Document ID: SEC-2018-0158-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Notice
Title: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Changes: Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC
Posted Date: 2018-01-26T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 18 (Friday, January 26, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3790-3794]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-01356]

[[Page 3790]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-82541; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2018-004]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; 
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To 
Amend Exchange Rule 7047

January 19, 2018.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that 
on January 9, 2018, The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq'' or 
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in 
Items I, II, and III, below, which Items have been prepared by the 
Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments 
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend Exchange Rule 7047 to reflect 
substantial enhancements to Nasdaq Basic since the current distribution 
fees were set in 2009. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to modify 
distribution fees, currently set at $1,500 for both internal and 
external distribution, into separate fees of $2,000 per month for 
external (or external and internal) distribution and $1,500 per month 
for internal-only distribution. The proposal is described in further 
detail below.
    The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's 
website at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/, at the principal office of 
the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in 
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such 
statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to adjust the fee schedule for Nasdaq Basic 
to reflect substantial enhancements to the product since the current 
distribution fees were set in 2009.\3\ Specifically, the Exchange 
proposes to amend the distribution fees for Nasdaq Basic at Rule 7047, 
currently set at $1,500 for both internal and external distribution, 
into separate fees of $2,000 per month for external (or external and 
internal) distribution and $1,500 per month for internal-only 
distribution.\4\
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    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59244 (January 13, 
2009), 74 FR 4065 (January 22, 2009) (SR-NASDAQ-2008-102). The 
initial proposal included separate distribution fees for securities 
listed with other exchanges, which were removed in Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 59712 (April 6, 2009), 74 FR 17273 (April 
14, 2009) (SR-NASDAQ-2009-028). SR-NASDAQ-2009-028 also added a 
credit for user fees, which was removed in Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 78578 (August 15, 2016), 81 FR 55513 (August 19, 2016) 
(SR-NASDAQ-2016-109).
    \4\ Distribution fees for Nasdaq Last Sale (``NLS'') set forth 
at Rule 7039(c) shall remain unchanged.
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Nasdaq Basic
    Nasdaq Basic is a real-time market data product that offers Best 
Bid and Offer and Last Sale information for all U.S. exchange-listed 
securities based on liquidity within the Nasdaq Market Center and 
trades reported to the FINRA/Nasdaq Trade Reporting Facility (``TRF''). 
It is a subset of the ``core'' quotation and last sale data provided by 
securities information processors (``SIPs'') under the CTA Plan and the 
Nasdaq UTP Plan. Nasdaq Basic is separated into three components, which 
may be purchased individually or in combination: (i) Nasdaq Basic for 
Nasdaq, which contains the best bid and offer on the Nasdaq Market 
Center and last sale transaction reports for Nasdaq and the FINRA/
Nasdaq TRF for Nasdaq-listed stocks; (ii) Nasdaq Basic for NYSE, which 
covers NYSE-listed stocks, and (iii) Nasdaq Basic for NYSE American 
(formerly NYSE MKT), which provides data on stocks listed on NYSE 
American and other listing venues whose quotes and trade reports are 
disseminated on Tape B. The specific data elements available through 
Nasdaq Basic are: (i) Nasdaq Basic Quotes (``QBBO''), the best bid and 
offer and associated size available in the Nasdaq Market Center, as 
well as last sale transaction reports; (ii) Nasdaq opening and closing 
prices, as well as IPO and trading halt crosses; and (iii) general 
exchange information, including systems status reports, trading halt 
information, and a stock directory.
    Each Distributor of Nasdaq Basic, or Derived Data therefrom, 
currently pays $1,500 per month for either internal or external 
distribution or both,\5\ in addition to user fees set forth under Rule 
7047(b).
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    \5\ See Rule 7047(c)(1).
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Proposed Change
    Nasdaq Basic is one of a number of market information services 
offered by the Exchange. Such services are inextricably connected to 
trade execution: Market information services require trade orders to 
provide useful information, and investors utilize market information to 
make trading decisions. Over the eight years that have elapsed since 
the current distribution fees were set in 2009,\6\ the Exchange has 
invested in an array of upgrades to both its trade execution and market 
information services, which have increased the value of these services 
overall, and Nasdaq Basic in particular.\7\
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    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59712 (April 6, 
2009), 74 FR 17273 (April 14, 2009) (SR-NASDAQ-2009-028).
    \7\ Many of these upgrades are common to several Nasdaq-
affiliated exchanges, as improvements to the products and services 
of one exchange are reproduced in other exchanges.
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    The Exchange proposes to adjust its fee schedule for Nasdaq Basic 
to reflect the value of the many improvements to the product, which 
include:
     Enhanced Services. In 2014, the Exchange enhanced the 
Nasdaq Basic data feed by: (i) Converting to binary codes to make more 
efficient use of bandwidth and to provide greater timestamp 
granularity; (ii) adding a symbol directory message to identify a 
security and its key characteristics; (iii) adding a new IPO message 
for Nasdaq-listed securities for quotation release time and IPO price; 
and (iv) adding the Market Wide Circuit Breaker (``MWCB'') Decline 
Level message to inform recipients of the setting for MWCB breach 
points for the trading day, and an MWCB Status Level Message to inform 
data recipients when an MWCB has breached an established level.\8\
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    \8\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2013-45 and http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2013-33.
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     Nanosecond Granularity. In 2016 [sic], Nasdaq introduced a 
new version of Nasdaq Last Sale which allowed for timestamp granularity 
to the nanosecond.\9\
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    \9\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2016-03.

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[[Page 3791]]

     Exchange Traded Managed Funds (``ETMFs''). In 2015, the 
Exchange modified the data feed for Nasdaq Basic to accommodate an 
ETMF, a type of investment vehicle that combines the features of an 
open-end mutual fund and an Exchange Traded Fund (``ETF'') to support 
an actively managed-investment strategy.\10\ ETMF trading differs from 
other types of equity trading in that it uses a trading protocol called 
``Net Asset Value-Based Trading,'' in which all bids, offers, and 
execution prices are expressed as a premium or discount to the ETMF's 
next-determined Net Asset Value (``NAV''). This distinct pricing format 
requires an entirely new set of data fields in which to distribute 
information related to prices and trades, and the Exchange modified 
Nasdaq Basic to accommodate that format.\11\
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    \10\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73562 (November 7, 
2014), 79 FR 68309 (November 14, 2014) (SR-NASDAQ-2014-020) 
(approving the listing and trading of Exchange-Traded Managed Fund 
Shares).
    \11\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2015-7.
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     Qualified Contingent Trade Modifier. In 2015, Nasdaq 
introduced a new field to Nasdaq Basic to identify a Qualified 
Contingent Trades [sic] (``QCT''),\12\ a transaction consisting of two 
or more component orders executed as agent or principal where the 
execution of one component is contingent upon the execution of all 
other components at or near the same time, and the price is determined 
by the relationship between the component orders and not the current 
market price for the security.\13\ The additional field identifies 
whether a particular transaction is part of a QCT.
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    \12\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2015-24.
    \13\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54389 (August 31, 
2006), 71 FR 52829 (September 7, 2006).
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     Adjusted Closing Price. In 2013, Nasdaq introduced the 
adjusted closing price as a field to reflect a security's previous day 
official closing price, adjusted for corporate actions. For Nasdaq-
listed securities, the Nasdaq Official Closing Price is used,\14\ and 
the consolidated close from the security's listing exchange is used for 
non-Nasdaq securities.\15\
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    \14\ Nasdaq's closing cross process produces a tradable closing 
price that represents either the closing cross or the best available 
price at the time of the transaction.
    \15\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2013-25.
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     New System Event Messages. In 2013, Nasdaq began 
disseminating event messages to indicate the start and end of system 
hours.\16\
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    \16\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2013-20.
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     Geographic Diversity. In 2015, all of the Nasdaq Exchanges 
moved their Disaster Recover [sic] (``DR'') center from Ashburn, 
Virginia, to Chicago, Illinois. As a result, customers can both receive 
market data and send orders through the Chicago facility, potentially 
reducing overall networking costs. Adding such geographic diversity 
helps protect the market in the event of a catastrophic event impacting 
the entire East Coast.\17\
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    \17\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2015-17.
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     Chicago ``B'' Feeds. In 2017, all of the Nasdaq exchanges 
added a multicast IP address for proprietary equity and options data 
feeds in Chicago, allowing firms the choice of having additional 
redundancy to ensure data continuity.\18\
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    \18\ See http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/TraderNews.aspx?id=dtn2017-02.
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    While these changes were being implemented, distributor fees for 
Nasdaq Basic were falling in real terms as a result of inflation. 
Indeed, the proposed fee increase is partially offset by inflation,\19\ 
and represents only an approximately 3.7 percent annual increase 
between 2009 and 2017. The Exchange believes that the remaining 
percentage increase over inflation is more than justified by the 
substantial upgrades described above.
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    \19\ The Consumer Price Index indicates that prices increased 
approximately 17 percent between January 2009 and November 2017. See 
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
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    As a result of these upgrades, the Exchange proposes to separate 
the internal and external distribution fees for Nasdaq Basic, 
increasing external (and combined internal and external) distribution 
fees from $1,500 to $2,000 per month, and leaving internal distribution 
fees unchanged. Given these specific enhancements to Nasdaq Basic, and 
to the Exchange's system generally, and given the fact that the 
Exchange has not increased the distributor fees since 2009, the 
Exchange believes that the proposed fee increase is appropriate.
    Nasdaq Basic is optional in that the Exchange is not required to 
offer it and broker-dealers are not required to purchase it. Firms can 
discontinue use at any time and for any reason, including an assessment 
of the fees charged.
    The proposed change does not change the cost of any other Exchange 
product.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that its proposal is consistent with Section 
6(b) of the Act,\20\ in general, and furthers the objectives of 
Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\21\ in particular, in that it 
provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and 
other charges among members and issuers and other persons using any 
facility, and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between 
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
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    \20\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \21\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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    The Commission and the courts have repeatedly expressed their 
preference for competition over regulatory intervention in determining 
prices, products, and services in the securities markets. In Regulation 
NMS, while adopting a series of steps to improve the current market 
model, the Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in 
determining prices and self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') revenues 
and, also, recognized that current regulation of the market system 
``has been remarkably successful in promoting market competition in its 
broader forms that are most important to investors and listed 
companies.'' \22\
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    \22\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 
2005), 70 FR 37496, 37499 (June 29, 2005) (``Regulation NMS Adopting 
Release'').
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    Likewise, in NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange Commission 
\23\ (``NetCoalition'') the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's use of 
a market-based approach in evaluating the fairness of market data fees 
against a challenge claiming that Congress mandated a cost-based 
approach.\24\ As the court emphasized, the Commission ``intended in 
Regulation NMS that `market forces, rather than regulatory 
requirements' play a role in determining the market data . . . to be 
made available to investors and at what cost.'' \25\
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    \23\ See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
    \24\ See NetCoalition, at 534-535.
    \25\ Id. at 537.
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    Further, ``[n]o one disputes that competition for order flow is 
`fierce.' . . . As the SEC explained, `[i]n the U.S. national market 
system, buyers and sellers of securities, and the broker-dealers that 
act as their order-routing agents, have a wide range of choices of 
where to route orders for execution'; [and] `no exchange can afford to 
take its market share percentages for granted' because `no exchange 
possesses a monopoly, regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of 
order flow from broker dealers'. . . .'' \26\
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    \26\ Id. at 539 (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
59039 (December 2, 2008), 73 FR 74770, 74782-83 (December 9, 2008) 
(SR-NYSEArca-2006-21)).
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    The Exchange proposes to separate the internal and external 
distribution fees for Nasdaq Basic, increasing external (and combined 
internal and

[[Page 3792]]

external) distribution fees from $1,500 to $2,000 per month, and 
leaving internal distribution fees unchanged. The Exchange believes 
that the proposed fee increase is reasonable. While the Exchange has 
not increased such fees since 2009, the Exchange has added a number of 
enhancements since that time to Nasdaq Basic and the Exchange systems 
that support it. These enhancements, which are described in greater 
detail above, increase the value of Nasdaq Basic. The proposed fee 
increase is therefore reflective of, and closely aligned to, these 
enhancements and the corresponding increased value of the data feed.
    The proposed changes are equitable allocations of reasonable dues, 
fees and other charges because the Exchange makes all services and 
products subject to these fees available on a non-discriminatory basis 
to similarly-situated recipients, and the proposed fee increase here 
will apply equally to all members that are external (or combined 
internal and external) Distributors. As noted above, the Exchange has 
made a number of product and system enhancements to Nasdaq Basic, and, 
while internal Distributors have also received the benefit of these 
enhancements, the Exchange is not increasing the fee for internal 
Distributors at this time. This distinction is not unreasonable because 
a higher fee for external, as opposed to internal, distribution is 
based on the observation that external distributors typically charge 
fees for external distribution, while internal distributors usually do 
not. As such, external distributors have the opportunity to derive 
greater value from such distribution, and that greater value is 
reflected in higher external distribution fees. The differential 
between external and internal distribution fees is well-recognized in 
the financial services industry as a reasonable distinction, and has 
been repeatedly accepted by the Commission as an equitable allocation 
of reasonable dues, fees and other charges.\27\ The Act does not 
prohibit all distinctions among customers, but rather discrimination 
that is unfair. As the Commission has recognized, ``[i]f competitive 
forces are operative, the self-interest of the exchanges themselves 
will work powerfully to constrain unreasonable or unfair behavior.'' 
\28\ Accordingly, ``the existence of significant competition provides a 
substantial basis for finding that the terms of an exchange's fee 
proposal are equitable, fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably or 
unfairly discriminatory.'' \29\
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    \27\ See, e.g., Rules 7019 (Market Data Distributor Fees); 
7022(c) (Short Interest Report); 7023(c) (Enterprise License Fees 
for Depth-of-Book Data); and 7052(c) (Distributor Fees for Nasdaq 
Daily Short Volume and Monthly Short Sale Transaction Files).
    \28\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (December 2, 
2008), 73 FR 74770 (December 9, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21).
    \29\ Id.
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    In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted SROs and broker-
dealers (``BDs'') increased authority and flexibility to offer new and 
unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority 
would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur 
innovation and competition for the provision of market data. The 
Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the market in 
proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of facilitating 
efficiency and competition:

    [E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the 
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the 
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to 
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that 
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive 
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal 
analysis of the need for such data.\30\
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    \30\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 29, 
2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005) (``Regulation NMS Adopting 
Release'').

    The Commission was speaking to the question of whether BDs should 
be subject to a regulatory requirement to purchase data, such as depth-
of-book data, that is in excess of the data provided through the 
consolidated tape feeds, and the Commission concluded that the choice 
should be left to them. Accordingly, Regulation NMS removed unnecessary 
regulatory restrictions on the ability of exchanges to sell their own 
data, thereby advancing the goals of the Act and the principles 
reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should 
determine whether proprietary data is sold to BDs at all, it follows 
that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market 
as well. Accordingly, ``the existence of significant competition 
provides a substantial basis for finding that the terms of an 
exchange's fee proposal are equitable, fair, reasonable, and not 
unreasonably or unfairly discriminatory.'' \31\
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    \31\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (December 2, 
2008), 73 FR 74770 (December 9, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21).
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    The proposed fees, like all market data fees, are constrained by 
the Exchange's need to compete for order flow, as discussed below, and 
are subject to competition from other exchanges and among broker-
dealers for customers. If Nasdaq is incorrect in its assessment of 
price, it may lose market share as a result.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. In terms of inter-market 
competition, the Exchange notes that it operates in a highly 
competitive market in which market participants can readily favor 
competing venues if they deem fee levels at a particular venue to be 
excessive, or rebate opportunities available at other venues to be more 
favorable. In such an environment, the Exchange must continually adjust 
its fees to remain competitive with other exchanges and with 
alternative trading systems that have been exempted from compliance 
with the statutory standards applicable to exchanges. Because 
competitors are free to modify their own fees in response, and because 
market participants may readily adjust their order routing practices, 
the Exchange believes that the degree to which fee changes in this 
market may impose any burden on competition is extremely limited.
    Nasdaq Basic is a type of ``non-core'' data that provides a subset 
of the core quotation and last sale data provided by securities 
information processors under the CTA Plan and the Nasdaq UTP Plan. In 
2016, an Administrative Law Judge in an application for review by the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association of actions taken 
by Self-Regulatory Organizations examined whether another non-core 
product, Depth-of-Book data, is constrained by competitive forces.\32\ 
After a four-day hearing and presentation of substantial evidence, the 
administrative law judge stated that ``competition plays a significant 
role in restraining exchange pricing of depth-of-book products'' \33\ 
because ``depth-of-book products from different exchanges function as 
substitutes for each other,'' \34\ and, as such, ``the threat of 
substitution from depth-of-book customers constrains

[[Page 3793]]

their depth-of-book prices.'' \35\ As a result, ``[s]hifts in order 
flow and threats of shifting order flow provide a significant 
competitive force in the pricing of . . . depth-of-book data.'' \36\ 
The judge concluded that ``[u]nder the standards articulated by the 
Commission and D.C. Circuit, the Exchanges have shown that they are 
subject to significant competitive forces in setting fees for depth-of-
book data: the availability of alternatives to the Exchanges' depth-of-
book products, and the Exchanges' need to attract order flow from 
market participants constrains prices.'' \37\ As such, Nasdaq's depth-
of-book fees are ``constrained by significant competitive forces.'' 
\38\
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    \32\ See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, 
Initial Decision Release No. 1015, 2016 SEC LEXIS 2278 (A.L.J. June 
1, 2016).
    \33\ Id. at 92.
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ Id. at 93
    \36\ Id. at 104.
    \37\ Id. at 86.
    \38\ Id. at 120.
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    As an example of the impact of market forces on the price of 
proprietary data, the Exchange just last year lowered the Nasdaq Basic 
Enterprise License fee for the distribution of certain information by 
broker-dealers from $350,000 to $100,000.\39\
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    \39\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79456 (December 2, 
2016) 81 FR 88716 (December 8, 2016) (SR-NASDAQ-2016-162) (proposing 
a fee decrease for an enterprise license for the distribution of 
Nasdaq Basic to Non-Professional and Professional Subscribers with 
whom the broker-dealer has a brokerage relationship).
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    Market forces constrain the price of Nasdaq Basic, just as they do 
other market data fees, in the competition among exchanges and other 
entities to attract order flow and in the competition among 
Distributors for customers. Order flow is the ``life blood'' of the 
exchanges. Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues 
for their order flow, including SRO markets, as well as internalizing 
BDs and various forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), 
including dark pools and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). 
Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade 
executions, and two FINRA-regulated TRFs compete to attract 
internalized transaction reports. The existence of fierce competition 
for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity on the part 
of BDs, which may readily reduce costs by directing orders toward the 
lowest-cost trading venues.
    Transaction execution and proprietary data products are 
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of 
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a 
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision 
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the 
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the 
execution fees, data quality and price, and distribution of its data 
products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot 
exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only 
insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist 
them or their customers in making trading decisions.
    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution 
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a 
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both 
trading execution and data products and the joint costs it incurs to 
provide both.
    Moreover, the operation of the exchange is characterized by high 
fixed costs and low marginal costs. This cost structure is common in 
content and content distribution industries such as software, where 
developing new software typically requires a large initial investment 
(and continuing large investments to upgrade the software), but once 
the software is developed, the incremental cost of providing that 
software to an additional user is typically small, or even zero (e.g., 
if the software can be downloaded over the internet after being 
purchased).\40\
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    \40\ See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, ``The New 
Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying 
Defensible Criteria of Market Power,'' Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 
70, No. 3 (2003).
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    In Nasdaq's case, it is costly to build and maintain a trading 
platform, but the incremental cost of trading each additional share on 
an existing platform, or distributing an additional instance of data, 
is very low. Market information and executions are each produced 
jointly (in the sense that the activities of trading and placing orders 
are the source of the information that is distributed) and are each 
subject to significant scale economies. In such cases, marginal cost 
pricing is not feasible because if all sales were priced at the margin, 
Nasdaq would be unable to defray its platform costs of providing the 
joint products.
    An exchange's BD customers view the costs of transaction executions 
and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A BD 
will disfavor a particular exchange if the expected revenues from 
executing trades on the exchange do not exceed net transaction 
execution costs and the cost of data that the BD chooses to buy to 
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice 
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in 
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds 
its expected value, the BD will choose not to buy it. Moreover, as a BD 
chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular exchange, the value of 
the product to that BD decreases, for two reasons. First, the product 
will contain less information, because executions of the BD's trading 
activity will not be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more 
important, the product will be less valuable to that BD because it does 
not provide information about the venue to which it is directing its 
orders. Data from the competing venue to which the BD is directing more 
orders will become correspondingly more valuable.
    Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain 
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint 
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, 
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering 
total costs. Nasdaq pays rebates to attract orders, charges relatively 
low prices for market information and charges relatively high prices 
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy 
of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting relatively 
low prices for accessing posted liquidity, and setting relatively high 
prices for market information. Still others may provide most data free 
of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to recover their 
costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by providing 
opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to charge 
lower direct fees for executions and data.
    In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating 
maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which 
suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint 
offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an ``excessive'' price 
for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in 
lower prices for other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm 
will experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse 
to its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price 
of data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the

[[Page 3794]]

cost of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will 
fall.\41\
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    \41\ Moreover, the level of competition and contestability in 
the market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that 
compete for order flow, including SRO markets, internalizing BDs and 
various forms of ATSs, including dark pools and ECNs. Each SRO 
market competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, 
and two FINRA-regulated TRFs compete to attract internalized 
transaction reports. It is common for BDs to further and exploit 
this competition by sending their order flow and transaction reports 
to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single 
market. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and 
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of 
proprietary data products. The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and 
ATSs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently 
capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for 
proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently 
permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently 
do or have announced plans to do so, including Nasdaq, NYSE, NYSE 
American, NYSE Arca, IEX, and Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(``CBOE'').
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    The proposed changes will separate the internal and external 
distribution fees for Nasdaq Basic, increasing external distribution 
fees from $1,500 to $2,000 per month, and leaving internal distribution 
fees unchanged. The proposed price changes will not impose any burden 
on competition because external distributors typically charge fees for 
external distribution, and thereby usually derive greater value from 
such distribution than internal distributors, which typically do not 
charge fees, and that greater value supports higher external 
distribution fees. This distinction between external and internal 
distribution fees is common in the financial services industry, and has 
been applied to other products without any anti-competitive effect. As 
explained, these fees will become one aspect of the total cost of 
interacting with the Exchange, and if these total costs prove to be 
excessive, the Exchange will lose revenue as a result. Accordingly, the 
Exchange does not believe that the proposed changes will impair the 
ability of members or competing order execution venues to maintain 
their competitive standing in the financial markets.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were either solicited or received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\42\
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    \42\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is: (i) 
Necessary or appropriate in the public interest; (ii) for the 
protection of investors; or (iii) otherwise in furtherance of the 
purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the 
Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the 
proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2018-004 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2018-004. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments 
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are 
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying 
information from comment submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2018-004 and should be submitted 
on or before February 16, 2018.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\43\
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    \43\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-01356 Filed 1-25-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P