Document ID: PHMSA-2014-0040-0001
Agency: phmsa
Document Type: Notice
Title: Guidance: Pipeline Flow Reversals, Product Changes and Conversion to Service
Posted Date: 2014-09-18T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56121-56122]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-22201]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2014-0040]

Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Pipeline Flow Reversals, Product 
Changes and Conversion to Service

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin

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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to alert operators of 
hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipelines of the potential 
significant impact flow reversals, product changes and conversion to 
service may have on the integrity of a pipeline. Failures on natural 
gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines have occurred after 
these operational changes. This advisory bulletin describes specific 
notification requirements and general operating and maintenance (O&M) 
and integrity management actions regarding flow reversals, product 
changes and conversion to service. This advisory bulletin also 
recommends additional actions operators should take when these 
operational changes are made including the submission of a 
comprehensive written plan to the appropriate PHMSA regional office 
regarding these changes prior to implementation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Julie Halliday by phone at 202-366-
0287 or by email at julie.halliday@dot.gov. Information about PHMSA may 
be found at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    Two recent pipeline failures occurred on hazardous liquid pipelines 
where the flow had been reversed. The Tesoro High Plains Pipeline 
rupture was discovered on September 29, 2013, after leaking an 
estimated 20,000 barrels of crude oil in a North Dakota field. The 
location of pressure and flow monitoring equipment had not been changed 
to account for the reversed flow. The Pegasus Pipeline failed on March 
29, 2013, releasing about 5,000 barrels of crude oil into a 
neighborhood in Faulkner County, Arkansas. The pipeline flow had been 
reversed in 2006. Due to these recent accidents and other information 
PHMSA has become aware of as a result of the large number of recent or 
proposed flow reversals, product changes and conversion to service 
projects, PHMSA is alerting operators to the potential significant 
impact these changes may have on the integrity of a pipeline.
    In response to shifts in the supply of and demand for various 
products transported by gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, operators 
may consider making operational changes to their pipelines including 
flow reversal, product change (e.g., crude oil to refined product) and/
or conversion to service (e.g., convert from natural gas to crude oil) 
(49 CFR 192.14 and 195.5). Flow reversals, product changes and 
conversions to service may impact various aspects of a pipeline's 
operation, maintenance, monitoring, integrity management and emergency 
response. Pressure gradient, velocity, and the location, magnitude, and 
frequency of pressure surges and cycles may change. Operators may also 
consider increasing the throughput capacity of the pipeline. Increasing 
throughput may also impact the pressure profile and pressure 
transients. Product changes may warrant a material compatibility and 
corrosion susceptibility review. Leak detection and monitoring systems 
may be affected. Significant additions, removal or modifications of 
pump stations, compressor stations, tank farms and In-Line Inspection 
(ILI) launching/receiving facilities may be required. Appurtenances 
such as flow meters, strainers, liquid separators, corrosion control 
devices, leak detection devices, control valves and sectionalizing 
valves may need to be altered.

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2014-04)

    To: Owners and Operators of Onshore Oil Pipeline Systems.
    Subject: Guidance for Pipeline Flow Reversals, Product Changes and 
Conversion to Service.
    Advisory: This advisory bulletin describes specific notification 
requirements and general O&M and integrity management requirements as 
well as additional actions operators should consider taking before, 
during and after flow reversals, product changes, and conversion to 
service. PHMSA refers operators to detailed guidance published in the 
document, Guidance to Operators Regarding Flow Reversals, Product 
Changes and Conversion to Service, which provides operators with 
PHMSA's expectations with respect to complying with existing 
regulations and also contains recommendations that operators should 
consider prior to implementing these changes. The document addresses 
flow reversals, product changes and conversion to service individually. 
The document is located at: http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Pipeline/Regulations/GORRPCCS.pdf.

Notification Requirements & Consideration

    Pipeline operators are required to notify PHMSA when the cost to 
make these changes exceeds $10 million per Sec. Sec.  191.22(c) and 
195.64(c). While not common, pre-existing special permits or state 
waivers may require the operator to contact PHMSA prior to significant 
operational changes such as flow reversal, product changes or 
conversion to service. Operators should contact PHMSA regarding changes 
to pipelines with a special permit irrespective of specific language 
requiring it.
    Per Sec.  192.909, operators of gas transmission pipelines must 
notify PHMSA if these changes will substantially affect their integrity 
management program, its implementation, or modify the schedule for 
carrying out the program elements. Under Sec.  194.121, operators of 
onshore oil pipelines must submit a modified response plan within 30 
days of making a change in operating conditions that substantially 
affects its implementation. Operators will need to reflect changes due 
to conversion to service and product changes on subsequent Annual 
Report (required by Sec. Sec.  191.17 and 195.49) and National Pipeline 
Mapping System submissions (required by The Pipeline Safety Improvement 
Act of 2002). Interim NPMS submissions reflecting the changes are not 
required; operators should wait until their next scheduled NPMS 
submission. Operators are strongly encouraged to submit a comprehensive 
written plan to the appropriate PHMSA regional office prior to 
performing flow reversals, product changes and conversions to service.

O&M and Integrity Management Requirements and Considerations

    Requirements to address O&M and integrity issues inherent with flow 
reversals, product changes and conversions to service are embedded in 
many parts of the code. While review of O&M and integrity management 
plan aspects are carried out during regular compliance and verification 
activities, these matters may be reviewed to the extent that the 
incremental increase in

[[Page 56122]]

risk as a result of these changes may be relevant. Operators should be 
prepared to demonstrate how they addressed impacts to O&M, emergency 
plans, control room management, operator qualification training, 
emergency responder training, public awareness, spill response, maps 
and records, and integrity management programs and plans for the 
affected pipeline facilities. Integrity management requires operators 
to proactively anticipate hazards, evaluate risks and identify 
preventative and mitigative actions to manage operational changes that 
have the potential to increase the risk of failure or the increase in 
potential consequences of a failure. Flow reversal, product change or 
conversion to service meet these criteria. Operators must document the 
reason for, and resulting changes to, their integrity management 
program prior to implementation. The safe operation of an existing 
pipeline for use under these proposed operating conditions is dependent 
on the integrity of the pipeline. Facilities built under older versions 
of the code may need additional assessment to determine whether they 
remain safe to operate under these changed conditions. The integrity 
assessments are done in accordance with the most recent version of the 
code.
    Operators should review past integrity assessments, assessment 
tools and inspections. As a result of these changes, the location of 
certain threats may change. Previous assessments may not have evaluated 
the integrity of the pipeline at the location where the threat will be 
after these operational changes have been implemented. Reassessment may 
be in order. Operators should incorporate applicable findings from 
PHMSA's research and development program into their integrity 
management program. For low frequency electric resistance welded (LF-
ERW) pipe, operators should review Project 390, Comprehensive 
Study to Understand Longitudinal ERW Seam Failures. These reports 
review findings from seam cracking issues from many failures such as: 
Pressure tests, predictive model accuracies for crack type and fracture 
mode, ILI and in-the-ditch evaluation tool findings. The reports are 
located on PHMSA's Web site http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=390.
    Conversion to service allows previously used steel pipelines to 
qualify for use without meeting the design and construction 
requirements applicable to new pipelines, but the regulations require 
the pipeline be tested in accordance with 192 subpart J or 195 subpart 
E per Sec. Sec.  192.14(a)(4) and 195.5(a)(4) respectively. This 
includes the requirement to perform a new pressure test. The procedure 
to carry out the pressure test must be included in the written 
procedure required in Sec. Sec.  192.14(a) and 195.5(a). Operators 
should consider performing ILI and hydrostatic pressure with a spike 
test prior to implementing any of these changes especially if 
historical records have indications of previous in-service or 
hydrostatic pressure test failures, selective seam corrosion, stress 
corrosion cracking, other cracking threats or other systemic concerns. 
A spike test 30 minutes in duration at 100 percent to 110 percent 
specified minimum yield strength or between 1.39 to 1.5 times the 
maximum allowable operating pressure for gas and the maximum operating 
pressure for hazardous liquids is suggested as it is the best method 
for evaluating cracking threats at this time.
    Integrity depends on accurate records to make suitable decisions. 
Operators should validate material and strength test records for all 
affected segments of pipe as reminded in an advisory bulletin (ADB 12-
06) published on May 7, 2012; 77 FR 26822 titled: Pipeline Safety: 
Verification of Records. If the operator is missing records, they 
should create and implement a plan to obtain material documentation. If 
mechanical and/or chemical properties (mill test reports) are missing, 
the plan should require destructive tests to confirm material 
properties of pipeline. Certain high risk pipelines merit a greater 
level of due diligence. While a new hydrostatic pressure test with a 
spike test is an important part of confirming the integrity of a 
pipeline, it may not be advisable to perform flow reversals, product 
changes or conversion to service under the following conditions:
     Grandfathered pipelines that operate without a Part 192, 
Subpart J pressure test or where sufficient historical test or material 
strength records are not available.
     LF-ERW pipe, lap welded, unknown seam types and with seam 
factors less than 1.0 as defined in Sec. Sec.  192.113 and 195.106.
     Pipelines that have had a history of failures and leaks 
most especially those due to stress corrosion cracking, internal/
external corrosion, selective seam corrosion or manufacturing defects.
     Pipelines that operate above Part 192 design factors 
(above 72% SMYS).
     Product change from unrefined products to highly volatile 
liquids.
    Sectionalizing valves and leak detection systems are important 
facility components to reduce the consequences of failure. The 
integrity assessment should also include a review of the adequacy of 
the number, location and time for closure of existing valves and its 
leak detection capability. Operators should enhance their communication 
with affected stakeholders concerning the changes with supplemental 
messages per API RP 1162 (incorporated by reference Sec. Sec.  192.7 
and 195.3). Public awareness communication should start in the projects 
planning stage, continue into the operations phase, provide project 
specific information and be responsive to the concerns of potentially 
affected persons. Operators should use the information in Guidance to 
Operators Regarding Flow Reversals, Product Changes and Conversion to 
Service and develop a comprehensive written plan when performing flow 
reversals, product changes and conversions to service. Operators are 
strongly encouraged to submit their plan to the appropriate PHMSA 
regional office.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601 and 49 CFR 1.53.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 12, 2014.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy and Programs.
[FR Doc. 2014-22201 Filed 9-17-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P