Document ID: FRA-2019-0068-0326
Agency: fra
Document Type: Rule
Title: Texas Central Railroad High-Speed Rail Safety Standards
Posted Date: 2020-11-03T05:00Z

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 213 (Tuesday, November 3, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 69700-69776]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-20388]

[[Page 69699]]

Vol. 85

Tuesday,

No. 213

November 3, 2020

Part II

 Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Part 299

Texas Central Railroad High-Speed Rail Safety Standards; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 213 / Tuesday, November 3, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 69700]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 299

[Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, Notice 5]
RIN 2130-AC84

Texas Central Railroad High-Speed Rail Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; rule of particular applicability and record of 
decision.

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SUMMARY: This final rule of particular applicability (RPA) establishes 
safety standards for the Texas Central Railroad (TCRR or the railroad) 
high-speed rail (HSR) system. These standards are not intended for 
general application in the railroad industry, but apply only to the 
TCRR system planned for development in the State of Texas. This rule 
takes a systems approach to safety, and so includes standards that 
address the aspects of the TCRR HSR system consistent with the 
regulatory framework for the general system, but in a manner 
appropriate to TCRR's technology and application, including signal and 
trainset control, track, rolling stock, operating practices, system 
qualifications, and maintenance. The TCRR HSR system is planned to 
operate from Houston to Dallas, on dedicated track, with no grade 
crossings, at speeds not to exceed 330 km/h (205 mph). The TCRR rolling 
stock, track, and core systems will replicate the Tokaido Shinkansen 
HSR system operated by the Central Japan Railway Company (JRC), and 
will be used exclusively for revenue passenger service.

DATES: Effective date. This final rule is effective December 3, 2020.
    Incorporation by reference. The incorporation by reference of the 
standards listed in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal 
Register as of December 3, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Docket: For access to the docket to read background 
documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any 
time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For issues related to the technical 
safety requirements: Frederick Mottley, Systems Engineer, at (617) 494-
3160; Devin Rouse, Mechanical Engineer, at (202) 493-6185; or Michael 
Hunter, Attorney Adviser, at (202) 493-0368. For issues related to the 
Record of Decision: Kevin Wright, Environmental Protection Specialist 
at (202) 493-0845; or Kathryn Johnson, Attorney Adviser, at (202) 493-
0407.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory Authority
III. Proceedings to Date
IV. Discussion of Comments Received on the NPRM
    A. Context and Overview
    B. Regulatory Approach
    C. General Safety Oversight
    D. Interference With the Union Pacific Railroad
    E. Track Safety
    F. Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection
    G. Reissuance of NPRM
    H. Electrical Arcing From the Overhead Catenary System
    I. Right-of-Way Barrier Protection
    J. Emergency Response
    K. Noise Emission and Vibration
    L. Eminent Domain
    M. Regulatory Evaluation
    N. Enforcement
V. Discussion of Final Rule and Regulatory Changes
    A. Non-Substantive Corrections
    B. Evaluation of Substantive Changes
    1. Sec.  299.5 Definitions
    2. Subpart B--Signal and Trainset Control System
    3. Sec.  299.345 Visual Inspections; Right-of-Way
    4. Sec.  299.347 Special Inspections
    5. Sec.  299.713 Program Approval Procedures
    C. Trainset Image Recording System
    D. Decision Under 49 U.S.C. 20306, Exemption for Technological 
Improvements
    E. Incorporation by Reference
VI. FRA's Record of Decision
    A. Summary of Alternatives Considered
    1. No Build Alternative
    2. Build Alternatives
    B. Environmentally Preferable Alternative
    1. Environmentally Preferable Build Alternative
    2. Environmentally Preferable Houston Station Option
    C. Mitigation Commitments
VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; 
Regulatory Flexibility Assessment
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. International Trade Impact Assessment
    F. National Environmental Policy Act
    G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
    H. Clean Air Act/Air Quality General Conformity
    I. Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act
    J. Department of Transportation Act Section 4(f) Determination
    K. Endangered Species Act/Section 7 U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Biological Opinion
    L. Executive Order 11990 Preservation of the Nation's Wetlands 
(Executive Order 11990 & DOT Order 5660.1a)
    M. Floodplain Management (Executive Order 11988 & DOT Order 
5650.2)
    N. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)
    O. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    P. Energy Impact

I. Executive Summary

    On August 30, 2019, FRA granted TCRR's rulemaking petition 
(petition), which was submitted April 16, 2016.\1\ The petition 
proposed comprehensive safety requirements for the application of JRC's 
Tokaido Shinkansen technology, and its associated design and 
engineering principals. TCRR's petition represented that the regulatory 
requirements offered by TCRR translate the technological and 
operational aspects of the JRC Tokaido Shinkansen system in a manner 
that can be regulated under a framework similar to other US passenger 
rail operations while maintaining the integrity of the safety case 
developed by JRC over 50 years of experience operating high-speed 
trains.
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    \1\ TCRR supplemented its petition in August 2016, and submitted 
an updated petition in September 2017.
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    The Tokaido Shinkansen system first went into service on October 1, 
1964, under the operation of the Japanese National Railways (JNR). On 
April 1, 1987, JNR was privatized and split into six passenger 
railroads and a freight railroad. JRC took over operations of the 
Tokaido Shinkansen system in Central Japan, and is still operating the 
system today. In over 50 years of Tokaido Shinkansen system operations, 
JNR, and now JRC, have optimized operations to a very high level of 
safety and performance. The Tokaido Shinkansen system has moved over 6 
billion passengers without a passenger fatality or injury due to 
trainset accidents such as a derailment or collision.
    TCRR intends to implement a high-speed passenger rail system by 
using the Tokaido Shinkansen system's service-proven technology and by 
replicating JRC's operational and maintenance practices and procedures. 
TCRR plans to implement the latest, service-proven derivative of the 
N700 trainset and other core systems currently in use on the Tokaido 
Shinkansen line,\2\ which have been refined for high-speed operations 
over the last 50+ years. TCRR plans to adapt the N700 series trainset 
and supporting systems in a manner suitable for the Texas environment 
and operate under a regulatory framework that

[[Page 69701]]

enables FRA to provide effective safety oversight.
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    \2\ Subsequent references to ``N700'' or ``N700 series 
trainset'' are meant to refer to the N700 series trainset currently 
in, or future variants approved for, use.
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    FRA has evaluated the economic burden that the final rule would 
have on TCRR. Discussion of this can be found under section VII. A. 
Executive Orders 12866 and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures. FRA concluded that because this final rule generally 
includes only voluntary actions, or alternative action that would be 
voluntary, the final rule does not impart additional burdens on TCRR.
    Further, this document also contains FRA's Record of Decision with 
respect to the environmental review conducted pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as discussed in section VI. FRA's 
Record of Decision.
    Except for the changes discussed under sections V. A. Non-
substantive Corrections and V. B. Evaluation of Substantive Changes, 
FRA is adopting the rule text of the NPRM otherwise unchanged in this 
final rule.

II. Statutory Authority

    Under the Federal railroad safety laws, FRA has jurisdiction over 
all railroads, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 20102, except urban rapid 
transit operations that are not connected to the general railroad 
system of transportation (general system). Moreover, FRA considers a 
standalone intercity railroad line to be part of the general system, 
even if it is not physically connected to other railroads (as FRA has 
previously stated with respect to the Alaska Railroad; 49 CFR part 209, 
appendix A). FRA considers the contemplated TCRR system as intercity 
passenger rail, not urban rapid transit. Accordingly, the TCRR system 
will be subject to FRA jurisdiction, whether it connects to the general 
system or not. Please see FRA's policy statement, contained at 49 CFR 
part 209, appendix A, discussing in greater detail FRA's jurisdiction 
over passenger railroads, which includes discussion on how FRA 
characterizes passenger operations.
    FRA has a regulatory program in place, pursuant to its statutory 
authority, to address equipment, track, operating practices, and human 
factors in the existing, conventional railroad environment. However, 
significant operational and equipment differences exist between TCRR's 
system and existing passenger operations in the United States. In many 
of the railroad safety disciplines, FRA's existing regulations do not 
address the safety concerns and operational peculiarities of the TCRR 
system. Therefore, to allow TCRR to operate as envisioned, an 
alternative regulatory approach is required to provide safety 
oversight.

III. Proceedings to Date

    On March 10, 2020, FRA published a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM).\3\ The NPRM proposed safety standards to enable safe operations 
and an alternate method for Federal safety oversight. The NPRM also 
opened the public comment period, which was initially scheduled to 
close on May 11, 2020.
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    \3\ 85 FR 14036.
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    On March 12, 2020, FRA announced that it was holding three public 
hearings on the NPRM, and was conducting proceedings under 49 U.S.C. 
20306.\4\ Those hearings were to be held in Dallas, Navasota, and 
Houston, Texas, between March 31 and April 2, 2020. However, in light 
of the President's March 13, 2020, national emergency declaration, 
Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel 
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) public health emergency, and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance to cancel mass 
gatherings of people,\5\ FRA postponed the three public hearings on 
March 30, 2020.\6\
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    \4\ 85 FR 14449.
    \5\ See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/large-events/mass-gatheringsready-for-covid-19.html.
    \6\ 85 FR 17527.
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    On April 16, 2020, FRA announced, consistent with CDC guidance 
advising against in-person gatherings, that it decided to convene the 
three public hearings, and to conduct proceedings under 49 U.S.C. 
20306, telephonically between May 4th through 6th, 2020.\7\ The choice 
to conduct these hearings telephonically represented merely a change in 
the manner of public engagement. Also, in the same announcement, FRA 
extended the comment period to May 26, 2020, so that members of the 
public would have adequate time to review and provide written comments 
on the transcripts of the three public hearings conducted. Further, FRA 
addressed the numerous requests it received to not hold ``virtual 
hearings,'' due to concerns over the lack of reliable high-speed 
internet access, and/or to postpone hearings until they can be safely 
held in-person.
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    \7\ 85 FR 21159.
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    In response to public comments, FRA explained that it decided to 
hold telephonic hearings, capable of accommodating the same number of 
participants as previously scheduled in-person hearings, as it was 
consistent with ensuring public health and that no technology beyond a 
telephone was necessary for participation. Moreover, FRA explained that 
there was no need to further postpone the public hearings or further 
extend the comment period given the extensive public outreach already 
conducted related to this proposed rule, and the supplementary nature 
of the public hearings as related to the opportunity to provide 
detailed written comments on the proposed rule.
    FRA conducted the three telephonic public hearings, and proceedings 
under 49 U.S.C. 20306, as scheduled and the comment period closed on 
May 26, 2020. FRA is aware of concerns that the publication of the 
final environmental impact statement (EIS) effectively cut off the 
comment period for the NPRM on May 15, 2020. Those concerns are 
unfounded. The Final EIS stated that--

    As of the execution of this Final EIS on May 15, 2020, oral 
comments made during the public hearings and written comments 
submitted to the Docket have raised no new substantive issues 
relevant to environmental concerns from those received during the 
public comment period of the Draft EIS (discussed in Section 9.6.2, 
Public and Agency Involvement, Draft EIS Comment Period, and 
Appendix H, Response to Draft EIS Comments) or on topics not already 
covered within this Final EIS. FRA will continue to evaluate 
comments received during the comment period for the Proposed 
Rulemaking. FRA will address comments on technical safety 
requirements proposed in the NPRM in the Final Rule, which will be 
published in the Federal Register.\8\
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    \8\ See Docket FRA-2019-0068, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement at ES-5.

    It is clear from the text of the Final EIS that FRA did not close 
the rulemaking comment period on May 15, 2020. Rather, FRA informed the 
public that FRA was not able to consider in the Final EIS comments 
submitted on the NPRM that were received by FRA after May 15, 2020. 
This was necessary to allow for printing and distribution of the Final 
EIS. However, the text of the Final EIS clarified that FRA continued to 
consider comments submitted during the rulemaking comment period.

IV. Discussion of Comments Received on the NPRM 9
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    \9\ Comments submitted regarding the Final EIS are addressed 
below, under section VII. F. National Environmental Policy Act.
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    During the 77-day comment period, FRA received 287 written 
submissions providing comments on the NPRM and had fifty-two 
individuals provide testimony during the three days of public hearings. 
As discussed below, not all comments necessitated a response in this 
final rule, but all comments were carefully and thoroughly considered.
    Although FRA's responses to comments, discussed below, generally

[[Page 69702]]

address issues raised in comments critical of the rulemaking or TCRR, 
or both, FRA also received comments supportive of the rulemaking or 
TCRR, or both. Commenters providing support ranged from members of the 
public, to various railroad or railroad-related associations, to State 
and Federal elected officials. As these supportive commenters did not 
raise any substantive issues regarding the technical safety 
requirements proposed in the NPRM, FRA has not provided a response to 
those comments in this final rule.
    FRA also received comments requesting that FRA either extend the 
comment period or otherwise postpone the issuance of this final rule, 
or objecting to the telephonic hearing format or the notice provided 
for the public hearings. These comments are addressed above, in section 
III. Proceedings to Date.
    FRA did not provide responses in this final rule to comments that 
were considered either outside the scope of the rulemaking, or that 
raised issues that were previously raised to FRA as part of the 
environmental review process, which FRA addressed and responded to in 
the Final EIS released on May 29, 2020, available for review on FRA's 
website for the environmental review of the proposed Dallas to Houston 
High-Speed Rail.\10\
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    \10\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement.
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    FRA's responses below address the remaining comments received. 
These comments were either critical of the rulemaking or raised issues 
necessitating further explanation or clarification. As multiple 
commenters raised similar issues, FRA organized its responses so that 
like-issues are grouped together.

A. Context and Overview

    FRA received comments regarding the timing of the rulemaking in 
relation to the timing of the EIS. Commenters expressed confusion over 
how the rulemaking and NEPA processes, and the final rule and the EIS 
relate to each other. Commenters were concerned about FRA granting a 
``safety permit'' without conducting surveys of the entire right-of-way 
(ROW), or other types of analyses (such as a hazard analysis). In 
addition, commenters raised concerns about the timing of coordination 
with other Federal agencies that may need to occur before or during 
construction.
    As discussed in the NPRM, TCRR approached FRA in March of 2014, 
seeking assistance in understanding how FRA would or could apply its 
regulations to a high-speed passenger railroad system that replicated 
the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system, as operated by JRC.\11\ On June 25, 
2014, FRA published a Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement in the Federal Register.\12\ On December 22, 2017, FRA 
published its Draft EIS and opened its comment period.\13\ FRA stated 
in the Draft EIS that FRA's regulations at the time did not address 
safety requirements comprehensively for passenger train operations 
above 150 mph, such as TCRR's contemplated operation. As such, FRA 
would need to take some form of regulatory action to ensure the 
contemplated system would be operated safely, such as issuing an RPA, 
imposing requirements or conditions by order(s) or waiver(s), or taking 
some other form of regulatory action.\14\ This regulatory action 
constitutes a Major Federal Action requiring review under NEPA.\15\
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    \11\ 85 FR 14036, 14038.
    \12\ 79 FR 36123.
    \13\ 82 FR 60723 and FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--
Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Draft Environmental Impact Statement.
    \14\ While this statement was accurate at the time of 
publication of the Draft EIS in December 2017, it was incomplete. 
The Final EIS clarified that it was not just the proposed speed of 
the TCRR's passenger operations that require FRA regulatory action. 
As described in the Final EIS, FRA's existing regulations do not 
adequately address the safety concerns and operational 
characteristics of TCRR's proposed HSR system. FRA. Dallas to 
Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas 
https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final 
Environmental Impact Statement, Chapter 1.0, Introduction. 
Subsequent to the publication of the Draft EIS, in November 2018, 
FRA published a final rule establishing safety standards for 
passenger operations up to 220 miles per hour.
    \15\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Abstract.
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    The purpose of the NEPA process is to inform the decisionmaker and 
the public of the potential environmental impacts that may result from 
the proposed action. As such, the EIS must be finalized before the 
agency takes the action that is the subject of the environmental 
review. The Final EIS itself, while a meaningful milestone in the NEPA 
process, does not permit construction or operations. Rather, the EIS 
enables FRA to reach a decision that is informed by an understanding of 
the potential environmental impacts of this rulemaking.
    The analysis of potential environmental impacts in the EIS is based 
on TCRR's conceptual engineering design, which is contained in 
conceptual engineering reports prepared by TCRR and appended to the 
Draft and Final EIS. While the conceptual engineering design has been 
appropriately used to inform the NEPA process, TCRR must complete more 
thorough engineering and design work to facilitate construction. TCRR 
will need to consider the agreed upon mitigation and compliance 
measures \16\ and the requirements of this rule as it advances the 
engineering design. In addition, TCRR must follow all applicable 
Federal, State, and local requirements, which are separate from FRA's 
jurisdiction. This includes the Surface Transportation Board (STB), 
which issued a decision on July 16, 2020, finding that the operation 
proposed by TCRR is subject to STB jurisdiction.\17\
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    \16\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments, Mitigation 
Commitments.
    \17\ Surface Transportation Board Decision, Texas Central 
Railroad and Infrastructure, Inc. & Texas Central Railroad, LLC-
Petition for Exemption-Passenger Rail Line Between Dallas and 
Houston, Tex., July 16, 2020, Docket No. FD 36025. STB also found 
that TCRR must file an application under 49 U.S.C. 10901 and 49 CFR 
part 1150 to seek STB authority to construct and operate its 
proposed system.
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    FRA does not grant any kind of construction approval or permit. 
Neither does this final rule, by itself, grant any permission or 
authority for TCRR to operate. Furthermore, this rulemaking does not 
relieve TCRR of its responsibilities to design, construct and operate a 
safe railroad. It merely provides alternatives to certain requirements 
and safety standards, which are more appropriate for the technology and 
system proposed by TCRR. TCRR must design, operate and maintain its 
system in compliance with this regulation.
    What this final rule does is establish the minimum Federal safety 
requirements with which TCRR must comply. The publication of this final 
rule is the beginning for TCRR, not the end, of its continuous 
obligation to demonstrate compliance with the regulation. FRA will 
continue to provide safety oversight throughout TCRR's development and 
testing phases, in addition to during revenue operations. In this 
manner, the expectations for compliance are no

[[Page 69703]]

different for TCRR than any other railroad under FRA jurisdiction.
    Prior to commencing actual revenue operations, TCRR will need to 
demonstrate that all the safety critical components system work 
together as a single, integrated system, pursuant to subpart F of this 
rule.\18\ This involves a number of points of compliance that TCRR will 
work through over the coming years.
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    \18\ See the discussion of System Qualification in the NPRM at 
85 FR 14036, 14044.
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    To underscore this point, there are several significant 
requirements that TCRR must meet. For example, TCRR must demonstrate 
that the trainset meets the requisite crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements as established under subpart D.\19\ Also, TCRR 
must have its positive train control (PTC) system certified in 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20157 and subpart B of this final rule.\20\ 
Further, TCRR must train and qualify its employees performing safety 
sensitive functions before those employees engage in their respective 
work (i.e., drivers will need to be certified under 49 CFR part 240, 
maintenance employees will need to be qualified in accordance with 
TCRR's training program established under 49 CFR part 243, etc.).\21\ 
Moreover, not only initially, but continuously thereafter, TCRR must 
demonstrate that its track meets the track safety standards outlined in 
subpart C. In addition, not only must TCRR comply with the technical 
safety requirements established in this final rule, it also must comply 
with the other regulations identified under Sec.  299.3(c), such as 
part 214, Railroad Workplace Safety; part 219, Control of Alcohol and 
Drug Use; part 228, Hours of Service of Railroad Employees; and part 
270, System Safety Program.
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    \19\ See the discussion of crashworthiness and occupant 
protection under Trainset Structure of the NPRM at 85 FR 14036, 
14039, and under section IV. F. Crashworthiness and Occupant 
Protection of this final rule.
    \20\ Please also see the discussion of Automatic Train Control 
System in the NPRM. 85 FR 14036, 14041.
    \21\ Please also see section IV. C. 8. Personnel Qualification 
in the NPRM at 85 FR 14036, 14045, and section IV. G. Reissuance of 
NPRM of this final rule.
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    FRA notes that there were questions and concerns raised with 
respect to the lack of interoperability of the system. However, lack of 
interoperability is not, per se, a bar to operation in the U.S. It is 
true that FRA stated in 2016 that it did not envision a network of 
standalone, non-interoperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide 
network, but this perspective was built largely on historical 
precedence and should not be interpreted as a prohibition in any way. 
And in 2018, FRA stated that standalone systems should continue to be 
regulated comprehensively (such as through a rule of particular 
applicability or other specific regulatory action(s)), and on a case-
by-case basis, as it is prudent due to the small number of potential 
operations and the potential for significant differences in their 
design.\22\ Since then, FRA has not seen a proliferation of non-
interoperable systems in the U.S. In fact, FRA has seen more potential 
conventional (steel-wheel-on-steel-rail) operations avail themselves of 
the Tier III requirements rather than pursuing the more arduous and 
costly route of being a standalone system. For example, Amtrak's next-
generation Acela is in the process of demonstrating that its new 
trainsets comply with the Tier III requirements. XpressWest, is 
attempting to conduct Tier III operations between Victorville, CA and 
Las Vegas, NV (the XpressWest bullet train). And while FRA generally 
considers matters in the context of the established interoperable 
general railroad system, FRA's mission is to enable safe, reliable, and 
efficient movement of people and goods by rail, regardless of the 
technology used.
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    \22\ 83 FR 59182, 59186.
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B. Regulatory Approach

    Several commenters asked why FRA elected to pursue a rule of 
particular applicability for TCRR. Initially, FRA notes that taking 
action to provide a regulatory framework to govern the operation of the 
system proposed by TCRR is consistent with FRA's mission is to enable 
safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods by rail. 
Further, as FRA stated when granting the petition to undertake the 
rulemaking, TCRR's petition demonstrated that TCRR's system would 
replicate the system and operations of the Tokaido Shinkansen, as 
operated by JRC, allowing TCRR to take advantage of that system's 
exemplary 50-year safety record. (Docket FRA-2019-0068, FRA Letter 
Granting Petition).
    As discussed under section III. Regulatory Approach of the NPRM, 
FRA explained that it was taking this approach as it was consistent 
with its statement in the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final 
rule, published November 21, 2018.\23\ FRA considers TCRR a standalone 
system, as its tracks are not physically connected to the rest of the 
general system, and would be prohibited from doing so by this 
regulation. FRA stated in 2018 that a standalone system's regulation 
would have to bring together all aspects of railroad safety (such as 
operating practices, signal and trainset control, and track) that must 
be applied to the individual system.\24\ Such an approach covers more 
than passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular ROW 
intrusion protection and other safety requirements not typically 
addressed in FRA's more general regulations. With this regulation, FRA 
continues to believe that addressing proposals for standalone HSR 
systems in this manner is prudent. Entities considering standalone 
operations voluntarily assume the higher costs of building new and 
dedicated infrastructure, knowing they cannot take advantage of the 
cost savings from sharing existing infrastructure.
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    \23\ 85 FR 14036, 14037; 83 FR 59182.
    \24\ 83 FR 59182, 59186.
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    Alternatively, FRA could have issued a comprehensive set of waivers 
from FRA's existing regulations, to the extent permitted by law, under 
49 U.S.C. 20103(b), in order to provide regulatory approval to the 
operation. However, in this case, electing to develop and publish a 
comprehensive regulation is more efficient. Such a regulation, in 
addition to providing regulatory approval, institutes a comprehensive 
regulatory framework, that provides TCRR clarity on the minimum Federal 
safety standards that it must comply with through technology-
specific,\25\ performance-based requirements. In addition, it provides 
the railroad a higher degree of regulatory certainty than waivers, as 
waivers are revocable, subject to changing conditions, and necessitate 
renewal, generally every five years. Further, by issuing an RPA, FRA is 
able to protect the integrity of the system, by establishing regulatory 
requirements codifying the service-proven technological, operational, 
and maintenance aspects of the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system operated 
by JRC.
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    \25\ Note, FRA typically tries to craft regulations so that they 
are technology-neutral and performance-based. Because TCRR's safety 
case is derived from the use of JRC's technology, and operational 
and maintenance practices, this regulation was written specifically 
for that technology to maintain the integrity of the baseline safety 
case.
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C. General Safety Oversight

    FRA received a number of comments, both written oral, concerning a 
lack of adequate safety oversight for TCRR. The commenters expressed 
general concerns regarding the safe construction of the system, and 
more specific concerns with construction of the system where it 
intersects various pipelines. In addition, commenters expressed 
concerns that no

[[Page 69704]]

one agency would be responsible for the overall safety of the system 
and for the perceived lack of coordination between three specific 
Federal agencies: FRA, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC). As these comments are closely related, FRA will address them 
together.
    DOT does not have plenary authority to regulate every aspect of 
transportation and is limited to the authority granted to it by 
Congress. Accordingly, the same is true for each of DOT's operating 
administrations--the regulatory authority for each one is limited at 
the Federal level by the scope of authority granted by Congress.
    As discussed above in section II. Statutory Authority, FRA's 
authority to regulate the railroad industry is established in 49 U.S.C. 
ch. 201. FRA has jurisdiction over all railroads, as defined in 49 
U.S.C. 20102, except urban rapid transit operations that are not 
connected to the general railroad system of transportation. Notably, 
FRA has broad authority to regulate every area of railroad safety. 49 
U.S.C. 20103. But, there must be a nexus to railroad safety for FRA to 
regulate. However, FRA does not exercise jurisdiction under all of its 
regulations to the full extent permitted by statute. Based on its 
knowledge of where the safety problems were occurring at the time of 
its regulatory action, and its assessment of the practical limitations 
on its role, FRA decided to regulate something less than the total 
universe of railroads.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ 49 CFR part 209, Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While FRA's jurisdiction is broad, it is not unlimited, and there 
are some areas where FRA defers to another entity. In practice, FRA 
exercises its authority through regulations on matters where safety is 
most effectively addressed at the Federal level, and is necessary to 
ensure unimpeded interstate commerce, or explicitly required by 
statute. Some elements of safety are more effectively addressed by 
other levels of government (i.e., State or local), or by industry 
itself through the development and maintenance of industry standards 
and recommended practices. For example, the civil construction of a 
railroad and its structures are more effectively addressed by State and 
local requirements that take into account the geotechnical, seismic, 
and hydrological conditions associated with a local environment. While 
FRA could assert its safety authority over the design and construction 
of a railroad bridge, for example, these specific requirements are more 
effectively addressed and monitored at the State and local level. 
Similarly, in railroad repair shop environments, where railroads 
perform maintenance on their equipment, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration provides Federal safety oversight of the work 
conditions within the shop environment, even though it is a railroad 
facility and railroad employees are involved.
    With that said, FRA clarifies that there is no one agency that is 
responsible for every aspect of safety as it relates to TCRR. To ensure 
proper safety of the system, each Federal, State, and local authority 
must perform its part. FRA will certainly oversee railroad safety where 
conditions might impact the safe operation of the system, but other 
agencies will also play a role. Where there are intersections among 
agencies, appropriate coordination must occur to ensure that the proper 
agency or entity is enforcing the correct requirements (whether 
Federal, State, or local), at the appropriate time. In the same spirit, 
where non-governmental organizations have a potential nexus of safety 
considerations (e.g., TCRR operations adjacent to Union Pacific 
Railroad (UPRR) operations), it is expected that those organizations 
coordinate appropriately with each other in good faith.
    In turning to the specific issues raised about safety oversight of 
the construction of the system, and the safety of the TCRR system in 
relation to pipelines in the vicinity, FRA clarifies that where a 
condition impacts the safe operation of the railroad, FRA could 
intervene to ensure the condition is properly remediated. Although FRA 
has not exercised its jurisdiction in this area (civil construction), 
FRA would not be precluded from doing so, should the need arise, to 
ensure railroad safety. The particular facts of a situation would 
dictate the appropriate authority to handle the issue.
    Generally, TCRR is obligated to comply with PHMSA's safety 
requirements, including those related to pipeline damage, electrical 
emissions, and cathodic protection, where there are pipeline crossings. 
FERC has no jurisdiction or decision-making authority over the 
construction or operation of TCRR's system. FERC-regulated pipelines 
occur in the vicinity of the alignment, and relocation and/or 
maintenance activities of these utilities during the construction of 
the system may require FERC involvement by the applicable utility 
providers. PHMSA and FERC requirements are discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.9.2, Utilities and Energy, Regulatory Context of the Final 
EIS.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All natural gas utility providers, including Atmos Energy, are 
required to operate in accordance with operational safety regulations, 
including regulations promulgated by PHMSA, and would have to consider 
how external factors might impact their operational safety as the 
parties communicate and coordinate during planning and development. Id.
    It is not necessary for FRA to coordinate with PHMSA or FERC in 
order to develop the minimum Federal railroad safety requirements 
contained in this final rule. As discussed above, FERC has no 
involvement during the development of minimum Federal safety standards 
for the operation of the TCRR system. As TCRR advances from the 
conceptual engineering that was the basis for the environmental 
analysis in the Final EIS to design engineering, more detailed 
information will become available about pipelines that may need to be 
relocated, which would be subject to FERC jurisdiction. In addition, 
TCRR is already required to comply with PHMSA requirements regarding 
pipeline safety applicable to utility crossings, relocations, and/or 
maintenance activities involving natural gas or hazardous liquid 
transportation pipelines impacted by TCRR's system. FRA is unaware of 
any need to amend PHMSA's requirements in light of the contemplated 
TCRR system.
    Although no coordination was necessary, FRA has nonetheless 
coordinated with both FERC and PHMSA after receiving the public 
comments regarding pipeline safety and in response to the expressed 
lack of coordination. Both the EIS and the development of the safety 
standards in this final rule represent only the beginning of 
coordination on these issues common to any linear construction project, 
and FRA would expect TCRR to continue and, as necessary expand, this 
coordination and engagement as TCRR moves forward.

D. Interference With the Union Pacific Railroad

    A number of comments received were focused on the potential impacts 
to conventional track circuits and signaling technology caused by 
TCRR's electrified railroad. UPRR submitted

[[Page 69705]]

comments expressing these concerns to both the Draft EIS and the 
NPRM.\28\
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    \28\ See Section 3.15, Electromagnetic Fields of the Final EIS 
for a discussion of the potential impacts associated with the 
generation of electromagnetic fields.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA notes that the matter of potential interference to conventional 
track circuits and signaling technology, whether from traction power 
systems,\29\ or other known sources, is a matter that is not unique to 
the contemplated TCRR operation. The effects and potential interference 
that can be caused by rail vehicle traction power systems are well-
established, and require design-specific and local environmental 
information to assess. To date, FRA has not promulgated specific 
regulations addressing the use of traction power systems on railroads 
holistically, as the matter has been effectively handled by industry 
standards, local or utility requirements (if applicable), and 
contractual responsibilities. In this final rule FRA does not deviate 
from this practice and therefore is not regulating TCRR's traction 
power system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ A tractive power system is a system that provides a means 
to produce tractive effort to a trainset or motive power unit, i.e., 
the propulsion system. Most traction power systems utilize the 
transmission of direct current (DC) or alternating current (AC) 
electricity by means of an overhead wire or powered third rail to 
convert electrical energy to tractive effort (the force that 
accelerates a vehicle along a track).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Electrified railroads and transit systems operate over and adjacent 
to rail lines using conventional track circuitry and signaling 
technology throughout the U.S., including FRA-regulated operations on 
the Northeast Corridor, and in Pennsylvania, Chicago, northern Indiana, 
Denver, and San Francisco (specifically the electrification of 
Caltrain's commuter rail service, currently in progress). Furthermore, 
numerous light-rail and transit operations utilize traction power 
systems that operate adjacent to, or in some cases directly on, FRA-
regulated properties utilizing conventional signaling technology (e.g., 
Utah Transit Authority's mid-Jordan extension). FRA points to numerous 
examples that UPRR itself, operates over or adjacent to 25kVA 
electrified track, including most notably Denver's A-line, which 
operates on electrified track directly adjacent to UPRR utilizing the 
same PTC technology.
    Several commenters, including UPRR, provided broad language 
concerning the need to address potential electromagnetic interference 
(EMI), but provided no specific justification as to why current 
industry practice, or the requirements proposed within the NPRM were 
insufficient. FRA believes the high-level language used by the 
commenters to describe the hazard, unaccompanied by any supporting 
technical data, underscores a lack of understanding of the subject 
matter.
    Although commenters did not specify the mechanism by which traction 
power systems may introduce risk, they may be concerned with the 
potential for voltages to be induced into parallel conductors (i.e., 
UPRR's track) which, in turn, could interfere with rudimentary circuit 
designs and technology being employed by UPRR for track circuit 
occupancy and grade crossing activation circuits. Commenter references 
to interference with UPRR's PTC system may likewise relate to the 
potential for induced voltage that could lead to a track circuit 
appearing to be unoccupied even though a train may actually be shunting 
the circuit. This typically occurs with more primitive DC and AC 
technologies, if not designed to account for such conditions, as those 
types of primitive technologies cannot decipher the induced voltage 
from the circuit's own power source. FRA notes that while this is 
certainly a hazard that must be addressed, such site-specific issues 
can only be addressed as TCRR proceeds from conceptual to detailed 
design phases. It is FRA's expectation that TCRR and any affected 
stakeholders will collaboratively address any potential impacts in the 
same manner as all other projects have, to date.
    Although FRA believes the matter is sufficiently addressed under 
its current regulatory framework, this final rule addresses traction 
power system EMI and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) as it relates 
to safety critical equipment and systems employed by TCRR. See Sec.  
299.435(e). This requirement is an adaptation of the electrical systems 
requirements for Tier II trainsets in 49 CFR 238.425. TCRR proposed 
applying these requirements to be consistent with deliberations by the 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee on a recommended expansion of FRA's 
Tier III requirements in a future rulemaking. UPRR commented on this 
requirement contained in the NPRM, but did not understand the 
requirement, its context, or origins. The requirement under Sec.  
299.435(e) is not intended to provide a means for UPRR to negate its 
responsibilities to ensure that its own systems are designed to protect 
against undesired inputs and potential interference, as UPRR's 
suggested modifications and commentary recommend, but rather to 
illustrate the due diligence performed through the development of the 
rulemaking. Both FRA and TCRR recognized the importance of EMI/EMC for 
electrified high-speed railroads, and the inclusion of this requirement 
will ensure TCRR is responsive to the issue.
    UPRR also raised concern over sightlines being reduced at a 
particular highway-rail grade crossing on UPRR's system due to the 
possible future placement of a TCRR viaduct support column. UPRR's 
concern is based on the conceptual engineering provided as part of the 
environmental review process. Similar to the above discussion on 
possible EMI with UPRR's signal system, FRA would expect that the two 
railroads work together, and with the owner of the roadway, to identify 
and mitigate any hazards associated with reduced sightlines at any 
impacted highway-rail grade crossing, once final designs are developed. 
In addition, FRA expects that any localized risk presented regarding 
these issues would be identified in TCRR's risk-based hazard analysis 
program under part 270 and mitigated appropriately.

E. Track Safety

    Several commenters raised concerns with the potential for buckling 
of the track structure due to high ambient temperatures in Texas during 
the summer. These general concerns were supplemented by comments that 
soil conditions and curvature in the alignment could exacerbate this 
potential. Many cited challenges UPRR has faced in this regard to 
support their concerns. A certain set of commenters further argued that 
an expert report had identified ``sharp curves'' in the alignment as a 
potential risk when compared to tangent track; while it is factually 
correct that the probability of rail buckling is higher for a curve 
compared to tangent track, the commenters seem to have mischaracterized 
this relationship in this particular instance to support their point. 
In either case, this regulation addresses this risk in a manner that is 
consistent with how this risk is managed for all railroads under FRA's 
jurisdiction, and when combined with JRC's adopted practice, provides a 
level of engineering and internal rail stress management that is 
superior to most, if not all, North American practice.
    The continuous welded rail (CWR) program, as proposed in the NPRM, 
is a translation and an adaptation of JRC's designs, standards, and 
procedures. Like the track and CWR requirements applicable to railroads 
on the general system under 49 CFR part 213, the track and CWR 
requirements in this rule are independent of the specific environmental 
conditions over which they are applied. The governing site-specific 
geotechnical, drainage, and

[[Page 69706]]

weather conditions will drive the detailed design of the track and its 
support structure in order to achieve and maintain compliance with the 
regulatory requirements. (Please see the discussion under section IV. 
A. Context and Overview of this final rule.) These safety requirements 
set the standards that must be maintained by the track and track 
structure design. In addition, these safety requirements set the 
operational limitations associated with various track conditions. In 
effect, these represent variables that the railroad must consider when 
determining its final designs. If it is not possible to attain the 
required alignment geometry or maintain a specific track class due to 
site specific conditions, then the design operating speed must reflect 
what is safely achievable. Concurrently, safe operational limits will 
also be validated by comprehensive dynamic tests of the actual revenue 
trainsets over the entire line, as required under Subpart F. While the 
variables at play in this rule are specific to TCRR (based on JRC's 
designs), the fundamental railroad engineering principles and design 
process is not. To be clear, the conceptual engineering report included 
as part of the Final EIS does not represent the final design of TCRR's 
alignment and track structure. This regulation will help TCRR establish 
a safe, detailed design.
    The track safety standards under Subpart C of the final rule 
translate the track safety standards as implemented on JRC's Tokaido 
Shinkansen HSR system for TCRR's HSR system. As discussed in the NPRM, 
the Tokaido Shinkansen's technical safety requirements were developed 
over many years, and have been highly optimized in conjunction with the 
rest of the system (i.e., signal and train control, and rolling stock), 
since service began over 50 years ago. The primary reason for adopting 
the Tokaido Shinkansen's technical safety requirements for TCRR is to 
ensure the safety of the TCRR operation by protecting the integrity of 
the system as established by JRC. These requirements are, in many 
cases, more stringent than requirements under 49 CFR part 213 that were 
developed for operation of a broad range of equipment (freight and 
passenger) over the general network.
    Furthermore, the approach JRC takes to manage internal rail stress 
in the Tokaido Shinkansen system is very different than standard North 
American practice. The final rule requires TCRR to comply with the JRC 
approach, to ensure that the integrity of the safety case behind the 
Tokaido Shinkansen can be maintained. In addition to the comprehensive 
use of well-designed expansion joints and other engineering means 
intended to manage internal rail stress caused by thermal (and other) 
loads, the regulation requires procedures, operational restrictions, or 
both, for high temperature scenarios that are more advanced and 
conservative than those employed by North American railroads. For 
example, these procedures require TCRR to monitor rail temperature 
continuously, which is far more stringent than the ``average'' 
temperature approach often used by most railroads. Likewise, a system 
of reference markers is required to be used on the field side of all 
track to help proactively identify any track shift that might occur. 
The ties and fastener system, and the ballast, are specifically 
engineered for the tonnage and speed of the equipment operating over it 
to provide maximum resistance to track buckling. This is superior to 
the practice of most U.S. railroads, which have to design to a general 
standard since a variety of equipment traverses their track. The 
comprehensive monitoring of track conditions through temperature, 
geometry and ride quality readings, in addition to traditional visual 
inspections, enables the railroad to analyze the conditions of the rail 
in a manner that is far superior to using only visual observation as 
suggested by commenters.
    A number of comments also focused on the effects that heat can have 
on CWR, and the fact that alignment curvature can increase horizontal 
rail forces which could, in-turn, lead to buckling if the track is not 
sufficiently restrained and internal rail stress is not managed 
effectively. Many comments focus on concerns associated with a specific 
curve referred to as the ``Hockley curve.'' These comments primarily 
stem from Delta Troy Interests, LTD. (Delta Troy), and its commissioned 
study conducted by the Virginia consulting firm R.L. Banks & 
Associates, Inc.\30\ (RLBA). These comments and the RLBA study attempt 
to connect an increased probability for buckling to occur in non-
tangent (curved) track, and particularly with the Hockley curve, with 
the fact that non-tangent rail can experience higher lateral rail 
forces due to thermal expansion. This specific portion of the proposed 
alignment does not represent a geometrically challenging portion, but 
Delta Troy indicated that its concern for this portion of proposed 
alignment is underscored by the fact that it traverses a site of a 
planned real estate development by the company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See http://www.rlbadc.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commissioned RLBA study loosely connects the concern of track 
buckling with the fact that this particular curve includes a radius 
that could be near the allowable limit for maximum speed operation. 
Delta Troy, RLBA, and other commenters, insinuate that a different 
alignment would enable TCRR to avoid ``numerous sharp curves.'' Whether 
intentional or not, the comments and RLBA analysis ignore the fact that 
the Hockley curve (and other similar curves designed to allow for 
maximum design speed of a high-speed train), by nature, utilize a curve 
radius that is not fairly compared to the high-degree curvature that 
can pose a risk for track buckling, particularly when compared to 
freight railroads that utilize a more economical focused approach to 
CWR management. To insinuate that the curves are ``sharp,'' and thus 
intrinsically unsafe as proposed, is simply not true.
    The RLBA study attempts to describe the effects of curvature on the 
potential for track buckling. However, this is an issue that is not 
unique to TCRR, and there are various means by which track can be 
designed to address and mitigate these concerns safely. Further, while 
the RLBA study recognized that the NPRM contained a requirement for the 
railroad to develop a CWR plan to address internal rail stress related 
to CWR, the study incorrectly asserts that FRA should dictate specific 
alignment geometry as a matter of safety. This is not appropriate or 
necessary, as the safety concern is addressed by the track safety 
standards and CWR requirements, as described above. Moreover, this 
final rule addresses these issues in the same manner as all other U.S. 
railroad operations subject to FRA's jurisdiction.

F. Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection

    Some commenters raised concerns regarding the crashworthiness 
requirements proposed in the NPRM. An examination of these comments, 
however, suggests that they stem from an incomplete reading of the 
NRPM. FRA proposed to retain the crashworthiness and occupant 
requirements established by JRC intended to address potential residual 
risks to the operation and to ensure the trainset can handle the 
expected operational loads experienced in the intended service 
environment.\31\ While these requirements are not directly comparable 
to standard U.S. practice, as the NPRM explains, the service

[[Page 69707]]

environment of TCRR's contemplated system is vastly different and 
presents significantly less risk than conventional North American 
railroad rights-of-way. Id. To adhere to requirements based on hazards 
that have otherwise been heavily mitigated or eliminated would require 
significant modification to the existing service-proven trainset design 
by changing the weight and dynamic characteristics, making it 
effectively a new trainset design, which would negate the service-
proven nature of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 85 FR 14036, 14039.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters asserted that FRA is exempting TCRR from any 
crashworthiness requirements so that the N700 series trainset 
technology could be imported. This assertion, however, is not supported 
by the requirements proposed in the NPRM, as FRA makes clear that its 
approach is to ensure that the trainset is safe for the environment in 
which it will operate. To this end, FRA is including additional 
requirements that are not inherent in the JRC approach to trainset 
structure design. These requirements include a dynamic collision 
scenario analysis that is designed to address the residual risks that 
could potentially exist within the TCRR operating environment.\32\ Of 
particular note, in this instance, is the inclusion of the steel coil 
collision scenario outlined in Sec.  299.403(c). Despite the safety 
record of JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen system, FRA believes that the North 
American environment poses unique risks with respect to potential 
objects that might somehow enter the protected ROW, either by accident 
or on purpose. In this case, FRA believes that requiring dynamic 
collision scenario analysis using the 14,000-lbs steel coil scenario 
derived from existing requirements to protect against risks presented 
by grade crossings can serve as a conservative surrogate for potential 
hazards that might be present on the TCRR ROW (e.g., feral hogs, stray 
livestock, unauthorized disposal of refuse). With the inclusion of this 
dynamic collision scenario, and adaptations of existing U.S. 
requirements on emergency systems and fire safety, FRA believes it has 
reasonably addressed risks unique to the TCRR operating environment in 
a manner that appropriately considers crashworthiness and occupant 
protection standards for the operating environment intended, while at 
the same time keeping intact the service-proven nature of the 
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ This reference to ``operating environment'' or 
``environment in which the equipment will operate'' or other similar 
references, means, in this discussion, the fully dedicated, fully 
grade-separated ROW that is not comingled with any other type of 
equipment (freight or passenger).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Reissuance of NPRM

    UPRR commented \33\ that FRA needs to re-notice the proposed rule 
so that it: (1) Adequately considers the safety impact on already 
existing railroads that will intersect and/or run adjacent to the 
proposed system; (2) specifically evaluates whether modification of 
each safety-critical aspect of the Japanese Shinkansen system is needed 
in order to transplant and implement them in the United States; and (3) 
provides sufficient detail to enable the public to understand the 
safety standards, operational requirements, or regulatory framework 
applicable to TCRR fully. UPRR's comments express concern that the NPRM 
``lacks any analysis of the potential disruption to other railroad 
operations and infrastructure and the consequential safety and economic 
impacts to communities and the region,'' and the NPRM ``focuses solely 
on the safety of [TCRR's] operations and neglects to consider the 
potential impact on safety of current rail operations; operations that 
are fully compliant with existing FRA regulations.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, Document ID: FRA-2019-0068-0316.
    \34\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA received a similar comment from Delta Troy.\35\ Delta Troy 
identified six ``deficiencies'' that ``plague the safety analysis'' in 
the NPRM, and elaborated that any attempt to fix the deficiencies in a 
final rule would be so extensive that the final would look nothing like 
the NPRM and therefore would not be a ``logical outgrowth'' of the 
NPRM, thus necessitating FRA to re-notice the proposed rule. The six 
areas identified by Delta Troy are that the NPRM: (1) Failed to 
adequately evaluate possible EMI from TCRR to the adjacent UPRR rail 
line; \36\ (2) unreasonably assumed exigent circumstances will not 
require coupling or uncoupling; \37\ (3) failed to examine the safety 
impact of TCRR's grade separation proposal on the adjacent UPRR rail 
line; \38\ (4) failed to acknowledge or examine the possible increase 
in truck traffic and grade crossing usage due to TCRR's proposed 
viaduct; \39\ (5) did not recognize that a different alignment could 
alleviate the risks of heat-induced track buckling and slow orders; 
\40\ and (6) ignored the context and local circumstances in which 
proposed operations will occur.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, Document ID: FRA-2019-0068-0315.
    \36\ See section IV. D. Interference with the Union Pacific 
Railroad of this final rule.
    \37\ See sections IV. J. Emergency Response and V. D. Decision 
under 49 U.S.C. 20306, Exemption for technological improvements of 
this final rule.
    \38\ See section IV. D. Interference with the Union Pacific 
Railroad of this final rule.
    \39\ See section IV. D. Interference with the Union Pacific 
Railroad of this final rule.
    \40\ See section IV. E. Track Safety of this final rule.
    \41\ See section IV. J. Emergency Response of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA responds to Delta Troy's six identified ``deficiencies'' in 
other areas of this final rule, and so FRA will address UPRR's concerns 
here. Primarily, UPRR expressed concern with possible EMI resulting 
from TCRR's contemplated system, along with potential increased risk at 
certain grade crossings, which is addressed in section IV. D. 
Interference with the Union Pacific Railroad. What remains are 
essentially concerns regarding whether the requirements of the rule, as 
they were proposed, properly account for the effect on safety of 
adjacent railroads, that FRA has somehow deprived the public of a 
meaningful opportunity to comment, and that the requirements are 
consistent with the requirements of JRC.
    UPRR stated in its comment that the NPRM was conclusory in its 
approach in ``importing'' the Shinkansen's regulatory framework without 
properly accounting for the effect on the safety of other existing rail 
operations or of the costs imposed on those other rail operations.\42\ 
However, FRA expects that the final rule framework would have no direct 
bearing on the safety of UPRR's operation, assuming it is in compliance 
with its own requirements to protect its systems from electrical 
interference. FRA makes clear that it is imposing its own regulatory 
regime on TCRR. As discussed above, this rulemaking is translating the 
safety-critical technical requirements as implemented on JRC's Tokaido 
Shinkansen system to allow FRA to provide effect safety oversight, as 
discussed in the NPRM.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See also section IV. M. Regulatory Evaluation of this final 
rule.
    \43\ 84 FR 14036.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    UPRR also stated that FRA has deprived the public of a meaningful 
opportunity to comment. FRA disagrees and has clearly met the minimum 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Under 5 U.S.C. 
553(b)(3), when engaged in rulemaking, an agency is required to provide 
notice of a proposed rulemaking to the public through publication in 
the Federal Register, and shall, among other things, include either the 
terms or substance of the proposed rule, or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved. The NPRM, as it explained, was based on 
the petition and associated supporting

[[Page 69708]]

technical information, all of which was made available for public 
review and scrutiny.\44\ In addition, the NPRM exceeded the statutory 
requirement to provide merely the substance of the proposed rule, by 
providing the entirety of the proposed rule text for critical 
examination by interested members of the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ 85 FR 14036, 14038.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a related concern, UPRR stated that it was unclear what FRA 
meant when it used the terms ``shall be based on'' in the regulatory 
text, when referring to requirements for TCRR. For example, under Sec.  
299.707, FRA is requiring that TCRR's initial maintenance schedules, 
included as part of its inspection, testing, and maintenance program, 
be based on those maintenance schedules in effect on JRC's Tokaido 
Shinkansen system. UPRR asserted that the use of this reference created 
ambiguity to the degree that it denied the public a meaningful 
opportunity to comment. Again, FRA disagrees. FRA is unclear as to what 
ambiguity exists in light of the information in the rulemaking docket, 
in both meeting presentations and associated section analyses, provided 
by TCRR.\45\ FRA placed this information in the docket, to allow 
interested members of the public to scrutinize and provide comment. As 
part of those documents, the maintenance intervals in effect on JRC at 
the time of submittal of the documents was included. As part of the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program review and approval 
process under this final rule, TCRR must demonstrate how its initial 
maintenance intervals replicate those of JRC. FRA would expect TCRR to 
include the most current maintenance intervals in use by JRC for the 
Tokaido Shinkansen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ For example, the following provides information on 
maintenance intervals associated with rolling stock: Docket No. FRA-
2019-0068, Document IDs. FRA-2019-0068-0016 ``2017--Exhibit C-8 
Subpart J Section Analysis (Inspection Testing and Maintenance),'' 
FRA-2019-0068-0022 ``2017--Presentation M10P04--N700 Bogie ITM (CI 
redacted),'' and FRA-2019-0068-0024 ``JRCs Practice on Movement of 
Defective Equipment (CI redacted).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Along with the claims discussed above, UPRR raised several comments 
regarding some of the regulatory text associated with Sec. Sec.  
299.13(c)(3), 299.207, 299.209, 299.215, 299.341, and 299.351-299.357. 
The concerns were focused on ensuring that the language of those 
sections, as proposed in the NPRM, would be consistent with similar 
requirements for JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen system so that TCRR would be 
able to replicate the Tokaido Shinkansen properly. UPRR was concerned 
that FRA did not ensure this consistency and asked FRA to explain in 
detail whatever differences might exist in a reissued NPRM so that the 
public could meaningfully participate in the rulemaking process.
    FRA believes that UPRR does not understand fully what FRA stated in 
the NPRM, nor what the rule text is accomplishing for the above-cited 
sections of this final rule. As discussed in the NPRM, TCRR's petition 
represented that the regulatory requirements offered by TCRR were 
translated from the technological and operational aspects of the JRC 
Tokaido Shinkansen.\46\ Each of the above-cited sections referenced by 
UPRR are either technological or operational in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ 85 FR 14036.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, as it relates to the personnel training requirements under 
Sec.  299.13(c)(3), it is unclear to FRA what precise misunderstanding 
UPRR has about this proposed requirement. Section 299.13(c)(3) requires 
TCRR to comply with part 243, which is a performance-based regulation 
that is designed to accommodate myriad different railroad job functions 
and personnel qualifications. This part provides a railroad with broad 
autonomy in determining how its safety-critical employees are 
categorized and does not dictate in any way the required level of 
training or qualification of employees as UPRR seems to suggest. Part 
243 is designed to help ensure that safety critical roles and 
qualifications are identified, and that proper adherence to an adequate 
training program is maintained and documented. JRC's training and 
qualification program is very thorough and comprehensive and far 
exceeds the level of employee training, development, and hands-on 
experience practiced by most, if not all, North American rail 
operators. As such, TCRR should have no difficulty complying with the 
requirements of part 243, and TCRR should be able to leverage fully 
JRC's proven approach to personnel training and qualification.
    In a similar vein, UPRR's comment regarding the PTC Safety Plan 
Content Requirements in Sec.  299.207 is equally perplexing. The PTC 
requirements proposed are derived from 49 CFR part 236, subpart I, but 
modified to reflect only those requirements common to all systems, and 
specific to standalone systems, such as TCRR's. PTC is not a technology 
itself, but rather a set of performance requirements that establish the 
minimum functionality a train control system must have, the most 
fundamental of which are required by statute. PTC terminology used in 
this context is unique to the U.S. statutory and regulatory 
requirements. The PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) is the primary means by which 
the railroad demonstrates compliance with the requirements in subpart B 
of this final rule. And, as long as TCRR's train control system, as 
implemented in Texas, meets the minimum performance and functionality 
requirements of subpart B, what requirements exist in Japan are 
irrelevant in relation to PTC, especially as Japan has no equivalent 
PTC requirement. To put it another way, subpart B requires that TCRR 
demonstrate that its PTC system, as implemented and installed in Texas, 
fulfill the minimum safety requirements--it is not intended to prove 
JRC's technology or its implementation. Likewise, paragraph (a)(6) 
dictates that TCRR demonstrate the adequacy of its program, but it does 
not prescribe how TCRR must do so. In this respect, any pertinent 
training or qualifications required for the successful implementation 
of JRC's Automatic Train Control (ATC) technology would be expected to 
be articulated within TCRR's plan and consistent with JRC's training.
    With respect to Sec. Sec.  299.209 and 299.215, these sections were 
not specifically included in TCRR's petition. However, in TCRR's 
petition, TCRR stated that it would comply with subpart I of 49 CFR 
part 236, in toto. As further explained in the NRPM, FRA stated that it 
was tailoring the requirements of part 236, subpart I, to TCRR's 
standalone PTC system.\47\ Sections 299.209 and 299.215 contain 
virtually equivalent requirements as Sec. Sec.  236.1029 and 236.1039. 
And with respect to the cited track sections, Sec. Sec.  299.341, and 
299.351-299.357, TCRR provided FRA the language for these sections, 
again representing in its petition that they translate the 
technological and operational aspects of JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 85 FR 14036, 14041.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, part 299, subpart B of this final rule is a 
performance standard. This provides TCRR appropriate flexibility in how 
it complies with the requirements, allowing TCRR to replicate the 
service-proven, safety-critical aspects of JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen. In 
its regulatory language, FRA is not requiring TCRR to deviate from JRC 
practice, but expects TCRR to remain consistent with JRC practice.
    In addition to the six ``deficiencies'' noted above, Delta Troy 
also commented that FRA's NPRM was deficient and contrary to the APA in 
that it did not provide adequate notice in the docket of an ``economic 
analysis,''

[[Page 69709]]

and that the NPRM was based on a ``world that no longer exists.''
    In support of its assertion that FRA failed to provide adequate 
notice of an ``economic analysis'' in accord with the APA, Delta Troy 
argues that it could not find any type of economic analysis despite 
FRA's repeated mentioning of such an analysis during the telephonic 
hearings held on May 4-6, 2020. Delta Troy cited to the transcript of 
the May 6th hearing, noting that on page 3 of the transcript the 
Hearing Officer stated that the ``purpose of tonight's hearing is for 
FRA to listen to any interested party's comments on the technical 
safety requirements proposed in the NPRM along with the associated 
economic analysis published in the rule's online docket.'' \48\ 
Further, Delta Troy explained that it examined the NPRM and could not 
find an economic analysis contained in the NPRM, nor in the rulemaking 
docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 05.06.2020--TCRR Telephonic Hearing Transcript at page 3, 
available at www.regulations.gov, Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, Docket 
ID: FRA-2019-0068-0300.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA disagrees. FRA provided its evaluation of the regulatory burden 
on the regulated entity in the NPRM as it is required to under 
Executive Order (E.O.) 12866.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Section V. A. Executive Orders 12866, 13771, and DOT 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the NPRM. 85 FR 14036, 14047.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In support of its claim that the ``NPRM must be replaced as it is 
based on a world that no longer exists,'' Delta Troy invokes the 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) public health emergency. Delta Troy 
asserted that the future of intercity travel will be dramatically 
different from the recent past. It further asserted that the decision 
to move forward with the rulemaking was based on projected ridership 
and train designs that were developed prior to the COVID-19 public 
health emergency, and thus now must be re-evaluated in light of the 
current global situation, and no final rule should be issued until the 
re-evaluation is complete.
    While FRA agrees that these are unprecedented times, it disagrees 
that the rulemaking is obsolete. As explained in section IV. B. 
Regulatory Approach of this final rule, FRA advanced the rulemaking 
because TCRR's proposal: (1) Is consistent with FRA's mission is to 
enable safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods by 
rail; and (2) demonstrated that the proposed system would replicate the 
system and operations of the Tokaido Shinkansen system and its 50-year 
safety record. This rulemaking removes the government barrier to 
private industry seeking to bring transportation innovations to the 
United States; FRA's analysis in an E.O. 12866 context properly relates 
to the effects of government regulatory burdens, and not whether TCRR's 
proposed operation is financially viable. In addition, the analysis 
performed under E.O. 12866 as part of the NPRM and this final rule do 
not rely on ridership estimates or other projections of demand.
    To the commenter's assertion that train design must be reevaluated 
due to the pandemic, the technical safety requirements identified in 
the NPRM remain valid. FRA is not amending any of its other passenger 
equipment safety regulations to mandate train designs account for any 
form of social distancing. FRA expects the railroads and the public to 
abide by protocols and guidance issued by other Federal agencies, and 
State and local governments, and does not believe that rulemaking is 
appropriate.

H. Electrical Arcing From the Overhead Catenary System

    A number of commenters raised concern about the ``sparking'' effect 
often associated with electrified trains. This concern was tied to the 
fact Atmos Energy maintains a natural gas compression station near the 
contemplated TCRR alignment, and that a ``spark'' from a passing high-
speed train could in-turn ignite some volume of gas present at either 
the compression station, or pipelines along the route. However, no 
specific context or evidence was provided to elaborate why the design 
or operation of either the railroad, the compression station, or a 
pipeline, provides for a specific risk to adjacent property.
    The ``spark'' often associated with electrified train systems is 
caused when there is a separation between the power source (the 
catenary system) and its collector (the pantograph on the roof of the 
train). When this separation occurs, it is possible for current to 
continue to flow between the power source and collector. In these 
situations, the high voltage ionizes the air and causes what is known 
as an electrical arc or ``spark'' between the two components. This 
occurrence is part of the normal operation of an electrical traction 
power system like the one proposed by TCRR, and by itself does not pose 
any particular safety risk. Existing FRA regulations do not cover 
electrical arcing because of the lack of a particular safety risk. 
Further, the JRC technology and maintenance practice that is being 
adopted by TCRR has refined this interface to minimize this arcing 
effect significantly, and to a degree that is not comparable to what 
might be witnessed on light-rail or other conventional U.S. electrified 
operations.
    FRA does not believe that this issue requires regulatory action 
within this rule. However, as this issue has been raised, FRA expects 
TCRR to work with Atmos Energy, and any other entity to examine the 
risk, and take whatever precautionary measures that are necessary. To 
this extent, FRA would expect TCRR appropriately addresses this risk 
within the context of its System Safety Program, and is willing to 
provide assistance in coordinating with external entities or 
regulators, as appropriate.

I. Right-of-Way Barrier Protection

    A certain number of comments were raised concerning ROW protection 
and the potential use of barriers in certain situations. These comments 
primarily involved the ability of feral hogs to access the track, but 
also raised questions regarding the protection of TCRR structures and 
track from UPRR derailments.
    With respect to general ROW protection, and specifically the risk 
posed by local feral hogs, FRA notes that safety is generally 
established through multiple fronts. In this case, in addition to 
requirements for ROW protection within this rule under Sec.  
299.13(b)(3), FRA also points to its crashworthiness discussion in 
section IV. F. Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection, above. Most 
notably, in developing the requirements of this final rule, both FRA 
and TCRR considered the potential for differences between the Japanese 
and U.S. operating environments. The existence of animals and other 
potential obstructions supports the adoption of the final rule 
requirement to verify the crashworthiness of the trainset structure to 
protect against the residual risk that might exist beyond even the best 
ROW protection measures.
    As it relates to protection of TCRR structures or ROW from 
potential incursions due to UPRR derailments, such mitigations are not 
covered under FRA's current regulations, and protection of bridge piers 
is typically driven by industry or local standard. Factors that would 
drive such decisions are highly variable based on specific site 
conditions (e.g., track centers, curvature, difference in height 
between top-of-rail, etc.) and cannot be adequately addressed globally. 
FRA expects that once structural designs exist, any localized risk 
presented would be identified in TCRR's risk-based hazard analysis 
program under part 270 and mitigated appropriately.

[[Page 69710]]

J. Emergency Response

    As part of the public hearing process, several comments were 
received with respect to emergency response and access for first 
responders. These comments largely articulated concerns regarding the 
effect that the absence of certain safety requirements might have on 
first responders' ability to get inside a trainset, the impact 
construction might generally have on emergency response times, the 
ability of first responders to access the ROW, and coordination with 
local first responders to ensure adequate capability to respond to an 
emergency on the high-speed railroad. Comments related to the first 
topic, the ability first responders gaining access to a trainset, are 
addressed in the discussion regarding safety appliances under section 
V. D. Decision under 49 U.S.C. 20306, Exemption for technological 
improvements of this final rule. Those comments related to potential 
disruptions to normal emergency response routes caused by construction 
are outside the scope of this rulemaking.\50\ FRA defers to local and 
State officials in the coordination of potential road closures or other 
impacts to potential emergency response times caused by construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ While outside the scope of rulemaking FRA considered 
potential disruptions to emergency response routes in Section 
3.16.5.2.2, Safety and Security, Build Alternatives of the Final 
EIS. TCRR has agreed to implement mitigation to address potential 
delays. See Section 3.16.6.2, Safety and Security, Mitigation 
Measures of the Final EIS, SS-MM#1, Model Construction Impacts on 
Emergency Response Times of the Final EIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As it relates to comments regarding ROW access and TCRR 
coordination with local first responders, FRA notes that the NPRM 
proposed to apply all Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness 
requirements contained within 49 CFR part 239, and is doing so in this 
final rule. Right-of-way access, coordination, and establishment of the 
emergency equipment needs and training requirements for local first 
responders are a part of the planning process required by part 239. 
Many of these specific planning activities cannot begin in earnest 
until final ROW designs are developed. This rule only establishes the 
planning requirements, with the execution of those requirements 
naturally occurring at a later time, and is identical to the 
requirements with which all other passenger railroads in the U.S. must 
comply.
    A number of commenters objected to TCRR's limited early engagement 
with local first responders. Specifically, commenters raised concern 
with TCRR having asked the local first responders what equipment the 
first responders thought would be necessary in responding to an 
emergency on the railroad. Commenters expressed disappointment that 
TCRR was not advising the local first responders as to the type of 
equipment TCRR would expect the first responders to have. In addition, 
commenters noted that TCRR has not provided a list of necessary or 
required equipment to the local first responders. This appears to be a 
byproduct of misunderstanding the level of maturity of the system, and 
the fact that only conceptual design exists at this stage. The actions 
taken by TCRR at this early stage demonstrate a proactive approach to 
the matter, and will help inform the railroad on the capability of the 
local first responders along the alignment. This knowledge will benefit 
TCRR as it continues to develop the engineering design, and situations 
such as ladder height, emergency egress and equipment needs, and ROW 
access capability.

K. Noise Emission and Vibration

    Several commenters raised concerns about the noise emission and 
vibration that will be caused by the passing of the trainset once in 
service. With respect to noise emission, when looking at Sec.  
299.3(c)(3) as proposed in the NPRM and in this final rule, TCRR must 
comply with 49 CFR part 210, Railroad Noise Emission Compliance 
Regulations, which prescribes minimum compliance regulations for 
enforcement of the Railroad Noise Emission Standards established by the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 40 CFR part 201.
    There are no required vibration standards for railroads. However, 
FRA evaluated the potential impacts resulting from vibration during 
construction and operation of the HSR system in the Final EIS, and 
found that while there may be some annoyance impacts due to vibration 
during construction, no vibration impacts due to operations are 
anticipated. Nevertheless, the Final EIS identified mitigation measures 
for potential noise and vibration impacts, which includes compliance 
with local regulations on noise and vibration as well as conducting 
additional noise and vibration assessments and monitoring noise and 
vibration during operations testing.\51\ In addition, where 
construction activities such as pile driving for structures and 
vibratory compaction for ground improvements would occur within 50 feet 
of underground utilities, TCRR would coordinate with the utilities to 
identify where relocation and/or encasement would be needed to avoid 
vibration damage from nearby construction, and compensate the utilities 
for such work.\52\ TCRR has agreed to implement the identified 
mitigation. See section VI. C. Mitigation Commitments, of this final 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Section 3.4., 
Noise and Vibration.
    \52\ Id. at 3.4-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

L. Eminent Domain

    One commenter raised the issue of eminent domain and asked FRA what 
influence its Federal actions would have on any eminent domain issue. 
To the best of FRA's knowledge, eminent domain powers under the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are not involved. FRA understands 
the eminent domain issues to be centered on the interpretation of 
various Texas State statutes. FRA defers to the State of Texas to 
interpret its own statutes.

M. Regulatory Evaluation

    Several commenters discussed the financial feasibility of TCRR and 
stated that FRA did not take this into account when it issued the NPRM. 
However, it is outside FRA's regulatory scope to consider the economic 
viability of a specific railroad project, so it was not addressed as 
part of the NPRM.\53\ FRA's economic analysis in the NPRM evaluates the 
impact of the Federal regulatory burden on TCRR operations.\54\ FRA's 
responsibility is to ensure that the railroad industry is operating in 
a safe manner, not to examine the economic viability of a specific 
project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 85 FR 14036, 14048, FN 10.
    \54\ In addition, as required by NEPA, FRA considered as part of 
the EIS the overall direct and indirect impacts to the socioeconomic 
environment that may occur as a result of TCRR's construction and 
operation of its proposed project, including employment and 
earnings, property impacts, property tax and net change in tax 
revenue. FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Section 
3.14.5.2.3, Economic Impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, several commenters asserted that FRA did not 
adequately account for the costs in its economic analysis. As discussed 
in the NPRM, FRA concluded that since TCRR's compliance with the 
requirements in this rulemaking are voluntary, the rulemaking does not 
impose any additional Federal regulatory burdens.\55\ Costs such as 
equipment design,

[[Page 69711]]

equipment changes, associated studies, and other costs are costs 
voluntarily assumed by TCRR to create the specific system contemplated 
by this rule. TCRR petitioned FRA for a rulemaking so it could create a 
unique HSR system, which does not meet Tier III passenger equipment 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ 85 FR 14036, 14047.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    UPRR commented that the rulemaking did not address the effect of 
the implementation of TCRR's system and on the safety of other 
entities. UPRR further stated that although TCRR's actions may be 
considered voluntary, TCRR's system would introduce outside 
interference on adjacent railroads, which require action and incur cost 
to address. FRA understands that there could be costs to existing 
railroads when an adjacent railroad begins operations, these costs will 
not necessarily occur and FRA is unable to estimate them. These costs 
are speculative and are difficult to determine because the final 
designs for the TCRR project are not yet developed. Therefore, these 
costs are not included in FRA's economic analysis. Further, as 
explained above in response to UPRR concerns regarding potential 
interference, FRA expects that the final rule framework would have no 
direct bearing on the safety of UPRR's operation.
    Several commenters also stated that the requirements, as proposed 
in the NPRM, would have an impact on small entities and FRA did not 
account for this within its regulatory flexibility analysis. FRA, in 
conjunction with the Small Business Administration (SBA), has developed 
a definition of small entities that is used when evaluating the 
economic impact of regulations. Commuter railroads serving populations 
of 50,000 or less are considered to be small entities, therefore TCRR 
is not a small entity and the regulation will not impact any small 
entities. For further information, please see FRA's discussion of its 
regulatory flexibility analysis, as required by the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act \56\ and E.O. 13272,\57\ under section V. B. Regulatory 
Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; Regulatory Flexibility 
Assessment of the NPRM \58\ and section VII. B. Regulatory Flexibility 
Act and Executive Order 13272; Regulatory Flexibility Assessment of 
this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \57\ 67 FR 53461 (Aug. 16, 2002).
    \58\ 85 FR 14036, 14048.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

N. Enforcement

    As stated in the NPRM under section IV. F. Enforcement, FRA will 
publish a civil penalty schedule on its website.\59\ Because such 
penalty schedules are statements of agency policy, notice and comment 
are not required prior to their issuance, nor are they required to be 
published in the CFR.\60\ Although not required, FRA solicited comment 
on this subject, but did not receive any comments on the types of 
actions or omissions under each regulatory section that would subject a 
person to the assessment of a civil penalty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 85 FR 14036, 14046.
    \60\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA also clarifies that other enforcement tools, such as emergency 
orders, individual liability actions, or compliance orders, are 
available for FRA to use, as necessary, in providing safety oversight 
of TCRR.

V. Discussion of Final Rule and Regulatory Changes

A. Non-Substantive Corrections

    TCRR, in its comments, pointed out a few instances where FRA had 
inadvertently included (or failed to include) certain regulatory text 
that was not submitted in the proposed rule text included with TCRR's 
petition. In response, FRA is modifying the final rule, but these 
changes are not substantive.
    Under proposed Sec.  299.301(b), FRA included maintenance-of-way 
(MOW) yards (locations where MOW equipment is stored) when discussing 
restoration or renewal of track class H2. As track within MOW yards 
will be classified only as track class H0, it was not correct for FRA 
to include a reference to yards in this provision. Accordingly, in this 
final rule, FRA has removed ``yards and'' from paragraph (b).
    Under proposed Sec.  299.345, FRA converted a table appearing in 
TCRR's petition to rule text. The table depicted the frequency of 
certain types of required track inspections. In converting the table to 
text, FRA clarified the requirements contained in the table. However, 
in doing so, there were also some inadvertent errors in the NPRM rule 
text. Under Sec.  299.345(b)(1), which contains the requirements for 
safe walkway inspections, FRA failed to include the text from footnote 
1 to Sec.  2xx.343(c) from the TCRR petition's rule text. The footnote 
permitted a visual inspection during overnight hours and, in the event 
of extreme weather, from the trainset cab in lieu of a safe walkway 
inspection. To correct this oversight, FRA is adding new paragraph 
(b)(1)(vii), which permits a visual inspection from the trainset cab or 
an on-track visual inspection in lieu of a safe walkway inspection in 
the event of extreme weather. FRA slightly modified the language to 
make clear that an inspection during the overnight hours is considered 
an on-track visual inspection.
    In addition, under Sec.  299.345(b)(2), FRA proposed requirements 
for on-track inspections for track other than track located within 
Train Maintenance Facilities (TMFs) and MOW yards. Proposed paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii) specified that turn-outs and track crossings were to be 
inspected at least once a week, with a minimum of three calendar days 
between inspections. However, FRA inadvertently failed to distinguish 
between turn-outs and track crossing on ballasted track versus on non-
ballasted track. In this final rule, FRA is making that distinction by 
clarifying that the requirements of Sec.  299.345(b)(2)(iii) apply only 
to turn-outs and rail crossings on ballasted track. FRA has added new 
paragraph (b)(2)(iv) for non-ballasted track, which specifies that 
turn-outs and rail crossings on non-ballasted track shall have an on-
track inspection conducted at least once every two weeks, with a 
minimum of six calendar days between inspections. This is consistent 
with the rule text in TCRR's petition.
    Under Sec.  299.345(b)(3), FRA inadvertently restricted the conduct 
of on-track inspections to ``during maintenance hours.'' Under Sec.  
299.301(b), track maintenance in MOW yards and TMFs is not restricted 
to maintenance hours, as it is for mainline track under Sec.  
299.301(a). As such, track inspections can be conducted under traffic 
conditions, so long as proper on-track safety is provided as required 
under 49 CFR part 214. Under Sec.  299.3(c), TCRR must comply with 49 
CFR part 214 for on-track safety, with the exception of Sec.  214.339. 
Accordingly, in this final rule, FRA removed ``during maintenance 
hours'' from Sec.  299.345(b)(3) and added new paragraph (b)(3)(iii) to 
make explicit the requirement that 49 CFR part 214 (with the exception 
of Sec.  214.339) be followed for on-track safety within the TMFs and 
MOW yards when on-track inspections are performed under traffic 
conditions. Nothing in this discussion should be construed as affecting 
the general prohibition under Sec.  299.301(a) of performing on-track 
maintenance or inspections of track, other than track in MOW yards and 
TMFs, under traffic conditions. In those locations, MOW work and 
revenue service must still be

[[Page 69712]]

temporally separated, as discussed in the NRPM.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ 85 FR 14036, 14038 and 14043.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under proposed Sec.  299.609(a), FRA inadvertently left out the 
word ``types'' after vehicle. In this final rule, FRA has added the 
word ``types'' to clarify the requirement, which is consistent with FRA 
practice regarding vehicle/track interaction qualification.
    In addition to the above changes, FRA also made several minor 
technical changes. Under Sec.  299.315(g), FRA removed an incorrect 
cross-reference to Sec.  299.337 as the term ``vehicle type'' is not 
used in Sec.  299.337. Under Sec.  299.407(d), FRA changed ``emergency 
window exit'' to ``emergency egress window'' for consistency of term 
use. FRA made the same change for the same reason to Sec.  299.427. 
Finally, under Sec.  299.439(b), FRA fixed an incorrect reference to 
``this paragraph'' and correctly changed the reference to ``paragraph 
(c) of this section.''

B. Evaluation of Substantive Changes

1. Sec.  299.5 Definitions
    In its comments, TCRR requested that FRA make some changes to the 
rule text to help remove ambiguity. Under Sec.  299.5, TCRR requested 
that FRA amend the proposed definition of ``passenger equipment.'' In 
support of its request, TCRR stated that the proposed definition 
implied that TCRR's trainsets would be approved for use on JRC's 
Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system, which TCRR commented is not correct. 
While TCRR's trainset will be based on current or future variants of 
the N700 series trainset approved for use on the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR 
system, TCRR's trainset itself will not be approved for use on the 
Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system, as it has fewer passenger cars than what 
JRC runs. Accordingly, TCRR requested that FRA change the definition of 
``passenger equipment'' to mean the N700 series trainset that is based 
on trainsets currently in service, or future variants operated on, 
JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen system, or any unit thereof. FRA agrees and 
has made the change in this final rule. To be clear, the term 
``passenger equipment'' is referring to the N700 series passenger 
trainset that TCRR will operate on its system, which is based on the 
trainset in use presently, or future variants thereof, by JRC on the 
Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system. What is important is not whether the 
TCRR trainset has been approved for use on the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR 
system, but that it is based on that technology and complies with the 
requirements of this rule.
    In addition, under Sec.  299.5, TCRR requested that FRA amend the 
proposed definition of ``in passenger service/in revenue service.'' In 
support of its request, TCRR pointed to proposed Sec.  299.13(a)(3), 
which discussed and defined the requirement for temporally separating 
scheduled ROW maintenance from revenue passenger operations. TCRR 
raised a concern in its comment that leaving a passenger trainset 
properly secured in a station overnight during MOW operations could run 
afoul of the temporal separation requirement. TCRR further explained 
that its understanding of the temporal separation requirement under 
Sec.  299.13(a)(3), as proposed in the NPRM, is that the ROW must be 
cleared of all revenue service trainsets (including any trainset 
repositioning moves) in order to ensure trainsets cannot be moved into 
established maintenance zones. Moreover, TCRR stated that it would not 
consider a parked, properly secured trainset in a station location to 
be a revenue service trainset because it would not be actively carrying 
or available to carry passengers. TCRR further stated that a trainset 
could be considered available to carry passengers, and thus considered 
``in passenger service/in revenue service'' only after receiving power 
from the overhead catenary system and receiving a pre-departure 
inspection by the driver. And, as overhead catenary power will be 
restored to the ROW only after it has been cleared of MOW equipment, 
with the general control center returning the signal and trainset 
control system to the state required to protect revenue operations, a 
trainset could not be considered ``in passenger service/in revenue 
service'' during MOW operations, thus accomplishing the temporal 
separation required by the rule. Accordingly, to codify this 
understanding, TCRR requested that FRA add to the definition of ``in 
passenger service/in revenue service'' a carve-out that a trainset that 
is parked and properly secured within a station overnight is not 
considered to be in revenue service, and thereby it does not need to be 
cleared from the ROW prior to MOW operations commencing.
    The purpose of the temporal separation requirement is two-fold: (1) 
Protection of passengers in the high-speed trainsets from a collision 
with heavy MOW equipment; and (2) protection of the MOW employees 
performing work within the ROW from the risk of being struck by a high-
speed trainset. In both situations, the risk involves a moving high-
speed trainset. As discussed in the NPRM, removal of overhead catenary 
power to those sections of the ROW where MOW operations are occurring 
or planned to occur is a requirement,\62\ and without overhead catenary 
power, a high-speed trainset is incapable of generating tractive power, 
so those two risks, a collision between a high-speed trainset carrying 
passengers and MOW equipment, and MOW employees being struck by a high-
speed trainset, are heavily mitigated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ 85 FR 14036, 14043.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, when looking at the requirements for temporal separation 
under Sec.  299.13(a)(3), there is a requirement that the railroad must 
complete its trainset repositioning moves prior to the commencement of 
MOW operations. Trainset repositioning moves are not considered ``in 
passenger service/in revenue service,'' but rather considered ``in 
service,'' as that term was defined in the NPRM, as trainsets being 
repositioned would not necessarily be available to carry passengers. In 
addition, as scheduled MOW operations \63\ occur outside of revenue 
service hours, FRA would expect trainsets to be loaded with passengers 
or available to carry passengers, and thus would not consider trainsets 
outside of revenue service hours to be ``in passenger service/in 
revenue service.'' But, they may be considered ``in service.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Unscheduled or emergency MOW operations during revenue 
service hours to repair a broken rail, for example, requires TCRR to 
halt revenue service over the affected portion of the right-of-way 
until the repair work is completed and has been inspected. See Sec.  
299.301(a) (prohibiting the restoration or renewal of track under 
traffic conditions that is located other than in TMFs and MOW 
yards).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, FRA is adopting the proposed definition of ``in 
passenger service/in revenue service'' in this final rule unchanged. 
But, FRA is amending the definition of ``in service'' to include a 
fourth exception to address the situation where TCRR has a trainset 
parked in a station location that is properly secured and has been 
deemed not in service by the railroad (meaning TCRR is not intending on 
repositioning or otherwise moving the trainset until the cessation of 
MOW operations).
2. Subpart B--Signal and Trainset Control System
    In its response to the NPRM, TCRR provided several comments and 
suggested edits with respect to FRA's proposed requirements for a PTC 
system, the certification process, and TCRR's interpretation of how 
those requirements should apply to its proposed use of the Tokaido

[[Page 69713]]

Shinkansen ATC technology. FRA finds that many of these comments appear 
to originate from a misunderstanding of how the term ``system'' is used 
and what, exactly, FRA must certify under 49 U.S.C. 20157, 
Implementation of positive train control systems.
    TCRR commented on Sec.  299.201(c) and asserted that it does not 
anticipate the need for any regression testing \64\ before FRA 
certifies TCRR's PTC system. In support of its assertion, TCRR stated 
that TCRR's system will be based on the service-proven Tokaido 
Shinkansen ATC system, and TCRR does not anticipate that any changes 
will be made to safety-critical software prior to obtaining PTC System 
Certification from FRA. Further, while TCRR does not believe regression 
testing would be necessary prior to its initial installation of ATC and 
FRA certification, TCRR does believe regression testing is appropriate 
for potential changes to its ATC technology that could possibly occur 
in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Regression testing is used to ensure that previously tested 
software still performs as intended after a change to that software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As proposed in the NPRM, Sec.  299.201(c) generally authorizes TCRR 
to conduct field testing of its uncertified PTC system and field 
regression testing of its FRA-certified PTC system, which could 
encompass, for example, future modifications to ATC functionality. As 
proposed, paragraph (c) was not intended to specify what type of tests 
are required in either instance. The exact tests to be performed are to 
be defined by the railroad in the development of its PTCSP, 
particularly with respect to the content requirements in Sec.  
299.207(a)(7), (a)(9), and (a)(10). TCRR must demonstrate that its PTC 
system, as built, fulfills the requirements contained in subpart B. The 
distinction that TCRR's proposed PTC system is based on a service-
proven technology has no bearing in this instance. Under the statutory 
mandate, FRA must certify that a railroad's PTC system complies with 
the applicable PTC regulations (in this instance, 49 CFR part 299, 
subpart B), not the theoretical capability of the technology.\65\ What 
constitutes safety-critical software has yet to be defined in detail by 
TCRR, as required under Sec.  299.441, and the changes required to be 
made to the existing ATC software (whether on the executive or 
application side) have yet to be described.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ 49 U.S.C. 20157(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As such, although the term ``regression testing'' in paragraph (c) 
is used in the context of post-certification field testing, this is not 
intended to suggest that this is the only circumstance that would call 
for regression testing, as several railroads have performed regression 
testing on an ongoing basis before and after obtaining PTC System 
Certification from FRA. FRA does not agree with TCRR's reading of Sec.  
299.201(c) as requiring regression testing; that paragraph merely 
authorizes TCRR to conduct various levels of field testing, including 
regression testing. FRA believes the necessary level of testing and 
validation should be determined as TCRR's system is developed and 
implemented, as required under Sec.  299.207.
    In its comments, TCRR also asserts that because it plans to use an 
existing signaling system, the requirement to include a ``description 
of the safety assurance concepts that are to be used for system 
development, including an explanation of the design principles and 
assumptions'' within TCRR's PTCSP (see Sec.  299.207(a)(2)) should only 
apply only to modifications to its system. TCRR contends that because 
the system was developed long ago, these principles would not apply in 
the same manner as they would to a system that is under development. 
TCRR recommends that paragraph (a)(2) be modified to refer only to 
safety-critical changes to the ATC system, not the initial version of 
TCRR's ATC system. FRA disagrees with this perspective.
    TCRR is correct that the core safety assurance concepts, design 
principles, and design assumptions are fundamental to the development 
of any new system, but they are also equally important in the 
implementation of existing technology. These core concepts, principles, 
and assumptions provide a baseline for safety assurance that govern the 
safe implementation of a system, whether proven or novel. In the case 
of TCRR, although the ATC system used on JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen HSR 
system was developed years ago, FRA would expect that the fundamental 
concepts (e.g., fail safe), essential design principles, and any 
assumptions critical to the safety case of the system are understood by 
TCRR in a manner that can be articulated as part of its PTCSP. If TCRR 
cannot articulate these fundamental concepts, FRA would question how 
TCRR intends to ensure that the application and installation of the 
system in Texas is performed correctly. FRA acknowledges that JRC's 
Tokaido Shinkansen ATC technology has an extraordinary safety record, 
but TCRR must provide sufficient information in its PTCSP for FRA to 
certify that the ATC system in Texas fulfills the requirements under 49 
CFR part 299, subpart B.
    With respect to the requirement to include a complete description 
of TCRR's verification and validation process in its PTCSP, under Sec.  
299.207(a)(5), TCRR proposed that operational data from JRC's Tokaido 
Shinkansen HSR system would serve to adequately demonstrate that the 
technology and its functions, as conceived by JRC, have been 
successfully validated. FRA suspects that TCRR's interpretation comes 
from its perception that this requirement, and the corresponding 
requirement in 49 CFR 236.1015(d)(5), are intended for the validation 
and verification of a new system under development. FRA would like to 
make clear that a verification and validation process is essential to 
the implementation of any system, whether new or previously certified. 
The actual application of a technology is just as important as its 
theoretical performance. In this respect, even railroads that are 
implementing previously certified and type-approved PTC systems have 
substantial verification and validation processes and tests to ensure 
that the system, once installed, functions as designed and intended. 
Operational data from the existing JRC operation would not suffice in 
this case. As an example, a technology may be proven to effectively 
enforce civil speeds (i.e., speed limits), but if the installation or 
application design is not correct, the cab signal code or track chart 
could allow for a maximum authorized speed that is not consistent with 
the safe civil speed required for a particular curve. Errors such as 
this are not uncommon when considering the volume of work that must be 
performed to install a system on hundreds (or thousands) of miles of 
track, and thus the verification and validation process is critical for 
the safe implementation of any train control system.
    In its comments, TCRR further recommended changes to Sec.  
299.207(a)(18) to specifically reference the Tokaido Shinkansen system 
as being the baseline for comparison with TCRR's system. However, the 
modification is unnecessary for TCRR to reference the Tokaido 
Shinkansen as the baseline for comparison. As TCRR correctly 
identified, this requirement is derived from 49 CFR 236.1007(c)(1). FRA 
believes that, when possible, the RPA and the existing PTC requirements 
for high-speed service should be consistent. TCRR will be able to 
comply with Sec.  299.207(a)(18), as the provision permits TCRR to use 
foreign service data in its PTCSP.
    FRA is updating the language under Sec.  299.209(e) to directly 
reference Sec.  236.1029(h). The language of

[[Page 69714]]

Sec.  299.209(e) as proposed in the NPRM was based on the language of 
Sec.  236.1029(h), so the requirement to report has not changed. This 
is consistent with other sections under subpart B.
    In addition, in its comments, TCRR acknowledges that proposed Sec.  
299.211 would establish certain security requirements for a PTC system 
utilizing wireless communications. Although TCRR does not currently 
intend for its ATC system to utilize wireless communications, TCRR 
comments that it does not object to retaining this provision in case it 
utilizes wireless communications in the future. Accordingly, FRA will 
retain the language under proposed Sec.  299.211, as it mirrors the 
existing PTC requirements under Sec.  236.1033.
3. Sec.  299.345 Visual Inspections; Right-of-Way
    Under Sec.  299.345(b)(3)(i) and (ii), TCRR asked for the 
inspection frequency to be reduced from twice to once during the 
relevant period. As proposed, Sec.  299.345(b)(3)(i) and (ii) require 
TCRR to inspect track within TMFs and MOW yards twice during a 60-day 
period for ballasted track and twice during a 120-day period for non-
ballasted track. TCRR commented that although the rule language as 
proposed was consistent with the rule text provided with TCRR's 
petition, it is not wholly consistent with JRC practice. According to 
TCRR, JRC's practice is to inspect this type of track only once during 
the relevant periods (a 60-day period for ballasted track and a 120-day 
period for non-ballasted track). FRA recognizes that the language as 
proposed under Sec.  299.345(b)(3)(i) and (ii) appears to contain 
requirements more stringent than what JRC requires on the Tokaido 
Shinkansen HSR system. Therefore, consistent with FRA and TCRR's goal 
to replicate JRC's requirements as closely as possible, FRA has made 
the requested change.
4. Sec.  299.347 Special Inspections
    TCRR requested in its comments that FRA amend the language of 
proposed Sec.  299.347. As proposed, Sec.  299.347 contains 
requirements for TCRR to conduct a special inspection of its track and 
ROW prior to the operation of a trainset in the event of fire, flood, 
severe storm, or temperature extremes that could damage the track 
structure. TCRR pointed out, though, that the language of proposed 
Sec.  299.347 prohibits movement of a trainset, regardless of location 
in the ROW (e.g., between stations), until an inspection has been 
performed. TCRR also stated that JRC has certain operating rules that 
would permit movement of a trainset to the next forward station 
location prior to an inspection so long as specific criteria were met. 
TCRR offered as an example if operations were suspended due to a heavy 
rainfall, defined by an amount of rain measured by that segment's 
rainfall gauge over a specific time interval preceding the trainset 
movement, a trainset would be allowed to move to the next station at a 
speed not to exceed 30 km/h (18.6 mph). Accordingly, TCRR requested 
that FRA amend the language of this section to require inspections of 
the track and ROW to be performed as soon as possible after the 
occurrence of a fire, flood, severe storm, temperature extremes, or 
other types of events that may cause damage to the track structure, in 
accordance with the railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program, and operating rules.
    FRA agrees that an event may occur while a trainset is en route 
between stations that would halt the operation of the trainset prior to 
reaching the next station and trigger a special inspection, as proposed 
in the NPRM under Sec.  299.347. Because of this, FRA has updated this 
section in the final rule. FRA has designated the previously 
undesignated text as paragraph (a) and added a new paragraph (b) to 
allow a trainset that is between stations to proceed to the next 
forward station at restricted speed, not to exceed 30 km/h (18.6 mph) 
after an event contemplated by this section occurs. This allows for the 
movement of passengers to a station so they are not stranded in the ROW 
until an inspection of the track and ROW can be performed. However, FRA 
makes clear that no trainset may depart a station location until a 
special inspection of the effected track and ROW can be performed. This 
new paragraph (b) is only to permit the movement of passengers to the 
next station that would otherwise be stranded between station 
locations. Should the track and/or ROW be discovered to be damaged so 
as to put the safety of the passengers in jeopardy, then the movement 
is expected to stop until the track is inspected by a qualified person, 
and the qualified person makes a determination that movement can safely 
proceed.
5. Sec.  299.713 Program Approval Procedures
    TCRR further requested that FRA amend the language of Sec.  
299.713(c)(2) as proposed in the NPRM. As proposed, Sec.  299.713(c)(2) 
provided the procedures for approval of amendments to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program. Any amendment that relaxes an FRA-
approved requirement will be reviewed by FRA within 45 days of receipt 
of the amendment, by which time FRA will notify TCRR whether the 
amendment is approved, or if not approved, stating the specific points 
in which the amendment is deficient. Crucial to this part of the 
paragraph was that the railroad could not implement the amendment until 
FRA had approved it. The proposed paragraph further stated that if the 
railroad wanted to amend the program by making an FRA-approved 
requirement more stringent, the railroad could implement the amendment 
prior to receiving FRA approval on the amendment.
    Although TCRR generally accepted that the language would address 
many possible amendments, TCRR commented that there may be situations 
where it is unclear as to whether the proposed inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program amendment is making an FRA-approved requirement 
more stringent or relaxed. Thus, TCRR requested FRA change the language 
of proposed paragraph (c)(2), such that if the railroad proposes to 
amend an FRA-approved program requirement that TCRR deems to be more 
stringent, the railroad is permitted to act immediately to implement 
the amendment prior to obtaining FRA approval.
    FRA is not adopting TCRR's recommendation because FRA finds the 
language to be sufficiently clear and expects that most situations, as 
TCRR has acknowledged, will be straightforward in their resolution. For 
example, if TCRR wishes to perform inspections more frequently than 
required in its inspection, testing, and maintenance program, FRA would 
consider TCRR's proposed action as more stringent than what is 
required. Conversely, if TCRR wishes to perform inspections less 
frequently than required in its inspection program, testing, and 
maintenance program, FRA would consider TCRR's proposed action as less 
stringent than what is required, and TCRR must have FRA approval before 
implementing the change. When there is a question as to whether TCRR's 
proposed action is making a requirement more stringent or relaxed, FRA 
would expect TCRR to either treat the action as relaxing, triggering 
FRA review, or to contact FRA to inquire.

C. Trainset Image Recording System

    In the NPRM, FRA proposed to make applicable to TCRR the 
requirement to have an image recording system installed on its 
trainsets, consistent with FRA's Locomotive Image and Audio Recording 
Devices for Passenger Trains

[[Page 69715]]

NPRM.\66\ As discussed in the TCRR NPRM, FRA stated that once the image 
recording device rulemaking was finalized, that FRA would make 
conforming changes to this final rule's regulatory text. However, as 
FRA has not yet published the image recording devices final rule, FRA 
will make any necessary changes to this regulation as part of that 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ 85 FR 14036, 14041; (84 FR 35712, Jul. 24, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Decision Under 49 U.S.C. 20306, Exemption for Technological 
Improvements

    As discussed in the NPRM, FRA's safety appliance regulation is 
based on longstanding statutory requirements for individual railroad 
cars used in general service. These requirements are primarily intended 
to keep railroad employees safe while performing their essential job 
functions. Historically, these duties have revolved around the practice 
of building trains by switching individual cars or groups of cars, and 
are not directly applicable to how modern high-speed passenger 
equipment is designed and operated. The application of such appliances 
would require a significant redesign of HSR equipment, and would create 
aerodynamic problems, particularly with respect to associated noise 
emissions. In the NPRM, FRA proposed to exempt TCRR from statutory 
requirements that are not applicable or practical for inclusion on its 
high-speed trainset technology, pursuant to the authority granted under 
49 U.S.C. 20306.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ 85 FR 14036, 14040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rather than apply legacy requirements that are inappropriate for 
the proposed equipment's design and service environment, this final 
rule focuses on how to provide a safe environment for crews as it 
pertains to the N700 series trainset, and modern high-speed operations 
throughout the world. In this respect, this final rule defines specific 
safety appliance performance requirements applicable to this semi-
permanently coupled trainset. By focusing on the job functions this 
approach is expected to: Improve safety for crews and railroad 
employees; provide flexibility for superior designs based on modern 
ergonomics; and allow for elimination of appliances when their 
functionality is moot (e.g., riding on side sill steps despite an 
inability to couple/decouple cars). FRA believes it is appropriate to 
grant relief under the discretionary process established under 49 
U.S.C. 20306 and adopts these requirements under its statutory 
authority as part of this rulemaking.
    As part of the hearing held on May 4, 2020, FRA conducted 
proceedings under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to determine whether to invoke its 
discretionary authority to provide relief to TCRR from certain 
requirements of 49 U.S.C. ch. 203 for its planned operation of high-
speed trainsets built to the requirements contained in this final rule. 
Under 49 U.S.C. 20306, FRA may exempt TCRR from the above-identified 
statutory requirements based on evidence received and findings 
developed at a hearing demonstrating that the statutory requirements 
``preclude the development or implementation of more efficient railroad 
transportation equipment or other transportation innovations under 
existing law.''
    In its rulemaking petition, TCRR requested FRA exercise its 
discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt its high-speed 
passenger rail trainsets from the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 20302, 
which mandates that railroad vehicles be equipped with: (1) Secure sill 
steps and efficient hand brakes; (2) secure grab irons or handholds on 
vehicle ends and sides for greater security to individuals coupling and 
uncoupling vehicles; and (3) the standard height of drawbars. See 49 
U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), and (a)(3). On May 14, 2020, FRA granted 
similar relief under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt Amtrak's new high-speed 
passenger rail trainsets,\68\ based on evidence presented at a public 
hearing held on December 11, 2019. TCRR also testified at this hearing 
in support of Amtrak's petition and noted its pending need for similar 
technological exemption. FRA notes no substantive differences in the 
justification for exemption between TCRR and Amtrak, as both requests 
pertain to the implementation of modern high-speed passenger rail 
trainsets. FRA believes its exemption for such technology under 
Amtrak's petition could be extended to any similar high-speed passenger 
rail trainset technology, but given the unique nature of this 
rulemaking, and the overlap in timing between TCRR's petition and FRA's 
decision to grant Amtrak's petition, FRA felt it was appropriate to 
conduct proceedings under 49 U.S.C. 20306 as part of the hearing held 
on May 4, 2020. By taking this approach, FRA could ensure transparency 
and provide ample opportunity for comment from those most affected by 
the TCRR proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See docket FRA-2019-0066.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In support of its request for an exemption, TCRR noted in its 
petition that safety appliances such as sill steps, or end or side 
handholds, are typically used in conventional North American practice 
by maintenance personnel who ride the side of trainsets in yards or 
maintenance facilities for marshalling operations. The N700 series 
trainset, as described in this final rule, is a fixed-consist trainset 
where trainset make-up only occurs in defined locations where 
maintenance personnel can safely climb on, under, or between the 
equipment, consistent with the protections afforded under 49 CFR part 
218.
    In addition, the leading and trailing ends of the N700 series 
trainset are equipped with an automatic coupler located behind a 
removable shroud. These couplers, as proposed by TCRR, will only be 
used for rescue operations in accordance with TCRR's operating rules, 
and provide for the safe coupling of one trainset to another (i.e., 
each end will have automatic self-centering couplers that couple to 
other trainsets on impact, and uncouple by mechanisms that do not 
require a person to go between trainsets or activate a traditional 
uncoupling lever). Further, as proposed, level boarding will be 
provided at all locations in trainset maintenance facilities where crew 
and maintenance personnel are normally required to access or disembark 
trainsets. Moreover, because the equipment is a fixed-consist trainset 
in which individual vehicles are semi-permanently coupled and, as noted 
above, individual vehicles can only be disconnected in repair 
facilities where personnel can work on, under, or between units under 
protections consistent with 49 CFR part 218, having drawbars at the 
statutorily prescribed height is unnecessary.
    As such, there is not a functional need to equip the ends of the 
trainsets with sill steps, end or side handholds, or uncoupling levers. 
As this technology is intended to operate at high-speeds, the inclusion 
of these appurtenances would have a significant and detrimental impact 
on the aerodynamics of the trainset. This increase in the aerodynamic 
footprint would negatively impact both efficiency and aerodynamic noise 
emissions.
    TCRR also noted that trainset securement will be provided by the 
use of wheel chocks in addition to stringent operating rules and 
procedures, which will be consistent with the service-proven procedures 
utilized on the Tokaido Shinkansen system. In addition, as proposed in 
the NPRM, TCRR will be required to demonstrate, as part of its vehicle 
qualification procedures, that the procedures

[[Page 69716]]

effectively secure the trainset (see Sec.  299.607).
    In sum, TCRR asserted that requiring compliance with the identified 
statutory requirements would serve to preclude the development or 
implementation of more efficient railroad transportation equipment or 
other transportation innovations under existing law.
    During the hearing conducted on May 4, 2020, TCRR provided 
testimony in support of its exemption request, which reiterated its 
position stated in its rulemaking petition, which is summarized 
below.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See 05.04.2020--TCRR Telephonic Hearing Transcript at page 
17-30, available at www.regulations.gov, Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, 
Document ID: 2019-0068-0291.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TCRR testified that, with respect to couplers being able to couple 
automatically on impact and capable of being uncoupled without the 
necessity of an individual going between ends of vehicles, that the 
inter-car connections and coupling mechanisms on TCRR's trainsets are 
different than those envisioned by 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(A). TCRR 
explained that its trainsets can only be separated at a maintenance 
facility, as the separation of the trainset requires special tools and 
procedures to safety disconnect the inter-car mechanical and electrical 
connections. Separation at a maintenance facility also provides 
railroad employees needing to go between individual cars proper safety 
protection. Further, TCRR testified that its trainsets will be equipped 
with rescue couplers at each end of the trainset in the event a 
trainset needs to be rescued from the ROW. These rescue couplers are 
located within a removable shroud at each end of the train set, and are 
automatic couplers, in that they couple upon impact.
    With respect to 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(2), which requires secure grab 
irons or handholds on the ends and sides of vehicles for greater 
security for individuals involved with coupling and uncoupling 
vehicles, TCRR testified that these are not necessary due to the 
coupling arrangement of its trainset, described above. TCRR further 
testified that inclusion of these safety appliances would have a 
significant and detrimental impact on the aerodynamic performance of 
the trainset and significantly increase the aerodynamic noise generated 
from the trainset. TCRR stated that providing an exemption from these 
requirements is consistent with the treatment of similar equipment.
    TCRR further testified with respect to 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(3), which 
requires drawbars to be of a standard height as specified by FRA 
regulation, that TCRR will not conduct any type of joint operation with 
conventional freight or passenger equipment. Accordingly, as TCRR 
testified, there is no need to have couplers at a standard height, as 
TCRR's trainsets will have no need to couple to dissimilar equipment.
    TCRR next testified with respect to 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B), which 
requires vehicles to be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient 
handbrakes, that TCRR's trainset will not be equipped with a handbrake. 
TCRR further testified that its unattended trainsets will be secured 
through a combination of an urgent brake application, which is 
equivalent to an emergency brake application in the U.S., and the use 
of wheel chocks. According to TCRR's testimony, this is reflective of 
JRC's practice on the Tokaido Shinkansen system, which has a 
demonstrated safety record. TCRR also testified that its operating 
rules will also define securement procedures, which will be based on 
the service-proven procedures employed by JRC.
    TCRR also testified that sill steps and vertical handholds are not 
necessary for railroad employees to access or disembark from its 
trainsets. TCRR offered that it will have provisions for high-level 
boarding at all locations (passenger stations and maintenance 
facilities) an employee could be expected to access or disembark a 
trainset.
    As noted above, FRA received several comments regarding TCRR's 
request for exemption. Some comments concerned the effect that the lack 
of identified safety appliances would have on the ability for TCRR to 
separate a train in the event of an emergency, while other comments 
concerned the impact that the absence of said appliance would have to 
emergency egress and first responder access to the trainset. In both 
instances, while FRA deeply appreciates the commenters' concerns with 
respect to the efficacy of emergency response, assisting in emergency 
rescue access is not the purpose of the safety appliances in question, 
and in many ways, what TCRR has proposed exceeds common practice for 
emergency passenger egress and first responder rescue access within the 
U.S.
    In addition, FRA would like to address the comments related to the 
separation of trains in an emergency. While semi-permanently coupled 
passenger equipment is virtually universal for high-speed operations, 
it is also very common throughout conventional passenger and freight 
operations throughout the U.S., most often seen in Multiple Unit (MU) 
trainset operations and articulated freight cars (e.g., double-stack 
well car sets). It is not common practice to break a train apart as 
part of an emergency procedure. Rescue of an entire disabled trainset 
is the most common scenario, and TCRR will be equipping its lead units 
with rescue couplers and other appliances to allow for a disabled 
trainset to be towed, if necessary. If a train is disabled such that 
intermediate uncoupling would be required to move it, it would 
typically be more appropriate to evacuate the impaired train either to 
a safe location, or by cross-transfer to another trainset, pursuant to 
the railroad's emergency plans. FRA notes that it is not the intent of 
the safety appliance requirements to prevent the use of semi-
permanently coupled or articulated rail vehicles, whether by statute or 
regulation. Rather, the purpose of these appliances is to ensure that 
railroad personnel are provided the means to perform their duties 
safely, particularly where coupling or switching are common place. 
Notably, while the absence of such practice reduces the operational 
flexibility afforded to the railroad, it also serves to reduce the 
hazards that railroad personnel are exposed to, which, in itself, is a 
worthwhile application of safe practice being proposed for TCRR.
    Notwithstanding FRA's prior statements on this topic, FRA received 
several comments expressing concern over first responder access to a 
trainset that is not equipped with traditional safety appliances. As 
discussed previously, safety appliances are primarily for railroad 
employee protection. Other rescue access and emergency egress systems 
are relied on to facilitate the entry of first responders into a 
trainset, and evacuation of passengers off a trainset, such as rescue 
access/emergency egress windows and doors, and roof spots, to name a 
few. See, generally, subpart D--Rolling Stock. Although safety 
appliances, if present, may be used for rescue access and emergency 
egress, it is not the primary function of these appliances. In 
addition, the safety appliances that would typically be utilized to 
access a trainset are not required under statute, and in virtually all 
cases, are insufficient for emergency egress and access needs.
    Safety appliances as not required to be part of the required 
emergency systems for passenger equipment. Generally, it is FRA's 
position that the safest location for a passenger during an emergency 
is within the trainset or passenger car. There are limited 
circumstances where an evacuation to an adjacent car would be 
necessary, and

[[Page 69717]]

only in a life-threatening scenario is passenger self-evacuation off a 
train necessary. In addition, FRA also generally assumes that first 
responders will have certain equipment with them when responding to an 
emergency involving a train, to include ladders, axes, portable jaws-
of-life, and other access-gaining tools. Furthermore, TCRR's proposal 
includes the use of deployable ladders with handrails to facilitate 
egress and access from the trainset to ground level in the event of an 
emergency or other appropriate situation. The use of such on-board 
ladders, while not required by this regulation, provide a superior 
means to get on or off the trainset in such scenarios than any 
traditional safety appliance, particularly for first responders. 
Further, not all emergencies require an immediate stopping of the 
trainset, as it may be more efficient to meet first responders at a 
dedicated location (such as a station location, or a location where 
access has been specifically planned for) to permit easier access to 
the trainset. Understandably, FRA is also aware that there may be 
emergency situations that will not permit continued travel along the 
ROW, such as a derailment of the equipment.
    FRA also received a comment from Delta Troy challenging the 
legality of virtual hearings to satisfy the hearing requirement of 49 
U.S.C. 20306.\70\ In its comment, Delta Troy argued that virtual 
hearings are not an adequate or sufficient replacement for the value of 
a public hearing during notice-and-comment rulemaking, in addition to 
the statutory requirement that findings under 49 U.S.C. 20306 be based 
on evidence developed ``at a hearing.'' In support of its position, 
Delta Troy stated that conducting a virtual hearing would necessarily 
limit and truncate public engagement and discourse. And that ``untold 
members of the public'' would be precluded from participation because 
they lack adequate internet access, whether due to financial, 
technological, or other reasons. In conclusion, Delta Troy stated that 
a virtual hearing would not meet the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 20306, 
nor would it comport with ``the spirit of public comment'' as described 
in the APA. FRA disagrees and notes that 49 U.S.C. 20306 is silent as 
to the manner in which hearings may be conducted. As discussed under 
section III. Proceedings to Date, the telephonic hearings that FRA 
conducted represented only a change in the way information was 
exchanged. Further, the change to a telephonic hearing was made 
specifically to address the internet reliability concerns raised by 
Delta Troy and other commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See FRA Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, Document ID: FRA-2019-
0068-0039.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the evidence developed at the hearing, including 
supporting information provided in TCRR's rulemaking petition, FRA is 
providing TCRR with its requested relief, as not doing so would 
preclude the development or implementation of more efficient railroad 
transportation equipment. FRA makes clear, though, that this relief 
will be in effect for high-speed trainsets, used only on TCRR's system, 
for the life of each variation put into service. If the equipment is 
sold or transferred to any other entity in the U.S., that entity would 
have to request its own relief under 49 U.S.C. 20306.

E. Incorporation by Reference

    FRA is incorporating by reference six Japanese Industrial Standards 
(JIS) and three ASTM International (ASTM) standards. As required by 1 
CFR 51.5, FRA has summarized the standards it is incorporating by 
reference and has shown the reasonable availability of those standards 
here. The Japanese Industrial Standards are reasonably available to all 
interested parties online at www.jsa.or.jp (Japanese site), or 
www.jsa.or.jp/en (English site). In addition, the ASTM standards are 
reasonably available to all interested parties online at www.astm.org.
    In Sec.  299.13(d)(4) and (5), FRA incorporates by reference three 
versions of JIS E 1101, ``Flat bottom railway rails and special rails 
for switches and crossings of non-treated steel.'' JIS E 1101:2001 
addresses the manufacturing of the steel rail. It specifies the quality 
and tests for flat bottom railway rails of non-treated steel, with a 
calculated mass of 30 kg/m or more, and special rails for those railway 
switches and crossings. JIS E 1101:2006 and JIS E 1101:2012 amend JIS E 
1101:2001 by updating references to other cited standards (e.g., 
updating the title to the cited reference), updating references to 
specific clauses within a cited standard, or by deleting a reference to 
a cited standard. By incorporating these standards by reference, TCRR 
will be required to use rail that is manufactured to the same 
specifications as the rail used on the Tokaido Shinkansen system, which 
will help ensure that the rail side of the wheel-rail interface remains 
identical to that used on the service-proven high-speed lines of JRC.
    Under Sec.  299.403(b), FRA incorporates by reference two versions 
of JIS E 7105 ``Rolling Stock--Test methods of static load for body 
structures.'' JIS E 7105:2006 addresses test methods for trainset 
carbodies. It specifies the test methods of static load for confirming 
strength, rigidity, and the like of body structures for passenger 
stock, such as electric railcars, internal combustion railcars, and 
passenger cars, principally. JIS E 7105:2011 amends JIS E 7105:2006 by 
updating references to other cited standards (e.g., updating the title 
to the cited reference), updating references to specific clauses within 
a cited standard, or by updating specifications from the 2006 version. 
By incorporating these standards by reference, FRA will maintain the 
same strength and rigidity of TCRR's trainset carbody structure. This 
will help preserve the occupied volume from premature degradation due 
to typical in-service loads and vibration.
    Under Sec.  299.409(g), FRA incorporates by reference JIS B 
8265:2010 ``Construction of pressure vessels general principles.'' JIS 
B 8265:2010 addresses manufacturing of pressure vessels and specifies 
certain requirements for the construction and fixtures of pressure 
vessels with the design pressure of less than 30 MPa. By incorporating 
this standard by reference, FRA will ensure that the pressurized air 
reservoirs used in TCRR's trainset are designed and constructed to the 
same service-proven standard as used in the N700 trainsets currently 
operated on the Tokaido Shinkansen system.
    Under Sec.  299.423(e)(1) and (f)(3), FRA incorporates by reference 
ASTM D 4956-07[epsiv]1 ``Standard Specification for 
Retroreflective Sheeting for Traffic Control,'' approved March 15, 
2007. ASTM D 4956-07[epsiv]1 covers flexible, nonexposed 
glass bead lens and microprismatic, retroreflective sheeting designed 
for use on traffic control signs, delineators, barricades, and other 
devices.
    Under Sec.  299.423(e)(1), FRA incorporates by reference ASTM E 
810-03 ``Standard Test Method for Coefficient of Retroreflection of 
Retroreflective Sheeting Utilizing the Coplanar Geometry,'' approved 
February 10, 2003. Test method ASTM E 810-03 describes an instrument 
measurement of the retroreflective performance of retroreflective 
sheeting. Under Sec.  299.423(e)(2), FRA incorporates by reference ASTM 
E 2073-07 ``Standard Test Method for Photopic Luminance of 
Photoluminescent (Phosphorescent) Markings,'' approved July 1, 2007. 
FRA also incorporates by reference Section 5.2 of ASTM E 2073-07 under 
Sec.  299.423(e)(2) and Sec.  299.423(e)(2)(ii). Test method ASTM E 
2073-07 covers a procedure for determining the photopic luminance of 
photoluminescent (phosphorescent) markings. It does not cover scotopic 
or mesopic measurements. Incorporation

[[Page 69718]]

of the three ASTM standards by reference is to ensure that the 
materials used for interior and exterior emergency markings can provide 
adequate photoluminescence or retroreflectivity. As the markings 
utilizing these materials will be relied on during emergencies (either 
for passenger egress or first responder access), it is important that 
the marking can be easily identified and followed should the emergency 
occur during hours of limited visibility, with possible degradation or 
complete loss of interior lighting. The standards either provide 
performance specifications for design and manufacture, or provide the 
testing methods.

VI. FRA's Record of Decision

    This final rule constitutes the Record of Decision (ROD) for FRA's 
publication of an RPA, pursuant to NEPA and the NEPA implementing 
regulations from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).\71\ In 
making its decision to proceed with the RPA, FRA considered the 
information and analysis included in the Draft and Final EIS, public 
and agency comments submitted on the Draft and Final EIS for Dallas to 
Houston High-Speed Rail, technical supporting information, and public 
and agency comments submitted on the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ 40 CFR 1500-1508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As required by CEQ regulations,\72\ in addition to the Agency's 
decision, this final rule and ROD sets forth a summary of the 
alternatives considered by FRA in reaching its decision, including the 
environmentally preferable alternative, and identifies the mitigation 
measures to be implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ 40 CFR 1505.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Summary of Alternatives Considered

    TCRR identified its intent to construct and operate a high-speed 
rail system between Dallas and Houston in its rulemaking petition. 
Therefore, while FRA's decision is whether to publish an RPA (or take 
other regulatory action necessary for the implementation of the Tokaido 
Shinkansen technology within the U.S.), FRA also identified and 
evaluated six end-to-end Build Alternatives in the Draft and Final EIS 
to understand the potential impacts that could result if FRA publishes 
the RPA and TCRR advances the proposed Dallas to Houston project.
    To identify the six end-to-end Build Alternatives evaluated in the 
Draft and Final EIS, FRA completed a two-step alternatives development 
process. Section 2.4, Alternatives Considered, Development and 
Evaluation of Proposed Corridors of the Final EIS, summarizes the 
process FRA undertook to identify four corridor alternatives. The 
Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail Project, Corridor Alternatives 
Analysis Technical Report, which describes the corridor analysis in 
detail, is available on FRA's website.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallashttps://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 2.5, Alternatives Considered, Development and Evaluation of 
Initial Alignment, Station and TMF Alternatives of the Final EIS, 
details the process that FRA undertook to identify the six build 
alternatives that were evaluated in the Draft and Final EIS. The 
complete analysis of alignment alternatives is described in the Dallas 
to Houston High Speed Rail Project, Alignment Alternatives Analysis 
Report, also available on FRA's website.
1. No Build Alternative
    As required by NEPA, the Final EIS included the No Build 
Alternative, also known as the alternative of no action, in its 
analysis as the baseline for comparison with Build Alternatives A 
through F and the three Houston Terminal Station Options. Under the No 
Build Alternative, FRA would not publish an RPA or take other 
regulatory action necessary for the implementation of the Tokaido 
Shinkansen technology within the U.S.; therefore, TCRR would not 
construct nor be able to operate the HSR system and associated 
facilities. Travel between Dallas and Houston would continue via 
existing highway (IH-45) and airport (Dallas Fort Worth International 
Airport [DFW], Dallas Love Field Airport [DAL], George Bush 
Intercontinental Airport [IAH] and William P. Hobby Airport [HOU]) 
infrastructure. See Section 2.61, Alternatives Considered, No Build 
Alternative of the Final EIS for a full description of the No Build 
Alternative.
2. Build Alternatives
    The two-step alternatives development process resulted in the six 
end-to-end Build Alternatives, A through F, considered in the Draft and 
Final EIS. For analytical purposes, each alternative was divided into 
segments, as depicted on Figure 2-28 of the Final EIS.\74\ Table 1 
identifies the segments that create each Build Alternative. In addition 
to the track alignments, the limits of disturbance evaluated for each 
Build Alternative contains the infrastructure necessary to support HSR 
operations including stations, TMFs, MOW Facilities, signaling and 
communications infrastructure, Traction Power Substations (TPSS), 
sectioning posts, and sub-sectioning posts. See Section 2.6.2, 
Alternatives Considered, Build Alternatives of the Final EIS for 
complete descriptions of the alternatives and associated 
infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final EIS analyzed the three stations proposed by TCRR, the 
Dallas Terminal Station, Brazos Valley Intermediate Station in Grimes 
County, and the Houston Terminal Station (which included three station 
location options in Houston). Stations and platforms would be designed 
to accommodate planned future operations. Two TMFs would be located 
near the terminal stations to serve as cleaning and maintenance 
facilities for the HSR trainsets. Each would occupy approximately 100 
acres and include sidings for trainset storage, trainset car washes and 
other facilities. Seven MOW facilities would be located every 15 to 46 
miles along the HSR ROW. Each MOW facility would be approximately 35 
acres and have sidings for MOW equipment and sweeper vehicles. 
Signaling and communications infrastructure would typically be between 
0.1 and 0.3 acre and spaced no more than 25 miles apart along the 
alignment. Radio towers approximately 50 feet tall would be spaced at 
approximately 6-mile intervals. Approximately 14 TPSSs, including 2 at 
the TMFs, would be spaced between 10 and 25 miles apart, generally 
adjacent to or within 1 mile of existing 138 kV transmission line. The 
TPSSs would have a footprint of approximately 6 acres with a substation 
building of approximately 2,200 square feet. An anticipated 11 
sectioning posts and nine sub-sectioning posts would be placed between 
the TPSSs. Each would have a footprint of approximately one half to one 
acre each, with a small electrical building (approximately 1,600 square 
feet).

                 Table 1--Build Alternatives A Through F
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Build alternative                         Segment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative A...........................  1, 2A, 3A, 4, 5.
Alternative B...........................  1, 2A, 3B, 4, 5.
Alternative C...........................  1, 2A, 3C, 5.
Alternative D...........................  1, 2B, 3A, 4, 5.
Alternative E...........................  1, 2B, 3B, 4, 5.
Alternative F...........................  1, 2B, 3C, 5.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 69719]]

    Segment 1 is located in Dallas County and is common to all Build 
Alternatives. The segment is approximately 18-miles and includes the 
Dallas Terminal Station, Dallas TMF and a TPSS. Segment 2A, located in 
Ellis County beginning about 1.5 miles south of the Ellis County Line, 
is approximately 23 miles in length. Segment 2A includes one MOW 
facility and one TPSS. Segment 2B is also located in Ellis County and 
is approximately 23 miles in length. Segment 2B includes one MOW 
facility and one TPSS. Segment 3A is located in Ellis and Navarro 
counties. It is approximately 30 miles in length and includes one 
siding-off track and two TPSSs. Segment 3B is also located in Ellis and 
Navarro counties and is approximately 31 miles in length. Segment 3B 
includes one siding off track and one TPSS. Segment 3C, approximately 
113 miles long, is located in Navarro, Freestone, Leon, Madison and 
Grimes counties. Segment 3C includes two MOW facilities, one siding off 
track and six TPSSs. Segment 4 is located in Freestone, Limestone, 
Leon, Madison and Grimes counties. It is approximately 80 miles in 
length and includes two MOW facilities, two siding off tracks and four 
TPSSs. Segment 5, at approximately 84 miles, is common to all Build 
Alternatives. It is located in Grimes, Waller and Harris counties. 
Segment 5 includes the Brazos Valley Intermediate Station, one TMF, two 
MOW facilities, one siding off track and four TPSSs.
    In addition, as detailed in Section 2.5.2.3, Alternatives 
Considered, Houston Terminal Station Options of the Final EIS, three 
terminal station options, including the Industrial Site, Northwest Mall 
and Northwest Transit Center were considered for the Houston Terminal 
Station located in northwest Houston within the vicinity of US 290, IH-
10 and IH-610 north of Post Oak Road, west of IH-610 and just north of 
Hempstead Road.

B. Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    The environmentally preferable alternative is the alternative that 
is least damaging to the environment or that best protects, preserves, 
and enhances historic, cultural, and natural resources.\75\ After 
considering the comparative analysis of the potential impacts of the No 
Build Alternative, Build Alternatives A-F, and the three Houston 
Terminal Station options presented in the Final EIS, FRA finds that 
Build Alternative A (comprised of Segments 1, 2A, 3A, 4, and 5) and the 
Houston Northwest Mall Terminal Station Option, which were identified 
as the Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS, are the environmentally 
preferable alternatives that provide the best balance to transportation 
goals while minimizing physical impacts to the built and natural 
environment.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ CEQ's Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National 
Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 FR 18026 (Mar. 23, 1981, as 
amended 1986).
    \76\ See Section 2.7, Alternatives Considered, Preferred 
Alternative of the Final EIS for a more detailed comparison of the 
potential environmental impacts that differentiate the Build 
Alternatives and Houston Terminal Station Options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Environmentally Preferable Build Alternative
    For many resource areas, there are no distinguishable differences 
in impacts among Build Alternatives A-F.\77\ When the environmental 
impacts of Build Alternatives A-F are compared, Build Alternative A 
would have the overall fewest permanent impacts to the socioeconomic, 
natural, physical, and cultural resources environment, including 
generally fewer permanent acquisitions and displacements, and impacts 
to transportation, floodplains, and waters of the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Including air quality, elderly and handicapped, 
socioeconomic, electromagnetic field, environmental justice, 
vibration, aesthetics and visual, and greenhouse gas emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, Segment 2B, a component of Build Alternatives D, E, 
and F, would cross U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) fee land. 
Coordination with USACE identified that the USACE National Non-
Recreation Outgrant Policy would prevent USACE from carrying forward 
Segment 2B in the USACE evaluation criteria, as there is a viable 
alternative not on federal property. Environmental resources that 
differentiate Build Alternatives A, B, and C are presented in Table 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Specific impacts are not included in this comparison table 
if they are equal across Build Alternatives A, B and C. Section 
references within this table are to sections of the Final EIS.
    \79\ Threatened and Endangered Species acreages include habitat 
for species with mapped habitat that may be impacted, including the 
Houston toad, large-fruited sand verbena, and Navasota ladies'-
tresses. Threatened and endangered species in the Study Area that 
may be impacted, but that do not have mapped habitat, include the 
interior least tern and the whooping crane.
    \80\ Road modifications reflect the number of reroutes, road 
adjustments, or road over rail constructions that would occur. Some 
roads are affected by multiple modifications (such as IH-45). 
Modifications do not reflect total number of roads, but total number 
of road construction sites.
    \81\ Shared access roads are included in roadway modification 
lengths. Shared access roads will be developed to provide for 
maintenance, emergency response access, and private property access 
with a corresponding reduction in the number of new public roads to 
decrease burden on roadway authorities. Shared access roads would be 
constructed and maintained by TCRR.
    \82\ Anxiety Aerodrome would be directly impacted by Segment 3B, 
which is part of Alternatives B and E. Indirect impacts to special 
status farmland in Section 3.13, Land Use of the Final EIS are 
defined as a 25-foot setback added to the LOD to account for 
indirect loss of productive farmland to accommodate the use of farm 
and ranch equipment or impacts such as induced wind and changes in 
irrigation.

                            Table 2--Comparison of Build Alternatives A, B and C \78\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Evaluation criteria                    Measure               Alt A           Alt B           Alt C
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Water Quality (Section 3.3)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impaired Waterbodies--303(d) List.....  Feet....................           344.7           517.4             496
Impaired Waterbodies Total............  Feet....................           830.0         1,002.7           981.3
Groundwater Wells.....................  Count...................               9              13               7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Noise and Vibration (Section 3.4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Severe Noise Impact:
    Residential.......................  Count...................              10              12              10
Moderate Noise Impact:
    Residential.......................  Count...................             280             290             275
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Hazardous Materials and Solid Waste (Section 3.5)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-Risk Hazardous Material Sites.....  Count...................             297             298             326

[[Page 69720]]

 
Moderate-Risk Hazardous Material Sites  Count...................             155             155             165
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Natural Ecological Systems and Protected Species (Section 3.6) 79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protected Species Modeled Habitat--     Acres...................             328             328             325
 Temporary.
Protected Species Modeled Habitat--     Acres...................           1,058           1,058           1,452
 Permanent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Waters of the U.S. (Section 3.7)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stream Crossings--Temporary...........  Feet....................          83,459          83,791          90,942
Stream Crossings--Permanent...........  Feet....................          38,898          45,631          35,096
Wetlands--Temporary...................  Acres...................            59.5            59.0            44.3
Wetlands--Permanent...................  Acres...................            50.0            47.4            63.4
Waterbodies--Temporary................  Acres...................            33.5            36.3            30.4
Waterbodies--Permanent................  Acres...................            27.6            27.2            21.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Floodplains (Section 3.8)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impacts to 100-Year Floodplain........  Acres...................             616             557             642
Impacts to 500-Year Floodplain........  Acres...................             132             132             133
Permanent Impacts to 100-Year and 500-  Acres...................             529             479             579
 Year Floodplains.
Temporary Impacts to 100-Year and 500-  Acres...................             219             210             196
 Year Floodplains.
Total Acres of Impacted Floodplain....  Acres...................             748             689             775
Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct          Count...................              63              63              71
 Crossings of FEMA Zone AE.
Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct          Count...................             126             142             137
 Crossings of FEMA Zone A.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Utilities and Energy (Section 3.9)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Electric TPSS Connections.........  Count...................              13              12              13
Electric Utility Pole Adjustments.....  Count...................              85              85              74
Total Electric Connections and          Count...................              98              97              87
 Adjustment.
Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells...........  Count...................              37              37              22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources (Section 3.10)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Number of Adverse Visual          Count...................              11              11              10
 Resource Impacts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Transportation (Section 3.11)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Road Modifications \80\ (Public and     Count...................             138             150             102
 Private).
Road Modifications \81\ (Public only).  Count...................              59              66              79
Length added to Public Roads (miles)..  Miles...................            16.8            21.4            46.9
Length removed from Public Roads        Miles...................             5.1             5.0            27.2
 (miles).
Impacts to airports \82\..............  Count...................               0               1               0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Land Use (Section 3.13)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LU Conversion--Temporary..............  Acres...................         2,553.4         2,532.9         2,393.2
LU Conversion--Permanent..............  Acres...................         6,619.8         6,814.0         7,295.6
Special Status Farmland--Temporary....  Acres...................         1,710.8         1,690.4         1,459.8
Special Status Farmland--Permanent....  Acres...................         3,534.5         3,764.3         3,573.4
Special Status Farmland--Indirect \5\.  Acres...................           847.5           888.2           697.3
Displacement--Commercial (primary)....  Count...................              42              42              65
Displacement--Residence (primary).....  Count...................             235             255             239
Displacement--Community Facilities      Count...................               2               2               3
 (primary).
Estimated Permanent Parcel              Count...................           1,731           1,814           1,789
 Acquisitions.
Estimated Temporary Parcel              Count...................             272             277             259
 Acquisitions.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--      Count...................             196             223             196
 Agriculture.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--      Count...................              12              12              18
 Commercial.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--      Count...................               2               2               1
 Cultural/Civic Resources.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--Oil   Count...................              12              12              17
 and Gas.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--      Count...................              49              50              51
 Residence.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--      Count...................               0               0               1
 Transportation and Utilities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Safety and Security (Section 3.16)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Permanent Road Modifications resulting  Count...................              12              13               9
 in 1 minute or more in additional
 through travel time.
Total fire and EMS service areas        Count...................              56              57              51
 bisected by construction.
Fire and EMS providers with high        Count...................               3               4               5
 potential for construction effects.
Fire and EMS providers with localized   Count...................               8               7               6
 potential for construction effects.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 69721]]

 
                                     Recreational Facilities (Section 3.17)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parks.................................  Count...................               0               0               1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Environmental Justice (Section 3.18)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Minority and/or Low-Income    Count...................              80              80              81
 block groups intersected by the Study
 Area.
Number of all block groups intersected  Count...................             118             118             119
 by the Study Area.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Cultural Resources (Section 3.19)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adverse Impacts to Historic Properties  Count...................              14              14              13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Soils and Geology (Section 3.20)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOD Area..............................  Acres...................         9,173.4         9,347.1         9,689.0
Shrink-Swell Potential--Low...........  Acres...................         2,593.6         2,585.8         2,848.3
Shrink-Swell Potential--Moderate......  Acres...................         1,458.4         1,465.1         1,485.0
Shrink-Swell Potential--High..........  Acres...................         2,284.0         2,477.1         2,471.2
Shrink-Swell Potential--Very High.....  Acres...................         2,727.9         2,697.5         2,781.8
Erosion Potential--Low................  Acres...................         1,611.6         1,591.3         1,914.1
Erosion Potential--Moderate...........  Acres...................         4,511.2         4,619.9         4,786.6
Erosion Potential--High...............  Acres...................         2,963.5         3,036.8         2,907.9
Corrosion Potential--Low..............  Acres...................            55.3            71.8            81.4
Corrosion Potential--Moderate.........  Acres...................         2,204.8         2,182.0         2,761.1
Corrosion Potential--High.............  Acres...................         6,824.5         6,992.5         6,764.5
Prime Farmland Soils..................  Acres...................         5,245.3         5,454.7         5,033.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: AECOM, 2019.

2. Environmentally Preferable Houston Station Option
    Like the Build Alternatives, for most resource areas, there are no 
distinguishable differences among the Houston Terminal Station Options. 
When the environmental impacts of each station option are compared, the 
Houston Industrial Site Terminal Station Option would have fewer 
permanent impacts to the socioeconomic, natural, physical, and cultural 
resources environment. However, the Houston Industrial Site Terminal 
Station Option would require the use of a resource protected by Section 
4(f) of the Department Transportation Act,\83\ which the other Houston 
Terminal Station Options would not.\84\ Because of the special 
consideration given to resources protected under Section 4(f), FRA 
finds that the Houston Industrial Site Terminal Station Option is not 
environmentally preferable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ 49 U.S.C. 303.
    \84\ See Chapter 7.0, Section 4(f) and Section 6(f) Evaluation, 
of the Final EIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When the environmental impacts of Houston Northwest Mall Terminal 
Station Option and Northwest Transit Center Terminal Station Option are 
compared, the Houston Northwest Mall Terminal Station Option would have 
fewer permanent impacts to the socioeconomic, natural, physical, and 
cultural resources environment, as shown in Table 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ Section references within this table are to sections of the 
Final EIS.

   Table 3--Comparison of Houston Northwest Transit Center Terminal Station Options and Houston Northwest Mall
                                          Terminal Station Option \85\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     Northwest
              Evaluation criteria                            Measure              Transit Center  Northwest Mall
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Hazardous Materials and Solid Waste (Section 3.5)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-Risk Hazardous Material Sites.............  Count...........................               6               0
Moderate-Risk Hazardous Material Sites........  Count...........................               8               3
High-Risk Hazardous Material Sites............  Count...........................               0               0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Waters of the U.S. (Section 3.7)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wetlands--Temporary...........................  Acres...........................             1.6             0.0
Waterbodies--Temporary........................  Acres...........................            0.10             0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Transportation (Section 3.11)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intersections at LOS E or F...................  Count...........................              22              24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 69722]]

 
                                             Land Use (Section 3.13)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LU Conversion--Temporary......................  Acres...........................            11.8            27.4
LU Conversion--Permanent......................  Acres...........................            88.7            75.8
Displacement--Commercial (primary)............  Count...........................              15              22
Displacement--Community Facility (primary)....  Count...........................               1               0
Estimated Permanent Parcel Acquisitions.......  Count...........................              43              40
Estimated Temporary Parcel Acquisitions.......  Count...........................               0               1
Estimated Structure Acquisitions--Commercial..  Count...........................               0               1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Socioeconomics and Community Facilities (Section 3.14)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community Facility............................  Count...........................               1               0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Cultural Resources (Section 3.19)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adverse Impacts to Historic Properties........  Count...........................               1               0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: AECOM 2019.

C. Mitigation Commitments

    FRA identified compliance and mitigation measures based upon 
identification of best practices and technical consideration of the 
likely success in implementation, Agency consultations, comments on the 
Draft and Final EIS, regulatory requirements, and input from TCRR. 
These mitigation commitments would avoid, minimize, mitigate, or 
compensate for the potential adverse impacts related to the 
construction and/or operation of TCRR's proposed Dallas to Houston 
project.
    TCRR has agreed to implement the compliance and mitigation measures 
identified in the Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail Mitigation 
Commitments, which is located on FRA's website.\86\ The compliance and 
mitigation measures were also included in the Final EIS. In addition, 
TCRR is responsible for adhering to applicable Federal, State, and 
local laws, ordinances and requirements. TCRR has agreed to maintain an 
environmental compliance system to serve as a database of compliance 
and mitigation commitments and provide accountability and transparency 
to environmental regulatory agencies. TCRR will also prepare a 
quarterly report that summarizes the status of implementing compliance 
and mitigation measures by geographic area, mitigation activities 
completed, significant upcoming activities, and any corrective actions 
taken for any instances of non-compliance. TCRR will make the quarterly 
report available to the public by posting it on the TCRR website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments, Mitigation 
Commitments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures

    The TCRR high-speed system is modeled on JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen 
HSR system, which does not meet many of the requirements under the 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards (Tier III) final rule.\87\ TCRR 
desires to maintain the safety record of the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR 
system, so it is imperative that the systems approach to safety and the 
philosophy of the JRC system be implemented in the United States. As 
such, TCRR is requesting, through this rulemaking, that it comply with 
regulations that are different, and in some instances, more stringent 
than the Tier III requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ 83 FR 59182 (Nov. 21, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA has a regulatory program that addresses equipment, track, 
operating practices, and human factors in the existing, conventional 
railroad environment. However, significant operational and equipment 
differences exist between the system contemplated by TCRR and other 
passenger operations in the United States. In many of the railroad 
safety disciplines, FRA's existing regulations do not address the 
operational characteristics of TCRR's system. Therefore, to ensure that 
this new system will operate safely, minimum Federal safety standards 
must be in place when TCRR commences operations.
    Through this final rule, FRA will regulate the TCRR system as a 
standalone system. FRA stated in the Tier III final rule that a 
standalone system would have to combine all aspects of railroad safety 
(such as operating practices, signal and train control, and track) that 
must be applied to the individual system. Such an approach covers more 
than passenger equipment and would likely necessitate particular ROW 
intrusion protection and other safety requirements not adequately 
addressed in FRA's regulations. Without this final rule, TCRR would not 
be allowed to implement its system as it does not meet many of the 
requirements of FRA's existing regulations of general applicability. 
Accordingly, by enabling private activity that would otherwise be 
prohibited, this final rule is an E.O. 13771 deregulatory action.
    E.O. 12866 requires agencies to account for additional regulatory 
burdens that a particular regulatory action would have on a regulated 
entity. In the rulemaking context, under E.O. 12866, two similar forms 
of regulatory action (e.g., a rulemaking versus a waiver process) could 
have substantially different burdens on a regulated entity. For this 
reason, the methodology used to evaluate burdens of a particular 
regulatory action on a regulated entity under E.O. 12866 will differ 
from the methodology used under NEPA to assess the potential 
environmental impacts that may result from the regulatory action. For 
more information regarding the NEPA process, please see section VII. F. 
National Environmental

[[Page 69723]]

Policy Act, or the Final EIS which has been included in the rulemaking 
docket (Docket No. FRA-2019-0068, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement).
    This final rule though, as an RPA, was not subject to review under 
E.O. 12866, as that applies only to rules of general applicability. 
Accordingly, FRA concluded that because this final rule generally 
includes only voluntary actions or alternative actions that would be 
voluntary, the final rule does not impart additional burdens on 
regulated entities, specifically TCRR. Even though not subject to E.O. 
12866 review, FRA has provided a qualitative discussion on the costs, 
benefits, and alternatives considered, which can be found under section 
V. A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures of the NPRM.\88\ Responses to comments on FRA's regulatory 
evaluation are under section IV. M. Regulatory Evaluation of this final 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 85 FR 14036, 14047.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; Regulatory 
Flexibility Assessment

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 \89\ and E.O. 13272 \90\ 
require agency review of proposed and final rules to assess their 
impacts on small entities. An agency must prepare a Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis unless it determines and certifies that a rule, if 
promulgated, would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \90\ 67 FR 53461, Aug. 16, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601 as a small business 
concern that is independently owned and operated, and is not dominant 
in its field of operation. The SBA has authority to regulate issues 
related to small businesses, and stipulates in its size standards that 
a ``small entity'' in the railroad industry is a for profit ``line-haul 
railroad'' that has fewer than 1,500 employees, a ``short line 
railroad'' with fewer than 500 employees, or a ``commuter rail system'' 
with annual receipts of less than seven million dollars.\91\ In 
addition, section 601(5) of the Small Business Act defines ``small 
entities'' as governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, 
villages, school districts, or special districts with populations less 
than 50,000 that operate railroads. Federal agencies may adopt their 
own size standards for small entities in consultation with SBA and in 
conjunction with public comment. Thus, in consultation with SBA, FRA 
has published a final statement of agency policy that formally 
establishes ``small entities'' or ``small businesses'' as railroads, 
contractors, and shippers that meet the revenue requirements of a Class 
III railroad--$20 million or less in inflation-adjusted annual 
revenue--and commuter railroads or small government jurisdictions that 
serve populations of 50,000 or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ ``Size Eligibility Provisions and Standards,'' 13 CFR part 
121, subpart A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As this final rule applies only to one railroad, TCRR, which 
provides intercity rail passenger service between Dallas and Houston, 
Texas, which have populations larger than 50,000 people, TCRR is not 
considered a small entity.
    FRA invited all interested parties to submit comments, data, and 
information demonstrating the potential economic impact on any small 
entity that would result from the adoption of the final rule. During 
the comment period, FRA did not receive any comments from the public or 
stakeholders regarding the impact that the final rule would have on 
small entities.
    Accordingly, the Administrator of FRA hereby certifies that this 
final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,\92\ and its 
implementing regulations,\93\ when information collection requirements 
pertain to nine or fewer entities, Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) approval of the collection requirements is not required. This 
regulation pertains to one railroad, and therefore, OMB approval of the 
paperwork collection requirements in this final rule is not required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520.
    \93\ 5 CFR part 1320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Federalism Implications

    E.O. 13132, ``Federalism,'' \94\ requires FRA to develop an 
accountable process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State 
and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have 
federalism implications.'' ``Policies that have federalism 
implications'' are defined in the E.O. to include regulations that have 
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' Under 
E.O. 13132, an agency may not issue a regulation with federalism 
implications that imposes substantial direct compliance costs and that 
is not required by statute, unless the Federal Government provides the 
funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State 
and local governments, or the agency consults with State and local 
government officials early in the process of developing the regulation. 
Where a regulation has federalism implications and preempts State law, 
the agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the 
process of developing the regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule has been analyzed under the principles and criteria 
contained in E.O. 13132. This final rule will not have a substantial 
effect on the States or their political subdivisions, and it will not 
affect the relationships between the Federal Government and the States 
or their political subdivisions, or the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. In addition, 
FRA has determined that this regulatory action will not impose 
substantial direct compliance costs on the States or their political 
subdivisions. Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of 
E.O. 13132 do not apply.
    However, the final rule arising from this rulemaking could have 
preemptive effect by operation of law under certain provisions of the 
Federal railroad safety statutes, specifically the former Federal 
Railroad Safety Act of 1970,\95\ and the former Locomotive Boiler 
Inspection Act (LIA).\96\ Section 20106 provides that States may not 
adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or order related to 
railroad safety or security that covers the subject matter of a 
regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security 
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies 
under the ``essentially local safety or security hazard'' exception to 
section 20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court as preempting the field concerning locomotive safety.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106.
    \96\ 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 
20701-20703.
    \97\ See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 
(1926).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the

[[Page 69724]]

United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not 
considered unnecessary obstacles.\98\ The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Public Law 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule on foreign 
commerce and believes that its requirements are consistent with the 
Trade Agreements Act. The requirements are safety standards, which, as 
noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to trade.

F. National Environmental Policy Act

    FRA is the lead agency for the preparation of the EIS in compliance 
with CEQ's NEPA-implementing regulations,\99\ FRA's Procedures for 
Considering Environmental Impacts,100 and associated 
environmental laws. Cooperating agencies in the EIS include the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Highway 
Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the STB, USACE and 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). The Texas 
Department of Transportation provided technical assistance to FRA in 
the preparation of the EIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ 40 CFR 1500-1508.
    \100\ 64 FR 28545 (May 26, 1999), as updated in 78 FR 2713 (Jan. 
14, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA published a Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS in the 
Federal Register on June 25, 2014.\101\ The NOI announced FRA's intent 
to prepare an EIS and the beginning of the scoping period, provided a 
brief background on TCRR's proposal, and identified the preliminary 
contents of the EIS, the required approvals by the Federal Government, 
and procedures expected for coordination and public involvement based 
on NEPA requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ 79 FR 36123 (Jun. 24, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After publication of the NOI, FRA conducted extended scoping 
through January 9, 2015. Notification of the extended scoping period 
included an email to the mailing list, letters to elected officials, 
FRA media advisory and a notice on FRA's website. FRA also conducted a 
series of 12 public scoping meetings in October and December 2014. A 
total of 1,943 individuals, including 118 elected officials, attended 
12 public scoping meetings. Additional details on these public scoping 
meetings may be found on FRA's website.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail Scoping Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After scoping, FRA identified the Build Alternatives described in 
section VI. A. Summary of Alternatives Considered of this final rule, 
and evaluated the potential impacts of those alternatives in the Draft 
EIS. On December 22, 2017, EPA published a Notice of Availability (NOA) 
for the Draft EIS in the Federal Register.\103\ FRA circulated the 
Draft EIS to affected local jurisdictions, State and Federal agencies, 
tribes, community organizations and other interested groups, interested 
individuals and the public. The Draft EIS was available for public 
review at 24 locations and posted on the FRA website.\104\ FRA 
published notices that the Draft EIS was available for review in 27 
newspapers throughout the area of the proposed Dallas to Houston 
project and FRA also mailed notices to 2,722 individuals, landowners 
and organizations on the mailing list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ 82 FR 60723 (Dec. 22, 2017).
    \104\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Draft Environmental Impact Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As required by NEPA, the EIS identified the purpose and need to 
which the agency is responding.\105\ FRA's purpose and need was 
developed in response to the proposal in the petition submitted by 
TCRR, which is also the basis for FRA's regulatory action. Accordingly, 
in the EIS, FRA identified that ``the purpose of the privately proposed 
Project is to provide the public with reliable and safe HSR 
transportation between Dallas and Houston.'' The need is described in 
detail in Section 1.2.2, Introduction, Need of the Final EIS. The Draft 
EIS analyzed six end-to-end Build Alternatives (Alternatives A through 
F) and three Houston Terminal Station Options: The Houston Industrial 
Site Station Terminal, the Houston Northwest Mall Terminal Station, and 
the Houston Northwest Transit Center Terminal Station, as well as the 
No Build Alternative. The Build Alternatives included a terminal 
station in Dallas and an intermediate station in Grimes County. As 
required by CEQ regulations,\106\ the Draft EIS identified Build 
Alternative A as the Preferred Alternative. The Draft EIS did not 
identify a preferred Houston Terminal Station option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ 40 CFR 1502.13.
    \106\ 40 CFR 1502.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The public comment period for the Draft EIS ran from December 22, 
2017 through March 9, 2018. FRA conducted 11 public hearings to accept 
agency and public comments on the Draft EIS during the comment period. 
FRA received a total of 25,309 comments from approximately 6,000 
individuals. A total of 2,971 individuals, including 84 elected 
officials, attended the 11 public hearings. See Section 9.6, Public and 
Agency Involvement, Draft EIS of the Final EIS for more information on 
the public comment period and hearing format.
    FRA reviewed and assessed all comments (written and oral) received 
during the public comment period on the Draft EIS through the 
preparation of the Final EIS. These comments helped to inform FRA's 
development of the Final EIS. FRA responded to all public comments in 
the Final EIS.
    The Final EIS identifies, evaluates, and documents the potential 
environmental and socioeconomic effects of FRA's proposed action. This 
includes implementing TCRR's proposed HSR service between Dallas and 
Houston as described in TCRR's petition, which is the only future 
operating location TCRR has identified to FRA. As required by CEQ 
regulations,\107\ the Final EIS identified Build Alternative A 
(comprised of Segments 1, 2A, 3A, 4, and 5) and the Houston Northwest 
Mall Terminal Station Option as the Preferred Alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ 40 CFR 1502.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA's rulemaking would enable the safe operation of TCRR's HSR 
system in locations other than between Dallas and Houston, even though 
FRA is aware of no proposal to operate such service. Thus, the Final 
EIS also evaluates and documents the reasonably foreseeable potential 
beneficial and adverse environmental impacts of implementing TCRR's HSR 
system in any location within the United States.\108\ However, as TCRR 
has not proposed to operate in any other location, discussion of 
location-specific impacts, other than the service proposed in TCRR's 
rulemaking petition and conceptual engineering, would be speculative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Section 3.1.2, Impacts of the TCRR HSR System Independent 
of Location of the Final EIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA signed the Final EIS on May 15, 2020, and EPA published an NOA 
for the EIS in the Federal Register on May 29, 2020.\109\ FRA also 
circulated the Final EIS to affected local jurisdictions, State and 
Federal agencies, tribes, community organizations and other interested 
groups, interested individuals and the public. The Final EIS was made 
available for public review at 24

[[Page 69725]]

locations and was posted on the FRA website.\110\ FRA also provided 25 
print copies and 200 electronic copies (via USB flash drive) of the 
Final EIS to the public, upon request. The NOA was published in 26 
newspapers throughout the area of the proposed Dallas to Houston 
project and mailed notices to 5,018 individuals, landowners and 
organizations on the mailing list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ 85 FR 32390 (May 29, 2020).
    \110\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Summary of Comments on the Final EIS
    FRA reviewed and analyzed comments received since the Final EIS was 
released on May 29, 2020. FRA received a total of 96 comment 
submissions from approximately 76 individuals, agencies, businesses, 
and/or organizations between May 29, 2020 and July 28, 2020. 
Submissions were categorized by comment topic, which resulted in some 
submissions being split into multiple comments, and in total FRA 
received 143 comments. In general, comments were regarding impacts to 
transportation, cultural resources, build alternatives, project 
viability, general project support or opposition, or the overall NEPA 
process. Comments received have raised no new substantive issues 
relevant to environmental concerns from those received during the 
public comment period of the Draft EIS (see Appendix H, Response to 
Draft EIS Comments of the Final EIS) or on topics not already addressed 
within the Final EIS. However, several comments raised issues that 
warrant clarification or correction here, specifically comments related 
to the capital cost of TCRR's proposed Dallas to Houston project, and 
safety concerns related to electrical arcing from the HSR system and 
proximity to natural gas pipelines.
    Several commenters noted that capital costs publicly reported by 
TCRR in April 2020 ($30 billion) differ from the capital costs reported 
in the Final EIS ($16-19 billion). The capital costs estimate in the 
Final EIS (Section 3.14.5.2.3, Socioeconomics and Community Facilities, 
Economic Impacts) includes construction labor, materials, indirect 
costs, and approximately $2.6 billion for systems and rolling stock.
    Additional information provided by TCRR clarified that the $30 
billion capital costs reported by Texas Central Board Chairman Drayton 
McLane in an April 8, 2020, letter was based on the overall 
conservative project costs. This value included the direct costs to 
design, construct, and commission the rail system as portrayed in the 
Final EIS, but also other indirect costs excluded from the Final EIS 
analysis (e.g., land acquisition, litigation, property taxes, 
insurance, financing costs, and increased costs of foreign supply). 
TCRR also reported that the $30 billion included contingency and 
increased escalation of costs.
    FRA believes that the increased escalation costs could result in 
larger economic benefits than what was identified in the Final EIS. 
Therefore, the escalation values in the $16 billion and $19 billion 
($2019) projections from the Final EIS represent a more conservative 
estimate of the potential beneficial impacts.
    Comments regarding safety concerns related to electrical arcing 
from the HSR system and proximity to natural gas pipelines were similar 
to the comments FRA received on those topics in response to the NPRM. 
FRA notes that proximity to pipelines was addressed in the Final EIS 
(See Section 3.9, Utilities and Energy) and in the detailed discussion 
in response to comments in section IV. C. General Safety Oversight, of 
this final rule. As discussed in section IV. H. Electrical Arcing from 
the Overhead Catenary System, of this final rule, this occurrence is 
part of the normal operation of an electrical traction power system 
like the one proposed by TCRR, and by itself does not pose any 
particular safety risk. FRA does not believe there is a potential 
environmental impact or safety concern as a result of this phenomenon 
that requires assessment under NEPA.
    Clarifications and/or updates to the Final EIS text, some of which 
were identified in comments submitted on the Final EIS, are included in 
the Final EIS Errata and Updated Information.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments, Final EIS Errata and 
Updated Information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Potential Environmental Impacts
    The Final EIS assessed the potential beneficial and adverse 
environmental impacts of FRA's proposed rulemaking. The Final EIS 
considered impacts from TCRR's proposed project, the approximately 240-
mile, for-profit, HSR system connecting Dallas and Houston based on 
JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen system technology, as described in Section 
2.2, Alternatives Considered, Proposed HSR Infrastructure and 
Operations of the Final EIS and in the rulemaking petition submitted by 
TCRR. The HSR service between Dallas and Houston is the only proposed 
service or future operating location TCRR has identified to FRA and 
therefore FRA determined it was appropriate to evaluate the potential 
project-specific impacts of this proposed service. The potential 
impacts that would result from implementing the proposed project are 
identified and discussed in Chapter 3.0, Affected Environment and 
Environmental Consequences and Chapter 4, Indirect and Cumulative 
Impacts, of the Final EIS and are summarized below in Table 4.

                               Table 4--Summary of Potential Direct Impacts \112\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Houston Terminal
       Evaluation criteria                Measure         Build alts. A-F    Station options         Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Air Quality (Final EIS Section 3.2)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Quality Impacts..............  N/A.................      Net emissions benefit for permanent operations,
                                                                     temporary construction impacts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Water Quality (Final EIS Section 3.3)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impaired Waterbodies--303(d) List  Feet................        344.7-517.4                  0        344.7-517.4
Impaired Waterbodies with TMDLs..  Feet................              485.3                  0              485.3
Impaired Waterbodies Total.......  Feet................        830-1,002.7                  0        830-1,002.7
Active Public Water System Wells.  Count...............                  1                  0                  1
Groundwater Wells................  Count...............               7-13                  0               7-13

[[Page 69726]]

 
Reservoir/Dam Crossings..........  Count...............                  0                  0                  0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Noise and Vibration (Final EIS Section 3.4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Severe Noise Impact:
    Residential..................  Count...............               9-12                  0               9-12
    Institutional................  Count...............                  0                  0                  0
Moderate Noise Impact:
    Residential..................  Count...............            275-295                  0            275-295
    Institutional................  Count...............                  1                  0                  1
Vibration Impact:
    Residential..................  Count...............                  0                  0                  0
    Institutional................  Count...............                  0                  0                  0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Hazardous Materials and Solid Waste (Final EIS Section 3.5)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-Risk Hazardous Material Sites  Count...............            297-326                0-6            297-332
Moderate-Risk Hazardous Material   Count...............            155-165                3-8            158-173
 Sites.
High-Risk Hazardous Material       Count...............                3-4                0-2                3-6
 Sites.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Natural Ecological Systems and Protected Species (Final EIS Section 3.6) \113\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protected Species Modeled          Acres...............            325-328                  0            325-328
 Habitat--Temporary.
Protected Species Modeled          Acres...............        1,058-1,452                  0        1,058-1,452
 Habitat--Permanent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Waters of the U.S. (Final EIS Section 3.7)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stream Crossings--Temporary......  Feet................      83,459-90,942                  0      83,459-90,942
Stream Crossings--Permanent......  Feet................      34,839-45,631                  0      34,839-45,631
Wetlands--Temporary..............  Acres...............          44.3-61.1                  0          44.3-61.1
Wetlands--Permanent..............  Acres...............          47.4-64.4              0-1.6          47.4-66.0
Waterbodies--Temporary...........  Acres...............          27.9-36.3              0-0.1          27.9-36.4
Waterbodies--Permanent...........  Acres...............          21.1-29.3                  0          21.1-29.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Floodplains (Final EIS Section 3.8)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impacts to 100-Year Floodplain...  Acres...............            557-657                  0          557-657.0
Impacts to 500-Year Floodplain...  Acres...............            132-133              0-0.1          132-133.1
Permanent Impacts to 100-Year and  Acres...............            479-589              0-0.1          479-589.1
 500-Year Floodplains.
Temporary Impacts to 100-Year and  Acres...............            196-225                  0          196-225.0
 500-Year Floodplains.
Total Acres of Impacted            Acres...............            689-790              0-0.1          689-790.1
 Floodplain.
Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct     Count...............              63-76                 NA            63-76.0
 Crossings of FEMA Zone AE.
Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct     Count...............            126-155                 NA          126-155.0
 Crossings of FEMA Zone A.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Utilities and Energy (Final EIS Section 3.9)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Electric TPSS Connections....  Count...............              12-13                  0              12-13
Electric Utility Pole Adjustments  Count...............              74-89                  0              74-89
Total Electric Connections and     Count...............             87-102                  0             87-102
 Adjustment.
Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells......  Count...............              22-37                  0              22-37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Aesthetics and Scenic Resources (Final EIS Section 3.10)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Number of Beneficial \114\.  Count...............                  2                  1                  3
Total Number of Neutral..........  Count...............                  8                  0                  8
Total Number of Adverse..........  Count...............                  2                  0                  2
Total Number of Adverse Visual     Count...............              10-11                  0              10-11
 Resource Impacts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Transportation (Final EIS Section 3.11)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail Crossings \115\.............  Count...............                 27                  0                 27
Road Modifications \116\ (Public   Count...............            102-158                  0            102-158
 and Private).
Road Modifications \117\ (Public   Count...............              59-80                  0              59-80
 only).
Length added to Public Roads       Miles...............          16.6-46.9                  0          16.6-46.9
 (miles).
Length removed from Public Roads   Miles...............           5.0-27.2                  0           5.0-27.2
 (miles).
Impacts to airports \118\........  Count...............                0-1                  0                0-1
Number of Intersections at LOS E   Count...............                 NA              22-25              22-25
 or F.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 69727]]

 
                                Elderly and Handicapped (Final EIS Section 3.12)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elderly and Handicapped Impacts..  NA..................    Proposed project would be designed, constructed and
                                                         operated in compliance with ADA; therefore, there would
                                                            be no impacts related to accessibility of the HSR
                                                                 system for the elderly and handicapped.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Land Use (Final EIS Section 3.13)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Land Use Conversion--     Acres...............    2,393.2-2,592.4             0-27.4    2,393.2-2,619.8
 Temporary.
Existing Land Use Conversion--     Acres...............    6,610.0-7,295.6          75.8-92.2    6,685.8-7,387.8
 Permanent.
Special Status Farmland--          Acres...............    1,459.8-1,719.4                0.0    1,459.8-1,719.4
 Temporary.
Special Status Farmland--          Acres...............    3,483.5-3,764.3                0.0    3,483.5-3,764.3
 Permanent.
Special Status Farmland--Indirect  Acres...............        697.3-888.2                0.0        697.3-888.2
 \119\.
Displacement--Commercial           Count...............              42-65              14-22              56-87
 (primary).
Displacement--Residence (primary)  Count...............            235-269                  0            235-269
Displacement--Community            Count...............                2-3                  0                2-3
 Facilities (primary) \120\.
Estimated Permanent Parcel         Count...............        1,731-1,847              25-43        1,756-1,890
 Acquisitions.
Estimated Temporary Parcel         Count...............            258-277                0-1            258-278
 Acquisitions.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............            196-230                  0            196-230
 Agriculture.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............              12-18                0-1              12-19
 Commercial.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............                  0                  0                  0
 Community Facilities.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............                1-2                  0                1-2
 Cultural/Civic Resources.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............              12-17                  0              12-17
 Oil and Gas.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............              49-54                  0              49-54
 Residence.
Estimated Structure Acquisitions-- Count...............                0-1                  0                0-1
 Transportation and Utilities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Socioeconomics and Community Facilities (Final EIS Section 3.14)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Communities with Disrupted         Count...............                  4                  0                  4
 Character and Cohesion.
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
Economic Impacts.................  NA..................                          Positive
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
Employment.......................  Job Years...........                          317,207
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
Earnings.........................  2019 billions.......                           $14.50
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
Tax Revenue......................  N...................                          Positive
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
Children's Health and Safety       Count...............                  0                0-1                0-1
 \121\.
Community Facilities \122\.......  Count...............                  5                0-1                5-6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Electromagnetic Fields (Final EIS Section 3.15)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electromagnetic Field (EMF)        NA..................        No EMI or adverse EMF exposure would occur.
 Impacts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Safety and Security (Final EIS Section 3.16)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Permanent Road Modifications       Count...............               8-13                  0               8-13
 resulting in 1 minute or more in
 additional through travel time.
Permanent Road Modifications       Count...............                0-1                  0                0-1
 reducing through travel time by
 1 minute or more.
Total fire and EMS service areas   Count...............              51-57                  0              51-57
 bisected by construction.
Fire and EMS providers with high   Count...............                3-5                  0                3-5
 potential for construction
 effects.
Fire and EMS providers with        Count...............                6-8                  0                6-8
 localized potential for
 construction effects.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Recreational Facilities (Final EIS Section 3.17)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parks............................  Count...............                0-2                  0                0-2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Environmental Justice (Final EIS Section 3.18)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Minority and/or Low-     Count...............              80-81                5-7              85-88
 Income block groups intersected
 by the Study Area.
Number of all block groups         Count...............            118-119               8-14            126-133
 intersected by the Study Area.
Identified Minority and/or Low-    Count...............                  5                  1                  5
 Income Communities.
Disproportionately High and        NA..................                 No                 No                 No
 Adverse Impact to Minority and/
 or Low-Income Communities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 69728]]

 
                                   Cultural Resources (Final EIS Section 3-19)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adverse Impacts to Historic        Count...............              11-14                0-1              11-15
 Properties.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Soils and Geology (Final EIS Section 3.20)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOD Area.........................  Acres...............    9,173.4-9,718.4            0-103.9    9,173.4-9,822.4
Shrink-Swell Potential--Low......  Acres...............    2,585.8-2,848.3                  0    2,585.8-2,848.3
Shrink-Swell Potential--Moderate.  Acres...............    1,456.9-1,485.0           3.0-19.2    1,459.9-1,504.0
Shrink-Swell Potential--High.....  Acres...............    2,284.0-2,484.4                  0    2,284.0-2,484.4
Shrink-Swell Potential--Very High  Acres...............    2,697.5-2,806.7                  0    2,697.5-2,806.7
Erosion Potential--Low...........  Acres...............    1,591.3-1,981.9                  0    1,591.3-1,981.9
Erosion Potential--Moderate......  Acres...............    4,472.1-4,786.6           3.0-47.0    4,475.1-4,833.6
Erosion Potential--High..........  Acres...............    2,907.9-3,036.8           3.0-16.2    2,910.9-3,053.0
Corrosion Potential--Low.........  Acres...............          55.3-81.4                  0          55.3-81.4
Corrosion Potential--Moderate....  Acres...............    2,182.0-2,761.1                  0    2,182.0-2,761.1
Corrosion Potential--High........  Acres...............    6,764.5-7,021.2              11-51    6,775.5-7,072.2
Prime Farmland Soils.............  Acres...............    4,990.8-5,454.7                  0    4,990.8-5,454.7
Surface Mines \123\..............  Count...............              0 \a\                  0              0 \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Green House Gas Emissions (Final EIS Section 3.21)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GHG Emissions....................  NA..................   No long-term increases in GHG emissions; would likely
                                                           reduce GHG emissions by shifting the modes of travel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ Section references within this table are to the sections 
of the Final EIS.
    \113\ Threatened and Endangered Species acreages include habitat 
for species with modeled habitat that may be impacted, including 
Houston toad, large-fruited sand verbena and Navasota ladies'-
tresses. Threatened and endangered species in the Study Area that 
may be impacted but that do not have modeled habitat include the 
interior least tern and the whooping crane.
    \114\ A single landscape unit is shared between Segment 5 and 
the Houston Terminal Station Options; therefore, the total number of 
beneficial landscape units is the same as Build Alternative A.
    \115\ Totals for rail impacts do not include rail at Houston 
Terminal Stations. Totals also include DART-owned rail lines in 
Dallas County.
    \116\ Road modifications reflect the number of reroutes, road 
adjustments, or road over rail constructions that would occur. Some 
roads are affected by multiple modifications (such as IH-45). 
Modifications do not reflect total number of roads but total number 
of road construction sites.
    \117\ Shared access roads are included in roadway modification 
lengths. Shared access roads will be developed to provide for 
maintenance, emergency response access, and private property access, 
with a corresponding reduction in the number of new public roads to 
decrease burden on roadway authorities. Shared access roads would be 
constructed and maintained by TCRR.
    \118\ Anxiety Aerodrome would be directly impacted by Segment 
3B, which are part of Alternatives B and E.
    \119\ Indirect impacts to special status farmland in Section 
3.13, Land Use of the Final EIS are defined as a 25-foot setback 
added to the LOD to account for indirect loss of productive farmland 
to accommodate the use of farm and ranch equipment or impacts such 
as induced wind and changes in irrigation.
    \120\ The ``Community Facilities'' category in Section 3.14, 
Socioeconomics and Community Facilities of the Final EIS, 
encompasses categories of affected structures and facilities that 
are broken down into more defined categories within Section 3.13, 
Land Use of the Final EIS, therefore values between the two sections 
are not identical. Refer to the Section for a complete definition of 
each category.
    \121\ Children's health and safety impacts are the result of 
temporary construction effects. These impacts will no longer exist 
once construction has ended.
    \122\ The ``Community Facilities'' category in Section 3.14, 
Socioeconomics and Community Facilities of the Final EIS, 
encompasses categories of affected structures and facilities that 
are broken down into more defined categories within Section 3.13, 
Land Use of the Final EIS, therefore values between the two sections 
are not identical. Refer to the Section for a complete definition of 
each category.
    \123\ The Midlothian Quarry and Plant in Ellis County was 
identified at approximately one-half-mile west of Segment 2A. Exact 
limits would need to be field-verified to confirm or discount 
presence in the Study Area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with E.O. 12898 and USDOT Order 5610.2(a), FRA is 
required to identify and address minority and low-income populations 
that are affected by disproportionately high and adverse impacts by a 
Federal action and to provide opportunities for meaningful 
participation. As part of the preparation of the EIS, persons who have 
a potential interest in the proposed Dallas to Houston project, 
including members of minority and low-income populations, were invited 
to participate in the environmental review process.
    FRA identified and addressed the potential effects of the 
alternatives on minority and low-income populations in Section 3.18, 
Environmental Justice in the Final EIS. FRA conducted specific outreach 
efforts to connect with potentially impacted minority and low-income 
populations in the Study Area and to bring awareness of the proposed 
project to communities or individuals; gather additional feedback on 
the potential impacts of the proposed project; and identify appropriate 
mitigation for minority and low-income populations.
    Five neighborhoods or communities identified in minority and/or 
low-income block groups would be potentially impacted: Downtown Dallas, 
Le May and Le Forge neighborhood, Hash Road and Nail Drive, Plantation 
Forest and the Houston Terminal Station Option area (including Spring 
Branch Super Neighborhood). The EIS identified disproportionately high 
and adverse effects to minority and/or low-income communities near the 
station locations in Dallas and Houston related to air-quality impacts 
during construction, as well as effects related to structure 
displacement and parcel acquisition, and disruption to community 
cohesion for the Le May and Le Forge neighborhood, Hash Road and Nail 
Drive, and Plantation Forest communities. All identified locations 
where there would be disproportionately high and adverse effects would 
be on Segment 1 and Segment 5, which are common to all Build 
Alternatives.
    TCRR will mitigate adverse air quality effects during construction 
through use of dust suppression techniques, wetting and covering 
construction materials transported near homes or businesses, limiting 
construction vehicle travel

[[Page 69729]]

speeds and idling of construction equipment, and by complying with the 
Texas Low Emission Diesel Fuel Program, as identified in the Mitigation 
Commitments. TCRR will mitigate localized impacts to the Le May and Le 
Forge neighborhood, the Hash Road and Nail Drive neighborhood and the 
Plantation Forest neighborhood by implementing mitigation developed 
based on consultation with community members, as identified in the 
Mitigation Commitments. Mitigation includes making offers to acquire 
all properties and attempts to relocate within proximity or in the same 
neighborhood (for the Le May and Le Forge neighborhood), extending the 
notice to vacate period, and offering personal relocation assistance. 
After implementation of mitigation measures, there would be no 
disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority and/or low-
income populations as a result of the Build Alternatives and Houston 
Terminal Station Options.

H. Clean Air Act/Air Quality General Conformity

    The Clean Air Act of 1970 (as amended) requires Federal agencies to 
determine the conformity of proposed actions with respect to State 
Implementation Plans for attainment of air quality goals.\124\ As 
detailed in Section 3.2, Affected Environment and Environmental 
Consequences, Air Quality of the Final EIS, FRA assessed air quality 
impacts through an analysis of emissions that would occur during 
construction and operation of the proposed Dallas to Houston project 
for a general conformity analysis.\125\ FRA has determined that the 
predicted annual pollutant emissions during the 5-year construction 
period in nonattainment areas (Dallas-Fort Worth [DFW], Houston-
Galveston-Brazoria [HGB], and Freestone and Anderson Counties 
nonattainment area [FRE]) generated by the proposed project are all 
below general conformity de minimis threshold values and no conformity 
determination is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. (1970).
    \125\ 40 CFR part 51, subpart W, and 40 CFR part 93, subpart B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act

    Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and 
its implementing regulations \126\ require that prior to issuing 
Federal funding, partial funding, permitting, licensing, approval or 
taking other action, Federal agencies must take into account the 
effects of their undertakings on historic properties and provide the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) an opportunity to 
comment on the undertaking.\127\ FRA determined that the undertaking 
would adversely affect historic properties. However, because FRA is not 
able to fully determine effects to historic properties prior to this 
final rule, consistent with 36 CFR 800.14(b)(1)(ii), FRA, in 
consultation with the Texas Historical Commission (THC), ACHP, USACE, 
TCRR, and other consulting parties, developed a Programmatic Agreement 
(PA) for the undertaking. The PA establishes the process that governs 
the resolution of adverse effects from the undertaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ 36 CFR 800.
    \127\ 54 U.S.C. 306108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA provided consulting parties with an opportunity to review and 
comment on the draft PA prior to the release of the Final EIS and 
provided the public an opportunity to review the draft PA by appending 
the draft PA to the Final EIS. During the 30-day public review from May 
29, 2020, through June 29, 2020, FRA received a total of four comments 
that were specific to the PA. These include one comment from THC, two 
comments from consulting parties, and one comment from the public. In 
response to these comments, FRA added two new consulting parties to the 
PA. The executed PA is available on FRA's website.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments, Section 106 
Programmatic Agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Department of Transportation Act Section 4(f) Determination

    Section 4(f) of the USDOT Act of 1966 prohibits USDOT agencies from 
approving the use of a Section 4(f) property unless: The agency 
determines that there is no feasible or prudent alternative to such 
use, and a project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to 
the property resulting from such use; or a finding can be made that a 
project, including any measure(s) to minimize harm, has a de minimis, 
or minimal, impact on the Section 4(f) property.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ 49 U.S.C. 303.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the evaluation contained within Chapter 7.0, Section 4(f) 
and Section 6(f) Evaluation of the Final EIS, FRA determines that there 
is no prudent and feasible alternative to the use of three properties 
protected by Section 4(f): DA.023 (Cadiz Street Underpass and 
Overpass), Dallas; DA.076a (Guiberson Corporation), Dallas; and DA.110b 
(Linfield Elementary School).
    All possible planning to minimize harm, identified through 
consultation with officials with jurisdiction, was incorporated through 
TCRR's design refinements to reduce or eliminate impacts to Section 
4(f) properties where reasonably feasible.
    FRA provided the Section 4(f) evaluation to U.S. Department of the 
Interior (DOI) and shared it with the officials with jurisdiction for 
the Section 4(f) properties with the May 29, 2020, release of the Final 
EIS. DOI did not comment on FRA's Final Section 4(f) Evaluation.

K. Endangered Species Act/Section 7 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Biological Opinion

    Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 as amended,\130\ the 
USFWS has the authority to list and monitor the status of species whose 
populations are threatened or endangered, and including the ecosystems 
on which they depend. Section 7 of the ESA requires that Federal 
agencies consult with the USFWS to ensure projects they authorize, fund 
or carry out would not jeopardize the continued existence of an 
endangered or threatened species or destroy or adversely modify 
designated critical habitat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ 16 U.S.C. 1531, et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described in Section 3.6, Natural Ecological Systems and 
Protected Species, of the Final EIS, FRA determined the proposed Dallas 
to Houston project would have ``no effect'' on the West Indian manatee 
(Trichechus manatus), golden-cheeked warbler (Setophaga [Dendroica] 
chrysoparia), Texas fawnsfoot (Truncilla macrodon), and Texas prairie 
dawn (Hymenoxys texana) because suitable habitat (or modeled habitat) 
was not identified within the Action Area. FRA determined it ``may 
affect, but is not likely to adversely affect'' the Houston toad 
(Anaxyrus houstonensis), interior least tern (Sterna antillarum), 
whooping crane (Grus americana) based on the results of presence/
absence species surveys and the implementation of avoidance and 
mitigation measures. FRA determined it ``may affect, and is likely to 
adversely affect'' due to the presence of Navasota ladies'-tresses 
(Spiranthes parksii) within the Study Area and the potential for large-
fruited sand verbena (Abronia marcocarpa) in unsurveyed areas.
    On November 14, 2019, FRA submitted a Biological Assessment (BA) to 
USFWS as part of formal consultation

[[Page 69730]]

under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. USFWS issued a Biological Opinion 
(BO) detailing mitigation measures for the proposed Dallas to Houston 
project on July 8, 2020 (02ETTX00-2019-F-2135).\131\ The BO found that 
the proposed Dallas to Houston project would not likely jeopardize the 
continued existence of the federally endangered large-fruited sand-
verbena or the federally endangered Navasota ladies'-tresses, and 
includes the following conservation measures: TCRR will offset the loss 
of large-fruited sand-verbena habitat by conserving acres under 
permanent protection within the species' known geographic range; TCRR 
will offset the loss of Navasota ladies'-tresses habitat by conserving 
acres under permanent protection within the species' known geographic 
range; and TCRR will institute measures to avoid and minimize potential 
impacts to the 25 Navasota ladies'-tresses individuals found during 
species-specific surveys in Madison County.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments, Biological Opinion. 
FRA has since reinitiated consultation for the limited purpose of 
addressing TCRR's recent identification of locations for permittee 
responsible mitigation. The reinitiation follows TCRR's consultation 
with the USACE Fort Worth District as part of the Clean Water Act 
permitting process and does not affect the BO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BO provided concurrence with FRA's determination that the 
proposed Dallas to Houston project ``may affect, but is not likely to 
adversely affect'' the interior least tern, whooping crane, and the 
Houston toad due to implementation of avoidance and minimization 
measures detailed in Appendix A of the BO. The BO also included 
additional conservation recommendations specific to the large-fruited 
sand-verbena; Navasota ladies'-tresses; landscaping to benefit the 
large-fruited sand-verbena, Navasota ladies'-tresses, and/or their 
habitats; the candidate species, Texas fawnsfoot; and avian species 
including migratory birds. TCRR has agreed to comply with the BO.

L. Executive Order 11990 Preservation of the Nation's Wetlands 
(Executive Order 11990 & DOT Order 5660.1a)

    For projects that are undertaken, financed, or assisted by Federal 
agencies, potential impact to wetlands are considered under E.O. 11990, 
Protection of Wetlands. The objective of E.O. 11990 is to minimize the 
destruction, loss or degradation of wetlands while enhancing and 
protecting the natural and beneficial values.\132\ DOT Order 5660.1a 
sets forth DOT policy for interpreting E.O. 11990 and requires that 
transportation projects ``located in or having an impact on wetlands'' 
should be conducted to assure protection of the Nation's wetlands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ The White House, E.O. 11990--Protection of Wetlands, 42 FR 
2696.1, Office of the White House Press Secretary, 1977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the USACE and EPA have statutory responsibilities 
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).\133\ Under this Act, 
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the U.S. may 
require permit authorization. Section 401 of the CWA regulates the 
discharge of pollutants into waters of the U.S. and is enforced by the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The USACE has 
statutory authority under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act to 
regulate the construction of any structure in or over a navigable water 
of the U.S. and for any structure or work that affects the course, 
location or condition of the navigable waterbody.\134\ Section 14 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act, commonly referred to as Section 408, 
requires approval from USACE to alter a USACE federally authorized 
civil works project.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.
    \134\ 33 U.S.C. 403.
    \135\ 33 U.S.C. 408.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As detailed within Section 3.7, Affected Environment and 
Environmental Consequences, Waters of the U.S. of the Final EIS, 
impacts would occur within waters of the U.S. during the construction 
and operation of the proposed Dallas to Houston project. TCRR, in 
coordination with the USACE Fort Worth and Galveston Districts, is 
developing the final design to avoid and minimize impacts to waters of 
the U.S., as practicable. However, due to the linear nature and the 
curvature restrictions associated with the operation of the HSR system, 
some crossings would be unavoidable. Impacts to waters of the U.S. 
would require Section 404/401/10 CWA permits and Section 408 
permissions from USACE and TCEQ that would include permit provisions to 
avoid, minimize, and mitigate impacts. TCRR has agreed to implement 
compliance and mitigation measures to offset effects of construction 
within the wetlands and waters of the U.S.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail--Passenger Service 
from Houston to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments, Mitigation 
Commitments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

M. Floodplain Management (Executive Order 11988 & DOT Order 5650.2)

    E.O. 11988, Floodplain Management requires Federal agencies avoid 
adverse impacts on floodplains to the extent possible, determine 
whether reasonable alternatives exist that avoid impacts to 
floodplains, and avoid situations that would support floodplain 
development if a practicable alternative exists.\137\ USDOT Order 
5650.2 (Floodplain Management and Protection) establishes policies and 
procedures for transportation projects regarding floodplain impacts 
that include avoiding and minimizing, where practicable or reasonable, 
adverse impacts to floodplains and restoring and preserving natural and 
beneficial floodplain functions that are adversely impacted by 
transportation projects.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ 44 CFR 9, Floodplain Management and Protection of 
Wetlands, 2003.
    \138\ USDOT, Floodplain Management and Protection, DOT 5650.2, 
1979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As detailed within 3.8, Affected Environment and Environmental 
Consequences, Floodplains of the Final EIS, FRA determined that the 
proposed Dallas to Houston project would impact 748 acres of 100-year 
and 500-year regulatory floodplains. During construction, the footprint 
of the LOD additional workspace area, laydown yards and construction 
workspace would have a temporary impact to the floodplains. The HSR 
track and supporting facilities (e.g., permanent roads, parking areas, 
access/maintenance areas, terminals, and non-vegetated embankments) 
would also result in a permanent impact to the floodplain system and a 
permanent increase in impervious cover and an increase in ground 
compaction in those areas during operations.
    TCRR's proposed design would minimize potential increases to the 
floodplain elevations by retaining existing water surface elevations 
where feasible to avoid impacting the available flood storage and 
minimizing fill in sensitive areas. Many regulatory floodplains and 
unregulated stream segments would be fully spanned and potential 
impacts avoided. TCRR will implement best management practices for 
construction and operation within floodplains as detailed in the 
Mitigation Commitments.

N. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)

    FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in E.O. 13175, ``Consultation and Coordination 
with Indian Tribal Governments,'' dated

[[Page 69731]]

November 6, 2000. This final rule will not have a substantial direct 
effect on one or more Indian tribes, will not impose substantial direct 
compliance costs on Indian tribal governments, and will not preempt 
tribal laws. Therefore, the funding and consultation requirements of 
E.O. 13175 do not apply, and a tribal summary impact statement is not 
required.

O. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Under section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. 
L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless otherwise 
prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions on 
State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector (other 
than to the extent that such regulations incorporate requirements 
specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 
1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general notice of 
proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the promulgation of any 
rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in expenditure 
by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any final rule for 
which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency 
shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the effect on State, 
local, and tribal governments and the private sector. This final rule 
will not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of $100,000,000 
or more (as adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year, and thus 
preparation of such a statement is not required.

P. Energy Impact

    E.O. 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly 
Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,'' requires Federal agencies 
to prepare a Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy 
action.'' \139\ FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with 
E.O. 13211 and determined that this regulatory action is not a 
``significant energy action'' within the meaning of the E.O.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ 66 FR 28355 (May 22, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    E.O. 13783, ``Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,'' 
requires Federal agencies to review regulations to determine whether 
they potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced 
energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, 
and nuclear energy resources.\140\ FRA has determined this regulatory 
action will not burden the development or use of domestically produced 
energy resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ 82 FR 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 299

    High-speed rail, Incorporation by reference, Railroad safety, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Tokaido Shinkansen.

The Rule

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA adds part 299 to 
chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as 
follows:

0
1. Part 299 is added to read as follows:

PART 299--TEXAS CENTRAL RAILROAD HIGH-SPEED RAIL SAFETY STANDARDS

Subpart A--General Requirements
Sec.
299.1 Purpose and scope.
299.3 Applicability.
299.5 Definitions.
299.7 Responsibility for compliance.
299.9 Notifications and filings.
299.11 Electronic recordkeeping.
299.13 System description.
299.15 Special approvals.
299.17 Incorporation by reference.
Subpart B--Signal and Trainset Control System
Sec.
299.201 Technical PTC system requirements.
299.203 PTC system required.
299.205 PTC System Certification.
299.207 PTC Safety Plan content requirements.
299.209 PTC system use and failures.
299.211 Communications and security requirements.
299.213 Records retention.
299.215 Operations and Maintenance Manual.
Subpart C--Track Safety Standards
Sec.
299.301 Restoration or renewal of track under traffic conditions.
299.303 Measuring track not under load.
299.305 Drainage.
299.307 Vegetation.
299.309 Classes of track: operating speed limits.
299.311 Track geometry; general.
299.313 Track geometry; performance based.
299.315 Curves; elevations and speed limitations.
299.317 Track strength.
299.319 Track fixation and support.
299.321 Defective rails.
299.323 Continuous welded rail (CWR) plan.
299.325 Continuous welded rail (CWR); general.
299.327 Rail end mismatch.
299.329 Rail joints and torch cut rails.
299.331 Turnouts and crossings generally.
299.333 Frog guard rails and guard faces; gauge.
299.335 Derails.
299.337 Automated vehicle-based inspection systems.
299.339 Daily sweeper inspection.
299.341 Inspection of rail in service.
299.343 Initial inspection of new rail and welds.
299.345 Visual inspections; right-of-way.
299.347 Special inspections.
299.349 Inspection records.
299.351 Qualifications for track maintenance and inspection 
personnel.
299.353 Personnel qualified to supervise track restoration and 
renewal.
299.355 Personnel qualified to inspect track.
299.357 Personnel qualified to inspect and restore continuous welded 
rail.
Subpart D--Rolling Stock
Sec.
299.401 Clearance requirements.
299.403 Trainset structure.
299.405 Trainset interiors.
299.407 Glazing.
299.409 Brake system.
299.411 Bogies and suspension system.
299.413 Fire safety.
299.415 Doors.
299.417 Emergency lighting.
299.419 Emergency communication.
299.421 Emergency roof access.
299.423 Markings and instructions for emergency egress and rescue 
access.
299.425 Low-location emergency exit path marking.
299.427 Emergency egress windows.
299.429 Rescue access windows.
299.431 Driver's controls and cab layout.
299.433 Exterior lights.
299.435 Electrical system design.
299.437 Automated monitoring.
299.439 Event recorders.
299.441 Trainset electronic hardware and software safety.
299.443 Safety appliances.
299.445 Trainset inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
299.447 Movement of defective equipment.
Subpart E--Operating Rules
Sec.
299.501 Purpose.
299.503 Operating rules; filing and recordkeeping.
299.505 Programs of operational tests and inspections; 
recordkeeping.
299.507 Program of instruction on operating rules; recordkeeping.
Subpart F--System Qualification Tests
Sec.
299.601 Responsibility for verification demonstrations and tests.
299.603 Preparation of system-wide qualification test plan.
299.605 Functional and performance qualification tests.
299.607 Pre-revenue service systems integration testing.
299.609 Vehicle/track system qualification.
299.611 Simulated revenue operations.
299.613 Verification of compliance.

[[Page 69732]]

Subpart G--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Program
Sec.
299.701 General requirements.
299.703 Compliance.
299.705 Standard procedures for safely performing inspection, 
testing, and maintenance, or repairs.
299.707 Maintenance intervals.
299.709 Quality control program.
299.711 Inspection, testing, and maintenance program format.
299.713 Program approval procedures.

Appendix A to Part 299--Criteria for Certification of Crashworthy Event 
Recorder Memory Module

Appendix B to Part 299--Cab Noise Test Protocol

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303, 
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 
CFR 1.89.

Subpart A--General Requirements

Sec.  299.1   Purpose and scope.

    This part prescribes minimum Federal safety standards for the high-
speed transportation system described in detail in Sec.  299.13, known 
as Texas Central Railroad, LLC and hereinafter referred to as the 
``railroad.'' The purpose of this part is to prevent accidents, 
casualties, and property damage which could result from operation of 
this system.

Sec.  299.3   Applicability.

    (a) This part applies only to the railroad, as described in Sec.  
299.13.
    (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c) of this section, this part, 
rather than the generally applicable Federal railroad safety 
regulations, shall apply to the railroad.
    (c) The following Federal railroad safety regulations found in 
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and any amendments are 
applicable to the railroad.
    (1) Part 207, Railroad Police Officers;
    (2) Part 209, Railroad Safety Enforcement Procedures;
    (3) Part 210, Railroad Noise Emission Compliance Regulations;
    (4) Part 211, Rules of Practice;
    (5) Part 212, State Safety Participation Regulations;
    (6) Part 214, Railroad Workplace Safety, except Sec.  214.339;
    (7) Part 216, Special Notice and Emergency Order Procedures;
    (8) Part 218, Railroad Operating Practices;
    (9) Part 219, Control of Alcohol and Drug Use;
    (10) Part 220, Radio Standards and Procedures;
    (11) Part 225, Railroad Accidents/Incidents: Reports, 
Classification, and Investigations;
    (12) Part 227, Occupational Noise Exposure except Sec.  
227.119(c)(10) and (11) with respect to the railroad's high-speed 
trainsets only, which shall comply with 299.431(h) and (i);
    (13) Part 228, Hours of Service of Railroad Employees;
    (14) Part 233, Signal Systems Reporting Requirements;
    (15) Part 235, Instructions Governing Applications for Approval of 
a Discontinuance or Material Modification of a Signal System or Relief 
from the Requirements of Part 236, except Sec.  235.7;
    (16) Part 236, Installation, Inspection, Maintenance and Repair of 
Signal and Train Control System, Devices, and Appliances, subparts A 
through G, as excepted by the railroad's PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) under 
Sec.  299.201(d);
    (17) Part 237, Railroad Bridge Safety Standards;
    (18) Part 239, Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness;
    (19) Part 240, Qualification and Certification of Locomotive 
Engineers;
    (20) Part 242, Qualification and Certification of Train Conductors;
    (21) Part 243, Training, Qualification, and Oversight for Safety-
Related Railroad Employees;
    (22) Part 270, System Safety Program
    (23) Part 272, Critical Incident Stress Plans; and
    (24) The following parts shall apply to the railroad's maintenance-
of-way equipment as it is used in work trains, rescue operations, yard 
movements, and other non-passenger functions:
    (i) Part 215, Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards;
    (ii) Part 223, Glazing Standards;
    (iii) Part 229, Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards, except--
    (A) Section 229.71. Instead, the railroad's maintenance-of-way 
equipment shall comply with Sec.  299.401(b), except for the sweeper 
vehicle, which shall have a clearance above top of rail no less than 35 
mm (1.77 inches).
    (B) Section 229.73. Instead, the railroad's maintenance-of-way 
equipment shall be designed so as to be compatible with the railroad's 
track structure under subpart C of this part.
    (iv) Part 231, Railroad Safety Appliance Standards; and,
    (v) Part 232, Railroad Power Brakes and Drawbars.
    (d) The Federal railroad safety statutes apply to all railroads, as 
defined in 49 U.S.C. 20102. The railroad covered by this part is a 
railroad under that definition. Therefore, the Federal railroad safety 
statutes, Subtitle V of Title 49 of the United States Code, apply 
directly to the railroad. However, pursuant to authority granted under 
49 U.S.C. 20306, FRA has exempted the railroad from certain 
requirements of 49 U.S.C. ch. 203.

Sec.  299.5  Definitions.

As used in this part--

Absolute block means a block of track circuits in which no trainset is 
permitted to enter while occupied by another trainset.
Adjusting/de-stressing means the procedure by which a rail's neutral 
temperature is readjusted to the desired value. It typically consists 
of cutting the rail and removing rail anchoring devices, which provides 
for the necessary expansion and contraction, and then re-assembling the 
track.
Administrator means the Administrator of the FRA or the Administrator's 
delegate.
Associate Administrator means FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety 
and Chief Safety Officer, or that person's delegate.
Automatic train control (ATC) means the signaling system, composed of 
ground and on-board equipment. The on-board equipment continually 
receives a signal from the ground equipment. ATC on-board equipment 
controls the trainset speed to prevent train-to-train collisions and 
overspeed derailments.
ATC cut-out mode means the mode of ATC on-board equipment used for 
emergency operations to disable the ATC on-board equipment on the 
trainset.
ATC main line mode means the mode of ATC on-board equipment which 
controls trainset speed on mainlines.
ATC overrun protection means an overlay of the ATC shunting mode to 
prevent overrun at the end of a track.
ATC shunting mode means the mode of ATC on-board equipment which 
restricts the trainsets maximum speed to 30 km/h (19 mph).
Brake, air means a combination of devices operated by compressed air, 
arranged in a system and controlled electrically or pneumatically, by 
means of which the motion of a train or trainset is retarded or 
arrested.
Brake, disc means a retardation system used on the passenger trainsets 
that utilizes flat discs as the braking surface.

[[Page 69733]]

Brake, electric means a trainset braking system in which the kinetic 
energy of a moving trainset is used to generate electric current at the 
traction motors, which is then returned into the catenary system.
Brake, emergency application means a brake application initiated by a 
de-energized brake command and is retrievable when there is no 
malfunction that initiates an automatic emergency brake application. An 
emergency brake application can be initiated by the driver or 
automatically by ATC. An emergency brake application, as defined here, 
is equivalent to a full-service brake application in the U.S.
Brake, urgent application means an irretrievable brake application 
designed to minimize the braking distance. An urgent brake application, 
as defined here, is the equivalent of an emergency brake application in 
the U.S.
Bogie means an assembly that supports the weight of the carbody and 
which incorporates the suspension, wheels and axles, traction motors 
and friction brake components. Each unit of a trainset is equipped with 
two bogies. In the U.S., a bogie is commonly referred to as a truck.
Broken rail means a partial or complete separation of an otherwise 
continuous section of running rail, excluding rail joints, expansion 
joints, and insulated joints.
Buckling incident/buckling rail means the formation of a lateral 
misalignment caused by high longitudinal compressive forces in a rail 
sufficient in magnitude to exceed the track geometry alignment safety 
limits defined in Sec.  299.311.
Buckling-prone condition means a track condition that can result in the 
track being laterally displaced due to high compressive forces caused 
by critical rail temperature combined with insufficient track strength 
and/or train dynamics.
Cab means the compartment or space within a trainset that is designed 
to be occupied by a driver and contain an operating console for 
exercising control over the trainset.
Cab car means a rail vehicle at the leading or trailing end, or both, 
of a trainset which has a driver's cab and is intended to carry 
passengers, baggage, or mail. A cab car may or may not have propelling 
motors.
Cab end structure means the main support projecting upward from the 
underframe at the cab end of a trainset.
Cab signal means a signal located in the driver's compartment or cab, 
indicating a condition affecting the movement of a trainset.
Calendar day means a time period running from one midnight to the next 
midnight on a given date.
Cant deficiency means the additional height, which if added to the 
outer rail in a curve, at the designated vehicle speed, would provide a 
single resultant force, due to the combined effects of weight and 
centrifugal force on the vehicle, having a direction perpendicular to 
the plane of the track.
Continuous welded rail (CWR) means rail that has been welded together 
into lengths exceeding 122 m (400 feet). Rail installed as CWR remains 
CWR, regardless of whether a joint is installed into the rail at a 
later time.
Consist, fixed means a semi-permanently coupled trainset that is 
arranged with each unit in a specific location and orientation within 
the trainset.
Core system, high-speed means the safety-critical systems, sub-systems, 
and procedures required for a high-speed system operation that assures 
a safe operation as required within this part.
Crewmember means a railroad employee called to perform service covered 
by 49 U.S.C. 21103.
Critical buckling stress means the minimum stress necessary to initiate 
buckling of a structural member.
Desired rail installation temperature range means the rail temperature 
range in a specific geographical area, at which forces in CWR installed 
in that temperature range should not cause a track buckle in extreme 
heat, or a pull-apart during extreme cold weather.
Disturbed track means the disturbance of the roadbed or ballast 
section, as a result of track maintenance or any other event, which 
reduces the lateral or longitudinal resistance of the track, or both.
Driver means any person who controls the movement of a trainset(s) from 
the cab, and is required to be certified under 49 CFR part 240. A 
driver, as used in this part, is equivalent to a locomotive engineer.
Employee or railroad employee means an individual who is engaged or 
compensated by the railroad or by a contractor to the railroad to 
perform any of the duties defined in this part.
Event recorder means a device, designed to resist tampering, that 
monitors and records data, as detailed in Sec. Sec.  299.439 and 
236.1005(d) of this chapter, over the most recent 48 hours of operation 
of the trainset.
Expansion joint means a piece of special trackwork designed to absorb 
heat-induced expansion and contraction of the rails.
General control center means the location where the general control 
center staff work.
General control center staff means qualified individuals located in the 
general control center who are responsible for the safe operation of 
the railroad's high-speed passenger rail system. The duties of 
individuals who work at the general control center include: Trainset 
movement control, crew logistic management, signaling, passenger 
services, rolling stock logistic management, and right-of-way 
maintenance management.
Glazing, end-facing means any exterior glazing installed in a trainset 
cab located where a line perpendicular to the exterior surface glazing 
material makes horizontal angle of 50 degrees or less with the 
longitudinal center line of the rail vehicle in which the panel is 
installed. A glazing panel that curves so as to meet the definition for 
both side-facing and end-facing glazing is end-facing glazing.
Glazing, exterior means a glazing panel that is an integral part of the 
exterior skin of a rail vehicle with a surface exposed to the outside 
environment.
Glazing, side-facing means any glazing located where a line 
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes an angle of 
more than 50 degrees with the longitudinal center line of the rail 
vehicle in which the panel is installed.
High voltage means an electrical potential of more than 150 volts.
In passenger service/in revenue service means a trainset that is 
carrying, or available to carry, passengers. Passengers need not have 
paid a fare in order for the trainset to be considered in passenger or 
in revenue service.
In service means, when used in connection with a trainset, a trainset 
subject to this part that is in revenue service, unless the equipment--

    (1) Is being handled in accordance with Sec.  299.447, as 
applicable;
    (2) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track;
    (3) Is on a storage track and is not carrying passengers; or,

[[Page 69734]]

    (4) Is parked at a station location and has been properly secured 
in accordance with Sec. Sec.  299.409(n) and 299.431(d).

Insulated joint, glued means a rail joint located at the end of a track 
circuit designed to insulate electrical current from the signal system 
in the rail.
Interior fitting means any component in the passenger compartment which 
is mounted to the floor, ceiling, sidewalls, or end walls and projects 
into the passenger compartment more than 25 mm (1 in.) from the surface 
or surfaces to which it is mounted. Interior fittings do not include 
side and end walls, floors, door pockets, or ceiling lining materials, 
for example.
Intermediate car means a passenger car or unit of a trainset located 
between cab cars which may or may not have propelling motors.
L/V ratio means the ratio of the lateral force that any wheel exerts on 
an individual rail to the vertical force exerted by the same wheel on 
the rail.
Lateral means the horizontal direction perpendicular to the direction 
of travel.
Locomotive means a piece of on-track rail equipment, other than hi-
rail, specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may 
consist of one or more units operated from a single control stand with 
one or more propelling motors designed for moving other passenger 
equipment; with one or more propelling motors designed to transport 
freight or passenger traffic, or both; or without propelling motors but 
with one or more control stands.
Longitudinal means in a direction parallel to the direction of travel 
of a rail vehicle.
Marking/delineator means a visible notice, sign, symbol, line or trace.
N700 means the N700 series trainset that is based on trainsets 
currently in, or future variants operated on, JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen 
system, or any unit thereof.
Occupied volume means the volume of a passenger car or a unit in a 
trainset where passengers or crewmembers are normally located during 
service operation, such as the cab and passenger seating areas. The 
entire width of a vehicle's end compartment that contains a control 
stand is an occupied volume. A vestibule is typically not considered 
occupied.
On-board attendant means a qualified individual on a trainset that is 
responsible for coordination with a station platform attendant to 
assure safety during passenger boarding and alighting within a station. 
An on-board attendant, as used in this part, is equivalent to a 
passenger conductor.
Override means to climb over the normal coupling or side buffers and 
linking mechanism and impact the end of the adjoining rail vehicle or 
unit above the underframe.
Overrun protection coil means track circuit cables placed short of 
turnouts, or crossovers within stations and trainset maintenance 
facilities to prevent unauthorized route access.
Passenger car means a unit of a trainset intended to provide 
transportation for members of the general public. A cab car and an 
intermediate car are considered passenger cars.
Passenger compartment means an area of a passenger car that consists of 
a seating area and any vestibule that is connected to the seating area 
by an open passageway.
Passenger equipment means the N700 series trainset that is based on 
trainsets currently in, or future variants operated on, JRC's Tokaido 
Shinkansen system, or any unit thereof.
Permanent deformation means the undergoing of a permanent change in 
shape of a structural member of a rail vehicle.
PTC means positive train control as further described in Sec.  299.201.
Qualified individual means a person that has successfully completed all 
instruction, training, and examination programs required by both the 
employer and this part, and that the person, therefore, may reasonably 
be expected to perform his or her duties proficiently in compliance 
with all Federal railroad safety laws, regulations, and orders.
Rail neutral temperature is the temperature at which the rail is 
neither in compression nor tension.
Rail temperature means the temperature of the rail, measured with a 
rail thermometer.
Rail vehicle means railroad rolling stock, including, but not limited 
to, passenger and maintenance vehicles.
Railroad equipment means all trains, trainsets, rail cars, locomotives, 
and on-track maintenance vehicles owned or used by the railroad.
Railroad, the means the company, also known as the Texas Central 
Railroad, LLC, which is the entity that will operate and maintain the 
high-speed rail system initially connecting Dallas to Houston, Texas, 
and is responsible for compliance with all aspects of this rule.
Repair point means a location designated by the railroad where repairs 
of the type necessary occur on a regular basis. A repair point has, or 
should have, the facilities, tools, and personnel qualified to make the 
necessary repairs. A repair point need not be staffed continuously.
Representative car/area means a car/area that shares the relevant 
characteristics as the car(s)/area(s) it represents (i.e., same 
signage/marking layout, and charging light system for passive systems 
or light fixtures and power system for electrically powered systems).
Rollover strength means the strength provided to protect the structural 
integrity of a rail vehicle in the event the vehicle leaves the track 
and impacts the ground on its side or roof.
Safety appliance means an appliance, required under 49 U.S.C. ch. 203, 
excluding power brakes. The term includes automatic couplers, 
handbrakes, crew steps, handholds, handrails, or ladder treads made of 
steel or a material of equal or greater mechanical strength used by the 
traveling public or railroad employees that provides a means for safe 
coupling, uncoupling, or ascending or descending passenger equipment.
Safety-critical means a component, system, software, or task that, if 
not available, defective, not functioning, not functioning correctly, 
not performed, or not performed correctly, increases the risk of damage 
to railroad equipment or injury to a passenger, railroad employee, or 
other person.
Search, valid means a continuous inspection for internal rail defects 
where the equipment performs as intended and equipment responses are 
interpreted by a qualified individual as defined in subpart C.
Semi-permanently coupled means coupled by means of a drawbar or other 
coupling mechanism that requires tools to perform the coupling or 
uncoupling operation. Coupling and uncoupling of each semi-permanently 
coupled unit in a trainset can be performed safely only while at a 
trainset maintenance facility where personnel can safely get under a 
unit or between units, or other location under the protections of

[[Page 69735]]

subpart B of part 218 of this chapter.
Side sill means that portion of the underframe or side at the bottom of 
the rail vehicle side wall.
Shinkansen, Tokaido means the high-speed rail system operated by the 
Central Japan Railway Company between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, Japan, that 
is fully dedicated and grade separated.
Slab track means railroad track structure in which the rails are 
attached to and supported by a bed or slab, usually of concrete (or 
asphalt), which acts to transfer the load and provide track stability.
Spall, glazing means small pieces of glazing that fly off the back 
surface of the glazing when an object strikes the front surface.
Speed, maximum approved means the maximum trainset speed approved by 
FRA based upon the qualification tests conducted under Sec.  
299.609(g).
Speed, maximum authorized means the speed at which trainsets are 
permitted to travel safely, as determined by all operating conditions 
and signal indications.
Speed, maximum safe operating means the highest speed at which trainset 
braking may occur without thermal damage to the discs.
Station platform attendant means a qualified individual positioned on 
the station platform in close proximity to the train protection 
switches while a trainset is approaching and departing a station, and 
is responsible for coordination with an on-board attendant to assure 
safety during passenger boarding and alighting within a station.
Superelevation means the actual elevation of the outside rail above the 
inside rail.
Sweeper vehicle means a rail vehicle whose function is to detect 
obstacles within the static construction gauge prior to the start of 
daily revenue service.
Tight track means CWR which is in a considerable amount of compression.
Track acceleration measurement system (TAMS) means an on-track, 
vehicle-borne technology used to measure lateral and vertical carbody 
accelerations.
Track geometry measurement system (TGMS) means an on-track, vehicle-
borne technology used to measure track surface, twist, crosslevel, 
alignment, and gauge.
Track lateral resistance means the resistance provided to the rail/
crosstie structure against lateral displacement.
Track longitudinal resistance means the resistance provided by the rail 
anchors/rail fasteners and the ballast section to the rail/crosstie 
structure against longitudinal displacement.
Track, non-ballasted means a track structure not supported by ballast 
in which the rails are directly supported by concrete or steel 
structures. Non-ballasted track can include slab track and track 
structures where the rails are directly fixed to steel bridges or to 
servicing pits within trainset maintenance facilities.
Train means a trainset, or locomotive or locomotive units coupled with 
or without cars.
Train-induced forces means the vertical, longitudinal, and lateral 
dynamic forces which are generated during train movement and which can 
contribute to the buckling potential of the rail.
Train protection switch means a safety device located on station 
platforms and on safe walkways along the right-of-way. The train 
protection switch is tied directly into the ATC system and is used in 
the event that trainsets in the immediate area must be stopped.
Trainset means a passenger train including the cab cars and 
intermediate cars that are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a 
single consist. The individual units of a trainset are uncoupled only 
for emergencies or maintenance conducted in repair facilities.
Trainset maintenance facility means a location equipped with the 
special tools, equipment, and qualified individuals capable of 
conducting pre-service inspections and regular inspections on the 
trainsets in accordance with the railroad's inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program. Trainset maintenance facilities are also 
considered repair points.
Transponder means a wayside component of the ATC system used to provide 
trainset position correction on the mainline or to provide an overlay 
of overrun protection within a trainset maintenance facility.
Underframe means the lower horizontal support structure of a rail 
vehicle.
Unit, trainset means a cab car or intermediate car of a trainset.
Vestibule means an area of a passenger car that normally does not 
contain seating, is located adjacent to a side exit door, and is used 
in passing from a seating area to a side exit door.
Yard means a system of tracks within defined limits and outside of the 
territory controlled by signals, which can be used for the making up of 
non-passenger trains or the storing of maintenance-of-way equipment.
Yield strength means the ability of a structural member to resist a 
change in length caused by an applied load. Exceeding the yield 
strength will cause permanent deformation of the member.

Sec.  299.7   Responsibility for compliance.

    (a) The railroad shall not--
    (1) Use, haul, or permit to be used or hauled on its line(s) any 
trainset--
    (i) With one or more defects not in compliance with this part; or
    (ii) That has not been inspected and tested as required by a 
provision of this part.
    (2) Operate over any track, except as provided in paragraph (e) of 
this section, with one or more conditions not in compliance this part, 
if the railroad has actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to the 
violation, or a reasonable person acting in the circumstances and 
exercising reasonable care would have that knowledge.
    (3) Violate any other provision of this part or any provision of 
the applicable FRA regulations listed under Sec.  299.3(c).
    (b) For purposes of this rule, a trainset shall be considered in 
use prior to the trainset's departure as soon as it has received, or 
should have received the inspection required under this part for 
movement and is ready for service.
    (c) Although many of the requirements of this part are stated in 
terms of the duties of the railroad, when any person (including, but 
not limited to, a contractor performing safety-related tasks under 
contract to the railroad subject to this part) performs any function 
required by this part, that person (whether or not the railroad) is 
required to perform that function in accordance with this part.
    (d) For purposes of this part, the railroad shall be responsible 
for compliance with all track safety provisions set forth in subpart C 
of this part. When the railroad and/or its assignee have actual 
knowledge of the facts giving rise to a violation, or a reasonable 
person acting in the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would 
have knowledge that the track does not comply with the requirements of 
this part, it shall--
    (1) Bring the track into compliance;
    (2) Halt operations over that track; or

[[Page 69736]]

    (3) Continue operations over the segment of non-complying track in 
accordance with the provisions of Sec.  299.309(b) or (c).
    (e) The FRA Administrator may hold the railroad, the railroad's 
contractor, or both responsible for compliance with the requirements of 
this part and subject to civil penalties.

Sec.  299.9   Notifications and filings.

    All notifications and filings to the FRA required by this part 
shall be submitted to the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety 
and Chief Safety Officer, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 
20590, unless otherwise specified.

Sec.  299.11   Electronic recordkeeping.

    The railroad's electronic recordkeeping shall be retained such 
that--
    (a) The railroad maintains an information technology security 
program adequate to ensure the integrity of the electronic data storage 
system, including the prevention of unauthorized access to the program 
logic or individual records;
    (b) The program and data storage system must be protected by a 
security system that utilizes an employee identification number and 
password, or a comparable method, to establish appropriate levels of 
program access meeting all of the following standards:
    (1) No two individuals have the same electronic identity; and
    (2) A record cannot be deleted or altered by any individual after 
the record is certified by the employee who created the record.
    (c) Any amendment to a record is either--
    (1) Electronically stored apart from the record that it amends; or
    (2) Electronically attached to the record as information without 
changing the original record;
    (d) Each amendment to a record uniquely identifies the person 
making the amendment;
    (e) The system employed by the railroad for data storage permits 
reasonable access and retrieval; and
    (f) Information retrieved from the system can be easily produced in 
a printed format which can be readily provided to FRA representatives 
in a timely manner and authenticated by a designated representative of 
the railroad as a true and accurate copy of the railroad's records if 
requested to do so by FRA representatives.

Sec.  299.13   System description.

    (a) General. This section describes the components, operations, 
equipment, and systems of the railroad's high-speed rail system. The 
railroad shall adhere to the following general requirements:
    (1) The railroad shall not exceed the maximum trainset speed 
approved by FRA under Sec.  299.609(g) while in revenue service, up to 
a maximum speed of 330 km/h (205 mph).
    (2) The railroad shall not transport or permit to be transported in 
revenue service any product that has been established to be a hazardous 
material pursuant to 49 CFR part 172, as amended.
    (3) The railroad shall not conduct scheduled right-of-way 
maintenance on a section of the right-of-way prior to that section of 
the right-of-way being cleared of all revenue service trainsets 
(including any trainset repositioning moves), and proper action is 
taken by the general control center staff to protect incursion into 
established maintenance zones by revenue trainsets. Additionally, the 
railroad shall not commence revenue service prior to completion of the 
maintenance activities, that section of the right-of-way being cleared 
of all maintenance-of-way equipment. Further, the railroad is 
prohibited from commencing revenue operations until after conclusion of 
the daily sweeper inspection, under Sec.  299.339, and the general 
control center returning the signal and trainset control system to the 
state required to protect revenue operations.
    (b) Right-of-way. (1) The railroad shall operate on a completely 
dedicated right-of-way and shall not operate or conduct joint 
operations with any other freight equipment, other than the railroad's 
maintenance-of-way equipment, or passenger rail equipment. Only the 
railroad's high-speed trainsets approved for revenue operations under 
this part, and any equipment required for construction, maintenance, 
and rescue purposes may be operated over the railroad's right-of-way.
    (2) There shall be no public highway-rail grade crossings. Animal 
and non-railroad equipment crossings shall be accomplished by means of 
an underpass or overpass. Private at-grade crossings shall be for the 
exclusive use by the railroad and shall be limited to track Classes H0 
and H1.
    (3) The railroad shall develop and comply with a right-of-way 
barrier plan. The right-of-way barrier plan shall be maintained at the 
system headquarters and will be made available to FRA upon request. At 
a minimum, the plan will contain provisions in areas of demonstrated 
need for the prevention of--
    (i) Vandalism;
    (ii) Launching of objects from overhead bridges or structures onto 
the path of trainsets;
    (iii) Intrusion of vehicles from adjacent rights-of-way; and
    (iv) Unauthorized access to the right-of-way.
    (4) The entire perimeter of the system's right-of-way, except for 
elevated structures such as bridges and viaducts, shall be permanently 
fenced. Elevated structures shall be equipped with walkways and safety 
railing.
    (5) The railroad shall install intrusion detectors in accordance 
with the requirements set forth in subpart B of this part.
    (6) The railroad shall install rain, flood, and wind detectors in 
locations identified by the railroad, based on relevant criteria used 
by JRC to provide adequate warning of when operational restrictions are 
required due to adverse weather conditions. Operating restrictions 
shall be defined in the railroad's operating rules.
    (7) Access to the right-of-way for maintenance-of-way staff shall 
be provided on both sides of the right-of-way in accordance with the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program. This access shall be 
protected against entry by unauthorized persons.
    (8) Provisions shall be made to permit emergency personnel to 
access the right-of-way in accordance with the Emergency Preparedness 
Plan pursuant to part 239 of this chapter. This access shall be 
protected against entry by unauthorized persons.
    (9) Throughout the length of the right-of-way, the railroad shall 
install walkways located at a safe distance from the tracks at a 
minimum distance of 2.0 m (6.56 feet) from the field side of the 
outside rail for a design speed of 330 km/h (205 mph). The walkways 
shall be used primarily for track and right-of-way inspection, but may 
be used for emergency evacuation or rescue access.
    (10) Access to the right-of-way by maintenance-of-way personnel 
shall not be allowed during revenue operations unless the access is 
outside the minimum safe distance defined in Sec.  299.13(b)(9). In the 
event of unscheduled maintenance or repair, emergency access will be 
provided under specific circumstances allowed under the railroad's 
operating rules and the inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
    (11) The railroad shall record all difficulties and special 
situations regarding geology, hydrology, settlement, landslide, 
concrete, and quality criteria that arise during construction of the 
right-of-way. After construction, the railroad shall monitor

[[Page 69737]]

the stability and quality standards of structures such as bridges, 
viaducts, and earth structures.
    (12) The railroad shall make available for review by the FRA the 
track layout drawings which show, at a minimum, the following 
information:
    (i) Length of straight sections, spirals and curves, curve radius, 
superelevation, superelevation variations, gradients, and vertical 
curve radii;
    (ii) Turnouts and crossover location, technology, and geometry;
    (iii) Maximum operating speed and allowable cant deficiencies;
    (iv) Signal boxes, Go/No-Go signals, and communication devices;
    (v) Details and arrangement of track circuitry;
    (vi) Power feeding equipment including sectionalization, and return 
routing;
    (vii) Location of accesses to the right-of-way; and
    (viii) The railroad shall also submit the specifications for the 
track layout, permissible track forces, components such as rail, 
ballast, ties, rail fasteners, and switches.
    (13) Protection devices shall be installed on all highway bridge 
overpasses in accordance with the right-of-way plan in paragraph (b)(3) 
of this section.
    (14) There shall be no movable bridges in the railroad's system. 
Stationary rail bridges located over highways or navigable waterways 
shall have their foundations, piers, or other support structure 
appropriately protected against the impact of road vehicles or water-
borne vessels.
    (15) Train protection switches shall be installed at regular 
intervals on both sides of the right-of-way at intervals defined by the 
railroad and at intervals not to exceed 60 m (197 feet) on platforms 
within stations. These devices shall act directly on the ATC system.
    (16) The railroad shall use the design wheel and rail profiles, 
service-proven on the Tokaido Shinkansen system, or alternate wheel and 
rail profiles approved by FRA.
    (c) Railroad system safety--(1) Inspection, testing, and 
maintenance procedures and criteria. The railroad shall develop, 
implement, and use a system of inspection, testing, maintenance 
procedures and criteria, under subpart G of this part, which are 
initially based on the Tokaido Shinkansen system service-proven 
procedures and criteria, to ensure the integrity and safe operation of 
the railroad's rolling stock, infrastructure, and signal and trainset 
control system. The railroad may, subject to FRA review and approval, 
implement inspection, testing, maintenance procedures and criteria, 
incorporating new or emerging technology, under Sec.  299.713(c)(4).
    (2) Operating practices. The railroad shall develop, implement, and 
use operating rules, which meet the standards set forth in subpart E of 
this part and which are based on practices and procedures proven on the 
Tokaido Shinkansen system to ensure the integrity and safe operation of 
the railroad's system. The railroad shall have station platform 
attendants on the platform in close proximity to the train protection 
switches required by paragraph (b)(15) of this section, while trainsets 
are approaching and departing the station. The railroad's operating 
rules shall require coordination between on-board crew and station 
platform attendants to assure safety during passenger boarding and 
alighting from trainsets at stations.
    (3) Personnel qualification requirements. The railroad shall 
develop, implement, and use a training and testing program, which meets 
the requirements set forth in this part and part 243 of this chapter, 
to ensure that all personnel, including railroad employees and 
employees of railroad contractors, possess the skills and knowledge 
necessary to effectively perform their duties.
    (4) System qualification tests. The railroad shall develop, 
implement, and use a series of operational and design tests, which meet 
the standards set forth in subpart F of this part, to demonstrate the 
safe operation of system components, and the system as a whole.
    (d) Track and infrastructure. (1) The railroad shall construct its 
track and infrastructure to meet all material and operational design 
criteria, within normal acceptable construction tolerances, and to meet 
the requirements set forth in subpart C of this part.
    (2) The railroad shall operate on nominal standard gauge, 1,435 mm 
(56.5 inches), track.
    (3) The railroad shall install and operate on double track 
throughout the mainlines, with a minimum nominal distance between track 
centerlines of 4 m (13.1 feet) for operating speeds up to 170 km/h (106 
mph) (track Classes up to H4) and 4.2 m (13.8 feet) for operating 
speeds greater than 170 km/h (106 mph) (track Classes H5 and above). 
Generally, each track will be used for a single direction of traffic, 
and trainset will not overtake each other on mainline tracks (except at 
non-terminal station locations). The railroad may install crossover 
connections between the double track at each station, and at regular 
intervals along the line to permit flexibility in trainset operations, 
maintenance, and emergency rescue.
    (4) The railroad's main track (track Classes H4 and above) shall 
consist of continuous welded rail. Once installed, the rail shall be 
field-welded to form one continuous track segment except rail expansion 
joints and where glued-insulated joints are necessary for signaling 
purposes. The rail shall be JIS E 1101 60 kg rail, as specified in JIS 
E 1101:2001(E) as amended by JIS E 1101:2006(E), and JIS E 1101:2012(E) 
(all incorporated by reference, see Sec.  299.17).
    (5) In yards and maintenance facilities, where operations will be 
at lower speeds, the railroad shall install either JIS E 1101 50kgN 
rail or JIS E 1101 60 kg rail as specified in JIS E 1101:2001(E) as 
amended by JIS E 1101:2006(E), and JIS E 1101:2012(E) (all incorporated 
by reference, see Sec.  299.17).
    (6) The railroad shall use either ballasted or non-ballasted track 
to support the track structure, as appropriate for the intended high-
speed system.
    (i) Except as noted in paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of this section, for 
ballasted mainline track structure, the railroad shall install pre-
stressed concrete ties.
    (ii) For special track work such as turnouts and expansion joints, 
and at transitions to bridges, and for non-ballasted track, the 
railroad shall install either pre-stressed, composite ties, or use 
direct fixation. Detailed requirements are included in subpart C of 
this part.
    (7) Turnouts, expansion joints and glued-insulated joints shall be 
of the proven design as used on the Tokaido Shinkansen system.
    (8) The trainsets and stations shall be designed to permit level 
platform boarding for passengers and crew at all side entrance doors. 
Provisions for high level boarding shall be made at all locations in 
trainset maintenance facilities where crew and maintenance personnel 
are normally required to access or disembark trainsets.
    (e) Signal and trainset control systems. (1) The railroad's signal 
and trainset control systems, shall be based upon the service-proven 
system utilized on the Tokaido Shinkansen system and shall include an 
automatic train control (ATC) system, interlocking equipment, and 
wayside equipment, including: track circuits, transponders, and Go/No-
Go signals in stations and trainset maintenance facilities.
    (2) The railroad's signaling system shall extend beyond the 
mainline into trainset maintenance facilities and be

[[Page 69738]]

designed to prevent collisions at all speeds.
    (3) The ATC system shall be designed with a redundant architecture 
utilizing an intrinsic fail-safe design concept.
    (4) The trainset braking curves shall be determined by the on-board 
equipment based on the ATC signal from the ground facility and on-board 
database that includes the alignment and rolling stock performance 
data. The on-board equipment shall generate the braking command based 
upon the trainset location, speed, and braking curves.
    (5) The ATC on-board equipment shall have three modes: mainline, 
shunting, and cut-out.
    (i) Mainline mode shall be used for operations on mainlines and for 
entering into the trainset maintenance facilities. The mainline mode of 
ATC on-board equipment shall provide the following functions:
    (A) Prevent train-to-train collisions; and
    (B) Prevent overspeed derailments.
    (ii) Shunting mode shall be used to protect movements within 
trainset maintenance facilities and for emergency operations as 
required by the operating rules. When operating in shunting mode, the 
trainset shall be restricted to a maximum speed of 30 km/h.
    (iii) Cut-out mode shall be used for emergency operations and/or in 
the event of an ATC system failure as required by the operating rules.
    (6) Interlocking equipment shall prevent the movement of trainsets 
through a switch in an improper position and command switch-and-lock 
movements on mainlines and within trainset maintenance facilities.
    (7) Track circuits shall be used to provide broken rail detection.
    (8) Overrun protection coils shall be used at mainline turnouts, 
crossovers within stations and trainset maintenance facilities to 
prevent unauthorized route access.
    (9) Transponders shall be used on the mainline to provide trainset 
position correction. Transponders may be used to provide an overlay of 
overrun protection within a trainset maintenance facility.
    (10) Go/No-Go signals shall be used in stations for shunting and 
emergency operations and in trainset maintenance facilities to provide 
trainset movement authority.
    (11) The railroad shall include an intrusion detection system as 
required by paragraph (b)(3) and (5) of this section that shall 
interface with the ATC system and have the capability to stop the 
trainset under specified intrusion scenarios.
    (f) Communications. (1) The railroad shall install a dedicated 
communication system along the right-of-way to transmit data, 
telephone, and/or radio communications that is completely isolated and 
independent of the signal and trainset control system. To ensure 
transmission reliability, the system shall include back-up transmission 
routes.
    (2) For trainset operation and maintenance, the railroad shall 
install--
    (i) A portable radio system for maintenance and service use; and
    (ii) A trainset radio, which shall facilitate communication between 
each trainset and the general control center.
    (g) Rolling stock. (1) The railroad's rolling stock shall be 
designed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the requirements 
set forth in subparts D, E, and G of this part.
    (2) The railroad shall utilize bi-directional, fixed-consist, 
electric multiple unit (EMU), high-speed trainsets based on the N700.
    (3) Each trainset shall be equipped with wheel slide control.
    (4) Each trainset shall be equipped with two electrically connected 
pantographs. The position of the pantographs (up or down) shall be 
displayed in the driver's cab.
    (5) The driver's cab shall be a full width and dedicated cab and 
shall be arranged to enhance safety of operation, range of vision, 
visibility and readability of controls and indicators, accessibility of 
controls, and climate control.
    (6) The railroad's passenger equipment brake system shall be based 
on the N700's design and shall meet the following standards:
    (i) Each trainset shall be equipped with an electronically 
controlled brake system that shall ensure that each unit in the 
trainset responds independently to a brake command. The brake command 
shall be transmitted through the on-board internal trainset control 
network, as well as through the trainline for redundancy.
    (A) Motorized cars shall be equipped with regenerative and 
electronically controlled pneumatic brakes. The system shall be 
designed to maximize the use of regenerative brakes.
    (B) Non-motorized cars shall be equipped with electronically 
controlled pneumatic brakes.
    (C) The friction brakes on each bogie shall be cheek mounted disc 
brakes.
    (D) Each car shall be equipped with an electronic and pneumatic 
brake control unit and a main reservoir. The system shall be designed 
that in the event of a failure of an electronic control unit in a car, 
brake control shall be provided by the electronic control unit on the 
adjacent car. Each car in the trainset shall be equipped with a backup 
wheel slide protection controller that will provide wheel slide 
protection in the event of a wheel slide protection controller failure.
    (ii) The braking system shall be designed with the following brake 
controls: Service, emergency, urgent, and rescue brake.
    (iii) The service and emergency brake shall be applied 
automatically by ATC or manually by the driver.
    (iv) The urgent brake control shall be independent of the service 
and emergency brake control and shall be automatically applied if the 
trainset is parted. Application of the urgent brake shall produce an 
irretrievable stop. The urgent brake force shall be designed to vary 
according to speed in order to minimize the braking distance and avoid 
excessive demand of adhesion at higher speeds.
    (v) A disabled trainset shall be capable of having its brake system 
controlled electronically by a rescue trainset.
    (vi) Independent of the driver's brake handle in the cab, each 
trainset shall be equipped with two urgent brake switches in each cab 
car, accessible only to the crew; located adjacent to the door control 
station and that can initiate an urgent brake application. If door 
control stations are provided in intermediate cars that are accessible 
only to crew members, then the urgent brake switches must also be 
included adjacent to the door control stations.
    (vii) The railroad shall establish a maximum safe operating speed 
to address brake failures that occur in revenue service as required by 
Sec.  299.409(f)(4). In the event of any friction brake failure on a 
trainset, the speed shall be limited by ATC on-board equipment in 
accordance with the brake failure switch position selected by the 
driver and as required by Sec.  299.447.

Sec.  299.15   Special approvals.

    (a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and 
action upon requests for special approval of alternative standards to 
this part.
    (b) Petitions for special approval of alternative standard. Each 
petition for special approval of an alternative standard shall 
contain--
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
    (2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the 
particular requirements of this part; and

[[Page 69739]]

    (3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, establishing that the 
alternative will provide at least an equivalent level of safety.
    (c) Petitions for special approval of alternative compliance. Each 
petition for special approval of alternative compliance shall contain--
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to the petition;
    (2) High-speed core systems and system components of special design 
shall be deemed to comply with this part, if the FRA Associate 
Administrator determines under paragraph (d) of this section that the 
core system or system components provide at least an equivalent level 
of safety in the environment defined within Sec.  299.13 with respect 
to the protection of railroad employees and the public. In making a 
determination under paragraph (d) of this section the Associate 
Administrator shall consider, as a whole, all of those elements of 
casualty prevention or mitigation relevant to the integrity of the core 
system or components that are addressed by the requirements of this 
part.
    (d) Petition contents. The Associate Administrator may only make a 
finding of equivalent safety and compliance with this part, based upon 
a submission of data and analysis sufficient to support that 
determination. The petition shall include--
    (1) The information required by Sec.  299.15(b) or (c), as 
appropriate; Information, including detailed drawings and materials 
specifications, sufficient to describe the actual construction and 
function of the core systems or system components of special design;
    (2) A quantitative risk assessment, incorporating the design 
information and engineering analysis described in this paragraph, 
demonstrating that the core systems or system components, as utilized 
in the service environment defined in Sec.  299.13, presents no greater 
hazard of serious personal injury than existing core system or system 
components that conform to the specific requirements of this part.
    (e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the 
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraphs (b) and (c) 
of this section.
    (f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of 
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, any person may comment on the 
petition.
    (1) Each comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which 
it is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the 
commenter in the proceeding.
    (2) Each comment shall be submitted to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Docket Operations (M-30), West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, and 
shall contain the assigned docket number for that proceeding. The form 
of such submission may be in written or electronic form consistent with 
the standards and requirements established by the Federal Docket 
Management System and posted on its website at http://www.regulations.gov.
    (g) Disposition of petitions. (1) FRA will conduct a hearing on a 
petition in accordance with the procedures provided in Sec.  211.25 of 
this chapter.
    (2) If FRA finds that the petition complies with the requirements 
of this section or that the proposed plan is acceptable the petition 
will be granted, normally within 90 days of its receipt. If the 
petition is neither granted nor denied within 90 days, the petition 
remains pending for decision. FRA may attach special conditions to the 
approval of the petition. Following the approval of a petition, FRA may 
reopen consideration of the petition for cause stated.
    (3) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the 
requirements of this section, or that the proposed plan is not 
acceptable or that the proposed changes are not justified, or both, the 
petition will be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
    (4) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration 
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other 
interested parties.

Sec.  299.17   Incorporation by reference.

    Certain material is incorporated by reference into this part with 
the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for 
inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6052); 
email: FRALegal@dot.gov and is available from the sources indicated in 
this section. It is also available for inspection at the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the 
availability of this material at NARA, email fedreg.legal@nara.gov or 
go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
    (a) ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West 
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959, www.astm.org.
    (1) ASTM D 4956-07[egr]\1\, Standard Specification for 
Retroreflective Sheeting for Traffic Control, approved March 15, 2007; 
into Sec.  299.423.
    (2) ASTM E 810-03, Standard Test Method for Coefficient of 
Retroreflection of Retroreflective Sheeting Utilizing the Coplanar 
Geometry, approved February 10, 2003; into Sec.  299.423.
    (3) ASTM E 2073-07, Standard Test Method for Photopic Luminance of 
Photoluminescent (Phosphorescent) Markings, approved July 1, 2007; into 
Sec.  299.423.
    (b) Japanese Standards Association 3-13-12 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 
108-0073, Japan, www.jsa.or.jp (Japanese site), or www.jsa.or.jp/en 
(English site).
    (1) JIS B 8265:2010(E) ``Construction of pressure vessels-general 
principles,'' Published December 27, 2010, Second English edition, 
published December 2013; into Sec.  299.409.
    (2) JIS E 1101:2001(E), ``Flat bottom railway rails and special 
rails for switches and crossings of non-treated steel,'' Published 
March 21, 2001, Second English edition, published August 2008; into 
Sec.  299.13(d).
    (3) JIS E 1101:2006(E) ``Flat bottom railway rails and special 
rails for switches and crossings of non-treated steel,'' (Amendment 1), 
Published March 27, 2006, First English edition, published December 
2006; into Sec.  299.13(d).
    (4) JIS E 1101:2012(E) ``Flat bottom railway rails and special 
rails for switches and crossings of non-treated steel,'' (Amendment 2), 
Published February 20, 2012, First English edition, May 2012; into 
Sec.  299.13(d).
    (5) JIS E 7105:2006(E), ``Rolling Stock--Test methods of static 
load for body structures,'' Published February 6, 2006, First English 
edition published May 2010; into Sec.  299.403(b).
    (6) JIS E 7105:2011(E), ``Rolling Stock--Test methods of static 
load for body structures,'' (Amendment 1) Published September 7, 2011, 
First English edition, published December 2011; into Sec.  299.403(b).

Subpart B--Signal and Trainset Control System

Sec.  299.201   Technical PTC system requirements.

    (a) The railroad shall comply with all applicable requirements 
under 49 U.S.C. 20157, including, but not limited to, the statutory 
requirement to fully implement an FRA-certified PTC system prior to 
commencing revenue service.
    (b) The railroad's PTC system shall be designed to prevent train-
to-train

[[Page 69740]]

collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into established work 
zone limits, and movements of trainset through switches left in the 
wrong position, reliably and functionally, in accordance with Sec.  
236.1005(a) and (c) through (f) of this chapter.
    (c) The railroad is authorized to conduct field testing of its PTC 
system on its system, prior to obtaining PTC System Certification from 
FRA, in accordance with its system-wide qualification test plan under 
Sec.  299.603. During any field testing of its uncertified PTC system 
and regression testing of its FRA-certified PTC system, FRA may oversee 
the railroad's testing, audit any applicable test plans and procedures, 
and impose additional testing conditions that FRA believes may be 
necessary for the safety of trainset operations.
    (d) The railroad is not exempted from compliance with any 
requirement of subparts A through G of 49 CFR part 236, or 49 CFR parts 
233 and 235, unless the railroad's FRA-approved PTCSP provides for such 
an exemption.
    (e)(1) All materials filed in accordance with this subpart must be 
in the English language, or have been translated into English and 
attested as true and correct.
    (2) Each filing referenced in this subpart may include a request 
for full or partial confidentiality in accordance with Sec.  209.11 of 
this chapter. If confidentiality is requested as to a portion of any 
applicable document, then in addition to the filing requirements under 
Sec.  209.11 of this chapter, the person filing the document shall also 
file a copy of the original unredacted document, marked to indicate 
which portions are redacted in the document's confidential version 
without obscuring the original document's contents.

Sec.  299.203   PTC system required.

    The railroad shall not commence revenue service prior to installing 
and making operative its FRA-certified PTC system.

Sec.  299.205   PTC System Certification.

    (a) Prior to operating its PTC system in revenue service, the 
railroad must first obtain a PTC System Certification from FRA by 
submitting an acceptable PTCSP and obtaining FRA's approval of its 
PTCSP.
    (b) Each PTCSP requirement under this subpart shall be supported by 
information and analysis sufficient to establish that the PTC system 
meets the requirements of Sec.  236.1005(a) and (c) through (f) of this 
chapter.
    (c) If the Associate Administrator finds that the PTCSP and its 
supporting documentation support a finding that the PTC system complies 
with Sec.  236.1005(a) and (c) through (f) of this chapter and Sec.  
299.211, the Associate Administrator shall approve the PTCSP. If the 
Associate Administrator approves the PTCSP, the railroad shall receive 
PTC System Certification for its PTC system and shall implement the PTC 
system according to the PTCSP.
    (d) Issuance of a PTC System Certification is contingent upon FRA's 
confidence in the implementation and operation of the subject PTC 
system. This confidence may be based on FRA-monitored field testing or 
an independent assessment performed in accordance with Sec.  236.1017 
of this chapter.
    (e)(1) As necessary to ensure safety, FRA may attach special 
conditions to its certification of the railroad's PTC System.
    (2) After granting a PTC System Certification, FRA may reconsider 
the PTC System Certification upon revelation of any of the following 
factors concerning the contents of the PTCSP:
    (i) Potential error or fraud;
    (ii) Potentially invalidated assumptions determined as a result of 
in-service experience or one or more unsafe events calling into 
question the safety analysis supporting the approval.
    (3) During FRA's reconsideration in accordance with this paragraph, 
the PTC system may remain in use if otherwise consistent with the 
applicable law and regulations, and FRA may impose special conditions 
for use of the PTC system.
    (4) After FRA's reconsideration in accordance with this paragraph, 
FRA may:
    (i) Dismiss its reconsideration and continue to recognize the 
existing PTC System Certification;
    (ii) Allow continued operations under such conditions the Associate 
Administrator deems necessary to ensure safety; or
    (iii) Revoke the PTC System Certification and direct the railroad 
to cease operations.
    (f) FRA shall be afforded reasonable access to monitor, test, and 
inspect processes, procedures, facilities, documents, records, design 
and testing materials, artifacts, training materials and programs, and 
any other information used in the design, development, manufacture, 
test, implementation, and operation of the system, as well as interview 
any personnel.
    (g) Information that has been certified under the auspices of a 
foreign regulatory entity recognized by the Associate Administrator 
may, at the Associate Administrator's sole discretion, be accepted as 
independently verified and validated and used to support the railroad's 
PTCSP.
    (h) The railroad shall file its PTCSP in FRA's Secure Information 
Repository at https://sir.fra.dot.gov, consistent with Sec.  
299.201(e).

Sec.  299.207   PTC Safety Plan content requirements.

    (a) The railroad's PTCSP shall contain the following elements:
    (1) A hazard log consisting of a comprehensive description of all 
safety-relevant hazards of the PTC system, specific to implementation 
on the railroad, including maximum threshold limits for each hazard 
(for unidentified hazards, the threshold shall be exceeded at one 
occurrence);
    (2) A description of the safety assurance concepts that are to be 
used for system development, including an explanation of the design 
principles and assumptions;
    (3) A risk assessment of the as-built PTC system;
    (4) A hazard mitigation analysis, including a complete and 
comprehensive description of each hazard and the mitigation techniques 
used;
    (5) A complete description of the safety assessment and 
Verification and Validation processes applied to the PTC system, their 
results, and whether these processes address the safety principles 
described in appendix C to part 236 of this chapter directly, using 
other safety criteria, or not at all;
    (6) A complete description of the railroad's training plan for 
railroad, and contractor employees and supervisors necessary to ensure 
safe and proper installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, 
repair, inspection, testing, and modification of the PTC system;
    (7) A complete description of the specific procedures and test 
equipment necessary to ensure the safe and proper installation, 
implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, 
and modification of the PTC system on the railroad and establish 
safety-critical hazards are appropriately mitigated. These procedures, 
including calibration requirements, shall be consistent with or explain 
deviations from the equipment manufacturer's recommendations;
    (8) A complete description of the configuration or revision control 
measures designed to ensure that the railroad or its contractor does 
not adversely affect the safety-functional requirements and that 
safety-critical hazard mitigation processes are not

[[Page 69741]]

compromised as a result of any such change;
    (9) A complete description of all initial implementation testing 
procedures necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements 
are met and safety-critical hazards are appropriately mitigated;
    (10) A complete description of all post-implementation testing 
(validation) and monitoring procedures, including the intervals 
necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements, safety-
critical hazard mitigation processes, and safety-critical tolerances 
are not compromised over time, through use, or after maintenance 
(adjustment, repair, or replacement) is performed;
    (11) A complete description of each record necessary to ensure the 
safety of the system that is associated with periodic maintenance, 
inspections, tests, adjustments, repairs, or replacements, and the 
system's resulting conditions, including records of component failures 
resulting in safety-relevant hazards (see Sec.  299.213);
    (12) A safety analysis to determine whether, when the system is in 
operation, any risk remains of an unintended incursion into a roadway 
work zone due to human error. If the analysis reveals any such risk, 
the PTCSP shall describe how that risk will be mitigated;
    (13) A complete description of how the PTC system will enforce 
authorities and signal indications;
    (14) A complete description of how the PTC system will 
appropriately and timely enforce all integrated hazard detectors in 
accordance with Sec.  236.1005 of this chapter;
    (15) The documents and information required under Sec.  299.211;
    (16) A summary of the process for the product supplier or vendor to 
promptly and thoroughly report any safety-relevant failures or 
previously unidentified hazards to the railroad, including when another 
user of the product experiences a safety-relevant failure or discovers 
a previously unidentified hazard;
    (17) Documentation establishing--by design, data, or other 
analysis--that the PTC system meets the fail-safe operation criteria 
under paragraph (b)(4)(v) of appendix C to part 236 of this chapter; 
and,
    (18) An analysis establishing that the PTC system will be operated 
at a level of safety comparable to that achieved over the 5-year period 
prior to the submission of the railroad's PTCSP by other train control 
systems that perform PTC functions, and which have been utilized on 
high-speed rail systems with similar technical and operational 
characteristics in the United States or in foreign service.
    (b) As the railroad's PTC system may be considered a standalone 
system pursuant to Sec.  236.1015(e)(3) of this chapter, the following 
requirements apply:
    (1) The PTC system shall reliably execute the functions required by 
Sec.  236.1005 of this chapter and be demonstrated to do so to FRA's 
satisfaction; and
    (2) The railroad's PTCSP shall establish, with a high degree of 
confidence, that the system will not introduce any hazards that have 
not been sufficiently mitigated.
    (c) When determining whether the PTCSP fulfills the requirements 
under this section, the Associate Administrator may consider all 
available evidence concerning the reliability of the proposed system.
    (d) When reviewing the issue of the potential data errors (for 
example, errors arising from data supplied from other business systems 
needed to execute the braking algorithm, survey data needed for 
location determination, or mandatory directives issued through the 
computer-aided dispatching system), the PTCSP must include a careful 
identification of each of the risks and a discussion of each applicable 
mitigation. In an appropriate case, such as a case in which the 
residual risk after mitigation is substantial, the Associate 
Administrator may require submission of a quantitative risk assessment 
addressing these potential errors.
    (e) The railroad must comply with the applicable requirements under 
Sec.  236.1021 of this chapter prior to modifying a safety-critical 
element of an FRA-certified PTC system.
    (f) If a PTCSP applies to a PTC system designed to replace an 
existing certified PTC system, the PTCSP will be approved provided that 
the PTCSP establishes with a high degree of confidence that the new PTC 
system will provide a level of safety not less than the level of safety 
provided by the system to be replaced.

Sec.  299.209   PTC system use and failures.

    (a) When any safety-critical PTC system component fails to perform 
its intended function, the cause must be determined and the faulty 
component adjusted, repaired, or replaced without undue delay. Until 
repair of such essential components is completed, the railroad shall 
take appropriate action as specified in its PTCSP.
    (b) Where a trainset that is operating in, or is to be operated 
within, a PTC-equipped track segment experiences a PTC system failure 
or the PTC system is otherwise cut out while en route (i.e., after the 
trainset has departed its initial terminal), the trainset may only 
continue in accordance with all of the following:
    (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(4) of this section, when no 
absolute block protection is established, the trainset may proceed at a 
speed not to exceed restricted speed.
    (2) When absolute block protection can be established in advance of 
the trainset, the trainset may proceed at a speed not to exceed 120 km/
h (75 mph), and the trainset shall not exceed restricted speed until 
the absolute block in advance of the trainset is established.
    (3) A report of the failure or cut-out must be made to a designated 
railroad officer of the railroad as soon as safe and practicable.
    (4) Where the PTC system is the exclusive method of delivering 
mandatory directives, an absolute block must be established in advance 
of the trainset as soon as safe and practicable, and the trainset shall 
not exceed restricted speed until the absolute block in advance of the 
trainset is established.
    (5) Where the failure or cut-out is a result of a defective onboard 
PTC apparatus, the trainset may be moved in passenger service only to 
the next forward location where the necessary repairs can be made; 
however, if the next forward location where the necessary repairs can 
be made does not have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of 
passengers, the trainset may be moved past the repair location in 
service only to the next forward passenger station in order to 
facilitate the unloading of passengers. When the passengers have been 
safely unloaded, the defective trainset shall be moved to the nearest 
location where the onboard PTC apparatus can be repaired or exchanged.
    (c) The railroad shall comply with all provisions in its PTCSP for 
each PTC system it uses and shall operate within the scope of initial 
operational assumptions and predefined changes identified.
    (d) The normal functioning of any safety-critical PTC system must 
not be interfered with in testing or otherwise without first taking 
measures to provide for the safe movement of trainsets that depend on 
the normal functioning of the system.
    (e) The railroad shall comply with the reporting requirements under 
Sec.  236.1029(h) of this chapter.
    (f) The railroad and the PTC system vendors and/or suppliers must 
comply with each applicable requirement under Sec.  236.1023 of this 
chapter.

[[Page 69742]]

Sec.  299.211   Communications and security requirements.

    (a) All wireless communications between the office, wayside, and 
onboard components in a PTC system shall provide cryptographic message 
integrity and authentication.
    (b) Cryptographic keys required under this section shall--
    (1) Use an algorithm approved by the National Institute of 
Standards or a similarly recognized and FRA-approved standards body;
    (2) Be distributed using manual or automated methods, or a 
combination of both; and
    (3) Be revoked--
    (i) If compromised by unauthorized disclosure of the cleartext key; 
or
    (ii) When the key algorithm reaches its lifespan as defined by the 
standards body responsible for approval of the algorithm.
    (c) The cleartext form of the cryptographic keys shall be protected 
from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or substitution, except 
during key entry when the cleartext keys and key components may be 
temporarily displayed to allow visual verification. When encrypted keys 
or key components are entered, the cryptographically protected 
cleartext key or key components shall not be displayed.
    (d) Access to cleartext keys shall be protected by a tamper-
resistant mechanism.
    (e) If the railroad elects to also provide cryptographic message 
confidentiality, it shall:
    (1) Comply with the same requirements for message integrity and 
authentication under this section; and
    (2) Only use keys meeting or exceeding the security strength 
required to protect the data as defined in the railroad's PTCSP.
    (f) The railroad, or its vendor or supplier, shall have a 
prioritized service restoration and mitigation plan for scheduled and 
unscheduled interruptions of service. This plan shall be made available 
to FRA upon request, without undue delay, for restoration of 
communication services that support PTC system services.

Sec.  299.213   Records retention.

    (a) The railroad shall maintain at a designated office on the 
railroad--
    (1) A current copy of each FRA-approved PTCSP that it holds;
    (2) Adequate documentation to demonstrate that the PTCSP meets the 
safety requirements of this RPA, including the risk assessment;
    (3) An Operations and Maintenance Manual, pursuant to Sec.  
299.215; and
    (4) Training and testing records pursuant to Sec.  236.1043(b) of 
this chapter.
    (b) Results of inspections and tests specified in the PTCSP must be 
recorded pursuant to Sec.  236.110 of this chapter.
    (c) Each contractor providing services relating to the testing, 
maintenance, or operation of the railroad's PTC system shall maintain 
at a designated office training records required under Sec. Sec.  
236.1043(b) of this chapter, and 299.207(a)(6).
    (d) After the PTC system is placed in service, the railroad shall 
maintain a database of all safety-relevant hazards as set forth in its 
PTCSP and those that had not been previously identified in its PTCSP. 
If the frequency of the safety-relevant hazards exceeds the threshold 
set forth in its PTCSP, then the railroad shall--
    (1) Report the inconsistency in writing to FRA's Secure Information 
Repository at https://sir.fra.dot.gov, within 15 days of discovery;
    (2) Take prompt countermeasures to reduce the frequency of each 
safety-relevant hazard to below the threshold set forth in its PTCSP; 
and
    (3) Provide a final report when the inconsistency is resolved to 
FRA's Secure Information Repository at https://sir.fra.dot.gov, on the 
results of the analysis and countermeasures taken to reduce the 
frequency of the safety-relevant hazard(s) below the threshold set 
forth in its PTCSP.

Sec.  299.215   Operations and Maintenance Manual.

    (a) The railroad shall catalog and maintain all documents as 
specified in its PTCSP for the operation, installation, maintenance, 
repair, modification, inspection, and testing of the PTC system and 
have them in one Operations and Maintenance Manual, readily available 
to persons required to perform such tasks and for inspection by FRA and 
FRA-certified state inspectors.
    (b) Plans required for proper maintenance, repair, inspection, and 
testing of safety-critical PTC systems must be adequate in detail and 
must be made available for inspection by FRA and FRA-certified state 
inspectors where such PTC systems are deployed or maintained. They must 
identify all software versions, revisions, and revision dates. Plans 
must be legible and correct.
    (c) Hardware, software, and firmware revisions must be documented 
in the Operations and Maintenance Manual according to the railroad's 
configuration management control plan and any additional configuration/
revision control measures specified in its PTCSP.
    (d) Safety-critical components, including spare equipment, must be 
positively identified, handled, replaced, and repaired in accordance 
with the procedures specified in the railroad's PTCSP.
    (e) The railroad shall designate in its Operations and Maintenance 
Manual an appropriate railroad officer responsible for issues relating 
to scheduled interruptions of service.

Subpart C--Track Safety Standards

Sec.  299.301   Restoration or renewal of track under traffic 
conditions.

    (a) Restoration or renewal of track, other than in yards and 
trainset maintenance facilities, under traffic conditions is 
prohibited.
    (b) Restoration or renewal of track under traffic conditions on 
track Class H2 in trainset maintenance facilities is limited to the 
replacement of worn, broken, or missing components or fastenings that 
do not affect the safe passage of trainset.
    (c) The following activities are expressly prohibited on track 
Class H2 in trainset maintenance facilities under traffic conditions:
    (1) Any work that interrupts rail continuity, e.g., as in joint bar 
replacement or rail replacement;
    (2) Any work that adversely affects the lateral or vertical 
stability of the track with the exception of spot tamping an isolated 
condition where not more than 4.5 m (15 feet) of track are involved at 
any one time and the ambient air temperature is not above 35[deg]C 
(95[deg]F); and
    (3) Removal and replacement of the rail fastenings on more than one 
tie at a time within 4.5 m (15 feet).

Sec.  299.303   Measuring track not under load.

    When unloaded track is measured to determine compliance with 
requirements of this part, evidence of rail movement, if any, that 
occurs while the track is loaded shall be added to the measurements of 
the unloaded track.

Sec.  299.305   Drainage.

    Each drainage or other water carrying facility under or immediately 
adjacent to the roadbed shall be maintained and kept free of 
obstruction, to accommodate expected water flow for the area concerned.

Sec.  299.307   Vegetation.

    Vegetation on railroad property which is on or immediately adjacent 
to roadbed shall be controlled so that it does not--

[[Page 69743]]

    (a) Become a fire hazard to track-carrying structures;
    (b) Obstruct visibility of railroad signs and signals along the 
right-of-way;
    (c) Interfere with railroad employees performing normal trackside 
duties;
    (d) Prevent proper functioning of signal and communication lines; 
or
    (e) Prevent railroad employees from visually inspecting moving 
equipment from their normal duty stations.

Sec.  299.309   Classes of track: operating speed limits.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and as 
otherwise provided in this part, the following maximum allowable 
operating speeds apply--

                        Table 1 to paragraph (a)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Over track that  meets all of the         The maximum  allowable
  requirements  prescribed in this  part       operating speed in km/h
                   for--                                (mph)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class H0 track............................  20 (12)
Class H1 track............................  30 (19)
Class H2 track............................  70 (44)
Class H3 track............................  120 (75)
Class H4 track............................  170 (106)
Class H5 track............................  230 (143)
Class H6 track............................  285 (177)
Class H7 track............................  330 (205)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, if a 
segment of track does not meet all of the requirements for its intended 
Class, it is to be reclassified to the next lower track Class for which 
it does meet all of the requirements of this part. However, if the 
segment of track does not at least meet the requirements for track 
Class H1 track, operations may continue at Class H1 speeds for a period 
of not more than 30 days without bringing the track into compliance, 
under the authority of an individual designated under Sec.  299.353, 
after that individual determines that operations may safely continue 
and subject to any limiting conditions specified by such individual.
    (c) If a segment of track designated as track Class H0 does not 
meet all of the requirements for its intended class, operations may 
continue at Class H0 speeds for a period of not more than 30 days 
without bringing the track into compliance, under the authority of an 
individual designated under Sec.  299.353, after that individual 
determines that operations may safely continue and subject to any 
limiting conditions specified by such individual.
    (d) No high-speed passenger trainset shall operate over track Class 
H0.

Sec.  299.311   Track geometry; general.

    If the values listed in the following table are exceeded, the 
railroad shall initiate remedial action. A reduction in operating speed 
so that the condition complies with the limits listed for a lower speed 
shall constitute bringing the track into compliance.

                                                                Table 1 to Sec.   299.311
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Track geometry parameter (millimeter (mm))               Track class                H0       H1       H2       H3       H4       H5       H6       H7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gauge is measured between the heads of the    Min...............................     1429     1429     1429     1429     1429     1429     1429     1429
 rails at right angles to the rails in a
 plane 14 mm (0.55 inches) below the top of
 the rail head and may not exceed--.
                                              Max...............................     1454     1454     1454     1454     1454     1454     1454     1454
The deviation from uniformity\1\ of the mid-  10 m chord........................       38       31       31       14       12       10        8        7
 chord offset on either rail for a 10 meter
 (m) chord (alignment) may not be more than--
 .
The deviation from uniform profile on either  10 m chord........................       40       40       40       27       22       18       15       13
 rail at the mid-ordinate of a 10 m chord
 (surface) may not be more than--.
The deviation from uniform crosslevel at any  ..................................       50       26       26       22       18       14        9        9
 point on tangent and curved track may not
 be more than--.
The difference in crosslevel between any two  2.5 m.............................       26       26       26       22       18       14        9        9
 points 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) apart (twist)
 may not be more than--.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Uniformity for alignment at any point along the track is established by averaging the measured mid-chord offset values for a 10 m (32.8 feet) chord
  for nine consecutive points that are centered around that point and spaced at 2.5 m (8.2 feet) intervals.

Sec.  299.313   Track geometry; performance based.

    (a) For all track of Class H4 and above, vibration in the lateral 
and vertical directions measured on the carbody of a vehicle 
representative of the service fleet traveling at a speed no less than 
10 km/h (6.2 mph) below the maximum speed permitted for the class of 
track, shall not exceed the limits prescribed in the following table:

                        Table 1 to paragraph (a)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Carbody acceleration limits 1 2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Lateral vibration \3\               Vertical vibration \3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 0.35 g peak-to-peak....................  <= 0.45g peak-to-peak
1 sec window..............................  1 sec window
excluding peaks < 50 msec.................  excluding peaks < 50 msec
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Carbody accelerations in the vertical and lateral directions shall
  be measured by accelerometers oriented and located in accordance with
  Sec.   299.337(c)(3).
\2\ Acceleration measurements shall be processed through an LPF with a
  minimum cut-off frequency of 10 Hz. The sample rate for acceleration
  data shall be at least 200 samples per second.
\3\ Peak-to-peak accelerations shall be measured as the algebraic
  difference between the two extreme values of measured acceleration in
  any 1-second time period, excluding any peak lasting less than 50
  milliseconds.

    (b) If the carbody acceleration requirements are not met on a 
segment of track, the segment of track is to be reclassified to the 
next lower Class of track for which it does meet the requirements of 
this part.

[[Page 69744]]

Sec.  299.315   Curves; elevation and speed limitations.

    (a) The maximum elevation of the outside rail of a curve may not be 
more than 200 mm (7-7/8 inches). The outside rail of a curve may not be 
lower than the inside rail by design, except when engineered to address 
specific track or operating conditions; the limits in Sec.  299.311 
apply in all cases.
    (b) The maximum allowable posted timetable operating speed for each 
curve is determined by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.000

Where--

Vmax = Maximum allowable posted timetable operating speed 
(km/h).
Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail (mm). Actual 
elevation, Ea, for each 50-meter track segment in the 
body of the curve is determined by averaging the elevation for 11 
points through the segment at 5-meter spacing. If the curve length 
is less than 50-meters, average the points through the full length 
of the body of the curve.
Eu = Qualified cant deficiency (mm) of the vehicle type.
R = Radius of curve (m). Radius of curve, R, is determined by 
averaging the radius of the curve over the same track segment as the 
elevation.

    (c) All vehicles are considered qualified for operating on track 
with a cant deficiency, Eu, not exceeding 75 mm (3 inches).
    (d) Each vehicle type must be approved by FRA, under Sec.  299.609, 
to operate on track with a qualified cant deficiency, Eu, 
greater than 75 mm (3 inches). Each vehicle type must demonstrate in a 
ready-for-service load condition, compliance with the requirements of 
either paragraph (d)(1) or (2) of this section.
    (1) When positioned on a track with a uniform superelevation equal 
to the proposed cant deficiency:
    (i) No wheel of the vehicle unloads to a value less than 60 percent 
of its static value on perfectly level track; and
    (ii) For passenger cars, the roll angle between the floor of the 
equipment and the horizontal does not exceed 8.6 degrees; or
    (2) When operating through a constant radius curve at a constant 
speed corresponding to the proposed cant deficiency, and a test plan is 
submitted and approved by FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.609(d)--
    (i) The steady-state (average) load on any wheel, throughout the 
body of the curve, is not less than 60 percent of its static value on 
perfectly level track; and
    (ii) For passenger cars, the steady-state (average) lateral 
acceleration measured on the floor of the carbody does not exceed 
0.15g.
    (e) The railroad shall transmit the results of the testing 
specified in paragraph (d) of this section to FRA in accordance with 
Sec. Sec.  299.9 and 299.613 requesting approval under Sec.  299.609(g) 
for the vehicle type to operate at the desired curving speeds allowed 
under the formula in paragraph (b) of this section. The request shall 
be made in writing and shall contain, at a minimum, the following 
information:
    (1) A description of the vehicle type involved, including schematic 
diagrams of the suspension system(s) and the estimated location of the 
center of gravity above top of rail; and
    (2) The test procedure, including the load condition under which 
the testing was performed, and description of the instrumentation used 
to qualify the vehicle type, as well as the maximum values for wheel 
unloading and roll angles or accelerations that were observed during 
testing.

    Note 1 to paragraph (e)(2). The test procedure may be conducted 
whereby all the wheels on one side (right or left) of the vehicle 
are raised to the proposed cant deficiency and lowered, and then the 
vertical wheel loads under each wheel are measured and a level is 
used to record the angle through which the floor of the vehicle has 
been rotated.

    (f) Upon FRA approval of the request to approve the vehicle type to 
operate at the desired curving speeds allowed under the formula in 
paragraph (b) of this section, the railroad shall notify FRA in 
accordance with Sec.  299.9 in writing no less than 30 calendar days 
prior to the proposed implementation of the approved higher curving 
speeds allowed under the formula in paragraph (b) of this section. The 
notification shall contain, at a minimum, identification of the track 
segment(s) on which the higher curving speeds are to be implemented.
    (g) As used in this section, and Sec.  299.609, vehicle type means 
like vehicles with variations in their physical properties, such as 
suspension, mass, interior arrangements, and dimensions that do not 
result in significant changes to their dynamic characteristics.

Sec.  299.317   Track strength.

    (a) Track shall have a sufficient vertical strength to withstand 
the maximum vehicle loads generated at maximum permissible trainset 
speeds, cant deficiencies and surface limitations. For purposes of this 
section, vertical track strength is defined as the track capacity to 
constrain vertical deformations so that the track shall, under maximum 
load, remain in compliance with the track performance and geometry 
requirements of this part.
    (b) Track shall have sufficient lateral strength to withstand the 
maximum thermal and vehicle loads generated at maximum permissible 
trainset speeds, cant deficiencies and lateral alignment limitations. 
For purposes of this section lateral track strength is defined as the 
track capacity to constrain lateral deformations so that track shall, 
under maximum load, remain in compliance with the track performance and 
geometry requirements of this part.

Sec.  299.319   Track fixation and support.

    (a) Crossties, if used shall be of concrete or composite 
construction, unless otherwise approved by FRA under Sec.  299.15, for 
all tracks over which trainsets run in revenue service.
    (b) Each 25 m (82 feet) segment of track that contains crossties 
shall have--
    (1) A sufficient number of crossties to provide effective support 
that will--
    (i) Hold gauge within limits prescribed in Sec.  299.311;
    (ii) Maintain surface within the limits prescribed in Sec.  
299.311;
    (iii) Maintain alignment within the limits prescribed in Sec.  
299.311; and
    (iv) Maintain longitudinal rail restraint.
    (2) The minimum number and type of crossties specified in paragraph 
(b)(4) of this section and described in paragraph (c) or (d) of this 
section, as applicable, effectively distributed to support the entire 
segment;
    (3) At least one non-defective crosstie of the type specified in 
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section that is located at a joint 
location as specified in paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (4) The minimum number of crossties as indicated in the following 
table:

[[Page 69745]]

                                           Table 1 to Paragraph (b)(4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Minimum number of non-defective crossties
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Other than on non-ballasted     Non-ballasted
                  Track class                           bridge & turnout              bridge          Turnout
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H0............................................  20..............................              26              24
H1............................................  28..............................              36              33
H2............................................  31, unless inside a TMF, then 28              36              33
H3............................................  35..............................              40              37
H4-H7.........................................  39..............................              45              41
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (c) Crossties, other than concrete, counted to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in paragraph (b)(4) of this section shall not 
be--
    (1) Broken through;
    (2) Split or otherwise impaired to the extent the crossties will 
allow the ballast to work through, or will not hold spikes or rail 
fasteners;
    (3) Deteriorated so that the tie plate or base of rail can move 
laterally 9.5 mm (\3/8\ inch) relative to the crossties;
    (4) Cut by the tie plate through more than 40 percent of a 
crosstie's thickness;
    (5) Configured with less than 2 rail holding spikes or fasteners 
per tie plate; or
    (6) Unable, due to insufficient fastener toeload, to maintain 
longitudinal restraint and maintain rail hold down and gauge.
    (d) Concrete crossties counted to satisfy the requirements set 
forth in paragraph (b)(4) of this section shall not be--
    (1) Broken through or deteriorated to the extent that prestressing 
material is visible;
    (2) Deteriorated or broken off in the vicinity of the shoulder or 
insert so that the fastener assembly can either pull out or move 
laterally more than 9.5 mm (\3/8\ inch) relative to the crosstie;
    (3) Deteriorated such that the base of either rail can move 
laterally more than 9.5 mm (\3/8\ inch) relative to the crosstie;
    (4) Deteriorated so that rail seat abrasion is sufficiently deep so 
as to cause loss of rail fastener toeload;
    (5) Deteriorated such that the crosstie's fastening or anchoring 
system is unable to maintain longitudinal rail restraint, or maintain 
rail hold down, or maintain gauge due to insufficient fastener toeload; 
or
    (6) Configured with less than two fasteners on the same rail.
    (e) Classes H0 and H1 track shall have one crosstie whose 
centerline is within 0.61 m (24 inches) of each rail joint (end) 
location. Classes H2 and H3 track shall have one crosstie whose 
centerline is within 0.46 m (18 inches) of each rail joint (end) 
location. Classes H4-H7 track shall have one crosstie whose centerline 
is within 0.32 m (12.6 inches) of each rail joint (end) location. The 
relative position of these crossties is described in the following 
three diagrams:
    (1) Each rail joint in Classes H0 and H1 track shall be supported 
by at least one crosstie specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this 
section whose centerline is within 1.22 m (48 inches) as shown in 
Figure 1 to this paragraph.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.001

    (2) Each rail joint in Classes H2 and H3 track shall be supported 
by at least one crosstie specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this 
section whose centerline is within 0.92 m (36.2 inches) as shown in 
Figure 2 to this paragraph.

[[Page 69746]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.002

    (3) Each rail joint in Classes H4-H7 track shall be supported by at 
least one crosstie specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section 
whose centerline is within 0.64 m (25.2 inches) as shown in Figure 3 to 
this paragraph.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.003

    (f) In Class H3 track there shall be at least two non-defective 
ties each side of a defective tie.
    (g) In Classes H4 to H7 track and at any expansion joints there 
shall be at least three non-defective ties each side of a defective 
tie.
    (h) Defective ties shall be replaced in accordance with the 
railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
    (i) Track shall be fastened by a system of components that 
effectively maintains gauge within the limits prescribed in Sec.  
299.311. Each component of each such system shall be evaluated to 
determine whether gauge is effectively being maintained.
    (j) For track constructed without crossties, such as slab track and 
track connected directly to bridge structural components, track over 
servicing pits, etc., the track structure shall be sufficient to 
maintain the geometry limits specified in Sec.  299.311.

Sec.  299.321   Defective rails.

    (a) The railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program 
shall include a description of defective rails consistent with the 
practice on the Tokaido Shinkansen system. The inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program shall include identification of rail defect types, 
definition of the inspection criteria, time required for verification 
and the corresponding remedial action.
    (b) When the railroad learns that a rail in that track contains any 
of the defects listed in the railroad's inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program, a person designated under Sec.  299.353 or Sec.  
299.355 shall determine whether the track may continue in use. If the 
designated person determines that the track may continue in use, 
operation over the defective rail is not permitted until--
    (1) The rail is replaced or repaired; or
    (2) The remedial action prescribed in the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program is initiated.

Sec.  299.323   Continuous welded rail (CWR) plan.

    (a) The railroad shall have in effect and comply with a plan that 
contains written procedures which address: The installation, 
adjustment, maintenance, and inspection of CWR; and inspection of CWR 
joints.
    (b) The railroad shall file its CWR plan with FRA pursuant to Sec.  
299.9. The initial CWR plan shall be filed 60 days prior to 
installation of any CWR track. The effective date of the plan is the 
date the plan is filed with FRA.
    (c) The railroad's existing plan shall remain in effect until the 
railroad's new plan is developed and filed with FRA.

Sec.  299.325   Continuous welded rail (CWR); general.

    The railroad shall comply with the contents of the CWR plan 
developed under Sec.  299.323. The plan shall contain the following 
elements--
    (a) Procedures for the installation and adjustment of CWR which 
include--
    (1) Designation of a desired rail installation temperature range 
for the geographic area in which the CWR is located;
    (2) De-stressing procedures/methods which address proper attainment 
of the desired rail installation temperature range when adjusting CWR; 
and
    (3) Glued insulated or expansion joint installation and maintenance 
procedures.
    (b) Rail anchoring, if used, or fastening requirements that will 
provide sufficient restraint to limit longitudinal rail and crosstie 
movement to the extent practical, and that specifically address

[[Page 69747]]

CWR rail anchoring or fastening patterns on bridges, bridge approaches, 
and at other locations where possible longitudinal rail and crosstie 
movement associated with normally expected trainset-induced forces--is 
restricted.
    (c) CWR joint installation and maintenance procedures.
    (d) Procedures which specifically address maintaining a desired 
rail installation temperature range when cutting CWR including rail 
repairs, in-track welding, and in conjunction with adjustments made in 
the area of tight track, a track buckle, or a pull-apart.
    (e) Procedures which control trainset speed on CWR track when--
    (1) Maintenance work, track rehabilitation, track construction, or 
any other event occurs which disturbs the roadbed or ballast section 
and reduces the lateral or longitudinal resistance of the track; and
    (2) The difference between the rail temperature and the rail 
neutral temperature is in a range that causes buckling-prone conditions 
to be present at a specific location.
    (f) Procedures which prescribe when and where physical track 
inspections are to be performed under extreme temperature conditions.
    (g) Scheduling and procedures for inspections to detect cracks and 
other indications of potential failures in CWR joints.
    (h) The railroad shall have in effect a comprehensive training 
program for the application of these written CWR procedures, with 
provisions for periodic retraining for those individuals designated as 
qualified in accordance with this subpart to supervise the 
installation, adjustment, and maintenance of CWR track and to perform 
inspections of CWR track.
    (i) The plan shall prescribe and require compliance with 
recordkeeping requirements necessary to provide an adequate history of 
track constructed with CWR. At a minimum, these records shall include--
    (1) The rail laying temperature, location, and date of CWR 
installations. Each record shall be retained until the rail neutral 
temperature has been adjusted; and
    (2) A record of any CWR installation or maintenance work that does 
not conform to the written procedures. Such record must include the 
location of the rail and be maintained until the CWR is brought into 
conformance with such procedures.

Sec.  299.327   Rail end mismatch.

    Any mismatch of rails at joints may not be more than that 
prescribed by the following table:

                        Table 1 to Sec.   299.327
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Any mismatch of rails at joints may
                                       not be more than the following:
                                   -------------------------------------
            Track class              On the tread of   On the gauge side
                                      the rail ends     of the rail ends
                                           (mm)               (mm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
H0................................                  6                  5
H1-H2.............................                  4                  4
H3-H7.............................                  2                  2
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec.  299.329   Rail joints and torch cut rails.

    (a) Each rail joint, insulated joint, expansion joint, and 
compromise joint shall be of a structurally sound design and 
appropriate dimensions for the rail on which it is applied.
    (b) If a joint bar is cracked, broken, or permits excessive 
vertical movement of either rail when all bolts are tight, it shall be 
replaced.
    (c) Except for glued-insulated joints, each joint bar shall be held 
in position by track bolts tightened to allow the joint bar to firmly 
support the abutting rail ends. For track Classes H0 to H3 track bolts 
shall be tightened, as required, to allow longitudinal movement of the 
rail in the joint to accommodate expansion and contraction due to 
temperature variations.
    (d) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, each rail 
shall be bolted with at least two bolts at each joint.
    (e) Clamped joint bars may be used for temporary repair during 
emergency situations, and speed over that rail end and the time 
required to replace the joint bar must not exceed the limits specified 
in the inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
    (f) No rail shall have a bolt hole which is torch cut or burned.
    (g) No joint bar shall be reconfigured by torch cutting.
    (h) No rail having a torch cut or flame cut end may be used.

Sec.  299.331   Turnouts and crossings generally.

    (a) In turnouts and track crossings, the fastenings shall be intact 
and maintained to keep the components securely in place. Also, each 
switch, frog, and guard rail shall be kept free of obstructions that 
may interfere with the passage of wheels. Use of rigid rail crossings 
at grade is limited to track Classes H0, H1, and H2.
    (b) The track through and on each side of track crossings and 
turnouts shall be designed to restrain rail movement affecting the 
position of switch points and frogs.
    (c) Each flangeway at turnouts shall be at least 39 mm (1.5 inches) 
wide.
    (d) For all turnouts and track crossings, the railroad shall 
prepare inspection and maintenance requirements to be included in the 
railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program.

Sec.  299.333   Frog guard rails and guard faces; gauge.

    The guard check and guard face gages in frogs shall be within the 
limits prescribed in the following table:

[[Page 69748]]

                        Table 1 to Sec.   299.333
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Guard check gage
                                     The distance
                                   between the gauge    Guard face gage
                                   line of a frog to     The distance
                                  the guard line \1\   between the guard
                                   of its guard rail       lines,\1\
           Track class             or guarding face,    measured across
                                    measured across   the track at right
                                  the track at right     angles to the
                                     angles to the    gauge line,\2\ may
                                  gauge line,\2\ may  not be more than--
                                  not be less than--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
H0-H7...........................  1,393 mm..........  1,358 mm.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A line along that side of the flangeway which is nearer to the
  center of the track and at the same elevation as the gage line.
\2\ A line 14 mm (0.55 inches) below the top of the center line of the
  head of the running rail, or corresponding location of the tread
  portion of the track structure.

  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.004
  
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.005
  
Sec.  299.335   Derails.

    (a) Derails shall be installed at locations where maintenance-of-
way equipment can access track other than Class H0, in a configuration 
intended to derail the un-controlled equipment away from the mainline 
and at a distance from the point of intersection with the mainline that 
will not foul the dynamic envelope of the mainline.
    (b) Each derail shall be clearly visible to railroad personnel 
operating rail equipment on the affected track and to railroad 
personnel working adjacent to the affected track. When in a locked 
position, a derail shall be free of any lost motion that would allow it 
to be operated without removal of the lock.
    (c) Each derail shall be maintained and function as intended.
    (d) Each derail shall be properly installed for the rail to which 
it is applied.
    (e) If a track is equipped with a derail it shall be in the 
derailing position except as provided in the railroad's operating 
rules, special instructions, or changed to permit movement.

Sec.  299.337   Automated vehicle-based inspection systems.

    (a) A qualifying Track Geometry Measurement System (TGMS) and a 
qualifying Track Acceleration Measurement System (TAMS) shall be 
operated over the route at the following frequency:
    (1) For track Class H3, at least twice per calendar year with not 
less than 120 days between inspections; and
    (2) For track Classes H4, H5, H6, and H7, at least twice within any 
60-day period with not less than 12 days between inspections.
    (b) The qualifying TGMS shall meet or exceed minimum design 
requirements which specify that--
    (1) Track geometry measurements shall be taken no more than 1 meter 
(3.3 feet) away from the contact point of wheels carrying a vertical 
load of no less than 4,500 kg (10,000 lb) per wheel;
    (2) Track geometry measurements shall be taken and recorded on a 
distance-based sampling interval not exceeding 0.60 m (2 feet), 
preferably 0.30 m (1 foot);
    (3) Calibration procedures and parameters are assigned to the 
system which assures that measured and recorded values accurately 
represent track conditions. Track geometry measurements recorded by the 
system shall not differ on repeated runs at the same site at the same 
speed more than 3 mm (\1/8\ inch); and
    (4) The TGMS shall be capable of measuring and processing the 
necessary track geometry parameters to determine compliance with 
Sec. Sec.  299.311 and 299.315.

[[Page 69749]]

    (c) A qualifying TAMS shall be on a vehicle having dynamic response 
characteristics that are representative of other vehicles assigned to 
the service and shall--
    (1) Be operated at the revenue speed profile in accordance with 
Sec.  299.309;
    (2) Be capable of measuring and processing carbody acceleration 
parameters to determine compliance with Carbody Acceleration Limits per 
Sec.  299.313; and
    (3) Monitor lateral and vertical accelerations of the carbody. The 
accelerometers shall be attached to the carbody on or under the floor 
of the vehicle, as near the center of a bogie as practicable.
    (d) The qualifying TGMS and TAMS shall be capable of producing, 
within 24 hours of the inspection, output reports that--
    (1) Provide a continuous plot, on a constant-distance axis, of all 
measured track geometry and carbody acceleration parameters required in 
paragraph (b) and (c) of this section;
    (2) Provide an exception report containing a systematic listing of 
all track geometry and all acceleration conditions which constitute an 
exception to the class of track over the segment surveyed.
    (e) The output reports required under paragraph (d) of this section 
shall contain sufficient location identification information which 
enables field personnel to easily locate indicated exceptions.
    (f) Following a track inspection performed by a qualifying TGMS or 
TAMS, the railroad shall, institute remedial action for all exceptions 
to the class of track in accordance with the railroad's inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program.
    (g) The railroad shall maintain for a period of one year following 
an inspection performed by a qualifying TGMS and TAMS, a copy of the 
plot and the exception report for the track segment involved, and 
additional records which--
    (1) Specify the date the inspection was made and the track segment 
involved; and,
    (2) Specify the location, remedial action taken, and the date 
thereof, for all listed exceptions to the class.

Sec.  299.339   Daily sweeper inspection.

    A sweeper vehicle shall be operated each morning after the 
overnight maintenance over all tracks except track Class H2 in 
stations, prior to commencing revenue service over that track. The 
sweeper vehicle shall operate at a speed no greater than 120 km/h (75 
mph) to conduct a visual inspection to ensure the right-of-way is clear 
of obstacles within the clearance envelope and to identify conditions 
that could cause accidents, and shall have a minimum clearance of no 
less than 35 mm above top of rail.

Sec.  299.341   Inspection of rail in service.

    (a) Prior to revenue service the railroad shall submit written 
procedures for the inspection of rails in accordance with the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
    (b) On track Classes H4 to H7, and H2 within stations, a continuous 
search for internal defects shall be made of all rail within 180 days 
after initiation of revenue service and, thereafter, at least annually, 
with not less than 240 days between inspections.
    (c) Each defective rail shall be marked with a highly visible 
marking on both sides of the rail.
    (d) Inspection equipment shall be capable of detecting defects 
between joint bars and within the area enclosed by joint bars.
    (e) If the person assigned to operate the rail defect detection 
equipment being used determines that, due to rail surface conditions, a 
valid search for internal defects could not be made over a particular 
length of track, the test on that particular length of track cannot be 
considered as a search for internal defects under this section.
    (f) When the railroad learns, through inspection or otherwise, that 
a rail in that track contains any of the defects in accordance with 
Sec.  299.321, a qualified individual designated under Sec.  299.353 or 
Sec.  299.355 shall determine whether or not the track may continue in 
use. If the qualified individual so designated determines that the 
track may continue in use, operation over the defective rail is not 
permitted until--
    (1) The rail is replaced; or
    (2) The remedial action as prescribed in Sec.  299.321 has been 
taken.
    (g) The person assigned to operate the rail defect detection 
equipment must be a qualified operator as defined in this subpart and 
have demonstrated proficiency in the rail flaw detection process for 
each type of equipment the operator is assigned.

Sec.  299.343   Initial inspection of new rail and welds.

    (a) The railroad shall provide for the initial inspection of newly 
manufactured rail, and for initial inspection of new welds made in 
either new or used rail. The railroad may demonstrate compliance with 
this section by providing for--
    (1) Mill inspection. A continuous inspection at the rail 
manufacturer's mill shall constitute compliance with the requirement 
for initial inspection of new rail, provided that the inspection 
equipment meets the applicable requirements as specified under the 
railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program and Sec.  
299.321. The railroad shall obtain a copy of the manufacturer's report 
of inspection and retain it as a record until the rail receives its 
first scheduled inspection under Sec.  299.341;
    (2) Welding plant inspection. A continuous inspection at a welding 
plant, if conducted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section, and accompanied by a plant operator's report of 
inspection which is retained as a record by the railroad, shall 
constitute compliance with the requirements for initial inspection of 
new rail and plant welds, or of new plant welds made in used rail; and
    (3) Inspection of field welds. Initial inspection of new field 
welds, either those joining the ends of CWR strings or those made for 
isolated repairs, shall be conducted before the start of revenue 
service in accordance with the railroad's inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program. The initial inspection may be conducted by means 
of portable test equipment. The railroad shall retain a record of such 
inspections until the welds receive their first scheduled inspection 
under Sec.  299.341.
    (b) Each defective rail found during inspections conducted under 
paragraph (a)(3) of this section shall be marked with highly visible 
markings on both sides of the rail and the appropriate remedial action 
as set forth in Sec.  299.341 will apply.

Sec.  299.345   Visual inspections; right of way.

    (a) General. All track shall be visually inspected in accordance 
with the schedule prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section by an 
individual qualified under this subpart. The visual inspection shall be 
conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program under subpart G of this 
part.
    (b) Inspection types and frequency--(1) Safe walkway inspection. 
Except for track located inside trainset maintenance facilities and MOW 
yards and the associated portions of the right-of-way, the right-of-way 
and all track shall be inspected from the safe walkway during daytime 
hours, in accordance with the following conditions:
    (i) Ballasted track shall be inspected at least once every two 
weeks, with a minimum of six calendar days in between inspections.

[[Page 69750]]

    (ii) Non-ballasted track shall be inspected at least once every 
four weeks, with a minimum of twelve calendar days in between 
inspections.
    (iii) No two consecutive visual inspections from the safe walkway 
shall be performed from the same safe walkway. Safe walkway inspections 
shall alternate between safe walkways on each side of the right-of-way.
    (iv) In stations, the safe walkway inspection may be performed from 
either the safe walkway or the station platform.
    (v) An additional on-track visual inspection conducted during 
maintenance hours under paragraph (b)(2) of this section performed in 
place of a visual inspection from the safe walkway under paragraph 
(b)(1) of this section will satisfy the visual inspection requirement 
of paragraph (b)(1) of this section. However, a safe walkway visual 
inspection performed under paragraph (b)(1) of this section cannot 
replace an on-track visual inspection conducted during maintenance 
hours under paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
    (vi) Except for paragraph (b)(1)(v) of this section, inspections 
performed under paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall not occur during 
the same week as inspections performed under paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section.
    (vii) In the event a safe walkway visual inspection is not possible 
on a given day due to extreme weather, the inspection may be conducted 
from the cab of a trainset or as an on-track visual inspection on that 
day in accordance with the inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program.
    (2) On-track inspections; other than trainset maintenance 
facilities and MOW yards. Except for track located inside trainset 
maintenance facilities and MOW yards and the associated portions of the 
right-of-way, on-track visual inspections, conducted on foot during 
maintenance hours, shall be performed on all track in accordance with 
the following conditions:
    (i) Ballasted track shall be inspected at least once every two 
weeks, with a minimum of six calendar days in between inspections.
    (ii) Non-ballasted track shall be inspected at least once every 
four weeks, with a minimum of twelve calendar days in between 
inspections.
    (iii) Turn-outs and track crossings on ballasted track shall be 
inspected at least once a week, with a minimum of three calendar days 
in between inspections.
    (iv) Turn-outs and track crossings on non-ballasted track shall be 
inspected at least once every two weeks, with a minimum of six calendar 
days in between inspections.
    (3) On-track inspections; trainset maintenance facilities and MOW 
yards. For track located inside trainset maintenance facilities and MOW 
yards and the associated portions of the right-of-way, including turn-
outs and track crossings, on-track visual inspections, conducted on 
foot, shall be performed on all track in accordance with the following 
conditions:
    (i) Ballasted track shall be inspected at least once during any 60-
day period, with a minimum of twelve calendar days in between 
inspections.
    (ii) Non-ballasted track shall be inspected at least once within 
any 120-day period, with a minimum of twenty-four calendar days in 
between inspections.
    (iii) On-track safety shall be established in accordance with 49 
CFR part 214 of this chapter, except for 49 CFR 214.339.
    (4) Visual inspections from trainset cab. Visual inspections from 
trainset cab shall be performed for the right-of-way and track for 
track Class H3 and above, except for track leading to a trainset 
maintenance facility, at least twice weekly with a minimum of two 
calendar days between inspections.
    (c) If a deviation from the requirements of this subpart is found 
during the visual inspection, remedial action shall be initiated 
immediately in accordance with the railroad's inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program required under subpart G of this part.

Sec.  299.347   Special inspections.

    (a) In the event of fire, flood, severe storm, temperature 
extremes, or other occurrence which might have damaged track structure, 
a special inspection shall be made of the track and right-of-way 
involved as soon as possible after the occurrence, prior to the 
operation of any trainset over that track.
    (b) Should a trainset be between stations when an event such as 
those described in paragraph (a) of this section occurs, that trainset 
may proceed to the next forward station at restricted speed, in 
accordance with the railroad's operating rules and inspection, testing, 
and maintenance program.

Sec.  299.349   Inspection records.

    (a) The railroad shall keep a record of each inspection required to 
be performed on that track under this subpart.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, each 
record of an inspection under Sec. Sec.  299.325 and 299.345 shall be 
prepared on the day the inspection is made and signed by the person 
making the inspection.
    (c) Records shall specify the track inspected, date of inspection, 
location, and nature of any deviation from the requirements of this 
part, name of qualified individual who made the inspection, and the 
remedial action, if any, taken by the person making the inspection.
    (d) Rail inspection records shall specify the date of inspection, 
the location and nature of any internal defects found, name of 
qualified individual who made the inspection, the remedial action taken 
and the date thereof, and the location of any intervals of track not 
tested pursuant to Sec.  299.341 of this part. The railroad shall 
retain a rail inspection record for at least two years after the 
inspection and for one year after remedial action is taken.
    (e) The railroad shall make inspection records required by this 
section available for inspection and copying by the FRA.
    (f) For purposes of compliance with the requirements of this 
section, the railroad may maintain and transfer records through 
electronic transmission, storage, and retrieval provided that--
    (1) The electronic system is compliant with the requirements of 
Sec.  299.11;
    (2) The electronic storage of each record shall be initiated by the 
person making the inspection within 24 hours following the completion 
of that inspection; and
    (3) Track inspection records shall be kept available to persons who 
performed the inspection and to persons performing subsequent 
inspections.
    (g) Each track/vehicle performance record required under Sec.  
299.337 shall be made available for inspection and copying by the FRA.

Sec.  299.351   Qualifications for track maintenance and inspection 
personnel.

    (a) General. The railroad shall designate qualified individuals 
responsible for the maintenance and inspection of track in compliance 
with the safety requirements prescribed in this subpart. Each 
designated individual, including contractors and their employees, must 
meet the minimum qualifications set forth in this subpart.
    (b) Recordkeeping. In addition to the requirements contained in 
Sec.  243.203 of this chapter, the railroad shall also maintain, with 
respect to the designation of individuals under this subpart, the track 
inspection records made by each individual as required by Sec.  
299.349.

[[Page 69751]]

Sec.  299.353   Personnel qualified to supervise track restoration and 
renewal.

    Each individual designated to supervise restorations and renewals 
of track, shall have--
    (a) Successfully completed a course offered by the employer or by a 
college level engineering program, supplemented by special on-the-job 
training emphasizing the techniques to be employed in the supervision, 
restoration, and renewal of high-speed track;
    (b) Demonstrated to the railroad, at least once per calendar year, 
that the individual--
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of this subpart that 
apply to the restoration and renewal of the track for which he or she 
is responsible;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely 
compensate for those deviations.
    (c) Written authorization from the railroad or the employer to 
prescribe remedial actions to correct or safely compensate for 
deviations from the requirements of this subpart and shall have 
successfully completed a recorded examination on this subpart as part 
of the qualification process.

Sec.  299.355   Personnel qualified to inspect track.

    Each individual designated to inspect track for defects, shall 
have--
    (a) Successfully completed a course offered by the railroad or by a 
college level engineering program, supplemented by special on-the-job 
training emphasizing the techniques to be employed in the inspection of 
high-speed track;
    (b) Demonstrated to the railroad, at least once per calendar year, 
that the individual--
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of this subpart that 
apply to the inspection of the track for which he or she is 
responsible;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely 
compensate for those deviations.
    (c) Written authorization from the railroad or the employer to 
prescribe remedial actions to correct or safely compensate for 
deviations from the requirements in this subpart and shall have 
successfully completed a recorded examination on this subpart as part 
of the qualification process.

Sec.  299.357   Personnel qualified to inspect and restore continuous 
welded rail.

    Individuals designated under Sec.  299.353 or 299.355 that inspect 
continuous welded rail (CWR) or supervise the installation, adjustment, 
and maintenance of CWR in accordance with the written procedures 
established by the railroad shall have--
    (a) Current qualifications under either Sec.  299.353 or 299.355;
    (b) Successfully completed a training course of at least eight 
hours duration specifically developed for the application of written 
CWR procedures issued by the railroad;
    (c) Demonstrated to the railroad that the individual--
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of those written CWR 
procedures;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or 
compensate for those deviations safely.
    (d) Written authorization from the railroad or the employer to 
prescribe remedial actions to correct or safely compensate for 
deviations from the requirements in those procedures and must have 
successfully completed a recorded examination on those procedures as 
part of the qualification process. The recorded examination may be 
written, or in the form of a computer file with the results of an 
interactive training course.

Subpart D--Rolling Stock

Sec.  299.401   Clearance requirements.

    (a) General. The rolling stock shall be designed to meet all 
applicable clearance requirements of the railroad. The railroad shall 
make its clearance diagrams available to FRA upon request.
    (b) Clearance above top of rail. No part or appliance of a trainset 
except the wheels, sander tips, wheel guards, and other components 
designed to be in the path of the wheel (i.e., above the rail and 
aligned inside the wheel width path) may be less than 60 mm (2.36 
inches) above the top of rail.
    (c) Obstacle deflector. The leading end of a trainset shall be 
equipped with an obstacle deflector that extends across both rails of 
the track. The minimum clearance above the rail of the obstacle 
deflector shall be 76 mm (3 inches), and the maximum clearance shall be 
229 mm (9 inches).
    (d) Flexible wheel guards. The lead axle of a trainset shall be 
equipped with flexible wheel guards mounted on the bogie below the 
primary suspension with a maximum clearance above the rail of 15 mm 
(0.59 inches).

Sec.  299.403  Trainset structure.

    (a) Occupied volume integrity. To demonstrate resistance to loss of 
occupied volume, the trainsets shall comply with both the compression 
load requirement in paragraph (b) of this section and the dynamic 
collision requirements in paragraph (c) of this section.
    (b) Compression load requirement. The end compression load shall be 
applied to the vehicle as defined in JIS E 7105:2006(E) as amended by 
JIS E 7105:2011(E) (all incorporated by reference, see Sec.  299.17), 
with an end load magnitude no less than 980 kN (220,300 lbf) without 
permanent deformation of the occupied volume.
    (c) Dynamic collision scenario. In addition to the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section, occupied volume integrity shall also be 
demonstrated for the trainset through an evaluation of a dynamic 
collision scenario in which a moving trainset impacts a proxy object 
under the following conditions:
    (1) The initially-moving trainset is made up of the equipment 
undergoing evaluation at its AW0 ready-to-run weight.
    (2) The scenario shall be evaluated on tangent, level track.
    (3) The trainset shall have an initial velocity of 32 km/h (20 mph) 
and shall not be braked.
    (4) The proxy object shall have the following characteristics:
    (i) The object shall be a solid circular cylinder that weighs 6350 
kg (14,000 pounds);
    (ii) The object shall have a width of 914 mm (36 inches) and a 
diameter of 1219 mm (48 inches);
    (iii) The axis of the cylinder shall be perpendicular to the 
direction of trainset motion and parallel to the ground; and
    (iv) The center of the object shall be located 762 mm (30 inches) 
above the top of the underframe.
    (5) Two collision configurations shall be evaluated.
    (i) The center of the object shall be located 483 mm (19 inches) 
from the longitudinal centerline of the trainset; and
    (ii) The center of the object shall be aligned with the side of the 
cab car at the point of maximum width.
    (6) The model used to demonstrate compliance with the dynamic 
collision requirements must be validated. Model validation shall be 
demonstrated and submitted to FRA for review and approval.
    (7) As a result of the impact described in paragraphs (c)(5)(i) and 
(ii) of this section--
    (i) One of the following two conditions must be met for the 
occupied volume:

[[Page 69752]]

    (A) There shall be no more than 254 mm (10 inches) of longitudinal 
permanent deformation; or
    (B) Global vehicle shortening shall not exceed 1 percent over any 
4.6 m (15-feet) length of occupied volume.
    (ii) Compliance with each of the following conditions shall also be 
demonstrated for the cab after the impact:
    (A) Each seat provided for an employee regularly assigned to occupy 
the cab, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, shall maintain a 
survival space where there is no intrusion for a minimum of 305 mm (12 
inches) from each edge of the seat. Walls or other items originally 
within this defined space shall not further intrude more than 38 mm 
(1.5 inches) towards the seat under evaluation.
    (B) There shall be a clear exit path for the occupants of the cab;
    (C) The vertical height of the cab (floor to ceiling) shall not be 
reduced by more than 20 percent; and
    (D) The operating console shall not have moved closer to the 
driver's seat by more than 51 mm (2 inches).
    (d) Equipment override. (1) Using the dynamic collision scenarios 
described in paragraph (c) of this section, and with all units in the 
trainset positioned at their nominal running heights, the anti-climbing 
performance shall be evaluated for each of the following sets of 
initial conditions:
    (2) For the initial conditions specified in paragraphs (c)(1) 
through (3) of this section, compliance with the following conditions 
shall be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:
    (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of 
the connected equipment shall not change by more than 102 mm (4 
inches); and
    (ii) The tread of any wheel of the trainset shall not rise above 
the top of rail by more than 102 mm (4 inches).
    (e) Roof and side structure integrity. To demonstrate roof and side 
structure integrity, each passenger car shall comply with the 
following:
    (1) Rollover strength. (i) Each passenger car shall be designed to 
rest on its side and be uniformly supported at the top and bottom cords 
of the vehicle side. The allowable stress in the structural members of 
the occupied volumes for this condition shall be one-half yield or one-
half the critical buckling stress, whichever is less. Local yielding to 
the outer skin of the passenger car is allowed provided that the 
resulting deformations in no way intrude upon the occupied volume of 
the car.
    (ii) Each passenger car shall also be designed to rest on its roof 
so that any damage in occupied areas is limited to roof extrusions. 
Other than roof extrusions, the allowable stress in the structural 
members of the occupied volumes for this condition shall be one-half 
yield or one-half the critical buckling stress, whichever is less. 
Local yielding to the outer skin, including the floor structure, of the 
car is allowed provided that the resulting deformations in no way 
intrude upon the occupied volume of the car. Deformation to the roof 
extrusions is allowed to the extent necessary to permit the vehicle to 
be supported directly on the top chords of the sides and ends.
    (2) Side structure. (i) The sum of the section moduli about a 
longitudinal axis, taken at the weakest horizontal section between the 
side sill and roof, of the extrusions on each side of the car located 
between the inside edge of the doors shall be not less than 3.95 x 105 
mm\3\ (24.1 in\3\).
    (ii) The sum of the section moduli about a transverse axis, taken 
at the weakest horizontal section on each side of the car located 
between body corners shall be not less than 2.64 x 105 mm\3\ (16.1 
in\3\).
    (iii) The minimum section moduli or thicknesses specified in 
paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section shall be adjusted in proportion to 
the ratio of the yield strength of the material used to a value of 172 
MPa (25 ksi).
    (iv) The combined thickness of the skin of the side structure 
extrusions shall not be less than 3 mm (0.125 inch) nominal thickness. 
The thicknesses shall be adjusted in proportion to the ratio of the 
yield strength of the material used to a value of 172 MPa (25 ksi).
    (f) Bogie-to-carbody attachment. (1) The bogie-to-carbody 
attachment shall utilize the service-proven design as used on the N700.
    (2) The bogie shall be securely attached to the carbody and 
designed to operate without failure under the operating conditions of 
the railroad, including expected mechanical shocks and vibrations.

Sec.  299.405   Trainset interiors.

    (a) Interior fittings. Interior fittings of trainsets shall be--
    (1) Securely attached and designed to operate without failure under 
the conditions typically found in passenger rail equipment including 
expected mechanical vibrations, and shock.
    (2) To the extent possible, all interior fittings shall be recessed 
or flush mounted. Corners and/or sharp edges shall be either avoided or 
padded to mitigate the consequence of impact with such surfaces.
    (b) Luggage stowage. (1) Luggage stowage racks shall slope downward 
in the outboard direction at a minimum ratio of 1:8 with respect to a 
horizontal plane to provide lateral restraint for stowed articles.
    (2) Luggage stowage compartments shall provide longitudinal 
restraint for stowed articles.

Sec.  299.407   Glazing.

    (a) General. The railroad shall install glazing systems compliant 
with the requirements defined in this section.
    (b) Trainset glazing; end-facing. (1) Each end-facing exterior 
window of the trainset shall comply with the requirements for large 
object and ballistic impact scenarios as defined in this section.
    (2) Each end-facing exterior window of the trainset shall 
demonstrate compliance with the following requirements for the large 
object impact test.
    (i) The glazing article shall be impacted with a cylindrical 
projectile that complies with the following design specifications as 
depicted in Figure 1 to paragraph (b)(2)(i)(D) of this section:
    (A) The projectile shall be constructed of aluminum alloy such as 
ISO 6362-2:1990, grade 2017A, or its demonstrated equivalent;
    (B) The projectile end cap shall be made of steel;
    (C) The projectile assembly shall weigh 1 kilogram (kg) (-0, +0.020 
kg) or 2.2 lbs (-0, +0.044 lbs) and shall have a hemispherical tip. 
Material may be removed from the interior of the aluminum portion to 
adjust the projectile mass according to the prescribed tolerance. The 
hemispherical tip shall have a milled surface with 1 mm (0.04 inches) 
grooves; and
    (D) The projectile shall have an overall diameter of 94 mm (3.7 
inches) with a nominal internal diameter of 70 mm (2.76 inches).

[[Page 69753]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.006

    (ii) The test of the glazing article shall be deemed satisfactory 
if the test projectile does not penetrate the glazing article, the 
glazing article remains in its frame, and the witness plate is not 
marked by spall.
    (iii) A new projectile shall be used for each test.
    (iv) The glazing article to be tested shall be that which has the 
smallest area for each design type. For the test, the glazing article 
shall be fixed in a frame of the same construction as that mounted on 
the vehicle.
    (v) A minimum of four tests shall be conducted and all must be 
deemed satisfactory. Two tests shall be conducted with the complete 
glazing article at 0 [deg]C  0.5 [deg]C (32 [deg]F  0.9 [deg]F) and two tests shall be conducted with the complete 
glazing article at 20 [deg]C  5 [deg]C (68 [deg]F  9 [deg]F). For the tests to be valid it shall be demonstrated 
that the core temperature of the complete glazing article during each 
test is within the required temperature range.
    (vi) The test glazing article shall be mounted at the same angle 
relative to the projectile path as it will be to the direction of 
travel when mounted on the vehicle.
    (vii) The projectile's impact velocity shall equal the maximum 
operating speed of the trainset plus 160 km/h (100 mph). The projectile 
velocity shall be measured within 4 m (13 feet) of the point of impact.
    (viii) The point of impact shall be at the geometrical center of 
the glazing article.
    (3) Representative samples for large object impact testing of large 
end-facing cab glazing articles may be used, instead of the actual 
design size provided that the following conditions are met:
    (i) Testing of glazing articles having dimensions greater than 
1,000 mm by 700 mm (39.4 by 27.6 inches), excluding framing, may be 
performed using a flat sample having the same composition as the 
glazing article for which compliance is to be demonstrated. The glazing 
manufacturer shall provide documentation containing its technical 
justification that testing a flat sample is sufficient to verify 
compliance of the glazing article with the requirements of this 
paragraph.
    (ii) Flat sample testing is permitted only if no surface of the 
full-size glazing article contains curvature whose radius is less than 
2,500 mm (98 inches); and when a complete, finished, glazing article is 
laid (convex side uppermost) on a flat horizontal surface, the 
distance, (measured perpendicularly to the flat surface) between the 
flat surface and the inside face of the glazing article is not greater 
than 200 mm (8 inches).
    (4) End-facing glazing shall demonstrate sufficient resistance to 
spalling, as verified by the large impact

[[Page 69754]]

projectile test under the following conditions:
    (i) An annealed aluminum witness plate of maximum thickness 0.15 mm 
(0.006 inches) and of dimension 500 mm by 500 mm (19.7 by 19.7 inches) 
is placed vertically behind the sample under test, at a horizontal 
distance of 500 mm (19.7 inches) from the point of impact in the 
direction of travel of the projectile or the distance between the point 
of impact of the projectile and the location of the driver's eyes in 
the driver's normal operating position, whichever is less. The center 
of the witness plate is aligned with the point of impact.
    (ii) Spalling performance shall be deemed satisfactory if the 
aluminum witness plate is not marked.
    (iii) For the purposes of this part, materials used specifically to 
protect the cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall shields) shall not be 
required to meet the flammability and smoke emission performance 
requirements of Sec.  299.413.
    (5) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall, at a minimum, 
provide ballistic penetration resistance that meets the requirements of 
appendix A to part 223 of this chapter.
    (c) Trainset glazing; side-facing. Except as provided in paragraph 
(d) of this section, each side-facing exterior window in a trainset 
shall comply with the requirements for Type II glazing as defined in 
part 223 of this chapter or other alternative standard approved by FRA.
    (d) Side-facing breakable glazing. A side-facing exterior window 
intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency egress window may 
comply with an alternative standard approved for use by FRA under Sec.  
299.15.
    (e) Certification of Glazing Materials. Glazing materials shall be 
certified in accordance with the following procedures:
    (1) Each manufacturer that provides glazing materials, intended by 
the manufacturer for use in achieving compliance with the requirements 
of this subpart, shall certify that each type of glazing material being 
supplied for this purpose has been successfully tested in accordance 
with this section and that test verification data are available to the 
railroad or to FRA upon request.
    (2) Tests performed on glazing materials for compliance with this 
part shall be conducted by either--
    (i) An independent third party (lab, facility, underwriter); or
    (ii) The glazing manufacturer, providing FRA with the opportunity 
to witness all tests by written notice, a minimum of 30 days prior to 
testing.
    (3) Any glazing material certified to meet the requirements of this 
part shall be re-certified if any change is made to the glazing that 
may affect its mechanical properties or its mounting arrangement on the 
vehicle.
    (4) All certification/re-certification documentation shall be made 
available to FRA upon request. The test verification data shall contain 
all pertinent original data logs and documentation that the selection 
of material samples, test set-ups, test measuring devices, and test 
procedures were performed by qualified individuals using recognized and 
acceptable practices and in accordance with this section.
    (5) Glazing shall be marked in the following manner:
    (i) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall be permanently 
marked, prior to installation, in such a manner that the marking is 
clearly visible after the material has been installed. The marking 
shall include:
    (A) The words ``FRA TYPE IHS'' to indicate that the material meets 
the requirements specified in paragraph (b) of this section;
    (B) The manufacturer of the material; and
    (C) The type or brand identification of the material.
    (ii) Each side-facing exterior window in a trainset shall be 
permanently marked, prior to installation, in such a manner that the 
marking is clearly visible after the material has been installed. The 
marking shall include:
    (A) The words ``FRA TYPE II'' to indicate that the material meets 
the requirements specified in paragraph (c) of this section;
    (B) The manufacturer of the material; and
    (C) The type or brand identification of the material.
    (f) Glazing securement. Each exterior window shall remain in place 
when subjected to--
    (1) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two 
trainsets pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while 
traveling in opposite directions, each trainset traveling at the 
maximum approved trainset speed in accordance with Sec.  299.609(g); 
and
    (2) The impact forces that the exterior window is required to 
resist as specified in this section.

Sec.  299.409   Brake system.

    (a) General. The railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and 
testing the maximum safe operating speed for its trainsets that results 
in no thermal damage to equipment or infrastructure during normal 
operation of the brake system.
    (b) Minimum performance requirement for brake system. Each 
trainset's brake system, under the worst-case adhesion conditions as 
defined by the railroad, shall be capable of stopping the trainset from 
its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the 
track over which the trainset is operating.
    (c) Urgent brake system. A trainset shall be provided with an 
urgent brake application feature that produces an irretrievable stop. 
An urgent brake application shall be available at any time, and shall 
be initiated by an unintentional parting of the trainset or by the 
trainset crew from the conductor rooms.
    (d) Application/release indication. The brake system shall be 
designed so that an inspector may determine whether the brake system is 
functioning properly without being placed in a dangerous position on, 
under or between the equipment. This determination may be made through 
automated monitoring system that utilizes sensors to verify that the 
brakes have been applied and released.
    (e) Passenger brake alarm. (1) A means to initiate a passenger 
brake alarm shall be provided at two locations in each unit of a 
trainset. The words ``Passenger Brake Alarm'' shall be legibly 
stenciled or marked on each device or on an adjacent badge plate.
    (2) All passenger brake alarms shall be installed so as to prevent 
accidental activation.
    (3) When a passenger brake alarm is activated, it shall initiate an 
emergency brake application. The emergency brake application can be 
overridden by the driver so that the trainset can be stopped at a safe 
location.
    (4) To retrieve the emergency brake application described in 
paragraph (e)(3) of this section, the driver must activate appropriate 
controls to issue a command for brake application as specified in the 
railroad's operating rules.
    (f) Degraded brake system performance. The following requirements 
address degraded brake system performance on the railroad's high-speed 
trainsets--
    (1) Loss of power or failure of regenerative brake shall not result 
in exceeding the allowable stopping distance as defined by the 
railroad;
    (2) The available friction braking shall be adequate to stop the 
trainset safely under the operating conditions defined by the railroad;

[[Page 69755]]

    (3) The operational status of the trainset brake system shall be 
displayed for the driver in the operating cab; and
    (4) Under Sec.  299.607(b)(5), the railroad shall demonstrate 
through analysis and testing the maximum speed for safely operating its 
trainsets using only the friction brake system with no thermal damage 
to equipment or infrastructure. The analysis and testing shall also 
determine the maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of 
operative friction brakes.
    (g) Main reservoir system. The main reservoirs in a trainset shall 
be designed and tested to meet the requirements set forth in JIS B 
8265:2010(E) (incorporated by reference, see Sec.  299.17). Reservoirs 
shall be certified based on their size and volume requirements.
    (h) Main reservoir tests. Prior to initial installation, each main 
reservoir shall be subjected to a pneumatic or hydrostatic pressure 
test based on the maximum working pressure defined in paragraph (g) of 
this section unless otherwise established by the railroad's mechanical 
officer. Records of the test date, location, and pressure shall be 
maintained by the railroad for the life of the equipment. Periodic 
inspection requirements for main reservoirs shall be defined in the 
railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program required under 
Sec.  299.445.
    (i) Brake gauges. All mechanical gauges and all devices providing 
electronic indication of air pressure that are used by the driver to 
aid in the control or braking of a trainset shall be located so that 
they can be conveniently read from the driver's normal position during 
operation of the trainset.
    (j) Brake application/release. (1) Brake actuators shall be 
designed to provide brake pad clearance when the brakes are released.
    (2) The minimum brake cylinder pressure shall be established to 
provide adequate adjustment from minimum service to emergency for 
proper trainset operation.
    (k) Leakage. The method of inspection for main reservoir pipe and 
brake cylinder pipe leakage shall be prescribed in the railroad's 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program required by Sec.  299.445.
    (l) Slide alarm. (1) A trainset shall be equipped with an adhesion 
control system designed to automatically adjust the braking force on 
each wheel to prevent sliding during braking.
    (2) A wheel slide alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall 
alert the driver in the operating cab to wheel-slide conditions on any 
axle of the trainset.
    (3) Operating restrictions for a trainset with wheel slide 
protection devices that are not functioning as intended shall be 
defined by the railroad under its requirements for movement of 
defective equipment required by Sec.  299.447, and within the 
railroad's operating rules, as appropriate.
    (m) Monitoring and diagnostic system. Each trainset shall be 
equipped with a monitoring and diagnostic system that is designed to 
assess the functionality of the brake system for the entire trainset 
automatically. Details of the system operation and the method of 
communication of brake system functionality prior to the dispatch of 
the trainset shall be described in detail in the railroad's Operating 
Rules and inspection, testing, and maintenance program required by 
Sec.  299.445.
    (n) Trainset securement. Each trainset shall be equipped with a 
means of securing the equipment, independent of the friction brake, on 
the grade condition defined by the railroad. The railroad's operating 
rules shall define procedures for trainset securement and the railroad 
shall demonstrate that these procedures effectively secure the 
equipment in accordance with Sec.  299.607(b)(5).
    (o) Rescue operation; brake system. A trainset's brake system shall 
be designed so as to allow a rescue vehicle or trainset to control its 
brakes when the trainset is disabled.

Sec.  299.411   Bogies and suspension system.

    (a) Wheel climb. (1) Suspension systems shall be designed to 
reasonably prevent wheel climb, wheel unloading, rail rollover, rail 
shift, and a vehicle from overturning to ensure safe, stable 
performance and ride quality. These requirements shall be met--
    (i) In all operating environments, and under all track conditions 
and loading conditions as determined by the railroad; and
    (ii) At all track speeds and over all track qualities consistent 
with the requirements in subpart C of this part, up to the maximum 
trainset speed and maximum cant deficiency of the equipment in 
accordance with Sec.  299.609(g).
    (2) All passenger equipment shall meet the safety performance 
standards for suspension systems contained in Sec.  299.609(h). In 
particular--
    (i) Vehicle/track system qualification. All trainsets shall 
demonstrate safe operation during vehicle/track system qualification in 
accordance with Sec.  299.609 and is subject to the requirements of 
Sec.  299.315.
    (ii) Revenue service operation. All passenger equipment in service 
is subject to the requirements of Sec.  299.315.
    (b) Lateral accelerations. The trainsets shall not operate under 
conditions that result in a steady-state lateral acceleration greater 
than 0.15g, as measured parallel to the car floor inside the passenger 
compartment.
    (c) Journal bearing overheat sensors. Bearing overheat sensors 
shall be provided on all journal bearings on each trainset.

Sec.  299.413   Fire safety.

    (a) General. All materials used in constructing the interior of the 
trainset shall meet the flammability and smoke emission characteristics 
and testing standards contained in appendix B to part 238 of this 
chapter. For purposes of this section, the interior of the trainset 
includes walls, floors, ceilings, seats, doors, windows, electrical 
conduits, air ducts, and any other internal equipment.
    (b) Certification. The railroad shall require certification that a 
representative sample of combustible materials to be--
    (1) Used in constructing a passenger car or a cab, or
    (2) Introduced in a passenger car or a cab, as part of any kind of 
rebuild, refurbishment, or overhaul of the car or cab, has been tested 
by a recognized independent testing laboratory and that the results 
show the representative sample complies with the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section at the time it was tested.
    (c) Fire safety analysis. The railroad shall ensure that fire 
safety considerations and features in the design of the trainsets 
reduce the risk of personal injury caused by fire to an acceptable 
level in its operating environment using a formal safety methodology. 
To this end, the railroad shall complete a written fire safety analysis 
for the passenger equipment being procured. In conducting the analysis, 
the railroad shall--
    (1) Identify, analyze, and prioritize the fire hazards inherent in 
the design of the equipment.
    (2) Take effective steps to design the equipment and select 
materials which help provide sufficient fire resistance to reasonably 
ensure adequate time to detect a fire and safely evacuate the 
passengers and crewmembers, if a fire cannot be prevented. Factors to 
consider include potential ignition sources; the type, quantity, and 
location of the materials; and availability of rapid and safe egress to 
the exterior of the equipment under conditions secure from fire, smoke, 
and other hazards.

[[Page 69756]]

    (3) Reasonably ensure that a ventilation system in the equipment 
does not contribute to the lethality of a fire.
    (4) Identify in writing any trainset component that is a risk of 
initiating fire and which requires overheat protection. An overheat 
detector shall be installed in any component when the analysis 
determines that an overheat detector is necessary.
    (5) Identify in writing any unoccupied trainset compartment that 
contains equipment or material that poses a fire hazard, and analyze 
the benefit provided by including a fire or smoke detection system in 
each compartment so identified. A fire or smoke detector shall be 
installed in any unoccupied compartment when the analysis determines 
that such equipment is necessary to ensure sufficient time for the safe 
evacuation of passengers and crewmembers from the trainset. For 
purposes of this section, an unoccupied trainset compartment means any 
part of the equipment structure that is not normally occupied during 
operation of the trainset, including a closet, baggage compartment, 
food pantry, etc.
    (6) Determine whether any occupied or unoccupied space requires a 
portable fire extinguisher and, if so, the proper type and size of the 
fire extinguisher for each location. As required by Sec.  239.101 of 
this chapter, each passenger car is required to have a minimum of one 
portable fire extinguisher. If the analysis performed indicates that 
one or more additional portable fire extinguishers are needed, such 
shall be installed.
    (7) Analyze the benefit provided by including a fixed, automatic 
fire-suppression system in any unoccupied trainset compartment that 
contains equipment or material that poses a fire hazard, and determine 
the proper type and size of the automatic fire-suppression system for 
each such location. A fixed, automatic fire-suppression system shall be 
installed in any unoccupied compartment when the analysis determines 
that such equipment is practical and necessary to ensure sufficient 
time for the safe evacuation of passengers and crewmembers from the 
trainset.
    (8) Explain how safety issues are resolved in the design of the 
equipment and selection of materials to reduce the risk of each fire 
hazard.
    (9) Describe the analysis and testing necessary to demonstrate that 
the fire protection approach taken in the design of the equipment and 
selection of materials meets the fire protection requirements of this 
part.
    (d) Inspection, testing, and maintenance. The railroad shall 
develop and adopt written procedures for the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of all fire safety systems and fire safety equipment on the 
passenger equipment it operates under Sec.  299.445(b), and subpart G 
of this part. The railroad shall comply with those procedures that it 
designates as mandatory for the safety of the equipment and its 
occupants.

Sec.  299.415   Doors.

    (a) Each powered, exterior side door in a vestibule that is 
partitioned from the passenger compartment of a trainset shall have a 
manual override device that is--
    (1) Capable of releasing the door to permit it to be opened without 
power.
    (2) Located such that--
    (i) Interior access is provided adjacent to each manual door 
release mechanism; and,
    (ii) Exterior access is provided on each side of each car.
    (3) Designed and maintained so that a person may access and operate 
the override device readily without requiring the use of a tool or 
other implement.
    (4) The railroad may protect a manual override device used to open 
a powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen.
    (5) When a manual override device is activated, door panel 
friction, including seals and hangers, shall allow the doors to be 
opened or closed manually with as low a force as practicable.
    (6) The emergency release mechanism shall require manual reset.
    (b) Each passenger car shall have a minimum of one exterior side 
door per side. Each such door shall provide a minimum clear opening 
with dimensions of 813 mm (32 inches) horizontally by 1,850 mm (72.8 
inches) vertically.
    (c) Door exits shall be marked, and instructions provided for their 
use, as specified in Sec.  299.423.
    (d) All doors intended for access by emergency responders shall be 
marked, and instructions provided for their use, as specified in Sec.  
299.423.
    (e) Vestibule doors and other interior doors intended for passage 
through a passenger car.
    (1) General. Except for a door providing access to a control 
compartment each powered vestibule door and any other powered interior 
door intended for passage through a passenger car shall have a manual 
override device that conforms with the requirements of paragraphs 
(e)(2) and (3) of this section.
    (2) Manual override devices. Each manual override device shall be:
    (i) Capable of releasing the door to permit it to be opened without 
power;
    (ii) Located adjacent to the door it controls; and
    (iii) Designed and maintained so that a person may readily access 
and operate the override device from each side of the door without the 
use of a tool or other implement.
    (3) Marking and instructions. Each manual override device and each 
retention mechanism shall be marked, and instructions provided for 
their use, as specified in Sec.  299.423.
    (f) The status of each powered, exterior side door in a passenger 
car shall be displayed to the driver in the operating cab. Door 
interlock sensors shall be provided to detect trainset motion and shall 
be nominally set to operate at 5 km/h.
    (g) All powered exterior side passenger doors shall--
    (1) Be equipped with the service-proven door safety system utilized 
by the N700 or an alternate door safety system designed subject to a 
Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA);
    (2) Be designed with an obstruction detection system capable of 
detecting a rigid flat bar, 6.4 mm (\1/4\ inches) wide and 76 mm (3 
inches) high and a rigid rod, 9.5 mm (\3/8\ inches) in diameter;
    (3) Incorporate an obstruction detection system sufficient to 
detect large obstructions;
    (4) Be designed so that activation of a door by-pass feature does 
not affect the operation of the obstruction detection system on all the 
other doors on the trainset;
    (5) Have the door control station located in a secured area that is 
only accessible to crewmembers or maintenance personnel;
    (6) Be designed such that the door open or closed circuit is not 
affected by the throttle position; and
    (7) Use discrete, dedicated trainlines for door-open and door-close 
commands, door-closed summary circuit, and no motion, if trainlined.
    (h) All powered exterior side door systems in a trainset shall--
    (1) Be designed with a door summary circuit. The door summary 
circuit shall be connected or interlocked to prohibit the trainset from 
developing tractive power if an exterior side door in a passenger car, 
other than a door under the direct physical control of a crewmember for 
his or her exclusive use, is not closed;
    (2) Be connected to side door status indicators located on the 
exterior of each unit of the trainset;
    (3) Be connected to a door summary status indicator that is readily 
viewable to the driver from his or her normal position in the operating 
cab;

[[Page 69757]]

    (4) If equipped with a trainset-wide door by-pass device, be 
designed so that the trainset-wide door by-pass functions only when 
activated from the operating cab of the trainset;
    (5) Be equipped with a lock (cut-out/lock-out) mechanism installed 
at each door panel to secure a door in the closed and locked position. 
When the lock mechanism is utilized to secure the door in the closed 
position, a door-closed indication shall be provided to the door 
summary circuit; and
    (6) Be designed such that a crew key or other secure device be 
required to lock-out an exterior side door to prevent unauthorized use.
    (i)(1) Visual inspections and functional tests. The inspection and 
functional tests required for the door safety system, including the 
trainset-wide door by-pass verification, shall be conducted in 
accordance with the railroad's trainset inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program in accordance with Sec.  299.445, and operating 
rules under subpart E.
    (2) Face-to-face relief. Crewmembers taking control of a trainset 
do not need to perform a visual inspection or a functional test of the 
door by-pass devices in cases of face-to-face relief of another 
trainset crew and notification by that crew as to the functioning of 
the door by-pass devices.
    (j) The railroad shall maintain a record of each door by-pass 
activation and each unintended opening of a powered exterior side door, 
including any repair(s) made, in the defect tracking system as required 
by Sec.  299.445(h).

Sec.  299.417   Emergency lighting.

    (a) General. Emergency lighting shall be provided in each unit of a 
trainset. The emergency lighting system shall be designed to facilitate 
the ability of passengers and trainset crew members, and/or emergency 
responders to see and orient themselves, to identify obstacles, in 
order to assist them to safely move through and out of a passenger rail 
car.
    (1) Emergency lighting shall illuminate the following areas:
    (i) Passenger car aisles, passageways, and toilets;
    (ii) Door emergency exit controls/manual releases;
    (iii) Vestibule floor near the door emergency exits (to facilitate 
safe entrance/exit from the door);
    (iv) Within the car diaphragm and adjacent area; and
    (v) Specialty car locations such as crew offices.
    (b) Minimum illumination levels. (1) A minimum, average 
illumination level of 10.7 lux (1 foot-candle) measured at floor level 
adjacent to each exterior door and each interior door providing access 
to an exterior door (such as a door opening into a vestibule);
    (2) A minimum, average illumination level of 10.7 lux (1 foot-
candle) measured 635 mm (25 inches) above floor level along the center 
of each aisle and passageway;
    (3) A minimum illumination level of 1.1 lux (0.1 foot-candle) 
measured 635 mm (25 inches) above floor level at any point along the 
center of each aisle and passageway;
    (c) Lighting activation. Each emergency lighting fixture shall 
activate automatically or be energized continuously whenever the car is 
in revenue service and normal lighting is not available.
    (d) Independent power source. Emergency lighting system shall have 
an independent power source(s) that is located in or within one half a 
car length of each light fixture it powers.
    (e) Functional requirements. Emergency lighting system components 
shall be designed to operate without failure and capable of remaining 
attached under the conditions typically found in passenger rail 
equipment including expected mechanical vibrations, and shock in 
accordance with Sec.  299.405(a)(1), as well as comply with 
electromagnetic interference criteria in Sec.  299.435(e).
    (1) All emergency lighting system components shall be capable to 
operate in all railcar orientations.
    (2) All emergency lighting system components shall be capable to 
operate when normal power is unavailable for 90 minutes without a loss 
of more than 40% of the minimum illumination levels specified in 
paragraph (b) of this section.
    (f) Inspection. (1) The railroad shall inspect the emergency 
lighting system as required by its inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program in accordance with Sec.  299.445.
    (2) If batteries are used as independent power sources, they shall 
have automatic self-diagnostic modules designed to perform discharge 
tests.

Sec.  299.419   Emergency communication.

    (a) PA (public address) system. Each passenger car shall be 
equipped with a PA system that provides a means for a trainset 
crewmember to communicate by voice to passengers of his or her trainset 
in an emergency situation. The PA system shall also provide a means for 
a trainset crewmember to communicate by voice in an emergency situation 
to persons in the immediate vicinity of his or her trainset (e.g., 
persons on the station platform). The PA system may be part of the same 
system as the intercom system.
    (b) Intercom system. Each passenger car shall be equipped with an 
intercom system that provides a means for passengers and crewmembers to 
communicate by voice with each other in an emergency situation. Except 
as further specified, at least one intercom that is accessible to 
passengers without using a tool or other implement shall be located in 
each end (half) of each car.
    (c) Marking and instructions. The following requirements apply to 
all units of a trainset:
    (1) The location of each intercom intended for passenger use shall 
be conspicuously marked with HPPL material in accordance with Sec.  
299.423; and
    (2) Legible and understandable operating instructions shall be made 
of HPPL material in accordance with Sec.  299.423 and posted at or near 
each such intercom.
    (d) Back-up power. PA and intercom systems shall have a back-up 
power system capable of--
    (1) Powering each system to allow intermittent emergency 
communication for a minimum period of 90 minutes. Intermittent 
communication shall be considered equivalent to continuous 
communication during the last 15 minutes of the 90-minute minimum 
period; and
    (2) Operating in all equipment orientations within 90 degrees of 
vertical.
    (e) Additional requirements. The PA and intercom systems shall be 
designed to operate without failure and remain attached under the 
conditions typically found in passenger rail equipment including 
expected mechanical vibrations, and shock in accordance with Sec.  
299.405(a)(1), as well as comply with electromagnetic interference 
criteria in Sec.  299.435(e).

Sec.  299.421   Emergency roof access.

    (a) Number and dimensions. Each passenger car shall have a minimum 
of two emergency roof access locations, each providing a minimum 
opening of 660 mm (26 inches) longitudinally (i.e., parallel to the 
longitudinal axis of the car) by 610 mm (24 inches) laterally.
    (b) Means of access. Emergency roof access shall be provided by 
means of a conspicuously marked structural weak point in the roof for 
access by properly equipped emergency response personnel.
    (c) Location. Emergency roof access locations shall be situated so 
that when a car is on its side--
    (1) One emergency access location is situated as close as 
practicable within

[[Page 69758]]

each half of the roof as divided top from bottom; and
    (2) One emergency access location is situated as close as 
practicable within each half of the roof as divided left from right. 
(See Figure 1 to this paragraph.)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.007

    (d) Obstructions. The ceiling space below each emergency roof 
access location shall be free from wire, cabling, conduit, and piping. 
This space shall also be free of any rigid secondary structure (e.g., a 
diffuser or diffuser support, lighting back fixture, mounted PA 
equipment, or luggage rack) where practicable. It shall be permissible 
to cut through interior panels, liners, or other non-rigid secondary 
structures after making the cutout hole in the roof, provided any such 
additional cutting necessary to access the interior of the vehicle 
permits a minimum opening of the dimensions specified in paragraph (a) 
of this section to be maintained.
    (e) Marking instructions. Each emergency roof access location shall 
be conspicuously marked with retroreflective material of contrasting 
color meeting the minimum requirements specified in Sec.  299.423. 
Legible and understandable instructions shall be posted at or near each 
such location.

Sec.  299.423   Markings and instructions for emergency egress and 
rescue access.

    (a) General. Instructions and markings shall be provided in each 
unit of a trainset in accordance with the minimum requirements of this 
section to provide instructions for passengers and trainset crewmembers 
regarding emergency egress, and rescue access instructions for 
emergency responders.
    (b) Visual identity and recognition. Emergency exit signage/marking 
systems shall enable passengers and trainset crewmembers to make 
positive identification of emergency exits.
    (1) Each interior emergency exit sign and emergency exit locator 
sign shall be conspicuous (i.e., clearly recognizable/distinguishable) 
or become conspicuous to passengers and trainset crewmembers 
immediately and automatically upon the loss of power for normal 
lighting, from a minimum distance of 1.52 m (5 feet).
    (2) The signs and markings shall operate independently of the car's 
normal and emergency lighting systems, for a minimum of 90 minutes 
after loss of all power for normal lighting.
    (3) An emergency exit locator sign shall be located in close 
proximity of each emergency exit and shall work in conjunction with the 
emergency exit sign. The location of the sign, directional arrow(s), or 
wording shall guide passengers and trainset crewmembers to the 
emergency exit route.
    (c) Rescue access signage/marking systems. (1) Rescue access 
signage and marking systems shall enable emergency responders to make 
positive identification of rescue access points.
    (2) Rescue access information for emergency responders placed on 
the exterior of the carbody shall, at a minimum, consist of the 
following:
    (i) Each door intended for use by emergency responders for rescue 
access shall be identified with emergency access signs, symbols, or 
other conspicuous marking consisting of retroreflective material that 
complies with paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section.
    (ii) Rescue access door control locator signs/markings and 
instructions;
    (A) Each door intended for use by emergency responders for rescue 
access shall have operating instructions for opening the door from 
outside the car placed on or immediately adjacent to the door on the 
carbody. If a power door does not function with an integral release 
mechanism, the instructions shall indicate the location of the exterior 
manual door control.
    (B) Each power door intended for use by emergency responders for 
rescue access which has a non-integral release mechanism located away 
from the door, shall have a door control sign/marking placed at the 
location of this control that provides instructions for emergency 
operation, either as part of the access sign/marking or as another 
sign/marking.
    (C) Each car equipped with manual doors shall have operating 
instructions for opening the door from the exterior, either as part of 
the access sign/marking or as another sign/marking.
    (iii) Rescue access window locator signs/markings and instructions; 
and
    (A) Each rescue access window shall be identified with a unique 
retroreflective and easily recognizable sign, symbol, or other 
conspicuous marking that complies with paragraphs (d) and (e) of this 
section.
    (B) Signs, symbols, or marking shall be placed at the bottom of 
each such window, on each window, or adjacent

[[Page 69759]]

to each window, utilizing arrows, where necessary, to clearly designate 
rescue assess window location. Legible and understandable window-access 
instructions, including any pictogram/instructions for removing the 
window, shall be posted at or near each rescue access window.
    (iv) Roof access locator signs/markings and instructions.
    (A) The location of each emergency access point provided on the 
roof of a passenger car shall be clearly marked with retroreflective 
material of contrasting color that complies with paragraphs (d) and (e) 
of this section.
    (B) Legible and understandable instructions shall be posted at or 
near each such location.
    (C) If emergency roof access is provided by means of a structural 
weak point:
    (1) The retroreflective material shall clearly mark the line along 
which the roof skin shall be cut; and
    (2) A sign plate with a retroreflective border shall also state:
    CAUTION--DO NOT USE FLAME CUTTING DEVICES.
    CAUTION--WARN PASSENGERS BEFORE CUTTING.
    CUT ALONG DASHED LINE TO GAIN ACCESS.
    ROOF CONSTRUCTION--[STATE RELEVANT DETAILS].
    (d) Color contrast. Exterior signs/markings shall provide luminance 
contrast ratio of not less than 0.5, as measured by a color-corrected 
photometer.
    (e) Materials--(1) Retroreflective material. Exterior emergency 
rescue access locator signs/markings shall be constructed of 
retroreflective material that conforms to the specifications for Type I 
material sheeting, as specified in ASTM D 4956-07 [egr]\1\ 
(incorporated by reference, see Sec.  299.17), as tested in accordance 
with ASTM E 810-03 (incorporated by reference, see Sec.  299.17).
    (2) HPPL materials. All HPPL materials used in finished component 
configurations shall comply with the minimum luminance criterion of 7.5 
mcd/m\2\ after 90 minutes when tested according to the provisions of 
ASTM E 2073-07 (incorporated by reference, see Sec.  299.17), with the 
following three modifications:
    (i) Activation. The HPPL material shall be activated with a 
fluorescent lamp of 40W or less and a color temperature of 4000-4500K 
that provides no more than 10.7 lux (1 fc) of illumination as measured 
on the material surface. The activation period shall be for no more 
than 60 minutes.
    (ii) Luminance. The photopic luminance of all specimens of the HPPL 
material shall be measured with a luminance meter as defined in section 
5.2 of ASTM E 2073-07, a minimum of 90 minutes after activation has 
ceased.
    (iii) Luminance in mcd/m\2\. The test report shall include a 
luminance measurement 90 minutes after activation has ceased.
    (f) Recordkeeping. (1) The railroad shall retain a copy of the car 
manufacturer/supplier provided independent laboratory certified test 
report results showing that the illuminance or luminance measurements, 
as appropriate, on the active area of the signage/marking component. 
Such records shall be kept until all cars with those components are 
retired, transferred, leased, or conveyed to another railroad for use 
in revenue service. A copy of such records shall be transferred to the 
accepting railroad along with any such cars.
    (2) The railroad shall retain a copy of the railroad-approved 
illuminance test plan(s) and test results until the next periodic test, 
or other test specified in accordance with the railroad's inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program is conducted on a representative car/
area, or until all cars of that type are retired, or are transferred, 
leased, or conveyed to another railroad. A copy of such records shall 
be transferred to the accepting railroad along with such car(s).
    (3) The railroad shall retain a copy of the certified independent 
laboratory test report results that certify that the retroreflective 
material complies with Type I materials per ASTM D-4956-07 [egr]\1\ 
until all cars containing the retroreflective material are retired, or 
are transferred, leased, or conveyed to another railroad. A copy of 
such records shall be provided to the accepting railroad along with any 
car(s) that are transferred, leased, or conveyed.

Sec.  299.425   Low-location emergency exit path marking.

    (a) General. Low-location emergency exit path marking (LLEEPM) 
shall be provided in each unit of a trainset. The LLEEPM system shall 
be designed to identify the location of primary door exits and the exit 
path to be used to reach such doors by passengers and trainset 
crewmembers under conditions of darkness when normal and emergency 
sources of illumination are obscured by smoke or are inoperative.
    (b) Visual identity and recognition. The LLEEPM system shall be 
conspicuous (i.e., clearly recognizable/distinguishable), or become 
conspicuous immediately and automatically from a low-location upon loss 
of power for normal lighting, and under the minimum general emergency 
light illumination levels as specified in Sec.  299.423.
    (c) Signage and markings. At a minimum, the LLEEPM system shall 
have the following three components:
    (1) Primary door exit signs. (i) Each primary door exit shall be 
clearly marked with an exit sign;
    (ii) The exit sign shall be visible from a low-location from the 
exit along the exit path; and
    (iii) Each exit sign shall be located on or immediately adjacent to 
each door and placed between 152.4 and 457.2 mm (6 and 18 inches) above 
the floor.
    (2) Primary door exit marking/delineators. (i) The location of the 
exit path shall be marked using electrically powered (active) marking/
delineators or light fixtures, HPPL (passive) marking/delineators or a 
combination of these two systems.
    (ii) The requirements in this section apply for both electrical and 
HPPL components, whether installed on the walls, floors, or seat 
assemblies.
    (iii) Each primary door shall be marked on or around the door's 
operating handle.
    (3) Exit path marking/delineators. (i) The marking/delineator 
components shall be positioned so as to identify an exit path to all 
primary exits that is clearly visible and easily recognizable from any 
seat or compartment in the trainset, when normal lighting and emergency 
lighting are unavailable in conditions of darkness and/or smoke.
    (ii) Markings/delineators shall be located on the floor or no 
higher than 457.2 mm (18 inches) on the seat assembly, or walls/
partitions of aisles, and/or passageways.
    (iii) Changes in the direction of the exit path shall be indicated 
by the LLEEPM and be placed within 102 mm (4 inches) of the corner of 
the exit path.
    (d) Material--(1) HPPL passive systems. HPPL strip marking/
delineator material used for LLEEPM components shall be capable of 
providing a minimum luminance level of 7.5 mcd/m\2\, measured 90 
minutes after normal power has ceased.
    (2) Electroluminescent marking/delineator strips. The luminance 
value of the electroluminescent (EL) marking/delineator strip shall be 
at least 1,000 mcd/m\2\, as measured on the strip surface.
    (e) Conspicuity of markings. LLEEPM signs shall comply with the 
text, color and respective illuminance or luminance requirements 
specified in Sec.  299.423 and in this section.

[[Page 69760]]

    (f) Emergency performance duration. The LLEEPM system shall operate 
independently of the car's normal and emergency lighting systems for 90 
minutes after loss of all power for normal lighting.
    (g) Recordkeeping. (1) The railroad shall retain a copy of the car 
manufacturer/supplier provided certified independent laboratory test 
report results showing that the illuminance or luminance measurements, 
as appropriate, on the active area of the signage/marking/delineator 
component comply with the criteria specified in Sec.  299.423 and in 
this section.
    (2) The railroad shall retain a copy of the railroad-approved 
illuminance test plan(s) and test results until the next periodic test, 
or other test specified in accordance with the railroad's inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program and ensure that tests are conducted on 
a representative car, or until all cars of that type are retired, 
transferred, leased, or conveyed to another railroad. A copy of such 
records shall be provided to the accepting railroads along with any 
car(s) that are transferred, leased, or conveyed.
    (3) Illegible, broken, damaged, missing, or non-functioning 
components of the LLEEPM system, including the normal and emergency 
power systems, shall be reported and repaired in accordance with the 
railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program as specified in 
Sec.  299.445.

Sec.  299.427   Emergency egress windows.

    (a) Number and location. Each unit in a trainset shall have a 
minimum of four emergency egress windows. At least one emergency egress 
window shall be located in each side of each end (half) of the car, in 
a staggered configuration where practicable. (See Figure 1 to this 
paragraph.)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR03NO20.008

    (b) Ease of operability. Each emergency egress window shall be 
designed to permit rapid and easy removal from the inside of the car 
during an emergency situation using a hammer designed to break the 
glazing that shall be located adjacent to each emergency egress window. 
The railroad shall inspect for the presence of the emergency hammers 
each day prior to the trainset being placed into service in accordance 
with Sec.  299.711(b).
    (c) Dimensions. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this 
section, each emergency egress window in a passenger car shall have an 
unobstructed opening with minimum dimensions of 660 mm (26 inches) 
horizontally by 610 mm (24 inches) vertically. A seatback is not an 
obstruction if it can be moved away from the window opening without 
using a tool or other implement.
    (d) Marking and instructions. (1) Each emergency egress window 
shall be conspicuously and legibly marked with luminescent material on 
the inside of each car to facilitate passenger egress as specified in 
Sec.  299.423.
    (2) Legible and understandable operating instructions, including 
instructions for removing the emergency egress window shall be made of 
luminescent material, shall be posted at or near each such emergency 
egress window as specified in Sec.  299.423.
    (e) Obstructions. If emergency egress window removal may be 
hindered by the presence of a seatback, headrest, luggage rack, or 
other fixture, the instructions shall state the method for allowing 
rapid and easy removal of the emergency egress window, taking into 
account the fixture(s), and this portion of the instructions may be in 
written or pictorial format.
    (f) Additional emergency egress windows. Any emergency egress 
window in addition to the minimum number required by paragraph (a) of 
this section that has been designated for use by the railroad need not 
comply with the minimum dimension requirements in paragraph (c) of this 
section, but must otherwise comply with all requirements in this 
subpart applicable to emergency egress windows.

Sec.  299.429   Rescue access windows.

    (a) General. Each emergency egress window required by Sec.  299.427 
shall also serve as a means of rescue access.
    (b) Ease of operability. Each rescue access window must be capable 
of being removed without unreasonable delay by an emergency responder 
using tools or implements that are commonly available to the responder 
in a passenger trainset emergency.
    (c) Marking and instructions. (1) Each rescue access window shall 
be marked with retroreflective material on the exterior of each car as 
specified in Sec.  299.423. A unique and easily recognizable symbol, 
sign, or other conspicuous marking shall also be used to identify each 
such window.
    (2) Legible and understandable window-access instructions, 
including

[[Page 69761]]

instructions for removing the window, shall be posted at or near each 
rescue access window as specified in Sec.  299.423.

Sec.  299.431   Driver's controls and cab layout.

    (a) Driver controls and cab layout. Driver controls and cab layout 
shall replicate that used in the N700, unless otherwise approved by 
FRA.
    (b) Cab seating. Each seat provided for an employee regularly 
assigned to occupy a cab and any floor-mounted seat in the cab shall be 
securely attached in accordance with Sec.  299.405.
    (c) Cab interior surface. Sharp edges and corners shall be 
eliminated from the interior of the cab, and interior surfaces of the 
cab likely to be impacted by an employee during a collision or 
derailment shall be padded with shock-absorbent material.
    (d) Cab securement. Trainset interior cab doors shall be equipped 
with the following:
    (1) A secure and operable device to lock the door from the outside 
that does not impede egress from the cab; and
    (2) A securement device on each cab door that is capable of 
securing the door from inside of the cab.
    (e) Cab glazing serviceability. End-facing cab windows of the lead 
trainset cab shall be free of cracks, breaks, or other conditions that 
obscure the view of the right-of-way for the crew from their normal 
position in the cab.
    (f) Floors of cabs, passageways, and compartments. Floors of cabs, 
passageways, and compartments shall be kept free from oil, water, waste 
or any obstruction that creates a slipping, tripping or fire hazard. 
Floors shall be properly treated to provide secure footing.
    (g) Cab environmental control. Each lead cab in a trainset shall be 
heated and air conditioned. The HVAC system shall be inspected and 
maintained to ensure that it operates properly and meets the railroad's 
performance standard which shall be defined in the inspection, testing, 
and maintenance program.
    (h) Trainset cab noise. Performance standards for the railroad's 
trainsets--
    (1) The average noise levels in the trainset cab shall be less than 
or equal to 85 dB(A) when the trainset is operating at maximum approved 
trainset speed as approved under Sec.  299.609(g). Compliance with this 
paragraph (h)(1) shall be demonstrated during the pre-revenue service 
system integration testing as required by Sec.  299.607.
    (2) The railroad shall not make any alterations during maintenance 
or modifications to the cab, that cause the average sound level to 
exceed the requirements in paragraph (h)(1) of this section.
    (3) The railroad or manufacturer shall follow the test protocols 
set forth in appendix B to this part to determine compliance with 
paragraph (h)(1) of this section, and, to the extent reasonably 
necessary to evaluate the effect of alterations during maintenance, to 
determine compliance with paragraph (h)(2) of this section.
    (i) Maintenance of trainset cabs. (1) If the railroad receives an 
excessive noise report, and if the condition giving rise to the noise 
is not required to be immediately corrected under this part, the 
railroad shall maintain a record of the report, and repair or replace 
the item identified as substantially contributing to the noise:
    (i) On or before the next periodic inspection required by the 
railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program under subpart 
G; or
    (ii) If the railroad determines that the repair or replacement of 
the item requires significant shop or material resources that are not 
readily available, at the time of the next major equipment repair 
commonly used for the particular type of maintenance needed.
    (2) The railroad has an obligation to respond to an excessive noise 
report that a trainset-cab-occupant files. The railroad meets its 
obligation to respond to an excessive noise report, as set forth in 
paragraph (i)(1) of this section, if the railroad makes a good faith 
effort to identify the cause of the reported noise, and where the 
railroad is successful in determining the cause, if the railroad 
repairs or replaces the items that cause the noise.
    (3)(i) The railroad shall maintain a written or electronic record 
of any excessive noise report, inspection, test, maintenance, 
replacement, or repair completed pursuant to paragraph (i) of this 
section, and the date on which that inspection, test, maintenance, 
replacement, or repair occurred. If the railroad elects to maintain an 
electronic record, the railroad must satisfy the conditions listed in 
Sec.  299.11.
    (ii) The railroad shall retain these records for a period of one 
year.
    (iii) The railroad shall establish an internal, auditable, 
monitorable system that contains these records.
    (j) Trainset sanitation facilities for employees. Sanitation 
facilities shall be provided for crewmembers either:
    (1) On the trainset, that meet otherwise applicable sanitation 
standards, which are accessible at frequent intervals during the course 
of their work shift; or
    (2) Ready access to railroad-provided sanitation facilities outside 
of the trainset.
    (k) Speed indicators. (1) Each trainset controlling cab shall be 
equipped with a speed indicator which is--
    (i) Accurate within 2 km/h (1.24 miles per hour) for 
speed lower than 30 km/h (18.6 miles per hour), then increasing 
linearly up to 12 km/h (7.5 miles per hour) at 500 km/h 
(311 miles per hour); and
    (ii) Clearly readable from the driver's normal position under all 
light conditions.
    (2) The speed indicator shall be based on a system of independent 
on-board speed measurement sources guaranteeing the accuracy level 
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section under all operational 
conditions. The system shall be automatically monitored for 
inconsistencies and the driver shall be automatically notified of any 
inconsistency potentially compromising this accuracy level.
    (3) The speed indicator shall be calibrated periodically as defined 
in the railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
    (l) Cab lights. (1) Each trainset cab shall have cab lights which 
will provide sufficient illumination for the control instruments, 
meters, and gauges to enable the driver to make accurate readings from 
his or her normal positions in the cab. These lights shall be located, 
constructed, and maintained so that light shines only on those parts 
requiring illumination and does not interfere with the driver's vision 
of the track and signals. Each trainset cab shall also have a 
conveniently located light that can be readily turned on and off by the 
driver operating the trainset and that provides sufficient illumination 
for them to read trainset orders and timetables.
    (2) Cab passageways and compartments shall be illuminated.

Sec.  299.433   Exterior lights.

    (a) Headlights. Each leading end of a trainset shall be equipped 
with two or more headlights.
    (1) Each headlight shall produce 80,000 candela.
    (2) Headlights shall be arranged to illuminate signs in the right-
of-way.
    (3) Headlights shall be recognized 600 m (1,968 feet) ahead of the 
cab car by a driver in another trainset or a maintenance person 
standing in the right-of-way under clear weather conditions.
    (b) Taillights (marking devices). (1) The trailing end of the 
trainset shall be equipped with two red taillights;
    (2) Each taillight shall be located at least 1.2 m (3.9 feet) above 
rail;

[[Page 69762]]

    (3) Each taillight shall be recognizable 200 m (656 feet) ahead of 
the cab car by a driver in another trainset or a maintenance person 
standing in the right-of-way under clear weather conditions;
    (4) Taillights of the trailing end of the trainset shall be on when 
the trainset is in operation;
    (5) Taillights shall not be on in the direction of trainset travel, 
except if the driver shall re-position the trainset in a station. Such 
re-positioning operations shall be done in accordance with the 
railroad's operating rules; and
    (6) In an emergency situation, the headlight on the rear of the 
trainset may serve as the taillights in accordance with the railroad's 
operating rules.

Sec.  299.435   Electrical system design.

    (a) Overhead collector systems. (1) Pantographs shall be so 
arranged that they can be operated from the driver's normal position in 
the cab. Pantographs that automatically rise when released shall have 
an automatic locking device to secure them in the down position.
    (2) Each overhead collector system, including the pantograph, shall 
be equipped with a means to electrically ground any uninsulated parts 
to prevent the risk of electrical shock when working on the system.
    (3) Means shall be provided to permit the driver to determine that 
the pantograph is in its lowest position, and for securing the 
pantograph if necessary, without the need to mount the roof of the 
trainset.
    (4) Each trainset equipped with a pantograph operating on an 
overhead collection system shall also be equipped with a means to 
safely lower the pantograph in the event of an emergency. If an 
emergency pole is used for this purpose, that part of the pole which 
can be safely handled shall be marked to so indicate. This pole shall 
be protected from moisture and damage when not in use. Means of 
securement and electrical isolation of a damaged pantograph, when it 
cannot be performed automatically, shall be addressed in the railroad's 
operating rules.
    (b) Circuit protection. (1) Each auxiliary circuit shall be 
provided with a circuit breaker or equivalent current-limiting devices 
located as near as practicable to the point of connection to the source 
of power for that circuit. Such protection may be omitted from circuits 
controlling safety-critical devices.
    (2) The 25-kV main power line shall be protected with a lightning 
arrestor, automatic circuit breaker, and overload relay. The lightning 
arrestor shall be run by the most direct path possible to ground with a 
connection to ground of not less than No. 6 AWG. These overload 
protection devices shall be housed in an enclosure designed 
specifically for that purpose with the arc chute vented directly to 
outside air.
    (3) Auxiliary power supply (440 VAC), providing power distribution, 
shall be provided with both overload and ground fault protection.
    (c) Main battery system. (1) The main batteries shall be isolated 
from the cab and passenger seating areas by a non-combustible barrier.
    (2) If batteries have the potential to vent explosive gases, the 
batteries shall be adequately ventilated to prevent accumulation of 
explosive concentrations of these gases.
    (3) Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against 
overcharging.
    (4) Battery circuits shall include an emergency battery cut-off 
switch to completely disconnect the energy stored in the batteries from 
the load.
    (d) Capacitors for high-energy storage. (1) Capacitors, if 
provided, shall be isolated from the cab and passenger seating areas by 
a non-combustible barrier.
    (2) Capacitors shall be designed to protect against overcharging 
and overheating.
    (e) Electromagnetic interference (EMI) and electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMC). (1) The railroad shall ensure electromagnetic 
compatibility of the safety-critical equipment systems with their 
environment. Electromagnetic compatibility can be achieved through 
equipment design or changes to the operating environment.
    (2) The electronic equipment shall not produce electrical noise 
that interferes with trainline control and communications or with 
wayside signaling systems.
    (3) To contain electromagnetic interference emissions, suppression 
of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
    (4) Electrical and electronic systems of equipment shall be capable 
of operation in the presence of external electromagnetic noise sources.
    (5) All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage or 
improper operation, or both, due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions. This includes protection 
from both power frequency and harmonic effects as well as protection 
from radio frequency signals into the microwave frequency range.
    (f) Insulation or grounding of metal parts. All unguarded 
noncurrent-carrying metal parts subject to becoming charged shall be 
grounded or thoroughly insulated.
    (g) High voltage markings: doors, cover plates, or barriers. 
External surfaces of all doors, cover plates, or barriers providing 
direct access to high voltage equipment shall be conspicuously and 
legibly marked ``DANGER-HIGH VOLTAGE'' or with the word ``DANGER'' and 
the normal voltage carried by the parts so protected. Labels shall be 
retro-reflective.
    (h) Hand-operated switches. All hand-operated switches carrying 
currents with a potential of more than 150 volts that may be operated 
while under load shall be covered and shall be operative from the 
outside of the cover. Means shall be provided to show whether the 
switches are open or closed. Switches that should not be operated while 
under load shall be conspicuously and legibly marked with the words 
``must not be operated under load'' and the voltage carried.
    (i) Conductors; jumpers; cable connections. (1) Conductor sizes 
shall be selected on the basis of current-carrying capacity, mechanical 
strength, temperature, flexibility requirements, and maximum allowable 
voltage drop. Current-carrying capacity shall be derated for grouping 
and for operating temperature.
    (2) Jumpers and cable connections between trainset units shall be 
located and guarded to provide sufficient vertical clearance. They may 
not hang with one end free.
    (3) Cable and jumper connections between trainset units may not 
have any of the following conditions:
    (i) Broken or badly chafed insulation;
    (ii) Broken plugs, receptacles, terminals, or trainline pins; and
    (iii) Broken or protruding strands of wire.
    (j) Traction motors. All traction motors shall be in proper working 
order, or safely cut-out.

Sec.  299.437   Automated monitoring.

    (a) Each trainset shall be equipped to monitor the performance of 
the following systems or components:
    (1) Reception of cab and trainset control signals;
    (2) Electric brake status;
    (3) Friction brake status;
    (4) Fire detection systems, if so equipped;
    (5) Auxiliary power status;
    (6) Wheelslide;
    (7) On-board bearing-temperature sensors;
    (8) Door open/closed status; and
    (9) Bogie vibration detection.
    (b) When any of the monitored parameters are out of predetermined

[[Page 69763]]

limits, an alert shall be sent immediately to the driver. The 
railroad's operating rules shall control trainset movement when the 
monitored parameters are out of predetermined limits.
    (c) The railroad shall develop appropriate operating rules to 
address driver and equipment performance in the event that the 
automatic monitoring system becomes defective.
    (d) The monitoring system shall be designed with an automatic self-
test feature that notifies the driver that the monitoring capability is 
functioning correctly and alerts the driver when a system failure 
occurs.

Sec.  299.439   Event recorders.

    (a) Duty to equip and record. Each trainset shall be equipped with 
an operative event recorder that monitors and records as a minimum all 
safety data required by paragraph (b) of this section. The event 
recorder shall record the most recent 48 hours of operational data of 
the trainset on which it is installed.
    (b) Equipment requirements. Event recorders shall monitor and 
record data elements or information needed to support the data elements 
required by paragraph (c) of this section. The data shall be recorded 
with at least the accuracy required of the indicators displaying any of 
the required data elements to the driver.
    (c) Data elements. The event recorder shall be equipped with a 
certified crashworthy event recorder memory module that meets the 
requirements of appendix A to this part. The certified event recorder 
memory module shall be mounted for its maximum protection. The event 
recorder shall record, and the certified crashworthy event recorder 
memory module shall retain, the following data elements or information 
needed to support the data elements:
    (1) Trainset speed;
    (2) Selected direction of motion;
    (3) Date and time;
    (4) Distance traveled;
    (5) Throttle position;
    (6) Applications and operations of the trainset brake system, 
including urgent and emergency applications. The system shall record, 
or provide a means of determining, that a brake application or release 
resulted from manipulation of brake controls at the position normally 
occupied by the driver. In the case of a brake application or release 
that is responsive to a command originating from or executed by an on-
board computer (e.g., electronic braking system controller, controlling 
cab electronic control system, or trainset control computer), the 
system shall record, or provide a means of determining, the involvement 
of any such computer;
    (7) Applications and operations of the regenerative brake;
    (8) Cab signal aspect(s);
    (9) Urgent brake application(s);
    (10) Passenger brake alarm request;
    (11) Wheel slip/slide alarm activation (with a property-specific 
minimum duration);
    (12) Trainset number;
    (13) Trainset tractive effort (positive and negative);
    (14) Trainset brake cylinder pressures;
    (15) Cruise control on/off, if so equipped and used;
    (16) Bogie vibration detection;
    (17) Door status opened/closed; and
    (18) Safety-critical trainset control data routed to the 
controlling driver's display with which the driver is required to 
comply, specifically including text messages conveying mandatory 
directives and maximum authorized speed. The specific information 
format, content, and proposed duration for retention of such data shall 
be specified in the PTC Safety Plan submitted for the trainset control 
system under subpart B, subject to FRA approval. If it can be 
calibrated against other data required by this part, such trainset 
control data may, at the election of the railroad, be retained in a 
separate certified crashworthy memory module.
    (d) Response to defective equipment. A trainset on which the event 
recorder has been taken out of service may remain in-service only until 
the next pre-service inspection. A trainset with an inoperative event 
recorder is not deemed to be in improper condition, unsafe to operate, 
or a non-complying trainset under Sec.  299.447.
    (e) Annual tests. (1) The railroad's inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program under subpart G of this part shall require annual 
testing of the event recorder. All testing under this section shall be 
performed at intervals that do not exceed 368 calendar days.
    (2) A microprocessor-based event recorder with a self-monitoring 
feature equipped to verify that all data elements required by this part 
are recorded, requires further maintenance and testing only if either 
of the following conditions exist:
    (i) The self-monitoring feature displays an indication of a 
failure. If a failure is displayed, further maintenance and testing 
must be performed until a subsequent test is successful. When a 
successful test is accomplished, a record, in any medium, shall be made 
of that fact and of any maintenance work necessary to achieve the 
successful result. This record shall be available at the location where 
the trainset is maintained until a record of a subsequent successful 
test is filed; or
    (ii) A download of the event recorder, taken within the preceding 
30 days and reviewed for the previous 48 hours of trainset operation, 
reveals a failure to record a regularly recurring data element or 
reveals that any required data element is not representative of the 
actual operations of the trainset during this time period. If the 
review is not successful, further maintenance and testing shall be 
performed until a subsequent test is successful. When a successful test 
is accomplished, a record, in any medium, shall be made of that fact 
and of any maintenance work necessary to achieve the successful result. 
This record shall be kept at the location where the trainset is 
maintained until a record of a subsequent successful test is filed. The 
download shall be taken from information stored in the certified 
crashworthy crash hardened event recorder memory module.
    (f) Preserving accident data. If any trainset equipped with an 
event recorder, or any other trainset mounted recording device or 
devices designed to record information concerning the functioning of a 
trainset, is involved in an accident/incident that is required to be 
reported to FRA under part 225 of this chapter, the railroad shall, to 
the extent possible, and to the extent consistent with the safety of 
life and property, preserve the data recorded by each such device for 
analysis by FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.11. This preservation 
requirement permits the railroad to extract and analyze such data, 
provided the original downloaded data file, or an unanalyzed exact copy 
of it, shall be retained in secure custody and shall not be utilized 
for analysis or any other purpose except by direction of FRA or the 
National Transportation Safety Board. This preservation requirement 
shall expire one (1) year after the date of the accident/incident 
unless FRA or the Board notifies the railroad in writing that the data 
are desired for analysis.
    (g) Relationship to other laws. Nothing in this section is intended 
to alter the legal authority of law enforcement officials investigating 
potential violation(s) of Federal or State criminal law(s), and nothing 
in this chapter is intended to alter in any way the priority of 
National Transportation Safety Board investigations under 49 U.S.C. 
1131 and 1134, nor the authority of the Secretary of Transportation to 
investigate railroad accidents under 49 U.S.C. 5121, 5122, 20107, 
20111, 20112, 20505, 20702, 20703, and 20902.

[[Page 69764]]

    (h) Disabling event recorders. Any individual who willfully 
disables an event recorder, or who tampers with or alters the data 
recorded by such a device is subject to civil penalty as provided in 
part 218 of this chapter, and to disqualification from performing 
safety-sensitive functions on a railroad under subpart D of part 209 of 
this chapter.

Sec.  299.441   Trainset electronic hardware and software safety.

    (a) Purpose and scope. The requirements of this section apply to 
all safety-critical electronic control systems, subsystems, and 
components on the trainsets, except for on-board signaling and trainset 
control system components that must meet the software safety 
requirements defined in subpart B of this part.
    (b) Applicability. (1) The trainsets shall utilize the service-
proven safety-critical electronic control systems, subsystems, and 
components as used on the N700 to control and monitor safety-critical 
components.
    (2) Any modifications to the existing service-proven safety-
critical electronic control systems, subsystems, and components shall 
be subject to the requirements defined in paragraph (c) of this 
section.
    (i) The railroad shall assure that the suppliers of new or modified 
safety-critical systems, subsystems, and components utilize an industry 
recognized hardware and software development process which is evaluated 
and certified by an independent third-party assessor authorized by the 
industry standard utilized.
    (ii) The railroad shall require that all suppliers submit the 
certifications and audit results as applicable. All such certifications 
shall be made available to FRA upon request.
    (3) Any major upgrades or introduction of new safety-critical 
technology shall be subject to Sec.  299.613(d).
    (c) Electronic hardware and software safety program. The railroad 
shall develop and maintain a written electronic hardware and software 
safety program to guide the design, development, testing, integration, 
and verification of all new or modified safety-critical trainset 
hardware and software.
    (1) Hardware and software safety program description. The hardware 
and software safety program shall include a description of how the 
following will be implemented to ensure safety and reliability:
    (i) The hardware and software design process;
    (ii) The hardware and software design documentation;
    (iii) The hardware and software hazard analysis;
    (iv) Hardware and software safety reviews;
    (v) Hardware and software hazard monitoring and tracking;
    (vi) Hardware and software integration safety testing;
    (vii) Demonstration of overall hardware and software system safety 
as part of the pre-revenue service testing of the equipment; and
    (viii) Safety-critical changes and failures.
    (2) Safety analysis. The hardware and software safety program shall 
be based on a formal safety methodology that includes a FMECA; 
verification and validation testing for all hardware and software 
components and their interfaces; and comprehensive hardware and 
software integration testing to ensure that the hardware and software 
system functions as intended.
    (3) Compliance. The railroad shall comply with the elements of its 
hardware and software safety program that affect the safety of the 
passenger trainset.
    (4) Safety-critical changes and failures. Whenever a planned 
safety-critical design change is made to the safety-critical electronic 
control systems, subsystems and components (the products) that are in 
use by the railroad and subject to this subpart, the railroad shall--
    (i) Notify FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.9 of the design changes 
made by the product supplier;
    (ii) Ensure that the safety analysis required under paragraph 
(c)(2) of this section is updated as required;
    (iii) Conduct all safety-critical changes in a manner that allows 
the change to be audited;
    (iv) Document all arrangements with suppliers for notification of 
all electronic safety-critical changes as well as safety-critical 
failures in the supplier's system, subsystem, or components, and the 
reasons for that change or failure from the suppliers, whether or not 
the railroad has experienced a failure of that safety-critical system, 
sub-system, or component;
    (v) Specify the railroad's procedures for action upon receipt of 
notification of a safety-critical change or failure of an electronic 
system, sub-system, or component, and until the upgrade or revision has 
been installed;
    (vi) Identify all configuration/revision control measures designed 
to ensure that safety-functional requirements and safety-critical 
hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any such 
change, and that any such change can be audited;
    (vii) Require suppliers to provide notification of all electronic 
safety-critical changes as well as safety-critical failures in the 
supplier's system, subsystem, or components;
    (ix) Document all arrangements with suppliers for notification of 
any and all electronic safety-critical changes as well as safety-
critical failures in the supplier's system, subsystem, or components.
    (d) Specific requirements. Hardware and software that controls or 
monitors a trainset's primary braking system shall either--
    (1) Fail safely by initiating an emergency or urgent brake 
application in the event of a hardware or software failure that could 
impair the ability of the driver to apply or release the brakes; or
    (2) Provide the driver access to direct manual control of the 
primary braking system (emergency or urgent braking).
    (e) Inspection, testing, and maintenance records. The inspection, 
testing, and maintenance conducted by the railroad in accordance with 
Sec.  299.445 shall be recorded in hardcopy or stored electronically. 
Electronic recordkeeping or automated tracking systems, subject to the 
provisions contained in Sec.  299.11, may be utilized to store and 
maintain any testing or training record required by this subpart. 
Results of product testing conducted by a vendor in support of a safety 
analysis shall be provided to and recorded by the railroad.
    (1) The testing records shall contain all of the following:
    (i) The name of the railroad;
    (ii) The location and date that the test was conducted;
    (iii) The equipment tested;
    (iv) The results of tests;
    (v) The repairs or replacement of equipment;
    (vi) Any preventative adjustments made; and
    (vii) The condition in which the equipment is left.
    (2) Each record shall be--
    (i) Signed by the employee conducting the test, or electronically 
coded, or identified by the automated test equipment number;
    (ii) Filed in the office of a supervisory official having 
jurisdiction, unless otherwise noted; and
    (iii) Available for inspection and copying by FRA.
    (3) The results of the testing conducted in accordance with this 
section shall be retained as follows:
    (i) The results of tests that pertain to installation or 
modification of a product

[[Page 69765]]

shall be retained for the life-cycle of the product tested and may be 
kept in any office designated by the railroad;
    (ii) The results of periodic tests required for the maintenance or 
repair of the product tested shall be retained until the next record is 
filed and in no case less than one year; and
    (iii) The results of all other tests and training shall be retained 
until the next record is filed and in no case less than one year.
    (f) Review of safety analysis. (1) Prior to the initial planned use 
of a new product as defined by paragraphs (b)(2) or (3) of this 
section, the railroad shall notify FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.9 
of the intent to place this product in service. The notification shall 
provide a description of the product, and identify the location where 
the complete safety analysis documentation and the testing are 
maintained.
    (2) The railroad shall maintain and make available to FRA upon 
request all railroad or vendor documentation used to demonstrate that 
the product meets the safety requirements of the safety analysis for 
the life-cycle of the product.
    (g) Hazard tracking. After a new product is placed in service in 
accordance with paragraphs (b)(2) or (3) of this section, the railroad 
shall maintain a database of all safety-relevant hazards encountered 
with the product. The database shall include all hazards identified in 
the safety analysis and those that had not been previously identified 
in the safety analysis. If the frequency of the safety-relevant hazards 
exceeds the threshold set forth in the safety analysis, then the 
railroad shall--
    (1) Report the inconsistency to the Associate Administrator, within 
15 days of discovery in accordance with Sec.  299.9;
    (2) Take immediate countermeasures to reduce the frequency of the 
safety-relevant hazard(s) below the threshold set forth in the safety 
analysis;
    (3) Provide a final report to the Associate Administrator, on the 
results of the analysis and countermeasures taken to mitigate the 
hazard to meet the threshold set forth in the safety analysis when the 
problem is resolved. For hazards not identified in the safety analysis 
the threshold shall be exceeded at one occurrence; and
    (4) Electronic or automated tracking systems used to meet the 
requirements contained in paragraph (g) of this section shall be in 
accordance with Sec.  299.11.
    (h) Operations and maintenance manual. The railroad shall maintain 
all supplier or vendor documents pertaining to the operation, 
installation, maintenance, repair, modification, inspection, and 
testing of the safety-critical electronic control systems, subsystems 
and components.
    (i) Training and qualification program. Under Sec.  299.13(c)(3), 
the railroad shall establish and implement a training and qualification 
program for the safety-critical electronic control systems, subsystems, 
and components subject to subpart G of this part prior to the safety-
critical electronic control systems, subsystems, and components being 
placed in use.
    (j) Operating personnel training. The training program required by 
Sec.  299.13(c)(3) for any driver or other person who participates in 
the operation of a trainset using the safety-critical electronic 
control systems, subsystems and components shall address all the 
following elements:
    (1) Familiarization with the electronic control system equipment 
on-board the trainset and the functioning of that equipment as part of 
the system and in relation to other on-board systems under that 
person's control;
    (2) Any actions required of the operating personnel to enable or 
enter data into the system and the role of that function in the safe 
operation of the trainset;
    (3) Sequencing of interventions by the system, including 
notification, enforcement, and recovery from the enforcement as 
applicable;
    (4) Railroad operating rules applicable to control systems, 
including provisions for movement and protection of any unequipped 
passenger equipment, or passenger equipment with failed or cut-out 
controls;
    (5) Means to detect deviations from proper functioning of on-board 
electronic control system equipment and instructions explaining the 
proper response to be taken regarding control of the trainset and 
notification of designated railroad personnel; and
    (6) Information needed to prevent unintentional interference with 
the proper functioning of on-board electronic control equipment.

Sec.  299.443   Safety appliances.

    (a) Couplers. (1) The leading and trailing ends of each trainset 
shall be equipped with an automatic rescue coupler that couples on 
impact.
    (i) Uncoupling of the rescue coupler shall be done only at a 
trainset maintenance facility or other location where personnel can 
safely get under or between units.
    (ii) The leading and the trailing ends of a trainset are not 
required to be equipped with sill steps or end or side handholds.
    (2) The leading and trailing end couplers and uncoupling devices 
may be stored within a removable shrouded housing.
    (3) Leading and trailing automatic couplers of trainsets shall be 
compatible with the railroad's rescue vehicles. A coupler adaptor can 
be used to meet this requirement.
    (4) The railroad shall develop and implement rescue procedures that 
assure employee safety during rescue operations and shall be contained 
in the railroad's operating rules.
    (5) Each unit within a trainset shall be semi-permanently coupled 
and shall only be uncoupled at a trainset maintenance facility or other 
locations identified by the railroad where the protections afforded in 
subpart B of part 218 of this chapter can be applied.
    (6) The ends of units in a trainset that are semi-permanently 
coupled are not required to be equipped with automatic couplers, sill 
steps, end handholds or side handholds.
    (b) Crew access. (1) Each trainset shall provide a minimum of two 
(2) locations per side, where crew members can board or disembark the 
trainset safely from ground level.
    (2) Each location used for crew access shall be equipped with 
retractable stairs with handrails designed for safe access to the 
trainset from ground level.

Sec.  299.445   Trainset inspection, testing, and maintenance 
requirements.

    (a) General. (1) The railroad shall develop a written inspection 
program for the rolling stock, in accordance with and approved under 
the requirements of Sec.  299.713. As further specified in this 
section, the program shall describe in detail the procedures, 
equipment, and other means necessary for the safe operation of the 
passenger equipment, including all inspections set forth in paragraph 
(e) of this section. This information shall include a detailed 
description of the methods of ensuring accurate records of required 
inspections.
    (2) The initial inspection, testing, and maintenance program 
submitted under Sec.  299.713 shall, as a minimum, address the specific 
safety inspections contained in paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this 
section. The railroad may submit the procedures detailing the bogie 
inspections or general overhaul requirements contained in paragraph 
(e)(3) and (4) of this section, respectively, at a later date than the 
initial inspection, testing, and maintenance program, but not less than 
180 days prior to the scheduled date of the first bogie inspection or 
general overhaul.
    (b) Identification of safety-critical items. In addition to safety 
critical items identified under Sec.  299.711(b), on-board

[[Page 69766]]

emergency equipment, emergency back-up systems, trainset exits and 
trainset safety-critical hardware and software systems in accordance 
with Sec.  299.441 shall be deemed safety-critical.
    (c) Compliance. The railroad shall adopt and comply with the 
approved inspection, testing, and maintenance program in accordance 
with Sec.  299.703.
    (d) General condition. The inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program shall ensure that all systems and components of the equipment 
are free of conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, 
passengers, or equipment. These conditions include, but are not limited 
to the following:
    (1) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease;
    (2) Improper functioning of a component;
    (3) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect, or weakness 
of a component;
    (4) A leak;
    (5) Use of a component or system under conditions that exceed those 
for which the component or system is designed to operate; and
    (6) Insecure attachment of a component.
    (e) Specific safety inspections. The program under paragraph (a) of 
this section shall specify that all passenger trainsets shall receive 
thorough safety inspections by qualified individuals designated by the 
railroad at regular intervals. At a minimum, and in addition to the 
annual tests required for event recorder under Sec.  299.439(e), the 
following shall be performed on each trainset:
    (1) Pre-service inspections. (i) Each trainset in use shall be 
inspected at least once every two calendar days by qualified 
individuals at a location where there is a repair pit and access to the 
top of the trainset. The inspection shall verify the correct operation 
of on-board safety systems defined in the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program. If any of the conditions defined as safety-
critical in paragraph (b) of this section and Sec.  299.711(b) are 
found during this inspection, the trainset shall not be put into 
service until that condition is rectified. The pre-service inspection 
shall include the following:
    (A) Functional tests to determine the status of application and 
release of the service, emergency, and urgent air brakes using the 
monitoring system;
    (B) Operational tests of the exterior doors; and
    (C) A review of the log of on-board ATC equipment.
    (ii) If the existence of any safety-critical conditions cannot be 
determined by use of an automated monitoring system, the railroad shall 
perform a visual inspection to determine if the condition exists.
    (2) Regular inspections. The railroad shall perform a regular 
inspection on all trainsets in accordance with the test procedures and 
inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) of this section and at 
the intervals defined by paragraph (f) of this section. If any of the 
conditions defined as safety-critical in paragraph (b) of this section 
and Sec.  299.711(b) are found during this inspection, the trainset 
shall not be put into service until that condition is rectified.
    (3) Bogie inspections. The railroad shall perform a bogie 
inspection on all trainsets in accordance with the test procedures and 
inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) of this section and at 
the intervals defined by paragraph (f) of this section. If any of the 
conditions defined as safety-critical in paragraph (b) of this section 
and Sec.  299.711(b) are found during this inspection, the trainset 
shall not be put into service until that condition is rectified.
    (4) General overhaul. The railroad shall perform a general overhaul 
on all trainsets in accordance with the test procedures and inspection 
criteria established in paragraph (a) of this section and at the 
intervals defined by paragraph (f) of this section. If any of the 
conditions defined as safety-critical in paragraph (b) of this section 
and Sec.  299.711(b) are found during this inspection, the trainset 
shall not be put into service until that condition is rectified.
    (f) Maintenance intervals. The railroad's program established 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall include the railroad's 
scheduled maintenance intervals for all specific safety inspections in 
paragraph (e) of this section, as required by Sec.  299.707.
    (g) Training and qualification program. The railroad shall 
establish a training and qualification program as defined in Sec.  
299.13(c)(3) to qualify individuals to perform inspections, testing, 
and maintenance on the equipment. Only qualified individuals shall 
perform inspections, testing, and maintenance of the equipment.
    (h) Reporting and tracking of repairs to defective trainsets. The 
railroad shall have in place prior to start of operations a reporting 
and tracking system for passenger trainsets with a defect not in 
conformance with this subpart. The reporting and tracking system shall 
record the following information:
    (1) The identification number of the defective unit within a 
trainset, and trainset identification number;
    (2) The date the defect was discovered;
    (3) The nature of the defect;
    (4) The determination made by a qualified individual whether the 
equipment is safe to run;
    (5) The name of the qualified individual making such a 
determination;
    (6) Any operating restrictions placed on the equipment; and
    (7) Repairs made and the date that they were completed.
    (i) Retention of records. At a minimum, the railroad shall keep the 
records described in paragraph (j) of each required inspection under 
this section in accordance with Sec.  299.11. Each record shall be 
maintained for at least one year from the date of the inspection.
    (j) Availability of records. The railroad shall make defect 
reporting and tracking records available to FRA upon request.
    (k) Brake system repair points. The railroad shall designate brake 
system repair points in the inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program required by paragraph (a) of this section. No trainset shall 
depart a brake system repair point unless that trainset has a 100 
percent operational brake system.

Sec.  299.447   Movement of defective equipment.

    (a) A trainset with one or more conditions not in compliance with 
the list of safety critical defects identified in accordance with Sec.  
299.445(b) during a pre-service inspection required by Sec.  
299.445(e)(1) shall not be moved in revenue service and shall only be 
moved in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, and after 
departure in compliance with the pre-service inspection required by 
Sec.  299.445(e)(1), a trainset with one or more conditions not in 
compliance with the list of safety critical defects identified in 
accordance with Sec. Sec.  299.445(b) and 299.711(b) may be moved in 
revenue service only after the railroad has complied with all of the 
following:
    (1) A qualified individual determines that it is safe to move the 
trainset, consistent with the railroad's operating rules;
    (i) If appropriate, these determinations may be made based upon a 
description of the defective condition provided by a crewmember.
    (ii) If the determinations required by this paragraph are made by 
an off-site qualified individual based on a description of the 
defective condition by on-site personnel, then a qualified individual 
shall perform a physical

[[Page 69767]]

inspection of the defective equipment, at the first location possible, 
in accordance with the railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program and operating rules, to verify the description of the defect 
provided by the on-site personnel.
    (2) The qualified individual who made the determination in 
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, notifies the driver in charge of 
movement of the trainset, in accordance with the railroad's operating 
rules, of the maximum authorized speed, authorized destination, and any 
other operational restrictions that apply to the movement of the non-
compliant trainset. This notification may be achieved through the tag 
required by paragraph (b)(3) of this section; and
    (3) A tag bearing the words ``non-complying trainset'' and 
containing the following information, are securely attached to the 
control stand on each control cab of the trainset:
    (i) The trainset number and unit or car number;
    (ii) The name of the qualified individual making the determination 
in paragraph (b)(1) of this section;
    (iii) The location and date of the inspection that led to the 
discovery of the non-compliant item;
    (iv) A description of each defect;
    (v) Movement restrictions, if any;
    (vi) The authorized destination of the trainset; and
    (vii) The signature, if possible, as well as the job title and 
location of the person making the determinations required by this 
section.
    (4) Automated tracking systems used to meet the tagging 
requirements contained in paragraph (b)(3) of this section may be 
reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to ensure the integrity of 
the system. FRA's Associate Administrator may prohibit or revoke the 
railroad's ability to utilize an automated tracking system in lieu of 
tagging if FRA finds that the automated tracking system is not properly 
secure, is inaccessible to FRA or the railroad's employees, or fails to 
track or monitor the movement of defective equipment adequately. Such a 
determination will be made in writing and will state the basis for such 
action.
    (c) A trainset that develops a non-complying condition in service 
may continue in revenue service, so long as the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section are otherwise fully met, until the next 
pre-service inspection.
    (d) In the event of an in-service failure of the braking system, 
the trainset may proceed in accordance with the railroad's operating 
rules relating to the percentage of operative brakes and at a speed no 
greater than the maximum authorized speed as determined by Sec.  
299.409(f)(4) so long as the requirements of paragraph (b) of this 
section are otherwise fully met, until the next pre-service inspection.
    (e) A non-complying trainset may be moved without passengers within 
a trainset maintenance facility, at speeds not to exceed 16 km/h (10 
mph), without meeting the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section 
where the movement is solely for the purpose of repair. The railroad 
shall ensure that the movement is made safely.
    (f) Nothing in this section authorizes the movement of equipment 
subject to a Special Notice for Repair under part 216 of this chapter 
unless the movement is made in accordance with the restrictions 
contained in the Special Notice.

Subpart E--Operating Rules

Sec.  299.501   Purpose.

    Through the requirements of this subpart, FRA learns the condition 
of the operating rules and practices in use by the railroad. The rules 
and practices covered by this subpart include the procedures for 
instruction and testing of all employees involved with the movement of 
rail vehicles, including drivers, on-board attendants, station platform 
attendants, general control center staff, and all maintenance staff, 
which are necessary to ensure that they possess the requisite skill and 
knowledge of the rules and operating practices to maintain the safety 
of the system.

Sec.  299.503   Operating rules; filing and recordkeeping.

    (a) Prior to commencing operations, the railroad shall develop a 
code of operating rules, timetables, and timetable special 
instructions. The initial code of operating rules, timetables, and 
timetable special instructions shall be based on practices and 
procedures proven on the Tokaido Shinkansen system.
    (b) The railroad shall keep one copy of its current code of 
operating rules, timetables, timetable special instruction, at its 
system headquarters, and shall make them available to FRA for 
inspection and copying during normal business hours. If the railroad 
elects to maintain an electronic record, the railroad must satisfy the 
conditions listed in Sec.  299.11.

Sec.  299.505   Programs of operational tests and inspections; 
recordkeeping.

    (a) Requirement to conduct operational tests and inspections. The 
railroad shall periodically conduct operational tests and inspections 
to determine the extent of employee knowledge, application, and 
compliance with its code of operating rules, timetables, and timetable 
special instructions in accordance with a written program retained at 
its system headquarters.
    (b) Railroad and railroad testing officer responsibilities. (1) 
Each railroad officer who conducts operational tests and inspections 
(railroad testing officer) shall--
    (i) Be qualified on the railroad's operating rules in accordance 
with Sec.  299.507;
    (ii) Be qualified on the operational testing and inspection program 
requirements and procedures relevant to the testing and inspections the 
officer will conduct;
    (iii) Receive appropriate field training, as necessary to achieve 
proficiency, on each operational test or inspection that the officer is 
authorized to conduct; and
    (iv) Conduct operational tests and inspections in accordance with 
the railroad's program of operational tests and inspections.
    (2) The railroad shall maintain a record documenting qualification 
of each railroad testing officer. The record shall be retained by the 
railroad and shall be made available to representatives of the FRA for 
inspection and copying during normal business hours. If the railroad 
elects to maintain an electronic record, the railroad must satisfy the 
conditions listed in Sec.  299.11.
    (c) Written program of operational tests and inspections. Within 30 
days of commencing operations, the railroad shall have a written 
program of operational tests and inspections in effect. The railroad 
shall maintain one copy of its current program for periodic performance 
of the operational tests and inspections required by paragraph (a) of 
this section, and shall maintain one copy of each subsequent amendment 
to the program as amendments are made. These records shall be retained 
at the system headquarters of the railroad for three calendar years 
after the end of the calendar year to which they relate. These records 
shall be made available to representatives of the FRA for inspection 
and copying during normal business hours. The program shall--
    (1) Provide for operational testing and inspection under the 
various operating conditions on the railroad;
    (2) Describe each type of operational test and inspection adopted, 
including the means and procedures used to carry it out;
    (3) State the purpose of each type of operational test and 
inspection;

[[Page 69768]]

    (4) State the frequency with which each type of operational test 
and inspection is conducted;
    (5) The program shall address with particular emphasis those 
operating rules that cause or are likely to cause the most accidents or 
incidents, such as those accidents or incidents identified in the six-
month reviews and the annual summaries as required under paragraphs (e) 
and (f) of this section;
    (6) Identify the officer(s) by name and job title responsible for 
ensuring that the program of operational tests and inspections is 
properly implemented and is responsible for overseeing the entire 
program. The responsibilities of such officer(s) shall include, but not 
be limited to, ensuring that the railroad's testing officers are 
directing their efforts in an appropriate manner to reduce accidents/
incidents and that all required reviews and summaries are completed; 
and
    (7) Include a schedule for making the program fully operative 
within 210 days after it begins.
    (d) Records. (1) The railroad shall keep a written or electronic 
record of the date, time, place, and result of each operational test 
and inspection that was performed in accordance with its program. Each 
record shall specify the officer administering the test and inspection 
and each employee tested. These records shall be retained at the system 
headquarters of the railroad for one calendar year after the end of the 
calendar year to which they relate. These records shall be made 
available to representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours.
    (2) The railroad shall retain one copy of its current program for 
periodic performance of the operational tests and inspections required 
by paragraph (a) of this section and one copy of each subsequent 
amendment to such program. These records shall be retained for three 
calendar years after the end of the calendar year to which they relate 
at the system headquarters where the tests and inspections are 
conducted. These records shall be made available to representatives of 
the FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours.
    (e) Reviews of tests and inspections and adjustments to the program 
of operational tests--(1) Reviews by the railroad. Not less than once 
every 180 days the railroad's designated officer(s) shall conduct 
periodic reviews and analyses as provided in this paragraph and shall 
retain, at its system headquarters, one copy of the reviews. Each such 
review shall be completed within 30 days of the close of the period. 
The designated officer(s) shall conduct a written review of--
    (i) The operational testing and inspection data for the system to 
determine compliance by the railroad testing officers with its program 
of operational tests and inspections required by paragraph (c) of this 
section. At a minimum, this review shall include the name of each 
railroad testing officer, the number of tests and inspections conducted 
by each officer, and whether the officer conducted the minimum number 
of each type of test or inspection required by the railroad's program;
    (ii) Accident/incident data, the results of prior operational tests 
and inspections, and other pertinent safety data for the system to 
identify the relevant operating rules related to those accidents/
incidents that occurred during the period. Based upon the results of 
that review, the designated officer(s) shall make any necessary 
adjustments to the tests and inspections required of railroad officers 
for the subsequent period(s); and
    (iii) Implementation of the program of operational tests and 
inspections from a system perspective, to ensure that it is being 
utilized as intended, that the other reviews provided for in this 
paragraph have been properly completed, that appropriate adjustments 
have been made to the distribution of tests and inspections required, 
and that the railroad testing officers are appropriately directing 
their efforts.
    (2) Records retention. The records of reviews required in 
paragraphs (e)(1) of this section shall be retained for a period of one 
year after the end of the calendar year to which they relate and shall 
be made available to representatives of FRA for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours.
    (f) Annual summary on operational tests and inspections. Before 
March 1 of each calendar year, the railroad shall retain, at its system 
headquarters, one copy of a written summary of the following with 
respect to its previous year's activities: The number, type, and result 
of each operational test and inspection that was conducted as required 
by paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section. These records shall be 
retained for three calendar years after the end of the calendar year to 
which they relate and shall be made available to representatives of FRA 
for inspection and copying during normal business hours.
    (g) Electronic recordkeeping. Nothing in this section precludes the 
railroad from maintaining the information required to be retained under 
this part in an electronic format provided that the railroad satisfy 
the conditions listed in Sec.  299.11.
    (h) Disapproval of program. Upon review of the program of 
operational tests and inspections required by this section, the 
Associate Administrator for Safety may, for cause stated, disapprove 
the program in whole or in part. Notification of such disapproval shall 
be made in writing and specify the basis for the disapproval decision. 
If the Associate Administrator for Safety disapproves the program--
    (1) The railroad has 35 days from the date of the written 
notification of such disapproval to--
    (i) Amend its program; or
    (ii) Provide a written response in support of the program to the 
Associate Administrator for Safety. If the Associate Administrator for 
Safety still disapproves the program in whole or in part after 
receiving the railroad's written response, the railroad shall amend its 
program.
    (2) A failure to adequately amend the program will be considered a 
failure to implement a program under this subpart.

Sec.  299.507   Program of instruction on operating rules; 
recordkeeping.

    (a) To ensure that each railroad employee whose activities are 
governed by the railroad's operating rules understands those rules, the 
railroad periodically shall instruct each such employee on the meaning 
and application of its operating rules with a written program developed 
under Sec.  299.13(c)(3) and retained at its system headquarters.
    (b) Prior to commencing operations, the railroad shall file and 
retain one copy of its current program for the periodic instruction of 
its employees as required by paragraph (a) of this section and shall 
file and retain one copy of any amendment to that program as amendments 
are made. These records shall be retained at the railroad's system 
headquarters for one calendar year after the end of the calendar year 
to which they relate. These records shall be made available to 
representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying during normal 
business hours. This program shall--
    (1) Describe the means and procedures used for instruction of the 
various classes of affected employees;
    (2) State the frequency of instruction and the basis for 
determining that frequency;
    (3) Include a schedule for completing the initial instruction of 
employees who are already employed when the program begins;

[[Page 69769]]

    (4) Begin on the date of commencing operations; and
    (5) Provide for initial instruction of each employee hired after 
the program begins.
    (c) The railroad is authorized to retain by electronic 
recordkeeping its program for periodic instruction of its employees on 
operating rules, provided that the requirements stated in Sec.  299.11 
are satisfied.

Subpart F--System Qualification Tests

Sec.  299.601   Responsibility for verification demonstrations and 
tests.

    The railroad shall comply with the pre-revenue qualification tests 
and verification requirements set forth in this subpart to demonstrate 
the overall safety of the system, prior to revenue operations.

Sec.  299.603   Preparation of system-wide qualification test plan.

    (a) Prior to execution of any tests as defined in this subpart, the 
railroad shall develop a system-wide qualification test plan, that 
identifies the tests that will be carried out, to demonstrate the 
operability of all system elements, including track and infrastructure, 
signal and trainset control system, communications, rolling stock, 
software, and operating practices, and the system as a whole.
    (b) The system-wide qualification test plan shall be submitted to 
FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.9 for review at least 180 days prior 
to testing. FRA shall notify the railroad, in writing, within 45 days 
of receipt of the railroad's submission, and identify any deficiencies 
in the test plan. FRA will notify the railroad of any procedures to be 
submitted for review. The plan shall include the following:
    (1) A list of all tests to be conducted;
    (2) A summary statement of the test objectives;
    (3) A planned schedule for conducting the tests which indicates the 
sequence of testing and interdependencies; and
    (4) The approach taken for--
    (i) Verifying results of installation tests performed by 
contractors and manufacturers;
    (ii) Functional and performance qualification testing of individual 
safety-related equipment, facilities, and subsystems in accordance with 
Sec.  299.605;
    (iii) Pre-revenue service system integration testing of the system 
per Sec.  299.607, that includes vehicle/track system qualification 
testing per Sec.  299.609;
    (iv) Simulated revenue operations of the system per Sec.  299.611;
    (v) Compliance with operating rules as per subpart E of this part;
    (vi) Training and qualification of all personnel involved in the 
test program to conduct tests safely and in accordance with operating 
rules;
    (vii) Verification of all emergency preparedness procedures; and
    (viii) Field testing of the railroad's uncertified PTC system and 
regression testing of its FRA-certified PTC system, under Sec.  
299.201.
    (c) The railroad shall adopt and comply with the system-wide 
qualification test plan, including completion of all tests required by 
the plan.
    (d) After FRA review of the system-wide test plan, detailed test 
procedures as required by paragraph (b) of this section shall be 
submitted 15 days prior to testing to FRA in accordance with Sec.  
299.9 for review.
    (e) Each test procedure shall include the following elements:
    (1) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal 
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the railroad's system 
meets the safety design and performance requirements specified in this 
part when operated in the environment in which it will be used;
    (2) Any special safety precautions to be observed during the 
testing;
    (3) A description of the railroad property or facilities to be used 
to conduct the tests;
    (4) Prerequisites for conducting each test;
    (5) A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted. 
This description shall include--
    (i) An identification of the systems and equipment to be tested;
    (ii) The method by which the systems and equipment shall be tested;
    (iii) The instrumentation to be used and calibration procedures;
    (iv) The means by which the test results will be recorded, analyzed 
and reported to FRA;
    (v) A description of the information or data to be obtained;
    (vi) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be 
analyzed or used;
    (vii) A description of any criteria to be used as safety limits 
during the testing;
    (viii) The criteria to be used to evaluate performance of the 
systems and equipment. If system qualification is to be based on 
extrapolation of less than full-level testing results, the analysis 
done to justify the validity of the extrapolation shall be described; 
and
    (ix) Inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures to be followed 
to ensure that testing is conducted safely.
    (f) The railroad shall provide FRA notice at least 30 days in 
advance of the times and places of any domestic testing and notice at 
least 90 days in advance for testing not conducted domestically to 
permit FRA observation of such tests.

Sec.  299.605   Functional and performance qualification tests.

    The railroad shall conduct functional and performance qualification 
tests, prior to commencing revenue operations, to verify that all 
safety-critical components meet all functional and all performance 
specifications.

Sec.  299.607   Pre-revenue service system integration testing.

    (a) Prior to commencing revenue operations, the railroad shall 
conduct tests of the trainsets throughout the system to--
    (1) Verify mechanical positioning of the overhead catenary system; 
and
    (2) Verify performance of the trainset, track, and signal and 
trainset control systems.
    (b) The railroad shall demonstrate safe operation of the system 
during normal and degraded-mode operating conditions. At a minimum, the 
following operation tests shall be performed:
    (1) Slow-speed operation of a trainset;
    (2) Verification of correct overhead catenary and pantograph 
interaction;
    (3) Verification of trainset clearance at structures and passenger 
platforms;
    (4) Incremental increase of trainset speed;
    (5) Performance tests on trainsets to verify braking rates in 
accordance with Sec.  299.409;
    (6) Verification of vehicle noise;
    (7) Verification of correct vehicle suspension characteristics;
    (8) Vehicle/track system qualification as defined in Sec.  299.609;
    (9) Load tests with vehicles to verify relay settings and signal 
and communication system immunization;
    (10) Monitoring of utility supply circuits and telephone circuits 
to ensure the adequacy of power supplies, and to verify that transient-
related disturbances are within acceptable limits;
    (11) Verification of vehicle detection due to shunting of signal 
system circuits;
    (12) Verification of safe operation of the signal and trainset 
control system as required by subpart B of this part;
    (13) Tests of trainset radio reception during system-wide vehicle 
operation; and
    (14) Verification of electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic 
compatibility between various subsystems.

[[Page 69770]]

Sec.  299.609   Vehicle/track system qualification.

    (a) General. All vehicles types intended to operate in revenue 
service shall be qualified for operation in accordance with this 
subpart. A qualification program shall be used to demonstrate that the 
vehicle/track system will not exceed the wheel/rail force safety 
limits, and the carbody and bogie acceleration criteria specified in 
paragraph (h) of this section--
    (1) At any speed up to and including 10 km/h (6 mph) above the 
proposed maximum operating speed; and
    (2) On track meeting the requirements for the class of track 
associated with the proposed maximum operating speed as defined in 
Sec.  299.309. For purposes of qualification testing, speeds may exceed 
the maximum allowable operating speed for the class of track in 
accordance with the test plan approved by FRA.
    (b) New vehicle/track system qualification. Vehicle types not 
previously qualified under this subpart shall be qualified in 
accordance with the requirements of this paragraph (b).
    (1) Carbody acceleration. For vehicle types intended to operate in 
revenue service at track class H4 speeds or above, qualification 
testing conducted over a representative segment of the route shall 
demonstrate that the vehicle type will not exceed the carbody lateral 
and vertical acceleration safety limits specified in paragraph (h) of 
this section.
    (2) Bogie lateral acceleration. For vehicle types intended to 
operate at track class H4 speeds or above, qualification testing 
conducted over a representative segment of the route shall demonstrate 
that the vehicle type will not exceed the bogie lateral acceleration 
safety limit specified in paragraph (h) of this section.
    (3) Measurement of wheel/rail forces. For vehicle types intended to 
operate at track class H4 speeds or above, qualification testing 
conducted over a representative segment of the route shall demonstrate 
that the vehicle type will not exceed the wheel/rail force safety 
limits specified in paragraph (h) of this section.
    (c) Previously qualified vehicle/track system. Vehicle/track 
systems previously qualified under this subpart for a track class and 
cant deficiency on one route may be qualified for operation at the same 
class and cant deficiency on another route through testing to 
demonstrate compliance with paragraph (a) of this section in accordance 
with the following:
    (1) Carbody acceleration. For vehicle types intended to operate at 
track class H4 speeds and above, qualification testing conducted over a 
representative segment of the new route shall demonstrate that the 
vehicle type will not exceed the carbody lateral and vertical 
acceleration safety limits specified in paragraph (h) of this section.
    (2) Bogie lateral acceleration. For vehicle types intended to 
operate at track class H4 speeds or above, measurement of bogie lateral 
acceleration during qualification testing shall demonstrate that the 
vehicle type will not exceed the bogie lateral acceleration safety 
limit specified in paragraph (h) of this section. Measurement of bogie 
lateral acceleration, if conducted, shall be performed over a 
representative segment of the new route.
    (d) Vehicle/track system qualification testing plan. To obtain the 
data required to support the qualification program outlined in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, the railroad shall submit a 
qualification testing plan as required by Sec.  299.603(b) at least 60 
days prior to testing, requesting approval to conduct the testing at 
the desired speeds and cant deficiencies. This test plan shall provide 
for a test program sufficient to evaluate the operating limits of the 
track and vehicle type and shall include--
    (1) Identification of the representative segment of the route for 
qualification testing;
    (2) Consideration of the operating environment during qualification 
testing, including operating practices and conditions, the signal 
system, and trainset on adjacent tracks;
    (3) The maximum angle found on the gauge face of the designed 
(newly-profiled) wheel flange referenced with respect to the axis of 
the wheelset that will be used for the determination of the Single 
Wheel L/V Ratio safety limit specified in paragraph (h) of this 
section; and
    (4) A target maximum testing speed in accordance with paragraph (a) 
of this section and the maximum testing cant deficiency.
    (e) Qualification testing. Upon FRA approval of the vehicle/track 
system qualification testing plan, qualification testing shall be 
conducted in two sequential stages as required in this subpart.
    (1) Stage-one testing shall include demonstration of acceptable 
vehicle dynamic response of the subject vehicle as speeds are 
incrementally increased--
    (i) On a segment of tangent track, from acceptable track class H4 
speeds to the target maximum test speed; and
    (ii) On a segment of curved track, from the speeds corresponding to 
76 mm (3 inches) of cant deficiency to the maximum testing cant 
deficiency.
    (2) When stage-one testing has successfully demonstrated a maximum 
safe operating speed and cant deficiency, stage-two testing shall 
commence with the subject equipment over a representative segment of 
the route as identified in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
    (i) A test run shall be conducted over the route segment at the 
speed the railroad will request FRA to approve for such service.
    (ii) An additional test run shall be conducted at 10 km/h (6 mph) 
above this speed.
    (3) When conducting stage-one and stage-two testing, if any of the 
monitored safety limits are exceeded on any segment of track, testing 
may continue provided that the track location(s) where any of the 
limits are exceeded be identified and test speeds be limited at the 
track location(s) until corrective action is taken. Corrective action 
may include making adjustments to the track, to the vehicle, or to both 
of these system components.
    (4) Prior to the start of the qualification testing program, a 
qualifying Track Geometry Measurement System (TGMS) shall be operated 
over the intended route within 30 calendar days prior to the start of 
the qualification testing program to verify compliance with the track 
geometry limits specified in Sec.  299.311.
    (f) Qualification testing results. The railroad shall submit a 
report to FRA detailing all the results of the qualification program in 
accordance with Sec.  299.613. The report shall be submitted at least 
60 days prior to the intended operation of the equipment in revenue 
service over the route.
    (g) Cant deficiency. Based on the test results and all other 
required submissions, FRA will approve a maximum trainset speed and 
value of cant deficiency for revenue service, normally within 45 days 
of receipt of all the required information. FRA may impose conditions 
necessary for safely operating at the maximum approved trainset speed 
and cant deficiency.
    (h) Vehicle/track interaction regulatory limits. The following 
vehicle/track interaction regulatory limits shall not be exceeded 
during qualification testing in accordance with this section.
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Sec.  299.611   Simulated revenue operations.

    (a) The railroad shall conduct simulated revenue operations for a 
minimum period of two weeks prior to revenue operations to verify 
overall system performance, and provide operating and maintenance 
experience.
    (b) The railroad shall maintain a log of tests conducted during the 
simulated revenue operations period. This log of tests shall identify 
any problems encountered during testing, and actions necessary to 
correct defects in workmanship, materials, equipment, design, or 
operating parameters.
    (c) The railroad shall implement all actions necessary to correct 
safety defects, as identified by the log prior to the initiation of 
revenue service.

Sec.  299.613   Verification of compliance.

    (a) The railroad shall prepare a report detailing the results of 
functional and performance qualification tests, pre-revenue service 
system integration testing, and vehicle/track system qualification 
tests required under Sec. Sec.  299.605, 299.607, and 299.609 
respectively. The report shall identify any problems encountered during 
testing, and alternative actions necessary to correct defects in 
workmanship, materials, equipment, design, or operating parameters.
    (b) The railroad shall implement all actions necessary to correct 
defects, as identified by the report.
    (c) The railroad shall submit the report(s) required by paragraph 
(a) of this section to FRA prior to commencing simulated revenue 
operations and at least 60 days prior to the intended start of full 
revenue service per Sec.  299.609(f).
    (d)(1) Prior to implementing a major upgrade to any safety-critical 
system component or sub-system, or prior to introducing any new safety-
critical technology, the railroad shall submit for FRA approval the 
detailed test procedures and/or analysis in accordance with Sec.  
299.603(d).
    (2) The railroad shall prepare a report detailing the results of 
functional and performance qualification tests, pre-revenue service 
system integration testing, and vehicle/track system qualification 
tests required under Sec. Sec.  299.605, 299.607, and 299.609 
respectively pertaining to a major upgrade to any safety-critical 
system component or sub-system, or introduction of any new safety-
critical technology. The report shall identify any problems encountered 
during testing, and alternative actions necessary to correct defects in 
workmanship, materials, equipment, design, or operating parameters.

Subpart G--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Program

Sec.  299.701   General requirements.

    Under the procedures provided in Sec.  299.713, the railroad shall 
obtain FRA approval of a written inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program. The program shall provide detailed information, consistent 
with the requirements set forth in Sec. Sec.  299.337 through 299.349, 
and 299.445(a), on the inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures 
necessary for the railroad to safely operate its system. This 
information shall include a detailed description of--
    (a) Safety inspection procedures, intervals, and criteria;
    (b) Test procedures and intervals;
    (c) Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
    (d) Maintenance procedures; and
    (e) Special testing equipment or measuring devices required to 
perform safety inspections and tests.

Sec.  299.703   Compliance.

    After the railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance program 
is approved by FRA pursuant to the requirements and procedures set 
forth in Sec.  299.713, the railroad shall adopt and comply with the 
program, and shall perform--
    (a) All inspections and tests described in the program in 
accordance with the procedures and criteria that the railroad 
identified as safety-critical; and
    (b) All maintenance tasks and procedures described in the program 
in accordance with the procedures and intervals that the railroad 
identified as safety-critical.

Sec.  299.705   Standard procedures for safely performing inspection, 
testing, and maintenance, or repairs.

    (a) The railroad shall establish written standard procedures for 
performing all safety-critical or potentially hazardous inspection, 
testing, maintenance, and repair tasks. These standard procedures 
shall--
    (1) Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the 
task;
    (2) Describe the knowledge necessary to safely perform the task;
    (3) Describe any precautions that shall be taken to safely perform 
the task;
    (4) Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform 
the task;
    (5) Be approved by the railroad's official responsible for safety;
    (6) Be enforced by the railroad's supervisors responsible for 
accomplishing the tasks; and
    (7) Be reviewed annually by the railroad. The railroad shall 
provide written notice to FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.9 at least 
one month prior to the annual review. If the Associate Administrator or 
their designee indicates a desire to be present, the railroad shall 
provide a scheduled date and location for the annual review. If the 
Associate Administrator requests the annual review be performed on 
another date but the railroad and the Associate Administrator are 
unable to agree on a date for rescheduling, the annual review may be 
performed as scheduled.

[[Page 69774]]

    (b) The inspection, testing, and maintenance program required by 
this section is not intended to address and should not include 
procedures to address employee working conditions that arise in the 
course of conducting the inspections, tests, and maintenance set forth 
in the program. When reviewing the railroad's program, FRA does not 
intend to review or approve any portion of the program that relates to 
employee working conditions.

Sec.  299.707   Maintenance intervals.

    (a) The initial scheduled maintenance intervals shall be based on 
those in effect on the Tokaido Shinkansen system as required under 
Sec.  299.13(c)(1).
    (b) The maintenance interval of safety-critical components shall be 
changed only when justified by accumulated, verifiable operating data, 
and approved by FRA under paragraph Sec.  299.713.

Sec.  299.709   Quality control program.

    The railroad shall establish an inspection, testing, and 
maintenance quality control program enforced by the railroad or its 
contractor(s) to reasonably ensure that inspections, testing, and 
maintenance are performed in accordance with inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program established under this subpart.

Sec.  299.711   Inspection, testing, and maintenance program format.

    The submission to FRA for each identified subsystem shall consist 
of two parts--
    (a) The complete inspection, testing, and maintenance program, in 
its entirety, including all required information prescribed in Sec.  
299.701, and all information and procedures required for the railroad 
and its personnel to implement the program.
    (b) A condensed version of the program that contains only those 
items identified as safety-critical, per Sec.  299.703 submitted for 
approval by FRA under Sec.  299.713.

Sec.  299.713   Program approval procedure.

    (a) Submission. Except as provided in Sec.  299.445(a)(2), the 
railroad shall submit for approval an inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program as described in Sec.  299.711(b) not less than 180 
days prior to pre-revenue service system integration testing. The 
program shall be submitted to FRA in accordance with Sec.  299.9. If 
the railroad seeks to amend an approved program as described in Sec.  
299.711(b), the railroad shall file with FRA in accordance with Sec.  
299.9 for approval of such amendment not less than 60 days prior to the 
proposed effective date of the amendment. A program responsive to the 
requirements of this subpart or any amendment to the program shall not 
be implemented prior to FRA approval.
    (b) Contents. Each program or amendment shall contain:
    (1) The information prescribed in Sec.  299.701 for such program or 
amendment; and
    (2) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to review of the program, its 
content, or amendments.
    (c) Approval. (1) Within 90 days of receipt of the initial 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program, FRA will review the 
program. The Associate Administrator will notify the primary railroad 
contact person in writing whether the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program is approved and, if not approved, the specific 
points in which the program is deficient. Deficiencies identified shall 
be addressed as directed by FRA prior to implementing the program.
    (2) FRA will review each proposed amendment to the program that 
relaxes an FRA-approved requirement within 45 days of receipt. The 
Associate Administrator will then notify the primary railroad contact 
person in writing whether the proposed amendment has been approved by 
FRA and, if not approved, the specific points in which the proposed 
amendment is deficient. The railroad shall correct any deficiencies as 
directed by FRA prior to implementing the amendment. For amendments 
proposing to make an FRA-approved program requirement more stringent, 
the railroad is permitted to implement the amendment prior to obtaining 
FRA approval.
    (3) Following initial approval of a program or amendment, FRA may 
reopen consideration of the program or amendment for cause stated.
    (4) The railroad may, subject to FRA review and approval under 
Sec.  299.15, implement inspection, testing, maintenance procedures and 
criteria, incorporating new or emerging technology.

Appendix A to Part 299--Criteria for Certification of Crashworthy Event 
Recorder Memory Module

    Section 299.439(c) requires that trainsets be equipped with an 
event recorder that includes a certified crashworthy event recorder 
memory module. This appendix prescribes the requirements for 
certifying an event recorder memory module (ERMM) as crashworthy, 
including the performance criteria and test sequence for 
establishing the crashworthiness of the ERMM as well as the marking 
of the event recorder containing the crashworthy ERMM.

A. General Requirements

    (a) Each manufacturer that represents its ERMM as crashworthy 
shall, by marking it as specified in section B of this appendix, 
certify that the ERMM meets the performance criteria contained in 
this appendix and that test verification data are available to the 
railroad or to FRA upon request.
    (b) The test verification data shall contain, at a minimum, all 
pertinent original data logs and documentation that the test sample 
preparation, test set up, test measuring devices and test procedures 
were performed by designated, qualified individuals using recognized 
and acceptable practices. Test verification data shall be retained 
by the manufacturer or its successor as long as the specific model 
of ERMM remains in service on any trainset.
    (c) A crashworthy ERMM shall be marked by its manufacturer as 
specified in section B of this appendix.

B. Marking Requirements

    (a) The outer surface of the event recorder containing a 
certified crashworthy ERMM shall be colored international orange. In 
addition, the outer surface shall be inscribed, on the surface 
allowing the most visible area, in black letters on an international 
orange background, using the largest type size that can be 
accommodated, with the words ``CERTIFIED DOT CRASHWORTHY'', followed 
by the ERMM model number (or other such designation), and the name 
of the manufacturer of the event recorder. This information may be 
displayed as follows:

CERTIFIED DOT CRASHWORTHY

    Event Recorder Memory Module Model Number

    Manufacturer's Name

Marking ``CERTIFIED DOT CRASHWORTHY'' on an event recorder designed 
for installation in the railroad's trainsets is the certification 
that all performance criteria contained in this appendix have been 
met and all functions performed by, or on behalf of, the 
manufacturer whose name appears as part of the marking, conform to 
the requirements specified in this appendix.

    (b) Retro-reflective material shall be applied to the edges of 
each visible external surface of an event recorder containing a 
certified crashworthy ERMM.

C. Performance Criteria for the ERMM

    An ERMM is crashworthy if it has been successfully tested for 
survival under conditions of fire, impact shock, static crush, fluid 
immersion, and hydro-static pressure contained in one of the two 
tables shown in this section of appendix B. (See Tables 1 and 2.) 
Each ERMM must meet the individual performance criteria in the 
sequence established in section D of this appendix. A performance 
criterion is deemed to be met if, after undergoing a test 
established in this appendix B for that criterion, the ERMM has 
preserved all of the data stored in it. The data set stored in the 
ERMM to be tested shall include all the recording elements required 
by Sec.  299.439(c). The following tables describe alternative 
performance criteria that may be used when testing an ERMM's

[[Page 69775]]

crashworthiness. A manufacturer may utilize either table during its 
testing but may not combine the criteria contained in the two 
tables.

                  Table 1 to Appendix A of Part 299--Acceptable Performance Criteria--Option A
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Parameter                         Value                   Duration                 Remarks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire, High Temperature...............  750 [deg]C (1400         60 minutes.............  Heat source: Oven.
                                        [deg]F).
Fire, Low Temperature................  260 [deg]C (500 [deg]F)  10 hours...............
Impact Shock.........................  55g....................  100 ms.................  \1/2\ sine crash pulse.
Static Crush.........................  110kN (25,000 lbf).....  5 minutes..............
Fluid Immersion......................  #1 Diesel, #2 Diesel,    Any single fluid, 48
                                        Water, Salt Water,       hours.
                                        Lube Oil.
                                       Fire Fighting Fluid....  10 minutes, following    Immersion followed by
                                                                 immersion above.         48 hours in a dry
                                                                                          location without
                                                                                          further disturbance.
Hydrostatic Pressure.................  Depth equivalent = 15    48 hours at nominal
                                        m. (50 ft.).             temperature of 25
                                                                 [deg]C (77 [deg]F).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Table 2 to Appendix A to Part 299--Acceptable Performance Criteria--Option B
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Parameter                         Value                   Duration                 Remarks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire, High Temperature...............  1,000 [deg]C (1,832      60 minutes.............  Heat source: Open
                                        [deg]F).                                          flame.
Fire, Low Temperature................  260 [deg]C (500 [deg]F)  10 hours...............  Heat source: Oven.
Impact Shock--Option 1...............  23gs...................  250 ms.................
Impact Shock--Option 2...............  55gs...................  100 ms.................  \1/2\ sine crash pulse.
Static Crush.........................  111.2kN (25,000 lbf),    5 minutes. (single       Applied to 25% of
                                        44.5kN (10,000 lbf).     ``squeeze'').            surface of largest
                                                                                          face.
Fluid Immersion......................  #1 Diesel, #2 Diesel,    48 hours each..........
                                        Water, Salt Water,
                                        Lube Oil, Fire
                                        Fighting Fluid.
Hydrostatic Pressure.................  46.62 psig (= 30.5 m.    48 hours at nominal
                                        or 100 ft.).             temperature of 25
                                                                 [deg]C (77 [deg]F).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Testing Sequence

    In order to reasonably duplicate the conditions an event 
recorder may encounter, the ERMM shall meet the various performance 
criteria, described in section C of this appendix, in a set 
sequence. (See Figure 1). If all tests are done in the set sequence 
(single branch testing), the same ERMM must be utilized throughout. 
If a manufacturer opts for split branch testing, each branch of the 
test must be conducted using an ERMM of the same design type as used 
for the other branch. Both alternatives are deemed equivalent, and 
the choice of single branch testing or split branch testing may be 
determined by the party representing that the ERMM meets the 
standard.

[[Page 69776]]

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E. Testing Exception

    If a new model ERMM represents an evolution or upgrade from an 
older model ERMM that was previously tested and certified as meeting 
the performance criteria contained in section C of this appendix, 
the new model ERMM need only be tested for compliance with those 
performance criteria contained in section C of this appendix that 
are potentially affected by the upgrade or modification. FRA will 
consider a performance criterion not to be potentially affected if a 
preliminary engineering analysis or other pertinent data establishes 
that the modification or upgrade will not change the performance of 
the older model ERMM against the performance criterion in question. 
The manufacturer shall retain and make available to FRA upon request 
any analysis or data relied upon to satisfy the requirements of this 
paragraph to sustain an exception from testing.

Appendix B to Part 299--Cab Noise Test Protocol

    This appendix prescribes the procedures for the in-cab noise 
measurements for high-speed trainsets at speed. The purpose of the 
cab noise testing is to ensure that the noise levels within the cab 
of the trainset meet the minimum requirements defined within Sec.  
299.431(h).

A. Measurement Instrumentation

    The instrumentation used shall conform to the requirements 
prescribed in appendix H to part 229 of this chapter.

B. Test Site Requirements

    The test shall meet the following requirements:
    (a) The passenger trainset shall be tested over a representative 
segment of the railroad and shall not be tested in any site 
specifically designed to artificially lower in-cab noise levels.
    (b) All windows, doors, cabinets, seals, etc., must be installed 
in the trainset cab and be closed.
    (c) The heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system 
or a dedicated heating or air conditioner system must be operating 
on high, and the vents must be open and unobstructed.

C. Procedures for Measurement

    (a) LAeq,T is defined as the A-weighted, equivalent 
sound level for a duration of T seconds, and the sound level meter 
shall be set for A-weighting with slow response.
    (b) The sound level meter shall be calibrated with the acoustic 
calibrator immediately before and after the in-cab tests. The 
calibration levels shall be recorded.
    (c) Any change in the before and after calibration level(s) 
shall be less than 0.5 dB.
    (d) The sound level meter shall be located:
    (1) Laterally as close as practicable to the longitudinal 
centerline of the cab, adjacent to the driver's seat,
    (2) Longitudinally at the center of the driver's nominal seating 
position, and
    (3) At a height 1219 mm (48 inches) above the floor.
    (e) The sound measurements shall be taken autonomously within 
the cab.
    (f) The sound level shall be recorded at the maximum approved 
trainset speed (0/-3 km/h).
    (g) After the passenger trainset speed has become constant at 
the maximum test speed and the in-cab noise is continuous, 
LAeq,T shall be measured, either directly or using a 1 
second sampling interval, for a minimum duration of 30 seconds at 
the measurement position (LAeq, 30s).

D. Reporting

    To demonstrate compliance, the railroad shall prepare and submit 
a test report in accordance with Sec.  299.613. As a minimum that 
report shall contain--
    (a) Name(s) of person(s) conducting the test, and the date of 
the test.
    (b) Description of the passenger trainset cab being tested, 
including: Car number and date of manufacture.
    (c) Description of sound level meter and calibrator, including: 
Make, model, type, serial number, and manufacturer's calibration 
date.
    (d) The recorded measurement during calibration and for the 
microphone location during operating conditions.
    (e) The recorded measurements taken during the conduct of the 
test.
    (f) Other information as appropriate to describe the testing 
conditions and procedure.

    Issued in Washington, DC.
Quintin Kendall,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2020-20388 Filed 11-2-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P