Document ID: NHTSA-2020-0063-0004
Agency: nhtsa
Document Type: Notice
Title: Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance: Daimler Trucks North America, LLC; Denial
Posted Date: 2023-03-22T04:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 55 (Wednesday, March 22, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17291-17295]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-05901]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0063; Notice 2]

Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, Denial of Petition for 
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Denial of petition.

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SUMMARY: Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (DTNA), has determined that 
certain model year (MY) 2020-2021 Freightliner Cascadia motor vehicles 
(heavy trucks) do not fully comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated 
Equipment. DTNA filed a noncompliance report dated May 12, 2020, and 
amended the report on December 23, 2021. DTNA subsequently petitioned 
NHTSA (the ``Agency'') on June 4, 2020, and later amended its petition 
on July 13, 2020, and again on January 19, 2022, for a decision that 
the subject noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to motor 
vehicle safety. This notice announces the denial of DTNA's petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leroy Angeles, Office of Vehicle 
Safety Compliance, NHTSA, (202) 366-5304.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Overview

    DTNA has determined that certain MY 2020-2021 Freightliner Cascadia 
heavy trucks do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 
S4, S6.1.5.1, S9.6.2, S14.9.3.9.3, and Figure 2 of FMVSS No. 108, 
Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR 571.108). 
DTNA filed a noncompliance report dated May 12, 2020, and amended the 
report on December 23, 2021, pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and 
Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports. DTNA subsequently petitioned 
NHTSA on June 4, 2020, and later amended its petition on July 13, 
2020,\1\ and again on January 19, 2022, for an exemption from the 
notification and remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. chapter 301 on the 
basis that these noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to 
motor vehicle safety, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and 
49 CFR part 556, Exemption for Inconsequential Defect or Noncompliance.
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    \1\ DTNA initially amended its petition on July 13, 2022, and 
DTNA subsequently resubmitted that amended petition on July 22, 
2022, due to an incorrect date on the top of the amended petition.
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    Notice of receipt of DTNA's petition was published with a 30-day 
public comment period, on April 13, 2022, in the Federal Register (87 
FR 22019). No comments were received. To view the petition and all 
supporting documents log onto the Federal Docket Management System 
(FDMS) website at https://www.regulations.gov/. Then follow the online 
search instructions to locate docket number ``NHTSA-2020-0063.''

II. Trucks Involved

    Approximately 24,282 MY 2020-2021 Freightliner Cascadia heavy 
trucks manufactured between January 16, 2019, and March 27, 2020, are 
potentially involved.

III. Noncompliances

    DTNA identified two noncompliances pertaining to the subject 
trucks' hazard warning signal lamps. First, the hazard warning signal 
lamps do not meet the flash rate required by paragraph S6.1.5.1 of 
FMVSS No. 108 under all operating conditions. Specifically, if a 
subject vehicle is operated at a speed of 20 miles per hour \2\ (MPH) 
or more during the emergency braking (EB) phase of an Active Brake 
Assist (ABA) event, the subject trucks' hazard warning signal lamps are 
actuated at a flash rate of 140 flashes per minute when the flash rate 
should be between 60 and 120 flashes per minute. Second, the subject 
truck automatically activates the hazard warning signal lamps during 
certain operating conditions, specifically, when the subject truck has 
progressed to the third phase of an ABA event. Automatic activation of 
the hazard warning signal lamps is contrary to the definition of the 
``vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit,'' which states it is 
a driver-controlled device.
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    \2\ DTNA's initial petition cited a number in kilometers per 
hour. However, documents that DTNA provided to NHTSA at later dates 
cited numbers in miles per hour and, therefore, the Agency uses 
miles per hour in this section. Regardless, the activation speed 
threshold was not a factor in NHTSA's decision since the activation 
in general was the concern.
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IV. Rule Requirements

    Paragraphs S4, S6.1.5.1, S9.6.2, S14.9.3.9.3, and Figure 2 of FMVSS 
No. 108 include the requirements relevant to this petition. Paragraph 
S4 defines the ``vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit'' as a 
driver-controlled device that causes all required turn signal lamps to 
flash simultaneously to indicate to approaching drivers the presence of 
a vehicular hazard. Paragraph S6.1.5.1 requires that ``[i]n all 
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses, the 
activation of the vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit must 
cause to flash simultaneously sufficient turn signal lamps to meet, as 
a minimum, the turn signal photometric requirements of this standard.'' 
Paragraph S9.6.2, in part, requires that the vehicular hazard warning 
signal operating unit must provide a means for actuating all switches 
simultaneously by a single driver action. Paragraph S14.9.3.9.3, in 
part, requires that the flash rate cannot exceed 120 flashes per minute 
under the conditions shown in Figure 2.

[[Page 17292]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN22MR23.005

V. Summary of DTNA's Petition

    The views and arguments presented in this section summarize the 
views and arguments provided by DTNA in its petition, including 
amendments. They do not reflect the views of the Agency. DTNA describes 
the subject noncompliances and states its belief that the 
noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to motor vehicle 
safety.

A. Noncompliance With FMVSS No. 108's Flash Rate Requirement

    DTNA identifies the three phases of an Active Brake Assist (ABA) 
event as follows: the Optic Acoustic Warning (OAW) phase, the Warn 
(Haptic) Braking (WB/HB) phase, and the EB phase. DTNA explains that 
the first phase--the OAW phase--warns the operator of a possible 
collision with a pop-up and audio alert only. The truck will then move 
into the second phase--the WB/HB phase--to assist the driver in 
mitigating a possible collision if the driver does not apply sufficient 
deceleration to the service brakes by applying 50 percent deceleration 
to the vehicle. DTNA further explains that ``[i]f the system deems it 
necessary,'' the ABA will start the third phase--the EB phase--which 
applies maximum braking force to assist the driver in bringing the 
truck to a complete halt. Additionally, DTNA states that the warning 
system only engages during this third phase, and, therefore, the third 
phase is the only time when the hazard warning signal lamps are 
automatically activated at a flash rate that exceeds the allowable 
limit.
    DTNA provides background information, detailing the development of 
its ABA system,\3\ which is not reiterated here. DTNA states that its 
findings show that an EB event is an extremely rare scenario that is 
visible only for a short period of time in only the rarest of extreme 
braking events, and the amount of time that drivers of other vehicles 
might notice this noncompliance is negligible. DTNA states that the 
average EB event lasts less than 1 second, and in millions of miles of 
recorded data, the longest EB event observed lasted less than 3 
seconds. Therefore, DTNA concludes that the difference in number of 
blink cycles between the maximum permissible flash rate and emergency 
braking flash rate on the subject trucks is minimal.
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    \3\ Details of DTNA's ABA development can be found in its 
petition at https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2020-0063-0002.
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    With respect to the noncompliant flash rate, DTNA further contends 
that the flashing warning lights provide drivers of other vehicles with 
a safe indication of the aggressiveness of the braking. DTNA claims 
that NHTSA has previously found that under certain extreme braking 
events, flashing warning lights may be regarded as a safe indicator for 
rear signaling, citing a NHTSA study, which stated that ``a rear-
signaling system that extinguishes somewhat after a vehicle comes to a 
complete stop should provide benefit by reducing a substantial 
percentage of collisions with stopped lead vehicles, while reducing 
annoyance caused by extended signaling after a vehicle is stopped. Data 
suggest this type of signal would address approximately 45 percent (10 
out of 22) of stopped-lead-vehicle crashes.'' \4\ DTNA notes that the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has granted an 
approval for hazmat hauler tanker trucks to use amber brake activated 
lights, following a 30-month study by Groendyke Transportation, which 
found that a pulsating amber brake light reduced rear-end collisions by 
roughly 34 percent.\5\
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    \4\ DTNA cites Analyses of Rear-End Crashes and Near-Crashes in 
the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study to Support Rear-Signaling 
Countermeasure Development. DOT HS 810 846 (October 2007).
    \5\ See Groendyke Transportation's application for exemption 
containing the 30-month study, FMCSA's decision and all associated 
documents at https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2018-0223.
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    Additionally, DTNA says that NHTSA has previously granted petitions 
for noncompliances, similar to the subject noncompliant flash rate,\6\ 
where those noncompliances only occur ``under specific and rare 
conditions,'' \7\ and ``were granted for short duration of 
occurrence.'' \8\
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    \6\ See General Motors Corporation; Grant of Application for 
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 66 FR 32871 (June 18, 
2001).
    \7\ See General Motors, LLC, Grant of Petition for Decision of 
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 83 FR 7847 (February 22, 2018) and 
General Motors, LLC, Grant of Petition for Decision of 
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013).
    \8\ See Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Grant of Petition for 
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 84 FR 8151 (March 6, 
2019), Maserati S.p.A and Maserati North America, Inc., Grant of 
Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 1676 
(January 13, 2016), and General Motors Corporation; Grant of 
Application for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 61 FR 
56734 (November 4, 1996).
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    DTNA states that it is not aware of any accidents, injuries, owner 
complaints or field reports in relation to the subject noncompliances.

[[Page 17293]]

B. Noncompliance Due to Automatic Activation of Hazard Warning Signal 
Lamps

    On September 13, 2021,\9\ NHTSA contacted DTNA to discuss the 
automatic activation of the hazard warning signal lamps. DTNA clarified 
that based on an analysis of prior Agency interpretations, it believed 
that the ``limited technical parameters and operating conditions under 
which the hazard warning lamps would activate'' did not constitute a 
noncompliance with FMVSS No. 108. NHTSA informed DTNA that the prior 
interpretations did not support DTNA's position because the subject 
trucks ``have not come to a complete stop at the time the hazard 
warning lamps activate.'' As a result, DTNA amended its original 
petition to include the automatic activation of the hazard warning 
signal lamps as a second noncompliance.
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    \9\ Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, Receipt of Petition for 
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance (87 FR 22019) published on 
April 13, 2022, incorrectly stated that NHTSA contacted DTNA on 
September 13, 2022, when it should have stated that NHTSA contacted 
DTNA on September 13, 2021.
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    In the amended petition, DTNA contends that this second 
noncompliance is also inconsequential because the ``limited context in 
which the hazard lamps automatically activate ensures the message which 
the hazard warning lamps is communicating is clear and does not confuse 
other drivers about the meaning of the lamps.'' DTNA again explains the 
phases of its ABA system and says that if the driver does not disengage 
the ABA system, the system will apply the maximum braking force and 
cause the truck to come to a complete stop. When the EB is activated 
during the third and final phase, while the subject truck is traveling 
at 20 mph or more, ``the hazard warning lamps are automatically 
activated and flash at a rate of 140 Hz.'' Therefore, DTNA says, the 
automatic activation of the hazard warning signal lamps would not occur 
in stop and go traffic. DTNA notes that after the subject truck comes 
to a complete stop, the hazard warning lamps revert to a standard flash 
rate and ``the hazard warning signal operating unit can be manually 
engaged by the driver'' throughout the ABA event.
    DTNA then contends that the automatic activation of the hazard 
warning signal lamps is consistent with two prior NHTSA interpretations 
in which DTNA argues that ``the agency has found automatic activation 
of the hazard warning signal operating unit to be appropriate in 
certain circumstances.'' Specifically, DTNA claims that NHTSA's 
November 18, 2016, interpretation letter to General Motors (GM) \10\ 
supports DTNA's position. In that interpretation letter, DTNA says that 
NHTSA ``concluded that in the context of an adaptive cruise control 
system, automatic activation of the hazard warning lamps was consistent 
with FMVSS 108 if the human driver failed to respond to the system's 
requests to regain control of the vehicle.''
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    \10\ See NHTSA's letter to Brian Latouf, Executive Director, GM 
(November 18, 2016) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/16-1289-gm-hazard-innovative-28-apr-16-rsy.
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    DTNA argues the automatic activation of hazard warning signal lamps 
is also consistent with the condition found in the interpretation 
letter to GM.\11\ DTNA believes that SAE J910, January 1966 further 
supports this argument and quotes the section which states: ``A 
vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit is a driver controlled 
device which causes all turn signal lamps to flash simultaneously to 
indicate to the approaching drivers the presence of a vehicular 
hazard.'' In addition, DTNA states that an appropriate use of hazard 
warning lamps is ``to indicate that a vehicle is moving at a slower 
rate of speed than surrounding traffic'' and refers to NHTSA's 
interpretation letter to Senator Richard Lugar in support of this 
claim. Therefore, DTNA contends that the noncompliant automatic 
activation in the subject trucks ``is consistent with the type of 
message the hazard lamps are intended to convey.'' \12\
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    \11\ Id.
    \12\ See Letter to Sen. Richard Lugar (May 9, 2000) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/21478ztv.
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    DTNA concludes its petition by expressing its belief that the 
subject noncompliances are inconsequential as they relate to motor 
vehicle safety, and that its petition to be exempted from providing 
notification of the noncompliances, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30118, and 
a remedy for the noncompliances, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30120, should 
be granted.

VI. NHTSA's Analysis

    The burden of establishing the inconsequentiality of a failure to 
comply with a performance requirement in an FMVSS is substantial and 
difficult to meet. Accordingly, the Agency has not found many such 
noncompliances inconsequential.\13\
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    \13\ Cf. Gen. Motors Corporation; Ruling on Petition for 
Determination of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897, 19899 
(Apr. 14, 2004) (citing prior cases where noncompliance was expected 
to be imperceptible, or nearly so, to vehicle occupants or 
approaching drivers).
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    In determining inconsequentiality of a noncompliance, NHTSA focuses 
on the safety risk to individuals who experience the type of event 
against which a recall would otherwise protect.\14\ In general, NHTSA 
does not consider the absence of complaints or injuries when 
determining if a noncompliance is inconsequential to safety. The 
absence of complaints does not mean vehicle occupants have not 
experienced a safety issue, nor does it mean that there will not be 
safety issues in the future.\15\
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    \14\ See Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for Decision of 
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013) (finding 
noncompliance had no effect on occupant safety because it had no 
effect on the proper operation of the occupant classification system 
and the correct deployment of an air bag); Osram Sylvania Prods. 
Inc.; Grant of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 
Noncompliance, 78 FR 46000 (July 30, 2013) (finding occupant using 
noncompliant light source would not be exposed to significantly 
greater risk than occupant using similar compliant light source).
    \15\ See Morgan 3 Wheeler Limited; Denial of Petition for 
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 21663, 21666 (Apr. 
12, 2016); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 
754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding defect poses an unreasonable risk 
when it ``results in hazards as potentially dangerous as sudden 
engine fire, and where there is no dispute that at least some such 
hazards, in this case fires, can definitely be expected to occur in 
the future'').
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A. Noncompliance With FMVSS No. 108's Flash Rate Requirement

    The Agency disagrees with DTNA that the increased flash rate during 
the AEB event is negligible. Rather, the Agency believes that the 
noncompliant flash rate is noticeable and concerning. Notably, the 
increase in flash rate would not occur if automatic activation of the 
hazard warning signal lamps were not present.
    NHTSA disagrees with DTNA's assertion about the Agency's October 
2007 study entitled ``Analyses of Rear-End Crashes and Near-Crashes . . 
. '' (DOT HS 810 846), which DTNA cites to argue that NHTSA has 
previously found that flashing warning lights under certain extreme 
braking events may be regarded as a safer indicator for rear signaling. 
NHTSA finds that the conclusions in the Agency's 2007 study do not 
support a finding that DTNA's noncompliance is inconsequential to 
vehicle safety for several reasons. First, DTNA's hazard warning signal 
lamps are not equivalent to the enhanced rear-lighting system 
referenced in the study. The study expressly pointed out that these 
enhanced concepts are intended to supplement rather than replace 
conventional rear signaling. Second, as explained in the study, the 
research was performed by an external party and it explicitly states 
that, ``the opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in

[[Page 17294]]

this publication are those of the authors--and not necessarily those 
and do not represent opinions, findings, or conclusions of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation or the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.'' \16\ Therefore, even if the Agency agreed with DTNA 
about what this study says, the study would not serve as a 
justification for companies not to comply with a motor vehicle safety 
standard. Second, NHTSA considered this study in the context of DTNA's 
petition for inconsequential noncompliance, and the Agency determined 
that the study does not comprehensively address potential safety 
problems resulting from this noncompliance. For example, the research 
study did not evaluate whether rear signaling systems adversely affect 
vehicle safety. Additionally, the research study was not designed to 
examine all potential vehicle safety consequences caused by enhanced 
rear signaling systems.\17\ Rather, the research study was limited to 
evaluating whether enhanced rear signaling systems effectively caught 
the attention of study participants and led to participants 
subsequently applying their vehicle's brakes. Moreover, the research 
study did not explore other factors which may include, but are not 
limited to, an enhanced rear signaling system's potential to draw 
attention away from all other vehicles, masking of lamps used by 
emergency vehicles, impact on drivers of adjacent vehicles, and 
potential to cause confusion. Third, while the 100-car naturalistic 
research study did provide justification for various deceleration 
criteria for enhanced rear-lighting systems, NHTSA believes additional 
research is required before the overall effectiveness of enhanced rear-
lighting systems can be determined. Fourth, if, assuming arguendo, 
NHTSA were to conclude that rear-lighting systems are indeed effective, 
NHTSA would still need to promulgate a new regulation that adopts a 
standardized protocol for attention-getting lamps that indicate 
deceleration in lieu of or as a supplement to steady burning lamps, 
which NHTSA's vehicle safety standard currently requires. Finally, 
NHTSA has a longstanding position that standardized lighting during 
braking events is important to vehicle safety--and promoting non-
standardized signaling would undermine that safety objective.
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    \16\ Analyses of Rear-End Crashes and Near-Crashes in the 100-
Car Naturalistic Driving Study to Support Rear-Signaling 
Countermeasure Development. DOT HS 810 846 (October 2007). See Page 
3 of the PDF here: https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/analyses20of20rear-end20crashes20and20near-crashes20dot20hs2081020846.pdf.
    \17\ Enhanced rear signaling systems is a term used throughout 
the report, DOT HS 810 846, to refer to experimental rear signaling 
systems.
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    NHTSA also disagrees with DTNA's interpretation of Groendyke 
Transportation's 30-month study, which found that a ``pulsating amber 
brake light reduced rear-end collisions by roughly 34%.'' First, the 
lamps that formed the basis of Groendyke's petition were part of an 
additional brake-activated amber flashing auxiliary lamp--which is a 
different type of system than DTNA's subject system--and importantly, 
the vehicles on which they were installed retained the compliant 
steady-burning brake lamps. Second, NHTSA finds that the data generated 
by Groendyke's study is not statistically significant and there could 
be any number of exogenous factors as to why the number of rear-end 
collisions differ, which might not have anything to do with the 
installation of the pulsating amber brake light. Third, the data 
presented by Groendyke did not include detailed data on the types of 
crashes experienced by its fleet, which NHTSA would need in order to 
properly evaluate the effectiveness of Groendyke's additional lamps. 
Therefore, the results of this study are questionable and not 
applicable to other systems that modify the behavior of the required 
lamps, as is the case in the subject petition.
    DTNA states that NHTSA has previously granted petitions for 
noncompliances similar to the noncompliant flash rate--where those 
noncompliances only occur ``under specific and rare conditions,'' and 
``were granted for short duration of occurrence.'' However, the Agency 
is unable to properly address this assertion because DTNA did not 
provide any data that would quantify the rarity of the subject 
noncompliance. Nevertheless, we address each petition below in the 
order it was cited.
    DTNA claims in its petition that the Agency's June 18, 2001, grant 
of a GM petition, 66 FR 32871, is an Agency decision that supports 
DTNA's petition. The Agency disagrees with DTNA and finds that the 
Agency's 2001 grant is irrelevant to both of DTNA's subject 
noncompliances. In that decision, the Agency determined that the brief 
single flash of the center high mounted stop lamp during the activation 
of the hazard warning signal lamps as not rising to the level of 
impairment that would detract or confuse other road users on the 
meaning of the hazard warning signal lamp. In contrast, DTNA's system 
may confuse other road users because it intentionally uses the hazard 
warning signal lamps to indicate braking which is a non-standard 
signal.
    Next, DTNA refers to the Agency's February 22, 2018, grant of a GM 
petition, 83 FR 7847, as an Agency decision that supports DTNA's 
petition. The Agency again disagrees with DTNA because the 
noncompliance at issue in the Agency's 2018 decision is not comparable 
with DTNA's subject noncompliance due to a difference in the likelihood 
of an occurrence. For example, GM's subject noncompliance occurred 
under very limited and unusual circumstances, it was difficult to 
recreate in laboratory settings, and it was highly unlikely to occur 
under normal driving conditions.
    DTNA provides three additional Agency decisions on 
inconsequentiality petitions \18\ that the Agency believes are 
irrelevant to DTNA's petition. These three petitions are all related to 
various vehicle telltales (e.g., passenger airbag telltale, electronic 
stability control telltale, and tire pressure monitoring system 
telltale), which are only visible to the occupants within the vehicle 
(i.e., drivers of other vehicles do not see the warnings). The impact 
on other roadway users was not a primary consideration in evaluating 
those petitions, and therefore, NHTSA finds that the Agency's decisions 
on those petitions are not relevant to DTNA's petition.
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    \18\ 78 FR 35355 (June 12, 2013), 84 FR 8151 (March 6, 2019), 
and 81 FR 1676 (January 13, 2016).
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    Finally, DTNA offers the Agency's November 4, 1996, grant of a GM 
petition, which is also irrelevant to DTNA's petition. GM's petition 
concerned intermittent operation of the turn signal self-canceling 
feature, which caused the turn signal to continue to flash after the 
affected vehicles completed a turn. Consequently, NHTSA considered the 
impact on vehicle safety when an operator of an affected vehicle did 
not notice that the turn signal continued to flash. The Agency's 
decision on GM's petition is irrelevant because it concerned a vehicle 
that had an alternate system--a chime--which served to remind the 
operator to turn off the turn signal if the turn signal remained 
activated for more than half a mile. Overall, the facts in GM's 
petition are completely different from the subject petition and do not 
concern either the hazard warning signal lamps or the intentional 
activation of a non-standard signal.

B. Noncompliance Due to Automatic Activation of Hazard Warning Signal 
Lamps

    NHTSA does not agree with DTNA's assertion that its hazard warning 
signal

[[Page 17295]]

lamps are similar to GM's hazard warning signal lamps, which NHTSA 
discussed in an interpretation letter to GM.\19\ The NHTSA 
interpretation letter that DTNA references pertains to GM's adaptive 
cruise control system (herein referred to as ``Super Cruise''). 
However, the differences between Super Cruise and DTNA's system are 
notable. For example, the Super Cruise hazard warning signal lamps only 
activate after the GM vehicles have come to a complete stop. In 
contrast, DTNA's system operates while vehicles are in motion on a 
roadway and traveling at various speeds. Another significant difference 
is that with respect to Super Cruise, the actions that a vehicle 
automatically takes only occur after the Super Cruise system determines 
that a driver is unable or unwilling to take control of the vehicle 
(e.g., the driver is incapacitated or unresponsive). In contrast, video 
provided by DTNA appears to show that an affected truck may not have 
come to a complete stop during the ABA event, or taken evasive 
maneuvers--then the truck continued to move with traffic after the 
event concluded. Furthermore, it appeared that DTNA's system kept the 
hazard warning signal lamps activated--even after the Automatic 
Emergency Braking (AEB) event concluded and the operator of the truck 
maintained or increased the speed to match the flow of traffic.
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    \19\ See NHTSA's letter to Brian Latouf, Executive Director, GM 
(November 18, 2016) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/16-1289-gm-hazard-innovative-28-apr-16-rsy.
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    While DTNA believes that this noncompliance is also inconsequential 
because the ``limited context in which the hazard lamps automatically 
activate ensures the message which the hazard warning lamps is 
communicating is clear and does not confuse other drivers about the 
meaning of the lamps,'' NHTSA disagrees. As NHTSA noted in the 2016 
letter to GM, the purpose of the hazard warning is to indicate to 
approaching drivers that the vehicle is stopped or is proceeding at a 
slower rate than surrounding traffic. So, for example, we have opined 
that the hazard lights may be automatically activated following a crash 
\20\ or once the vehicle is stopped in or near the roadway by a ``Super 
Cruise'' system after a human driver fails to respond \21\ because in 
those situations there would be no ambiguity about the signal's meaning 
(that the vehicle is stopped).
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    \20\ See Letter to Timothy Bartlett (January 28, 2002) at 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/23695ztv.
    \21\ See Letter to Brian Latouf, Executive Director, GM 
(November 18, 2016) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/16-1289-gm-hazard-innovative-28-apr-16-rsy.
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    On the other hand, we have expressly found that automatic 
activation of the hazard lights is not permitted to indicate a braking 
event, such as ``hard'' braking. For example, in a letter to Steele 
Enterprises, we opined that the hazards could not be automatically 
activated upon application of a vehicle's anti-lock brake system.\22\ 
We affirmed this letter in our subsequent letter to Senator Lugar, 
which DTNA cited in its petition. There, we noted that the system at 
issue would automatically activate the vehicle's hazard warning system 
``when a vehicle is rapidly braking.'' We opined that automatic 
activation of the hazard lamps was not permitted in this situation 
because it had the potential for confusing other motorists.\23\
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    \22\ See Letter to Mark Steele, Steel Enterprises (October 7, 
1999) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/20662ztv.
    \23\ See Letter to Senator Lugar (May 9, 2000) at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/21478ztv. See also Letter to Paul 
Michelotti (January 5, 2001) (opining that FMVSS No. 108 does not 
permit automatic activation of hazard warning lights ``under 
circumstances of heavy braking or sudden stoppage'') at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/22403ztv.
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    DTNA's reliance on the letter to Senator Lugar is therefore 
misplaced. We disagree that the automatic activation in the subject 
trucks--when the truck is in motion to indicate an emergency braking 
event--is consistent with the type of message the hazard lamps are 
intended to convey. We also disagree that the hazard warning lamps 
remaining activated after the AEB event has concluded and the truck 
resumes in motion is permitted. Neither case represents the 
circumstances in which the hazard lights are customarily used. 
Moreover, because the truck's stop lamps (which are steady-burning) are 
activated in the second phase, activating the hazard lamps in the third 
phase, should the attached trailer be configured to have a combined 
stop lamp and turn signal lamp, would cause the stop lamps to flash. We 
believe both of these aspects of the warning activation, either 
separately or in combination, have the potential to confuse other 
motorists that follow an affected truck. Finally, while DTNA states 
that ``throughout the ABA event, the hazard warning signal operating 
unit can be manually engaged by the driver,'' NHTSA believes this is an 
irrelevant argument as DTNA's system automatically operates the hazard 
warning signal lamps even when it is not manually activated.

VII. NHTSA's Decision

    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that DTNA has 
not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 
noncompliances are inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 
Accordingly, DTNA's petition is hereby denied and DTNA is obligated to 
provide notification of and free remedy for the noncompliances under 49 
U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.

(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120: delegations of authority at 49 
CFR 1.95 and 501.8.)

Anne L. Collins,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-05901 Filed 3-21-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P