Document ID: SEC-2023-0606-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Rule
Title: Form PF; Event Reporting for Large Hedge Fund Advisers and Private Equity Fund Advisers; Requirements for Large Private Equity Fund Adviser Reporting
Posted Date: 2023-06-12T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 112 (Monday, June 12, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 38146-38278]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-09775]

[[Page 38145]]

Vol. 88

Monday,

No. 112

June 12, 2023

Part II

Securities and Exchange Commission

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17 CFR Parts 275 and 279

Form PF; Event Reporting for Large Hedge Fund Advisers and Private 
Equity Fund Advisers; Requirements for Large Private Equity Fund 
Adviser Reporting; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 112 / Monday, June 12, 2023 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 38146]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 275 and 279

[Release No. IA-6297; File No. S7-01-22]
RIN 3235-AM75

Form PF; Event Reporting for Large Hedge Fund Advisers and 
Private Equity Fund Advisers; Requirements for Large Private Equity 
Fund Adviser Reporting

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'' or 
``Commission'') is adopting amendments to Form PF, the confidential 
reporting form for certain SEC-registered investment advisers to 
private funds to require event reporting upon the occurrence of key 
events. The amendments also require large private equity fund advisers 
to provide additional information to the SEC about the private equity 
funds they advise. The reporting requirements are designed to enhance 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council's (``FSOC'') ability to 
monitor systemic risk as well as bolster the SEC's regulatory oversight 
of private fund advisers and investor protection efforts.

DATES: 
    Effective dates: This rule is effective June 11, 2024, except for 
the amendments to Form PF sections 5 and 6 (referenced in 17 CFR 279.9) 
which are effective December 11, 2023.
    Compliance dates: For the amended, existing Form PF sections and 
amendments to 17 CFR 275.204(b)-1, June 11, 2024. For new Form PF 
sections 5 and 6, December 11, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Holowka, Jill Pritzker, and 
Samuel Thomas, Senior Counsels; Sirimal R. Mukerjee, Senior Special 
Counsel; or Melissa Roverts Harke, Assistant Director, at (202) 551-
6787 or IArul[email protected], Investment Adviser Regulation Office, Division 
of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F 
Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-8549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is adopting amendments to 
Form PF [17 CFR 279.9] and Rule 204(b)-1 under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80b] (``Advisers Act'').\1\
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 80b. Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to the 
Advisers Act, or any section of the Advisers Act, we are referring 
to 15 U.S.C. 80b, at which the Advisers Act is codified, and when we 
refer to rules under the Advisers Act, or any section of these 
rules, we are referring to title 17, part 275 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations [17 CFR 275], in which these rules are published.

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        Commission reference                     CFR citation
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Form PF.............................  17 CFR 279.9.
Rule 204(b)-1.......................  17 CFR 275.204(b)-1.
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Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Discussion
    A. Current Reporting for Large Hedge Fund Advisers to Qualifying 
Hedge Funds
    1. Timing of Hedge Fund Current Reports
    2. Extraordinary Investment Losses
    3. Significant Margin and Default Events
    4. Prime Broker Relationship Terminated or Materially Restricted
    5. Changes in Unencumbered Cash
    6. Operations Events
    7. Large Withdrawal and Redemption Requests, Inability To 
Satisfy Redemptions, or Suspensions of Redemptions
    8. Explanatory Notes
    B. Quarterly Private Equity Event Reports for All Private Equity 
Fund Advisers
    1. Adviser-Led Secondary Transactions
    2. Removal of General Partner or Election To Terminate the 
Investment Period or Fund
    C. Filing Fees and Format for Reporting
    D. Large Private Equity Fund Adviser Reporting
    1. New Question on General Partner or Limited Partner Clawbacks
    2. Other Amendments to Large Private Equity Fund Adviser 
Reporting
    E. Effective and Compliance Dates
III. Other Matters
IV. Economic Analysis
    A. Introduction
    B. Economic Baseline and Affected Parties
    1. Economic Baseline
    2. Affected Parties
    C. Benefits and Costs
    1. Benefits
    2. Costs
    D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    E. Reasonable Alternatives
    1. Changing the Frequency of Current Reporting, Quarterly 
Reporting Events, and Annual Reporting Events
    2. Changing Current Reporting Filing Time
    3. Alternative Reporting Thresholds for Current Reporting by 
Hedge Fund Advisers (Versus Just Large Hedge Fund Advisers to 
Qualifying Hedge Funds)
    4. Different Size Thresholds for Private Equity Fund Advisers 
Who Must File Quarterly and Annual Reports on the Occurrence of 
Reporting Events
    5. Changing the Reporting Events for Current Reporting by Hedge 
Fund Advisers
    6. Alternative Size Threshold for Section 4 Reporting by Large 
Private Equity Fund Advisers
    7. Alternatives to the New Section 4 Reporting Requirements for 
Large Private Equity
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Purpose and Use of the Information Collection
    B. Confidentiality
    C. Burden Estimates
    1. Proposed Form PF Requirements by Respondent
    2. Final Form PF Requirements by Respondent
    3. Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates
    4. Annual Monetized Time Burden Proposed and Final Estimates
    5. Annual External Cost Burden Proposed and Final Estimates
    6. Summary of Proposed and Final Estimates and Change in Burden
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
Statutory Authority

I. Introduction

    The Commission is adopting amendments to Form PF, the form that 
certain investment advisers registered with the Commission use to 
report confidential information about the private funds that they 
advise. Form PF provides the Commission and FSOC with important 
information about the basic operations and strategies of private funds 
and has helped establish a baseline picture of the private fund 
industry for use in assessing systemic risk.\2\ We now have almost a 
decade of experience analyzing the information

[[Page 38147]]

collected on Form PF.\3\ In that time, the private fund industry has 
grown in size and evolved in terms of business practices, complexity of 
fund structures, and investment strategies and exposures.\4\ Based on 
this experience and in light of these changes, the Commission and FSOC 
identified significant information gaps and situations where more 
granular and timely information would improve our understanding of the 
private fund industry and the potential systemic risk within it, and 
improve our ability to protect investors.\5\ Accordingly, to enhance 
the FSOC's monitoring and assessment of systemic risk and to collect 
additional data for the Commission's use in its regulatory programs, in 
January 2022 the Commission proposed amendments to enhance the 
information advisers file on Form PF.\6\
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    \2\ Advisers Act section 202(a)(29) defines the term ``private 
fund'' as an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined 
in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (``Investment 
Company Act''), but for sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act. 
Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act provides an exclusion 
from the definition of ``investment company'' for any issuer whose 
outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are 
beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons (or, in the 
case of a qualifying venture capital fund, 250 persons) and which is 
not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering 
of its securities. Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act 
provides an exclusion from the definition of ``investment company'' 
for any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned 
exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such 
securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and 
does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such 
securities. The term ``qualified purchaser'' is defined in section 
2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act. Since Form PF's adoption 
Commission staff have used Form PF statistics to inform our 
regulatory programs and establish census type information regarding 
the private fund industry. See SEC 2022 Annual Staff Report Relating 
to the Use of Form PF Data (Dec. 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/2022-pf-report-congress.pdf. Staff reports, 
statistics, and other staff documents (including those cited herein) 
represent the views of Commission staff and are not a rule, 
regulation, or statement of the Commission. The Commission has 
neither approved nor disapproved the content of these documents and, 
like all staff statements, they have no legal force or effect, do 
not alter or amend applicable law, and create no new or additional 
obligations for any person. The Commission has expressed no view 
regarding the analysis, findings, or conclusions contained therein.
    \3\ Form PF was adopted in 2011 as required by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Public Law 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See Reporting by Investment Advisers 
to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity 
Trading Advisors on Form PF, Advisers Act Release No. 3308 (Oct. 31, 
2011) [76 FR 71128 (Nov. 16, 2011)], at section I (``2011 Form PF 
Adopting Release''). In 2014, the Commission amended Form PF section 
3 in connection with certain money market fund reforms. See Money 
Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Advisers Act Release No. 
3879 (July 23, 2014) [79 FR 47736 (Aug. 14, 2014)] (``2014 Form PF 
Amending Release''). Form PF is a joint form between the Commission 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') only with 
respect to sections 1 and 2 of the Form; sections 3 and 4, were 
adopted only by the Commission. Current Form PF section 5, request 
for temporary hardship exemption, which will become new section 7, 
is adopted only by the Commission. We are adopting new sections 5 
and section 6 and amending section 4, all of which are adopted only 
by the Commission.
    \4\ The value of private fund net assets reported on Form PF has 
almost tripled, growing from $5 trillion in 2013 to nearly $14 
trillion through the second quarter of 2022, while the number of 
private funds reported on the form has increased by 110% in that 
time period. Unless otherwise noted, the private funds statistics 
used in this Release are from the Private Funds Statistics second 
quarter of 2022. Any comparisons to earlier periods are from the 
private funds statistics from that period, all of which are 
available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics.shtml. SEC staff began publishing the private fund 
statistics in 2015, including data from 2013. Therefore, many 
comparisons in this Release discuss the nine year span from the 
beginning of 2013 through the second quarter of 2022. Some 
discussion in this Release compares data from a seven year span, 
from the beginning of 2015 through the second quarter of 2022, 
because the SEC staff began publishing that particular data in 2016.
    \5\ We are adopting these amendments, in part, pursuant to our 
authority under section 204(b) of the Advisers Act, which gives the 
Commission the authority to establish certain reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements for advisers to private funds and 
provides that the records and reports of any private fund to which 
an investment adviser registered with the Commission provides 
investment advice are deemed to be the records and reports of the 
investment adviser.
    \6\ Amendments to Form PF to Require Current Reporting and Amend 
Reporting Requirements for Large Private Equity Advisers and Large 
Liquidity Fund Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 5950 (Jan. 26, 
2022) [87 FR 9106 (Feb. 17, 2022)] (``2022 Form PF Proposing 
Release''). The Commission voted to issue the 2022 Form PF Proposing 
Release on Jan. 26, 2022. The release was posted on the Commission 
website that day, and comment letters were received beginning that 
same date. The comment period closed on Mar. 21, 2022. We have 
considered all comments received since Jan. 26, 2022. In Aug. 2022, 
the Commission and the CFTC proposed amendments to Form PF regarding 
certain reporting requirements for all filers and large hedge fund 
advisers. Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large 
Hedge Fund Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 6083 (Aug. 10, 2022) 
[87 FR 35938 (Sept. 1, 2022)] (``2022 Form PF Joint Proposing 
Release'').
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    The Commission received a number of comment letters on the 2022 
Form PF Proposing Release.\7\ Some commenters generally supported the 
policy goals of the proposal, stating that the proposal would help the 
Commission and FSOC assess and respond to systemic risk as well as 
consider appropriate policy responses.\8\ Other commenters generally 
asserted that the proposal was not the appropriate way of achieving 
FSOC and the Commission's policy goals of assessing systemic risk and 
investor protection, respectively, due to the reporting and monitoring 
burdens they would impose.\9\ Certain commenters stated that the 
reporting requirements are not indicative of systemic risk.\10\ Some 
commenters argued that, instead, the proposed reporting requirements 
were more focused on supporting the Commission's regulatory examination 
and enforcement functions, and that these requirements would overburden 
advisers (especially smaller advisers) with compliance costs that 
investors would likely bear and obscure data that is related to 
systemic risk.\11\ Lastly, other commenters stated that the SEC should 
consider the proposed amendments in tandem with the 2022 Form PF Joint 
Proposing Release as the amendments to both may impact each other and 
create a collective compliance burden that potentially should be 
implemented at one time if adopted.\12\
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    \7\ The comment letters on the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release 
(File No. S7-01-22) are available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-01-22/s70122.htm.
    \8\ See, e.g., Comment Letter of The Predistribution Initiative 
(Mar. 21, 2022) (``PDI Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of Mark C. 
(Feb. 21, 2022) (``Mark C. Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of 
Public Citizen (Mar. 21, 2022) (``Public Citizen Comment Letter''); 
Comment Letter of Anonymous Retail Investor (Mar. 24, 2022) 
(``Anonymous Retail Investor Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of 
Better Markets (Mar. 21, 2022) (``Better Markets Comment Letter''); 
Comment Letter of Americans for Financial Reform Education Fund 
(Mar. 21, 2022) (``AFREF Comment Letter'').
    \9\ See, e.g., Comment Letter of Alternative Investment 
Management Association Limited and the Alternative Credit Council 
(Mar. 21, 2022) (``AIMA/ACC Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of 
Real Estate Roundtable (Mar. 21, 2022) (``RER Comment Letter''); 
Comment Letter of Managed Funds Association (Mar. 21, 2022) (``MFA 
Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of Center for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 21, 2022) (``USCC 
Comment Letter'').
    \10\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; RER Comment Letter; 
Comment Letter of the American Investment Council (Mar. 21, 2022) 
(``AIC Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of the Real Estate Board of 
New York (Mar. 21, 2022) (``REBNY Comment Letter'').
    \11\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter.
    \12\ See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter (Oct. 11, 2022); MFA Comment 
Letter (Mar. 16, 2023). See discussion infra at section II.E.
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    We are adopting the amendments largely as proposed, but with 
certain modifications in response to comments received:
     First, we are adopting new current reporting requirements 
for large hedge fund advisers regarding their qualifying hedge 
funds.\13\ We are modifying the proposal and eliminating the proposed 
current report for changes in unencumbered cash. Also, instead of 
reporting in one business day, as proposed, the amendments will require 
large hedge fund advisers to qualifying hedge funds to report as soon 
as practicable upon, but no later than 72 hours after, the occurrence 
of certain events that we believe may indicate significant stress or 
otherwise serve as signals of potential systemic risk implications or 
as potential areas for inquiry so as to mitigate investor harm.
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    \13\ Currently, most private fund advisers report general 
information on Form PF, such as the types of private funds advised 
(e.g., hedge funds, private equity funds, or liquidity funds), fund 
size, use of borrowings and derivatives, strategy, and types of 
investors. Depending on their size, certain larger private fund 
advisers report more detailed information on the qualifying hedge 
funds, the liquidity funds and the private equity funds that they 
advise on a quarterly or annual basis. In particular, three types of 
``Large Private Fund Advisers'' must complete certain additional 
sections of the current Form PF: (1) any adviser having at least 
$1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to 
hedge funds as of the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter 
(``large hedge fund advisers''); (2) any adviser managing a 
liquidity fund and having at least $1 billion in combined regulatory 
assets under management attributable to liquidity funds and money 
market funds as of the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter 
(``large liquidity fund advisers''); and (3) any adviser having at 
least $2 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable 
to private equity funds as of the last day of the adviser's most 
recently completed fiscal year (``large private equity fund 
adviser''). A qualifying hedge fund is defined in Form PF as ``any 
hedge fund that has a net asset value (individually or in 
combination with any feeder funds, parallel funds and/or dependent 
parallel managed accounts) of at least $500 million as of the last 
day of any month in the fiscal quarter immediately preceding your 
most recently completed fiscal quarter.''
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     Second, in a modification from the proposal, we are also 
adopting event

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reporting for all private equity fund advisers, which would include 
quarterly reporting within 60 days after quarter ends for two of the 
proposed current reporting items: (1) adviser-led secondary 
transactions, and (2) general partner removals and investor elections 
to terminate a fund or its investment period. We are requiring annual 
large private equity fund adviser reporting, however, with respect to 
general partner or limited partner clawbacks,\14\ which we had proposed 
to be reported on a current basis by all private equity fund 
advisers.\15\
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    \14\ We have made a global modification in Form PF to replace 
the term ``private equity adviser'' with ``private equity fund 
adviser.'' We believe that ``private equity fund adviser'' is the 
more precise term, but we do not view this modification as resulting 
in substantive differences.
    \15\ This item has also been moved from proposed section 6 to 
section 4 because it is now an annual reporting item for large 
private equity fund advisers.
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     Third, with modifications from the proposal, we are 
adopting several additional reporting items as well as amendments to 
require large private equity fund advisers to report more detailed 
information regarding certain activities of private equity funds that 
are important to the assessment of systemic risk and for the protection 
of investors. We are also adopting tailored amendments to gather more 
information from large private equity fund advisers regarding fund 
strategies and use of leverage as well as other amendments. In a change 
from the proposal, we are not adopting a lower $1.5 billion reporting 
threshold for large private equity fund advisers for purposes of 
reporting in section 4 and are instead retaining the existing $2 
billion threshold.
    The Commission proposed amendments that would have required large 
liquidity fund advisers to report substantially the same information 
that money market funds would be required to report on Form N-MFP under 
the Commission's proposal to amend that form.\16\ However, we are 
continuing to consider comments relating to the proposed large 
liquidity fund adviser amendments--and the proposed amendments to Form 
N-MFP on which they are based--and are not adopting amendments to Form 
PF concerning large liquidity fund advisers at this time.
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    \16\ See Money Market Fund Reforms, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 34441 (Dec. 15, 2021) [87 FR 7248 (Feb. 8, 2022)] 
(``Money Market Fund Proposing Release'').
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    The amendments we are adopting are important enhancements to the 
ability to monitor and assess systemic risk and to determine whether 
and how to deploy the Commission's or FSOC's regulatory tools.\17\ The 
amendments will also strengthen the effectiveness of the Commission's 
regulatory programs, including examinations, investigations, and 
investor protection efforts relating to private fund advisers. We 
consulted with FSOC to gain input on these amendments to help ensure 
that Form PF continues to provide FSOC with information it can use to 
assess systemic risk.
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    \17\ Accordingly, we are adopting the amendments the Commission 
proposed in the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release at this time to 
facilitate FSOC and the Commission's assessment of systemic events 
and the Commission's investor protection efforts through current 
reporting, and we are continuing to consider comments received in 
connection with the 2022 Form PF Joint Proposing Release. See 
discussion of compliance dates for respective sections of Form PF 
infra at section II.E.
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II. Discussion

A. Current Reporting for Large Hedge Fund Advisers to Qualifying Hedge 
Funds

    We are adopting amendments that will require large hedge fund 
advisers to file a current report with respect to one or more current 
reporting events at a qualifying hedge fund that they advise.\18\ We 
are modifying some of the proposed reporting events and eliminating the 
proposed unencumbered cash current report while also extending the 
reporting period from one business day to as soon as practicable, but 
no later than 72 hours. Currently, large hedge fund advisers file Form 
PF quarterly, which could cause Form PF data to be stale during fast 
moving events that could have systemic risk implications or negatively 
impact investors. The current reporting requirements for qualifying 
hedge funds will provide important, current information to the 
Commission and FSOC to facilitate timely assessment of the causes of 
the current reporting event, the potential impact on investors and the 
financial system, and any potential regulatory responses.\19\ More 
specifically, a timely notice could allow the Commission and FSOC to 
assess the need for potential regulatory action, and could allow the 
Commission to pursue potential outreach, examinations, or 
investigations in response to any harm to investors or potential risks 
to financial stability on an expedited basis before they worsen. The 
current reports will also enhance our analysis of information the 
Commission already collects across funds and other market participants, 
allowing FSOC and the Commission to identify patterns that may present 
systemic risk or that could result in investor harm, respectively. The 
Commission and its staff will be able to use the information contained 
in the current reports to assess the nature and extent of the risks 
presented, as well as the potential effect on any impacted fund and the 
potential contagion risks across funds and counterparties more broadly.
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    \18\ As proposed and in connection with the addition of new 
section 5 for current reporting, we are also making conforming 
changes to rule 204(b)-1 under the Advisers Act to re-designate 
current section 5, which includes instructions for requesting a 
temporary hardship exemption, as section 6.
    \19\ In a change from the proposal, we are replacing ``reporting 
event'' with ``current reporting event'' in the Form PF Glossary to 
highlight that these events are current events occurring at funds 
specific to section 5 reporting. ``Current reporting events'' 
includes any event that triggers the requirement to complete and 
file a current report pursuant to the items in section 5. We are 
defining ``current report'' to include a report provided pursuant to 
the items in section 5.
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    Some commenters generally supported the requirement to provide 
current reports for certain events that may signal systemic risk or 
trigger certain investor protection concerns and some, in particular, 
stated that the one business day requirement was necessary to formulate 
an FSOC or Commission response to fast-moving market events.\20\ Other 
commenters stated that some of the reporting items were not reflective 
of systemic risk concerns and did not directly connect the proposed 
reporting requirements with specific investor protection concerns.\21\ 
For example, two commenters stated that extraordinary investment losses 
are not necessarily indicative of systemic risk and that losses are an 
investment risk that should not be conflated with investor 
protection.\22\
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    \20\ See, e.g., PDI Comment Letter; AFREF Comment Letter; Mark 
C. Comment Letter; Public Citizen Comment Letter; Anonymous Retail 
Investor Comment Letter; Better Markets Comment Letter.
    \21\ See, e.g., Comment Letter of SIFMA (Mar. 21, 2022) (``SIFMA 
Comment Letter'') (stating that triggering events, like the 
extraordinary loss current report, premised on investor protection 
concerns such as ``large, sharp, and sustained losses'' should be 
viewed as part of the investment risks associated with any 
investing). See also IAA Comment Letter (stating that many of the 
items proposed to be reported on a current basis will not assist the 
Commission or FSOC in addressing systemic risk, that current 
reporting is not necessary to meet the Commission's investor 
protection goals, and that the Commission appears to conflate 
investment protection with mitigation of investment risk and 
losses).
    \22\ Id.
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    As discussed below, the current reporting events include 
extraordinary investment losses, certain margin events, counterparty 
defaults, material changes in prime broker relationships, operations 
events, and certain events associated with redemptions. We

[[Page 38149]]

designed the current reporting events to indicate significant stress at 
a fund that could harm investors or signal risk in the broader 
financial system. For example, large investment losses or a margin 
default involving one large, highly levered hedge fund may have 
systemic risk implications. Counterparties to a fund in distress could 
react by increasing margin requirements, limiting borrowing, or forcing 
asset sales, and these responses could amplify the event and have 
potential contagion effects on the broader financial system. Similarly, 
reports of large investment losses at qualifying hedge funds (even if 
not the largest or most levered) may signal market stress that could 
have systemic effects.\23\ Current reports would be especially useful 
during periods of market volatility and stress, when the Commission and 
FSOC may receive a large number of current reports and ascertain the 
affected funds and gather information to assess any potential contagion 
or systemic impact. The Commission or FSOC may analyze the events and 
organize outreach to the impacted entities, funds, counterparties, or 
other market participants that the current reports and other data may 
indicate could be next in a contagion circumstance. For example, if one 
fund that was particularly concentrated in a deteriorating position or 
strategy reported an extraordinary loss or was terminated by its prime 
broker for reasons related to that position or strategy, Commission 
staff could potentially conduct outreach to fund counterparties or 
other similarly situated funds to assess whether any regulatory action 
could mitigate the potential for contagion or harm to investors. Though 
some commenters stated that the current reports were not properly 
focused on systemic risk and would instead subject advisers to 
regulatory examinations and enforcement actions, we continue to believe 
that the potential seriousness of the events warrants the collection of 
current reports that could indicate directly systemic risk and investor 
protection concerns.\24\
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    \23\ See, e.g., Better Markets Comment Letter (stating new 
reporting requirements will allow regulators to determine whether an 
issue at a private fund potentially signals deteriorating market 
conditions that could cascade into a crisis, or whether an issue at 
a private fund is itself indicative of a crisis already underway and 
that, if the Commission or FSOC determines that a crisis is 
underway, current reporting with details of fund assets, its 
exposures, and its counterparties will give the Commission and FSOC 
crucial information about where a crisis may spread).
    \24\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter (stating that the new 
reporting requirements go beyond Congress' mandate and the current 
Form PF Rule's stated objectives to foster the Commission's more 
general objectives: data collection to support examinations, and its 
regulatory and enforcement programs), and AIC Comment Letter 
(additional information that is merely potentially useful to the SEC 
as a compliance monitoring tool in administering its examination and 
enforcement programs is not an appropriate justification for 
significantly expanding reporting on Form PF and is inconsistent 
with the primary purpose of Form PF and the intent of Congress).
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    The current reporting events generally incorporate objective tests 
to allow advisers to determine whether a report must be filed. In 
response to comments, we either eliminated or further tailored the 
current reporting events both to decrease the reporting burden and to 
reduce the possibility of reporting ``false positives'' (i.e., 
incidents that trigger the proposed current reporting requirement but 
do not actually raise significant risks) for events that may not 
indicate the potential for systemic risk or investor harm.\25\ We also 
addressed comments that indicated that we should limit or better 
explain proposed current reporting triggers that use materiality 
thresholds, like the proposed prime broker relationship termination and 
operations event current reporting items, and instead simplify the 
analysis required to determine if you need to report by making 
reporting dependent on binary events.\26\ As a result, a number of the 
items continue to include quantifiable threshold percentage tests or 
have been further refined to trigger reporting for events that are 
likely indicative of severe stress at a fund or may have broader 
implications for systemic risk for which we seek timely information 
while minimizing the potential for false positives and multiple 
unnecessary current reports.
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    \25\ In some instances our refinement of questions to include 
more current statistics would also likely reduce the number of 
``false negatives.''
    \26\ See AIMA Comment Letter and SIFMA Comment Letter. Several 
commenters pointed to National Futures Association (``NFA'') 
Compliance Rule 2-50 as a form that provided more binary and limited 
types of reporting. NFA Notice 9080--NFA Compliance Rule 2-50: CPO 
Notice Filing Requirements. The Interpretive Notice is available at 
https://www.nfa.futures.org/rulebooksql/rules.aspx?Section=9&RuleID=9080. See also discussions infra at 
sections II.A.4 and II.A.6.
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    To supplement the objective triggers, several of the items include 
check boxes, largely as proposed, that will provide additional context 
and avoid requiring advisers to provide narrative responses during 
periods of stress under time pressure. These check boxes will allow the 
Commission and FSOC to review and analyze the current reports and 
screen false positives during periods in which they may be actively 
evaluating fast-moving market events and potentially prioritizing 
responses to certain affected funds, counterparties, or other market 
participants.
    The adopted amendments will establish new section 5 that will 
contain Items A through J. Section 5, Item A will require advisers to 
identify themselves and the reporting fund, including providing the 
reporting fund's name, private fund identification number, National 
Futures Association identification number (if any), and Legal Entity 
Identifier (if any).\27\ Section 5, Items B through I will set forth 
the current reporting events and the applicable reporting requirements 
for each event. Like the proposal, the amendments will have an optional 
repository for explanatory notes in section 5, Item I that the adviser 
may use to improve understanding of any information reported in 
response to the other section 5 items. The following sections discuss 
the timing for filing the current reports and each adopted current 
reporting event.
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    \27\ Form PF section 5, Item A would also require identifying 
information on the reporting fund's adviser, including the adviser's 
full legal name, SEC 801-Number, NFA ID Number (if any), large 
trader ID (if any), and large trader ID suffix (if any), as well as 
the name and contact information of the authorized representative of 
the adviser and any related person who is signing the current 
report.
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1. Timing of Hedge Fund Current Reports
    In a change from the proposal, the amendments will extend the time 
period for the filing of current reports. Instead of a one business day 
filing requirement, large hedge fund advisers to qualifying hedge funds 
are required to report as soon as practicable, but no later than 72 
hours, upon the occurrence of certain events that we believe may 
indicate significant stress or otherwise serve as signals of potential 
systemic risk implications.
    Some commenters expressed concern that the proposed requirement to 
file reports within one business day to the Commission would be 
burdensome and potentially lead to inaccurate or inadequate reporting 
at a time when advisers and their personnel are grappling with a 
potential crisis at the reporting fund.\28\ More specifically,

[[Page 38150]]

some commenters stated that advisers would need to develop complicated 
internal operations capable of performing calculations on a daily basis 
that may not be applicable to illiquid or hard-to-value assets and that 
the resulting data may be of limited utility to regulators.\29\ One 
commenter indicated that critical reporting of fast moving events could 
be delayed by weekends or holidays.\30\ Some commenters suggested that 
advisers could notify the Commission of the occurrence of current 
reporting events using telephone or email in shorter time frames while 
delaying current reporting on Form PF to a later date.\31\
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    \28\ See, e.g., Comment Letter of the Institutional Limited 
Partners Association (Mar. 21, 2022) (``ILPA Comment Letter''); 
AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; Comment Letter of State Street Corporation 
(Mar. 21, 2022) (``State Street Comment Letter''); Comment Letter of 
National Venture Capital Association (Mar. 21, 2022) (``NVCA Comment 
Letter''); RER Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter; Comment Letter 
of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Mar. 21, 2022) (``Schulte Comment 
Letter''); Comment Letter of the Investment Adviser Association 
(Mar. 21, 2022) (``IAA Comment Letter''); NYC Bar Comment Letter; 
REBNY Comment Letter.
    \29\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter and USCC Comment Letter. 
See also, infra discussion of daily fund value statistics in section 
II.A.2.
    \30\ See Comment Letter of Sarah A. (Mar. 11, 2022) (``Sarah A. 
Comment Letter'') and AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \31\ See SIFMA Comment Letter and State Street Comment Letter.
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    Receiving current reports on a timely basis will help address the 
Commission's and FSOC's need, discussed above, for current information. 
In order to allow advisers to qualifying hedge funds additional time to 
evaluate and obtain the necessary data to confirm the existence of a 
filing event, which will help improve the quality of the information 
contained in the report, the amendments will require advisers to file 
current reports for current reporting events as soon as practicable, 
but no later than 72 hours, upon the occurrence of a reporting event 
rather than one business day. We believe that shifting from a business 
day approach to one measuring elapsed hours after an event will address 
commenter concerns that critical reporting of fast moving events could 
be delayed by weekends or holidays.\32\ We believe that this time 
period properly balances commenters' concerns with the Commission's 
need for timely information, while allowing advisers to collect 
information within 72 hours that may not be readily ascertainable at 
the event's immediate outset. The 72 hour period begins upon the 
occurrence of the current reporting event, or the time when the adviser 
reasonably believes that the event occurred, and, as proposed, the form 
requires the adviser to respond to the best of its knowledge on the 
date of the report. To illustrate, if an adviser determined that a 
current reporting event occurred on Monday at noon, it would have to 
file a current report, as soon as practicable, but no later than 
Thursday before noon.
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    \32\ See Sarah A. Comment Letter and AIMA/ACC Comment Letter. We 
are amending Instructions 1, 3, 9, and 12 of the general 
instructions to reflect this new obligation for large hedge fund 
advisers. Specifically, we are amending Instruction 3 to identify 
new section 5 and Instruction 9 to address the timing of filing the 
current reports.
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    By extending the time period from one business day to 72 hours, we 
believe that an adviser will have sufficient time to identify events 
and conduct sufficient analysis to review and file timely current 
reports. Though some commenters stated that certain current reports 
will be burdensome to establish systems and processes to identify 
triggering events, in our experience, advisers to qualifying hedge 
funds generally already maintain the sophisticated operations and 
resources necessary to provide these reports. Moreover, changes we have 
made to the metrics for the 20 percent extraordinary loss and margin 
thresholds should alleviate concerns about the burdens and 
uncertainties concerning the timely valuation of illiquid or hard-to-
value assets.\33\ Though some commenters suggested that current 
reporting could include informal telephoning or emailing of the 
Commission, we continue to believe that reporting through Form PF will 
provide the Commission and FSOC with a systematic means through which 
to assess the events underlying the reporting.\34\
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    \33\ See discussion at infra sections II.A.2. and II.A.3.a.
    \34\ Though we require filing reports using Form PF, we also 
encourage engagement with Commission staff from registrants in 
periods of stress or otherwise.
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    Lastly, advisers will be able to file an amendment to a previously 
filed current report to correct information that was not accurate at 
the time of filing in the event that information in a current report 
was inaccurate or was filed in error.\35\ In a change from the 
proposal, to facilitate the filing of amendments, we are making a 
change to include the time of filing to enable the identification of 
previous filings.\36\
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    \35\ Instruction 16 explains that an adviser is not required to 
update information that it believes in good faith properly responded 
to Form PF on the date of filing even if that information is 
subsequently revised for purposes of the adviser's recordkeeping, 
risk management or investor reporting (such as estimates that are 
refined after completion of a subsequent audit).
    \36\ See Form PF section 5, Item A. Item A also has an 
additional change to require advisers to enter a CRD number to help 
identify the adviser.
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2. Extraordinary Investment Losses
    We are adopting, largely as proposed, current reporting to require 
large hedge fund advisers, whose advised qualifying hedge funds 
experience extraordinary losses within a short period of time, to 
provide a current report describing the losses.\37\ In a change from 
the proposal, reporting for extraordinary investment losses would be 
triggered by a loss equal to or greater than 20 percent of a fund's 
``reporting fund aggregate calculated value'' (``RFACV''), which we 
discuss further below, as opposed to the fund's most recent net asset 
value (``MRNAV''), over a rolling 10-business-day period.\38\ This 
current reporting event will capture, for example, a situation where 
the fund's RFACV is $1 billion and the fund loses $20 million per 
business day for a consecutive 10 business days. It will also capture a 
loss of $200 million in one business day as the rolling 10-business-day 
period is backward looking. We designed the threshold to capture a 
significant loss at the reporting fund over a relatively short rolling 
period as well as a precipitous loss without capturing immaterial 
losses that may not be indicative of stress at the fund.
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    \37\ See Form PF section 5, Item B.
    \38\ The Commission proposed to include a definition for 
``reporting fund aggregate calculated value'' in the 2022 Form PF 
Joint Proposing Release. The comment letters on the 2022 Form PF 
Joint Proposing Release (File No. S7-22-22) are available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-22/s72222.htm. The RFACV statistic will 
only apply to section 5 of Form PF.
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    Some commenters supported the extraordinary loss event.\39\ One 
commenter stated that a 20 percent loss over a 10-day period would be a 
significant event for any hedge fund and may render some funds 
insolvent.\40\ Other commenters questioned whether the 20 percent loss 
threshold was truly significant or indicative of actual stress, and 
stated that in volatile or broadly down markets, the Commission might 
receive a large number of reports of limited value.\41\ Some commenters 
questioned the Commission's use of MRNAV and stated that the Commission 
base the loss threshold on a more current net asset value figure,\42\ a 
net asset value figure compiled on a best efforts basis from their 
evaluation of fair-valued assets and unaudited figures,\43\ or a month-
end net asset value.\44\
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    \39\ See, e.g., Better Markets Comment Letter. See also ICGN 
Comment Letter.
    \40\ Better Markets Comment Letter.
    \41\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter. AIMA/ACC also stated 
that the 20% threshold may not properly account for volatile market 
strategies that funds may employ.
    \42\ Comment Letter of Anonymous (Feb. 25, 2022). Two commenters 
also criticized basing this threshold on a dated net asset value 
figure. See SIFMA Comment Letter and MFA Comment Letter.
    \43\ See MFA Comment Letter.
    \44\ See Schulte Comment Letter and MFA Comment Letter.
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    We continue to believe that the extraordinary loss current 
reporting

[[Page 38151]]

event will capture critical periods of hedge fund stress. Accordingly, 
we are adopting, as proposed, current reporting based on a 20 percent 
loss but, in a change from the proposal, are establishing the threshold 
by reference to the RFACV fund value statistic. As discussed below, 
RFACV is a more current statistic than the MRNAV filed on Form PF and 
will limit the potential for over or under-reporting. We believe that a 
20 percent loss of RFACV over a 10-business-day period is sufficiently 
high to avoid over-reporting during periods of relative market 
stability, but sufficiently low that it avoids under-reporting during 
periods of market stress.\45\ It is also our understanding that prime 
brokers and other fund counterparties already track certain net asset 
value triggers over varying periods and routinely build them into the 
risk control provisions of their agreements (e.g., prime broker 
agreements, total return swap agreements, or ISDA Master 
Agreements).\46\ Such net asset value decline triggers typically range 
from 10 percent to 25 percent declines over a 30 day period.\47\ 
Accordingly, we believe a 20 percent decline is appropriate considering 
that such a decline may have triggered or nearly triggered a 
contractual reporting threshold with credit and trading counterparties 
who view net asset value triggers as potential early warning indicators 
of hedge fund stress or potential liquidation. The reporting of large 
losses will provide notice to the Commission and FSOC of potential fund 
or market issues in advance of the occurrence of more downstream 
consequences, such as sharp margin increases, defaults, fund 
liquidations, or ramifications for other types of Commission 
registrants.\48\ Such losses could signal a precipitous liquidation or 
broader market instability that could lead to secondary effects, 
including greater margin and collateral requirements, financing costs 
for the fund, and the potential for large investor redemptions.
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    \45\ See discussion of thresholds at infra section IV.C.1.a.
    \46\ See, e.g., Poseidon Retsinas, How Fund Managers Can 
Mitigate NAV Triggers' Impact on Trading Agreements, Hedge Fund Law 
Report (May 14, 2020) (``HFL Report''), available at https://www.hflawreport.com/6769831/how-fund-managers-can-mitigate-nav-triggers-impact-on-trading-agreements.thtml. See also discussion of 
the 20% threshold infra at text accompanying footnote 323.
    \47\ Id.
    \48\ For example, a hedge fund's registered broker-dealer 
counterparties may be subject to large losses, or registered 
investment companies with similar portfoloio exposures, though not 
necessarily as leveraged, might be at risk for future losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Though commenters asserted that sharp broad-based market downturns 
may lead to a large number of reports from advisers, we believe that 
such reporting still will be useful to FSOC or the Commission during 
market instability. Moreover, in singular events, large, sharp, and 
sustained losses suffered by one fund within this short period may 
signal potential concerns for similarly situated funds, allowing FSOC 
and the Commission to analyze the scale and scope of the event and 
whether additional funds that may have similar investments, market 
positions, or financing profiles are at risk.
    The amendments use RFACV as a reference statistic in response to 
commenters' concerns that MRNAV was too dated of a statistic and could 
result in false positives.\49\ RFACV also is responsive to commenters' 
assertions that the reference value statistic be compiled on a best 
efforts basis from an evaluation of fair-valued assets and unaudited 
figures. RFACV is defined as ``every position in the reporting fund's 
portfolio, including cash and cash equivalents, short positions, and 
any fund-level borrowing, with the most recent price or value applied 
to the position for purposes of managing the investment portfolio'' and 
may be calculated using the adviser's own methodologies and conventions 
of the adviser's service providers, provided that these are consistent 
with information reported internally.\50\ The RFACV is a signed value 
calculated on a net basis and not on a gross basis. While the inclusion 
of income accruals is recommended, the approach to the calculation 
should be consistent over time.\51\ This calculation is similar to the 
typical practices for computing daily profit and loss and generally 
should include all items at their most recent, reasonable estimate, 
which will be marked-to-market for all holdings that can reasonably be 
marked daily. These value estimates are appropriate because they are 
both guided by the reporting fund's valuation policies and procedures 
that are shared with fund investors and counterparties and are 
increasingly performed and provided by third-party administrators who 
specialize in position-level valuation and reporting.\52\
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    \49\ See Comment Letter of Anonymous (Feb. 25, 2022). Other 
commenters also criticized basing this threshold on a dated net 
asset value figure. See SIFMA Comment Letter and MFA Comment Letter.
    \50\ See section IV.C.2 infra (discussing the risks of 
unintended consequences of using RFACV statistics and the factors 
that mitigate those risks including the sharing of valuation 
policies with investors and that fund valuation is often outsourced 
to fund service providers with standardized methodologies).
    \51\ See Form PF Glossary. Those funds that do compute a daily 
net asset value may use it as their reporting fund aggregate 
calculated value. Where one or more portfolio positions are valued 
less frequently than daily, the last price used should be carried 
forward, though a current FX rate may be applied if the position is 
not valued in U.S. dollars. It is not necessary to adjust the RFACV 
for accrued fees or expenses. Position values do not need to be 
subjected to fair valuation procedures. While the RFACV definition 
permits funds to compute it excluding accrued fees and expenses, and 
without updating less frequently valued positions, these are 
optional, and intended to reduce burden for the funds. If the funds 
already calculate net asset value without these modifications on a 
daily basis, they can use it wherever RFACV is used.
    \52\ See infra footnote 423.
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    Using this statistic will be both more timely and less burdensome 
than a requirement to calculate a daily net asset value, which would 
necessarily require the adviser to make daily calculations of all of 
the fund's assets and liabilities, including accrued fees and expenses. 
Referencing a timelier statistic based on a daily estimate of the 
fund's value will provide a more current and accurate picture of large 
fund losses and also acknowledges that many funds do not perform daily 
net asset value calculations, because they may only strike a net asset 
value weekly, at month end, or at investor request, or because certain 
of their portfolio assets are only valued on a periodic basis.\53\ The 
use of RFACV will be less burdensome than a daily net asset value 
figure to operationalize because, in our experience, it will rely on 
systems that many large hedge fund advisers already employ, while not 
requiring the adviser to adjust for accrued fees or expenses, subject 
position values to fair valuation procedures, or include income 
accruals. At the same time, we are allowing advisers to use their own 
internal methodologies or those of their service providers when 
calculating RFACV, provided that these are consistent with information 
reported internally.
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    \53\ Advisers utilizing RFACV should rely upon the information 
available to them at that current point in time when filing this 
item. For example, if reporting on Friday, and the reporting fund 
knows it has a position mark that will not be updated until Sunday, 
the adviser should generally rely on the Friday number for purposes 
of the calculation and the determination of whether to file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under this current reporting event, the revised Item B requires 
reporting if ``on any business day the 10-day holding period return of 
the reporting fund is less than or equal to -20 percent of reporting 
fund aggregate calculated value.'' In a change from the proposal, 
``holding period return'' and ``daily rate of return'' are new terms in 
the Form PF Glossary to help advisers calculate the daily rate-of-
return and link those daily returns together to calculate a cumulative 
rate of return over the 10-day holding period to promote consistent 
responses to the

[[Page 38152]]

current report.\54\ When triggered, an adviser must file the following 
information: (1) the dates of the 10-business-day period over which the 
loss occurred, (2) the holding period return, and (3) the dollar amount 
of the loss over the 10-business-day period.\55\ If the loss continues 
past the initial 10-business-day period, advisers will not report a 
second time until the fund has experienced a second loss of an 
additional 20 percent of the fund's RFACV over a second rolling 10-
business-day period to begin on or after the end date stated in the 
adviser's initial Item B current report. This information will allow 
the Commission and FSOC to understand the scale of the loss and its 
potential effects both to investors in the reporting fund as well as 
the broader financial markets, particularly if current reports are 
filed by multiple advisers.
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    \54\ ``Holding period return'' is defined in the Form PF 
Glossary to mean the cumulative daily rate of return over the 
holding period calculated by geometrically linking the daily rates 
of return. Holding period return (%) = (((1 + R1) x (1 + 
R2) . . . (1 + R10))-1) x 100 where 
R1, R2 . . . R10 are the daily 
rates of return during the holding period expressed as decimals. 
``Daily rate-of-return'' is defined as the percentage change in the 
reporting fund aggregate value from one day to the next and adjusted 
for subscriptions and redemptions, if necessary.
    \55\ ``Dollar amount of loss over the 10-business-day period'' 
is defined in the Form PF Glossary to facilitate reporting of the 
extraordinary loss current report and is equal to the reporting fund 
aggregate value at the end of the 10-business-day loss period less 
the reporting fund aggregate value at the beginning of the 10-
business day loss period less the net of any subscriptions or 
redemptions during the 10-business-day period.
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3. Significant Margin and Default Events
    We are adopting, largely as proposed, current reporting of 
significant margin and default events that occur at qualifying hedge 
funds advised by large hedge fund advisers or at their 
counterparties.\56\ Significant increases in margin, inability to meet 
a margin call, margin default, and default of a counterparty are strong 
indicators of fund and potential market stress. The triggers and 
underlying thresholds are calibrated to identify stress at a fund that 
may signal the potential for precipitous liquidations or broader market 
instability that may affect similarly situated funds, or markets in 
which the fund invests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See Form PF section 5, Item C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Increases in Margin
    We are requiring advisers to report significant increases in the 
reporting fund's requirements for margin, collateral, or an equivalent 
(collectively referred to as ``margin'') based on a 20 percent 
threshold.\57\ In a change from the proposal, and consistent with our 
adopted amendments to the extraordinary loss current report, we are 
referencing a different fund value statistic, average daily RFACV. 
Average daily RFACV is a more current statistic than MRNAV and, 
accordingly, will increase the report's accuracy and limit the 
potential for over- or under-reporting. In particular, in response to 
commenters that stated that the daily computation of net asset value 
may be burdensome, we selected average daily RFACV, because it is 
comparatively less burdensome and does not require all the calculations 
(e.g., adjustments for accrued fees and expenses or fair valuation 
procedures) necessary for striking a daily net asset value.\58\ The 
margin increase current report relies on RFACV outlined above in the 
extraordinary loss section, but is the average of the daily RFACV for 
the end of the business day on business days one through ten of the 
reporting period. As with the use of RFACV in the extraordinary loss 
current report, using the average daily RFACV will provide a more 
current daily number from which to calculate margin increases as 
opposed to using a dated net asset value statistic reported on Form PF 
that may be in excess of 60 days old.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ An equivalent is any other type of payment or value 
understood to serve the same purposes as margin or collateral.
    \58\ See discussion in supra section II.A.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current reporting of margin increases will provide FSOC and the 
Commission with valuable information that may provide early indications 
of stress at a fund before a potential default occurs triggering more 
widespread systemic impacts or harm to investors. Sudden and 
significant margin increases can have critical effects on funds that 
may be operating with large amounts of leverage and could serve as 
precursors to defaults at fund counterparties and eventual liquidation. 
Large, sustained margin increases also may effectively signal that 
counterparties are concerned about a fund's portfolio positions as well 
as the potential for future margin increases from the fund's other 
counterparties. Moreover, a number of margin increase reports from 
multiple funds that invest in certain securities or sectors through 
different counterparties will provide FSOC and the Commission with a 
broader picture of industry-wide risks and potential investor harms, 
respectively.
    Some commenters supported the requirement as proposed.\59\ One 
commenter stated that if the fund triggered a 20 percent margin 
increase it could be indicative of a risk to investors in the fund and 
should be reported.\60\ Others opposed it, stating that the 20 percent 
threshold was too low or arbitrarily drawn without support,\61\ would 
capture routine margin activity occurring in the normal course of 
business,\62\ would likely cause excess reporting that would not be 
indicative of fund stress, and relied on a dated net asset value 
statistic that had the potential to induce either over or 
underreporting.\63\ Other commenters expressed concern that the terms 
``margin,'' ``collateral,'' or ``an equivalent'' were not clearly 
defined.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Comment Letter of International Corporate Governance 
Network (Mar. 21, 2022) (``ICGN Comment Letter''); AFREF Comment 
Letter.
    \60\ ICGN Comment Letter.
    \61\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter.
    \62\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \63\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter.
    \64\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter, SIFMA Comment 
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters that questioned the 20 percent threshold 
and its reliance on a dated MRNAV statistic, the amendments will 
reference a more current value statistic while retaining the 20 percent 
increase. We are triggering reporting on whether the total dollar value 
of margin, collateral, or an equivalent posted by the reporting fund at 
the end of a rolling 10-business-day period less the total dollar value 
of margin, collateral, or an equivalent posted by the reporting fund at 
the beginning of the rolling 10-business-day period is greater than or 
equal to 20 percent of the average daily RFACV during the period.
    We are adopting ``average daily reporting fund aggregate calculated 
value'' as a new defined term in the Form PF Glossary to help advisers 
calculate the amount of the margin increase and promote consistent 
responses to the current report.\65\ This change away from the 
reference net asset value statistic (MRNAV) should lessen under- and 
over-reporting by providing a more current reference statistic, 
decreasing the potential for false positives. In response to comments 
that specifically questioned the 20 percent threshold, we believe a 20 
percent increase based on the new RFACV statistic will improve our 
ability to capture truly large and sudden margin increase events.\66\ 
Specifically, 20 percent is an appropriate threshold for reporting 
increases in margin

[[Page 38153]]

because our experience and data suggests that a margin increase of this 
magnitude as a percentage of a fund's market value could represent a 
significantly higher percentage increase in margin itself.\67\ Given 
that margin increases can happen quickly in volatile markets, reporting 
limited to large margin defaults alone would not allow the Commission 
and the FSOC to identify the extent of increasing liquidity constraints 
among market participants which could impair market function.\68\
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    \65\ The Form PF Glossary definition of ``average daily 
reporting fund aggregate calculated value'' references the 
``reporting fund aggregate calculated value'' that is utilized by 
the Item B extraordinary loss question.
    \66\ See supra section II.A.2. discussion of RFACV.
    \67\ One estimate from the academic literature indicates that an 
increase in margin or collateral of 20% of the average daily RFACV 
over a ten-day period represents a substantially large increase in 
the actual level of margin or collateral, which would have 
potentially serious consequences for a fund depending on its 
circumstances. Based on a sample of large hedge fund advisers' 
qualifying hedge funds from Q4 2012 to Q1 2017, the paper finds that 
the hedge funds in the sample had median collateral as a percentage 
of borrowings of 121%, median borrowings of $.443 billion, and a 
median NAV of $.997 billion. This indicates that a typical hedge 
fund in the sample has collateral as a percentage of NAV of 
approximately 54.1%. For such a hedge fund, an increase in margin/
collateral of 20% of RFACV represents an almost 40% increase in the 
level of margin/collateral posted. See Mathias S. Kruttli, Phillip 
J. Monin & Sumudu W. Watugala, The Life of the Counterparty: Shock 
Propagation in Hedge Fund-Prime Broker Credit Networks, (Dec. 2022). 
See also discussion of the margin increase threshold infra section 
IV.C.1.a.
    \68\ See Review of Margining Practices, Bank for International 
Settlement, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Committee on 
Payments and Market Structure, Board of International Securities 
Commissions (Sept. 2022), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d537.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We continue to believe that the terms ``margin'' and ``collateral'' 
are general terms that will allow advisers to apply the reporting 
trigger to their unique collateral requirements. Commenters requested a 
more detailed definition of both ``margin'' and ``collateral,'' but 
these terms are common terms for margin that we believe properly scope 
the margin activity for which we seek reporting without potentially 
narrowing or limiting reporting to certain types of margin requirements 
specific to certain funds and their counterparty agreements.\69\ In our 
experience, ``margin'' and ``collateral'' generally refer to assets and 
cash that can be claimed by a fund counterparty, lender, or 
clearinghouse if needed to satisfy an obligation. These terms refer 
both to assets that have been physically transferred to an account 
outside the fund as well as those that remain in the fund's accounts, 
but have been identified by custodians, prime brokers, and fund 
administrators as collateral for an obligation. The inclusion of ``or 
an equivalent'' is designed to provide increased flexibility to account 
for funds' unique circumstances. In the event advisers have unique 
circumstances related to their margining practices and reporting of 
margin increases, advisers may use the explanatory notes section to 
explain their margin increase current report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See AIMA Comment Letter and MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The adviser will be required to report (1) the dates of the 10-
business-day period over which the increase occurred; (2) the total 
dollar amount of the increase; (3) the total dollar value amount of 
margin, collateral or an equivalent posted by the reporting fund at 
both the beginning and the end of the 10-business-day period during 
which the increase was measured (an addition from the proposal); \70\ 
(4) the average daily RFACV of the reporting fund during the 10-
business-day period during which the increase was measured (an addition 
from the proposal); and (5) the identity of the counterparty or 
counterparties requiring the increase(s). In a change from the 
proposal, we are requiring the disclosure of the average daily 
reporting fund aggregate calculated value of the reporting fund during 
the 10-business-day period during which the increase was measured to 
provide FSOC and the Commission with a fund value statistic that 
provides additional context for the margin increase. If the increases 
in margin were to continue past the initial 10-business-day period, 
advisers should not file another current report until on or after the 
next 10-business-day period beginning on or after the end date stated 
in the adviser's initial Item C current report. In circumstances where 
multiple counterparties are involved, advisers will list all 
counterparties who increased margin requirements. In addition, the 
adviser must use check boxes to describe the circumstances of the 
margin increase. Commenters stated that the margin increase item would 
capture margin activity that was within business as usual operations. 
As discussed above, this reporting item is triggered on a 20 percent 
increase in margin, which we believe is a significant increase that 
will not capture margin activity that is within business as usual 
operations. In addition, the amended form contains clearly defined 
check boxes for this item that will allow the Commission and FSOC to 
understand the cause of the margin increase reports that may help 
distinguish the levels of risk. These items are largely unchanged from 
the proposal and include: (1) exchange or central clearing counterparty 
\71\ requirements or known regulatory action affecting one or more 
counterparties; (2) one or more counterparties independently increasing 
the reporting fund's margin requirements; (3) the reporting fund 
establishing a new relationship or new business with one or more 
counterparties; (4) new investment positions, investment approach or 
strategy and/or portfolio turnover of the reporting fund; (5) a 
deteriorating position or positions in the reporting fund's portfolio 
or other credit trigger under applicable counterparty agreements; and/
or (6) a reason ``other'' than those outlined that, in a change from 
the proposal, will now require advisers to provide an explanation in 
the explanatory notes section.\72\ This information, along with any 
information advisers include in the explanatory notes section, will 
provide useful context concerning the margin increase and will better 
enable the Commission and FSOC to both screen false positives for 
margin increases (i.e., incidents that trigger the proposed current 
reporting requirement but do not actually raise significant risks) and 
assess significant margin events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ In a change from the proposal, we are requiring the total 
dollar value amount of margin, collateral or an equivalent posted by 
the reporting fund at the end of the 10-business-day period during 
which the increase was measured rather than a cumulative figure. We 
believe having the dollar value figure measured both at the 
beginning and at the end of the 10-business day period will provide 
more detailed and useful information to the Commission and FSOC.
    \71\ In a change from the proposal, we are including ``central 
clearing counterparty'' or ``CCP'' requirements in this check box to 
reflect better the types requirements that can be imposed by central 
counterparties or clearing houses and impact margin.
    \72\ In a change from the proposal we are requiring advisers 
that check ``other'' to provide an explanation of their use of other 
in the explanatory notes section to provide additional context to 
their current report.
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b. Fund Margin Default or Inability To Meet Margin Call
    We are also requiring, as proposed, advisers to report a fund's 
margin default or inability to meet a call for margin, collateral, or 
an equivalent (taking into account any contractually agreed cure 
period).\73\ Quickly identifying such events is important because funds 
that are in margin default or that are unable to meet a call for margin 
are at risk of triggering the liquidation of their positions at their 
counterparties, and this presents serious risks to the fund's 
investors, its

[[Page 38154]]

counterparties, and potentially the broader financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See Form PF section 5, Item D. In situations where there is 
a contractually agreed upon cure period, an adviser will not be 
required to file an Item D current report until the expiration of 
the cure period, unless the fund does not expect to be able to meet 
the margin call during such cure period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter supported reporting related to margin defaults or 
inability to meet a call for margin if it was limited to circumstances 
where there was a written notice of default because counterparty 
agreements typically require written notice of default, and written 
notice provides a bright line test for determining whether a default 
occurred.\74\ The same commenter also stated that only large defaults 
in excess of 5 percent of a fund's last reported net asset value 
adjusted for subscriptions and redemptions should be reported to avoid 
the possibility of immaterial defaults.\75\ Other commenters asserted 
that if the Commission did adopt any of the current reporting items, it 
should focus on margin defaults and the inability to satisfy 
redemptions, as both were events that signaled potential stress to the 
financial sector by contributing to fire sales and counterparty 
exposure risk.\76\ Another commenter stated that other market 
participants like major broker-dealers, banks, or other counterparties 
could more readily provide this information to the Commission.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See MFA Comment Letter.
    \75\ Id.
    \76\ See, e.g., AIMA Comment Letter.
    \77\ NYC Bar Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are largely adopting this item, as proposed, because margin 
defaults or a determination of an inability to meet margin calls are 
risk events that may portend liquidation events that could trigger 
systemic risk or harm investors. While commenters indicated that we 
should limit this reporting to large margin defaults or collect this 
information from other market participants or registrants, we do not 
believe doing so would capture key indicators of fund risk. Default 
events in certain trades, strategies, or positions will provide insight 
into whether funds or counterparties facing similar positions may be at 
risk. Reporting limited to large margin defaults, conversely, may not 
provide the FSOC with sufficiently early or fulsome information to 
identify and help prevent potential contagion. Furthermore, we believe 
it is important to receive this confidential reporting directly from 
the advisers to these large qualifying hedge funds on Form PF, because 
a fund's broker-dealer or bank counterparties may only have limited 
visibility into a fund's stress rather than a comprehensive picture of 
a fund's overall counterparty risks. In addition, we believe that 
limiting reporting to only written notifications of a default may 
incentivize funds or their counterparties to avoid written notice of 
default, particularly when it may be less clear a party is in default. 
The amendments, like the proposal, will continue to require advisers to 
file a current report in situations where there is a dispute with 
regard to the margin call to avoid delays in reporting. Advisers will 
not be required to file a current report in situations where there is a 
dispute in the amount and appropriateness of a margin call, provided 
the reporting fund has sufficient assets to meet the greatest of the 
disputed amount. According this flexibility allows funds and advisers 
that are capable of meeting a margin call time to respond to and 
resolve a margin dispute with their counterparties.
    Under the amendments, an adviser will report for each separate 
counterparty for which the event occurred: (1) the date the adviser 
determines or is notified that a reporting fund is in margin default or 
will be unable to meet a margin call with respect to a counterparty; 
(2) the dollar amount of the call for margin, collateral, or 
equivalent; and (3) the legal name and LEI (if any) of the 
counterparty. In addition, the adviser will check any applicable check 
boxes that would describe the adviser's current understanding of the 
circumstances of the adviser's default or its determination that the 
fund will be unable to meet a call for increased margin.\78\ These 
include: (1) an increase in margin requirements by the counterparty; 
(2) losses in the value of the reporting fund's portfolio or other 
credit trigger under the applicable counterparty agreement; (3) a 
default or settlement failure of a counterparty; or (4) a reason 
``other'' than those outlined for which the adviser will be required to 
provide further information in the explanatory notes item.\79\ These 
check boxes will enable the Commission and FSOC to identify and 
evaluate the circumstances underlying the inability to meet a call for 
margin. If the fund is unable to meet margin or defaulted with multiple 
counterparties on the same day, the adviser will file one current 
report broken out with details for each counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Form PF section 5, Item D, Question 15.
    \79\ In a change from the proposal we are requiring advisers 
that check ``other'' to provide an explanation of their use of 
``other'' in the explanatory notes section to provide additional 
context to their current report.
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c. Counterparty Default
    The amendments, like the proposal, will require advisers to report 
a margin, collateral or equivalent default or failure to make any other 
payment in the time and form contractually required by a 
counterparty.\80\ Counterparty defaults can have serious implications 
for transacting funds, the funds' investors, and the broader market. A 
current report of a counterparty default will help the Commission and 
FSOC identify funds or market participants that may be affected by a 
counterparty's default and analyze whether there are broader 
implications for systemic risk or investor protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ See Form PF section 5, Item E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter supported the reporting of counterparty defaults,\81\ 
while others believed this item should only capture larger counterparty 
defaults that accounted for a greater portion of the fund's net asset 
value than the proposed 5 percent threshold.\82\ Some commenters stated 
that there should not be a percentage threshold associated with the 
counterparty defaults and that, if a percentage was relied upon, the 
Commission's five percent threshold was too low.\83\ Another commenter 
argued that counterparty default reporting should not be required for 
all types of market participants, but should be limited to regulated 
broker-dealers and banks, while noting that the net asset value 
calculation for counterparty defaults should be amended to a timelier 
figure that accounts for interim subscriptions and redemptions.\84\ 
Other commenters stated that the triggers for a counterparty default 
notification differ from the default provisions utilized in industry 
standard documents and that the definitions and default provisions in 
the standard documents be expressly incorporated into Form PF 
triggers.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ AFREF Comment Letter.
    \82\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter; AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; 
IAA Comment Letter; and NYC Bar Comment Letter.
    \83\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter and NYC Bar Comment 
Letter.
    \84\ MFA Comment Letter.
    \85\ NYC Bar Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are adopting the counterparty default event with minor 
amendments as counterparty defaults to hedge funds of the size of 
qualifying hedge funds would be central to any analysis of systemic 
risk or potential risk of investor harm. A single hedge fund 
counterparty, such as a large broker dealer, may have dozens of fund 
counterparties that may be subject to a pending default. Though some 
commenters stated that certain definitions and default provisions in 
industry standard documents should be expressly incorporated into the 
counterparty default current report trigger, based on our review of 
certain industry contracts we believe the

[[Page 38155]]

adopted reporting item will broadly capture default reporting triggers 
in many contracts. We also believe, given the variability we observed 
in industry contract default triggers, that it would be impractical to 
design a default trigger in the form that matches industry documents.
    A current report for this item will be triggered if a counterparty 
to the reporting fund (1) does not meet a call for margin or has failed 
to make any other payment, in the time and form contractually required 
(taking into account any contractually agreed cure period); and (2) the 
amount involved is greater than five percent of RFACV. While we are not 
adopting a minimum threshold for reporting on a qualifying hedge fund's 
margin default given the potential implications of such a default, we 
are adopting a threshold for counterparty defaults that could affect a 
sizeable percentage of the fund's value. However, in response to 
comments that the MRNAV was not reflective of the current value of the 
fund, we are amending this item to reference the more current RFACV 
statistic that is employed in the extraordinary loss and margin event 
items.
    While some commenters believed the five percent default trigger to 
be too low, we believe that the five percent of the timelier RFACV 
statistic is an appropriate threshold to trigger reporting because 
counterparty defaults of this size could have systemic waterfall 
effects, triggering forced-selling by the fund and identifying 
potential risks for other hedge funds that may transact with the same 
counterparty.\86\ Moreover, the five percent threshold is a figure we 
have used in Form PF to measure and collect information regarding 
sizable exposures to creditors or counterparties.\87\ We understand it 
also represents an often-used industry practice for measuring 
significant exposure at both the position level and the counterparty-
exposure level. A default at this level could be a sign of issues at 
both the fund and counterparty making it well suited for systemic risk 
monitoring. Even if a five percent default is insignificant at a fund 
level, a high number of such reports across a number of hedge funds can 
be significant systemically, especially if it involves similar 
counterparties. Setting the threshold for counterparty defaults at five 
percent of the RFACV would limit the reports for de minimis or 
superficial defaults that may be the result of a short-lived 
operational error. We are not limiting reporting to defaults that occur 
only at regulated broker-dealer and bank counterparties because there 
are circumstances where large defaults with non-regulated market 
participants, such as foreign entities or private special purpose 
entities, may have direct impacts on the reporting fund and broader 
implications for systemic risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Update on Review 
of Asset Management Products and Activities (Apr. 2016), at 15-18, 
available at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf (noting that large highly interconnected 
counterparties play a role in whether hedge fund activities have 
financial stability implications).
    \87\ See current question 47 of Form PF: Identify each creditor, 
if any, to which the reporting fund owed an amount in respect of 
borrowings equal to or greater than 5% of the reporting fund's net 
asset value as of the data reporting date. For each such creditor, 
provide the amount owed to that creditor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments will require an adviser to report: (1) the date of 
the default; (2) the dollar amount of the default; and (3) the legal 
name and LEI (if any) of the counterparty. In the event that multiple 
counterparties to the fund default on the same day, the reporting item 
will allow an adviser to file a single current report broken out with 
details for each counterparty default. In the event that counterparties 
to the fund default on different days, the adviser would file a 
separate current report for each counterparty default that occurred. We 
did not provide check boxes for this item, because advisers to the 
funds are unlikely to have complete information regarding their 
counterparty's default and the responses would likely be speculative.
4. Prime Broker Relationship Terminated or Materially Restricted
    The prime broker current report we proposed would have required an 
adviser to report a material change in the relationship between the 
reporting fund and a prime broker.\88\ In response to comments, we are 
adopting a modified reporting item to require an adviser to report only 
the termination or material restriction of the reporting fund's 
relationship with a prime broker.\89\ We have narrowed the focus of 
this current report trigger to exclude relationship changes that could 
be initiated by the fund for business reasons that may not be 
indicative of fund or market stress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, supra footnote 6, at 
section II.A.1.c.
    \89\ See Form PF section 5, Item F.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters supported a current report for material changes in 
the prime broker relationship.\90\ Others opposed it, stating that 
prime brokers and funds would have difficulty discerning what 
constituted a ``material'' change in the relationship,\91\ that both 
parties may terminate relationships for ordinary business reasons that 
are not indicative of fund or counterparty stress,\92\ and that the 
Commission only should require reporting when the prime broker or the 
fund terminates the relationship for default or breach of the 
agreement, which would serve as a bright line.\93\ Other commenters 
argued that the prime broker current reporting event was unnecessary or 
duplicative of the margin default current report \94\ and, therefore, 
should be removed.\95\ Another commenter stated that starting or 
terminating a relationship with a prime broker occurs on a frequent 
basis and is not an indication of potential stress at the fund but, in 
most instances, is based on business imperatives.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ ICGN Comment Letter; AFREF Comment Letter.
    \91\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter; NYC 
Bar Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; and USCC Comment Letter.
    \92\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC; MFA Comment Letter; NYC Bar Comment 
Letter; IAA Comment Letter; and SIFMA Comment Letter.
    \93\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \94\ See supra section II.A.3.
    \95\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter and IAA Comment Letter.
    \96\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering comments that expressed concern with the broad 
scope of reporting any ``material change'' in the relationship with a 
prime broker, we generally are narrowing the prime broker reporting 
items from what was proposed by requiring reporting under two separate 
instructions. The first instruction requires reporting when the prime 
broker terminates the agreement or ``materially restricts its 
relationship with the fund, in whole or in part, in markets where that 
prime broker continues to be active.'' For example, if a prime broker 
will no longer conduct certain trades on behalf of a U.S. fund in a 
particular market, like a major foreign equities market, this, in our 
view, would constitute a ``material restriction.'' On the other hand, 
if the same prime broker ceases activities in a market for all 
customers, this should not trigger a current report for an individual 
fund affected by this action. To address commenters who expressed 
concern that discerning a ``material change'' was difficult, we believe 
a material restriction generally would include a prime broker imposing 
substantial changes to credit limits or significant price increases, or 
stating that it ceases to support the fund in an important market or 
asset type, even if it does not terminate the relationship. We are not 
limiting this reporting trigger to

[[Page 38156]]

terminations, because there are certain circumstances indicating 
potential stress or investor protection concerns in which a prime 
broker may not explicitly terminate the relationship, but rather that 
significantly limits the fund's ability to operate.
    The prime broker current report includes a new second instruction 
that captures instances where there is a fund termination event as well 
as a cessation of the relationship whether initiated by the prime 
broker or the fund. The change narrows the circumstances that can give 
rise to a report as the instruction states that termination events, as 
specified in the prime broker agreement or related agreements that are 
isolated to the financial state, activities, or other conditions solely 
of the prime broker should not be considered for purposes of the 
current report. Thus, a termination would need to be fund-specific and 
would not be reportable if the adviser understands that the termination 
was a part of a widespread change applicable to other of the prime 
broker's clients and isolated to the financial state, activities, or 
other characteristics solely of the prime broker. By narrowing the 
prime broker reporting items from the proposal, advisers would not be 
required to report when funds terminate or materially restrict prime 
broker relationships for ordinary course business reasons and would 
limit reporting to prime broker terminations or material restrictions 
that we believe are most clearly linked to potential fund stress and 
resulting systemic risk.
    We also believe it is appropriate to leverage prime broker 
agreements to capture termination events that indicate stress at a 
fund. These agreements typically contain provisions, the violation of 
which may indicate stress at a fund, but may not as a matter of 
industry practice be immediately enforced resulting in the termination 
of the agreement or relationship between the prime broker and the 
reporting fund.\97\ In our experience we believe it is important to 
capture circumstances in which a fund has, for example, repeatedly 
breached margin thresholds and is technically in default, but the prime 
broker has not terminated the relationship, and at a later date asks 
the fund to find prime brokerage services elsewhere. Accordingly, the 
item will also require an adviser to report a termination of the 
relationship between the prime broker and the reporting fund if the 
relationship between the prime broker and the reporting fund was 
terminated in the last 72 hours or less in accordance with the section 
5 current reporting period, and a ``termination event'' was activated 
in the prime brokerage agreement, or related agreements, within the 
last 12 months.\98\ By leveraging the prime broker agreement, or other 
related agreements with termination events in the trigger for 
reporting, we will capture non-routine terminations that may be 
indicative of stress at a fund including, for example certain ``key 
man'' provisions, like the departure of a manager. While funds and 
their prime brokers might terminate their relationship over ordinary 
business terms, this current report will capture terminations or 
material restrictions that might indicate more serious issues for a 
fund. Lastly, this current reporting event is tied to termination 
events that may have been triggered in the past 12 months in 
recognition that a termination may take time to become finalized after 
a termination event was activated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Similarly, we requested comment on prime broker agreements, 
specifically whether the agreements include termination events 
related to net asset value triggers. We did not receive specific 
comments on whether prime broker agreements specifically include 
termination events related to net asset value triggers. We do not 
believe it is necessary to include specific references to 
terminations related to net asset value triggers in the prime broker 
current report because, in our experience, net asset value triggers 
are included in some agreements already, but may not be used in many 
agreements depending upon the types of fund and strategies involved.
    \98\ Under this reporting item the 72-hour time period within 
which an adviser must report would begin to run upon the occurrence 
of the termination or a material restriction or when the 
adviserreasonably believed such an event occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This current report will allow the Commission and FSOC, for 
example, to assess whether a particular termination would have a 
greater or lesser impact on the broader market or on investors and 
better understand what potentially caused the termination. Though some 
commenters stated the prime broker current report was duplicative of 
the margin default current report, we continue to believe that a prime 
broker-specific question is necessary in addition to the margin default 
current report because prime broker terminations may signal stress that 
did not lead to a margin default or may indicate other potential 
investor protection issues.
    Terminations or material restriction of a reporting fund's prime 
brokerage relationships of this type may signal that the fund or the 
brokers with whom the fund transacts are experiencing stress and may be 
subject to an increased risk of default or, in the case of the 
reporting fund, potential liquidation. In addition, a prime broker that 
is no longer willing to provide services to a fund client could be 
apprehensive of a fund's investment positions or trading practices and 
may consider the fund to be an unacceptable risk as a counterparty. 
Therefore, material restrictions upon such relationships may indicate 
potential stress at the fund that may have implications for investor 
harm and broader systemic risk concerns. In a modification from the 
proposal, the prime broker reporting item will require an adviser to 
provide the date of the termination or material restriction, the date 
of the termination event(s) if different, and the legal name and LEI 
(if any) of the prime broker involved. We are not adopting the check 
boxes that we proposed, because they are no longer needed in light of 
the narrower focus of the report on terminations or material 
restrictions. However, the explanatory notes item is available if 
advisers would like to provide more details. Lastly, the item will 
include a new note stating that if a prime broker changes the terms of 
its relationship with the reporting fund in a way that significantly 
limits the fund's ability to operate under the terms of the original 
agreement, or significantly impairs the fund's ability to trade, the 
adviser should consider it a ``material restriction'' that would 
require filing of the prime broker current report.\99\ We believe this 
note is necessary to ensure that certain circumstances that amount to 
an effective ``firing'' of the fund are captured by the current report. 
Moreover, in response to commenters that had generally asserted that a 
``material change'' to the prime broker agreement would be difficult to 
determine when considering filing this item, we are providing this note 
to provide specificity as to when there is a ``material restriction.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See Form PF section 5, Item F.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Changes in Unencumbered Cash
    In a departure from the proposal, we are not adopting a requirement 
that an adviser report a significant decline in holdings of 
unencumbered cash. In the proposal, a current report for changes in 
unencumbered cash would have been triggered if the value of the 
reporting fund's unencumbered cash declined by more than 20 percent of 
the reporting fund's most recent net asset value over a rolling 10-
business-day period.
    Some commenters supported the inclusion of this item, stating that 
unencumbered cash was an important metric for understanding hedge fund 
stability.\100\ Other commenters

[[Page 38157]]

challenged it, primarily on the grounds that it would capture new 
investments or routine cash movements in certain strategies resulting 
in some funds filing numerous reports over the course of a year.\101\ 
Another commenter also stated that the definition of ``unencumbered 
cash'' in Form PF is inconsistent with how most advisers would 
calculate unencumbered cash internally.\102\ Another commenter stated 
that the 2022 Form PF Joint Proposing Release's change of the 
definition of ``cash equivalents'' that excluded U.S. Treasury 
securities would create confusion for advisers seeking to comply with 
an unencumbered cash current report.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ AFREF Comment Letter and ICGN Comment Letter.
    \101\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter; 
IAA Comment Letter; Schulte Comment Letter; TIAA Comment Letter; and 
MFA Comment Letter.
    \102\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \103\ See MFA Comment Letter (Mar. 16, 2023) (stating that the 
proposed definition of ``cash equivalents'' was inconsistent with 
how financial markets generally and advisers treat short-term 
Treasury securities for risk management and cash management 
purposes).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are not adopting this item after considering comments received, 
including those commenters that stated the unencumbered cash current 
report may result in a large number of false positives related to 
certain transactions that occur in the normal course of some 
strategies. For example, commenters stated that changes in unencumbered 
cash to purchase highly liquid sovereign bonds or to transfer cash 
between U.S. Treasuries and sovereign debt would result in a fund 
submitting 30-70 reports a year to the Commission.\104\ Though we still 
believe that unencumbered cash levels could serve as a marker for fund 
health in periods of market volatility or stress, receiving such a 
potentially large number of reports annually that may not be indicative 
of fund stress does not align with our policy goals for current 
reporting. For example, it may be difficult to distinguish quickly for 
reporting purposes between increases of unencumbered cash that could be 
attributable to ordinary course trading activity versus substantial 
increases or decreases that are a direct result of fund losses or cash 
transactions that the fund undertook in response to increased market 
volatility. An additional difficulty is that different types of 
strategies utilize very different unencumbered cash levels making it 
difficult to find a single unencumbered cash indicator that is 
meaningful, without many false positives and negatives. Lastly, other 
current reporting items, especially the extraordinary loss, margin, and 
prime broker questions, will provide real time insight into fund stress 
and hedge fund stability, at which this proposed question was aimed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Operations Events
    The proposed operations event current report would have required an 
adviser to report when the adviser or reporting fund experiences a 
``significant disruption or degradation'' of the reporting fund's ``key 
operations,'' whether as a result of an event at the reporting fund, 
the adviser, or other service provider to the reporting fund.\105\ 
Under the proposal, key operations would have meant operations 
necessary for (1) the investment, trading, valuation, reporting, and 
risk management of the reporting fund; as well as (2) the operation of 
the reporting fund in accordance with the Federal securities laws and 
regulations. The proposal also would have defined ``significant 
disruption or degradation'' to mean a 20 percent disruption or 
degradation of normal volume or capacity. We are adopting, with certain 
changes from the proposal, the requirement for an adviser to report 
when the adviser or reporting fund experiences a ``significant 
disruption or degradation'' of the reporting fund's ``critical 
operations,'' whether as a result of an event at the reporting fund, 
the adviser, or other service provider to the reporting fund.\106\ As 
discussed below, in light of comments received, we are not adopting the 
proposed 20 percent threshold for the ``significant disruption or 
degradation'' definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, supra footnote 6, at 
section II.A.1.e.
    \106\ See Form PF section 5, Item G. The Operations Events 
report was initially proposed as Item H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We continue to believe that an operations event involving a 
qualifying hedge fund could have systemic risk implications if the fund 
is not able to trade as a result of such an event. In addition, notice 
of operations events from multiple advisers could provide an early 
indicator of market-wide operations events to both the Commission and 
FSOC. Such events could include a service provider outage that may 
affect the ability of multiple funds to trade, leading to negative 
implications for those funds' investors and broader systemic risks.
    Some commenters generally supported the Commission's receiving 
current reports about operations events that affected private fund 
advisers, their funds, and their service providers.\107\ For example, 
one commenter stated that operations events should be the subject of 
reporting because they can have systemic risk implications while also 
supporting the Commission's policy goal of investor protection.\108\ 
Others took issue with the proposal defining a ``significant disruption 
or degradation'' as a ``20% disruption or degradation of normal volume 
or capacity,'' generally arguing that quantifying the scale of a 
disruption would be both difficult and operationally burdensome.\109\ 
Some commenters indicated that the operations event item would be too 
difficult to respond to in one day under what may be potentially 
difficult operational circumstances in which the origin of the problem 
may still be undiscovered.\110\ One commenter objected to the inclusion 
of service providers in the item, stating that naming a service 
provider in a filing to the Commission could violate confidentiality 
agreements or open the adviser or fund to legal liability from their 
service providers.\111\ Other commenters stated that we should only 
require reporting in the event that an adviser initiated a disaster 
recovery or business continuity plan.\112\ Some commenters questioned 
whether Form PF was the appropriate place for operations event 
reporting, stating that the Form PF operations event item may 
potentially conflict with, or be duplicative of, the Commission's 
proposal relating to cybersecurity risk management.\113\ One such 
commenter asserted that the operations item's timing for reporting 
conflicted with the Commission's recent cybersecurity proposal and also 
did not properly reflect the dichotomy between adviser and fund-level 
events, stating that events involving severe weather or cybersecurity 
issues appear to be adviser-level events as opposed to the other 
proposed key events, which are all fund-level specific.\114\ Another

[[Page 38158]]

commenter indicated that there were broad trends from other legislative 
and regulatory initiatives that the Commission should draw from in its 
approach to operations event reporting to help ensure Commission 
reporting works consistently with these other requirements.\115\ The 
same commenter requested that, if the Commission adopted the operations 
report, it provide an additional mechanism to provide updates on the 
status of the significant disruption or degradation so as to provide 
ongoing details and eventual notice to the Commission and FSOC of the 
event's resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ AFREF Comment Letter and ICGN Comment Letter.
    \108\ See CRINDATA Comment Letter.
    \109\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; CRINDATA Comment 
Letter; ICGN Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; 
Schulte Comment Letter; and SIFMA Comment Letter.
    \110\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; NYC Bar Comment 
Letter; and IAA Comment Letter.
    \111\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \112\ See, e.g., Schulte Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; and 
MFA Comment Letter.
    \113\ See generally AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; USCC Comment 
Letter; Comment Letter of CRINDATA, LLC (Mar. 21, 2022) (``CRINDATA 
Comment Letter''). See Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment 
Advisers, Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development 
Companies, Advisers Act Release No. 5956 (Feb. 9, 2022) [87 FR 13524 
(Mar. 9, 2022)].
    \114\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter, at 25 (stating that in another 
Commission proposal, Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, 
Governance, and Incident Disclosure, certain advisers are required 
to disclose information, on amended Form 8-K, about a cybersecurity 
incident within four business days after it has determined that it 
has experienced a material cybersecurity incident).
    \115\ See CRINDATA Comment Letter. The letter discussed the 
recent enactment of the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical 
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (``CIRCIA''). See Cyber Incident 
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, H.R. 2471, 116th 
Cong. (2022). The letter also discussed the 2021 Department of the 
Treasury and banking regulators rule. See Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Computer-Security 
Incident Notification Requirements for Banking Organizations and 
Their Bank Service Providers (Nov. 18, 2021) [86 FR 66424 (Nov. 23, 
2021)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments, we are adopting much of the operations 
event current report as proposed, but are making two modifications: (1) 
re-titling ``key operations'' to be ``critical operations''; and (2) 
not adopting the definition of a ``significant disruption or 
degradation'' which contained the 20 percent threshold. In response to 
commenter concerns that the operations item may be conflating adviser 
and fund-level events, we believe that the check boxes and associated 
reporting fund census data collected from Item A of the current report 
will allow us to properly determine whether this is an adviser-wide 
issue or fund-specific. We believe it is important to include adviser 
events in the operations report, because it will allow the Commission 
and FSOC to determine quickly whether all, or just some, of an 
adviser's funds or other systems are significantly disrupted or 
degraded. Moreover, we believe that by including the adviser and the 
reporting fund in the current report, the report will be more tailored 
and capture situations in which only certain of an adviser's reporting 
funds will have suffered a significant disruption or degradation. For 
example, this could include a situation in which only one of an 
adviser's funds are impacted by an outage at a pricing provider that 
values certain asset types specific to that fund's portfolio. In 
addition, we acknowledge that there are other government cybersecurity 
initiatives and our own proposed cybersecurity rulemaking as raised by 
commenters.\116\ However, this reporting requirement relates to 
operations events that go beyond cybersecurity, and receiving such 
private fund specific operations event reporting with this 
particularity will inform the FSOC's and Commission's assessment of 
systemic risk and investor protection efforts.
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    \116\ See supra footnote 113.
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    In response to commenters' concerns that operations events may be 
difficult both to discern and accurately report within one business 
day, we are, as discussed above, extending the reporting period from 
one business day to as soon as reasonably practicable, but no later 
than 72 hours upon the occurrence of the event. In such circumstances, 
with this additional time, an adviser likely will be able to ascertain 
more information about the operations event and its impact(s) on the 
reporting fund. As a result, and to alleviate commenter concerns, the 
report will serve as an expedient means of notifying the Commission and 
FSOC with salient information about potential stress events rather than 
an alert that would need to be updated.
    While some commenters stated that naming a service provider in 
operations reporting could open a fund or adviser to liability, we 
believe that identifying which service provider is contributing to the 
impairment of a reporting fund's operations may have implications for 
other advisers and funds that utilize the same service provider, the 
identification of which is critical for FSOC's ability to monitor 
systemic risk.\117\ Moreover, Form PF is a non-public confidential 
reporting form, and any current reports identifying service providers 
involved in an operations event would be reported on a confidential 
basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are not triggering an operations current report only upon the 
initiation of a business continuity or disaster recovery plan as there 
are certain internal operations scenarios that may be indicative of 
fund stress, but may not necessarily cause an adviser to initiate firm-
wide disaster or business continuity plans.\118\ For example, there are 
situations that do not involve natural disasters or force majeure 
events, but involve more isolated adviser or fund specific events that 
would not trigger a business continuity plan like when certain key 
persons that are integral to certain of a fund's operations or certain 
trading systems or software are unavailable and the adviser or fund is 
unable to perform its critical operations without them. The current 
report will include, as proposed, the check the box reporting to 
indicate whether the adviser has initiated a disaster recovery or 
business continuity plan relating to the operations event as this will 
provide greater context to the nature of the operations event and its 
impact on the adviser and fund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ One commenter stated that a business continuity plan would 
not appear to be a good proxy for receiving information sought by 
the operations event report. See CRINDATA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rather than ``key operations,'' in a change from the proposal, we 
will use a different term, ``critical operations,'' but maintain 
substantially the same underlying definition that we had proposed. 
``Critical operations'' better reflects the nature and types of events 
for which we seek reporting. For this purpose, critical operations are 
operations necessary for (1) the investment, trading, valuation, 
reporting, and risk management of the reporting fund; or (2) the 
operation of the reporting fund in accordance with the Federal 
securities laws and regulations.\119\ In response to commenters' 
concerns about the practicality of the 20 percent threshold, we are not 
adopting the definition of a ``significant disruption or degradation'' 
which contained the threshold. After considering comments, we 
understand there may be circumstances where it would be difficult to 
quantitatively measure disruptions in critical operations. While we are 
not adopting the numeric threshold, we continue to believe that, in 
circumstances where operations are reasonably measurable, a 20 percent 
disruption or degradation of normal volume or capacity generally might 
be indicative of the types of stress for which reporting may be 
necessary.

[[Page 38159]]

We understand that many large hedge fund advisers maintain 
sophisticated back office operations, or already engage service 
providers that reasonably would be able to measure whether an event has 
impaired their critical operations beyond a 20 percent threshold. For 
example, in most cases, operations event reporting would likely be 
required if a software malfunction at the adviser disrupted the trading 
volume of a reporting fund by 20 percent or more of its normal 
capacity. This item will require reporting in cases where an adviser's 
ability to value the fund's assets is significantly disrupted or 
degraded, for example, in connection with operational issues at a 
service provider. As another example, events such as a severe weather 
event causing wide-spread power outages that significantly disrupt or 
degrade critical operations also would require reporting.
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    \119\ While the proposed definition of ``key operations'' 
included operations that are ``necessary for (1) the investment, 
trading, valuation, reporting, and risk management of the reporting 
fund; and (2) the operation of the reporting fund in accordance with 
the Federal securities laws and regulations'' (emphasis added), the 
Commission intended for each provision of the definition to be 
considered a key operation. See 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, 
supra footnote 6, at n.39 and accompanying text (``Key operations 
means, for this purpose, operations necessary for (1) the 
investment, trading, valuation, reporting, and risk management of 
the reporting fund; as well as (2) the operation of the reporting 
fund in accordance with the Federal securities laws and 
regulations'' (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we are clarifying the 
definition of ``critical operations'' by defining the term as 
operations ``necessary for (1) the investment, trading, valuation, 
reporting, and risk management of the reporting fund; or (2) the 
operation of the reporting fund in accordance with the Federal 
securities laws and regulations'' (emphasis added). See Form PF 
Glossary.
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    As proposed, the operations event current report will require the 
date of the operations event (or an estimate of when it occurred), and 
the date the operations event was discovered. Also largely as proposed, 
the operations event current report will require the adviser to provide 
additional information concerning its current understanding of the 
circumstances relating to the operations event and its impact on the 
normal operations of the reporting fund using check boxes.\120\ These 
include whether: (1) the event occurred at a service provider; \121\ 
(2) the event occurred at a reporting fund or reporting fund adviser or 
a related person; (3) the event is related to a natural disaster or 
other force majeure event; or (4) an unlisted ``other'' event occurred 
for which the adviser will be required to provide further information 
in the explanatory notes item.\122\ In addition, this current report 
would require an adviser to indicate whether it has initiated a 
business continuity plan relating to the operations of the adviser or 
reporting fund as we believe this may provide additional appropriate 
context to the operations event.
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    \120\ Form PF section 5, Item H, Questions 26 through 28.
    \121\ If the event occurred at a service provider, an adviser 
also must report the legal name of the service provider; the service 
provider's LEI, if any; and the types of services provided by the 
service provider.
    \122\ As noted above, in a change from the proposal we are 
requiring advisers that check ``other'' to provide an explanation of 
their use of other in the explanatory notes section to provide 
additional context to their current report.
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    As proposed, the operations event current report also will require 
the adviser to check a box to describe its current understanding of the 
impact of the operations event on the normal operations of the 
reporting fund, including whether the event resulted in the disruption 
or degradation of: (1) trading of portfolio assets; (2) the valuation 
of portfolio assets; (3) the management of the reporting fund's 
investment risk; (4) the ability to comply with applicable laws, rules, 
and regulations; or (5) any ``other'' type of operational impact than 
those outlined, which an adviser is required to explain further in the 
separate explanatory notes item. We continue to believe that these 
explanatory check boxes, along with the separate explanatory notes item 
should advisers need to provide more detailed reporting, will provide 
appropriate context to current reports filed for operations events and 
allow the Commission and FSOC to evaluate quickly the potential level 
of risk to funds, advisers, and their service providers.
7. Large Withdrawal and Redemption Requests, Inability To Satisfy 
Redemptions, or Suspensions of Redemptions
    We are adopting, largely as proposed, reporting for large 
withdrawal and redemption requests, inability to satisfy redemptions or 
withdrawals, and suspensions of redemptions or withdrawals.\123\ These 
current reports will provide more detailed and timely information to 
the Commission and FSOC indicating the potential for investor harm, 
forced selling in liquidations, or broader systemic risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See Form PF, section 5 Items H and I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Withdrawal and Redemption Requests
    We are adopting the large withdrawals and redemptions current 
report, largely as proposed. The current report will require an adviser 
to report if the fund receives cumulative requests for withdrawals or 
redemption exceeding 50 percent of the most recent net asset value 
(after netting against subscriptions or other contributions from 
investors received and contractually committed).\124\ We believe that 
the obligation to redeem sizable withdrawal or redemption requests of 
50 percent or more of a reporting fund's most recent net asset value, 
despite pre-existing gates or limitations, may present significant 
risks to the fund and increases the risk that it may be forced to 
liquidate assets (potentially at lower prices), disproportionately 
penalizing non-redeeming investors, and potentially impacting markets 
more broadly.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ As with the proposed use of ``most recent net asset 
value'' in other circumstances described above, this measure could 
result in over-reporting or under-reporting, but we believe that a 
simple to determine measure would ease the monitoring and reporting 
burden for advisers. In addition, the option for an adviser to add 
explanatory notes to its current report to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the redemptions mitigates these concerns.
    \125\ See George O. Aragon, Tolga Ergun, Mila Getmansky & Giulio 
Girardi, Hedge Funds: Portfolio, Investor, and Financing Liquidity, 
DERA White Paper (May 17, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/dera_hf-liquidity.pdf (discussing hedge fund liquidity and the 
impact of redemptions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters supported reporting for large withdrawal or 
redemption requests of 50 percent or more,\126\ while another commenter 
felt it was an arbitrary and unsupported.\127\ Others stated that 
withdrawals or redemptions of this magnitude may occur in the ordinary 
course, and the 50 percent threshold might therefore produce ``false 
positives'' in certain cases, such as single investor funds with large 
institutional investors, changes in client preference or commercial 
considerations, or scheduled structured withdrawals or 
redemptions.\128\ One commenter believed that the current reporting 
event should have a minimum $1 billion threshold, asserting that $250 
million in redemptions for a minimally sized $500 million qualifying 
hedge fund is a relatively low number of systemic risk monitoring.\129\ 
This commenter also suggested this reporting trigger not disregard any 
pre-existing gates or limitations as these often serve to prevent 
sudden large redemptions and such reports will significantly distort 
the risk posed by notified redemptions. The same commenter also 
asserted that the redemptions current report did not address the 
mismatch in timing between redemption requests, which are normally 
given anywhere from 30 to 90 days before the applicable redemption 
date, and subscriptions, which are usually contracted for in the two to 
five day period prior to the subscription date meaning that advisers 
would not be able to net subscriptions against redemption requests 
before having to report.\130\
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    \126\ AFREF Comment Letter (stating that by some estimates 
redemption requests leading up to the financial crisis indicated 
that a quarter of the hedge fund industry sold 40% or more of their 
equity portfolios and the average hedge fund during that time sold 
about 30% of its equity portfolio).
    \127\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \128\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter; 
MFA Comment Letter; and NYC Bar Comment Letter.
    \129\ MFA Comment Letter.
    \130\ MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are maintaining the 50 percent threshold, as proposed. We 
continue to believe, and some commenters support, that funds receiving 
such large withdrawal or redemption requests in

[[Page 38160]]

between routine quarterly reports on Form PF may be subject to 
increased selling and liquidity pressures that could be particularly 
harmful to investors and may contribute to the potential for broader 
market implications, especially if the fund is invested in illiquid 
assets and engages in a fire sale of assets.\131\ The 50 percent 
threshold represents what we believe is well accepted as a substantial 
withdrawal that could threaten the fund's health and potentially 
markets if it requires substantial portfolio sales. Indeed, one 
commenter that disagreed with the scope of the withdrawal and 
redemptions event for the assessment of systemic risk acknowledged such 
a withdrawal could indicate a run on a fund or stress at a particular 
fund.\132\ Another commenter stated that substantial redemptions at a 
fund could signal that external or internal events are causing 
investors to lack confidence in the fund's adviser and that, if the 
fund is not able to handle the redemptions without selling assets, 
other investors that remain in the fund could be seriously harmed.\133\ 
Moreover, we do not believe that this item should have a $1 billion 
floor as substantial withdrawals from multiple qualifying hedge funds 
could indicate systemic risk that we believe warrants monitoring even 
if such withdrawals are less than $1 billion at an individual 
qualifying hedge fund. We designed this item to capture large dollar-
value redemption requests and avoid capturing routine redemptions in 
the ordinary course.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ AFREF Comment Letter. See also MFA Comment Letter. MFA 
noted that subject to certain conditions it supported the 
50%withdrawal threshold, but that there should be a minimum dollar 
threshold of $1 billion to trigger reporting.
    \132\ NYC Bar Comment Letter.
    \133\ ICGN Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We considered the comment that this reporting item should not 
disregard pre-existing gates or other liquidity limitations. However, 
requests for redemptions of this size can have impacts despite 
liquidity limitations. For example, if it is public knowledge that a 
fund is facing large redemptions, other investors may submit 
withdrawals, which will pressure a gated fund to liquidate or lead to a 
flood of asset sales once the gate is lifted due to pent up redemption 
pressures. If an adviser believes a report may be a ``false positive'' 
and the large withdrawals are occurring in the ordinary course of 
business for the fund, advisers may indicate the circumstances behind 
the large withdrawal(s) in the explanatory notes item. In addition, an 
event that one fund may consider a ``false positive'' may be more 
systemically significant if the conditions triggering it are amassed 
across a number of qualifying hedge funds. Commenters stated that a 
mismatch in timing between redemption requests and subscriptions could 
distort reporting of this item, but withdrawals or redemptions in 
excess of 50 percent in spite of subscriptions would still be a notable 
event for which notice would provide the Commission and FSOC with 
important insight.\134\ Based on the above, timely notice of such 
events in this current report will allow the Commission and FSOC to 
analyze the potential implications for the fund's investors and 
systemic risks should such withdrawals or redemptions precipitate 
large-scale liquidations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the withdrawals and redemptions current report, an adviser 
will enter: (1) the date on which the net redemption requests exceeded 
50 percent of the most recent net asset value; (2) the net value of 
redemptions paid from the reporting fund between the last data 
reporting date (the end of the most recently reported fiscal quarter on 
Form PF) and the date of the current report; (3) the percentage of the 
fund's net asset value the redemption requests represent; and (4) 
whether the adviser has notified the investors that the reporting fund 
will liquidate.
b. Inability To Satisfy Redemptions or Suspension of Redemptions
    We are adopting, largely as proposed, the requirement for an 
adviser to report if a qualifying hedge fund is unable to satisfy 
redemptions, or suspends redemptions for more than five consecutive 
business days. We have modified the form text from the proposal to 
state that an adviser would report in either of two cases: if the 
reporting fund (1) is unable to pay redemption requests, or (2) has 
suspended redemptions and the suspension lasts for more than 5 
consecutive business days. One commenter stated that the proposed item 
was indicative of significant distress that could potentially lead to 
counterparty losses and that the five consecutive business day 
qualification period would appropriately limit reporting of temporary 
redemption suspensions that would have less of an impact on investors 
or the broader market.\135\ Another commenter suggested that the 
trigger for reporting a failure to pay redemption requests should be 
five days following the due date specified for payment of redemption 
proceeds under a fund's governing documents and that hedge funds 
typically have a specified timeframe for paying redemption requests, 
and a filing should be triggered under this current report only after 
this timeframe has passed if a redemption remains unsatisfied.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \136\ MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This reporting item will help the Commission and FSOC identify 
stress at a reporting fund and evaluate the effects of these 
circumstances on fund investors and the markets more broadly. We 
recognize that redemptions are governed by preexisting terms and 
conditions outlined in fund contracts and governing documents. However, 
we are not modifying the item in response to commenters stating that 
reporting should be triggered only after the period specified for 
payment of redemption proceeds under a fund's governing documents 
because reporting should be based on whether, as a factual matter, the 
fund has suspended redemptions for a period of five consecutive 
business days or not. The reporting of inability to satisfy redemptions 
or a prolonged suspension of redemptions will provide a potential early 
warning of the fund's liquidation and potentially allow the Commission 
or FSOC to analyze or respond to any perceived harm to investors or 
systemic risks on an expedited basis before they worsen. The five 
consecutive business day period for suspensions is properly balanced so 
as to limit reporting of temporary redemption suspensions that we 
believe have less of an impact on investors or the broader market. 
Under this current report, the adviser is required to report: (1) the 
date the reporting fund was unable to pay redemption requests or 
suspended redemptions; (2) the percentage of redemptions requested and 
not yet paid; and (3) whether the adviser has notified the investors 
that the reporting fund will liquidate.
8. Explanatory Notes
    We are adopting the explanatory notes item, largely as proposed. 
This item will allow an adviser to provide a narrative response if it 
believes that additional information would be helpful in understanding 
the information reported in the current report(s). Current reports may 
benefit from additional context so that the Commission and FSOC can 
effectively evaluate them. This approach is consistent with other 
current reports filed with the Commission, where registrants have 
requested the flexibility to provide additional narrative information 
relating to the

[[Page 38161]]

circumstances surrounding the current report.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See Part H of Form N-RN.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There were limited comments on this item. One commenter stated that 
this information would be helpful in understanding the information 
reported in response to any item in section 5, but that it is unlikely 
to be helpful if operations events do not require additional 
elaboration in the narrative response section.\138\ As discussed above, 
we believe the operations event and its underlying reporting fields 
will capture enough data so as to enable the Commission and FSOC to 
assess the event properly in circumstances where advisers do not think 
a narrative response would be helpful. However, in certain 
circumstances where advisers check an ``other'' box we are now 
requiring advisers to provide an additional explanation in the 
explanatory notes section. We believe that requiring additional context 
for the ``other'' items will allow the Commission and FSOC to assess 
current reports, and especially the operations event item, more 
readily. As reporting under this section is largely optional outside of 
instances where they check ``other'', commenters will not need to 
respond to this item if additional elaboration is not helpful. The same 
commenter also stated that subsequent updates to the current report 
should provide more detail, including when the event is resolved. We 
are not, however, adopting a follow-up option for operations event 
reports as these current reports' primary purpose is advance notice of 
a potential systemic risk event or potential harm to investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ CRINDATA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Quarterly Private Equity Event Reports for All Private Equity Fund 
Advisers

    In a change from the proposal, we are modifying section 6 of the 
proposed Form PF to be filed on a quarterly basis rather than on a 
current basis and moving one of the proposed private equity event 
reports to annual reporting in section 4.\139\ Under the proposal, 
private equity adviser current reporting events included: (1) execution 
of an adviser-led secondary transaction, (2) implementation of a 
general partner or limited partner clawback, and (3) investor election 
to remove a fund's general partner or to terminate a fund's investment 
period or a fund. We will require reporting of the adviser-led 
secondaries event and the investor election to remove a fund's general 
partner or to terminate a fund's investment period or a fund event, but 
in a change from the proposal, we are moving the general partner or 
limited partner clawbacks event to section 4, where it will be reported 
on an annual basis with the other large private equity fund adviser 
reporting.\140\ The section 6 reports will be termed ``private equity 
event reports'' and advisers will file these reports within 60 days 
after the end of their fiscal quarters.\141\ If a private equity event 
did not occur during a particular quarter, then an adviser would not be 
required to file a section 6 report for that quarter. Receiving this 
information on a quarterly basis will provide timely notice of these 
private equity events and important information for the Commission's 
regulatory programs, including examinations, investigations, investor 
protection efforts, and policy relating to private fund advisers. It 
also will improve the Commission and FSOC's ability to evaluate 
material changes in market trends at the reporting funds by providing 
information on certain events that could significantly affect both 
investors and markets more broadly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ All private equity advisers will need to report if any of 
these events occurred during the applicable quarter for each private 
equity fund they advise. Private equity fund advisers must only 
report each instance of a reporting event once on the section 6 
filing that covers the quarter in which such instance occurred. It 
is not necessary to report the same instance of a reporting event 
again on future section 6 filings.
    \140\ See discussion infra in section II.D.1.
    \141\ See Form PF Glossary (definition of ``private equity event 
reports'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters agreed that collecting this information from all 
private equity fund advisers would be beneficial \142\ by, for 
instance, providing meaningful information to the Commission's 
oversight efforts \143\ and improving the Commission's and FSOC's 
ability to react to market events.\144\ Other commenters argued that 
the proposal did not sufficiently demonstrate how this information is 
connected to systemic risk \145\ or how the Commission would use this 
information to uphold investor protection.\146\ One commenter stated 
that there was little justification for one business day reporting for 
both the adviser-led secondary transactions event and the removal of a 
general partner, termination of the investment period or termination of 
a fund event and advocated for extending the time period.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See, e.g., ILPA Comment Letter; ICGN Comment Letter; and 
Comment Letter of the Private Equity Stakeholder Project (Mar. 21, 
2022) (``PESP Comment Letter'').
    \143\ See ILPA Comment Letter.
    \144\ See PESP Comment Letter.
    \145\ See, e.g., AIMA Comment Letter and Schulte Comment Letter.
    \146\ See, e.g., AIMA Comment Letter; NVCA Comment Letter; and 
AIC Comment Letter.
    \147\ See, e.g., AIMA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters asserted that a one-business-day reporting 
requirement may be unnecessary in certain instances for these private 
equity event reports. While some commenters recognized the importance 
of timely reporting through a one-business-day reporting regime for the 
events set forth in the proposal,\148\ a number of other commenters 
criticized the proposed one-business-day reporting as being 
unnecessarily onerous.\149\ Several commenters requested, as an 
alternative, an annual reporting requirement for these events.\150\ 
Other commenters supported changing section 6 reporting from current 
reporting to quarterly reporting if there was an event to report, and 
that this delay would not diminish the Commission's ability to 
investigate and, if appropriate, respond to protect investors.\151\ 
Some commenters stated that some of the reporting events can occur in 
the ordinary course of business and do not require urgent action.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter and PESP Comment Letter. 
One commenter requested that we consider using calendar days instead 
of business days to avoid delays in reporting. See Sarah A. Comment 
Letter.
    \149\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter and AIC Comment Letter.
    \150\ See, e.g., Comment Letter of Ropes and Gray LLP (Mar. 21, 
2022) (``Ropes & Gray Comment Letter'') (recommending that if the 
Commission wishes event reporting on adviser-led secondaries, it be 
included as part of the regular annual reporting of large private 
equity advisers on Form PF) and IAA Comment Letter (generally 
objecting to the reporting of the current event items for private 
equity fund advisers but saying any reporting of such items should 
at a minimum be moved to section 4 of Form PF for annual reporting 
by large private equity fund advisers).
    \151\ See, e.g., NVCA Comment Letter (suggesting the Commission, 
instead of requiring current reports for private equity fund 
advisers, require quarterly event reports filed 60 days after the 
end of each fiscal quarter if those events occur) and MFA Comment 
Letter (suggesting quarterly reporting).
    \152\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering comments, we are requiring all private equity 
fund advisers reporting on Form PF to file reports on a quarterly basis 
upon (1) execution of an adviser-led secondary transaction, or (2) 
investor election to remove a fund's general partner or to terminate a 
fund's investment period or a fund, rather than within one business day 
after a reporting event as proposed.\153\ We recognize that removal of 
a general partner or the termination of a fund's investment period or a 
fund may result from a stress event at a fund,

[[Page 38162]]

but this may not come into effect until after the stress event occurs. 
For example, we understand that such an event could involve a 
longstanding decline in performance, a disagreement concerning the 
direction of the fund, or the replacement of key fund personnel, all of 
which are events that may have serious implications for investors, but 
would not necessarily indicate urgent harm or imminent systemic risk 
that would necessitate a current report. We also acknowledge that some 
adviser-led secondary transactions, may not inherently indicate that a 
fund is in urgent distress, and that such transactions do not occur 
rapidly, thus creating less of a need for a current report.\154\ We 
remain concerned, however, that some of these events, which include a 
higher potential for conflicts of interest or fund distress generally 
may signal an investor protection issue at a particular fund. Moreover, 
these reports will enable the Commission to assess trends in these 
reporting events that may signal the exacerbation of conflicts of 
interest within the private equity industry. Though we are adopting 
quarterly reporting, we did consider requiring private equity fund 
advisers to file current reports within 72 hours instead of one 
business day as proposed. After considering comments, we view these 
reporting items as likely to reveal trends that emerge more slowly as 
compared to hedge funds because private equity funds typically invest 
in more illiquid assets over longer time horizons with more limited 
redemption rights.\155\ Thus, we believe that requiring reporting of 
these events on a quarterly basis appropriately balances the effects 
and burdens of imposing these reporting obligations on private equity 
fund advisers \156\ while also enhancing the Commission's investor 
protection efforts and FSOC's ability to monitor for systemic risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ As discussed below, we are requiring reporting of the 
implementation of a general partner or limited partner clawback on 
an annual basis from large private equity fund advisers. See infra 
Section II.D.1.
    \154\ See, e.g., Ropes & Gray Comment Letter and IAA Comment 
Letter.
    \155\ See discussion infra in section IV.B.2.
    \156\ See infra section IV.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of 
the changes in these anticipated costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Both of these reporting triggers are important events for a fund, 
and each one raises distinct conflicts of interest, which we discuss in 
greater detail below. As one example, we understand an investor 
election to terminate a fund's investment period is often tied to a 
change in how management fees are calculated for the remainder of the 
fund's life. Specifically, following the termination of an investment 
period, management fees generally ``step down'' to a percentage of 
invested capital, rather than a percentage of aggregate capital 
commitments. An adviser that fails to effectively administer such a 
change may overcharge management fees--a deficiency that the staff has 
observed in numerous instances.\157\ Requiring reporting of these key 
events on a quarterly basis will allow the Commission to better 
identify such events and more carefully evaluate when conflicts of 
interests may be harming investors. In addition, because removals of 
general partners, terminations of a fund or its investment period, and 
adviser-led secondaries represent a significant potential for conflicts 
of interest and other sources of investor harm, we are not limiting 
reporting to only large private equity advisers in the annual reporting 
presented in Section 4. By requiring reporting of these events from all 
private equity fund advisers the Commission will receive broader 
reporting coverage of such transactions across the private equity 
industry to target its examination program more efficiently and better 
identify areas in need of more timely regulatory oversight and 
assessment, which should increase both the efficiency and effectiveness 
of its programs and, thus, increase investor protection.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ Risk Alert, Observations from Examinations of Private Fund 
Advisers (Jan. 27, 2022) available at https://www.sec.gov/files/private-fund-risk-alert-pt-2.pdf (noting that EXAMS staff observed 
private fund advisers that did not follow practices described in 
fund disclosures regarding the calculation of the fund-level 
management fee during a private fund's Post-Commitment Period. EXAMS 
staff observed that such failures resulted in investors paying more 
in management fees than they were required to pay under the terms of 
the fund disclosures).
    \158\ See discussion infra at section IV.C.1.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters requested additional private equity current 
reporting events, including where the adviser has indemnified itself 
from covering any penalties and/or legal costs and other ``for-cause'' 
key events.\159\ While these events can be significant for a fund, we 
do not believe they are as critical for the FSOC to monitor systemic 
risk or for the Commission's investor protection efforts and may be 
difficult to tailor for reporting purposes. Indemnification for 
penalties and/or legal costs can cover a litany of scenarios. It would 
likely be difficult to compare a specific indemnification event against 
another and, as a result, may be hard to determine greater trends in 
the financial condition of the private equity industry. Similarly, a 
``for-cause'' key event can include a broad range of events that are 
difficult to compare. Trends in some of these events across large 
private equity fund advisers may be related to systemic risk and some 
of these events may relate to investor protection, but some--adviser-
specific poor performance, for example--may be idiosyncratic. The 
reporting triggers we are adopting, on the other hand, are better 
tailored to our overall policy goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See, e.g., ILPA Comment Letter and PESP Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters requested an exception for reporting events that 
occur in the ordinary course of a private equity fund adviser's 
business that are not suggestive of or do not give rise to concerns 
related to market stress or risks to investors.\160\ While we 
acknowledge that some of these reporting events may not indicate a 
stress event for an individual fund, monitoring these events will 
support the Commission's investor protection efforts by better 
informing the Commission's regulatory programs while assessing trends 
in the aggregate frequencies of these reporting events across the 
private equity industry will enhance FSOC's monitoring of systemic 
risk. While a single adviser-led secondary transaction may not be 
significant on its own, an increase in the number of these transactions 
across the private equity industry could be significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ See, e.g., Ropes & Gray Comment Letter and IAA Comment 
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Adviser-Led Secondary Transactions
    We are adopting proposed section 6 Item B, requiring private equity 
fund advisers to report any adviser-led secondary transactions, but 
with reporting on a quarterly basis within 60 days of the end of each 
fiscal quarter.\161\ This item requires reporting upon the completion 
of an adviser-led secondary transaction, including the transaction 
closing date and a brief description of the transaction. As proposed, 
we are defining ``adviser-led secondary transaction'' as any 
transaction initiated by the adviser or any of its related persons 
\162\ that offers private fund investors the choice to: (1) sell all or 
a portion of their interests in the private fund; or (2) convert or 
exchange all or a portion of their interests in the private fund for 
interests in another vehicle advised by the adviser or any of its 
related persons.\163\ Transactions are only subject to reporting if 
they are initiated by a private equity fund's

[[Page 38163]]

adviser or a related person of the adviser.\164\
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    \161\ See Form PF Section 6, Item B.
    \162\ See Form PF Glossary (definition of ``related person'').
    \163\ See Form PF Glossary (definition of ``adviser-led 
secondary transaction'').
    \164\ Whether a transaction is initiated by the adviser or its 
related persons requires a facts and circumstances analysis. 
However, we generally do not view a transaction to be initiated by 
the adviser or one of its related persons to the extent the adviser 
or one of its related persons, at the unsolicited request of an 
investor, participates in the secondary sale of such investor's fund 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters supported the requirement to report adviser-led 
secondary transactions, including some that agreed that this reporting 
requirement will help the Commission fulfill its investor protection 
role.\165\ Other commenters argued that adviser-led secondary 
transactions are not historically connected to systemic risk, and that 
they can represent a strengthening market in certain cases.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See, e.g., Better Markets Comment Letter and PDI Comment 
Letter.
    \166\ See, e.g., AIMA Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter; and 
USCC Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We acknowledge that an adviser-led secondary transaction can 
indicate strength in a particular investment in certain cases. For 
instance, we understand an adviser-led secondary transaction can be 
used to extend or add on to a successful investment.\167\ Nonetheless, 
adviser-led secondary transactions typically reflect a deviation from 
the traditional life cycle of a private equity investment. In some 
instances, an adviser may use an adviser-led secondary transaction to 
attempt to restructure an investment portfolio that is struggling.\168\ 
In other instances, an adviser may use an adviser-led secondary 
transaction to extend an investment beyond the contractually agreed 
upon term of the fund that holds it.\169\ In either case, an adviser-
led secondary transaction can have a meaningful impact on the liquidity 
profile of a private equity investment and/or the private equity fund 
that held it originally. Additionally, we understand that these 
transactions may present conflicts of interest that merit timely 
reporting, particularly those conflicts that arise because the adviser 
(or its related person) is on both sides of the transaction with 
potentially different economic incentives.\170\ As an example, in the 
continuation fund context, an investor may be forced to liquidate a 
position it would otherwise wish to retain if it is unable to 
adequately conduct diligence or negotiate the terms of the continuation 
fund before its election is due. Requiring quarterly reporting of these 
complex transactions will allow the Commission to identify when such 
events have occurred and more carefully evaluate whether conflicts of 
interests have harmed investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ See, e.g., Ropes & Gray Comment Letter. See also, GP-led 
Secondary Fund Restructurings, Considerations for Limited and 
General Partners, Institutional Limited Partners Association (Apr. 
2019), available at https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ILPA-Guidance-on-GP-Led-Secondary-Fund-Restructurings-Apr-2019-FINAL.pdf.
    \168\ See, e.g., Rae Wee, Turnover surges as funds rush to exit 
private equity stakes, Reuters (Dec. 18, 2022) available at https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/global-markets-privateequity-pix-2022-12-19/.
    \169\ See, e.g., Madeline Shi, Investors up allocation to 
secondaries as GPs seek alternative liquidity sources, PitchBook 
(Sep. 15, 2022) available at https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/investor-secondaries-growth-alternative-liquidity.
    \170\ We recognize that other types of conflicted transactions, 
such as investment-level cross transactions, often raise important 
conflicts of interest. However, we view adviser-led secondaries as 
presenting significant, intrinsic conflicts of interest due to their 
nature as fund-level conflicted transactions that often affect all 
investor capital in a fund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, adviser-led secondary transactions can have 
implications for systemic risk assessment as they have become 
increasingly common in the private equity industry in recent years, and 
therefore could represent changes in the liquidity of the private 
equity market. For example, to the extent that an upward trend in 
adviser-led secondary transactions reflects a reduction in the 
liquidity of the private equity market stemming from private equity 
fund advisers' inability to sell portfolio companies to third-party 
buyers (or to sell those companies at existing valuations), 
transactions of this nature could be an indicator of a deflating 
investment bubble that may be important in informing systemic risk 
assessment. This quarterly event reporting will provide the Commission 
and FSOC with timely data regarding the frequency and circumstances 
surrounding these transactions and allow the Commission and FSOC to 
better assess market trends and potential market impacts.
    One commenter stated that adviser-led secondary transactions can 
raise conflicts of interest, but that such conflicts of interest can be 
mitigated through thoughtful processes, disclosure and investor or 
advisory board consent where necessary.\171\ While thoughtful 
processes, disclosure and investor or advisory board consent can be 
helpful, in the Commission's experience, they are not always utilized 
and, even when used, do not always ameliorate investor protection 
concerns. For example, it is the Commission's observation that 
investors are often given very short timeframes in which to choose 
whether to cash out of their investment or participate in an adviser-
led secondary transaction. Investors are not always able to 
sufficiently diligence the adviser-led secondary transaction before 
they must decide to whether to commit to it. As another example, some 
advisers seek advisory board consent for adviser-led secondary 
transactions, but such advisory boards are comprised of only the 
largest investors in the fund, and the adviser does not seek consent 
from the remaining investors. As a result, we believe it is appropriate 
and necessary to require reporting of adviser-led secondary 
transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ See AIMA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter suggested an ordinary course exception.\172\ 
Ordinary course adviser-led secondary transactions are just as integral 
to the Commission's investor protection concerns as they still involve 
conflicts of interest. They also will be informative to FSOC's and 
Commission's assessment of systemic risk in monitoring broader 
liquidity trends in the private equity market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ See IAA Comment Letter.
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2. Removal of General Partner or Election To Terminate the Investment 
Period or Fund
    We are adopting the requirement for all private equity fund 
advisers to report the removal of a general partner or election to 
terminate the investment period or fund item as an event reporting 
item, but, in a change from the proposal, advisers will report these 
events within 60 days after a fiscal quarter-end rather than within one 
business day. As proposed, this item will require all private equity 
fund advisers to report when a fund's investors have: (1) removed the 
adviser or an affiliate as the general partner or similar control 
person of a fund; (2) elected to terminate the fund's investment 
period; or (3) elected to terminate the fund, in each case as 
contemplated by the fund documents. This item requires reporting of the 
effective date of the applicable removal or termination event and a 
description of such removal or termination event. This required 
reporting is triggered upon an adviser receiving notification of the 
investors' election in each case.
    Some commenters supported the proposed requirement to report when 
investors remove a general partner, or elect to terminate an investment 
period or a fund.\173\ Others criticized this reporting requirement as 
being unrelated to market conditions and/or

[[Page 38164]]

likely to cause a disproportionate number of false positives.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ See, e.g., AFREF Comment Letter and Public Citizen Comment 
Letter.
    \174\ See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter; AIMA Comment Letter; and 
MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Investor removal of a general partner or election to terminate a 
fund's investment period or a fund itself are uncommon events. We 
understand that, generally, investors would prefer to avoid these 
actions unless unavoidable because the consequence of each could be 
damaging to a fund.\175\ If a general partner is removed, there will 
likely be a gap in management of a fund as well as the risk that a new 
general partner may not be able to manage the fund as effectively. If 
investors elect to terminate the investment period of a fund or the 
fund itself, the entire investment strategy and planning of the fund 
can be disrupted and could indicate the occurrence of investor harm at 
the fund or other ongoing risks to investors. A collective increase in 
the number of any or all of these events occurring also could indicate 
a risk of market deterioration, particularly given the broader market 
impact of individual private equity funds due to the increase in the 
median fund size for the private equity asset class and rise in larger 
private equity funds.\176\ If the general partner of a large buy-out 
fund is removed, it could also increase risk for its portfolio 
companies if the adviser is no longer as willing to insert equity 
capital when needed. Requiring reporting of these events will provide 
the Commission and FSOC with notification of this event (of which we 
might otherwise be unaware at the time it is initiated), and allow for 
better evaluation and monitoring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ See, e.g., LPs Vote to Boot GP from Debut Fund, but the 
Real Challenge Lies Ahead, Buyout Insider (July 27, 2021) available 
at https://www.buyoutsinsider.com/lps-vote-to-boot-gp-from-debut-fund-but-the-real-challenge-lies-ahead/.
    \176\ See Private Market Mega-Funds Raise More than $329B in 
2021, PitchBook (Dec. 14, 2021) (``Pitchbook Article''), available 
at https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/2021-largest-mega-funds-private-equity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, these trigger events are all indicative of critical 
circumstances for conflicts of interest that present increased risks to 
investors. Removal of a general partner presents an inherent conflict 
for private equity fund advisers. An election to terminate an 
investment period of a fund or a fund itself has numerous consequences 
for investors, such as changes to management fees and liquidation 
requirements, and the staff has often had insufficient visibility into 
these activities by private equity fund advisers, which may pose risks 
to fund investors.\177\ Requiring reporting of these events will allow 
the Commission to identify such events and any associated investor 
protection concerns better, including by more carefully evaluating the 
inherent conflicts of interests that these events represent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ For example, we are aware that there have been instances 
where management fees were overcharged after certain triggering 
events like the write-off of specific portfolio investments. See, 
e.g., In the Matter of ECP Manager LP, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 5373 (Sep. 27, 2019) (settled action) (alleging that 
private equity fund adviser failed to apply the management fee 
calculation method specified in the limited partnership agreement by 
failing to account for write downs of portfolio securities causing 
the fund and investors to overpay management fees).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize, however, that these events likely do not create the 
type of urgent distress that would necessitate current reporting, as we 
had proposed. We understand that these decisions are not arrived at 
suddenly and that the assets of the fund will still be held for a 
significant period of time if the fund is wound down. Thus, we believe 
that requiring reporting of these events on a quarterly basis 
appropriately balances the effects and burdens of imposing these 
reporting obligations on private equity fund advisers \178\ while also 
enhancing the Commission's investor protection efforts and FSOC's 
ability to monitor for systemic risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ See infra section IV.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of 
the changes in these anticipated costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters suggested limiting reporting for termination of 
a fund's investment period to ``for cause'' terminations only.\179\ We 
understand that general partner removals and investor elections to 
terminate a fund's investment period or a fund are typically associated 
with a serious conflict between investors and the adviser or between 
different members of the adviser.\180\ While not all instances of these 
events may be strictly ``for cause,'' they all represent serious 
departures from ordinary course operations. Additionally, we are not 
requiring reporting for all terminations of a fund's investment period 
or of a fund. Rather, we are only requiring reporting when investors 
elect to terminate a fund's investment period or a fund. We believe 
that events of this nature are rare, and accordingly, reporting will 
also be rare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter and NVCA Comment Letter.
    \180\ In our experience, advisers sometimes pursue these actions 
when there is disagreement between different investment 
professionals at an adviser that wish to separate their businesses. 
For example, one of these individuals may remain associated with the 
fund through a new general partner entity while the other individual 
leaves the adviser entirely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to the explanatory notes item that we are adopting in 
section 5 for current reporting by large hedge fund advisers to 
qualifying hedge funds, section 6, Item D, will allow an adviser to 
provide an optional narrative response if it believes that additional 
information is helpful in explaining the circumstances of events 
reported in section 6. We proposed including an optional explanatory 
note question in the proposed Section 6, Item E as part of the current 
reports for private equity fund advisers. Since this explanatory note 
question is optional, we think it is appropriate to give private equity 
fund advisers the opportunity to provide any explanatory notes for 
section 6 quarterly reporting that they deem helpful. We did not 
receive specific comments on whether to include this section to allow 
an adviser to provide an optional narrative response. We continue to 
believe this will allow an adviser the ability to provide additional, 
helpful information where necessary.

C. Filing Fees and Format for Reporting

    Consistent with the proposal, we are requiring large hedge fund 
advisers to file current reports and private equity advisers to file 
quarterly private equity event reports through the same non-public 
filing system they use to file the rest of Form PF, the Private Fund 
Reporting Depository (``PFRD'').\181\ Large hedge fund advisers will 
file current reports on section 5, and all private equity advisers will 
file event reports on section 6 of Form PF. Filers will not submit any 
other sections of Form PF at the time a either of these reports is 
filed. This requirement is designed to facilitate reporting of clear 
information in an efficient manner. Under the rule, advisers filing 
reports on section 5 and 6 are required to pay to the operator of PFRD 
fees that have been approved by the SEC. The SEC in a separate action 
will approve filing fees that reflect the reasonable costs associated 
with the filings and the establishment and maintenance of the filing 
system.\182\ Advisers also will be able to amend their section 5 and 6 
reports if they discover that information they filed was not accurate 
at the time of filing.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ See Instruction 12. See also rule 17 CFR 275.204(b)-1.
    \182\ See section 204(c) of the Advisers Act.
    \183\ Consistent with the current instructions for other types 
of Form PF filings, large hedge fund advisers are not required to 
update information that they believe in good faith properly 
responded to Form PF on the date of filing even if that information 
is subsequently revised for purposes of recordkeeping, risk 
management or investor reporting (such as estimates that are refined 
after completion of a subsequent audit). This requirement is 
designed to provide advisers with a way to correct current reports, 
just as all advisers can correct other types of Form PF filings. See 
Instruction 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter stated that it could be counterproductive to require 
an adviser

[[Page 38165]]

to pay a fee to report a potential operations event.\184\ However, this 
approach is consistent with established Form PF requirements, and we 
have not observed a correlation between filing fees and lower levels of 
filing Form PF in the past. Filing fees also support the system for 
Form PF filing, including cybersecurity and other technological 
supports, which we believe benefits filers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ See CRINDATA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Large Private Equity Fund Adviser Reporting

    We are amending the requirements relating to reporting by large 
private equity fund advisers in section 4 of Form PF to: (1) add 
certain questions that are designed to improve FSOC's ability to 
monitor systemic risk and FSOC's and the Commission's ability to 
evaluate material changes in market trends at the reporting funds; and 
(2) add new questions designed to enhance our understanding of certain 
practices of private equity fund advisers and amend certain existing 
questions to improve data collection.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ Consistent with the proposal, Item B is being split into 
three new items to be designated new Item B ``Certain information 
regarding the reporting fund,'' new Item C ``Reporting fund and 
controlled portfolio company financing,'' and new Item D ``Portfolio 
company investment exposures.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This reporting also will improve FSOC's ability to monitor systemic 
risk and the Commission and FSOC's ability to evaluate material changes 
in market trends at the reporting private equity funds by providing 
information on certain events and developments that could significantly 
affect both investors and markets more broadly. Reporting of this type 
on an annual basis by the largest private equity fund advisers has 
become increasingly important as private equity has continued to grow 
over the last decade and become a significant part of the economy and 
financial markets. Investors are increasingly exposed to the private 
equity industry as many pension funds and other institutional investors 
have allocated more assets to private equity investments. The number of 
investors \186\ and median fund size \187\ of private equity funds has 
increased. The number of larger private equity funds has risen.\188\ 
These developments merit greater risk-based monitoring and oversight by 
the Commission and FSOC given the potential consequences for an 
increasing pool of private equity investors as well as financial 
markets broadly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ Since 2013, the number of private equity funds has more 
than doubled from under 7,000 to nearly 19,000, private equity fund 
gross assets have quadrupled from $1.6 trillion to $6.4 trillion, 
and private equity fund net assets have also nearly quadrupled, 
increasing from $1.5 trillion to $5.7 trillion. See Private Funds 
Statistics, supra footnote 4.
    \187\ See Pitchbook Article, supra footnote 176.
    \188\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We proposed, but are not adopting, lowering the reporting threshold 
for large private equity fund advisers for purposes of section 4 of 
Form PF from $2 billion to $1.5 billion in private equity fund assets 
under management. A number of commenters criticized the proposal to 
lower this threshold as being arbitrary and/or not connected to 
systemic risk.\189\ Some commenters stated that reducing this threshold 
would result in substantial burdens for small and mid-sized private 
equity fund advisers who will be newly covered.\190\ Of these, one 
commenter argued that lowering this threshold could limit competition, 
as the smaller private equity fund advisers find it more difficult to 
compete against larger advisers, which can absorb the costs related to 
the additional filing requirements more easily due to scale.\191\ Some 
commenters suggested increasing the threshold rather than 
reducing.\192\ On the contrary, several commenters supported the 
reduction to the large private equity fund adviser reporting threshold, 
stating that it is important for the Commission and FSOC to receive 
reporting from the same proportion of private equity funds, based on 
committed capital, as when Form PF was created.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter; and 
USCC Comment Letter.
    \190\ See, e.g., Schulte Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; and 
RER Comment Letter.
    \191\ See Schulte Comment Letter.
    \192\ See RER Comment Letter and AIC Comment Letter.
    \193\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter and Better Markets Comment 
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When Form PF was originally adopted in 2011, the $2 billion 
reporting threshold was intended to capture 75 percent of the U.S. 
private equity industry based on committed capital.\194\ At proposal, 
the existing $2 billion threshold captured about 67 percent of the U.S. 
private equity industry.\195\ However, in response to commenters, we 
have conducted additional analysis on the U.S. private equity industry 
and have observed recent accelerated growth in the relative percentage 
of large private equity fund advisers. The existing $2 billion 
threshold now captures about 73 percent of the U.S. private equity 
industry.\196\ If these trends continue, we expect the $2 billion 
threshold to capture 75 percent or more of the U.S. private equity 
industry in the near future. As a result, at this time, we no longer 
believe it is appropriate to reduce this reporting threshold to $1.5 
billion to achieve the original intention for Form PF to capture 75 
percent of the U.S. private equity industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ See 2011 Form PF Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, at 
32.
    \195\ Based on data reported on Form PF and Form ADV as of Dec. 
2020.
    \196\ Based on data reported on Form PF and Form ADV as of June 
2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter stated that private equity fund advisers with less 
than $1.5 billion in private equity fund assets under management have 
the potential to either make higher risk loans or take on higher risk 
borrowing.\197\ While some smaller private equity fund advisers may 
sometimes engage in risky behaviors, it is less likely that such 
practices by smaller advisers will lead to systemic risks based solely 
on their size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See PDI Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter suggested using metrics other than assets under 
management to determine if a firm meets the threshold for reporting as 
a large private equity fund adviser.\198\ We have considered using 
metrics other than assets under management for purposes of this 
threshold, but we anticipate that they would be more likely to lead to 
adverse incentives.\199\ We believe that assets under management 
continues to be the appropriate metric and is less likely to create 
these adverse incentives. In sum, given the recent trends in the U.S. 
private equity industry discussed above, we believe that the existing 
threshold strikes an appropriate balance between obtaining information 
on a significant portion of the private equity industry and seeking to 
minimize the burdens imposed on private equity fund advisers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See Comment Letter of Michelle Katauskas (Jan. 27, 2022).
    \199\ For instance, if we were to define large private equity 
fund advisers based on number of employees, advisers may be 
incentivized to outsource operations and minimize compliance 
personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. New Question on General Partner or Limited Partner Clawbacks
    We proposed to require all advisers to private equity funds to file 
a current report within one business day upon the implementation of a 
general partner or limited partner clawback in excess of an aggregate 
amount equal to 10 percent of a fund's aggregate capital commitments. 
Some commenters supported the requirement to report general and limited 
partner clawbacks.\200\ Other commenters criticized this reporting

[[Page 38166]]

requirement as being unrelated to declining market environments or 
systemic risk.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See, e.g., AFREF Comment Letter; Public Citizen Comment 
Letter.
    \201\ See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter; AIMA Comment Letter; and 
SIFMA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Limited partner clawbacks could signal that a fund is under stress 
or is anticipating being under stress. For example, a limited partner 
clawback (or clawbacks) in an aggregate amount of more than 10 percent 
of a private equity fund's aggregate capital commitments might suggest 
that the fund is planning for a material event (e.g., substantial 
litigation or legal judgment) that could negatively affect investors. 
While an individual limited partner clawback of this magnitude may be 
idiosyncratic, an upward trend in implementations of such limited 
partner clawbacks may be a reflection of stress in the market. Such 
potential impact merits regular reporting to allow for improved risked-
based monitoring.
    General and limited partner clawbacks also create complex conflicts 
of interests. Typically, the legal mechanics of general partner and 
limited partner clawbacks are negotiated early on in a fund's life, 
long before the inciting event occurs. Furthermore, fund advisers 
typically have significant control over the circumstances that 
eventually lead to a general partner or limited partner clawback. For 
instance, if a private equity fund adviser is concerned about over 
performance towards the beginning of a fund's life and under 
performance later on, it can delay realizing a portfolio investment to 
reduce the risk of a general partner clawback. Similarly, if a private 
fund adviser anticipates needing to initiate a limited partner clawback 
due to litigation, the private fund adviser is likely the one already 
responding to the litigation process and informing investors about it. 
Each of these circumstances raises critical conflicts of interest that 
may harm investors. Requiring reporting of general and limited partner 
clawbacks will allow the Commission to better identify such events and 
more carefully evaluate when and whether investors may have been 
harmed.
    Additionally, we do not agree that general partner or limited 
partner clawbacks are unrelated to systemic risk. These clawbacks often 
occur when the fund has had successful investments earlier in the life 
of the fund, but the fund's later investments are less successful. 
Accordingly, while a single general partner clawback may not rise to a 
level of systemic significance, the widespread implementation of 
general partner clawbacks may be a sign of a deteriorating market, 
which could have systemic risk implications. Given that the 
implementation of general partner clawbacks by private equity funds is 
typically rare, if there is an upward trend in funds implementing 
general partner clawbacks, such trend could be indicative of a 
distressed market. Reporting could help the Commission and FSOC 
identify particular markets, sectors or funds on which such a declining 
market environment could have an outsized impact and which may merit 
additional monitoring given the potential consequence for both 
investors and financial market stability.
    After considering comments, as noted above,\202\ we now are 
requiring information about clawbacks to be reported annually by large 
private equity fund advisers.\203\ General partner clawbacks and 
certain limited partner clawbacks will be reported in response to new 
Question 82 in section 4.\204\ Requiring reporting of clawbacks will 
enable the Commission and FSOC to monitor declining market conditions 
in the markets in which private equity invests, and will improve the 
Commission's visibility into circumstances involving clawbacks that may 
implicate investor protection risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ See supra section II.B.
    \203\ Large private equity fund advisers will need to report any 
of these private equity reporting events that occurred during the 
applicable reporting period of their filing for each private equity 
fund they advise. Large private equity fund advisers must only 
report each instance of a private equity reporting event once on the 
Form PF filing that covers the period in which such instance 
occurred. It is not necessary to report the same instance of a 
private equity reporting event again on future Form PF filings.
    \204\ We are also making conforming changes for its new 
placement in section 4 of Form PF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering comments, we recognize that requiring reporting 
of clawbacks within one business day of the event could be unnecessary, 
particularly given that these events tend to build over the life of a 
private equity fund with a multi-year term.\205\ As a result, we are 
requiring large private equity advisers to file these reports on an 
annual basis as part of their regular Form PF filing rather than one 
business day as proposed. We believe this timing better balances the 
Commission's need for the information to enhance its regulatory 
programs and the assessment of broader private equity trends and 
declining market conditions while also recognizing that general partner 
or limited partner clawbacks at a particular fund may occur during 
years-long investment horizons. However, we continue to believe that 
clawback reporting that indicated a large spike in the number of 
limited partner clawbacks across the private equity industry may raise 
systemic risk or investor protection concerns that the Commission would 
need to evaluate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ See, e.g., RER Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter; AIMA 
Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In another modification from the proposal, we are only requiring 
large private equity fund advisers to complete this question. While 
some commenters broadly supported the former current event reporting 
questions as proposed,\206\ a number of other commenters criticized 
them, noting that the proposal did not require current reporting for 
smaller hedge fund advisers and stating that the burdens of this 
reporting would fall disproportionately on smaller private equity fund 
advisers.\207\ Of these commenters, several suggested adding thresholds 
to these reporting questions to mitigate these burdens.\208\ Requiring 
all private equity fund advisers to complete the clawbacks question 
would provide additional information to FSOC and Commission that may be 
helpful in the assessment of systemic risk, but after reviewing 
comments, we acknowledge that the clawback question pertains more to 
the monitoring of broader developing trends in private equity fund 
activities relevant to the protection of investors and to the 
assessment of systemic risk. As mentioned above, the widespread 
implementation of general partner clawbacks at large private equity 
funds may signal deteriorating market trends, which could have systemic 
risk implications given the large size of the private equity funds 
involved. Accordingly, we believe that by focusing clawback reporting 
on large private equity fund advisers on an annual basis, we will be 
able to evaluate material changes in market trends and investor 
protection issues in private equity funds. This approach also preserves 
FSOC's ability to monitor for systemic risk. The existing questions in 
section 4 are similarly intended to serve this purpose.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter; Public Citizen Comment 
Letter and PESP Comment Letter.
    \207\ See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter and 
AIC Comment Letter.
    \208\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter and TIAA Comment Letter.
    \209\ See 2011 Form PF Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, at 
text accompanying nn. 94-95. The relative percentage of large 
private equity fund advisers in the U.S. private equity industry has 
also broadly trended upwards over time. As a result, a growing 
portion of private equity fund advisers are required to complete the 
reporting in section 4. For example, based on staff review of Form 
ADV filings and data from Private Fund Statistics reports, section 4 
covered approximately 67% of private equity gross assets in 2020 and 
covers 73% of private equity gross assets today. See Private Funds 
Statistics, supra footnote 4.

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[[Page 38167]]

    Question 82 is substantively identical to the proposed current 
reporting requirement and will require reporting by large private 
equity fund advisers on the implementation of: (1) any general partner 
clawback or (2) a limited partner clawback (or clawbacks) in excess of 
an aggregate amount equal to 10 percent of a fund's aggregate capital 
commitments. This reporting includes the effective date of the clawback 
and the reason for the clawback.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ Question 83 pertains to both general partner clawbacks and 
limited partner clawbacks. This question also requires filers to 
specify the type of clawback implemented (i.e., whether it is a 
general partner clawback or limited partner clawback).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are defining, as proposed, a ``general partner clawback'' as any 
obligation of the general partner, its related persons, or their 
respective owners or interest holders to restore or otherwise return 
performance-based compensation to the fund pursuant to the fund's 
governing agreements.\211\ For example, if the general partner of a 
fund is entitled to performance-based compensation equaling 20 percent 
of the fund's profits over the life of the fund and the fund 
distributes such compensation to the general partner periodically based 
on the profitability of the fund at the time of distribution, the 
general partner may have received distributions of performance-based 
compensation over the life of the fund in excess of 20 percent of the 
fund's aggregate profits. In this situation, under the fund's governing 
documents, the fund's general partner is required to return the excess 
performance-based compensation it received to the fund.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ See Form PF Glossary (definition of ``general partner 
clawback''). We are defining ``performance-based compensation'' as 
any allocations, payments, or distributions of capital based on the 
reporting fund's (or its investments') capital gains, capital 
appreciation and/or profit. This definition includes cash or non-
cash compensation, including in-kind allocations, payments, or 
distributions of performance-based compensation. See also Form PF 
Glossary (definition of ``performance-based compensation''). We have 
slightly revised this definition from the proposal--and removed 
``portfolio investment'' as a defined term--to more precisely 
capture performance-based compensation in the private fund space. We 
do not view these slight revisions as substantive changes from what 
was proposed.
    \212\ Specifically, this required reporting is triggered at the 
time the general partner becomes obligated to return to the fund 
performance-based compensation in excess of the amount it was 
ultimately entitled to receive under the fund's governing documents 
regardless of when such compensation is actually returned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are also defining, as proposed, ``limited partner clawback'' 
(sometimes referred to as a limited partner ``giveback'') as an 
obligation of a fund's investors to return all or any portion of a 
distribution made by the fund to satisfy a liability, obligation, or 
expense of the fund pursuant to the fund's governing agreements.\213\ 
This required reporting is triggered when the aggregate limited partner 
clawbacks over the course of a fund's life exceed 10 percent of such 
fund's aggregate capital commitments at such time. Advisers generally 
should file for each additional limited partner clawback, regardless of 
its size, over the course of such fund's remaining life once such 
fund's aggregate limited partner clawbacks have exceeded this 10 
percent threshold.\214\ Requiring this minimum threshold is appropriate 
because we believe a clawback of this magnitude is more likely to be 
associated with an event that could have a significant negative impact 
on a fund's investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ See Form PF Glossary (definition of ``limited partner 
clawback'').
    \214\ For example, if a fund has a life of 10 years and has a 
limited partner clawback equal to 4% of its aggregate capital 
commitments each and every year of its life, this required reporting 
will be triggered in each of years 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter suggested that, like for limited partner clawbacks, 
we should limit reporting on general partner clawbacks to those that 
are in excess of 10 percent of the fund's aggregate capital 
commitments.\215\ However, it is our understanding that private fund 
advisers generally should have greater control over the circumstances 
leading to a general partner clawback than a limited partner clawback. 
We understand that limited partner clawbacks, on the other hand, are 
often associated with lawsuits or other unforeseen events which the 
adviser may be able to influence but may not be able to prevent, even 
if the amount of the limited partner clawback is small. Accordingly, we 
believe it is important to require reporting on all general partner 
clawbacks but to limit reporting of limited partner clawbacks to those 
exceeding a minimum size threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ See NVCA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to section 5, Item J and the proposed section 6, Item E, 
Question 83 will allow an adviser to provide an optional narrative 
response if it believes that additional information is helpful in 
explaining the circumstances of its responses in section 4. We had 
proposed including an optional explanatory note question in the 
proposed section 6, Item E as part of the current reports for private 
equity fund advisers. Since we are including the general partner or 
limited partner clawbacks in the reporting for large private equity 
fund advisers as part of section 4, we are adding an optional 
explanatory note question for section 4. Since this explanatory note 
question is optional, we think it is appropriate to give large private 
equity fund advisers the opportunity to provide any explanatory notes 
for section 4 that they deem helpful. We did not receive specific 
comments on whether to include this section to allow an adviser to 
provide an optional narrative response. We continue to believe this 
will allow an adviser the ability to provide additional, helpful 
information where necessary.
2. Other Amendments to Large Private Equity Fund Adviser Reporting
    Private Equity Fund Investment Strategies. As proposed, we are 
adding Question 66 to section 4 to collect information about private 
equity fund investment strategies.\216\ Form PF does not currently 
collect data on private equity fund strategies. Question 66 is 
structured similarly to Question 20, which collects information about 
hedge fund strategies and includes common strategies employed by 
private equity funds. This question requires advisers to choose from a 
list of strategies by percent of deployed capital even if the 
categories do not precisely match the characterization of the reporting 
fund's strategies. To facilitate completion of this question and 
alleviate challenges filers face in choosing among a limited list of 
investment strategy types, in a modification from the proposal, filers 
will be able to choose from a drop-down menu that includes all 
investment strategy categories for Form PF. If a reporting fund engages 
in multiple strategies, the adviser will have to provide a good faith 
estimate of the percentage the reporting fund's deployed capital 
represented by each strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ For purposes of this question, which is to be completed by 
Form PF filers that fill out section 4, private equity fund 
investment strategies generally include private credit (and 
associated sub-strategies such as distressed debt, senior debt, 
special situations, etc.), private equity (and associated sub-
strategies such as early stage, buyout, growth, etc.), real estate, 
annuity and life insurance policies, litigation finance, digital 
assets, general partner stakes investing, and others. In connection 
with this question, we are also adding one new term to the Form PF 
Glossary of Terms for ``general partner stakes investing'' to 
provide specificity regarding the reporting of this term and to 
improve data quality. See Form PF Glossary of Terms. We proposed 
adding ``digital assets'' as a new term to the Form PF Glossary of 
Terms. The Commission and staff are continuing to consider this term 
and are not adopting ``digital assets'' as part of this rule at this 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 66 also includes an ``other'' category for advisers to 
select in cases where a reporting fund's strategy is not listed, but an 
adviser selecting ``other'' in response to this question must explain 
why. This requirement is designed to improve data quality by

[[Page 38168]]

providing context to an adviser's selection of the ``other'' category. 
It also should help ensure that advisers are not selecting the 
``other'' category when they should be reporting information in a 
different strategy category. Question 66 is designed to allow FSOC to 
filter data for targeted analysis, monitor trends in the private equity 
industry, analyze potential systemic risk, and to support the 
Commission's oversight of advisers to the private equity industry and 
investor protection efforts.
    Some commenters supported adding this investment strategy reporting 
requirement as being beneficial to the FSOC and Commission's oversight 
of advisers to the private equity industry.\217\ Other commenters 
argued that this investment strategy reporting requirement is too 
burdensome relative to its nexus to systemic risk.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter and PDI Comment Letter.
    \218\ See, e.g., REBNY Comment Letter and RER Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to the growth in the industry since adoption of Form PF and the 
diversity of strategies currently employed by private equity funds, it 
is important that we collect this investment strategy information. 
Different strategies carry different types and levels of risk for the 
markets and financial stability. Reporting on investment strategies 
will allow the Commission and FSOC to understand and better assess the 
potential market and systemic risks presented by the different 
strategies to both markets and investors. A shift in the reporting of 
private equity assets towards riskier strategies, for instance, could 
provide valuable information about emerging systemic risks. Similarly, 
this information will allow the Commission and FSOC to better assess 
private equity funds' increasing role in providing credit to companies.
    While we recognize that adding this question will create some 
additional burdens for large private equity fund advisers, these 
burdens should be small relative to the benefits discussed above. We do 
not believe that a large private equity fund adviser providing a good 
faith estimate of its investment strategies by percentage will require 
substantial, additional accounting or other compliance work. We have 
also included the ``other'' category to allow large private equity fund 
advisers some flexibility with respect to reporting these investment 
strategies provided that they explain their use of this category.
    One commenter suggested requiring more granular disclosure of 
private equity fund investment strategies, including requiring the 
disclosure of industries included in each strategy.\219\ Types of 
industries are generally more amorphous than investment strategies, and 
many industries also overlap--for example, an investment in a 
healthcare technology company could be interpreted as either a 
healthcare or technology investment. It is also difficult to correlate 
risk with specific industries, as subcategories within industries may 
vary widely in terms of risk. Accordingly, we are not requiring 
reporting of industries at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ See PDI Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fund-Level Borrowings. As proposed, we are adding Question 68 to 
require advisers to report additional information on any fund-level 
borrowing. If a fund engages in fund-level borrowing, this question 
requires the adviser to provide (1) information on each borrowing or 
other cash financing available to the fund,\220\ (2) the total dollar 
amount available, and (3) the average amount borrowed over the 
reporting period. Consistent with the requirements for hedge fund 
reporting on borrowing in Form PF, private equity fund advisers that 
are required to complete this question in section 4 may skip Question 
12 in section 1b.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ We are including other cash financing available to the 
fund as part of this question to capture instances in which a fund 
has access to capital that would not be considered borrowing, for 
example, where a private equity fund adviser agrees to provide a 
cash infusion to a fund it advises.
    \221\ Consistent with the requirements for hedge fund reporting 
on borrowing in Form PF, we have integrated the components of 
question 12 into this Question 68 that were not already included at 
proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters supported adding this fund-level borrowing 
reporting requirement, stating that it will help the Commission and 
FSOC better identify and monitor the use of leverage within private 
equity funds.\222\ Other commenters argued that this reporting 
requirement is unrelated to systemic risk.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter; PDI Comment Letter; and 
TIAA Comment Letter.
    \223\ See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; and NYC Bar Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We understand that fund-level borrowing--particularly subscription 
lines of credit--have become increasingly important to the operation of 
private equity funds since the adoption of Form PF.\224\ Funds vary in 
how they employ these facilities and their impacts can often be opaque 
for investors. While some private equity funds use subscription lines 
appropriately, we have observed some funds seeking to take advantage of 
these arrangements. For instance, certain funds may use subscription 
lines to inflate the performance metrics--such as the internal rate of 
return--that are reported to investors. Other funds may not 
appropriately inform investors about the costs that investors must bear 
in connection with the use of a subscription line. Additionally, funds 
that allow large unpaid amounts to remain on their subscription lines 
over an extended period of time may be exposed to greater liquidity 
risk which may have knock-on effects for their investors and portfolio 
investments. We believe that the prevalence of these subscription lines 
of credit could raise important systemic risk and investor protection 
concerns, and therefore it is important that the Commission and FSOC 
receive more detailed information on them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ See, e.g., Enhancing Transparency Around Subscription 
Lines of Credit, Institutional Limited Partners Association (June 
2020), available at https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ILPA-Guidance-on-Disclosures-Related-to-Subscription-Lines-of-Credit_2020_FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Events of Default, Bridge Financing to Controlled Portfolio 
Companies, and Geographic Breakdown of Investments. As proposed, we are 
amending three existing questions in section 4. First, we are amending 
existing Question 74 to require advisers to provide more granular 
information about the nature of reported events of default, such as 
whether it is a payment default of the private equity fund, a payment 
default of a CPC, or a default relating to a failure to uphold terms 
under the applicable borrowing agreement (other than a failure to make 
regularly scheduled payments).\225\ This more detailed information will 
help the Commission and FSOC better assess the impact of default events 
to both investors and markets more generally and may indicate emerging 
potential systemic risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ We would redesignate Question 74 as Question 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, we are amending existing Question 75, which requires 
reporting on the identity of the institutions providing bridge 
financing to the adviser's CPCs and the amount of such financing, to 
add additional counterparty identifying information (i.e., LEI (if any) 
and if the counterparty is affiliated with a major financial 
institution, the name of the financial institution).\226\ This 
information should be readily available to advisers, and will provide 
globally standardized identification information about counterparty 
entities reported in this

[[Page 38169]]

question that will enhance the Commission's and FSOC's ability to 
analyze exposure data for purposes of assessing systemic risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ We would redesignate Question 75 as Question 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, we are amending existing Question 78, which requires 
reporting on the geographical breakdown of investments by private 
equity funds, by moving away from reporting based on a static group of 
regions and countries and towards identifying a private equity fund's 
greatest country exposures based on a percent of net asset value.\227\ 
These changes to existing Question 78 will improve the usefulness of 
data collected, as reporting is currently limited to exposure by region 
with additional reporting on a limited number of countries of interest. 
For example, information obtained from this question could provide 
insight into whether a critical mass of private equity funds have 
investments concentrated in a country that is experiencing significant 
political instability or a natural disaster, which could be important 
for systemic risk assessments. We have found the existing reporting 
approach lacks precision because the regions are not uniformly defined 
and although countries of interest change over time, the form is not 
dynamic in this regard. This amendment will require advisers to report 
all countries (by ISO country code \228\) to which a reporting fund has 
exposure of 10 percent or more of its net asset value. We believe this 
exposure threshold represents significant country exposure, while 
balancing the burden that the question would create for advisers. 
Advisers will have to follow Instruction 15 for purposes of calculating 
the information in the proposal, including reporting the exposure in 
U.S. dollars which will improve data comparability across funds. 
Advisers also will categorize investments based on concentrations of 
risk and economic exposure. We are also removing regional level 
reporting because we are now able to analyze regional exposure using 
the country level information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ We would redesignate Question 78 as Question 67.
    \228\ This is similar to reporting on Form N-PORT and will 
improve the comparability of data between Form PF and Form N-PORT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters supported amending these questions to require 
more granular information, agreeing with the proposal that these 
amendments will improve the FSOC and Commission's assessment of 
systemic risk.\229\ Commenters otherwise generally did not specifically 
address these proposed amendments. We continue to believe that we 
should amend these questions as proposed for the reasons set forth 
above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ See ICGN Comment Letter and PDI Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Not Adopting Certain Proposed Large Private Equity Fund Adviser 
Questions. In response to commenters, we are not adopting the following 
proposed large private equity fund adviser questions at this time: (1) 
restructuring/recapitalization of a portfolio company; \230\ (2) 
investments in different levels of a single portfolio company's capital 
structure by related funds; \231\ (3) financing of portfolio companies; 
\232\ (4) floating rate borrowings of controlled portfolio companies; 
\233\ and (5) controlled portfolio companies owned by private equity 
funds.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ Proposed as Question 70 in section 4.
    \231\ Proposed as Question 71 in section 4.
    \232\ Proposed as Question 74 in section 4.
    \233\ Proposed as Question 82 in section 4.
    \234\ Proposed as Question 67 in section 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters supported adopting these proposed questions on the 
belief that they would be beneficial to the FSOC and Commission's 
assessment of systemic risk.\235\ Of these, one commenter argued that 
some of these questions would be particularly helpful to understand 
systemic risk related to leverage and credit.\236\ Another commenter 
stated that these questions will improve monitoring of where risks 
might be building up in the industry as a whole, in particular funds, 
at fund investors, and in the portfolio companies of private equity 
funds.\237\ On the other hand, some commenters criticized these 
questions as being burdensome and unrelated to systemic risk.\238\ 
Several commenters emphasized the additional difficulty that these 
questions pose due to the complexity and administrative expense 
inherent in collecting the necessary information at the portfolio-
company-level.\239\ A few commenters stated that a private equity fund 
may not have a controlling interest in all of its portfolio company 
investments and thus may not be able to collect the required 
information.\240\ Several commenters also argued that the scope of some 
of these questions is too broad and that they would capture minor and/
or ordinary course transactions.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter; PDI Comment Letter; and 
AFREF Comment Letter.
    \236\ See PDI Comment Letter.
    \237\ See Better Markets Comment Letter.
    \238\ See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; RER Comment Letter; and 
SIFMA Comment Letter.
    \239\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter; RER Comment Letter; and 
MFA Comment Letter.
    \240\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter and REBNY Comment Letter. 
The SIFMA Comment Letter also stated that the existence of minority 
investors in a single portfolio company may result in duplicative 
reporting for certain of these proposed questions.
    \241\ See, e.g., TIAA Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter; and 
MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we continue to believe that these questions would provide 
benefits to the FSOC's and Commission's assessment of systemic risk and 
the Commission's investor protection efforts for the reasons described 
above, we acknowledge the concerns raised by some commenters. For 
example, each of these questions is focused on collecting information 
at the portfolio company-level rather than the fund-level. As stated by 
commenters,\242\ private equity funds may not have a controlling 
interest in any or all of their portfolio company investments. In such 
cases, a private equity fund may not be able to obtain or accurately 
report the portfolio company information that was proposed. Depending 
on size and strategy, many private equity funds also have ten or more 
portfolio company investments and some may have hundreds or more. As a 
result, as some commenters argued,\243\ we recognize that the costs 
associated with collecting this information may be far higher than 
collecting information at the fund itself. Additionally, we understand 
that some of these questions may capture ordinary course transactions 
in certain instances. We believe that narrowing these questions in a 
productive and meaningful way will require further study and analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter and REBNY Comment Letter.
    \243\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter; RER Comment Letter; and 
MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We considered, but are not adopting, a modification of these 
questions, in each case, to only require reporting of controlled 
portfolio companies. However, this modification would reduce the value 
of this reporting because non-controlling investments in portfolio 
companies can still be substantial and have systemic consequences. 
Accordingly, we have decided to adopt the proposed questions that are 
at the fund-level, but not adopt these proposed questions that focus on 
a fund's portfolio investments at this time. We believe this approach 
strikes the right balance between collecting beneficial information and 
minimizing the burdens placed on private equity funds and their 
advisers.

E. Effective and Compliance Dates

    In order to provide time for advisers to prepare to comply with the 
amendments, including reviewing the requirements, building the 
appropriate internal reporting and tracking systems, and collecting the 
required information,

[[Page 38170]]

as well as to simplify the compliance process, the effective dates for 
the amendments are the same as the compliance dates. A commenter noted 
that different compliance dates for these amendments as well as those 
proposed in the 2022 Form PF Joint Proposing Release may lead to 
inconsistent reporting as well as additional compliance burdens.\244\ 
We acknowledge that having separate effective and compliance dates 
could cause reporting that is inconsistent since we are amending 
certain existing questions in Form PF. If a period exists during which 
some advisers may be completing the old version of these questions and 
other advisers are completing the amended versions, they may be 
providing different types of information. For example, private equity 
fund advisers might provide different categories of information with 
respect to geographical breakdowns of investments due to the amendments 
to Question 67 during this interim period. This information could be 
difficult to compare and thus would limit its value for the FSOC and 
our assessment of systemic risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ See MFA Comment Letter (Mar. 16, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are, however, adopting two separate effective/compliance dates. 
For new sections 5 and 6, the effective/compliance date is December 11, 
2023, which is six months after the date of publication of the rules; 
and for the amended, existing sections, the effective/compliance date 
is June 11, 2024, which is one year from the date of publication of the 
rules. We are requiring an earlier effective/compliance date for the 
new Form PF sections 5 and 6, because it requires reporting based on 
distinct event triggers, and it is important that the Commission and 
FSOC begin receiving this information as soon as practicable to improve 
their assessment of systemic risk. Similarly, we are adopting these 
changes to the Commission's sections of Form PF separately and before 
any changes proposed in the 2022 Form PF Joint Proposing Release 
because it is important that the Commission and FSOC begin receiving 
this information, especially hedge fund current reporting and private 
equity event reporting, on a more expedited basis to improve the 
assessment of systemic risk and investor protection. We are adopting a 
later effective/compliance date for the amended, existing sections to 
provide advisers with additional time to review the amendments, build 
the appropriate internal reporting and tracking systems, and collect 
the required information.
    One commenter requested a compliance period of at least 18 months 
after the effective date for all amendments to Form PF.\245\ We are 
providing a six-month period before the simultaneous compliance/
effective date for the new current and quarterly reporting in sections 
5 and 6, as indicated above, because this information is imperative to 
FSOC and our assessment of systemic risk as well as the Commission's 
investor protection mission. After reviewing comments, we believe it is 
necessary that the Commission and FSOC begin receiving these current 
and quarterly reports in a shorter six-month time frame to promptly 
improve their assessment of systemic risk. Additionally, while we 
recognize that preparing to complete the amended, existing sections 
will require additional time, we believe that providing a one-year 
period to do so is sufficient given the modifications of this rule from 
the proposal. Accordingly, beginning six months after the date of this 
rule's publication in the Federal Register, any adviser that is 
required to file sections 5 or 6 of Form PF must do so. Starting one 
year after the date of publication of the rule in the Federal Register, 
any adviser that is required to file Form PF must complete the fully 
amended form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ See IAA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments we adopt relate to different sections of Form PF 
than those proposed in the 2022 Form PF Joint Proposing Release and, 
because they are separate, we believe that the compliance periods are 
appropriate. If the Commission adopts amendments proposed in the 2022 
Form PF Joint Proposing Release, the Commission may address any 
potential issues or concerns with the compliance date at that time.

III. Other Matters

    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs has designated these rules as not a ``major 
rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
    The requirements for reporting by hedge funds, including the 
amendments adopted here, function independently from those governing 
reporting by private equity funds. As explained above, each set of 
amendments addresses particular concerns of the Commission focused on 
the context in which they function, and provide benefits in furtherance 
of the Commission's mission of investor protection and systemic risk 
monitoring by FSOC. If any of the provisions of these rules, or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held to be 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances that 
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

IV. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction

    The Commission is mindful of the economic effects, including the 
costs and benefits, of the final amendments. Section 202(c) of the 
Advisers Act provides that when the Commission is engaging in 
rulemaking under the Advisers Act and is required to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest, the Commission shall also consider whether the action will 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation, in addition to 
the protection of investors.\246\ The analysis below addresses the 
likely economic effects of the final amendments, including the 
anticipated and estimated benefits and costs of the amendments and 
their likely effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
The Commission also discusses the potential economic effects of certain 
alternatives to the approaches taken in these final amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \246\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many of the benefits and costs discussed below are difficult to 
quantify. For example, the Commission cannot quantify how regulators 
may adjust their policies and oversight of the private fund industry in 
response to the additional data collected under the final amendments. 
Also, in some cases, data needed to quantify these economic effects are 
not currently available and the Commission does not have information or 
data that would allow such quantification. For example, costs 
associated with the final amendments may depend on existing systems and 
levels of technological expertise within the private fund advisers, 
which could differ across reporting persons. While the Commission has 
attempted to quantify economic effects where possible, much of the 
discussion of economic effects is qualitative in nature. The Commission 
has sought comment on all aspects of the economic analysis, especially 
any data or information that would enable a quantification of economic 
effects, and the analysis below takes into consideration relevant 
comments received.

[[Page 38171]]

B. Economic Baseline and Affected Parties

1. Economic Baseline
    The Commission adopted Form PF in 2011, with additional amendments 
made to section 3 along with certain money market reforms in 2014.\247\ 
Form PF complements the basic information about private fund advisers 
and funds reported on Form ADV.\248\ Unlike Form ADV, Form PF is not an 
investor-facing disclosure form. Information that private fund advisers 
report on Form PF is provided to regulators on a confidential basis and 
is nonpublic.\249\ The purpose of Form PF is to provide the Commission 
and FSOC with data that regulators can deploy in their regulatory and 
oversight programs directed at assessing and managing systemic risk and 
protecting investors both in the private fund industry and in the U.S. 
financial markets more broadly.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ See supra footnote 3.
    \248\ Investment advisers to private funds report on Form ADV 
general information about private funds that they advise. This 
includes basic organizational, operational information, and 
information about the fund's key service providers. Information on 
Form ADV is available to the public through the Investment Adviser 
Public Disclosure System, which allows the public to access the most 
recent Form ADV filing made by an investment adviser. See, e.g., 
Form ADV, Investor.gov, available at https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/form-adv; see also 
SEC, Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, available at https://adviserinfo.sec.gov/. Some private fund advisers that are required 
to report on Form ADV are not required to file Form PF (for example, 
exempt reporting advisers and advisers with less than $150 million 
in private fund assets under management). Other advisers are 
required to file Form PF and are not required to file Form ADV (for 
example, commodity pools that are not private funds). Based on the 
staff review of Form ADV filings and the Private Fund Statistics, 
less than 10% of funds reported on Form ADV but not on Form PF in 
2022. See infra footnote 284.
    \249\ Commission staff publish quarterly reports of aggregated 
and anonymized data regarding private funds on the Commission's 
website. See Division of Investment Management, Private Fund 
Statistics, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics.shtml; see also supra footnote 4.
    \250\ See supra section I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Private funds and their advisers play an important role in both 
private and public capital markets. These funds, including hedge funds 
and private equity, currently have more than $17.0 trillion in gross 
private fund assets.\251\ Private funds invest in large and small 
businesses and use strategies that range from long-term investments in 
equity securities to frequent trading and investments in complex 
instruments. Their investors include individuals, institutions, 
governmental and private pension funds, and non-profit organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ These estimates are based on staff review of data from the 
Private Fund Statistics report for the first quarter of 2022, issued 
in Jan. 2023. Private fund advisers who file Form PF currently have 
$20.1 trillion in gross assets. See Division of Investment 
Management, Private Fund Statistics (Jan. 3, 2023), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics.shtml. As discussed above, not all private fund advisers 
are required to file Form PF. See supra footnote 248.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Before Form PF was adopted, the Commission and other regulators had 
limited visibility into the economic activity of private funds and 
their advisers, and relied largely on private vendor databases about 
private funds that covered only voluntarily provided private fund data 
and are not representative of the total population.\252\ Form PF 
represented an improvement in available data about private funds and 
their advisers, both in terms of its reliability and completeness.\253\ 
Generally, investment advisers registered (or required to be 
registered) with the Commission with at least $150 million in private 
fund assets under management must file Form PF.\254\ Smaller private 
fund advisers and all private equity fund advisers file annually to 
report general information such as the types of private funds advised 
(e.g., hedge funds or private equity funds), fund size, use of 
borrowings and derivatives, strategy, and types of investors.\255\ 
Large private equity fund advisers also provide data about each private 
equity fund they manage. Large hedge fund advisers also provide data 
about each reporting fund they manage, and are required to file 
quarterly.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ See, e.g., SEC, 2020 Annual Staff Report Relating to the 
Use of Form PF Data (Nov. 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/2020-pf-report-congress.pdf.
    \253\ Id.
    \254\ Registered investment advisers with less than $150 million 
in private funds assets under management, exempt reporting advisers, 
and state-registered advisers report general private fund data on 
Form ADV, but do not file Form PF. See supra footnote 248.
    \255\ Id.
    \256\ See supra footnotes 13, 254.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission and FSOC now have almost a decade of experience with 
analyzing the data collected on Form PF. The collected data has helped 
FSOC establish a baseline picture of the private fund industry for the 
use in assessing systemic risk \257\ and improved the Commission's 
oversight of private fund advisers.\258\ Form PF data also has enhanced 
the Commission and FSOC's ability to frame regulatory policies 
regarding the private fund industry, its advisers, and the markets in 
which they participate, as well as more effectively evaluate the 
outcomes of regulatory policies and programs directed at this sector, 
including the management of systemic risk and the protection of 
investors.\259\ Additionally, based on the data collected through Form 
PF filings, regulators have been able to regularly inform the public 
about ongoing industry statistics and trends by generating quarterly 
Private Fund Statistics reports \260\ and by making publicly available 
certain results of staff research regarding the characteristics, 
activities, and risks of private funds and their advisers.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ See, e.g., Office of Financial Research (OFR), 2021 Annual 
Report to Congress (Nov. 2021), available at https://www.financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/OFR-Annual-Report-2021.pdf; and Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 2020 
Annual Report (2020), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2020AnnualReport.pdf.
    \258\ See supra footnote 252.
    \259\ See supra footnotes 257, 258.
    \260\ See supra footnotes 4, 249.
    \261\ See, e.g., David C. Johnson & Francis A. Martinez, Form PF 
Insights on Private Equity Funds and Their Portfolio Companies, Off. 
Fin. Res. Brief Series 18-01 (June 14, 2018), available at https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/2018/06/14/form-pf-insights-on-private-equity-funds/; Daniel Hiltgen, Private Liquidity Funds: 
Characteristics and Risk Indicators, DERA White Paper (Jan. 27, 
2017) (``Hiltgen Paper''), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/2017-03/Liquidity%20Fund%20Study.pdf; George O. Aragon, Tolga Ergun, 
Mila Getmansky & Giulio Girardi, Hedge Funds: Portfolio, Investor, 
and Financing Liquidity, DERA White Paper (May 17, 2017), available 
at https://www.sec.gov/files/dera_hf-liquidity.pdf; George O. 
Aragon, A. Tolga Ergun & Giulio Girardi, Hedge Fund Liquidity 
Management: Insights for Fund Performance and Systemic Risk 
Oversight, DERA White Paper (Mar. 23, 2022), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3734596 (retrieved from Elsevier SSRN database); 
Mathias S. Kruttli, Phillip J. Monin & Sumudu W. Watugala, The Life 
of the Counterparty: Shock Propagation in Hedge Fund-Prime Broker 
Credit Networks, 146 J. Fin. Econ. 965 (2022) (``Kruttli, Monin & 
Watugala''); Mathias S. Kruttli, Phillip J. Monin, Lubomir Petrasek 
& Sumudu W. Watugala, Hedge Fund Treasury Trading and Funding 
Fragility: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis, Fed. Res. Bd., Fin. & 
Econ. Discussion Series 2021-038 (Apr. 2021), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/hedge-fund-treasury-trading-and-funding-fragility-evidence-from-the-covid-19-crisis.htm; Mathias S. 
Kruttli, Phillip J. Monin & Sumudu W. Watugala, Investor 
Concentration, Flows, and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Hedge Funds, 
Fed. Res. Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2017-121 (Dec. 15, 
2017), available at https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, this decade of experience with analyzing Form PF data has 
also highlighted certain limitations of information collected on Form 
PF, including information gaps and situations where additional and 
timelier information would improve the Commission and FSOC's 
understanding of the private fund industry and the potential systemic 
risk relating to its activities, and improve regulators' ability to 
protect investors.\262\ The need for additional and timelier 
information collected on Form PF is further

[[Page 38172]]

heightened by the increasing significance of private fund advisers to 
financial markets and to the broader economy, and resulting regulatory 
concerns regarding potential risks to U.S. financial stability from 
this sector.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See supra section I.
    \263\ The private fund industry has experienced significant 
growth in size and changes in terms of business practices, 
complexity of fund structures, and investment strategies and 
exposures in the past decade. See supra footnote 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Affected Parties
    The final rule amends and introduces new reporting requirements for 
the advisers to hedge funds \264\ and private equity funds.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Form PF defines ``hedge fund'' broadly to include any 
private fund (other than a securitized asset fund) that has any of 
the following three characteristics: (1) a performance fee or 
allocation that takes into account unrealized gains, or (2) a high 
leverage (i.e., the ability to borrow more than half of its net 
asset value (including committed capital) or have gross notational 
exposure in excess of twice its net asset value (including committed 
capital)), or (3) the ability to short sell securities or enter into 
similar transactions (other than for the purpose of hedging currency 
exposure or managing duration). Any non-exempt commodity pools about 
which an investment adviser is reporting or required to report are 
automatically categorized as hedge funds. Excluded from the ``hedge 
fund'' definition in Form PF are vehicles established for the 
purpose of issuing asset backed securities (``securitized asset 
funds''). See Form PF Glossary.
    \265\ Form PF defines ``private equity fund'' broadly to include 
any private fund that is not a hedge fund, liquidity fund, real 
estate fund, securitized asset fund or venture capital fund and does 
not provide investors with redemption rights in the ordinary course. 
Private funds that have the ability to borrow or short securities 
have to file as a hedge fund. See Form PF Glossary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Hedge funds are one of the largest categories of private 
funds,\266\ and as such play an important role in the U.S. financial 
system due to their ability to mobilize large pools of capital, take 
economically important positions in a market, and their extensive use 
of leverage, derivatives, complex structured products, and short 
selling.\267\ While these features may enable hedge funds to generate 
higher returns as compared to other investment alternatives, the same 
features may also create spillover effects in the event of losses 
(whether caused by their investment and derivatives positions or use of 
leverage or both) that could lead to significant stress or failure not 
just at the affected fund but also across financial markets.\268\
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    \266\ See supra footnote 251.
    \267\ See, e.g., Lloyd Dixon, Noreen Clancy & Krishna B. Kumar, 
Hedge Fund and Systemic Risk, RAND Corporation (2012); John Kambhu, 
Til Schuermann & Kevin Stiroh, Hedge Funds, Financial 
Intermediation, and Systemic Risk, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Rpt. 
No. 291, July's Econ. Policy Rev. (2007).
    \268\ See supra footnotes 257, 263; see also infra section 
IV.C.1.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the second quarter of 2022, there were 9,733 hedge funds 
reported on Form PF, managed by 1,857 advisers. Hedge fund advisers 
that are required to file Form PF had investment discretion over 
approximately $9.4 trillion in gross assets under management, which 
represented almost half of the reported assets in the private fund 
industry.\269\ Currently, hedge fund advisers with between $150 million 
and $2 billion in regulatory assets (that do not qualify as large hedge 
fund advisers) file Form PF annually, in which they provide general 
information about funds they advise such as the types of private funds 
advised, fund size, their use of borrowings and derivatives, strategy, 
and types of investors. Large hedge fund advisers with at least $1.5 
billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to hedge 
funds file Form PF quarterly, in which they provide data about each 
hedge fund they managed during the reporting period (irrespective of 
the size of the fund). Large hedge fund advisers must report more 
information on Form PF about qualifying hedge funds \270\ than other 
hedge funds they manage during the reporting period. In the second 
quarter of 2022, there were 2,059 qualifying hedge funds reported on 
Form PF, managed by 598 advisers. These advisers had $7.9 trillion in 
gross assets under management, which represented approximately 84 
percent of the reported hedge fund assets.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ See supra footnote 251. In the second quarter of 2022, 
hedge fund assets accounted for 47% of the gross asset value 
(``GAV'') ($9.4/$20.1 trillion) and 35% of the net asset value 
(``NAV'') ($4.9/$13.9 trillion) of all private funds reported on 
Form PF.
    \270\ See supra footnote 13.
    \271\ See supra footnote 251. In the second quarter of 2022, 
qualifying hedge fund assets accounted for 84% of the GAV ($7.9/$9.4 
trillion) and 80% of the NAV ($3.9/$4.9 trillion) of all hedge funds 
reported on Form PF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Private equity funds are another large category of funds in the 
private fund industry. In the second quarter of 2022, there were 18,987 
private equity funds reported on Form PF, managed by 1,635 advisers. 
Advisers to private equity funds had investment discretion over 
approximately one third of the reported gross assets in the private 
fund industry.\272\ Many private equity funds focus on long-term 
returns by investing in a private, non-publicly traded company or 
business--the portfolio company--and engage actively in the management 
and direction of that company or business in order to increase its 
value.\273\ Investments in private equity funds are often more illiquid 
with more limited redemption rights as a result.\274\ Other private 
equity funds may specialize in making minority investments in fast-
growing companies or startups.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ See supra footnote 251. In the first quarter of 2022, 
private equity assets accounted for 32% of the GAV ($6.4/$20.1 
trillion) and 41% of the NAV ($5.7/$13.9 trillion) of all private 
funds reported on Form PF.
    \273\ After purchasing controlling interests in portfolio 
companies, private equity fund advisers frequently get involved in 
managing those companies by serving on the company's board; 
selecting and monitoring the management team; acting as sounding 
boards for CEOs; and sometimes stepping into management roles 
themselves. See, e.g., Private Equity Funds, Investor.gov, available 
at https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/investment-products/private-investment-funds/private-equity.
    \274\ Id.
    \275\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While all fund advisers are subject to fiduciary duties to their 
clients, private equity funds' long-term investment horizons and 
various relationships with affiliates and portfolio companies mean that 
there exist opportunities for fund advisers to pursue transactions or 
investments despite conflicts of interest and also to extract private 
benefits at the expense of the funds they manage and, by extension, the 
limited partners invested in the funds.\276\ The Commission has brought 
several enforcement actions against private equity fund advisers that 
allegedly received undisclosed fees and expenses,\277\ impermissibly 
shifted and misallocated expenses,\278\ or failed to disclose conflicts 
of interests adequately.\279\ In addition, private equity funds' 
increasingly extensive use of leverage for financing portfolio 
companies and a significant increase in

[[Page 38173]]

the use of private credit strategies both raise systemic risk 
concerns.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ Private equity fund advisers may be managing multiple 
private equity funds and portfolio companies. The funds typically 
pay the private equity fund adviser for advisory services. 
Additionally, the portfolio companies may also pay the private 
equity fund adviser for services such as managing and monitoring the 
portfolio company. Affiliates of the private equity fund adviser may 
also play a role as service providers to the funds or the portfolio 
companies. See, e.g., SEC, Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations, Risk Alert, Observations from Examinations of 
Investment Advisers Managing Private Funds (June 23, 2020), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/files/Private%20Fund%20Risk%20Alert_0.pdf; Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC 
Division of Enforcement, Securities Enforcement Forum West 2016 
Keynote Address: Private Equity Enforcement Securities and Exchange 
Commission (May 12, 2016) (``Ceresney Keynote''), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-equity-enforcement.html.
    \277\ See, e.g., In the Matter of Blackstone Management 
Partners, L.L.C., et. al., Advisers Act Release No. 4219 (Oct. 7, 
2015) (settled action).
    \278\ See, e.g., In the Matter of Cherokee Investment Partners, 
LLC and Cherokee Advisers, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4258 (Nov. 
5, 2015) (settled action); In the Matter of Lincolnshire Management, 
Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 3927 (Sept. 22, 2014) (settled 
action).
    \279\ See, e.g., In the Matter of Mitchell J. Friedman, Advisers 
Act Release No. 5338 (Sept. 4, 2019) (settled action).
    \280\ See Moody's Warns of `Systemic Risks' in Private Credit 
Industry, Fin. Times (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/862d0efb-09e5-4d92-b8aa-7856a59adb20. One 
commenter argues that this Moody's report is ``more speculative than 
informative . . . Investors have significant transparency on how 
leverage might be employed by the investment manager as part of 
their due diligence process prior to investing. This will include 
any appropriate leverage limits, risk management systems, the source 
of financing as well as the collateral required. Leverage providers, 
typically banks but also some pension funds or insurers, will also 
undertake their own analysis before providing financing to private 
credit funds. Their risk appetite therefore plays a significant role 
in determining the availability of leverage for private credit 
funds.'' The commenter argues that ``[t]he actual observations of 
that report do not match the Commission's conclusion,'' based on a 
quote that ``vehicles balance [. . .] risks through portfolio 
diversity and stronger creditor protections in loan agreements than 
for institutional loans.'' AIMA/ACC Comment Letter. However, while 
we agree that it is important to distinguish leverage at the fund 
level and portfolio company leverage, we believe that the 
commenter's statements do not engage with key conclusions of the 
Moody's study, namely that ``private credit also heightens credit 
risks via reduced transparency, rising leverage and lender 
concentrations. Additionally, its rapid growth and the 
disintermediation of regulated financial institutions are sweeping a 
mounting tide of leverage into a less-regulated grey zone, with 
systemic implications. Risks that are rising beyond the spotlight of 
public investors and regulators may be difficult to quantify, even 
as they come to have broader economic consequences.'' Moody's 
Investors Service, As Private Credit Continues to Grow, Risks are 
Getting Swept Into Grey Zone (Oct. 25, 2021), available at https://live.moodys.io/global-banking-series-america-edition/global-investment-banks-navigating-a-changing-world/as-private-credit-continues-to-grow-risks-are-getting-swept-into-grey-zone. For 
additional discussion of leveraged lending and systemic risk, see, 
e.g., Rod Dubitsky, CLOs, Private Equity, Pensions, and Systemic 
Risk, 26 J. Structured Fin. 8 (2020), available at https://jsf.pm-research.com/content/26/1/8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, all private equity fund advisers registered with the 
Commission who are required to file Form PF must do so annually. 
Private equity fund advisers with between $150 million and $2 billion 
in regulatory assets under management attributable to private equity 
funds must provide general information while large private equity fund 
advisers with at least $2 billion in regulatory assets under management 
must report more detailed data about the private equity funds they 
manage (section 4 of Form PF).\281\ In the second quarter of 2022, 
there were 18,987 private equity funds reported on Form PF, managed by 
1,635 advisers, with $6.4 trillion in gross assets under 
management.\282\ Of those, 6,644 funds were private equity funds 
managed by 435 large private equity fund advisers with discretion over 
nearly $4.9 trillion in gross assets, representing 77 percent of the 
reported private equity assets.\283\ However, because not all private 
equity fund advisers file Form PF, section 4 private equity fund 
advisers represent less than 77 percent of total private equity fund 
regulatory assets. Currently, the $2 billion reporting threshold 
captures 73 percent of the entire private equity industry.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ See supra footnote 13.
    \282\ See supra footnote 251.
    \283\ Id.
    \284\ Based on staff review of Form ADV filings, in 2022, the 
aggregate regulatory assets under management under the discretion of 
private equity fund advisers were $6.7 trillion. According to the 
Private Fund Statistics Report, this aggregate estimate includes 
approximately $6.4 trillion (95%) in gross assets under management 
by private equity fund advisers that file Form PF, $4.9 trillion of 
which were under the discretion of large private equity fund 
advisers. This represents 73% of the industry. See supra footnote 
251.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Private funds are typically limited to accredited investors and 
qualified clients such as pension funds, insurance companies, 
foundations and endowments, and high income and net worth 
individuals.\285\ Retail U.S. investors with exposure to private funds 
are typically invested in private funds indirectly through public and 
private pension plans and other institutional investors.\286\ In the 
second quarter of 2022, public pension plans had $1,871 billion 
invested in reporting private funds while private pension plans had 
$1,341 billion invested in reporting private funds, making up 13.5 
percent and 9.7 percent of the overall beneficial ownership in the 
private equity industry, respectively.\287\ Private fund advisers have 
also sought to be included in individual investors' retirement plans, 
including their 401(k)s.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ See supra footnote 273; see also Hedge Funds, 
Investor.gov, available at https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/investment-products/private-investment-funds/hedge-funds.
    \286\ See supra footnotes 251, 285.
    \287\ Id.
    \288\ See, e.g., Dep't of Labor, Information Letter (June 3, 
2020), available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/information-letters/06-03-2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Benefits and Costs

1. Benefits
    The final amendments are designed to facilitate two primary goals 
the Commission sought to achieve with reporting on Form PF as 
articulated in the original adopting release, namely: (1) facilitating 
FSOC's understanding and monitoring of potential systemic risk relating 
to activities in the private fund industry and assisting FSOC in 
determining whether and how to deploy its regulatory tools with respect 
to nonbank financial companies; and (2) enhancing the Commission's 
ability to evaluate and develop regulatory policies and improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Commission's efforts to protect 
investors and maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ See supra footnote 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the final amendments include amendments to section 4 
of Form PF, which will enhance and provide more specificity regarding 
the information collected on large advisers of private equity funds, 
including new annual reporting for certain triggering events that were 
originally proposed as current reporting requirements for all private 
equity fund advisers. The final amendments also introduce new section 5 
of Form PF, which will require advisers to qualifying hedge funds to 
provide current reporting to the Commission when their funds are facing 
certain events that may signal stress or potential future stress in 
financial markets or implicate investor protection concerns. In 
addition, the final amendments include improvements to definitions and 
existing questions aimed to reduce their ambiguity and improve data 
quality. Below we discuss benefits associated with the specific 
elements of the amendments.
a. Current Reporting Requirements for Large Hedge Fund Advisers to 
Qualifying Hedge Funds (Section 5 of Form PF)
    The final amendments introduce new section 5 of Form PF requiring 
large hedge fund advisers to qualifying hedge funds (i.e., hedge funds 
with a net asset value of at least $500 million) to file a current 
report with the Commission when their funds experience certain stress 
events: (1) extraordinary investment losses, (2) significant margin 
events and default events, (3) a prime broker relationship being 
terminated or materially restricted, (4) operations events, and (5) 
certain events associated with withdrawals and redemptions at the 
reporting hedge fund.\290\ These events may serve as signals to the 
Commission and FSOC about significant stress at the reporting fund and 
potential risks to financial stability. Advisers will be required to 
file current reports within 72 hours of the occurrence of such an 
event.\291\ Advisers will also be allowed to provide a narrative 
response if they believe that additional information would be helpful

[[Page 38174]]

in understanding the information reported in the current 
report(s).\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ See supra section II.A.1. In a departure from the 
proposal, we are not adopting a requirement that an adviser report a 
significant decline in holdings of unencumbered cash.
    \291\ This is a departure from the proposal, which required 
advisers to file a current report within one business day of the 
occurrence of such an event. As discussed above, advisers should 
consider filing a current report as soon as possible following such 
an event. See supra section II.A.1.
    \292\ See supra section II.A.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The reporting of these stress events is designed to assist the 
Commission and FSOC in assessing potential risks to financial stability 
that hedge funds' activities could pose due to the complexity of their 
strategies, their interconnectedness in the financial system, and the 
limited regulations governing them.\293\ There are two main channels 
through which stress events at an individual hedge fund may pose risks 
to broader financial stability: forced liquidation of assets, which 
could depress asset prices, and spillover of stress to the fund's 
counterparties, which could negatively impact other activities of the 
counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \293\ See supra sections II.A., II.A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, when a large hedge fund experiences significant losses, a 
margin default, or faces large redemptions, it may be forced to 
deleverage and liquidate its positions at substantially depressed 
prices. Forced liquidation of assets by the hedge fund at depressed 
prices may affect other investors and financial institutions holding 
the same or similar assets.\294\ Consequently, more investors and 
financial institutions may then face increased stress from margin calls 
and creditor concerns. This could lead to more sales at depressed 
prices, potentially causing stress across the entire financial system. 
Second, large hedge funds that use leverage through loans, derivatives, 
or reverse repurchase agreements with other financial institutions as 
counterparties may cause significant problems at those financial 
institutions in times of stress.\295\ This in turn may force those 
institutions to scale back their lending efforts and other investment 
and financing activities with other counterparties, thereby potentially 
creating stress for other market participants.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ For example, because financial institutions base asset 
valuations in part on recent transaction prices for comparable 
assets, when assets are sold at depressed prices, forced 
liquidations at depressed prices could lead to lower valuations for 
entire classes of similar assets. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. Econ. 
Perspectives 29 (2011), available at https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.25.1.29; see also Fernando Duarte & Thomas 
Eisenbach, Fire-Sale Spillovers and Systemic Risk, 76 J. Fin. 1251, 
1251-1256 (2021), available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jofi.13010; Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Krause, Hedge 
Funds and Systemic Risk, in Handbook on Hedge Funds (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2016).
    \295\ For example, a lender to a hedge fund may view its loans 
as increasingly high risk as the hedge fund's balance sheet 
deteriorates. See, e.g., Mark Gertler & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Chapter 
11--Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle 
Analysis, in Handbook of Monetary Economics (2010), available at 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/obstfeld/kiyotaki.pdf.
    \296\ For example, if a bank has a large exposure to a hedge 
fund that defaults or operates in markets where prices are falling 
rapidly, the bank's greater exposure to risk may reduce its ability 
or willingness to extend credit to worthy borrowers. To the extent 
that these bank-dependent borrowers cannot access alternative 
sources of funding, their investment and economic activity could be 
curtailed. See, e.g., Reint Gropp, How Important Are Hedge Funds in 
a Crisis?, FRBSF Econ. Letter (Apr. 14, 2014), available at https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2014-11.pdf. Even banks and 
financial institutions that are not directly harmed by the forced 
liquidation of assets by hedge funds may contribute to a system-wide 
lending contraction in response to hedge fund crises, to the extent 
they withdraw capital from lending to exploit distressed prices. 
See, e.g., Jeremy Stein, Member of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Workshop on `Fire Sales' as a Driver of 
Systemic Risk in Tri-Party Repo and Other Secured Funding Markets 
(Oct. 4, 2013), available at https://www.bis.org/review/r131007d.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result, a stress event at one large hedge fund may potentially 
spill over to the fund's lenders, counterparties, and across the entire 
financial system, carrying with it significant economic costs and the 
loss of confidence of investors. We believe that a timely notice about 
stress events could provide an early warning of the fund's assets 
liquidation and risk to counterparties. Such a timely notice could 
allow the Commission and FSOC to assess the need for a regulatory 
policy response, if any, and could allow the Commission to pursue 
potential outreach, examinations, or investigations, in response to any 
harm to investors or potential risks to financial stability on an 
expedited basis before those harms or risks worsen.
    In addition, current reporting of stress events at multiple 
qualifying hedge funds may indicate broader market instability with 
potential risks for similarly situated funds, or markets in which these 
funds invest. Current reports will allow the Commission and FSOC to 
assess the prevalence of the reported stress events based on the number 
of funds filing in a short time frame, and identify patterns among 
similarly situated funds and common factors that contributed to the 
reported stress events. In that regard, current reports will be 
especially useful during periods of market volatility and stress, when 
the Commission and FSOC are actively and quickly ascertaining the 
affected funds, gathering information to assess systemic risk, and 
determining whether and how to pursue regulatory responses, if any, and 
when the Commission is actively determining whether and how to pursue 
outreach, examinations, or investigations. We anticipate that the 
current reporting requirement will improve the transparency to the 
Commission and FSOC of hedge fund activities and risk exposures, which 
will enhance systemic risk assessment and investor protection efforts.
    We believe that those efforts will be beneficial for hedge fund 
advisers, hedge funds, and hedge fund investors, as well as for other 
market participants, as the new and timely information about stress 
events at hedge funds will help the Commission and FSOC to assess 
emerging risk events proactively, and will help the Commission further 
evaluate the need for outreach, examinations, or investigations, in 
order to minimize market disruptions. In turn, this could help develop 
robust resolution mechanisms for dealing with the stress at 
systemically important hedge funds, which could lead to more resilient 
financial markets and instill stronger investor confidence in the U.S. 
hedge fund industry and financial markets more broadly.\297\ The 
Commission may also use this information to further advance investor 
protection efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ See, e.g., J[oacute]n Dan[iacute]elsson, Ashley Taylor & 
Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds Be 
Regulated? A Survey, 1 J. Fin. Stability 522 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also anticipate that the current reporting requirements might 
incentivize some hedge fund managers to enhance internal risk controls 
and reporting, which could support more effective risk management for 
these funds.\298\ However, some investment advisers commented that they 
did not believe that a current reporting regime would provide any 
incentive for enhanced internal controls.\299\ We disagree with the 
assertion that there will be no additional incentives to enhance 
internal risk controls. We believe that at the margin there may be such 
enhanced incentives. To the extent these enhanced internal risk 
controls and reporting improve managers' ability to monitor and respond 
to potential stress events, we believe this could provide market-wide 
benefits to funds, their investors, and financial markets more broadly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \298\ For example, fund advisers may not internalize all of the 
benefits that enhanced risk reporting provides other fund advisers 
and investors to other fund advisers. Current reporting requirements 
may result in reporting practices that are more consistent with fund 
advisers considering the impact of their internal risk reporting on 
the broader market.
    \299\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, other commenters stated that under the current 
reporting regime, investors may demand additional reporting themselves, 
knowing that reporting systems are being developed for Commission and

[[Page 38175]]

FSOC reporting.\300\ To the extent investors secure this additional 
reporting, those investors would benefit from enhanced information on 
potential risks associated with their investments.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ See, e.g., SIFMA Comment Letter; AIMA Comment Letter.
    \301\ These benefits would be partially offset by the additional 
costs to funds of this reporting, and those costs may be passed on 
to investors. See infra section IV.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, requiring hedge fund advisers to report stress events 
on Form PF will support regulatory efficiency because all eligible 
hedge fund advisers will be required to file information about certain 
stress events on a standardized form. Advisers will also be allowed to 
provide a narrative response if they believe that additional 
information would be helpful in understanding the information reported 
in the current report(s).\302\ Having standardized information, plus 
additional potential narrative detail explaining additional context 
behind the standardized reporting, will provide a more complete record 
of significant stress events in the hedge fund industry that can be 
used by the Commission and FSOC to identify regulatory tools and 
mechanisms that could potentially be used to make future systemic 
crises episodes both less likely to occur as well as less costly and 
damaging when they do occur.\303\ The observations from this research 
could help inform and frame regulatory responses to future market 
events and policymaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ See supra section II.A.8.
    \303\ For instance, a more complete record would allow the staff 
to more accurately assess the prevalence of the reported stress 
events, identify patterns among affected funds, and detect factors 
that contributed to the reported stress events. The observations 
from this research could be used to identify causes for, and 
implications of, possible future similar stress events, or causes 
of, and implications for, investor harm, thus enabling the 
Commission and FSOC to better assess such future events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some investment adviser groups raised three categories of concerns 
with respect to current reporting, which we will discuss in turn: 
First, some commenters broadly question whether current reporting can 
provide useful data indicative of systemic risk or market stress at 
all.\304\ Second, as a closely related matter, one commenter questioned 
whether the Commission would be able to take relevant actions using the 
data from the current reporting regime in the event of systemic risk or 
market stress.\305\ Lastly, some commenters questioned the Commission's 
analysis in the particular threshold choices of the trigger events in 
the current reporting regime.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter.
    \305\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \306\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, some commenters more broadly questioned the benefits of 
current reporting. For example, one commenter stated that ``there is no 
policy justification for the proposed amendments which would seek to 
impose unnecessary and disproportionate compliance and operational 
burdens on advisers.'' \307\ Commenters also stated, broadly, that the 
events the Commission requests reporting on are not indicative of 
systemic risk and market disruption,\308\ or that the data produced 
will have little utility in assessing actual systemic risks.\309\ We 
disagree. As an initial matter, the above literature supports a view 
that extraordinary investment losses (or other systemic stress events) 
at one large hedge fund may potentially spill over to the fund's 
lenders, counterparties, and across the entire financial system. We 
believe the broader criticisms by commenters do not dispute these 
results. These commenters also do not dispute that the current 
reporting regime will facilitate outreach, examinations, or 
investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \308\ Id.
    \309\ MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, other commenters support the stated benefits. For 
example, one commenter stated that ``[t]he Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission in 2011 cited the lack of transparency into the non-bank 
sector numerous times as a major contributor to the financial crisis of 
2008. To prevent additional financial instability stemming from a lack 
of visibility for regulators into hedge fund holdings, and to enable 
the FSOC and policy makers to consider appropriate policy responses, 
the Commission and FSOC both need to have this critical data.'' \310\ 
Another commenter supported the current reporting disclosures, stating 
that they believed the systemic risk posed by private funds ought to be 
monitored.\311\ As a final example, a third commenter specifically 
described the risks from extraordinary investment losses at a hedge 
fund as being able to impact markets, necessitating intervention to 
protect markets and investors, and stating broadly that the rest of the 
triggering events are similarly important.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \310\ AFREF Comment Letter; see also supra section II.A.
    \311\ Public Citizen 50 Comment Letter (``We support these 
additional disclosures. Because the scope of private funds is so 
large, the systemic risk they pose must be monitored with greater 
care. We specifically support the urgent reporting of losses. Losses 
of 20% or more may indicate stress at the fund or even the markets 
where the fund participates.''); see also supra section II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certain revisions to the final amendments are in response to 
comments that specific elements of the proposed current reporting 
triggers were redundant or likely to result in false positive reports 
that were not indicators of systemic stress, and thus preserve the 
benefits of the proposal while removing unnecessary costs as compared 
to the proposed current reporting triggers. For example, some 
commenters stated that parties may terminate prime broker relationships 
for ordinary business reasons that are not indicative of fund or 
counterparty stress, among other related concerns.\312\ After 
considering comments, we are narrowing the prime broker reporting items 
to only apply when the prime broker terminates the agreement or 
materially restricts its relationship with the fund, in whole or in 
part, in markets where that prime broker continues to be active,\313\ 
or when there is a termination of the relationship between the prime 
broker and the reporting fund if a ``termination event'' was activated 
in the prime brokerage agreement, or related agreements, in the last 12 
months.\314\ Similarly, with respect to changes in unencumbered cash, 
some commenters argued that the proposed current reporting trigger 
would capture routine cash movements in certain strategies resulting in 
some funds filing numerous reports over the course of a year.\315\ We 
are persuaded by commenters and are not adopting this item after 
considering comments received.\316\ Lastly, some commenters argued that 
the proposed extraordinary investment loss and margin increase 
reporting based on outdated NAV figures would yield unreliable current 
reports. For example, an extraordinary investment loss current report 
regime based on an outdated NAV figure would yield excessive reports 
during upward-trending markets, when current fund values greatly exceed 
last quarter's NAV and subsequent losses are therefore overly likely to 
exceed 20 percent of last quarter's NAV.\317\ The final amendments 
instead require reporting based on the more timely RFACV measure.\318\ 
We believe these changes

[[Page 38176]]

preserve the benefits of the final amendments while reducing the costs 
relative to the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ See supra section II.A.4.
    \313\ This instruction excludes termination events related to 
the financial state, activities or other characteristics solely of 
the prime broker. See supra section II.A.4.
    \314\ See supra section II.A.4.
    \315\ See supra section II.A.5.
    \316\ See supra section II.A.5.
    \317\ See supra section II.A.2.
    \318\ See supra sections II.A.2, II.A.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, in addition to questioning whether the trigger events in 
the current reporting regime are useful as relevant indicators of 
systemic risk or market stress, one commenter questioned whether the 
Commission had demonstrated an ability to intervene to avoid a 
subsequent systemic event using current reporting data.\319\ However, 
again, this commenter broadly does not dispute that the current 
reporting trigger events will facilitate outreach, examinations, or 
investigations. We have also discussed above the other potential 
responses that would be facilitated by the timely notices of a stress 
event under the current reporting regime, such as FSOC and the 
Commission analyzing the scale and scope of the event and identifying 
whether additional funds that may have similar investments, market 
positions, or financing profiles are at risk.\320\ For example, as 
noted above, if one fund that was particularly concentrated in a 
deteriorating position or strategy reported an extraordinary loss or 
was terminated by their prime broker for reasons related to that 
position or strategy, Commission staff could potentially conduct 
outreach to fund counterparties or other similarly situated funds to 
assess whether any regulatory action could mitigate the potential for 
contagion or harm to investors.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \319\ AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \320\ See supra sections II.A., II.A.2.
    \321\ See supra section II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, some commenters argue that benefits of certain current 
reports will be mitigated where other triggering events have already 
provided pertinent information.\322\ We agree that this may be true in 
certain cases. For example, for extraordinary losses that result from 
adverse movements against short positions, the reporting fund will, in 
general, be required to post additional margin or collateral. The 
benefits from the subsequent margin, collateral, or equivalent increase 
may be limited by the Commission having already received an 
extraordinary investment loss current report. However, we believe that 
the current reporting triggering events all offer unique benefits. For 
example, margin, collateral, or equivalent increases may result from 
increased volatility before defaults actually occur, providing early 
warning indicators of hedge fund stress or potential liquidation, much 
like extraordinary investment losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, commenters questioned the Commission's analysis in several 
of the particular parameter choices of the current reporting regime. We 
discuss these parameter choices each in turn.
    First, some commenters questioned whether the extraordinary 
investment loss current report threshold should be set at 20 percent, 
or some higher threshold.\323\ While the Commission requested comment 
on the choice of threshold,\324\ no commenter offered data or analysis 
targeted at estimating a different threshold for extraordinary 
investment losses. Only one commenter suggested an alternative 
threshold of 50 percent, but did so with no data or analysis defending 
this alternative threshold as more optimal than a 20 percent threshold, 
besides the fact that it would generate fewer current reports.\325\ 
Moreover, other commenters supported the extraordinary loss current 
reporting regime as proposed, with a 20 percent threshold.\326\ As 
noted above, it is also our understanding that NAV decline triggers in 
risk control provisions of prime broker agreements or ISDA master 
agreements typically range from 10 percent to 25 percent declines over 
a 30 day period.\327\ We are not aware of any data or literature that 
would suggest a flaw in a choice of a 20 percent threshold. We 
therefore continue to believe that the benefits stated above will be 
achieved with an extraordinary loss current reporting regime based on a 
20 percent loss threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \323\ See supra section II.A.2; see also, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment 
Letter (``[T]he Proposing Release does not elaborate on its 
`experience' nor does it provide robust data or examples of hedge 
funds experiencing equal or greater losses than 20 percent of the 
fund's most NAV reported on Form PF that would justify inclusion of 
the quantitative threshold.''); MFA Comment Letter (``For reports 
required under section 5.B. (Extraordinary Investment Loss), raise 
the threshold of extraordinary losses to 50 percent. . . . A higher 
reporting threshold will reduce the `noise' of a large number of 
reports that are based on temporary market events.'').
    \324\ 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, supra footnote 6, at 19, 
116.
    \325\ MFA Comment Letter.
    \326\ See supra section II.A; see also, e.g., Better Markets 
Comment Letter (``[A] 20 percent loss in value over such a short 
term would certainly rattle investors, spook markets, and 
necessitate an urgent and hard look by regulators into a variety of 
issues related to the fund to protect markets and investors.''); 
Public Citizen 50 Comment Letter (``Losses of 20 percent or more may 
indicate stress at the fund or even the markets where the fund 
participates.'').
    \327\ See supra section II.A.2; see also, e.g., HFL Report, 
supra footnote 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, in further response to the comment file's concerns 
regarding the parameter choice for extraordinary investment losses, we 
are able to examine existing Form PF's monthly reports of gross and net 
performance. While there are no existing data on how often 
extraordinary investment loss current reports would be received under 
the final amendments to Form PF, we have examined the number of times a 
qualifying hedge fund's monthly gross and net performance, as reported 
on the existing Form PF, crossed thresholds of 10 percent through 35 
percent from 2013-2021.\328\ We believe that, in general, a hedge fund 
reporting a monthly loss of X percent in historical Form PF data 
indicates that, had a current reporting regime with a threshold of X 
percent for extraordinary investment losses been in place in the past, 
that hedge fund would have generated a current report in that month. 
Therefore, the frequency of hedge funds reporting monthly losses of 
different percentages in historical data represents a useful proxy for 
how often current reports are likely to be generated in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ A qualifying hedge fund is defined in Form PF as ``any 
hedge fund that has a net asset value (individually or in 
combination with any feeder funds, parallel funds and/or dependent 
parallel managed accounts) of at least $500 million as of the last 
day of any month in the fiscal quarter immediately preceding your 
most recently completed fiscal quarter.'' Monthly gross and net 
performance results are reported in Section 1b, Item C, Question 17. 
See supra footnote 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Before analyzing the data, we evaluate two reasons why these data 
may differ from the rate that current reports will be generated. First, 
the reference statistics used for extraordinary investment loss current 
reporting do not require the deduction of all fees and expenses or the 
inclusion of income accruals. Therefore, the rate of reporting under 
the current reporting regime will likely be in the range of, but not 
necessarily equal to, the gross and net performance loss threshold 
crossing rates provided above. Second, while statistical models and 
literature vary in terms of whether they indicate 10-day hedge fund 
losses are likely to be greater or less than monthly losses, as a 
leading matter, standard deviations of many statistical processes 
increase with time horizon. We therefore believe that both the gross 
and net performance tables as presented below, which are based on 
monthly performances, likely overstate the rate at which hedge fund 
losses under the current reporting regime would be triggered by each of 
the above thresholds. This would indicate that a 20 percent threshold 
is conservatively high and is likely to reduce costs from false 
positive reports during periods where there is no market stress,

[[Page 38177]]

potentially at the expense of generating fewer current reports during a 
systemic risk episode.
    We first tabulate the number of private funds in Form PF with 
performance data. This is provided in Table 1. The third and fourth 
columns demonstrate that the majority of funds and advisers in all 
years report 12 months of performance data.

                                                     Table 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Number of
                                                                                Number of funds   advisers with
                    Year                      Number of funds     Number of      with 12 months    12 months of
                                                                   advisers      of performance    performance
                                                                                      data             data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013........................................             1369              469             1041              402
2014........................................             1515              514             1207              450
2015........................................             1570              522             1241              458
2016........................................             1572              509             1241              455
2017........................................             1699              528             1345              474
2018........................................             1718              538             1394              471
2019........................................             1684              525             1388              472
2020........................................             1722              526             1272              454
2021........................................             1727              561             1430              509
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We next examine two key features of Form PF monthly performance 
data: The number of threshold crossings during periods where there is 
no market stress, and the number of threshold crossings during periods 
of market stress. Tables 2 and 3 display the number of times a 
qualifying hedge fund's monthly gross and net performance, as reported 
on the existing Form PF, crossed thresholds of 10 percent through 35 
percent separately in 2020 and then in the years 2013-2019 and 2021.

                                                     Table 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Average number of instances per year of qualifying hedge fund monthly net
                                                      performance losses greater than threshold
              Year(s)              -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        -10%         -15%         -20%         -25%         -30%         -35%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013-2019, 2021...................          127           49           27           17           11            8
2020..............................          885          443          229          135           90           63
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                     Table 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Average number of instances per year of qualifying hedge fund monthly gross
                                                      performance losses greater than threshold
              Year(s)              -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        -10%         -15%         -20%         -25%         -30%         -35%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013-2019, 2021...................          133           48           27           16           11            9
2020..............................          902          446          230          132           91           63
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thresholds of 10 percent and 15 percent demonstrate substantially 
high rates of crossing of these thresholds in all years, including 
periods with no indicators of market stress. This indicates a high 
likelihood that extraordinary investment loss current reporting 
thresholds set at 10 percent or 15 percent would yield a large number 
of current report filings every month, regardless of market conditions. 
Thresholds of 30 percent and 35 percent demonstrate few crossings of 
these thresholds even in 2020, indicating a risk that extraordinary 
investment loss current reporting with a 30 percent (or higher) 
threshold would fail to generate a sufficiently broad sample that would 
allow FSOC and the Commission to analyze the scale and scope of any 
future systemic events and whether additional funds that may have 
similar investments, market positions, or financing profiles are at 
risk. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that Tables 3 and 4 are 
likely conservative estimates of the number of current reports that 
would be generated by each threshold choice.
    While the thresholds of both 20 percent and 25 percent yield 
relatively few crossings of thresholds prior to 2020, and a large 
number of threshold crossings in 2020, we believe the additional 
current reports generated in 2020 using a period of 20 percent will 
lead to substantially improved systemic risk assessment. As noted 
above, one commenter suggested a threshold of 50 percent.\329\ However, 
it is clear from Tables 2 and 3 that any threshold greater than 35 
percent would substantially or completely erode the benefits of the 
current reporting system by producing negligible numbers of current 
reports even in a systemic crisis. To the extent that that these tables 
overstate the rate at which hedge fund losses under the current 
reporting regime would be triggered by each of the above thresholds, as 
noted above, we believe that a 20 percent threshold is conservatively 
high. To the extent we have selected a conservatively high threshold, 
the choice will reduce costs from false positive reports during periods 
where there is no market stress,

[[Page 38178]]

potentially at the expense of reduced benefits if the current reporting 
regime generates fewer current reports during a systemic risk episode.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \329\ See MFA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar concerns from commenters arose with respect to threshold 
choices for significant margin increases, default events, and 
withdrawals and redemptions.\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \330\ See supra sections II.A.3, II.A.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to margin increases, as an initial matter, margin 
increases may be viewed as potential hedges by a counterparty against 
future possible losses of an investment portfolio. From that 
perspective, we believe that it is reasonable to use the same threshold 
for margin increases as for extraordinary investment losses. Moreover, 
as with extraordinary investment losses, while the Commission requested 
comment on the appropriateness of this threshold choice,\331\ no 
commenter offered data or analysis targeted at estimating a different 
threshold, or indicated any data or literature that would suggest a 
flaw in our threshold choices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \331\ 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, supra footnote 6, at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In further response to commenter concerns, we have also re-
evaluated the literature on margin increases. One recent estimate from 
the academic literature indicates that an increase in margin or 
collateral of 20 percent of the average daily RFACV over a 10-day 
period represents a substantially large increase in the actual level of 
margin/collateral.\332\ Specifically, this estimate from the 
literature, based on a sample of large hedge fund advisers' qualifying 
hedge funds from Q4 2012 to Q1 2017, finds that the hedge funds in the 
sample had median collateral as a percentage of borrowings of 121 
percent, median borrowings of $.443 billion, and a median NAV of $.997 
billion. This indicates that a typical hedge fund in the sample has 
collateral as a percentage of NAV of approximately 54.1 percent.\333\ 
For such a hedge fund, an increase in margin/collateral of 20 percent 
of RFACV represents an almost 40 percent increase in the level of 
margin/collateral posted.\334\ We believe this represents a 
substantially large increase in the level of margin/collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ Kruttli, Monin & Watugala, supra footnote 261.
    \333\ 1.21851*.443/.997 = .541.
    \334\ Kruttli, Monin & Watugala, supra footnote 261. While there 
is not reliable data on the average level of margin/collateral 
increases by bilateral intermediaries during the Covid-19 financial 
turmoil, we note that a 40% increase in the level of margin/
collateral is consistent with how much central counterparties 
increased their initial margin requirements during this period. See, 
e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures, Board of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions, Consultative Report, Review of Margining 
Practices (Oct. 2021), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d526.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The distributions of fund borrowings and collateralization in the 
sample are right-skewed, and so the results for the largest hedge funds 
in the data differ from the results for the median hedge fund.\335\ The 
75th percentile fund NAV in the data is $2 billion, the 75th percentile 
of fund borrowings is $1.3 billion, and the 75th percentile for 
collateral as a percentage of borrowings is 183.8 percent.\336\ Such a 
hedge fund has collateral as a percentage of NAV of approximately 
119.47 percent. For such a hedge fund, an increase in margin/collateral 
of 20 percent of RFACV represents a 16.7 percent increase in the level 
of margin/collateral, compared to almost 40 percent for the median 
hedge fund. This indicates that the largest hedge funds may be required 
to file current reports for smaller increases in the level of their 
margin/collateral as compared to smaller hedge funds. However, for such 
a fund, an increase in margin/collateral of 20 percent of RFACV 
represents a $400 million increase in margin/collateral, and we believe 
such large increases in margin/collateral at the largest hedge funds 
are likely still to be indicative of potential systemic risk, 
especially if multiple such increases are reported to the Commission 
and FSOC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ Kruttli, Monin & Watugala, supra footnote 261.
    \336\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Default events and withdrawals/redemptions also have associated 
parameter choices. Counterparty defaults must be reported that 
accounted for a greater portion of the fund's NAV than a 5 percent 
threshold, and withdrawals/redemptions must be reported when they 
exceed 50 percent of the most recent net asset value (after netting 
against subscriptions or other contributions from investors received 
and contractually committed).\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ See supra sections II.A.3, II.A.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are no data currently available that we are aware of, in Form 
PF or otherwise, that would provide an estimate as to how often 
counterparty default or withdrawal/redemption current reports are 
likely to be received. While the Commission requested comment on the 
appropriateness of these threshold choices,\338\ no commenter offered 
data or analysis targeted at estimating a different threshold, or 
indicated any data or literature that would suggest a flaw in our 
threshold choices. However, as discussed above, we believe that the 
counterparty default threshold represents an often-used industry 
practice for measuring significant exposure at both the position level 
and the counterparty-exposure level. A default at this level could be a 
sign of issues at both the fund and counterparty making it well suited 
for systemic risk monitoring. Even if a five percent default is 
insignificant at a fund level, a high number of such reports can be 
significant systemically.\339\ We also believe that withdrawals/
redemptions exceeding 50 percent of a fund net asset value is well 
accepted as a substantial withdrawal that threatens a fund's health and 
potentially markets if it requires substantial portfolio sales.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, supra footnote 6, at 29, 
41.
    \339\ See supra section II.A.3.
    \340\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Quarterly Private Equity Event Reports for All Private Equity 
Advisers
    In a change from the proposal, the final amendments will require 
section 6 of Form PF to be filed on a quarterly basis and will narrow 
the scope of events included in this reporting to only include (1) 
execution of an adviser-led secondary transaction, and (2) investor 
election to remove a fund's general partner or to terminate a fund's 
investment period or a fund.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ The required reporting of these events was initially 
proposed as a current reporting requirement. See supra section II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although advisers to private equity funds have become an essential 
part of the U.S. financial system,\342\ there is only partial and 
insufficient information about their funds' governance, strategies, 
performance, and volatility available to regulators. Moreover, because 
private equity funds' investments are mostly in private companies and 
businesses, there is limited information available on the performance 
of these investments, on the performance and volatility of private 
equity funds, and therefore on potential harms investors may face.\343\ 
As a result, significant events at private equity funds that could have 
substantial

[[Page 38179]]

consequences for a fund's investors--namely a removal of a general 
partner, termination of a fund or its investment period, or the 
occurrence of an adviser-led secondary--may not be known to the 
Commission or FSOC early enough to enable any effective regulatory 
response, outreach, examinations, or investigation that could 
effectively further investor protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \342\ See supra section IV.B.2.
    \343\ Even when the updated valuations of private equity 
portfolio companies are available, these valuations may appear 
relatively uninformative as they tend to respond slowly to market 
information and could be artificially smoothed. See Tim Jenkinson, 
Miguel Sousa & R[uuml]diger Stucke, How Fair are the Valuations of 
Private Equity Funds? (Feb. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at https://www.psers.pa.gov/About/Investment/Documents/PPMAIRC%202018/27%20How%20Fair%20are%20the%20Valuations%20of%20Private%20Equity%20Funds.pdf; Robert Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven Kaplan, Private 
Equity Performance: What Do We Know?, 69 J. Fin. 1851 (Mar. 27, 
2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These new quarterly reporting requirements for private equity fund 
advisers will provide a timelier alert to the Commission on significant 
developments at the reporting funds that could potentially cause 
investor harm and loss of investor confidence. Such alerts will enable 
the Commission to assess in a reasonably prompt time-frame the severity 
of the reported events at the reporting private equity fund and, to the 
extent the reported event may cause significant investor harm and loss 
of investor confidence, these alerts will allow the Commission to frame 
potential regulatory responses.
    The Commission could also use the information provided in these 
quarterly reports to target its examination program more efficiently 
and better identify areas in need of more timely regulatory oversight 
and assessment, which should increase both the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its programs and, thus, increase investor protection. 
For example, the removal of a fund's adviser or affiliate as general 
partner, termination of a fund's investment period, or termination of a 
fund could signal the liquidation of the fund earlier than anticipated, 
which could present risks to investors and potentially certain markets 
in which the fund assets were invested, as the entire investment 
strategy and planning of the fund can be disrupted.\344\ We understand 
that, because the consequence of each of these actions could be 
damaging to a fund, investors would generally prefer to negotiate with 
a fund's adviser to avoid the adviser pursuing any of these 
actions.\345\ Quarterly reports of these events from private equity 
fund advisers of any size may therefore reflect potential areas for 
Commission outreach, examinations, or investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See supra section II.B.
    \345\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As another example, a report about an adviser-led secondary 
transaction may signal to the Commission a potential area for inquiry 
to prevent investor harm and protect investors' interests, as such 
transactions may present fund-level conflicts of interest, such as 
those that arise because the adviser (or its related person) is on both 
sides of the transaction in adviser-led secondary transactions with 
potentially different economic incentives.\346\ Reporting about such 
events could alert the Commission to specific investor protection 
issues at the fund's adviser, including potential conflicts of 
interest, and therefore merit targeted oversight and assessment. 
Quarterly reporting about such events could alert the Commission to 
specific investor protection issues at the fund's adviser, including 
potential conflicts of interest that merit more timely targeted 
oversight and assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \346\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These events may also signal to the Commission and FSOC the 
presence of significant changes in market trends and potential 
developing or growing risks to broader financial markets, as well as 
indicate potential areas for the Commission to pursue outreach, 
examinations, and investigations designed to prevent investor harm and 
protect investors' interests. Private equity fund investors will 
benefit, as the new and timely information about private equity funds 
and their advisers would help the Commission and FSOC to assess risks 
as they emerge and address them with appropriate regulatory responses, 
if any, thereby minimizing potential investor harms and market 
disruptions, as well as limiting potential damages and costs associated 
with them. Data on these events may also may help inform and frame any 
regulatory response to future market events and future policymaking.
    Also, multiple reports about removals of general partners, 
terminations of a fund's investment period, or terminations of a fund 
itself may reflect rising market stress. In particular, these events 
may pose risks for private equity portfolio companies, who may face 
liquidity challenges from removal of the private equity fund's capital, 
for example if the adviser is no longer as willing to insert equity 
capital when needed once key GPs are removed.\347\ Similarly, multiple 
reports about adviser-led secondary transactions such as a fund 
reorganization may serve as a warning to the Commission and FSOC about 
deteriorating market conditions that may prevent private equity 
managers from utilizing more traditional ways to exit their portfolio 
companies and realize gains.\348\ These events also can represent risks 
for private equity portfolio companies, who may face liquidity risks 
from removal of a private equity fund's capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ Id.
    \348\ For example, private equity exits have been adversely 
affected by the global Covid-19 pandemic as the three traditional 
ways for private equity fund advisers to exit portfolio companies--
trade sales, secondary buy-outs and initial public offerings 
(``IPOs'')--became unattainable or unattractive for some advisers. 
See, e.g., Alastair Green, Ari Oxman & Laurens Seghers, Preparing 
for Private-Equity Exits in the COVID-19 Era, McKinsey & Co., 
Private Equity & Principal Investors Insights (June 11, 2020), 
available at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-insights/preparing-for-private-equity-exits-in-the-covid-19-era. Conversely, during the same period, there was 
an increase in the adviser-led secondary transactions. See, e.g., 
Nicola Chapman, Martin Forbes, Colin Harley & Sherri Snelson, 
Private Equity Turns to Fund Restructurings in COVID-19 Slowdown, 
White & Case Debt Explorer (Feb. 8, 2021), available at https://debtexplorer.whitecase.com/leveraged-finance-commentary/private-equity-turns-to-fund-restructurings-in-covid-19-slowdown#!.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters stated that private equity reporting of 
these events does not need to be done within one business day in order 
for the information to be actionable for the Commission and FSOC.\349\ 
We agree with these commenters in part, for example that these 
reporting items as likely to reveal trends that emerge more slowly as 
compared to hedge funds because private equity funds typically invest 
in more illiquid assets over longer time horizons with more limited 
redemption rights,\350\ and have revised the reporting requirement 
timeline to instead be quarterly, within 60 days of the end of the 
quarter.\351\ However, because we believe that these events represent 
more timely risks of conflicts of interest between advisers and their 
investors, we do not agree that the investor protection benefits from 
these quarterly reporting events could be substantially achieved with 
an annual reporting requirement, unlike general partner and limited 
partner clawbacks, for which we are replacing the proposed current 
reporting requirements with annual reporting requirements.\352\ As 
discussed below, general partner and limited partner clawbacks 
represent the realization of risk that develop over the life of a 
private equity fund, potentially over several years, and so do not 
represent sources of investor harm requiring more frequent reporting 
than annual.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \349\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter; see 
also supra section II.B.
    \350\ See supra section IV.B.2.
    \351\ See supra section II.B. One commenter suggested quarterly 
reporting as an alternative for private equity current reports. See 
MFA Comment Letter.
    \352\ Id., see also infra section IV.C.1.c.
    \353\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We similarly believe that, because removals of general partners, 
terminations of a fund or its investment period, and adviser-led 
secondaries represent potentially significant potential for conflicts 
of interest and other sources of investor harm, that

[[Page 38180]]

limiting reporting to only large private equity advisers would 
substantially reduce the benefits of the required reporting. We believe 
that the investor protection benefits associated with these events 
require reporting from all private equity fund advisers.
    Some advisers' comment letters asserted that these events in 
private equity funds do not reflect areas of systemic risk or investor 
harm.\354\ However, other comment letters from investors agreed with 
our description of benefits in the proposing release and stated that 
reporting of these private equity events are relevant for systemic risk 
and investor protection.\355\ Moreover, the comment letters disputing 
the relevance of private equity reporting benefits do not address the 
above facts demonstrating that the private equity industry can be a 
relevant source of investor harm or systemic risk. Commenters also did 
not dispute the increasing number of investors in private equity funds 
and the increasing exposure of public pension plans to private 
equity.\356\ It is also the Commission's view that quarterly reporting 
of these events may provide insight into key events in the private 
equity industry and allow the Commission and FSOC to identify sources 
of investor harm and potential risks, as they emerge, in the private 
equity space that might otherwise be obscured.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \354\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; Schulte Comment 
Letter.
    \355\ See, e.g., ILPA Comment Letter; ICGN Comment Letter; PESP 
Comment Letter.
    \356\ See supra sections II.B, IV.B.2.
    \357\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Reporting of General Partner or Limited Partner Clawbacks for Large 
Private Equity Fund Advisers
    The final amendments introduce a new annual reporting event into 
section 4 of Form PF requiring all large advisers of private equity 
funds to file a report with the Commission on an annual basis 
disclosing whether an implementation of a general partner or limited 
partner clawback occurred at one or more funds that they manage.\358\ 
An adviser would also be permitted to provide an optional narrative 
response if it believes that additional information is helpful in 
explaining the circumstances of its responses in section 4, including 
general partner or limited partner clawbacks.\359\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \358\ The required reporting of these events was initially 
proposed as a current reporting requirement. See supra section II.D.
    \359\ See supra section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above,\360\ although advisers to private equity funds 
have become an essential part of the U.S. financial system,\361\ there 
is only partial and insufficient information about their funds' 
governance, strategies, performance, and volatility available to 
regulators.\362\ As a result, general partner and limited partner 
clawbacks at private equity funds that could have substantial 
consequences for the fund's investors may not ever be known to the 
Commission or FSOC, preventing any possible regulatory response, 
outreach, examinations, or investigations that could further investor 
protection. The final rule will also enable the Commission and FSOC to 
identify trends in the use of clawbacks and any resulting potential 
systemic risk and investor protection concerns. The observations from 
this research could potentially inform and frame any regulatory 
response to future market events and policymaking related to use of 
clawbacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \360\ See supra section IV.C.1.b.
    \361\ See supra section IV.B.2.
    \362\ See supra footnote 343 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Reports of general partner or limited partner clawbacks may signal 
to the Commission and FSOC the presence of significant changes in 
market trends surrounding liquidity or credit conditions, and potential 
developing or growing risks to broader financial markets, as well as 
indicate potential areas for the Commission to pursue outreach, 
examinations, and investigations designed to prevent investor harm and 
protect investors' interests. For example, an implementation of a 
limited partner clawback may signal that the fund is planning for a 
material event such as substantial litigation or a legal judgment that 
could negatively impact the fund's investors and potentially other 
market participants. This information could also be used to target its 
examination program more efficiently and effectively and better 
identify areas in need of regulatory oversight and assessment, which 
should increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of its programs 
and, thus, increase investor protection.
    In addition, reporting of clawbacks at multiple private equity 
funds may indicate broader market instability that negatively affects 
similarly situated funds, or markets in which these funds invest. For 
example, widespread implementation of general partner clawbacks among 
private equity funds may be a sign of an emerging market-wide stress 
episode, worsening of economic conditions contributing to the 
underperformance of the funds' portfolio companies, or deteriorating 
private equity credit environments. Because limited partner clawbacks 
may signal increasing rates of litigation or legal judgment, widespread 
increased rates of such clawbacks may also indicate stress in the 
market as evidenced by higher rates of legal judgments.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \363\ See supra section II.D.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These reports will therefore allow the Commission and FSOC to 
assess the prevalence of clawbacks and identify patterns among 
similarly situated funds and any common factors that contributed to the 
reported events. We anticipate that the improved transparency of 
private equity fund activities as a result of the final reporting 
requirements to the Commission and FSOC will enhance regulatory 
systemic risk assessment and investor protection efforts. Because an 
adviser will also be allowed to provide a narrative response if it 
believes that additional information would be helpful in understanding 
the information reported in new section 4 reporting questions on 
clawbacks,\364\ the Commission's and FSOC's efforts will benefit from 
additional potential narrative detail explaining the context behind the 
reporting events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \364\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters stated that private equity reporting of 
these events does not need to be done within one business day in order 
to achieve these benefits.\365\ Unlike the quarterly reporting 
requirements discussed above,\366\ for general partner and limited 
partner clawbacks we agree that the principal benefits from reporting 
of these events accrue from revealing the frequency of these reporting 
events and an enhanced ability for the Commission to examine potential 
conflicts of interest across the private equity industry.\367\ In 
particular, we believe that these events tend to build over the life of 
a private equity fund with a multi-year term.\368\ In particular, the 
legal mechanics of general partner and limited partner clawbacks are 
negotiated early on in a fund's life, long before the inciting event 
occurs.\369\ Then, an inciting event for a clawback actually occurs, 
typically, when the fund has had successful investments earlier in the 
life of the

[[Page 38181]]

fund, but the fund's later investments are less successful.\370\ Thus, 
we believe that many of the benefits of private equity reporting of 
these events that we described in the proposing release will be 
maintained with annual reporting, and that annual reporting (rather 
than current reporting or quarterly reporting) will substantially 
mitigate the burden on private equity fund advisers, relative to the 
proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \365\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter; see 
also supra section II.D.1.
    \366\ See supra section IV.C.1.b.
    \367\ See supra section II.D.1.
    \368\ See supra section II.B.2; see also, e.g., RER Comment 
Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter; AIMA Comment Letter.
    \369\ Id.
    \370\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe the benefits of the new annual reporting events will be 
substantially preserved, relative to the proposal to have these events 
be current reports. We believe that annual reporting of clawbacks will 
substantially preserve the benefits of the required reporting because 
it will still produce data on trends in these reporting events, and 
upwards trends may represent rising systemic stress at private equity 
funds and rising conflicts of interest within the private equity 
industry. Unlike the quarterly reporting events,\371\ we believe that 
measurement of annual trends is sufficiently informative for the 
Commission's and FSOC's systemic risk assessment and investor 
protection efforts, as we believe general partner and limited partner 
clawbacks currently do not represent more immediate systemic risks or 
risks of investor harm. General partner and limited partner clawbacks 
represent the realization of risk that develop over the life of a 
private equity fund, potentially over several years, and so we believe 
that they do not represent sources of investor harm requiring more 
frequent reporting than annual.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \371\ See supra section II.B.
    \372\ See supra section II.D.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also limited the reporting requirements to large private 
equity fund advisers only. While the threshold for which private equity 
fund advisers must file section 4 of Form PF captures approximately 73 
percent of assets held by private equity funds, preserving the majority 
of systemic risk assessment and investor protection benefits, the 
investor protection benefits will be reduced by the loss of reporting 
of these events for smaller private equity fund advisers.\373\ However, 
the staff's understanding is that general partner and limited partner 
clawbacks are comparatively rare, and so we believe the losses of 
benefits from this reduction in reporting are likely to be small, while 
the reduction in burden will be comparatively larger from narrowing the 
scope to only large private equity advisers.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ Moreover, this coverage has broadly trended upwards over 
time. For example, based on staff review of Form ADV filings and 
data from Private Fund Statistics reports, section 4 covered 
approximately 67% of private equity gross assets in 2020 and covers 
73% of private equity gross assets today. See Division of Investment 
Management, Private Fund Statistics (Jan. 3, 2023), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics.shtml; see also supra sections II.B., IV.B, footnotes 
251, 284. Lastly, limiting the reporting to only large private 
equity fund advisers means that smaller private equity fund advisers 
will face no increased burdens under the final amendments.
    \374\ See infra sections IV.C.2, V.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some advisers' comment letters asserted that these events in 
private equity funds do not represent areas of systemic risk or 
investor harm.\375\ However, other comment letters from investors 
agreed with the benefits articulated in the proposing release, and 
stated that reporting of these private equity events are relevant for 
systemic risk monitoring and investor protection.\376\ Moreover, as 
discussed above,\377\ the comment letters disputing the relevance of 
private equity reporting benefits did not address the above facts 
motivating these private equity events as a relevant source of 
information on potential rising systemic risks over time. Commenters 
also do not dispute the increasing number of investors in private 
equity funds and the increasing exposure of public pension plans to 
private equity.\378\ It is also the Commission's view that reporting of 
these events may thus provide insight into key trends in the private 
equity industry and potentially enable the Commission and FSOC to 
identify risks in the private equity space that might otherwise be 
obscured.\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \375\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; Schulte Comment 
Letter.
    \376\ See, e.g., ILPA Comment Letter; ICGN Comment Letter; PESP 
Comment Letter.
    \377\ See supra section IV.C.1.b.
    \378\ See supra sections II.D.1, IV.B.2.
    \379\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Other Amendments To Reporting for Large Private Equity Fund Advisers
    The final amendments to section 4 of Form PF include requirements 
for additional information that large private equity fund advisers must 
provide regarding their activities, risk exposures, and counterparties 
on an annual basis.\380\ The final amendments will further improve the 
transparency of private equity fund activities and risks to the 
Commission and FSOC and help in developing a more complete picture of 
the markets where private equity funds operate. In turn, this will 
enhance the Commission's and FSOC's ability to assess potential 
systemic risks presented by private equity funds, as well as the 
potential for loss of investor confidence should conflicts of interest 
in private equity funds materialize. Specifically, new information 
about private equity funds will assist regulators in understanding the 
diversity of and trends in investment strategies employed by advisers 
to private equity funds,\381\ as well as their fund-level 
borrowings.\382\ The final amendments will also provide for more 
information regarding risks from default,\383\ risks from counterparty 
exposures,\384\ and risks from outside the U.S.\385\ An adviser would 
also be permitted to provide an optional narrative response if it 
believes that additional information is helpful in explaining the 
circumstances of any of its responses in section 4.\386\ This improved 
understanding will aid the Commission and FSOC in effectively and 
efficiently assessing new systemic risks and other potential sources of 
investor harm, as well as informing the Commission's and FSOC's broader 
views on the private equity landscape.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \380\ See supra section II.D.2.
    \381\ The final amendments introduce a new Question 66 that asks 
advisers to provide information about their private fund strategies 
by choosing from a mutually exclusive list of strategies, allocating 
the percent of capital deployed to each strategy, even if the 
categories do not precisely match the characterization of the 
reporting fund's strategies. If a reporting fund engages in multiple 
strategies, the adviser would provide a good faith estimate of the 
percentage the reporting fund's deployed capital represented by each 
strategy. We believe that analysis of trends from this question, and 
resulting systemic risk assessment, will also benefit from allowing 
advisers to choose from a drop-down menu that includes all 
investment strategy categories for Form PF. We believe this will 
increase the likelihood that advisers will be able to easily 
identify a selection that accurately reflects their fund's strategy. 
See supra section II.D.2. Along with this question, the final 
amendments will define ``general partner stakes investing'' in the 
glossary, providing specificity regarding the reporting of this term 
and improving data quality. See supra footnote 216 and accompanying 
text.
    \382\ The final amendments introduce a new Question 68 that 
requires advisers to report additional information on fund-level 
borrowing. Id.
    \383\ The final amendments amend existing Question 74 to require 
advisers to provide more information about the nature of reported 
events of default, such as whether it is a payment default of the 
private equity fund, a payment default of a CPC, or a default 
relating to a failure to uphold terms under the applicable borrowing 
agreement (other than a failure to make regularly scheduled 
payments). Id.
    \384\ The final amendments amend existing Question 75, which 
requires reporting on the identity of the institutions providing 
bridge financing to the adviser's CPCs and the amount of such 
financing, to add additional counterparty identifying information 
(i.e., LEI (if any) and if the counterparty is affiliated with a 
major financial institution, the name of the financial institution). 
Id.
    \385\ The final amendments amend existing Question 78, which 
asks advisers to report the geographical breakdown of investments by 
private equity funds. The new requirement asks for a private equity 
fund's greatest country exposures based on a percent of net asset 
value. Id.
    \386\ See supra section II.D.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 38182]]

    Overall, the amendments to section 4 of Form PF will ultimately 
assist the Commission and FSOC in better identifying and assessing 
risks to U.S. financial stability and pursuing appropriate regulatory 
policy in response, and will further assist the Commission in 
determining the potential need for outreach, examinations, and 
investigations, thereby enhancing efforts to protect investors and 
other market participants. We expect that the new information about 
large private equity fund advisers and funds they manage will enable 
the Commission and FSOC to better assess potential risks to financial 
markets and investor harm.
    Some commenters argued that investment strategy reporting 
requirement is too burdensome relative to its nexus to systemic 
risk.\387\ Other commenters also argued that the new fund-level 
borrowing reporting requirement is unrelated to systemic risk.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ See, e.g., REBNY Comment Letter; RER Comment Letter.
    \388\ See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; NYC Bar Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, as noted above,\389\ some commenters supported the 
benefits from these two new reporting requirements, stating that adding 
investment strategy reporting requirement as being beneficial to the 
FSOC and Commission's oversight of advisers to the private equity 
industry.\390\ One commenter suggested requiring more granular 
disclosure of private equity fund investment strategies, including 
requiring the disclosure of industries included in each strategy.\391\ 
Some commenters also supported adding the additional fund-level 
borrowings reporting requirement, stating that it will help the 
Commission and FSOC identify and assess the use of leverage within 
private equity funds.\392\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \389\ See supra section II.D.2.
    \390\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter; PDI Comment Letter.
    \391\ See PDI Comment Letter.
    \392\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter; PDI Comment Letter; TIAA 
Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, we believe both of these new reporting requirements offer 
specific insights that contribute to systemic risk and investor 
protection benefits. First, different investment strategies carry 
different types and levels of risk for the markets and financial 
stability. Second, advisers to private equity funds vary in their use 
of fund-level borrowing, in particular with certain funds using 
subscription credit facilities to boost performance metrics, with 
investors bearing the cost of interest on the debt used and potentially 
suffering lower total returns.\393\ Moreover, large unpaid borrowings 
that remain on subscription lines can pose additional liquidity risks 
during periods of market stress, potentially contributing to systemic 
risks. The additional private equity reporting in the final amendments 
will therefore allow the Commission and FSOC to understand and better 
assess these risks, and will further allow the Commission to analyze 
new areas of potential investor harm to determine any necessary 
outreach, examination, or investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \393\ See, e.g., James F. Albertus & Matthew Denes, Distorting 
Private Equity Performance: The Rise of Fund Debt, Frank Hawkins 
Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Report (June 2019), available 
at https://www.kenaninstitute.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/DistortingPrivateEquityPerformance_07192019.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, as noted above,\394\ several comments supported the 
benefits from amendments requiring more information, and commenters 
otherwise did not specifically address those amendments.\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \394\ See supra section II.D.2.
    \395\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter; PDI Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Costs
    The final amendments to Form PF will lead to certain additional 
costs for private fund advisers. These costs are broadly most likely to 
be borne by private funds, and therefore by private funds' investors, 
though some portion of these costs may be borne by advisers. These 
costs will vary depending on the scope of the required information and 
the frequency of the reporting, which is determined based on the size 
and types of funds managed by the adviser. For the current reporting 
requirements for hedge funds and the new quarterly and annual reporting 
requirements for private equity funds on the occurrence of reporting 
events, the costs will also vary depending on whether funds experience 
a reporting event and the frequency of those events. Generally, the 
costs will be lower for private fund advisers that manage fewer private 
fund assets or that do not manage types of private funds that may be 
more prone to financial stress events. These costs are quantified, to 
the extent possible, by examination of the analysis in section 
V.C.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \396\ A 2015 survey of SEC-registered investment advisers to 
private funds affirmed the Commission's cost estimates for smaller 
private fund advisers' Form PF compliance costs, and found that the 
Commission overestimated Form PF compliance costs for larger private 
fund advisers. See Wulf Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 9 Brook. J. Corp., Fin., and Comm. L. (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We anticipate that the costs to advisers will be comprised of both 
direct compliance costs and indirect costs. Direct costs for advisers 
will consist of internal costs (for compliance attorneys and other non-
legal staff of an adviser, such as computer programmers, to prepare and 
review the required disclosure) and external costs (including filing 
fees as well as any costs associated with outsourcing all or a portion 
of the Form PF reporting responsibilities to a filing agent, software 
consultant, or other third-party service provider).\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \397\ See infra section V.C. (for an analysis of the direct 
costs associated with the new Form PF requirements for quarterly and 
annual filings).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the direct costs associated with the final 
amendments will be most significant for the first updated Form PF 
report that a private fund adviser will be required to file because the 
adviser will need to familiarize itself with the new reporting form and 
may need to configure its systems to efficiently gather the required 
information. In addition, we believe that some large private fund 
advisers will find it efficient to automate some portion of the 
reporting process, which will increase the burden of the initial 
filing. In subsequent reporting periods, we anticipate that filers will 
incur significantly lower costs because much of the work involved in 
the initial report is non-recurring and because of efficiencies 
realized from system configuration and reporting automation efforts 
accounted for in the initial reporting period. This is consistent with 
the results of a survey of private fund advisers, finding that the 
majority of respondents identified the cost of subsequent annual Form 
PF filings at about half of the initial filing cost.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \398\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We anticipate that the final amendments aimed at improving data 
quality and comparability will impose limited direct costs on advisers 
given that advisers already accommodate similar requirements in their 
current Form PF and Form ADV reporting and can utilize their existing 
capabilities for preparing and submitting an updated Form PF. We expect 
that most of the costs will arise from the requirements for large 
private equity fund advisers to report additional information on Form 
PF,\399\ as well as new current reporting requirements for advisers to 
qualifying

[[Page 38183]]

hedge funds as well as new quarterly and annual reporting requirements 
for private equity funds on the occurrence of reporting events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \399\ These costs will be substantially mitigated, in comparison 
to the proposing release, by the removal of several items from the 
final amendments in response to comment letters. For example, we do 
not believe that a large private equity fund adviser providing a 
good faith estimate of its investment strategies by percentage will 
require substantial additional accounting or other compliance work. 
See supra section II.D.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For existing section 4 filers, the direct costs associated with the 
final amendments to section 4 will mainly include an initial cost to 
set up a system for collecting, verifying additional information, and 
limited ongoing costs associated with periodic reporting of this 
additional information.\400\ Certain elements of the final adopted 
amendments to section 4 are designed to mitigate these costs. For 
example, we believe that allowing advisers to choose from a drop-down 
menu that includes all investment strategy categories for Form PF will 
reduce the burden of strategy reporting by making it easier for 
advisers to identify a selection that reflects their fund 
strategy.\401\ We have also removed certain questions from the final 
amendments in response to commenters' concerns on the burden of those 
questions.\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \400\ Based on the analysis in section V.C., direct internal 
compliance costs for section 4 filers associated with the 
preparation and reporting of additional information is estimated at 
$13,905 per annual filing per large private equity fund adviser, and 
includes the new costs associated with new annual event reporting. 
This is calculated as the cost of filing under the proposal of 
$41,730 minus the cost of filing prior to the proposal of $27,825. 
See Table 8. It is estimated that there will be no additional direct 
external costs and no changes to filing fees associated with the 
final amendments to section 4. See Table 10.
    \401\ See supra section II.D.2.
    \402\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The direct costs associated with the new current reporting 
requirements for the advisers of qualifying hedge funds and quarterly 
reporting for private equity funds on the occurrence of reporting 
events will include initial costs required to set up a system for 
monitoring significant events that are subject to the reporting 
requirement as well as filing fees (the amount of which would be 
determined by the Commission in a separate action).\403\ We anticipate 
these initial costs to be limited because the reporting events were 
tailored and designed not to be overly burdensome and to allow hedge 
fund advisers and private equity fund advisers to use existing risk 
management frameworks that they already maintain to actively assess and 
manage risk. For example, for private equity fund advisers, we believe 
that every private equity fund adviser already has systems for 
documenting the occurrence of an adviser-led secondary transactions. In 
particular, advisers will use the same PFRD non-public filing system as 
used to file the rest of Form PF.\404\ The subsequent compliance costs 
will depend on the occurrence of the reporting events and frequency 
with which those events occur.\405\ To the extent that the reporting 
events occur infrequently, we anticipate the costs to be limited as 
hedge fund advisers and private equity fund advisers will not be 
required to file reports in the absence of the events. For example, 
during periods of normal market activity, we expect relatively few 
filings for this part of Form PF. The costs associated with the 
amendment, however, will increase with the frequency of stress events 
at the adviser's hedge funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \403\ See infra section V.
    \404\ Id.
    \405\ Based on the analysis in section V.C., direct internal 
costs associated with the preparation and filing of current reports 
is estimated at $5,160 per report for large hedge fund advisers and 
$2,024 per quarterly filing of a private equity event report for all 
private equity fund advisers. See Table 9. In addition, large hedge 
fund advisers and all private equity fund advisers will be subject 
to an external cost burden of $1,695 per report associated with 
outside legal services and additional one-time cost ranging from $0 
to $15,000 per adviser associated with system changes. See Table 12. 
Additionally, there will be a filing fee per current report for 
hedge fund advisers and all private equity fund advisers that is yet 
to be determined. See Table 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the corresponding initial costs associated with the 
final annual reporting requirements of general partner or limited 
partner clawbacks for private equity fund advisers, which was 
previously proposed as a reporting event requiring a current report, 
will be limited.\406\ This is because we are requiring the reporting 
only from large private equity fund advisers on an annual basis, which 
we believe will allow those advisers to modify existing systems and 
processes--rather than generate new ones--as these advisers are already 
collecting and reporting information specific to private equity funds 
on an annual basis. We similarly anticipate these initial costs to be 
limited because we believe that every private equity fund adviser 
already has systems for documenting the occurrence of general partner 
or limited partner clawbacks. Also, limiting the reporting to only 
large private equity fund advisers means that smaller private equity 
fund advisers will face no increased burdens under the final 
amendments.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \406\ Based on the analysis in section V.C., the initial direct 
internal costs associated with the preparation of annual reporting 
of general partner or limited partner clawbacks for large private 
equity fund advisers, previously required as current event 
reporting, is $3,965 per year over three years (given by the 
additional direct initial costs relative to the proposal, or $32,592 
- $26,775, which includes an amortization over three years). See 
Table 7. Similarly, the direct ongoing annual costs for the former 
current event reporting questions for large private equity fund 
advisers is $6,480 (given by the additional direct internal costs 
relative to the proposal, or $41,730 - $35,250). See Table 8. 
Private equity fund advisers will no longer face an additional 
external cost burden associated with the annual event reporting 
items. See Table 11.
    \407\ See infra section V.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters stated that there would be substantial burden 
including initial set-up costs, external costs, and ongoing costs 
associated with the current reporting regime.\408\ More specifically, 
commenters expressed concern that the proposed requirement to file 
reports within one business day to the Commission would be burdensome 
and potentially lead to inaccurate or inadequate reporting at a time 
when advisers and their personnel are grappling with a potential crisis 
at the reporting fund.\409\ Some commenters also stated that advisers 
would need to develop complicated internal operations capable of 
performing calculations on a daily basis that may not be applicable to 
illiquid or hard-to-value assets and that the resulting data may be of 
limited utility to regulators.\410\ Some commenters identified specific 
elements of the proposed current reporting regime as costly, such as 
the proposed requirements that required a daily NAV calculation.\411\ 
One commenter lastly expressed concerns with the costs needed to build 
these systems in time to meet the proposed compliance date timeline, 
requesting an 18 month transition period instead.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \408\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter (stating, among other 
concerns, that ``private fund managers and their administrators will 
have to bear the costs of building and maintaining systems that 
would have to monitor aspects of their funds' investments, 
redemptions, margin and collateral positions, and other aspects of 
fund operations on a daily basis to determine whether a report is 
required.''); see also, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \409\ ILPA Comment Letter; AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; State Street 
Comment Letter; NVCA Comment Letter; RER Comment Letter; SIFMA 
Comment Letter; Schulte Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; NYC Bar 
Comment Letter; REBNY Comment Letter.
    \410\ SIFMA Comment Letter and USCC Comment Letter.
    \411\ See, e.g., MFA Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter.
    \412\ MFA Comment Letter. Our estimates of quantified costs, 
including costs for one-time system changes, consider the need to 
build systems in time for compliance dates for current and private 
equity event reporting. See infra section V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certain changes in the final amendments are in response to these 
comment file considerations on the costs of the proposal, including the 
changes to current reporting for extraordinary investment losses, 
margin events, prime broker relationship changes, and operations 
events, the decisions to extend hedge fund adviser current reporting to 
72 hours, the decision to extend private equity fund adviser reporting 
of general partner

[[Page 38184]]

removals and fund terminations to quarterly reporting, and the decision 
to switch reporting of general partner and limited partner clawbacks 
from current to annual reporting limited to large private equity fund 
advisers.\413\ We believe that these changes to the final amendments 
will help avoid unnecessary burdens on advisers. For example, we 
specify that we believe the RFACV reference statistic for current 
reporting of extraordinary investment losses and margin events will in 
general be governed by existing fund valuation policies and 
procedures.\414\ We have also narrowed the scope of current reporting 
of prime broker relationship changes.\415\ The final amendments have 
also changed the current reporting required timing for hedge funds from 
one business day to 72 hours, changed the reporting timing for adviser-
led secondaries, removal of a general partner, and election to 
terminate a fund or its investment period from current reporting to 
quarterly reporting, changed the reporting timing and scope for 
reporting of clawbacks by private equity funds from current reporting 
for all private equity funds within one business day to annual 
reporting only for large private equity fund advisers, and removed the 
current reporting regime for changes in unencumbered cash 
altogether.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \413\ See supra sections II.A, II.B, II.D.1.
    \414\ See supra sections II.A.2, II.A.3.
    \415\ See supra section II.A.4.
    \416\ See supra sections II.A, II.A.5, II.B, II.D.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also stated that certain terms associated with the 
current reporting regime are potentially ambiguous. These commenters 
specifically requested more precise definitions associated with 
``margin'' and ``collateral.'' \417\ We believe that any such costs 
associated with the ambiguity of the terms ``margin'' and 
``collateral'' will be de minimis, because (1) we believe these are 
common terms with accepted industry definitions,\418\ and (2) the Form 
PF instructions on the current reporting of increases in margin include 
language designed to provide increased flexibility to account for 
funds' unique circumstances.\419\ Commenters' concerns could also be 
relevant for the term ``termination event'' as applied in the current 
report triggering event for prime broker relationship termination.\420\ 
We similarly believe in this instance that any costs associated with 
ambiguity of the term ``termination event'' will be de minimis, because 
we understand such termination events to be commonly understood clauses 
in prime broker contractual relationships in the industry.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \417\ See AIMA Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter; see also 
supra section II.A.3.
    \418\ See supra footnote 69 and accompanying text.
    \419\ See supra section II.A.3.
    \420\ See supra section II.A.4.
    \421\ See, e.g., David S. Mitchell, William C. Thum, Aaron S. 
Cutler & Eduardo Ugarte II, Trading Agreements and NAV Termination 
Triggers--Avoiding Unexpected Landmines, Bloomberg Law Reports, 
2009, available at https://www.friedfrank.com/uploads/siteFiles/Publications/576038144C948759E3DBB1410957B03B.pdf; The Credit and 
Legal Risks of Entering Into an ISDA Agreement, ThinkAdvisor (Jan. 
3, 2005), available at https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2005/01/03/the-credit-and-legal-risks-of-entering-into-an-isda-master-agreement/; 
HFL Report, supra footnote 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Indirect costs for advisers will include the costs associated with 
additional actions that advisers may decide to undertake in light of 
the additional reporting requirements. Specifically, to the extent that 
the final amendments provide an incentive for advisers to improve 
internal controls and devote additional time and resources to managing 
their risk exposures and enhancing investor protection, this may result 
in additional expenses for advisers, some of which may be passed on to 
the funds and their investors.\422\ For example, as discussed above, 
some commenters stated that under the current reporting regime, 
investors may demand additional reporting themselves, knowing that 
reporting systems are being developed for Commission and FSOC 
reporting.\423\ While this additional reporting may benefit investors, 
the costs of this additional reporting represent an additional cost of 
the rule, and these costs may be passed on to investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \422\ As discussed above, the length of the reporting period is 
intended to mitigate costs associated with advisers needing to both 
respond to the reporting event and file the required current report. 
See supra section II.A.
    \423\ SIFMA Comment Letter; AIMA Comment Letter. See supra 
section IV.C.1.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Indirect costs for investors may also include unintended negative 
consequences where advisers change their behavior in response to the 
final reporting requirements.\424\ First, there may be unintended 
changes in adviser behavior associated with extraordinary investment 
loss current reporting based on the RFACV measure. Because the RFACV 
measure requires reporting based on the most recent price or value 
applied to the position for purposes of managing the investment 
portfolio, advisers may have an incentive to change their valuation 
methodologies for purposes of managing the investment portfolio in 
order to circumvent required reporting of extraordinary investment 
losses, and these changes may be to the detriment of fund investors. 
For example, the RFACV measure allows advisers who do not value a 
position daily to carry forward the last price when calculating RFACV, 
and advisers may cease certain daily valuations in response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \424\ Whether respondents may want to change their behavior in 
response to reporting requirements, in an effort to influence what 
they must report, is referred to as the ``incentive compatibility'' 
of the reporting regime. An incentive compatible reporting regime is 
one where respondents do not change their behavior in response to 
reporting requirements. See, e.g., Andreu Mas-Colell, et al., 
Chapter 13, in Microeconomic Theory (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), for 
a discussion of incentive compatibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, we believe there are two key factors that mitigate, but 
may not eliminate, this concern. First, advisers must document their 
valuation principles and methodologies in investor-facing 
documents.\425\ Investors are advised by industry literature to closely 
scrutinize these manuals and evaluate the fund's valuation 
practices.\426\ Second, we understand

[[Page 38185]]

that many advisers outsource the back office functionality of valuation 
and other position-level reporting to fund administrators, and these 
administrators would be unlikely to revise their valuation services to 
aid an adviser in avoiding filing a current report.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \425\ See, e.g., Erin Faccone, The Essential Guide to Third-
Party Valuations for Hedge Fund Investors 1, CAIA (2018), available 
at https://caia.org/sites/default/files/essentials.pdf (``Starting 
from the top, every fund manager must have a written valuation 
policy in place that is used to price the portfolio.''); PWC, Guide 
to Sound Practices for the Valuation of Investments 4 (2018 ed.), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-20/s70720-7464497-221255.pdf (``In advance of a fund's launch, a summary of practical 
and workable pricing and valuation practices, procedures and 
controls should be enshrined in a Valuation Policy Document and 
approved by the fund governing body in consultation with the 
investment manager and other relevant stakeholders. The Valuation 
Policy Document, which may be based in whole or in part on the 
investment manager's and/or the valuation service provider's 
valuation policies, should address the universe of instruments in 
which the fund may invest, and should be reviewed at least annually 
(and more frequently where the circumstances warrant) by the 
investment manager and the fund governing body. Regardless of how 
simple a fund's valuation procedures may appear, proper 
documentation of the valuation process removes the scope for dispute 
or uncertainty in the future and provides a clear framework for 
governance in the area.'').
    \426\ Id. See also, e.g., IOSCO, Principles for the Valuation of 
Hedge Fund Portfolios Final Report, A Report of the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions 1 (Nov. 2007), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD253.pdf, (``This paper is focused on 
principles for valuing the investment portfolios of hedge funds and 
the challenges that arise when valuing illiquid or complex financial 
instruments. The principles are designed to mitigate the structural 
and operational conflicts of interest that may arise between the 
interests of the hedge fund manager and the interests of the hedge 
fund. Hedge funds may use significant leverage in their investment 
strategies, the impact of which increases the importance of 
establishing appropriate valuations of a hedge fund's financial 
instruments . . . . Investors need to be vigilant with respect to 
any hedge fund that does not exhibit these principles throughout all 
aspects of its valuation process. Investors should satisfy 
themselves that the management and governance culture promotes the 
application of the principles to the extent practicable. While the 
adoption and compliance with these principles should benefit 
investors, the measures themselves will not reduce the need for 
investors to conduct appropriate initial and ongoing due diligence 
with respect to their interests in hedge funds.'').
    \427\ See, e.g., PWC, Asset Management Benchmarking--Fund 
Administration 8 (July 2015), available at https://www.pwc.com/gx/
en/asset-management/benchmarking-hub/assets/pwc-am-fund-
administration.pdf#:~:text=More%20than%20half%20of%20hedge%20funds%20
and%20hybrid,of%20them%20to%20outsource%20some%20back%20office%20func
tions.%C2%B2 (``In recent PwC study on Hedge Fund Administration, 
from 2006 to 2013, the percentage of hedge fund AUM outsourced to 
administrators increased dramatically from 50 percent to 81 
percent.''); Fund Administration Services, SS&C Tech, available at 
https://www.ssctech.com/outsourcing-services/fund-administration-services (describing handling of NAV calculations, supplemental NAV 
transparency reporting, income and expense accruals, and other 
services); Fund Services, STP Investment Services, available at 
https://stpis.com/services/fund-services/ (offering a variety of 
fund services including a service to ``Price portfolio holdings 
based upon your valuation policy'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a second example, there may be unintended consequences 
associated with current reporting of margin/collateral increases. This 
current reporting trigger event increases the incentives for hedge 
funds to attempt to convince their counterparties to forego calling 
more collateral in the opening stages of a systemic risk event, so that 
the hedge fund can avoid filing a current report. Because 
counterparties calling more collateral can be a prophylactic, systemic-
risk-reducing measure, this response by hedge funds carries a risk of 
making subsequent systemic risk episodes more damaging. While we 
believe the risk of this unintended consequence is low, because hedge 
funds already have substantial incentives to attempt to avoid margin/
collateral increases and we do not believe this rule substantially 
increases those incentives, at the margin it may occur. Hedge funds may 
also have an increased incentive to avoid prime broker terminations in 
response to the current reporting requirements, but we again believe 
these potential costs are likely to be low, because hedge funds already 
have a strong incentive to avoid prime broker terminations.
    Form PF collects confidential information about private funds and 
their trading strategies, and the inadvertent public disclosure of such 
competitively sensitive and proprietary information could adversely 
affect the funds and their investors. Some commenters expressed 
concerns over these risks of potential inadvertent public 
disclosures.\428\ However, we anticipate that these adverse effects 
will be mitigated by certain aspects of the Form PF reporting 
requirements and controls and systems designed by the Commission for 
handling the data. For example, with the exception of select questions, 
such as those relating to restructurings or recapitalizations of 
portfolio companies and investments in different levels of the same 
portfolio company by funds advised by the adviser and its related 
person,\429\ Form PF data generally could not, on its own, be used to 
identify individual investment positions. The Commission has controls 
and systems for the use and handling of the final modified and new Form 
PF data in a manner that reflects the sensitivity of the data and is 
consistent with the maintenance of its confidentiality. The Commission 
has substantial experience with the storage and use of nonpublic 
information reported on Form PF as well as other nonpublic information 
that the Commission handles in its course of business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \428\ See, e.g., AIMA Comment Letter.
    \429\ See supra section II.D.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation

    We anticipate that the increased ability for the Commission's and 
FSOC's oversight, resulting from the final amendments, will promote 
better functioning and more stable financial markets, which would lead 
to efficiency improvements. The additional and timelier data collected 
on the amended Form PF about private funds and advisers will help 
reduce uncertainty about risks in the U.S. financial system and inform 
and frame regulatory responses to future market events and 
policymaking. It will also help develop regulatory tools and mechanisms 
that could potentially be used to make future systemic crises episodes 
less likely to occur and less costly and damaging when they do occur.
    Also, we believe that the final amendments will improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Commission's and FSOC's oversight 
of private fund advisers by enabling them to manage and analyze 
information related to the risks posed by private funds more quickly, 
more efficiently, and more consistently than is currently possible. 
Private fund advisers' responses to new questions will help the 
Commission and FSOC better understand the investment activities of 
private funds and the scope of their potential effect on investors and 
the U.S. financial markets.
    We do not anticipate significant effects of the final amendments on 
competition in the private fund industry because the reported 
information generally will be nonpublic and similar types of advisers 
will have comparable burdens under the amended Form. Some commenters 
stated that the additional compliance costs of the rule will impact 
smaller advisers, who may need to increase their management fees to 
cover the cost of compliance with additional reporting requirements 
more than larger advisers who can absorb the additional compliance 
costs, and further stated this may negatively impact competition.\430\ 
We believe these impacts on competition will be limited for two 
reasons. First, the reporting requirements were tailored and designed 
not to be overly burdensome. Second, we have implemented changes in the 
final amendments that are in response to comment file considerations on 
the costs of the proposal that reduce the costs of the final amendments 
relative to the proposal. However, at the margin, the heightened 
compliance costs for smaller advisers from the final amendments may 
negatively affect competition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \430\ See, e.g., Schulte Comment Letter; PDI Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the benefits sections, we expect the final 
amendments will enhance the Commission's and FSOC's systemic risk 
assessment and investor protection efforts, which could ultimately lead 
to more resilient financial markets and instill stronger investor 
confidence in the U.S. private fund industry and financial markets more 
broadly. We anticipate that these developments will make U.S. financial 
markets more attractive for investments and improve private fund 
advisers' ability to raise capital, thereby, facilitating capital 
formation.

E. Reasonable Alternatives

1. Changing the Frequency of Current Reporting, Quarterly Reporting 
Events, and Annual Reporting Events
    At the proposing stage, we considered an alternative to current 
reporting for hedge fund and private equity fund advisers, namely 
requiring advisers to report relevant information as part of the 
existing Form PF filing or on a scheduled basis, such as semi-annually, 
quarterly, or monthly. The final amendments incorporate that 
alternative in part, as the final amendments require all private equity 
fund advisers to report certain events quarterly and requiring large 
private equity fund advisers to

[[Page 38186]]

report other events annually, depending on the event, but still 
requires current reporting for large hedge fund advisers to qualifying 
hedge funds.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ See supra section II.A, II.B, II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an alternative to the final amendments, we considered requiring 
these hedge fund advisers to report relevant information as part of the 
existing Form PF filing or on a scheduled basis. In general, this 
alternative would provide the Commission and FSOC with the same 
information but on a less timely basis and without substantially 
reducing the cost to hedge fund advisers. Specifically, we believe that 
this alternative approach would not significantly reduce the cost 
burden to hedge fund advisers compared to the final current reporting 
requirement, because hedge fund advisers would still need to incur 
initial costs to set up a system for monitoring significant events that 
are subject to the final current reporting requirement.
    At the same time, delayed reporting about stress events at hedge 
funds would significantly reduce the Commission's and FSOC's ability to 
assess and frame timely responses to the emerging risks and limit 
potential market disruptions, damages, and costs associated with them.
    We also considered a final rule for hedge fund advisers that would 
require advisers to, on an annual basis, submit reports of their daily 
tracking of the reference statistics currently included in the current 
reporting regime. For example, instead of submitting a current report 
of an extraordinary investment loss as defined by the above RFACV 
measure, hedge fund advisers could file an annual report of their daily 
RFACV values over the course of the year. This would provide more 
granular information,\432\ but the information would still be less 
timely, and this reporting would be a substantially higher burden for 
hedge fund advisers, who would need to conduct additional due diligence 
on every single daily RFACV value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \432\ For example, this alternative would allow the Commission 
to more precisely measure the frequency of RFACV losses of different 
sizes than is possible today. See supra IV.C.1.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We lastly considered requiring all private equity fund advisers to 
also report general partner or limited partner clawbacks quarterly, or 
requiring only large private equity fund advisers to report adviser-led 
secondaries, removals of general partners, and fund terminations 
annually. Requiring all private equity fund advisers to report general 
partner or limited partner clawbacks quarterly would substantially 
increase the burden on private equity fund advisers, and by extension 
their investors, especially for private equity fund advisers who do not 
currently file Form PF sections for large private equity fund advisers. 
As discussed above, we do not believe the additional investor 
protection or systemic risk assessment benefits justify this additional 
burden, particularly given that these events tend to build over the 
life of a private equity fund with a multi-year term.\433\ In 
particular, the legal mechanics of general partner and limited partner 
clawbacks are negotiated early on in a fund's life, long before the 
inciting event occurs.\434\ Then, an inciting event for a clawback 
actually occurs, typically, when the fund has had successful 
investments earlier in the life of the fund, but the fund's later 
investments are less successful.\435\ We believe trends of these types 
of events can be appropriately analyzed through information from large 
private equity fund advisers on an annual basis. Conversely, because 
removals of general partners, terminations of a fund or its investment 
period, and adviser-led secondaries represent potentially significant 
and more timely potential for conflicts of interest and other sources 
of investor harm, limiting reporting to annual reporting would 
substantially reduce the benefits of the required reporting. We believe 
that the investor protection benefits associated with these events 
require more timely reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \433\ See supra sections II.B.2, IV.C.1.c.
    \434\ Id.
    \435\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Changing Current Reporting Filing Time
    At the proposing stage, we considered an alternative to require 
hedge fund and private equity fund advisers to file current reports 
within a time period longer than the proposed one business day. The 
final amendments incorporate that alternative, and will require hedge 
fund advisers to file current reports within 72 hours, and will no 
longer require private equity fund advisers to file current reports, 
instead requiring either quarterly or annual reporting depending on the 
former current reporting event.\436\ We have also considered an 
alternative to require hedge fund advisers to file current reports 
within even longer time periods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \436\ See supra section II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although this alternative would provide more time to hedge fund 
advisers to prepare and file the form, we do not anticipate that this 
would substantially reduce the cost burden to advisers as compared to 
the final 72 hour reporting requirement. We believe that the structures 
of the final reporting requirements are relatively simple and require 
advisers to flag the reporting event from a menu of available options 
and add straightforward explanatory notes about the events, which 
generally should not require considerable time to complete. Extending 
the reporting time period may increase internal costs to advisers to 
prepare and review the required disclosure, to the extent a longer 
reporting time period indirectly signals to advisers a need for greater 
detail, thoroughness, or diligence.
    On the other hand, due to the time sensitive nature of the reported 
events, additional reporting time would significantly reduce the 
Commission's and FSOC's ability to assess and frame timely responses to 
the emerging risks and limit potential market disruptions, damages and 
costs associated with them.
3. Alternative Reporting Thresholds for Current Reporting by Hedge Fund 
Advisers (Versus Just Large Hedge Fund Advisers to Qualifying Hedge 
Funds)
    We considered an alternative to require all hedge fund advisers to 
file section 5 of Form PF upon occurrence of stress events at one of 
their hedge funds (irrespective of the fund size) instead of requiring 
this reporting from only large advisers to qualifying hedge funds.
    Although this information would be beneficial for the Commission 
and FSOC, as this would provide a more complete picture of the stress 
events in the hedge fund industry and allow better assessment of 
systemic risk and investor protection issues in the smaller hedge funds 
space, we believe that this benefit would be marginal as compared to 
the benefit of the information about qualifying hedge funds for two 
reasons. First, the hedge fund industry is dominated by qualifying 
hedge funds that currently account for approximately 81 percent of the 
industry's gross assets under management among filers of Form PF.\437\ 
Therefore, the final current reporting requirement will cover stress 
events that affect a broad, representative set of assets in the hedge 
fund industry. Second, the final current reporting is designed to serve 
as a signal to the Commission and FSOC about systemically important 
stress events at hedge funds. Stress events at larger hedge funds are 
more likely to be systemically important due to their quantitatively 
important positions in a market and more extensive use of

[[Page 38187]]

leverage. Overall, we believe at this time that requiring advisers to 
smaller hedge funds to file current reports would impose a significant 
burden on these smaller advisers and not significantly expand or 
improve the Commission's and FSOC's oversight and assessment of 
systemic risk efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \437\ See supra footnote 271.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also considered an alternative to increase the reporting 
threshold for hedge funds that would require a subgroup of the largest 
qualifying hedge funds to file current reports. Although this 
alternative would reduce the reporting burden at smaller qualifying 
hedge advisers, we believe that this would also reduce the benefit 
associated with the final current reporting. Specifically, we believe 
that this alternative would likely impede the Commission's and FSOC's 
ability to assess and respond to emerging industry risks, as this would 
reduce the scope of reported stress events to the events that affect 
the largest qualifying hedge funds. To the extent that largest 
qualifying hedge funds have a greater propensity to withstand 
deteriorating market conditions, the Commission and FSOC would have 
less visibility into the stress events that simultaneously affect 
smaller qualifying hedge funds that may indicate or have implications 
for systemic risk and investor protection concerns.
4. Different Size Thresholds for Private Equity Fund Advisers Who Must 
File Quarterly and Annual Reports on the Occurrence of Reporting Events
    The final amendments will require new annual reporting of general 
partner or limited partner clawbacks as part of section 4 for large 
private equity fund advisers. We considered instead requiring this new 
annual reporting for more private equity fund advisers, for example by 
creating a new section 1d of Form PF that would apply to all private 
equity fund advisers who file Form PF. This alternative would enhance 
the benefits of the rule by generating annual reports on clawbacks. 
This is because section 4 of Form PF, for large private equity fund 
advisers, relies on a size threshold that already captures 
approximately 73 percent of the private equity market.\438\ However, a 
number of commenters criticized the proposed private equity reporting 
requirements as being overly burdensome, and suggested adding 
thresholds to the former current event reporting questions to mitigate 
these burdens.\439\ We believe that the clawback question pertains more 
to the evaluation of broader emerging trends in certain private equity 
fund activities relevant to the assessment of systemic risk and to the 
protection of investors, and so we believe the losses of benefits from 
narrowing the scope to large private equity advisers will be small. We 
also understand clawbacks to be infrequent activities. Accordingly, we 
believe that by focusing clawback reporting on large private equity 
fund advisers, we will be able to evaluate material changes in market 
trends and investor protection issues in private equity funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \438\ See supra sections II.B, IV.B.2.
    \439\ See supra sections II.B, II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final amendments will also require new quarterly reporting of 
removals of general partners, terminations of an investment period or 
fund life, and adviser-led secondaries from all private equity fund 
advisers. We considered instead requiring this new quarterly reporting 
for only large private equity fund advisers. However, because removals 
of general partners, terminations of a fund or its investment period, 
and adviser-led secondaries represent potentially significant potential 
for conflicts of interest and other sources of investor harm, we 
believe limiting reporting to only large private equity advisers would 
substantially reduce the benefits of the required reporting. We believe 
that the investor protection benefits associated with these events 
require reporting from all private equity fund advisers.
5. Changing the Reporting Events for Current Reporting by Hedge Fund 
Advisers
    We also considered alternatives to which stress events should 
trigger current reporting for hedge fund advisers. Alternative 
reporting events include both different thresholds for how severe of a 
stress event triggers a current report, as well as different categories 
of stress events altogether, separate from those considered in the 
final amendments. For example, hedge fund reporting for extraordinary 
investment losses could be revised to be triggered by a 10 percent 
loss, or a 30 percent loss, or any other threshold.\440\ As another 
alternative, the threshold could instead compare losses against the 
volatility of the fund's returns. As discussed above, commenters argued 
that the Commission should consider alternative thresholds for every 
reporting event, and in one case a commenter suggested an alternative 
threshold choice for extraordinary investment loss current 
reporting.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \440\ We estimated the likely relative frequency of current 
reporting at these different thresholds above. See supra section 
IV.C.1.a. MFA suggested a threshold of 50%, but did not offer any 
analysis defending this alternative threshold choice. See MFA 
Comment Letter.
    \441\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar alternative thresholds were considered for other reporting 
events. For example, current reporting of default events could be 
limited to only defaults of a certain size.\442\ Current reporting of 
margin/collateral increases could be limited to only report large 
increases of margin/collateral on uncleared positions, or positions not 
cleared by a central counterparty.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \442\ See supra section II.A.3.
    \443\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, current reporting could alternatively be triggered by 
stress events besides those considered in the final amendments. For 
example, hedge fund current reporting could be triggered by a large 
increase in the volatility of the fund's returns, even if that 
volatility does not result in investment losses. We considered this 
alternative again with respect to the final amendments.
    In general, alternative triggers to the final current reporting 
requirements would either provide the Commission and FSOC with more 
information at a greater cost to advisers, less information at a lower 
cost to advisers, or an alternative metric for measuring the same 
stress event as the final reporting event. We believe that the 
thresholds in the final amendments will trigger reporting for relevant 
stress events for which we seek timely information while minimizing the 
potential for false positives and multiple unnecessary current reports. 
For example, we have discussed the potential for alternative thresholds 
associated with current reporting requirements in detail above, 
including how the threshold choices balance the need for timely 
information with risk of false positives.\444\ For other alternatives, 
we believe that the alternative would not substantially reduce the 
costs for advisers. For example, we do not believe that limiting 
current reporting of margin/collateral increases to uncleared positions 
would reduce costs because, as several commenters state, the cost of 
margin/collateral current reporting includes the cost of developing 
systems for daily tracking of margin/collateral at the reporting fund, 
and limiting the triggering event to uncleared positions or positions 
not cleared by a central counterparty would not alleviate those 
costs.\445\ To the extent that hedge funds currently do track their 
total daily margin/collateral, and this alternative would require them 
to instead

[[Page 38188]]

disentangle margin/collateral for cleared and uncleared positions, this 
alternative could be even more costly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \444\ See supra section IV.C.1.a.
    \445\ See supra section IV.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Alternative Size Threshold for Section 4 Reporting by Large Private 
Equity Fund Advisers
    The final amendments to section 4 of Form PF will maintain the 
current filing threshold for large private equity fund advisers at $2 
billion. We also considered alternatives to reduce the reporting size 
threshold below $2 billion or increase it above $2 billion.
    While some commenters suggested increasing the reporting 
threshold,\446\ we believe that increasing the threshold for large 
private equity fund advisers above $2 billion would likely impede the 
Commission's and FSOC's ability to a representative picture of the 
private fund industry and lead to misleading conclusions regarding 
emerging industry trends and characteristics, as this would reduce the 
coverage of private equity assets in today's market below 73 
percent.\447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \446\ RER Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter.
    \447\ See supra section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, reducing the current report size threshold below 
$2 billion would be marginally beneficial for the Commission's and 
FSOC's risk oversight and assessment efforts as this would increase the 
representativeness of the sample of reporting advisers. While some 
commenters supported lowering the threshold,\448\ most commenters 
opposed the additional costs associated with lowering the threshold and 
questioned the benefits of lowering the threshold.\449\ Collecting more 
detailed information about these funds would help the Commission and 
FSOC to detect certain new trends and group behaviors with potential 
systemic consequences among these advisers and funds. However, this 
would also increase the number of advisers that would be categorized as 
large private equity fund advisers subject to the more detailed 
reporting and impose additional reporting burden on those advisers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \448\ See, e.g., ICGN Comment Letter and Better Markets Comment 
Letter.
    \449\ See, e.g., Schulte Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; and 
RER Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We think that the current threshold of $2 billion in the final 
amendments strikes an appropriate balance between obtaining information 
regarding a significant portion of the private equity industry for 
analysis while continuing to minimize the burden imposed on smaller 
advisers.
7. Alternatives to the New Section 4 Reporting Requirements for Large 
Private Equity
    The additional large private equity fund adviser questions and 
revisions to existing questions are designed to enhance the 
Commission's and FSOC's understanding of certain practices in the 
private equity industry and amend certain existing questions to improve 
data collection.\450\ We also considered alternatives to these final 
amendments in the form of different choices of framing, level of detail 
requested, and precise information targeted, and considered these 
alternatives again with respect to the final amendments. For example, 
for Question 66 of section 4, on reporting of private equity 
strategies, we considered consolidating ``Private Credit--Junior/
Subordinated Debt,'' ``Private Credit--Mezzanine Financing,'' ``Private 
Credit--Senior Debt,'' and Private Credit--Senior Subordinated Debt'' 
into the ``Private Credit--Direct Lending/Mid Market Lending'' 
category.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \450\ See supra section II.D.
    \451\ See supra section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the amendments as stated in the final rule, 
including the decision to not adopt portfolio-level reporting 
requirements, maximize data quality and enhance the usefulness of 
reported data, without imposing unnecessary additional burden on 
filers.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \452\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the final Form PF and rule 204(b)-1 revise an 
existing ``collection of information'' within the meaning of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\453\ The SEC published a 
notice requesting comment on changes to this collection of information 
in the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release and submitted the collection of 
information to the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review 
in accordance with the PRA.\454\ The title for the collection of 
information we are amending is ``Form PF and Rule 204(b)-1'' (OMB 
Control Number 3235-0679), and includes both Form PF and rule 204(b)-1 
(``the rules''). The Commission's solicitation of public comments 
included estimating and requesting public comments on the burden 
estimates for all information collections under this OMB control number 
(i.e., both changes associated with the rulemaking and other burden 
updates). These changes in burden also reflect the Commission's 
revision and update of burden estimates for all information collections 
under this OMB control number (whether or not associated with 
rulemaking changes) and responses to the Commission's request for 
public comment on all information collection burden estimates for this 
OMB control number. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person 
is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it 
displays a currently valid OMB control number. Compliance with the 
information collection is mandatory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \453\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 through 3521.
    \454\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d); 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The respondents are investment advisers who are (1) registered or 
required to be registered under Advisers Act section 203, (2) advise 
one or more private funds, and (3) managed private fund assets of at 
least $150 million at the end of their most recently completed fiscal 
year (collectively, with their related persons).\455\ Form PF divides 
respondents into groups based on their size and types of private funds 
they manage, requiring some groups to file more information more 
frequently than others. The types of respondents are (1) smaller 
private fund advisers (i.e., private fund advisers who do not qualify 
as a large private fund adviser), (2) large hedge fund advisers, (3) 
large liquidity fund advisers, and (4) large private equity fund 
advisers.\456\ As discussed more fully in section II above and as 
summarized in sections V.A and V.C below, the rules will require 
current reporting for qualifying hedge fund advisers, will require 
private equity event reporting for all private equity fund advisers, 
and will revise what large private equity fund advisers are required to 
file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \455\ See 17 CFR 275.204(b)-1.
    \456\ See supra footnote 13 (discussing the definitions of large 
hedge fund advisers and large private equity fund advisers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have revised our burden estimates in response to comments we 
received, to reflect modifications from the proposal, and to take into 
consideration updated data. We received general comments to our time 
and cost burdens indicating that we underestimated the burdens to 
implement the proposed amendments to Form PF, particularly with respect 
to the new systems required to comply with the proposed current 
reporting obligations.\457\ One commenter stated that the proposed 
``real-time'' current reporting requirements would impose significant 
operational burdens on private fund advisers.\458\ Another commenter 
stated that the calculations required for the operations event current

[[Page 38189]]

reporting item would be very costly.\459\ Conversely, as discussed 
above more fully in sections I and II above, the amendments as adopted 
have been modified in some respects from the proposal in a manner that 
changes our time and cost burden estimates. The new current reporting 
requirement for large hedge fund advisers will require such advisers to 
report current reporting events as soon as practicable, but no later 
than 72 hours from the current reporting event, rather than within one 
business day as proposed. The new private equity event reporting 
requirement for all private equity fund advisers will require such 
advisers to report certain events within 60 days from the adviser's 
fiscal quarter end, rather than within one business day as proposed. We 
are also eliminating or tailoring certain reporting events that trigger 
a current report filing obligation for large hedge fund advisers and a 
private equity event report filing obligation for private equity fund 
advisers. For example, we are tailoring the private equity fund adviser 
event reporting requirement to be limited to reporting on a quarterly 
basis on (1) general partner removals and investor elections to 
terminate a fund or its investment period and (2) the occurrence of 
execution of an adviser-led secondary transaction. Large private equity 
fund advisers will be also required to report the implementation of a 
general partner or limited partner clawback on an annual basis in lieu 
of the proposed requirement, which would have required all private fund 
advisers (both smaller private fund advisers that advise private equity 
funds and large private equity fund advisers) to report these events 
within one business day. These changes from the proposal will reduce 
the scope of categories subject to current reporting and private equity 
event reporting, which reduce our estimated burdens. Several commenters 
also stated that our cost analysis underestimated the cost of a daily 
net asset value calculation because it would require the development of 
new systems.\460\ In a change from the proposal, the current reporting 
requirements for qualifying hedge fund advisers will require 
calculation of RFACV, rather than a daily net asset value calculation, 
which will reduce the burden on qualifying hedge fund advisers. We are 
also not adopting at this time the proposed amendments that would have 
required large liquidity funds to report certain additional 
information. Further, in a change from the proposal, we are not 
adopting a change to the filing threshold for large private equity fund 
advisers, which has changed the estimated number of large private 
equity fund adviser filers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \457\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; 
MFA Comment Letter; USCC Comment Letter.
    \458\ See RER Comment Letter.
    \459\ See AIMA/ACC Comment Letter.
    \460\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter; 
USCC Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we have modified our estimates from the proposal to 
address general comments to our proposed time and cost estimates for 
current reporting and private equity event reporting.\461\ We have 
increased our estimate on the number of annual responses for current 
reporting and private equity event reporting. We have also increased 
our time burden estimate for current reporting requirements for large 
hedge fund advisers in response to comments we received to include 
additional estimated cost and time burden to comply with the new 
current reporting requirements. The time burden estimate changes also 
reflect changes from the proposed current reporting requirements 
discussed more fully above, such as the change in the reporting 
timeframes and the changes in the reporting events that decrease our 
time burden estimate. Our time and cost estimates also incorporate 
other adjustments, which are not based on changes from the proposed 
amendments, for updated data for the estimated number of respondents 
and salary/wage information across all respondent types.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \461\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; MFA Comment Letter; 
State Street Comment Letter; USCC Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Purpose and Use of the Information Collection

    The rules implement provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank Act''), which 
amended the Advisers Act to require the SEC to, among other things, 
establish reporting requirements for advisers to private funds.\462\ 
The rules are intended to assist FSOC in its monitoring obligations 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, but the SEC also may use information 
collected on Form PF in its regulatory programs, including 
examinations, investigations, and investor protection efforts relating 
to private fund advisers.\463\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \462\ See 15 U.S.C. 80b-4(b) and 15 U.S.C. 80b-11(e).
    \463\ See 2011 Form PF Adopting Release, supra footnote 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final amendments are designed to enhance FSOC's ability to 
monitor systemic risk as well as bolster the SEC's regulatory oversight 
of private fund advisers and investor protection efforts. The final 
amendments do the following:
     Require all qualifying hedge fund advisers to file current 
reports upon certain current reporting events, as discussed more fully 
in section II.A above;
     Require all private equity fund advisers to file private 
equity event reports upon certain reporting events, as discussed more 
fully in section II.B above; and
     Adopt additional reporting items for large private equity 
fund advisers and amend how large private equity fund advisers report 
information about the private equity funds they advise, as discussed 
more fully in section II.B above.
    The final current reporting rule requires advisers to qualifying 
hedge funds to report information upon certain current reporting events 
as soon as practicable, but no later than 72 hours from the current 
reporting event. The final private equity event reporting rule requires 
all private equity fund advisers to report information upon certain 
reporting events on a quarterly basis.\464\ As discussed more fully in 
sections I and II, above, we are adopting the current reporting and 
private equity event reporting requirements so FSOC can receive more 
timely data to identify and respond to qualifying hedge funds and 
private equity funds that are facing stress that could result in 
systemic risk or harm to investors, while modifying the deadline to 
report to lessen the burden on such funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \464\ See 5 CFR 1320.5(d)(2)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Confidentiality

    Responses to the information collection will be kept confidential 
to the extent permitted by law.\465\ Form PF elicits non-public 
information about private funds and their trading strategies, the 
public disclosure of which could adversely affect the funds and their 
investors. The SEC does not intend to make public Form PF information 
that is identifiable to any particular adviser or private fund, 
although the SEC may use Form PF information in an enforcement action 
and to assess potential systemic risk.\466\ SEC staff issues certain 
publications designed to inform the public of the private funds 
industry, all of which use only aggregated or masked information to 
avoid potentially disclosing any proprietary information.\467\ The

[[Page 38190]]

Advisers Act precludes the SEC from being compelled to reveal Form PF 
information except (1) to Congress, upon an agreement of 
confidentiality, (2) to comply with a request for information from any 
other Federal department or agency or self-regulatory organization for 
purposes within the scope of its jurisdiction, or (3) to comply with an 
order of a court of the United States in an action brought by the 
United States or the SEC.\468\ Any department, agency, or self-
regulatory organization that receives Form PF information must maintain 
its confidentiality consistent with the level of confidentiality 
established for the SEC.\469\ The Advisers Act requires the SEC to make 
Form PF information available to FSOC.\470\ For advisers that are also 
commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisers, filing Form PF 
through the Form PF filing system is filing with both the SEC and 
CFTC.\471\ Therefore, the SEC makes Form PF information available to 
FSOC and the CFTC, pursuant to Advisers Act section 204(b), making the 
information subject to the confidentiality protections applicable to 
information required to be filed under that section. Before sharing any 
Form PF information, the SEC requires that any such department, agency, 
or self-regulatory organization represent to the SEC that it has in 
place controls designed to ensure the use and handling of Form PF 
information in a manner consistent with the protections required by the 
Advisers Act. The SEC has instituted procedures to protect the 
confidentiality of Form PF information in a manner consistent with the 
protections required in the Advisers Act.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \465\ See 5 CFR 1320.5(d)(2)(vii) and (viii).
    \466\ See 15 U.S.C. 80b-10(c).
    \467\ See, e.g., Private Funds Statistics, issued by staff of 
the SEC Division of Investment Management's Analytics Office, which 
we have used in this PRA as a data source, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics.shtml.
    \468\ See 15 U.S.C. 80b-4(b)(8).
    \469\ See 15 U.S.C. 80b-4(b)(9).
    \470\ See 15 U.S.C. 80b-4(b)(7).
    \471\ See 2011 Form PF Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, at 
n.17.
    \472\ See 5 CFR 1320.5(d)(2)(viii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Burden Estimates

    We are revising our total burden final estimates to reflect the 
final amendments, updated data, and new methodology for certain 
estimates, and comments we received to our estimates.\473\ The tables 
below map out the proposed and final Form PF requirements as they apply 
to each group of respondents and detail our burden estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \473\ For the previously approved estimates, see ICR Reference 
No. 202011-3235-019 (conclusion date Apr. 1, 2021), available at 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=202011-3235-019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Proposed Form PF Requirements by Respondent

                              Table 1--Proposed Form PF Requirements by Respondent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 Large private
             Form PF                Smaller private    Large hedge fund     Large liquidity       equity fund
                                    fund  advisers         advisers         fund  advisers         advisers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1a and section 1b (basic  Annually..........  Quarterly.........  Quarterly.........  Annually.
 information about the adviser
 and the private funds it
 advises). No proposed revisions.
Section 1c (additional            Annually, if they   Quarterly.........  Quarterly, if they  Annually, if they
 information concerning hedge      advise hedge                            advise hedge        advise hedge
 funds). No proposed revisions.    funds.                                  funds.              funds.
Section 2 (additional             No................  Quarterly.........  No................  No.
 information concerning
 qualifying hedge funds). No
 proposed revisions.
Section 3 (additional             No................  No................  Quarterly.........  No.
 information concerning
 liquidity funds). Proposed
 revisions.
Section 4 (additional             No................  No................  No................  Annually.
 information concerning private
 equity funds). Proposed
 revisions.
Section 5 (current reporting      No................  Upon a reporting    No................  No.
 concerning qualifying hedge                           event.
 funds). The proposal would add
 section 5.
Section 6 (current reporting for  Upon a reporting    No................  No................  Upon a reporting
 private equity fund advisers).    event, if they                                              event.
 The proposal would add section    advise private
 6.                                equity funds.
Section 7 (temporary hardship     Optional, if they   Optional, if they   Optional, if they   Optional, if they
 request). The proposed rules      qualify.            qualify.            qualify.            qualify.
 would make this available for
 current reporting.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 38191]]

                                Table 2--Final Form PF Requirements by Respondent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 Large private
             Form PF                Smaller private    Large hedge fund     Large liquidity       equity fund
                                    fund  advisers         advisers         fund  advisers         advisers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1a and section 1b (basic  Annually..........  Quarterly.........  Quarterly.........  Annually.
 information about the adviser
 and the private funds it
 advises). No final revisions.
Section 1c (additional            Annually, if they   Quarterly.........  Quarterly, if they  Annually, if they
 information concerning hedge      advise hedge                            advise hedge        advise hedge
 funds). No final revisions.       funds.                                  funds.              funds.
Section 2 (additional             No................  Quarterly.........  No................  No.
 information concerning
 qualifying hedge funds). No
 final revisions.
Section 3 (additional             No................  No................  No................  No.
 information concerning
 liquidity funds). No final
 revisions.
Section 4 (additional             No................  No................  No................  Annually.
 information concerning private
 equity funds). The final rules
 modify section 4.
Section 5 (current reporting      No................  As soon as          No................  No.
 concerning qualifying hedge                           practicable upon
 funds). The final rules add                           a current
 section 5.                                            reporting event,
                                                       but no later than
                                                       72 hours.
Section 6 (event reporting for    Within 60 days of   No................  No................  Within 60 days of
 private equity fund advisers).    fiscal quarter                                              fiscal quarter
 The final rules add section 6.    end upon a                                                  end upon a
                                   reporting event,                                            reporting event.
                                   if they advise
                                   private equity
                                   funds.
Section 7 (temporary hardship     Optional, if they   Optional, if they   Optional, if they   Optional, if they
 request).The final rules make     qualify.            qualify.            qualify.            qualify.
 this available for current and
 private equity event reporting.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates
    Below are tables with annual hour burden proposed and final 
estimates for (1) initial filings, (2) ongoing annual and quarterly 
filings, (3) current reporting and private equity event reporting, and 
(4) transition filings, final filings, and temporary hardship requests.

                  Table 3--Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Number of
                                        respondents =   Hours per                 Hours per      Aggregate hours
            Respondent \1\                aggregate      response                 response      amortized over 3
                                          number of        \3\                amortized over 3      years \5\
                                        responses \2\                             years \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate................         \6\ 313           40    / 3 =                 13             4,069
    Final Estimate...................         \7\ 358           40    / 3 =                 13             4,654
    Previously Approved..............             272           40                          23             6,256
    Change...........................              86            0                        (10)           (1,602)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate................          \8\ 14          325    / 3 =                108             1,512
    Final Estimate...................          \9\ 16          325    / 3 =                108             1,728
    Previously Approved..............              17          325                         658            11,186
    Change...........................             (1)            0                       (550)           (9,458)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Liquidity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate................          \10\ 1          202    / 3 =                 67                67
    Final Estimate...................          \11\ 1          200    / 3 =                 67                67
    Previously Approved..............               2          200                         588             1,176
    Change...........................             (1)            0                       (521)           (1,109)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate................         \12\ 42          250    / 3 =                 83             3,486
    Final Estimate...................         \13\ 17     \14\ 252    / 3 =                 84             1,428
    Previously Approved..............               9          200                         133             1,197
    Change...........................               8           52                        (49)               231
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ We expect that the hourly burden will be most significant for the initial report because the adviser will
  need to familiarize itself with the new reporting form and may need to configure its systems in order to
  efficiently gather the required information. In addition, we expect that some large private fund advisers will
  find it efficient to automate some portion of the reporting process, which will increase the burden of the
  initial filing but reduce the burden of subsequent filings.
\2\ This concerns the initial filing; therefore, we estimate one response per respondent. The proposed and final
  changes are due to using updated data to estimate the number of advisers. The proposed changes concerning
  large private equity fund advisers also were due to the proposed amendment to reduce the filing threshold,
  which will not be adopted in this Release.
\3\ Hours per response proposed and final changes for large private equity fund advisers are due to amendments
  to section 4. Hours per response proposed estimate changes for large liquidity fund advisers were due to
  proposed amendments to section 3. We have reduced the final hours estimate from the proposed hours estimate
  because the proposed large liquidity fund amendments will not be adopted in this Release.

[[Page 38192]]

 
\4\ We amortize the initial time burden over three years because we believe that most of the burden would be
  incurred in the initial filing. We use a different methodology to calculate the estimate than the methodology
  staff used for the previously approved burdens. We believe the previously approved burdens for initial filings
  inflated the estimates by using a methodology that included subsequent filings for the next two years, which,
  for annual filers, included 2 subsequent filings, and for quarterly filers, included 11 subsequent filings.
  For the requested burden, we calculate the initial filing, as amortized over the next three years, by
  including only the hours related to the initial filing, not any subsequent filings. This approach is designed
  to more accurately estimate the initial burden, as amortized over three years. (For example, to estimate the
  previously approved burden for a large hedge fund adviser making its initial filing, staff estimated that the
  adviser would have an amortized average annual burden of 658 hours (1 initial filing x 325 hours + 11
  subsequent filings (because it files quarterly) x 150 hours = 1,975 hours. 1,975 hours/3 years = approximately
  658 previously approved hours per response, amortized over three years).) Changes are due to using the revised
  methodology, and changes for the large hedge fund advisers also are due to amendments to section 4. The
  proposed changes for large liquidity fund advisers were due to proposed amendments to section 3, which we are
  not adopting in this Release.
\5\ (Number of responses) x (hours per response amortized over three years) = aggregate hours amortized over
  three years. Changes are due to (1) using updated data to estimate the number of advisers and (2) the new
  methodology to estimate the hours per response, amortized over three years. For large private equity fund
  advisers, changes in our proposed estimates were also due to the proposed amendments to lower the threshold,
  which we are not adopting in this Release, and amendments to section 4. The proposed changes for large
  liquidity fund advisers were due to proposed amendments to section 3, which we are not adopting in this
  Release.
\6\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 2,427 smaller private fund advisers
  filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 12.9
  percent of them did not file for the previous due date. (2,427 x 0.129 = 313 advisers.)
\7\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 2,616 smaller private fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the most recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of 13.7
  percent of them did not file during the prior year. (2,616 x 0.137 = 358.39 advisers, rounded to 358
  advisers.)
\8\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 545 large hedge fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 2.6 percent
  of them did not file for the previous due date. (545 x 0.026 = 14.17 advisers, rounded to 14 advisers.)
\9\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 598 large hedge fund advisers filed Form
  PF in the most recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of 2.7 percent
  of them did not file during the prior year. (598 x 0.027 = 16.146 advisers, rounded to 16 advisers.)
\10\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 23 large liquidity fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 1.5 percent
  of them did not file for the previous due date. (23 x 0.015 = 0.345 advisers, rounded up to 1 adviser.)
\11\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 22 large liquidity fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the most recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of 1.5
  percent of them did not file during the prior year. (22 x 0.015 = 0.33 advisers, rounded up to 1 adviser.)
\12\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 364 large private equity fund advisers
  filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 3.5
  percent of them did not file for the previous due date. (364 x 0.035 = 12.74 advisers, rounded to 13
  advisers.) As discussed in section II.B of the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, we estimated that reducing the
  filing threshold for large private equity fund advisers would capture eight percent more of the U.S. private
  equity industry based on committed capital (from 67 percent to 75 percent of the U.S. private equity
  industry). Therefore, we proposed to estimate the number of large private equity fund advisers would increase
  by eight percent, as a result of the proposed threshold. (364 large private equity fund advisers x 0.08 =
  29.12, rounded to 29 additional large private equity fund advisers filing for the first time as a result of
  the proposed threshold + 13 advisers = 42 advisers.)
\13\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 435 large private equity fund advisers
  filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of
  3.9 percent of them did not file during the prior year. (435 x 0.039 = 16.97 advisers, rounded to 17
  advisers.) In a change from the proposal, we are not adopting a change to the filing threshold for large
  private equity fund advisers in this Release.
\14\ The increase in the hours estimate from the proposing estimate to the final estimate is due to the change
  from a current reporting requirement to an annual reporting requirement for large private equity fund advisers
  for general partner and limited partner clawbacks, as more fully described in Section II.D above, and in
  response to commenters. Our final estimate considers that certain proposed questions for large private equity
  fund advisers will be on an annual, rather than a current, basis.

        Table 4--Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Number of              Number of           Hours per
          Respondent \1\              respondents             responses            response           Aggregate
                                     (advisers) \2\              \3\                 \4\              hours \5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate.............        \6\ 2,114     x              1     x            15     =        31,710
    Final Estimate................        \7\ 2,258     x              1     x            15     =        33,870
    Previously Approved...........            2,055     x              1     x            15     =        30,825
    Change........................              203                    0                   0               3,045
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate.............          \8\ 531     x              4     x           150     =       318,600
    Final Estimate................          \9\ 582     x              4     x           150     =       349,200
    Previously Approved...........              537     x              4     x           150     =       322,200
    Change........................               45                    0                   0              27,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Liquidity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate.............          \10\ 22     x              4     x            71     =         6,248
    Final Estimate................          \11\ 21     x              4     x            70     =         5,880
    Previously Approved...........               20     x              4     x            70     =         5,600
    Change........................                1                    0                   0                 280
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund
 Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate.............         \12\ 351     x              1     x           125     =        43,875
    Final Estimate................         \13\ 418     x              1     x      \14\ 128     =        53,504
    Previously Approved...........              313     x              1     x           100     =        31,300
    Change........................              105                    0                  28              22,204
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ We estimate that after an adviser files its initial report, it will incur significantly lower costs to file
  ongoing annual and quarterly reports, because much of the work for the initial report is non-recurring and
  likely created system configuration and reporting efficiencies.
\2\ Changes to the number of respondents are due to using updated data to estimate the number of advisers. For
  large private equity fund advisers, the changes in our proposed estimates were also due to the amendment to
  lower the threshold, which we are not adopting in this Release.
\3\ Smaller private fund advisers and large private equity fund advisers file annually. Large hedge fund
  advisers and large liquidity fund advisers file quarterly.
\4\ Hours per response changes for the large private equity fund advisers are due to the amendments to section
  4. Hours per response proposed estimate changes for large liquidity fund advisers were due to proposed
  amendments to section 3. We have reduced the final hours estimate for large liquidity fund advisers from the
  proposed hours estimate because the proposed large liquidity fund amendments will not be adopted in this
  Release.
\5\ Changes to the aggregate hours are due to using updated data to estimate the number of advisers. For large
  private equity fund advisers, changes also are due to the amendments to section 4.
\6\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 2,427 smaller private fund advisers
  filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. We estimated that 313 of them filed an initial filing, as
  discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. (2,427 total
  smaller advisers-313 advisers who made an initial filing = 2,114 advisers who make ongoing filings.)
\7\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 2,616 smaller private fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the most recent reporting period. We estimated that 358 of them filed an initial filing, as
  discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. (2,616 total
  smaller advisers-358 advisers who made an initial filing = 2,258 advisers who make ongoing filings.)
\8\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 545 large hedge fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. We estimated that 14 of them filed an initial filing, as discussed in
  Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. (545 total large hedge fund
  advisers-14 advisers who made an initial filing = 531 advisers who make ongoing filings.)

[[Page 38193]]

 
\9\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 598 large hedge fund advisers filed Form
  PF in the most recent reporting period. We estimated that 16 of them filed an initial filing, as discussed in
  Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. (598 total large hedge fund
  advisers-16 advisers who made an initial filing = 582 advisers who make ongoing filings.)
\10\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 23 large liquidity fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. We estimated that one of them filed an initial filing, as discussed in
  Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. (23 total large liquidity fund
  advisers-1 adviser who made an initial filing = 22 advisers who make ongoing filings.)
\11\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 22 large liquidity fund advisers filed
  Form PF in the most recent reporting period. We estimated that one of them filed an initial filing, as
  discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. (22 total large
  liquidity fund advisers-1 adviser who made an initial filing = 21 advisers who make ongoing filings.)
\12\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 364 large private equity fund advisers
  filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 3.5
  percent of them did not file for the previous due date. (364 x 0.035 = 12.74 advisers, rounded to 13
  advisers.) (364 total large private equity fund advisers-13 advisers who made an initial filing = 351 advisers
  who make ongoing filings.) Lowering the filing threshold for large private equity fund advisers would result
  in additional advisers filing for the first time, as discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and
  Final Estimates for Initial Filings.
\13\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 435 large private equity fund advisers
  filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of
  3.9 percent of them did not file during the prior year. (435 x 0.039 = 16.97 advisers, rounded to 17
  advisers.) (435 total large private equity fund advisers-17 advisers who made an initial filing = 418 advisers
  who make ongoing filings.) As discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for
  Initial Filings, we are not adopting the proposed change in threshold for large private equity fund advisers.
\14\ The increase in the hours estimate from the proposing estimate to the final estimate is due to the change
  from a current reporting requirement to an annual reporting requirement for large private equity fund advisers
  for general partner and limited partner clawbacks, as more fully described in Section II.D above, and in
  response to commenters. Our final estimate considers that certain proposed questions for large private equity
  fund advisers will be on an annual, rather than a current, basis.

     Table 5--Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Current Reporting and Private Equity Event
                                                    Reporting
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Aggregate           Hours per
                       Respondent \1\                         number of            response           Aggregate
                                                              responses              \2\                hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate......................................            6     x           8.5     =            51
    Final Estimate.........................................           20     x             5     =           100
                                                            ----------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved....................................                     Not Applicable
    Change.................................................                     Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate......................................            6     x           8.5     =            51
    Final Estimate.........................................       \3\ 60     x            10     =           600
                                                            ----------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved....................................                     Not Applicable
    Change.................................................                     Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate......................................            6     x           8.5     =            51
    Proposed Estimate......................................           20     x             5     =           100
                                                            ----------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved....................................                     Not Applicable
    Change.................................................                     Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ In a change from the proposal, qualifying hedge fund advisers will file current reports under section 5 as
  soon as practicable, but no later than 72 hours from the current reporting event, and private equity fund
  advisers will file event reports under section 6 on a quarterly basis, in each case rather than within one
  business day as proposed. There are no previously approved estimates for the proposed and final current
  reporting and private equity event reporting amendments because they are new requirements.
\2\ We estimated in the proposal that the time to prepare and file a current report would range from 4 hours to
  8.5 hours, depending on the current reporting event. Therefore, we proposed to use the upper range (8.5 hours)
  to calculate estimates. In our final estimates, we have revised the estimated time to prepare and file a
  current report for large hedge fund advisers to 10 hours. We considered comments that we received to our hour
  burden estimate, as well as changes to current reporting questions and the reporting timeline from the
  proposed amendments to the final amendments. Our final time burden estimate includes the costs associated with
  the required explanatory notes that are more fully described in section II.D.1 above. We have revised the
  estimated time to prepare and file a private equity event report for private equity fund advisers to 5 hours
  in consideration of changes from the proposed amendments to the final amendments to the event reporting
  questions and the change in the reporting timeline from within one business day to on a quarterly basis.
\3\ In light of comments received and modifications to the proposal, our estimate of the aggregate number of
  responses expected across all current reporting and private equity event reporting categories has increased.
  As discussed more fully in section IV.C.1.a above and in consideration of comments we received, we have
  modified our estimate of the number of current reports associated with extraordinary losses for large hedge
  fund advisers. We have also modified our estimate of current reports and private equity reporting events
  associated with other reporting event categories. We also recognize in our estimate that advisers may
  concurrently experience multiple current reporting events or private equity reporting events, as applicable,
  and may therefore report more than one reporting event in a single filing.

[[Page 38194]]

  Table 6--Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Transition Filings, Final Filings, and Temporary
                                                Hardship Requests
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Aggregate
                                                              number of           Hours per           Aggregate
                      Filing type \1\                         responses            response           hours \3\
                                                                 \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition Filing from Quarterly to Annual:
    Proposed Estimate.....................................        \4\ 63     x          0.25     =         15.75
    Final Estimate........................................        \5\ 71     x          0.25     =         17.75
    Previously Approved...................................            45     x          0.25     =         11.25
    Change................................................            26                   0                 6.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Filings:
    Proposed Estimate.....................................       \6\ 232  .....         0.25     =            58
    Final Estimate........................................       \7\ 235     x          0.25     =         58.75
    Previously Approved...................................            54     x          0.25     =          13.5
    Change \8\............................................           181                   0               45.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Temporary Hardship Requests:
    Proposed Estimate.....................................         \9\ 3     x             1     =             3
    Final Estimate........................................        \10\ 4     x             1     =             4
    Previously Approved...................................             4     x             1     =             4
    Change................................................             0                   0                  0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Advisers must file limited information on Form PF in three situations. First, any adviser that transitions
  from filing quarterly to annually because it has ceased to qualify as a large hedge fund adviser or large
  liquidity fund adviser, must file a Form PF indicating that it is no longer obligated to report on a quarterly
  basis. Second, any adviser that is no longer subject to Form PF's reporting requirements, must file a final
  report indicating this. Third, an adviser may request a temporary hardship exemption if it encounters
  unanticipated technical difficulties that prevent it from making a timely electronic filing. A temporary
  hardship exemption extends the deadline for an electronic filing for seven business days. To request a
  temporary hardship exemption, the adviser must file a request on Form PF. Under the final rule, temporary
  hardship exemptions are available for current reporting and private equity event reporting, as discussed in
  section II. This final amendment will not result in any changes to the hours per response.
\2\ Changes to the aggregate number of responses are due to using updated data. Changes for final filings also
  are due to using a different methodology, as discussed below.
\3\ Changes to the aggregate hours are due to the changes in the aggregate number of responses.
\4\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 568 advisers filed quarterly reports in
  the fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 11.1 percent of them
  filed a transition filing. (568 x 0.111 = 63 responses.)
\5\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 620 advisers filed quarterly reports in
  the most recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of 11.5 percent of
  them filed a transition filing. (620 x 0.115 = 71.3 responses, rounded to 71 responses.)
\6\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 3,359 advisers filed Form PF in the
  fourth quarter of 2020. Based on filing data from 2016 through 2020, an average of 6.9 percent of them filed a
  final filing. (3,359 x 0.069 = approximately 232 responses.)
\7\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 3,671 advisers filed Form PF in the most
  recent reporting period. Based on filing data from 2017 through 2021, an average of 11.5 percent of them filed
  a final filing. (3,671 x 0.115 = approximately 422 responses.)
\8\ Changes for final filings are due to using a different methodology. The previously approved estimates used a
  percentage of quarterly filers to estimate how many advisers filed a final report. We use a percentage of all
  filers to estimate how many advisers filed a final report, because all filers may file a final report, not
  just quarterly filers. Therefore, this methodology is designed to more accurately estimate the number of
  responses for final filings.
\9\ In the case of the proposed estimates, based on experience receiving temporary hardship requests, we
  estimate that 1 out of 1,000 advisers will file a temporary hardship exemption annually. Private Funds
  Statistics show there were 3,359 private fund advisers who filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. (3,359/
  1,000 = approximately 3 responses.)
\10\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show there were 3,671 private fund advisers
  who filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. (3,671/1,000 = approximately 4 responses.)

4. Annual Monetized Time Burden Proposed and Final Estimates
    Below are tables with annual monetized time burden proposed and 
final estimates for (1) initial filings, (2) ongoing annual and 
quarterly filings, (3) current reporting and private equity event 
reporting, and (4) transition filings, final filings, and temporary 
hardship requests.\474\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \474\ The hourly wage rates used in our proposed and final 
estimates are based on (1) SIFMA's Management & Professional 
Earnings in the Securities Industry 2013, modified by SEC staff to 
account for an 1,800-hour work-year and inflation, and multiplied by 
5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and 
overhead; and (2) SIFMA's Office Salaries in the Securities Industry 
2013, modified by SEC staff to account for an 1,800-hour work-year 
and inflation, and multiplied by 2.93 to account for bonuses, firm 
size, employee benefits and overhead. The final estimates are based 
on the preceding SIFMA data sets, which SEC staff have updated since 
the proposing release to account for current inflation rates.

[[Page 38195]]

                                       Table 7--Proposed and Final Annual Monetized Time Burden of Initial Filings
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                             Aggregate
                                                                       Per                  Per response              Aggregate           monetized time
                          Respondent \1\                             response             amortized over 3            number of               burden
                                                                       \2\                    years \3\             responses \4\         amortized over
                                                                                                                                              3 years
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate............................................  \5\ $13,620    / 3 =             $4,540     x              313     =       $1,421,020
    Final Estimate...............................................   \6\ 15,520    / 3 =              5,174     x              358     =        1,852,292
    Previously Approved..........................................       13,460                                 x              272     =        3,661,120
    Change.......................................................        2,060                                                 86            (1,808,828)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate............................................  \7\ 104,423    / 3 =             34,808     x               14     =          487,312
    Final Estimate...............................................  \8\ 118,890    / 3 =             39,630     x               16     =          634,080
    Previously Approved..........................................      103,123                                 x               17     =        1,753,091
    Change.......................................................       15,767                                                (1)            (1,119,011)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Liquidity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate............................................   \9\ 64,893    / 3 =             21,631     x                1     =           21,631
    Final Estimate...............................................  \10\ 73,200    / 3 =             24,400     x                1     =           24,400
    Previously Approved..........................................       63,460                                 x                2     =          126,920
    Change.......................................................        9,740                                                (1)              (102,520)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate............................................  \11\ 80,325    / 3 =             26,775     x               42     =        1,124,550
    Final Estimate...............................................  \12\ 92,221    / 3 =             30,740     x               17     =          522,580
    Previously Approved..........................................       63,460                                 x                9     =          571,140
    Change.......................................................       28,761                                                  8               (48,560)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ We expect that the monetized time burden will be most significant for the initial report, for the same reasons discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour
  Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings. Accordingly, we anticipate that the initial report will require more attention from senior
  personnel, including compliance managers and senior risk management specialists, than will ongoing annual and quarterly filings. Changes are due to
  using (1) updated hours per response estimates, as discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings, (2)
  updated aggregate number of responses, as discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings, and (3) updated
  wage estimates. Changes to the aggregate monetized time burden, amortized over three years, also are due to amortizing the monetized time burden,
  which the previously approved estimates did not calculate, as discussed below.
\2\ For the hours per response in each calculation, see Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings.
\3\ We amortize the monetized time burden for initial filings over three years, as we do with other initial burdens in this PRA, because we believe that
  most of the burden would be incurred in the initial filing. The previously approved burden estimates did not calculate this.
\4\ See Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings.
\5\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for smaller private fund advisers, we estimated that the initial report would most likely be completed
  equally by a compliance manager at a cost of $316 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $365 per hour. Smaller private fund
  advisers generally would not realize significant benefits from or incur significant costs for system configuration or automation because of the
  limited scope of information required from smaller private fund advisers. (($316 per hour x 0.5) + ($365 per hour x 0.5)) x 40 hours per response =
  $13,620.
\6\ In the case of the final estimates, for smaller private fund advisers, we estimate that the initial report will most likely be completed equally by
  a compliance manager at a cost of $360 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $416 per hour. Smaller private fund advisers
  generally would not realize significant benefits from or incur significant costs for system configuration or automation because of the limited scope
  of information required from smaller private fund advisers. (($416 per hour x 0.5) + ($360 per hour x 0.5)) x 40 hours per response = $15,520.
\7\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for large hedge fund advisers, we estimated that for the initial report, of a total estimated burden of 325
  hours, approximately 195 hours will most likely be performed by compliance professionals and 130 hours would most likely be performed by programmers
  working on system configuration and reporting automation. Of the work performed by compliance professionals, we anticipate that it will be performed
  equally by a compliance manager at a cost of $316 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $365 per hour. Of the work performed
  by programmers, we anticipated that it would be performed equally by a senior programmer at a cost of $339 per hour and a programmer analyst at a cost
  of $246 per hour. (($316 per hour x 0.5) + ($365 per hour x 0.5)) x 195 hours = $66,397.50. (($339 per hour x 0.5) + ($246 per hour x 0.5)) x 130
  hours = $38,025. $66,397.50 + $38,025 = $104,422.50, rounded to $104,423.
\8\ In the case of the final estimates, for large hedge fund advisers, we estimate that for the initial report, of a total estimated burden of 325
  hours, approximately 195 hours will most likely be performed by compliance professionals and 130 hours will most likely be performed by programmers
  working on system configuration and reporting automation. Of the work performed by compliance professionals, we anticipate that it will be performed
  equally by a compliance manager at a cost of $360 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $416 per hour. Of the work performed
  by programmers, we anticipate that it will be performed equally by a senior programmer at a cost of $386 per hour and a programmer analyst at a cost
  of $280 per hour. (($360 per hour x 0.5) + ($416 per hour x 0.5)) x 195 hours = $75,600. (($386 per hour x 0.5) + ($280 per hour x 0.5)) x 130 hours =
  $43,290. $75,600 + $43,290 = $118,890.
\9\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for large liquidity fund advisers, we estimated that for the initial report, of a total estimated burden of
  202 hours, approximately 60 percent would most likely be performed by compliance professionals and approximately 40 percent would most likely be
  performed by programmers working on system configuration and reporting automation (that is approximately 121 hours for compliance professionals and 81
  hours for programmers). Of the work performed by compliance professionals, we anticipated that it would be performed equally by a compliance manager
  at a cost of $316 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $365 per hour. Of the work performed by programmers, we anticipated
  that it would be performed equally by a senior programmer at a cost of $339 per hour and a programmer analyst at a cost of $246 per hour. (($316 per
  hour x 0.5) + ($365 per hour x 0.5)) x 121 hours = $41,200.50. (($339 per hour x 0.5) + ($246 per hour x 0.5)) x 81 hours = $23,692.50. $41,200.50 +
  $23,692.50 = $64,893.
\10\ In the case of the final estimates, for large liquidity fund advisers, we estimate that for the initial report, of a total estimated burden of 200
  hours, approximately 60 percent will most likely be performed by compliance professionals and approximately 40 percent will most likely be performed
  by programmers working on system configuration and reporting automation (that is approximately 120 hours for compliance professionals and 80 hours for
  programmers). Of the work performed by compliance professionals, we anticipate that it will be performed equally by a compliance manager at a cost of
  $360 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $416 per hour. Of the work performed by programmers, we anticipate that it will be
  performed equally by a senior programmer at a cost of $386 per hour and a programmer analyst at a cost of $280 per hour. (($360 per hour x 0.5) +
  ($416 per hour x 0.5)) x 120 hours = $46,560. (($386 per hour x 0.5) + ($280 per hour x 0.5)) x 80 hours = $26,640. $46,560 + $26,640 = $73,200.
\11\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for large private equity fund advisers, we expected that for the initial report, of a total estimated burden
  of 250 hours, approximately 60 percent would most likely be performed by compliance professionals and approximately 40 percent would most likely be
  performed by programmers working on system configuration and reporting automation (that is approximately 150 hours for compliance professionals and
  100 hours for programmers). Of the work performed by compliance professionals, we anticipated that it would be performed equally by a compliance
  manager at a cost of $316 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $365 per hour. Of the work performed by programmers, we
  anticipated that it would be performed equally by a senior programmer at a cost of $339 per hour and a programmer analyst at a cost of $246 per hour.
  (($316 per hour x 0.5) + ($365 per hour x 0.5)) x 150 hours = $51,075. (($339 per hour x 0.5) + ($246 per hour x 0.5)) x 100 hours = $29,250. $51,075
  + $29,250 = $80,325.
\12\ In the case of the final estimates, for large private equity fund advisers, we expect that for the initial report, of a total estimated burden of
  252 hours, approximately 60 percent will most likely be performed by compliance professionals and approximately 40 percent will most likely be
  performed by programmers working on system configuration and reporting automation (that is approximately 151 hours for compliance professionals and
  101 hours for programmers). Of the work performed by compliance professionals, we anticipate that it will be performed equally by a compliance manager
  at a cost of $360 per hour and a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $416 per hour. Of the work performed by programmers, we anticipate
  that it will be performed equally by a senior programmer at a cost of $386 per hour and a programmer analyst at a cost of $280 per hour. (($360 per
  hour x 0.5) + ($416 per hour x 0.5)) x 151 hours = $58,588. (($386 per hour x 0.5) + ($280 per hour x 0.5)) x 101 hours = $33,633. $58,588 + $33,633 =
  $92,221.

[[Page 38196]]

        Table 8--Proposed and Final Annual Monetized Time Burden of Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Per              Aggregate             Aggregate
                     Respondent \1\                         response           number of          monetized time
                                                              \2\              responses              burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate...................................   \3\ $4,230     x     \4\ 2,114     =       $8,942,220
    Final Estimate......................................    \5\ 4,815     x     \6\ 2,258     =       10,872,270
    Previously Approved.................................     4,173.75     x         2,055     =        8,577,056
    Change..............................................       641.25                 203              2,295,214
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate...................................   \7\ 42,300     x     \8\ 2,124     =       89,845,200
    Final Estimate......................................   \9\ 48,150     x    \10\ 2,328     =      112,093,200
    Previously Approved.................................    41,737.50     x         2,148     =       89,652,150
    Change..............................................     6,412.50                 180             22,441,050
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Liquidity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate...................................  \11\ 20,022     x       \12\ 88     =        1,761,936
    Final Estimate......................................  \13\ 22,470     x       \14\ 84     =        1,887,480
    Previously Approved.................................    29,216.25     x            80     =        2,337,300
    Change \9\..........................................   (6,746.25)                   4              (449,820)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate...................................  \15\ 35,250     x      \16\ 351     =       12,372,750
    Final Estimate......................................  \17\ 41,730     x      \18\ 418     =       17,443,140
    Previously Approved.................................       27,825     x           313     =        8,709,225
    Change..............................................       13,905                 105              8,733,915
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ We expect that the monetized time burden will be less costly for ongoing annual and quarterly reports than
  for initial reports, for the same reasons discussed in Table 4: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final
  Estimates for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings. Accordingly, we anticipate that senior personnel will bear
  less of the reporting burden than they would for the initial report. Changes are due to using (1) updated wage
  estimates, (2) updated hours per response estimates, as discussed in Table 4: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and
  Final Estimates for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings, and (3) updated aggregate number of responses.
  Changes to estimates concerning large liquidity fund advisers primarily appear to be due to correcting a
  calculation error, as discussed below.
\2\ For all types of respondents, in the case of the proposed estimates, we estimated that both annual and
  quarterly reports would be completed equally by (1) a compliance manager at a cost of $316 per hour, (2) a
  senior compliance examiner at a cost of $243, (3) a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $365 per
  hour, and (4) a risk management specialist at a cost of $203 an hour. ($316 x 0.25 = $79) + ($243 x 0.25 =
  $60.75) + ($365 x 0.25 = $91.25) + ($203 x 0.25 = $50.75) = $281.75, rounded to $282 per hour. For all types
  of respondents, in the case of the final estimates, we estimate that both annual and quarterly reports would
  be completed equally by (1) a compliance manager at a cost of $360 per hour, (2) a senior compliance examiner
  at a cost of $276, (3) a senior risk management specialist at a cost of $416 per hour, and (4) a risk
  management specialist at a cost of $232 an hour. ($360 x 0.25 = $90) + ($276 x 0.25 = $69) + ($416 x 0.25 =
  $104) + ($232 x 0.25 = $58) = $321. To calculate the cost per response for each respondent, we used the hours
  per response from Table 4: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly
  Filings.
\3\ In the case of the proposed estimates, cost per response for smaller private fund advisers: ($282 per hour x
  15 hours per response = $4,230 per response.)
\4\ In the case of the proposed estimates, (2,114 smaller private fund advisers x 1 response annually = 2,114
  aggregate responses.)
\5\ In the case of the final estimates, cost per response for smaller private fund advisers: ($303 per hour x 15
  hours per response = $4,545 per response.)
\6\ In the case of the final estimates, (2,258 smaller private fund advisers x 1 response annually = 2,258
  aggregate responses.)
\7\ In the case of the proposed estimates, cost per response for large hedge fund advisers: ($282 per hour x 150
  hours per response = $42,300 per response.)
\8\ In the case of the proposed estimates, (531 large hedge fund advisers x 4 response annually = 2,124
  aggregate responses.)
\9\ In the case of the final estimates, cost per response for large hedge fund advisers: ($321 per hour x 150
  hours per response = $48,150 per response.)
\10\ In the case of the final estimates, (582 large hedge fund advisers x 4 responses annually = 2,328 aggregate
  responses.)
\11\ In the case of the proposed estimates, cost per response for large liquidity fund advisers: ($282 per hour
  x 71 hours per response = $20,022 per response.)
\12\ In the case of the proposed estimates, (22 large liquidity fund advisers x 4 responses annually = 88
  aggregate responses.)
\13\ In the case of the final estimates, cost per response for large liquidity fund advisers: ($321 per hour x
  70 hours per response = $22,470 per response.)
\14\ In the case of the final estimates, (21 large liquidity fund advisers x 4 responses annually = 84 aggregate
  responses.)
\15\ The previously approved estimates appear to have mistakenly used a different amount of hours per response
  (105 hours), rather than the actual estimate for large liquidity fund advisers (which was 70 hours per
  response), causing the monetized time burden to be inflated in error. Therefore, the extent of these changes
  are primarily due to using the correct hours per response, which we now estimate as 70 hours, as discussed in
  Table 4: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings. In the case
  of the proposed estimates, cost per response for large private equity fund advisers: ($282 per hour x 125
  hours per response = $35,250 per response.)
\16\ In the case of the proposed estimates, (351 large private equity fund advisers x 1 response annually = 351
  aggregate responses.)
\17\ In the case of the final estimates, cost per response for large private equity fund advisers: ($321 per
  hour x 130 hours per response = $41,730 per response.)
\18\ In the case of the final estimates, (418 large private equity fund advisers x 1 response annually = 418
  aggregate responses.)

[[Page 38197]]

Table 9--Proposed and Final Annual Monetized Time Burden of Current Reporting and Private Equity Event Reporting
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Aggregate
                                                               Per               number of            Aggregate
                      Respondent \1\                         response            responses            monetized
                                                                                    \2\              time burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate....................................   \3\ $4,182     x              6     =        $25,902
    Final Estimate.......................................   \4\ $2,024     x             20     =         40,480
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved..................................                      Not Applicable
    Change...............................................                      Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate....................................    \5\ 3,538     x              6     =         21,228
    Final Estimate.......................................    \6\ 5,160     x             60     =        309,600
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved..................................                      Not Applicable
    Change...............................................                      Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate....................................    \3\ 4,182     x              6     =         25,092
    Final Estimate.......................................    \4\ 2,024     x             20     =         40,480
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved..................................                      Not Applicable
    Change...............................................                      Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ In a change from the proposal, qualifying hedge fund advisers will file current reports under section 5 as
  soon as practicable, but no later than 72 hours from the current reporting event, and private equity fund
  advisers will file event reports under section 6 on a quarterly basis, in each case rather than within one
  business day as proposed. There are no previously approved estimates for these proposed and final amendments
  because they are new requirements.
\2\ See Table 5: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Current Reporting and Private Equity Event
  Reporting.
\3\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for the cost per response for smaller private fund advisers and large
  private equity fund advisers, we estimated that, depending on the circumstances, different legal professionals
  at the adviser would work on the current report or the private equity event report, as applicable. We
  estimated that the time costs for a legal professional to be approximately $492, which is a blended average of
  hourly rate for a deputy general counsel ($610) and compliance attorney ($373). (8.5 hours to file current
  report or private equity event report, as applicable x $492 per hour for a legal professional = $4,182).
\4\ In the case of the final estimates, we estimate that the time costs for a legal professional to be
  approximately $560, which is a blended average of hourly rate for a deputy general counsel ($695) and
  compliance attorney ($425). We estimate that the time costs for a financial professional to be approximately
  $355, which is a blended average hourly rate for a senior risk management specialist ($416) and a financial
  reporting manager ($339). Of the total 5 hours that a private equity event report would take, we estimate that
  an adviser would spend on average 2.5 hours of legal professional time and 1.5 hours of financial professional
  time to prepare, review, and submit a private equity event report. (2.5 hours x $560 per hour for a legal
  professional = $1,400) + (1.5 hours x $416 per hour for a financial professional = $624) = $2,024.
\5\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for the cost per response, we estimated that, depending on the
  circumstances, different legal professionals and financial professionals at the advisers would work on the
  current report because the current reporting events may require both legal and quantitative analysis. We
  estimated that the time costs for a legal professional to be approximately $492, which is a blended average of
  hourly rate for a deputy general counsel ($610) and compliance attorney ($373). We estimate that the time
  costs for a financial professional to be approximately $331, which is a blended average hourly rate for a
  senior risk management specialist ($365) and a financial reporting manager ($297). Of the total 8.5 hours that
  a current report would take, we estimate that an adviser would spend on average 4.5 hours of legal
  professional time and 4 hours of financial professional time to prepare, review, and submit a current report
  pursuant to section 5. (4.5 hours x $492 per hour for a legal professional = $2,214) + (4 hours x $331 per
  hour for a financial professional = $1,324) = $3,583.
\6\ In the case of the final estimates, we estimate that the time costs for a legal professional to be
  approximately $560, which is a blended average of hourly rate for a deputy general counsel ($695) and
  compliance attorney ($425). We estimate that the time costs for a financial professional to be approximately
  $355, which is a blended average hourly rate for a senior risk management specialist ($416) and a financial
  reporting manager ($339). Of the total 10 hours that a current report would take, we estimate that an adviser
  would spend on average 5.5 hours of legal professional time and 4.5 hours of financial professional time to
  prepare, review, and submit a current report. (5.5 hours x $560 per hour for a legal professional = $3,080) +
  (5 hours x $416 per hour for a financial professional = $2,080) = $5,160.

 Table 10--Proposed and Final Annual Monetized Time Burden for Transition Filings, Final Filings, and Temporary
                                                Hardship Requests
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Aggregate
                                                               Per               number of            Aggregate
                     Filing Type \1\                         response            responses            monetized
                                                                                    \2\              time burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition Filing from Quarterly to Annual:
    Proposed Estimate....................................      \3\ $18     x             63     =         $1,134
    Final Estimate.......................................    \4\ 20.50     x             71     =       1,455.50
    Previously Approved..................................        17.75     x             45     =         621.25
    Change...............................................         2.75                   26               834.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Filings:
    Proposed Estimate....................................       \5\ 18     x            232     =          4,176
    Final Estimate.......................................    \6\ 20.50     x            422     =          8,651
    Previously Approved..................................        17.75     x             54     =         958.50
    Change...............................................         2.75                  368             7,692.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Temporary Hardship Requests:

[[Page 38198]]

 
    Proposed Estimate....................................      \7\ 222     x              3     =            666
    Final Estimate.......................................   \8\ 252.38     x              4     =       1,009.52
    Previously Approved..................................       221.63     x              4     =         886.52
    Change...............................................        30.75                    0                  123
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ All changes are due to using updated data concerning wage rates and the number of responses.
\2\ See Table 6: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Transition Filings, Final Filings, and
  Temporary Hardship Requests.
\3\ In the case of the proposed estimates, we estimated that each transition filing would take 0.25 hours and
  that a compliance clerk would perform this work at a cost of $72 an hour. (0.25 hours x $72 = $18.)
\4\ In the case of the final estimates, we estimate that each transition filing will take 0.25 hours and that a
  compliance clerk would perform this work at a cost of $82 an hour. (0.25 hours x $82 = $20.50.)
\5\ In the case of the proposed estimates, we estimated that each transition filing would take 0.25 hours and
  that a compliance clerk would perform this work at a cost of $72 an hour. (0.25 hours x $72 = $18.)
\6\ In the case of the final estimates, we estimate that each transition filing will take 0.25 hours and that a
  compliance clerk would perform this work at a cost of $82 an hour. (0.25 hours x $82 = $20.50.)
\7\ In the case of the proposed estimates, we estimated that each temporary hardship request will take 1 hour.
  We estimated that a compliance manager would perform five-eighths of the work at a cost of $316 and a general
  clerk would perform three-eighths of the work at a cost of $64. (1 hour x ((\5/8\ of an hour x $316 = $197.50)
  + (\3/8\ of an hour x $64 = $24)) = $238 per response.
\8\ In the case of the final estimates, we estimate that each temporary hardship request will take 1 hour. We
  estimate that a compliance manager would perform five-eighths of the work at a cost of $360 and a general
  clerk would perform three-eighths of the work at a cost of $73. (1 hour x ((\5/8\ of an hour x $360 = $225) +
  (\3/8\ of an hour x $73 = $27.38)) = $252.38 per response.

5. Annual External Cost Burden Proposed and Final Estimates
    Below are tables with annual external cost burden proposed and 
final estimates for (1) initial filings as well as ongoing annual and 
quarterly filings and (2) current reporting and private equity event 
reporting. There are no filing fees for transition filings, final 
filings, or temporary hardship requests and we continue to estimate 
there would be no external costs for those filings, as previously 
approved.

                                  Table 11--Proposed and Final Annual External Cost Burden for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings as Well as Initial Filings
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                                         Aggregate
                                                                                                                                  External                                external
                                                                                  Filing                    External              cost of                                 cost of       Total
                                                            Number of            fee per           Total    cost of               initial            Number  of           initial     aggregate
                     Respondent \1\                       responses per           filing           filing   initial                filing             initial              filing      external
                                                         respondent \2\            \3\              fees     filing              amortized          filings \6\          amortized     cost \8\
                                                                                                              \4\                  over 3                                  over 3
                                                                                                                                 years \5\                               years \7\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund Advisers
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proposed Estimate..................................               1     x        $150     =      $150                               Not Applicable                                       \9\
                                                                                                                                                                                        $364,050
    Final Estimate.....................................               1     x         150     =       150                               Not Applicable                                      \10\
                                                                                                                                                                                         392,400
    Previously Approved................................               1     x         150     =       150                               Not Applicable                                   349,050
    Change.............................................               0                 0               0                                  No Change                                      43,350
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate..................................               4     x         150     =       600     50,000    / 3 =        16,667     x            14     =       233,338         \11\
                                                                                                                                                                                         560,338
    Final Estimate.....................................               4     x         150     =       600     50,000    / 3 =        16,667     x            16     =       266,672         \12\
                                                                                                                                                                                         625,472
    Previously Approved................................               4     x         150     =       600     50,000                            x            17     =       850,000    1,182,400
    Change.............................................               0                 0               0          0                                        (1)           (583,328)    (556,928)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Liquidity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate..................................               4     x         150     =       600     50,000    / 3 =        16,667     x             1     =        16,667  \13\ 30,467
    Final Estimate.....................................               4     x         150     =       600     50,000    / 3 =        16,667     x             1     =        16,667  \14\ 29,867
    Previously Approved................................               4     x         150     =       600     50,000                            x             2     =       100,000      113,200
    Change.............................................               0                 0               0          0                                        (1)            (83,333)     (83,333)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate..................................               1     x         150     =       150     50,000    / 3 =        16,667     x            42     =       700,014         \15\
                                                                                                                                                                                         754,614
    Final Estimate.....................................               1     x         150     =       150     50,000    / 3 =        16,667     x            17     =       283,339         \16\
                                                                                                                                                                                         348,589

[[Page 38199]]

 
    Previously Approved................................               1     x         150     =       150     50,000                            x             9     =       450,000      498,300
    Change.............................................               0                 0               0          0                                          8           (166,661)    (149,711)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ We estimate that advisers would incur the cost of filing fees for each filing. For initial filings, advisers may incur costs to modify existing systems or deploy new systems to support
  Form PF reporting, acquire or use hardware to perform computations, or otherwise process data required on Form PF.
\2\ Smaller private fund advisers and large private equity fund advisers file annually. Large hedge fund advisers and large liquidity fund advisers file quarterly.
\3\ The SEC established Form PF filing fees in a separate order. Since 2011, filing fees have been and continue to be $150 per annual filing and $150 per quarterly filing. See Order Approving
  Filing Fees for Exempt Reporting Advisers and Private Fund Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 3305 (Oct. 24, 2011) [76 FR 67004 (Oct. 28, 2011)].
\4\ In the previous PRA submission for the rules, staff estimated that the external cost burden for initial filings would range from $0 to $50,000 per adviser. This range reflected the fact
  that the cost to any adviser may depend on how many funds or the types of funds it manages, the state of its existing systems, the complexity of its business, the frequency of Form PF
  filings, the deadlines for completion, and the amount of information the adviser must disclose on Form PF. Smaller private fund advisers would be unlikely to bear such costs because the
  information they must provide is limited and will, in many cases, already be maintained in the ordinary course of business. We continue to estimate that the same cost range would apply.
\5\ We amortize the external cost burden of initial filings over three years, as we do with other initial burdens in this PRA, because we believe that most of the burden would be incurred in
  the initial filing. The previously approved burden estimates did not calculate this.
\6\ See Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings.
\7\ Changes to the aggregate external cost of initial filings, amortized over three years are due to (1) using updated data and (2) amortizing the external cost of initial filings over three
  years, which the previously approved PRA did not calculate. Changes concerning large private equity fund advisers in our proposed estimates were also due to the proposed amendment to reduce
  the filing threshold, which we are not adopting in this Release.
\8\ Changes to the total aggregate external cost are due to (1) using updated data and (2) amortizing the external cost of initial filings over three years, which the previously approved PRA
  did not calculate. Changes concerning large private equity fund advisers in our proposed estimates were also due to the proposed amendment to reduce the filing threshold, which we are not
  adopting in this Release.
\9\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 2,427 smaller private fund advisers filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. (2,427 smaller private fund advisers x
  $150 total filing fees) = $364,050 aggregate cost.
\10\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 2,616 smaller private fund advisers filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. (2,616 smaller private fund
  advisers x $150 total filing fees) = $392,400 aggregate cost.
\11\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 545 large hedge fund advisers filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. (545 large hedge fund advisers x $600 total
  filing fees) + $233,338 total external costs of initial filings, amortized over three years = $560,338 aggregate cost.
\12\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 598 large hedge fund advisers filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. (598 large hedge fund advisers x $600
  total filing fees) + $266,672 total external costs of initial filings, amortized over three years = $625,472 aggregate cost.
\13\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 23 large liquidity fund advisers filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. (23 large liquidity fund advisers x $600
  total filing fees) + $16,667 total external costs of initial filings, amortized over three years = $30,467 aggregate cost.
\14\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 22 large liquidity fund advisers filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. (22 large liquidity fund advisers x
  $600 total filing fees) + $16,667 total external costs of initial filings, amortized over three years = $29,867 aggregate cost.
\15\ In the case of the proposed estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 364 large private equity fund advisers filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020. (364 large private equity fund
  advisers x $150 total filing fees) + $700,014 total external costs of initial filings, amortized over three years = $754,614 aggregate cost.
\16\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show 435 large private equity fund advisers filed Form PF in the most recent reporting period. (435 large private equity fund
  advisers x $150 total filing fees) + $283,339 total external costs of initial filings, amortized over three years = $348,589 aggregate cost.

     Table 12--Proposed and Final Annual External Cost Burden for Current Reporting and Private Equity Event
                                                    Reporting
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Cost of
                                                        outside
                                 Aggregate            counsel per           Aggregate     One-time      Total
        Respondent \1\           number of          current report           cost of      cost of     aggregate
                                 responses            or private             outside       system      external
                                    \2\              equity event            counsel    changes \3\    cost \4\
                                                        report
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Private Fund
 Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate........             6     x         \5\ $992     =        $5,952      $12,500      $18,452
    Final Estimate...........            20     x        \6\ 1,695     =        33,900       15,000       48,900
                              ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved......                                    Not Applicable
                              ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Change...................                                    Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Hedge Fund Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate........             6     x          \5\ 992     =         5,952       12,500       18,452
    Final Estimate...........            60     x        \6\ 1,695     =       101,700       15,000      116,700
                              ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved......                                    Not Applicable
                              ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Change...................                                    Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Private Equity Fund
 Advisers:
    Proposed Estimate........             6     x          \5\ 992     =         5,952       12,500       18,452
    Final Estimate...........            20     x        \6\ 1,695     =        33,900       15,000       48,900
                              ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Previously Approved......                                    Not Applicable
                              ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Change...................                                    Not Applicable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 38200]]

 
Advisers would pay filing fees, the amount of which would be determined in a separate action.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ In a separate action, the SEC would approve filing fees that reflect the reasonable costs associated with
  current report and private equity event report filings and the establishment and maintenance of the filing
  system. (See 15 U.S.C. 80b-4(c).) We estimate that large hedge fund advisers and private equity fund advisers
  would incur costs of outside counsel for each current report or private equity event report, as applicable. We
  also estimate that large hedge fund advisers and private equity fund advisers may incur a one-time cost to
  modify existing systems or deploy new systems to support current reporting or private equity event reporting,
  as applicable, acquire or use hardware to perform computations, or otherwise process data to identify the
  reporting events set forth in section 5 or section 6, as applicable, because such reporting events are
  quantitative. There are no previously approved estimates for the current reporting amendment or private equity
  event report amendment because they are new requirements.
\2\ See Table 5: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Current Reporting and Private Equity Event
  Reporting.
\3\ In the case of the proposed estimates, we estimated that the one-time external cost burden would range from
  $0 to $12,500, per adviser. This range of costs reflects the fact that the cost to any adviser might depend on
  how many funds or the types of funds it manages, the state of its existing systems, and the complexity of its
  business. In consideration of comments, we have increased our estimate of the one-time external cost burden to
  between $0 and $15,000, per adviser. Our cost estimate also considers the compliance date for current and
  private equity event reporting.
\4\ (Aggregate cost of outside counsel) + (one-time cost of system changes, as applicable) = total aggregate
  cost.
\5\ In the case of the proposed estimates, we estimated the cost for outside legal counsel is $496. This is
  based on an estimated $400 per hour cost for outside legal services, as used by the Commission for these
  services in the ``Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150
  Million Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers'' final rule, Advisers Act Release No. 3222 (June 22,
  2011) [76 FR 39646 (July 6, 2011)], as inflated using the Consumer Price Index. We estimated that
  approximately two hours of the total legal professional time that would otherwise be spent on current
  reporting, would be shifted from in-house legal professionals to outside legal counsel. (2 hours x $496 for
  outside legal services = $992.)
\6\ In the case of the final estimates, we estimate the cost for outside legal counsel is $565. We estimate that
  approximately three hours of the total legal professional time that would otherwise be spent on current
  reporting or private equity event reporting, would be shifted from in-house legal professionals to outside
  legal counsel. The increased hour estimate reflects our increased hour burden for current reporting and
  private equity event reporting. (3 hours x $565 for outside legal services = $1,695.)

6. Summary of Proposed and Final Estimates and Change in Burden

                                  Table 13--Aggregate Annual Proposed Estimates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Proposed                           Previously
        Description \1\             estimate       Final estimate       approved                Change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondents...................  3,388             3,671             3,225             446 respondents.\4\
                                 respondents \2\.  respondents \3\.  respondents.
Responses.....................  5,363 responses   5,907 responses   5,056 responses.  851 responses.\7\
                                 \5\.              \6\.
Time Burden...................  409,797 hours     451,012 hours     409,768 hours...  41,244 hours.\10\
                                 \8\.              \9\.
Monetized Time Burden           $116,054,007      $145,721,172.52   $122,152,100.25.  $23,569,072.27.\13\
 (Dollars).                      \11\.             \12\.
External Cost Burden (Dollars)  $1,739,825 \14\.  $1,610,828 \15\.  $3,628,850......  ($2,018,022).\16\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Changes are due to (1) the amendments, (2) using updated data, and (3) using different methodologies to
  calculate certain estimates, as described in this PRA.
\2\ Private Funds Statistics show the following advisers filed Form PF in the fourth quarter of 2020: 2,427
  smaller private fund advisers + 545 large hedge fund advisers + 23 large liquidity fund advisers + 364 large
  private equity fund advisers = 3,359 advisers. 3,359 advisers + 29 additional large private equity fund
  advisers filing for the first time as a result of the proposed threshold = 3,388 respondents.
\3\ In the case of the final estimates, Private Funds Statistics show the following advisers filed Form PF in
  the most recent reporting period: 2,616 smaller private fund advisers + 598 large hedge fund advisers + 22
  large liquidity fund advisers + 435 large private equity fund advisers = 3,671 respondents.
\4\ Changes are due to (1) the proposed amendment to reduce the filing threshold for large private equity fund
  advisers, which we are not adopting in this Release, and (2) using updated data.
\5\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for initial filings (Table 3): (313 smaller private fund adviser
  responses + 14 large hedge fund adviser responses + 1 large liquidity fund adviser response + 42 large private
  equity fund adviser responses = 370 responses.) For ongoing annual and quarterly filings (Table 8): 2,114
  smaller private fund adviser responses + 2,124 large hedge fund adviser responses + 88 large liquidity fund
  adviser responses + 351 large private equity fund adviser responses = 4,677 responses.) For current reporting
  (Table 5): (6 smaller private fund adviser responses + 6 large hedge fund adviser responses + 6 large private
  equity fund adviser responses = 18 responses.) (370 responses for initial filings + 4,677 responses for
  ongoing annual and quarterly filings + 18 responses for current reporting + 63 responses for transition
  filings + 232 responses for final filings + 3 responses for temporary hardship requests = 5,363 responses.)
\6\ In the case of the final estimates, for initial filings (Table 3): (358 smaller private fund adviser
  responses + 16 large hedge fund adviser responses + 1 large liquidity fund adviser response + 17 large private
  equity fund adviser responses = 392 responses. For ongoing annual and quarterly filings (Table 8): 2,258
  smaller private fund adviser responses + 2,328 large hedge fund adviser responses + 84 large liquidity fund
  adviser responses + 418 large private equity fund adviser responses = 5,088 responses.) For current reporting
  and private equity event reporting (Table 5): (20 smaller private fund advisers responses + 60 large hedge
  fund adviser responses + 20 large private equity fund responses = 100 responses.) (392 responses for initial
  filings + 5,088 responses for ongoing annual and quarterly filings + 100 responses for current reporting and
  private equity event reporting + 71 responses for transition filings + 252 responses for final filings + 4
  responses for temporary hardship requests = 5,907 responses.)
\7\ Changes are due to (1) the amendment to add current reporting requirements, (2) the proposal to reduce the
  filing threshold for large private equity fund advisers, which we are not adopting in this Release, and (3)
  updated data concerning the number of filers.

[[Page 38201]]

 
\8\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for initial filings: (4,069 hours for smaller private fund advisers +
  1,512 hours for large hedge fund advisers + 67 hours for large liquidity fund advisers + 3,486 hours for large
  private equity fund advisers = 9,134 hours). For ongoing annual and quarterly filings: (31,710 hours for
  smaller private fund advisers + 318,600 hours for large hedge fund advisers + 6,248 for hours large liquidity
  fund advisers + 43,875 hours for large private equity fund advisers = 400,433 hours). For current reporting:
  (51 hours for smaller private fund advisers + 51 hours for large hedge fund advisers + 51 hours for large
  private equity fund advisers = 153 hours.) (9,134 hours for initial filings + 400,433 for ongoing annual and
  quarterly filings + 153 hours for current reporting + 15.75 hours for transition filings + 58 hours for final
  filings + 3 hours for temporary hardship requests = 409,796.75 hours, rounded to 409,797 hours.
\9\ In the case of the final estimates, for initial filings: (4,654 hours for smaller private fund advisers +
  1,728 hours for large hedge fund advisers + 67 hours for large liquidity fund advisers + 1,428 hours for large
  private equity fund advisers = 7,877 hours). For ongoing annual and quarterly filings: (33,870 hours for
  smaller private fund advisers + 349,200 hours for large hedge fund advisers + 5,880 for hours large liquidity
  fund advisers + 53,504 hours for large private equity fund advisers = 442,454 hours). For current reporting
  and private equity event reporting: (100 hours for smaller private fund advisers + 600 hours for large hedge
  fund advisers + 100 hours for large private equity fund advisers = 800 hours.) (7,877 hours for initial
  filings + 442,254 hours for ongoing annual and quarterly filings + 800 hours for current reporting and private
  equity event reporting + 17.75 hours for transition filings + 58.75 hours for final filings + 4 hours for
  temporary hardship requests = 451,011.5 hours, rounded to 451,012 hours.
\10\ Although we would expect the time burden to increase more, given the amendments, we estimate a smaller
  increase primarily because we use a different methodology to calculate initial burden hours, as discussed in
  Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial Filings, because the previously approved
  burdens for initial filings appear to have inflated the estimates.
\11\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for initial filings: ($1,421,020 for smaller private fund advisers +
  $487,312 for large hedge fund advisers + $21,631 for large liquidity fund advisers + $1,124,550 for large
  private equity fund advisers = $3,054,513). For ongoing annual and quarterly filings: ($8,942,220 for smaller
  private fund advisers + $89,845,200 for large hedge fund advisers + $1,761,936 for large liquidity fund
  advisers + $12,372,750 for large private equity fund advisers = $112,922,106). For current reporting: ($25,092
  for smaller private equity fund advisers + $21,228 for large hedge fund advisers + $25,092 for large private
  equity fund advisers = $71,412). ($3,054,513 for initial filings + $112,922,106 for ongoing annual and
  quarterly filings + $71,412 for current reporting + $1,134 for transition filings + $4,176 for final filings +
  $666 for temporary hardship requests = $116,054,007.)
\12\ In the case of the final estimates, for initial filings: ($1,852,292 for smaller private fund advisers +
  $634,080 for large hedge fund advisers + $24,400 for large liquidity fund advisers + $522,580 for large
  private equity fund advisers = $3,033,352). For ongoing annual and quarterly filings: ($10,872,270 for smaller
  private fund advisers + $112,093,200 for large hedge fund advisers + $1,887,480 for large liquidity fund
  advisers + $17,443,140 for large private equity fund advisers = $142,286,090). For current reporting and
  private equity event reporting: ($40,480 for smaller private equity fund advisers + $309,600 for large hedge
  fund advisers + $40,480 for large private equity fund advisers = $390,560). ($3,033,352 for initial filings +
  $142,286,090 for ongoing annual and quarterly filings + $390,560 for current reporting and private equity
  event reporting + $1,420 for transition filings + $8,651 for final filings + $1,099.52 for temporary hardship
  requests = $145,721,172.52).
\13\ Although we would expect the monetized time burden to increase, given the amendments, we estimate it would
  decrease primarily because we use a different methodology to calculate it. We believe the previously approved
  burden inflated the estimates by using a methodology that inflated an element of the total: the monetized time
  burden for initial filings. To calculate the monetized time burden for initial filings, the previously
  approved estimates included subsequent filings. For the requested total burden, we calculate the initial
  filing element by including only the hours related to the initial filing, not any subsequent filings. We also
  amortize the monetized time burden for an initial filing over three years, by dividing the initial filing
  burden by three years, as discussed in Table 3: Annual Hour Burden Proposed and Final Estimates for Initial
  Filings. The methodology is designed to more accurately reflect the estimates.
\14\ In the case of the proposed estimates, for annual, quarterly, and initial filing costs: ($364,050 for
  smaller private fund advisers + $560,338 for large hedge funds + $30,467 for large liquidity fund advisers +
  $754,614 for large private equity fund advisers = $1,709,469). For current reporting: ($5,952 for smaller
  private fund advisers + $18,452 for large hedge funds + $5,952 for large private equity fund advisers =
  $30,356). ($1,709,469 annual, quarterly, and initial cost external cost burden + $30,356 current reporting
  external cost burden = $1,739,825 total annual external cost burden.)
\15\ In the case of the final estimates, for annual, quarterly, and initial filing costs: ($392,400 for smaller
  private fund advisers + $625,472 for large hedge funds + $29,867 for large liquidity fund advisers + $348,589
  for large private equity fund advisers = $1,396,328). For current reporting and private equity event
  reporting: ($48,900 for smaller private equity fund advisers + $116,700 for large hedge funds + $48,900 for
  large private equity fund advisers = $214,500). ($1,396,328 annual, quarterly, and initial cost external cost
  burden + $214,500 current reporting external cost burden = $1610,828 total annual external cost burden.)
  Although we would expect the external cost burden to increase, given the amendments, we estimate it would
  decrease primarily because we use a different methodology to calculate it.
\16\ We believe the previously approved burden inflated the estimates by (1) multiplying the filing fees by
  three years and (2) not amortizing the external costs for initial filings: ($742,950 aggregate annual filing
  fees x 3 years = $2,228,850 in filing fees) + $1,400,000 external costs of initial filings = $3,628,850). We
  do not multiply the aggregate annual filing fees by three years because we are estimating the external cost
  burden for one year, not three. We amortize the external cost for initial filings over three years, by
  dividing the external cost of an initial filing by three years, as discussed in Table 10: Annual External Cost
  Burden for Ongoing Annual and Quarterly Filings as well as Initial Filings. The methodology is designed to
  more accurately reflect the estimates.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 
1980 (``Regulatory Flexibility Act''),\475\ the Commission certified 
that the amendments to Advisers Act rule 204(b)-1 and Form PF would 
not, if adopted, have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.\476\ The Commission included this 
certification in section V of the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release. As 
disclosed in more detail in the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release, for 
purposes of the Advisers Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, an 
investment adviser generally is a small entity if it: (1) has assets 
under management having a total value of less than $25 million; (2) did 
not have total assets of $5 million or more on the last day of the most 
recent fiscal year; and (3) does not control, is not controlled by, and 
is not under common control with another investment adviser that has 
assets under management of $25 million or more, or any person (other 
than a natural person) that had total assets of $5 million or more on 
the last day of its most recent fiscal year.\477\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \475\ 5. U.S.C. 601, et seq.
    \476\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
    \477\ 17 CFR 275.0-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By definition, no small entity on its own would meet rule 204(b)-1 
and Form PF's minimum reporting threshold of $150 million in regulatory 
assets under management attributable to private funds. Based on Form PF 
and Form ADV data as of December 2022, the SEC estimates that no small 
entity advisers are required to file Form PF. The SEC does not have 
evidence to suggest that any small entities are required to file Form 
PF but are not filing Form PF. The Commission therefore stated in the 
2022 Form PF Proposing Release there would be no significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities from the proposed 
amendments to Advisers Act rule 204(b)-1 and Form PF.
    The Commission requested comment on the Commission's certification 
in section V of the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release. While some 
commenters addressed the potential impact of the proposed amendments on

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smaller and mid-size private funds,\478\ no commenters responded to 
this request for comment regarding the Commission's certification. We 
are adopting the amendments largely as proposed, with certain 
modifications as discussed more fully above in section II that do not 
affect the Advisers Act rule 204(b)-1 and Form PF's minimum reporting 
threshold. We do not believe that these changes alter the basis upon 
which the certification in the 2022 Form PF Proposing Release was made. 
Accordingly, we certify that the final amendments to Advisers Act rule 
204(b)-1 and Form PF will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \478\ See, e.g., AIMA/ACC Comment Letter; Better Markets Comment 
Letter; PDI Comment Letter; Schulte Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment 
Letter; TIAA Comment Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Statutory Authority

    The Commission is amending Form PF pursuant to authority set forth 
in Sections 204(b) and 211(e) of the Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-4(b) 
and 80b-11(e)].

List of Subjects 17 CFR Part 275 and 279

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

Text of Rules

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, title 17, chapter II of 
the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows.

PART 275--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940

0
1. The general authority citation for part 275 continues to read as 
follows.

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)(G), 80b-2(a)(11)(H), 80b-
2(a)(17), 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-4a, 80b-6(4), 80b-6a, and 80b-11, unless 
otherwise noted.
* * * * *

0
2. Amend Sec.  275.204(b)-1 by revising paragraphs (f)(2)(i) and (f)(3) 
to read as follows:

Sec.  275.204(b)-1  Reporting by investment advisers to private funds.

* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Complete and file in paper format, in accordance with the 
instructions to Form PF, Item A of Section 1a and Section 7 of Form PF, 
checking the box in Section 1a indicating that you are requesting a 
temporary hardship exemption, no later than one business day after the 
electronic Form PF filing was due; and
* * * * *
    (3) The temporary hardship exemption will be granted when you file 
Item A of Section 1a and Section 7 of Form PF, checking the box in 
Section 1a indicating that you are requesting a temporary hardship 
exemption.
* * * * *

PART 279--FORMS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 
1940

0
3. The authority citation for part 279 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-1, 
et seq., Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.

Sec.  279.9  Form PF, reporting by investment advisers to private 
funds.

0
4. Revise Form PF [referenced in Sec.  279.9].

    Note:  Form PF will not appear in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.

    By the Commission.

    Dated: May 3, 2023.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

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[FR Doc. 2023-09775 Filed 6-9-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-C