Document ID: FAA-2012-1093-0015
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Brantly International, Inc. Helicopters
Posted Date: 2014-10-07T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 194 (Tuesday, October 7, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60339-60343]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-23592]

[[Page 60339]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-1093; Directorate Identifier 2011-SW-020-AD; 
Amendment 39-17989; AD 2014-20-16]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Brantly International, Inc. Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Brantly 
International, Inc. (Brantly) Model B-2, Model B-2A, and Model B-2B 
helicopters with certain main rotor blades. This AD requires inspecting 
each main rotor (M/R) blade for a crack or delamination and removing 
the blade if a crack exists or if the delamination exceeds certain 
thresholds. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of M/R blade 
cracks and an incident in which a crack that originated near the M/R 
blade trailing edge resulted in the loss of a large section of the M/R 
blade. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent loss of the M/R 
blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

DATES: This AD is effective November 12, 2014.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain documents listed in this AD as of November 12, 
2014.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Brantly International, Inc, 621 South Royal Lane, Suite 100, Coppell, 
Texas 75019, telephone (972) 829-4638, email 
tarcher@superiorairparts.com. You may review a copy of the referenced 
service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 
Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 
76137.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the Docket Operations Office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, any incorporated-by-reference 
service information, the economic evaluation, any comments received, 
and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations 
Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations Office, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-
140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marc Belhumeur, Senior Project 
Engineer, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 
2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5170; 
email 7-AVS-ASW-170@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    On October 16, 2012, at 77 FR 63285, the Federal Register published 
our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposed to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to Brantly Model B-2, 
Model B-2A, and Model B-2B helicopters, with an M/R blade, part number 
(P/N) 248-101, 248-202, or 248-404, installed. The proposed 
requirements were intended to prevent loss of the M/R blade and 
subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
    The NPRM was prompted by a 2007 incident in New Zealand in which a 
large inboard section of the M/R blade of a Brantly B-2B helicopter 
separated from the helicopter during flight. The pilot was able to land 
the helicopter without further damage. Laboratory analysis concluded 
that the M/R blade failure was caused by hydrocarbon contaminants 
inside the blade's skin-to-foam bond and that the fracture originated 
near the blade's trailing edge. There were three other reports of 
portions of M/R blades separating during flight and another five 
reports of M/R blades having cracks or other defects found during 
inspections.

Comments

    After our NPRM (77 FR 63285, October 16, 2012), was published, we 
received comments from 10 commenters.

Request

Allow Some Cracking, Delamination, and Imperfections

    Two commenters requested that the AD allow cracks in accordance 
with approved maintenance inspection procedures and criteria. Three 
commenters requested that the AD allow some delamination as provided 
for in Brantly's service information, which is up to 10 square inches 
of delamination outside of the inboard 12 inches of the M/R blade. Four 
commenters requested that some imperfections be allowed in the blades 
as listed in the approved factory maintenance inspection procedures. 
Some of these commenters stated that a small dent, nick, crease, 
wrinkle, or bend in the skin of the blade, especially in the middle or 
trailing edge, does not cause the blade to crack and is not necessarily 
a safety issue. These commenters expressed concern that many Brantly 
helicopters will be grounded because of slight imperfections in the 
main rotor blades that are not a safety issue.
    We disagree with allowing any crack in a blade, but we agree the AD 
should allow some delamination and imperfections. A crack in a blade 
renders it unairworthy, and no data supports that any crack in these 
blades is a safe condition. Also, no supporting data justifies allowing 
10 square inches of delamination to address the unsafe condition, and 
such a large area is not supported by any known industry standards. We 
are changing the AD, however, to allow up to 2 square inches of 
delamination outside of the inboard 12 inches. We are also removing the 
dent, nick, crease, wrinkle, bends, extra hole, and inadequate rivet 
spacing requirements from the AD. Although eliminating these conditions 
is good design practice, the data we have does not support that a crack 
in the Brantly rotor blade skins was caused by small dents, nicks, 
creases, wrinkles, bends, extra hole, or inadequate rivet spacing.

Remove Certain Blades From the Applicability

    Two commenters requested that we remove blade P/Ns 248-101 and 248-
202 from the applicability of the AD. These commenters did not believe 
the unsafe condition applies to these blades because they are 
significantly different in composition and bonding agent than the P/N 
248-404 blade. The commenters stated the -101 and -202 blades develop 
cracks from improper maintenance, rigging, and operation.
    We disagree. Failures and fractures have occurred in the field in 
the P/N 248-202 blades, and we have been provided with no supporting 
data that shows they occurred because of improper rigging, maintenance, 
or operation of the aircraft. Brantly, with help from a laboratory 
report written by a metallurgical engineering company, concluded that 
the M/R blade failure was caused by hydrocarbons contamination inside 
the blades' skin-to-foam bond and that the fractures originated near 
the trailing edge. The P/N 248-101 and P/N 248-404 blades are similar 
in construction to the P/N 248-202 blades, and thus are included and 
addressed in this AD. The AD does, however, address the blades 
separately by not requiring inspecting the P/N

[[Page 60340]]

248-404 blades until after 10 years or 1,000 hours time-in-service 
(TIS), instead of within 8 hours TIS like the other blades.

Eliminate or Change the Eddy Current Inspection Requirements

    Eight commenters requested that we eliminate the eddy current 
inspection from the AD. Five commenters requested replacing the eddy 
current inspection with other types (visual, tap test, fluorescent or 
dye penetrant) of inspection. Some commenters said eddy current testing 
was impractical because it could not be done successfully at certain 
locations. Many commenters believed an eddy current inspection would 
not successfully detect a crack or would provide false readings. One 
commenter stated that the eddy current inspection would destroy the 
blade.
    We disagree. An eddy current inspection is needed to detect a 
potential unsafe condition, and it is a reasonable, widely used, and 
cost-effective procedure. No alternate procedure has been provided that 
can address the unsafe condition as reliably. Visual or magnifying 
glass inspections are not as effective as eddy current inspections. The 
eddy current inspection procedure has been validated and is similar to 
other blade crack inspections. While there may be some false 
indication, these should be false positives, which can be re-evaluated. 
The procedure is a nondestructive inspection and if done correctly, 
will not destroy any blade. The procedure can be done in the field by a 
qualified inspector if the inspection area is clean, has proper 
lighting, and has the proper equipment. We have not been provided with 
any supporting data that justifies eliminating the eddy current 
inspection from the AD.
    We do agree with one commenter who requested a visual inspection 
before the first flight of each day being performed by the helicopter 
owner or operator, since this is best accomplished as part of the other 
daily inspections and does not require tools. We also agree with 
reducing the scope of the eddy current inspection area to just the 
first inboard 12 inches because this is where the fractures have 
occurred. Eddy current inspecting the outboard area would not be 
effective in finding the unsafe condition. The AD reflects these 
changes.

Replace the Inspection Requirements

    Two commenters suggested replacing the AD requirements with 
different requirements. One commenter requested a mandatory inspection 
to identify those main rotor blades not produced or repaired using an 
FAA approved quality system or materials or processes. The commenter 
believed such blades alone may contain the unsafe condition due to 
unapproved blade spars and hinge blocks. Another commenter proposed a 
check of all used blades because the unsafe condition is caused by 
incorrect installation of the blade damper units.
    We disagree. The lab report concluded that the M/R blade failure 
was caused by hydrocarbons contamination inside the blades' skin-to-
foam bond and that the fracture originated near the trailing edge. No 
data supports a conclusion that the spar or hinge block were unapproved 
or that the rivet hole edge distance or pattern caused the unsafe 
condition. Also, no data shows that the damper caused the unsafe 
condition and thus an initial check for improper damper installation is 
not merited. There is history that the incident helicopter may have had 
quick starts and that the dampers had to be replaced, but the quick 
starts and damper issues have not been substantiated to be the root 
cause.

Allow Routine Maintenance To Correct The Unsafe Condition

    Five commenters stated that routine maintenance inspections are 
sufficient to detect a crack in the blades. One commenter requested 
that a revision to the Brantly Service Bulletin would correct the blade 
problem and provided suggested content.
    We disagree. The failures that have occurred in the field show that 
the blades have an unsafe condition and that the current routine 
maintenance and inspection procedures do not have adequate methods to 
address it. The procedures in the commenter's suggested revision of the 
service bulletin are also inadequate to address the unsafe condition 
because those procedures do not include a necessary eddy current 
inspection and allow too much duration between magnifying glass 
inspections. Additionally, the FAA does not have the authority to 
require Brantly to revise its service information with a specific 
maintenance procedure. Rather, we correct an unsafe condition by 
mandating certain actions through an AD.

Withdraw the NPRM Because There Is No Unsafe Condition

    One commenter requested we withdraw the AD for more analysis and 
testing of the blades. The commenter questioned the data and analyses 
relied upon to conclude an unsafe condition exists on these blades and 
suggested the FAA has insufficient information upon which to make its 
determination. The commenter stated the FAA should determine the 
precise root cause and the exact serial number series of affected 
blades before issuing an AD. Another commenter requested that we 
perform ``a verification and validation on actual Brantly helicopter 
blades'' before issuing the AD. Four commenters stated that no blade 
failures have caused an accident or loss of life and that the blade 
problem that prompted this AD resulted from the aircraft owner's 
improper maintenance.
    We disagree. Improper maintenance and operation has not been shown 
to be the root cause of the blade failures. The root cause of the 
failures has been demonstrated by Brantly with help from a laboratory 
report written by a metallurgical engineering company. The report took 
into account stresses and loading and determined that skin fracture was 
propagated by corrosion fatigue and mechanical fatigue. The report 
concluded that the M/R blades failure was caused by hydrocarbons 
contamination inside the blades' skin-to-foam bond and that the 
fracture originated near the trailing edge.
    Additional information about the data and analyses we relied upon 
in issuing this AD includes the following. The original blades were 
certificated using a crack initiation methodology (e.g., using the S-N 
curves and Miner's Rule). Shortly after certification, a fatigue test 
was accomplished on the mid-span of the spar and skin. 
Stereomicroscopy, wavelength dispersive X-ray spectroscopy, combustion 
testing, tensile testing, peel testing, scanning electron microscopy, 
micro Fourier infrared spectroscopy, and hardness testing were all 
performed to determine the causes of the delamination and crack 
propagation. An M/R blade failure analysis, risk analysis, cost 
analysis, and economic analysis were performed before we issued the 
NPRM. The failures were found in the skin-to-foam bond and in the skin 
and rivets at the rivet joints attaching the skin to the hinge block 
and/or spar. The cracks originated near the skins' trailing edge and 
propagated between rivet holes and into the leading edge rivet holes. 
These rivets carry shear between the hinge block and skin and the spar 
and skin. Per the laboratory report, the bonding material between the 
skin to foam was 3M 1239 & 3M 11239A, the foam core was Stafoam AA604, 
the type of rivets were AA1100, and the blade was P/N 248-202. No 
serial number sequence has been determined or is needed since only the 
part numbers are necessary to identify the applicable blades.
    We also disagree that loss of life or significant damage to an 
aircraft must

[[Page 60341]]

occur for us to determine that there is an unsafe condition. Because it 
is a critical component, failure of an M/R blade could have 
catastrophic consequences. However, the commenters are correct that the 
event in New Zealand was classified as an incident instead of an 
accident because the helicopter landed without further damage. We have 
revised the preamble of this AD to reflect this change.

Blade Repairs

    One commenter requested the FAA license a certified repair center 
to rebuild the blades if they crack before the spar and hinge-block 
have reached their life limit. Another commenter asked us to approve a 
blade re-skinning or repair process instead of the blade replacement 
requirement in the AD. Three commenters stated that no replacement 
blades exist, and therefore if the AD is adopted as proposed, it will 
ground all flying Brantly helicopters until a source for new blades is 
found or a facility is certified to re-build the blades.
    We disagree. We are unaware of any approved process specification 
or data to rebuild or re-skin blades to an airworthy condition. 
Assuming such a process does exist, requiring a repair center to 
rebuild or re-skin the blades is beyond the authority of the FAA. To 
the extent spare blades may not exist to replace blades that fail the 
inspection requirements of this AD, the FAA cannot base its AD action 
on whether spare parts are available or can be produced. While every 
effort is made to avoid grounding aircraft, we must address the unsafe 
condition.

Issue an SAIB

    One commenter requested that we issue a special airworthiness 
information bulletin (SAIB) with certain visual inspection and 
maintenance procedures and provided proposed contents.
    We disagree. An SAIB contains non-mandatory information and 
guidance for certain safety issues. The SAIB is an information tool to 
alert, educate, and make recommendations to the aviation community 
about ways to improve the safety of a product. An SAIB may not be 
issued where there is an unsafe condition. The FAA has data supporting 
its determination that an unsafe condition exists with the specified 
Brantly main rotor blades.
    We also disagree with the proposed SAIB contents. No supporting 
data has been provided demonstrating how the proposed inspection and 
maintenance practices would stop the blade skins from cracking or 
delaminating from the foam core because of random overload events and 
improper operation. Also, no supporting data has been provided that 
shows that an improperly manufactured or installed hinge block caused 
the unsafe condition. The proposed SAIB content also eliminates the 
necessary eddy current inspection and reduces the 10x magnifying glass 
inspection, which we have determined are necessary to correct the 
unsafe condition.

Training Programs

    One commenter requested education and training for maintenance 
providers, operators, and owners with respect to the blades. 
Specifically, the commenter wanted the training to include the 
significance of the placards, type certificate data sheet (TCDS) 
instructions, and operating limitations. The commenter stated that 
Brantly helicopters are safe and attributed the blade failures to lack 
of education and proper maintenance and operation of the aircraft and 
its components.
    We disagree. Individuals responsible for maintaining and operating 
an airworthy helicopter are required to know the significance of 
placards, TCDS instructions, and operating limitations. While 
additional training may be beneficial, we have no information to 
suggest that it would correct the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination

    We have reviewed the relevant information, considered the comments 
received, and determined that an unsafe condition exists and is likely 
to exist or develop on other products of these same type designs and 
that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD 
requirements as proposed with the changes described previously. We have 
also made minor editorial changes in referencing the service 
information to meet current publishing requirements. These changes are 
consistent with the intent of the proposals in the NPRM (77 FR 63285, 
October 16, 2012) and will not increase the economic burden on any 
operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Related Service Information

    We reviewed Brantly International Inc. Service Bulletin No. 111, 
dated February 10, 2011 (SB 111). The bulletin describes procedures for 
inspecting the M/R blades at intervals not to exceed 300 hours TIS 
using Eddy Current Procedure ET002, performing a visual inspection 
using a 10X power magnifying glass, and conducting a tap test every 25 
hours TIS and a visual inspection of the M/R blades before the first 
flight of the day.

Differences Between This AD and the Service Information

    SB-111 requires accomplishment of sections 1 and 2 before further 
flight. The AD requires them to be completed within 8 hours TIS. SB-111 
allows up to 10 square inches of delamination outside of the inboard 12 
inches of the M/R blade. The AD only allows up to 2 square inches of 
delamination outside of the inboard 12 inches of the M/R blade. SB-111 
requires inspecting for nicks, creases, wrinkles, bends, additional 
holes, extra rivets, and inadequate rivet spacing and replacing the 
blade if any of these conditions are found. The AD only requires 
inspecting for a crack and delamination and replacing the blade if 
there is a crack or if there is delamination in certain areas or 
exceeding a certain amount. SB-111 calls for eddy current inspections 
of the entire blade. The AD requires eddy current inspections for 
cracks only within the inboard 12 inches. Lastly, SB-111 specifies a 
daily inspection of the M/R blade. We are making a change from the NPRM 
to allow an owner/operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot 
certificate to perform a daily check of the M/R blade. The performance 
of the check is required to be entered into the aircraft's maintenance 
records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with applicable 
regulations. This authorization marks an exception to our standard 
maintenance regulations.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 76 helicopters of U.S. registry. 
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD, using an 
average of $85 per work-hour:
     For the visual check before the first flight of each day, 
we estimate that it requires about one half work-hour for a labor cost 
of about $43 per inspection cycle. No parts are needed, so the total 
cost for the U.S. fleet is $3,268.
     For the eddy current inspection, we estimate that it 
requires about three work-hours for a labor cost of $255 per inspection 
cycle. No parts are needed, so the total cost for the 76-helicopter 
U.S. fleet is $19,380 per inspection cycle.
     For the visual inspection with the magnifying glass and 
the tap inspection, we estimate that it requires about three work-hours 
for a labor cost of $255 per inspection cycle. No parts are needed, so 
the total cost for the U.S. fleet is $19,380 per inspection cycle.
     Replacing an M/R blade, if needed, requires about two 
work-hours for a labor cost of $170. An M/R blade costs

[[Page 60342]]

$7,500 for a total cost of $7,670 per helicopter, assuming one M/R 
blade is replaced.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that This AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent 
that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply 
with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2014-20-16 Brantly International, Inc.: Amendment 39-17989; Docket 
No. FAA-2012-1093; Directorate Identifier 2011-SW-020-AD.

(a) Applicability

    This AD applies to the Brantly International, Inc., (Brantly) 
Model B-2, Model B-2A, and Model B-2B helicopters, with a main rotor 
(M/R) blade, part number (P/N) 248-101, 248-202, or 248-404, 
installed, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

    This AD defines the unsafe condition as a crack or delamination 
in an M/R blade. This condition could result in loss of an M/R blade 
and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Effective Date

    This AD becomes effective November 12, 2014.

(d) Compliance

    You are responsible for performing each action required by this 
AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been 
accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

    (1) Before the first flight of each day, visually check the top 
and bottom of each M/R blade for a crack. Pay particular attention 
to the M/R blade root area, the area around the lead/lag damper 
mounting fork, and the trailing edge. These actions may be performed 
by the owner/operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot 
certificate, and must be entered into the aircraft records showing 
compliance with this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9 (a)(1) 
through (4) and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v). The record must be 
maintained as required by 14 CFR 91.417, 121.380, or 135.439.
    (2) Within 8 hours time-in-service (TIS), for a helicopter with 
an M/R blade, P/N 248-101 or P/N 248-202, and for a helicopter with 
an M/R blade P/N 248-404 with 10 or more years or 1,000 or more 
hours TIS, whichever occurs first, remove each M/R blade and:
    (i) Using an inspector qualified to the American Society for 
Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Level II or equivalent, eddy current 
inspect each M/R blade for a crack in accordance with paragraph 4 
and paragraphs 7 through 17 of Brantly International B-2 Main Rotor 
Blade Root Skin Inspection Technique Number ET002, dated November 
2007 (technique), except this AD only requires you to inspect the 
inboard first 12 inches of the top and bottom of each blade.

    Note 1 to paragraph (e)(2)(i) of this AD:  A copy of the 
Technique is attached to Brantly International, Inc., Service 
Bulletin No. 111, dated February 10, 2011 (SB 111).

    (ii) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 300 hours TIS or 
five calendar years, whichever occurs first, repeat the eddy current 
inspection in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 
(e)(2)(i) of this AD.
    (iii) Using a metallic coin or tap hammer, tap inspect each M/R 
blade for delamination in the bonded areas as shown on SB-111, 
Section 4. Pay particular attention to the root area in the first 12 
inches of the top and bottom of each M/R blade.
    (iv) Using a 10X or higher power magnifying glass, visually 
inspect the top and bottom of each M/R blade for a crack.
    (v) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 25 hours TIS, repeat 
the tap inspection in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 
(e)(2)(iii) of this AD and the visual inspection using a 10X or 
higher power magnifying glass in accordance with the requirements of 
paragraph (e)(2)(iv) of this AD.
    (3) Before further flight, remove from service any M/R blade 
with a crack, delamination within the inboard 12 inches, or total 
delamination greater than 2 square inches outside the inboard 12 
inches.

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA, may 
approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Marc Belhumeur, 
Senior Project Engineer, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Rotorcraft 
Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; 
telephone (817) 222-5170; email 7-AVS-ASW-170@faa.gov.
    (2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating 
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you 
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, 
the manager of the local flight standards district office or 
certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft 
complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(g) Subject

    Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6210, Main Rotor 
Blade.

(h) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed 
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do 
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Brantly International B-2 Main Rotor Blade Root Skin 
Inspection, Technique Number ET002, dated November 1, 2007.
    (ii) Brantly International Inc., Service Bulletin No. 111, dated 
February 10, 2011.
    (3) For Brantly service information identified in this AD, 
contact Brantly International, Inc., 621 South Royal Lane, Suite 
100, Coppell Texas, 75019, telephone (972) 829-4638, email 
tarcher@superiorairparts.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at FAA, Office of the 
Regional Counsel,

[[Page 60343]]

Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 
76137. For information on the availability of this material at the 
FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated 
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at 
NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 19, 2014.
Lance T. Gant,
Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2014-23592 Filed 10-6-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P