Document ID: FAA-2016-6144-0012
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Airbus SAS Airplanes
Posted Date: 2020-01-15T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 10 (Wednesday, January 15, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2284-2289]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-27884]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2016-6144; Product Identifier 2015-NM-088-AD; Amendment 
39-21012; AD 2019-24-01]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
Airbus SAS Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, 
-214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, 
-212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes; Model A330-200 and A330-200 
Freighter series airplanes; Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes; 
and Model A340-500 and -600 airplanes (except for airplanes equipped 
with flammability reduction means (FRM) approved by the FAA as 
compliant with the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule). This 
AD was prompted by the FAA's analysis of the fuel system reviews on 
these models conducted by the manufacturer. This AD requires modifying 
the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) to prevent development of an 
ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault 
conditions. This AD also provides alternative actions for cargo 
airplanes. This AD does not apply to airplanes equipped with FRM 
approved by the FAA. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe 
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective February 19, 2020.

ADDRESSES:

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
6144; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains 
this final rule, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 
other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, 2200 South 
216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-3225.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus SAS 
Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -231, 
-232, and -233 airplanes; Model A330-200, -200 Freighter, and -300 
series airplanes; and Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series 
airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 3, 2016 
(81 FR 26487). The NPRM was prompted by the FAA's analysis of fuel 
system reviews on these models conducted by the manufacturer. The NPRM 
proposed to require modifying the FQIS to prevent development of an 
ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault 
conditions. The NPRM also provided alternative actions for cargo 
airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address ignition sources 
inside the center fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel 
vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of 
the airplane.

Comments

    The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in 
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments 
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for NPRM

    The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) and National 
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) supported the intent of the 
NPRM. Additional comments from NATCA are addressed below.

[[Page 2285]]

Request To Withdraw NPRM: EASA's Different Risk Assessment Policy

    Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) noted 
differences between EASA's risk assessment policy and that of the FAA. 
Based on its own criteria, EASA concluded that there is no unsafe 
condition, and that in the absence of a Transport Airplane Risk 
Assessment Methodology (TARAM) analysis, the NPRM was based on 
noncompliance with Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, Fuel 
Tank System Fault Tolerance Evaluation Requirements, (66 FR 23086, May 
7, 2001) to 14 CFR part 21, and, more specifically, with 14 CFR 
25.981(a)(3), rather than a direct unsafe condition. The commenters 
asserted that Airbus has shown that the failure condition described in 
the NPRM is extremely improbable and not unsafe according to EASA 
policy. The commenters therefore considered the proposed corrective 
actions unnecessary.
    The FAA infers that the commenters request that the agency withdraw 
the NPRM. The FAA disagrees with the request. The FAA does not agree 
that the NPRM was based simply on a noncompliance with 14 CFR 25.981(a) 
identified from the manufacturer's fuel system reviews. This final rule 
addresses an unsafe condition identified by the FAA. The FAA determined 
that an unsafe condition exists using the criteria in FAA Policy 
Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15, ``SFAR 88--Mandatory Action Decision 
Criteria,'' dated February 25, 2003.\1\ That policy was used to 
evaluate the noncompliant design areas identified in the manufacturer's 
fuel system reviews and determine which noncompliance issues were 
unsafe conditions that required corrective action under 14 CFR part 39. 
The FAA's unsafe condition determination was not based on an assessment 
of average risk or total fleet risk, but rather was driven by the 
qualitative identification of an unacceptable level of individual risk 
that exists on flights that are anticipated to occur with a preexisting 
latent in-tank failure condition and with a flammable center fuel tank. 
While EASA referenced SFAR 88 as a factor in determination of the 
unsafe condition, the FAA did not include SFAR 88 in the above response 
because SFAR 88 was a procedural rule that required re-examination of 
compliance with 14 CFR 25.981(a). Noncompliance to SFAR 88 is not 
submitting the analysis that shows the design complies with 14 CFR 
25.981 and appendix H to part 25 (as amended at 66 FR 23086, May 7, 
2001, amendment 25-102). For these reasons, and based on further 
detailed responses to similar comments in supplemental NPRM (SNPRM) 
Docket No. FAA-2012-0187 (80 FR 9400, February 23, 2015), and in AD 
2016-07-07, Amendment 39-18452 (81 FR 19472, April 5, 2016) (``AD 2016-
07-07''), which addressed the same unsafe condition for Model 757 
airplanes, the FAA has determined that it is necessary to issue this 
final rule.
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    \1\ http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgPolicy.nsf/0/dc94c3a46396950386256d5e006aed11/$FILE/Feb2503.pdf.
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Request To Withdraw NPRM: Combination of Failures Is Extremely 
Improbable

    Airbus stated that the risk of ignition sources addressed by the 
NPRM results from combinations of the electrical fault conditions that 
have been demonstrated to be extremely improbable.
    The FAA infers that Airbus would like the NPRM withdrawn. The FAA 
disagrees with the request to withdraw the NPRM. While the average risk 
per flight hour of a fuel tank ignition source may be extremely 
improbable, the actual risk is not evenly spread across all flight 
hours, and is instead almost completely concentrated on the subset of 
flights that occur with a latent failure in the fuel tank and 
experience flammable conditions. For those flights, a single additional 
failure that causes a hot short onto compromised fuel tank circuit 
wiring could cause an ignition source. Such flights do not provide an 
acceptable level of safety. As explained in the previous comment 
disposition, the FAA considered both average fleet risk and individual 
risk and determined an unsafe condition existed based on individual 
risk, rather than average fleet risk. Finally, the proposed 
requirements in the NPRM are consistent with the FAA's policy for the 
unsafe condition determinations related to SFAR 88 contained in FAA 
Policy Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15, ``SFAR 88-Mandatory Action 
Decision Criteria,'' dated February 25, 2003. The FAA provided a 
detailed response to similar comments and described the FAA's risk 
assessment in a related SNPRM that addressed the same unsafe condition 
for Model 757 airplanes, in Docket No. FAA-2012-0187 (80 FR 9400, 
February 23, 2015); and in AD 2016-07-07. The FAA has therefore 
determined that it is necessary to issue this final rule.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: High Cost of Compliance

    Air France reported that EASA has not mandated any FRM retrofit on 
the affected airplanes, and explained that EASA's adoption of similar 
rulemaking would have unbearable impact (heavy costs including labor) 
on the Air France fleet.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenter's concerns about the cost of 
compliance with this AD, and the FAA infers that the commenter would 
like the NPRM withdrawn. The FAA considers it necessary to address this 
unsafe condition for the reasons discussed in the responses to the two 
comments above. The FAA considers these costs necessary to address the 
identified unsafe condition. The FAA has therefore determined that it 
is necessary to issue this final rule.

Request To Clarify Applicability: Limit to Airplanes Without FRM

    Because of numerous queries from airlines about the applicability 
of the proposed AD, Airbus requested that the FAA revise the SUMMARY 
and ``Proposed AD Requirements'' section of the NPRM by clarifying that 
the proposed AD does not apply to airplanes equipped with FRM.
    The FAA agrees to revise the SUMMARY of this final rule by 
highlighting the exception to the applicability, i.e., that airplanes 
are not affected by this AD if they are equipped with FRM approved by 
the FAA as compliant with the FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 
requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 14 CFR 26.33(c)(1). The 
applicability in paragraph (c) of the proposed AD, however, already 
excluded airplanes equipped with FRM; it is therefore unnecessary to 
change the regulatory language of this final rule to add this 
clarification.

Request To Clarify Number of Affected Airplanes

    Airbus requested that the FAA clarify the Costs of Compliance 
section in the NPRM to emphasize that the number of affected airplanes 
is based on the FAA's analysis of the number of airplanes identified in 
the applicability that are currently registered in the U.S. and 
operated under 14 CFR part 91. Airbus considered that this change would 
further explain the scope of the applicability of the proposed AD.
    The FAA agrees to clarify the affected airplanes. Although 
airplanes operated under 14 CFR part 91 are primarily affected by this 
AD and accounted for in the Costs of Compliance section of this AD, the 
applicability of this AD includes airplanes that are not equipped with 
FRM, operated under all potential 14 CFR operating requirements. It is 
clearer to apply the requirements based on the airplane type design 
rather than intended operating requirements. No

[[Page 2286]]

change to the final rule is necessary regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Applicability: Add Model A321

    Airbus stated that there is no valid rationale for excluding Model 
A321 series airplanes from the applicability of the proposed AD.
    The FAA agrees that the unsafe condition identified in the NPRM 
also applies to Model A321 series airplanes without FRM approved by the 
FAA as compliant with the FTFR rule requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 
14 CFR 26.33(c)(1). The addition of an airplane model to a final rule 
typically requires prior notice and opportunity for comment on that 
addition. However, section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) (5 U.S.C.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and 
comment procedures for rules when the agency, for ``good cause,'' finds 
that those procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.'' Under this section, an agency, upon finding good 
cause, may issue a final rule without seeking comment prior to the 
rulemaking. There are currently no Model A321 series airplanes on the 
U.S. Register that do not have FRM approved by the FAA. Therefore, 
notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary, 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B). The FAA has revised paragraph (c) of 
this AD to include FAA-certificated Model A321 series airplanes that 
are not equipped with FRM.

Request To Revise Applicability: Remove Model A330-300

    Airbus requested that the FAA revise the applicability of the 
proposed AD to remove Model A330-300 airplanes, because those airplanes 
are either not fitted with a center tank or, if fitted with a center 
tank, are compliant with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3), as amended at 66 FR 
23086, May 7, 2001, amendment 25-102. Airbus added that Model A330-300 
series airplanes fitted with a center wing tank will all have been 
delivered with compliant FRM.
    The FAA agrees with the commenter's request. Model A330-300 series 
airplanes were originally produced with no center fuel tank; therefore, 
those airplanes were not subject to the unsafe condition. Model A330-
300 series airplanes have been redesigned and are now equipped with an 
optional center fuel tank that is compliant with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3). 
Because of this unique design and production history, the FAA does not 
anticipate that any Model A330-300 series airplanes with a center fuel 
tank installed will be operated without a compliant FRM. The FAA 
therefore has removed Model A330-300 series airplanes from the 
applicability of this AD.

Request To Remove Paragraph (g)

    United Airlines noted that the overall applicability of the 
proposed AD was limited to airplanes without FRM, and requested that 
the FAA delete paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, since FRM will have 
been installed on all affected airplanes in passenger configuration by 
December 26, 2018--well ahead of the compliance deadline of the 
proposed AD.
    The FAA infers that the commenter has assumed that the requirements 
of paragraph (g) of this AD apply only to passenger-carrying airplanes 
in air carrier operations. The FAA disagrees with the request to remove 
paragraph (g) of this AD. There are other passenger-carrying airplanes 
operated under 14 CFR part 91 that are not required to install FRM. 
(The requirement to install FRM on all passenger-carrying airplanes 
operated by air carriers is in 14 CFR 121.1117.) Paragraph (g) of this 
AD is the main requirement for all affected airplanes, which includes 
both passenger-carrying (regardless of operations) and cargo-only 
airplanes. Paragraph (h) of this AD provides alternative actions for 
cargo-only airplanes. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this 
issue.

Request To Limit Modification Requirements to Certain Airplanes

    As an alternative to removing paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, 
United Airlines requested that the FAA instead revise that paragraph to 
limit the affected airplanes to those in cargo configurations that do 
not have FRM installed, and non-U.S. registered airplanes for which the 
FRM rule is not mandatory.
    The FAA disagrees with this request. Paragraph (g) of this AD is 
intended to include passenger-carrying airplanes with the unsafe 
condition, but the commenter's proposed change to the airplanes 
affected by paragraph (g) of this AD would not include those airplanes. 
As previously discussed, there are passenger-carrying airplanes 
operated under 14 CFR part 91 that are not required to install FRM. As 
with all ADs, this AD does not apply to non-U.S.-registered airplanes. 
Therefore, the FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Identify Compliant FRM as Acceptable

    Airbus requested that the FAA clearly identify the installation of 
FRM as an acceptable way to comply with the proposed AD requirements. 
Airbus noted that there are no FQIS or wiring modifications being 
designed for retrofit for the single-aisle/long range models, but FRM 
that is compliant with the FTFR rule is available (with possibly some 
necessary customization adaptations) for all concerned models, 
including potential future passenger-to-cargo conversions. Airbus noted 
that the FAA could have addressed the unsafe condition through means 
other than an AD, such as revising 14 CFR part 91 or mandating 
installation of an FRM on future passenger-to-freighter conversions by 
amended type certificate or supplemental type certificate.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenter's request. However, the FAA has 
determined that it is not necessary to identify FRM as acceptable for 
compliance with this AD, since this issue is already addressed in the 
AD applicability. Airplanes equipped with FAA-approved FRM that meets 
the requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 26.33(c)(1) are not affected by 
this AD. It is therefore unnecessary to include FRM installation as an 
alternative way to comply with the requirements of this AD. The FAA has 
not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Delay AD Pending Approved Procedures

    All Nippon Airways (ANA) noted that paragraph (g) of the proposed 
AD would require modifying the FQIS, but does not describe that 
modification. ANA therefore requested that the FAA delay issuance of 
the final rule until a specific procedure for operators to follow is 
available. ANA expressed concern that absent a clear description of the 
specific procedure that operators should follow, it will be difficult 
for operators to comply with the proposed requirements.
    The FAA infers that ANA is referring to specific service 
information for the operator to follow that will address the unsafe 
condition on the affected airplanes, since the NPRM does not specify 
service information. The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. 
Since the FAA has determined that an unsafe condition exists and that 
affected airplanes must be modified to ensure continued safety, further 
delay of this action would be inappropriate. Because of the additional 
delay due to litigation on the similar AD for Model 757 airplanes, AD 
2016-07-07, and the

[[Page 2287]]

compliance time extension to 72 months, which is discussed in the 
comment disposition below, the FAA finds that sufficient time exists 
for manufacturers to develop service information to support operator 
compliance with the requirements of this AD. If service information is 
developed, approved, and available in the future, operators may request 
approval under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD to use 
approved service instructions, as an alternative method of compliance 
(AMOC) for the requirements of this AD, or the FAA may approve the 
service information as a global AMOC for this AD.

Request To Change Compliance Time

    Airbus requested that the FAA extend the compliance time from 60 
months to 72 months, based on the compliance time in AD 2016-07-07, 
which has a similar unsafe condition and similar corrective actions.
    Conversely, NATCA recommended that the FAA reject requests for a 
compliance time longer than 5 years as proposed. Assuming final rule 
issuance in 2016, NATCA stated that a 5-year compliance time would 
result in required compliance by 2021--25 years after the TWA Flight 
800 fuel tank explosion that led to the requirements in SFAR 88, and 20 
years after issuance of SFAR 88.
    The FAA agrees with the request to extend the compliance time, and 
disagrees with NATCA's request. The FAA received similar requests to 
extend the compliance time from several commenters regarding the NPRMs 
for the FQIS modification on other airplanes. The FAA has determined 
that a 72-month compliance time is appropriate and will provide 
operators adequate time to prepare for and perform the required 
modifications without excessive disruption of operations. The FAA has 
determined that the requested moderate increase in compliance time will 
continue to provide an acceptable level of safety. The FAA has changed 
paragraphs (g) and (h)(2) of this AD accordingly.

Request To Clarify Certification Basis for Modification Requirements

    NATCA recommended that the FAA revise paragraph (g) of the proposed 
AD to clearly state that the required FQIS design changes must comply 
with the fail-safe requirements of 14 CFR 25.901(c), as amended by 43 
FR 50597, October 30, 1978, amendment 25-46, and 14 CFR 25.981(a) and 
(b), as amended by 66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001, amendment 25-102; NATCA 
added that these provisions are required by SFAR 88.
    The FAA infers that NATCA is proposing that the certification basis 
of the design changes to the FQIS system design be at the amendment 
levels cited above. The FAA further infers that NATCA proposes that the 
FAA require the entire FQIS system design to comply at those amendment 
levels rather than allowing only a portion of the system to comply with 
those amendments. The FAA partially agrees with NATCA's request. The 
FAA agrees that the design change must comply with the applicable 
certification basis, because design changes are required to comply with 
the applicable certification basis under part 21. The FAA disagrees, 
however, with identifying the specific certification basis in this AD, 
because it varies by design. In addition, the FAA previously identified 
in the SNPRM for AD 2016-07-07, in the response to comments under 
``Requests To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012). Based on 
Applicability'' that the option for cargo airplanes will require a 
partial exemption from 14 CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3). The partial 
exemption is needed because portions of the FQIS would remain 
unmodified, and the overall system would therefore still not fully 
comply with those regulations. The FAA has already granted such 
exemptions for other airplane models. Identifying these amendments as 
required would also not take into account exceptions (reversions to 
earlier versions of regulations) granted in the certification basis 
under 14 CFR 21.101. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this 
issue.

Request To Address Unsafe Condition on All Fuel Tanks

    NATCA recommended that the FAA require design changes that 
eliminate unsafe FQIS failure conditions on all fuel tanks on the 
affected models, regardless of fuel tank location or the percentage of 
time the fuel tank is flammable. NATCA referred to four fuel tank 
explosions in low-flammability exposure time fuel tanks identified by 
the FAA during FTFR rulemaking. NATCA stated that neither FRM nor 
alternative actions for cargo airplanes (e.g., BITE checks (checks of 
built-in test equipment) followed by applicable repairs before further 
flight and modification of the center fuel tank FQIS wiring within 72 
months) would bring the airplane into full regulatory compliance. NATCA 
added that the combination of failures described in the NPRM meets the 
criteria for ``known combinations'' of failures that require corrective 
action in Policy Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The FAA has 
determined that according to Policy Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15, this 
failure condition for the airplanes affected by this AD should not be 
classified as a ``known combination.'' While the FQIS design 
architecture is similar to that of the early Boeing Model 747 
configuration that is suspected of contributing to the TWA Flight 800 
fuel tank explosion, significant differences exist in the design of 
FQIS components and wire installations between the affected Airbus SAS 
models and the early Model 747 airplanes such that the intent of the 
``known combinations'' provision for low flammability fuel tanks in the 
policy memorandum is not applicable. Therefore, this AD affects only 
the identified Airbus airplanes with high flammability exposure time 
fuel tanks, as specified in paragraph (c) of this AD. The FAA provided 
a detailed response to similar comments in AD 2016-07-07. The FAA has 
not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Require Modifications on All Production Airplanes

    NATCA recommended that the FAA require designs that comply with 14 
CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3) on all newly produced transport 
airplanes. NATCA stated that continuing to grant exemptions to 14 CFR 
25.901(c), as amended by 42 FR 15042, March 17, 1977, amendment 25-40; 
and 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3), as amended by 66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001, 
amendment 25-102; has allowed continued production of thousands of 
airplanes with this known unsafe condition.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. This AD applies to 
airplanes, including newly produced airplanes, as specified in 
paragraph (c) of this AD. The recommendation to require production 
airplanes of existing designs to fully comply with 25.901(c) and 
25.981(a)(3) is outside the scope of this rulemaking. The FAA has not 
changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Require Design Changes From Manufacturers

    NATCA recommended that the FAA follow the agency's compliance and 
enforcement policy to require manufacturers to develop the necessary 
design changes soon enough to support operators' ability to comply with 
the proposed requirements. NATCA noted that SFAR 88 required 
manufacturers to develop all design changes for unsafe conditions 
identified by their SFAR 88

[[Page 2288]]

design reviews by December 2002, or within an additional 18 months if 
the FAA granted an extension.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenter's concerns. However, any 
enforcement action is outside the scope of this rulemaking. The FAA has 
not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Cost Estimate

    Air France noted that the cost section of the NPRM provided both 
1,200- and 74-work-hour estimates, and questioned which figure applied 
to the wire separation modification.
    The FAA agrees that clarification is needed, and has revised the 
Costs of Compliance section to specify 1,200 work-hours for the 
modification required by paragraph (g) of this AD, and 74 work-hours 
for the alternative wire separation modification provided by paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD.

Clarification of BITE Check Compliance Time

    The FAA has revised paragraph (h)(1) of this AD to clarify the 
compliance time for the BITE check relative to the requirement to 
record the fault codes. The FAA recognized that operators might 
interpret the proposed requirements for alternative actions for cargo 
airplanes as allowing additional flights prior to performing the BITE 
check after first recording the fault codes. The FAA intended for 
operators to perform the BITE check immediately after recording the 
fault codes to address both the fault codes that exist prior to 
performing the BITE check as well as any new codes that are identified 
during the BITE check.

Additional Compliance Time Change

    For consistency with similar ADs related to FQIS, the FAA has 
changed the repetitive interval for recording the existing fault codes 
stored in the fuel quantity indicating (FQI) computer and BITE check 
from ``not to exceed 650 flights hours'' to ``not to exceed 750 flights 
hours.'' The FAA has determined that this change continues to provide 
an acceptable level of safety.

Conclusion

    The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments 
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest 
require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously 
and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor 
changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM.
    The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final 
rule.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 1 airplane of U.S. registry.
    The FAA also estimates that it takes about 1,200 work-hours per 
product to comply with the basic modification requirements of paragraph 
(g) of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. The FAA 
received no definitive data that would enable the agency to provide 
cost estimates for the parts needed to do the actions specified in this 
AD. Based on these figures, the FAA estimates the labor cost of this AD 
on U.S. operators to be $102,000.
    The FAA has not received definitive information on the costs for 
the alternative wire separation modification specified in paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD. The cost for this action in similar rulemaking on 
other airplanes, however, suggests that this modification could take 
about 74 work-hours with parts costing about $10,000, for a total 
estimated cost to U.S. operators of $16,290 per product.
    The FAA estimates that the repetitive FQIS tank circuit checks 
associated with the alternative wire separation modification would take 
about 1 work-hour per check. The FAA estimates the cost of this check 
on U.S. operators to be $85 per product, per check.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.
    This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the 
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by 
FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is 
normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but 
during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the 
authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes and 
associated appliances to the Director of the System Oversight Division.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2019-24-01 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39-21012; Docket No. FAA-2016-6144; 
Product Identifier 2015-NM-088-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective February 19, 2020.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to the Airbus SAS airplanes, certificated in any 
category, identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (6) of

[[Page 2289]]

this AD, except airplanes equipped with a flammability reduction 
means (FRM) approved by the FAA as compliant with the Fuel Tank 
Flammability Reduction (FTFR) requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 14 
CFR 26.33(c)(1).
    (1) Model A318-111, -112, -121, and -122 airplanes.
    (2) Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 
airplanes.
    (3) Model A320-211, -212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes.
    (4) Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -231, -212, -213, and -232 
airplanes.
    (5) Model A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, and -243F 
airplanes.
    (6) Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, -313, -541, and -642 
airplanes.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by the FAA's analysis of fuel system 
reviews on the affected airplanes conducted by the manufacturer. The 
FAA is issuing this AD to address ignition sources inside the center 
fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could 
result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Modification

    Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the 
fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) to prevent development of an 
ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault 
conditions, using a method approved by the Manager, International 
Section, Transport Standard Branch, FAA.

(h) Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes

    For airplanes used exclusively for cargo operations: As an 
alternative to the requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD, do the 
actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and (2) of this AD. To 
exercise this alternative, operators must perform the first 
inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of this AD within 6 
months after the effective date of this AD. To exercise this 
alternative for airplanes returned to service after conversion of 
the airplane from a passenger configuration to an all-cargo 
configuration more than 6 months after the effective date of this 
AD, operators must perform the first inspection required by 
paragraph (h)(1) of this AD prior to further flight after the 
conversion.
    (1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, record 
the existing fault codes stored in the fuel quantity indicating 
(FQI) computer, and before further flight thereafter, do a BITE 
check (check of built-in test equipment) of the FQI computer, using 
a method approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport 
Standards Branch, FAA. If any fault code is recorded prior to the 
BITE check or as a result of the BITE check, before further flight, 
do all applicable repairs and repeat the BITE check until a 
successful test is performed with no fault found, using a method 
approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport Standards 
Branch, FAA. Repeat these actions thereafter at intervals not to 
exceed 750 flight hours. Modification as specified in paragraph 
(h)(2) of this AD does not terminate the repetitive BITE check 
requirement of this paragraph.
    (2) Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, modify 
the airplane by separating FQIS wiring that runs between the FQI 
computer and the center fuel tank wall penetrations, including any 
circuits that might pass through a main fuel tank, from other 
airplane wiring that is not intrinsically safe, using methods 
approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport Standards 
Branch, FAA.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, International Section, Transport Standards 
Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance 
with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or 
local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Dan Rodina, 
Aerospace Engineer, International Section, Transport Standards 
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone 
and fax 206-231-3225.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued in Des Moines, Washington, on December 4, 2019.
Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2019-27884 Filed 1-14-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P