Document ID: FAA-2008-0682-0001
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 Series Airplanes
Posted Date: 2008-06-17T04:00Z

[Federal Register: June 17, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 117)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 34233-34237]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr17jn08-14]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001-NM-237-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

 
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 Series 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking; reopening of 
comment period.

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SUMMARY: This document revises an earlier proposed airworthiness 
directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 
series airplanes. That proposed rule would have required replacing 
certain door-mounted escape slides and slide-raft assemblies with new 
slide-raft assemblies; replacing certain escape system latches with new 
latches; and modifying or replacing certain counterbalance assemblies 
with new counterbalance assemblies; as applicable. This new action 
revises the proposed rule by extending the compliance time, adding 
requirements to install a longer firing cable and test the valve of the 
inflation trigger system of the slide-raft, and, for certain airplanes, 
adding procedures to adjust the door counter balance systems. The 
actions specified by this new proposed AD are intended to prevent the 
escape slides and slide-rafts of the forward and mid-cabin entry and 
service doors from being too steep for evacuation in the event that the 
airplane rotates onto the aft fuselage into the extreme tip-back 
condition. In the extreme tip-back condition, the forward and mid-cabin 
exits could result in steeper sliding angles, which could cause injury 
to passengers and crewmembers during an emergency evacuation. This 
action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.

DATES: Comments must be received by July 14, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, 
Attention: Rules Docket No. 2001-NM-237-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 
Renton, Washington 98057-3356. Comments may be inspected at this 
location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays. Comments may be submitted via fax to (425) 227-1232. 
Comments may also be sent via the Internet using the following address: 
9-anm-nprmcomment@faa.gov. Comments sent via fax or the Internet must 
contain ``Docket No. 2001-NM-237-AD'' in the subject line and need not 
be submitted in triplicate. Comments sent via the Internet as attached 
electronic files must be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 or 2000 or 
ASCII text.
    The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be 
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box

[[Page 34234]]

3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined 
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 
Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Keith Ladderud, Aerospace Engineer, 
Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, Seattle 
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6435; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the 
proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as 
they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number 
and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All 
communications received on or before the closing date for comments, 
specified above, will be considered before taking action on the 
proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in 
light of the comments received.
    Submit comments using the following format:
     Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a 
request to change the compliance time and a request to change the 
service bulletin reference as two separate issues.
     For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed 
AD is being requested.
     Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each 
request.
    Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All 
comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing 
date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested 
persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with 
the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, 
stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments 
to Docket Number 2001-NM-237-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped 
and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

    Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules 
Docket No. 2001-NM-237-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 
98057-3356.

Discussion

    A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR part 39) to add an airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to 
certain Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 series airplanes, was published 
as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register on 
November 25, 2003 (68 FR 66026). That NPRM would have required 
replacing certain door-mounted escape slides and slide-raft assemblies 
with new slide-raft assemblies; replacing certain escape system latches 
with new latches; and modifying or replacing certain counterbalance 
assemblies with new counterbalance assemblies; as applicable. That NPRM 
was prompted by reports indicating that the original analysis of the 
highest sill heights for the forward and mid-cabin entry and service 
doors is no longer valid on certain Boeing Model 737-200 and -300 
series airplanes. That condition, if not corrected, could result in 
injury to passengers and crewmembers during an emergency evacuation.

Actions Since Issuance of Previous Proposal

    Since the issuance of that NPRM, we have received three reports of 
uncommanded deployments of the door-mounted escape slide inside the 
passenger cabin. The uncommanded inflation caused damage to a lavatory, 
ceiling panels, and doors. It has been determined that variability in 
packing the slide can result in excessive tension on the firing cable. 
Therefore, certain affected airplanes must have a longer firing cable 
installed, and the inflation trigger system must be tested. To 
accommodate this change, Boeing has issued the following service 
bulletins:
     Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-25A0266, Revision 2, 
dated September 27, 2007. We referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
767-25-0266, dated September 14, 2000, as the appropriate source of 
service information for accomplishing the required actions in the 
original NPRM. In addition to the existing actions, Revision 2 of the 
service bulletin specifies procedures to adjust the door counterbalance 
systems for Group 1 and 2 airplanes (procedures were added in Boeing 
Alert Service Bulletin 767-25A0266, Revision 1, dated December 4, 
2006). Revision 2 of the service bulletin also specifies that more work 
is necessary on airplanes changed in accordance with the procedures 
specified in the original release of the service bulletin. Revision 2 
also includes a reference to the procedures in Boeing Alert Service 
Bulletin 767-25A0395, Revision 1, adds instructions for adjusting the 
door counterbalance system for certain airplanes, and corrects certain 
part numbers (P/Ns), among other changes.
     Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-25A0395, Revision 1, 
dated January 25, 2007. This service bulletin describes procedures for 
determining if a slide-raft with supplier P/N 5A3294-1, 5A3294-2, 
5A3295-1, or 5A3295-3 (Boeing P/N S416T214-3, S416T214-4, S416T214-2, 
and S416T214-1, respectively), is installed. If those P/Ns are not 
installed, the service bulletin specifies that no further action is 
necessary. If any of those P/Ns are installed, the service bulletin 
provides procedures for lengthening the firing cable and testing the 
valve of the inflation trigger system of the escape slide-raft.
    Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-25A0395, Revision 1, refers to 
Goodrich Service Bulletin 5A3294/5A3295-25-362, dated July 25, 2006, as 
an additional source of service information for lengthening the firing 
cable and testing the valve of the inflation trigger system of the 
escape slide-raft.

Comments

    Due consideration has been given to the comments received in 
response to the original NPRM:

Support for the Original NPRM

    Airline Pilots Association, International (ALPA) concurs with the 
corrective actions in the original NPRM.

Support for Replacement Parts

    Goodrich Aircraft Interior Products states that it is prepared to 
support the need for replacement parts within the compliance time 
specified in the original NPRM.

Request To Clarify the Unsafe Condition

    Boeing requests a change to the wording of the unsafe condition in 
the Summary and Discussion sections of the NPRM. Boeing states that the 
existing slide-rafts are not ``too short to reach the ground'' as 
stated in the NPRM, but that the extreme tip-back condition results in 
a steeper sliding angle than the original design intent. Boeing 
requests that we instead specify, among other suggested wording, that 
``In the extreme tip-back condition, the forward and mid-cabin exits on 
one side of the airplane could result in steeper sliding angles. * * 
*''
    We partially agree with the requested changes. We disagree with 
using the words ``one side of the airplane''

[[Page 34235]]

because they imply that passengers and crewmembers could safely 
evacuate from the side of the airplane with the lower sliding angles. 
Damage associated with a landing gear failure on the lower side of the 
airplane could cause passengers and crewmembers to perceive that only 
the side of the airplane with the sliding angle that is ``too steep for 
evacuation'' would be available for emergency evacuation. In addition, 
this type of failure could render the exits on the lower, damaged side 
to be unusable and/or unsafe. We agree with the other requested changes 
because they clarify the unsafe condition. We have revised the Summary 
section accordingly. However, we have not revised the Discussion 
section since that section of the preamble does not reappear in the 
same form in the supplemental NPRM. Instead, the Discussion section in 
the supplemental NPRM restates the wording of the original NPRM for 
reference.

Requests To Revise Cost Impact Section

    Goodrich Aircraft Interior Products, All Nippon Airways (ANA), 
Boeing, and Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of its member 
American Airlines, all request that we revise the Cost Impact section 
of the NPRM. All commenters state that the costs shown in the NPRM are 
incomplete and should be revised.
    We agree with the commenters. The Cost Impact section of the NPRM 
did not include the cost of the slide-rafts. We have revised the Cost 
Impact section of the supplemental NPRM to include those costs.

Requests To Extend Compliance Time

    Boeing, ANA, and Air New Zealand request that we extend the 
compliance time. The commenters suggest extending the compliance time 
from the proposed 5 years to between 8 and 15 years. The commenters 
make their requests to extend the compliance time for numerous reasons, 
including:
     The proposed rule has a high economic impact on the 
operators, with small benefit to safety. Data are missing from the Cost 
Impact section of the proposed rule.
     The established replacement program (useful service life) 
of the life-limited slides and slide rafts is 15 years.
     There have been no reports of airplanes tipping back 
beyond the certified sill height.
     The exit slides and slide-rafts on the opposite side of 
the airplane would remain within the certified sill heights and 
corresponding sliding angles due to the roll of the airplane associated 
with the extreme tip-back condition. The existing slides are not too 
short to reach the ground (as stated in the proposed rule).
     The slide and slide-raft manufacturer will likely have 
trouble producing the number of slides and slide-raft units necessary 
to modify every affected airplane in the worldwide fleet.
     We need to take into consideration low-cycle, high-hour 
operations.
    We partially agree with the commenters' statements. Given the 
combination of an updated Cost Impact estimate for this supplemental 
NPRM (see ``Request To Revise Cost Impact Section'' above), and the 
risk of exposure to the situation addressed in this supplemental NPRM, 
we acknowledge that there is merit in revising the compliance time. It 
is our intent to allow operators to offset, partially, the costs 
associated with the supplemental NPRM by integrating the compliance 
time somewhat with the costs associated with normal slide replacement. 
Therefore, we have changed paragraph (a) of this supplemental NPRM to 
propose a compliance time of within 72 months after the effective date 
of the AD.
    We have also considered the other reasons commenters gave for 
extending the compliance time, as discussed below.
     We have determined that an interval based on the ``useful 
service life'' of the slides, which is 15 years, would not address the 
unsafe condition in a timely manner.
     We do not agree that having no reported incidents of 
airplanes tipping back beyond the certified sill heights is sufficient 
justification for extending the proposed compliance time. While the 
specific condition addressed in this supplemental NPRM has not been 
encountered in service, we have received reports of similar, but less 
severe, accidents and incidents that could have been more severe given 
slightly different conditions.
     We do not agree that the exit slides and slide-rafts on 
the opposite side of the airplane would remain within the certified 
sill heights and provide a means of safe exit. The gear failure may be 
associated with or may have caused other damage that would not only 
raise the exit heights on the far side of the airplane, but also could 
render the exits on the near side of the airplane unsafe and/or 
unusable.
     The slide manufacturer has indicated that it is prepared 
to support operators with sufficient supplies of replacement slides and 
slide-rafts for the worldwide fleet within the compliance time 
specified in this supplemental NPRM.
    Therefore, although we have extended the compliance time for other 
reasons, we do not agree that these comments give adequate 
justification for extending the compliance time any further.

Requests To Withdraw Proposed Rule

    ANA, and ATA on behalf of its member American Airlines, suggest 
that we withdraw the proposed rule because it represents a significant 
cost and addresses a scenario that is a remote possibility and, 
therefore, should not be considered an unsafe condition.
    American Airlines explains that, with one main landing gear out, 
the engine would remain attached at ``very low speeds'' that are 
associated with taxiing, and would not shear off due to the weight of 
the airplane, as explained in the ``Discussion'' section of the 
proposed rule. American Airlines also explains that the extreme tip-
back condition would occur only at extreme aft center-of-gravity (CG) 
conditions and that there is a low probability of this scenario 
resulting in a ``time limited'' (90-second) evacuation. American 
Airlines further states that there is a low probability of encountering 
the extreme tip-back position, based on no such occurrences having been 
encountered over the course of the fleet's high number of flight 
cycles.
    We do not agree with the commenters' requests to withdraw the 
original NPRM. We consider this to be an unsafe condition for the 
reasons already given in the original NPRM and for the following 
reasons.
    While we have received information from the airplane manufacturer 
that indicates that engines could not necessarily shear off the 
airplane at speeds experienced during taxi, takeoff, landing, or even 
under some emergency landing situations, further information from the 
manufacturer indicates that the CG associated with this condition is 
well within the current accepted operating parameters and is not an 
extreme condition. However, operators may consider CG restrictions and 
may make proposals for alternative methods of compliance (AMOC) 
consideration under the provisions of paragraph (d) of the supplemental 
NPRM. We will consider requests for approval of an AMOC if sufficient 
data are submitted to substantiate that the proposal would provide an 
acceptable level of safety.
    In addition, although the specific conditions addressed in the 
proposed rule have not been encountered in service, we have received 
reports of partial tip-back during accidents/incidents that could have 
resulted in

[[Page 34236]]

extreme tip-back given slightly different conditions, making this type 
of event foreseeable. During at least one of these partial tip-back 
events, the slides were deployed to facilitate evacuation. We do not 
agree that the low probability of encountering such a foreseeable event 
is justification to withdraw the original NPRM.

Request To Limit the Applicability of the Original NPRM

    UPS and ABX Air request that we revise the applicability of the 
original NPRM. UPS requests that we remove certain Model 767-300F 
series airplanes from the applicability of the proposed rule because 
they have a different egress system. ABX Air requests that the 
applicability of the proposed rule be limited to those airplanes that 
are required to be equipped with the affected escape slides. For 
example, the Model 767-300F (freighter) and Model 767-200 or 767-300 
series airplanes that have been modified from a passenger configuration 
to a cargo configuration are not subject to the unsafe condition 
addressed by the proposed rule.
    We agree that airplanes that are not required to be equipped with 
slides and slide-rafts are not subject to this unsafe condition. The 
applicability statement of the original NPRM currently includes only 
Model 767-200 and 767-300 series airplanes and does not include Model 
767-300F series airplanes; therefore, no change to the supplemental 
NPRM is necessary to exclude these airplanes from the applicability. 
However, we have revised the applicability statement of the 
supplemental NPRM to state that only Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 
series airplanes that are equipped with door-mounted escape slide 
systems are affected.

Request To Remove Paragraph (b) of the Original NPRM

    ABX Air recommends that we remove paragraph (b) of the original 
NPRM because the second sentence in the proposed rule, ``Compliance: 
Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously,'' already gives 
operators credit for accomplishing the actions before the effective 
date of the AD.
    We agree with the request to remove paragraph (b) of the original 
NPRM. Paragraph (b) was intended to give operators credit for 
accomplishing actions in accordance with an earlier version of the 
referenced service bulletin. However, in this case, there is no earlier 
version of the service bulletin, and paragraph (b) was included 
inadvertently in the original NPRM. We have revised the supplemental 
NPRM accordingly.

Removal of Table 1 of the Original NPRM

    We have removed Table 1 of the original NPRM. That table contains 
information about specific replacement procedures in Boeing Alert 
Service Bulletin 767-25-0266 that are necessary for each airplane 
group. We find that information is readily available in any revision of 
the service bulletin and therefore not necessary to include in the 
supplemental NPRM.

Conclusion

    Certain changes described above expand the scope of the original 
NPRM. As a result, we have determined that it is necessary to reopen 
the comment period to provide additional opportunity for the public to 
comment on this supplemental NPRM.

Cost Impact

    There are approximately 745 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 261 airplanes of U.S. registry 
would be affected by this supplemental NPRM. The work hours and 
required parts per airplane vary according to the configuration group 
to which the affected airplane belongs. The average labor rate is $80 
per work hour. The ``Cost Impact Per Airplane Configuration Group'' 
table shows the estimated costs.

                                                      Cost Impact per Airplane Configuration Group
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                                                               U.S.-                                                                      Fleet cost, by
              Airplane configuration group                  registered      Work hours       Kit cost       Slide cost       Cost per      configuration
                                                             airplanes                                                       airplane          group
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.......................................................             208               6          $1,236        $174,400        $176,116     $36,632,128
2.......................................................              12              12           2,472         354,264         357,696       4,292,352
3.......................................................              41              11          98,858         174,400         274,138      11,239,658
4.......................................................               0              11          34,012         174,400         209,292               0
5.......................................................               0              17          35,248         354,264         390,872               0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the figures in the ``Cost Impact Per Airplane 
Configuration Group'' table, the cost impact of this supplemental NPRM 
on U.S. operators is estimated to be $52,164,138.
    The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions 
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements 
of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions 
in the future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures 
discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to 
perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures 
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to 
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other 
administrative actions.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Impact

    The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it 
is determined that this proposal

[[Page 34237]]

would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed 
regulation (1) is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under 
Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 
and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, 
positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under 
the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft 
regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the 
Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules 
Docket at the location provided under the caption ``ADDRESSES.''

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 
part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as 
follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 2001-NM-237-AD.

    Applicability: Model 767-200 and -300 series airplanes, line 
numbers 1 through 793 inclusive, certificated in any category; 
equipped with door-mounted escape slide systems.
    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent the escape slides and slide-rafts of the forward and 
mid-cabin entry and service doors from being too steep for 
evacuation in the event that the airplane rotates onto the aft 
fuselage into the extreme tip-back condition, accomplish the 
following:

Replacement of Slide-Rafts

    (a) Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, 
replace the applicable slide-rafts at the applicable door or doors, 
and do all other applicable actions including, but not limited to, 
changing the latches, and replacing or modifying the counterbalance 
assemblies, by accomplishing all applicable actions specified in the 
Accomplishment Instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-25A0266, 
Revision 2, dated September 27, 2007.

Modification of the Firing Cable

    (b) Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, do a 
general visual inspection of the slide-raft(s) to determine if 
supplier part number (P/N) 5A3294-1, 5A3294-2, 5A3295-1, or 5A3295-3 
is installed (Boeing P/N S416T214-3, S416T214-4, S416T214-2, and 
S416T214-1, respectively). Do the inspection in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
25A0395, Revision 1, dated January 25, 2007. A review of airplane 
maintenance records is acceptable in lieu of this inspection if the 
P/N of the slide-raft can be conclusively determined from that 
review.
    (1) If no affected P/N is installed, no further action is 
required by this paragraph.
    (2) If any affected P/N is installed, before further flight, 
lengthen the firing cable and test the valve of the inflation 
trigger system of the escape slide-raft in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
25A0395, Revision 1, dated January 25, 2007.

    Note 1: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-25A0395, Revision 1, 
refers to Goodrich Service Bulletin 5A3294/5A3295-25-362, dated July 
25, 2006, as an additional source of service information for 
lengthening the firing cable and testing the valve of the inflation 
trigger system of the escape slide-raft.

Credit for Actions Accomplished Previously

    (c) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in 
accordance with the service bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD 
are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding requirements of 
this AD.

                                Table 1.--Previous Revisions of Service Bulletins
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Boeing Alert Service Bulletin               Revision level                           Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
767-25A0266..............................  1...........................  December 4, 2006.
767-25A0395..............................  Original....................  August 31, 2006.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (d)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different 
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 
FSDO.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 5, 2008.
Michael J. Kaszycki,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
 [FR Doc. E8-13579 Filed 6-16-08; 8:45 am]

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