Document ID: SEC-2021-1191-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: Fixed Income Clearing Corp.
Posted Date: 2021-09-02T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 168 (Thursday, September 2, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49387-49393]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-18950]

[[Page 49387]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-92799; File No. SR-FICC-2021-801]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Notice of No Objection to 
Advance Notice, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To Add the Sponsored GC 
Service and Make Other Changes

August 27, 2021.
    On May 12, 2021, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (``FICC'') filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') advance 
notice SR-FICC-2021-801 pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, entitled 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing 
Supervision Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) \2\ under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') \3\ to amend FICC's Government 
Securities Division Rulebook \4\ to add a new service that expands 
FICC's existing Sponsored Service. The advance notice was published for 
public comment in the Federal Register on June 3, 2021.\5\ On June 8, 
2021, FICC filed Amendment No. 1 to the advance notice, to correct an 
erroneous cross reference in the original filing.\6\ The advance 
notice, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is hereinafter referred to as 
the ``Advance Notice.'' On June 11, 2021, the Commission, by the 
Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority,\7\ 
requested additional information from FICC pursuant to Section 
806(e)(1)(D) of the Act.\8\ The request for information tolled the 
Commission's period of review of the Advance Notice until 60 days from 
the date of the Commission's receipt of the information requested from 
FICC, absent an additional information request.\9\ The Commission 
received the information requested from FICC on July 2, 2021.
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    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
    \4\ FICC's Government Securities Division (``GSD'') Rulebook 
(``Rules'') are available at http://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.
    \5\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92019 (May 27, 2021), 86 
FR 29834 (June 3, 2021) (SR-FICC-2021-801) (``Notice of Filing'').
    \6\ Amendment No. 1 made a correction to Exhibit 5 of the 
filing. On May 12, 2021, FICC also filed a related proposed rule 
change (SR-FICC-2021-003) with the Commission pursuant to Section 
19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 19b-4 thereunder. 15 U.S.C. 
78s(b)(1) and 17 CFR 240.19b-4, respectively. The proposed rule 
change was published in the Federal Register on June 1, 2021. 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92014 (May 25, 2021), 86 FR 
29334 (June 1, 2021) (SR-FICC-2020-003). On June 8, 2021, FICC filed 
Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change to make the same 
correction as regarding the Advance Notice. The proposed rule 
change, as amended by Amendment No. 1, is hereinafter referred to as 
the ``Proposed Rule Change.'' In the Proposed Rule Change, FICC 
seeks approval of proposed changes to its rules necessary to 
implement the Advance Notice. On June 24, 2021, the Commission 
published a notice designating a longer period of time for 
Commission action and a longer period for public comment on the 
Proposed Rule Change. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92185 
(June 15, 2021), 86 FR 33420 (June 24, 2021) (SR-FICC-2021-003). The 
Commission has received one comment in support of the Proposed Rule 
Change, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-ficc-2021-003/srficc2021003.htm. Because the proposals contained in the Advance 
Notice and the Proposed Rule Change are the same, the Commission 
considered all public comments received on the proposal as 
applicable to both filings, regardless of whether the comments were 
submitted with respect to the Advance Notice or the Proposed Rule 
Change.
    \7\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(93).
    \8\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(D).
    \9\ See 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(E)(ii) and (G)(ii); see Memorandum 
from the Office of Clearance and Settlement, Division of Trading and 
Markets, titled ``Commission's Request for Additional Information,'' 
available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ficc-an/2021/34-92019-memo-ficc.pdf.
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    The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on 
Amendment No. 1 from interested persons and, for the reasons discussed 
below, is hereby providing notice of no objection to the Advance 
Notice.

I. The Advance Notice

A. Background

1. FICC Services for Repurchase Agreement (``Repo'') Transactions
    Repos involve a pair of securities transactions between two 
parties. The parties agree to the terms of the trade, including the 
securities, principal amount, interest rate, haircut, and tenor (i.e., 
date of maturity). The first transaction (the ``Start Leg'') consists 
of the sale of securities, in which one party (the ``cash borrower'') 
delivers securities, and in exchange, the other party (the ``cash 
lender'') delivers cash. At the Start Leg, the cash borrower typically 
delivers an amount of securities equal in value to the amount of cash 
received from the cash lender, plus a haircut. Repo durations range 
from one day (``overnight'') to a year or more, but are usually less 
than three months (``term''). The second transaction (the ``End Leg'') 
occurs on a date after that of the Start Leg and consists of the 
repurchase of securities, in which the obligations to deliver cash and 
securities are the reverse of the Start Leg. At the End Leg, the cash 
borrower typically delivers the amount of cash borrowed, plus interest, 
and the cash lender returns the securities.
    FICC serves as CCP and provides clearance and settlement services 
to facilitate both bilateral and tri-party repo transactions. FICC 
facilitates bilateral repos \10\ in which all securities delivery 
obligations are made against full payment (``delivery-versus-payment'' 
or ``DVP'') (the ``DVP Service''). FICC generally novates and 
guarantees settlement of a trade upon validation of the trade details, 
which results in the legally binding and enforceable contract between 
FICC and the parties to the trade.\11\ On a daily basis, FICC 
aggregates and matches a member's offsetting obligations resulting from 
the member's trades, thereby netting the member's total daily 
settlement obligations.\12\
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    \10\ A bilateral repo is one in which the cash lender and cash 
borrower directly exchange cash and securities. In the bilateral 
repo market, the parties specify the securities used as collateral. 
Therefore, a cash lender seeking to obtain a particular security 
would utilize the bilateral repo market.
    \11\ See Rule 5, supra note 4.
    \12\ See Rule 11, supra note 4.
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    FICC facilitates tri-party repos \13\ through its General 
Collateral Finance (``GCF'') Repo[supreg] Service, which enables 
members to trade general collateral finance repos based on rate, term, 
and underlying product throughout the day on a blind basis.\14\ The 
Bank of New York Mellon operates the tri-party platform that 
facilitates trades conducted through the GCF Repo Service. FICC has 
established standardized, generic CUSIP Numbers exclusively for GCF 
Repo processing and to specify the acceptable types of underlying 
Fedwire book-entry eligible collateral, which include U.S. Treasuries, 
U.S. government agency securities, and certain mortgage-backed 
securities.\15\
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    \13\ A tri-party repo is one in which a clearing bank, acting as 
tri-party agent, provides to both the cash lender and the cash 
borrower certain operational, custodial, collateral management, and 
other services. In tri-party repo trading, both parties maintain 
accounts at a clearing bank, which facilitates the payment and 
delivery of cash and securities between the parties' accounts. In 
contrast to the bilateral repo market and its use of specific 
collateral, the tri-party repo market is exclusively for general 
collateral repos, meaning that the parties agree to use any 
securities from a pre-approved basket of acceptable securities as 
collateral. In a general collateral repo, the cash lender is 
indifferent to the particular securities it receives as collateral, 
provided that the securities come from the pre-approved basket of 
acceptable securities.
    \14\ See Rule 20, supra note 4.
    \15\ See Rule 1 (definitions of ``GCF Repo Transaction'' and 
``Generic CUSIP Number'') and Rule 20, Section 2, supra note 4; 
Notice of Filing, supra note 5 at 29836.

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[[Page 49388]]

2. Sponsored Membership
    In 2005, FICC established the Sponsored Service, allowing eligible 
members to sponsor their clients into a limited form of membership.\16\ 
A Sponsoring Member is permitted to submit to FICC, for comparison, 
novation, and netting, certain eligible securities transactions of its 
Sponsored Members. FICC requires each Sponsoring Member to establish an 
omnibus account at FICC (separate from its regular netting account) for 
Sponsored Member trading activity. Sponsored Members generally have to 
meet the definition of a qualified institutional buyer (``QIB''), as 
defined in Rule 144A \17\ under the Securities Act of 1933.\18\
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    \16\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51896 (June 21, 2005), 
70 FR 36981 (June 27, 2005) (SR-FICC-2004-22). See Rule 3A, supra 
note 4.
    \17\ 17 CFR 230.144A.
    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.
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    For operational and administrative purposes, FICC interacts solely 
with the Sponsoring Member as agent for purposes of the day-to-day 
satisfaction of its Sponsored Members' obligations to and from FICC, 
including their securities and funds-only settlement obligations.\19\ 
Sponsoring Members are also responsible for providing FICC with a 
Sponsoring Member Guaranty, whereby the Sponsoring Member guarantees to 
FICC the payment and performance by its Sponsored Members of their 
obligations under the Rules.\20\ Although Sponsored Members are 
principally liable to FICC for their own settlement obligations under 
the Rules, the Sponsoring Member Guaranty requires the Sponsoring 
Member to satisfy those settlement obligations on behalf of a Sponsored 
Member if the Sponsored Member defaults and fails to perform its 
settlement obligations.\21\
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    \19\ See Rule 3A, Section 8, supra note 4.
    \20\ See Rule 1 (definition of ``Sponsoring Member Guaranty'') 
and Rule 3A, Section 2(c), supra note 4.
    \21\ Id.
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B. Proposed Sponsored GC Service

    Currently, the Sponsored Service only facilitates trading in 
bilateral DVP repos, not tri-party repos. In the Advance Notice, FICC 
proposes to expand the Sponsored Service to accommodate tri-party repo 
trading, which it believes would increase term repo activity within the 
Sponsored Service. FICC states that several market participants have 
indicated that they currently transact tri-party term repos outside of 
central clearing because they are not operationally equipped to perform 
the collateral management and other functions associated with term DVP 
repos.\22\ In particular, money market funds and other mutual funds 
generally prefer to use the tri-party repo market because a clearing 
bank administers collateral management and other functions, as 
described above.\23\
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    \22\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 5 at 29836. A key 
difference between the bilateral and tri-party repo markets deals 
with the operational aspects of managing term repos. In the tri-
party repo market, a clearing bank typically automatically selects 
securities from the cash borrower's account to serve as collateral 
that satisfies the credit and liquidity criteria agreed between the 
parties. The clearing bank delivers securities against the 
simultaneous delivery of cash between the parties' accounts at the 
clearing bank. The clearing bank manages the regular revaluation of 
collateral, variation margining, income payments on the collateral, 
and collateral substitutions. In the bilateral repo market, the 
parties themselves perform such collateral management and other 
administrative functions.
    \23\ See Notice of Filing, supra note 5 at 29836.
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    Therefore, FICC proposes to add the Sponsored GC Service, which 
would allow (but not require) Sponsoring Members and their Sponsored 
Members to trade general collateral repos with each other on the tri-
party platform of a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank \24\ (each, a 
``Sponsored GC Trade''). Such general collateral repos would involve 
the same asset classes that are currently available for members using 
the GCF Repo Service.\25\ Consistent with the GCF Repo Service, the 
Sponsored GC Service would also permit cash borrowers to make 
collateral substitutions. Sponsored GC Trades would settle in a manner 
similar to the way Sponsoring Members and Sponsored Members currently 
settle tri-party repos with each other outside of central clearing.
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    \24\ The Bank of New York Mellon operates the tri-party platform 
that would facilitate trades conducted through the Sponsored GC 
Service.
    \25\ FICC would register a new series of Generic CUSIP Numbers 
for the Sponsored GC Service as follows: (i) U.S. Treasury 
Securities maturing in ten (10) years or less, (ii) U.S. Treasury 
Securities maturing in thirty (30) years or less, (iii) Non-
Mortgage-Backed U.S. Agency Securities, (iv) Federal National 
Mortgage Association (``Fannie Mae'') and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (``Freddie Mac'') Fixed Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities, 
(v) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, (vi) Government National Mortgage Association (``Ginnie 
Mae'') Fixed Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities, (vii) Ginnie Mae 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed Securities, (viii) U.S. Treasury 
Inflation-Protected Securities (``TIPS'') and (ix) U.S. Treasury 
Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities 
(``STRIPS''). The purpose of registering a new series of Generic 
CUSIP Numbers specific to the Sponsored GC Service is to avoid any 
operational processing errors that could otherwise result if a trade 
intended for the Sponsored GC Service was inadvertently processed as 
a GCF Repo transaction or vice versa. Notice of Filing, supra note 5 
at 29836.
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Sponsored GC Service Structure
    Sponsored GC Trades would only be between a Sponsored Member and 
its Sponsoring Member. FICC would novate only the End Legs of Sponsored 
GC Trades. Consistent with the current settlement process of such tri-
party repos outside of central clearing, the Start Legs of Sponsored GC 
Trades would continue to settle on a trade-for-trade basis on the tri-
party platform of a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank.\26\
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    \26\ FICC does not believe it would be efficient or appropriate 
to novate the Start Legs of Sponsored GC Trades, as that novation 
would unnecessarily complicate an already efficient process by 
requiring the parties to make significant operational and business 
changes to include FICC in the transaction chain. Since Sponsored GC 
Trades would only be between a Sponsored Member and its Sponsoring 
Member on a known (i.e., not blind) basis, all Start Leg obligations 
would settle between a single set of counterparties, negating any 
efficiency or reduced settlement risk that FICC's novation would 
provide. See Notice of Filing, supra note 5 at 29836-37.
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    Accrued repo interest on Sponsored GC Trades would be paid and 
collected by FICC on a daily basis. Additionally, if the market value 
of the securities collateral decreases from its market value at the 
Start Leg, the cash borrower would be required deliver to FICC 
additional securities (and/or cash) such that the market value of the 
total securities collateral remains at least equal to its market value 
at the Start Leg. Conversely, if the market value of the securities 
collateral increases from its value at the Start Leg, the cash lender 
would be required to deliver to FICC securities (and/or cash) such that 
the market value of the remaining securities collateral remains at 
least equal to its market value at the Start Leg. Such additional 
securities (and/or cash) must be delivered within the timeframe set 
forth in a proposed new schedule of Sponsored GC Trade timeframes set 
forth in the Rules.
    In order to facilitate settlement of securities and cash 
obligations, FICC would direct each party to a Sponsored GC Trade to 
make any payment or delivery due to FICC in respect of a Sponsored GC 
Trade (except for certain funds-only settlement obligations, as 
discussed below) directly to the relevant pre-novation counterparty. As 
a result, each transfer of securities and daily repo interest would be 
made directly between the Sponsored Member and its Sponsoring Member 
via the tri-party repo platform of a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent 
Bank.\27\
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    \27\ FICC similarly does not believe it would be appropriate for 
FICC to be in the transaction chain for each payment and delivery 
under a Sponsored GC Trade because inserting FICC in the middle of 
the payments and deliveries would require substantial changes in 
operational processes for both Sponsored Members and Sponsoring 
Members. FICC does not believe such operational changes are 
necessary since there can only be two pre-novation counterparties 
involved in the settlement of a Sponsored GC Trade (i.e., the 
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member client). See id.

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[[Page 49389]]

Market Risk Management
    FICC would manage its market risk with respect to Sponsored GC 
Trades similar to the manner in which FICC manages existing trades 
within the Sponsored Service. To mitigate market risk, FICC would 
calculate the Value at Risk (``VaR'') margin component (``VaR Charge'') 
\28\ for each Sponsored Member based on its activity in the Sponsored 
Service, including its activity in the proposed Sponsored GC Service. 
The VaR Charge for the Sponsoring Member's omnibus account for 
Sponsored Member trading activity would continue to be gross-margined 
as the sum of the individual VaR Charges for each Sponsored Member 
client.\29\
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    \28\ Each member's margin consists of a number of applicable 
components. The VaR Charge is typically the largest component of a 
member's margin requirement. The VaR Charge is designed to capture 
the potential market price risk associated with the securities in a 
member's portfolio. The VaR Charge is designed to provide an 
estimate of FICC's projected liquidation losses with respect to a 
defaulted member's portfolio at a 99 percent confidence level. See 
Rule 1 (definition of ``VaR Charge''), supra note 4; Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 83362 (June 1, 2018), 83 FR 26514 (June 7, 
2018) (SR-FICC-2018-001).
    \29\ See Rule 3A, Section 10, supra note 4.
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    Additionally, FICC would assign a symbol to each Sponsored Member 
to facilitate FICC's ability to surveil the Sponsored Member's activity 
across its Sponsored GC Trades as well as its other Sponsored Member 
Trades within the existing Sponsored Service (both with the same 
Sponsoring Member and across Sponsoring Members, if applicable). In 
addition, FICC would apply certain heightened requirements that apply 
to certain Sponsoring Members within the Sponsored GC Service as 
well.\30\ For example, FICC may impose heightened financial 
requirements on these Sponsoring Members based on their anticipated 
activity and other factors,\31\ and FICC may limit such a Sponsoring 
Member's activity if the sum of the VaR Charges of its omnibus and 
netting accounts exceeds its net capital.\32\
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    \30\ Specifically, these restrictions apply to Category 2 
Sponsoring Members, which are other members that meet certain 
financial requirements as compared to Category 1 Sponsoring Members, 
which are bank netting members that are well-capitalized with $5 
billion in equity capital. See Rule 3A, Section 2(a), supra note 4.
    \31\ See Rule 3A, Section 2(b), supra note 4.
    \32\ See Rule 3A, Section 2(h), supra note 4.
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    In addition, FICC would manage the mark-to-market risk associated 
with unaccrued repo interest on a Sponsored GC Trade through a proposed 
new interest rate mark component of funds-only settlement.\33\ FICC 
would also apply an Interest Adjustment Payment to Sponsored GC Trades 
to account for overnight use of funds by the Sponsoring Member or 
Sponsored Member, as applicable, based on such party's receipt from 
FICC of a Forward Mark Adjustment Payment (reflecting a GC Interest 
Rate Mark) on the previous business day.\34\
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    \33\ This GC Interest Rate Mark would be calculated in the same 
manner as the GCF Interest Rate Mark is for GCF Repo transactions. 
For a detailed description of the calculation, see Notice of Filing, 
supra note 5 at 29837.
    \34\ No other components of funds-only settlement would be 
necessary to apply to Sponsored GC Trades because, as described 
above, (i) all Sponsored GC Trades would novate after the settlement 
of the Start Legs of such trades (i.e., not during the Forward-
Starting Period), (ii) mark-to-market changes in the value of the 
securities transferred under Sponsored GC Trades would be managed by 
the Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank on FICC's behalf (consistent 
with the manner in which GCF Repo transactions are currently 
processed), and (iii) the accrued repo interest on Sponsored GC 
Trades would be passed on a daily basis, as described above.
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Liquidity Risk Management
    Currently, trades between a Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored 
Member do not independently create liquidity risk for FICC. Under its 
Rules, if a Sponsoring Member defaults, FICC may close out (that is, 
cash settle) the Sponsored Member trades of the defaulting Sponsoring 
Member.\35\ Similarly, if a Sponsored Member defaults, FICC may offset 
its settlement obligations to the Sponsoring Member against the 
Sponsoring Member's obligations under the Sponsoring Member Guaranty to 
perform on behalf of its defaulting Sponsored Member.\36\ Thus, in both 
default scenarios, FICC bears no liquidity risk.
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    \35\ See Rule 3A, Section 14(c), supra note 4. See also Rule 
22A, Section 2, supra note 4.
    \36\ See Rule 3A, Section 11, supra note 4.
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    As a result, to the extent a Sponsoring Member either (1) runs a 
matched book of Sponsored Member trades (i.e., enters into offsetting 
trades with its own Sponsored Members), or (2) simply enters into 
trades with its Sponsored Member (i.e., without entering into 
offsetting transactions), such activities do not increase FICC's 
liquidity risk. FICC bears liquidity risk only when a Sponsoring Member 
enters into an offsetting trade in which a third-party member is the 
pre-novation counterparty. In that scenario, FICC is required to settle 
the obligations of a defaulting Sponsoring Member.
    Since Sponsored GC Trades would not involve third-party members, 
such trades would impact FICC's liquidity risk in a similar manner to 
trades between a Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member in the 
current Sponsored Service. As a result, FICC proposes to manage the 
liquidity risk associated with Sponsored GC Trades in the same manner 
that it currently manages such risk for other trades between a 
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member.

C. Proposed Changes to Allocations Within the Capped Contingency 
Liquidity Facility (``CCLF'')

1. CCLF Background
    On April 25, 2017, the Commission approved FICC's adoption of the 
Clearing Agency Liquidity Risk Management Framework (``Framework''), 
which broadly describes FICC's liquidity risk management strategy and 
objective to maintain sufficient liquid resources in order to meet the 
potential amount of funding required to settle outstanding transactions 
of a defaulting member (including affiliates) in a timely manner.\37\ 
The Framework identifies, among other things, each of the qualifying 
liquid resources available to FICC, including the CCLF.\38\ The CCLF is 
a rules-based, committed liquidity resource, designed to enable FICC to 
meet its cash settlement obligations in the event of a default of the 
member (including the member's family of affiliated members) to which 
FICC has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible market 
conditions.\39\ FICC would activate the CCLF if, upon a member default, 
FICC determines that its non-CCLF liquidity resources would not 
generate sufficient cash to satisfy FICC's payment obligations to its 
non-defaulting members. In simple terms, a CCLF repo is equivalent to a 
non-defaulting member financing FICC's payment obligation under the 
original trade, thereby providing FICC with time to liquidate the 
securities underlying the original trade. More specifically, upon 
activating the CCLF, members would be called upon to enter into repo 
transactions (as cash lenders) with FICC (as cash borrower) up to a 
pre-determined capped dollar amount, thereby providing FICC with 
sufficient liquidity to meet its payment

[[Page 49390]]

obligations. For a non-defaulting member to whom FICC has a payment 
obligation disrupted by a member default, a CCLF repo would extinguish 
and replace the original trade that gave rise to FICC's payment 
obligation.
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    \37\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80489 (April 19, 
2017), 82 FR 19120 (April 25, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-008).
    \38\ See id.
    \39\ FICC designed the CCLF to meet the regulatory requirement 
for a covered clearing agency to measure, monitor, and manage its 
liquidity risk by maintaining sufficient liquid resources to effect 
same-day settlement of payment obligations in the event of a default 
of the participant family that would generate the largest aggregate 
payment obligation for the clearing agency in extreme but plausible 
market conditions. 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7)(i); see Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 82090 (November 15, 2017), 82 FR 55427, 
55430 (November 21, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-002); Rule 22A, Section 2a, 
supra note 4.
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    FICC determines the total size of the CCLF based on FICC's 
potential cash settlement obligations that would result from the 
default of the member (including affiliates) presenting the largest 
liquidity need to FICC over a specified look-back period, plus an 
additional liquidity buffer. Under the proposal in the Advance Notice, 
FICC would not change the method by which it determines the total size 
of the CCLF.
    FICC uses a tiered approach to allocate the total size of the CCLF 
among its members to arrive at the amount of each member's CCLF 
obligation. FICC allocates $15 billion of the total size of the CCLF 
among all members.\40\ FICC allocates the remainder of the total size 
of the CCLF among members that generate liquidity needs above the $15 
billion threshold based on the frequency that such members generate 
daily liquidity needs over $15 billion across supplemental liquidity 
tiers in $5 billion increments. Specifically, FICC calculates a dollar 
amount for the CCLF obligation applicable to each supplemental 
liquidity tier. FICC allocates the CCLF obligation for each 
supplemental liquidity tier to members on a pro-rata basis 
corresponding to the number of times each member generates liquidity 
needs within each supplemental liquidity tier.\41\
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    \40\ FICC has determined that $15 billion is an appropriate 
amount for allocation to all members because the average member's 
liquidity need from 2015-2016 was approximately $7 billion, with a 
majority of members (approximately 85 percent) having liquidity 
needs less than $15 billion. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
82090 (November 15, 2017), 82 FR 55427, 55430 (November 21, 2017) 
(SR-FICC-2017-002).
    \41\ For example, a member that generates daily liquidity needs 
in the $15-$20 billion supplemental liquidity tier would incur a 
pro-rata share for the $15-$20 billion supplemental liquidity tier 
only. Another member that generates daily liquidity needs in the 
$20-$25 billion supplemental liquidity tier would incur a pro-rata 
share for both the $15-$20 and $20-$25 billion supplemental 
liquidity tiers. A third member that generates daily liquidity needs 
in the $65-$70 billion supplemental liquidity tier would incur a 
pro-rata share for every supplemental liquidity tier. Each member's 
pro-rata share is based on the frequency with which the member 
generates daily liquidity needs in each supplemental liquidity tier. 
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80234 (March 14, 2017), 82 
FR 14401, 14404-05 (March 20, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-002).
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2. Current CCLF Allocation Methodology for the Sponsored Service
    Currently, FICC does not impose a CCLF obligation on a Sponsoring 
Member to the extent the Sponsoring Member runs a matched book of 
Sponsored Member trades. This is because to determine a Sponsoring 
Member's CCLF obligation, FICC nets all of the positions recorded in 
the Sponsoring Member's omnibus account (regardless of whether they 
relate to the same Sponsored Member) and separately nets all of the 
positions in the Sponsoring Member's netting account.\42\ As a result, 
to the extent a Sponsoring Member enters into perfectly offsetting 
Sponsored Member trades (i.e., the matched book scenario), the 
settlement obligations of those trades net out in the omnibus account 
and the netting account, with no resulting CCLF obligation for the 
Sponsoring Member.
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    \42\ See Rule 3A, Section 8(b) and Rule 22A, Section 2a(b), 
supra note 4.
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    However, if a Sponsoring Member enters into a Sponsored Member 
trade without entering into an offsetting transaction, the Sponsoring 
Member is subject to CCLF obligations for the position of its Sponsored 
Member recorded in its omnibus account as well as its own position 
arising from the Sponsored Member trade recorded in its netting 
account. Although the positions in the Sponsoring Member's omnibus 
account and netting account offset each other, FICC does not currently 
net such positions for CCLF purposes because CCLF allocations are 
determined at the participant account level.\43\ FICC believes the 
foregoing scenario should not contribute to the Sponsoring Member's 
CCLF obligation because, as described above in Section I.B, such 
offsetting obligations do not present liquidity risk to FICC.
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    \43\ This limitation on offset is consistent with FICC's 
approach of not offsetting the positions of two accounts of the same 
member for CCLF purposes. However, FICC notes an important 
difference between Sponsored Member trades and other FICC repo 
activity. See Notice of Filing, supra note 5 at 29842. Specifically, 
as mentioned above in Section I.A.2., the Sponsored Service requires 
a Sponsoring Member to maintain an omnibus account that is separate 
from its netting account. In contrast, for all other repo activity, 
members have the option to collapse all of their activity into a 
single participant account in order to achieve a similar netting 
benefit. Sponsoring Members do not have that option with respect to 
their Sponsored Member trades. Therefore, FICC believes this 
proposed change is necessary to ensure that a Sponsoring Member's 
CCLF obligations are calculated in a manner that more closely aligns 
with the liquidity risk associated with Sponsored Member trades. Id.
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3. Proposed CCLF Allocation Methodology for the Sponsored Service
    As described above, trades between a Sponsoring Member and its 
Sponsored Member do not independently create liquidity risk for FICC, 
and, therefore, FICC believes that such trades should not affect the 
Sponsoring Member's CCLF obligation. To ensure that a Sponsoring 
Member's CCLF obligation is calculated to reflect the lack of liquidity 
risk to FICC associated with Sponsored Member trades, FICC proposes to 
take into account, for CCLF calculation purposes, any offsetting 
settlement obligations between a Sponsoring Member's netting account 
and its omnibus account. This proposed change would ensure that all 
Sponsored Member trades, whether perfectly offset by other Sponsored 
Member trades (i.e., the matched book scenario) or not, would be 
recognized for CCLF purposes as not affecting FICC's liquidity risk. 
This proposed change would also apply to trades in the new Sponsored GC 
Service.\44\
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    \44\ For Sponsored GC Trades, this proposed change would ensure 
that FICC applies an appropriate CCLF obligation to a Sponsoring 
Member in the event a Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank allocates to 
a Sponsored GC Trade a different security than the security that 
underlies an offsetting Sponsored Member Trade. For example, a 
Sponsoring Member may enter into a Sponsored GC Trade on a Generic 
CUSIP Number and a separate offsetting Sponsored Member trade in a 
specific CUSIP Number. Although the specific CUSIP Number might also 
be an eligible security under the Generic CUSIP Number underlying 
the Sponsored GC Trade, the Sponsored GC Clearing Agent Bank could 
allocate to the Sponsored GC Trade a different eligible CUSIP Number 
from the list of eligible securities. FICC's proposed change would 
offset these positions across the Sponsoring Member's netting 
account and omnibus account to ensure that the CCLF obligation 
applicable to the Sponsoring Member accurately reflects the 
liquidity risk associated with those positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although, as noted above, the proposal in the Advance Notice would 
not affect the method by which FICC determines the total CCLF amount, 
FICC's proposal to net offsetting trades between a Sponsoring Member 
and its Sponsored Member for CCLF calculation purposes would affect the 
allocation of CCLF obligations over $15 billion to other members. 
Specifically, as described above, under the current Rules, if a 
Sponsoring Member enters into a Sponsored Member trade without entering 
into an offsetting transaction, the Sponsoring Member is subject to 
CCLF obligations for the position of its Sponsored Member recorded in 
its omnibus account as well as its own position arising from the 
Sponsored Member trade recorded in its netting account. Under the 
proposal, the Sponsoring Member would not incur CCLF obligations for 
such transactions. Therefore, a Sponsoring Member's peak daily 
liquidity is currently higher than it would be under the proposal. 
This, in turn, may decrease the frequency with which a Sponsoring 
Member's daily peak liquidity reaches into higher supplemental 
liquidity tiers. As a result,

[[Page 49391]]

the pro-rata allocation of CCLF obligations among members with daily 
peak liquidity in those supplemental liquidity tiers would 
increase.\45\ When fewer members generate peak liquidity needs in a 
supplemental liquidity tier, the remaining members that generate peak 
liquidity in that tier bear a larger pro-rata share of the CCLF 
allocations for that tier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The proposals in the Advance Notice would not change FICC's 
current methodology for calculating the total amount of the CCLF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the Advance 
Notice is consistent with the Clearing Supervision Act. Comments may be 
submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-FICC-2020-802 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

    Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-FICC-2021-801. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the advance notice that are filed with the 
Commission, and all written communications relating to the advance 
notice between the Commission and any person, other than those that may 
be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of such filings will also be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of FICC and FICC's website at 
https://www.dtcc.com/legal.
    All comments received will be posted without change. Persons 
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit 
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-FICC-2021-801 and should be 
submitted on or before September 17, 2021.

III. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Although the Clearing Supervision Act does not specify a standard 
of review for an advance notice, the stated purpose of the Clearing 
Supervision Act is instructive: To mitigate systemic risk in the 
financial system and promote financial stability by, among other 
things, promoting uniform risk management standards for SIFMUs and 
strengthening the liquidity of SIFMUs.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act authorizes the 
Commission to prescribe regulations containing risk management 
standards for the payment, clearing, and settlement activities of 
designated clearing entities engaged in designated activities for which 
the Commission is the supervisory agency.\47\ Section 805(b) of the 
Clearing Supervision Act provides the following objectives and 
principles for the Commission's risk management standards prescribed 
under Section 805(a): \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
    \48\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     To promote robust risk management;
     to promote safety and soundness;
     to reduce systemic risks; and
     to support the stability of the broader financial system.
    Section 805(c) provides, in addition, that the Commission's risk 
management standards may address such areas as risk management and 
default policies and procedures, among others areas.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has adopted risk management standards under Section 
805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act and Section 17A of the 
Exchange Act (the ``Clearing Agency Rules'').\50\ The Clearing Agency 
Rules require, among other things, each covered clearing agency to 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures that are reasonably designed to meet certain minimum 
requirements for its operations and risk management practices on an 
ongoing basis.\51\ As such, it is appropriate for the Commission to 
review advance notices against the Clearing Agency Rules and the 
objectives and principles of these risk management standards as 
described in Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act. As 
discussed below, the Commission believes the proposal in the Advance 
Notice is consistent with the objectives and principles described in 
Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act,\52\ and in the Clearing 
Agency Rules, in particular Rules 17Ad-22(e)(7) and (21).\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2, 2012) (S7-08-11). 
See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (September 28, 
2016), 81 FR 70786 (October 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) (``Covered Clearing 
Agency Standards''). FICC is a ``covered clearing agency'' as 
defined in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5).
    \51\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
    \52\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
    \53\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7) and (21).
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A. Consistency With Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act

1. Reducing Systemic Risks and Supporting the Stability of the Broader 
Financial System
    The Commission believes that the Advance Notice is consistent with 
the stated objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing 
Supervision Act because the changes proposed in the Advance Notice are 
consistent with reducing systemic risks, supporting the stability of 
the broader financial system, promoting robust risk management, and 
promoting safety and soundness.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that FICC's proposal to add the Sponsored 
GC Service to the existing Sponsored Service is consistent with the 
principles of reducing systemic risk and supporting the stability of 
the broader financial system. As described above in Section I.B., FICC 
proposes to add the Sponsored GC Service to facilitate centrally 
cleared tri-party repo trading between a Sponsored Member and its 
Sponsoring Member within FICC's Sponsored Service. The Sponsored GC 
Service is designed to enable a greater number of tri-party repo 
transactions to be eligible for FICC's netting services and subject to 
FICC's guaranteed settlement, novation, and risk management, which 
should help decrease the settlement and operational risk of such 
transactions relative to those made outside of central clearing. This 
risk reduction should, in turn, enhance the stability of the tri-party 
repo market.\55\ Furthermore, by enabling

[[Page 49392]]

FICC to provide CCP services covering a greater number of tri-party 
repo transactions, the Sponsored GC Service would enable FICC to 
control the liquidation of a greater number of positions in a member 
default scenario, which in turn, should help protect against the risk 
of a large-scale exit by institutional firms from the U.S. financial 
market in a stress scenario.\56\ Accordingly, the Commission believes 
that an increase in centrally cleared tri-party repo activity via the 
Sponsored GC Service would help reduce systemic risks and support the 
stability of the broader financial system, consistent with Section 
805(b) of the Act.\57\
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    \55\ FICC notes that the centrally cleared repo market has 
functioned well during periods of extreme market volatility, as 
evidenced during the unprecedented market volatility in March-April 
2020. See Notice of Filing, supra note 5 at 29835.
    \56\ See Letter from Robert Toomey, Managing Director and 
Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (June 18, 2021) at 2 (commenting that the proposed 
Sponsored GC Service should incentivize more central clearing of 
tri-party repos, thereby contributing to enhancing the capacity and 
resiliency of the repo market and mitigating the risk of a large-
scale exit by institutional firms from the market in a stress 
scenario). The U.S. financial market experienced such a liquidity 
drain from the repo market in the 2007-2008 financial crisis when 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers gave rise to concerns among cash 
provider institutional firms about the creditworthiness of their 
borrower counterparties. See Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A 
Memoir of a Crisis and its Aftermath 397 (2017) (discussing ``the 
paralyzing uncertainty [on the part of repo lenders] about banks' 
financial health'' in 2007 and 2008).
    \57\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also believes that FICC's proposal to change the 
CCLF allocation methodology is consistent with the principles of 
reducing systemic risks and supporting the stability of the broader 
financial system. As discussed above in Section I.C., trades between a 
Sponsoring Member and its Sponsored Member do not independently create 
liquidity risk for FICC. However, under the current Rules, if a 
Sponsoring Member enters into a Sponsored Member trade without entering 
into an offsetting transaction, the Sponsoring Member is subject to 
CCLF obligations for the Sponsored Member's position in the Sponsoring 
Member's omnibus account as well as its own position arising from the 
Sponsored Member trade recorded in its netting account. Although the 
positions in the Sponsoring Member's omnibus account and netting 
account offset each other, FICC does not currently net such positions 
for CCLF purposes because CCLF allocations are determined at the 
participant account level. FICC proposes to change the Rules to allow 
netting, for CCLF allocation purposes, of offsetting positions in a 
Sponsoring Member's omnibus account and netting account. FICC designed 
this proposal to ensure that a Sponsoring Member's CCLF obligation 
aligns more closely with the actual liquidity risk its trading activity 
presents to FICC. This, in turn, may decrease the frequency with which 
a Sponsoring Member's daily peak liquidity needs reach into higher CCLF 
supplemental liquidity tiers, resulting in a larger pro-rata allocation 
of CCLF obligations among other members whose daily peak liquidity 
needs reach into those supplemental liquidity tiers.
    Based on the foregoing, FICC's current CCLF allocation methodology 
subjects Sponsoring Members to CCLF obligations beyond the level of 
risk presented by their trading activity, essentially requiring those 
Sponsoring Members to partially subsidize the CCLF obligations of other 
members who would otherwise bear larger CCLF obligations under the 
proposal.\58\ As a result, Sponsoring Members must currently direct 
capital towards CCLF obligations that could otherwise be used to 
support the trading activity of their clients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ In reaching this conclusion, the Commission reviewed and 
analyzed an impact analysis filed by FICC, comparing the changes in 
CCLF allocations under the current Rules and under the proposal. As 
part of the Advance Notice, FICC filed Exhibit 3--FICC/GSD CCLF 
Allocations Impact Study. (Pursuant to 17 CFR 240.24b-2, FICC 
requested confidential treatment of Exhibit 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FICC's proposal to change the CCLF allocation methodology would 
result in a distribution of CCLF obligations that better aligns with 
the liquidity risk each member's trading activity presents to FICC. 
Market stability is enhanced when market participants are incentivized 
to manage the actual risks presented by their trading activity. 
Accordingly, the Commission believes that FICC's proposal to change the 
CCLF allocation methodology would help reduce systemic risk and support 
the stability of the broader financial system, consistent with Section 
805(b) of the Act.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Promoting Robust Risk Management and Safety and Soundness
    The Commission believes that FICC's proposals in the Advance Notice 
are consistent with the objectives of promoting robust risk management 
and promoting safety and soundness at FICC. With respect to the 
proposed Sponsored GC Service, FICC would leverage its existing risk 
management tools to manage the risks associated with repos transacted. 
For example, FICC would manage its market risk with respect to 
Sponsored GC Trades similar to the manner in which FICC manages 
existing trades within the Sponsored Service. Specifically, FICC would 
calculate the VaR Charge for each Sponsored Member based on its 
activity in the Sponsored Service, including its activity in the 
proposed Sponsored GC Service. The VaR Charge for the Sponsoring 
Member's omnibus account would continue to be the sum of the individual 
VaR Charges for each Sponsored Member client (i.e., gross-margined). 
Additionally, FICC would risk manage the mark-to-market risk associated 
with unaccrued repo interest on a Sponsored GC Trade through a proposed 
new interest rate mark, calculated in the same manner that FICC 
currently calculates the interest rate mark for GCF Repo transactions.
    Moreover, the Advance Notice includes a proposal for a new risk 
management feature for the Sponsored Service. Specifically, FICC would 
assign a symbol to each Sponsored Member to facilitate FICC's ability 
to surveil the Sponsored Member's activity across its Sponsored GC 
Trades as well as its other Sponsored Member Trades within the existing 
Sponsored Service. In addition, the new Sponsored GC Service would 
continue to apply certain heightened requirements on particular types 
of Sponsoring Members. The foregoing risk management measures would 
help FICC prevent and otherwise manage the risks presented by the 
potential default of a member within Sponsored GC Service. Accordingly, 
the Commission believes that the proposed Sponsored GC Service would 
promote robust risk management and safety and soundness at FICC, 
consistent with Section 805(b) of the Act.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also believes that FICC's proposals in the Advance 
Notice are consistent with the objective of promoting safety and 
soundness in the tri-party repo market. As discussed above, the 
Sponsored GC Service would make the risk-reducing benefits of central 
clearing available to a greater portion of trades in the tri-party repo 
market. Also, as described above in Section III.A.1., FICC's proposed 
CCLF allocation methodology would reduce CCLF obligations for 
Sponsoring Members with respect to Sponsored Member trades entered into 
without offsetting (i.e., matched book) trades. As a result, the 
proposed CCLF allocation methodology would reduce costs for Sponsoring 
Members and thereby provide an additional incentive for eligible market 
participants to join the Sponsored Service and offer the Sponsored GC 
Service to a potentially broader segment of the tri-party market. By 
bringing a greater portion of tri-party

[[Page 49393]]

repo trades into central clearing, the proposals in the Advance Notice 
would help to decrease the settlement and operational risk present when 
such trades are conducted outside of central clearing. The Sponsored GC 
Service would thereby contribute to the stability of the tri-party repo 
market. Furthermore, the Sponsored GC Service would enable FICC to 
centralize and control the liquidation of a greater number of tri-party 
repo transactions in the event of a member default, which in turn, 
would help protect the tri-party repo market against the destabilizing 
risk of a large-scale exit by institutional firms from the U.S. 
financial market in a stress scenario. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes that the proposed Sponsored GC Service would promote safety 
and soundness in the tri-party repo market, consistent with Section 
805(b) of the Act.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the Commission also believes that FICC's proposal to 
change the CCLF allocation methodology is consistent with the principle 
of promoting robust risk management. As described above in Section 
II.C., FICC's proposal to change the CCLF allocation methodology would 
not impact FICC's current methodology for determining the total amount 
of the CCLF. As a result, FICC would retain its current level of liquid 
resources. FICC's proposal would only change the allocation of CCLF 
obligations among FICC's members. As described above in this Section 
III.A.1., FICC's proposed CCLF allocation methodology would result in a 
CCLF obligation for each member that better corresponds to the actual 
liquidity risk each member's trading activity presents to FICC. 
Accordingly, the Commission believes FICC's proposed CCLF allocation 
methodology would promote robust risk management because it would 
better align the costs for a member to participate in FICC with the 
level of risk the member's trading activity presents to FICC, while 
still maintaining the same overall level of liquidity resources at 
FICC.

B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7) under the Exchange Act requires a covered 
clearing agency to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to effectively measure, 
monitor, and manage the liquidity risk that arises in or is borne by 
the covered clearing agency.\62\ As described above in Section I.C.3., 
FICC proposes to change the Rules to allow netting, for CCLF allocation 
purposes, of offsetting positions in a Sponsoring Member's omnibus 
account and netting account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FICC's proposal would not impact FICC's current methodology for 
determining the total amount of the CCLF as a liquidity resource. As 
discussed above in Section III.A.1., FICC proposes to change the Rules 
regarding CCLF allocation to ensure that a Sponsoring Member's CCLF 
obligation aligns more closely with the actual liquidity risk its 
trading activity presents to FICC. As a result, FICC's proposed CCLF 
allocation methodology represents more efficient liquidity risk 
management than the current methodology. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes that FICC's proposed CCLF allocation methodology is consistent 
with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7).\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21) under the Exchange Act requires a covered 
clearing agency to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to be efficient and 
effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the 
markets it serves, including the clearing agency's clearing and 
settlement arrangements and the scope of products cleared or 
settled.\64\ As described above in Section I.B., FICC's current 
Sponsored Service does not accommodate the trading of tri-party repos. 
FICC proposes to expand the Sponsored Service to allow tri-party repo 
trading to meet the needs of market participants that currently 
transact tri-party term repos outside of central clearing because they 
are not operationally equipped to perform the collateral management and 
other functions associated with term DVP repos. By expanding the 
Sponsored Service to facilitate tri-party repo trading, FICC seeks to 
provide a viable option for its members to transact term tri-party 
repos in central clearing. Sponsored GC Trades would settle in a manner 
similar to the way Sponsoring Members and Sponsored Members currently 
settle tri-party repos with each other outside of central clearing, 
thereby making it more operationally efficient for the parties to 
transact term repos with each other using FICC as the CCP. The 
Commission believes that the proposed Sponsored GC Service is 
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(21) \65\ because it is responsive to 
the requests from FICC's members for the ability to trade centrally 
cleared term tri-party repos in a manner that is efficient and 
effective in meeting the operational requirements of FICC's members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(21).
    \65\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Conclusion

    It is therefore noticed, pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(I) of the 
Clearing Supervision Act, that the Commission does not object to 
Advance Notice (SR-FICC-2021-801) and that FICC is authorized to 
implement the proposed change as of the date of this notice or the date 
of an order by the Commission approving Proposed Rule Change SR-FICC-
2021-003, whichever is later.

    By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-18950 Filed 9-1-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P