Document ID: SEC-2013-0354-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC
Posted Date: 2013-02-19T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 33 (Tuesday, February 19, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11705-11709]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-03706]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-68907; File No. SR-PHLX-2013-05]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Notice of 
Filing of Proposed Rule Change Regarding Catastrophic Errors

February 12, 2013.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that 
on January 31, 2013, NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC (``PHLX'' or ``Exchange'') 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the 
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which 
Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing 
this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from 
interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange is filing with the Commission a proposal to amend Rule 
1092, Obvious Errors and Catastrophic Errors. Specifically, Phlx 
proposes to amend Rule 1092(f)(ii) to permit the nullification of 
trades involving catastrophic errors in certain situations specified 
below.
    The text of the proposed rule change is set forth below. Proposed 
new language is italics; proposed deletions are in brackets.

* * * * *

Rule 1092. Obvious Errors and Catastrophic Errors

    The Exchange shall either nullify a transaction or adjust the 
execution price of a transaction that results in an Obvious Error as 
provided in this Rule.

[[Page 11706]]

    (a)-(e) No change.
    (f) Catastrophic Error Procedure.
    (i) Notification. If an Exchange member believes that it 
participated in a transaction that qualifies as a Catastrophic Error 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(ii) above, it must notify the Exchange's 
Regulatory staff by 8:30 a.m. ET, on the first trading day following 
the date on which the Catastrophic Error occurred. For transactions 
in an expiring options series that take place on an expiration day, 
an Exchange member must notify the Exchange by 5:00 p.m. ET that 
same day. Relief will not be granted under this paragraph: (i) 
unless notification is made within the prescribed time period; and 
(ii) if an Options Exchange Official has previously rendered a 
decision with respect to the transaction in question pursuant to 
Rule 1092(e).
    (ii) Catastrophic Error determination. An Options Exchange 
Official will determine whether the transaction(s) qualifies as a 
Catastrophic Error. If it is determined that a Catastrophic Error 
has occurred, the Options Exchange Official will adjust the 
execution price(s) of the transaction(s) according to subparagraph 
(f)(iii) below, as long as the adjusted price would not exceed the 
limit price of a non-broker-dealer customer's limit order, in which 
case the non-broker-dealer customer would have 20 minutes from 
notification of the proposed adjusted price to accept it or else the 
trade will be nullified. If it is determined that a Catastrophic 
Error has not occurred, the member requesting the determination will 
be subject to a charge of $5,000.
    (iii)-(iv) No change.
    (g) No change.
 Commentary:-----------------------------------------------------------
    .01-.02 No change.
* * * * *

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in 
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such 
statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The purpose of the proposal is to help market participants better 
manage their risk by addressing the situation where, under current 
rules, a trade can be adjusted to a price outside of a customer's 
limit. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend Rule 1092(f) to 
enable a non-broker-dealer customer who is the contra-side to a trade 
that is deemed to be a catastrophic error to have the trade nullified 
in instances where the adjusted price would violate the customer's 
limit price. Only if the customer, or his agent, affirms the customer's 
willingness to accept the adjusted price through the customer's limit 
price within 20 minutes of notification of the catastrophic error 
ruling would the trade be adjusted; otherwise it would be nullified. 
Today, all catastrophic error trades are adjusted, not nullified, on 
all of the options exchanges.
Background
    Currently, Rule 1092 governs obvious and catastrophic errors. 
Obvious errors are calculated under the rule by determining a 
theoretical price and determining, based on objective standards, 
whether the trade should be nullified or adjusted. The rule also 
contains a process for requesting an obvious error review. Certain more 
substantial errors may fall under the category of a catastrophic error, 
for which a longer time period is permitted to request a review and for 
which trades can only be adjusted (not nullified). Trades are adjusted 
pursuant to an adjustment table that, in effect, assesses an adjustment 
penalty. By adjusting trades above or below the theoretical price, the 
Rule assesses a ``penalty'' in that the adjustment price is not as 
favorable as the amount the party making the error would have received 
had it not made the error.
Proposal
    At this time, the Exchange proposes to change the catastrophic 
error process to permit certain trades to be nullified. The definition 
and calculation of a catastrophic error would not change.\3\ Once a 
catastrophic error is determined by Exchange staff, then if both 
parties to the trade are not a non-broker-dealer customer 
(``customer''),\4\ then the trade would be adjusted under the current 
rule. If one of the parties is a non-broker-dealer customer, then the 
adjusted price would be compared to the limit price of the order. If 
the adjusted price would violate the limit price (in other words, be 
higher than the limit price if it is a buy and lower than the limit 
price if it is a sell order), then the customer would be offered an 
opportunity to nullify the trade. If the customer (or the customer's 
broker-dealer agent) does not respond within 20 minutes, the trade 
would be adjusted under the current rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Nor is the definition or process for obvious errors 
changing.
    \4\ Professional customers are customers for purposes of Rule 
1092. See Rule 1000(b)(x).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These changes should ensure that a customer is not forced into a 
situation where the original limit price is violated and thereby the 
customer is forced to spend additional dollars for a trade at a price 
the customer had no interest in trading and may not be able to afford.

    Example 1--Resting Customer forced to adjust through his limit 
price and would prefer nullification

Day 1

8:00:00 a.m. (pre-market)--Customer A enters order on PHLX to buy 10 
GOOG May 750 puts for $25 (cost of $25,000, Customer has $50,000 in 
his trading account).
10:00:00 a.m.
    GOOG trading at $750
    May 750 puts $29.00-$31.00 (100 x 100) on all exchanges
10:04:00 a.m.
    GOOG drops to $690
    May 750 puts $25-$100 (10 x 10) PHLX
    May 750 puts $20-$125 (10 x 10) CBOE
    May 750 puts $10-$200 (100 x 100) on all other exchanges
10:04:01 a.m.
    Customer B enters order to sell 10 May 750 puts for $25 (credit 
of $25,000)
10:04:01 a.m.
    10 May 750 puts execute at $25 ($35 under parity)\5\ with 
Customer A buying and Customer B selling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Parity is the intrinsic value of an option when it is in-
the-money. With respect to puts, it is calculated by subtracting the 
price of the underlying from the strike price of the put. With 
respect to calls, it is calculated by subtracting the strike price 
from the price of the underlying.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10:04:02 a.m. (1 second later)
    GOOG trading $690
    May 750 puts $75-$78 (100 x 100) PHLX
    May 750 puts $75-$80 (10 x 10) CBOE
    May 750 puts $70-$80 (100 x 100) All other exchanges
    No obvious error is filed within 20 minute notification time 
required by rule. If this had been an obvious error review, the 
trade would have been nullified in accordance with Rule 1092 because 
one of the parties to the trade was a non-market maker.
4:00:00 p.m. (the close)
    GOOG trading $710
    May 750 puts $60-$63 (100 x 100) PHLX
    May 750 puts $55-$70 (10 x 10) CBOE
    May 750 puts $50-$70 (100 x 100) All other exchanges

Day 2

8:00:00 a.m. (pre-market)
    Customer B, submits S10 GOOG May 750 puts at $25 under 
Catastrophic Review.
    Trade meets the criteria of Catastrophic Error and is adjusted 
to $68 ($75 (the 10:04:02 a.m. price less $7 adjustment penalty).
9:30:00 a.m. (the opening)
    GOOG trading $725

[[Page 11707]]

    May 750 puts open $48.00-$51.00 (100 x 100) on all exchanges
    Under current rule:
    Without a choice, Customer A is forced to spend $68 (cost of 
$68,000, with only $25,000 in his account)
    Puts are now trading $48, so Customer A shows a loss of $20,000 
($68 less $48 x 10 contracts x 100 multiplier)
    Under proposed rule:
    Customer A would be able to choose to have the B10 GOOG May 750 
puts nullified avoiding both a loss, and an expenditure of capital 
exceeding the amount in his account. Customer B would be relieved of 
the obligation to sell the puts at 25 because the trade would be 
nullified.
    Example 2--Resting Customer trades, sells out his position, thus 
would choose to keep the adjusted trade and avoid nullification

Day 1

8:00:00 a.m. (pre-market)--Customer A enters order on PHLX to Buy 10 
BAC April 7.00 calls for $.01 (cost of $10 total. (Customer has 
$3,000 in his account).
10:00:00 a.m.
    BAC trading $11
    April 7 calls $4.50-$4.70 (100 x 100) on all exchanges
10:04:00 a.m.
    BAC Trading $11
    April 7 calls $.01-$4.70 (10 x 10) PHLX
    April 7 calls $4.50-$4.70 (10 x 10) CBOE
    April 7 calls $4.50-$4.70 (10 x 10)) All other exchanges
10:04:01 a.m.
    Customer B enters order to sell 10 April 7 calls at $.01 on PHLX 
with an ISO indicator (which allows trade through)
     10:04:01 a.m.
    10 April 7 calls execute at $.01 on PHLX Customer A buying and 
Customer B selling.
10:04:02 a.m. (1 second later)
    BAC is $11
    April 7 calls $4.50-$4.70 (10 x 10) PHLX
    April 7 calls $4.50-$4.70 (10 x 10) CBOE
    April 7 calls $4.50-$4.70 (10 x 10)) All other exchanges
    No obvious error is filed within 20 minute notification time 
required by rule. If this had been an obvious error review, the 
trade would have been nullified.
11:00:00 a.m.
    BAC trading $9.60
    April 7 calls $3.00-$3.25 (10 x 10) PHLX
    April 7 calls $.3.00-$3.25 (10 x 10) CBOE
    April 7 calls $3.00-$3.25 (10 x 10) All other exchanges
    Customer A sells 10 April 7 calls at $3.00 (a total credit of 
$3,000 for a $2,990 profit)
3:00:00 p.m.
    BAC trading $12.80
    April 7 calls $5.80-$6.00 (10 x 10) PHLX
    April 7 calls $5.80-$6.00 (10 x 10) CBOE
    April 7 calls $5.80-$6.00 (10 x 10) All other exchanges
    Customer A has now no position and would be at risk of a loss if 
nullified.
3:20:00 p.m.
    Customer B submits S10 BAC April 7 calls at $.01 under 
Catastrophic Error Review.
    Trade meets the criteria of Catastrophic Error and is adjusted 
to $2.50 ($4.50 (the 10:04:02 a.m. price) less $2 adjustment 
penalty).
Impact:
    Under current Rule: Customer A would be adjusted to $2.50 ($4.50 
(the 10:04:02 a.m. price) less $2 adjustment penalty.
    Under Proposed rule:
    Illustrating the need for a choice, Customer A chooses within 20 
minutes to accept an adjustment to $2.50 instead of a nullification, 
locking in a gain of $500 instead of $2.990 (B 10 at $2.50 vs. S10 
at $3.00).
    If not given a choice, Customer A would be naked short 10 calls 
at $3.00 that are now offered at $6.00 (a $3,000 loss).

    These examples illustrate the need for the non-broker dealer 
customer to have a choice in order to manage his risk. By applying a 
notification time limit of 20 minutes, it lessens the likelihood that 
the customer will try to let the direction of the market for that 
option dictate his decision for a long period of time, thus exposing 
the contra side to more risk. This 20 minute time period is akin to the 
notification period currently used in the rule respecting the 
notification period for starting the obvious error process for member 
organizations that initiated the order from off the floor of the 
Exchange (as opposed to on-floor specialists and ROTs).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See Phlx Rule 1092(e)(i)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a market maker or a broker-dealer, the penalty that is part of 
the price adjustment process is usually enough to offset the additional 
dollars spent, and they can often trade out of the position with little 
risk and a potential profit. For a customer who is not immersed in the 
day-to-day trading of the markets, this risk may be unacceptable. A 
customer is also less likely to be watching trading activity in a 
particular option throughout the day and less likely to be closely 
focused on the execution reports the customer receives after a trade is 
executed. Accordingly, the Exchange believes that it is fair and 
reasonable, and consistent with statutory standards, to change the 
procedure for catastrophic errors for customers and not for other 
participants.
    The Exchange believes that the proposal is a fair way to address 
the issue of a customer's limit price, yet still balance the competing 
interests of certainty that trades stand versus dealing with true 
errors. When Rule 1092 was first adopted, the Commission stated that it 
``* * * considers that in most circumstances trades that are executed 
between parties should be honored. On rare occasions, the price of the 
executed trade indicates an `obvious error' may exist, suggesting that 
it is unrealistic to expect that the parties to the trade had come to a 
meeting of the minds regarding the terms of the transaction. In the 
Commission's view, the determination of whether an `obvious error' has 
occurred, and the adjustment or nullification of a transaction because 
an obvious error is considered to exist, should be based on specific 
and objective criteria and subject to specific and objective 
procedures''. * * * The Commission believes that Phlx's proposed 
obvious error rule establishes specific and objective criteria for 
determining when a trade is an ``obvious error.'' Moreover, the 
Commission believes that the Exchange's proposal establishes specific 
and objective procedures governing the adjustment or nullification of a 
trade that resulted from an ``obvious error.'' \7\ Since 2004, Phlx has 
been administering this rule with respect to options trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49785 (May 28, 
2004), 69 FR 32090 (June 8, 2004) (SR-Phlx-2003-68).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2008, the Exchange amended Rule 1092 to adopt the catastrophic 
error provision. In doing so, the Exchange stated that it had ``weighed 
carefully the need to assure that one market participant is not 
permitted to receive a windfall at the expense of another market 
participant that made an Obvious Error, against the need to assure that 
market participants are not simply being given an opportunity to 
reconsider poor trading decisions. The Exchange states that, while it 
believes that the Obvious Error Rule strikes the correct balance in 
most situations, in some extreme situations, trade participants may not 
be aware of errors that result in very large losses within the time 
periods currently required under the rule. In this type of extreme 
situation, the Exchange believes its members should be given more time 
to seek relief so that there is a greater opportunity to mitigate very 
large losses and reduce the corresponding large wind-falls. However, to 
maintain the appropriate balance, the Exchange believes members should 
only be given more time when the execution price is much further away 
from the theoretical price than is required for Obvious Errors so that 
relief is only provided in extreme circumstances.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58002 (June 23, 
2008), 73 FR 36581 (June 27, 2008)(SR-Phlx-2008-42)(Notice of Filing 
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to 
Catastrophic Errors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange believes that this proposal is consistent with those 
principles because it strikes the aforementioned balance. The Exchange 
is proposing to amend Exchange Rule 1092 to eliminate the risk 
associated with (non-broker-dealer) customers

[[Page 11708]]

receiving an adjustment to a trade that is outside of the limit price 
of their order, when there is a catastrophic error ruling respecting 
their trade. The new provision would continue to entail specific and 
objective procedures. Furthermore, the new provision more fairly 
balances the potential windfall to one market participant against the 
potential reconsideration of a trading decision under the guise of an 
error.
    The obvious and catastrophic error rules of the options exchanges 
are similar, especially with respect to only adjusting trades that 
result in a catastrophic error. Nevertheless, the Exchange believes, 
based on the aforementioned example and member requests, that this 
aspect of the catastrophic error process should change, as explained 
above. The Exchange staff has focused on this particular situation 
because of a recent catastrophic error ruling that resulted in an 
appeal pursuant to Rule 1092(f)(iv). On appeal, the committee was 
concerned whether market participants are aware of how options exchange 
catastrophic errors are handled and whether the rule should be 
revisited. Relatedly, members of SIFMA's Options Committee also 
expressed concern during a recent meeting that this particular outcome 
may not be appropriate. Accordingly, the Exchange has determined to 
amend the rule.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that its proposal is consistent with Section 
6(b) of the Act \9\ in general, and furthers the objectives of Section 
6(b)(5) of the Act \10\ in particular, in that it is designed to 
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to remove impediments 
to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national 
market system, and, in general to protect investors and the public 
interest, by helping Exchange members better manage the risk associated 
with potential erroneous trades. Specifically, the Exchange believes 
that the proposal is consistent with these principles because it 
provides a fair process for customers to address catastrophic errors 
involving a limit order. In particular, the proposal still permits 
nullification in certain situations. Further, it gives customers a 
choice. For two reasons, the Exchange does not believe that the 
proposal is unfairly discriminatory, even though it offers some 
participants (customers) a choice as to whether a trade is nullified or 
adjusted, while other participants will continue to have all of their 
catastrophic errors adjusted. First, the rule currently differentiates 
among Participants: The notification period to begin the obvious error 
process is different for specialists and Registered Options 
Traders,\11\ and whether a trade is adjusted or busted also 
differs.\12\ Second, options rules often treat customers in a special 
way,\13\ recognizing that customers are not necessarily immersed in the 
day-to-day trading of the markets, less likely to be watching trading 
activity in a particular option throughout the day and may have limited 
funds in their trading accounts. Accordingly, differentiating among 
Participant types by permitting customers to have a choice as to 
whether to nullify a trade involving a catastrophic error is not 
unfairly discriminatory, because it is reasonable and fair to provide 
non-professional customers with additional options to protect 
themselves against the consequences of obvious errors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
    \11\ See Rule 1092(e)(i)(A).
    \12\ See Rule 1092(e)(i)(A).
    \13\ For example, many options exchange priority rules treat 
customer orders differently and some options exchanges only accept 
certain types of orders from customers. Most options exchanges 
charge different fees for customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange acknowledges that the proposal contains some 
uncertainty regarding whether a trade will be adjusted or nullified, 
depending on whether one of the parties is a customer, because a person 
would not know, when entering into the trade, whether the other party 
is or is not a customer. The Exchange believes that the proposal 
nevertheless promotes just and equitable principles of trade and 
protects investors and the public interest, because it eliminates a 
more serious uncertainty in the rule's operation today, which is price 
uncertainty. Today, a customer's order can be adjusted to a 
significantly different price, as the examples above illustrate, which 
is more impactful than the possibility of nullification. Furthermore, 
there is uncertainty in the current obvious error portion of Rule 1092 
(as well as the rules of other options exchanges), which Participants 
have dealt with for a number of years. Specifically, Rule 1092(e)(ii) 
provides that if it is determined that an Obvious Error has occurred: 
(A) Where each party to the transaction is either a specialist or ROT 
on the Exchange, the execution price of the transaction will be 
adjusted by an Options Exchange Official, unless both parties agree to 
nullify the transaction within ten minutes of being notified by 
Regulatory staff of the Obvious Error; or (B) where at least one party 
to the transaction in which an Obvious Error occurred is not a 
specialist or ROT on the Exchange, an Options Exchange Official will 
nullify the transaction, unless both parties agree to adjust the price 
of the transaction within 30 minutes of being notified by Regulatory 
staff of the Obvious Error. Therefore, a specialist who prefers 
adjustments over nullification cannot guarantee that outcome, because, 
if he trades with a customer, a resulting obvious error would only be 
adjusted if the customer agreed to an adjustment. This uncertainty has 
been embedded in the rule and accepted by market participants. The 
Exchange believes that this proposal, despite the uncertainty based on 
whether a customer is involved in a trade, is nevertheless consistent 
with the Act, because the ability to nullify a customer's trade 
involving a catastrophic error should prevent the price uncertainty 
that mandatory adjustment under the current rule creates, which should 
promote just and equitable principles of trade and protect investors 
and the public interest.
    The proposal sets forth an objective process based on specific and 
objective criteria and subject to specific and objective procedures. In 
addition, the Exchange has again weighed carefully the need to assure 
that one market participant is not permitted to receive a windfall at 
the expense of another market participant that made a catastrophic 
error, against the need to assure that market participants are not 
simply being given an opportunity to reconsider poor trading decisions. 
Accordingly, the Exchange has determined that introducing a 
nullification procedure for catastrophic errors is appropriate and 
consistent with the Act.
    Consistent with Section 6(b)(8),\14\ the Exchange also believes 
that the proposal does not impose a burden on competition not necessary 
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as described 
further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Currently, most options 
exchanges have similar, although not identical, rules regarding 
catastrophic errors. To the extent that this proposal would result in 
Phlx's rule being different, market participants may choose to route 
orders to Phlx, helping

[[Page 11709]]

Phlx compete against other options exchanges for order flow based on 
its customer service by having a process more responsive to current 
market needs. Of course, other options exchanges may choose to adopt 
similar rules. The proposal does not impose a burden on intra-market 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes 
of the Act, because, even though it treats different market 
participants differently, the Obvious Errors and Catastrophic Errors 
rule has always been structured that way and adding the ability for 
customers to choose whether a catastrophic error trade is nullified 
does not materially alter the risks faced by other market participants 
in managing the consequences of obvious errors. Overall, the proposal 
is intended to help market participants better manage the risk 
associated with potential erroneous options trades and does not impose 
a burden on competition.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were either solicited or received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the Exchange consents, the Commission shall: (a) By order approve 
or disapprove such proposed rule change, or (b) institute proceedings 
to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-PHLX-2013-05 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-PHLX-2013-05. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make publicly available. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-PHLX-2013-05 and should be 
submitted on or before March 12, 2013.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-03706 Filed 2-15-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P