Document ID: SEC-2020-1763-0001
Agency: sec
Document Type: Rule
Title: Whistleblower Program Rules
Posted Date: 2020-11-05T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 215 (Thursday, November 5, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 70898-70948]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-21444]

[[Page 70897]]

Vol. 85

Thursday,

No. 215

November 5, 2020

Part III

Securities and Exchange Commission

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17 CFR Parts 240 and 249

Whistleblower Program Rules; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 215 / Thursday, November 5, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 70898]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 240 and 249

[Release No. 34-89963; File No. S7-16-18]
RIN 3235-AM11

Whistleblower Program Rules

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') is 
adopting several amendments to the Commission's rules implementing its 
congressionally mandated whistleblower program. Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') provides, among 
other things, that the Commission shall pay--under regulations 
prescribed by the Commission and subject to certain limitations--to 
eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the Commission with 
original information about a violation of the federal securities laws 
that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or 
administrative action, or a related action, an aggregate amount, 
determined in the Commission's discretion, that is equal to not less 
than 10 percent, and not more than 30 percent, of monetary sanctions 
that have been collected in the covered or related actions. The 
Commission is adopting various amendments that are intended to provide 
greater transparency, efficiency and clarity to whistleblowers, to 
ensure whistleblowers are properly incentivized, and to continue to 
properly award whistleblowers to the maximum extent appropriate and 
with maximum efficiency. The Commission is also making several 
technical amendments, and adopting interpretive guidance concerning the 
term ``independent analysis.''

DATES: The final rules are effective December 7, 2020. For application 
dates for each amendment, see the table in Section III.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Emily Pasquinelli, Office of the 
Whistleblower, Division of Enforcement, at (202) 551-5973; Nicole 
Kelly, Office of the General Counsel, at (202) 551-4408, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is amending the following 
rules and adopting a new rule.

                               Amendments
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                                                           CFR citation
                  Commission reference                       (17 CFR)
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Rule 21F-2..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       2
Rule 21F-3..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       3
Rule 21F-4..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       4
Rule 21F-6..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       6
Rule 21F-7..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       7
Rule 21F-8..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       8
Rule 21F-9..............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                       9
Rule 21F-10.............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                      10
Rule 21F-11.............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                      11
Rule 21F-12.............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                      12
Rule 21F-13.............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                      13
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                        New Rule
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Rule 21F-18.............................................  Sec.   240.21F-
                                                                      18
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I. Background and Summary
    A. The Whistleblower Award Program
    B. Procedural Background and Summary of the Amendments Being 
Adopted
II. Description of Final Rule Amendments
    A. Rule 21F-4(d)--Definition of ``action''
    B. Rule 21F-4(e)--Definition of ``monetary sanctions''
    C. Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 21F-3(b) Defining ``related 
action''
    D. Rule 21F-6(c)--Establishment of a Presumption of the Maximum 
Statutory Amount for Certain Awards
    E. Rule 21F-6--Consideration of Dollar or Percentage Amounts in 
Applying the Award Factors
    G. Amendment to Exchange Act Rule 21F-2--Whistleblower Status, 
Award Eligibility, and Confidentiality and Retaliation Protection
    H. Rule 21F-8(d)--Forms Used for Whistleblower Program
    I. Rule 21F-8(e)--Claimants Who Submit False Information or 
Abuse Award Application Process
    J. Rule 21F-9--Procedures for Submitting Original Information
    K. Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 21F-12--Materials That May 
Form the Basis of the Commission's Award Determination
    L. Amendment to Exchange Act Rule 21F-13--The Administrative 
Record on Appeal
    M. Adoption of Exchange Act Rule 21F-18--Summary Disposition 
Process
    N. Technical Amendment to Rule 21F-4(c)(2)
    O. Interpretive Guidance Regarding the Meaning and Application 
of ``independent analysis''
III. Effective Date and Applicability Dates
IV. Other Matters
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
VI. Economic Analysis
    A. Economic Baseline
    B. Analysis of Benefits, Costs, and Economic Effects of the 
Adopted Rules
    C. Effects of the Rules on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital 
Formation
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act
VIII. Statutory Basis

I. Background and Summary

    The Commission's whistleblower program has made important 
contributions to the agency's efforts to enforce the federal securities 
laws. Original information provided by whistleblowers has led to 
enforcement actions in which the Commission has obtained more than $2.5 
billion in financial remedies, including more than $1.4 billion in 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and interest, of which almost $750 
million has been or is scheduled to be returned to harmed investors. In 
recognition of the important contributions of whistleblowers, the 
Commission has ordered over $523 million to 97 individuals in 80 
enforcement actions whose original information led to the success of 
Commission actions and, in some instances, related actions brought by 
other enforcement authorities against wrongdoers.

A. The Whistleblower Award Program

    Congress established the Commission's whistleblower program in July 
2010 by adding Section 21F to the Exchange Act. Among other things, 
Section 21F directs that the Commission pay awards, subject to certain 
limitations and conditions, to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide 
the Commission with original information about a violation of the 
securities laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered 
judicial or administrative action.\1\ Section 21F also directs that the 
awards must be an aggregate amount (the ``Award Amount''), determined 
in the Commission's discretion, that is equal to not less than 10 
percent, and not more than 30 percent, of what has been collected in 
the monetary sanctions imposed in the covered action and certain 
related actions.\2\ Further, Section 21F provides that monetary awards 
to whistleblowers shall be paid from a special fund that Congress 
established called the Investor Protection Fund (``IPF'').\3\
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(5).
    \3\ The IPF, which was established as part of the whistleblower 
program, is a statutorily established fund overseen by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury that serves primarily as the funding 
source for the Commission's whistleblower awards. Additionally, as 
detailed in Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3), 15 U.S.C. 78u-6, the IPF 
has a statutorily created self-replenishing process and is not 
contingent on annual appropriations from Congress.
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    In May 2011, the Commission adopted a set of rules to implement the 
whistleblower program. Those rules, which are codified at 17 CFR 
240.21F-1 through 17, provide the operative

[[Page 70899]]

definitions, requirements, and processes related to the whistleblower 
program. Among other things, these rules define key terms and phrases 
in Section 21F, specify the form and manner through which an individual 
must submit information to qualify for an award, and establish the 
procedures for determining the Award Amounts.

B. Procedural Background and Summary of the Amendments Being Adopted

    On June 28, 2018, the Commission proposed for public comment a 
package of rule amendments to the Commission's existing whistleblower 
rules (see Exchange Act Rules 21F-1 through 21F-17). These amendments 
were designed to enhance claim processing efficiency, clarify and bring 
greater transparency to the framework the Commission utilizes to 
exercise its discretion in determining Award Amounts, and otherwise 
address specific issues that have developed during the ten-year history 
of the whistleblower program.
    For example, the amendments are intended to provide additional 
efficiency and transparency to the extent possible regarding the 
application of the existing award factors specified in Rule 21F-6(a) 
and (b) (the ``Award Factors''), individually and collectively, 
particularly for awards where the statutory maximum award of 30 percent 
is $5 million or less, which represent the vast majority (in number) of 
all awards.\4\ Additionally, because whistleblowers entitled to receive 
awards pursuant to the Commission's rules should receive their awards 
as quickly as reasonably practicable, the Commission is implementing 
mechanisms to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its award 
determination process.
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    \4\ While the Commission has made a number of larger awards, the 
substantial majority of all awards were $5 million or less. The 
specific data regarding the Commission's whistleblower awards is 
detailed in the ``Economic Analysis'' section below. This 
information has informed our efforts to enhance the performance of 
the program.
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    The Commission received over 150 substantively distinct comment 
letters from approximately 100 commenters.\5\ In addition, the 
Commission received three form letters from over 9,300 commenters.\6\
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    \5\ A number of commenters submitted multiple letters.
    \6\ The Commission did not investigate the circumstances under 
which each of these approximately 9,300 commenters submitted a form 
letter, including whether they submitted the letter of their own 
accord, were solicited to submit the letter, or provided informed 
consent to submit the letter.
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    The Commission has carefully considered the comments received. As a 
threshold matter, we note that the Commission's discretion in 
determining Award Amounts, and the manner in which the Commission 
exercises that discretion, was a focus for many commenters. The 
Commission recognizes that its articulation of the manner in which the 
Commission exercises its authority to determine Award Amounts should be 
clarified. Accordingly, the Commission is adopting a provision that 
clarifies the Commission's broad discretion when applying the Award 
Factors and determining the Award Amount, including the discretion to 
consider and apply the Award Factors in percentage terms, dollar terms 
or some combination of percentage terms and dollar terms when 
determining the Award Amount. Aside from clarifying the Commission's 
broad discretion, the Commission is adopting the rules substantially as 
proposed with one exception. Specifically, the Commission is not 
adopting proposed Rule 21F-6(d)(2), which would have provided a 
specific process for the Commission to exercise its discretion to 
review certain larger awards (exceeding $30 million to an individual 
whistleblower) under certain circumstances.
    Although the Commission did not intend to create a new restriction 
on, or affect the size of, Award Amounts, this proposed rule was 
misperceived by some as a potential new restriction on Award Amounts. 
The proposed rule was one component of the Commission's effort to 
provide greater transparency, efficiency and certainty to the Award 
Amount determination process. Based on the comments received, the 
Commission's further analysis of the operation of the whistleblower 
program to date and the more comprehensive clarifying amendments being 
adopted, the Commission does not believe that proposed Rule 21F-6(d)(2) 
is necessary. Further, as discussed below in Section II(E), based on 
these same factors and with a focus on increased transparency, 
efficiency and clarity, we are adding a specific provision to Rule 21F-
6 that will create a presumption that, when (1) the statutory maximum 
authorized Award Amount is $5 million or less and (2) the negative 
Award Factors are not present, the Award Amount will be set at the 
statutory maximum, subject to the Commission's discretion to apply 
certain exclusions. Aside from this presumption, the process for 
recommendations by the Claims Review Staff (``CRS'') and the Office of 
the Whistleblower is not changing. Awards of this type--where the 
maximum statutory award of 30 percent is $5 million or less--make up 
the vast majority (in number) of all whistleblower awards to date. 
Consistent with the Commission's view that encouraging whistleblowers 
to come forward is important, the Commission believes any potential 
whistleblower should understand that where the aggregate maximum award 
for the actions resulting from that whistleblower's original 
information is likely to be $5 million or less (and where the negative 
Award Factors are not present), Rule 21F-6(c) will generally result in 
an Award Amount that is the statutory maximum.\7\ In addition to 
providing potential whistleblowers with greater transparency and 
certainty, this presumption should increase efficiency in the award 
review process.
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    \7\ Of the total 74 awards by enforcement action as of July 31, 
2020, including awards above and below $5 million, 31 awards were at 
the statutory maximum and an additional 16 received close to the 
maximum amount (in the top quarter of the range, i.e. 25% to 29%).
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    Below is a summary of the principal amendments to the Commission's 
whistleblower rules that are being adopted:
     Allowing awards based on deferred prosecution agreements 
(``DPAs'') and non-prosecution agreements (``NPAs'') entered into by 
the U.S. Department of Justice (``DOJ'') or a settlement agreement 
entered into by the Commission outside of a judicial or administrative 
proceeding to address violations of the securities laws;
     Consistent with the Commission's practice in award 
determinations to date, clarifying the current definition of related 
action to make clear that recovery from the Commission for the related 
action is not available where the Commission determines that a separate 
whistleblower award program more appropriately applies to the non-
Commission action;
     Providing a specific process presumptively setting Award 
Amounts at the top end of the range when the statutory maximum award of 
30 percent is $5 million or less and the negative Award Factors are not 
present, subject to the discretion of the Commission to apply certain 
exclusions;
     Clarifying the Commission's broad discretion when applying 
the Award Factors in Rule 21F-6(a) and (b) and setting Award Amounts, 
including the discretion to consider the Award Factors in percentage 
terms, dollar terms or some combination thereof; and
     Revising the Commission's definition of ``whistleblower'' 
in light of

[[Page 70900]]

the Supreme Court's decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. 
Somers,\8\ and making certain related clarifications to Rule 21F-2 to 
address various other interpretive questions that have arisen in 
connection with the Court's holding.
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    \8\ Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
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    In addition to the foregoing amendments, the Commission is adopting 
several other amendments to our whistleblower rules that are intended 
to clarify and enhance certain policies, practices, and procedures in 
implementing the program. The Commission is revising Exchange Act Rule 
21F-4(e) to clarify the definition of ``monetary sanctions.'' Further, 
the Commission is revising Exchange Act Rule 21F-9 to provide the 
agency with additional flexibility to modify the manner in which 
individuals may submit Form TCR (Tip, Complaint or Referral) and to 
provide a new mechanism for individuals who failed to timely comply 
with the requirements of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 21F-9 to 
obtain an award if the Commission can readily determine that they 
clearly qualify for an award. Additionally, the Commission is adopting 
revisions to Exchange Act Rule 21F-8 to provide the agency with 
additional flexibility regarding the forms used in connection with the 
whistleblower program,\9\ revisions to Exchange Act Rule 21F-12 to 
clarify the list of materials that the Commission may rely upon in 
making an award determination, and revisions to Rule 21F-13 to clarify 
the materials that may be part of the administrative record for 
purposes of judicial review.
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    \9\ 17 CFR 249.1800-1801.
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    Two further changes are designed to help increase the Commission's 
efficiency in processing whistleblower award applications. The 
Commission is adding a new paragraph (e) to Exchange Act Rule 21F-8 to 
clarify the agency's ability to bar individuals from submitting 
whistleblower award applications when they are found to have submitted 
false information in violation of Exchange Act Section 21F(i) and Rule 
8(c)(7) thereunder, as well as to afford the Commission the ability to 
bar individuals who repeatedly make frivolous award claims in 
Commission actions. The Commission is also adding new Exchange Act Rule 
21F-18 to create a summary disposition procedure for certain types of 
common denials, such as untimely award applications and applications 
involving a tip that was not provided to the Commission in the form and 
manner that the Commission's rules require. Under this new summary 
disposition process, the Office of the Whistleblower may issue the 
preliminary award denial in a limited class of relatively 
straightforward matters; for all other award applications our current 
award-processing procedures as specified in Rule 21F-10 will continue 
to apply, which, among other things, means that the preliminary award 
determination will be issued by the CRS and not the Office of the 
Whistleblower.\10\
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    \10\ Exchange Act Rule 21F-10(d) and Rule 21F-11(d) authorize 
the CRS to make a preliminary determination on an award application 
for a covered action and related action, respectively. Further, in 
accordance with Section 4A(b) of the Exchange Act, both rules now 
clarify that Commission will be provided the opportunity to review 
any preliminary determination before it is provided to a claimant. 
See id. (providing that ``the Commission shall retain a 
discretionary right to review'' actions taken ``[w]ith respect to 
the delegation of any of [the Commission's] functions'').
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    Also, the Commission is adopting interpretive guidance to help 
clarify the meaning of ``independent analysis'' as that term is defined 
in Exchange Act Rule 21F-4(b)(3) and used in the definition of 
``original information.'' \11\ Further, the Commission is specifying 
the applicability dates for each rule amendment that we are adopting.
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    \11\ In addition to the amendments and other modifications 
described above, we are adopting a technical correction to Exchange 
Act Rule 21F-4(c)(2), to modify an erroneous internal cross-
reference, as well as several technical modifications to Exchange 
Act Rules 21F-9, 10, 11, and 12, to accommodate certain of the 
substantive and procedural changes described above.
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    Finally, the Commission received a number of comments in response 
to the proposing release requesting additional transparency related to 
the administration of the whistleblower program. The Commission has 
considered these concerns and the following actions are in response to 
them.\12\ The Commission is directing that the Office of the 
Whistleblower will include in its annual reports to Congress (beginning 
with the fiscal year 2020 report), in an aggregated manner, an overview 
discussion of the factors that were present in the awards throughout 
the year, including (to the extent practicable) a qualitative 
discussion of how these factors affected the Commission's determination 
of Award Amounts. The Office of the Whistleblower will continue to make 
available on its web page, and will review and update as necessary on 
not less than an annual basis, information regarding its approach to 
processing whistleblower award claims, including the initial review and 
prioritization of award claims.\13\
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    \12\ None of the measures discussed in this paragraph are 
intended to create any enforceable rights. The measures discussed 
have no legal force or effect; they do not alter or amend applicable 
law, and create no new or additional obligations for any person.
    \13\ This information is available at https://www.sec.gov/files/OWB%20Approach%20to%20Processing%20Award%20Claims.pdf.
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II. Description of Final Rule Amendments

A. Rule 21F-4(d)--Definition of ``action''

1. Proposed Rule
    Section 21F of the Exchange Act requires the Commission to pay 
whistleblower awards, with certain limitations and subject to certain 
conditions, in relation to the ``successful enforcement'' of ``any 
covered judicial or administrative action'' brought by the Commission 
and certain ``related [judicial or administrative] actions'' of other 
governmental entities, most notably DOJ.\14\ The Commission proposed to 
add a new paragraph (3) to existing Rule 21F-4(d) (defining an 
``action'') to provide that the term ``administrative action'' includes 
a deferred prosecution agreement (``DPA'') or a non-prosecution 
agreement (``NPA'') entered into by DOJ or a state attorney general in 
a criminal case as well as a settlement agreement entered into by the 
Commission outside of the context of a judicial or administrative 
proceeding to address violations of the securities laws; and further 
that any money required to be paid in such actions will be deemed a 
``monetary sanction'' within the meaning of Rule 21F-4(e). This 
proposed addition to Rule 21F-4 sought to make awards available to 
meritorious whistleblowers in cases where these alternative vehicles 
are used to address violations of law. Its premise was the same as that 
underlying current Rule 21F-4(d)(1): Our view that Congress did not 
intend for meritorious whistleblowers to be denied awards simply 
because of the procedural vehicle that the Commission (or another 
governmental entity) has selected to resolve an enforcement matter.
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    \14\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1). A ``covered judicial or 
administrative action'' is any judicial or administrative action 
brought by the Commission under the securities laws that results in 
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Id. 78u-6(a)(1). A 
``related action'' is a judicial or administrative action brought by 
any of several governmental entities designated in the statute that 
is based upon the original information provided by a whistleblower 
that led to successful enforcement of a Commission covered action. 
Id. 78u-6(a)(5). Awards range between 10 percent and 30 percent ``of 
what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed'' in the 
action. Id. 78u-6(b)(1)(A), 78u-6(b)(1)(B).

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[[Page 70901]]

2. Comments Received
    Most of the commenters who addressed proposed Rule 21F-4(d)(3) 
supported it.\15\ Commenters generally agreed that the rule would 
reduce uncertainty for potential whistleblowers and supported the 
rationale stated in the proposed rule of assuring that the availability 
of a whistleblower award not depend on the procedural vehicle that the 
Government may use to resolve an enforcement matter.\16\
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    \15\ See letters from Anat R. Admati, Faculty Director, and 
Graham Scott Steele, Director, Corporations and Society Initiative, 
Stanford University Graduate School of Business (Sept. 18, 2018) 
(``Admati and Steele Letter''); Americans for Financial Reform 
Education Fund (Sept. 18, 2018) (``AFREF Letter''); Better Markets 
(Sept. 18, 2018) (``Better Markets Letter''); Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association (Sept. 18, 2018) (``SIFMA 
Letter''); Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC (Sept. 17, 2018) 
(``Cohen Milstein Letter''); Richard Jansson (June 5, 2019) 
(``Jansson Letter''); Eileen Morrell (Sept. 17, 2018) (``Morrell 
Letter''); Harry Markopolos (Sept. 14, 2018) (``Markopolos 
Letter''); Joe Fischer (Aug. 9, 2018) (``Fischer Letter''); Peter 
Sivere dated July 13, 2018, Aug. 14, 2018, Aug. 16, 2018, Aug. 20, 
2018 (two letters submitted on this date), Aug. 21, 2018, Aug. 27, 
2018 (two letters submitted on this date), Sept. 2, 2018 (two 
letters submitted on this date), Sept. 10, 2018, and Sept. 14, 2018 
(collectively ``Sivere'' unless specified by date); Think Computer 
Foundation (July 17, 2018) (``Think Computer Letter''); Taxpayers 
Against Fraud (Sept. 18, 2018) (``TAF Letter''); G. Johnson (July 
29, 2018) (``Johnson Letter''); Anonymous-88 (July 28, 2018), 
(``Anonymous-88 Letter'').
    \16\ See Admati and Steele Letter; AFREF Letter; Cohen Milstein 
Letter; Jansson Letter; Fischer Letter; TAF Letter; Johnson Letter.
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    One commenter emphasized the important role that DPAs and NPAs play 
in fostering corporate compliance, cooperation, and remediation.\17\ 
This commenter offered that it would be contrary to the public interest 
if, in encouraging vigorous compliance programs and extraordinary 
cooperation in investigations, DOJ or the Commission decided not to 
offer a company a DPA or an NPA for fear that, as a result, a 
meritorious whistleblower would not receive an award. Similarly, this 
commenter stated that it would be unfair to whistleblowers to be 
deprived of an award simply because of ``positive conduct'' by the 
entities about which whistleblowers provided information. For these 
reasons, this commenter believed that permitting awards based on DPAs 
and NPAs would fairly balance the important goals of rewarding 
whistleblowers and encouraging companies to adopt effective compliance 
programs and to cooperate fully during investigations in the hope of 
obtaining a DPA or an NPA.
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    \17\ See SIFMA Letter.
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    Several commenters advocated that we pay awards in other 
circumstances beyond the DPAs, NPAs, and settlement agreements 
addressed in the proposed rule. One commenter urged that awards should 
be available in cases where, even if the Commission does not bring a 
covered action, the whistleblower's tip led DOJ to take action 
(including cases where DOJ issues a declination letter).\18\ Another 
commenter stated that we should pay awards in cases where we refer a 
whistleblower complaint to a self-regulatory organization that 
subsequently takes enforcement action relating to the complaint.\19\ 
One commenter asserted that an award should be available, irrespective 
of the mechanism by which a matter is resolved, any time a 
whistleblower's information assists the Commission or other 
governmental entities in obtaining money.\20\ Another commenter opined 
that ``any monetary payment to the SEC by an entity accused of 
wrongdoing, after and because of the commencement of an SEC inquiry, 
could be fairly classified as the result of an administrative action, 
even if the matter does not proceed to be heard by an administrative 
judge.'' \21\ Another commenter suggested that we pay awards in cases 
with less than $1 million in monetary sanctions.\22\
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    \18\ See Sivere Letters dated Aug. 14 and 10, 2018.
    \19\ See letter from Anonymous-46 (Sept. 9, 2018).
    \20\ See TAF Letter.
    \21\ See Think Computer Letter.
    \22\ See Anonymous-88 Letter.
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    Two commenters did not support the proposal to pay whistleblower 
awards on the basis of DPAs and NPAs entered into by criminal 
authorities and Commission settlement agreements outside of the context 
of a judicial or administrative proceeding.\23\ One of these commenters 
stated that these types of agreements are not always filed in court or 
subject to judicial oversight, which is an important ``check and 
balance'' on the process.\24\ This commenter further stated that the 
Commission does not have any particular expertise in the myriad state 
laws that may come into play with respect to a settlement with a 
particular state attorney general, and that the standards of 
culpability under state law may differ considerably from those under 
the federal securities laws. This commenter thus urged that paying 
whistleblower awards on the basis of state DPAs and NPAs would lead to 
``inconsistency in the eligibility standards under the Commission's 
rules, and could create an imbalance among the states.''
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    \23\ See letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital 
Markets Competitiveness (Sept. 18, 2018) (``CCMC Letter''); letter 
from Carrie Devorah (July 30, 2018) (``Devorah Letter'').
    \24\ See CCMC Letter.
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    This same commenter also stated that interpreting the term 
``administrative action'' to include DPAs, NPAs, and Commission 
settlement agreements outside of the context of a judicial or 
administrative proceeding would be contrary to the plain meaning of the 
term ``action,'' inconsistent with current usage of the term and 
judicial precedent, and would lack any basis in the Dodd-Frank Act 
itself. Instead, this commenter asserted, DPAs, NPAs, and Commission 
settlement agreements encompassed by the proposed rule are not 
``actions'' because they are contracts among regulators and third 
parties, are entered into voluntarily by those third parties, and 
cannot be unilaterally implemented by any individual regulator.
3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we have decided to adopt Rule 21F-
4(d)(3) with three changes. First, we have decided not to extend the 
rule to DPAs and NPAs entered into by state attorneys general in 
criminal cases. Second, we have added the modifier ``similar'' in 
paragraph (d)(3)(ii), which describes the Commission settlement 
agreements to which the rule will apply, in order to clarify the 
features of these agreements that merit treating them as administrative 
actions that impose monetary sanctions. Third, we have decided to apply 
the rule to any DPA, NPA, or Commission settlement agreement that would 
otherwise fall within the terms of the rule (provided that the 
agreement was entered into after July 21, 2010, which is the date after 
which the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
took effect).\25\
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    \25\ We have effectuated this change by revising the language in 
Rule 21F-10(b) and Rule 21F-11(b). Specifically, we have added 
language to those rules so that the effective date of the amended 
rules will serve as the trigger date that begins a 90-day period for 
a whistleblower to submit an application for a DPA, NPA, or 
Commission settlement agreement entered after July 21, 2010 but 
prior to the effective date of the amended rules (although any award 
application that as of the effective date of these rule amendments 
is already pending for an DPA, NPA, or Commission settlement 
agreement covered by this rule need not be resubmitted). We believe 
that applying the revised definition of ``action'' to these prior 
DPAs, NPAs, and Commission settlement agreements is consistent with 
the purposes of the program to compensate meritorious whistleblowers 
when their information also leads the authorities identified in the 
statute to successfully resolve a related matter while, at the same 
time, not creating an undue additional burden on the Office of the 
Whistleblower in processing what we anticipate should be a 
relatively small number of applications.
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    For the reasons described in the Proposing Release, we disagree 
with the

[[Page 70902]]

commenter who asserted that we lack authority to interpret the term 
``administrative action'' to also encompass DPAs and NPAs entered into 
by DOJ and settlement agreements entered into by the Commission outside 
of the context of a judicial or administrative proceeding. Rather, we 
conclude that the term ``administrative action'' is sufficiently broad 
to encompass these alternative vehicles for resolving investigations 
into violations of law. In particular, as noted previously, Congress's 
use of the term ``administrative action''--rather than administrative 
proceeding--does not limit award consideration to cases where 
investigations are resolved through formal adjudicatory administrative 
proceedings, and our rulemaking authority under Section 21F and other 
provisions of the Exchange Act therefore permits us to bring the 
agreements described in the proposed rule within the definition of an 
``administrative action.'' \26\
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    \26\ Section 21F(j) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(j), 
grants us ``the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to implement'' the whistleblower award 
program. Similarly, Section 23(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
78w(a)(1), expressly provides the Commission the ``power to make 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to 
implement the provisions'' of the Exchange Act. In addition, we have 
broad definitional authority pursuant to Section 3(b) of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(b), which provides us with the ``power 
by rules and regulations to define . . . terms used in [the Exchange 
Act].''
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    Several circumstances inform our decision to treat DPAs and NPAs 
entered into by DOJ as forms of ``administrative action'' for purposes 
of Section 21F.\27\ First, DOJ itself recognizes the importance of DPAs 
and NPAs in the hierarchy of tools that are available for addressing 
criminal misconduct on the part of companies, their officers, and their 
employees.\28\ DOJ has explained that DPAs and NPAs provide a ``middle 
ground'' for resolution of a criminal matter in circumstances where a 
declination is determined to be inappropriate, but a conviction of a 
company may have significant collateral consequences for innocent third 
parties.\29\ Second, DPAs and NPAs entered into by DOJ ordinarily 
impose significant continuing obligations and conditions on subject 
companies, coupled with clear and substantial consequences for 
default--including the continuation or initiation of criminal 
prosecution.\30\ Thus, on its face, the terms of a DPA or an NPA 
reflect a substantive resolution of a criminal matter by DOJ--in other 
words, an action--and not simply the closing of the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ We note that, because criminal charges are filed in 
connection with a DPA (and later dismissed if all the terms of the 
agreement are satisfied), a DPA in our view also satisfies the 
alternative requirement of being a ``judicial action.''
    \28\ See US Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual, Sec.  9-28.200, 9-
28.1100 (2018) (available at https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.200) 
(``Justice Manual''); see also Memorandum from Brian A. Benczkowski, 
Assistant Attorney General, re: Selection of Monitors in Criminal 
Division Matters (Oct. 11, 2018) (available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1100366/download) (describing 
DPAs, NPAs, and plea agreements as forms of corporate criminal 
resolution).
    \29\ See Justice Manual Sec.  9-28.1100.
    \30\ For example, DPAs and NPAs entered by DOJ have stated terms 
(usually two to three years). At the end of the term, if the company 
has fulfilled all of its obligations--including making any required 
monetary payments--the government will typically dismiss the charges 
(in connection with DPAs) or not file charges (in the case of an 
NPA). Typically, in both DPAs and NPAs the company is required to 
admit responsibility for the conduct of its officers and employees 
and to admit to a detailed statement of facts that supports the 
government's case. The company is also typically required during the 
term of the agreement to self-report any new evidence of violations. 
The government, acting in its sole discretion, determines whether 
the company has fulfilled all of its obligations under the 
agreement. If the company fails to do so, then the government may 
proceed with the prosecution (in the case of a DPA) or file charges 
against the company (in the case of an NPA). Applicable statutes of 
limitation are typically tolled during the term of the agreement, 
and the statement of facts to which the company admitted is 
admissible into evidence in any prosecution resulting from failure 
to comply with the agreement.
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    For similar reasons, it is reasonable to view payments made under 
DOJ DPAs and NPAs as ``monetary sanctions'' on which a whistleblower 
award can be based. Section 21F(a)(4) defines ``monetary sanctions,'' 
in relevant part, as ``monies, including penalties, disgorgement, and 
interest, ordered to be paid . . . as a result of such action or any 
settlement of such action.'' \31\ The payments required under a DPA or 
an NPA with DOJ are enforceable as a result of the company's admissions 
of facts and liability, which would support the government's criminal 
charges, coupled with the company's agreement to toll applicable 
statutes of limitations in the event DOJ determines (in its sole 
discretion) that prosecution is warranted because the company has 
breached the agreement. Given these provisions, the practical effect of 
a DPA or an NPA is to compel the subject company to make the monetary 
payments to which it has agreed or face the possibility of criminal 
prosecution on the basis of its previous admissions. Under these 
circumstances, payments made under a DPA or an NPA with DOJ are 
reasonably viewed as ``ordered'' within the meaning of Section 21F.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(4), 78u-6 (b)(1).
    \32\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(4); see Order, Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining an ``Order'' as ``A command, direction, or 
instruction''); U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-10-110, DOJ Has 
Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, but Should Evaluate Effectiveness 11 (2009) 
(characterizing payments under DPAs and NPAs as ``monetary penalties 
imposed by DOJ . . . .''). We have also carefully considered whether 
to include declination letters within the ambit of Rule 21F-4(d)(3), 
and we have determined not to do so. We recognize that, in some 
instances, recent declination letters recite considerations similar 
in certain respects to provisions found in DPAs and NPAs, such as a 
company's agreement to cooperate, make monetary payments, and 
undertake remedial measures. See, e.g., Justice Manual Sec.  9-
47.120 (2018) (available at https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977) (FCPA Corporate Enforcement 
Policy). However, declination letters as a class do not appear to 
reflect many of the key attributes of DPAs and NPAs described above 
(e.g., admissions and tolling of applicable statutes of limitations) 
that have been important to our decision to make whistleblower 
awards available for DPAs and NPAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the implementation of our whistleblower program to date we have 
not had occasion to consider a DPA or an NPA entered into by a state 
attorney general in a criminal case. We proposed to include such 
agreements in Rule 21F-4(d)(3)(i) in the expectation that they should 
generally be similar in nature to DPAs and NPAs entered into by DOJ. 
However, we are persuaded by the concern expressed by one commenter 
that including state DPAs and NPAs in the rule risks introducing 
inconsistency in the eligibility standards for related action awards as 
a result of the application of varying culpability and other standards 
under state law.\33\ DPAs and NPAs are long-established in DOJ 
practice, and their terms, conditions, and use have been subject to a 
great deal of transparency.\34\ But the Commission has limited insight 
into the practices of 50 state attorneys general (plus the District of 
Columbia's) in entering into DPAs and NPAs, and we believe it would be 
administratively infeasible to establish consistent award standards if 
required, on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether any particular 
state DPA or NPA includes terms sufficiently similar to those that 
typify DOJ DPAs and NPAs such that the state instrument should also be 
deemed an ``administrative action'' that imposes ``monetary 
sanctions.'' For this reason, new Rule 21F-4(d)(3) does not extend to 
DPAs or NPAs entered into by state attorneys general in criminal cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See CCMC Letter.
    \34\ See notes 28 to 30, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rule we are adopting today includes settlement agreements 
similar to DOJ DPAs and NPAs entered into by the Commission outside of 
the context of a judicial or administrative proceeding. In our 
practice, these agreements have included key provisions typically 
analogous to those

[[Page 70903]]

found in DOJ DPAs and NPAs that warrant also treating them as 
``administrative actions,'' with the payments required under these 
agreements constituting ``monetary sanctions.'' Among the provisions 
that we deem important to our analysis are: (1) Substantial continuing 
obligations on the part of the respondent (e.g., detailed and specific 
cooperation requirements and a requirement that any successors to the 
respondent be bound by the agreement); (2) specificity as to conduct 
that constitutes a violation of the agreement (e.g., further violations 
of the federal securities laws, provision of false information, and 
failure to make payments on the schedule and in the amounts due); (3) 
tolling of applicable statutes of limitations; and (4) clear and 
substantial consequences for default, including the respondent's 
agreement not to contest or challenge the admissibility in a future 
enforcement action of factual statements supporting the Commission's 
case that are recited as part of the agreement, as well as the 
respondent's consent to the use of any documents, testimony, or other 
evidence previously provided by it in a future enforcement action 
resulting from its violations.
    However, extending awards to the other circumstances suggested by 
some of the commenters would exceed our statutory authority. As Section 
21F defines a ``covered judicial or administrative action'' to require 
``monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million,'' \35\ we are unable to pay 
awards in Commission actions where we obtain any smaller amount of 
monetary sanctions. For similar reasons, the suggestion of some 
commenters that an award be available any time a whistleblower's 
information helps secure a payment of money to the Commission sweeps 
too broadly; our ability to pay a whistleblower award turns in each 
case on whether a payment can reasonably be viewed as a ``monetary 
sanction,'' defined in relevant part as ``monies, including penalties, 
disgorgement, and interest, ordered to be paid . . . as a result of 
such action or any settlement of such action.'' \36\ In addition, 
because a ``related action'' is defined in the statute to require that 
the same original information provided by the whistleblower also led to 
the successful enforcement of the Commission action,\37\ we cannot 
grant an award for an action by DOJ or a self-regulatory organization 
absent a predicate Commission covered action as to which the 
whistleblower also merits an award.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(1).
    \36\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(4), 78u-6 (b)(1). As the Proposing 
Release explained, in our view, a payment of money is reasonably 
treated as ``ordered'' when the governmental entity has some 
mechanism to compel the payment either directly or indirectly. This 
could include, but does not necessarily require, the ability to 
obtain a court order requiring the payment. As is further discussed 
above, the requisite indicia of compulsion are present in the 
agreements described in proposed Rule 21F-4(d)(3) because of the 
significant consequences that may result from a breach of the 
payment obligation under the agreement.
    \37\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(5).
    \38\ See In the Matter of the Claim for an Award in Connection 
with a Notice of Covered Action, Exchange Act Release No. 34-84506, 
2018 WL 5619386 n.5 (Oct, 30, 2018) (``The Commission may make an 
award to a whistleblower in connection with a related action only if 
the Commission has determined that the whistleblower is entitled to 
an award for a Commission covered action.'') (emphasis in original). 
As with other related actions, we do not believe it is necessary to 
require the Office of the Whistleblower to post notices of DPAs or 
NPAs entered into by DOJ. In the great majority of cases, claimants 
should be able to learn about DPAs and NPAs through public 
announcements. Some claimants also may know of a DPA or NPA as a 
result of having communicated with the authority bringing the 
action. In the rare instance where a claimant can demonstrate that 
compliance with Rule 21F-11(b) was not practicable because a DPA or 
an NPA was non-public and the claimant did not obtain actual 
knowledge of the agreement prior to the deadline for filing an award 
claim, the Commission could consider exercising its authority to 
waive compliance with the rule. See Section 36(a) of the Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a), and Rule 21F-8(a). Commission settlement 
agreements subject to the rule are publicly announced on our 
website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Rule 21F-4(e)--Definition of ``monetary sanctions''

1. Proposed Rule
    Rule 21F-4(e) currently defines the term ``monetary sanctions'' to 
mean ``any money, including penalties, disgorgement, and interest, 
ordered to be paid and any money deposited into a disgorgement fund or 
other fund pursuant to Section 308(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(15 U.S.C. 7246(b)) as a result of a Commission action or a related 
action.'' This definition substantially tracks the definition set forth 
in Section 21F of the Exchange Act.\39\ The Commission proposed to 
amend Rule 21F-4(e) to provide that the term ``monetary sanctions'' 
means: (1) A required payment that results from a Commission action or 
related action and which is either (i) expressly designated by the 
Commission in an administrative proceeding or a court of competent 
jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding as disgorgement, a penalty, or 
interest thereon, or (ii) otherwise required as relief for the 
violations that are the subject of the covered action or related 
action; or (2) any money deposited into a disgorgement fund or other 
fund pursuant to Section 308(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 
U.S.C. 7246(b)), as a result of such action or any settlement of such 
action.
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    \39\ According to section 21F(a)(4), the term ``monetary 
sanctions,'' when used with respect to any judicial or 
administrative action, means any monies, including penalties, 
disgorgement, and interest, ordered to be paid; and any monies 
deposited into a disgorgement fund or other fund pursuant to section 
308(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7246(b)), as a 
result of such action or any settlement of such action. 15 U.S.C. 
78u-6(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of the proposed amended rule was intended to 
clarify--consistent with our existing practice--that a required payment 
not expressly designated as disgorgement, penalty, or interest, must be 
in the nature of relief for the violations charged in order to be 
considered a ``monetary sanction'' for purposes of the whistleblower 
award program. Thus, we explained, if, for example, a court orders an 
asset freeze and appoints a receiver in a Commission enforcement 
action, and, without separately entering a disgorgement order, the 
court subsequently issues an order approving the receiver's plan to 
distribute money to injured investors, the amended rule would treat 
that second order as a monetary sanction under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of 
the proposed rule. However, if the receiver requests approval to use 
frozen funds to pay creditors, taxes to a governmental entity, 
attorney's fees, or other costs of the receivership, such payments 
would not constitute monetary sanctions under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) 
because they are not in the nature of relief for the violations 
charged.
2. Comments Received
    Some commenters supported the proposed amendment to the definition 
of ``monetary sanctions.'' \40\ However, one of these commenters 
expressed concern that if the Commission were to obtain a court order 
for defendants to pay ``$1 million in restitution payments and $1 
million in punitive damages,'' the order for punitive damages might not 
be viewed ``as relief'' for the securities violations.\41\ This 
commenter recommended use of ``broader terminology, without 
substantially changing the way [the Commission] calculates qualifying 
payments from the way it does now.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See CCMC Letter; Think Computer Letter; letter from 
Anonymous-135 (Oct. 22, 2019).
    \41\ See Think Computer Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several other commenters objected to the proposed amendment.\42\ 
Some

[[Page 70904]]

commenters argued that the proposed changes would introduce ambiguity 
or confusion into the rule.\43\ In particular, one of these commenters 
observed that our use of the word ``required'' in the proposed rule 
would lead to ``confusion and uncertainty'' and suggested that we 
revert to the statutory term ``ordered.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See TAF Letter; letter from Whistleblower Law 
Collaborative, LLC (Sept. 18, 2018) (``Whistleblower Law 
Collaborative Letter''); Markopolos Letter; letter from Anonymous-12 
(Sept. 18, 2018) (``Anonymous-12 Letter''); and letter from Mac 
Vineyard (Sept. 29, 2018) (``Vineyard Letter'').
    \43\ See TAF Letter; Whistleblower Law Collaborative Letter; 
Markopolos Letter.
    \44\ See Whistleblower Law Collaborative Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The principal concern of objectors appeared to be that the 
definition of ``monetary sanctions'' should be flexible enough to 
support whistleblower awards in a variety of circumstances that did not 
appear to be covered by the proposed amendment. For example, several 
commenters urged that the definition of ``monetary sanctions'' should 
permit payments to a whistleblower based on recoveries by a bankruptcy 
trustee to the same degree as a receiver appointed in a Commission 
enforcement action.\45\ One of these commenters asserted: ``While Ponzi 
cases often go into receivership, public company accounting frauds . . 
. often end up in federal bankruptcy court. It is important for 
corporate whistleblowers to know they will be rewarded for turning in 
their company even if exposing the fraud ends up bankrupting the 
company.'' \46\ Another of these commenters similarly supported awards 
in connection with bankruptcy proceedings, making the point that 
``[t]he primary purpose of the two proceedings is essentially the same: 
To place control of the company in the hands of a disinterested party 
in order to properly run, reorganize or liquidate the business and 
protect investors and creditors.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See TAF Letter; Whistleblower Law Collaborative Letter; 
Markopolos Letter; Anonymous-12 Letter.
    \46\ See Markopolos Letter.
    \47\ See TAF Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to including bankruptcy cases, one commenter argued 
that the definition of ``monetary sanctions'' should be broad enough to 
permit awards in other forms of proceedings ``where sanctions or 
settlements result because of the Commission's work and/or the 
whistleblower's tip . . . .'' \48\ This commenter urged that ``the 
definition of `monetary sanctions' should be sufficiently flexible . . 
. to allow the Commission to consider sanctions obtained in any 
proceeding which results from the Commission's action (or a `related 
action'), where there is a strong nexus (e.g., a common nucleus of 
operating facts) between the matter in question and the whistleblower's 
tip and the ensuing investigation, and results in monetary relief for 
injured parties such as investors. In other words, the Commission's 
definition of `monetary sanction' should be sufficiently flexible to 
accurately reflect what the whistleblower's tip accomplished in the 
form of relief to defrauded investors.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See Whistleblower Law Collaborative Letter.
    \49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This same commenter also asserted that there are many cases where 
the cost of recovery and administration of claims ``cannibalizes'' a 
substantial portion of the funds available for distribution to injured 
investors.\50\ The commenter gave as an example a $100 million fraud 
case where a receiver successfully recovers $10 million but bills $7.5 
million in professional expenses and fees. In such a case, the 
commenter opined, it would seem unduly harsh to calculate the award on 
$2.5 million; an award should be based on the gross amount recovered, 
and not reduced because of ``billings from attorneys, accountants, or 
other professionals.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Id.
    \51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we have decided to adopt Rule 21F-
4(e) substantially as proposed. However, in response to concerns raised 
by some commenters about potential confusion, and to more closely track 
the statutory language, we have determined to use the word ``ordered,'' 
rather than ``required,'' so that Rule 21F-4(e) as adopted, in relevant 
part, now reads, ``(e) Monetary sanctions means: (1) An order to pay 
money that results from a Commission action or related action and which 
is either: (i) Expressly designated as penalty, disgorgement, or 
interest; or (ii) Otherwise ordered as relief for the violations that 
are the subject of the covered action or related action . . . .'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ The proposed rule substituted the term ``required'' to 
reflect the recognition in proposed Rule 21F-4(d)(3) that monetary 
obligations under DPAs, NPAs, and Commission settlement agreements 
outside of the context of a judicial or administrative proceeding 
are not reflected in formal adjudicative orders. However, we have 
now included in the discussion of Rule 21F-4(d)(3), as adopted, 
additional explanation of these agreements and why the payments 
under them are reasonably viewed as ``ordered'' for purposes of the 
definition of monetary sanctions, rendering it unnecessary to 
substitute ``required'' for ``ordered'' in Rule 21F-4(e). We have 
also revised paragraph (e)(1)(i) to refer to ``a penalty, 
disgorgement, or interest'' rather than ``disgorgement, a penalty, 
or interest thereon,'' as was used in the proposed rule, in order to 
more closely track the statutory language and eliminate any 
potential confusion regarding this phraseology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to comments relating to bankruptcy proceedings, our 
statutory authority does not extend to paying whistleblower awards for 
recoveries in bankruptcy proceedings or other proceedings that may in 
some way ``result from'' the Commission's enforcement action and the 
activities of the whistleblower. Under Section 21F, we are authorized 
to pay whistleblower awards only on the basis of monetary sanctions 
that are imposed ``in'' a covered judicial or administrative action or 
related action.\53\ A ``covered judicial or administrative action'' is 
an action ``brought by the Commission under the securities laws that 
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million,'' \54\ while a 
``related action'' must be brought by one of the enforcement and 
regulatory authorities specified in the statute.\55\ Bankruptcy 
proceedings are not brought by either the Commission acting under the 
securities laws or by one of the designated related-action authorities, 
and orders to pay money that result from bankruptcy proceedings are not 
imposed ``in'' Commission covered actions or related actions. The same 
is true of monetary payments that may result from other forms of 
proceedings that are not Commission covered actions or related 
actions.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1)(A) through (B).
    \54\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(1).
    \55\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(5). These authorities are the Attorney 
General of the United States, an appropriate regulatory authority (a 
term which is further defined in Exchange Act Rule 21F-4(g)), a 
self-regulatory organization, or a State Attorney General in 
connection with a criminal investigation. 15 U.S.C. 78u-
6(h)(2)(D)(i).
    \56\ With respect to the commenter who sought to ensure that 
punitive damages would be covered by the rule, we note that punitive 
damages are not obtainable in Commission covered actions. However, 
the Commission may order (in an administrative proceeding) or seek 
(in a federal court action) civil money penalties, which are covered 
by the statute and the rule and therefore are a basis for posting a 
Notice of Covered Action and paying a whistleblower award.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Defining ``monetary sanctions'' to include payments that are 
ordered ``as relief for the violations that are the subject of the . . 
. action'' is most consistent with our statutory authority. As noted, 
Section 21F(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines ``monetary sanctions,'' 
in relevant part, as ``any monies, including penalties, disgorgement, 
and interest, ordered to be paid; . . . as a result of [any judicial or 
administrative] action or the settlement of such action.'' \57\ Under 
accepted principles of statutory construction, the words that follow 
``including''--penalties, disgorgement, and interest--although not an 
exhaustive list, are illustrative of the

[[Page 70905]]

general principle to be applied.\58\ Accordingly, as the D.C. Circuit 
has held, we think it is reasonable to ``expand on the remedies 
explicitly included in the statute only with remedies similar in nature 
to those enumerated.'' \59\ Because ``penalties, disgorgement, and 
interest'' describe forms of monetary relief for the violations that 
are the subject of an action, this provision reflects a congressional 
expectation that we would pay whistleblower awards only with respect to 
other orders to pay money that also constitute relief for the 
violations. For example, although restitution is not one of the 
sanctions set forth after the word ``including,'' restitution ordered 
in a criminal proceeding is a form of relief for the violations that 
are the subject of the action, and therefore is a ``monetary sanction'' 
that will support a related-action whistleblower award.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(4).
    \58\ See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 317 (2010); United 
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).
    \59\ United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d at 1200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, we are not persuaded by the commenter who urged 
that we define ``monetary sanctions'' to include a court's orders to 
pay a receiver's fees or billings from attorneys, accountants, or other 
professionals. Treating a court order to pay such fees as a ``monetary 
sanction'' would not comport with the statutory language (as just 
discussed).\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ As more fully discussed in the Proposing Release, we also 
view the requirement in Section 21F(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(1), 
that a Commission action must ``result[ ] in monetary sanctions 
exceeding $1,000,000'' (emphasis added), and the requirement in 
Section 21F(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(4), that a monetary sanction 
must be a ``result of'' an action, as supporting our interpretation. 
The phrase ``results in'' suggests to us that Congress was 
addressing those monetary obligations that the action secures ``as 
relief'' for the violations that are the subject of the action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, as the Proposing Release stated, this conclusion is 
buttressed by Congress's use of the phrase ``monetary sanctions imposed 
in the action'' in further describing the sanctions that would support 
a whistleblower award.\61\ While in normal parlance a person might say 
that disgorgement or civil penalties were ``imposed'' as a result of a 
securities-law violation, we do not believe that one would typically 
say that a court order approving fees and expenses of a court-appointed 
receiver or other professionals hired by the receiver ``impos[ed]'' a 
monetary sanction. Rather, this language indicates that the 
congressional focus was on monetary obligations that are in the nature 
of relief for the violations that are the subject of the action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1)(A) through (B) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Proposing Release stated generally that a court order 
approving a receiver's plan to distribute money to injured investors 
would be treated as a monetary sanction. We further clarify here, in 
line with Commission practice, the types of distributions to injured 
investors that will be treated as monetary sanctions. Although the 
Commission may seek the appointment of a receiver in an enforcement 
action filed in federal court, a receiver does not work for the 
Commission, represent the interests of the Commission, or even 
represent the interests of investors. Rather, a receiver is an officer 
of the court, appointed by the court to take custody of assets over 
which the court asserts jurisdiction (the receivership estate), for the 
benefit of all persons whom the court may later adjudge to have rights 
in the property.\62\ Depending on the violations charged and the 
attendant facts and circumstances of the case, a court order directing 
a receiver appointed in a Commission enforcement action to make a 
distribution to investors may reflect recompense to the investors of 
money lost as a result of the securities violations, or it instead may 
simply reflect a return of assets that the receiver has obtained in his 
custodial capacity, which is greater than the amount of money lost as a 
result of the violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 370-71 
(1908). Indeed, viewing a court order to pay a receiver's fees as a 
``monetary sanction'' cannot be squared with the legal status of a 
receiver as an officer of the court and the receiver's fees as costs 
incurred by the court in administering the receivership property. 
Ralph Ewing Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers 
Sec. Sec.  11, 637 (3d ed. 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, in a simple hypothetical case where an investment 
adviser is charged with violating the securities laws for 
misappropriating $1 million from a fund that holds $100 million, 
investors lost $1 million as a result of the violations. If, for some 
reason, a receiver were appointed in the case and the receiver were 
ordered to unwind the funds and return all fund assets to the 
investors, any amounts paid in excess of the $1 million lost as a 
result of the violations would be a return of custodial assets held by 
the receiver, and not relief for the violations.
    Under Rule 21F-4(e) as amended, we first look to whether an order 
to pay money is expressly designated as penalty, disgorgement, or 
interest. If so, then that order establishes the amount of monetary 
sanctions in the case as to that defendant. Absent an order to pay 
money expressly designated as a penalty, disgorgement, or interest, we 
will consider whether an order to pay money to investors is in the 
nature of relief for the violations that were the subject of the 
action. In the context of a Commission covered action where a receiver 
is appointed and the court orders a distribution of money in the 
receivership estate to investors, we will begin our assessment of the 
amount of the applicable monetary sanctions with an amount that does 
not exceed the higher of (i) the ill-gotten gains received by the 
defendants over which the receiver has been appointed, or (ii) 
investors' losses as a result of the violations. In determining the 
investor losses, we will consider losses that flowed from the violative 
conduct alleged in the covered action, to the extent such losses 
approximate the monetary sanctions the Commission could obtain in the 
covered action. In addition, we will not treat as a ``monetary 
sanction'' amounts that merely reflect a return of custodial assets to 
investors and not relief for the violations.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Under Section 21F(b)(1), the Award Amount must be between 
10 percent and 30 percent ``of what has been collected'' of the 
monetary sanctions imposed in a Commission covered action or a 
related action. When, pursuant to the analysis above, a receiver's 
distribution to investors is the basis for the amount of a monetary 
sanction under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of Rule 21F-4, that amount is 
deemed ``collected'' at the time the court orders the distribution. 
However, in a case involving a receiver in which the court has 
ordered penalties, disgorgement, or interest under paragraph 
(e)(1)(i), as noted above, that order--not the amounts distributed 
by the receiver--establishes the amount of the monetary sanction as 
to that defendant. In this circumstance, payment of an award based 
on the amount ``collected'' turns on the Commission's ability to 
conclude that some portion of funds or other assets over which the 
receiver assumes control should be treated as satisfying the court's 
monetary judgment in favor of the Commission. In applying this 
principle we have and will continue to generally expect--absent 
particular facts and circumstances supporting a different approach--
to look to the amount distributed to investors as the amount 
collected for award purposes. If the amount distributed to investors 
includes monies paid to the receiver by other defendants to satisfy 
their own respective monetary orders, then we would generally expect 
to net these monies. For example, if two defendants are each 
separately ordered to pay disgorgement of $1 million, each 
contribute $500,000 to the receivership estate, and the receiver 
distributes $1 million to investors, then only $500,000 is 
``collected'' as to each defendant's disgorgement order.
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C. Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 21F-3(b) Defining ``related action''

1. Proposed Amendments
    Under Exchange Act Section 21F(b), any whistleblower who obtains an 
award based on a Commission enforcement action may be eligible for an 
award based on monetary sanctions

[[Page 70906]]

that are collected in a related action. Exchange Act Rule 21F-3(b) 
implements this statutory directive.
    Rule 21F-3(b)(1) defines ``related action.'' The Commission 
proposed to amend the existing definition to clarify that a 
whistleblower would qualify for a potential related-action award if 
either (i) the whistleblower provided to the other governmental entity 
that pursued the purported related action the same information that the 
whistleblower provided to the Commission and the provision of that 
information led to the successful enforcement of the Commission covered 
action or (ii) the Commission itself provided that information to the 
other governmental entity and the provision of that information led to 
the successful enforcement of the related action.\64\
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    \64\ We also indicated that we are making a technical 
modification to the definition in Rule 21F-3(b)(1) to conform the 
existing rule language with the statutory definition as provided in 
Section 21F(a)(6) of the Exchange Act. This technical amendment 
clarifies that with respect to any related action the action must be 
``based on'' the same original information that the whistleblower 
voluntarily provided to the Commission and that ``led to the 
Commission to obtain monetary sanctions totaling more than 
$1,000,000.'' As currently drafted, the rule reads as though this 
requirement applies only to criminal actions brought by a state 
attorney general.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the Commission proposed a new paragraph (4) to Rule 
21F-3(b) that would apply to situations where the Commission's 
whistleblower program and one or more separate whistleblower award 
programs might potentially apply to the same action. The proposed new 
paragraph (4)--the ``multiple-recovery rule''--is based on the 
Commission's experience and past practice and is intended to clarify 
various issues relating to the application of the Commission's 
whistleblower program when another award program would potentially 
apply to the same action. It would provide that, notwithstanding the 
definition of related action in Rule 21F-3(b)(1), ``if a judicial or 
administrative action is subject to a separate monetary award program 
established by the Federal Government, a state government, or a self-
regulatory organization, the Commission will deem the action a related 
action only if the Commission finds (based on the unique facts and 
circumstances of the action) that its whistleblower program has the 
more direct or relevant connection to the action.'' Proposed paragraph 
(4) would also provide that even ``[i]f the Commission does determine 
to deem the action a related action, the Commission will not make an 
award to you for the related action if you have already been granted an 
award by the governmental entity responsible for administering the 
other whistleblower award program. Further, if you were denied an award 
by the other award program, you will not be permitted to readjudicate 
any issues before the Commission that the governmental entity 
responsible for administering the other whistleblower award program 
resolved against you as part of the award denial.'' Lastly, proposed 
paragraph (4) provided that, if the Commission makes an award before an 
award determination is finalized by the governmental entity responsible 
for administering the other award program, the Commission would 
condition its award on the meritorious whistleblower making a prompt, 
irrevocable waiver of any claim to an award from the other award 
program.
    Beyond these proposed amendments, the Commission also stated that 
as part of this rulemaking it is considering whether to repeal Exchange 
Act Rule 21F-3(b)(3)--which provides a somewhat different mechanism to 
determine that recovery from the Commission is not available where the 
whistleblower program administered by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) is involved--so that the provisions of proposed 
paragraph (4) would apply to all instances where a potential multiple 
recovery might occur.
2. Comments Received
    With respect to the proposed revision of paragraph (1) of Rule 21F-
3(b), the Commission received two comments.\65\ One of the comment 
letters opposed the proposal and the other raised concerns.\66\
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    \65\ See letters from Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP (July 24, 
2018) (``Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto July 24 Letter'') and Sen. Charles 
E. Grassley (Sept. 18, 2018) (``Sen. Grassley Letter'').
    \66\ Neither of these comments expressed any concern with the 
technical revision to conform paragraph (1) to the statutory 
definition of related action in Section 21F(a) of the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Both commenters expressed the view that the Commission cannot 
require whistleblowers to provide directly any information to any 
federal or state agency (or other governmental entity that can bring a 
related action) that does not have rules protecting whistleblower 
confidentiality and allowing anonymous whistleblower submissions. The 
commenter who opposed the proposed change also asserted that the 
confidentiality concern is not ameliorated by the alternative that 
allows the Commission to share the whistleblower's information directly 
with the other governmental entity because the whistleblower may never 
be informed that the information has been provided.\67\ Finally, the 
opposing commenter asserted that the revised language in proposed 
paragraph (1) would not cover situations where one sister agency (e.g., 
DOJ) provided a whistleblower's information to another sister agency 
(e.g., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), but neither the 
Commission nor the whistleblower had directly provided the information 
to the second sister agency.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto July 24 Letter.
    \68\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the proposed multiple-recovery rule, two commenters 
supported the proposal. One commenter stated that the proposal would 
improve the Commission's stewardship of the disbursement of public 
funds,\69\ while another agreed with the Commission's preliminary view 
that a whistleblower should neither have multiple recoveries on the 
same action nor multiple bites at the adjudicatory apple.\70\ One 
commenter recommended that the Commission go further by categorically 
excluding from the related-action definition any judicial or 
administrative action that may be subject to an alternative award 
program.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See CCMC Letter.
    \70\ See Center for Workplace Compliance Letter.
    \71\ See CCMC Letter.
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    Several commenters opposed the proposed multiple-recovery rule. The 
principal concerns raised were that: (i) The proposed amendment would 
increase the uncertainty and delay concerning any potential award and 
that this might discourage a whistleblower from coming forward; \72\ 
(ii) the proposal is unnecessary because the Commission has never 
encountered a situation where a second whistleblower program 
potentially applied; \73\ (iii) the proposal places an unreasonable 
burden on potential whistleblowers and could undermine the 
confidentiality protections in Section 21F(h)(2) by forcing 
whistleblowers to submit their information to other entities that may 
have a competing whistleblower program; \74\ (iv) the Commission should 
not read Section 21F's language to impose a cross-agency cumulative 30 
percent award ceiling; \75\ and (v) the proposal ignores the fact that 
other whistleblower programs may have different award criteria and 
eligibility

[[Page 70907]]

considerations, including significantly reduced payout potentials.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See TAF Letter; Cornell Securities Law Clinic (Sept. 17, 
2018) (``Cornell Law Clinic Letter''); Anonymous-9 (Sept. 18, 2018) 
(``Anonymous-9 Letter''); Think Computer Letter; AFREF Letter.
    \73\ See TAF Letter.
    \74\ See Sen. Grassley Letter; Anonymous-9 Letter.
    \75\ See AFREF Letter; Think Computer Letter.
    \76\ See Anonymous-9 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters offered alternatives to the proposed multiple-
recovery rule. One alternative would be to allow a whistleblower to 
decide whether to receive an award from the Commission's whistleblower 
award program or the other award program after the whistleblower has 
been informed by both programs about their respective award 
determinations.\77\ A second alternative would authorize a Commission 
award on an action as a supplement to the award authorized by the other 
whistleblower program up to an aggregate maximum based on the 
application of the statutory maximum percentage under the Commission's 
program (i.e., 30 percent) to a combination of the multiple 
recoveries.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See AFREF Letter; Think Computer Letter.
    \78\ See AFREF Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, two commenters supported the existing paragraph (3) of 
Rule 21F-3(b) and its framework for preventing multiple-recoveries or 
issue re-adjudication where both the Commission's and the CFTC's 
whistleblower programs might apply. In supporting the framework of 
paragraph (3), one of the commenters observed that the SEC and the CFTC 
regulate very similar and at times overlapping markets and the 
commenter believed that this counseled for retention of the existing 
paragraph (3).\79\ Another commenter suggested that the existing 
framework of paragraph (3) should actually be expanded to cover all 
situations where the Commission might encounter a potentially 
applicable alternative whistleblower program that relates to another 
governmental entity's action.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See Think Computer Letter.
    \80\ See Anonymous-9 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After reviewing the comments, we are (i) adopting revised paragraph 
(1) of Rule 21F-3(b) as proposed with one further clarification; (ii) 
removing existing paragraph (3) concerning potential multiple recovery 
under the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs for the same action; and 
(iii) adopting proposed paragraph (4) as new paragraph (3) of Rule 21F-
3(b).\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ We are making one further clarifying change. The proposed 
rule text stated that in assessing whether an action brought by 
another entity qualifies as a related action under the Commission's 
whistleblower program, the Commission will consider the ``unique 
facts and circumstances'' of the case. We are concerned that the use 
of the word ``unique'' may suggest that something highly unusual or 
special about the case will be relevant to the analysis, but that 
was not the intention of the proposal. Accordingly, to clarify that 
each case will be assessed on its own particular facts and 
circumstances, the final rule text does not include the word 
``unique.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Revised paragraph (1) of Rule 21F-3(b) provides that a related 
action is: (i) A judicial or administrative action yielding monetary 
sanctions; (ii) that is brought by one of the entities listed in Rule 
21F-3(b)(1)(i)-(iv); and (iii) that is based upon information that 
either the whistleblower provided directly to the governmental entity 
or the Commission itself passed along to the other governmental entity 
pursuant to the Commission's procedures for sharing information, and 
which is the same original information that the whistleblower 
voluntarily provided to the Commission and that led the Commission to 
obtain monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million.\82\ The 
modification that we are making to the proposed rule text would include 
a clarification that a related action must yield monetary sanctions 
because the statute requires that any Award Amount must be tied 
directly to the monetary sanctions imposed.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Experience with the program has shown that other types of 
actions, including actions under antitrust law, are not likely to 
qualify as related actions where they do not have a clear, explicit, 
and direct connection to the conduct governed by the securities law.
    \83\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons stated in the Proposing Release, it is appropriate 
that for an action to qualify as a potential related action a 
whistleblower must have submitted information directly to the 
governmental entity that brought the action, or the Commission must 
have provided the whistleblower's information directly to the 
governmental entity. This requirement is already provided for in Rule 
21F-11(c), and it reflects our interpretation of the requirement in 
Section 21F(a)(5) of the Exchange Act that a related action must be 
``based upon the original information provided by a whistleblower'' to 
the Commission. In addition, our experience with the whistleblower 
program to date leads us to conclude that these requirements regarding 
the provision of information are appropriate and beneficial to allow us 
to work with the governmental entity that has brought the purported 
related action to assess the role a whistleblower's information 
actually played in contributing to the success of the action. These two 
alternative requirements have allowed our staff to work with the other 
governmental entity in a way that is not unduly burdensome to our staff 
or the other governmental entity to reasonably trace the role of the 
information from the other governmental entity's receipt of it 
(including whether it was duplicative of information the other 
governmental entity already had and what role the information played in 
advancing the governmental entity's investigation) through to the 
success of the purported related action.
    We acknowledge the commenters' concerns that a whistleblower may 
decline to provide information directly to a governmental entity that 
lacks any confidentiality or anonymity protections because of a 
potential heightened risk of disclosure. But thus far in our experience 
administering the program, we have routinely observed that many 
whistleblowers have been directly sharing information with entities 
that can bring potential related actions. That said, to the extent some 
subset of whistleblowers may have concerns about submitting their 
potential original information to one of these entities, they can take 
steps to remove any information that may disclose their identity before 
providing it to the other governmental entity and, when submitting 
their tip to that governmental entity, explain that information that 
may identify the whistleblower has been excluded but that it can 
potentially be obtained by the governmental entity from the 
Commission.\84\ In this way, if the authority seeks and obtains 
information from the Commission that might reasonably disclose the 
whistleblower's identity, the other governmental entity will be subject 
to the same heightened confidentiality obligations that Section 
21F(h)(2) imposes on the Commission.\85\
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    \84\ If the whistleblower includes the Commission's TCR number 
in his or her submission to the other governmental entity, this 
should make it possible for the Commission to locate the information 
and provide it to the other governmental entity subject to the 
procedures and requirements for sharing such information. Further, 
if the other governmental entity for some reason is unwilling to 
accept an anonymous whistleblower tip submitted by an individual, 
the whistleblower could request, in writing, that the Commission 
staff provide the tip to the governmental entity and Commission 
staff will assess whether doing so would be appropriate given the 
nature of the tip, among other relevant considerations. Generally, 
before providing a whistleblower's tip to another governmental 
entity, the other authority must agree to maintain all whistleblower 
identifying information as confidential in accordance with the 
requirements established under Section 21F(h)(2)(A). In determining 
whether to provide information to another governmental entity or 
authority based on a whistleblower's request, we anticipate that the 
staff will consider the same mix of factors that the staff already 
looks to in deciding whether to share information.
    \85\ See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(2)(D)(ii)(I) (directing that DOJ, 
various federal regulatory agencies, self-regulatory organizations, 
state attorney generals and regulatory authorities, and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board ``shall maintain'' any 
whistleblower identifying information provided to them from the 
Commission ``as confidential in accordance with'' the same 
heightened confidentiality obligations that Section 21F(h)(2)(A) of 
the Exchange Act imposes on the Commission).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 70908]]

    While we appreciate that this may take additional effort by a 
whistleblower who is seeking to ensure that his or her information is 
received by the other governmental entity without losing the statutory 
confidentiality guarantees, we do not believe that this should impose 
an undue burden. Moreover, in the context of anonymous submissions made 
to the Commission, a whistleblower could similarly provide that same 
submission to one of the related-action entities even if the 
governmental entity does not expressly provide for anonymous 
disclosures. Under the Commission's rules, an anonymous whistleblower 
seeking to be eligible for an award must have an attorney, so the 
attorney should be well positioned to make the anonymous submission to 
the other governmental entity and to serve as the whistleblower's point 
of contact in dealing with that governmental entity.
    We also determined not to revise the new rule to permit awards when 
another governmental entity that can pursue a potential related action 
shares information with a third governmental entity. In our view, the 
difficulties that could arise in trying to accurately and consistently 
assess the award criteria as a result of such an indirect chain of 
information transfer could pose undue burdens on our ability to 
reasonably make reliable award determinations.\86\ In light of this, it 
is appropriate to anticipate that a whistleblower who may want a 
related-action award from any governmental entity should either provide 
that information directly to the governmental entity or otherwise rely 
on the Commission in its sole discretion to determine whether to share 
the information with another governmental entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ We note that if a whistleblower can identify (or staff is 
aware of) an instance where this type of sharing of information 
clearly occurred, and provided that the claimant would be entitled 
to an award had the individual shared the information directly, the 
Commission would not be foreclosed from making a related-action 
award. See 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a) (Exchange Act provision affording the 
Commission discretionary waiver authority).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Turning to the multiple-recovery rule that we are adopting as new 
paragraph (3) of Rule 21F-3(b), this rule is appropriate for all of the 
reasons specified in the Proposing Release. As we explained, those 
considerations are: (i) Permitting potential multiple recoveries on a 
single action could allow a total award in excess of the 30 percent 
ceiling that Congress has historically imposed in establishing federal 
whistleblower award programs in the modern era; (ii) in our view, the 
related-action-award component of the Commission's whistleblower 
program is intended to allow meritorious whistleblowers the opportunity 
to obtain a financial award for the ancillary recoveries that otherwise 
might not be covered by a whistleblower program even though the action 
resulted from the same original information the whistleblower provided 
to the Commission; and (iii) permitting whistleblowers to recover under 
both our award program and a separate award program for the same action 
would produce the irrational result of encouraging multiple ``bites at 
the apple'' in adjudicating claims for the same action and potentially 
allowing multiple recoveries. This rule codifies the approach the 
Commission has previously taken where another award program is 
available in connection with an action for which a related-action award 
is sought.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See In the Matter of the Claims for Award in Connection 
with a Notice of Covered Action, Exchange Act Release No. 34-84046, 
2018 WL 4488273 at *6 (Sept. 6, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In deciding to adopt the rule as proposed, we are unpersuaded by 
the concerns raised by those commenters who opposed the proposed rule. 
Although one commenter opposed the rule on the theory that it was 
unnecessary as the Commission had not encountered a matter involving a 
potential multiple recovery, as noted, the Commission has, in fact, 
issued a final order in connection with an award that involved a 
potential multiple recovery.\88\ Further, we do not believe that our 
multiple-recovery rule will disincentivize (because of uncertainty 
about receiving an award or otherwise) whistleblowers from coming to 
the Commission. Potential whistleblowers still stand to receive an 
award both for any Commission covered action \89\ and any ancillary 
action that may produce an award under the alternative whistleblower 
program. We do not agree that our rule should result in any appreciable 
additional delay for whistleblowers in receiving an award 
determination; in assessing this threshold question, the Commission and 
the CRS should be able to rely on publicly available information to 
determine the relative relationship of the other governmental entity's 
action to our whistleblower program and to the other potentially 
applicable award program.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ Id.
    \89\ And as discussed below in connection with new Rule 21F-
6(c), the incentive to come forward to potentially receive an award 
on a Commission action should be increased as a result of that rule 
amendment. This is because (subject to certain conditions) Rule 21F-
6(c) will establish a presumption where the aggregate maximum award 
for actions resulting from a whistleblower's original information is 
$5 million or less (and the negative Award Factors are not present), 
that the Award Amount be set at the statutory maximum.
    \90\ We use the term ``governmental entity'' in the Description 
of Final Rule Amendments to refer to self-regulatory organizations, 
state governments and their various agencies, and federal government 
agencies and departments. The terminology is intended to capture not 
just governmental entities that may currently have a whistleblower 
program, but governmental entities that in the future may adopt or 
oversee a whistleblower program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We do not believe that our rule should impact a whistleblower's 
confidentiality protections under Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act 
because those protections--to the extent that they apply in any given 
context--are not contingent on the recovery of an award in connection 
with another governmental entity's action. We are also unpersuaded that 
our rule will impose an undue burden on a whistleblower by forcing a 
whistleblower to submit information to another governmental entity that 
may have its own whistleblower award program; in our view, if Congress 
or some other governmental entity has established a whistleblower 
program, it is not unreasonable to expect that a whistleblower should 
comply with that program's requirements for submitting information in 
order to be eligible for an award under it.
    As we explained at the time that we proposed this rule, in 
determining whether a potential related action has a more direct or 
relevant connection to the Commission's whistleblower program than 
another award program, the Commission has and will continue to consider 
the nature, scope, and impact of the misconduct charged in the 
purported related action, and its relationship to the federal 
securities laws. This inquiry will include consideration of, among 
other things: (i) The relative extent to which the misconduct charged 
in the potential related action implicates the public policy interests 
underlying the federal securities laws (e.g., investor protection) 
versus other law enforcement or regulatory interests (e.g., tax 
collection or fraud against the Federal Government); (ii) the degree to 
which the monetary sanctions imposed in the potential related action 
are attributable to conduct that also underlies the federal securities 
law violations that were the subject of the Commission's enforcement 
action; and (iii) whether the potential related action involves

[[Page 70909]]

state-law claims and the extent to which the state may have a 
whistleblower award program that potentially applies to that type of 
law-enforcement action.\91\ To take an example, we would not expect 
that our program would apply under the new rule to a DOJ action that 
charges a scheme to avoid tax obligations and imposes monetary 
sanctions; the IRS's award program would have a more direct and 
relevant connection to the case than the Commission's whistleblower 
program.\92\ In addition, we would not expect the IRS's award program 
to apply to a Commission securities fraud action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ To the extent that a state adopts a whistleblower award 
program relating directly to state securities law violations, we 
generally anticipate the Commission will find that the state award 
program should be the operative whistleblower program to determine 
whether to reward the whistleblower for that state action rather 
than the Commission's award program. The state program would likely 
be the more direct or relevant program and thus the appropriate 
avenue for the whistleblower to seek an award.
    \92\ By contrast, to the extent that a DOJ enforcement action 
centers on insider-trading violations that are based on the same 
misconduct that was the subject of the Commission's covered action, 
and that most of the monetary sanctions arise from the insider-
trading violations, the Commission will likely treat the matter as a 
related action notwithstanding any potential restitution ordered due 
to any tax violations included within the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We considered the alternatives advanced by commenters but believe 
that our approach continues to be appropriate. We disagree that another 
governmental entity's action should be excluded from our program in all 
instances when another whistleblower award program might apply; it is 
preferable to continue to review each such case to determine whether 
based on the particular facts and circumstances it has a closer 
relationship to our whistleblower program or the alternative program. 
We are also unpersuaded that a whistleblower should be able either to 
collect a supplemental award from us up to a 30 percent total recovery 
from the various programs (e.g., the Commission would have the 
discretion to add an additional amount to ``cap off'' up to 30 percent 
any award another governmental entity made that was below our statutory 
cap). Nor are we persuaded that a whistleblower should be allowed to 
choose which award (e.g., the Commission's award for a related action 
versus another governmental entity's award for that same related 
action) to accept after learning the award determination from each of 
the potentially applicable award programs. These proposals are in our 
view needlessly inefficient, as both proposals would have both agencies 
conduct independent assessments of a whistleblower's contribution to 
the same action; further, as we explained above, including by the 
example referencing the IRS award program, we do not believe that 
Congress ever intended for multiple governmental award programs to 
yield awards on the same action.\93\ Further, we are not persuaded that 
the potential existence of different eligibility requirements cuts 
against our rule. If we determine that another award program has a more 
direct or relevant connection to a particular action brought by another 
governmental entity, in our view it is fair and reasonable to require 
the whistleblower to meet all the same criteria and to be subject to 
the same award considerations that would be applied to any other 
applicant seeking a recovery under that other program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ One commenter argued that the new rule is inconsistent with 
the definition of related action in Exchange Act Section 21F(a)(5) 
because, according to the commenter, the ``plain meaning'' of that 
provision states that the Commission ``shall pay'' an award for an 
action or proceeding brought by another authority without any 
qualification or limitation based on the existence of an alternative 
whistleblower award program. See letters from Kohn, Kohn & 
Colapinto, LLP (Sept. 10, 2020) (``Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto Sept. 10, 
2020 Letter''). The Commission has previously noted that, ``on its 
face, Exchange Act Section 21F does not exclude from the definition 
of related action those judicial or administrative actions . . . 
that have a less direct or relevant connection to our whistleblower 
program than another whistleblower scheme.'' In the Matter of the 
Claims for Award in Connection with a Notice of Covered Action, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-84046, 2018 WL 4488273 at *6 (Sept. 6, 
2018). Nonetheless, as the Commission has previously explained, we 
``perceive ambiguity when considering this language in the context 
of the overall statutory scheme. We believe that an understanding 
focused exclusively on the statutory definition of related action 
would produce a result that Congress neither contemplated nor 
intended.'' Id. The commenter further noted that ``the whistleblower 
advocacy community has never supported a `double recovery' concept'' 
and suggested we extend the CFTC ``double recovery'' rule that the 
Commission adopted in 2011 so that it bars recoveries from other 
comparable programs. For the reasons discussed above and in the 
proposing release, we decline to do so because we believe that the 
new rule provides the Commission with appropriate flexibility in 
addressing situations that implicate possible multiple recoveries 
and should foster a more coherent approach for the resolution of 
award matters that potentially implicate multiple whistleblower 
award programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, we have determined to repeal existing Rule 21F-3(b)(3) 
relating to the CFTC's award program and to allow our new multiple-
recovery rule to apply to all actions brought by another governmental 
entity where one or more alternative whistleblower award programs might 
apply. A uniform rule to apply in these situations--including where the 
CFTC's whistleblower award program is implicated--is administratively 
preferable. This is because the Commission will have the authority 
under the new rule (based on the specific facts and circumstances of 
the underlying action) to assess which award program should more 
logically apply to an action brought by another authority. Under the 
rule we are repealing, the Commission has no such authority and instead 
the determination as to which whistleblower program applies is largely 
controlled (as the existing rule provides for) by the happenstance of 
which agency (i.e., the SEC or the CFTC) first adjudicates an award 
application in connection with that action.

D. Rule 21F-6--Clarification of Commission's Discretion

    Rule 21F-6 establishes the analytical framework that the Commission 
follows in exercising its discretion in both setting the appropriate 
amount of an award in connection with a particular Commission or 
related action and in determining an individual award for each 
whistleblower where the Commission makes awards to more than one 
whistleblower in connection with the same action.
    In comments received in response to proposed new paragraphs (c) and 
(d) of Rule 21F-6 (discussed further below), there appeared to be some 
confusion regarding the Commission's discretion to consider the dollar 
amount of monetary sanctions collected, as opposed to focusing 
exclusively on a percentage amount (i.e., between 10% and 30%) in the 
statutory range when applying the Award Factors and setting the Award 
Amount. Certain commenters appeared to assert that nothing in the 
statute suggests that the Commission, in setting the Award Amount, may 
consider the actual dollar value of the sanctions collected.\94\ In 
addition, a hypothetical in the 2018 Proposing Release may have added 
to this confusion.\95\ As the discussion below demonstrates, the 
statement that the Commission would be unable to consider the dollar 
amount, and rather only the percentage amount, in the context of the 
hypothetical was incorrect and did not reflect the Commission's 
prevailing understanding of its discretion or its practice in 
considering and applying the Award Factors and setting Award Amounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See TAF Letter.
    \95\ See Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR at 34,713-714, nn. 
99 & 105 (July 20, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has had and continues to have broad discretion in 
applying the Award Factors and setting the Award Amount, including the 
discretion to consider and apply the Award Factors in percentage terms,

[[Page 70910]]

dollar terms or some combination thereof.
    The statutory language in Section 21F demonstrates that Congress 
gave the Commission the ability--and the discretion--to consider the 
application of the award criteria provided for in Rule 21F-6(a) and (b) 
in dollar terms. For example, the language in Section 21F(c)(1) 
repeatedly refers to the Commission setting the ``amount of the 
award,'' which indicates that Congress afforded the Commission 
discretion to consider the application of the Award Factors, and make 
an award to a meritorious whistleblower, in dollar terms.\96\ Nothing 
in the text of Section 21F indicates any intent on the part of Congress 
to limit the Commission's discretion in this regard.\97\ Indeed, the 
only reference to percentages in the award provisions of the statute is 
for purposes of setting the upper and lower bounds in dollar terms for 
the Award Amount.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
    \97\ See also Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR at 34,713-
34,713, nn. 99 & 105 (July 20, 2018).
    \98\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1)(A) and (B).
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    To implement Section 21F(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, the Commission 
adopted Exchange Act Rule 21F-5 (titled ``Amount of award'') and 21F-6 
(titled ``Criteria for determining amount of award''). Rule 21F-5(a) 
reiterates the statutory direction that the ``determination of the 
amount of an award is in the discretion of the Commission.'' Rule 21F-
5(b) states that, if all the conditions for a whistleblower award are 
satisfied, ``the Commission will then decide the percentage amount of 
the award applying the criteria set forth in'' Rule 21F-6.
    We further observe that the Commission's long-standing 
interpretation of Rule 21F-6(a)(3)--law enforcement interest--already 
specifically references the Commission's discretion to consider the 
monetary sanctions and the potential Award Amount when assessing that 
factor, and, as described below, we are adding language to clarify (as 
contemplated by the statutory language) that the Commission has the 
same discretion with respect to the other existing Award Factors.
    We also note that, as a practical matter, award determinations have 
historically been recommended to the Commission by the CRS as both a 
dollar amount and the corresponding percentage of monetary sanctions 
collected. In considering the application of the Award Factors and the 
Award Amount, it therefore would have been difficult as a practicable 
matter to require that the relevant dollar amounts not be considered by 
the Commission in applying the Award Factors. Moreover, it has been the 
Commission's long-standing general practice in the public whistleblower 
award orders (and notices announcing awards) to describe those awards 
in actual dollar amounts, not percentages (which are generally 
redacted). This practice has been followed for the common-sense reason 
that actual dollar figures--not abstract percentages--are most likely 
to advance the whistleblower award program's goal of incentivizing 
potential whistleblowers.
    To clarify the Commission's discretionary authority, we are 
modifying Rule 21F-6 to state that the Commission may consider the 
factors, and only the factors set forth in in Rule 21F-6, in relation 
to the facts and circumstances of each case in setting the dollar or 
percentage amount of the award.\99\ This new language, by expressly 
referring to setting the dollar or percentage amount of the award, 
makes clear that the Commission and the CRS may, in applying the Award 
Factors specified in Rule 21F-6(a) and (b) and setting the Award 
Amount, consider the potential dollar amount that corresponds to the 
application of any of the factors.\100\
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    \99\ We are also making two other modifications to the first 
sentence of Rule 21F-6. First, we are replacing the words ``award 
percentage'' with just ``award.'' We are making this technical 
modification because we announce awards to the public primarily in 
dollar terms. Second, for the same reasons discussed above in 
footnote 81, we are removing the word ``unique.''
    \100\ As is the case with every aspect of any award 
determination under Rule 21F-6, the Commission shall not consider 
the balance of the IPF when exercising this express discretionary 
authority or the discretionary authority afforded by new Rule 21F-
6(c). Section 21F(c)(1)(B)(ii) prohibits the Commission from 
adjusting an individual award based on the availability of money in 
the IPF; specifically, it provides that ``[i]n determining the 
amount of an award,'' the Commission ``shall not take into 
consideration the balance of the [IPF].''
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    The discretion that we are clarifying is the Commission's 
discretion in applying the Award Factors--in percentage terms, dollar 
terms, or some combination thereof--and setting the Award Amount. This 
is not a separate (post application of the Award Factors) assessment of 
whether Award Amounts are too small or too large. We also are affirming 
that Award Amounts should be based exclusively on the application of 
the Award Factors.\101\
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    \101\ In deciding to clarify that the Commission may consider 
the dollar amount as it assesses the Award Factors, the Commission 
has determined that it is not necessary or appropriate to amend the 
Award Factors themselves. In the future, the Commission could amend 
the Award Factors through appropriate notice and comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe the clarity and transparency provided by this amendment 
will not affect the determination of Award Amounts. The process for 
recommendations from the CRS is not changing except for some increases 
due to the presumption described above for awards of less than $5 
million. The Commission has had and continues to have the discretion to 
apply the Award Factors to determine the Award Amount within the 
statutory range. We also believe that the clarity and transparency 
provided by this and the other amendments the Commission is adopting, 
will further incentivize whistleblowers to come forward and to do so as 
promptly as practicable.\102\
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    \102\ To add further transparency, we are also modifying Rule 
21F-10 and Rule 21F-11 to make clear that, in applying the award 
factors specified in Rule 21F-6 and determining the award dollar and 
percentage amounts set forth in the preliminary determination, the 
award factors may be considered by the SEC staff and the Commission 
in dollar terms, percentage terms or some combination thereof. We 
further clarify that, should a claimant choose to contest a 
preliminary determination, the claimant may set forth the reasons 
for the objection to the proposed amount of an award, including the 
grounds therefore, in dollar terms, percentage terms or some 
combination thereof.
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    The amendment we are adopting was the subject of a question posed 
to commenters in the proposing release. While the proposing release 
included proposed rule text that embodied the Commission's general 
discretion to consider the dollar amount of any increase or decrease 
under paragraphs (a) and (b) for large awards (along with the proposed 
specific mechanism for increasing small awards under $2 million), the 
proposing release asked commenters whether this approach should ``cover 
all awards considered under Exchange Act Rule 21F-6[.]'' The proposing 
release explained that this approach might ``allow [the Commission] to 
better assess each enhancement or reduction in dollar terms'' to permit 
the Commission to ``more realistically and concretely assess the impact 
of each award factor on the overall award to ensure that [the 
Commission is] appropriately rewarding the whistleblower and 
incentivizing future whistleblowers[.]'' \103\
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    \103\ The proposing release noted that ``to the extent that 
individuals are motivated to come forward based on a potential 
award, it is the total dollar payout that'' is generally relevant to 
them.
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E. Rule 21F-6(c)--Establishment of a Presumption of the Maximum 
Statutory Amount for Certain Awards

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed paragraph (c) to Rule 21F-6, which would 
add to Rule 21F-6's existing framework by providing a specific 
mechanism for the

[[Page 70911]]

Commission to exercise its discretion to increase any awards to a 
single whistleblower that would likely be below $2 million.
    Specifically, proposed paragraph (c) would provide that, ``[i]f the 
resulting award after applying the award factors specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) would yield a potential payout to a single 
whistleblower below $2 million (or any such greater amount that the 
Commission may periodically establish through publication of an order 
in the Federal Register), the Commission may increase the award so that 
the likely total payout to the whistleblower reflects a dollar amount 
that the Commission determines is appropriate to achieve the program's 
objectives of rewarding meritorious whistleblowers and sufficiently 
incentivizing future whistleblowers who might otherwise be concerned 
about the low dollar amount of a potential award; provided that in no 
event shall the provision be utilized to raise a potential award payout 
(as assessed by the Commission at the time it makes the award 
determination) above $2 million (or by such other amount as the 
Commission may designate by order) nor will the total amount awarded to 
all whistleblowers in the aggregate be greater than 30 percent.''
    The proposed rule further provided that an increase to an Award 
Amount would not be available in the event that the award either 
involved any of the negative award criteria specified in Rule 21F-
6(b)--i.e., culpability, unreasonable reporting delay, or interference 
with a company's internal compliance processes or reporting program--or 
triggered the culpability provision of Rule 21F-16. The Commission 
explained that it believed proposed paragraph (c) could provide an 
important additional incentive for potential whistleblowers to come 
forward.
2. Comments Received
    The Commission received several comments on the proposed rule. Each 
of the commenters who supported the proposed rule suggested that it 
could help incentivize more whistleblowers to come forward.\104\ By 
contrast, commenters who opposed the rule suggested: The proposed rule 
would not encourage whistleblowers to come forward because it would 
introduce additional uncertainty into the award process; \105\ there is 
no justification for an enhancement to an award if the existing Award 
Factors do not justify a higher award; \106\ the Commission already has 
the authority to enhance an award up to the maximum possible amount so 
the proposed rule change is unnecessary; \107\ and Congress did not 
authorize the Commission to apply any dollar amount considerations in 
setting an Award Amount.\108\
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    \104\ AFREF Letter; SIFMA Letter; Public Citizen Letter; Cohen 
Milstein Letter; Markopolos Letter.
    \105\ Cornell Law Clinic Letter; Think Computer Letter.
    \106\ CCMC Letter.
    \107\ Morrell Letter.
    \108\ Better Markets Letter.
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3. Final Rule
    After considering the various views expressed in the comments, and 
consistent with the Commission's determination that increased 
transparency, efficiency, and clarity will enhance the overall 
effectiveness of the program, we have determined to adopt the proposed 
rule with several modifications.\109\
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    \109\ In addition to these modifications to the rule text, we 
are making one further change from the proposing release. The 
Commission intends new Rule 21F-6(c) to be applicable to all claims 
pending as of the effective date of these amendments so that those 
pending claims may receive the benefits of this amendment.
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    First, the reach of the rule will be expanded to include a greater 
number of potential award matters. Specifically, the rule will now be 
presumptively available, subject to the exclusions set forth below, if 
the statutory maximum award of 30 percent of the monetary sanctions 
collected in any covered and related action(s), in the aggregate, is $5 
million or less, and the Commission determines there is no reasonable 
anticipation that future collections would cause the statutory maximum 
award to be paid to any whistleblower to exceed $5 million in the 
aggregate, and the negative Award Factors are not present.
    In selecting $5 million as the ceiling for the new rule's 
application, we considered the fact that a majority of awards should, 
based on historical experience, be subject to this new rule. We believe 
there will be gains in efficiency from streamlining the award 
determination process for awards where the whistleblower did not 
trigger any of the negative award factors in Exchange Act Rule 6(b). In 
this category of cases, experience with the program demonstrates that 
there is no significant programmatic value in expending time and effort 
weighing minor increases or reductions to the Award Amount. Further, we 
believe application of this rule will save the majority of meritorious 
whistleblowers time and effort in explaining what they believe is the 
appropriate Award Amount in their award applications and in any 
subsequent response the whistleblower might file in response to a 
preliminary determination. Moreover, providing increased transparency, 
efficiency and clarity for this wide range of awards should help to 
further incentivize individuals to come forward because they can have 
more comfort, provided the criteria for the rule's application are met, 
that they may receive an award that is at the statutory maximum.
    Second, we have revised the criteria for eligibility of the rule to 
allow more claimants to potentially receive the maximum statutory 
award. Consistent with the proposed rule, to be eligible for 
application of the new rule a claimant must not have acted in such a 
manner that he or she triggered the negative award factors specified in 
either Rule 21F-6(b)(1) (culpability in connection with the securities 
law violation) or Rule 21F-6(b)(3) (malfeasance in connection with an 
internal compliance program) with respect to the claimant's award 
application, and the claimant must not have acted in a manner that 
triggers Rule 21F-16 (concerning awards to whistleblowers who engage in 
highly culpable misconduct). In a change from the proposed rule, a 
claimant's unreasonable delay under Rule 21F-6(b)(2) will not 
automatically disqualify the individual from receiving the enhancement 
under the new rule. Rather, the Commission in certain cases may 
exercise its discretion to allow a claimant to receive the benefit of 
the statutory maximum authorized by this rule notwithstanding his or 
her unreasonable delay, where the Commission determines that it is 
consistent with the public interest, the promotion of investor 
protection, and the objectives of the whistleblower program. Although 
we anticipate that this discretionary authority will not be routinely 
used where unreasonable delay has occurred, it will be available to the 
Commission where the public interest, investor protection and 
programmatic considerations counsel in favor of allowing the claimant 
to receive the statutory maximum.\110\
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    \110\ In determining whether compelling circumstances exist to 
use this authority, the Commission may consider (among other 
relevant facts and circumstances presented by a particular award 
application) the following: Whether the period of delay that is 
determined to be unreasonable was on balance minimal; whether 
investors experienced additional harm during the period of 
unreasonable delay; and whether the Commission's ability to pursue 
an enforcement action was appreciably jeopardized as a result of the 
period of unreasonable delay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, subject to the below exceptions, the new rule embodies a 
presumption that the Commission will

[[Page 70912]]

pay a meritorious claimant the statutory maximum amount where none of 
the negative award criteria specified in Rule 21F-6(b)--i.e., 
culpability, unreasonable reporting delay, or interference with a 
company's internal compliance processes or reporting program--are 
implicated and the award claim does not trigger Rule 21F-16 (concerning 
awards to whistleblowers who engage in culpable conduct).
    Fourth, consistent with the presumption of the rule's 
applicability, an otherwise eligible claimant will not receive the 
statutory maximum if the Commission determines in its discretion that 
either: (1) The claimant's assistance as assessed by the Commission 
under Rule 21F-6(a) was, under the relevant facts and circumstances, 
limited; or (2) the Commission determines that providing the statutory 
maximum in the particular matter would be inconsistent with the public 
interest, investor protection or the objectives of the whistleblower 
program (the ``Exclusions''). These two Exclusions--which are the only 
means by which the presumption discussed above may be overcome--are 
intended to preserve the Commission's discretion to deny a statutory-
maximum enhancement in situations where doing so is consistent with the 
program's overall goals.
    The first Exclusion, for example, will allow the Commission 
discretion to deny a statutory-maximum enhancement where it determines 
that the assistance provided by the whistleblower was limited, with the 
degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower to be assessed in 
accordance with Rule 21F-6(a). This exclusion is consistent with prior 
past Commission practice in the case of limited assistance. Based on 
experience with the program, the Commission does not expect the 
presumption to be overcome by this Exclusion in the vast majority of 
circumstances.
    The second discretionary Exclusion will preserve the Commission's 
discretion to deny a statutory-maximum enhancement where relevant 
circumstances counsel against an enhancement. As an example, if the 
claimant has engaged in securities-law violations that were unrelated 
to the conduct that formed the basis for the covered action, the 
Commission could (in its discretion) exclude the claimant from 
receiving a statutory-maximum enhancement.
    Fifth, although we anticipate that the Commission should have 
little difficulty applying the presumptive enhancement afforded by Rule 
21F-6(c) in cases involving a single meritorious whistleblower, the new 
rule recognizes that there are cases that will involve multiple 
meritorious whistleblowers. Where at least one of the multiple 
meritorious whistleblowers would qualify for the presumption if that 
individual were the sole meritorious whistleblower, the new rule will 
operate to ensure that the total aggregate award paid to all 
meritorious whistleblowers is the statutory maximum. But because these 
cases could involve any number of meritorious whistleblowers and 
because these cases could reflect any number of whistleblowers that 
might qualify for the enhancement rule were they the only whistleblower 
in the matter, the new rule provides flexibility in how the Commission 
should allocate the statutory maximum Award Amount in these instances. 
Nonetheless, the rule requires that in allocating that amount among the 
meritorious claimants, the Commission will consider all relevant 
facts.\111\
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    \111\ We have decided not to adopt the proposed mechanism that 
would authorize the Commission to increase the $5 million figure 
through the publication of an order in the Federal Register. Such a 
mechanism is no longer necessary given our decision to expand the 
scope of the rule and the fact that (based on historical experience) 
the vast majority of awards will now be covered by this rule given 
its expanded scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In adopting this rule, we concur with those commenters who 
expressed the view that this new provision could help to further 
incentivize whistleblowers to come forward to the Commission. Contrary 
to what some commenters suggested, we believe that we are significantly 
increasing certainty. When there are no negative award factors present 
and the statutory maximum award of 30 percent is $5 million or less, 
there will be a presumption in favor of an Award Amount at the 
statutory maximum, subject to the Exclusions.\112\ Thus, we believe 
that this new rule will likely increase--not decrease--a reasonable 
individual's willingness to report potential securities-law 
violations.\113\
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    \112\ For awards where the statutory maximum award of 30 percent 
is greater than $5 million, the Commission will continue to analyze 
the Award Factors identified in Rule 21F-6 in determining the Award 
Amount. Based on the historical application of the award factors, if 
none of the negative Award Factors specified in Rule 21F-6(b) are 
present, the award amount would be expected to be in the top third 
of the award range.
    \113\ Morrell Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, we agree with the commenter that suggested that the 
Commission already possesses discretionary authority to increase any 
award to the statutory maximum. But expressly setting forth the 
specific terms and eligibility criteria in the new rule should help 
increase the public's confidence that the Commission will presumptively 
set the Award Amount at the statutory maximum in those cases where none 
of the negative award criteria specified in Rule 21F-6(b)(2) are 
present, the statutory maximum award of 30 percent is $5 million or 
less, and the Exclusions are not applicable.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ For the reasons already discussed above, we do not agree 
with the commenter that stated that Congress did not authorize the 
Commission to utilize dollar-amount considerations in setting 
awards. 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(c)(1). See also id. 78u-6(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Rule 21F-6(d)--Enhanced Review of Certain Awards

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed a new paragraph (d) that would add to Rule 
21F-6's existing analytical framework by providing a mechanism for the 
Commission in its discretion to conduct an enhanced review of awards in 
situations where a whistleblower has provided information that led to 
the success of one or more covered or related actions that, 
collectively, result in at least $100 million in collected monetary 
sanctions.
    This proposed provision would have formalized the exercise of the 
Commission's discretion in setting Award Amounts in two respects where 
the potential Award Amount might involve a large payout. First, 
proposed paragraph (d)(1) would have expressly stated that the 
Commission has the discretion to consider the potential dollar amount 
when applying each of the existing award criteria.
    Second, proposed paragraph (d)(2) would have provided an express 
mechanism for the Commission to adjust the award if, after 
consideration of the existing Award Factors in paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of Rule 21F-6, the Commission finds that the potential award (from any 
Commission actions and related actions, collectively) exceeds what is 
reasonably necessary to reward the whistleblower and to incentivize 
similarly situated whistleblowers. Further, proposed paragraph (d)(2) 
would have made clear that any increases or decreases to a 
whistleblower's Award Amount under that paragraph shall not yield a 
potential award payout (as assessed by the Commission at the time that 
it makes the award determination) below $30 million, nor may any 
reduction result in the total amount awarded to all meritorious 
whistleblowers, collectively, for each covered or related action 
constituting less than 10 percent of the monetary sanctions collected 
in that action.

[[Page 70913]]

2. Comments Received
    This proposed rule received a substantial number of public 
comments. Many of these letters were one of two different form letters 
that opposed proposed paragraph (d), as described in the letters. The 
first set of these form letters incorrectly stated that proposed 
paragraph (d) would ``cap[] rewards in the largest cases to the lowest 
percentage rate.'' \115\ The second set of form letters--contrary to 
the explanations offered in the Proposing Release--claimed that 
paragraph (d) would ``plac[e] an arbitrary limit'' on rewards and 
``authorize . . . drastic reductions in the amount of rewards in major 
fraud cases.'' \116\ The proposed rule would not have imposed a ``cap'' 
or an ``arbitrary limit,'' nor would it have resulted in a ``drastic 
reduction'' in Award Amounts. Aside from the form-letter comments, the 
Commission received approximately 30 unique comment letters from 
persons expressing views on proposed paragraph (d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ Form Letter A.
    \116\ Form Letter C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A minority of the unique comments supported the proposal.\117\ One 
such commenter stated that there is a public policy interest in 
allowing the Commission to make discretionary increases or decreases to 
Award Amounts with extremely large payouts because, according to the 
commenter, there is not necessarily a correlation between the size of a 
judgment and the seriousness of the violation; as a result, it could be 
perceived as unfair if an uncomplicated whistleblower submission could 
earn a whistleblower a significant windfall.\118\ Relatedly, another 
commenter asserted that awards substantially over $30 million create a 
potential public perception of ``jackpot justice'' that may harm the 
overall credibility of the Commission's enforcement program.\119\ 
Additionally, two commenters asserted that awards over $30 million 
provide little marginal incentive for a whistleblower to come forward 
because individuals who receive awards over that amount should be 
financially secure for the rest of their lives.\120\ Another commenter 
who supported proposed paragraph (d) stated that the Commission should 
have the flexibility to adjust awards downward as it deems appropriate 
provided that the Commission explains its reasoning in the award 
order.\121\
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    \117\ The Commission also received a draft paper that supported 
proposed Rule 21F-6(d), asserting (among other things) that relying 
strictly on award percentages (without consideration of the 
corresponding dollar amount) ``does not ensure that awards will not 
vastly exceed what is necessary to incentivize whistleblowers to 
come forward[.]'' Amanda M. Rose, Calculating SEC Whistleblower 
Awards: A Theoretical Approach (May 28, 2019 Draft).
    \118\ See Anonymous-9 Letter.
    \119\ See SIFMA Letter.
    \120\ See SIFMA Letter; CWC Letter.
    \121\ See letter from Anonymous-123 (Oct. 31, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the unique comment letters opposing the proposed 
provision, the principal arguments against it generally related to the 
mechanism in paragraph (d)(2) that would formalize the use of 
Commission discretion to reduce large awards downward--but never below 
$30 million--under certain circumstances.\122\ The principal arguments 
against paragraph (d)(2) are listed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ Several commenters noted that the proposed rule may be 
unnecessary because the Commission has not made any awards above the 
$30 million threshold. See, e.g., TAF Letter. But in fact the 
Commission had issued two awards exceeding $30 million to a single 
whistleblower. See In the Matter of the Claims for an Award in 
Connection with a Notice of Covered Action, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-82987, 2018 WL 1378788 (Mar. 19, 2018); In the Matter of the 
Claims for an Award in Connection with a Notice of Covered Action, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-73174, 2014 WL 4678597 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
Moreover, since the comments in question were received, the 
Commission has made additional awards to individual whistleblowers 
above $30 million. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Claims for an 
Award in Connection with a Notice of Covered Action, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-89002, 2020 WL 3030497 (June 4, 2020); In the Matter 
of the Claims for an Award in Connection with a Notice of Covered 
Action, Exchange Act Release No. 34-85412, 2019 WL 1353776 (Mar. 26, 
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     By permitting a reduction to or a capping of awards, the 
provision could disincentivize whistleblowers who may have information 
about massive frauds or other securities law violations.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See, e.g., TAF Letter; Cohen Milstein Letter; Markopolos 
Letter; Public Citizen Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Large awards are important to the program's success 
because these awards generate public awareness of the program.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See, e.g., TAF Letter; National Whistleblower Center 
Letter (Sept. 18, 2018) (``NWC Sept. 18 Letter'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The proposal to reduce awards could contravene the 
statutory language that prohibits the Commission from taking the IPF's 
balance into account when making whistleblower award 
determinations.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ See, e.g., TAF Letter; AFREF Letter; NWC Sept. 18 Letter; 
Sen. Grassley Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In considering whether to adopt a mechanism to reduce 
large awards, the Commission should focus exclusively on motivating 
people who know of potential securities law violations to report the 
violation and not on whether the monies could be used for other 
important public purposes.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ See Admati & Steele Letter; NWC Sept. 18 Letter; Sen. 
Grassley Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The proposal would establish a 10 percent cap for awards 
above $30 million and the statute does not permit such a cap.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See TAF Letter; letter from Taylor S. Amarel (Aug. 16, 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     By operating as a 10 percent cap on whistleblower awards, 
the rule could decrease the amount of overseas violations of the 
securities laws that are detected because large awards incentivize 
foreigners who may lack employment anti-retaliation protections under 
U.S. law.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ See NWC Sept. 18 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A 10 percent cap on awards could discourage companies from 
maintaining adequate internal compliance programs if companies are 
aware that whistleblowers are less likely to report potential 
violations to the Commission.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See NWC Sept. 18 Letter; see also Sen. Grassley Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Large awards are needed to help mitigate the cost of 
professional and social sanctions that whistleblowers might 
experience.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See, e.g., letter from Wampler Buchanan Walker Chabrow 
Banciella & Stanley, P.A. (Sept. 14, 2018) (``Wampler Letter''); 
Sen. Grassley Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The proposed rule would introduce an additional layer of 
uncertainty for potential whistleblowers and thus could reduce their 
willingness to assume the risks associated with reporting.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See, e.g., TAF Letter; NWC Sept. 18 Letter; Better Markets 
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A ``cap'' would be unfair to individuals who disclose 
industry-wide frauds because they might no longer be able to work in 
their chosen field.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See Markopolos Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Proposed paragraph (d)(2)'s terms such as ``reasonably 
necessary'' are ``fuzzy'' and may result in downward-award adjustments 
based on political considerations.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ See Think Computer Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The $30 million threshold in proposed paragraph (d)(2) is 
not based on the value of the particular whistleblower's information or 
behavior.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ See Sen. Grassley Letter; see also Wampler Letter; letter 
from Anonymous-43 (Sept. 9, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     ``By simultaneously increasing the smallest awards and 
decreasing the largest awards,'' the Commission ``risks encouraging 
more low-level employees to report minor fraud while potentially 
deterring high-level executives from reporting major fraud.'' \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ See Admati & Steele Letter; see also Better Markets 
Letter; Jansson Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments on this proposed rule and further 
analysis of the operation of the whistleblower

[[Page 70914]]

program to date, we have concluded that it is not necessary to adopt 
the formalized mechanism for the Commission to exercise its discretion 
to apply the Award Factors and set Award Amounts, and thus we have 
determined not to adopt it. We note that many of the comments received 
demonstrated a misperception of Proposed Rule 21F-6(d)(2) that would 
have applied to exceedingly large potential awards. A significant 
number of commenters asserted that this proposed rule would effectively 
result in Award Amounts being capped or set at the statutory minimum. 
We think it is important to correct this misunderstanding for potential 
whistleblowers and the public generally: Proposed Rule 21F-6(d)(2) did 
not introduce a cap nor was it intended to function in any way as an 
award cap.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ Our determination not to adopt proposed paragraph (d)(2) 
or any other downward-departure mechanism is not intended to imply 
that we agree with the arguments advanced by the comments opposing 
it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Rule 21F-6(b)--Interpretive Guidance Regarding the Meaning of 
``unreasonable delay''

1. Proposed Guidance
    Rule 21F-6(b)(2) provides that the Commission will reduce an award 
if it finds that the whistleblower engaged in ``unreasonable delay'' in 
reporting a potential securities-law violation to the Commission. 
Further, new Rule 21F-6(c)--as discussed above--provides that the 
presumption under that rule will generally not be available if a 
whistleblower engaged in unreasonable delay. In the Proposing Release, 
we explained that any delay in reporting to the Commission beyond 180 
days would be deemed presumptively unreasonable.
    In proposing this interpretive guidance, we explained that the 
presumption could be overcome depending on potential highly unusual 
facts and circumstances of a particular award application connected to 
the delay. We also cautioned that shorter periods of delay (i.e., less 
than 180 days) may also qualify as unreasonable depending on the 
particular facts and circumstances at issue, including, for example, 
whether the violations were ongoing, whether investors continued to 
experience harm or the whistleblower continued to profit from the 
wrongdoing during the period of the whistleblower's delay, or whether 
the delay had a discernable impact on the monetary sanctions that were 
ordered in the enforcement action.
2. Comments Received
    We received only a few comments on the proposed unreasonable-delay 
guidance.\137\ One commenter voiced support, asserting that the 
guidance would bring clarity and establish a general bright-line 
standard that could be adjusted on a case-by-case basis.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See TAF Letter; Wampler Buchanan Letter; Think Computer 
Letter.
    \138\ See TAF Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters expressed concerns about the guidance. One asserted 
that a whistleblower who is genuinely continuing to pursue internal 
compliance procedures past the 180-day period should not be 
presumptively deemed to have unreasonably delayed reporting.\139\ The 
other commenter who opposed the guidance expressed the view that the 
Commission should continue to evaluate unreasonable delay on a case-by-
case basis.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See Wampler Letter.
    \140\ Think Computer Letter. This commenter noted as an 
illustration supporting the continuation of a case-by-case basis 
that it may sometimes be reasonable for a whistleblower to delay 
beyond 180 days to avoid burdening the Commission with confusing and 
potentially peripheral information. But once a potential 
whistleblower knows the relevant facts that comprise a potential 
securities law violation the potential whistleblower should take 
appropriate steps to report those facts without delay irrespective 
of any concern by the whistleblower that certain of the facts may 
turn out to be peripheral or otherwise not relevant to the potential 
violation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments on this proposed rule and as a 
result of further analysis of the operation of the whistleblower 
program, we have determined not to adopt a specific time-based 
presumption of unreasonable delay as interpretive guidance. We continue 
to believe that a 180-day time period may be consistent with 
unreasonable delay in many circumstances. But we are persuaded that the 
idiosyncratic nature of the various claims the Commission is often 
presented with counsels in favor of continuing to assess the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Among other relevant considerations in 
assessing whether a delay was in part or in whole unreasonable (and 
whether any reduction is warranted if the delay was unreasonable) 
include whether the delay was a result of circumstances beyond the 
whistleblower's control and whether reasonable actions were taken by 
the whistleblower during the period of delay.
    For example, we agree with the commenter who expressed the view 
that delay by a whistleblower who is genuinely following internal 
compliance procedures or otherwise genuinely attempting to address the 
misconduct internally may be reasonable. Specifically, if the 
whistleblower provides evidence for the administrative record that the 
whistleblower was continuing to pursue the matter internally and the 
company's responses to the whistleblower indicated that the company was 
taking investigatory or remedial action in a diligent and timely 
fashion, delay of up to or more than a 180-day period may be deemed 
reasonable under the facts and circumstances. The Commission will also 
continue to consider, for example, whether a whistleblower's delay was 
in whole or in part reasonably attributable to illness or other 
personal or family circumstances or to a reasonable amount of time 
spent attempting to ascertain relevant facts or obtain an attorney in 
order to remain anonymous.
    The Commission will continue to evaluate whether the violations 
were continuing during the delay and whether investors were being 
harmed during that time. Another relevant consideration that the 
Commission may consider is whether the delay threatened the 
Commission's ability to pursue the violations either because of the 
statute of limitations,\141\ or the loss or destruction of evidence 
during the period of delay. The Commission will also continue to 
consider whether the whistleblower might ultimately profit from the 
delay by obtaining a larger Award Amount because the failure to report 
permitted the misconduct to continue, which can affect the calculation 
of the monetary sanctions, including, for example, increased 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and penalties. The Commission will 
continue to set awards at amounts that appropriately reflect these 
considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ The Supreme Court has held that the Commission may not 
seek disgorgement or penalties in any enforcement action that is 
brought after five years of the date the violation occurred. See 
Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017); Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 
(2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We continue to encourage whistleblowers to report as early as 
possible, to ensure the Commission is able to timely address misconduct 
and, whenever possible, return those funds to harmed investors.

H. Amendment to Exchange Act Rule 21F-2--Whistleblower Status, Award 
Eligibility, Confidentiality, and Retaliation Protection

1. Proposed Rule
    As explained in the Proposing Release, proposed Rule 21F-2 sought 
to

[[Page 70915]]

conform whistleblower status, award eligibility, confidentiality, and 
retaliation protection in light of the Supreme Court's holding 
regarding Section 21F in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers.\142\ In 
Digital Realty, the Court held that Dodd-Frank's definition of 
``whistleblower,'' codified in Section 21F(a)(6),\143\ requires a 
report to the Commission as a prerequisite for retaliation protection, 
and that the Commission's broader interpretation of that term in 
connection with retaliation protection under Section 21F was therefore 
not entitled to deference.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
    \143\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(6).
    \144\ Digital Realty Trust, 138 S. Ct. at 781-82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to Digital Realty, proposed Rule 21F-2(a) provided a 
uniform definition of whistleblower status to apply for all purposes 
under Section 21F--award eligibility, confidentiality, and retaliation 
protection--while tracking the ``whistleblower'' definition in Section 
21F(a)(6). Accordingly, proposed Rule 21F-2(a) conferred whistleblower 
status only on (i) an individual; (ii) who provides the Commission with 
information ``in writing''; and only if (iii) ``the information relates 
to a possible violation of the federal securities laws (including any 
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission) 
that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.''
    Proposed Rules 21F-2(b), (c), and (d) specified how the 
whistleblower status conferred by paragraph (a) operates across the 
various contexts of award eligibility, confidentiality, and retaliation 
protection. Thus, proposed Rule 21F-2(b) specified that, to be eligible 
for an award in a Commission action based on information provided to 
the Commission, a person ``must comply with the procedures and the 
conditions described in'' Rules 21F-4, 21F-8, and 21F-9. Likewise, 
proposed Rule 21F-2(c) specified that, to qualify for confidentiality 
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(2) \145\ based on information 
provided to the Commission, a person ``must comply with the procedures 
and the conditions described in'' Rule 21F-9(a)--that is, must submit 
information using the Commission's online portal or Form TCR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 21F-2(d) sought to define the scope of retaliation 
protection under Section 21F consistent with the Supreme Court's 
holding in Digital Realty, by specifying both who is eligible for 
protection as a whistleblower and also what conduct is protected from 
employment retaliation.\146\ In explaining who is eligible for 
retaliation protection, proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(i) and (ii) required 
that a person must ``qualify as a whistleblower under section (a) 
before experiencing the retaliation'' for which redress is sought and 
also must ``reasonably believe'' that the information provided to the 
Commission relates to a possible securities law violation. In 
explaining what conduct is protected from retaliation, proposed Rule 
21F-2(d)(iii) required that a person must perform a ``lawful act'' that 
both is done in connection with any of the activities described in 
Section 21F(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)\147\ and also ``relate[s] to the subject 
matter of'' the person's submission to the Commission under proposed 
Rule 21F-2(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ See Digital Realty Trust, 138 S. Ct. at 777.
    \147\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(2) resolved a timing issue not addressed by 
either the statute or the Digital Realty decision, by clarifying that a 
person does not need to qualify as a whistleblower under Rule 21F-2(a) 
at the time she or he performed the lawful act described in Rule 21F-
2(d)(1)(iii), in order to be eligible for retaliation protection; 
rather, a person eligible for retaliation protection is protected from 
retaliation for prior lawful acts when the alleged retaliatory conduct 
occurs after the person qualifies as a whistleblower. Moreover, 
proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(3) and (4) carried forward provisions of the 
existing Rule 21F-2 without a substantive change. Paragraph (d)(3) 
stated that retaliation protection applies regardless of whether a 
person satisfies all the procedures and conditions to qualify for an 
award. Paragraph (d)(4) stated that the retaliation prohibition in 
Section 21F(h)(1) and the rules thereunder shall be enforceable in an 
action or proceeding brought by the Commission.
2. Comments Received
    We received several comments addressing proposed Rule 21F-2's 
definition of whistleblower status and the scope of retaliation 
protection.\148\ Commenters generally acknowledged the need to revise 
these aspects of the existing rule to conform to the Digital Realty 
decision.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ We did not receive any comments addressing the following 
aspects of proposed Rule 21F-2: Limiting whistleblower status to 
individuals, under proposed Rule 21F-2(a)(2); the clarification of 
the phrase ``securities laws'' in Section 21F(a)(6), under proposed 
Rule 21F-2(a)(1); defining award eligibility and confidentiality, 
under proposed Rule 21F-2(b) and (c); extending retaliation 
protection to a lawful act performed in connection with any of the 
activities described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), under 
proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii)(A); and providing that Section 
21F(h)(1) and the rules thereunder shall be enforceable by the 
Commission, under proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(4).
    \149\ See, e.g., CWC Letter; SIFMA Letter. But see joint letter 
from National Employment Lawyers Association, Government 
Accountability Project, and Public Citizen (Sept. 18, 2018) (``NELA 
Letter'') (opposing proposed rule to the extent it went further than 
required by Digital Realty); TAF Letter (endorsing comments from 
NELA); letter from Anonymous-52 (Sept. 7, 2018) (arguing that the 
Commission should challenge Digital Realty as wrongly decided).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters were divided on the proposal to require that a person 
provide information ``in writing'' to the Commission in order to 
qualify for whistleblower status under Rule 21F-2(a)(1). Two commenters 
supported the ``in writing'' proposal. One suggested further requiring 
that information be provided consistent with Rule 21F-9(a)--that is, 
either on Form TCR or through the online portal--not only for award 
eligibility and confidentiality, but also for retaliation 
protection.\150\ The other recommended that the Commission make it a 
practice to physically or electronically date-stamp every written 
submission.\151\ One commenter opposed the ``in writing'' requirement 
as too restrictive, since people may make oral reports out of a sense 
of urgency or fear of retaliation, and since oral reports in the form 
of interviews or testimony can still provide substantial assistance to 
the Commission.\152\ Three joint commenters opposed the ``in writing'' 
requirement as not required by the text of Section 21F and as 
inconsistent with the statute's remedial purpose, while observing that 
Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (``Sarbanes-Oxley'') \153\ 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (``FLSA'') \154\ have been construed 
as affording protection to oral reports.\155\ These joint commenters 
also asserted that, contrary to the justifications for this requirement 
in the Proposing Release, committing oral reports to writing would not 
pose a burden to the Commission's staff and there was no evidence that 
past protections for oral reports under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806 and 
Exchange Act Section 21F had enmeshed the Commission's staff in 
disputes in private retaliation lawsuits.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ See CCMC Letter.
    \151\ See CWC Letter.
    \152\ See TAF Letter.
    \153\ 18 U.S.C. 1514A.
    \154\ 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3).
    \155\ See NELA Letter.
    \156\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, commenters were divided on the specific request for 
comment whether the new rule should enumerate any additional ``manner'' 
of providing

[[Page 70916]]

information to the Commission. One commenter argued against enumerating 
any of the manners described in clause (ii) of Section 21F(h)(1)(A), 
such as testimony, since this commenter agreed with the analysis in the 
Proposing Release that clause (ii) is best read as extending employment 
retaliation protection to acts of continued cooperation by a person who 
has already provided information to the Commission.\157\ But other 
commenters supported enumerating the manners described in clause (ii) 
precisely because Section 21F lists them and because of the 
Commission's interest in ensuring that persons can testify or otherwise 
assist the Commission without reprisal.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See CWC Letter (citing Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR 
34,702, 34,718 n.144 (July 20, 2018)).
    \158\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters offered further feedback on the definition of 
whistleblower status under proposed Rule 21F-2(a)(1). Some commenters 
supported the extension of whistleblower status to persons who provide 
information concerning ``possible'' violations of the federal 
securities laws.\159\ Another commenter suggested excluding from 
whistleblower status any individual who participated in wrongdoing, on 
a theory of unclean hands.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See id.
    \160\ See CCMC Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters took opposing views on whether an individual should be 
required to report to the Commission before receiving retaliation 
protection under proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(1). One commenter supported 
this requirement as dictated by the Digital Realty decision and 
observed the logical impossibility of ``commit[ting] retaliation 
because of a protected activity that has not yet occurred.'' \161\ 
Three joint commenters believed, to the contrary, that this approach, 
in combination with the proposed protection for ``lawful acts'' done 
before the Commission report, would create a loophole by not protecting 
those who report internally before approaching the Commission, thereby 
incentivizing prompt firings for internal reports.\162\ These 
commenters further believed this approach would encourage an employer 
to argue that the employee was fired in retaliation for the internal 
report rather than the report to the Commission.\163\ As an 
alternative, these commenters proposed that the internal disclosure be 
deemed an initial step in disclosing to the Commission, and that the 
employer be required to forward the internal disclosure and its 
response to the Commission.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ See CWC Letter (emphasis in original).
    \162\ See NELA Letter.
    \163\ See id.
    \164\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three joint commenters supported the proposal to afford retaliation 
protection, just as the current rule does, to persons who ``reasonably 
believe'' that the information provided to the Commission concerns a 
possible violation of the federal securities laws under proposed Rule 
21F-2(d)(1)(ii).\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters disagreed with one another on the limitation under 
proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii)(B) that retaliation protection will 
attach to a lawful act only if that act ``relate[s] to the subject 
matter of your submission to the Commission under'' Rule 21F-2(a). One 
commenter supported this ``subject matter'' limitation as embodying the 
principle that the submission to the Commission establishes the 
parameters of retaliation protection.\166\ Three joint commenters 
opposed this limitation as not required by either the text of Section 
21F or the Digital Realty decision and as injecting uncertainty as to 
how close a nexus would be required between the lawful act and the 
subject matter of the submission.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ See CWC Letter.
    \167\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter urged against the proposal to afford retaliation 
protection, just as the current rule does, regardless of whether the 
individual also satisfies the procedures and conditions for award 
eligibility, under proposed Rule 21F-2(d)(3).\168\ This commenter 
instead advocated for expressly treating the procedures and conditions 
for award eligibility under Rules 21F-4, 21F-8, and 21F-9 as 
prerequisites for retaliation protection.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See CCMC Letter.
    \169\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters were divided in responding to the request for comment 
whether participation in internal compliance systems should continue to 
be considered in determining the amount of an award, given the change 
in retaliation protection resulting from the Digital Realty decision. 
Two commenters \170\ as well as three joint commenters \171\ supported 
retaining this factor in the award analysis. One commenter believed 
that doing so would maintain the incentives for robust internal 
compliance programs, which the commenter described as the first and 
best line of defense against violations of the federal securities 
laws.\172\ This commenter also suggested that the Commission consider 
an explicit program that, in appropriate cases where an individual 
bypasses internal compliance and goes directly to the Commission, would 
allow the company to run its own internal investigation and report the 
results before the Commission staff takes substantial investigative 
steps.\173\ A second commenter similarly cited the benefits of internal 
compliance programs for both employers and employees,\174\ while three 
joint commenters suggested that the Commission should retain this award 
factor while actively warning individuals about the limitations on 
retaliation protection for internal disclosures.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ See CWC Letter; SIFMA Letter.
    \171\ See NELA Letter.
    \172\ See SIFMA Letter.
    \173\ See id.
    \174\ See CWC Letter.
    \175\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Five commenters opposed keeping participation in internal 
compliance systems as a consideration in determining the amount of an 
award, reasoning that the Digital Realty decision leaves such reports 
unprotected from retaliation.\176\ One commenter stated that it is 
simply not practical to assume that individuals will always be able to 
submit reports simultaneously to the Commission and to an internal 
compliance program.\177\ Three commenters argued that any provisions to 
encourage internal reports would be illegal in light of the Supreme 
Court's recognition in Digital Realty that Congress designed Section 
21F not to encourage internal reports but to encourage reports to the 
Commission.\178\ These same three commenters further suggested that the 
Commission clarify that the internal compliance programs addressed in 
proposed Rule 21F-2 do not include internal investigations led by 
company counsel and that the Commission eliminate existing Rule 21F-
4(b)(4)(iii), which generally requires certain employees in managerial, 
compliance, and other positions as well as auditors to wait 120 days 
before reporting to the Commission.\179\ On the elimination of Rule 
21F-4(b)(4)(iii), these three commenters were joined by a fourth.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ See letter from Anonymous-64 (Aug. 21, 2018) (``Anonymous-
64 Letter''); Sen. Grassley Letter; Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto July 24 
Letter; Morrell Letter; TAF Letter.
    \177\ See Sen. Grassley Letter.
    \178\ See Anonymous-64 Letter; Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto July 24 
Letter; Morrell Letter.
    \179\ See id.
    \180\ See Sen. Grassley Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also took opposing views on whether proposed Rule 21F-2 
should enumerate additional forms of retaliation as falling within the 
prohibition in Section 21F(h)(1)(A). One

[[Page 70917]]

commenter endorsed enumerating ``downstream'' conduct such as 
preventing a whistleblower from obtaining future employment,\181\ while 
another commenter opposed doing so based on its assertion that the law 
is less clear as to retaliation protection for future employment.\182\ 
Three joint commenters supported broadly construing the retaliation 
prohibition to encompass any employment action that is reasonably 
likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ See TAF Letter.
    \182\ See CWC Letter (citing Dellinger v. Science Applications 
Int'l Corp., 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011)).
    \183\ See NELA Letter (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. 
v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we are adopting Rule 21F-2 as 
proposed, with the addition of interpretive guidance defining the scope 
of retaliatory conduct prohibited by Section 21F(h)(1)(A). In addition, 
in the Proposing Release we observed that proposed Rule 21F-2 would 
render inapplicable the formal interpretation that the Commission 
issued in 2015 regarding the meaning of Exchange Act Rule 21F-9. See 83 
FR at 34718 n.193 (citing Interpretation of the SEC's Whistleblower 
Rules under Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 80 FR 
47829 (Aug. 10, 2015)). That formal interpretation explained that 
compliance with Exchange Act Rule 21F-9 was not required to qualify as 
a whistleblower for purposes of Section 21F's employment retaliation 
protections. See 80 FR at 47830. Because the Digital Realty decision 
has since adopted a narrower reading of what is required to qualify as 
a whistleblower for Section 21F's employment retaliation protections, 
we now repeal that interpretive guidance as obsolete.
4. Whistleblower Status Under Rule 21F-2(a)
    Requiring information to be provided to the Commission ``in 
writing'' as a condition of whistleblower status under Rule 21F-2(a) 
appropriately addresses the interests of affording flexibility to 
persons who report to the Commission and promoting reasonable certainty 
and efficiency for the Commission, including for the Commission staff 
who receive and process such reports. Were the rule to require that 
such reports also comply with Rule 21F-9(a)--that is, that they be made 
either on Form TCR or through the online portal--for retaliation 
protection, as one commenter suggested,\184\ the burden to persons 
making such reports would increase without any corresponding benefit. 
As the Proposing Release explained, compliance with Rule 21F-9(a) is 
required in other contexts because it allows precise and reliable 
tracking of information for determining award eligibility as well as 
for helping clarify which submitters should receive heightened 
confidential treatment. There would be no similar benefit in the 
retaliation context, however, where the key issue following Digital 
Realty is not how the information was handled by the Commission's staff 
but whether the information was provided to the Commission at all.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ See CCMC Letter.
    \185\ As for the suggestion that the staff make it a practice to 
date-stamp every written submission, see CWC Letter, we observe that 
it is already the staff's practice to upload to the TCR System, upon 
receipt, every written report of a possible securities law 
violation. That system automatically generates an electronic record 
of the date and time the corresponding TCR is created within the 
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nor are we persuaded that the ``in writing'' requirement is too 
onerous, as other commenters suggested.\186\ Our experience to date in 
the awards context suggests that this requirement presents, at most, a 
minimal burden to individuals who want to report potential securities 
law violations to the Commission while facilitating the staff's use of 
the information. To the degree that some individuals may face urgent 
circumstances,\187\ the ``in writing'' requirement affords ample 
flexibility in the means of transmission--for example, online 
submission, email, facsimile, or U.S. Mail--to meet that urgency. 
Moreover, given that Digital Realty has altered the legal landscape by 
strictly limiting retaliation protection to persons who have reported 
to the Commission, as distinct from persons who report internally, we 
anticipate that direct reports to the Commission may increase, and so 
protecting oral reports to the Commission could result in litigation 
disputes about what information was orally provided and on what dates. 
We decline the invitation of three joint commenters \188\ to 
investigate how many such disputes arose in the past, since the Digital 
Realty decision is likely to encourage more direct reports to the 
Commission and thus any earlier data would likely have limited 
predictive value under the post-Digital Realty regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ See, e.g., TAF Letter.
    \187\ See id.
    \188\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nor is a contrary result required by judicial decisions finding 
oral reports protected under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806 and the FLSA, 
since those decisions typically addressed oral reports made internally 
to an employer who necessarily had a pre-existing employment 
relationship with the complainant.\189\ Our rule, by contrast, must 
preserve administrative efficiency and reliability while addressing 
external reports to the Commission from members of the public 
throughout the country and, indeed, across the globe.\190\ Exchange Act 
Section 21F(a)(6) allows us discretion to determine the required 
``manner'' of providing information, and we conclude that limiting 
whistleblower status to reports made ``in writing'' is the better 
programmatic approach for the reasons above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See id. (collecting cases). Indeed, the cited Supreme 
Court decision addressing the FLSA did not extend retaliation 
protection to all oral reports, but only to those oral reports 
sufficient to give the employer fair notice that the employee was 
making a complaint. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11-14.
    \190\ See Office of the Whistleblower, 2018 Annual Report to 
Congress 22-23 (2018) (documenting geographic dispersal of 
whistleblowers throughout the United States and from 72 other 
countries during fiscal year 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to keeping the ``in writing'' requirement, we have 
decided to adopt proposed Rule 21F-2(a) without specifying any other 
``manners'' of providing information to the Commission. Although some 
commenters suggested that we specify the additional conduct enumerated 
in clause (ii) of Section 21F(h)(1)(A), such as testimony in an action 
brought by the Commission, we adhere to our analysis of clause (ii) in 
the Proposing Release. In particular, because clause (ii) refers to 
``such information'' provided under the preceding clause (i), we 
continue to believe that clause (ii) is more reasonably understood as 
extending employment retaliation protection to acts of continued 
cooperation by a person who has already provided information to the 
Commission. And, as a practical matter, providing information to the 
Commission in writing presents a minimal burden for any individual who 
wants to receive retaliation protection under Section 21F for such acts 
of continued cooperation.
    We have also declined the invitation of one commenter \191\ to 
modify proposed Rule 21F-2(a) to exclude from whistleblower status any 
individual who participated in wrongdoing. Nothing in the Digital 
Realty decision, which is the impetus for the present revisions to Rule 
21F-2, requires such an exclusion. Even were we writing on a blank 
slate, we find it significant that Congress chose not to adopt such a 
broad limitation on whistleblower status under Section 21F(a)(6), but 
instead

[[Page 70918]]

chose the more narrow option of denying award eligibility under Section 
21F(c)(2)(B) \192\ to ``any whistleblower who is convicted of a 
criminal violation related to the [covered action] for which the 
whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under this section.'' 
Based on our experience to date, moreover, existing Rule 21F-6(b)(1) 
provides appropriate flexibility on a case-by-case basis for decreasing 
an award based on a whistleblower's culpability.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ See CCMC Letter.
    \192\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(c)(2)(B).
    \193\ Indeed, the Commission followed a similar analysis when it 
declined suggestions to implement a per se exclusion for culpable 
whistleblowers in our 2011 rulemaking. See Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protections, 76 FR 34300, 34350-51 (June 13, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Retaliation Protection Under Rule 21F-2(d)
    We are adopting Rule 21F-2(d)(1) as proposed to limit retaliation 
protection to persons who qualify as whistleblowers by providing 
information to the Commission before experiencing retaliation, as 
expressly required by the Digital Realty decision.\194\ At the same 
time, we are also adopting Rule 21F-2(d)(2) as proposed to extend 
retaliation protection to lawful acts described in Exchange Act Section 
21F(h)(1)(A) even if done before reporting to the Commission when the 
retaliation takes place after a person qualifies as a ``whistleblower'' 
by providing information directly ``to the Commission'' consistent with 
Section 21F(a)(6). We believe this interpretation is consistent with 
the language of Section 21F(h)(1)(A).\195\ Although the net result is 
to limit retaliation protection for persons who report internally 
before reporting to the Commission,\196\ this outcome is driven by the 
Supreme Court's holding that Section 21F distinguishes between ``who'' 
is protected as a whistleblower under Section 21F(a)(6) and ``what'' 
conduct is protected under Section 21F(h)(1)(A).\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ See Digital Realty Trust, 138 S. Ct. at 778 (``Somers did 
not provide information `to the Commission' before his termination, 
Sec.  78u-6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a `whistleblower' at the 
time of the alleged retaliation. He is therefore ineligible to seek 
relief under Sec.  78u-6(h).'').
    \195\ See Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR 34720 (July 20, 
2018) (observing that the statute is silent on this timing issue).
    \196\ Cf. NELA Letter.
    \197\ See Digital Realty Trust, 138 S. Ct. at 777.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Supreme Court's holding forecloses the alternative suggested by 
certain commenters \198\ that we require employers to forward all 
internal reports to the Commission and that we therefore afford 
retaliation protection to an employee's internal report as an ``initial 
step'' in reporting to the Commission. Even under that suggested 
regime, retaliation protection under Section 21F would not attach to a 
person who reported only indirectly--by making an internal report that 
was then forwarded by the employer to the Commission--until that same 
person also qualified as a ``whistleblower'' by providing information 
directly ``to the Commission'' consistent with Section 21F(a)(6).\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See NELA Letter.
    \199\ Even where retaliation protection under Section 21F does 
not attach, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806 may still provide retaliation 
protection for certain internal reports. See 18 U.S.C. 1514A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are adopting Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii)(B) as proposed to state that 
retaliation protection will attach to a lawful act performed by a 
whistleblower only if the act ``relate[s] to the subject matter of'' 
the whistleblower's report to the Commission. Given Section 21F's 
silence and the Supreme Court's decision not to address whether any 
such connection should be required,\200\ ``we believe this 
clarification helps avoid the incongruous result that a person could 
qualify just once as a whistleblower and then receive lifetime 
protection for any non-Commission reports . . . with respect to 
distinct securities law violations that occur years later.'' \201\ This 
provision thus helps effectuate what the Supreme Court recognized as 
Congress's core objective of encouraging reports to the 
Commission.\202\ Although some commenters expressed reservations about 
the uncertainty this provision might generate for whistleblowers,\203\ 
we anticipate that this provision will be applied in a flexible manner 
to accommodate whistleblowers who make a good-faith effort to comply 
with our rules in seeking retaliation protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See Digital Realty Trust, 138 S. Ct. at 780-81.
    \201\ See Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR 34720 n.168 (July 
20, 2018).
    \202\ See Digital Realty Trust, 138 S. Ct. at 777.
    \203\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are declining the invitation of one commenter \204\ to limit 
retaliation protection strictly to persons who satisfy the procedures 
and conditions for award eligibility under Rules 21F-4, 21F-8, and 21F-
9. Such a limitation would create significant and arbitrary hazards for 
whistleblowers who typically would be unable to assess at the time they 
report to the Commission, for example, whether their information is 
``original'' under Rule 21F-4(b)(1)(ii) in the sense that it is not 
already known to the Commission from any other source. The text, 
history, and purposes of Section 21F do not indicate that such an 
approach would be appropriate. To the contrary, that approach would 
severely undermine the incentives for individuals to report potential 
securities law violations to the Commission as intended by Congress.
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    \204\ See CCMC Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the scope of the retaliatory conduct prohibited by Section 
21F(h)(1)(A), we agree with the commenter who asserted that the 
decisional law is too uncertain to warrant revising Rule 21F-2 to 
prohibit discrimination by an employer against a whistleblower who is 
not currently employed, but rather seeking prospective employment.\205\ 
Accordingly, Rule 21F-2 as adopted remains silent on that question. At 
the same time, we have determined to provide guidance, following the 
Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway 
Company v. White, that we interpret Section 21F(h)(1)(A) as prohibiting 
any retaliatory activity by an employer against a whistleblower that 
``a reasonable employee [would find] materially adverse,'' which means 
``it well might have dissuade[d] a reasonable worker'' from engaging in 
any lawful act encompassed by Section 21F(h)(1)(A).\206\ In particular, 
we conclude that such a broad standard will promote greater ease of 
administration than revising Rule 21F-2 to include a list of prohibited 
forms of retaliation,\207\ which might inadvertently omit certain 
retaliatory activities that otherwise would meet the Burlington 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ See CWC Letter (citing Dellinger v. Science Applications 
Int'l Corp. 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011)). Much like the FLSA 
retaliation provision at issue in Dellinger, see 649 F.3d at 228-30, 
the language of Section 21F(h)(1)(A) focuses on employment 
relationships without expressly encompassing prospective employers.
    \206\ 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In Burlington, the Supreme Court construed the phrase 
``discriminate against'' in the retaliation provision of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 57. That statute stated, in 
relevant part, ``It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants 
for employment'' because of their protected conduct. Id. at 62 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Section 21F(h)(1)(A) reads at least as broadly, ``No employer 
may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against a 
whistleblower'' because of the whistleblower's protected conduct. 15 
U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). Given that both statutes 
use the same phrase ``discriminate against,'' we expect that courts 
will follow Burlington in construing the scope of retaliatory 
conduct covered by Section 21F(h)(1)(A).
    \207\ Cf. NELA Letter.

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[[Page 70919]]

6. Other Rules Addressing Internal Compliance
    In the Proposing Release, we solicited comment on whether, given 
the change in retaliation protection following Digital Realty, it would 
be appropriate to change the Commission's use of award criteria that 
consider participation in internal compliance systems. As discussed 
above, a number of commenters suggested it would be inappropriate or 
even unlawful to retain such award criteria and Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(iii) 
in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 21F as 
conditioning retaliation protection on reporting to the Commission 
rather than simply reporting internally.\208\ This interpretation is 
inconsistent with both Digital Realty and Section 21F. As the Supreme 
Court explained, Congress's enactment of Section 21F in the Dodd-Frank 
Act in 2010 built upon its earlier enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 
806, which already afforded retaliation protection for certain internal 
reports.\209\ Section 21F repealed neither Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806 
nor any of the other provisions of the federal securities laws that 
require or encourage the maintenance and use of internal compliance 
systems for responding to possible violations of the federal securities 
laws. Accordingly, we have implemented Section 21F in a way that does 
not frustrate the design of these other statutes that Congress has 
chosen to retain. To that end, it is appropriate to retain the 
provisions in our whistleblower rules that help preserve the internal 
compliance systems adopted under those other statutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ See Anonymous-64 Letter; Sen. Grassley Letter; Kohn, Kohn 
& Colapinto July 24 Letter; Morrell Letter.
    \209\ See 138 S. Ct. at 773.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on our review of the comments received, and in light of our 
experience to date, we are retaining the award criteria, particularly 
Rule 21F-6(a)(4) and (b)(3), that consider the whistleblower's 
participation in or frustration of internal compliance systems when 
determining the amount of an award. In particular, we are persuaded 
that the possibility of an increased award under Rule 21F-6(a)(4) 
remains an appropriate incentive for whistleblowers to use internal 
compliance systems where available, while the possibility of a 
decreased award under Rule 21F-6(b)(3) remains an appropriate deterrent 
against acts to undermine such a system. Nothing in either of these 
provisions will change the award analysis for a whistleblower who, out 
of fear of reprisal or for any other reason, reports directly to the 
Commission in order to secure retaliation protection under Section 21F. 
In other words, we will not construe a direct report to the Commission, 
made to secure retaliation protection under Section 21F, to constitute 
an act that undermines an internal compliance system under Rule 21F-
6(b)(3).
    Based on these same considerations, we are retaining Rule 21F-
4(b)(4)(iii), which generally requires certain employees in managerial, 
compliance, and other positions as well as auditors to wait 120 days 
before reporting to the Commission, if they want their information to 
be considered ``original'' for purposes of award eligibility. As we 
explained in adopting this rule, ``we believe there are good policy 
reasons to exclude information from consideration . . . where its use 
in a whistleblower submission might undermine the proper operation of 
internal compliance systems.'' \210\ In other words, repeal of this 
rule could create incentives for such employees and auditors to report 
potentially unlawful conduct to the Commission in hopes of an award 
instead of fulfilling their professional responsibilities within those 
internal compliance systems by internally reporting information and 
allowing a reasonable response time.\211\ While these personnel will 
lack retaliation protection under Section 21F until they report to the 
Commission, this compromise is appropriate in light of the narrow 
categories of personnel covered by Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(iii) and the need 
to preserve the proper operation of internal compliance systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 FR 
34,300, 34,317 (June 13, 2011).
    \211\ See id. at 34,315-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are declining the suggestion of one commenter \212\ to adopt an 
explicit program that, in appropriate cases where an individual 
bypasses internal compliance and goes directly to the Commission, would 
allow the company to run its own internal investigation and report the 
results before the Commission staff takes substantial investigative 
steps. The better approach in our view is to maintain the discretion of 
the Division of Enforcement to decide how best to evaluate and 
investigate potential violations, including the potential role of 
internal investigations. We see no need in light of Digital Realty to 
adopt a one-size-fits-all policy for all enforcement matters.\213\
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    \212\ See SIFMA Letter.
    \213\ We also decline the suggestion of certain commenters to 
clarify that the internal compliance programs addressed in proposed 
Rule 21F-2 do not include internal investigations led by company 
counsel. See Anonymous-64 Letter; Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto July 24 
Letter; Morrell Letter. Rule 21F-2 itself does not refer to internal 
compliance systems per se, and the suggested revision has nothing to 
do with Digital Realty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To illustrate how Rule 21F-2 will operate in practice, consider the 
following hypothetical scenario: An employee at a publicly traded 
issuer overhears a conversation by colleagues discussing a scheme to 
create an artificial boost for reported sales. The employee 
investigates and discovers that sales invoices are being generated 
without any corresponding movement of inventory, and then reports the 
possible misconduct to the issuer's chief compliance officer. But a 
week passes without any action being taken on the report. If the 
Commission then receives an email from that employee in which the 
employee reports the same possible misconduct, and in sending the email 
the employee reasonably believed that the report relates to a possible 
securities laws violation, then the employee would qualify as a 
whistleblower under Rule 21F-2(a) and would be eligible for anti-
retaliation protections under Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(i)-(ii) as of the time 
the employee provides the information to the Commission. Assuming that 
the employee's internal report was within the scope of Section 806(a) 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, that internal report itself would be a protected 
``lawful act'' under Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii). The fact that the employee 
made the internal report before the Commission report would not make a 
difference for anti-retaliation protections under Rule 21F-2(d)(2). 
That said, if the employee wanted to be eligible for an award under 
Rule 21F-2(b) and to qualify for confidentiality protections under Rule 
21F-2(c), he or she would need to make his or her first report of that 
information to the Commission using Form TCR or through the online 
portal at www.sec.gov, as required by Rule 21F-9(a), and not through an 
email to the Commission. To qualify for an award, the employee would 
additionally need to satisfy the relevant procedural requirements, 
eligibility criteria, and other conditions described in Rules 21F-3 
through 21F-18.

I. Rule 21F-8(d)--Forms Used for Whistleblower Program

1. Proposed Rule
    Rule 21F-8 describes certain requirements that a whistleblower must 
satisfy to be eligible for an award, including the form and manner in 
which information is submitted to the Commission. The Commission 
proposed to add a new paragraph (d) to provide the Commission with 
additional

[[Page 70920]]

flexibility to change the forms it uses to administer the program. The 
new subparagraph (d)(1) would allow the Commission to periodically 
designate on its web page a revised Form TCR for individuals seeking to 
submit original information to the Commission. Similarly, subparagraph 
(d)(2) would allow the Commission to periodically designate a revised 
Form WB-APP for individuals making a claim for an award.
2. Comments Received
    We received few comments on proposed Rule 21F-8(d). Two commenters 
supported the proposed amendment,\214\ while others offered suggested 
modifications.\215\ Two commenters suggested a thirty (30) day grace 
period to allow a potential whistleblower to use the prior version of 
each form before a revised version is posted to the Commission 
website.\216\ One commenter suggested that forms be amended at most 
once per year,\217\ while another commenter recommended that the 
Commission add a section to address the seven factors affecting an 
award determination.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See Think Computer Letter; TAF Letter.
    \215\ See CCMC Letter; TAF Letter.
    \216\ Id.
    \217\ See Think Computer Letter.
    \218\ See letter from Anonymous-24 (Sept. 15, 2018).
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3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we are adopting Rule 21F-8(d) as 
proposed with a slight modification. We agree that it is reasonable to 
allow a whistleblower to continue to use the superseded versions of the 
Form TCR and Form WB-APP for a 30-day period following the public 
release of each revised form. This modification would be reflected in a 
new sentence added to Proposed Rule 21F-8(a).
    While we considered the remaining suggested modifications, they are 
not reflected in the final rule. One of the goals of the proposal is to 
ensure that the information the Commission requests in the Form TCR 
conforms to the information that the Commission requests through the 
online portal. Permitting the Form TCR to be changed only once a year 
would run the risk of soliciting asymmetrical information through the 
two submission methods which would undermine the purpose of the 
proposed Rule 21F-8(d).
    Finally, we are not persuaded that Form TCR should be amended to 
include a section for the seven factors for determining the amount of 
an award as described in Rule 21F-6(a) and 21F-6(b). The Form WB-APP 
asks an individual to explain the basis for the Award Amount that the 
individual is seeking. To that end, an applicant is permitted to 
include supporting documents and to attach additional pages to the Form 
WB-APP. In our experience implementing the program, most claimants 
already use this opportunity to supplement their award application.

J. Rule 21F-8(e) and a Clarifying Amendment to Rule 21F-8(c)(7)--Abuse 
of Award Application Process or Submission of False Information in 
Connection With the Whistleblower Program and Certain Other Dealings 
With the Commission

1. Proposed Rule
    Proposed Rule 21F-8(e)(1) would authorize the Commission to 
permanently bar an individual who submits three or more award 
applications that are frivolous or lack a colorable connection between 
the tip and the action. The proposed rule would also authorize the 
Commission to bar an individual who has been deemed ineligible for an 
award pursuant to paragraph (c)(7) of Rule 21F-8 for knowingly and 
willfully making false statements to the Commission or another 
governmental entity.
    Further, paragraph (e)(2) would require the Office of the 
Whistleblower to notify the claimant of its assessment that the award 
application is frivolous or lacks a colorable connection to the action, 
and give the claimant the opportunity to withdraw the application 
before a Preliminary Determination or Preliminary Disposition 
recommending a bar is issued. If a bar is recommended, the applicant 
would have an opportunity to submit a response in accordance with the 
award processing procedures specified in Rule 21F-10(e)(2) and Rule 
21F-18(b)(3).
2. Comments Received
    Nearly all commenters supported the proposed rule.\219\ Many shared 
our concern that frivolous award applications divert the Commission's 
limited resources and threaten the effective and efficient operation of 
the program.\220\ Some commenters suggested imposing a permanent bar 
after an individual has submitted one \221\ or two \222\ frivolous 
applications. However, one commenter suggested that the bar should 
apply only to claimants who filed three frivolous award applications in 
one year.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ See SIFMA Letter; CWC Letter; Cohen Milstein Letter; 
Markopolos Letter; Think Computer Letter; TAF Letter; Anonymous-9 
Letter; Sen. Grassley Letter; letter from Anonymous-33 (Sept. 14, 
2018); CCMC Letter.
    \220\ See CCMC Letter; SIFMA Letter; Cohen Milstein Letter.
    \221\ See Markopolos Letter.
    \222\ See TAF Letter.
    \223\ See Think Computer Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters--while supporting the proposed rule--raised 
concerns about the timing and frequency of the process for withdrawing 
a frivolous application. One commenter stated that the time period 
between when the Office of the Whistleblower advises a claimant that a 
claim is considered frivolous and when the claimant actually withdraws 
the claim should take no more than fifteen days.\224\ Another commenter 
recommended that claimants not be given unlimited opportunities to 
withdraw an application that has initially been deemed frivolous. 
Instead, the claimant should be able to withdraw only the first 
frivolous claim, after which any other frivolous claim would count 
toward the three without an opportunity to withdraw it.\225\
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    \224\ See Think Computer Letter.
    \225\ See Anonymous-9 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rules
    After considering the comments, we are adopting Rule 21F-8(e) 
substantially as proposed with three modifications.
    First, the notice provision and opportunity to withdraw 
applications that are frivolous or lack a colorable connection to the 
matter will apply only to the initial three such applications reviewed 
by the Office of the Whistleblower.\226\ We agree with the commenter 
who suggested that claimants should not be provided an unlimited 
opportunity to withdraw award applications that might be subject to a 
bar and believe that limiting this opportunity to three such 
applications after the claimant receives a preliminary notification 
from the Office of the Whistleblower about the application's frivolous 
nature is the appropriate approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ We have also clarified that a claimant will have only 30 
days from the date of the notification by the Office of the 
Whistleblower to provide that Office with notice that the 
application has been withdrawn. Failure to provide timely notice 
will result in the application being considered for purposes of a 
potential bar. For purposes of determining whether a bar should be 
imposed under this rule, claimants will not be permitted to withdraw 
their application (1) after the 30-day period to withdraw has run 
following notice from the Office of the Whistleblower with respect 
to the initial three applications assessed by that Office to be 
frivolous, or (2) after a Preliminary Determination or Preliminary 
Disposition has issued in connection with any other frivolous 
application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the final rule includes a new paragraph (e)(4) that 
addresses pending

[[Page 70921]]

award applications.\227\ The rule codifies the Commission's existing 
practice of barring applicants who submit materially false, fictitious, 
or fraudulent statements in their dealings with the Commission \228\ 
and provides an important new tool for the Commission in processing 
frivolous award applications.\229\ As the Proposing Release explained, 
these applications consume a disproportionate amount of staff resources 
that could otherwise be dedicated to analyzing potentially meritorious 
award applications.\230\
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    \227\ Additionally, proposed paragraph (e)(2) has been broken 
into separate paragraphs (e)(2) and (e)(3) with minor modifications 
in phrasing.
    \228\ See May 12, 2014 and August 5, 2015 Commission Final 
Orders finding two serial filers ineligible for awards pursuant to 
Rule 21F-8(c)(7) of the Exchange Act because of a materially false, 
fictitious, and fraudulent statements made in their respective 
dealings with the Commission.
    \229\ Frivolous claims are those that lack any reasonable or 
plausible connection to the covered or related action.
    \230\ As an example of the delays and inefficiencies that a 
frivolous award claim may introduce, see generally Final Order of 
the Commission (May 12, 2014) (available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/owb-multiple-final-051214.pdf) (explaining 
that, in barring a frivolous award claimant, the claimant had 
consumed considerable staff effort with ``frivolous claims and 
caused a delay in the Commission's ability to make a final 
determination to the three legitimate whistleblowers'' in the 
particular matter and also noting the ``time and effort OWB staff 
expended to prepare the administrative record and other materials 
for an additional 51 claims'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, we are adding clarifying language to Rule 21F-8(c)(7) to 
address the circumstances under which Rule 21F-8(c)(7), and by 
extension the bar, will apply. As adopted, the rule provides that 
individuals who have violated Rule 21F-8(c)(7) may be permanently 
barred from making future whistleblower award applications or otherwise 
participating in the program.\231\ To clarify the standard to be 
applied, the additional language will provide that 21F-8(c)(7) will 
apply, in the context of the eligibility of a whistleblower and by 
extension in the context of the new authority to bar an applicant, only 
where there has been a finding by the Commission or a court of 
competent jurisdiction that the individual provided materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent representations, statements, or documents. 
After considering the programmatic interests underlying the rule, we 
are also clarifying that the disqualification from eligibility in Rule 
21F-8(c)(7), and by extension the permanent bar in Rule 21F-8(e), will 
not apply where the Commission, in its discretion, determines that 
refraining from finding a violation of Rule 21F-8(c)(7) is consistent 
with the public interest, the promotion of investor protection, and the 
objectives of the whistleblower program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ If such a bar is issued, it will apply to any other award 
applications from the claimant without any assessment by the 
Commission of the merits of those other award applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we are adding clarifying language to address which 
dealings with the Commission will be considered when applying the rule. 
While we expect that the Commission will impose a bar based upon a 
violation of 21F-8(c)(7) primarily in situations where there is a 
finding that an individual has provided materially false information in 
some way connected to the whistleblower program, the Proposing Release 
stated that the proposed rule would also apply to ``false, fictitious, 
or fraudulent representations, statements, or documents beyond those 
made in connection with an award determination.'' We continue to 
believe this is appropriate grounds on which to impose a bar and we are 
adding clarifying language to Rule 21F-8(c)(7) to provide that the 
dealings include ``dealings beyond the whistleblower program and 
covered action.'' For example, there may be situations where an 
individual's untruthful conduct in connection with the Commission 
(albeit outside a context associated with the whistleblower program or 
the covered action) may be sufficiently egregious or harmful, such that 
the Commission should have the ability to deem the individual's actions 
a violation of Rule 21F-8(c)(7) and deny a monetary award to such an 
individual under Section 21F and potentially bar the individual from 
future whistleblower applications or from otherwise participating in 
the program.\232\ In light of the clarifying language noted further 
above, however, we expect there to be certain situations in which the 
Commission finds it in the public interest not to apply a 
disqualification or bar. The clarifying provisos to Rule 21F-8(c)(7) 
reflect this balanced approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ The Commission does not intend that in assessing a 
whistleblower's eligibility, and by extension the potential 
application of the bar, there will be an inquiry into the 
whistleblower's prior dealings with the Commission to ensure that 
the individual did not engage in any misconduct covered by the 
exclusion provided for in Rule 21F-8(c)(7). Rather, the Commission 
anticipates that it will only utilize this rule to determine that a 
whistleblower is ineligible for the individual's ``other dealings 
with the Commission'' if the Commission has previously made (or 
otherwise learns of) a prior finding of material misconduct. 
Further, to the extent that the misconduct covered by this rule may 
occur in a judicial or administrative enforcement proceeding, the 
Commission in applying this rule will as a general matter deem a 
whistleblower ineligible only if there was an express finding during 
the course of that judicial or administrative enforcement 
proceeding, or in a related proceeding, that the individual 
willfully made the sort of materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement covered by the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that focusing our authority to impose a bar in the 
limited the situations described above will discourage individuals 
from, in an effort to mislead or hinder the Commission or other 
governmental entity, (i) knowingly or willfully making materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or (ii) 
using any false writing or document knowing the writings or documents 
contain materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or 
information.
    Turning to the procedural aspects of the new rule, Rule 21F-8(e) 
provides in paragraph (e)(2) that the Preliminary Determination or 
Preliminary Summary Disposition generally must inform the claimant that 
a permanent bar is being considered, in order to afford the claimant an 
opportunity to submit a response in accordance with the claims review 
procedures in Rules 21F-10(e)(2) and 21F-18(b)(3). We have added a 
sentence to paragraph (e)(2) to clarify that, if the basis for a bar 
arises or is discovered after the issuance of the Preliminary 
Determination or Preliminary Summary Disposition, then the Office of 
the Whistleblower must notify the claimant and afford the claimant an 
opportunity to submit a response before the Commission determines 
whether to issue a bar. This procedure will give the claimant notice 
and an opportunity to be heard before the issuance of a permanent bar 
where, for example, the claimant makes a false statement or submits a 
fictitious document in response to the Preliminary Determination or 
Preliminary Summary Disposition.
    Finally, the new paragraph (e)(4) explains that Rule 21F-8(e) 
applies to all award applications pending as of the effective date of 
these rules, but the Office of the Whistleblower must advise claimants, 
prior to a Preliminary Determination or Preliminary Summary 
Disposition, of any assessment by that Office that the conditions for 
issuing a bar are satisfied because of a frivolous claim or a false or 
fictitious statement or document submitted prior to the effective date. 
If the claimant withdraws the relevant award application(s) within 30 
days of receiving notice from the Office of the Whistleblower, then the 
Commission will not consider the withdrawn award application(s) in 
determining whether to impose a permanent bar. This approach strikes an 
appropriate balance between the need to process pending award 
applications efficiently and the need to provide fair notice to 
claimants of the possible consequences should they refuse to

[[Page 70922]]

withdraw an award application made prior to the effective date of these 
rules.

K. Rule 21F-9--Procedures for Submitting Original Information

1. Proposed Rule
    Current Rule 21F-9 describes the procedures for submitting original 
information to the Commission. The Commission proposed to amend Rule 
21F-9(a) to clarify that an individual must use certain prescribed 
submission methods to qualify for an award and/or confidentiality 
protections under Rule 21F-2(b) and (c). As proposed, an individual 
would have to submit information to the Commission by one of three 
methods: (1) Online, through the Commission's electronic TCR portal; 
(2) by mailing or faxing a Form TCR to the Office of the Whistleblower 
at the mailing address or fax number identified on the SEC's web page 
for making such submissions; or (3) by any such method that the 
Commission may expressly designate on its website.
    We also proposed new paragraph 9(e), which would clarify that the 
first time an individual provides information to the Commission that 
the individual will rely upon as a basis for a claim, the individual 
must have provided the information in accordance with Rule 21F-9(a) and 
(b).\233\ Currently our rules do not provide any established mechanism 
to permit individuals who fail to comply with the TCR requirement 
(including the requirement to provide a signed declaration) to qualify 
for an award with respect to information they provide to the Commission 
prior to filing a TCR (and signed declaration). However, proposed 
paragraph 9(e) provided the Commission with new authority to waive 
compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) when the Commission determines 
that the administrative record ``clearly and convincingly'' 
demonstrates that the individual would otherwise qualify for an award 
and the individual shows that he or she complied with paragraphs (a) 
and (b) within 30 days of communicating with the staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \233\ Many of the comments that the Commission received on this 
portion of the rule seem to have believed that this rule would 
impose a new obligation on potential whistleblowers. It did not. 
Rather, this portion of the proposed rule merely codified the 
Commission's existing interpretation of its current rules; indeed, 
this portion of the proposed rule was fully consistent with how the 
Commission has interpreted and applied its current whistleblower 
rules since those rules were promulgated in 2011. See, e.g., In the 
Matter of the Claims for Award in Connection with a Notice of 
Covered Action, Exchange Act Release No. 34-83689, 2018 WL 3546251 
(July 23, 2018); In the Matter of the Claims for Award in Connection 
with a Notice of Covered Action, Exchange Act Release No. 34-82181, 
2017 WL 5969236 (Nov. 30, 2017). Further, the proposal was 
consistent with Section 21F in which Congress directed that 
individuals may obtain an award only if they follow the form and 
manner prescribed by the Commission for submitting information; 
failure to do so under the statute means that an individual will be 
ineligible for an award. See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(6) (requiring that 
to qualify as a whistleblower information must be ``provide[d] . . . 
in a manner established'' by the Commission's rules); id. 78u-
6(c)(2)(D) (directing that ``[n]o award . . . shall be made . . . to 
any whistleblower who fails to submit information to the Commission 
in such form as the Commission may, by rule, require''). The 
important change that was reflected in this proposed rule was the 
30-day period in which the Commission could waive an untimely 
failure to comply with the rule; thus, the changes proposed by this 
rule were intended to benefit potential whistleblowers by 
potentially granting relief to them in certain circumstances where 
they have failed to adhere to the procedural requirements for 
submitting information and this proposed rule in no way reflected 
any new obligation on individuals receiving an award.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments Received
    We received several comments that addressed proposed amendments to 
paragraph (a) of Rule 21F-9. Two commenters supported the 
proposal.\234\ One of those commenters supported proposed paragraph 
21F-9(a) as long as the SEC has a process in place to address technical 
security issues with the TCR portal that the public may identify.\235\ 
Another commenter, while not clearly supporting or opposing the 
proposal, suggested permitting filing of the Form TCR by email.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ See Think Computer Letter; CCMC Letter.
    \235\ See Think Computer Letter.
    \236\ See letter from Liam Foster (Sept. 18, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to proposed paragraph (e), the Commission received 
numerous copies of a form letter that stated the proposed rule language 
``would create unrealistic reporting procedures that would disqualify a 
vast number of whistleblowers, simply because they reported their 
concerns to the wrong office at the SEC, rather than filling out a 
specific form and filing it according to specific reporting 
procedures.'' \237\ Beyond these form letters, the Commission received 
a number of unique comments from the public. One commenter generally 
supported the proposal, asserting that it would bring greater clarity 
to the parameters for obtaining an award, but this commenter opposed 
the exception granting the Commission discretion to waive some criteria 
on the ground that it could open the agency to endless waiver requests 
from ``bad actors.'' \238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ Form Letter C.
    \238\ See CCMC Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several other commenters raised broader concerns with proposed 
paragraph (e).\239\ One commenter stated that proposed paragraph 9(e) 
would render a whistleblower who ``contacts anyone at the SEC without 
first having a filed a TCR . . . automatically ineligible for an 
award.'' \240\ Another commenter stated that proposed Rule 21F-9(e) 
thwarted congressional intent by limiting the types of information for 
which an individual can claim whistleblower credit.\241\ This commenter 
also asserted that the Commission may use a whistleblower's information 
well before the whistleblower knows the information was helpful and 
recommended that any restriction on the time for filing a compliant TCR 
be tied to the latest date on which the individual could reasonably be 
aware that (1) the individual's information assisted the Commission, 
and (2) the individual may therefore be eligible for an award.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ See Anonymous-9 Letter; letter from Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto 
(May 6, 2019) (``Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto May 6 Letter'').
    \240\ See Kohn, Kohn, & Colapinto May 6 Letter.
    \241\ See TAF Letter.
    \242\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters thought the proposal did not reflect the day-to-day 
practice in which potential whistleblowers directly contact Commission 
staff with information about suspected securities law violations. One 
commenter asserted that SEC staff has welcomed direct contact with the 
public and that when a matter is time sensitive these interactions can 
allow the SEC employees to act quickly without waiting for the TCR 
system to review any pertinent information.\243\ The commenter 
suggested that excluding such communications from consideration in an 
award determination would discourage individuals from providing 
information through the most expedient channels.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ See Anonymous-9 Letter.
    \244\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed concern that the paragraph 9(e) exception 
for noncompliance with paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) placed ``strict 
limits'' on the Commission's ability to grant waivers because ``the 
whistleblower must meet a high standard that the information they 
provided resulted in the enforcement action . . .'' and must do so by 
``clear and convincing evidence.'' \245\ The same commenter suggested 
that the proposed exception actually limited the Commission's ability 
to use its general exemptive authority.\246\ The commenter also 
suggested that the Commission could use its discretionary authority 
under Rule 9(e) to reduce a whistleblower's award to 10 percent and the 
whistleblower ``would have no

[[Page 70923]]

recourse or appeal.'' \247\ And that commenter suggested that because 
the Commission's web page provides ``numerous methods'' to contact the 
agency about potential securities-law violations or related issues, 
this may result in individuals initially reporting information to the 
Commission in a manner that results in an eventual disqualification 
from receiving an award.\248\ Finally, several commenters suggested 
that the Commission should establish a ``good cause'' exception that 
would excuse an individual's non-compliance with the TCR and 
declaration requirements of Rule 21F-9 in any situation where the 
individual would otherwise qualify as a meritorious whistleblower.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ See Kohn, Kohn, & Colapinto May 6 Letter.
    \246\ Id.
    \247\ Id.
    \248\ See letter from Kohn, Kohn, & Colapinto (Oct. 16, 2019) 
(``Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto Oct. 16 Letter'').
    \249\ See letter from Kohn, Kohn, & Colapinto (Oct. 21, 2019) 
(``Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto Oct. 21 Letter''); letter from Phillips & 
Cohen LLP (Oct. 25, 2019) (``Phillips & Cohen Letter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we are adopting the final rule as 
proposed with several important substantive modifications to paragraph 
(e). First, we are clarifying that an individual need not in the first 
instance provide original information to the Commission in accordance 
with the procedures in Rule 21F-9(a) and (b), but may instead provide 
original information in a different manner, provided that the 
individual complies with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) within 30 days of first 
providing that original information. Second, we are permitting an 
individual who fails to satisfy these procedural requirements to 
qualify for a waiver if the individual can demonstrate that he or she 
complied with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) within 30 days of first learning 
about the requirements. Third, we are making this waiver automatic when 
the criteria specified in the rule are satisfied. Fourth, we have 
revised the language of the proposed rule to require that the 
Commission must be able to ``readily'' determine that the 
administrative record ``unambiguously''--rather than ``clearly and 
convincingly''--demonstrates that the claimant would otherwise qualify 
for an award in order for us to grant a waiver of noncompliance.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ We are also making the discretionary safe harbor provided 
by Rule 21F-9(e) effective as to all award claims still pending on 
the effective date of the rules. We believe that doing so is 
appropriate as we think that all claimants--not just future 
whistleblowers--should be able to benefit from this new mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the whistleblower rules were implemented in 2011, the 
Commission has required any individual seeking an award and/or the 
confidentiality protections of the program to submit a tip through the 
Commission's online portal or by submitting a Form-TCR by mail or 
fax.\251\ The requirement to file a TCR has been a necessary initial 
step for an individual to obtain treatment as a ``whistleblower'' under 
our rules \252\ and, in our experience, has proved beneficial to the 
effective administration of our whistleblower program. Accordingly, the 
Commission has treated the failure to file a properly executed TCR as 
grounds for denial of a claim for award.\253\ Thus, paragraph 9(e) as 
proposed would not have created a new obligation for potential 
whistleblowers; rather, it was intended to clarify the Commission's 
existing approach when making award determinations--when an individual 
provides information to the Commission that he or she will rely upon as 
a basis for claiming an award, the information should be provided 
initially in accordance with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b). We view this 
clarification of the importance of the Commission's TCR-filing 
requirement as merely a codification of current practice--i.e., 
whistleblowers must comply with the procedures for submitting their 
information in order to later be eligible for a potential award. 
Moreover, the Commission's experience with the program to date 
demonstrates in our view that the procedures for submitting information 
to the Commission to qualify for an award--including those specified in 
Rule 21F-9(e)--do not create unrealistic or onerous reporting 
procedures for potential whistleblowers and that any burdens on the 
public are outweighed by the administrative efficiencies to the program 
and the agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ Rule 21F-9(a), (b).
    \252\ Under Rule 21F-2, as amended, a TCR filing remains 
necessary to obtain whistleblower confidentiality protections and 
award eligibility.
    \253\ See, e.g., In the Matter of the Claims for Award in 
Connection with a Notice of Covered Action, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-82181, 2017 WL 5969236 (Nov. 30, 2017) (denying two claimants, in 
part, on the ground that they had failed to submit their original 
information to the Commission in the form and manner required to 
qualify as a whistleblower).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    That said, we have not applied these procedural requirements 
rigidly and have through our practice permitted whistleblowers to 
``perfect'' their submissions of original information by complying with 
the requirements of Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) for a brief period of time 
from the date they first provide the information to the Commission. 
This practice of permitting individuals to perfect their submission has 
grown out of our recognition of the practical realities of how 
whistleblowers or their counsel may first relay information to the 
Commission. Based on our historical practice, and our consideration of 
the comments that we have received on proposed paragraph (e), we have 
modified the rule to expressly provide that an individual's first 
contact with the Commission need not be in the form of a TCR with an 
accompanying declaration. Rather, to qualify for a potential award 
under the rule we are adopting, an individual need only submit the TCR 
and declaration within 30 days of first providing that information to 
the Commission. As modified from the proposed rule, paragraph (e) now 
fully captures the current practice that we have found both beneficial 
to the agency's administration of the program and practicable for 
individuals to follow without imposing unnecessary burdens on them.
    We view the new express waiver authority as an important mechanism 
to protect the ability of these individuals to obtain an award 
notwithstanding their untimely compliance with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b). 
Specifically, the new express waiver authority will permit an otherwise 
clearly meritorious whistleblower who failed to comply with Rule 21F-
9(a) and (b) within 30 days of first providing original information to 
the Commission to nonetheless obtain an award provided that the 
individual complied with those requirements within 30 days of first 
learning of them and the Commission can readily develop an 
administrative record that unambiguously demonstrates that the 
individual would otherwise merit an award, without a significant 
expenditure of staff time and resources to do so. Significantly, our 
rules currently do not provide any established mechanism to permit 
individuals who fail to comply with the TCR requirement (including the 
requirement to provide a signed declaration) to qualify for an award 
with respect to information they provide to the Commission prior to 
filing a TCR (and signed declaration). New Rule 21F-9(e) now provides 
that mechanism. In determining whether the new waiver authority 
applies, the Commission will consider that any whistleblower 
represented by counsel has constructive notice \254\ of the 
requirements of Rule

[[Page 70924]]

21F-9(a) and (b) as of the date counsel was retained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ Constructive notice is generally defined as ``[n]otice 
arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and 
circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.'' Black's 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although we recognize that some commenters have challenged the 
long-standing requirement that whistleblowers should file their 
original information on a TCR in order to obtain an award based on that 
information, the policy grounds for this requirement are sound. The 
Commission has strived to ensure that (1) all TCRs are collected in one 
central place; (2) the TCR data is combined with other public and 
confidential information on the persons and entities identified in the 
TCRs, and (3) investigative resources are dedicated to the TCRs 
presenting the greatest threat of investor harm. We understand that 
some whistleblowers may choose to contact staff directly to share 
information about a suspected violation of the securities laws. 
However, we do not view such outreach as satisfying or obviating the 
requirement to file a TCR. Indeed, there are important reasons for 
requiring the timely submission of a TCR (and an accompanying 
declaration) which benefit both the whistleblower and the Commission's 
programmatic interests.
    First, these requirements ensure that the agency has an accurate 
record of the information a potential whistleblower deems important to 
the Commission's enforcement efforts instead of relying on Commission 
staff to file a TCR summarizing the individual's information. Without 
this safeguard, disputes may arise as to what information an individual 
actually provided in the initial contact with Commission staff and when 
the information was submitted to the TCR system. Second, the 
requirement to file a TCR at the outset of the information-sharing 
process provides a clear indication to staff that the submitter is 
seeking the heightened confidentiality protections that are afforded by 
Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act; \255\ it is important that 
submitters make this clear up front in this manner because it alerts 
the staff about the extent to which it may (or may not) reveal the 
submitter's information to third parties, including other government 
agencies, and it also determines whether other government agencies are 
themselves subject to the heightened confidentiality requirements of 
Section 21F(h)(2).\256\ Third, the TCR requirement memorializes the 
timing of a whistleblower's provision of information, which is 
especially important if a subsequent whistleblower provides similar 
information or if the whistleblower seeks the program's confidentiality 
and/or retaliation protections. Fourth, the TCR requirement allows the 
Commission to manage and track ``the thousands of tips that it receives 
annually and to connect tips to each other so as to make better use of 
the information provided . . .'' \257\ The accompanying declaration 
requirement helps deter individuals from submitting false tips that 
result in the inefficient use of the Commission's resources.\258\ We 
find it significant that Section 21F provides that an individual 
``shall'' be denied an award if he or she fails to submit information 
to the Commission in the form and manner required--a strong signal of 
congressional intent that individuals seeking an award must follow the 
procedures that the Commission establishes for submitting 
information.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(2).
    \256\ For example, if a submitter fails to provide information 
on a TCR and the staff shares it with the another government agency 
before the TCR is submitted, that agency will not be subject to the 
confidentiality requirements of Section 21F(h)(2) and this may lead 
to the disclosure of the submitter's identity. Filing the TCR as 
part of the initial information-sharing means that the legal 
protections of Section 21F(h)(2) will apply if the Commission shares 
the submitter's information with the other agency.
    \257\ See Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower 
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 
FR 70,502 (November 17, 2010).
    \258\ Id.
    \259\ See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding the foregoing, the changes that we have expressly 
incorporated into paragraph (e) will afford an opportunity for 
individuals who first come to the Commission with original information 
without complying with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) to perfect their 
submissions and thus potentially qualify for an award. Specifically, in 
those instances when an individual first provides information to the 
Commission without complying with Rule 21F-9(a) and 9(b), the following 
mechanisms will now be available: (1) The individual can perfect his or 
her submission by complying with those rules within 30 days of first 
providing original information to the Commission; \260\ (2) after 30 
days of first providing original information to the Commission, the 
individual may still qualify for a waiver from having failed to timely 
comply with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) if the individual can demonstrate 
that he or she complied with these procedural requirements within 30 
days of first learning about them \261\ and the Commission can readily 
develop an administrative record that unambiguously demonstrates that 
the individual would otherwise merit an award, without a significant 
expenditure of staff time and resources to do so. As compared with the 
proposed rule, we have determined to make the waiver of non-compliance 
with Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) automatic, rather than discretionary, when 
the Commission finds that the whistleblower has established that the 
conditions for the waiver are satisfied. Further, we have determined to 
provide for such a waiver opportunity from the time when the individual 
first learns of the Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) requirements rather than 
establishing a fixed deadline calculated from when the original 
information is first submitted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ As noted in the Proposing Release, even if the individual 
does not satisfy the procedural requirements within the 30-day safe 
harbor, he or she may remain award-eligible for any new information 
that is submitted later in accordance with the Rule 21F-9 
procedures. See Proposing Release note 195. For example, in our 
experience, whistleblowers frequently share information and insights 
with the Enforcement staff in a series of communications over time. 
Such contacts may range from formal interviews, meetings, or even 
sworn testimony to more informal contacts such as email exchanges. 
To date, the Commission has employed a flexible approach in 
whistleblower awards to treat individuals as award-eligible for any 
new information submitted after the individual has complied with the 
TCR-filing requirement, and we expect to continue that practice 
under new Rule 21F-9(e). See In the Matter of the Claim for Award, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-78025, 2016 WL 3194294 (June 9, 2016).
    \261\ Such a demonstration will require a sworn declaration or 
other supporting materials satisfactory to the Commission. We note 
that the Office of the Whistleblower makes clear on its web page 
that, to qualify for an award, an individual must submit information 
regarding possible law violations to the Commission in one of two 
ways: (1) Submitting a tip electronically through the SEC's Tips, 
Complaints and Referrals Portal, or (2) mailing or faxing a Form TCR 
to the SEC. See https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/submit-a-tip. In 
determining whether the new waiver authority applies, the Commission 
will consider that any whistleblower represented by counsel has 
constructive notice of the requirements of Rule 21F-9(a) and (b) as 
of the date counsel was retained. Further, if staff advises an 
individual to review the whistleblower website or to otherwise 
obtain information about the whistleblower program, the Commission 
may under the particular facts and circumstances consider the 
individual to have received constructive notice as of the date the 
staff communicated this information to the individual.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the suggestion of a commenter, we have eliminated the 
phrase ``clearly and convincingly'' and replaced it with the terms 
``readily'' and ``unambiguously'' in order to avoid confusion and any 
suggestion that we intended to incorporate into our practice under 
paragraph 9(e) other areas of law that may require proof by ``clear and 
convincing'' evidence. That said, it would be harmful to the effective 
and efficient administration of our whistleblower program to broadly 
waive non-compliance with the TCR-filing

[[Page 70925]]

requirement for non-meritorious claimants or claimants whose 
entitlement to an award is not clearly established by the 
administrative record, and we also believe that doing so would be 
inconsistent with the congressional directive that individuals 
``shall'' comply with the Commission's procedures for submitting 
information.\262\ In adopting this provision for situations where the 
record ``unambiguously'' demonstrates that an individual would 
otherwise qualify for an award (and the record can ``readily'' be 
developed to confirm this without a significant expenditure of staff 
time and resources to do so), we intend the exception to be available 
only where a clear case exists that the claimant otherwise merits an 
award, and the claimant submitted his or her TCR and declaration as 
required by Rule 21F-9(a) and 9(b) within 30 days of first learning 
about those requirements.\263\ That said, the Commission continues to 
retain its separate discretionary exemptive authorities under Rule 21F-
8(a) and Exchange Act Section 36(a) for circumstances that may warrant 
exemptive relief.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ The standard being adopted is in some respects akin to the 
plain-error standard of review under which some appellate courts 
require that, if a litigant argues that an error occurred in the 
trial court but the litigant failed to raise the issue with the 
trial court in a timely manner, the error must be ``obvious'' and 
``clear-cut'' for the appellate court to grant relief. See, e.g., 
United States v. Wahid, 614 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). For a 
claimant to qualify for discretionary relief under Rule 21F-9(e), 
the claimant's status as a meritorious whistleblower must be clear-
cut, obvious, and readily ascertainable.
    \263\ The heightened confidentiality protections afforded by 
Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act will not attach until an 
individual has submitted a TCR in compliance with Rule 21F-9.
    \264\ The Commission's discretionary exemptive authorities will 
continue to include circumstances where a whistleblower is 
represented by counsel, but the facts and circumstances nevertheless 
warrant relief from the requirements under Rule 21F-9(a) and (b). 
And in pending cases, the staff will continue to assess the facts 
and circumstances of each case to determine whether to recommend to 
the Commission that application of the exemptive authority is 
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, we have determined not to adopt the recommendation 
discussed above from several commenters that the Commission afford an 
unlimited opportunity for any individual that might otherwise qualify 
as a meritorious whistleblower to comply with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 21F-9(a) and (b). That standard would generate 
additional inefficiencies in the program by requiring the Commission in 
all cases to develop a comprehensive record detailing whether a 
claimant was in fact meritorious before deciding whether the claimant 
should be excused from the filing obligation. This would be 
particularly burdensome because there may be no clear documentation as 
to when and with whom on the staff a claimant spoke--or what was 
conveyed--before filing a TCR and officially becoming a whistleblower 
potentially eligible for an award. For this reason, we believe that it 
is appropriate to limit the exception for untimely compliance with Rule 
21F-9(a) and (b) to those claimants whom the Commission can readily 
determine would otherwise clearly qualify as meritorious whistleblowers 
without a significant expenditure of staff time and resources to do so. 
In our view, this approach strikes an appropriate balance--ensuring 
that individuals who would clearly obtain an award but for their 
untimely compliance will in fact receive an award (provided they comply 
with the 30-day period in paragraph (e)), while not imposing new and 
undue burdens on the program to develop comprehensive records in cases 
involving claimants who would not be clearly entitled to an award 
(thereby preventing the diversion of staff time and resources from 
cases involving meritorious whistleblowers who did in fact adhere to 
the filing requirements of Rule 21F-9).

L. Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 21F-12--Materials That May Form the 
Basis of the Commission's Award Determination

1. Proposed Rule
    As explained in the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed two 
revisions to Exchange Act Rule 21F-12, which specifies the materials 
that may form the basis of the Commission's award determination. First, 
proposed Rule 21F-12(a)(3) would clarify that the Commission and the 
CRS (and the Office of the Whistleblower when processing a claim 
pursuant to proposed Rule 21F-18) may rely upon materials timely 
submitted by the whistleblower in response to the Notice of Covered 
Action, a request from the Office of the Whistleblower or the 
Commission, or the Preliminary Determination.\265\ Materials submitted 
after the respective deadlines for these submissions would not be 
considered absent extraordinary circumstances excusing the delay.\266\ 
Second, proposed Rule 21F-12(a)(6) would clarify that it applies only 
to materials submitted by third parties, not to materials submitted by 
claimants themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ The deadline for filing a claim for a whistleblower award 
is ninety (90) days after the relevant Notice of Covered Action 
under Rule 21F-10(a) & (b) and Rule 21F-11(a) & (b). Consistent with 
Rule 21F-8(b), the Commission may specify a deadline when it 
requests additional information from the whistleblower in support of 
an award application. 17 CFR 240.21F-8(b). The time frame for 
responding to the Preliminary Determination is expressly established 
by Rule 21F-10(e) and Rule 21F-11(e). 17 CFR 240.21F-10(e), 21F-
11(e).
    \266\ 17 CFR 240.21F-8(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments Received
    We received three comments supporting the proposed revisions to 
Rule 21F-12 and none in opposition.\267\ One of these supporting 
commenters also expressed concern, however, that the timeliness 
requirement under proposed Rule 21F-12(a)(2) would prevent claimants 
from alerting the Commission to developments arising after a deadline, 
such as changes in the law, additional hardships suffered, and the 
collection of additional funds on behalf of affected investors.\268\ To 
accommodate this concern, this commenter suggested that Rule 21F-12 be 
revised to allow the supplemental filing, after a deadline, of ``a 
reasonably short presentation of (1) information requested by the 
Commission, and/or (2) information that could not reasonably have been 
known to the whistleblower at the WB-APP deadline.'' \269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ CCMC Letter; TAF Letter; Think Computer Letter.
    \268\ See TAF Letter.
    \269\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we are adopting the revisions to 
Rule 21F-12 as proposed. We have decided not to make further revision 
to accommodate submissions concerning subsequent developments \270\ 
because our existing rules already meet that concern in two ways. 
First, existing Rule 21F-8(b) already permits the Commission to request 
additional information from a whistleblower in support of an award 
application, regardless of whether the application deadline (or any 
other relevant deadline) has already passed. Second, existing Rule 21F-
8(a) already permits the Commission, in its sole discretion, to waive a 
deadline in the whistleblower rules based upon a showing of 
extraordinary circumstances.\271\ Thus, the Commission already 
possesses ample discretion to allow a post-deadline submission 
concerning subsequent developments such as changes in the law precisely 
because, by definition, that information was not available to the 
claimant before the deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ Id.
    \271\ Id. 21F-8(a).

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[[Page 70926]]

M. Amendment to Exchange Act Rule 21F-13--The Administrative Record on 
Appeal

1. Proposed Rule
    As explained in the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed 
revisions to Exchange Act Rule 21F-13 (which governs the administrative 
record on appeal) to eliminate the designation of items for inclusion 
in the record on appeal and instead to define the record on appeal in a 
manner that conforms more closely to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Proposed Rule 21F-13(b) would exclude from the 
record on appeal any pre-decisional or internal deliberative process 
materials that are prepared exclusively to assist either the Commission 
or the CRS, and also would exclude any materials that exclusively 
concern any claimant other than the claimant who brought the appeal, in 
matters where multiple claimants applied for an award under a single 
Notice of Covered Action.
2. Comments Received
    We received two comments supporting the proposed revisions to Rule 
21F-13 and none in opposition.\272\ One of these commenters also 
suggested that internal deliberative process materials should be made 
available so that whistleblowers can more easily identify errors in the 
analysis of the CRS and the Commission.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ CCMC Letter; Think Computer Letter.
    \273\ Think Computer Letter. This commenter asserted, ``The 
Commission has no stated basis for excluding these materials from 
the record, and the justification of avoiding potential future 
embarrassment is insufficient as a legal rationale.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we are adopting the revisions to 
Rule 21F-13 as proposed. We have decided not to make internal 
deliberative process materials available to whistleblowers as part of 
the record on appeal. As noted when we adopted our whistleblower rules 
in 2011, ``[t]hese materials are by their nature pre-decisional work 
product that may often contain the staff's `frank discussion of legal 
and policy making materials,' and the disclosure of these materials 
would have a chilling effect on our decision-making process.'' \274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 FR 
34,347 (June 13, 2011) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 
U.S. 132, 151 (1975)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

N. Adoption of Exchange Act Rule 21F-18--Summary Disposition Process

1. Proposed Rule
    As explained in the Proposing Release, proposed Rule 21F-18 would 
authorize the Office of the Whistleblower to follow a summary 
disposition process for certain categories of denials of award 
applications that are relatively straightforward, as a more streamlined 
alternative to the existing processes specified in Rules 21F-10 and 
21F-11. Thus, proposed Rule 21F-18 would apply to five categories of 
denials: (1) Untimely award applications; (2) failure to submit a tip 
in compliance with Rule 21F-9; (3) where the staff handling the covered 
action or the underlying investigation (or examination) never received 
or used the claimant's information and otherwise had no contact with 
the claimant; (4) failure to comply with Rule 21F-8(b), which 
encompasses Commission requests for supplemental information and for 
signed confidentiality agreements; and (5) failure to specify the tip 
on which the award claim is based. For these categories of denials, the 
Office of the Whistleblower rather than the CRS would assume 
responsibility for reviewing the record, issuing a Preliminary 
Determination (here, a ``Preliminary Summary Disposition''), 
considering any written response filed by the claimant, and issuing any 
Proposed Final Determination (here, a ``Proposed Final Summary 
Disposition''). Additionally, a claimant seeking to challenge a 
Preliminary Summary Disposition would have 30 days rather than 60 days 
in which to file a written response and would receive a staff 
declaration containing the pertinent facts rather than the full 
administrative record supporting the Preliminary Summary Disposition.
2. Comments Received
    Five commenters supported proposed Rule 21F-18,\275\ of which three 
believed that the new summary disposition process would promote staff 
efficiency in processing likely meritorious whistleblower award 
claims.\276\ Eight commenters opposed the proposed rule,\277\ of which 
six argued that the Commission should provide a quantitative analysis 
of the anticipated effect of the proposal on the existing queue of 
whistleblower award claims.\278\ Those who opposed the proposed rule 
also contended that its effect on the existing queue of claims is 
unclear because likely frivolous claims are already placed at the back 
of the queue \279\ and that the proposal would not address the time 
required to gather the information necessary to decide a claim.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ Anonymous-9 Letter; Anonymous-33 Letter; CCMC Letter; CWC 
Letter; TAF Letter.
    \276\ CCMC Letter; CWC Letter; TAF Letter.
    \277\ Letters from Anonymous-26 (Sept. 15, 2018) (``Anonymous-26 
Letter''); Anonymous-28 (Sept. 15, 2018) (``Anonymous-28 Letter''); 
Anonymous-29 (Sept. 15, 2018) (``Anonymous-29 Letter''); Anonymous-
35 (``Anonymous-35 Letter'') (Sept. 14, 2018); Anonymous-65 
(``Anonymous-65 Letter'') (Aug. 21, 2018); Anonymous-73 
(``Anonymous-73 Letter'') (Aug. 17, 2018); Devorah Letter; Think 
Computer Letter.
    \278\ Anonymous-26 Letter; Anonymous-28 Letter; Anonymous-29 
Letter; Anonymous-35 Letter; Anonymous-65 Letter; Anonymous-73 
Letter.
    \279\ Anonymous-35 Letter.
    \280\ Anonymous-73 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters addressed whether proposed Rule 21F-18 would afford 
claimants due process.\281\ In this context, one commenter asserted 
that the new rule would reduce ``potential whistleblowers' certainty 
that their information would ever be taken seriously'' and suggested as 
an alternative that the Office of the Whistleblower engage in ``more 
transparent communication with whistleblowers (and other types of 
stakeholders).'' \282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ Compare TAF Letter (stating that proposed Rule 21F-18 
would ``ensure the provision of due process'' to claimants) with 
Think Computer Letter (stating that proposed Rule 21F-18 is likely 
to be challenged on due process grounds).
    \282\ See Think Computer Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters expressed concern that 30 days would be too narrow a 
window for claimants to prepare and file a written response to a 
Preliminary Summary Disposition.\283\ One of these asserted that a 30-
day window would be too narrow absent a permanent tracking mechanism to 
give claimants immediate notification of a Preliminary Summary 
Disposition.\284\ The other suggested that claimants should be granted 
an automatic 30-day extension (for 60 days total) upon written 
request.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ See Anonymous-33 Letter; Devorah Letter.
    \284\ See Devorah Letter.
    \285\ See Anonymous-33 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    After considering the comments, we are adopting Rule 21F-18 as 
proposed.\286\ In our experience to date,

[[Page 70927]]

the five categories of relatively straightforward denials encompassed 
by this rule have consumed a disproportionate share of staff time and 
resources, with little or no corresponding benefit from utilizing the 
more robust procedures under Rules 21F-10 and 21F-11. We anticipate 
that the new summary disposition process will conserve time in 
preparing the administrative record,\287\ since all pertinent facts 
will be gathered in a single staff declaration at the Preliminary 
Summary Disposition stage rather than in multiple declarations as has 
been common in the past. We anticipate that the new process will permit 
the more efficient disposition of all claims at all points in the 
queue.\288\
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    \286\ The final rule text has been modified to conform to the 
text of the discussion in the Proposing Release. The final rule text 
also clarifies in section (a)(1)(2) that the summary disposition 
process will apply to the denial of claims for failure to comply 
with Rule 21F-9 only if the claimant is not eligible for a waiver 
under either Rule 21F-9(e) or the Commission's other waiver 
authorities because the Commission cannot readily develop an 
administrative record that unambiguously demonstrates that the 
claimant would otherwise qualify for an award. This language thus 
ensures that the summary disposition process in Rule 21F-18 will be 
applied in a manner consistent with the claimant's eligibility for a 
waiver or lack thereof under either Rule 21F-9(e) or the 
Commission's other waiver authorities.
    \287\ Cf. letter from Anonymous-73 (Aug. 17, 2018).
    \288\ Cf. letter from Anonymous-35 (Sept. 14, 2018).
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    In our view, the summary disposition process under new Rule 21F-18 
will afford claimants due process in the disposition of their claims. 
Courts have emphasized that ``[i]n informal adjudications like these, 
agencies must satisfy only minimal procedural requirements.'' \289\ 
Thus, the Due Process Clause \290\ imposes no blanket obligation to 
allow the submission of rebuttal evidence by a claimant \291\ or to 
disclose the agency's own evidence in order to facilitate such a 
rebuttal.\292\ New Rule 21F-18 affords claimants appropriate procedural 
protection; they have an opportunity to submit a rebuttal statement 
after having received the Preliminary Summary Disposition and the 
supporting staff declaration. Moreover, both the Preliminary Summary 
Disposition and the Commission's final order will provide a brief 
statement of the grounds for denial of the award application,\293\ and 
a claimant may seek judicial review of the latter as specified in 
Exchange Act Section 21F(f).\294\ Accordingly, the summary disposition 
process will be fair and transparent, with an abbreviated record and a 
streamlined process commensurate with the straightforward nature of the 
issues relevant to these subsets of award claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ Sw. Airlines Co. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 650 F.3d 752, 757 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
    \290\ U.S. Const. amend. V.
    \291\ See Butte Cty., Calif. v. Chaudhuri, 887 F.3d 501, 506 
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
    \292\ See Sw. Airlines, 650 F.3d at 757.
    \293\ See Butte Cty., Calif. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010).
    \294\ See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(f).
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    For similar reasons, we are adopting the 30-day window to respond 
to a Preliminary Summary Disposition, as proposed.\295\ Courts have 
sustained even shorter response periods in the absence of any blanket 
obligation to accept rebuttal evidence,\296\ and we likewise find it 
instructive that Congress established a 30-day window for claimants to 
petition for judicial review of our final award determinations.\297\ We 
also anticipate that the Office of the Whistleblower will continue its 
current practice of providing claimants with prompt notice of such 
preliminary decisions using the most efficient means of delivery in 
light of the contact information provided by the claimant. Moreover, 
any claimant who demonstrates that extraordinary circumstances will 
prevent a timely written response may argue that the Commission should 
exercise its discretion under Rule 21F-8(a) to extend this 30-day 
deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR 34,726 (July 20, 2018) 
(``Given the relatively straightforward nature of the matters that 
would generally be eligible for summary disposition, this 30-day 
window will afford any claimant a sufficient opportunity to provide 
a meaningful reply'' to a Preliminary Summary Disposition.).
    \296\ See Butte Cty., 887 F.3d at 506 (sustaining 20-day 
response period).
    \297\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(f).
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O. Technical Amendment to Rule 21F-4(c)(2)

    In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to make a 
technical amendment to Rule 21F-4(c)(2) to correct an existing error in 
the text of that rule. We did not receive any comments on this proposed 
modification. Thus, for the reasons explained in the Proposing Release, 
we are adopting the proposed technical amendment to this rule.

P. Interpretive Guidance Regarding the Meaning and Application of 
``independent analysis''

1. Proposed Interpretive Guidance
    Section 21F of the Exchange Act limits whistleblower awards to 
individuals who, among other requirements, submit ``original 
information'' about possible securities violations. The statute defines 
``original information'' as information that:

    (A) Is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a 
whistleblower;
    (B) is not known to the Commission from any other source, unless 
the whistleblower is the original source of the information; and
    (C) is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a 
judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental report, 
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 
whistleblower is a source of the information.\298\
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    \298\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(3). Our rules add the requirement that 
``original information'' must have been submitted for the first time 
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. Rule 21F-4(b)(1)(iv).

    Further, before we can grant an award, we must determine that the 
whistleblower's ``original information . . . led to the successful 
enforcement'' of a Commission covered action or a related action.\299\
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    \299\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In promulgating our whistleblower rules, we further defined the 
terms ``independent knowledge'' and ``independent analysis,'' as used 
in Section 21F(a)(3)(A) of the definition of ``original information'':

    (2) Independent knowledge means factual information in your 
possession that is not derived from publicly available sources. You 
may gain independent knowledge from your experiences, 
communications, and observations in your business or social 
interactions.
    (3) Independent analysis means your own analysis, whether done 
alone or in combination with others. Analysis means your examination 
and evaluation of information that may be publicly available, but 
which reveals information that is not generally known or available 
to the public.

    The Commission proposed interpretive guidance to address the 
potential availability of a whistleblower award in cases where 
information provided by a whistleblower is not based on the 
whistleblower's ``independent knowledge'' but, instead, is premised on 
information derived from the whistleblower's ``independent analysis'' 
of publicly available information. In formulating our views, we 
considered Congress's and the Commission's determinations to 
substantially restrict any role for publicly available information in 
potential whistleblower awards. Further, with reference to the 
requirement of Rule 21F-4(b)(3) that ``independent analysis'' must 
``reveal[ ] information that is not generally known or available to the 
public,'' we considered the framework that the D.C. Circuit and other 
federal courts of appeal have developed for determining when fraudulent 
transactions are deemed to have been publicly disclosed for purposes of 
the so-called ``public disclosure bar'' under the False Claims 
Act.\300\ Based on our review, we concluded:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A).

    In order to qualify as ``independent analysis,'' a 
whistleblower's submission must

[[Page 70928]]

provide evaluation, assessment, or insight beyond what would be 
reasonably apparent to the Commission from publicly available 
information. In assessing whether this requirement is met, the 
Commission would determine based on its own review of the relevant 
facts during the award adjudication process whether the violations 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
could have been inferred from the facts available in public sources.

    In further clarifying our approach, we stated:

    A whistleblower's examination and evaluation of publicly 
available information does not constitute ``analysis'' if the facts 
disclosed in the public materials on which the whistleblower relies 
and in other publicly available information are sufficient to raise 
an inference of the possible violations alleged in the 
whistleblower's tip. This is because, where the violations that the 
whistleblower alleges can be inferred by the Commission from the 
face of public materials, those violations are not ``reveal[ed]'' to 
the Commission by the whistleblower's tip or any purported analysis 
that the whistleblower has submitted. Rather, in order for a 
whistleblower to be credited with providing ``independent 
analysis,'' the whistleblower's examination and evaluation should 
contribute ``significant independent information'' that ``bridges 
the gap'' between the publicly available information and the 
possible securities violations.

    We explained that ``significant independent information'' that 
``bridges the gap'' in revealing violations may be found in the 
application of technical expertise, and we gave as a specific example 
of qualifying ``analysis'' the type of highly probative submissions to 
the Commission made by Harry Markopolos in his efforts to expose the 
Bernard Madoff fraud. However, we also stated that technical expertise 
is not required. For example, non-experts may configure publicly 
available information in a non-obvious way that reveals patterns 
indicating possible violations that would not be otherwise inferable 
from the public information or may engage in highly probative 
calculations or some other meaningful exercise with the information 
that may demonstrate the possibility of securities violations.
    However, we contrasted analysis of this type with cases where the 
whistleblower directs the staff to publicly available information and 
states that the information itself suggests a fraud or other 
violations. The latter cases would not qualify as ``independent 
analysis.'' We offered as examples tips where the whistleblower points 
to common hallmarks of fraud on the face of the public materials (e.g., 
impossibly high, guaranteed investment returns or extravagant claims in 
press releases) or to public discourse (e.g., discussions on a public 
message board) in which investors or others are alleging a fraudulent 
scheme. We also stated that the result would be the same whether the 
individual relied on only one source (e.g., a single website) to 
collect the publicly available information that demonstrates the 
hallmarks of the fraud or the individual relied on a multitude of 
different publicly available sources. We stated that, in each case, the 
touchstone is whether the whistleblower's submission is revelatory in 
utilizing publicly available information in a way that goes beyond the 
information itself and affords the Commission with important insights 
or information about possible violations.
    Finally, we explained that, even when this standard is met, a 
whistleblower's independent analysis must still have ``led to'' a 
successful covered enforcement action. This standard requires an 
assessment of whether the whistleblower's analysis--as distinct from 
the publicly available information on which the analysis was based--
either (1) was a principal motivating factor in the staff's decision to 
open its investigation, or (2) made a substantial and important 
contribution to the success of an existing investigation.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \301\ Although the interpretive guidance set forth in this 
release is comprehensive and need not be read in conjunction with 
the Proposing Release, we incorporate the Proposing Release herein 
by reference to the extent that it reflects additional supporting 
analysis and citations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments Received
    We received 28 comments on our proposed interpretive guidance 
regarding ``independent analysis.'' Twenty-four of these were critical 
of the guidance.\302\ The predominant objection of these commenters was 
that the proposed interpretive guidance would permit the Commission to 
deny awards based on a ``retroactive'' or ``hindsight'' determination 
of whether violations were ``reasonably apparent'' and ``could have'' 
been determined from information that was publicly available.\303\ Some 
commenters expressed a further concern that this determination would be 
made by an individual Enforcement staff member responsible for the 
investigation, who might be predisposed to say that she could have 
inferred the violation herself from the publicly available information 
supplied by the whistleblower.\304\ A number of commenters pointed 
critically to past violations such as the Bernard Madoff fraud that the 
Commission failed to identify on its own.\305\ Those commenters urged 
that an award should be available under the ``independent analysis'' 
prong of ``original information'' any time a member of the public 
directs the staff to publicly available information of which the staff 
was not aware and the staff acts upon the tip by pursuing an 
investigation (and ultimately an enforcement action); an award should 
be denied only if the staff, in fact, found the information and acted 
on its own.\306\ One commenter argued that the whistleblower's 
conclusion that violations exist should itself be viewed as non-public 
information that the Commission did not previously possess.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ See Think Computer Letter; letter from Anonymous-92 (July 
18, 2018) (``Anonymous-92 Letter''); Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto July 24 
Letter; letter from Anonymous-89 (July 25, 2018) (``Anonymous-89 
Letter''); letters from Chris DiIorio dated July 2, 2018 and Aug. 2, 
2018 (collectively ``DiIorio Letters''); letters from Dom Laviola 
dated June 28, 2018 and Aug. 9, 2018 (collectively ``Laviola 
Letters''); Anonymous-73 Letter; letter from Anonymous-72 (Aug. 17, 
2018) (``Anonymous-72 Letter''); letter from Anonymous-71 (Aug. 20, 
2018) (``Anonymous-71 Letter''); letter from Terry Smith (Aug. 22, 
2018) (``Smith Letter''); Markopolos Letter; letter from National 
Whistleblower Center (Sept. 17, 2018) (``NWC Sept. 17 Letter''); 
Jansson letter; letter from Arthur ``Two Sheds'' Jackson (Sept. 17, 
2018) (``Jackson Letter''); Cohen Milstein Letter; letter from Annie 
Bell (Sept. 18, 2018) (``Bell Letter''); Better Markets Letter; 
Anonymous-9 Letter; AFREF Letter; TAF Letter; letter from Anonymous-
121 (Oct. 17, 2018); (``Anonymous-121 Letter''); letter from 
Anonymous-122 (Oct. 29, 2018) (``Anonymous-122 Letter''); letter 
from Phillips & Cohen LLP (Oct. 25, 2019) (``Phillips & Cohen 
Letter); letter from Anonymous-136 (Nov. 18, 2019) (``Anonymous-136 
Letter'').
    \303\ See Think Computer Letter; Anonymous-89 Letter; DiIorio 
Letters; Laviola Letters; Anonymous-73 Letter; Anonymous-71 Letter; 
Smith Letter; Markopolos Letter; NWC Sept. 17 Letter; Jansson 
Letter; Jackson Letter; Cohen Milstein Letter; Better Markets 
Letter; Anonymous-9 Letter; AFREF Letter; TAF Letter; Anonymous-121 
Letter.
    \304\ See TAF Letter; Phillips & Cohen Letter.
    \305\ See Think Computer Letter; Anonymous-89 Letter; Dilorio 
Letters; Anonymous-73 Letter; Anonymous -71 Letter; NWC Sept. 17 
Letter; Jackson Letter; Better Markets Letter.
    \306\ See Anonymous-92 Letter; Anonymous-73 Letter; Anonymous-71 
Letter; Markopolos Letter; NWC Sept. 17 Letter; Better Markets 
Letter; Anonymous-9 Letter; AFREF Letter; TAF Letter; Anonymous-121 
Letter; Anonymous-122 Letter.
    \307\ See Cohen Milstein Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also urged that the proposed interpretation of 
``independent analysis'' would discourage potential whistleblowers 
because it would introduce ambiguity and uncertainty into the process 
(e.g., as to the meaning of ``reasonably apparent''); \308\ that 
whistleblowers should not be denied awards since they take significant 
personal and professional risks in coming forward; \309\ and that the 
proposed interpretive guidance runs counter to Congress's express 
intent to make whistleblower awards available based on ``analysis'' of

[[Page 70929]]

publicly available information.\310\ Some commenters acknowledged that 
merely pointing the Commission to a newspaper article or other publicly 
available information should not qualify for an award; but, these and 
other commenters emphasized the importance of contributions made by 
financial services professionals, market analysts, and others who apply 
specialized training or expertise to the review of publicly available 
information, as well as the contributions of individuals who devote a 
``substantial application of time and resources'' in ``exhaustive 
research'' sifting through and assembling disparate pieces of public 
information to identify possible violations.\311\ Two of these 
commenters also pointed out that information may be technically 
available to the public but obscure, costly, difficult to obtain, or 
largely inaccessible to most people (e.g., documents produced in 
response to a FOIA request).\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \308\ See Think Computer Letter; Anonymous-73 Letter; Jansson 
Letter; Better Markets Letter; Anonymous-9 Letter; AFREF Letter; TAF 
Letter.
    \309\ See Laviola Letters; Anonymous-73 Letter; Better Markets 
Letter; TAF Letter: Bell Letter.
    \310\ See Anonymous-92 Letter; Anonymous-73 Letter; Anonymous-71 
Letter; NWC Sept. 17 Letter; Better Markets Letter; Laviola Letters.
    \311\ See Anonymous-92 Letters; Markopolos Letter; TAF Letter; 
Cohen Milstein Letter; Anonymous-9 Letter; Phillips & Cohen Letter; 
Anonymous-136 letter.
    \312\ See Markopolos Letter; Anonymous-9 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters argued that False Claims Act precedent involving 
the public disclosure bar should not be applied to interpreting the 
Commission's rule on independent analysis.\313\ One of these commenters 
argued that Commission actions differ from qui tam actions to the 
extent that Commission actions involve entities for which there is a 
large amount of publicly available information (e.g., periodic reports 
or regulatory filings).\314\ Thus, this commenter argued, ``there will 
almost always be publicly available information involved in 
whistleblower submissions, leaving the quality of the whistleblower's 
analysis as the key variable in most cases except the most brazen 
frauds.'' \315\ Another commenter argued that Congress specifically 
included the term ``analysis'' in Section 21F in recognition of the 
fact that ``in the financial services industry . . . participants have 
specialized knowledge and/or experience reviewing financial statements, 
contracts, and filings and might be able to identify fraud . . . .'' 
\316\ According to this commenter, this fact distinguishes Section 21F 
from the public disclosure bar because ``Congress specifically wanted 
industry professionals to add their analysis with regards to the SEC 
program to help root out fraud.'' A third commenter argued that the 
False Claims Act expressly permits the government to allow relators to 
pursue actions notwithstanding the public disclosure bar and also 
permits courts to grant awards even where the action is based primarily 
on public information.\317\ One commenter supported the proposed 
interpretive guidance, including the approach of grounding the 
``independent analysis'' framework in federal case law under the False 
Claims Act.\318\ This commenter argued that the Commission's resources 
should not be diverted from ``genuine enforcement cases,'' into 
``separating wheat from chaff when bounty seekers submit information 
that is already in the public record and contains no original 
analysis.'' Another commenter echoed this sentiment, specifically 
voicing concern that claims by company outsiders who appear to use 
certain methods of analysis from publicly available information to 
formulate claims of fraud ``distract[] SEC resources from investigating 
whistleblower claims by individuals who have been or are subject to 
retaliation and loss of employment from raising concerns of malfeasance 
to their employer.'' \319\ This commenter, who identified herself as a 
former company insider with ``inside knowledge of the Company,'' urged 
that the award program should be focused on individuals who are at 
personal risk of retaliation and who provide the Commission with 
``specific facts, documents, and relevant analysis to support their 
allegations.'' \320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ See Think Computer Letter; Anonymous-92 Letter; Cohen 
Milstein Letter.
    \314\ A qui tam action allows a private party to bring an action 
on the government's behalf, and, if the government action is 
successful, then the private party can share in the award.
    \315\ See Think Computer Letter (emphasis in original).
    \316\ See Anonymous-92 Letter.
    \317\ See Cohen Milstein Letter.
    \318\ See CCMC Letter. However, this commenter also argued that 
the ``inference'' standard is too low and that ``the tip should 
provide concrete, actionable information to the Commission.'' The 
proposed guidance does not indicate, as the commenter may have 
believed, that a tip would qualify for an award if the whistleblower 
raised an inference of the violations, but rather that the 
whistleblower would not merit an award if the facts in publicly 
available information were sufficient to raise such an inference.
    \319\ See letter from Eileen Morrell (Aug. 29, 2019).
    \320\ Id. Two other commenters did not indicate disapproval of 
the proposed guidance, but asked only that it not be applied to tips 
that have been received before the effective date of the amended 
rules. See letter from Anonymous-124 (Nov. 4, 2018); letter from 
Taylor S. Amarel (Nov. 9, 2018) (``Amarel Letter''). These 
commenters stated that they had previously submitted TCRs under the 
existing rule, which, as noted, requires that ``analysis'' must 
``reveal[ ] information that is not generally known or available to 
the public,'' and further stated that ```bridging the gap' is 
different than `not generally known.' '' The interpretive guidance 
does not change any existing rules or the standards applied 
thereunder, but merely clarifies the standards under the existing 
rules that define and apply the term ``independent analysis.'' 
Further, as discussed below, the interpretation reflected in the 
guidance is consistent with statutory requirements. For these 
reasons, we believe that it is appropriate to apply the guidance to 
previously submitted TCRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Interpretive Guidance
    After considering the comments, we have decided to adopt the 
interpretive guidance as proposed with one additional interpretation. 
Subject to Section 21F(a)(3)(C) of the Exchange Act,\321\ in the 
exercise of our discretion the Commission may determine that a 
whistleblower's examination and evaluation of publicly available 
information reveals information that is ``not generally known or 
available to the public''--and therefore is ``analysis'' within the 
meaning of Rule 21F-4(b)(3)--where: (1) The whistleblower's conclusion 
of possible securities violations derives from multiple sources, 
including sources that, although publicly available, are not readily 
identified and accessed by a member of the public without specialized 
knowledge, unusual effort, or substantial cost; and (2) these sources 
collectively raise a strong inference of a potential securities law 
violation that is not reasonably inferable by the Commission from any 
of the sources individually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \321\ Section 21F(a)(3)(C) requires that ``original information 
not be exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or 
administrative hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a 
source of the information.'' 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(3)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Our experience in administering the whistleblower program, and our 
review of the comments submitted, confirm the existence of uncertainty 
regarding the requirement of Rule 21F-4(b)(3) that independent analysis 
must ``reveal[[hairsp]] information that is not generally known or 
available to the public.'' By clarifying our application of the rule, 
we expect to encourage more high-quality submissions that may result in 
successful enforcement actions, promote transparency, reduce the volume 
of non-meritorious claims, and increase the efficiency of the 
whistleblower program. The interpretive guidance is not intended to 
discourage tips from financial services professionals and others who 
develop key insights and illuminate possible violations through the 
application of expertise to the review and evaluation of publicly 
available information. Moreover, as we explained, technical expertise 
is not a requirement under the guidance. We expect to treat as 
``independent analysis'' highly-probative submissions in which the 
whistleblower's insights

[[Page 70930]]

and evaluation provide significant independent information that 
``bridges the gap'' between the publicly available information itself 
and the possibility of securities violations. The additional guidance 
we are adopting adds further clarification by describing a specific 
path available to experts and non-experts alike who devote substantial 
time and effort and develop unique insights from bringing together 
information from multiple specialized or difficult-to-obtain sources.
    Conversely, our experience has shown that some claimants seek 
awards based on submissions that do little more than highlight 
information that is reasonably evident from the public sources. We gave 
as examples cases where the whistleblower points to common hallmarks of 
fraud on the face of the public materials (e.g., impossibly high, 
guaranteed investment returns or extravagant claims in press releases) 
or to public discourse (e.g., discussions on a public message board) in 
which investors or others are alleging a fraudulent scheme. Submissions 
of this type do not constitute ``independent analysis.'' We emphasize, 
however, that there is no bright-line test and whether any particular 
submission contains sufficient independent insights to rise to the 
level of analysis--and, hence, ``original information''--will depend on 
all of the facts and circumstances of the case.
    In addition to promoting transparency and efficiency in the 
operation of our whistleblower program, we continue to believe that 
Congress did not intend that we should pay whistleblower awards merely 
for alerting the Commission staff to publicly-available information. 
The model for ``independent analysis'' that Congress had before it at 
the time was the detailed and sophisticated work performed by Harry 
Markopolos to expose the Madoff fraud, which consisted of more than 
simply providing the Commission with already-public information.
    In conformance with this limitation, our interpretive guidance 
adapts to the Section 21F context the framework that has found 
widespread acceptance among federal courts of appeals for determining 
when fraudulent transactions are deemed to already be publicly 
disclosed under analogous provisions of the federal False Claims 
Act.\322\ Although commenters criticized this approach as permitting 
the Commission to make a ``retroactive'' determination of whether the 
violations were ``reasonably apparent,'' we view the framework as an 
important analytical tool to help inform our judgment on a dispositive 
question under Section 21F: Whether a whistleblower's submission is 
original, and not merely a recitation of publicly available 
information. We observe further that, to the extent that our evaluation 
under the guidance is backward-looking, it is reasonably based only on 
information that was publicly available at the time of the 
whistleblower's tip; it does not evaluate the whistleblower's 
submission in light of any information that subsequently became public 
or in light of the investigative record.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ We are not persuaded by the view that we should not follow 
False Claims Act precedent because of contextual differences between 
the False Claims Act and Section 21F. First, the fact that a large 
amount of publicly available information is filed with the 
Commission does not suggest a reason for granting awards based 
merely on publicly available information; as one commenter observed, 
the key variable remains ``the quality of the whistleblower's 
analysis'' of such information. See Think Computer Letter. Second, 
nothing in the interpretive guidance is inconsistent with Congress's 
expectation that the term ``analysis'' in Section 21F should support 
awards when financial services professionals develop original 
insights about possible violations through application of their 
specialized knowledge or experience to the review of publicly 
available information. Third, Section 21F does not have provisions 
similar to those found in the False Claims Act that permit the 
government to allow a relator to pursue an action notwithstanding 
the public disclosure bar (31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A)) or that permit a 
discretionary award of up to 10% when an action is based primarily 
on certain publicly available information (31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1)).
    \323\ Moreover, our rules already require that we make a range 
of determinations about the nature, sources, and impact of the 
information provided by a whistleblower before we can credit it as 
``original information.'' For example, in assessing whether a 
whistleblower possessed ``independent knowledge'' under Rule 21F-
4(b)(2), we must exclude information that is ``derived from publicly 
available sources.'' Under Rule 21F-4(b)(4), we consider whether the 
information was obtained by an excluded person or under excluded 
circumstances, and, if so, whether an exception permitting use of 
the information applies. Under Rule 21F-4(b)(6), we consider how the 
information provided by a whistleblower related to other information 
already in our possession at the time and whether the 
whistleblower's submission ``materially add[ed]'' to our base of 
knowledge about the matter. Viewed in the context of the many 
individual determinations that we already must make in our 
evaluation of whether a whistleblower provided ``original 
information,'' it is reasonable that we should also consider whether 
the whistleblower provided ``significant independent information'' 
that ``bridge[d] the gap'' between the publicly available 
information and the possible securities violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are conscious of the concern expressed by some commenters that 
individual Enforcement staff assigned to the investigation will be 
responsible for determining whether the publicly available information 
was sufficient to raise an inference of the violations. This is not the 
case. In our award process, all determinations relevant to award 
entitlement--including whether the claimant provided ``original 
information''--are made in the first instance by the CRS, which 
currently is comprised of the Director and Deputy Director of the 
Enforcement Division and five other Enforcement senior officers. 
Further, all preliminary award denials that are contested are 
adjudicated by the Commission. As a result, the role of the individual 
Enforcement staff member is merely to relay to the CRS the facts 
relative to the investigation that are pertinent to the CRS's 
deliberations. It is the job of the CRS (and ultimately the Commission) 
to determine whether the claimant's submission constitutes 
``independent analysis'' through the application of an objective, 
rather than a subjective, standard of reasonableness to the record. The 
interpretive guidance we are adopting provides a framework, consistent 
with existing legal standards, for making this judgment.
    The commenters who urged that the test for ``independent analysis'' 
turn on whether the whistleblower provided information of which the 
staff was not aware and that, in fact, caused the staff to take action 
would read the ``analysis'' requirement out of the statute. Under the 
second prong of ``original information'' (Section 21F(a)(3)(B)), we are 
required to determine that information provided by a whistleblower was 
``not known to the Commission from any other source''; and under 
Section 21F(b)(1) we must determine that original information provided 
by a whistleblower ``led to'' the successful enforcement of a 
Commission covered action or a related action.\324\ We are obliged to 
interpret ``analysis'' in the first prong of ``original information'' 
(Section 21F(a)(3)(A)) in a manner that gives independent meaning to 
this term and is not redundant of the requirements that a 
whistleblower's information be unknown to the Commission and lead to a 
successful enforcement action.\325\
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    \324\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(3)(B), 78u-6(b)(1).
    \325\ See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) 
(noting ``the established principle'' that ``every clause or word of 
a statute'' should be ``give[n] effect, if possible''); Lowe v. SEC, 
472 U.S. 181, 207 n.53 (1985) (similar).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Put another way, in order to merit an award a whistleblower, among 
other things, must provide information that is not known to the 
Commission from any other source, that leads to successful enforcement, 
and that also comprises ``independent analysis'' (or ``independent 
knowledge''). Importantly, no commenters suggested any alternative 
interpretations that would distinguish submissions that

[[Page 70931]]

provide ``analysis'' of publicly available information from those that 
fail to do so.
    Our conclusion is buttressed by our reading of Section 21F(a)(6) 
\326\ in conjunction with Section 21F(b)(1).\327\ Section 21F(a)(6) 
defines a ``whistleblower,'' in relevant part, as an individual (or two 
or more individuals acting jointly) who provide ``information'' 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission. 
However, Section 21F(b)(1) authorizes us to pay awards only to 
whistleblowers who provide ``original information'' to the Commission. 
We read these provisions as reflecting Congress's understanding that 
``information'' and ``original information'' are distinct concepts, and 
that some number of individuals who are ``whistleblowers'' by virtue of 
the ``information'' they provide to the Commission may not also qualify 
as having provided ``original information.'' We cannot interpret 
``independent analysis'' in a way that erases these distinctions and 
provide awards for any ``information'' that results in a successful 
enforcement action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(6).
    \327\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, we observe that Section 21F(a)(3)(C) requires that 
``original information'' not be ``exclusively derived . . . from the 
news media.'' \328\ However, the ``news media'' is not limited to 
conventional news sources. The Supreme Court has indicated that the 
identical term in the False Claims Act's public disclosure bar has 
``broad sweep,'' \329\ and lower courts interpreting that provision 
have held that ``news media'' include publicly available websites that 
promote a company's services and products.\330\ Thus, in many cases, 
fulfilling our statutory duty not to grant awards for information that 
is ``exclusively derived . . . from the news media'' will require that 
we find in the whistleblower's purported ``analysis'' a degree of 
substance that goes beyond the information available on the face of a 
public website.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(3)(C).
    \329\ Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 
563 U.S. 401, 408 (2011).
    \330\ See United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 
F.3d 805, 813 (11th Cir. 2015); United States ex rel. Cherwenka v. 
Fastenal Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75108, *20 (D. Minn. 2018); 
United States ex rel. Green v. Service Contract Education and 
Training Trust Fund, 843 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2012).
    \331\ See generally Schindler Elevator, 563 U.S. at 408 (``[T]o 
determine the meaning of one word in the public disclosure bar, we 
must consider the provision's `entire text,' read as an `integrated 
whole.' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, in response to those commenters who expressed concern that 
the proposed interpretive guidance would discourage individuals from 
taking the significant personal and professional risks of becoming 
whistleblowers, we note that our rules provide whistleblowers with the 
ability to submit tips anonymously.\332\ Further, the interpretive 
guidance as proposed, as well as the additional interpretation adopted 
today, will enable such professionals to be treated as having provided 
``original information'' in appropriate cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ See Rule 21F-9(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Effective Date and Applicability Dates

    The amended rules will become effective 30 days after publication 
in the Federal Register. Although we proposed that the amended rules 
would take effect 60 days after publication, we believe that it would 
benefit the program to have the amended rules take effect sooner given 
that these rules: (i) Largely codify existing agency interpretations 
and practice; (ii) involve a necessary change to conform Exchange Act 
Rule 21F-2 to a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court; and (iii) otherwise 
are procedural in nature and intended to achieve efficiencies in the 
Commission's processing of whistleblower award applications.
    The table below explains whether and how the amended rules will 
apply:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 21F-2 addressing whether            The amendments to Rule 21F-2
 whistleblower status and certain         shall apply as follows: With
 threshold criteria related to award      respect to employment
 eligibility, heightened                  retaliation claims, the
 confidentiality from identity            amended rule applies only to
 disclosure, and employment anti-         employment-retaliation
 retaliation protection.                  violations occurring after the
                                          effective date of the rules;
                                          with respect to award
                                          eligibility and
                                          confidentiality protections,
                                          the amended rule applies only
                                          to information about a
                                          potential securities law
                                          violation that is submitted
                                          for the first time by an
                                          individual after the effective
                                          date of the rules.
Rule 21F-3(b)(1) and (b)(3) defining     The amendments to Rule 21F-3(b)
 ``related action''.                      shall apply only to covered-
                                          action and related-action
                                          award applications that are
                                          connected to a Notice of
                                          Covered Action (see Exchange
                                          Act Rule 21F-10(a)) posted on
                                          or after effective date of the
                                          rules.
                                         Note: Although this rule will
                                          not apply to pending award
                                          applications, the Commission
                                          may use its adjudicatory
                                          authority to apply the same
                                          principles to pending award
                                          applications.
Rule 21F-4(c)(2) technical amendment...  Rule 21F-4(c)(2) shall apply to
                                          all new whistleblower award
                                          applications filed after the
                                          effective date of the rules,
                                          as well as all whistleblower
                                          award applications that are
                                          pending and have not yet been
                                          the subject of a final order
                                          of the Commission by the
                                          effective date.
Rule 21F-4(d) defining ``action''......  Rule 21F-4(d) as amended shall
                                          apply to any DPA, NPA, or
                                          Commission settlement
                                          agreement that has a date of
                                          entry after July 21, 2010.
Rule 21F-4(e) defining ``monetary        Rule 21F-4(e) as amended shall
 sanctions''.                             be utilized by the Commission
                                          after the effective date of
                                          the final rules in determining
                                          whether an action qualifies as
                                          a ``covered action'' and in
                                          calculating any outstanding
                                          payments to be made to
                                          meritorious whistleblowers.
Rule 21F-6 concerning the Commission's   All aspects of this rule shall
 discretion to consider the dollar        apply to all award claims
 amount of monetary sanctions collected   still pending as of the
 when applying the award factors and      effective date of the rules.
 concerning award calculations for
 certain awards of $5 million or less.

[[Page 70932]]

 
Rule 21F-8(d) concerning flexibility     Rule 21F-8(d)(1) shall apply
 regarding the forms used in connection   only in connection with
 with the whistleblower program and       submissions of information
 related rule modifications.              that are made by an individual
                                          after the effective date of
                                          the proposed rules. Further,
                                          Rule 21F-8(d)(2) shall apply
                                          only to covered-action and
                                          related-action award
                                          applications that are
                                          connected to a Notice of
                                          Covered Action (see Exchange
                                          Act Rule 21F-10(a)) posted on
                                          or after the effective date of
                                          the rules.
Rule 21F-8(e) concerning false           Rule 21F-8(e) shall apply to
 statements or frivolous submissions,     all award claims still pending
 and revised Rule 21F-8(c).               as of the effective date of
                                          the rules, but as provided in
                                          Rule 21F-8(e)(4), claimants
                                          will be given notice and an
                                          opportunity to withdraw the
                                          relevant award application(s)
                                          submitted prior to the
                                          effective date. Further,
                                          revised Rule 21F-8(c)(7) shall
                                          apply to all award claims
                                          still pending as of the
                                          effective date of the rules.
Rule 21F-9 regarding Form TCR..........  Rule 21F-9 as amended shall
                                          apply only in connection with
                                          submissions of information
                                          that are made by an individual
                                          to qualify as a whistleblower
                                          after the effective date of
                                          the rules, except Rule 21F-
                                          9(e) shall apply to all award
                                          claims still pending as of the
                                          effective date of the rules.
Rule 21F-12 regarding materials that     Rule 21F-12 as amended shall
 may form the basis of the Commission's   apply only to covered-action
 award determination.                     and related-action award
                                          applications that are
                                          connected to a Notice of
                                          Covered Action (see Exchange
                                          Act Rule 21F-10(a)) posted on
                                          or after the effective date of
                                          the rules.
Rule 21F-13 regarding the                Rule 21F-13 as amended shall
 administrative record on appeal.         apply only to covered-action
                                          and related-action award
                                          applications that are
                                          connected to a Notice of
                                          Covered Action (see Exchange
                                          Act Rule 21F-10(a)) posted on
                                          or after the effective date of
                                          the rules.
Rule 21F-18 establishing a summary       Rule 21F-18 shall apply to any
 disposition process.                     whistleblower award
                                          application for which the
                                          Commission has not yet issued
                                          a Preliminary Determination as
                                          of the effective date of the
                                          rules, as well as to any
                                          future award applications that
                                          might be filed.
Interpretive guidance regarding the      As we noted in the Proposing
 meaning and application of the term      Release, although the
 ``independent analysis'' in Rule 21F-4.  Commission proposed the
                                          interpretive guidance for
                                          public comment, the Commission
                                          intends to rely on the
                                          principles articulated in the
                                          guidance for any whistleblower
                                          claims that are still pending
                                          at any stage because this
                                          guidance clarifies the
                                          existing rules that define and
                                          apply the term ``independent
                                          analysis.''
                                         Note: As discussed supra note
                                          320, the Commission received
                                          two comment letters concerning
                                          the application of the
                                          independent-analysis
                                          interpretive guidance to tips
                                          received before the effective
                                          date of the rules. For the
                                          reasons discussed in note 320,
                                          we have declined to follow
                                          that suggestion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Other Matters

    If any of the provisions of these amendments, or the application of 
these provisions to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, 
such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or application of 
such provisions to other persons or circumstances that can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or application.
    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act,\333\ the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs has designated these amendments as 
not a ``major rule,'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \333\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Background

    Certain provisions of the whistleblower rule amendments contain 
``collection of information'' requirements within the meaning of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\334\ To qualify as a 
whistleblower, individuals seeking to submit information of a possible 
securities law violation to the Commission must do so by providing 
information through the Commission's online portal or by submitting the 
paper Form TCR. Individuals seeking an award must make their award 
request using a paper Form WB-APP. The hours and costs associated with 
preparing and submitting information through the online portal and 
affected forms constitute reporting and cost burdens imposed by each 
collection of information. An agency may not sponsor, conduct, or 
require a response to an information collection unless a currently 
valid Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') control number is 
displayed. The Commission submitted a proposed reorganization of the 
affected collections of information to OMB for review in accordance 
with the PRA.\335\ The titles for the affected collections of 
information were: (1) ``Electronic Data Base Collection System--TCR'' 
(OMB Control No. 3235-0672); and (2) ``Form TCR'' and ``Form WB-APP'' 
(OMB Control No. 3235-0686).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \334\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \335\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Estimated Costs and Burdens

    As described in more detail above, to provide the Commission with 
the ability to make timely corresponding adjustments to the paper Form 
TCR when it determines to modify the online portal, the Commission is 
modifying Exchange Act Rule 21F-8 by adding a new section (d)(1) that 
reads as follows: ``The Commission will periodically designate a Form 
TCR (Tip, Complaint, or Referral) that individuals seeking be eligible 
for an award through the process identified in Sec.  240.21F-9(a)(2) 
shall use.'' In addition, to provide the Commission with greater 
administrative flexibility to modify Form WB-APP, the Commission is 
modifying Exchange Act Rule 21F-8 by adding a new section (d)(2) that 
reads as follows: ``The Commission will also periodically designate a 
Form WB-APP for use by individuals seeking to apply for an award under 
either Sec.  240.21F-10 or Sec.  240.21F-11.''
    In connection with these amendments, the Commission proposed that 
the OMB control numbers for the associated collections of information 
be

[[Page 70933]]

reorganized, so that both the online portal and Form TCR would fall 
under the same OMB control number (No. 3235-0672), and Form WB-APP 
would have its own OMB control number (No. 3235-0686). The collections 
of information would be re-titled, and the associated burden estimates 
adjusted accordingly.
    In the Proposing Release, the Commission stated that it did not 
anticipate that the amendments would increase the burden or cost to 
individuals preparing and submitting the required information through 
the online portal and affected forms. Although certain modifications 
would be made to Form TCR so that the information elicited by the form 
is consistent with the information collected through the online portal, 
the Commission stated that these conforming modifications would not 
increase appreciably the burden for individuals completing the form.
    The table below summarizes the burden and cost estimates associated 
with the online portal and affected forms after the proposed 
reorganization of the relevant control numbers:

               Table 1 of Section V.B.: Revised Burden Estimates Under the Proposed Reorganization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    OMB control
                              Title                                     No.        Burden hours        Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Tips, Complaints and Referrals (TCR)''........................       3235-0672           9,050         $42,000
``Form WB-APP''.................................................       3235-0686             110           4,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission did not receive any comments that directly addressed 
its Paperwork Reduction Act analysis or the reorganized burden 
estimates, and we do not believe any changes in the final rules will 
affect these burden estimates.

C. Mandatory Collection of Information

    A whistleblower is required to complete either a hardcopy Form TCR 
or submit his or her information electronically through the online 
portal and to complete Form WB-APP to qualify for a whistleblower 
award.

D. Confidentiality

    As explained above, the statute provides that the Commission must 
maintain the confidentiality of the identity of each whistleblower, 
subject to certain exceptions. Section 21F(h)(2) states that, except as 
expressly provided:

    [T]he Commission and any officer or employee of the Commission 
shall not disclose any information, including information provided 
by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be 
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower, except in 
accordance with the provisions of section 552a of title 5, United 
States Code, unless and until required to be disclosed to a 
defendant or respondent in connection with a public proceeding 
instituted by the Commission [or certain specific entities listed in 
paragraph (C) of Section 21F(h)(2)].

    Further, as discussed above, Rule 21F-2(c) requires that an 
individual who is seeking this heightened confidentiality protection 
must submit his or her information to the Commission using the online 
portal or by completing a hardcopy Form TCR. If an individual fails to 
do so, then under our amended rule he or she will be ineligible for the 
heightened confidentiality protections.
    Section 21F(h)(2) also permits the Commission to share information 
received from whistleblowers with certain domestic and foreign 
regulatory and law enforcement agencies. However, the statute requires 
the domestic entities to maintain such information as confidential, and 
requires foreign entities to maintain such information in accordance 
with such assurances of confidentiality as the Commission deems 
appropriate.
    In addition, Section 21F(d)(2) provides that a whistleblower may 
submit information to the Commission anonymously and still be eligible 
for an award, so long as the whistleblower is represented by counsel. 
However, the statute provides that a whistleblower must disclose his or 
her identity prior to receiving payment of an award.

VI. Economic Analysis

    The Whistleblower Program helps the Commission better enforce the 
federal securities laws. Unlike some of our rulemakings, we are not 
addressing a market failure or market risk here. Rather, based on our 
decade of experience administering the program, we have identified 
aspects of the program that could be improved to enhance its 
efficiency. Accordingly, the amendments to the whistleblower rules are 
designed to be thoughtful improvements that should help enhance the 
overall functioning of the program in ways that continue to encourage 
individuals to come forward to report securities-law violations. The 
specific changes we are adopting are designed to improve the efficiency 
of claims processing and provide additional transparency that may 
strengthen whistleblower incentives.\336\ By improving the 
Whistleblower Program, these amendments should contribute to an 
improvement in the Commission's law enforcement efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \336\ See section I.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is sensitive to the economic consequences of its 
rules, including the benefits, costs, and effects on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation. Section 23(a)(2) \337\ of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the Commission, in 
promulgating rules under the Exchange Act, to consider the impact that 
any rule may have on competition and prohibits the Commission from 
adopting any rule that would impose a burden on competition not 
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange 
Act. Further, Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act \338\ requires the 
Commission, when engaging in rulemaking where it is required to 
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest, to consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
    \338\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The economic analysis focuses on the amendments to Rule 21F-2, Rule 
21F-3(b)(3), Rule 21F-4(d)(3), Rule 21F-6, Rule 21F-8(e), newly adopted 
Exchange Act Rule 21F-18, and the adopted interpretive guidance 
concerning the term ``independent analysis.'' As discussed above:
     The amendments to Rule 21F-2 are in response to the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. 
Somers; \339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amended Rule 21F-3(b)(3) makes it clear that recovery from 
the Commission is not possible where the Commission determines that a 
separate whistleblower program more

[[Page 70934]]

appropriately applies to a non-Commission action;
     Amended Rule 21F-4(d)(3) would allow awards based on DPAs 
or NPAs entered into by DOJ and settlement agreements entered into by 
the Commission;
     Amended Rule 21F-6(c) provides additional clarity 
regarding the potential award assessment;
     The newly added language to the opening paragraph of Rule 
21F-6 clarifies the Commission's discretion to consider the dollar 
amount of monetary sanctions collected when considering the existing 
Award Factors and setting the Award Amount;
     Amended Rule 21F-8(e) would provide authority to bar 
applicants from future award applications in certain limited 
situations;
     New Rule 21F-18 would provide a streamlined award 
consideration process for certain limited categories of non-meritorious 
applications; and
     The adopted interpretive guidance would help clarify the 
meaning of ``independent analysis'' as that term is defined in Exchange 
Act Rule 21F-4 and utilized in the definition of ``original 
information.''
    The other amendments adopted in this release are either procedural, 
technical in nature, or codify existing practice, and therefore we do 
not expect them to have significant benefits, costs, and economic 
effects, or significantly impact efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.
    Many of the benefits and costs discussed below are difficult to 
quantify. For example, although the analysis that follows details the 
specific ways in which we expect the adopted rules to affect 
whistleblower incentives, we lack the data necessary to estimate the 
magnitudes of these effects separately or in the aggregate. Similarly, 
we cannot precisely estimate the additional awards paid out of the IPF 
due to the inclusion of DPAs and NPAs entered into by DOJ or settlement 
agreements entered into by the Commission in the definition of an 
``administrative action.'' \340\ Therefore, while we have attempted to 
quantify economic effects where possible, much of the discussion of 
economic effects is qualitative in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ For an explanation of the IPF, see supra footnote 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Economic Baseline

    To examine the potential economic effects of the amendments, we 
employ as a baseline the rules that the Commission adopted in May 2011 
to implement the whistleblower program as currently administered, and 
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. 
Somers. Further, we provide summary statistics that describe the 
distribution of awards paid by the whistleblower program under the 2011 
rules, and estimates of wages and salaries obtained from a number of 
surveys.
1. Supreme Court Decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers
    As described above, the Supreme Court held in Digital Realty Trust, 
Inc. v. Somers \341\ that Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act 
unambiguously requires that a person report a possible securities law 
violation to the Commission in order to qualify for employment 
retaliation protection.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
    \342\ Id. at 781-82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Awards Issued by the SEC Whistleblower Program
    From August 2012 through July 2020, the Commission's whistleblower 
program issued 81 whistleblower awards to 88 individuals (including, as 
explained above, individuals who acted as joint whistleblowers).\343\ 
Table 1 of Section VI.A.3 reports the frequency distribution of these 
awards by award size. Sixty (74%) of these awards were less than $5 
million, of which 45 (56%) awards were less than $2 million. The dollar 
amount of these 60 awards makes up 16 percent of the dollar amount of 
all awards. Of the remaining 21 awards, 15 were at least $5 million but 
less than $30 million and six exceeded $30 million. The dollar amount 
of the 15 awards that were at least $5 million but less than $30 
million makes up 39 percent of the dollar amount of all awards. The 
dollar amount of the six awards that exceeded $30 million makes up 45 
percent of the dollar amount of all awards. According to the Office of 
the Whistleblower, of the 88 individuals who have received awards, 
approximately 7 percent are high-ranking corporate executives at 
companies of varying sizes and a majority of these executives received 
awards that were under $5 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \343\ These totals treat as single awards several cases where 
whistleblowers' original information led to multiple covered actions 
that were processed together in one award order recognizing the 
total contributions of the whistleblower. Similarly, consistent with 
the approach above governing cases where we grant an award for both 
a Commission enforcement action and a related action by another 
governmental entity based on the same information provided by the 
whistleblower (see Rule 21F-3(b)), we consider covered-action awards 
together with their corresponding related-action awards as single 
whistleblower awards.

                    Table 1 of Section VI.A.3: Frequency Distribution of Whistleblower Awards
  [We use awards issued to whistleblowers by the SEC Whistleblower Program from August 2012 through July 2020.
 ``Number'' is the number of awards that fall within an award size category. ``Percent'' is the number of awards
 in an award size category as a fraction of the total number of awards. ``Percent of Total Dollars Awarded'' is
           the dollars awarded in an award size category as a fraction of the total dollars awarded.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Percent of
                       Award size category                            Number          Percent      total dollars
                                                                                                      awarded
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than $2 million............................................              45              56               6
At least $2 million but less than $5 million....................              15              19              10
At least $5 million but less than $10 million...................               6               7               8
At least $10 million but less than $15 million..................               2               2               5
At least $15 million but less than $20 million..................               4               5              13
At least $20 million but less than $30 million..................               3               4              13
At least $30 million............................................               6               7              45
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................              81             100             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 70935]]

    In addition to summarizing the distribution of awards to 
whistleblowers, we also summarize the distribution of awards by 
enforcement action. For each enforcement action, we identify all 
whistleblowers who receive an award for that enforcement action and sum 
their awards to arrive at the aggregate award for that enforcement 
action. Table 2 of Section VI.A.3 indicates that between August 2012 
and July 2020, there were 74 enforcement actions for which the 
Commission issued whistleblower awards.\344\ Fifty-six enforcement 
actions had awards of less than $5 million, of which 43 awards were 
less than $2 million. The dollar amount of awards associated with these 
56 actions makes up 15 percent of the dollar amount of all awards. Of 
the remaining 18 actions, 13 had aggregate awards of at least $5 
million but less than $30 million and only five had an aggregate award 
that exceeded $30 million. The dollar amount of awards associated with 
the 13 actions makes up 34 percent of the dollar amount of all awards. 
The dollar amount of the awards associated with the five largest 
actions makes up 51 percent of the dollar amount of all awards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ As noted, we aggregate related actions with their 
corresponding Commission actions for purposes of this analysis.

                Table 2 of Section VI.A.3: Frequency Distribution of Awards by Enforcement Action
[We use awards issued to whistleblowers by the SEC Whistleblower Program from August 2012 through July 2020. For
  each enforcement action, we identify all whistleblowers who received an award for that enforcement action and
   sum their awards to arrive at the aggregate award for that enforcement action. ``Number'' is the number of
  aggregate awards that fall within an award size category. ``Percent'' is the number of aggregate awards in an
  award size category as a fraction of the total number of awards. ``Percent of Total Dollars Awarded'' is the
             dollars awarded in an award size category as a fraction of the total dollars awarded.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Percent of
                       Award size category                            Number         Percent *     total dollars
                                                                                                      awarded
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than $2 million............................................              43              58               6
At least $2 million but less than $5 million....................              13              18               9
At least $5 million but less than $10 million...................               5               7               6
At least $10 million but less than $15 million..................               2               3               5
At least $15 million but less than $20 million..................               3               4              10
At least $20 million but less than $30 million..................               3               4              13
At least $30 million............................................               5               7              51
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................              74             100             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figures do not sum to 100% due to rounding.

3. Estimates of Current Annual Wages
    Prospective whistleblowers' annual wages are potentially relevant 
to various aspects of the adopted rules. In particular, summary 
statistics of annual wages could inform an assessment of the potential 
impact of Rule 21F-6(c) on whistleblowing incentives. Table 3 of 
Section VI.A.3 presents, by industry, the pre-tax annual wages per 
employee (``average wages'') estimated by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for 2018.\345\ Average wages vary from a low of $24,087 in 
the leisure and hospitality industry to a high of $113,781 in the 
information industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \345\ Wage data used for calculating the annual wages per 
employee are derived from the quarterly tax reports submitted to 
state government workforce agencies by employers, subject to state 
unemployment insurance laws, and from Federal agencies subject to 
the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees program. Further 
information is available at https://www.bls.gov/cew/cewbultncur.htm#Tables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These averages do not reflect the substantial degree of within-
industry wage variation. For example, more senior employees involved in 
financial activities likely earn higher wages than their more junior 
counterparts; likewise, staff who supply significant expertise may earn 
more than those who do not. A 2017 report documenting survey responses 
from 377 financial professionals included average base salaries for 
senior-level financial executives between $133,859 and $342,154, 
depending on title and whether companies are public or private.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \346\ See ``Financial Executive Compensation Report 2017,'' 
Grant Thornton LLP and Financial Executives Foundation, Inc., 2017 
(available at https://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-
files/tax/pdfs/FEI-financial-exec-comp-survey-2017/FEI-survey-
results-2017.ashx).

  Table 3 of Section VI.A.3: 2018 Average Annual Wages per Employee by
                                Industry
 [This table presents the pre-tax annual wages per employee at privately
owned establishments aggregated by industry as reported by the Bureau of
                           Labor Statistics.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Annual wages
                        Industry                           per employee
                                                                ($)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural resources and mining............................          59,628
Construction............................................          62,727
Manufacturing...........................................          68,525
Trade, transportation, and utilities....................          47,607
Information.............................................         113,781
Financial activities....................................          95,561
Professional and business services......................          75,169
Education and health services...........................          50,444
Leisure and hospitality.................................          24,087

[[Page 70936]]

 
Other services..........................................          38,464
Unclassified............................................          57,227
------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Analysis of Benefits, Costs, and Economic Effects of the Adopted 
Rules

    In this section, we discuss the potential benefits, costs, and 
economic effects of the adopted rules. We also respond to comments that 
relate to the benefits, costs, and economic effects of these rules.
1. Amendments to Rule 21F-2
    Most of the amendments to Rule 21F-2 are either in response to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers \347\ 
or conform the rule substantively with current practice. Two 
amendments, however, do represent changes relative to the economic 
baseline, and their potential benefits, costs, and economic effects are 
discussed here. Final Rule 21F-2(a)(1) extends employment retaliation 
protection only to an individual who provides the Commission with 
information ``in writing.'' Final Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii), among other 
things, limits employment retaliation protection to lawful acts that 
``relate to the subject matter'' of the person's submission to the 
Commission under final Rule 21F-2(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Final Rule 21F-2(a)(1)
    Final Rule 21F-2(a)(1) could potentially impose a burden on those 
individuals who want to report potential violations to the Commission 
and wish to qualify as a ``whistleblower'' solely for employment 
retaliation protection. Such individuals might decide not to report to 
the Commission if the reporting burden is perceived to outweigh the 
benefits associated with retaliation protection. Our experience to date 
with individuals who have sought to qualify for a whistleblower award 
suggests that requiring that information be provided in writing 
presents, at most, a minimal burden to individuals who want to report 
violations to the Commission while facilitating the staff's use of the 
information. To the extent that this experience is informative about 
the reporting burden for individuals who will seek employment 
retaliation protection, such a burden would also be, at most, 
minimal.\348\ Accordingly, the final rule would likely not have an 
adverse impact on the whistleblowing incentives of those individuals 
who wish to qualify as a ``whistleblower'' solely for employment 
retaliation protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \348\ See also Section II.G.3.
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    We considered two alternatives to the approach we are adopting in 
Rule 21F-2(a): (1) Requiring information to be provided to the 
Commission consistent with Rule 21F-9(a)--that is, either through the 
online portal at http://www.sec.gov or by mailing or faxing a Form TCR 
to the Office of the Whistleblower; \349\ and (2) permitting additional 
manners of reporting for anti-retaliation purposes (such as placing a 
telephone call or making an oral report more generally).\350\
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    \349\ A commenter also suggested this alternative. See CCMC 
Letter.
    \350\ See letters from TAF and NELA.
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    We declined to adopt the first alternative because it would, in our 
view, unnecessarily limit the means of reporting to the Commission by 
individuals who are merely seeking employment retaliation protection. 
Limiting whistleblower status to those individuals who follow the first 
alternative could unnecessarily exclude individuals from the benefits 
of Section 21F(h)(2)'s employment retaliation protections without 
providing any accompanying benefit to the Commission, whistleblowers, 
or the public generally. Further, requiring that individuals report 
information simply ``in writing'' allows individuals to choose the 
least burdensome manner to report violations to the Commission, 
potentially lowering costs including, for example, time spent providing 
the information.
    A second alternative to the final rule would have permitted 
reporting violations other than ``in writing'' that would, nonetheless, 
preserve a whistleblower's retaliation protection. While the Digital 
Realty decision requires a report as a prerequisite for retaliation 
protection, it is the final rule that requires the report to the 
Commission to be ``in writing.'' Some commenters supported the ``in 
writing'' requirement because it provided clarity and certainty as to 
when the whistleblower provided information and what information was 
provided,\351\ while other commenters opposed the ``in writing'' 
requirement, noting that reporting can take many other forms and the 
purpose of the retaliation protection statute is to encourage 
reporting, whether in writing or not.\352\ One commenter noted that 
reporting not made in writing (e.g., oral disclosure) could readily be 
put into writing at the time of disclosure or any time after 
disclosure.\353\ However, such an approach could raise a number of 
concerns. There may be a loss of information or the introduction of 
ambiguity if the whistleblower fails to provide a sufficiently detailed 
and clear oral disclosure, especially if the whistleblower fears 
retaliation or is otherwise distracted. Second, there is likely to be a 
delay between receiving an oral disclosure and memorializing it. Third, 
to address the two foregoing concerns, repeated contacts with the 
whistleblower may be necessary, which could further delay getting the 
whistleblower's information to the appropriate staff. While the 
drafting of a written report takes time, a written report likely would 
mitigate the aforementioned concerns related to oral disclosure. 
Finally, a commenter noted that an urgent need to make an oral report, 
particularly if the whistleblower feared retaliation and was therefore 
unwilling to make a written report, could leave a whistleblower who 
provides valuable information to the Commission without retaliation 
protection.\354\ However, the act of providing a written report ensures 
that a whistleblower has the option to anonymously and confidentially 
report a violation and, more to the point, that the whistleblower will 
be provided with

[[Page 70937]]

retaliation protection. We decline to adopt the second alternative due 
to the concerns discussed above and to avoid potential costs that could 
arise if the Commission became involved in disputes in private anti-
retaliation lawsuits over what information was provided to whom on what 
dates. Requiring that any reporting be done in writing obviates these 
concerns and potential costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ See letters from CPMC and CWC.
    \352\ See Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto (May 6 Letter); NELA Letter; 
TAF Letter.
    \353\ See NELA Letter.
    \354\ See TAF Letter.
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b. Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii)
    Rule 21F-2(d)(1)(iii) helps avoid the result that an individual 
who, having qualified as a whistleblower under the Commission's rules 
could, as a result, receive subsequent employment retaliation 
protection for making a required disclosure within the meaning of 
clause (iii) of Section 21F(h)(1)(A) that does not relate to the 
subject matter of the report the whistleblower made to the Commission. 
For individuals who want to make non-Commission reports about potential 
violations to their employers and desire employment retaliation 
protection for such lawful acts, the final rule could increase the 
incentives of these individuals to also report directly to the 
Commission. While final Rule 21F-2(a)'s ``in writing'' requirement 
could potentially impose a burden on these individuals, for the reasons 
discussed in the analysis of final Rule 21F-2(a)(1), supra, we believe 
that such a reporting burden would, at most, be minimal and would 
likely not limit the reporting incentives afforded by final Rule 21F-
2(d)(1)(iii).
    As discussed above, although some commenters expressed reservations 
about the uncertainty this provision might generate for 
whistleblowers,\355\ we anticipate that this provision will be applied 
in a flexible manner to accommodate whistleblowers who make a good-
faith effort to comply with our rules in seeking retaliation 
protection. To the extent that the Commission's application is 
flexible, this provision should not discourage potential whistleblowers 
due to uncertainty about what conduct is protected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \355\ See NELA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rule 21F-3(b)(3) \356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \356\ This rule was proposed as new paragraph (4) to Exchange 
Act Rule 21F-3(b). See 83 FR at 34738.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As adopted, Rule 21F-3(b)(3) makes clear that a law-enforcement 
action will not qualify as a related action if the Commission 
determines that there is a separate whistleblower award program that 
more appropriately applies to the enforcement action. Further, Rule 
21F-3(b)(3) makes clear that the Commission will not make an award to 
the whistleblower for a potential related action if the whistleblower 
has already been granted an award by the governmental entity 
responsible for administering another whistleblower award program. 
Further, under final Rule 21F-3(b)(3), if the whistleblower was denied 
an award by another award program, the whistleblower would not be 
permitted to readjudicate any issues before the Commission that the 
governmental entity responsible for administering the other 
whistleblower award program resolved as part of the award denial.
    The final rule clarifies that a whistleblower may not adjudicate 
his or her contributions in separate forums and potentially obtain two 
separate awards based on the same whistleblower report. While the rules 
that were adopted in May 2011 precluded this result when an action is 
applicable to both the Commission's whistleblower program and the 
CFTC's whistleblower program,\357\ those rules do not expressly 
preclude this result when the non-SEC whistleblower program is 
administered by a governmental entity other than the CFTC. Thus, the 
Commission is amending its rules to reflect its current practice, thus 
clarifying that its position with respect to the CFTC applies to all 
other governmental entities,\358\ because we believe clarity in this 
area will improve decision making by whistleblowers and their counsel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \357\ See Rule 21F-3(b)(3).
    \358\ In addition to the CFTC, there are various Federal and 
state whistleblower programs that are currently administered by 
other agencies or governmental entities, including a program 
administered by the IRS, whistleblower award programs related to the 
False Claims Act and the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA), and state whistleblower award programs 
established in Utah and Indiana. See also Proposing Release 83 FR at 
34735.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule would likely not have an adverse impact on the 
incentives of individuals who may report violations that result in 
enforcement actions potentially implicating both the Commission's 
whistleblower program and the whistleblower program of another 
governmental entity. Such an individual likely has the ability to 
determine (e.g., using web searches, advice from legal counsel), 
whether her report could potentially be eligible for an award under the 
whistleblower program of another governmental entity if presented to 
that governmental entity, whether or not her report is ultimately 
eligible for an award under the Commission's whistleblower program. The 
existence of an alternative whistleblower program potentially improves 
the individual's overall likelihood of receiving an award from 
reporting a violation and would likely not adversely impact the 
individual's reporting incentives. In addition, potential 
whistleblowers with legal counsel likely would have taken into account 
the Commission's current practice, which the final rule codifies. As 
discussed in Section II(C) of the proposing release,\359\ to date, the 
Commission has never paid an award on a matter where a second 
whistleblower program also applied to the same matter, nor has the 
Commission ever indicated that it would do so. As such, the final rule 
is unlikely to present a potential whistleblower with a disincentive to 
report a possible securities law violation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \359\ See 83 FR at 34709-34711.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter was concerned that the proposed rule could 
disincentivize whistleblowing if the more applicable program has an 
award cap that is lower than the whistleblower's desired compensation 
(e.g., FIRREA's $1.6 million limit).\360\ In response to this concern, 
we note that whistleblowing is an individual decision that is generally 
guided by a complex mix of pecuniary elements and non-pecuniary 
elements.\361\ While it is possible that a more applicable award 
program with a lower award cap could, under the final rule, reduce a 
whistleblower's monetary incentives to report potential violations to 
the Commission, we believe that this possibility is so remote relative 
to other factors that it is unlikely to serve as a meaningful 
disincentive for a potential whistleblower. For example, when 
considering whether to report a potential violation to the Commission, 
that potential whistleblower still stands to receive an award from us 
for any Commission covered action; if a covered action does not occur, 
any ancillary action may produce an award for that whistleblower under 
the more applicable program. Even if the more applicable program has an 
award cap, individuals may still decide to report potential violations 
if they are sufficiently motivated by non-pecuniary elements, or the 
award amount available under the other program, or both. Because the 
amendment codifies current practice, we believe the final rule would 
likely not have an adverse impact on reporting incentives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \360\ See Cornell Law Clinic Letter.
    \361\ See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections 
Adopting Release, 76 FR at 34355, note 433.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Rule 21F-4(d)(3)
    Rule 21F-4(d)(3) provides that, for purposes of making a 
whistleblower

[[Page 70938]]

award, an NPA or DPA entered into by DOJ in a criminal case, or a 
settlement agreement entered into by the Commission outside of the 
context of a judicial or administrative proceeding to address 
violations of the securities laws, will be deemed to be an 
``administrative action'' and any money required to be paid thereunder 
will be deemed a ``monetary sanction.'' \362\ The rule will likely 
result in more awards because awards would be paid for DPAs and NPAs 
entered into by DOJ as well as settlement agreements entered into by 
the Commission in addition to judicial or administrative proceedings 
covered by the existing rules. The rule should enhance the incentives 
for whistleblowers to come forward in a timely manner to the extent 
that it signals to prospective whistleblowers that a wider array of 
enforcement resolutions may result in awards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \362\ See Section II.A.3 regarding the clarifications related to 
the requirement that agreements be ``similar'' in order to qualify 
as ``administrative actions'' imposing ``monetary sanctions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Rule 21F-6(c)
    Rule 21F-6(c) provides a specific presumption that, subject to 
Commission discretion and certain other conditions, where the statutory 
maximum award of 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected would 
total $5 million or less for all actions involving the whistleblower's 
same original information, the Award Amount presumptively will be set 
at the statutory maximum amount. However, this presumption would not 
apply under certain circumstances. For example, the Commission will not 
presume the award to be the statutory maximum amount if any of the 
negative Award Factors that are identified in Exchange Act Rule 21F-
6(b) are found to be present with respect to the whistleblower's award 
claim or if the award claim triggers Exchange Act Rule 21F-16 
(concerning awards to whistleblowers who engage in culpable conduct). 
In the case of multiple whistleblowers, the award could be set at the 
statutory maximum, but the allocation of the award could be altered if 
any of the negative Award Factors applied to one or more whistleblower. 
Additionally, where, under Rule 21F-6(a), the assistance provided by 
the whistleblower is limited, the Commission may exercise its 
discretion to set the Award Amount lower than the statutory maximum.
    The final rule could enhance the incentives of potential 
whistleblowers who anticipate receiving awards below $5 million and do 
not expect to be subject to any of the above conditions that would 
preclude an application of the presumption. The prospect of a larger 
award could further incentivize these potential whistleblowers to 
report violations in a timely manner to the Commission, including 
before any of the negative Award Factors are present. Further, we 
anticipate that the final rule will increase incentives to report 
wrongdoing more broadly. At the time of deciding whether to submit a 
tip, it would be very unlikely that a whistleblower could estimate 
accurately the amount that might be awarded. The final rule gives 
whistleblowers some assurance that if monetary sanctions were to be 
insufficient to support an award of over $5 million, then the award-
setting process will, in the vast majority of cases, start from the 
presumption of the maximum statutory award of 30% of monetary 
sanctions.
    From a cost perspective, the final rule could potentially result in 
larger awards being paid because an award that would yield a potential 
payout below $5 million may be increased. As indicated in Table 1 of 
Section VI.A.3, as of July 31, 2020, the Commission has granted 60 
whistleblower awards (i.e., 74 percent of awards and 16 percent of 
total dollars awarded) that were below $5 million. To the extent that 
the distribution of past awards provides a reasonable estimate of the 
distribution of likely future awards to whistleblowers, the majority of 
future awards are likely to be subject to the final rule.
    An alternative that we considered was using the $2 million 
threshold described in the proposal. In particular, the proposed rule 
would have increased incentives for potential whistleblowers who 
expected awards of less than $2 million, but with a potential increase 
to a maximum of $2 million. Like the final rule, the proposed rule 
would have included the limitations mentioned above to specify which 
whistleblowers could be considered for the presumption. The alternative 
would have provided increased incentives relative to current practice. 
Similarly, relative to current practice, the final rule's presumptive 
increase of small awards that are $5 million or less provides greater 
incentives and clarity regarding the application of increased awards 
for whistleblowers whose awards otherwise might have been smaller (and 
could have engendered concern in potential whistleblowers that they 
would have been smaller).
    Compared to the proposed rule, the final rule likely would result 
in increases to the amount of the award for more whistleblowers, as 
suggested by the number of awards that fell between $2 million and $5 
million, as shown in Table 1 of Section VI.A.3.
5. Proposed Rule 21F-6(d) and Amendments to Rule 21F-6
a. Consideration of Rule
    The amendments to Rule 21F-6 that we are adopting today clarify 
that the Commission has the authority to consider the dollar amount 
when applying the award criteria. Because these amendments only clarify 
the Commission's existing authority, we do not believe they will have 
significant benefits, costs, and economic effects, or will 
significantly impact efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
    As noted above, we are not adopting Proposed Rule 21F-6(d). As 
such, awards exceeding $30 million will not be subject to a specific 
mechanism for review. This alternative, as described in the proposal, 
would have provided a specific mechanism to guide the Commission's 
existing discretion to determine awards, specifically in the context of 
large awards. This mechanism would have provided a rubric within which 
the Commission could determine whether an award exceeded an amount 
necessary to sufficiently incentivize whistleblowers, which is a goal 
of the whistleblower award program.
    In the Proposing Release, we stated our belief that Proposed Rule 
21F-6(d) could reduce the likelihood of awards that are excessive in 
light of the whistleblower program's goals and the interests of 
investors and the public, and thus could foster more efficient use of 
the IPF.\363\ In light of some commenters' perception that any 
downward-departure mechanism for exceedingly large potential awards 
would serve to hold awards at the 10 percent statutory minimum, the 
Commission at this time has determined not to adopt this alternative, 
thereby avoiding any detrimental chilling effect on potential 
whistleblowers coming forward as a result of misperceiving the purpose 
and function of the proposed provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \363\ Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 FR 34,739 (July 20, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Rule 21F-8(e)
    As discussed above,\364\ we are adopting Rule 21F-8(e) 
substantially as proposed. The final rule could increase the speed and 
efficiency of the award determination process.\365\ By

[[Page 70939]]

permanently barring applicants that make three or more frivolous award 
applications the final rule could help free up staff resources that 
could then be devoted to processing potentially meritorious award 
applications and other work related to the whistleblower program.\366\ 
Based on the Commission's historical experience, the Commission 
believes the rule would have a meaningful impact in terms of freeing up 
staff resources. Likewise, to the extent that potentially being barred 
from awards discourages submitting frivolous applications, the rule may 
also create a deterrent effect that further limits the number of 
frivolous award applications that staff have to address. To the extent 
that the final rule fosters faster award determination and payment and 
to the extent that this motivates whistleblowing, individuals are more 
likely to come forward and report potential violations as a result of 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \364\ See Section II.I.
    \365\ We acknowledge that this potential benefit rests, in large 
part, on the premise that the applicants currently submitting 
multiple frivolous applications are unlikely to change their 
behavior.
    \366\ Other work includes, for example, serving as subject 
matter experts to investigative staff regarding whistleblower issues 
in investigations, intake of hard copy tips, posting of Notices of 
Covered Actions, and manning the whistleblower hotline. To help 
promote the SEC's whistleblower program and establish a line of 
communication with the public, the Office of the Whistleblower 
operates a hotline where whistleblowers, their attorneys, or other 
members of the public with questions about the program may call to 
speak to the Office of the Whistleblower's staff. During Fiscal Year 
2019, the Office of the Whistleblower returned over 2,600 calls from 
members of the public. Since May 2011 when the hotline was 
established, the Office of the Whistleblower has returned nearly 
24,000 calls from the public. See SEC Whistleblower Program 2019 
Annual Report to Congress (Nov. 15, 2019) (available at https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rule might dissuade individuals who are permanently barred from 
providing information in the future about possible securities law 
violations. We believe that this potential cost of the final rule could 
be mitigated by a number of factors.
    First, the number of individuals who may be permanently barred by 
the final rule for submitting three or more frivolous applications and 
who might subsequently have information about possible securities law 
violations that could be provided to the Commission is likely to be a 
small fraction of the population of meritorious award applicants, 
limiting the potential cost of the final rule. Through July 24, 2020, 
we have found that individuals that submitted three or more award 
applications make up approximately nine percent of the population of 
covered action award applicants. This estimate constitutes an upper 
bound of the actual fraction of applicants who submitted three or more 
frivolous applications and subsequently had information about possible 
securities law violations that could be provided to the 
Commission.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ To date, approximately 11 applicants submitted three or 
more applications who were determined to be potentially meritorious 
and not frivolous with respect to at least one of their 
applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, as discussed in the proposal, the Commission has issued two 
final orders that have permanently barred the applicants from 
submitting any further whistleblower award applications based on 
violations of Rule 21F-8(c)(7). Given that the final rule codifies the 
Commission's current practice, we believe that individuals who have 
been barred on the basis of Rule 21F-8(c)(7) could have already taken 
such current practice into account when deliberating on whether to 
report, even in the absence of the final rule.
    Finally, as discussed in the adopting release that accompanied the 
original whistleblower rules, whistleblowing is an individual decision 
that is generally guided by a complex mix of pecuniary elements and 
non-pecuniary elements.\368\ Individuals that are permanently barred 
from applying for whistleblower awards might still come forward and 
provide information about possible violations if they are sufficiently 
motivated by non-pecuniary elements.\369\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \368\ See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections 
Adopting Release, 76 FR at 34355, note 433.
    \369\ Id. An example of a non-pecuniary element is a sense of 
``doing the right thing.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also acknowledge the possibility that individuals who have made 
fewer than three frivolous award applications might be discouraged from 
reporting possible securities law violations because their next award 
application could be determined to be frivolous, which would increase 
the likelihood of a permanent bar from making any future award 
applications. We believe that this potential cost of the final rule 
could be mitigated by a number of factors.
    First, claimants may withdraw an application that the Office of the 
Whistleblower has assessed to be frivolous for up to three such 
applications. Second, the claims adjudication processes should help 
ensure that potentially meritorious claims will be considered as such 
by the Commission. Third, as discussed above, whistleblowing is an 
individual decision that is generally guided by a complex mix of 
pecuniary elements and non-pecuniary elements.\370\ Any individual may 
come forward and provide information about possible violations if she 
is sufficiently motivated by non-pecuniary elements.\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \370\ See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections 
Adopting Release, 76 FR at 34355, note 433.
    \371\ Id. and note 409.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule could further help protect investors and the public 
from potential harm that may flow from the provision of a materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or false 
writing or document with the intent of misleading or otherwise 
hindering the Commission or another governmental entity. This benefit 
could arise from the permanent bar as well as the deterrent effect that 
discourages conduct prohibited by Rule 21F-8(c)(7), each of which is 
mentioned above.
    As noted above, nearly all commenters supported the proposed rule. 
One commenter recommended not allowing unlimited opportunities to 
withdraw applications deemed frivolous.\372\ The Commission shares the 
commenter's view that the opportunities to withdraw frivolous 
applications should be limited. Granting unlimited opportunities to 
withdraw frivolous applications would not curtail the submission of 
frivolous claims and by lowering the cost of withdrawing, could give 
rise to more frivolous claims. Such an outcome likely would consume 
staff resources without generating commensurate benefits in terms of 
detecting securities violations and protecting investors. Thus, final 
Rule 21F-8(e) provides that an individual may withdraw the initial 
three applications that are deemed frivolous. The final rule balances 
efficiency of awards processing, providing fair notice to claimants of 
consequences of filing frivolous claims, and allowing a claimant--once 
informed that a claim has been determined frivolous--subsequently to 
submit a meritorious claim. In this regard, the process seeks to 
efficiently reject frivolous claims without unilaterally foreclosing 
the opportunity to submit information and potentially submit a 
meritorious claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \372\ See Anonymous-9 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Rule 21F-18
    Rule 21F-18(a) provides that the Office of the Whistleblower may 
use a summary disposition process to deny any award application that 
falls within any of the following categories: (1) Untimely award 
application; \373\ (2) noncompliance with the requirements of Rule 21F-
9, which concerns the manner for submitting a tip to qualify as

[[Page 70940]]

a whistleblower and to be eligible for an award; (3) claimant's 
information was never provided to or used by the staff handling the 
covered action or the underlying investigation (or examination), and 
those staff members otherwise had no contact with the claimant; (4) 
noncompliance with Rule 21F-8(b), which requires an applicant to submit 
supplemental information that the Commission may require \374\ and to 
enter into a confidentiality agreement; or (5) failure to specify in 
the award application the submission that the claimant made pursuant to 
Rule 21F-9(a) upon which the claim to an award is based. Rule 21F-18(b) 
specifies the procedures that shall apply to any award application 
designated for summary disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ The time periods for submitting an award application are 
specified in Rule 21F-10(b) and Rule 21F-11(b).
    \374\ The authority to require additional information of an 
applicant is delegated to the Office of the Whistleblower. See Rule 
21F-10(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule could reduce the diversion of staff resources and 
time that it might otherwise take to process claims that may be 
rejected on straightforward grounds. An award application that is 
processed by the final summary disposition process would not require 
the CRS to review the record, issue a Preliminary Determination, 
consider any written response filed by the claimant, or issue the 
Proposed Final Determination; these functions would be assumed by the 
Office of the Whistleblower. The summary disposition process 
incorporates two other modifications. First, the 30-day period for 
replying to a Preliminary Summary Disposition is shorter than the time 
period for replying to a Preliminary Determination provided for in 
Rules 21F-10(e)(2) and 21F-11(e)(2). This shorter period should be 
sufficient for a claimant to reply and is appropriate given that the 
matters subject to summary disposition should be relatively 
straightforward. Second, a claimant would not have the opportunity to 
receive the full administrative record upon which the Preliminary 
Summary Disposition was based. Instead, the Office of the Whistleblower 
would (to the extent appropriate given the nature of the denial) 
provide the claimant with a staff declaration that contains the 
pertinent facts upon which the Preliminary Summary Disposition is 
based. This modification from the record-review process specified in 
Rules 21F-10 and 21F-11 should still afford any claimant a sufficient 
opportunity to provide a meaningful reply to a Preliminary Summary 
Disposition. This should eliminate the delay that can arise when a 
claimant does not expeditiously request the record (which, in turn, 
delays the start of the 60-day period for a claimant to submit a 
response to a preliminary determination); elimination of these delays 
should help further expedite the summary adjudication process that we 
are adopting.
    As with Rule 21F-8(e), staff resources that are freed up as a 
result of the final rule could be devoted to processing potentially 
meritorious award applications or with other work related to the 
whistleblower program. This, in turn, could expedite the processing of 
potentially meritorious award applications. To the extent that faster 
processing of potentially meritorious award applications motivates 
whistleblowing, individuals may be more likely to come forward and 
report potential violations as a result of the final rule.
    We acknowledge the potential that certain aspects of the final rule 
might make it marginally more difficult for whistleblowers to respond 
to the denial of award applications (specifically the shorter time 
period to respond to the Preliminary Summary Disposition). Thus, it 
could be possible that the final rule might reduce the whistleblowing 
incentives of those individuals who consider the ease of responding to 
award application denials when deciding whether to come forward and 
report potential violations.
    However, certain factors substantially limit this potential for 
increased difficulties for whistleblowers. First, given that the 
matters subject to summary disposition should be relatively 
straightforward, we believe that the 30-day period for replying to a 
Preliminary Summary Disposition and the provision of a staff 
declaration (where applicable) should afford any claimant a sufficient 
opportunity to provide a meaningful reply to a Preliminary Summary 
Disposition. Second, as discussed above, the final rule may only be 
used to deny award applications that fall under certain restricted 
categories. Third, as discussed in the adopting release that 
accompanied the original whistleblower rules, whistleblowing is an 
individual decision that is generally guided by a complex mix of 
pecuniary elements and non-pecuniary elements.\375\ Individuals who may 
be concerned with the ease of responding to award application denials 
may still come forward and provide information about possible 
violations if they are sufficiently motivated by non-pecuniary 
elements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \375\ See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections 
Adopting Release, 76 FR at 34355, note 433.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, commenters were mixed in their reception of the 
rule. Commenters who supported it underscored the possibility that the 
process would promote efficiency of resources, while some commenters 
opposed it due to the unclear effect it would have on the existing 
queue of claims. We note that staff from the Office of the 
Whistleblower have found that the categories encompassed by this rule 
have consumed a disproportionate amount of time and staff resources 
without a corresponding benefit. Based on this input, we believe this 
rule should allow staff to more efficiently process claims and deal 
with the existing queue of claims while continuing to provide 
appropriate due process to claimants.
8. Interpretive Guidance Regarding the Meaning and Application of 
``Independent Analysis'' as Defined in Exchange Act Rule 21F-4(b)(3)
    The interpretive guidance adopted in the final rule does not change 
the existing rules, but merely clarifies the meaning of ``independent 
analysis'' as that term is defined in Exchange Act Rule 21F-4 and 
utilized in the definition of ``original information.'' As discussed 
earlier, a whistleblower's examination and evaluation of publicly 
available information does not constitute ``analysis'' if the facts 
disclosed in the public materials on which the whistleblower relies and 
in other publicly available information are sufficient to raise an 
inference of the possible violations alleged in the whistleblower's 
tip. In order for a whistleblower to be credited with ``analysis,'' the 
whistleblower's examination and evaluation should contribute 
``significant independent information'' that ``bridges the gap'' 
between the publicly available information and the possible securities 
violations. Assuming that a whistleblower's submission meets the 
threshold requirement that it constitutes ``independent analysis,'' for 
the whistleblower to be eligible for an award the ``information that . 
. . is derived from the . . . [whistleblower's] analysis'' must also be 
of such high quality that it leads to a successful enforcement action.
    The interpretive guidance could potentially reduce the 
whistleblowing incentives of those individuals who wish to satisfy the 
``independent analysis'' prong of the ``original information'' 
requirement by examining publicly available information and providing 
observations that do not go

[[Page 70941]]

beyond the information itself and reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. In light of the interpretive guidance, these individuals may 
decide not to provide such public information knowing that such 
information would not be credited as ``independent analysis'' and 
therefore not be eligible for a whistleblower award. While not 
qualifying as ``independent analysis,'' to the extent that the 
provision of reasonable inferences or observations that do not go 
beyond public information itself improves Commission enforcement or 
otherwise provides a benefit, any potential reduction in such provision 
could be a cost associated with the interpretive guidance. 
Nevertheless, individuals who are aware that public information would 
not be credited with ``independent analysis'' may still come forward 
and provide reasonable inferences or observations that do not go beyond 
public information itself to the Commission if they are sufficiently 
motivated by non-pecuniary elements.
    The interpretive guidance could increase the whistleblowing 
incentives of those individuals who possess ``significant independent 
information'' that ``bridges the gap'' between publicly available 
information (and reasonable inferences therefrom) and the conclusion 
that possible securities violations are indicated, but, in the absence 
of the guidance, may have decided against reporting to the Commission 
because of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of ``independent 
analysis.'' To the extent that these individuals come forward and 
report such significant independent information to the Commission in 
light of the interpretive guidance, the quantity and quality of 
reported information might increase, which in turn might improve the 
Commission's ability to enforce the Federal securities laws, detect 
violations, and deter potential future violations. Further, the 
clarification afforded by the interpretive guidance might also reduce 
the number of award applications that are made solely on the basis of 
the provision of public information and do not meet the ``independent 
analysis'' threshold.
    We are adopting an additional interpretation regarding information 
from sources that are technically public, but may be largely 
inaccessible to individuals without specialized knowledge. This 
additional guidance should benefit submitters of this type of 
information and others who devote substantial time and effort and 
develop unique insights from bringing together information from 
multiple specialized or difficult-to-obtain sources. To the extent that 
the number of claims that fail to meet the ``independent analysis'' 
threshold declines as a result of the interpretive guidance, staff 
resources could be freed up and devoted to processing potentially 
meritorious award applications and other work related to the 
whistleblower program as discussed earlier.

C. Effects of the Rules on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital 
Formation

    The Commission believes that the amendments make incremental 
changes to its whistleblower program. Thus, the Commission does not 
anticipate the effects on efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation to be significant. The Commission did not receive comments 
that address the discussion of efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation in the proposal.
    The final rules could have a positive indirect impact on investment 
efficiency and capital formation by increasing the incentives of 
potential whistleblowers to provide information on possible 
violations.\376\ Providing such information could increase the 
effectiveness of the Commission's enforcement activities. More 
effective enforcement could lead to earlier detection of violations and 
increased deterrence of potential future violations, which should 
assist in a more efficient allocation of investment funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \376\ See supra Section VI.B. for a discussion of how final 
Rules 21F-2(d)(1)(iii), 21F-4(d)(3), 21F-6(c), 21F-8(e), 21F-18, and 
the interpretive guidance could increase whistleblowing incentives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Serious securities frauds, for example, can cause inefficiencies in 
the economy by diverting investment funds from more legitimate, 
productive uses. If investors fear theft, fraud, manipulation, insider 
trading, or conflicted investment advice, their trust in the markets 
will be low, in both the primary market for issuance and the secondary 
market for trading.\377\ This would prompt investors to demand a higher 
risk premium for holding securities, increasing the cost of raising 
capital and impairing capital formation (relative to the case where 
rules against such abuses were in effect and properly enforced and 
obeyed). To the extent that the final rules increase deterrence of 
potential future violations, investors' trust in the securities markets 
would also increase. This increased investor trust will promote lower 
capital costs as more investors enter the market, and as investors 
generally demand a lower risk premium due to a reduced likelihood of 
securities fraud.\378\ This, too, should promote the efficient 
allocation of capital formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \377\ Giannetti and Wang (2016) show that, after the revelation 
of corporate fraud in a state, household stock market participation 
in that state decreases. Households decrease holdings in fraudulent 
as well as nonfraudulent firms, even if they do not hold stocks in 
fraudulent firms. This finding is consistent with the revelation of 
corporate fraud reducing investors' trust and participation in the 
stock market. See Mariassunta Giannetti and Tracy Yue Wang, 
Corporate scandals and household stock market participation, 71 J. 
Fin. 2591 (2016) (available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jofi.12399).
    \378\ See Ko, K. Jeremy, ``Economics Note: Investor 
Confidence,'' October 2017 (available at https://www.sec.gov/files/investor_confidence_noteOct2017.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, some of the final rules could reduce 
whistleblowing incentives in certain cases, although any such reduction 
in whistleblowing incentives--to the extent that it occurs--is 
justified in light of the potential for positive indirect impact on 
investment efficiency and capital formation discussed above. Rule 21F-
8(e) might reduce the whistleblowing incentives of (i) those 
individuals who are permanently barred under the final rule from 
submitting award applications and (ii) to a lesser extent, those 
individuals who have made fewer than three frivolous award 
applications. Additionally, Rule 21F-18 might reduce the whistleblowing 
incentives of those individuals who consider the ease of responding to 
award application denials when deciding whether to come forward and 
report potential violations. Further, the interpretive guidance might 
reduce the whistleblowing incentives of those individuals who wish to 
rely on the provision of solely public information to satisfy the 
``independent analysis'' prong of the ``original information'' 
requirement for a whistleblower award. Yet these potential reductions 
in whistleblowing incentives may be limited for reasons discussed 
earlier.
    We believe that Rule 21F-6(c) should enhance the whistleblowing 
incentives of those individuals who anticipate receiving awards that do 
not exceed $5 million by increasing their anticipated award to an 
amount of up to $5 million, and this in turn may have positive (albeit 
indirect) impacts on efficiency and capital formation.
    The final rules could also improve other forms of efficiency. By 
permanently barring applicants that make frivolous or fraudulent award 
applications, final Rule 21F-8(e) could help free up staff resources 
that could be used to expedite the processing of potentially 
meritorious award applications as well as the payment of awards. As 
discussed previously, to the extent that faster award application 
processing and award payment motivate whistleblowing, individuals are 
more likely to come forward and report

[[Page 70942]]

potential violations as a result of final Rule 21F-8(e) and final Rule 
21F-18. To the extent that the final rules promote the timely reporting 
of possible violations by increasing whistleblowing incentives and 
prevent the provision of a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation, or a false writing or document with intent 
of misleading or otherwise hindering the Commission or another 
governmental entity, the efficiency and speed in detecting violations 
would be enhanced, which could reduce losses associated with the misuse 
of resources and hasten public disclosure of such violations to 
securities markets. To the extent that the final rule enables earlier 
public disclosure of violations, which, in turn, allow rapid 
incorporation of such news and information into prices and investors' 
information sets, price and allocative efficiency of capital markets 
could be improved.
    Similar to the effects on capital formation, the effects of the 
final rules on competition would be indirect, and would flow from their 
effects on whistleblowing incentives. To the extent that the final 
rules increase the likelihood of detecting misconduct by increasing 
whistleblowing incentives, the final rules could reduce the unfair 
competitive advantages that some companies can achieve by engaging in 
undetected violations.\379\ Conversely, to the extent that the final 
rules decrease the likelihood of detecting misconduct by reducing 
whistleblowing incentives, the final rules could increase the unfair 
competitive advantages that some companies can achieve by engaging in 
undetected violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \379\ See 76 FR at 34362.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Section 603(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act \380\ requires the 
Commission to undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis of rules it 
is adopting unless the Commission certifies that the rules would not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.\381\ In the Proposing Release the Commission requested public 
comment on its preliminary regulatory-flexibility analysis but received 
none.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \380\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \381\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Small authority is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6) to mean ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction'' as defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) through (5). The 
definition of ``small authority'' does not include individuals. As 
explained in the Proposing Release, the rules apply only to an 
individual, or individuals acting jointly, who provide information to 
the Commission relating to the violation of the securities laws. 
Companies and other entities are not eligible to participate in the 
whistleblower program as whistleblowers. Consequently, the persons that 
will be subject to the amended rules are not ``small entities'' for 
purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    For the reasons stated above, the Commission certifies, pursuant to 
5 U.S.C. 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, that the rules would 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

VIII. Statutory Basis

    The Commission is adopting rule amendments, as well as the removal 
of references to various forms, contained in this document under the 
authority set forth in Sections 3(b), 21F, and 23(a) of the Exchange 
Act.

List of Subjects

17 CFR Part 240

    Administrative practice and procedure; Brokers; Confidential 
business information; Fraud Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; 
Securities; Swaps.

17 CFR Part 249

    Administrative practice and procedure; Brokers; Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements; Securities.

Text of the Amendments

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, title 17, chapter II of 
the Code of Federal Regulations is amended to read as follows:

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
1. The authority citation for part 240 continues to read in part as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78o-4, 
78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll, 78mm, 
80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 et 
seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 
1350; Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112-
106, sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
    Section 240.21F is also issued under Pub. L. 111-203, 922(a), 
124 Stat. 1841 (2010).
* * * * *

0
2. Section 240.21F-2 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-2  Whistleblower status, award eligibility, 
confidentiality, and retaliation protections.

    (a) Whistleblower status. (1) You are a whistleblower for purposes 
of Section 21F of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6) as of the time 
that, alone or jointly with others, you provide the Commission with 
information in writing that relates to a possible violation of the 
federal securities laws (including any law, rule, or regulation subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission) that has occurred, is ongoing, 
or is about to occur.
    (2) A whistleblower must be an individual. A company or other 
entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.
    (b) Award eligibility. To be eligible for an award under Section 
21F(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(b)) based on any 
information you provide that relates to a possible violation of the 
federal securities laws, you must comply with the procedures and the 
conditions described in Sec. Sec.  240.21F-4, 240.21F-8, and 240.21F-9. 
You should carefully review those rules before you submit any 
information that you may later wish to rely upon to claim an award.
    (c) Confidentiality protections. To qualify for the confidentiality 
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act (15 
U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(2)) based on any information you provide that relates 
to a possible violation of the federal securities laws, you must comply 
with the procedures and the conditions described in Rule 21F-9(a) 
(Sec.  240.21F-9(a)).
    (d) Retaliation protections. (1) To qualify for the retaliation 
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 
U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), you must satisfy all of the following criteria:
    (i) You must qualify as a whistleblower under paragraph (a) of this 
section before experiencing the retaliation for which you seek redress;
    (ii) You must reasonably believe that the information you provide 
to the Commission under paragraph (a) of this section relates to a 
possible violation of the federal securities laws; and
    (iii) You must perform a lawful act that meets the following two 
criteria:
    (A) First, the lawful act must be performed in connection with any 
of the activities described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A)(i) through (iii) of 
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) through (iii)); and
    (B) Second, the lawful act must relate to the subject matter of 
your submission to the Commission under paragraph (a) of this section.

[[Page 70943]]

    (2) To receive retaliation protection for a lawful act described in 
paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section, you do not need to qualify as a 
whistleblower under paragraph (a) of this section before performing the 
lawful act, but you must qualify as a whistleblower under paragraph (a) 
of this section before experiencing retaliation for the lawful act.
    (3) To qualify for retaliation protection, you do not need to 
satisfy the procedures and conditions for award eligibility in 
Sec. Sec.  240.21F-4, 240.21F-8, and 240.21F-9.
    (4) Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), 
including any rules promulgated thereunder, shall be enforceable in an 
action or proceeding brought by the Commission.

0
3. Amend Sec.  240.21F-3 by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (3) to read 
as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-3  Payment of awards.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) A related action is a judicial or administrative action that is 
brought by one of the governmental entities listed in paragraphs 
(b)(1)(i) through (iii) of this section or a self-regulatory 
organization as specified in paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this section 
(collectively ``governmental/SRO authority''), that yields monetary 
sanctions, and that is based upon information that either the 
whistleblower provided directly to a governmental/SRO entity or the 
Commission itself passed along to the governmental/SRO entity pursuant 
to the Commission's procedures for sharing information, and which is 
the same original information that the whistleblower voluntarily 
provided to the Commission and that led the Commission to obtain 
monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.
    (i) The Attorney General of the United States;
    (ii) An appropriate regulatory authority (as defined in Sec.  
240.21F-4); or
    (iii) A state Attorney General in a criminal case; or
    (iv) A self-regulatory organization (as defined in Sec.  240.21F-
4).
* * * * *
    (3) The following provision shall apply where a claimant's 
application for a potential related action may also involve a potential 
recovery from another whistleblower award program for that same action.
    (i) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(1) of this section, if a judicial 
or administrative action is subject to a separate monetary award 
program established by the Federal Government, a state government, or a 
self-regulatory organization, the Commission will deem the action a 
related action only if the Commission finds (based on the facts and 
circumstances of the action) that its whistleblower program has the 
more direct or relevant connection to the action.
    (ii) In determining whether a potential related action has a more 
direct or relevant connection to the Commission's whistleblower program 
than another award program, the Commission will consider the nature, 
scope, and impact of the misconduct charged in the potential related 
action, and its relationship to the Federal securities laws. This 
inquiry may include consideration of, among other things:
    (A) The relative extent to which the misconduct charged in the 
potential related action implicates the public policy interests 
underlying the Federal securities laws (such as investor protection) 
rather than other law-enforcement or regulatory interests (such as tax 
collection or fraud against the Federal Government);
    (B) The degree to which the monetary sanctions imposed in the 
potential related action are attributable to conduct that also 
underlies the Federal securities law violations that were the subject 
of the Commission's enforcement action; and
    (C) Whether the potential related action involves state-law claims 
and the extent to which the state may have a whistleblower award 
program that potentially applies to that type of law-enforcement 
action.
    (iii) If the Commission determines to deem the action a related 
action, the Commission will not make an award to you for the related 
action if you have already been granted an award by the governmental/
SRO entity responsible for administering the other whistleblower award 
program. Further, if you were denied an award by the other award 
program, you will not be permitted to readjudicate any issues before 
the Commission that the governmental/SRO entity responsible for 
administering the other whistleblower award program resolved against 
you as part of the award denial. Additionally, if the Commission makes 
an award before an award determination is finalized by the 
governmental/SRO entity responsible for administering the other award 
program, the Commission shall condition its award on the meritorious 
whistleblower making a prompt, irrevocable waiver of any claim to an 
award from the other award program.

0
4. Amend Sec.  240.21F-4 by:
0
 a. Revising paragraph (c)(2);
0
b. Adding paragraph (d)(3); and
0
c. Revising paragraph (e).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-4  Other definitions.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
* * * * *
    (2) You gave the Commission original information about conduct that 
was already under examination or investigation by the Commission, the 
Congress, any other authority of the federal government, a state 
Attorney General or securities regulatory authority, any self-
regulatory organization, or the PCAOB (except in cases where you were 
an original source of this information as defined in paragraph (b)(5) 
of this section), and your submission significantly contributed to the 
success of the action.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
* * * * *
    (3) For purposes of making an award under Sec. Sec.  240.21F-10 and 
240.21F-11, the following will be deemed to be an administrative action 
and any money required to be paid thereunder will be deemed a monetary 
sanction under Sec.  240.21F-4(e):
    (i) A non-prosecution agreement or deferred prosecution agreement 
entered into by the U.S. Department of Justice; or
    (ii) A similar settlement agreement entered into by the Commission 
outside of the context of a judicial or administrative proceeding to 
address violations of the securities laws.
    (e) Monetary sanctions means:
    (1) An order to pay money that results from a Commission action or 
related action and which is either:
    (i) Expressly designated as a penalty, disgorgement, or interest; 
or
    (ii) Otherwise ordered as relief for the violations that are the 
subject of the covered action or related action; or
    (2) Any money deposited into a disgorgement fund or other fund 
pursuant to section 308(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 
7246(b)), as a result of such action or any settlement of such action.
* * * * *

0
 5. Amend Sec.  240.21F-6 by:
0
a. Revising the first sentence of the introductory text; and
0
b. Adding paragraph (c).
    The revision and addition read as follows:

[[Page 70944]]

Sec.  240.21F-6  Criteria for determining amount of award.

    In exercising its discretion to determine the appropriate award, 
the Commission may consider the following factors (and only the 
following factors) in relation to the facts and circumstances of each 
case in setting the dollar or percentage amount of the award. * * *
* * * * *
    (c) Additional considerations in connection with certain awards of 
$5 million or less. (1) This subpart applies when the Commission is 
considering any meritorious award application where:
    (i) The statutory maximum award of 30 percent of the monetary 
sanctions collected in any covered and related action(s), in the 
aggregate, is $5 million or less, and the Commission determines that it 
does not reasonably anticipate that future collections would cause the 
statutory maximum award to be paid to any whistleblower to exceed $5 
million in the aggregate;
    (ii) None of the negative award factors specified in paragraphs 
Sec. Sec.  240.21F-6(b)(1) or 240.21F-6(b)(3) were found present with 
respect to the claimant's award application, and the award claim does 
not trigger Sec.  240.21F-16 (concerning awards to whistleblowers who 
engage in culpable conduct);
    (iii) The claimant did not engage in unreasonable reporting delay 
under Sec.  240.21F-(6)(b)(2) (although the Commission, in its sole 
discretion, may in certain limited circumstances determine to waive 
this criterion if the claimant can demonstrate that doing so based on 
the facts and circumstances of the matter is consistent with the public 
interest, the promotion of investor protection, and the objectives of 
the whistleblower program); and
    (iv) The Commission does not otherwise determine in its sole 
discretion that application of the enhancement afforded by this subpart 
would be inappropriate because either:
    (A) The whistleblower's assistance in the covered action or related 
action (as assessed under Sec.  240.21F-6(a) of this section) was, 
under the relevant facts and circumstances, limited; or
    (B) Providing the enhancement would be inconsistent with the public 
interest, the promotion of investor protection, or the objectives of 
the whistleblower program.
    (2) If the Commission determines that the criteria in Sec.  
240.21F-6(c)(1) are satisfied, the resulting payout to a claimant for 
the original information that the claimant provided that led to one or 
more successful covered or related action(s), collectively, will be the 
maximum allowed under the statute.
    (3) Notwithstanding Sec.  240.21F-6(c)(2), if two or more claimants 
qualify for an award in connection with any covered action or related 
action and at least one of those claimant's award applications 
qualifies under Sec.  240.21F-6(c)(1), the aggregate amount awarded to 
all meritorious claimants will be the statutory maximum. In allocating 
that amount among the meritorious claimants, the Commission will 
consider whether an individual claimant's award application satisfies 
Sec. Sec.  240.21F-6(c)(1)(ii) and 240.21F-6(c)(1)(iii).

0
6. Amend Sec.  Section 240.21F-7 by revising the introductory text of 
paragraph (a) to read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-7  Confidentiality of submissions

    (a) Pursuant to Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78u-6(h)(2)) and Sec.  240.21F-2(c), the Commission will not disclose 
information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of 
a whistleblower provided that the whistleblower has submitted 
information utilizing the processes specified in Sec.  240.21F-9(a), 
except that the Commission may disclose such information in the 
following circumstances:
* * * * *

0
7. Amend Sec.  240.21F-8 by:
0
a. Revising the section heading;
0
b. Revising paragraph (c)(7); and
0
c. Adding paragraphs (d) and (e).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-8  Eligibility and forms.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (7) The Commission or a court of competent jurisdiction finds that, 
in your whistleblower submission, your other dealings with the 
Commission (including your dealings beyond the whistleblower program 
and covered action), or your dealings with another governmental/SRO 
entity (as specified in Sec.  240.21F-3(b)(1)) in connection with a 
related action, you knowingly and willfully made any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or used any 
false writing or document knowing that it contains any materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry with intent to 
mislead or otherwise hinder the Commission or another governmental/SRO 
entity, provided that this provision should not apply if the 
Commission, in its discretion, finds it consistent with the public 
interest, the promotion of investor protection, and the objectives of 
the whistleblower program.
    (d) The Commission may modify or revise Form TCR and Form WB-APP as 
provided below.
    (1) The Commission will periodically designate on the Commission's 
web page a Form TCR (Tip, Complaint, or Referral) that individuals 
seeking to be eligible for an award through the process identified in 
Sec.  240.21F-9(a)(2) shall use.
    (2) The Commission will also periodically designate on the 
Commission's web page a Form WB-APP for use by individuals seeking to 
apply for an award in connection with a Commission-covered judicial or 
administrative action (15 U.S.C. 21F(a)(1)), or a related action (Sec.  
240.21F-3(b)(1)).
    (e) The Commission shall have the authority to impose a permanent 
bar on a claimant as provided below.
    (1) Grounds for a permanent bar. Submissions or applications that 
are frivolous or fraudulent, or that would otherwise hinder the 
effective and efficient operation of the Whistleblower Program may 
result in the Commission issuing a permanent bar as part of a final 
order in the course of considering a whistleblower award application 
from you. If such a bar is issued, the Office of the Whistleblower will 
not accept or act on any other applications from you. A permanent bar 
may be issued in the following circumstances:
    (i) If you make three or more award applications for Commission 
actions that the Commission finds to be frivolous or lacking a 
colorable connection between the tip (or tips) and the Commission 
actions for which you are seeking awards; or
    (ii) If the Commission finds that you have violated paragraph 
(c)(7) of this section.
    (2) General procedures for issuance of a permanent bar. The 
Commission will consider whether to issue a permanent bar in connection 
with an award application from you. In general, the Preliminary 
Determination or Preliminary Summary Disposition must state that a bar 
is being recommended, and you will then have an opportunity to respond 
in writing in accordance with the award processing procedures specified 
in Sec. Sec.  240.21F-10(e)(2) and 240.21F-18(b)(3). If the basis for a 
bar arises or is discovered after the issuance of a Preliminary 
Determination or Preliminary Summary Disposition, the Office of the 
Whistleblower shall notify you and afford you an opportunity to submit 
a response before the

[[Page 70945]]

Commission determines whether to issue a bar.
    (3) Notice and opportunity to withdraw frivolous applications. (i) 
Except as provided in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of this section, before any 
Preliminary Determination or Preliminary Summary Disposition is issued 
that may recommend a bar, the Office of the Whistleblower shall advise 
you of any assessment by that Office that your award application is 
frivolous (``frivolous application'') or based on a tip that lacks a 
colorable connection to the action for which you have sought an award 
(``noncolorable application''). If you withdraw your award application 
within 30 days of the notification from the Office of the 
Whistleblower, it will not be considered by the Commission in 
determining whether to exercise its authority under this paragraph (e).
    (ii) The notification and opportunity to withdraw provided for by 
paragraph (e)(3)(i) are limited to the first three applications 
submitted by you that are reviewed by the Office of the Whistleblower 
and preliminarily deemed by that Office to be either a frivolous 
application or a noncolorable application. After these first three 
award applications, you will not be provided notice or an opportunity 
to withdraw any other frivolous or noncolorable applications.
    (iii) For purposes of determining whether a bar should be imposed 
under section (e) of this rule, you will not be permitted to withdraw 
your application:
    (A) After the 30-day period to withdraw has run following notice 
from the Office of the Whistleblower with respect to the initial three 
applications assessed by that Office to be frivolous or lacking a 
colorable connection to the action; or
    (B) After a Preliminary Determination or Preliminary Summary 
Disposition has issued in connection with any other such application.
    (4) Award applications pending before the effective date of 
paragraph (e). (i) Paragraph (e) of this section shall apply to all 
award applications pending as of the effective date of paragraph (e) of 
this section. But with respect to any such pending award applications, 
the Office of the Whistleblower shall advise you, before any 
Preliminary Determination or Preliminary Summary Disposition is issued 
that may recommend a bar, of any assessment by that Office that the 
conditions for issuing a bar are satisfied because either:
    (A) You submitted an award application prior to the effective date 
of this section (e) and that application is frivolous or lacking a 
colorable connection between the tip and the action for which you have 
sought an award; or
    (B) You made a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation or used a false writing or document in 
violation of paragraph (c)(7) of this section prior to the effective 
date of this section (e).
    (ii) If, within 30 days of the Office of the Whistleblower 
providing the foregoing notification, you withdraw the relevant award 
application(s), the withdrawn award application(s) will not be 
considered by the Commission in determining whether to exercise its 
authority under paragraph (e). Further, the procedures specified in 
paragraph (e)(3)(i) through (iii) of this section shall apply to any 
award application that is pending as of the effective date of this rule 
that is determined to be a frivolous or noncolorable application.

0
8. Amend Sec.  240.21F-9 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a) and (b); and
0
b. Removing the parenthetical phrase ``(referenced in Sec.  249.1800 of 
this chapter)'' wherever it appears in paragraphs (c) introductory 
text, (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (d); and
0
c. Adding paragraph (e).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-9   Procedures for submitting original information.

    (a) To submit information in a manner that satisfies Sec.  240.21F-
2(b) and Sec.  240.21F-2(c) of this chapter you must submit your 
information to the Commission by any of these methods:
    (1) Online, through the Commission's website located at 
www.sec.gov, using the Commission's electronic TCR portal (Tip, 
Complaint, or Referral);
    (2) Mailing or faxing a Form TCR to the SEC Office of the 
Whistleblower at the mailing address or fax number designated on the 
SEC's web page for making such submissions; or
    (3) By any other such method that the Commission may expressly 
designate on its website as a mechanism that satisfies Sec. Sec.  
240.21F-2(b) and 240.21F-2(c) of this chapter. For a 30-day period 
following the Commission's designation of any new forms by placing them 
on the Commission's website, the Commission shall also continue to 
accept submissions made using the prior version of the forms.
    (b) Further, to be eligible for an award, you must declare under 
penalty of perjury at the time you submit your information pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section that your 
information is true and correct to the best of your knowledge and 
belief.
* * * * *
    (e) You must follow the procedures specified in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this section within 30 days of when you first provide the 
Commission with original information that you rely upon as a basis for 
claiming an award. If you fail to do so, then you will be deemed 
ineligible for an award in connection with that information (even if 
you later resubmit that information in accordance with paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this section). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission 
shall waive your noncompliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section if:
    (1) You demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that you 
complied with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section within 30 days of first obtaining actual or constructive notice 
about those requirements (or 30 days from the date you retain counsel 
to represent you in connection with your submission of original 
information, whichever occurs first); and
    (2) The Commission can readily develop an administrative record 
that unambiguously demonstrates that you would otherwise qualify for an 
award.

0
9. Amend Sec.  240.21F-10 by revising paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) 
to read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-10  Procedures for making a claim for a whistleblower 
award in SEC actions that result in monetary sanctions in excess of 
$1,000,000.

* * * * *
    (b) To file a claim for a whistleblower award, you must file Form 
WB-APP (as specified in Sec.  240.21F-8(d)(2). You must sign this form 
as the claimant and submit it to the Office of the Whistleblower by 
mail, email (as a PDF attachment), or fax (or any other manner that the 
Office permits).
    (1) All claim forms, including any attachments, must be received by 
the Office of the Whistleblower within ninety (90) calendar days of the 
date of the Notice of Covered Action in order to be considered for an 
award.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) of this section, the 
time period to file an application for an award based on a Commission 
settlement agreement covered by Sec.  240.21F-4(d) of this chapter 
shall be governed exclusively by Sec.  240.21F-11(b)(1) of this chapter 
if the settlement agreement was entered into after July 21, 2010 but 
before the effective date of this section as amended in 2020.
    (c) If you provided your original information to the Commission 
anonymously, you must disclose your identity on the Form WB-APP, and 
your identity must be verified in a form and manner that is acceptable 
to the Office

[[Page 70946]]

of the Whistleblower prior to the payment of any award.
    (d) Once the time for filing any appeals of the Commission's 
judicial or administrative action has expired, or where an appeal has 
been filed, after all appeals in the action have been concluded, one or 
more staff members designated by the Director of the Division of 
Enforcement (``Claims Review Staff'') will evaluate all timely 
whistleblower award claims submitted on Form WB-APP in accordance with 
the criteria set forth in these rules. In connection with this process, 
the Office of the Whistleblower may require that you provide additional 
information relating to your eligibility for an award or satisfaction 
of any of the conditions for an award, as set forth in Sec.  240.21F-
8(b) of this chapter. Following a determination by the Claims Review 
Staff (and an opportunity for the Commission to review that 
determination), the Office of the Whistleblower will send you a 
Preliminary Determination setting forth a preliminary assessment as to 
whether the claim should be allowed or denied and, if allowed, setting 
forth the proposed award dollar and percentage amount, and the grounds 
therefore.
    (e) You may contest the Preliminary Determination made by the 
Claims Review Staff by submitting a written response to the Office of 
the Whistleblower setting forth the grounds for your objection to 
either the denial of an award or the proposed amount of an award. The 
response must be in the form and manner that the Office of the 
Whistleblower shall require. You may also include documentation or 
other evidentiary support for the grounds advanced in your response. In 
applying the award factors specified in Sec.  240.21F-6 of this chapter 
and determining the award dollar and percentage amounts set forth in 
the Preliminary Determination, the award factors may be considered by 
the SEC staff and the Commission in dollar terms, percentage terms or 
some combination thereof. Should you choose to contest a Preliminary 
Determination, you may set forth the reasons for your objection to the 
proposed amount of an award, including the grounds therefore, in dollar 
terms, percentage terms or some combination thereof.
    (1) Before determining whether to contest a Preliminary 
Determination, you may:
    (i) Within thirty (30) days of the date of the Preliminary 
Determination, request that the Office of the Whistleblower make 
available for your review the materials from among those set forth in 
Sec.  240.21F-12(a) of this chapter that formed the basis of the Claims 
Review Staff's Preliminary Determination.
    (ii) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date of the 
Preliminary Determination, request a meeting with the Office of the 
Whistleblower; however, such meetings are not required and the office 
may in its sole discretion decline the request.
    (2) If you decide to contest the Preliminary Determination, you 
must submit your written response and supporting materials within sixty 
(60) calendar days of the date of the Preliminary Determination, or if 
a request to review materials is made pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of 
this section, then within sixty (60) calendar days of the Office of the 
Whistleblower making those materials available for your review.
* * * * *

0
10. Amend Sec.  240.21F-11 by revising paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and 
(e) to read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-11  Procedures for determining awards based upon a 
related action.

* * * * *
    (b) You must also use Form WB-APP (as specified in Sec.  240.21F-
8(d)(2)) to submit a claim for an award in a potential related action. 
You must sign this form as the claimant and submit it to the Office of 
the Whistleblower by mail, email (as a PDF attachment), or fax (or any 
other manner that the Office permits) as follows:
    (1) If a final order imposing monetary sanctions has been entered 
in a potential related action at the time you submit your claim for an 
award in connection with a Commission action, you must submit your 
claim for an award in that related action on the same Form WB-APP that 
you use for the Commission action. For purposes of this paragraph and 
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a final order imposing monetary 
sanctions is entered on the date of a court or administrative order 
imposing the monetary sanctions; however, with respect to any agreement 
covered by Sec.  240.21F-4(d) of this chapter (such as a deferred 
prosecution agreement or a nonprosecution agreement entered by the 
Department of Justice), the Commission will deem the date of the entry 
of the final order to be the later of either:
    (i) The effective date of this section as amended in 2020; or
    (ii) The date of the earliest public availability of the instrument 
reflecting the arrangement if evidenced by a press release or similar 
dated publication notice (or otherwise, the date of the last signature 
necessary for the agreement).
    (2) If a final order imposing monetary sanctions in a potential 
related action has not been entered at the time you submit your claim 
for an award in connection with a Commission action, you must submit 
your claim on Form WB-APP within ninety (90) days of the issuance of a 
final order imposing sanctions in the potential related action.
    (c) The Office of the Whistleblower may request additional 
information from you in connection with your claim for an award in a 
related action to demonstrate that you directly (or through the 
Commission) voluntarily provided the governmental/SRO entity (as 
specified in Sec.  240.21F-3(b)(1) of this chapter) the same original 
information that led to the Commission's successful covered action, and 
that this information led to the successful enforcement of the related 
action. Further, the Office of the Whistleblower, in its discretion, 
may seek assistance and confirmation from the governmental/SRO entity 
in making an award determination.
    (d) Once the time for filing any appeals of the final judgment or 
order in a potential related action has expired, or if an appeal has 
been filed, after all appeals in the action have been concluded, the 
Claims Review Staff (as specified in Sec.  240.21F-10(d) of this 
chapter) will evaluate all timely whistleblower award claims submitted 
on Form WB-APP in connection with the related action. The evaluation 
will be undertaken pursuant to the criteria set forth in these rules. 
In connection with this process, the Office of the Whistleblower may 
require that you provide additional information relating to your 
eligibility for an award or satisfaction of any of the conditions for 
an award, as set forth in Sec.  240.21F-(8)(b) of this chapter. 
Following a determination by the Claims Review Staff (and an 
opportunity for the Commission to review that determination), the 
Office of the Whistleblower will send you a Preliminary Determination 
setting forth a preliminary assessment as to whether the claim should 
be allowed or denied and, if allowed, setting forth the proposed award 
percentage amount.
    (e) You may contest the Preliminary Determination made by the 
Claims Review Staff by submitting a written response to the Office of 
the Whistleblower setting forth the grounds for your objection to 
either the denial of an award or the proposed amount of an award. The 
response must be in the form and manner that the Office of the 
Whistleblower shall require. You may also include documentation or 
other evidentiary support for the grounds

[[Page 70947]]

advanced in your response. In applying the award factors specified in 
Sec.  240.21F-6 of this chapter and determining the award dollar and 
percentage amounts set forth in the Preliminary Determination, the 
award factors may be considered by the SEC staff and the Commission in 
dollar terms, percentage terms or some combination thereof. Should you 
choose to contest a Preliminary Determination, you may set forth the 
reasons for your objection to the proposed amount of an award, 
including the grounds therefore, in dollar terms, percentage terms or 
some combination thereof.
    (1) Before determining whether to contest a Preliminary 
Determination, you may:
    (i) Within thirty (30) days of the date of the Preliminary 
Determination, request that the Office of the Whistleblower make 
available for your review the materials from among those set forth in 
Sec.  240.21F-12(a) of this chapter that formed the basis of the Claims 
Review Staff's Preliminary Determination.
    (ii) Within thirty (30) days of the date of the Preliminary 
Determination, request a meeting with the Office of the Whistleblower; 
however, such meetings are not required and the office may in its sole 
discretion decline the request.
    (2) If you decide to contest the Preliminary Determination, you 
must submit your written response and supporting materials within sixty 
(60) calendar days of the date of the Preliminary Determination, or if 
a request to review materials is made pursuant to paragraph (e)(1)(i) 
of this section, then within sixty (60) calendar days of the Office of 
the Whistleblower making those materials available for your review.
* * * * *

0
11. Amend Sec.  240.21F-12 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (a);
0
b. Amending paragraph (a)(2) by removing the parenthetical phrase 
``(referenced in Sec.  249.1800 of this chapter)''; and
0
c. Revising paragraphs (a)(3) and (6).
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-12  Materials that may form the basis of an award 
determination and that may be included in the record on appeal.

    (a) The following items constitute the materials that the 
Commission, the Claims Review Staff (as specified in Sec.  240.21F-
10(d) of this chapter), and the Office of the Whistleblower may rely 
upon to make an award determination pursuant to Sec. Sec.  240.21F-21F-
10, 240.21F-11, and 240.21F-18 of this chapter:
* * * * *
    (3) The whistleblower's Form WB-APP, including attachments, any 
supplemental materials submitted by the whistleblower before the 
deadline to file a claim for a whistleblower award for the relevant 
Notice of Covered Action, and any other materials timely submitted by 
the whistleblower in response either
    (i) To a request from the Office of the Whistleblower or the 
Commission; or
    (ii) To the Preliminary Determination or Preliminary Summary 
Disposition that was provided to the claimant;
* * * * *
    (6) Any other documents or materials from third parties (including 
sworn declarations) that are received or obtained by the Office of the 
Whistleblower to resolve the claimant's award application, including 
information related to the claimant's eligibility. (The Commission, the 
Claims Review Staff, and the Office of the Whistleblower may not rely 
upon information that the third party has not authorized the Commission 
to share with the claimant.)
* * * * *

0
12. Amend Sec.  240.21F-13 by revising paragraph (b) to read as 
follows:

Sec.  240.21F-13  Appeals.

* * * * *
    (b) The record on appeal shall consist of the Final Order, any 
materials that were considered by the Commission in issuing the Final 
Order, and any materials that were part of the claims process leading 
from the Notice of Covered Action to the Final Order (including, but 
not limited to, the Notice of Covered Action, whistleblower award 
applications filed by the claimant, the Preliminary Determination or 
Preliminary Summary Disposition, materials that were considered by the 
Claims Review Staff in issuing the Preliminary Determination or that 
were provided to the claimant by the Office of the Whistleblower in 
connection with a Preliminary Summary Disposition, and materials that 
were timely submitted by the claimant in response to the Preliminary 
Determination or Preliminary Summary Disposition). The record on appeal 
shall not include any pre-decisional or internal deliberative process 
materials that are prepared exclusively to assist the Commission and 
the Claims Review Staff (as specified in Sec.  240.21F-10(d) of this 
chapter) in deciding the claim (including the staff's Proposed Final 
Determination or the Office of the Whistleblower's Proposed Final 
Summary Disposition, or any Draft Preliminary Determination or Draft 
Summary Disposition that were provided to the Commission for review). 
When more than one claimant has sought an award based on a single 
Notice of Covered Action, the Commission may exclude from the record on 
appeal any materials that do not relate directly to the claimant who is 
seeking judicial review.

0
13. Add Sec.  240.21F-18 to read as follows:

Sec.  240.21F-18  Summary disposition.

    (a) Notwithstanding the procedures specified in Sec.  240.21F-10(d) 
through (g) and in Sec.  240.21F-11(d) through (g) of this chapter, the 
Office of the Whistleblower may determine that an award application 
that meets any of the following conditions for denial shall be resolved 
through the summary disposition process described further in paragraph 
(b) of this section:
    (1) You submitted an untimely award application;
    (2) You did not comply with the requirements of Sec.  240.21F-9 of 
this chapter when submitting the tip upon which your award claim is 
based, and you otherwise are not eligible for a waiver under either 
Sec.  240.21F-9(e) or the Commission's other waiver authorities;
    (3) The information that you submitted was never provided to or 
used by the staff handling the covered action or the underlying 
investigation (or examination), and those staff members otherwise had 
no contact with you;
    (4) You did not comply with Sec.  240.21F-8(b) of this chapter;
    (5) You failed to specify in the award application the submission 
pursuant to Sec.  240.21F-9(a) of this chapter upon which your claim to 
an award is based;
    (6) Your application does not raise any novel or important legal or 
policy questions.
    (b) The following procedures shall apply to any award application 
designated for summary disposition:
    (1) The Office of the Whistleblower shall issue a Preliminary 
Summary Disposition that notifies you that your award application has 
been designated for resolution through the summary disposition process. 
The Preliminary Summary Disposition shall also state that the Office 
has preliminarily determined to recommend that the Commission deny the 
award application and identify the basis for the denial.
    (2) Prior to issuing the Preliminary Summary Disposition, the 
Office of the Whistleblower shall prepare a staff

[[Page 70948]]

declaration that sets forth any pertinent facts regarding the Office's 
recommendation to deny your application. At the same time that it 
provides you with the Preliminary Summary Disposition, the Office of 
the Whistleblower shall, in its sole discretion, either
    (i) Provide you with the staff declaration; or
    (ii) Notify you that a staff declaration has been prepared and 
advise you that you may obtain the declaration only if within fifteen 
(15) calendar days you sign and complete a confidentiality agreement in 
a form and manner acceptable to the Office of the Whistleblower 
pursuant to Sec.  240.21F-8(b)(4) of this chapter. If you fail to 
return the signed confidentiality agreement within fifteen (15) 
calendar days, you will be deemed to have waived your ability to 
receive the staff declaration.
    (3) You may reply to the Preliminary Summary Disposition by 
submitting a response to the Office of the Whistleblower within thirty 
(30) calendar days of the later of:
    (i) The date of the Preliminary Summary Disposition, or
    (ii) The date that the Office of the Whistleblower sends the staff 
declaration to you following your timely return of a signed 
confidentiality agreement. The response must identify the grounds for 
your objection to the denial (or in the case of item (a)(5) of this 
section, correct the defect). The response must be in the form and 
manner that the Office of the Whistleblower shall require. You may 
include documentation or other evidentiary support for the grounds 
advanced in your response.
    (4) If you fail to submit a timely response pursuant to paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section, the Preliminary Summary Disposition will become 
the Final Order of the Commission. Your failure to submit a timely 
written response will constitute a failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.
    (5) If you submit a timely response pursuant to paragraph (b)(3) of 
this section, the Office of the Whistleblower will consider the issues 
and grounds advanced in your response, along with any supporting 
documentation that you provided, and will prepare a Proposed Final 
Summary Disposition. The Office of the Whistleblower may supplement the 
administrative record as appropriate. (This provision does not prevent 
the Office of the Whistleblower from determining that, based on your 
written response, the award claim is no longer appropriate for summary 
disposition and that it should be resolved through the claims 
adjudication procedures specified in either Sec. Sec.  240.21F-10 or 
240.21F-11 of this chapter).
    (6) The Office of the Whistleblower will then notify the Commission 
of the Proposed Final Summary Disposition. Within thirty (30) calendar 
days thereafter, any Commissioner may request that the Proposed Final 
Summary Disposition be reviewed by the Commission. If no Commissioner 
requests such a review within the 30-day period, then the Proposed 
Final Summary Disposition will become the Final Order of the 
Commission. In the event a Commissioner requests a review, the 
Commission will consider the award application and issue a Final Order.
    (7) The Office of the Whistleblower will provide you with the Final 
Order of the Commission.
    (c) In considering an award determination pursuant to this rule, 
the Office of the Whistleblower and the Commission may rely upon the 
items specified in Sec.  240.21F-12(a) of this chapter. Further, Sec.  
240.21F-12(b) of this chapter shall apply to summary dispositions.

PART 249--FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

0
14. The general authority citation for part 249 continues to read as 
follows, and sectional authorities for 249.1800 and 249.1801 are 
removed:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. and 7201 et seq.; 12 U.S.C. 
5461 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; Sec. 953(b), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1904; Sec. 102(a)(3), Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 309 (2012); 
Sec. 107, Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313 (2012), and Sec. 72001, 
Pub. L. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *

Subpart S--[Removed and Reserved]

0
15. Remove and reserve Subpart S, consisting of Sec. Sec.  249.1800 
through 249.1801.

    By the Commission.

    Dated: September 23, 2020.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-21444 Filed 11-4-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P