Document ID: USCG-2013-0316-0002
Agency: uscg
Document Type: Notice
Title: Interim Voluntary Guidelines: Outer Continental Shelf Units - Fire and Explosion Analyses (Federal Register Publication)
Posted Date: 2014-05-02T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 85 (Friday, May 2, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25139-25141]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-10010]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[USCG-2013-0316]

Outer Continental Shelf Units--Fire and Explosion Analyses

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of recommended interim voluntary guidelines.

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SUMMARY: As part of its continuing response to the explosion, fire and 
sinking of the mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON 
in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, the Coast Guard is providing 
recommended interim voluntary guidelines concerning fire and explosion 
analyses for MODUs and manned fixed and floating offshore facilities 
engaged in activities on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).

DATES: The recommended voluntary guidelines in this notice are 
effective May 2, 2014.
    Documents mentioned as being available in the docket are part of 
docket USCG-2013-0316 and are available for inspection or copying at 
the Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also find this 
docket on the Internet by going to http://www.regulations.gov, 
inserting USCG-2013-0316 in the ``Keyword'' box, and then clicking 
``Search.''

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this notice, 
call or email LCDR John H. Miller, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Design 
and Engineering Standards, Lifesaving and Fire Safety Division (CG-ENG-
4), telephone (202) 372-1372, email John.H.Miller@uscg.mil.

Background

    The ``Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding 
the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the 
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON in the Gulf of 
Mexico, April 20-22, 2010,'' (hereinafter referred to as ``Report''), 
and related Commandant's Final Action Memo, dated September 9, 2011, 
contain a number of recommendations for OCS safety improvements that 
are presently being evaluated for further regulatory action. (These 
documents may be found in the docket for this action, as indicated 
under ADDRESSES).
    Recommendations 1D, 1E, 2B, 2C, 2E, and 3A in the Report urged the 
Coast Guard to evaluate the need for fire and explosion risk analyses 
to ensure an adequate level of protection is provided for accommodation 
spaces, escape paths, embarkation stations, and structures housing 
vital safety equipment from drill floor and production area events. The 
Report highlighted the following considerations as areas not 
specifically addressed by current regulations:
     Minimum values are needed for explosion design loads for 
use in calculating the required blast resistance of structures;
     Explosion risk analysis of the design and layout of each 
facility should be performed to identify high risk situations;
     H-60 rated fire boundaries between the drilling area and 
adjacent accommodation spaces and spaces housing vital safety equipment 
may be necessary dependent on the arrangement of the facility;
     Uniform guidelines for performing engineering evaluations 
to ensure adequate protection of bulkheads and decks separating 
hazardous areas from adjacent structures and escape routes for likely 
drill floor fire scenarios are necessary;
     Performance-based fire risk analysis should be used to 
supplement the prescriptive requirements in the MODU Code; such 
analysis should use defined heat flux loads to calculate necessary 
levels of protection for structures, equipment, and vital systems that 
could be affected by fires on the drill floor;
     Maximum allowable radiant heat exposure limits for 
personnel at the muster stations and lifesaving appliance launching 
stations in anticipated evacuation scenarios should be implemented.
    To implement these recommendations, a future Coast Guard rulemaking 
will address fire and explosion risk analyses for MODUs and manned 
fixed and floating offshore facilities engaged in OCS activities. 
Comments will be invited in connection with that rulemaking.
    Currently, there is no requirement in the current OCS regulations, 
in Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), that requires a 
fire and explosion analysis that would implement the recommendations 
from the Report. Furthermore, while Section 9 of the 2009 IMO MODU Code 
contains some recommendations on the parameters of fire and explosion 
risk analysis, we believe that these recommendations are not 
sufficiently specific to adequately and consistently address these 
recommendations from the Report on their own.
    We believe that the recommendations from the 2009 IMO MODU Code are 
insufficiently specific for several reasons. Section 9.3.1 of the 2009 
MODU Code provides, ``In general, accommodation spaces, service spaces 
and control stations should not be located adjacent to hazardous areas. 
However, where this is not practicable, an engineering evaluation 
should be performed to ensure that the level of fire protection and 
blast resistance of the bulkheads and decks separating these spaces 
from the hazardous areas are adequate for the likely hazard.'' This 
requirement is not specific enough to consistently ensure the 
protection of safety-critical spaces and elements aboard MODUs and 
manned fixed and floating offshore facilities engaged in OCS 
activities, and needs to be supported by guidance to better define what 
the ``engineering evaluation'' should include and what performance 
criteria should be met to ensure ``adequate protection'' is provided. 
Safety-critical spaces and elements refers to any accommodation or work 
area, equipment, system, device, or material, the failure, destruction, 
or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the 
survivability of the facility and the personnel onboard. These safety-
critical spaces and

[[Page 25140]]

elements can include, but not be limited to, control stations, 
accommodation areas, vital safety equipment, escape routes and survival 
craft launching areas, and other equipment with escalation potential 
(e.g., fuel storage). Survivability refers to the event threshold 
determined by the company for the purposes of fire and explosion. This 
normally includes the specification of a sufficient period of time to 
maintain the habitability of safety-critical spaces and escape routes, 
temporary refuge, and muster areas to allow for emergency response and 
boarding of survival craft and subsequent evacuation of the facility.
    Additionally, Section 9.4.5 of the 2009 MODU Code also requires 
that, ``Consideration should be given by the Administration to the 
siting of superstructures and deckhouses such that in the event of fire 
at the drill floor at least one escape route to the embarkation 
position and survival craft is protected against radiation effects of 
that fire as far as practicable.'' This requirement is not specific 
enough to consistently ensure the protection of escape routes aboard 
MODUs and manned fixed and floating offshore facilities engaged in OCS 
activities, and needs to be supported by guidance to better define what 
level of ``radiation effects'' to personnel and safety equipment is 
acceptable.
    The Coast Guard believes the fire and explosion analysis guidelines 
set forth below are needed to uniformly implement the recommendations 
in paragraphs 9.3.1 and 9.4.5 of 2009 MODU Code, and address 
recommendations 1D, 1E, 2B, 2C, 2E, and 3A of the Report. It is the 
Coast Guard's belief that following these recommendations would yield 
significant safety improvements. These guidelines were developed based 
on industry standards, technical expert advice, and fire protection 
engineering references. These guidelines are intended for use in the 
design phase of new facility construction; however, they may be useful 
in assessing and increasing the safety of existing facilities.

Interim Voluntary Guidance

(a) Introduction

    As an interim measure pending a Coast Guard future rulemaking, 
owners/operators of MODUs and manned fixed and floating offshore 
facilities operating on the U.S. OCS are urged to consider voluntary 
compliance with the guidelines laid out below, to the extent 
appropriate and practicable.
    The intent of the recommendations set forth below is to provide a 
consistent approach for adequate protection of personnel and safety-
critical spaces and elements located on MODUS and manned fixed and 
floating offshore facilities against potential fire and explosion 
events following a catastrophic failure such as loss of well control. 
This approach should consider all facility operating modes including 
startup, maintenance periods, crew turnover, etc.

(b) Recommendations

(1) Engineering Evaluation
    The engineering evaluation of fire and blast loads in the design of 
offshore facilities should follow an established and widely accepted 
approach, normally based on the fire and explosion risk of hydrocarbon 
fuel sources. An engineering evaluation should identify hazards and the 
potential damage of major accident events. This evaluation should 
consist of a methodology that may include the following: hazard 
identification, consequence evaluation, adequacy of control and 
mitigation measures, and final risk assessment. The evaluation should 
be completed by a Registered Professional Fire Protection Engineer with 
experience in fire and explosion analysis, or by a recognized class 
society (under 46 CFR part 8) with similar equivalent experience.
    This evaluation should include establishment of accepted 
performance criteria to demonstrate that appropriate mitigating 
measures have been implemented to ensure survivability of the facility 
and personnel.
    The Coast Guard recommends the use of American Petroleum Institute 
(API) Recommended Practice (RP) 2FB for conducting an engineering 
evaluation.
    We note that there are other standards available that can be used 
for the engineering evaluation. We chose API RP 2FB because it contains 
thorough coverage of the elements which are important to an engineering 
evaluation and because the Coast Guard actively participates in the API 
committee process. We do note that there are alternative approaches 
that have been widely accepted by the oil and gas industry meeting the 
intent of this recommendation.
(2) Explosion Protection
    Maximum allowable values for explosion design loads should be 
determined based on accepted industry standards and used to calculate 
the required blast resistance of structures for each particular 
arrangement. Explosion design load means a nominal, peak overpressure 
that has been defined in industry standards based on a limited data set 
for a number of platform concept types (nominal values are determined 
from acquired experience or physical conditions). In cases where 
vulnerabilities are noted, facility arrangements should be modified or 
additional protective measures provided.
    We recommend use of the unmodified nominal explosion overpressures 
by facility type and load modifiers listed in API RP 2FB, Tables 
C.6.3.1-1 and C.6.3.2-1, where appropriate. As described in the guide, 
load modifiers should be used to account for the higher or lower 
pressures that may be associated with specific facility arrangements or 
operations.
    We do note that there are alternative explosion design loads that 
have been widely accepted by the oil and gas industry meeting the 
intent of this recommendation.
(3) Fire Protection
    The radiant heat flux produced by particular hazards should be 
prescribed and calculations completed to assess the effects on safety 
critical spaces and elements. Radiant heat flux means the rate of heat 
transfer per unit area perpendicular to the direction of heat flow; 
normally expressed in kilowatts per meters squared (kW/m\2\) or British 
Thermal Units per second foot squared (Btu/(s*ft\2\)). Radiant heat 
flux is a measure of the potential for injury, damage or fire spread 
(e.g., most common combustibles ignite when exposed to a radiant heat 
flux of 0.9-1.8 Btu/(s*ft\2\) or 10-20 kW/m\2\).
    The radiant heat flux from typical drill floor fire sources should 
be approximated from the following:
    (i) As specified in API RP 2FB, jet fires may give rise to radiant 
heat flux levels on the order of 300 KW/m\2\ in open conditions and up 
to 400 KW/m\2\ in confined areas. Jet fire refers to a high-pressure 
release of any flammable fluid or gases in a solution that forms a jet 
which is ignited, and in which the flame burns back against the flow 
towards the release point;
    (ii) As specified in API RP 2FB, pool fires may give rise to lower 
radiant heat flux levels on the order of 100-160 KW/m\2\. Pool fire 
refers to a body of fuel that is confined by physical boundaries (e.g., 
obstructions on the floor will limit a fuel release to a smaller area 
than the potential unconfined spill area).
    Where the safety-critical spaces and elements are exposed to a 
radiant heat flux up to 100 KW/m\2\, a passive structural fire 
protection equivalent

[[Page 25141]]

rating of A-60 should generally be considered sufficient for the 
surface facing the source of the radiant heat flux. For radiant heat 
flux levels 100 KW/m\2\ and above, H-60 rated protection should be 
considered as a minimum. In either case, the protection should continue 
on the adjacent sides of such structures for a minimum distance of 10 
feet (3 meters) from the surface facing the source of the radiant heat 
flux (SOLAS II-2/9.2.4.2.5). This overlapping of protection on adjacent 
areas is necessary to prevent the radiant heat from ``wrapping around'' 
to expose an inadequately protected area.
    The Coast Guard recommends use of the following references for 
calculating the radiant heat flux at a target from a fire source (i.e., 
pool or jet fire).
    (i) The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Fourth 
Edition (Section 3, Chapter 10);
    (iii) API Recommended Practice 2FB.
    We do note that there are alternative baseline radiant heat flux 
levels and calculations that have been recognized by the oil and gas 
industry meeting the intent of this recommendation.
(4) Heat Exposure
    The maximum radiant heat exposure to personnel should be evaluated 
at the assembly/muster stations and survival craft launching stations 
as well as along the normal escape routes from the accommodation and 
service areas to those areas.
    The maximum allowable radiant heat flux exposure for personnel at 
the muster stations and survival craft launching stations should be low 
enough to prevent injury when exposed for the period of time needed to 
embark and launch the survival craft (normally around 2.5 KW/m\2\ for 
approximately thirty minutes on bare skin).
    The Coast Guard recommends use of the following references for 
calculating the radiant heat flux exposure to a target and the limits 
on personnel exposure:
    (i) The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Fourth 
Edition (Section 2, Chapter 6; Section 3, Chapter 10);
    (ii) Fire Protection Handbook, Twentieth Edition (Section 6, 
Chapter 2);
    (iii) API Recommended Practice 2FB.
    We do note that there are alternative methods for calculating 
radiant heat flux exposure to personnel and exposure limits which meet 
the intent of this recommendation.
(5) Mitigation
    Where the explosion design load, radiant heat flux and radiant heat 
exposure values calculated for the facility exceed the recommended 
performance standard of the equipment in place, mitigation measures, 
such as venting, increased structural strength of blast-walls, 
bulkheads and decks, passive fire protection, re-arrangement and 
shifting of structures, or other viable and analyzed mitigation 
measures should be incorporated.

Authority; Disclaimer

    This document is issued under the authority of 5 U.S.C. 552(a), 43 
U.S.C. 1331, et seq., and 33 CFR 1.05-1. The guidance contained in this 
notice is not a substitute for applicable legal requirements or current 
Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
regulations, nor is it itself a regulation. It is not intended to nor 
does it impose legally binding requirements on any party. It represents 
the Coast Guard's current thinking on this topic and may assist 
industry, mariners, the general public, and the Coast Guard, as well as 
other Federal and State regulators, in instituting lessons learned from 
the Report.

    Dated: April 28, 2014.
J.G. Lantz,
Director of Commercial Regulations and Standards, U.S. Coast Guard.
[FR Doc. 2014-10010 Filed 5-1-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P