating the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the Implementation 
Guidance, and the FAQs Into a Single Interpretive Notice

    In response to the Request for Comment, the MSRB received comments 
from GFOA, NAMA, BDA and SIFMA on the MSRB's proposal of amending the 
2012 Interpretive Notice to consolidate the Implementation Guidance and 
the FAQs into a single publication. Commenters were generally 
supportive of the inclusion of the Implementation and the FAQs, but had 
specific suggestions in supplementing, revising, and/or deleting the 
proposed amendments, which are discussed below.
i. Inclusion of Language Regarding Underwriters' Fair Dealing 
Obligations to Other Parties in a Municipal Securities Financing
    As previously discussed, the Request for Comment incorporated 
existing language from the Implementation Guidance that:

    The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those 
duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer 
underwrites its new issue of municipal securities. This notice does 
not set out the underwriter's fair-practice duties to other parties 
to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The 
MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter 
deal fairly with all persons.

    BDA's response to the Request for Comment stated its belief that 
this this inclusion is ``unnecessary'' and will make compliance with 
the proposed rule change ``burdensome.'' \155\ The MSRB believes that 
the proposed change merely reiterates Rule G-17's general principle of 
fair dealing in relation to a dealer's municipal securities activities 
and so is a useful and necessary reminder to dealers of their 
obligations to other parties participating in a given municipal 
securities transaction. Moreover, given that this language is taken 
from the existing Implementation Guidance, the MSRB believes that it 
should not create a new compliance burden for underwriters, as it 
should be incorporated into existing policies, procedures, and 
training. Accordingly, the MSRB incorporated this language into the 
proposed rule change with a slight modification to clarify that a 
dealer's fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17 extends only as far as 
its municipal securities activities. In relevant part, the Revised 
Interpretive Notice would read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ BDA Letter II, at p. 1.

    The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those 
duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer 
underwrites a new issue of municipal securities. This notice does 
not set out the underwriter's fair-practice duties to other parties 
to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The 
MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter 
deal fairly with all persons in the course of the dealer's municipal 
securities activities.
ii. Inclusion of Language Regarding a Reasonable Basis for Underwriter 
Representations
    The Request for Comment incorporated existing language from the 
Implementation Guidance stating:

    The need for underwriters to have a reasonable basis for 
representations and other material information provided to issuers 
extends to the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material 
information being provided. The less certain an underwriter is of 
the validity of underlying assumptions, the more cautious it should 
be in using such assumptions and the more important it will be that 
the underwriter disclose to the issuer the degree and nature of any 
uncertainties arising from the potential for such assumptions not 
being valid. If an underwriter would not rely on any statements made 
or information provided for its own purposes, it should refrain from 
making the statement or providing the information to the issuer, or 
should provide any appropriate disclosures or other information that 
would allow the issuer to adequately assess the reliability of the 
statement or information before relying upon it. Further, 
underwriters should be careful to distinguish statements made to 
issuers that represent opinion rather than factual information and 
to ensure that the issuer is aware of this distinction.

    BDA objected to the inclusion of this language in its response to 
the Request for Comment as redundant, in that the language is ``already 
covered in the existing language'' of the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice.\156\ The MSRB understands BDA's comment to suggest that, 
because the 2012 Interpretive Notice already addresses the requirement 
for an underwriter to have a reasonable basis for its representations, 
the Implementation Guidance language is a superfluous addition. The 
MSRB believes that this language from the Implementation Guidance 
generally provides an important illustrative gloss on Rule G-17's 
general principle of fair dealing in relation to a dealer's specific 
obligations regarding certain representations and the assumptions upon 
which such representations are based. Moreover,

[[Page 39673]]

given that this language is taken from the existing Implementation 
Guidance, the MSRB believes that it should not create a new compliance 
burden for underwriters, as it should be incorporated into existing 
policies, procedures, and training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ BDA Letter II, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the MSRB incorporated this language into the proposed 
rule change as generally proposed in the Request for Comment with one 
minor exception. The MSRB omitted the statement that, ``[t]he less 
certain an underwriter is of the validity of underlying assumptions, 
the more cautious it should be in using such assumptions and the more 
important it will be that the underwriter disclose to the issuer the 
degree and nature of any uncertainties arising from the potential for 
such assumptions not being valid.'' The MSRB agrees with BDA that this 
language is redundant and potentially confusing. In relevant part, the 
Revised Interpretive Notice would read as follows:

    The need for underwriters to have a reasonable basis for 
representations and other material information provided to issuers 
extends to the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material 
information being provided. If an underwriter would not rely on any 
statements made or information provided for its own purposes, it 
should refrain from making the statement or providing the 
information to the issuer, or should provide any appropriate 
disclosures or other information that would allow the issuer to 
adequately assess the reliability of the statement or information 
before relying upon it. Further, underwriters should be careful to 
distinguish statements made to issuers that represent opinion rather 
than factual information and to ensure that the issuer is aware of 
this distinction.
iii. Reincorporation of the ``No Hair-Trigger'' Language From the 
Implementation Guidance
    As described above, the Request for Comment did not incorporate the 
existing language from the Implementation Guidance providing that, ``. 
. . the timeframes set out in the [2012 Interpretive Notice] are not 
intended to establish hair-trigger tripwires resulting in technical 
rule violations so long as underwriters act in substantial compliance 
with such timeframes and have met the key objectives for providing such 
disclosures under the [2012 Interpretive Notice].'' SIFMA ``strongly 
objected'' to the omission of this language, stating that the 
``language has been an important reassurance to our members who have 
acted in substantial compliance with prescribed timeframes despite 
transactions that have proceeded along unforeseen timelines and 
pathways.'' \157\ SIFMA argued that this statement in the 
Implementation Guidance has benefited dealers and regulators alike, by 
preserving valuable time and resources, and, more importantly, that it 
should be retained ``as-is'' unless the MSRB ``can point to prevalent 
abuses.'' \158\ The other commenters to the Request for Comment did not 
address the omission of this language. The MSRB is persuaded by SIFMA's 
concerns and believes there is a benefit to preserving aspects of the 
existing language from the Implementation Guidance, as it should be 
incorporated into existing policies, procedures, and training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 5.
    \158\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the proposed rule change would incorporate this 
concept from the Implementation Guidance into the Revised Interpretive 
Notice with certain clarifying and conforming edits to the language in 
order to promote consistency with the other amendments and to emphasize 
the facts and circumstances nature of the scope of an underwriter's 
fair dealing obligation under the Revised Interpretive Notice. In 
relevant part, the Revised Interpretive Notice would read as follows:

    The MSRB acknowledges that not all transactions proceed along 
the same timeline or pathway. The timeframes expressed herein should 
be viewed in light of the overarching goals of Rule G-17 and the 
purposes that the disclosures are intended to serve as further 
described in this notice. The various timeframes set out in this 
notice are not intended to establish strict, hair-trigger tripwires 
resulting in mere technical rule violations, so long as an 
underwriter acts in substantial compliance with such timeframes and 
meets the key objectives for providing disclosure under the notice. 
Nevertheless, an underwriter's fair dealing obligation to an issuer 
of municipal securities in particular facts and circumstances may 
demand prompt adherence to the timelines set out in this notice. 
Stated differently, if an underwriter does not timely deliver a 
disclosure and, as a result, the issuer: (i) Does not have clarity 
throughout all substantive stages of a financing regarding the roles 
of its professionals, (ii) is not aware of conflicts of interest 
promptly after they arise and well before the issuer effectively 
becomes fully committed--either formally (e.g., through execution of 
a contract) or informally (e.g., due to having already expended 
substantial time and effort)--to completing the transaction with the 
underwriter, and/or (iii) does not have the information required to 
be disclosed with sufficient time to take such information into 
consideration and, thereby, to make an informed decision about the 
key decisions on the financing, then the underwriter generally will 
have violated its fair-dealing obligations under Rule G-17, absent 
other mitigating facts and circumstances.

B. Amending the Nature, Timing, and Manner of Disclosures

    Each of the five commenters on the Request for Comment offered 
improvements to the nature, timing, and manner of disclosures required 
under the 2012 Interpretive Notice. At a more general level, commenters 
continued to share the view that the municipal securities market would 
benefit from reducing the volume and ``boilerplate'' nature of the 
disclosures required under the 2012 Interpretive Notice as generally 
proposed in the Request for Comment.
i. Disclosures Concerning the Contingent Nature of Underwriting 
Compensation
    As described above, the Request for Comment proposed an amendment 
to the 2012 Interpretive Notice that would require underwriters to 
deliver disclosures concerning the contingent nature of their 
underwriting compensation in their standard disclosures.\159\ To the 
degree that an underwriter's compensation on a particular transaction 
deviates from the structure described in the standard disclosures, 
under the language of the Request for Comment, the dealer would need to 
indicate in its transaction-specific disclosures that the information 
included in the standard disclosure on underwriter compensation does 
not apply and explain the alternative compensation structure as part of 
the transaction-specific disclosures, to the extent that such 
alternative compensation structure also presents a conflict of 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Disclosures Concerning the Contingent 
Nature of Underwriting Compensation and related notes 97 et. seq. 
supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its response to the Request for Comment, SIFMA indicated its 
belief that the proposed changes in the Request for Comment are 
contrary to the goals of the retrospective review, because ``it would 
invariably result in more standardized and generic disclosures that may 
district from more specific ones.'' \160\ SIFMA stated its preference 
to retain the current method of providing the disclosures. The MSRB did 
not receive any other comments on this proposed change and is persuaded 
by SIFMA's concerns. The MSRB believes that retaining the existing 
requirements regarding the disclosures of underwriter's compensation 
would be consistent with the goals of the retrospective review and not 
harm current municipal entity issuer protections. Accordingly, the 
proposed

[[Page 39674]]

rule change does not adopt the Request for Comment's approach to the 
disclosure of underwriter compensation and proposes to retain the 
existing requirements and structure under the 2012 Interpretive Notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ Id., at p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Disclosure of Potential Material Conflicts of Interest
    As previously described, the Request for Comment proposed certain 
revisions to the 2012 Interpretive Notice clarifying that a potential 
material conflict of interest must be disclosed if, but only if, it is 
``reasonably foreseeable'' that it will mature into an actual material 
conflict of interest during the course of that specific transaction 
between the issuer and the underwriter.\161\ The MSRB received several 
comments to the Request for Comment on this proposed change. GFOA and 
the City of San Diego supported the revision, while SIFMA continued to 
advocate for the elimination of this category of disclosure altogether. 
More specifically, GFOA stated that this ``reasonably foreseeable'' 
standard should be used, because continuing to require the disclosure 
of all potential material conflicts of interest ``could diminish the 
meaningful inclusions that issuers need to know.'' \162\ The City of 
San Diego indicated that the reasonably foreseeable standard provided a 
reasonable ``limit'' to what constitutes a potential material conflict 
of interest and indicated that the MSRB should not set a standard with 
``a greater likelihood.'' \163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Release--Amending the Nature, Timing, and 
Manner of Disclosures--Disclosure of Potential Material Conflicts of 
Interest and related notes 98 et. seq. infra.
    \162\ GFOA Letter II, at p. 2.
    \163\ City of San Diego Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, SIFMA reiterated its concern that the disclosure 
requirement, ``. . . be limited to actual, and not merely potential, 
material conflicts of interest, or in the very least, a highly likely 
standard.'' \164\ SIFMA stated that continuing to require the 
disclosure of potential material conflicts of interest would be 
``unnecessary, distracting, and does not advance the goal of the 
retrospective review'' and suggested that the proposed reasonably 
foreseeable standard ``would be exceedingly difficult to implement and 
monitor from a compliance standpoint.'' \165\ SIFMA's response to the 
Request for Comment further explained that, because any potential 
material conflict of interest that ripens into an actual conflict prior 
to the execution of the bond purchase agreement must be disclosed under 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice, the advance disclosure of such potential 
material conflicts of interest are unnecessary and distracting. 
Moreover, SIFMA stated that the consequence of misjudging whether and 
when a potential conflict of interest becomes material is too great, 
and, consequently, the reasonably foreseeable standard proposed in the 
Request for Comment would not reduce the volume of disclosures provided 
to issuers, as underwriters ``would be inclined,'' out of an abundance 
of caution or otherwise, to deliver the same level of disclosure as 
they currently deliver under the 2012 Interpretive Notice.\166\ SIFMA 
encouraged the MSRB to either eliminate the category of potential 
material conflicts altogether or, in the alternative, adopt a ``highly 
likely'' standard for those potential material conflicts of interest 
that must be disclosed.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 4.
    \165\ Id., pp. 4-5.
    \166\ Id.
    \167\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As indicated in the Request for Comment, the MSRB believes that the 
disclosure of material conflicts of interest remains significant to an 
issuer's evaluation of the dealer providing underwriting services, 
which justifies the obligation for underwriters to continue to provide 
these disclosures.\168\ To the degree that an underwriter has knowledge 
that a material conflict of interest does not currently exist, but is 
reasonably likely to ripen into an actual material conflict of interest 
during the course of the underwriting transaction, the MSRB believes 
that the municipal securities market is best served by the underwriter 
providing advanced notification to the issuer of the likelihood of such 
material conflict of interest, rather than waiting to disclose the 
conflict until it has ripened into an actual conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ For example, the MSRB notes the requirements to disclose 
conflicts of interest--including potential material conflicts of 
interest--under the 2012 Interpretive Notice may serve as an 
important tool for the issuer and underwriter to discuss and address 
other disclosure obligations that may arise in the course of a 
primary offering of municipal securities. See, e.g., Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-33741, ``Statement of the Commission Regarding 
Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others'' 
(Mar. 9, 1994) (the ``SEC's 1994 Interpretive Release''), 59 FR 
12748, at p. 12751 (March 17, 1994) (stating that ``. . . 
revelations about practices in the municipal securities offering 
process have highlighted the potential materiality of information 
concerning financial and business relationships, arrangements or 
practices, including political contributions, that could influence 
municipal securities offerings. . . . For example, such information 
could indicate the existence of actual or potential conflicts of 
interest, breach of duty, or less than arm's length transactions. 
Similarly, these matters may reflect upon the qualifications, level 
of diligence, and disinterestedness of financial advisors, 
underwriters, experts and other participants in an offering. Failure 
to disclose material information concerning such relationships, 
arrangements or practices may render misleading statements made in 
connection with the process, including statements in the official 
statement about the use of proceeds, underwriter's compensation and 
other expenses of the offering.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, the MSRB understands from issuers and dealers 
that the disclosures required under the 2012 Interpretive Notice can 
result in a long list of generic boilerplate disclosures with little 
actionable information, and which may distract an issuer's attention 
from conflicts of interest that are more concrete and specific to the 
transaction's participants, facts and circumstances. In this regard, 
the MSRB is persuaded by SIFMA's concerns that the Request for 
Comment's proposed ``reasonably foreseeable'' standard could be 
difficult to implement from a compliance perspective and so may not 
serve the goal of reducing boilerplate disclosure regarding potential 
material conflicts of interest and facilitating the more focused 
disclosure of the most likely and immediate conflicts.
    Accordingly, the proposed rule change incorporates a ``reasonably 
likely'' standard to define what potential material conflicts of 
interest must be disclosed in advance of ripening into an actual 
material conflict of interest during the course of a transaction. The 
MSRB believes that a reasonably likely standard appropriately balances 
competing policy interests, including by ensuring that issuers continue 
to benefit from the disclosure of potential material conflicts of 
interest, while at the same time attempting to reduce the volume of 
disclosures received by issuers and focusing the content of the 
disclosures to those conflicts that are more concrete and probable.
iii. Syndicate Manager Responsibility for the Standard Disclosures and 
Transaction-Specific Disclosures
    As described above, the Request for Comment proposed an amendment 
to the 2012 Interpretive Notice that would require, rather than permit, 
the standard disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures to be 
made by a syndicate manager ``on behalf of'' the other syndicate 
members.\169\ The MSRB

[[Page 39675]]

received specific comments from the City of San Diego, SIFMA, and BDA 
on this proposed change. As discussed below, the City of Sand Diego 
questioned the proposed change and encouraged the MSRB to retain a 
version of the existing requirements under the 2012 Interpretive 
Notice,\170\ while BDA and SIFMA supported the proposed change, but 
encouraged the MSRB to adopt clarifying amendments to the concept. The 
following provides a separate discussion regarding the MSRB's rationale 
for: Assigning to the syndicate manager's the sole obligation to 
deliver the standard disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures 
where a syndicate is formed; continuing to require co-managing 
underwriters in the syndicate to disclose in writing any applicable 
dealer-specific conflicts of interest; and the elimination of the 
Request for Comment's ``on behalf of'' concept related to the syndicate 
manager's obligation to deliver the standard disclosures and 
transaction-specific disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Syndicate Manager Responsibility for the 
Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific Disclosures and notes 
102 et. seq. supra.
    \170\ City of San Diego Letter, at p 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Amending the 2012 Interpretive Notice To Require the Syndicate 
Manager To Make the Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific 
Disclosures
    The City of San Diego objected to the inclusion of the proposed 
change and encouraged the MSRB to adopt a standard that would ensure 
each syndicate member is ``responsible for delivering the standard and 
transaction specific disclosures'' and ``required to obtain 
acknowledgement of receipt from the issuer.'' \171\ The City of San 
Diego reasoned that the burden placed on issuers of receiving multiple 
disclosures is manageable, even for frequent issuers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As outlined above, the MSRB remains persuaded by the comments to 
the Concept Proposal from BDA, NAMA, and the Florida Division of Bond 
Finance that requiring, rather than merely allowing, the syndicate 
manager to deliver the standard disclosures and transaction-specific 
disclosures is an efficient way to reduce the duplication of 
disclosures received by issuers where a syndicate is formed. The MSRB 
understands that in many instances syndicate members may be reluctant 
to rely on the syndicate manager's delivery of the disclosures, as 
currently permitted by the 2012 Interpretive Guidance, because 
confirming delivery of its disclosures provides greater regulatory 
certainty that it has met its fair dealing obligations to the issuer. 
Additionally, the MSRB continues to be persuaded by GFOA's comment on 
the Concept Proposal that ``issuers who may be frequently in the market 
have to tackle and acknowledge the paperwork many times.'' \172\ 
Accordingly, the proposed rule change incorporates the concept of only 
obligating the syndicate manager to provide the standard disclosures 
and transaction-specific disclosures where a syndicate is formed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ GFOA Letter I, at p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Declining To Amend the 2012 Interpretive Notice To Require Only the 
Syndicate Manager To Provide the Dealer-Specific Disclosures
    In contrast to the City of San Diego's view on this topic, BDA's 
comment on the Request for Comment encouraged the MSRB to go even 
further in reducing an underwriter's disclosure obligations by only 
requiring the syndicate manager to have an obligation to deliver the 
dealer-specific disclosures, and eliminating the obligation that co-
managers must deliver their individual dealer-specific disclosures. BDA 
cautioned the MSRB that continuing to require dealers who serve as co-
managers to provide the dealer-specific conflicts of interest result in 
``roughly the same number of disclosures to issuers as currently is the 
case.'' \173\ BDA reasoned that, ``[a]s a practical matter, conflicts 
of interest tend to be specific to dealers in that each dealer has 
specific arrangements that create the conflict,'' yet the disclosures 
of only the syndicate manager's dealer-specific conflicts of interest 
are sufficient, because ``the role of co-manager does not entail the 
kind of active discussions with an issuer to merit disclosure by all 
co-managers of their specific conflicts.'' \174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ BDA Letter II, at p. 3.
    \174\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB understands BDA's concern that continuing to require co-
managing underwriters to deliver their dealer-specific disclosures may 
not advance the goal of seeking to reduce the volume of disclosures to 
issuers.\175\ The MSRB, however, continues to be persuaded by comments 
to the Concept Proposal and the Request for Comment that non-
boilerplate disclosures regarding specific material conflicts of 
interest must be received by an issuer from each underwriter in the 
syndicate. While the general uniformity of the standard disclosures and 
the transaction-specific disclosures lend themselves to a single 
delivery in most circumstances, the MSRB believes that the relative 
uniqueness of the dealer-specific disclosures require a delivery 
obligation on the part of each co-managing underwriter. A co-managing 
underwriter's failure to deliver such disclosures could result in an 
issuer being unable to fully evaluate such co-managing underwriter's 
engagement in the syndicate and to make any appropriate disclosures to 
investors about the municipal securities offering. Accordingly, the 
MSRB declines to incorporate BDA's suggestion into the proposed rule 
change that only the syndicate manager is obligated to deliver the 
dealer-specific disclosures. Relatedly, the proposed rule change would 
not amend the guidance that, while each co-managing underwriter in the 
syndicate must disclose any applicable dealer-specific conflicts of 
interest, a co-managing underwriter has no obligation to affirmatively 
disclose in writing the absence of such conflicts.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ The MSRB also notes that pursuant to the existing 
requirements under the 2012 Interpretive Notice and the FAQs, a co-
managing underwriter would not have an obligation to deliver an 
affirmative statement in writing to the issuer indicating that no 
such dealer-specific conflicts exist, although a co-managing 
underwriter is not prohibited from doing so. The MSRB believes that 
one benefit of not requiring a co-managing underwriter to deliver 
such a disclosure is that issuers should be able to focus on the 
dealer-specific disclosures it does receive.
    \176\ For the avoidance of doubt, the proposed rule change would 
preserve the ability of an underwriter to deliver an affirmative 
statement providing that the underwriter does not have an actual 
material conflict of interest or potential material conflicts of 
interest subject to disclosure. Moreover, the proposed rule change 
incorporates the reminder in the Implementation Guidance that 
underwriters are obligated to disclose such conflicts of interest 
arising after the time of engagement with the issuer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Clarifying That an Underwriter That Becomes a Syndicate Manager is 
Not Required To Make the Standard Disclosures and Transaction-Specific 
Disclosures on Behalf of Co-Managing Underwriters
    SIFMA's response to the Request for Comment ``welcome[d] this 
proposal to reduce oftentimes duplicative disclosures to issuers,'' but 
also requested certain refinements to it.\177\ Specifically, SIFMA was 
concerned that the proposed change would require the syndicate manager 
to ``affirmatively state'' that the standard disclosures are provided 
``on behalf of the other syndicate members.'' \178\ SIFMA suggested 
that this would be problematic in instances when an underwriter may 
need to provide the disclosures in order to meet the deadlines proposed 
in the 2012 Interpretive Notice, but co-managing

[[Page 39676]]

underwriters have not yet been appointed and/or the underwriter is 
uncertain whether such a syndicate will be formed. SIFMA encouraged the 
MSRB to reconsider this ``on behalf of'' language to ensure that an 
underwriter is not required to suggest the appointment of co-managing 
underwriters in such instances or, presumably, to otherwise provide 
disclosures on behalf of a non-existent or still-forming syndicate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ SIFMA Letter II, at pp. 8-9.
    \178\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, BDA encouraged the MSRB to clarify the timing of a 
syndicate manager's delivery of disclosures, requesting specifics 
regarding the scenario in which an ``underwriter may deliver the 
standard disclosures and transaction-specific disclosures well before a 
syndicate is formed.'' \179\ BDA stated that the amendments should 
``clarify that standard disclosures and transaction-specific 
disclosures delivered by a syndicate manager can be delivered before a 
syndicate is formed and that the syndicate manager is not required to 
deliver new disclosures after a syndicate is formed or new syndicate 
members are added.'' \180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ BDA Letter II, at p. 3.
    \180\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB is persuaded by the scenarios that SIFMA and BDA describe 
and believes that requiring a syndicate manager to make the standard 
disclosures and the transaction-specific disclosures ``on behalf of '' 
the other members of the syndicate may unnecessarily be understood as 
requiring underwriters to deliver disclosures on behalf of non-existent 
syndicate members or otherwise defeat the purpose of the retrospective 
review by requiring an underwriter to re-deliver disclosures that had 
been provided, but delivered without such ``on behalf of'' language, in 
order to fulfill the dealer's fair dealing obligations to the 
issuer.\181\ Accordingly, the proposed rule change would strike the `` 
on behalf of'' language as generally proposed in the Request for 
Comment and would expressly clarify that, in those instances in which 
an underwriter has provided the standard disclosures and/or 
transaction-specific disclosures prior to the formation of the 
syndicate, it would suffice that the disclosures have been delivered 
and no affirmative statement that such disclosures are made ``on behalf 
of'' any future co-managing underwriter would be necessary.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ Here, the MSRB contemplates scenarios in which an 
underwriting syndicate unexpectedly forms subsequent to the delivery 
of the standard disclosures and/or transaction-specific disclosures 
and desires to clarify that underwriters are not obliged to re-
deliver such disclosures ``on behalf of'' the syndicate in order to 
meet their fair dealing obligations. The proposed rule change is 
intended to clarify that a syndicate manager is not required to re-
deliver any disclosures previously provided to an issuer upon the 
subsequent or concurrent formation of a syndicate. Notwithstanding 
this obligation, and for the avoidance of doubt, to the extent that 
the content of those disclosures may need to be supplemented or 
amended to account for a change in circumstances, an underwriter is 
still permitted to deliver such a supplement or amendment. As stated 
in the FAQs, ``unless directed otherwise by an issuer, an 
underwriter may update selected portions of disclosures previously 
provided so long as such updates clearly identify the additions or 
deletions and are capable of being read independently of the prior 
disclosures.''
    \182\ The proposed rule change is intended to similarly permit a 
syndicate manager to provide the standard disclosures and/or 
transaction-specific disclosures concurrent with or after the 
formation of the syndicate without the reference to the ``on behalf 
of'' language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Alternative to the Transaction-by-Transaction Delivery of the 
Disclosures as Proposed in the Request for Comment
    As further described above, the MSRB incorporated proposed 
amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice in the Request for Comment 
that permitted underwriters to provide standard disclosures to an 
issuer one time and then subsequently refer to and reconfirm those 
disclosures.\183\ The MSRB received specific comments from GFOA, NAMA, 
the City of San Diego, and SIFMA regarding this proposal and each 
comment was generally critical of the MSRB's proposed approach. GFOA's 
comment on the Request for Comment stated that the MSRB's proposal is 
``problematic'' and encouraged the MSRB to adopt an approach 
``mandat[ing] that disclosures are provided to issuers for each 
transaction, to ensure that the issuers are aware of the fair dealing 
requirement for each issuance of securities.'' \184\ Similarly, NAMA 
opposed any amendments that would eliminate the requirement for 
underwriters to provide disclosures for each transaction or otherwise 
allowed underwriters to reference back to previously provided 
disclosures. The City of San Diego agreed, stating that ``[i]t is most 
straight forward to require disclosures on a transaction by transaction 
basis.'' \185\ SIFMA appreciated the MSRB's attempt to respond to its 
request to provide an alternative manner of disclosure, but expressed 
concern that the MSRB's proposal ``complicates matters even further.'' 
\186\ SIFMA concluded that the MSRB's alternative proposal would be 
``operationally burdensome'' and ``do little to reduce the volume and 
nature of the paperwork.'' \187\ SIFMA reiterated its original 
suggestion for an annual disclosure process ``with bring-downs as 
necessary during the succeeding year.'' \188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Alternative to the Transaction-by-
Transaction Delivery of the Disclosures and related notes 107 et. 
seq. supra.
    \184\ GFOA Letter II, at pp. 1-2.
    \185\ City of San Diego Letter, at p. 1.
    \186\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 7.
    \187\ Id., at p. 8.
    \188\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the lack of support from commenters regarding the MSRB's 
proposal, the MSRB did not incorporate the concept into the proposed 
rule change and declines to incorporate a different concept into the 
proposed rule change regarding an alternative to the transaction-by-
transaction delivery of the disclosures, such as SIFMA's suggestion of 
annual disclosure process with bring-downs. The MSRB is persuaded by 
the comments from GFOA, NAMA, and City of San Diego that a transaction-
by-transaction approach to disclosure better ensures that issuers and 
their personnel are apprised of an underwriter's fair dealing 
obligations for each offering.
v. Separate Identification of the Standard Disclosures
    The MSRB incorporated a requirement in the Request for Comment that 
underwriters clearly identify each category of disclosure and generally 
separate them by placing the standard disclosures in an appendix or 
attachment.\189\ The MSRB suggested that such a change would allow 
issuers to discern and focus on the disclosures most important to them. 
The MSRB received several specific comments on this proposed change. 
GFOA's response to the Request for Comment supported the separation of 
disclosures, stating: ``[w]hen determining clarity and communication of 
disclosures, standard disclosures should be discussed separately from 
specific transaction and underwriter disclosures.'' \190\ NAMA 
similarly supported the separation of the standard disclosures from the 
transaction-specific disclosures as a way to highlight key items to its 
issuer clients.\191\ SIFMA suggested that the ``separation of actual 
and non-standard disclosures is a reasonable proposal.'' \192\ 
Accordingly, the proposed rule change incorporates the separation of 
the standard disclosures

[[Page 39677]]

from the transaction-specific disclosures and dealer-specific 
disclosures.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Separate Identification of the Standard 
Disclosures and related notes 110 et. seq. infra.
    \190\ GFOA Letter II, at p. 1.
    \191\ NAMA Letter II, at p. 2.
    \192\ SIFMA Letter II, at pp. 3-4.
    \193\ As discussed above, the MSRB reiterates, but is not 
amending at this time, the existing language from the 2012 
Interpretive Notice that disclosures must be ``designed to make 
clear'' to issuer officials ``the subject matter of such disclosures 
and their implications for the issuer.'' Thus, an underwriter's fair 
dealing obligation requires it to identify and separate transaction-
specific disclosures from dealer-specific disclosures to the extent 
possible without putting form over substance, as in the case of 
failing to fully discuss a conflict in a disclosure because it may 
not fit squarely into one category of disclosure versus another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi. Clarification That Underwriters Are Not Obligated To Provide 
Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other Parties
    The Request for Comment incorporated a proposed amendment to the 
2012 Interpretive Notice in order to expressly emphasize that 
underwriters are not required to make any disclosures on the part of 
issuer personnel or any other parties to the transaction.\194\ The MSRB 
received one specific comment on this topic. More specifically, SIFMA's 
response to the Request for Comment ``welcome[d]'' the MSRB's proposed 
clarification.\195\ The MSRB believes that this clarification is 
warranted to avoid any misinterpretation of the disclosure requirements 
of the proposed rule change. Accordingly, the proposed rule change 
would incorporate this language as generally proposed in the Request 
for Comment with supplemental language specifically clarifying that the 
an underwriter has no obligation to make any written disclosures 
described therein on the part of issuer personnel or any other parties 
to the transaction, as the standard disclosures, transaction-specific 
disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures are limited to underwriter 
conflicts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarification that Underwriters Are Not 
Obligated to Provide Written Disclosure of Conflicts of Other 
Parties and related note 114.
    \195\ SIFMA further asked the MSRB to provide examples of how 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice does not apply to other parties. 
Specifically, SIFMA requested ``examples of conflicts of other 
parties that would not need to be disclosed.'' SIFMA Letter II, at 
p. 4. The MSRB is open to SIFMA's request for examples, but believes 
that it is premature to provide such examples prior to the approval 
of the amended language in the proposed rule change. Given the facts 
and circumstances nature of such examples, the MSRB believes that it 
can better respond to SIFMA's request, assuming approval of the 
proposed change, through an FAQ or other compliance resource at a 
later date, if there is a continuing need for such examples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Clarity of Disclosures
    The MSRB proposed amendments to the 2012 Interpretive Notice in the 
Request for Comment that explicitly clarified that the disclosures be 
drafted in ``plain English.'' \196\ The MSRB received several comments 
on this topic in response to the Request for Comment. The City of San 
Diego, GFOA and NAMA each supported the requirement that the 
disclosures be drafted in plain English, while SIFMA objected to the 
incorporation of this particular standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Amending the Nature, Timing, 
and Manner of Disclosures--Clarity of Disclosures and related notes 
117 et. seq. infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of those in support of the standard, notably, the City of San Diego 
encouraged the MSRB to require underwriters to state whether their 
descriptions of certain complex municipal securities financing 
structures can be explained in plain English and, if not, to explicitly 
state that fact within the disclosure to alert an issuer that it may 
need to ask more questions.\197\ In contrast, SIFMA objected to the 
inclusion of a plain English standard, stating its belief that the 
standard would be ``susceptible to different interpretations'' and the 
formal adoption of such a standard would defeat the purposes of the 
retrospective review by causing underwriters to ``completely redo all 
manner of their G-17 disclosures.'' \198\ As an alternative, SIFMA 
suggested that the MSRB adopt a ``clear and concise'' standard.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ City of San Diego Letter, at p. 2.
    \198\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 6.
    \199\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the MSRB's intent of incorporating the ``plain 
English'' standard into the Request for Comment was merely to formalize 
a substantially equivalent standard to the one presently required under 
the 2012 Interpretive Notice. The MSRB did not intend to create a 
substantively different standard that would require underwriters to 
redraft their existing disclosure language. Consequently, the MSRB is 
persuaded by SIFMA's concerns that the adoption of a ``plain English'' 
standard may defeat the purposes of the retrospective review, because 
it would require underwriters to redraft existing disclosures to meet, 
in SIFMA's view, a new and elusive standard. For similar reasons, the 
MSRB is declining to incorporate the City of San Diego's suggestion, at 
this time, that would require underwriters to explicitly state if a 
disclosure could not be provided in plain English. Rather, the MSRB is 
persuaded by SIFMA's alternative proposal that the MSRB adopt a ``clear 
and concise'' standard. The MSRB believes that this addition is 
warranted to provide further clarification on the accessibility and 
readability of the disclosures required under the proposed rule change. 
Moreover, the MSRB believes that such a ``clear and concise'' standard 
is appropriate, because it has been adopted in other contexts related 
to the issuance of municipal securities, and, as a result, should be 
relatively familiar to issuers and underwriters alike.\200\ 
Accordingly, the MSRB proposed rule change incorporates a clear and 
concise standard and omits any specific reference to plain English.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ For example, the SEC has stated that, ``[l]ike other 
disclosure documents, official statements need to be clear and 
concise to avoid misleading investors through confusion and 
obfuscation.'' See the SEC's 1994 Interpretive Release, at p. 12753.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Inclusion of Existing Language Regarding the Discouragement of an 
Issuer's Engagement of a Municipal Advisor and Incorporation of a New 
Standard Disclosure Regarding the Issuer's Choice To Engage a Municipal 
Advisor

    As discussed above, the Request for Comment incorporated existing 
language from the Implementation Guidance stating that ``underwriters 
may not discourage issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise 
imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because 
the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide the services 
that a municipal advisor would.'' \201\ BDA and SIFMA objected to the 
inclusion of this language, while GFOA and NAMA encouraged the MSRB to 
adopt even stronger requirements in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Underwriter Discouragement of 
Use of Municipal Advisor; Addition of a New Standard Disclosure 
Regarding the Engagement of Municipal Advisors and related notes 134 
et. seq. supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    BDA objected to the inclusion of the language from the 
Implementation Guidance as redundant. Specifically, BDA stated that 
this language from the Implementation Guidance is ``entirely covered'' 
by the 2012 Interpretive Notice's statement that underwriters not 
``recommend issuers not retain a municipal advisor.'' \202\ SIFMA also 
thought that the proposed language was not necessary, and further 
stated that it would have unintended consequences by limiting 
``otherwise permissible advice, such as describing what services can 
and cannot be provided, between underwriters and their [issuer] clients

[[Page 39678]]

for fear of implying that a [municipal advisor] may be redundant.'' 
\203\ SIFMA further stated its belief that the language may create a 
``bias'' against underwriter-only transactions that ``could confuse 
issuers and discourage an issuer's flexibility to control the cost and 
scope of its financings in cases where it chooses not to use a 
[municipal advisor].'' \204\ SIFMA requested the MSRB eliminate the 
proposed language; clarify that neither municipal advisors, nor 
underwriters may misrepresent the services and duties that the other is 
permitted to provide; and prohibit municipal advisors from 
misrepresenting that there is a regulatory requirement for an issuer to 
hire a municipal advisor.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ BDA Letter II, at p. 2 (``The BDA believes that the 
additional sentence is entirely covered by the existing sentence 
that precedes the new sentence. Any underwriter who discourages an 
issuer from retaining a municipal advisor for any reasons would be 
making already a prohibited recommendation to do so.'').
    \203\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 6.
    \204\ Id.
    \205\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Conversely, in their responses to the Request for Comment, GFOA and 
NAMA each indicated that the proposed language was helpful, but 
encouraged the MSRB to go beyond just incorporating the language of the 
Implementation Guidance by adopting new, stronger prohibitions 
regarding underwriters deterring the engagement of municipal advisors. 
GFOA restated its request that the MSRB include a requirement that 
``underwriters affirmatively state that issuers may choose to hire a 
municipal advisor to represent their interests in a transaction.'' 
\206\ NAMA stated that its members are ``aware of instances where both 
underwriters and bond counsel directly deter the use of a municipal 
advisor or bond counsel dictates who the municipal advisor should be.'' 
\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ GFOA Letter II, at p. 2.
    \207\ NAMA Letter II, at p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB is persuaded by the comments from GFOA and NAMA about deal 
participants improperly dissuading issuers from considering the 
engagement of a municipal advisor and unfairly influencing issuers to 
engage one particular municipal advisor over another. However, the MSRB 
also believes there is merit to BDA and SIFMA's concerns, particularly 
regarding how further prohibitions may unintendedly chill otherwise 
valid underwriter advice and, thus, deprive issuers of the full benefit 
of an underwriters' expertise and experience in the market.
    Given that the language prohibiting underwriters from discouraging 
the engagement of a municipal advisor or implying a redundancy of 
services provided by a municipal advisor is taken from the existing 
Implementation Guidance, the MSRB believes that underwriters should 
already be familiar with the practical application of this language. 
The MSRB further believes that the language should already have been 
incorporated into existing policies, procedures and training and, as a 
result, should not significantly increase the regulatory burden on 
underwriters. Equally important, the MSRB does not believe that the 
statements are redundant, as BDA contends, because they add an 
important gloss on the general fair dealing obligation of underwriters. 
As the additional language makes clear, a recommendation not to engage 
a municipal advisor can come in many express or implied forms, 
including, but not limited to, express communications discouraging the 
use of a municipal advisor or by strong implication of the redundancy 
of a given municipal advisor's services.
    The MSRB believes there is potential merit to SIFMA's concerns that 
the proposed language may chill certain underwriter communications with 
issuers regarding municipal advisors and/or create a bias against 
underwriter only transactions that could lead to increased issuer 
borrowing costs. Nevertheless, the MSRB finds GFOA's comments to the 
Concept Proposal and Request for Proposal to be most persuasive on this 
topic, particularly in light of the MSRB's statutory mandate to protect 
municipal entities.\208\ In this way, municipal entity issuers, as 
represented by GFOA, desire the prohibitions on such underwriter 
communications to be strengthened, rather than relaxed. Moreover, while 
GFOA's comments did not directly address SIFMA's concerns regarding the 
possible negative effects that this proposed change may have on issuer 
decision-making, the MSRB generally understands GFOA's view to be that, 
at this time, the risks that an issuer misunderstands the distinctions 
between a municipal advisor's role and an underwriter's role, and/or 
that an issuer is unduly persuaded by an underwriter against the 
engagement of a municipal advisor, generally outweighs the risks that 
an underwriter will be compelled, out of an abundance of caution or 
otherwise, to abstain from certain conversations with an issuer during 
the course of a negotiated offering, or that an issuer may uninformedly 
decline an underwriter-only transaction to the detriment of its 
borrowing costs by engaging a municipal advisor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ In terms of municipal entity protection, the MSRB is 
further persuaded by academic evidence finding that issuers obtain 
real economic benefits from using municipal advisors. See note 87 
supra and related discussion in the Self-Regulatory Organization's 
Statement on Burden on Competition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In terms of SIFMA's other comments, the MSRB agrees that ``neither 
[municipal advisors] nor underwriters may misrepresent the services and 
duties that the other is permitted to provide,'' and that municipal 
advisors cannot make a misrepresentation regarding ``a regulatory 
requirement for an issuer to hire a [municipal advisor].'' \209\ 
However, the MSRB does not believe that the proposed rule change is the 
appropriate vehicle to address potential misrepresentations by 
municipal advisors, as the proposed rule change is limitedly focused on 
underwriters' fair dealing obligations to issuers, not the duties of 
loyalty and care that municipal advisors owe to their municipal entity 
clients.\210\ Accordingly, the MSRB declines to incorporate SIFMA's 
suggestions on these particular matters into the proposed rule 
change.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ SIFMA Comment Letter II, at p. 7.
    \210\ See Rule G-42. More specific to SIFMA's concern that a 
municipal advisor may misrepresent a regulatory requirement for an 
issuer to hire a municipal advisor, the MSRB notes that an issuer 
may be subject to state or local jurisdictional statutes, 
regulations, or other policies that may dictate such a requirement 
(i.e., if and when a municipal entity may or must engage a municipal 
advisor). To the degree that there is an actual jurisdictional 
requirement for a municipal entity to engage a municipal advisor, 
consistent with its duties of care and loyalty, a municipal advisor 
may accurately communicate such jurisdictional requirements to a 
municipal entity issuer.
    \211\ As a threshold matter, however, the MSRB notes that Rule 
G-42, on the duties of non-solicitor municipal advisors, requires a 
municipal advisor to conduct its municipal advisory activities with 
a municipal entity client in accord with a duty of care and a duty 
of loyalty. Absent potential exculpating facts and circumstances, 
knowingly misrepresenting the services of an underwriter or the 
regulatory requirements applicable to a municipal entity client 
would be a violation of a municipal advisor's duty of care and/or 
duty of loyalty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, the MSRB is incorporating into the Revised 
Interpretive Notice language from the Implementation Guidance that 
``underwriters may not discourage issuers from using a municipal 
advisor or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would 
be redundant because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can 
provide the services that a municipal advisor would,'' as generally 
proposed in the Request for Comment. Beyond this, the proposed rule 
change would incorporate GFOA's and NAMA's requests to further bolster 
the disclosures regarding an issuer's choice to engage a municipal 
advisor by incorporating a new disclosure into an underwriter's 
standard disclosures. Specifically, the

[[Page 39679]]

proposed rule change would require an underwriter to inform an issuer 
that ``the issuer may choose to engage the services of a municipal 
advisor to represent its interests in the transaction'' in a similar 
format and at the same time as the underwriter delivers certain other 
disclosures currently required under the 2012 Interpretive Notice.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ Like the existing, similar disclosures regarding the 
underwriter's role, the proposed rule change would require the 
underwriter to deliver this new disclosure at or before the time the 
underwriter has been engaged to perform underwriting services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Email Read Receipt as Issuer Acknowledgement

    The Request for Comment proposed a change to the acknowledgement 
requirement of the 2012 Interpretive Notice that would allow for an 
automatic email return receipt to satisfy the acknowledgement 
requirement, as more fully described above.\213\ The MSRB received 
several supportive comments specific to this proposed change. NAMA and 
SIFMA each expressed their support of the proposed change. 
Specifically, NAMA stated that it was ``. . . pleased that the [Request 
for Comment] . . . would continue to mandate a form of acknowledgement 
from issuers that the disclosures are received, even through an email 
return receipt.'' \214\ SIFMA similarly expressed its support for the 
incorporation into the Request for Comment of the concept that an 
automatic email return receipt could ``evidence receipt of the 
underwriter disclosures.'' \215\ The City of San Diego was similarly 
supportive, stating that ``a read receipt should be permitted so long 
as the underwriter has delivered the disclosure to the issuer 
designated primary contact.'' \216\ Notably, GFOA did not directly 
address this particular issue in its response to the Request for 
Comment, but did reiterate its preference that ``[t]ransaction specific 
and material underwriter conflicts of interest should be provided for 
each issuance of securities.'' \217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Email Read Receipt as Issuer 
Acknowledgement and related notes 125 et. seq. supra.
    \214\ NAMA Letter II, at p. 2.
    \215\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 2.
    \216\ City of San Diego Letter, at p. 2.
    \217\ GFOA Letter II, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on these comments, the MSRB believes the acknowledgement 
requirement continues to have value to ensure that issuers receive the 
disclosures. However, the MSRB does not believe underwriters should 
have to repeatedly seek a particularized form of acknowledgement, which 
an issuer may not provide. Accordingly, the proposed rule change would 
incorporate this change as generally proposed in the Request for 
Comment with additional emphasis and clarifications on three important 
aspects of the proposed change to the acknowledgement requirement.
    First, the proposed rule change would provide greater clarity 
regarding what type of automatic email receipt can meet an 
underwriter's fair dealing obligation to obtain written acknowledgement 
of an issuer's receipt of the applicable disclosures. Specifically, the 
proposed rule change would make clear that an automatic email read 
receipt must be obtained, rather than a mere automatic email delivery 
receipt, in order to meet the proposed rule change's acknowledgement 
obligations. The proposed rule change would define the term ``email 
read receipt'' to mean an automatic response generated by a recipient 
issuer official confirming that an email has been opened. An email 
delivery receipt that simply shows that a disclosure was successfully 
delivered fails to demonstrate whether the recipient actually received 
the disclosure in a working email inbox folder or if, for example, the 
disclosure was in fact delivered to a spam or junk file folder. An 
email delivery receipt that does not confirm that a recipient has in 
fact opened the email communication would not satisfy an underwriter's 
fair dealing obligation to obtain acknowledgement regarding the receipt 
of disclosures under the Revised Interpretive Notice.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ Although, the proposed rule change would make clear that 
such an email delivery receipt can still be used to evidence the 
timing regarding an underwriter's attempt to timely deliver a 
disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the proposed rule change would clarify that while an email 
read receipt may generally be an acceptable form of an issuer's written 
acknowledgement under the Revised Interpretive Notice, an underwriter, 
would not be able to rely on an email read receipt as an issuer's 
written acknowledgement where such reliance is unreasonable under all 
of the facts and circumstances, such as where the underwriter is on 
notice that the issuer official to whom the email is addressed has not 
in fact received or opened the email. If an underwriter is on notice 
that, for example, an issuer official has not in fact received and/or 
opened an email with the applicable disclosures, despite having 
received an affirmative email read receipt confirmation, then the 
underwriter would not have met its fair dealing obligation under the 
Revised Interpretive Notice to obtain written acknowledgement from the 
issuer. This language in the proposed rule change is intended to ensure 
that disclosures are in fact delivered to an issuer, and, thereby, 
issuer protection is not compromised.
    Finally, the proposed rule change would emphasize that an 
underwriter's fair dealing obligation to obtain an issuer's written 
acknowledgement can be satisfied by an email read receipt, but only if 
such email read receipt is from an appropriate issuer official. The 
Revised Interpretive Notice would state the underwriter has a fair 
dealing obligation to obtain such an email read receipt from the 
official of the issuer identified as the primary contact for receipt of 
such disclosures. In the absence of such identification, the 
underwriter would have a fair dealing obligation to receive an email 
read receipt from an issuer official that the underwriter reasonably 
believes has authority to bind the issuer by contract with the 
underwriter. Only email read receipts from such officials would meet an 
underwriter's fair dealing obligation under the Revised Interpretive 
Notice. Thus, the Revised Interpretive Notice would require 
underwriters to pay particular attention to the recipient providing an 
email read receipt. The additional emphasis in the proposed rule change 
is intended to ensure that disclosures are in fact delivered to the 
appropriate issuer personnel, and, thereby, issuer protection is not 
compromised by the return of an email read receipt from inappropriate 
issuer personnel.

E. Guidance Regarding Meaning of ``Recommendation''

    The Request for Comment proposed an amendment to the 2012 
Interpretive Notice and requested comment on whether the use of the 
recommendation analysis applicable to a G-42 Recommendation should be 
applicable to the determination of whether an underwriter is 
recommending a complex municipal securities financing.\219\ As 
currently provided in MSRB guidance, a G-42 Recommendation depends on 
the following ``two-prong'' analysis:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Clarification of the Meaning of 
``Recommendation'' and related notes 131 et seq. supra.

    First, the [municipal advisor's] advice must exhibit a call to 
action to proceed with a municipal financial product or an issuance 
of municipal securities and second, the [municipal advisor's] advice 
must be specific as to what municipal financial product or

[[Page 39680]]

issuance of municipal securities the municipal advisor is advising 
the [municipal entity client or obligated person client] to proceed 
with.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ See G-42 FAQs (note 37 supra).

    The MSRB received several comments on this topic. SIFMA's response 
to the Request for Comment stated its appreciation for the proposed 
change,\221\ while GFOA's and NAMA's responses cautioned the MSRB on 
the adoption of such a standard. More specifically, GFOA questioned 
whether this standard is ``the most appropriate'' and stated its belief 
that the proposed standard in the Request for Comment ``could prevent 
some issuers from receiving the right information they need to 
determine what financing structures are best for their government.'' 
\222\ NAMA's response to the Request for Comment stated that the G-42 
Recommendation analysis ``is not the right standard'' for this 
context.\223\ NAMA cautioned that, ``[a]pplying the G-42 
[R]ecommendation[] standard to underwriter G-17 disclosures creates a 
false regulatory parity that is not appropriate given the MSRB's 
mission to protect issuers and the very different roles and duties that 
municipal advisors and underwriters have to issuers.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ SIFMA Letter II, at p. 2 (stating, ``[w]e appreciate that 
the MSRB has proposed adopting some of the suggestions we made in 
our comment letter to the MSRB's [Concept Proposal], including . . . 
clarifying the applicability of MSRB Rule G-42's two-prong analysis 
to a recommendation for complex municipal financings . . .'').
    \222\ GFOA Letter II, at p. 2.
    \223\ NAMA Letter II, at p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB understands GFOA's and NAMA's comments to be grounded in a 
concern that municipal advisors have a baseline fiduciary duty to 
protect the interests of municipal entity issuers, whereby any 
municipal advisor communication constituting advice to or on behalf of 
a municipal entity issuer must be in the best interests of the 
municipal entity client without regard to the financial or other 
interests of the municipal advisor. In contrast, underwriters have a 
more limited fair dealing obligation. Building upon this distinction, 
the MSRB's two-pronged analysis under Rule G-42 is primarily intended 
to clarify when a municipal advisor has additional suitability and 
record-keeping obligations when making a particular type of 
recommendation (i.e., a G-42 Recommendation) \224\ to a municipal 
client and is not the analysis for more generally determining when a 
communication constitutes ``advice'' because it ``involves a 
recommendation.'' \225\ In consequence, GFOA's and NAMA's comments 
indicate their shared concern that, compared to the current disclosure 
obligations under the 2012 Interpretive Notice, issuers may receive 
less disclosure under the G-42 Recommendation standard and, thereby, 
have less information available to evaluate complex transactions.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ See the G-42 FAQs, at p. 2 (providing that, ``. . . in 
order for a communication by a municipal advisor to be a G-42 
Recommendation, it must, as a threshold matter, be advice and that 
advice must meet both prongs of a two-prong analysis. First, the 
advice must exhibit a call to action to proceed with a municipal 
financial product or an issuance of municipal securities and second, 
the advice must be specific as to what municipal financial product 
or issuance of municipal securities the municipal advisor is 
advising the MA Client to proceed with.'').
    \225\ The definition of the advice standard pursuant to Exchange 
Act Rule 15Ba1-1(d)(1)(ii), as adopted, ``does not exclude 
information that involves a recommendation.'' Registration of 
Municipal Advisors, Release No. 34-70462 (Sept. 20, 2013), 78 FR 
67467, at 67480 (Nov. 12, 2013). Additionally, the Commission stated 
that, ``. . . for purposes of the municipal advisor definition, the 
Commission believes that the determination of whether a 
recommendation has been made is an objective rather than a 
subjective inquiry. An important factor in this inquiry is whether, 
considering its content, context and manner of presentation, the 
information communicated to the municipal entity or obligated person 
reasonably would be viewed as a suggestion that the municipal entity 
or obligated person take action or refrain from taking action 
regarding municipal financial products or the issuance of municipal 
securities.'' Id.
    \226\ As one illustration of the possible distinctions in 
outcomes, if an underwriter presents a range of possible financing 
structures, but does not advise the issuer to proceed with any one 
specific structure, it may be ambiguous whether the underwriter met 
the second prong of the G-42 Recommendation analysis (i.e., whether 
the underwriter was specific enough as to what particular financing 
structure the issuer should proceed with). Under the Revised 
Interpretive Notice, if such a presentation reasonably would be 
viewed as a suggestion that the issuer take action regarding a 
financing structure or reasonably would influence the issuer to 
engage in a financing structure, then the underwriter would be 
deemed to have a made a recommendation regarding that financing 
structure and, thereby, triggered the applicable disclosure 
requirements.
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    The MSRB is persuaded by GFOA's and NAMA's concerns that issuers 
may receive less disclosure under the G-42 Recommendation standard than 
issuers currently receive under the 2012 Interpretive Notice and, 
therefore, the MSRB has not incorporated the G-42 Recommendation 
standard in the proposed rule change. At the same time, the MSRB is 
still persuaded by SIFMA's comment on the Concept Proposal that the 
MSRB should clarify the standard that determines whether an underwriter 
has made a ``recommendation'' of a municipal securities financing to an 
issuer in a negotiated offering.
    Accordingly, the proposed rule change expressly clarifies that the 
analysis to determine if an underwriter has made a ``recommendation'' 
triggering the complex municipal securities financing disclosures is 
whether--given its content, context, and manner of presentation--a 
particular communication from an underwriter to an issuer reasonably 
would be viewed as a call to action or reasonably would influence an 
issuer to engage in a complex municipal securities financing. This 
analysis to determine whether a recommendation has been made is not 
dissimilar to the analysis for municipal advisors,\227\ and borrows an 
objective rather than subjective inquiry analysis applicable to dealers 
in the context of MSRB Rule G-19, on suitability of recommendations and 
transactions, and, in this way, the MSRB believes it should be familiar 
to dealers.
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    \227\ See note 35 supra and related discussion.
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F. Disclosures to Conduit Borrowers

    As discussed above, the MSRB declined to incorporate an amendment 
into the Request for Comment that would explicitly extend the 
requirements of the 2012 Interpretive Notice to the fair dealing 
obligations underwriters owe to conduit borrowers. The MSRB received a 
single specific comment from SIFMA on this topic, which supported the 
MSRB's approach in the Request for Comment. The proposed rule change 
does not include any changes in this regard.\228\
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    \228\ See discussion supra under Self-Regulatory Organization's 
Statement on Burden on Competition--Identifying and Evaluating 
Reasonable Alternative Regulatory Approaches.
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G. Tiered Disclosure Requirements Based on Issuer Characteristics

    As discussed above, the MSRB declined to incorporate an amendment 
into the Request for Comment that would classify issuers into differing 
disclosure requirements based on various issuer characteristics, nor 
otherwise tailor the disclosure requirements applicable to specific 
categories of issuers.\229\ However, in response to requests from SIFMA 
and BDA regarding assessing the level of knowledge and experience of 
the issuer in order to determine the appropriate level of disclosure 
regarding a recommended financing structure, the Request for Comment 
incorporated the concept that, among other factors, an underwriter may 
consider the issuer's retention of an IRMA when assessing the issuer's 
level of knowledge. The Request for Comment provided:
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    \229\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Tiered Disclosure Requirements 
Based on Issuer Characteristics and related note 140 supra.

    Among other factors, a sole underwriter or syndicate manager 
(when there is an

[[Page 39681]]

underwriting syndicate) may consider the issuer's retention of an 
IRMA, who can help the issuer evaluate underwriter recommendations 
and identify potential conflicts of interest, when assessing the 
issuer's level of knowledge and experience with the recommended 
financing structure, which may support a determination by the sole 
underwriter or syndicate manager that a more limited disclosure 
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would satisfy the obligation for that transaction.

    To further illustrate this point regarding the various factors 
involved in determining the appropriate level of disclosure, the 
Request for Comment also integrated existing language from the 
Implementation Guidance suggesting that the level of transaction-
specific disclosures can vary over time, particularly if an issuer's 
personnel become more or less experienced with a given structure. In 
this regard, the Request for Comment provided:

    The level of transaction-specific disclosure to be provided to a 
particular issuer also can vary over time. To the extent that an 
issuer gains experience with a complex financing structure or 
product over the course of multiple new issues utilizing that 
structure or product, the level of transaction-specific disclosure 
required to be provided to the issuer with respect to such complex 
financing structure or product would likely be reduced over time. If 
an issuer that previously employed a seasoned professional in 
connection with its complex financings who has been replaced by 
personnel with little experience, knowledge or training serving in 
the relevant responsible position or in undertaking such complex 
financings, the level of transaction-specific disclosure required to 
be provided to the issuer with respect to such complex financing 
structure or product would likely increase.

    BDA objected to the inclusion of this language regarding the 
replacement of issuer personnel leading to increased disclosure, 
stating that, ``[i]n the abstract, there is no way to determine whether 
the level should increase or not because it will depend on many 
factors.'' \230\ The MSRB agrees with BDA's objection that the level of 
disclosure required in any given situation depends on numerous factors 
specific to that set of facts and circumstances and so the example 
provided from the Implementation Guidance may lead to confusion. For 
similar reasons, the MSRB also believes that the Request for Comment's 
language regarding an issuer's IRMA may similarly lead to confusion.
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    \230\ BDA Letter II, at p. 2.
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    Accordingly, the proposed rule change does not incorporate this 
language from the Implementation Guidance regarding the replacement of 
issuer personnel and, for similar reasons, does not incorporate the 
language from the Request for Comment regarding an issuer's engagement 
of an IRMA, as the concepts may lead to more, rather than less, 
confusion regarding the underwriter's obligation to reasonably 
determine the level of transaction-specific disclosures required. 
However, the proposed rule change does incorporate existing language 
from the Implementation Guidance regarding the variability of such 
disclosures, providing:

    The level of disclosure required may vary according to the 
issuer's knowledge or experience with the proposed financing 
structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks 
of the recommended financing, and financial ability to bear the 
risks of the recommended financing, in each case based on the 
reasonable belief of the underwriter. In this way, the level of 
disclosure to be provided to a particular issuer also can vary over 
time.

H. Issuer Opt-Out

    As discussed above, the MSRB did not incorporate an issuer opt-out 
concept into the Request for Comment that would give issuer's the 
option of declining to receive certain disclosures from 
underwriters.\231\ GFOA's and NAMA's response to the Request for 
Comment supported the omission of this concept. Accordingly, the 
proposed rule change does not incorporate such an opt-out concept.
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    \231\ See related discussion under Summary of Comments Received 
in Response to the Concept Proposal--Issuer Opt-Out and related note 
148 supra.
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    The MSRB considered the above-noted comments in formulating the 
proposed rule change herein.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period of up to 90 days (i) as 
the Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be 
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-MSRB- 2019-10 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-MSRB-2019-10. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the MSRB. All comments received 
will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are 
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying 
information from comment submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-MSRB-2019-10 and should be submitted on 
or before August 30, 2019.

    For the Commission, pursuant to delegated authority.\232\
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    \232\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-17047 Filed 8-8-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P