Document ID: FAA-2008-0274-0011
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Boeing Co. Model 757 Airplanes, Model 767 Airplanes, and Model 777-200, et al. Series Airplanes
Posted Date: 2010-07-13T04:00Z

[Federal Register: July 13, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 133)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 39804-39811]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr13jy10-7]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0274; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-038-AD; 
Amendment 39-16367; AD 2010-15-01]
RIN 2120-AA64

 
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 757 Airplanes, 
Model 767 Airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 
Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 
series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for damage of 
the electrical terminal at the left and right flightdeck window 1, and 
corrective actions if necessary. This AD also allows for replacing the 
flightdeck window 1 with a new improved flightdeck window equipped with 
different electrical connections, which terminates the repetitive 
inspections for that flightdeck window 1. This AD results from several 
reports of electrical arcs at the terminal blocks of the electrically 
heated flightdeck window 1. We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke and 
fire in the cockpit, which could lead to loss of visibility, and 
injuries to or incapacitation of the flightcrew.

DATES: This AD is effective August 17, 2010.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of August 17, 
2010.

[[Page 39805]]

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-
544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management 
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, 
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace 
Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone (425) 917-6478; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to 
certain Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777-200 and 
-300 series airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register 
on March 13, 2008 (73 FR 13483). That NPRM proposed to require 
repetitive inspections for damage of the electrical terminal at the 
left and right flightdeck window 1, and corrective actions if 
necessary. That NPRM also proposed to allow for replacing the 
flightdeck window 1 with a new improved flightdeck window equipped with 
different electrical connections, which would terminate the repetitive 
inspections for that flightdeck window 1.

Explanation of Revised Service Information

    After the NPRM was issued, Boeing issued the following service 
bulletins:
     Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, 
Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010, for Model 757-200, -200CB, and -200PF 
series airplanes.
     Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, 
Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, for Model 757-300 series airplanes.
    We referred to Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-
0019, and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, both 
Revision 1, both dated December 19, 2007, as appropriate sources of 
service information for doing the actions proposed in the NPRM.
    The actions specified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins 
757-30-0019 and 757-30-0020, both Revision 2, include an additional 
inspection of the J1 and J4 (upper) terminals; however, the inspection 
of the upper connections is not included in this AD. We find that to 
delay this action to include the inspection of the J1 and J4 terminals 
and to ensure that the public has sufficient time to consider and 
comment on the additional actions, would be inappropriate in light of 
the unsafe condition identified on the J5 terminal. We are considering 
additional rulemaking to require the inspection of the J1 and J4 
terminals.
    Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins 757-30-0019 and 757-30-
0020, both Revision 2, include a reduced compliance time of 500 flight 
hours or 150 days, whichever occurs first, for the detailed inspection 
for damage specified in paragraph (f) of this AD (paragraph (g) of the 
NPRM). We have not changed this AD to include the reduced compliance 
time. We have determined that the compliance time, as proposed, 
represents an appropriate interval of time in which the required 
actions can be performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, 
while still maintaining an adequate level of safety. We find that to 
delay this action to ensure that the public has sufficient time to 
consider and comment on the reduced compliance time, would be 
inappropriate in light of the identified unsafe condition.
    For Model 757 airplanes, Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins 
757-30-0019 and 757-30-0020, both Revision 2, also include a revised 
interval for repeating the detailed inspection for damage specified in 
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of the NPRM). 
We have determined that extending the repetitive intervals, as 
recommended by the manufacturer, is consistent with data on in-service 
failure reports and will not adversely affect safety for the affected 
airplane models. Therefore, we have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of 
this AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of the NPRM), to include the revised 
interval. For windows manufactured by GKN Aerospace Transparency 
Systems (GKN), the inspection is now specified at intervals not to 
exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever occurs later. For 
windows manufactured by PPG Aerospace (PPG), the inspection is now 
specified at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months, 
whichever occurs later. We have also revised this same repetitive 
interval for Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 series 
airplanes, as explained under ``Requests to Extend Repetitive 
Inspection Interval'' below.
    The Compliance paragraphs (1.E.) of Boeing Special Attention 
Service Bulletins 757-30-0019 and 757-30-0020, both Revision 2, give 
additional time for doing the corrective action if the screw is cross 
threaded and the terminal lug is tight. We have added paragraph (h)(1) 
to this AD to specify doing the corrective action within 150 days or 
500 flight hours after the inspection, whichever occurs first, rather 
than before further flight.
    We have changed Table 1 of this final rule to refer to Boeing 
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, Revision 2, dated April 
19, 2010; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, 
Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010; as appropriate sources of service 
information. We have also changed Table 2 of this final rule to state 
that actions done before the effective date of this AD in accordance 
with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019 or Boeing 
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, both Revision 1, both 
dated December 19, 2007, are acceptable for compliance with the 
corresponding requirements of this AD.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We considered the comments received from the 10 commenters.

Support for the NPRM

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) fully supports the 
proposed action for the lower (J5) terminal.

Issue a Supplemental NPRM or Withdraw the NPRM

    Air Transport Association (ATA) agrees with the intent of the 
proposal, but specifies that the NPRM, as written, has fundamental and 
detailed flaws that may not resolve the unsafe condition; instead, the 
NPRM focuses on electrical connections on another side of the terminal 
block, which likely are not the cause of the unsafe condition. ATA 
recommends that we instead issue a

[[Page 39806]]

supplemental NPRM that takes into consideration the comments of member 
airlines.
    American Airlines (AAL) indicates that the proposed rule is 
premature and should be withdrawn until the NTSB has completed its 
investigation of an incident of window heat arcing on a Model 757 
airplane at the J1 and J4 terminals. The NTSB also encourages amending 
the NPRM (we infer by supplemental NPRM) to include inspections of the 
J1 and J4 terminals on all of the affected flightdeck windows. The NTSB 
states that in a small number of cases it determined that a loose or 
inadequate connection at the J1 terminal or J4 terminal is the most 
likely cause of the smoke and/or fire in the cockpit.
    AAL, Continental Airlines (CAL), Delta Airlines (DAL), and United 
Airlines (UAL) request we withdraw the NPRM until we do further 
investigation to identify the root cause of the window arcing events. 
The commenters state that the proposed AD should mandate a 
comprehensive and worthwhile solution; that a credible analysis 
providing the true root cause of the failure must be completed first; 
and that further investigation could alter or add to the solution, thus 
rendering it more meaningful. Certain commenters suggest what the root 
causes might be, including the following:
     AAL contends that material design choices contribute to 
unintended cross threading and apparent lack of screw retention over 
time; and that under-torque of the connector screw as the lone primary 
failure is speculative and that a more likely source of heating is 
arcing along the braided power wire downstream of the window heat 
connector. In addition, AAL service history shows the primary cause of 
failure to be arcing at the heat braided power wire at the lower window 
along with delamination between the window heat layer and the outer 
glass.
     CAL states that it appears the root cause attributed to 
cross threading might actually be faulty solder joints, and that 
stripping of the tapped brass block due to repetitive application of 
current torque requirements could be a driving force behind in-service 
failures.
     DAL notes that poor design/manufacture of the flightdeck 
window 1 terminal contributes to arcing events and that the design does 
not support a long-term robust connection to the screw.
    We disagree with the requests to withdraw the NPRM or issue a 
supplemental NPRM.
    The incident of window heat arcing at the J1 and J4 terminals that 
was investigated by the NTSB is related to the unsafe condition 
addressed by the NPRM that preceded this final rule. We have reports of 
four events involving arcing of the flightdeck window heat system at 
the upper aft (J1) and upper forward (J4) terminals on the first 
officer's flightdeck window that caused the inner pane of glass to 
fracture. The events, which occurred between January 2001 and August 
2008, all occurred on Model 757 airplanes. Withdrawing the NPRM to 
include the upper terminals for Model 757 airplanes would be 
inappropriate as it would delay this AD action, which addresses 
failures of the lower (J5) terminal for Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 
airplanes, and Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. However, we are 
considering additional rulemaking to address arcing at the upper (J1 
and J4) terminals on Model 757 airplanes only.
    Regarding the requests to determine the root causes, we disagree 
with withdrawing the NPRM until a different root cause is identified. 
Although we agree with the commenters that the failure mode that causes 
a significant arcing event is the melting of solder or the de-soldering 
of the terminal connection, we disagree as to the cause of the de-
soldering of the terminal connection and subsequent arcing.
    We have received reports that attribute the primary cause of the 
overheating of the terminal to a cross-threaded screw, a loose screw, 
or an incorrectly installed screw. We have also found that the majority 
of the arcing events happened within 500 flight hours after the 
flightdeck window was replaced or had undergone maintenance. The 
unintended cross threading and apparent lack of screw retention over 
time have been reported on flightdeck windows manufactured by both GKN 
and PPG. The failure of the moisture seal and the delamination of the 
flightdeck window plies are addressed by other ADs and other service 
bulletins; but we point out that such failures are detectable.
    We find that the actions required by this AD will identify failures 
of the electrical terminals, regardless of the root cause, and that the 
corrective actions apply to all detected failures. However, if new 
information becomes available to justify revising this AD, we will 
consider further rulemaking.
    For the above reasons, no change has been made to the AD in 
response to the requests to withdraw the NPRM or issue a supplemental 
NPRM.

Requests To Extend Repetitive Inspection Interval

    Air France, ATA, and Northwest Airlines (NWA) request that we 
extend the interval for the repetitive inspection from 6,000 flight 
hours to 7,800 flight hours (Air France) or 8,000 flight hours (ATA and 
NWA). Air France contends that the inspections should be matched with 
the schedule for light maintenance checks. ATA recommends that we 
extend the interval based on service experience. NWA indicates there 
would not be an appreciable effect on safety in extending the 
inspection to an interval where the task can be performed during a 
scheduled ``C'' check in an environment more conducive to such 
maintenance.
    We partially agree with the requests to extend the repetitive 
inspection interval. We agree with the request to extend the interval 
for GKN flightdeck windows. As explained previously under ``Explanation 
of Revised Service Information,'' for windows manufactured by GKN, the 
inspection is now specified in this AD at intervals not to exceed 
12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever occurs later. According to 
reports the failure rate of GKN flightdeck windows seems to be 
substantially lower than the failure rate of the PPG flightdeck 
windows, and the severity of events of the GKN flightdeck windows is 
less.
    We disagree with extending the inspection interval for PPG 
flightdeck windows from 6,000 flight hours; however, we have determined 
that specifying the compliance time as 6,000 flight hours or 24 months, 
whichever occurs later, will provide relief to operators. In 
establishing the 6,000-flight-hour interval for those flightdeck 
windows, we considered not only the frequency of occurrence of the 
electrical connection failures, the time required to perform the 
inspection, and the consequent risk of uncorrected unsafe conditions, 
but also the scheduling of the inspections so they can be accomplished 
during regular maintenance down time. We determined that an interval of 
6,000 flight hours would give the operators ample time to schedule the 
proposed actions at a routine scheduled maintenance and detect an 
unsafe condition before an event.
    We have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD (paragraphs (g) 
and (h) of the NPRM) to include the revised intervals.

Requests To Clarify Intent of 500 Flight Hours for Inspection

    AAL, DAL, and UAL request that we clarify the intent of the initial 
repetitive inspection that is proposed within 500 flight hours after 
the corrective action for certain airplanes. DAL points out that as 
written in the NPRM an operator

[[Page 39807]]

could accomplish the detailed inspection after one flight hour and be 
in compliance with the proposed rule. UAL would like to know if the 
intent is to perform a quality check (which could be performed shortly 
after the replacement), or if the intent is to check for degradation of 
the torque value over time. UAL states that if the intent is the 
latter, the wording should be ``after 500 flight hours'' instead of 
``within 500 flight hours.'' AAL also states that the inspection could 
be done within an hour after the corrective action and asks if the 
intent is simply to do a quality check.
    We agree that the 500-flight-hour compliance time for the initial 
repetitive inspection for certain airplanes, as required by paragraph 
(g) of this AD (paragraph (h) of the NPRM), should be clarified. The 
intent of the inspection of certain airplanes ``within 500 flight hours 
after the corrective action,'' as specified in paragraph (g) of this 
AD, is a quality assurance check. The phrase ``within 500 flight hours 
after the corrective action'' correctly allows for doing the initial 
repetitive inspection before further flight following accomplishment of 
the corrective action. According to the majority of the reported arcing 
events, the result of an incorrectly assembled screw/lug electrical 
connection (a heated terminal and the possibility of subsequent arcing) 
occurred in-service after the assembly of the electrical connection. 
Additionally, the phrase ``within 500 flight hours after the corrective 
action'' would also provide sufficient time for operators of mixed or 
large fleets to do the inspection without compromising safety. We have 
not changed the AD in this regard.

Requests To Exclude Certain Window From Proposed Actions

    ATA, on behalf of its member AAL, requests that part number (P/N) 
141T4800 flightdeck windows be excluded from the actions proposed in 
the NPRM. AAL has data that confirm it has not experienced what they 
deemed a ``catastrophic'' arcing or smoke event on a flightdeck window, 
P/N 141T4800. All of the ``catastrophic'' arcing and smoke events AAL 
has experienced have occurred on flightdeck window P/N 141T4801 with 
lug and screw electrical connections. AAL states that the P/N 141T4800 
terminal blocks might show minor damage; however, the damage is limited 
and contained. AAL further asserts that the connection found in the 
terminating action proposed in the NPRM is exactly the P/N 141T4800 
connection; therefore, the AD should exclude flightdeck windows that 
currently have P/N 141T4800.
    We partially agree with the commenters. We agree that the 
performance of the P/N 141T4800 flightdeck window appears to be better 
than the P/N 141T4801 flightdeck window with lug and screw electrical 
connections; its failure rate is lower and the failures are not as 
severe. We disagree with excluding the P/N 141T4800 flightdeck windows 
from the AD because we have received reports of arcing events with the 
P/N 141T4800 flightdeck windows that require corrective action. 
However, we find that some mitigation is appropriate because the 
failure rate of the screw/lug terminal equipped PPG windshields to 
screw/lug equipped GKN flightdeck windows is about 2 to 1. Therefore, 
we have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD (paragraphs (g) and 
(h) of the NPRM) to specify a repetitive interval of 12,000 flight 
hours or 48 months, whichever occurs later, for screw/lug terminal 
equipped GKN flightdeck windows.

Requests To Include Certain P/N as Terminating Action

    GKN and AAL state that flightdeck window P/N 141T800-13/-14 should 
be included as a terminating action in the NPRM. The commenters state 
that service information points to damaged solder joints as the primary 
cause of the electrical arcs and point out that the P/N 141T800-13/-14 
flightdeck windows do not incorporate the design feature that causes 
extreme arcing, an ignition source, and melting of the glass; and that 
the design does not incorporate features that are subject to assembly 
error. Specifically, the commenters state that at the cockpit side, the 
flightdeck window P/N 141T800-13/-14 uses a screw connector which is 
seen as superior to the pin and socket connector used on the proposed 
terminating action windshield; this superiority is due to the high 
clamping pressure and ability to re-tighten or replace the screw in 
addition to the excellent material choice for the threaded insert.
    We disagree with the request to include flightdeck window P/N 
141T800-13/-14 as a terminating action. While we agree that damaged 
solder joints are the primary cause for the electrical arcs, we point 
out that the primary cause of loose connections is the incorrect torque 
of the screw or an incorrectly installed screw. A loose connection 
increases the heat at the terminal, which can cause damage to the 
internal solder joint. A loose screw or an incorrectly installed screw 
is due to limited access on the airplane. The pin/socket connector, 
which is the design proposed as the optional terminating action in the 
NPRM, is assembled in a controlled environment on a bench and with full 
access. The screw/lug design proposed by the commenters does not 
provide an equivalent level of safety to that of the pin/socket design, 
which is not subject to the same assembly errors. Therefore, we have 
not changed the AD in this regard.

Request for Further Analysis Before Terminating Action

    CAL, DAL, and ATA on behalf of its member AAL, request that we and 
the manufacturer perform an engineering analysis to determine whether 
pin and socket connections, proposed as an optional terminating action, 
offer any advantage over screw and lug connections. AAL has had 
considerable experience with pin and socket connections and states that 
carrying any appreciable current through a pin and socket connection is 
less reliable than a ring terminal and screw connection. CAL states 
that it has had problems with pin and socket connections; however, it 
applauds the mechanical joining at the mesh to block interface. CAL 
considers that more time is needed to determine if the pin and socket 
design is more reliable. DAL is unaware of any destructive testing that 
has been performed to substantiate the use of the new design as the 
corrective action for flightdeck window arcing events.
    We disagree with the need for further study. The pin and socket 
connection of the electrical heat terminal was designed and 
qualification tested for contact retention and current-carrying 
capacity by the suppliers as part of the certification process of the 
block. The testing verified the integrity of the design and showed it 
not to have nuisance failures. Further, the pin and socket technology 
is well-established and used in a significant number of electrical 
applications on the airplane. The pin and socket connectors for the 
flightdeck window heat terminal have been in service since 2004 without 
any reported failures. The failures that the commenters referred to 
were due to manufacturing error rather than a design defect. We have 
not changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Make Terminating Action Mandatory

    The NTSB asks that we make the installation of a new flightdeck 
window mandatory rather than optional and states that the installation 
would prevent similar events of smoke or fire in the cockpit. The NTSB 
notes that the NPRM proposes installation of a new

[[Page 39808]]

flightdeck window that incorporates the pin and socket electrical 
connection that provides a more secure connection and is less 
susceptible to installation errors. This new flightdeck window design 
also uses a crimped ring terminal that is internal to the terminal 
block; the crimped ring terminal connects the flightdeck window heat 
braid wire to the terminal, which addresses some of the solder issues 
suspected in the NTSB's investigations around the J1 and J4 terminals.
    We partially agree. While we agree with the commenter that the 
installation of the new flightdeck window with the pin and socket 
electrical connection is more robust because it is not as susceptible 
to assembly errors as is the flightdeck window with the screw/lug 
connection, we disagree with the request to make the installation of 
the flightdeck window with the new pin and socket electrical connection 
mandatory. The repetitive inspections and corrective actions required 
by this AD provide adequate means to maintain the safety of the screw/
lug flightdeck windows. Requiring the replacement of the flightdeck 
windows is not necessary to address the unsafe condition. We have not 
changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Improve Access to Terminal Block

    CAL notes that access to the terminal block on Boeing Model 757 
airplanes is ``atrocious''; even with small hands it cannot be held. 
CAL does not consider it a coincidence that this connection is the 
``problem child'' because access is so poor. This limited access, 
coupled with poor ``view-ability'' turns a simple installation into a 
very complex installation. CAL requests that certain aircraft 
improvements and modifications be addressed, as well as human factor 
items such as special tooling to be developed.
    We infer that the commenter asks us to address this issue in the 
AD. We partially agree with the request. The commenter is correct in 
saying that access to the electrical terminal block makes it difficult 
to achieve the torque limits outlined in the airplane maintenance 
manual and that this could be the primary reason for incorrectly 
assembled electrical terminations. We note that the optional 
terminating action of this AD (pin and socket design) is much easier to 
accomplish in the existing limited space. In addition, we find that to 
delay this action to allow time for modifications and human factor 
changes would be inappropriate in light of the identified unsafe 
condition. The commenter should note that under the provisions of 
paragraph (k) of the final rule, we will consider requests for approval 
of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) if sufficient data are 
submitted to substantiate that the design change would provide an 
acceptable level of safety.
    We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Revise Service Bulletins

    AAL requests revisions to the service bulletins listed in the table 
titled ``Requested revisions.''

                           Requested Revisions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Boeing special attention
      service bulletin--          Revision--             Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-30-0019..................  1..............  December 19, 2007.
757-30-0020..................  1..............  December 19, 2007.
767-30-0041..................  Original.......  December 5, 2007.
777-30-0012..................  2..............  December 19, 2007.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AAL lists several editorial changes in the service bulletins in its 
comments, and specifies that revisions would reduce the burden of 
processing numerous requests for AMOCs.
    UAL requests that we revise Boeing Special Attention Service 
Bulletin 777-30-0012, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2007, to clarify 
the following statement: ``There is a time limit on how long the old 
number 1 flightdeck window can be used.'' UAL would like to know if the 
time limit refers to the serviceability limit of the old flightdeck 
window, or the availability of the flightdeck window, or to future 
spares.
    We have discussed AAL's concerns with Boeing. In addition, we agree 
with UAL that the statement about the time limit is in error and should 
not be included in the service bulletin. We have also referred this 
concern to Boeing. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Add Reference to Table 1

    Boeing asks that we add a reference to Table 1 of the NPRM in the 
paragraph titled ``Actions Accomplished Previously,'' for the latest 
revision of the released service bulletins. Boeing points out that the 
service bulletins listed in both Table 1 and Table 2 are acceptable 
before the effective date of the AD.
    We disagree with the request to refer to Table 1 in the ``Credit 
for Actions Accomplished Previously'' paragraph of this AD. The intent 
of the ``Credit for Actions Accomplished Previously'' paragraph is to 
list service bulletins that are acceptable for compliance before the 
effective date of the AD, but not after the effective date of the AD. 
The service bulletins listed in Table 1 of the AD are acceptable for 
compliance both before and after the effective date of the AD. The 
acceptable use of the service bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD 
before the effective date is covered by the statement in paragraph (e) 
of this AD that says, ``Comply with this AD within the compliance times 
specified, unless already done.'' We have not changed the AD in this 
regard.

Request To Add Statement to AD Regarding Window Manufacturer

    Boeing asks that we add the following statement to the 
``Alternative Methods of Compliance'' paragraph of the NPRM: ``These 
inspections are for the 1 flight deck windows regardless of 
window manufacturer.'' Boeing explains that there are two different 
suppliers for the flightdeck windows, but each flightdeck window is 
connected to the airplane side wiring in the same manner and requires 
the specified inspections.
    We disagree with the request to change this AD to add the 
statement. The AD requires inspection of the flightdeck windows 
according to the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable service 
bulletin. The service bulletins listed in this AD apply to all 
flightdeck windows, regardless of manufacturer. We have not changed the 
AD in this regard.

Request To Take Similar Action for Model 747 Series Airplanes

    The NTSB believes that we should take similar action for Model 747 
series airplanes because a similar condition exists on those airplanes.
    We agree with the NTSB and are considering rulemaking to address a 
similar unsafe condition on Model 747 series airplanes. We have not 
changed this AD in this regard.

[[Page 39809]]

Clarification of Service Bulletin Information

    The last column in the table in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of 
Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, 
dated March 31, 2010, specifies repeating the inspection for damage at 
``intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months.'' The intent 
of that column is to specify an interval ``not to exceed 6,000 flight 
hours or 24 months, whichever occurs later.'' We have included the 
correct interval in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD.
    In several places of the Compliance paragraph (1.E.) of Boeing 
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 
31, 2010; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, 
Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010; the ``Action'' column implies that 
both the left and right windows must be replaced. For example, ``* * * 
replace windshield in accordance with Work Package 1, step 3. and Work 
Package 2, step 3.'' The intent is to state, ``* * * Work Package 1, 
step 3. or Work Package 2, as applicable * * *.'' Operators are to use 
one or the other (or both) work instruction, as applicable, to replace 
the window(s) that need replacing. We have included this information in 
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD.
    The Action column for Inspection Condition 4 in the table in 
paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of Boeing Special Attention Service 
Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, states ``3. If 
terminal lug is still loose.'' That statement should be ``3. If 
terminal lug is still loose then disassemble, inspect and reassemble 
the electrical connection.''

Explanation of Additional Changes

    We have clarified paragraph (f) of this AD (paragraph (g) of the 
NPRM) to specify that Work Packages 1 and 2 apply to the J5 terminal. 
As stated previously, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special 
Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 
2010, and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, 
Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010, include an inspection of the J1 and 
J4 (upper) electrical connections; however, the inspection of these 
connections is not included in this AD.
    We have clarified paragraph (g) of this AD (paragraph (h) of the 
NPRM) to remove the phrase ``or tightening a loose screw'' from the 
description of corrective actions that requires additional inspection 
within 500 flight hours. The only corrective action after which the 
inspection is necessary is replacement.
    After the NPRM was issued, we reviewed the figures we have used 
over the past several years to calculate AD costs to operators. To 
account for various inflationary costs in the airline industry, we find 
it necessary to increase the labor rate used in these calculations from 
$80 per work hour to $85 per work hour. The cost impact information, 
below, reflects this increase in the specified hourly labor rate.
    We have removed the ``Service Bulletin Reference'' paragraph from 
this AD. That paragraph was identified as paragraph (f) in the NPRM. 
Instead, we have provided the full service bulletin citations 
throughout this AD.
    We also have revised this final rule to identify the legal name of 
the manufacturer as published in the most recent type certificate data 
sheet for the affected airplane models.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that 
these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or 
increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 1,212 airplanes of U.S. registry. 
The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to 
comply with this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work hour.

                                                                          Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Action                  Work hours           Parts                Cost per product                          Fleet cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection..........................            1  None..................  $85, per inspection cycle..  $103,020, per inspection cycle.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of 
compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 44701.

[[Page 39810]]

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2010-15-01 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-16367. Docket No. FAA-
2008-0274; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-038-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective August 17, 
2010.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to the airplanes identified in Table 1 of 
this AD, certificated in any category.

                                     Table 1--Airplanes Affected by This AD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      The Boeing Company Model-               As identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-200, -200CB, and -200PF series     757-30-0019, Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010.
 airplanes.
757-300 series airplanes.............  757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010.
767-200, -300, and -300F series        767-30-0039, dated December 5, 2007.
 airplanes.
767-400ER series airplanes...........  767-30-0041, dated December 5, 2007.
777-200 and -300 series airplanes....  777-30-0012, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from several reports of electrical arcs at 
the terminal blocks of the electrically heated flightdeck window 1. 
We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke and fire in the cockpit, 
which could lead to loss of visibility, and injuries to or 
incapacitation of the flightcrew.

Compliance

    (e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

Inspection and Corrective Actions

    (f) Within 500 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, 
do a detailed inspection for damage (including arcing, loose 
terminal, or heat damage) of the electrical terminal (J5 terminal) 
at the left and right flightdeck window 1, and do all applicable 
corrective actions, by accomplishing all the actions for the J5 
terminal specified in Work Packages 1 and 2 of the applicable 
service bulletin specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as provided 
by paragraph (h) of this AD. Except as provided by paragraph (h) of 
this AD, do all applicable corrective actions before further flight. 
Except as provided by paragraph (g) of this AD, repeat the detailed 
inspection at the applicable interval specified in paragraph (f)(1) 
or (f)(2) of this AD. Doing the replacement specified in paragraph 
(i) of this AD terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of 
this paragraph for the replaced flightdeck window 1.
    (1) For flightdeck windows manufactured by GKN with SCREW/LUG 
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at 
intervals not to exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever 
occurs later.
    (2) For flightdeck windows manufactured by PPG with SCREW/LUG 
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at 
intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever 
occurs later.
    (g) For airplanes on which replacement with a new window 1 that 
uses screws and lugs for the electrical connections is done in 
accordance with Work Package 1 or 2 of the applicable service 
bulletin specified in Table 1 of this AD: Do the next detailed 
inspection within 500 flight hours after the corrective action, and 
repeat the inspection thereafter at the applicable interval 
specified in paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD. Doing the 
replacement specified in paragraph (i) of this AD terminates the 
repetitive inspection requirements of this paragraph for the 
replaced flightdeck window 1.
    (1) For flightdeck windows manufactured by GKN with SCREW/LUG 
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at 
intervals not to exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 months, whichever 
occurs later.
    (2) For flightdeck windows manufactured by PPG with SCREW/LUG 
electrical connections, repeat the detailed inspection thereafter at 
intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever 
occurs later.

Exceptions

    (h) Do the applicable actions specified in paragraph (f) of this 
AD except as provided by paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD.
    (1) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (f) of this 
AD, the screw is cross threaded and the terminal lug is tight, do 
the applicable corrective action within 150 days or 500 flight hours 
after the inspection, whichever occurs first.
    (2) Where paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special Attention Service 
Bulletin 757-30-0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, and Boeing 
Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-30-0019, Revision 2, dated 
April 19, 2010, states in the ``Action'' column to (for example) `` 
* * * replace windshield in accordance with Work Package 1, step 3. 
and Work Package 2, step 3,'' the intent of the applicable service 
bulletin is to state, `` * * * Work Package 1, step 3. or Work 
Package 2, as applicable * * *.'' Operators are to use one or the 
other (or both) work instruction, as applicable, to replace the 
window(s) that need replacing.

Optional Terminating Action

    (i) Replacing a flightdeck window 1 that uses screws and lugs 
for the electrical connections with a flightdeck window that uses 
pins and sockets for the electrical connections in accordance with 
Work Packages 3 or 4 of the applicable service bulletin specified in 
Table 1 of this AD ends the repetitive inspection requirements of 
this AD for that window 1.

Credit for Actions Accomplished Previously

    (j) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in 
accordance with the applicable service bulletin specified in Table 2 
of this AD are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding 
requirements of this AD.

                  Table 2--Acceptable Service Bulletins
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Boeing Special Attention
      Service Bulletin--          Revision--             Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-30-0019..................  Original.......  July 19, 2006.
757-30-0019..................  1..............  December 19, 2007.
757-30-0020..................  Original.......  July 19, 2006.
757-30-0020..................  1..............  December 19, 2007.
777-30-0012..................  Original.......  April 15, 2004.
777-30-0012..................  1..............  June 2, 2006.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 39811]]

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (k)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to 
ATTN: Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment 
Branch, ANM-130S, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone (425) 917-6478; fax (425) 917-6590. Information may 
be e-mailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different 
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a 
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. 
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (l) You must use the applicable service information contained in 
Table 3 of this AD to do the actions required by this AD, unless the 
AD specifies otherwise. If you accomplish the optional actions 
specified by this AD, you must use the applicable service 
information specified in Table 3 of this AD to perform those 
actions, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 
206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail 
me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.

               Table 3--Material Incorporated by Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Boeing Special Attention
      Service Bulletin--          Revision--             Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-30-0019..................  2..............  April 19, 2010.
757[dash]30[dash]0020........  2..............  March 31, 2010.
767[dash]30-0039.............  Original.......  December 5, 2007.
767-30-0041..................  Original.......  December 5, 2007.
777-30-0012..................  2..............  December 19, 2007.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-17046 Filed 7-9-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P