Document ID: OSHA-2014-0022-0001
Agency: osha
Document Type: Notice
Title: Permanent Variance Applications: Nucor Steel Connecticut, Inc.
Posted Date: 2015-12-02T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 231 (Wednesday, December 2, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75472-75480]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-30483]

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0022]

Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated; Application for Permanent 
Variance and Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for 
Comments

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of Nucor Steel 
Connecticut Incorporated for a permanent variance and interim order 
from the provisions of OSHA standards that regulate the control of 
hazardous energy (lockout/tagout) and presents the Agency's preliminary 
finding to grant the permanent variance. OSHA invites the public to 
submit comments on the variance application to assist the Agency in 
determining whether to grant the applicant a permanent variance based 
on the conditions specified in this notice of the application.

DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this 
notice, and requests for a hearing on or before January 4, 2016. The 
interim order described in this notice became effective on December 2, 
2015, and shall remain in effect until December 2, 2016 or until it is 
modified or revoked, whichever occurs first.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods:
    1. Electronically: Submit comments and attachments electronically 
at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal. 
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
    2. Facsimile: If submissions, including attachments, are not longer 
than 10 pages, commenters may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at 
(202) 693-1648.
    3. Regular or express mail, hand delivery, or messenger (courier) 
service: Submit comments, requests, and any attachments to the OSHA 
Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-2014-0022, Technical Data Center, U.S. 
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-2625, 
Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-2350 (TTY number: (877) 889-
5627). Note that security procedures may result in significant delays 
in receiving comments and other written materials by regular mail. 
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about security 
procedures concerning delivery of materials by express mail, hand 
delivery, or messenger service. The hours of operation for the OSHA 
Docket Office are 8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
    4. Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and 
the OSHA docket number (OSHA-2014-0022). OSHA places comments and other 
materials, including any personal information, in the public docket 
without revision, and these materials will be available online at 
http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the Agency cautions commenters 
about submitting statements they do not want made available to the 
public, or submitting comments that contain personal information 
(either about themselves or others) such as Social Security numbers, 
birth dates, and medical data.
    5. Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the 
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at 
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index; however, some information (e.g., 
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download 
through the Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material, 
are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. 
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for assistance in locating docket 
submissions.
    6. Extension of comment period: Submit requests for an extension of 
the comment period on or before January 4, 2016 to the Office of 
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Directorate of 
Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution 
Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210, or by fax to (202) 693-
1644.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is 
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office 
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999; 
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, 
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, 
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; phone: 
(202) 693-2110 or email: Robinson.kevin@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of this 
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov. 
This Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other 
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.
    Hearing Requests. According to 29 CFR 1905.15, hearing requests 
must include: (1) A short and plain statement detailing how the 
proposed variance would affect the requesting party; (2) a 
specification of any statement or representation in the variance 
application that the commenter denies, and a concise summary of the 
evidence adduced in support of each denial; and (3) any views or 
arguments on any issue of fact or law presented in the variance 
application.

I. Notice of Application

    On September 22, 2014, Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated 
(hereafter, ``NSCI'' or ``the applicant'') 35 Toelles Road, 
Wallingford, CT 06492, submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 
1905.11 (``Variances and other relief under section 6(d)'') an 
application for a permanent variance from several provisions of the 
OSHA standard that regulates the control of hazardous energy 
(``lockout/tagout'' or ``LOTO''), as well as a request for an interim 
order pending OSHA's decision on the application for variance (Ex. 
OSHA-2014-0022-0003) at its Wallingford, Connecticut facility. 
Specifically, NSCI seeks a variance from the provisions of the standard 
that require: (1) Lockout or tagout devices be affixed to each energy 
isolating device by authorized employees (29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i)); 
and (2) lockout devices, where used, be affixed in a manner to that 
will hold the energy isolating devices in a ``safe'' or ``off'' 
position (29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(ii)). NSCI also requested an interim 
order pending OSHA's decision on the application for variance.
    According to its application, NSCI manufactures steel wire rod and 
coiled rebar from billets of steel by using rolling and forming 
processes. Further, NSCI's description of its operation indicates that 
the hot steel billets are

[[Page 75473]]

shaped and formed into steel wire rod and coiled rebar by running them 
through a series of rolls. The rolls shape and form the steel as it 
moves from one stand to the next. Each roll has several passes (or 
grooves), only one of which is used at a time. The pass is designed to 
shape the bar to a certain size as it goes through the mill by 
compressing, squeezing, and stretching the bar. Rolls are designed with 
passes to bring a bar down through roughing, intermediate and finish 
mills to a finished size.
    As with any shaping tool, the passes wear during use and from time 
to time need to be changed. As the pass wears, the shape of the bar and 
the appearance of the bar are affected. When new rolls are brought into 
production, every pass is prepared with a spray that provides friction 
which allows the rolls to bite the bar between the rolls. Once rolls 
are in operation, roll grinding is regularly required, because during 
the operation of the mill stands water is used to cool the rolls to 
prevent fracturing and damage to the rolls. The water protects the pass 
while in use, but it also creates rust in the other passes. The rust 
can affect the final quality of the bar being processed, so steps are 
taken to remove the rust prior to restarting the operations. Rust is 
removed from the passes using a common 4-inch hand grinder. Since 
January 2012, the rolls have been ground with the rolls stopped and 
locked out.
    NSCI asserts that grinding the rolls requires access to the Motor 
Control Room (MCR), in order to operate the energy isolation 
disconnects for the roll mills. Employees who perform the particular 
task of grinding the passes would be exposed to potentially serious arc 
flash hazards if they accessed the MCR in order to perform energy 
isolation functions. To control exposure to the arc flash hazards, NSCI 
instituted safe work rules that: (1) Designate the MCR as a restricted 
entry work area; (2) restrict MCR access to qualified electricians 
only; and (3) prohibit employees who perform pass grinding from 
entering the MCR because they are not qualified electrical employees 
trained in recognition and mitigation of electrical hazards. Further, 
NSCI asserts that as a consequence of following these safe work rules 
the employees performing pass grinding cannot lockout the energy 
isolation disconnects located in the MCR or personally verify that a 
lockout has been performed.
    OSHA initiated a preliminary technical review of NSCI's variance 
application and developed a set of follow-up questions regarding the 
assertions of equivalent worker protection included in the application. 
On November 26, 2014, OSHA sent NSCI a letter containing a set of 
follow-up questions (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0006). On December 19, 2014, 
NSCI provided its responses to the follow-up questions (Ex. OSHA-2014-
0022-0007). Based on these responses to the follow-up questions and the 
alternate safety measures proposed in NSCI's application, on May 22, 
2015, the Agency sent NSCI a letter (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0009) 
describing its preliminary findings on the technical merits of the 
application. OSHA's letter also included a set of proposed conditions 
for the grant of an interim order and permanent variance and a request 
for NSCI's comments on these proposed conditions. On July 10, 2015, 
NSCI provided its response (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0010) indicating 
acceptance of the proposed conditions and including a few recommended 
changes. OSHA carefully reviewed NSCI's recommended changes and 
incorporated the majority of the changes into this notice.
    Following this review, OSHA determined that the applicant proposed 
an alternative that will provide a workplace as safe and healthful as 
that provided by the standard. OSHA is granting NSCI an interim order 
in order to permit it to continue work while OSHA continues to consider 
its application for a permanent variance.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    NSCI's variance application and the responses to OSHA's follow-up 
questions include the following: Detailed descriptions of the 
manufacturing process; the equipment used; the proposed alternative to 
lockout/tagout (LOTO) devices and procedures implemented during 
servicing and maintenance of specific equipment (e.g., grinding of roll 
mill passes located in the roll mill stands); and technical evidence 
supporting NSCI's assertions of equivalency of worker protection.
    According to the information included in its application, 
performing lockout on the roll mill stands requires access to the MCR, 
an area restricted to qualified electricians. Because NSCI employees 
who perform the particular task of grinding the passes are not 
qualified electrical employees trained in recognition and mitigation of 
electrical hazards, they may not access the MCR. Therefore, they cannot 
use the EID in that location to isolate the hazardous electrical energy 
or personally verify that energy isolation has been achieved if the EID 
is operated by a qualified employee.
    To address these issues, NSCI has developed an alternative method 
of preventing the unexpected startup or energization of the roll mill 
passes located in the roll mill stands. NSCI proposes to use a 
comprehensive engineered system and appropriate administrative 
procedures to meet the energy isolation requirements. The engineered 
system uses a ``trapped key'' concept and monitored safety-rated power 
relays in combination with administrative procedures the trapped key 
system described above to replace a locked out energy isolating device. 
The trapped key functions similar to a lockout device, in that only the 
employee in possession of the key can restart the machine undergoing 
maintenance. The single key is controlled through administrative group 
lockout procedures that NSCI believes match the requirements of 29 CFR 
1910.147.
    Further, NSCI asserts that its proposed trapped key energy control 
system has been evaluated \1\ for three scenarios that could result in 
unexpected energization of the rolls including: (1) Intentional de-
energization; (2) intentional re-energization; and (3) potential 
faults. The system prevents unexpected startup or energization in all 
three scenarios.
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    \1\ NSCI provided documentation that TUV Rheinland, an 
independent third-party testing laboratory reviewed and certified 
that the trapped key interlock system is a suitable component for 
use in safety category 2, 3, and 4 safety systems as specified in 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) machinery standards. Further, 
NSCI asserted that several independent experts (including Dr. James 
Barrett, Mr. Ed Grund, Mr. Bruce Main, and Mr. Alan Metelsky) 
skilled in the evaluation of electrical circuitry, guarding, and the 
control of hazardous energy evaluated the circuitry of the trapped 
key system and found that it was appropriately designed and 
installed for this application.
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    The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures 
included in its application provide its workers with a place of 
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain 
under the existing provisions of OSHA's control of hazardous energy 
(lockout/tagout) standard. The applicant certifies that it provided 
employee representatives with a copy of the variance application. The 
applicant also certifies that it notified its workers of the variance 
application by posting, at prominent locations where it normally posts 
workplace notices, a summary of the application and information 
specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the application. In 
addition, the applicant informed its

[[Page 75474]]

workers of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance 
application.

B. Variance From Paragraph (d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii) of 29 CFR 1910.147

    As an alternative means of compliance to the requirements of 
1910.147(d)(4(i) and (ii), NSCI is proposing to use a comprehensive 
engineered system and appropriate administrative procedures to meet 
these requirements. The engineered system uses a ``trapped key'' 
concept and monitored safety-rated power relays in combination with 
administrative procedures the trapped key system described above to 
replace a locked out energy isolating device. The trapped key functions 
similar to a lockout device, in that only the employee in possession of 
the key can restart the machine undergoing maintenance. The single key 
is controlled through administrative group lockout procedures identical 
to those required by 29 CFR 1910.147. Although the trapped key prevents 
normal intended startup of the equipment being serviced, it is not 
being used on an EID, as required by OSHA's standards. To meet this 
requirement, NSCI proposes to use a monitored safety-relay system that 
uses approved components, redundant systems, and control-reliable 
circuitry. Use of the proposed trapped key system in combination with 
detailed administrative energy control policies and procedures, as well 
as providing effective training would allow NSCI's authorized and 
affected employees to complete the required grinding of its stationary 
rolls in a manner that provides equivalency in energy isolation to 
compliance with the applicable provisions of the LOTO standard. The 
proposed trapped key system is based on use of an Allen Bradley 
GuardMaster safety-rated relay, which is specifically designed for 
safety applications. However, the use of the proposed Allen Bradley 
GuardMaster safety-rated relay does not meet the LOTO standard's 
definition of EID because this relay is a form of control circuitry.
    The applicant maintains that use of the proposed trapped key system 
provides equivalent safety with what can be achieved by strict 
compliance with the 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) requirements. According 
to NSCI's variance application, equivalent safety is achieved by 
prohibiting roll movement during de-energization while grinding is 
being performed, as well as prohibiting mistaken intentional re-
energization and re-energization due to fault conditions, without 
exposing employees to hazards within the MCR. To protect against system 
faults causing re-energization, the proposed trapped key system meets 
the requirements for control reliability as stated in ANSI B11.19 
(2010) Performance of Safeguarding, in that no single fault will result 
in the loss of the safety function. In addition, the system includes 
system fault monitoring, tamper resistance, and exclusive employee 
control over lockout devices.
    Further, the applicant asserts that the trapped key system uses 
well tried components, which is a key factor in the reliability of a 
control system. The system is based on an Allen Bradley GuardMaster 
safety rated relay which is specifically designed for safety 
applications. The trapped key is a specially manufactured unique key 
that is only available from the manufacturer at a significant cost, and 
cannot be otherwise duplicated.

C. Technical Review

    OSHA conducted a review of NSCI's application and the supporting 
technical documentation. After completing the review of the application 
and supporting documentation, OSHA concludes that NSCI:
    1. Modified the electrical controls at the pulpit (central control 
station located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill stands), to 
prevent employee exposure to hazards associated with movement of the 
roll mill while performing the task of grinding roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands;
    2. Installed a trapped key control system and implemented 
administrative energy control procedures that prevent employee exposure 
to hazards associated with energy while grinding on the roll mill 
passes;
    3. Utilizing qualified engineering safety experts, performed a job 
hazard analysis for roll grinding associated tasks, conducted and 
documented an electrical isolation analysis, system and functional 
safety reviews, and control reliability analysis to verify that the use 
of the trapped key system and administrative energy control procedures 
prevent the movement of roll mill passes; prevent mistaken or 
intentional re-energization; and maintain immobility in the event of 
fault conditions;
    4. Developed a two-tiered system of securing the trapped key as 
follows:
    a. Stopping the operation and energization of the roll mill passes 
by removing the trapped key from the system, and securing the key 
within a lockbox inside the pulpit area (central control station 
located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill stands); and
    b. Locking the key to the lockbox in the pulpit area inside a 
secondary group lock box installed on the roll mill floor, with each 
employee performing roll mill grinding applying their personal lock to 
the lockbox;
    5. Developed detailed administrative energy control procedures for 
use of the trapped key system;
    6. Implemented detailed administrative energy control procedures 
designed to ensure that each authorized employee applies a personal 
lock to the secondary group lock box;
    7. Procured and provided appropriate equipment and supplies;
    8. Made the administrative energy control policies and procedures 
available in English and Spanish;
    9. Trained authorized and affected employees on the application of 
the trapped key system and associated administrative energy control 
policies and procedures;
    10. Ensured that grinding on the passes is conducted only while 
using the administrative energy control procedures based on the trapped 
key system;
    11. Installed guarding on the entry/infeed and exit/outfeed sides 
of each roll mill stand to prevent employees from standing between 
turning mills and being exposed to the crushing hazards of in-running 
nip points;
    12. Developed additional administrative controls and procedures to 
minimize the potential for authorized and affected employees to enter 
between the mill stands when harm could occur; and
    13. Designated and posted the areas as ``No Entry'' unless the 
procedures (1-12 above) are followed.

III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Interim Order and 
the Application for a Permanent Variance

    This section describes the conditions that comprise the alternative 
means of compliance with 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii). These 
conditions form the basis of the interim order and NSCI's application 
for a permanent variance.\2\
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    \2\ In these conditions, the present tense form of the verb 
(e.g., ``must'') pertains to the interim order, while the future 
conditional form of the verb (e.g., ``would'') pertains to the 
application for a permanent variance (designated as ``permanent 
variance'').
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Proposed Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the interim order/proposed permanent variance limits/
would limit coverage of the conditions of the interim order/proposed 
permanent variance to the work situations specified under this proposed

[[Page 75475]]

condition. Clearly defining the scope of the interim order/proposed 
permanent variance provides/would provide NSCI, NSCI's employees, other 
stakeholders, the public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding 
the work situations in which the proposed permanent variance does/would 
apply and does not/would not apply. For example, condition A limits/
would limit coverage of the interim order/proposed permanent variance 
only to the task of grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill 
stands. The condition clarifies/would clarify that no other maintenance 
work, including electrical maintenance, may be/would be performed on 
the roll mill passes, the roll mill motors, other residual or stored 
energy sources, or electric circuits connected to the trapped key 
system or roll mill stands using the trapped key system to control 
hazardous energy.
    According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer or class or group of 
employers \3\ may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace 
or workplaces. If granted, the variance would apply to the specific 
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, if OSHA 
were to grant a permanent variance, it would apply to the applicant, 
NSCI at the Wallingford, CT plant only. As a result, it is important to 
understand that the interim order and proposed variance would not apply 
to any other employers or NSCI plant locations.
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    \3\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade 
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided 
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application 
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Proposed Condition B: Definitions

    Proposed condition B defines/would define a series of terms, mostly 
technical terms, used in the interim order and proposed permanent 
variance to standardize and clarify their meaning. Defining these terms 
serves to enhance the applicant's and its employees' understanding of 
the conditions specified by interim order and the proposed permanent 
variance.

Proposed Condition C: Safety and Health Practices

    Proposed condition C requires/would require the applicant to: (1) 
Modify certain controls at the pulpit by installing and operating a 
trapped key system designed to replace an energy isolating device; (2) 
develop and implement certain trapped key system-related alternate 
energy control policies and procedures; and (3) develop and implement a 
series of trapped key system-related hazard prevention and control 
requirements and methods designed to ensure the continued effective 
functioning of the alternate energy control equipment, policies, and 
procedures. Examples of such hazard control measures include, but are 
not limited to: (1) Conducting grinding on the passes only after using 
the steps required to properly de-energize the system; (2) under the 
direction of a qualified person,\4\ ensuring that the trapped key 
system is installed, inspected, serviced, maintained, used, and when 
appropriate modified in accordance with good engineering practices, 
and/or in strict accordance with the manufacturers' specifications and 
instructions, where available; and (3) no other maintenance is/would be 
performed on the roll mill stands while grinding is taking place.
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    \4\ See footnote 9.
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Proposed Condition D: Steps Required To De-Energize the System

    Proposed condition D requires/would require the applicant to 
develop and implement a detailed procedure for de-energizing the roll 
mill passes located in the roll mill stands in order to perform the 
grinding task. The procedure for de-energizing the roll mill passes 
includes/would include a series of steps to ensure that all authorized 
and effected employees are/would be notified that: The roll mill passes 
are/would be effectively de-energized; the task of grinding the roll 
mill passes is ready to begin; and no other servicing or maintenance 
is/would be performed on the roll mill stands while grinding is taking 
place.

Proposed Condition E: Steps Required To Start Motion Intentionally

    Proposed condition E requires/would require the applicant to 
develop and implement a detailed procedure for re-energizing and 
intentionally starting motion in the roll mill passes located in the 
roll mill stands in order to resume normal operations at the conclusion 
of the grinding task. The procedure for re-energizing the roll mill 
passes includes/would include a series of steps to ensure that all 
authorized and effected employees are/would be notified that the task 
of grinding the roll mill passes is complete and that the roll mill 
passes are/would be ready for use.

Proposed Condition F: Training and Methods of Operation

    Proposed condition F requires/would require the applicant to 
develop and implement an effective hazardous energy control 
qualification and training program for authorized employees involved in 
using the trapped key system while grinding roll mill passes. The 
condition specifies/would specify the factors that an employee must 
know following completion of the training program. Elements to be/would 
be included in the training program encompass, among others: The 
program to be/would be presented in language that the employees can 
understand; the instruction be/would be reviewed periodically to 
accommodate changes in the energy control program; the contents and 
conditions included in the interim order/proposed variance; and a job 
hazard analysis (JHA) in the use of the trapped key system, the 
identification of associated hazards, and safe application of the 
associated energy control procedures be/would be prepared and 
instructed. Additionally, proposed condition F also requires/would 
require the applicant to train each affected employee in the purpose 
and use of the alternative energy control procedures using the trapped 
key system.

Proposed Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    Proposed condition G requires/would require the applicant to 
develop, implement and operate an effective program for completing 
inspections, tests, program evaluations, and accident prevention for 
the use of the trapped key system and safe application of the hazardous 
energy control procedures in the roll mill stands and associated work 
areas. This condition will/would help to ensure the safe operation and 
physical integrity of the equipment and work area necessary for use of 
the trapped key system while conducting roll mill grinding operations, 
thereby enhancing worker safety by reducing the risk of unexpected 
energization of the equipment.
    This condition also requires/would require the applicant to 
document tests, inspections, corrective actions and repairs involving 
the use of the trapped key system, and maintain these documents. 
Further, this requirement will/would provide the applicant with 
information needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the 
continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine 
that the actions taken to correct defects were/would be appropriate.

Proposed Condition H: Recordkeeping

    Proposed condition H requires/would require the applicant to 
maintain records of specific factors associated with use of the trapped 
key system to prevent the unexpected energization of the equipment 
while grinding roll mill

[[Page 75476]]

passes. The information gathered and recorded under this provision, in 
concert with the information provided under proposed condition I 
(Notifications, for using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to 
investigate and record energy isolation failure-related injuries as 
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enabels/
would enable the applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of 
the permanent variance in preventing recordable injuries.\5\
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    \5\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping 
forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); and Updates to OSHA's 
Recordkeeping Rule (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html).
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Proposed Condition I: Notifications

    Proposed condition I requires/would require the applicant, within 
specified periods to: (1) Notify OSHA (i.e., Office of Technical 
Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA), and the Bridgeport, CT, 
Area Office) of any recordable injuries, illnesses, fatalities, work-
related in-patient hospitalizations, amputations and all losses of an 
eye (as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, and 1904.7 through 1904.12) that 
occur/would occur as a result of complying with the alternative energy 
control conditions of the variance (e.g., as a result of performing 
roll mill pass grinding operations) within 8 hours of the incident (or 
becoming aware of the incident); (2) provide OSHA (i.e., OTPCA and the 
Bridgeport, CT, Area Office) with a copy of the preliminary incident 
investigation report (using OSHA 301 form) within 24 hours of the 
incident (or becoming aware of the incident); (3) provide OSHA (i.e., 
OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office) with a copy of the full 
incident investigation within 7 calendar days of the incident (or 
becoming aware of the incident); (4) include on the 301 form 
information on the energy isolation procedures and conditions 
associated with the recordable injury or illness, the root-cause 
determination, and preventive and corrective actions identified and 
implemented; (5) provide its certification that it informed affected 
workers of the incident and the results of the incident investigation; 
(6) notify OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office within 15 working 
days should the applicant need to revise its energy isolation 
procedures to accommodate changes in the application of its trapped key 
system that affect/would affect its ability to comply with the 
conditions of the proposed permanent variance; and (7) provide/would 
provide OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office, by January 31st at 
the beginning of each calendar year, with a report covering the year 
just ended, evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate energy 
isolation program.
    The proposed requirement of this condition for completing and 
submitting the variance conditions-related (recordable) preliminary 
incident investigation report (OSHA 301 form) is/would be more 
restrictive than the current recordkeeping requirement of completing 
the OSHA 301 form within 7 calendar days of the incident 
(1904.29(b)(3)). Submittal of the preliminary incident investigation 
report will/would be followed by submittal of the full incident 
investigation report within 7 calendar days. This modified and more 
stringent incident investigation and reporting requirement is/would be 
restricted to variance conditions-related (recordable) incidents only. 
Providing this notification is/would be essential because time is/would 
be a critical element in OSHA's ability to determine the continued 
effectiveness of the variance conditions in preventing recordable 
incidents, and the employer's identification of appropriate hazard 
control measures and implementation of corrective and preventive 
actions. Further, these notification requirements enable/would enable 
the applicant, its employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness 
of the permanent variance in providing the requisite level of safety to 
the employer's workers and, based on this determination, whether to 
revise or revoke the conditions of the proposed permanent variance. 
Timely notification permits/would permit OSHA to take whatever action 
is necessary and appropriate to prevent further variance conditions-
related recordable injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to 
employees informs/would inform them of the precautions taken by the 
employer to prevent similar incidents in the future. Additionally, 
these notification requirements allow/would allow OSHA to: communicate 
effectively, expedite administration, and enforce the conditions of the 
interim order/proposed permanent variance.
    This proposed condition also requires/would require the applicant 
to notify OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or 
location for its main office, or transfers the operations covered by 
the interim order/proposed permanent variance to a successor company. 
In addition, the condition specifies/would specify that OSHA must 
approve the transfer of the interim order/permanent variance to a 
successor company. These requirements allow/would allow OSHA to 
communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the 
interim order/proposed permanent variance, and expedite the Agency's 
administration and enforcement of the interim order/permanent variance. 
Stipulating that an applicant is/would be required to have OSHA's 
approval to transfer an interim order/permanent variance to a successor 
company provides/would provide assurance that the successor company 
has/would have knowledge of, and will/would comply with, the conditions 
specified by the interim order/proposed permanent variance, thereby 
ensuring the safety of workers involved in performing the operations 
covered by the interim order/proposed permanent variance.

IV. Grant of Interim Order

    As noted earlier, on September 22, 2014, NSCI requested an interim 
order that will/would remain in effect until: December 2, 2016, or the 
Agency makes a decision on its application for a permanent variance, or 
it is modified or revoked, whichever occurs first. During the period 
starting with the publication of this notice and until the interim 
order expires, or the Agency modifies or revokes the interim order, or 
makes a decision on its application for a permanent variance, the 
applicant is required to comply fully with the conditions of the 
interim order (as an alternative to complying with the requirements of 
29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and 1910.147(d)(4)(ii) (hereafter, ``the 
standard'') that requires:
    A. Lockout or tagout devices be affixed to each energy isolating 
device by authorized employees (1910.147(d)(4)(i)); and
    B. Lockout devices, where used, be affixed in a manner to that will 
hold the energy isolating devices in a ``safe'' or ``off'' position (29 
CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(ii)).
    As described earlier in this notice (section II(C) Technical 
Review), after reviewing the proposed alternatives OSHA preliminarily 
determined that NSCI developed, and proposed to implement, effective 
alternative means of protection that protect its employees as 
effectively as paragraphs 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's LOTO 
standard during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding roll 
mill passes located in the roll mill stands.
    Based on a review of available evidence and the information 
provided in the applicant's variance application, OSHA is issuing an 
interim order.

[[Page 75477]]

Under the interim order and variance application, instead of complying 
with the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's 
LOTO standard, NSCI will: (1) Comply with the conditions listed below 
under ``Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Application 
for a Permanent Variance'' for as long as the Interim Order remains in 
effect; (2) comply fully with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR 
part 1910; and (3) provide a copy of this Federal Register notice to 
all employees affected by the conditions using the same means it used 
to inform these employees of its application for a permanent variance. 
Additionally, this interim order will remain in effect until December 
2, 2016; OSHA publishes its final decision on the variance application 
in the Federal Register; or OSHA modifies or revokes the interim order 
in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13, whichever occurs first.

V. Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Application for a 
Permanent Variance

    The following conditions apply to the interim order OSHA is 
granting to NSCI. In addition, these conditions specify the alternative 
means of compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 
1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) that NSCI is proposing for its permanent 
variance. The conditions apply to all NSCI employees located at the 35 
Toelles Road, Wallingford, CT 06492 establishment during the servicing 
and maintenance task of grinding roll mill passes located in the roll 
mill stands. These conditions are: \6\
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    \6\ See footnote 2.
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A. Scope

    1. This interim order/permanent variance applies/would apply only 
to the task of grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill 
stands of NSCI's Wallingford, CT establishment. This work is to be/
would be performed by authorized employees under alternative energy 
control procedures using a trapped key system and lockboxes.
    2. No other maintenance work, including electrical maintenance 
(such as troubleshooting or maintenance covered under 29 CFR 1910.333), 
may be/would be performed on the roll mill passes, the roll mill 
motors, or electric circuits connected to the trapped key system or 
roll mill stands using the trapped key system to control hazardous 
energy.
    3. If any other maintenance or servicing work is/would be 
performed, even if that work is performed at the same time as grinding 
roll mill passes, all of the maintenance work at that time must be/
would be performed under full lockout as required by 29 CFR 1910.147.
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 
1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii), NSCI must comply/would comply fully with 
all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1910.147 during 
servicing and maintenance of roll mills during the task of grinding 
roll mill passes.
    5. The interim order will remain in effect until December 2, 2016; 
OSHA modifies or revokes it; or OSHA publishes the Federal Register 
notice granting the permanent variance in accordance with 29 CFR 
1905.13, whichever occurs first.

B. Definitions

    The following definitions apply/would apply to this interim order/
proposed permanent variance:
    1. Affected employee--an employee whose job requires him/her to 
work in an area in which grinding of roll mill passes located in the 
roll mill stands is being performed.
    2. Authorized employee--an employee who uses the trapped key system 
in order to perform grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll 
mill stands. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when 
that employee's duties include performing grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands covered under this section.
    3. Competent person--an employee who is capable of identifying 
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings associated with 
grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands or working 
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, 
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to 
eliminate them.\7\
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    \7\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
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    4. Equipment lock box--a part of the trapped key system consisting 
of any group lock box designated for and mounted on or near equipment 
used for securing the equipment lock box key by use of a personal 
lockout device.
    5. Equipment lock box lock and key--a part of the trapped key 
system consisting of a uniquely identified equipment specific lock 
(red) and key used to secure the pulpit designated lock box containing 
and securing the trapped key.
    6. Group lock box--a purchased lock box labeled as ``TRAPPED KEY 
SYSTEM'' that is used to enable more than one lock to be applied to the 
box. There are two types of lock boxes used in association with the 
trapped key system (see definitions for pulpit designated lock box and 
secondary group lock box).
    7. Job Hazard Analysis/Job Safety Analysis--an evaluation of tasks 
or operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the 
necessary controls.
    8. Personal lock and key--a durable, standardized substantial and 
uniquely identified device (a lock) that is maintained and controlled 
by a single authorized employee whose name is attached to the device. 
The key is unique to this device and is equally maintained and 
controlled by the authorized employee \8\ whose name is attached to the 
device. The personal lock and key is used to secure the equipment lock 
box key in the secondary group lock box.
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    \8\ See 29 CFR part 1910 [Docket No. S-012A], RIN 1218-AA53. 
Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), regarding 
``one person, one lock, one key.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. Pulpit designated lock box--a group lock box mounted inside the 
pulpit designated for use with the ``TRAPPED KEY SYSTEM'' and including 
the: (a) Trapped key; (b) equipment lock box lock and key; and (c) 
pulpit operator personal lock and key placed on the pulpit designated 
lock box to secure the trapped key.
    10. Pulpit operator--an authorized employee who: (a) Is designated 
to work on a roll mill crew; (b) is authorized to use the trapped key 
system during the grinding of roll mill passes; and (c) is trained to 
operate the pulpit panel. The pulpit panel has the ability to control 
the following equipment systems: Reheat furnace, discharge roll line, 
turntable, roll mill stands A & B; roll mill stands 1-15; water system; 
finishing mill; laying head; and stelmore conveyor.
    11. Pulpit operator trapped key system personal lock and key--a 
part of the trapped key system consisting of a uniquely identified lock 
(green) and key used by the pulpit operator to secure the pulpit 
designated lock box containing and securing the trapped key.
    12. Qualified person--an employee who, by possession of a 
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully 
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the 
subject matter, the work, or the project.\9\
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    \9\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    13. Roll mill operator and/or lead--an authorized employee who is 
designated and trained to operate specific and multiple equipment 
systems or perform a specific job task that is part of the rolling 
process, including application of

[[Page 75478]]

the trapped key system for the grinding of roll mill passes.
    14. Secondary group lock box--a group lock box located on the mill 
floor just below the pulpit where authorized employees apply personal 
locks and follow trapped key system alternative energy isolation 
procedures to secure the equipment lock box key.
    15. Safety-rated relay--a device specifically designed for safety 
applications that meets the requirements for control reliability as 
stated in ANSI B11.19 (2010) Performance of Safeguarding. The term 
``control reliable'' means that no single fault will result in the loss 
of the safety function. In addition, the relay must include monitoring 
and tamper resistance.
    16. Team member--an employee who is trained and authorized to use 
the trapped key system in order to perform grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands.
    17. Trapped key--a specially manufactured unique key only available 
from its manufacturer that is inserted into the trapped key system's 
rotary switch. The rotary switch trapped key is mechanically attached 
by a chain to the pulpit designated lock box.
    18. Trapped key system--the alternative method of preventing the 
unexpected startup or energization during grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands. NSCI presented the trapped key system 
to OSHA in its variance application of September 22, 2014, as 
supplemented by its responses to OSHA's questions during the Agency's 
application review. The system is based on an Allen Bradley GuardMaster 
safety-rated relay which is specifically designed for safety 
applications and use of a trapped key that is a specially manufactured 
unique key only available from its manufacturer, and the administrative 
controls described in this variance.

C. Safety and Health Practices

    1. NSCI shall/would modify the electrical controls at the pulpit 
(central control station located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll 
mill stands), to prevent employee exposure to hazards associated with 
movement of the roll mill during the task of grinding roll mill passes;
    2. NSCI shall/would install a trapped key system;
    3. NSCI shall/would install a pulpit designated lock box for the 
trapped key in the pulpit area;
    4. NSCI shall/would install a secondary group lock box in the roll 
mills floor area for securing the pulpit designated lock box key;
    5. NSCI shall/would develop administrative energy control 
procedures for use of the trapped key system as described below;
    6. NSCI shall/would implement detailed energy control procedures 
designed to ensure that each authorized employee applies a personal 
lock to the secondary group lock box, and has the ability to personally 
verify de-energization of the system, as described below;
    7. NSCI shall/would make the energy control policies and procedures 
available to authorized and affected employees in English and Spanish;
    8. NSCI shall/would ensure that grinding on the passes is conducted 
only while using the administrative energy control procedures based on 
the trapped key system, or using full lockout procedures that comply 
with 29 CFR 1910.147 when the roll stands must be de-energized so that 
other maintenance operations can be performed simultaneously with roll 
grinding;
    9. NSCI shall/would install guarding on the entry/infeed and exit/
outfeed sides of each roll mill stand to prevent employees from 
standing between turning mills and being exposed to the crushing 
hazards of in-running nip points;
    10. NSCI shall/would develop additional administrative controls and 
procedures to minimize the potential for authorized and affected 
employees to enter between the mill stands when harm could occur; and
    11. NSCI shall/would designate and post the areas as ``No Entry'' 
unless the procedures (1-10) are followed.
    12. NSCI shall/would ensure that the trapped key system and its 
components are properly installed, inspected, maintained, and used so 
that it works as designed. NSCI shall strictly follow, where 
applicable, manufacturers' recommendations for the installation, 
inspection, maintenance, and use of the system and its components.
    13. NSCI shall/would ensure that the trapped key system is only 
altered or modified for uses specified and approved by a qualified 
person by following good engineering practices. Where available, such 
alterations and modifications shall strictly follow the manufacturers' 
specifications, instructions, and written authorization. No changes or 
modifications may be made to the trapped key system or its components 
that diminish the protection provided to affected employees.
    14. NSCI shall/would ensure that alteration or modification of the 
trapped key system is fully justified and documented when the 
manufacturers' specifications, instructions, and written authorization 
are lacking.
    15. NCSI shall/would implement a procedure to ensure that no other 
maintenance will be performed on the roll mill stands while grinding is 
taking place, unless full lockout is used for all maintenance tasks 
being performed at that time.

D. Steps Required To De-Energize the System

    NSCI shall/would develop and implement a detailed procedure for de-
energizing the roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands in 
order to perform the grinding task. The procedure for de-energizing the 
roll mill passes shall/would include the following steps:
    1. The authorized employee de-energizing the roll mill passes 
shall/would notify all affected employees that the equipment will be/
would be shut down and locked out to perform grinding of the passes;
    2. The pulpit operator shall/would turn off the control leveler on 
the control panel;
    3. The pulpit operator shall/would activate the E-stop;
    4. The pulpit operator verifies/would verify that the red ``system 
functional'' indicator is illuminated, then turns/would turn the 
trapped lockout key 90[ordm] to OFF position, and removes/would remove 
the trapped key from the panel. The operator verifies/would verify that 
the green ``safe to work indicator'' illuminates, and that the red 
``system functional'' indicator goes out;
    5. The pulpit operator:
    a. Places/would place the trapped key in the pulpit designated lock 
box and applies/would apply his or her personal lock to the pulpit 
designated lock box; and
    b. Applies/would apply the equipment lock box lock designated for 
this energy control procedure;
    6. The pulpit operator hands/would hand the equipment lock box lock 
key to the roll mill operator and/or lead;
    7. The roll mill operator and/or lead takes/would take the 
equipment lock box lock key to the secondary group lock box;
    8. The roll mill operator and/or lead places/would place the 
equipment lock box lock key in the secondary group lock box and 
attaches his or her personal lock;
    9. Authorized employees (team members) place/would place their 
personal locks on the secondary group lock box;
    10. The roll mill operator and/or lead verifies/would verify that 
the equipment is de-energized and locked out by trying

[[Page 75479]]

to operate the equipment (using the start button);
    11. The roll mill operator and/or lead ensures/would ensure that 
there are no additional sources of energy that could lead to the 
unexpected energization of the roll mill passes;
    12. Authorized employees who placed/would place their personal 
trapped key system locks on the secondary group lockout box shall/would 
also confirm that the equipment is fully de-energized;
    13. Authorized employees who placed/would place their personal 
locks on the secondary group lock box shall/would maintain their 
personal key in their possession while performing grinding of the roll 
mill passes; and
    14. Authorized employees shall/would perform the task of grinding 
the passes only while these procedures are/would be used.

E. Steps Required To Start Motion Intentionally

    NSCI shall/would develop and implement a detailed procedure for re-
energizing and intentionally starting motion in the roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands in order to resume normal operations at 
the conclusion of the grinding task. The procedure for re-energizing 
the roll mill passes shall/would include the following steps:
    1. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall/would check the 
equipment and the immediate area around the equipment to ensure that 
necessary items have been removed and that the equipment components are 
operationally intact;
    2. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall/would check the work 
area to ensure that all affected employees have been safely positioned 
or removed from the area;
    3. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall/would check that all 
controls are in the neutral or off position;
    4. Authorized employees shall/would remove their personal trapped 
key system locks from the secondary group lock box;
    5. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall/would remove the 
equipment lock box lock key from the secondary group lock box and take 
it to the pulpit;
    6. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall/would hand the 
equipment lock box lock key to the pulpit operator;
    7. The pulpit operator shall/would verify that all personnel are 
clear of the equipment before starting to re-energize the roll mill 
passes;
    8. The pulpit operator shall/would remove his or her trapped key 
system personal lock from the pulpit designated lock box;
    9. Using the equipment lock box lock key, the pulpit operator 
shall/would remove the equipment lock box lock;
    10. The pulpit operator shall/would remove the trapped key from the 
pulpit designated lock box and shall/would insert the key into the 
rotary switch and turn it 90[deg] to the ON position;
    11. The pulpit operator shall/would press the reset button to re-
energize the roll mill passes;
    12. The pulpit operator shall/would confirm that the green light 
clears and the red light activates indicating that the system is 
powered and that the trapped key system will no longer prevent roll 
mill motion; and
    13. The pulpit operator shall/would notify affected employees that 
the task of grinding the roll mill passes is complete and that the roll 
mill passes are ready for use.

F. Training and Methods of Operation

    NSCI shall/would develop and implement a detailed worker 
qualifications and training program. NSCI must/would:
    1. Develop an energy control training program and train each 
authorized employee, pulpit operator, roll mill designated person, and 
their supervisors on the trapped key system, and the procedures each 
must perform under it. The training program will be provided in a 
language that the employees can understand;
    2. Develop a training program and train each affected employee in 
the purpose and use of the alternative energy control procedures using 
the trapped key system before commencing operations under this interim 
order/proposed variance, and document this instruction. The training 
program will be provided in a language that the employees can 
understand;
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (1) of this 
condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes, in 
accordance with condition I-5, to the use of the trapped key system 
that affect its component configuration or operation and associated 
energy control procedures);
    4. Ensure that each authorized and affected employee, designated 
pulpit operator, roll mill designated person, and each of their 
supervisors have effective and documented training in the contents and 
conditions covered by this proposed variance;
    5. Ensure that only trained and authorized employees, designated 
pulpit operators, and roll mill designated persons, perform energy 
control procedures for the task of grinding roll mill passes;
    6. Prepare a JHA for the safe application of energy control 
procedures; and
    7. Review periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making 
changes, in accordance with conditions C-13 and I-5, to the component 
configuration or operation of the trapped key system and energy control 
procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes located in the 
roll mill stands), the contents of the JHA with affected personnel.

G. Inspections, Tests and Incident Prevention

    NSCI shall/would develop and implement a detailed program for 
completing inspections, tests, program evaluations and incident 
prevention. NSCI must/would:
    1. Initiate and maintain a program of frequent and regular 
inspections of the trapped key system and associated work areas by:
    a. Ensuring that a competent person (authorized employee) conducts 
daily visual checks and quarterly inspections and functionality tests 
of the trapped key system components and configuration or operation and 
energy control procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands to ensure that the procedure and the 
conditions of this variance are being followed;
    b. Ensuring that a competent person conducts weekly inspections of 
the work areas associated with the grinding of roll mill passes located 
in the roll mill stands; and
    c. Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person 
in conducting the weekly inspections of the work areas associated with 
the grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands and 
the quarterly inspections and functionality tests of the trapped key 
system components and configuration or operation and energy control 
procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes.
    2. Remove the equipment from service if the competent person 
determines that the equipment constitutes a safety hazard. NSCI must 
not return the equipment to service until the hazardous condition is 
corrected and the correction has been approved by a qualified person.
    3. All maintenance, servicing, and installation of replacement 
parts must be performed in strict accordance with good engineering 
practices. Where available, the maintenance, servicing and installation 
of replacement parts must strictly follow the manufacturers' 
specifications, instructions, and limitations.

[[Page 75480]]

H. Recordkeeping

    1. NSCI must/would maintain a record of any recordable injury, 
illness, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye or 
fatality (using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate and 
record energy control-related recordable injuries as defined by 29 CFR 
1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12 \10\), resulting from the task 
of grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands by 
completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work-
Related Injuries and Illnesses.
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    \10\ See footnote 5.
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    2. NSCI must/would maintain records of all tests and inspections of 
the component configuration or operation, and energy control 
procedures, as well as associated hazardous condition corrective 
actions and repairs.

I. Notifications

    To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein, 
NSCI shall/would:
    1. Notify the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office of any 
recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, 
amputations, loss of an eye or fatality (by submitting the completed 
OSHA 301 Incident Report form) resulting from implementing the 
alternative energy control procedures of the proposed variance 
conditions while completing the task of grinding roll mill passes 
located in the roll mill stands. The notification must be made within 8 
hours of the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable 
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an 
eye, or fatality.
    2. Submit a copy of the preliminary incident investigation (OSHA 
form 301) to the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office within 24 
hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a recordable 
case and submit a copy of the full incident investigation within 7 
calendar days of the incident or 7 calendar days after becoming aware 
of the case. In addition to the information required by the OSHA form 
301, the incident-investigation report must include a root-cause 
determination, and the preventive and corrective actions identified and 
implemented.
    3. Provide certification within 15 working days of the incident 
that NSCI informed affected workers of the incident and the results of 
the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and 
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    4. Notify the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office in writing 
and 15 working days prior to any proposed change in the energy control 
operations (including changes addressed by condition C-13) that affects 
NSCI's ability to comply with the conditions specified herein.
    5. Obtain OSHA's approval prior to implementing the proposed change 
in the energy control operations that affects NSCI's ability to comply 
with the conditions specified herein.
    6. Provide a written evaluation report, by January 31st at the 
beginning of each calendar year, with a report covering the year just 
ended, to the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office summarizing the 
quarterly inspections and functionality tests of the trapped key system 
components and configuration or operation and energy control procedures 
that affect the grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill 
stands, to ensure that the energy control procedure and the conditions 
of this variance are being followed.
    Note: The evaluation report is to contain summaries of: (1) The 
number of variance-related incidents (as recorded on OSHA 301 forms); 
and (2) root causes of any incidents, and preventive and corrective 
actions identified and implemented.
    7. Inform the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office as soon as 
possible after it has knowledge that it will:
    a. Cease to do business;
    b. change the location and address of the main office for managing 
the alternative energy control procedures specified herein; or
    c. transfer the operations specified herein to a successor company.
    8. Notify all affected employees of this interim order/proposed 
permanent variance by the same means required to inform them of its 
application for a variance.
    9. Request approval from OSHA for the transfer of the interim 
order/proposed permanent variance to a successor company.

Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice. 
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section 29 
U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912, 
Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

    Signed at Washington, DC, on November 25, 2015.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-30483 Filed 12-1-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-26-P