Document ID: FAA-2004-17005-20476
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area
Posted Date: 2008-12-16T05:00Z

[Federal Register: December 16, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 242)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 76195-76215]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr16de08-4]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 1 and 93

[Docket No. FAA-2004-17005; Amdt. Nos. 1-63 and 93-90]
RIN 2120-AI17

 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action codifies special flight rules and airspace and 
flight restrictions for certain aircraft operations in the Washington, 
DC Metropolitan Area. The FAA takes this action in the interest of 
national security. This action is necessary to enable the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
effectively execute their respective constitutional and 
Congressionally-mandated duties to secure, protect, and defend the 
United States.

DATES: Effective February 17, 2009.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this final rule, contact Ellen Crum, Airspace and Rules Group, Office 
of System Operations Airspace and AIM, Federal Aviation Administration, 
800 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
8783.
    For legal questions concerning this final rule, contact C.L. 
Hattrup, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 385-6124. Questions relating to 
national security determinations relevant to the enactment of this 
rule, or any matter falling under the purview of other U.S. government 
agencies, will be referred to the Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Defense, Department of Justice, or other agency, as 
appropriate.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA Administrator has broad authority to regulate the safe and 
efficient use of the navigable airspace (Title 49 United States Code 
(U.S.C.) 40103). The Administrator is also obligated to issue air 
traffic rules and regulations to govern the flight of aircraft, the 
navigation, protection and identification of aircraft for the 
protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient 
use of the navigable airspace. The Administrator is likewise authorized 
and obligated to issue regulations or orders assigning the use of the 
airspace to ensure the safety of aircraft as well as the efficient use 
of the airspace. Additionally, the Administrator is authorized and 
obligated to prescribe air traffic regulations for the flight of 
aircraft, to include mandating safe altitudes, for navigating, 
protecting, and identifying aircraft; protecting individuals and 
property on the ground; using the navigable airspace efficiently; and 
preventing collision of aircraft with other airborne objects, land or 
water vehicles, or other aircraft.
    The Administrator is authorized and obligated to establish security 
provisions governing use of and access to the navigable airspace by 
civil aircraft, balancing the needs of national security and national 
defense with the mandate to allow and encourage maximum use of the 
navigable airspace by civil aircraft. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
40103(b)(3)(A), the Administrator is authorized as well as obligated to 
establish areas in the airspace if the Administrator, after consulting 
with the Secretary of Defense, determines doing so is necessary in the 
interest of national security. Since the Department of Homeland 
Security was established in 2002 after the enactment of the statute 
referred to above, the Administrator's need and responsibility to 
consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security in addition to the 
Secretary of Defense is consistent with the intent and purpose of the 
statute.

List of Abbreviations and Terms Frequently Used in This Document

ADIZ--Air Defense Identification Zone
AOPA--Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ATC-Air Traffic Control
DASSP--DCA Access Standard Security Program
DCA VOR/DME--Washington, DC VHF omni-directional range/distance 
measuring equipment
DHS--Department of Homeland Security
DOD--Department of Defense
FRZ--Flight Restricted Zone
HSAS--Homeland Security Advisory System
IFR--Instrument flight rules

[[Page 76196]]

Maryland Three Airports--College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, and 
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
NCR--National Capital Region
NCRCC--National Capital Region Coordination Center
NM--Nautical mile
NOTAM--Notice to Airmen
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
ODNI--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
PCT--Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control (Potomac TRACON)
SFRA--Special Flight Rules Area
TFR--Temporary flight restriction
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
VFR--Visual flight rules

Table of Contents

I. Overview
    A. DC Area Airspace Operations Before September 11, 2001
    B. DC Area Airspace Operations After September 11, 2001
    C. National Security Initiatives
    D. The FAA's Role
    E. The 2003 NOTAM
    F. The 2005 Proposed Rule
    G. Public Comments In Response to the 2005 Proposed Rule
    H. The 2007 NOTAM
    I. Rationale for Adopting This Final Rule
    J. Use of Force
II. Management of Airspace for National Security Purposes
III. Summary of the Final Rule
    A. Differences Between the Proposed Rule and the Final Rule
    1. Regulatory text proposed as subpart B adopted as subpart V, 
with modification
    2. Dimensions of the DC SFRA
    3. Fringe airports
    4. Opening/closing flight plans
    5. Part 91 Operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport (DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP))
    6. Addition of definition of ``national defense airspace'' in 14 
CFR part 1
    7. Change ``aeromedical operations'' references to ``lifeguard 
or air ambulance operations under an FAA/TSA airspace 
authorization''
    B. Differences Between the August 30, 2007 NOTAM and the Final 
Rule
    C. Related Regulatory Activity
    1. 14 CFR parts 61 and 91
    2. 49 CFR part 1562
    3. 49 CFR parts 1520, 1540, and 1562
IV. Discussion of Public Comments
    A. Security Issues
    1. Restrictions on freedom are not justified
    2. General aviation aircraft pose no threat
    3. General aviation pilots pose no threat
    4. Aviation, especially general aviation, is being unfairly 
regulated instead of other modes of transportation
    5. An SFRA was established for Washington, DC, but not for other 
cities
    6. The DC SFRA is not necessary now that other security measures 
are in place
    7. Factors determining the dimensions of the DC FRZ and the DC 
SFRA
    8. The FAA needs the flexibility to change these requirements in 
response to a verified threat
    9. Alternatives considered prior to implementation of the DC 
SFRA
    10. Threat analysis for the Washington, DC area
    11. Treating unintentional airspace incursions as security 
threats
    B. Safety and Operational Issues
    1. Frequencies are congested, and controllers are overburdened 
and distracted
    2. Too many aircraft congregate around the same fixes while 
awaiting assignment of a discrete transponder code
    3. The DC SFRA forces pilots to fly over water and mountainous 
areas
    4. Pilots are afraid to engage in training/proficiency flying 
activities around the DC SFRA
    5. Safety is compromised because the DC SFRA requires more 
complex skills
    6. Delays in obtaining authorization to re-enter the DC SFRA 
cause safety problems
    7. DC SFRA procedures are a distraction to pilots, who should be 
focused on scanning for other aircraft
    8. The configuration of the DC SFRA is difficult for pilots to 
navigate
    9. Reduced airport services reduce options available to pilots
    C. Administrative and Regulatory Issues
    1. The FAA has not met statutory requirements to report to 
Congress the justification for keeping the DC SFRA
    2. The DC SFRA was intended to be temporary, and was put in 
place hastily, without public input
    3. Suggestions from commenters for alternatives to the DC SFRA
    4. The DC SFRA amounts to a ``taking'' (a seizure of private 
property without due process)
    5. The FAA allowed other Federal agencies to direct its decision 
making
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
VI. International Compatibility
VII. Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory Flexibility 
Determination and Analysis, International Trade Impact Assessment 
and Unfunded Mandates Assessment
    A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
    B. Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination
    C. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    D. International Trade Impact Assessment
    E. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
VIII. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
IX. Environmental Analysis
X. Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use
XI. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
XII. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

I. Overview

A. DC Area Airspace Operations Before September 11, 2001

    Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, aircraft operators in the 
Washington, DC National Capital Region (NCR) were subject to the 
General Operating and Flight Rules contained in 14 CFR part 91, 
including rules for operations in Class B airspace. Additionally, 
aircraft operators were not permitted to enter the prohibited areas 
already designated under 14 CFR part 73 for portions of the District of 
Columbia, including the White House, the U.S. Capitol building, and the 
U.S. Naval Observatory.

B. DC Area Airspace Operations After September 11, 2001

    In immediate response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FAA 
implemented numerous temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) across the 
United States in the interest of national security under 49 U.S.C. 
40103(b)(3). Civilian airports in the NCR were closed to commercial and 
general aviation operations while defense and law enforcement agencies 
assessed the risk of further terrorist activity. In addition, a 25-
nautical-mile-radius (NM) TFR area, extending from the surface to 
18,000 feet around Washington, DC, was established. Eventually, 
commercial flight activities were allowed to resume in graduated 
stages, and in December 2001, the 25-NM-radius TFR around Washington, 
DC was reduced to an approximately 15-NM radius centered on the 
Washington, DC very high frequency omni-directional range/distance 
measuring equipment (DCA VOR/DME).
    After 2001, as part of its homeland defense mission, the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was directed to expand its 
air defense mission to include combat air patrols throughout the United 
States, focusing primarily on major cities and major airports. This 
expanded U.S-Canada bi-national domestic defense mission is known as 
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). In 2003, as part of the nation's 
preparation for the war in Iraq, DHS initiated an operation called 
Operation Liberty Shield to enhance homeland security. In support of 
that initiative, the FAA, in consultation with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and other 
Federal agencies, implemented TFRs around Washington, DC New York City, 
and Chicago. The restrictions around New York City and Chicago were 
later rescinded when Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat 
levels declined. Restrictions around Washington, DC, were retained for 
reasons of national security, as discussed in more detail below.

C. National Security Initiatives

    As part of a renewed focus on national security and national 
defense after September 11, 2001, the Federal government implemented 
numerous policy changes and initiatives as part of

[[Page 76197]]

a coordinated, layered effort to identify, prevent, eliminate or 
minimize the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorists. For example, on 
June 20, 2006, the President issued National Security Presidential 
Directive-47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16, Aviation 
Security Policy, which led to the National Strategy for Aviation 
Security (NSAS). The NSAS Supporting Plans, which were issued on March 
26, 2007, include such things as aviation transportation system 
security, aviation transportation system recovery, aviation operational 
threat response, air domain surveillance and intelligence integration, 
domestic outreach, and international outreach. The NSAS links all 
agencies with responsibilities across the spectrum of protecting and 
securing the aviation domain. Primary agencies include DHS, DOD, the 
Departments of Transportation (DOT), Justice (DOJ), State (DOS), and 
Energy (DOE), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI).
    Another initiative after September 11, 2001, was the creation of 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under DOT for aviation 
security. In November 2002, DHS was created, and TSA was transferred to 
that Department. The FAA did not and does not have the responsibility, 
authority or ability to independently identify and assess threats to 
national security. These functions are performed by other Executive 
Branch departments and agencies with authority to do so.

D. The FAA's Role

    The FAA Administrator has responsibility for the management of the 
nation's airspace and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. Pursuant to 49 
U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (b)(2), the FAA Administrator has broad 
authority to regulate and manage national airspace in the interest of 
safety and efficiency. The FAA Administrator also has separate 
statutory authority under 40103(b)(3) to regulate and manage airspace 
solely for reasons of national security. That paragraph states the FAA 
Administrator, ``in consultation with the Secretary of Defense'' 
shall--``(A) establish areas in the airspace the Administrator decides 
are necessary in the interest of national defense; and (B) by 
regulation or order, restrict or prohibit flight of civil aircraft that 
the Administrator cannot identify, locate, and control with available 
facilities in those areas.'' The FAA works closely with the Secretary 
of Defense as well as the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), NORAD, DHS, 
and DOJ to identify and evaluate aviation- or airport-related threats 
or incidents from around the country, facilitate the appropriate level 
and scope of any response, and ensure that potentially significant 
information is elevated immediately under existing reporting or 
emergency notification procedures.
    The FAA is responsible for acting as the liaison with the DHS 
Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC). In creating the 
ONCRC, Congress recognized the unique and complex challenges that exist 
in the National Capital Region that is home to 12 local jurisdictions, 
two states, the District of Columbia, and all three branches of the 
Federal government. Actions taken by DHS, DOJ, DOT, DOD, DOS, DOE, 
ODNI, and the Office of the Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) to effectively discharge their complementary 
responsibilities include, but are not necessarily limited to--
     Creation of the Regional Incident Communication and 
Coordination System (RICCS), implemented through Memorandum of 
Understanding of NCR agencies;
     Improvement to the Domestic Emergency Management System; 
and
     Establishment of the National Capital Region Coordination 
Center (NCRCC), the Freedom Center, and the National Intelligence 
Center (NIC) to facilitate better real-time communication sharing among 
all the responsible agencies.
    One of the primary goals of the NCRCC was to enable all agencies to 
effectively carry out their respective roles and responsibilities, 
which are fully outlined in the NSAS Aviation Operational Threat 
Response Plan. The Secretary of Transportation is responsible for 
coordinating and managing the national airspace system, which includes, 
but is not limited to, supporting AOTR by expediting and deconflicting 
clearance and routing of DOD and DHS interdiction assets and providing 
air contact information to enhance airborne AOTR. The FAA also supports 
AOTR efforts and steady-state defense, security and other airborne law 
enforcement and crisis response missions through the planning and 
execution of a broad spectrum of airport and air traffic management 
related measures. These actions, including establishment of the DC 
SFRA, are taken by the FAA as the United States' civil aviation 
authority.

E. The 2003 NOTAM

    In February 2003, under 14 CFR 99.7, Special Security Instructions, 
the FAA established the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Air Defense 
Identification Zone (DC ADIZ) through the issuance of a Flight Data 
Center (FDC) NOTAM. The NOTAM also identified the previously 
established 15-NM restriction centered on the DCA VOR/DME as the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). The 
NOTAM prescribed radio communication, transponder, and flight plan 
requirements for pilots to follow while operating under visual flight 
rules (VFR) within the ADIZ. The DC ADIZ was put in place to provide a 
means for law enforcement and security communities to track aircraft 
operating in the vicinity of the nation's capital. Some types of 
operations, such as U.S. military, law enforcement, and lifeguard or 
air ambulance operations under an FAA/TSA airspace authorization, were 
excluded from the requirements. NOTAMs, however, are intended to be 
short-term measures to address temporary or unanticipated situations 
until the appropriate modifications can be made to procedures, 
publications, or regulations. Considering the continued significance of 
the NCR as a potential target, the FAA determined that it was necessary 
to issue permanent restrictions for operating in the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area.

F. The 2005 Proposed Rule

    On August 4, 2005, the FAA published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to codify flight restrictions that were 
implemented by various NOTAMs in effect at that time for certain 
aircraft operations in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area (70 FR 
45250; Aug. 4, 2005). The NPRM proposed to retain the two-way radio 
communication, transponder, and flight plan requirements found in the 
NOTAMs. In addition, although the Washington, DC airspace was referred 
to as an ADIZ in the NOTAMs, the NPRM proposed to rename the airspace 
as a Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA). Note that, except in contexts in 
which use of the term ``DC ADIZ'' or ``ADIZ'' is necessary, the term 
``DC SFRA'' is used in the remainder of this document, even though most 
public comments and historical documents contain the term ``ADIZ.'' The 
term ``DC SFRA'' includes both the airspace configuration in existence 
at the time of the NPRM and the re-configured airspace reflected in an 
August 30, 2007 NOTAM (discussed under ``I.H. The 2007 NOTAM'').

G. Public Comments in Response to the 2005 Proposed Rule

    The comment period on the NPRM closed on November 2, 2005. However, 
in response to requests from Members of Congress, industry 
associations, and

[[Page 76198]]

individual commenters, it was reopened until February 6, 2006 by notice 
published on November 7, 2005 (70 FR 67388; Nov. 7, 2005). In addition, 
the FAA held 4 public meetings on January 12 and 18, 2006, in Columbia, 
MD, and Dulles, VA, respectively.
    The FAA received over 21,000 written comments in addition to the 
oral comments submitted during the public meetings (contained in 
transcripts placed in the docket for this rulemaking). Commenters 
included individual pilots, airport owners, professional associations, 
aviation-related business owners, and search and rescue and aeromedical 
operators. The FAA notes that each comment was individually written, 
not a form letter or pre-printed postcard. Many comments contained a 
high level of detail. The FAA read all comments and meeting transcripts 
in the development of this final rule. The agency appreciates the input 
of each commenter. Due to the large number of comments, however, the 
FAA is not able to respond in detail to each issue raised. Rather, the 
FAA has identified overall themes for discussion under ``IV. Discussion 
of Public Comments.''
    Many commenters acknowledged that some type of special security is 
necessary to protect the nation's capital; however, essentially all of 
the commenters objected to the proposed rule. Many asserted that the 
FAA was allowing other Federal agencies to force the FAA to make 
airspace decisions the FAA would not otherwise implement. The FAA 
disagrees. As discussed above, the FAA Administrator has a 
responsibility to consult with the Secretary of Defense in the interest 
of national security. In addition, the FAA participates in government-
wide initiatives concerning the protection of the NCR. Many commenters 
also stated that the DC SFRA covered too large an area, and the 
specific measures implemented by NOTAM were unworkable. Commenters, 
therefore, were opposed to those measures being made permanent.
    The NPRM proposed a larger DC SFRA with different operating 
procedures than currently exist. One of the many factors taken into 
account for establishing the original, larger, and more restrictive 
area, now known as the DC SFRA, was to enable sufficient time and space 
for NORAD, as well as other agencies or law enforcement officials with 
authority to use armed force to counter threats to national security or 
to protect national security assets, to interdict, or intercept an 
aircraft. With the benefit of experience gained since the September 11, 
2001 attacks, the FAA, in consultation with defense, security, and law 
enforcement agencies, evaluated the comments to the 2005 NPRM and 
determined that some of the objections and concerns raised by the 
public had merit. The FAA and those agencies then considered the 
overall operational impact of the NCR airspace restrictions, HSAS 
threat levels, as well as the positive effects of additional controller 
support, pilot awareness training, security-related initiatives, and 
better information sharing and response coordination among responsible 
agencies. Based upon the above considerations, the FAA and the other 
agencies determined that national security, safety of flight, and 
safety of people on the ground would not be compromised with a reduced 
DC SFRA perimeter.

H. The 2007 NOTAM

    In response to public comments, the FAA modified the size and shape 
of the DC SFRA and its associated procedures through FDC NOTAMs 07/0206 
and 07/0211, which became effective August 30, 2007. In addition, the 
FAA added 3 sectors at Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control (Potomac 
TRACON) (PCT) to track aircraft in the DC SFRA and took steps to 
improve functions such as flight plan processing. These modifications 
are reflected in this final rule.
    In the August 30, 2007 NOTAMs, the dimensions of the DC FRZ 
remained essentially the same, except that the western boundary was 
moved slightly eastward, while the size of the DC SFRA was reduced from 
the wide-ranging outer boundary of the Washington Tri-Area Class B 
Airspace Area to a much smaller 30-NM radius from the DCA VOR/DME. As a 
result, the number of airports affected by the restrictions was 
reduced, and more navigable airspace was made available to pilots 
conducting operations in the area. The requirement for pilots to 
establish two-way communication with ATC, be equipped with an operating 
transponder with altitude-reporting capability, and file a flight plan 
remained the same. However, the revised NOTAMs also added a 
``maneuvering area'' for Leesburg Executive Airport, and imposed an 
indicated airspeed restriction of 180 knots or less (if capable) for 
all VFR operations within the DC SFRA/DC FRZ. For VFR aircraft 
operations conducted between 30- and 60-NM from the DCA VOR/DME, 
aircraft were restricted to an indicated airspeed of 230 knots or less 
(if capable).

I. Rationale for Adopting This Final Rule

    The FAA is taking this final action to enhance security in 
Washington, DC, the nation's capital. As the nation's capital, it has a 
unique symbolic, historic, and political status. Washington, DC is the 
seat of all three branches of the United States government, and is the 
home of the President (who serves as the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces) and the Vice President. Likewise, it is the home of the 
U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court, and thus is the residence and 
office location for the officials in the Constitutional order of 
succession. In addition, World Bank offices, foreign embassies, and the 
sovereign residences of foreign ambassadors credentialed to the United 
States are located in Washington, DC.
    The FAA, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and 
Homeland Security, has determined that implementation of this rule is 
necessary to enable those officials in carrying out their 
responsibilities to lawfully identify, counter, prevent, deter, or, as 
a last resort, disable with non-lethal or lethal force, any airborne 
object that poses a threat to national security. The rule will assist 
air traffic controllers and NCRCC officials in monitoring air traffic 
by identifying, distinguishing, and, more importantly, responding 
appropriately when an aircraft is off course or is not complying with 
ATC instructions. In addition, the FAA is permanently codifying 
restrictions previously implemented via the NOTAM system. This action 
will reduce confusion regarding operations within the DC SFRA and DC 
FRZ.

J. Use of Force

    The authority and obligation to use any type of armed force, deadly 
or otherwise, by the U.S. military is explained in Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), ``Standing Rules of 
Engagement (SROE) for Armed Forces of the United States'' 3121.01B, 
June 15, 2005. The introductory portion of the SROE is unclassified, 
and outlines the basic premise and basic guidance for any decision by 
the President or subordinate military commander or member of the armed 
forces to use force, deadly or otherwise, in individual self-defense or 
collective self-defense of the nation. The NSAS Aviation Operational 
Threat Response Plan further reinforces that conducting air defense of 
the United States and U.S. interests, including operations to interdict 
and, when

[[Page 76199]]

necessary, defeat airborne threats, as part of the active, layered 
defense of the United States is a responsibility of the Secretary of 
Defense. Through its Combatant Commands and NORAD, as appropriate, DOD 
directs the necessary supporting measures to implement Emergency 
Security Control of Air Traffic procedures in extreme circumstances. 
Through NORAD and the Combatant Commands, DOD is the only department 
authorized to direct engagement using deadly force against airborne 
civilian aircraft presenting an imminent threat to the United States or 
U.S. interests, unless the President directs otherwise. Rules for the 
Use of Force (RUF) for those engaged in law enforcement or security 
duties also exist for military or civilian law enforcement officers 
authorized to use force, deadly or otherwise, to protect certain high 
priority national security assets, and to otherwise perform their law 
enforcement or security related duties. The FAA is including 
information regarding the possible use of force in its mandatory online 
training course for pilots who fly within a 60 NM radius of the DCA 
VOR/DME so that pilots are aware of the potential risk.

II. Management of Airspace for National Security Purposes

    This final rule does not create any new class, type, or category of 
airspace. However, the Washington, DC SFRA is considered ``national 
defense airspace'' as referenced in 49 U.S.C. 46307, which states that 
a person who knowingly or willfully violates regulations or orders 
issued under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3) may be subject to criminal 
prosecution. The Department of Justice is responsible for determining 
if such action is warranted.
    As discussed in the ``Authority for This Rulemaking'' section 
above, 49 U.S.C. 40103 grants the Administrator broad authority to 
regulate the nation's airspace to ensure its safe and efficient use. 
Certain regulations currently issued by the Administrator control, 
designate, or assign airspace for national security and/or national 
defense purposes. These regulations include, but are not limited to, 
part 73, subpart C Prohibited Areas, and part 99, Security Control of 
Air Traffic. Part 73, subpart C provides for the designation of 
prohibited areas for national security purposes wherein no person may 
operate an aircraft without authorization from the agency, organization 
or military command that established the requirements for the 
prohibited area. (See 14 CFR 73.85, Using agency.) Part 99 states in 
part that any airspace of the contiguous United States that is not an 
ADIZ, in which the control of aircraft is required for reasons of 
national security, is a ``defense area.'' (See 14 CFR 99.3.) Part 99 
further provides that each person operating an aircraft in a defense 
area or ADIZ must comply with special security instructions issued by 
the Administrator in the interest of national security. (See 14 CFR 
99.7.)

III. Summary of the Final Rule

    This final rule establishes and defines the DC SFRA, which includes 
the DC FRZ. It also defines dimensions, procedures and required 
equipment for operating in the DC SFRA. These procedures include 
establishing two-way radio communication, filing flight plans, and 
using discrete transponder codes. In addition, the rule provides for 
traffic pattern operations at towered and non-towered airports within 
the DC SFRA, and provides relief from certain procedures for airports 
located near the boundary of the DC SFRA.

A. Differences Between the Proposed Rule and the Final Rule

    Since the proposed rule was published in 2005, the dimensions of 
the DC SFRA were reduced and procedures amended for aircraft operating 
within the DC SFRA. These modifications, largely relieving in nature, 
are reflected in this final rule. Consequently, there are some 
differences between the NPRM and this final rule. The significant 
differences are discussed below.
    1. Regulatory text proposed as subpart B adopted as subpart V, with 
modification: At the time the 2005 proposed rule was published, the FAA 
intended to adopt the proposed regulatory text as 14 CFR part 93, 
subpart B, which was reserved at the time. In the intervening time, 
however, the agency adopted another rulemaking action as subpart B. In 
the final rule, therefore, regulations proposed as subpart B are 
adopted as subpart V, proposed sections designated as Sec. Sec.  93.31 
through 93.49 are redesignated as Sec. Sec.  93.331 through 93.345 in 
the final rule, and proposed Sec. Sec.  93.45 and 93.49 are removed 
from the final rule. Provisions proposed in those sections are removed 
from the final rule because they have become unnecessary due to 
modifications implemented since the publication date of the NPRM.
    In addition, some proposed section headings are modified in the 
final rule. In the NPRM, certain section headings were in question 
format, while others were in caption format. In this final rule, 
section headings are in caption format. The following table provides a 
comparison between the NPRM and the final rule.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  NPRM                              Final rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpart B--Washington, DC, Metropolitan  Subpart V--Washington, DC,
 Area Special Flight Rules Area.          Metropolitan Area Special
                                          Flight Rules Area.
Sec.   93.31 What is the purpose of      Sec.   93.331 Purpose and
 this subpart and who would be            applicability of this subpart.
 affected?
Sec.   93.33 What could happen if you    Sec.   93.333 Failure to comply
 fail to comply with the rules of this    with this subpart.
 subpart?
Sec.   93.35 Definitions...............  Sec.   93.335 Definitions.
Sec.   93.37 General requirements for    Sec.   93.337 Requirements for
 operating in the Washington, DC,         operating in the DC SFRA.
 Metropolitan Area SFRA.
Sec.   93.39 Specific requirements for   Sec.   93.339 Requirements for
 operating in the Washington, DC,         operating in the DC SFRA,
 Metropolitan Area SFRA, including the    including the DC FRZ.
 FRZ.
Sec.   93.41 Aircraft operations         Sec.   93.341 Aircraft
 prohibited.                              operations in the DC FRZ.
Sec.   93.43 Requirements for aircraft   Sec.   93.343 Requirements for
 operations to or from College Park;      aircraft operations to or from
 Potomac Airfield; or Washington          College Park Airport; Potomac
 Executive/Hyde Field Airports.           Airfield; or Washington
                                          Executive/Hyde Field Airport.
Sec.   93.45 Special ingress/egress      Withdrawn. Referenced airports
 procedures for Bay Bridge and Kentmorr   are no longer fringe airports.
 Airports.
Sec.   93.47 Special egress procedures   Sec.   93.345 VFR outbound
 for fringe airports.                     procedures for fringe
                                          airports.

[[Page 76200]]

Sec.   93.49 Airport security            Withdrawn. Section no longer
 procedures.                              necessary subsequent to
                                          issuance of TSA final rule
                                          implementing ground security
                                          requirements and procedures at
                                          College Park Airport, Potomac
                                          Airfield and Washington
                                          Executive/Hyde Field (70 FR
                                          7150; Feb. 10, 2005).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Dimensions of the DC SFRA: In the final rule, the dimensions of 
the DC SFRA are reduced to a 30-NM radius around the DCA VOR/DME. The 
NPRM proposed that the dimensions of the DC SFRA mirror those 
designated in the NOTAM in effect at that time. Those dimensions, with 
some exceptions, were based on the outer boundary of the Washington 
Tri-Area Class B Airspace Area, and included an area of 4,029 square 
miles. Since the NPRM was published, the FAA, along with other Federal 
agencies, has determined that the NCR can be protected with a reduced 
restricted airspace area of 2,837 square miles.
    3. Fringe airports: Fringe airports are those airports located 
within just a few miles of the DC SFRA boundary established in this 
final rule. The FAA grants relief from certain DC SFRA procedures to 
pilots operating at fringe airports because departing aircraft 
penetrate the DC SFRA airspace for only a brief time. At the time of 
the NPRM, fringe airports included Airlie, VA, Albrecht, MD, Harris, 
VA, Martin, MD, Martin State, MD, Meadows, VA, and Mylander, MD, 
Stewart, MD, St. John, MD, Tilghman Whipp, MD, Upperville, VA, and 
Wolf, MD. With the reduction in the dimensions of the DC SFRA, those 
fringe airports are no longer within the DC SFRA; therefore, relief 
from DC SFRA procedures at those airports is no longer necessary. 
However, since implementation of the August 30, 2007 NOTAM, different 
airports (specifically, Barnes (MD47), Flying M Farms (MD77), Mountain 
Road (MD43), Robinson (MD14), and Skyview (51VA)) are now located just 
inside the boundary of the DC SFRA. These airports are defined as 
``fringe airports'' in the final rule.
    4. Opening/closing flight plans: In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that 
pilots open and close their flight plans by contacting an Automated 
Flight Service Station (AFSS). In response to public comments, the 
August 30, 2007 NOTAM modified this procedure. As reflected in this 
final rule, the flight plan is now opened when a pilot receives a 
discrete transponder code, and closed upon landing or exiting the DC 
SFRA.
    5. Part 91 Operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 
(DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP)): On July 19, 2005, TSA 
issued an interim final rule to restore access to Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Airport for certain operations under the DCA Access 
Standard Security Program (DASSP). In this final rule, Sec.  93.341 
(proposed as Sec.  93.41) is modified to permit aircraft operations 
under the DASSP.
    6. Addition of definition of ``national defense airspace'' in 14 
CFR part 1: In the preamble to the NPRM, the FAA stated that the DC 
SFRA would be classified as ``national defense airspace'' (NDA). It 
further stated that persons who knowingly or willfully violate the 
rules concerning operations in national defense airspace would be 
subject to criminal penalties as described in 49 U.S.C. 46307.
    National defense airspace is any airspace established by regulation 
or order issued under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3). An order or regulation 
issued under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3) is appropriate when the 
Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, has 
determined that it is necessary in the interest of national defense to 
restrict or prohibit flight of civil aircraft that cannot be 
identified, located, or controlled. The FAA realizes that most pilots 
consult FAA manuals and regulations for definitions of airspace terms, 
rather than Title 49 of the United States Code. In the final rule, 
therefore, the FAA is adding a definition of ``national defense 
airspace'' to Sec.  1.1 General Definitions.
    The FAA notes that, by adding this definition to 14 CFR part 1, the 
agency is not creating a new category of airspace, nor is it creating 
any new procedures or requirements. The FAA is simply clarifying that 
national defense airspace exists in those cases where it was designated 
under a regulation or order issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3).
    7. Change ``aeromedical operations'' references to ``lifeguard or 
air ambulance operations under an FAA/TSA airspace authorization:'' 
References to ``aeromedical flight operations'' and ``aeromedical 
services'' are changed to ``lifeguard or air ambulance operations under 
an FAA/TSA airspace authorization.'' This language is consistent with 
current terminology, and is used in the FAA's ``Aeronautical 
Information Manual.'' An air ambulance flight is performed by an 
operator that has been issued operations specifications to perform air 
ambulance operations in either an airplane or a helicopter. 
``Lifeguard'' is the call sign used by air ambulance operators whose 
mission is of an urgent medical nature. A lifeguard call sign is used 
only for that portion of the flight requiring expeditious handling.

B. Differences Between the August 30, 2007 NOTAM and the Final Rule

    The August 30, 2007, NOTAM contains information that is not 
included in this final rule. Information likely to change (such as 
telephone numbers and individuals' names) is not included in this rule. 
Other pertinent information for DC SFRA operations will continue to 
apply through NOTAM, including warnings concerning potential 
consequences of violations. This information includes, but is not 
limited to--
     Requirement for any pilot flying under VFR within a 60-NM 
radius of the DCA VOR/DME to complete free online training provided by 
the FAA;
     The requirement for aircraft to operate at altitudes that 
ensure acceptable radar coverage;
     Waiver procedures;
     Action in the event of a transponder failure;
     Speed restrictions;
     Resource information;
     The definition and requirement for operations within the 
Leesburg Maneuvering Area; and
     Explanation of DC SFRA transponder and flight plan 
requirements.

C. Related Regulatory Activity

    1. 14 CFR parts 61 and 91: On August 12, 2008, the FAA issued a 
final rule entitled ``Special Awareness Training for the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area'' (73 FR 46797; Aug. 12, 2008). The final rule, 
intended to reduce the number of unauthorized flights into the 
Washington, DC SFRA and DC FRZ through education of the pilot 
community, focuses primarily on training pilots on the procedures for 
flying in and around the DC SFRA and DC FRZ. It requires any pilot who 
flies under VFR within a 60-NM radius of the DCA VOR/DME to complete 
free online training provided by the FAA on its http://
www.FAASafety.gov Web site

[[Page 76201]]

and retain a completion certificate. This training will also inform 
pilots of potential adverse consequences arising from violation of the 
airspace. More than 7,000 pilots have completed the online training 
course.
    2. 49 CFR part 1562: On February 10, 2005, the TSA issued an 
interim final rule implementing ground security requirements and 
procedures at three Maryland airports (the ``Maryland Three 
Airports''--College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield and Washington 
Executive/Hyde Field) located within the Washington, DC Metropolitan 
Area Flight Restricted Zone (70 FR 7150; Feb. 10, 2005). That interim 
final rule established security rules for all pilots operating aircraft 
to or from any of the Maryland Three Airports as regulated by 49 CFR 
Part 1562, Subpart A. The interim final rule replaced the Special 
Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 94 previously issued by the FAA 
(67 FR 7538; Feb. 19, 2002).
    3. 49 CFR parts 1520, 1540, and 1562: On July 19, 2005, TSA issued 
an interim final rule establishing the DASSP to restore access to 
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport for certain aircraft 
operations while maintaining the security of critical Federal 
government and other assets in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area (70 
FR 41586; July 19, 2005). The interim final rule applies to all 
passenger aircraft operations into or out of DCA, except U.S. air 
carrier operations operating under a full security program required by 
49 CFR part 1544 and foreign air carrier operations operating under 49 
CFR 1546.101(a) or (b). The interim final rule establishes security 
procedures for aircraft operators and gateway airport and fixed-base 
operators, and security requirements relating to crewmembers, 
passengers, and armed security officers onboard aircraft operating into 
or out of DCA as regulated by 49 CFR part 1562, subpart B.

IV. Discussion of Public Comments

    The vast majority of commenters, while acknowledging that the FAA 
implemented the DC SFRA to enhance security in the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area, believed that the measures were overly burdensome to 
the aviation community and unnecessary. In addition, commenters 
repeatedly stated that the FAA had not adequately justified the 
airspace restrictions and procedures. As discussed in ``I. Overview,'' 
in response to these comments, the FAA modified, via NOTAM, the 
airspace restrictions and procedures that were proposed in the NPRM and 
made them less restrictive.
    Commenters raised security, safety and operational, administrative, 
and regulatory concerns in response to the NPRM. These comments and the 
FAA's responses are discussed below. (Comments raised regarding the 
FAA's economic analysis are discussed in the full regulatory evaluation 
in the docket for this rulemaking.)

A. Security Issues

    1. Restrictions on freedom are not justified: Numerous commenters 
said that the FAA did not provide sufficient justification for the 
existence of the DC SFRA itself. They felt that the government had, in 
effect, ``let the terrorists win'' as citizens' freedoms had been taken 
away in the name of security.
    The FAA acknowledges that actions taken immediately following 
September 11, 2001, imposed new and significant limits on access to the 
Washington, DC airspace. Initially airspace restrictions were greater 
than those that currently exist. The FAA has since reduced restrictions 
for the Maryland Three Airports, has worked with DHS to provide waivers 
to the NOTAM for aircraft operators, and has amended procedures and 
reduced the size of the DC SFRA. Though there are more procedures and 
restrictions in place for operating in the DC SFRA than there are for 
the Washington Tri-Area Class B Airspace Area, access to the airspace 
is available to pilots who comply with appropriate procedures. The FAA 
believes it has provided a balance between security needs and the 
public's right of transit through the navigable airspace as provided in 
49 U.S.C. 40103.
    As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, the FAA took this action 
in consideration of the fact that Washington, DC is unique as a 
symbolic military and political target. Historically, in times of war, 
a nation's seat of government provides an inviting target for enemy 
attacks because of its great political, economic and psychological 
value.
    Washington, DC is the seat of all three branches of the United 
States Government. The White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Supreme Court 
and other Federal court buildings are located in Washington, DC, as 
well other Executive-Legislative-, and Judicial-Branch buildings and 
the headquarters and operations facilities for the nation's domestic 
and international security apparatus. The nation's leaders (the 
President, the Vice President, Members of Congress, Cabinet members, 
and Supreme Court justices) are located in the NCR. In addition, 
American symbolic and historical sites (such as monuments and museums) 
are located in the NCR. World Bank offices, all foreign embassies, and 
the residences of foreign ambassadors to the United States are also 
located in the vicinity. The FAA notes that the United States has an 
obligation to protect other nations' sovereign spaces.
    Establishing the DC SFRA was one of many steps that were taken to 
ensure the security of the nation's capital. The FAA acknowledges that 
no single procedure or requirement is fail-safe; however, the FAA 
believes that this rule adds a layer of additional security to minimize 
actual threats that may require a graduated response by other U.S. 
government agencies.
    2. General aviation aircraft pose no threat: Many commenters said 
that general aviation aircraft do not pose a threat because their 
kinetic energy is low, their speeds are slow, and their cargo capacity 
is small.
    The FAA understands the commenters' concerns; however, the Federal 
government is concerned that an aircraft, regardless of size, could be 
used to transport individuals with criminal intentions or dangerous 
materials that could do significant harm to the NCR.
    An example of an incident that could have been avoided under this 
rule is that of the stolen Cessna 150, which on September 12, 1994, was 
deliberately crashed into the White House by a suicidal pilot. The 
plane had relatively little fuel on board and no explosive, 
radiological, biological, or chemical agents. Some commenters pointed 
to this 1994 incident as evidence that general aviation aircraft pose 
no real threat. However, had the aircraft been larger, or the pilot 
been carrying an explosive device or chemical/radiological/ biological 
agent, the impact could have resulted in the loss of life on the 
ground, or long term denial of access to the affected area.
    Intelligence information gathered after September 11, 2001, while 
not specifying an imminent threat of attack in the NCR, suggests that 
some extremists have considered using small aircraft for terrorist 
activities. The FAA estimates that there are approximately 200,000 
airplanes based at over 19,000 landing facilities within the United 
States. These facilities include both public- and private-use 
facilities, and, unlike air carrier operators, most are not subject to 
Federal security regulations. The government, therefore, remains 
concerned that terrorists launching attacks using stolen or hijacked 
planes remains a viable option.

[[Page 76202]]

    3. General aviation pilots pose no threat: Commenters asked why the 
government believes that general aviation pilots are a threat when no 
DC SFRA or DC FRZ incursion to date had been terrorism-related. The 
commenters pointed out that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were 
carried out by individuals flying large aircraft.
    The FAA notes that there is concern that terrorists may turn to 
general aviation as an alternative method for conducting operations, 
especially since the implementation of security enhancements for 
commercial aircraft and airports.
    In addition, the Federal government considers it an unacceptable 
risk to allow aircraft in the vicinity of Washington, DC without 
knowing the pilot's intentions. The requirements to file a flight plan 
before operating in the DC SFRA and squawk a discrete transponder code 
provide the FAA and other Federal agencies with critical information 
(i.e., direction of flight, type and color of aircraft, and airspeed) 
regarding aircraft operating within the DC SFRA.
    Commenters also stated that the requirements for operating in the 
DC SFRA, such as filing a flight plan, squawking a discrete transponder 
code, and maintaining two-way communications with ATC do nothing to 
ensure that a pilot entering the DC SFRA is not a terrorist.
    The FAA acknowledges that these measures do not ensure that a pilot 
or a passenger is not a terrorist. However, the measures provide ATC 
and law enforcement/security officials with additional information that 
may be useful in identifying a compliant pilot versus a non-compliant 
pilot. A flight plan provides ATC with pilot information and the 
pilot's intended route of flight. Further, the use of a discrete 
transponder code enables ATC to observe and monitor the aircraft while 
in the airspace. In addition, maintaining two-way radio communication 
allows officials to communicate with the pilot, and when necessary, 
determine whether the pilot is experiencing an emergency or aircraft 
equipment failure, or whether the pilot has simply committed a 
navigation error. Should there be any aircraft operator in the DC SFRA 
who has not filed a flight plan or has deviated from the intended route 
of flight, steps can be taken to get the aircraft back on course and 
enable those with response or security duties to determine if a threat 
exists and the appropriate course of action (including use of deadly 
force).
    4. Aviation, especially general aviation, is unfairly being 
regulated instead of other modes of transportation: Commenters believed 
the airspace restrictions were unfairly directed at aviation operations 
(most notably general aviation) while motor vehicles and rail traffic 
can still pass close to government buildings without much restriction.
    The FAA does not have jurisdiction over modes of transportation 
other than aviation. The agency points out, however, that the modes of 
transportation mentioned above are in fact restricted in some manner 
from getting too close to the White House and the U.S. Capitol. For 
example, at the White House, barriers such as fences, checkpoints, 
gates, bollards, and other screening systems are designed so that if a 
detonation does occur, the blast will not result in the destruction of 
the building or serious harm to protected persons. Vehicular traffic is 
prohibited on Pennsylvania Ave and E Street between 15th and 17th 
Streets. Additionally, trucks are not allowed on 17th Street, NW., 
between Constitution Ave and Pennsylvania Ave. Likewise, there are 
vehicular restrictions near and around the U.S. Capitol. While motor 
vehicles must follow roads, and trains must stay on tracks, airplanes 
can maneuver without such restraints and are not constrained by ground-
based barriers and restrictions.
    In addition, though many general aviation operators are impacted by 
these airspace restrictions, the rule itself is not specifically 
directed at general aviation operations. General aviation operators can 
and do operate under IFR, and IFR requirements have not been changed. 
Rather, the rule requires additional procedures for VFR operators, who 
would otherwise not be required to make their intentions known to ATC.
    5. An SFRA was established for Washington, DC, but not for other 
cities: Many commenters asked why only Washington, DC has permanent 
airspace restrictions. In addition, they pointed out that airspace 
restrictions around other places, such as New York City, have been 
discontinued since September 11, 2001, and said that those around 
Washington, DC also should be discontinued. Many commenters who lived 
outside the Washington, DC vicinity expressed concern that SFRAs would 
be put in place over their locales.
    The FAA has received requests from various officials to impose 
SFRA-type restrictions or prohibitions at locations including New York 
City and Chicago. The FAA has evaluated these requests, in consultation 
with other agencies, and concluded that restrictions were not required. 
Federal agencies that share responsibility for security of the National 
Airspace System closely monitor the threat to the nation's cities, 
including the unique security environments of cities such as 
Washington, DC, New York City, Chicago, and others. When developing 
risk mitigation plans, TSA considers threats, vulnerabilities, the 
criticality of a location or transportation system, and the potential 
consequence of an attack on that location or system. Risk mitigation 
plans are intended to ensure the security of the location or 
transportation system while allowing the nation's transportation system 
to continue operating. Sustainability is a primary concern when 
developing and implementing a risk mitigation plan.
    As previously discussed, Washington, DC is a high-value symbolic 
military and political target. The requirements of the DC SFRA allow 
ATC and law enforcement agencies to identify and track aircraft 
operating in the Washington, DC area and to focus on those targets of 
interest that may pose a hazard to the Washington, DC area.
    The Transportation Security Administration continually reviews and 
refines risk assessments and mitigation plans in order to address the 
threat from terrorist groups. The FAA maintains a continuous dialogue 
with appropriate agencies regarding threat and security issues that may 
pertain to aircraft operations. In consultation with these agencies, 
the FAA may implement additional measures, not only in the Washington, 
DC area, but in other locations, as needed, based on specific, credible 
intelligence. For example, on March 17, 2003, the national HSAS threat 
level was raised to Orange (high). In response, the FAA took a number 
of actions including the issuance of flight restrictions over New York 
City and Chicago, and cancelled all waivers for operations at the 
Maryland Three Airports and for sporting events. On April 17, 2003, the 
HSAS threat level was lowered to Yellow (elevated), and the above-
mentioned restrictions were cancelled. It should be noted that the HSAS 
threat level for the airline sector in the United States is currently 
at Orange (high).
    6. The DC SFRA is not necessary now that other security measures 
are in place: Several commenters agreed that the DC FRZ is necessary, 
but objected to the existence of the DC SFRA. They believed that, with 
the introduction of new security measures since 2003 (such as ground-
based missiles, better air interdiction capability, new technology to 
identify aircraft, laser warning systems, regulations that make it less 
likely that terrorists can go undetected,

[[Page 76203]]

and improved security around general aviation airports), the DC SFRA 
was no longer necessary.
    Commenters are correct that there are layers of security for 
aviation operations in addition to the DC SFRA. Other measures include 
vetting the FAA Airmen Certification Database, the joint TSA/industry 
Airport Watch Program, general aviation airport security guidelines, 
and mandatory flight school security awareness training, as well as 
regulatory programs for certain types of general aviation aircraft 
operators. These measures, when implemented together, provide improved 
protection of the airspace. In addition, the agency notes that 
heightened security measures for all aviation operations, not just 
general aviation, have been implemented.
    The FAA acknowledges that new aircraft tracking technology, 
Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal (ADAPT), has been developed 
since 2005; however, that system supplies information only regarding 
the aircraft, not the pilot operating it. The protection of this 
airspace requires the FAA and other government personnel to identify 
and track those operating in the DC SFRA. Requiring pilots to file 
flight plans is the least intrusive method of identifying who is 
operating an aircraft, and enables the FAA and law enforcement and 
security agencies to more quickly identify anomalous flight behavior, 
which may indicate a potential threat to the NCR.
    Some commenters asserted that there are better air defense 
capabilities, such as air interception and use of ground-based 
missiles, than restricting the airspace. The FAA notes that these 
measures are intended to be used only as a last resort. The airspace 
from 15- to 30-NM from the DCA VOR/DME provides a buffer area, which 
allows ATC and law enforcement/security officials to be aware of a non-
compliant aircraft before it penetrates the boundary of the DC FRZ. By 
the time an aircraft is at the edge of the DC FRZ, it is only minutes 
away from targets in the nation's capital. Relying solely on air 
defense capabilities could lead to air interception or use of lethal 
measures that could result in the loss of innocent lives in instances 
where pilots made inadvertent navigation errors or experienced 
equipment failures. Also, the buffer provided by the DC SFRA provides 
additional warning time for law enforcement officials to take 
appropriate emergency actions on the ground.
    Some pilots who operate in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area, 
such as those who operate out of the Maryland Three Airports, those who 
apply for waivers to operate within the DC FRZ, and crewmembers with an 
approved DCA Access Standard Security Program are vetted through 
various databases; however, this is a small percentage of pilots who 
fly in and through the DC SFRA.
    The FAA also acknowledges and appreciates the improved security 
programs in effect at some general aviation airports. For example, in 
2003, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) partnered with 
TSA to deploy a national security enhancement program called ``The 
Airport Watch Program.'' That program is patterned after the 
``Neighborhood Watch'' anti-crime program, and calls on members of the 
general aviation community to observe and report any suspicious 
activities at airports. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association has 
funded and distributed a wide range of educational materials, while TSA 
has provided a national, toll-free hotline (1-866-GA-SECURE). Programs 
like these add value to overall security efforts. However, they are 
voluntary and have not been implemented at all airports.
    7. Factors determining the dimensions of the DC FRZ and the DC 
SFRA: Some commenters stated that they did not understand what factors 
were considered when determining the radii of the DC FRZ and the DC 
SFRA.
    The purpose of the DC SFRA is to identify and track aircraft that 
may pose a threat to the NCR. Security agencies need enough time to 
take appropriate action if it is determined that a pilot may have 
harmful intentions. The FAA, DHS, and DOD determined the lateral limits 
based on a number of factors, such as launch response time and speed of 
intercept aircraft, and geographic dispersion of airfields, in addition 
to the locations of other critical infrastructure within the NCR.
    The FAA notes that the agency, in consultation with military and 
law enforcement agencies, has made every effort to keep the dimensions 
of the DC FRZ and the DC SFRA as small as possible to reduce the impact 
on the aviation community while meeting security and safety 
requirements.
    8. The FAA needs the flexibility to change these requirements in 
response to a verified threat: Many commenters expressed concern that, 
by codifying the substance of NOTAMs, the FAA would not be able to 
relax or tighten the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area airspace 
restrictions in response to changing HSAS threat levels.
    The FAA understands the commenters' concerns and assures the public 
that the agency retains the capability to adjust the restrictions as 
necessary. The DC SFRA was instituted in 2003 by NOTAM, in lieu of 
rulemaking, because of the urgent need to implement security measures 
in the NCR. A NOTAM can be issued quickly, while issuing a codified 
regulation can take years. However, as stated in 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3), 
``* * * the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, shall--* * * by regulation or order, restrict or prohibit 
flight of civil aircraft that the Administrator cannot identify, 
locate, and control with available facilities in those areas.'' 
Therefore, the appropriate method to implement permanent airspace 
restrictions is through the rulemaking process. When it became apparent 
that this airspace designation would be in effect indefinitely, the FAA 
initiated rulemaking action.
    The FAA notes that only certain elements of the 2007 NOTAM are 
being adopted as regulations. Some procedural details for SFRA 
operations, as well as warnings concerning potential consequences of 
violations, will continue to be addressed through NOTAM. The agency 
also retains the ability to issue additional special security 
instructions by NOTAM action under 14 CFR part 99 if security or threat 
conditions warrant. Airspace restrictions or control measures can be 
adjusted in accordance with HSAS threat levels and specific 
intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security will continue to 
coordinate with other Federal agencies to establish appropriate 
measures in response to specific threats.
    9. Alternatives considered prior to implementation of the DC SFRA: 
Numerous commenters wanted to know if the government considered any 
alternatives to the restrictions prior to establishing the SFRA in 
2003.
    Because of the need to protect the airspace around the Washington, 
DC Metropolitan Area quickly, the FAA did not publish alternatives for 
public notice and comment. However, the FAA and military and law 
enforcement agencies did discuss several alternatives before deciding 
on the requirements implemented in 2003. Those alternatives included 
establishing a 55-NM outer ring with a 15-NM inner ring, expanding the 
P-56 prohibited area above parts of Washington, DC to a radius of 30-
NM, and establishing outer rings as large as 75 NM or 110 NM. In each 
case, factors such as numbers of airports impacted and air traffic 
procedures were considered. The FAA and Federal law enforcement and 
security agencies have determined that the DC SFRA provides the minimal

[[Page 76204]]

spatial buffer consistent with the requirement to respond to aviation 
threats in the NCR.
    In addition, prior to the August 2007 modifications, the FAA, in 
consultation with the law enforcement and security agencies, did 
consider several alternatives, which were discussed in detail in the 
``Regulatory Flexibility'' section in the preamble to the NPRM.
    10. Threat analysis for the Washington, DC area: Several commenters 
inquired whether a threat analysis had been done for the Washington, DC 
area, and whether such analysis was available to the public.
    The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with ODNI, has 
analyzed the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences of an airborne 
attack against the NCR. They have concluded that the DC SFRA is a 
critical layer in the security and defense of the NCR. These analyses 
are classified and not available to the public.
    11. Treating unintentional airspace incursions as security threats: 
Numerous commenters objected to the FAA's ``zero tolerance'' approach 
to unintentional incursions. Many said that they had no violations on 
their records until they accidentally violated the DC SFRA or DC FRZ. 
Some asked for an ``amnesty'' program to allow pilots to clear their 
names of inadvertent or minor violations.
    The purpose of this rule is to provide security to the Washington, 
DC Metropolitan Area. Incursions into this airspace, whether 
intentional or not, or violations of any other procedures or rules 
applicable to this airspace, are taken very seriously, and may be 
enforced in accordance with the FAA's enforcement authority. The focus, 
emphasis, or level of penalties imposed by the FAA may vary, depending 
on the threat posture or HSAS threat levels in effect. The FAA's 
enforcement action does not mean that violations or violators will be 
categorized as ``national security threats.'' The FAA does not have 
authority to make such a determination or impose such a label on any 
violator.
    Because airspace established under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3) is, 
however, ``national defense airspace,'' that term will be used in 
connection with FAA enforcement actions, regardless of whether an 
incursion or violation was inadvertent or willful. No additional 
penalty imposed by the FAA will result from the status of the DC SFRA 
as ``national defense airspace.'' The status as ``national defense 
airspace,'' however, is important and relevant to the extent a pilot 
knowingly or willfully enters the DC SFRA in violation of the DC SFRA 
rules, procedures, or instructions of an air traffic controller or 
official while in flight. Unlike a willful violation of other airspace, 
knowing or willful violations of national defense airspace may subject 
the pilot to criminal liability under Federal criminal law. See 49 
U.S.C. 46307. The exercise of any prosecutorial decision to file 
criminal charges for a knowing or willful violation is a decision that 
will be made by appropriate Federal prosecutors or law enforcement 
officials.
    In addition, commenters expressed concern about the use of force by 
military or law enforcement personnel. The fact that a pilot is flying 
without permission into airspace designated for national security or 
without following the proper procedures may be one factor those 
officials take into account in determining the nature of the threat and 
what to do about it. As with any breach of a security perimeter, 
military or law enforcement officials with authority to defend the 
country may use lawful and appropriate force to do so. In the case of 
an aircraft incursion, interception, diversion, or other necessary 
means, force, up to and including deadly force, could be employed if an 
aircraft or airborne object is deemed to be an imminent or actual 
threat to national security. That determination will be made by 
appropriate military or command authority only on a case-by-case basis, 
specific to the situation. An incursion or violation of the DC SFRA, or 
any other airspace regulation, regardless of whether the airspace in 
question is ``national defense airspace,'' does not by itself authorize 
the use of force. It is however, one of the factors that should and 
will be considered along with all other relevant facts in existence at 
the time, in determining whether an aircraft or airborne object poses 
an imminent threat to national security.

B. Safety and Operational Issues

    Many commenters expressed concern that operating within the DC SFRA 
and the DC FRZ was unsafe for a number of reasons, which are discussed 
below. With the modifications adopted in the 2007 NOTAMs, the FAA has 
addressed a number of these concerns. In addition, however, the FAA 
notes that in accordance with 14 CFR 91.3, Responsibility and Authority 
of the Pilot in Command, the pilot in command is directly responsible 
for, and is the final authority on operation of the aircraft. 
Additionally, 14 CFR 91.103, Preflight action, requires that the pilot 
in command, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all 
available information concerning that flight. When operating under VFR, 
the pilot in command selects a destination, and makes a personal choice 
as to the course that will be flown. If the pilot desires to fly 
through the DC SFRA, he or she should always be prepared with an 
alternate flight plan in the event that ATC cannot accommodate his or 
her request, much as he or she would do in order to fly through other 
controlled airspace areas.
    To enhance safety, the FAA has taken numerous actions to 
disseminate information about the DC SFRA dimensions and operating 
requirements. These include the development of a free online course 
entitled ``Navigating the New DC ADIZ'' (available at http://
www.FAASafety.gov), which includes several downloadable procedures 
guides. Since July 2007, over 7,000 pilots have completed this course.
    Additionally, the FAA has depicted DC SFRA dimensions and 
communications frequencies on VFR sectional charts. The agency has also 
worked closely with pilot and aviation associations to inform the 
flying community. Since 2004, the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach 
Control (TRACON) (PCT) has hosted a DC SFRA seminar and Operation 
Raincheck briefings twice a year, with nearly 250 pilots attending each 
time. PCT personnel go out into the general aviation community to 
provide pilot briefings, typically conducting about 6 briefings a year 
with approximately 50 pilots attending each briefing. PCT personnel 
have staffed booths and conducted DC SFRA seminars at the AOPA annual 
open house at the Frederick Airport, MD with approximately 150 pilots 
in attendance.
    The FAA works closely with AOPA to disseminate the latest NOTAM 
information to its members. AOPA includes information pertaining to 
flight operations in the DC SFRA on its Web site. In addition, AOPA 
sent out posters that warn of the DC SFRA airspace, as well as 
distributed hundreds of letters to pilots advising of the DC SFRA and 
recommending they familiarize themselves with the procedures and 
airspace dimensions. The FAA continues to meet with AOPA on a regular 
basis to discuss operations within the DC SFRA.
    1. Frequencies are congested, and controllers are overburdened and 
distracted: Because a greater number of pilots must now establish two-
way radio communications with ATC, some commenters said that 
frequencies were congested and that controllers were overburdened and 
distracted from their primary air traffic separation duties. In

[[Page 76205]]

response to commenters' concerns about frequency congestion and air 
traffic controller workload, the FAA established several new procedures 
in connection with the August 30, 2007 NOTAM. First, the agency 
established three sectors (called ``ADIZ West,'' ``ADIZ South,'' and 
``ADIZ East'' in the NOTAM) at PCT. Second, the FAA established a 
communications frequency dedicated to DC SFRA communications for each 
of PCT's three DC SFRA sectors. During periods of high workload, 
including weekends and other times when general aviation pilots are 
likely to be conducting VFR operations in and around the DC SFRA, PCT 
can staff the three DC SFRA sectors with PCT personnel whose sole 
responsibility is to handle DC SFRA traffic. These steps have served 
to--(1) Mitigate PCT controller workload associated with DC SFRA 
traffic; (2) separate DC SFRA security identification and tracking 
functions from air traffic control separation duties, and (3) reduce 
delays for pilots seeking to operate to, from, or through this airspace 
area.
    The FAA also notes that the reduced dimensions of the DC SFRA, as 
defined in the August 30, 2007 NOTAM, along with establishment of a 
Leesburg Maneuvering Area with streamlined communications procedures, 
have served to reduce air traffic controller workload, frequency 
congestion, and delays for pilots. In addition, the FAA has further 
worked to reduce workload and frequency congestion by clarifying to 
both pilots and controllers that, unless specifically requested by a 
pilot and approved by ATC, radar services (e.g., traffic advisories, 
flight following) are not provided in association with DC SFRA 
security-related identification and tracking.
    2. Too many aircraft congregate around the same fixes while 
awaiting assignment of a discrete transponder code: Numerous commenters 
expressed concerns about the potential safety hazard created when large 
numbers of aircraft operate in the vicinity of the same fixes while 
awaiting assignment of a discrete transponder code to enter the DC 
SFRA. Commenters noted that when filing a DC SFRA flight plan, pilots 
had to state a fix (exit or entry point) on their flight plans. Even 
though there is no requirement for pilots to operate directly to, from, 
or over these fixes while establishing two-way radio communications 
with ATC and obtaining a discrete transponder code, commenters stated 
that many pilots are nevertheless congregating in the vicinity of these 
fixes.
    In response to these concerns, and in connection with the DC SFRA 
dimensional changes implemented in the August 30, 2007 NOTAM, the FAA 
made changes to the DC SFRA entry/exit points for flight plan filing 
purposes. Specifically, the agency established eight ``gates'' around 
the circumference of the DC SFRA. Pilots list the appropriate gate name 
on the DC SFRA flight plan, and enter or exit the DC SFRA at any point 
within the boundaries of that gate. The gate names and boundaries are 
now depicted on appropriate VFR charts. The FAA has also provided the 
online DC SFRA training course and its associated guidance materials 
and works with industry associations to educate pilots about these 
gates and boundaries.
    While the FAA recognizes that any navigational fix tends to be a 
high-traffic area, the agency reminds pilots that when operating under 
VFR, the pilot in command is responsible to see and avoid other 
aircraft. Before the implementation of the DC SFRA, the Washington Tri-
Area Class B Airspace Area was among the most congested in the nation, 
and extreme vigilance for other aircraft has been required. The DC SFRA 
has increased the number of pilots using air traffic services; however, 
the actual number of VFR aircraft operations has not changed 
significantly. What has changed is more awareness of aircraft in the 
area, which prior to the DC SFRA did not use ATC services; thus most 
pilots were not aware of the large number of VFR operations conducted.
    3. The DC SFRA forces pilots to fly over water and mountainous 
areas: Commenters noted that the DC SFRA restricts available airspace. 
Therefore, when pilots were unable to obtain an authorization to fly in 
the DC SFRA, they were forced to fly over mountainous areas to the west 
or over water of the Chesapeake Bay to the east. Commenters claimed 
that flight over mountains and water was unsafe.
    Flight over water or mountainous terrain is not inherently unsafe. 
The FAA acknowledges that when over mountains or water certain 
precautions should be taken in the event of an emergency, such as an 
engine failure. Carrying more fuel, identifying emergency landing 
locations, maintaining a higher altitude or carrying flotation devices 
are some steps a prudent pilot may take to mitigate any flight risk.
    When flying VFR, a pilot must consider the class of airspace and 
special use airspace along the route, and the associated procedures or 
requirements that must be met to transit the airspace. For example, 
most of the DC SFRA is contained within the Washington Tri-Area Class B 
Airspace Area. In accordance with 14 CFR 91.131, Operations in Class B 
Airspace, no person may operate an aircraft within Class B airspace 
without a clearance from ATC, and the aircraft must be equipped with a 
two-way radio and an altitude-reporting transponder. In addition, 
student pilots must meet specific training provisions of 14 CFR part 61 
prior to operating in a Class B airspace area. If a pilot intends to 
transit Class B airspace, the pilot must be able to meet the above 
conditions. In addition, a pilot must be prepared to circumnavigate the 
airspace if ATC is unable to provide a clearance into the airspace. In 
this area, this may mean a pilot would need to over fly the Blue Ridge 
Mountains or the Chesapeake Bay, and should always be prepared to do 
so. Implementation of the DC SFRA did not change this fact.
    The FAA believes that the August 30, 2007 reduction in DC SFRA 
dimensions, along with the establishment of associated new frequencies, 
gates, and procedures, has created more navigable airspace, thus 
providing more routes for pilots to transit the area. That action 
reduces the likelihood of pilots having to fly over mountainous terrain 
or water.
    4. Pilots are afraid to engage in training/proficiency flying 
activities around the DC SFRA: Many commenters stated that flight 
training and routine proficiency flying was reduced because of the fear 
of enforcement actions, thereby making it difficult to maintain the 
skills necessary to fly safely.
    The FAA is aware that there have been some cases in which pilots 
have not complied with the DC SFRA requirements, and consequently have 
been escorted by military aircraft and/or been met by law enforcement 
personnel on the ground. The agency understands that such events can be 
intimidating and that some pilots may opt to cease or reduce their 
flying activities rather than risk making an error. The FAA 
acknowledges that the existence of the DC SFRA may create more of a 
challenging environment for pilots not accustomed to communicating with 
ATC and regrets that some pilots may choose not to fly. However, the 
agency encourages pilots to use the many resources available to learn 
about DC SFRA operations, including completing the FAA's mandatory 
Special Awareness Training.
    5. Safety is compromised because the DC SFRA requires more complex 
skills: Commenters asserted that because more complex skills are 
required to operate within the DC SFRA, pilots have been

[[Page 76206]]

challenged beyond their capabilities, which has placed them in an 
unsafe situation.
    The airspace in which an aircraft operates dictates the equipment 
and communication requirements for those who operate within the 
designated airspace. Most of the DC SFRA lies within the boundaries of 
the Washington, DC Tri-Area Class B Airspace Area and as such, pilots 
have always been required to possess appropriate communication and 
navigation skills (see 14 CFR 91.131). If a pilot chooses to operate in 
the DC SFRA, it is imperative that he or she comply with Sec.  91.103, 
Preflight action, which, in part, requires that each pilot in command 
become familiar with all available information concerning that flight. 
As stated previously, information pertaining to the DC SFRA is readily 
available, and should be reviewed by all pilots who operate in the 
area.
    6. Delays in obtaining authorization to re-enter the DC SFRA cause 
safety problems: Commenters stated that they often encountered delays 
in obtaining authorization to re-enter the DC SFRA and noted that one 
pilot actually ran out of fuel while waiting.
    When the DC SFRA was initially implemented, both pilots and 
controllers had to adapt to the new requirements and develop workable 
DC SFRA operational procedures that could be clearly understood by all 
concerned. The FAA acknowledges and regrets that many pilots 
encountered delays when entering and exiting the DC SFRA during that 
time. Since then, pilots and controllers have become more familiar with 
the DC SFRA and its operating requirements, and ATC has developed 
procedures to accommodate the increase in operations. The agency 
believes that the reduced DC SFRA dimensions and new procedures, 
dedicated frequencies, and gates have significantly reduced the kind of 
delays pilots may have encountered when the DC SFRA was initially 
established.
    7. DC SFRA procedures are a distraction to pilots, who should be 
focused on scanning for other aircraft: AOPA expressed concern that DC 
SFRA procedures were a distraction to pilots engaged in other important 
operational activities, such as scanning for other aircraft.
    Although flight operations to, from, and within the DC SFRA may 
increase a pilot's workload by requiring additional attention to 
communication and navigation, the FAA does not believe that this in 
itself is a significant distraction to pilots. Well before any pilot 
who opts to operate within or adjacent to the DC SFRA departs, he or 
she must obtain a thorough pre-flight briefing in accordance with 14 
CFR 91.103. During the pre-flight briefing process, the pilot should 
resolve any questions or concerns so that when airborne, that pilot can 
concentrate on flying the aircraft, and scanning for other aircraft. 
The FAA also notes that in most cases, ATC radio transmissions to 
aircraft operating within the DC SFRA are minimal.
    8. The configuration of the DC SFRA is difficult for pilots to 
navigate: AOPA asserted that the configuration of the DC SFRA, which 
includes many irregular boundaries, makes it difficult for pilots to 
navigate.
    The FAA acknowledges that the initial boundaries of the DC SFRA, 
which were also proposed in the NPRM as dimensions for the DC SFRA, 
were not ideal. In response to these comments, in August 2007 the FAA 
reduced and reconfigured the DC SFRA to a 30-NM circle centered on the 
DCA VOR/DME. The FAA has also depicted these new boundaries on 
appropriate navigational charts. The agency believes that these steps 
have made it significantly easier for pilots to navigate in the NCR.
    9. Reduced airport services reduce options available to pilots: 
Some commenters asserted that a DC SFRA-related reduction in general 
aviation flights resulted in reduced airport services (e.g., 
maintenance and repair, avionics services, flight instruction, etc.). 
They alleged that this development had led to even greater reductions 
in general aviation flights as well as potential compromise of safety 
because pilots do not have as many options if they need emergency 
services.
    The FAA acknowledges that the existence and operating requirements 
of the DC SFRA have in some cases resulted in less traffic to some 
local airports, thus reducing revenue and services. The FAA has 
analyzed the impacts on local airports and businesses; this analysis is 
discussed in section ``VII. Regulatory Impact Analysis.'' The reduced 
size of the DC SFRA impacts fewer airports, so the FAA expects 
operations at those airports now located outside the DC SFRA to 
increase. The FAA has also established a maneuvering area to ease 
traffic flow in and out of the Leesburg Airport. In addition, three 
airports within the DC FRZ were provided some financial assistance from 
the Department of Transportation.

C. Administrative and Regulatory Issues

    1. The FAA has not met statutory requirements to report to Congress 
the justification for keeping the DC SFRA: AOPA and some individual 
commenters said the FAA had not been sending regular reports to 
Congress, as mandated by the Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (section 602).
    Paragraph (a) of that legislation stated that every 60 days the 
Administrator must transmit to the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, a report (in 
classified form) containing an explanation of the need for the DC ADIZ 
(now called the ``DC SFRA'').
    The commenters are correct that the FAA did not submit reports to 
Congress explaining the need for the DC SFRA. During the reorganization 
of agency functions after September 11, 2001, aviation intelligence 
responsibilities shifted from the FAA to DHS. The Secretary of DHS, 
therefore, briefed Congress on the need for the DC SFRA. In addition, 
in 2007, the Congressional Research Service performed its own research 
on the aviation security needs in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area.
    Paragraph (c) of the Vision 100 legislation called upon the FAA to 
transmit a report to Congress every 60 days describing changes in 
procedures or requirements that could improve operational efficiency or 
minimize operational impacts on pilots and controllers. The FAA has met 
this requirement and submits reports describing the changes to improve 
the operational efficiency or minimize operational impacts to the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate.
    2. The DC SFRA was intended to be temporary and was put in place 
hastily, without public input: When the DC SFRA was established via the 
NOTAM system, it was not known how long the flight restrictions would 
be in place. In the first few months of its implementation, the DC SFRA 
and its procedures were changed several times in response to changes in 
the HSAS threat levels. For example, a cut-out was made around Freeway 
Airport, Mitchellville, MD; certain airports (known as gateway 
airports) were identified and used as locations where aircraft and crew 
could be vetted through various databases prior to entering the DC 
SFRA; and ingress/egress procedures were instituted for Bay Bridge and 
Kentmorr Airports, Kent Island, MD. Security, law enforcement and FAA 
officials have met regularly to discuss and assess the security needs 
of the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area.

[[Page 76207]]

In August 2007, the dimensions of the DC SFRA were reduced, and 
procedures were amended, which has opened up more airspace to the 
aviation community and simplified procedures for pilots operating 
within the DC SFRA. The need to protect the nation's capital continues, 
and the FAA has determined that the most appropriate way to implement 
this special flight rules area is through the rulemaking process. The 
FAA also notes that prior to making this DC SFRA permanent, the agency 
published an NPRM requesting comments from the public. In response, the 
agency received over 21,000 comments, in addition to comments received 
at four public meetings.
    3. Suggestions from commenters for alternatives to the DC SFRA: The 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association submitted alternatives to the 
proposal, and recommended retaining the FRZ but only for larger, faster 
aircraft. AOPA's plan would have excepted aircraft that weigh 6,000 
pounds or less and that limit their speed to 160 knots or less from the 
DC SFRA requirements.
    The Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) also submitted numerous 
recommendations, including but not limited to reducing the FRZ from a 
15-NM radius to a 10-NM radius from the DCA VOR/DME and reducing the DC 
SFRA to a 20-NM radius of the DCA VOR/DME. In addition, EAA suggested 
using a larger TFR when HSAS threat levels are elevated.
    Many individual commenters suggested retaining the FRZ and 
eliminating the SFRA. The FAA appreciates these and other suggestions. 
The agency considered the recommendations but, in consultation with the 
Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group, determined that reducing 
the sizes of the FRZ and the SFRA to the degree the commenters 
suggested would not provide adequate warning time for law enforcement 
officials to take appropriate emergency actions on the ground. The FAA 
notes, however, that the size of the DC SFRA was reduced in August 
2007.
    As to the suggestion that smaller aircraft flying at slower speeds 
be exempted from meeting DC SFRA requirements, the FAA believes that 
such a measure would not allow the FAA to meet its objective of 
tracking all aircraft in the National Capital Region.
    Several commenters suggested that aircraft operating in the DC SFRA 
be equipped with new technology, such as Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast technology (ADS-B), for monitoring. Use of such 
technology was not proposed and is therefore outside the scope of this 
rulemaking. However, the FAA notes that ADS-B has been selected as the 
preferred next generation technology for surveillance and broadcast 
services. It has been successfully deployed in Alaska and several other 
locations. On October 5, 2007, the FAA published in the Federal 
Register an NPRM, which proposed in part, requirements for aircraft 
operating in Class B and C airspace areas to be equipped with ADS-B 
technology (72 FR 56947; Oct. 5, 2007). As part of that rulemaking 
effort, the FAA established an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) 
under Order 1110.147. That committee was chartered to deliver a report 
on how to optimize operational benefits of the ADS-B system and to 
provide recommendations to the FAA on the development of a final rule.
    4. The DC SFRA amounts to a ``taking'' (a seizure of private 
property without due process): Some commenters believed that the 
government is, in effect, practicing condemnation/seizure of private 
property without due process. Commenters alleged that the airspace 
restrictions have triggered a regulatory taking and, therefore, they 
deserve compensation. The commenters bolstered their argument by 
asserting that the decision to prohibit or restrict airspace indirectly 
results in a loss of business to airports or aviation-related 
businesses on the ground.
    Airspace is not private property; therefore, it is not property 
that can be owned by any person, as the term ``private property'' is 
used within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment. 
While the FAA's regulations or restriction imposed on any navigable, 
public airspace may interfere with, limit, or even prohibit the right 
of an individual to use that airspace, the restrictions do not 
constitute a taking of private property without due process or just 
compensation. The FAA acknowledges that establishing the DC SFRA will 
have an indirect impact on aviation-related businesses that may have an 
adverse economic effect due to a reduction of access to, or need for, 
their services. However, that indirect economic cost and personal 
inconvenience is not an impact unique to the general aviation community 
or the Washington, DC area. Rather, it is an impact experienced by many 
individuals and businesses in all areas of commerce as a result of the 
variety and scope of new security measures imposed by various levels of 
government after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
    5. The FAA allowed other Federal agencies to direct its decision 
making: Numerous commenters asserted that the FAA ``abdicated'' its 
rulemaking authority to other Federal entities. The commenters believed 
that the FAA had allowed security and law enforcement agencies to 
direct civilian airspace policy.
    As discussed in ``I. Overview,'' the FAA Administrator has 
statutory authority to manage the nation's airspace in the interest of 
national security. In carrying out this responsibility, the FAA 
consults with the Secretary of Defense and works closely with other 
Federal agencies to ensure the safety of civil aviation and to protect 
persons and property on the ground.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

    As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of the new information collection 
requirement(s) in this final rule to the Office of Management and 
Budget for its review. OMB approved the collection of this information 
and assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0706.
    In the preamble to the 2005 NPRM, in the ``Paperwork Reduction 
Act'' discussion, the FAA solicited comments on the information 
collection requirement for pilots operating under VFR to file flight 
plans. The FAA received numerous comments opposing the requirement. 
These comments, and the FAA's responses, are discussed elsewhere in 
this preamble.
    Number of respondents: The FAA does not know exactly how many 
pilots will file flight plans to access the DC SFRA and DC FRZ on an 
annual basis. To calculate the number of respondents, the FAA has 
divided 256,461 estimated annual number of operations by 15 operations 
per pilot annually, which equals 17,097.
    Cost: The FAA estimates the annual cost to comply with the 
information collection requirement of this final rule to be $1,831, 098 
($477,017 cost to activate a flight plan plus $1,354,081 cost to file a 
flight plan). The ten-year cost will be $18,310,980.
    The cost to activate a flight plan ($477,017) was calculated as 
follows.
    17,097--Respondents.
    15--Number of flight plans filed by each respondent annually.
    256,461--Annual number of flight plans.
    0.05 hour--Time needed to activate a flight plan.
    $37.20/hour--Value of pilot's time.
    The cost to file a flight plan ($1,354,081) was calculated as 
follows.
    17,097--Respondents.
    256,461--Annual number of flight plans.
    0.137 hour--Time (including wait time) needed to file a flight 
plan.

[[Page 76208]]

    $37.20/hour--Value of pilot's time.
    3.6%--Percent of pilots needing to refile a DC SFRA flight plan.
    Hours: The FAA estimates the rule will require 49,223.07 hours 
(12,823.5 hours to activate a flight plan plus 36,400.02 hours to file 
a flight plan). The number of hours over 10 years will be 492,230.70.
    An agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, 
nor may it impose an information collection requirement unless it 
displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
control number.

VI. International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these regulations.

VII. Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory Flexibility Determination 
and Analysis, International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded 
Mandates Assessment

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires 
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small 
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. 
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of 
the economic impacts of this final rule. We suggest readers seeking 
greater detail read the full regulatory impact analysis, a copy of 
which we have placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this 
final rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is an 
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is ``significant'' as defined in 
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) will have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) will not 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States; and (6) will not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or 
tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold 
identified above. These analyses are summarized below.
    The FAA has analyzed the expected costs of this regulation for a 
10-year period, from 2009 through 2018. As required by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), the present value of this cost stream was 
calculated using discount factors of 7 and 3 percent. All costs in this 
analysis are expressed in 2007 dollars.
    The FAA costed out four alternatives for this evaluation:
     Alternative 1 is what was contained in the NPRM, which 
mirrors the Washington Tri-Area Class B airspace area, with certain 
minor modifications. It also has a 15-NM FRZ. Its cost is $1.34 billion 
over ten years ($1.15 billion, discounted at 3 percent, and $942.26 
million discounted at 7 percent).
     Alternative 2 is the final rule, with a 30-NM DC SFRA, 15-
NM DC FRZ. Its cost is $1.04 billion over ten years ($886.34 million, 
discounted at 3 percent, and $756.98 million, discounted at 7 percent).
     Alternative 3 is the NPRM with enhanced procedures, such 
as ADS-B-equipped aircraft being exempt from the flight plan 
requirement and establishing two-way communication requirement, given 
certain conditions. Its cost is $1.30 billion over ten years ($1.11 
billion, discounted at 3 percent, and $919.31 million, discounted at 7 
percent).
     Alternative 4 contains a 15-NM DC FRZ, with the DC SFRA 
being determined by threat and air defense requirements, and 
established by NOTAM. For costing purposes, this alternative examined 
two scenarios, a 55-NM DC SFRA and a 20-NM DC SFRA. Its costs range 
from $3.29 billion over ten years ($2.80 billion, discounted at 3 
percent, and $2.13 billion, discounted at 7 percent) to $4.47 billion 
($3.82 billion, discounted at 3 percent, and $2.85 billion, discounted 
at 7 percent).
1. Costs
    There are two major sets of cost components--public sector and 
private sector.
    a. Public Sector: (1) A key component in defending the DC SFRA 
against attackers is the airplanes based at Andrews Air Force Base. 
Under most of the alternatives, given a 30-NM DC SFRA, the program 
depends on F-15s, F-16s, and helicopters to be ready to scramble to 
defend the DC SFRA; a scramble can range from pilots proceeding to 
battle stations, runway alerts, sending a helicopter to alert the 
errant aircraft, or sending out military aircraft to intercept the 
aircraft. The total cost of scrambles, including both F-15/F-16 and 
helicopter, is $324.64 million over ten years. Given a 20-NM DC SFRA, 
the program would depend on a fighter combat air patrol, 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week (24/7 fighter CAP) instead; this CAP uses F-15s and 
F-16s as well as KC-135 tankers to refuel these aircraft; these costs 
sum to $356 million annually. When DOD assets are deployed, air traffic 
control suspends operations and there is a delay cost. The total cost 
of suspending operations is $1.93 million over ten years. This estimate 
only takes local delays into consideration, and does not account for 
secondary delays and ripple effects that may be imposed on the aviation 
system.
    (2) The FAA installed additional radar facilities for support of 
the DC SFRA at Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), Ronald 
Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Baltimore/Washington 
International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), and PTC. Since these 
costs are ``sunk'', they are not considered to be an incremental cost 
of the rule. However, there are recurring annual costs summing to 
$375,000.
    (3) This rule requires additional controllers and flight service 
station specialists, as well as the cost of filing and activating DC 
SFRA-related flight plans. The FAA has dedicated 6 additional 
controller positions for 3 specific regions of the DC SFRA as a result 
of this rule. Over a ten-year period, the total cost of the additional 
controllers is $15.50 million. On average, about 4 full time equivalent 
positions are dedicated to filing flight plans at flight service 
stations; over a ten-year period, the total cost of the additional FSS 
specialists will be $6.45 million. The additional cost of filing and 
activating flight plans, over 10 years, sums to $59.33 million.

[[Page 76209]]

    Total public-sector costs, over the 10-year period, sum to $411.60 
million.
    b. Private Sector: The DC SFRA impacts aircraft operators, 
airports, and aviation-related businesses in the Washington, DC region. 
DC SFRA requirements have created delays and other costs to operators 
and have caused some operators to reduce the number of flights they 
take, shift operations to airspace and airports outside of the DC SFRA, 
and even to cease operations altogether. DC SFRA-related delays impose 
costs on operators and aviation-related businesses. The reduced number 
of operations has reduced revenue at airports and aviation-related 
businesses.
    (1) Operating Restrictions--The DC SFRA has created many delays to 
operators, including ground, flight, circumnavigation, and re-routing 
delays. VFR operators in the DC SFRA are required to file a DC SFRA 
flight plan and communicate with ATC, creating flight, ground, and re-
routing delays. In an effort to avoid these delays, some pilots 
circumnavigate the DC SFRA, although this also imposes an additional 
cost. Over ten years, the cost of operating restrictions is $355.80 
million.
    (2) Airports--The DC SFRA impacts many airports in the Washington, 
DC region, including airports located outside of the DC SFRA 
boundaries. The DC SFRA affects the behavior of aircraft operators in 
the region and results in decreased levels of aviation activity at some 
airports. However, the DC SFRA will also cause aviation activity at 
some airports in the region to increase. Much of the negative economic 
impact at some airports will be offset by gains at other airports. Over 
ten years, the affected airports have net revenue losses of $25.35 
million.
    (3) Aviation-related business--The DC SFRA impacts aviation-related 
businesses in the Washington, DC region because it causes some aircraft 
operators to alter their behavior. Aviation-related businesses include 
fixed-base operators (FBOs), passenger or freight charter operators, 
aerial photography and mapmaking businesses, aircraft maintenance and 
repair facilities, flight schools, restaurants and transportation 
services located at airports, and other businesses dependent on 
aviation activity. A decrease in the number of operations and active 
aircraft directly results in a decrease in revenue at these businesses. 
Other aviation-related businesses incur additional costs as a 
consequence of DC SFRA requirements. Over ten years, the affected 
businesses have revenue losses of $246.86 million.
    Total private sector costs, over ten years, sum to $628.00 million. 
Total public and private sector costs combined, over ten years, sum to 
$1.04 billion.
2. Benefits and Cost-Benefit Comparison
    The FAA looked at five scenarios, and computed the estimated mean 
consequence resulting if each scenario were to occur once in a 10-year 
period. The estimated means ranged from $0.12 billion ($0.09 billion, 
discounted) to $9.81 billion ($6.89 billion, discounted). These were 
compared to the cost of the rule, which is $1.04 billion ($756.98 
million, discounted). For three of these five scenarios, the required 
risk reduction could be less than 100 percent, and the rule would be 
cost beneficial.

B. Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the RFA. However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule 
is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that 
the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement 
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning 
should be clear.
    The FAA gathered data for airports and other aviation-related 
businesses that are located 60NM from the DCA VOR/DME. The U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA) classifies businesses as small based on 
size standards, typically expressed as annual revenue or number of 
employees. SBA publishes a table of small business size standards 
matched to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. 
The SBA defines privately owned airports as a small entity if annual 
revenue is less than $6.5 million. Publicly owned airports are defined 
as a small entity if annual revenue is less than $5 million. As Table 1 
shows, all impacted airports (with the exception of BWI, DCA and IAD) 
are well below these annual revenue thresholds. Revenue data is for 
2007.

                                            Table 1--Airport Revenue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Facility                      2007 Revenue               Facility               2007 Revenue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Essex Skypark.............................             $47,440  Lee.........................            $347,758
Freeway...................................             103,000  Harford County..............             378,192
Shoestring Aviation Airfield..............             110,482  Winchester Regional.........             386,365
Hanover...................................             116,019  Hagerstown Regional.........             439,083
Maryland..................................             119,100  Ridgely Airpark.............             493,240
College Park..............................             122,590  Stafford Regional...........             500,000
Davis.....................................             140,188  Bay Bridge..................             501,740
Potomac Airfield..........................             142,000  St. Mary's County Regional..             510,932
Front Royal-Warren County.................             151,280  Culpeper Regional...........             536,485
Fallston..................................             172,171  Warrenton-Fauquier..........             802,200
Clearview Airpark.........................             219,968  Leesburg Executive..........             805,068
Tipton....................................             250,000  Frederick Municipal.........             867,082
Suburban..................................             259,859  Montgomery County Airpark...             920,103
Orange County.............................             272,530  Manassas Regional...........           1,192,389
Shannon...................................             297,402  Martin State................           1,260,000

[[Page 76210]]

Washington Executive/Hyde Field...........             300,670  Carroll County Regional.....           1,302,400
Cambridge-Dorchester......................             301,297  Easton/Newnam Field.........           1,621,671
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The SBA size standards for aviation-related businesses at airports 
are listed in Table 2. The size standard for flight schools is annual 
revenue less than $23.5 million, for aircraft sales businesses it is 
annual revenue less than $9 million, and for other business types it is 
generally annual revenue less than $6.5 million. The SBA threshold for 
charter operators is less than 1,500 employees.

                       Table 2--SBA Size Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Annual revenue or employee
               Business type                threshold for small business
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aerial Photography........................  <$6.5 million.
Aircraft Rental...........................  <$6.5 million.
Aircraft Sales............................  <$9 million.
Charter, sightseeing, courier.............  <1,500 employees.
Fixed Base Operator.......................  <$6.5 million.
Flight School.............................  <$23.5 million.
Other.....................................  <$6.5 million.
Repair Station............................  <$6.5 million.
Working (agriculture, helicopter lift,      <$6.5 million.
 etc.).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA matched each DC SFRA-impacted aviation-related business to 
its appropriate NAICS code and compared it to the SBA size standard for 
that NAICS code. The FAA estimates that the majority of impacted 
businesses are considered small under the SBA size standards.
    The FAA found that the impact of the DC SFRA on some of these 
businesses was positive, while for others, it was negative. ``Congress 
considered the term `significant' to be neutral with respect to whether 
the impact is beneficial or harmful to small businesses. Therefore, 
agencies need to consider both beneficial and adverse impacts in an 
analysis.'' \1\ The FAA estimated the annualized revenue impact of the 
rule on each of the small entities, and determined that the rule will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. Except for two small entities which happen to be airports, 
the actual or estimated ratio of annualized revenue impacts to annual 
revenue was greater than 1 percent. Accordingly, the FAA prepared a 
regulatory flexibility analysis, as described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Small Business Administration, ``A Guide for Government 
Agencies--How To Comply With the Regulatory Flexibility Act'', May 
2003, page 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    Under section 603(b) of the RFA (as amended), each final regulatory 
flexibility analysis is required to address the following points: (1) 
Reasons the agency considered the rule, (2) the objectives and legal 
basis for the rule, (3) the kind and number of small entities to which 
the rule will apply, (4) the reporting, recordkeeping, and other 
compliance requirements of the rule, and (5) all Federal rules that may 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the rule.
    1. Reasons the FAA considered the rule--The FAA is taking this 
final action to enhance security in Washington, DC, the Nation's 
capital. As the Nation's capital, it has a unique symbolic, historic, 
and political status. Washington, DC is the seat of all three branches 
of the United States government, and is the home of the President and 
the Vice President. Likewise, it is the home of the U.S. Congress and 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and thus is the residence and office location 
for the officials in the Constitutional order of succession.
    The FAA, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and 
Homeland Security, has determined that implementation of this rule is 
necessary to enable those officials in carrying out their 
responsibilities to lawfully identify, counter, prevent, deter, or, as 
a last resort, disable with non-lethal or lethal force, any airborne 
object that poses a threat to national security. The rule will assist 
air traffic controllers and National Capital Region Communications 
Center officials in monitoring air traffic by identifying, 
distinguishing, and, more importantly, responding appropriately when an 
aircraft is off course or is not complying with ATC instructions.
    2. The objectives and legal basis for the rule--The objective of 
the rule is to codify the airspace restrictions within the Washington, 
DC Metropolitan Area. This effort is to assist DHS and DOD in their 
efforts to enhance security protection of vital national assets located 
within the National Capital Region. The legal basis for the rule is 
found in 49 U.S.C. 40103, et seq. The FAA and DHS must consider, as a 
matter of policy, maintaining and enhancing safety and security in air 
commerce as its highest priorities (49 U.S.C. 40101 (d)).
    3. The kind and number of small entities to which the rule will 
apply--The FAA identified 34 small airports and 395 small aviation-
related businesses that the rule will impact. Of the 34 small airports, 
12 are in the DC SFRA. Of the 395 small aviation-related businesses, 
274 are in the DC SFRA. Table 1 above lists the 34 small airports and 
Table 3 below shows the different types and number of small aviation-
related businesses to which this rule will apply.

   Table 3--Type and Number of Small Aviation-Related Business Impacted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Business type                            Count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aerial Photography......................................              16
Aircraft Rental.........................................              18
Aircraft Sales..........................................             121
Charter Operators.......................................              21
Fixed Base Operators....................................              61
Flight School...........................................             127
Repair Stations.........................................               9
Working.................................................               7
Other...................................................              15
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................             395
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. The reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements 
of the rule--As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of these sections to OMB for 
its review. However, there are no sections of the paperwork package 
that apply to the airports and aviation-related businesses. All of the 
economic impact discussed below deals with business gained or lost due 
to the requirements of the DC SFRA.
    5. All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
the rule--The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that duplicate, 
overlap, or conflict with the rule.
    6. Other considerations--Affordability analysis--For the purpose of 
this analysis, the degree to which small entities can afford the 
reduction in revenue resulting from the final rule is predicated on the 
availability of financial resources. Costs can be paid from existing 
assets such as cash, by

[[Page 76211]]

borrowing, through the provision of additional equity capital, by 
accepting reduced profits, by raising prices, or by finding other ways 
of offsetting costs.
    One means of assessing the affordability is the ability of each of 
the small entities to meet its short-term obligations, such as looking 
at net income, working capital and financial strength ratios. According 
to financial literature, a company's short-run financial strength is 
substantially influenced by its working capital position and its 
ability to pay short-term liabilities, among other things. However, the 
FAA was unable to find sufficient financial information for the 
majority of affected entities, and so used an alternative way of 
analyzing affordability. The approach used by the FAA was to compare 
the rule's impact on entity revenues with estimated revenues in the 
absence of the rule.
    The FAA was able to estimate the annual change in revenue and 2007 
revenue for the airports. However, the FAA was unable to locate revenue 
data for the aviation-related businesses. This analysis first discusses 
the airports and then the aviation-related businesses.
    (a) Airports--Table 38 in the full regulatory impact analysis lists 
the public use airports within the DC SFRA and between the DC SFRA and 
60 nautical miles from the DCA VOR/DME that are small entities. Column 
A lists each airport's estimated annual revenue in the absence of the 
rule and 2007 NOTAM.\2\ Column B lists each airport's estimated revenue 
in 2007 (with the NOTAM). Column C lists each airport's estimated 
change in revenue as a result of the DC SFRA, and was computed by 
subtracting Column A from Column B. A negative change in revenue 
implies that the airport is worse off because of this rule. Column D is 
the quotient of Column C and column A, or the ratio of annualized 
revenue change associated with the rule to the estimated non-NOTAM 
annualized revenue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ This value is used to ensure that the analysis examines the 
rule in accordance with the pre-9/11 baseline established in the 
full regulatory impact analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This information was used to assess the significance and 
affordability of this rule. Column E shows the airports for which the 
FAA expects this rule would have a significant impact, as described 
previously. Column F examines affordability using the alternative 
approach described above. The FAA considers that an airport would have 
trouble affording the rule if the change in its revenue is negative and 
exceeds 10 percent of its annualized change in revenue as a percentage 
of non-NOTAM revenue. The idea is that if a business has such a high 
loss in revenue, percentage-wise, it would likely have trouble 
affording the rule.
    Table 4 summarizes Table 38 in the full regulatory impact analysis 
by showing the number of airports, the number of those airports that 
might have trouble affording this rule, and the resultant percentage.

            Table 4--Affordability of Small Business Airports
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total number of small airports impacted.......................        34
Number of small airports for which the rule might be non-             12
 affordable...................................................
Percentage....................................................    35.29%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (b) Other Aviation-Related Businesses--Aviation-related businesses 
less than 60nm from DCA were identified from Dun & Bradstreet reports, 
comments to the 2005 DC SFRA NPRM, airport Web sites, AOPA Pilot Guide, 
World Aerospace Directory, FAA Operating Specification Sub System 
(OPSS), FAA Vital Information System (VIS), and FAA Form 5010 database. 
Although there was not enough data for the FAA to estimate business-by-
business revenue impacts, the agency was able to estimate aggregate 
revenue impacts for business within and outside of the DC SFRA. The 
aggregate data show that as a group, DC SFRA businesses will have 
trouble affording this rule, as shown in Table 22 in the full 
regulatory impact analysis, whereas non-SFRA businesses will benefit 
from this rule, as shown in Table 23 in the full regulatory impact 
analysis. Thus, from the perspective of affordability, the FAA expects 
that a number of aviation-related businesses based at airports inside 
the DC SFRA will have trouble affording this rule. (See Table D-1 in 
Appendix D in the full regulatory impact analysis for a list of SFRA 
and non-SFRA businesses.)
    7. Liquidity analysis/profitability analysis--As explained earlier, 
except for aggregate revenue data, the FAA was unable to find enough 
financial data for the impacted small businesses both inside and 
outside the DC SFRA to perform a liquidity analysis or a profitability 
analysis.
    8. Disproportionality analysis--The FAA considered whether small 
entities will be disadvantaged relative to large entities due to 
disproportionate impacts. There was no need for the FAA to conduct a 
disproportionality analysis for the airports because all airports 
affected by this rule are small businesses, so none would be advantaged 
over any other. For the aviation-related businesses, as can be seen in 
Table 5, the estimated revenue impact per aircraft operation is larger 
for the large businesses than for the small businesses; thus, there 
will be no disproportionate impact.

                      Table 5--Disproportionality Analysis for Aviation-Related Businesses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Revenue impact per
                                                         Total revenue     Total operations   aircraft operation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large...............................................          $8,581,818             237,643              $36.11
Small...............................................             531,751             148,519                3.58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. Competitiveness analysis--For the airports outside the DC SFRA, 
the average net increase in revenue as a percentage of estimated non-
NOTAM revenue was 4.9 percent. For those airports inside the DC SFRA, 
the average net decrease in revenue as a percentage of non-NOTAM 
revenue was 44.9 percent. Much of this decrease comes from the three 
airports within the DC FRZ--College Park, Potomac Airfield, and 
Washington Executive/Hyde Field; without these three airports, the 
average net decrease in revenue as a percentage of revenue resulting 
from the rule would be about 19.7 percent. The FAA expects that based 
on the results of this analysis, this rule will improve the 
competitiveness of small businesses outside the DC SFRA vis-[aacute]-
vis those inside the DC SFRA, since the revenue of most aviation-
related businesses is dependent on the number of aircraft operations 
taking place at that airport.
    10. Business closure analysis--It is difficult for the FAA to 
determine the

[[Page 76212]]

extent to which airports significantly impacted by this rule might have 
to cease operations. There are too many variables and some of the 
airports within the DC SFRA are already in serious financial 
difficulty; the information shown in the affordability analysis can be 
indicators of airport business closures. The FAA has no comparable 
financial information on the aviation-related businesses. To what 
extent the final rule makes the difference in whether these entities 
remain in business is difficult to answer. The FAA believes that there 
is a likelihood of business closure for some of these businesses as a 
result of this rule.
Alternatives
    The FAA considered alternatives to the rule for both airports and 
aviation-related businesses. A discussion of these alternatives 
follows. The third alternative is the final rule. For each alternative, 
the FAA first states the alternative, followed by a discussion, and why 
the FAA believes that the alternative would not enhance security.
    Alternative 1--Retain the DC FRZ, eliminate the rest of the DC 
SFRA--Under this alternative, airspace in the Washington DC 
Metropolitan area with flight restrictions would be reduced 
considerably. The only flight restrictions remaining would be within 
approximately 15 NM of the DCA VOR/DME, restricting all aircraft 
operations except part 121 operators, DOD operations, law enforcement 
operations and authorized emergency medical services operations. This 
removes the requirement for filing flight plans for aircraft operators 
in airspace outside the DC FRZ, resulting in reduced pilot and 
controller workload. This alternative would provide relief to those VFR 
operators that will operate in the DC SFRA area but not into the DC 
FRZ. It would restore former air traffic control procedures and air 
space configurations for some of the area. The FAA estimates that 
implementation of this alternative would have a positive effect for all 
of the impacted airports except for College Park, Washington Executive/
Hyde Field, and Potomac.
    Conclusion: This alternative is not preferred because it does not 
meet the safety and security requirements of those security agencies 
responsible for the safety of the Washington DC Metropolitan area. 
Thus, the FAA does not consider this to be a significant alternative in 
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603(d).
    Alternative 2--Rescind the FAA's NOTAM and the DC SFRA/DC FRZ 
immediately--This alternative would provide immediate relief to these 
airports and aviation-related businesses by removing security 
provisions and restoring former air traffic control procedures and 
airspace configurations. Implementation of this alternative would 
facilitate the return of pilots who, for the sake of operating 
simplicity and reduced flying costs, relocated to other airports. This 
would be the option with the least impact.
    Conclusion: The FAA believes that the threat of terrorists must be 
guarded against, and this option would not adequately achieve that 
goal. Rescinding these actions would increase the vulnerability and 
diminish the level of protection now in place to safeguard vital 
national assets located within the NCR. This alternative is rejected 
because it would compromise the security of vital national assets and 
increase their vulnerability. Thus, the FAA does not consider this to 
be a significant alternative in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603(d).
    Alternative 3--Codify existing flight restrictions over the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area (Final Rule)--Under this alternative, 
the government would maintain the present security and air traffic 
operational restrictions. The rule enhances security measures in that 
it requires any aircraft operating to and from the affected airports 
and transiting the DC SFRA to be properly identified and cleared. This 
alternative would affect all airports and aviation-related businesses.
    Conclusion: This alternative is preferred because it balances the 
security concerns against the impact on the airports and aviation-
related businesses.
    Alternative 4--Exempt small, slow aircraft--This alternative would 
exempt small, piston-driven aircraft. The rationale behind this 
alternative is that these aircraft are slower than turbine-driven 
aircraft and are much less likely to be a threat. Most general aviation 
aircraft fall into this category, and so most aircraft operators would 
not be subject to this rule. However, the FAA's air traffic controllers 
cannot distinguish between piston-drive and turbine-drive aircraft from 
radar or from transponder codes, making this alternative difficult to 
enforce, thus having the potential to compromise security.
    Conclusion: This alternative would increase the vulnerability of 
and diminish the level of protection now in place to safeguard vital 
national assets located within the National Capital Region. This 
alternative is rejected because it would compromise the security of 
vital national assets and increase their vulnerability. Thus, the FAA 
does not consider this to be a significant alternative in accordance 
with 5 U.S.C. 603(d).

D. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related 
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are 
not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this final rule and determined that it will have 
only a domestic impact and therefore no effect on international trade.

E. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a 
mandate is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA 
currently uses an inflation-adjusted value of $136.1 million in lieu of 
$100 million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements 
of Title II do not apply.

VIII. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The FAA has determined 
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the 
States, or the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have federalism 
implications.

IX. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the

[[Page 76213]]

categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no 
extraordinary circumstances.

X. Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, 
or Use

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not 
a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order because, 
while it is a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866, it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

XI. Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy of rulemaking documents using the 
Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://
www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this 
rulemaking.
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit 
or you may visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.

XII. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question 
regarding this document, you may contact your local FAA official, or 
the person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at 
the beginning of the preamble. You can find out more about SBREFA on 
the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/
sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 1

    Air transportation.

14 CFR Part 93

    Aircraft flight, Airspace, Aviation safety, Air traffic control, 
Aircraft, Airmen, Airports.

The Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration 
amends parts 1 and 93 of title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR 
parts 1 and 93) as follows:

PART 1--DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

0
2. Amend Sec.  1.1 by adding the definition of ``National defense 
airspace'' in alphabetical order to read as follows:

Sec.  1.1  General definitions.

* * * * *
    National defense airspace means airspace established by a 
regulation prescribed, or an order issued under, 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3).
* * * * *

PART 93--SPECIAL AIR TRAFFIC RULES

0
3. The authority citation for part 93 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40106, 40109, 40113, 44502, 
44514, 44701, 44719, 46301.

0
4. Add subpart V, consisting of Sec. Sec.  93.331 through 93.345, to 
read as follows:
Subpart V--Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area
Sec.
93.331 Purpose and applicability of this subpart.
93.333 Failure to comply with this subpart.
93.335 Definitions.
93.337 Requirements for operating in the DC SFRA.
93.339 Requirements for operating in the DC SFRA, including the DC 
FRZ.
93.341 Aircraft operations in the DC FRZ.
93.343 Requirements for aircraft operations to or from College Park 
Airport, Potomac Airfield, or Washington Executive/Hyde Field 
Airport.
93.345 VFR outbound procedures for fringe airports.

Subpart V--Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules 
Area

Sec.  93.331  Purpose and applicability of this subpart.

    This subpart prescribes special air traffic rules for aircraft 
operating in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area. Because 
identification and control of aircraft is required for reasons of 
national security, the areas described in this subpart constitute 
national defense airspace. The purpose of establishing this area is to 
facilitate the tracking of, and communication with, aircraft to deter 
persons who would use an aircraft as a weapon, or as a means of 
delivering weapons, to conduct an attack on persons, property, or 
buildings in the area. This subpart applies to pilots conducting any 
type of flight operations in the airspace designated as the Washington, 
DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area (DC SFRA) (as defined in 
Sec.  93.335), which includes the airspace designated as the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (DC FRZ) (as 
defined in Sec.  93.335).

Sec.  93.333  Failure to comply with this subpart.

    (a) Any violation. The FAA may take civil enforcement action 
against a pilot for violations, whether inadvertent or intentional, 
including imposition of civil penalties and suspension or revocation of 
airmen's certificates.
    (b) Knowing or willful violations. The DC FRZ and DC SFRA were 
established for reasons of national security under the provisions of 49 
U.S.C. 40103(b)(3). Areas established by the FAA under that authority 
constitute ``national defense airspace'' as that term is used in 49 
U.S.C. 46307. In addition to being subject to the provisions of 
paragraph (a) of this section, persons who knowingly or willfully 
violate national defense airspace established pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
40103(b)(3) may be subject to criminal prosecution.

Sec.  93.335  Definitions.

    For purposes of this subpart--
    DC FRZ flight plan is a flight plan filed for the sole purpose of 
complying with the requirements for VFR operations into, out of, and 
through the DC FRZ. This flight plan is separate and distinct from a 
standard VFR flight plan, and does not include search and rescue 
services.
    DC SFRA flight plan is a flight plan filed for the sole purpose of 
complying with the requirements for VFR operations into, out of, and 
through the DC SFRA. This flight plan is separate and distinct from a 
standard VFR flight

[[Page 76214]]

plan, and does not include search and rescue services.
    Fringe airports are the following airports located near the outer 
boundary of the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules 
Area: Barnes (MD47), Flying M Farms (MD77), Mountain Road (MD43), 
Robinson (MD14), and Skyview (51VA).
    Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (DC FRZ) is 
an area bounded by a line beginning at the Washington VOR/DME (DCA) 
311[deg] radial at 15 nautical miles (NM) (Lat. 38[deg]59'31'' N., 
Long. 077[deg]18'30'' W.); then clockwise along the DCA 15 nautical 
mile arc to the DCA 002[deg] radial at 15 NM (Lat. 39[deg]06'28'' N., 
Long 077[deg]04'32'' W.); then southeast via a line drawn to the DCA 
049[deg] radial at 14 NM (Lat. 39[deg]02'18'' N., Long. 076[deg]50'38'' 
W.); thence south via a line drawn to the DCA 064[deg] radial at 13 NM 
(Lat. 38[deg]59'01'' N., Long. 076[deg]48'32'' W.); thence clockwise 
along the 13 NM arc to the DCA 276[deg] radial at 13 NM 
(Lat.38[deg]50'53'' N., Long 077[deg]18'48'' W.); thence north to the 
point of beginning, excluding the airspace within a one nautical mile 
radius of the Freeway Airport, W00, Mitchellville, MD from the surface 
up to but not including flight level (FL) 180. The DC FRZ is within and 
part of the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area SFRA.
    Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area (DC 
SFRA) is an area of airspace over the surface of the earth where the 
ready identification, location, and control of aircraft is required in 
the interests of national security. Specifically, the DC SFRA is that 
airspace, from the surface to, but not including, FL 180, within a 30-
mile radial of Lat. 38[deg]51'34'' N., Long. 077[deg]02'11'' W., or the 
DCA VOR/DME. The DC SFRA includes the DC FRZ.

Sec.  93.337  Requirements for operating in the DC SFRA.

    A pilot conducting any type of flight operation in the DC SFRA must 
comply with the restrictions listed in this subpart and all special 
instructions issued by the FAA in the interest of national security. 
Those special instructions may be issued in any manner the FAA 
considers appropriate, including a NOTAM. Additionally, a pilot must 
comply with all of the applicable requirements of this chapter.

Sec.  93.339  Requirements for operating in the DC SFRA, including the 
DC FRZ.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section 
and in Sec.  93.345, or unless authorized by Air Traffic Control, no 
pilot may operate an aircraft, including an ultralight vehicle or any 
civil aircraft or public aircraft, in the DC SFRA, including the DC 
FRZ, unless--
    (1) The aircraft is equipped with an operable two-way radio capable 
of communicating with Air Traffic Control on appropriate radio 
frequencies;
    (2) Before operating an aircraft in the DC SFRA, including the DC 
FRZ, the pilot establishes two-way radio communications with the 
appropriate Air Traffic Control facility and maintains such 
communications while operating the aircraft in the DC SFRA, including 
the DC FRZ;
    (3) The aircraft is equipped with an operating automatic altitude 
reporting transponder;
    (4) Before operating an aircraft in the DC SFRA, including the DC 
FRZ, the pilot obtains and transmits a discrete transponder code from 
Air Traffic Control, and the aircraft's transponder continues to 
transmit the assigned code while operating within the DC SFRA;
    (5) For VFR operations, the pilot must file and activate a DC FRZ 
or DC SFRA flight plan by obtaining a discrete transponder code. The 
flight plan is closed upon landing at an airport within the DC SFRA or 
when the aircraft exits the DC SFRA;
    (6) Before operating the aircraft into, out of, or through the 
Washington, DC Tri-Area Class B Airspace Area, the pilot receives a 
specific Air Traffic Control clearance to operate in the Class B 
airspace area; and
    (7) Before operating the aircraft into, out of, or through Class D 
airspace area that is within the DC SFRA, the pilot complies with Sec.  
91.129 of this chapter.
    (b) Paragraph (a)(5) of this section does not apply to operators of 
Department of Defense aircraft, law enforcement operations, or 
lifeguard or air ambulance operations under an FAA/TSA airspace 
authorization, if the flight crew is in contact with Air Traffic 
Control and is transmitting an Air Traffic Control-assigned discrete 
transponder code.
    (c) When operating an aircraft in the VFR traffic pattern at an 
airport within the DC SFRA (but not within the DC FRZ) that does not 
have an airport traffic control tower, a pilot must--
    (1) File a DC SFRA flight plan for traffic pattern work;
    (2) Communicate traffic pattern position via the published Common 
Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF);
    (3) Monitor VHF frequency 121.5 or UHF frequency 243.0, if the 
aircraft is suitably equipped;
    (4) Obtain and transmit the Air Traffic Control-assigned discrete 
transponder code; and
    (5) When exiting the VFR traffic pattern, comply with paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (a)(7) of this section.
    (d) When operating an aircraft in the VFR traffic pattern at an 
airport within the DC SFRA (but not within the DC FRZ) that has an 
operating airport traffic control tower, a pilot must--
    (1) Before departure or before entering the traffic pattern, 
request to remain in the traffic pattern;
    (2) Remain in two-way radio communications with the tower. If the 
aircraft is suitably equipped, the pilot must also monitor VHF 
frequency 121.5 or UHF frequency 243.0;
    (3) Continuously operate the aircraft transponder on code 1234 
unless Air Traffic Control assigns a different code; and
    (4) Before exiting the traffic pattern, comply with paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (a)(7) of this section.
    (e) Pilots must transmit the assigned transponder code. No pilot 
may use transponder code 1200 while in the DC SFRA.

Sec.  93.341  Aircraft operations in the DC FRZ.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no pilot 
may conduct any flight operation under part 91, 101, 103, 105, 125, 
133, 135, or 137 of this chapter in the DC FRZ, unless the specific 
flight is operating under an FAA/TSA authorization.
    (b) Department of Defense (DOD) operations, law enforcement 
operations, and lifeguard or air ambulance operations under an FAA/TSA 
airspace authorization are excepted from the prohibition in paragraph 
(a) of this section if the pilot is in contact with Air Traffic Control 
and operates the aircraft transponder on an Air Traffic Control-
assigned beacon code.
    (c) The following aircraft operations are permitted in the DC FRZ:
    (1) Aircraft operations under the DCA Access Standard Security 
Program (DASSP) (49 CFR part 1562) with a Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) flight authorization.
    (2) Law enforcement and other U.S. Federal aircraft operations with 
prior FAA approval.
    (3) Foreign-operated military and state aircraft operations with a 
State Department-authorized diplomatic clearance, with State Department 
notification to the FAA and TSA.
    (4) Federal, State, Federal DOD contract, local government agency 
aircraft operations and part 121, 129 or 135 air carrier flights with 
TSA-approved full aircraft operator standard security programs/
procedures, if operating with DOD permission and notification to the 
FAA and the National

[[Page 76215]]

Capital Regional Coordination Center (NCRCC). These flights may land 
and depart Andrews Air Force Base, MD, with prior permission, if 
required.
    (5) Aircraft operations maintaining radio contact with Air Traffic 
Control and continuously transmitting an Air Traffic Control-assigned 
discrete transponder code. The pilot must monitor VHF frequency 121.5 
or UHF frequency 243.0.
    (d) Before departing from an airport within the DC FRZ, or before 
entering the DC FRZ, all aircraft, except DOD, law enforcement, and 
lifeguard or air ambulance aircraft operating under an FAA/TSA airspace 
authorization must file and activate an IFR or a DC FRZ or a DC SFRA 
flight plan and transmit a discrete transponder code assigned by an Air 
Traffic Control facility. Aircraft must transmit the discrete 
transponder code at all times while in the DC FRZ or DC SFRA.

Sec.  93.343  Requirements for aircraft operations to or from College 
Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, or Washington Executive/Hyde Field 
Airport.

    (a) A pilot may not operate an aircraft to or from College Park 
Airport, MD, Potomac Airfield, MD, or Washington Executive/Hyde Field 
Airport, MD unless--
    (1) The aircraft and its crew and passengers comply with security 
rules issued by the TSA in 49 CFR part 1562, subpart A;
    (2) Before departing, the pilot files an IFR or DC FRZ or DC SFRA 
flight plan with the Washington Hub Flight Service Station (FSS) for 
each departure and arrival from/to College Park, Potomac Airfield, and 
Washington Executive/Hyde Field airports, whether or not the aircraft 
makes an intermediate stop;
    (3) When filing a flight plan with the Washington Hub FSS, the 
pilot identifies himself or herself by providing the assigned pilot 
identification code. The Washington Hub FSS will accept the flight plan 
only after verifying the code; and
    (4) The pilot complies with the applicable IFR or VFR egress 
procedures in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of this section.
    (b) If using IFR procedures, a pilot must--
    (1) Obtain an Air Traffic Control clearance from the Potomac 
TRACON; and
    (2) Comply with Air Traffic Control departure instructions from 
Washington Executive/Hyde Field, Potomac Airport, or College Park 
Airport. The pilot must then proceed on the Air Traffic Control-
assigned course and remain clear of the DC FRZ.
    (c) If using VFR egress procedures, a pilot must--
    (1) Depart as instructed by Air Traffic Control and expect a 
heading directly out of the DC FRZ until the pilot establishes two-way 
radio communication with Potomac Approach; and
    (2) Operate as assigned by Air Traffic Control until clear of the 
DC FRZ, the DC SFRA, and the Class B or Class D airspace area.
    (d) If using VFR ingress procedures, the aircraft must remain 
outside the DC SFRA until the pilot establishes communications with Air 
Traffic Control and receives authorization for the aircraft to enter 
the DC SFRA.
    (e) VFR arrivals:
    (1) If landing at College Park Airport a pilot may receive routing 
via the vicinity of Freeway Airport; or
    (2) If landing at Washington Executive/Hyde Field or Potomac 
Airport, the pilot may receive routing via the vicinity of Maryland 
Airport or the Nottingham VORTAC.

Sec.  93.345  VFR outbound procedures for fringe airports.

    (a) A pilot may depart from a fringe airport as defined in Sec.  
93.335 without filing a flight plan or communicating with Air Traffic 
Control, unless requested, provided:
    (1) The aircraft's transponder transmits code 1205;
    (2) The pilot exits the DC SFRA by the most direct route before 
proceeding on course; and
    (3) The pilot monitors VHF frequency 121.5 or UHF frequency 243.0.
    (b) No pilot may operate an aircraft arriving at a fringe airport 
or transit the DC SFRA unless that pilot complies with the DC SFRA 
operating procedures in this subpart.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 9, 2008.
Robert A. Sturgell,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8-29711 Filed 12-15-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P