Document ID: FAA-2010-0800-0001
Agency: faa
Document Type: Rule
Title: Airworthiness Directives: Dassault-Aviation Model FALCON 7X Airplanes
Posted Date: 2010-08-24T04:00Z

[Federal Register: August 24, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 163)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 51931-51934]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr24au10-6]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0800; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-162-AD; 
Amendment 39-16416; AD 2010-18-03]
RIN 2120-AA64

 
Airworthiness Directives; Dassault-Aviation Model FALCON 7X 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing 
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of 
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an 
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    Several in service events related to various electrical systems, 
have led to the discovery of a common root cause: A leakage failure 
mode of Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) diodes used on Power 
Distribution Control Units (PDCU) cards or Generator Control Unit 
(GCU) cards in the Primary Power Distribution Boxes (PPDB). Due to 
such TVS diode failure mode, operation of some electrical circuits 
is degraded and some control signals are set at unexpected levels. 
Further analysis indicated that combination of a TVS diode failure 
with other systems failures could significantly reduce flight 
safety.
* * * * *
    The unsafe condition is a leakage failure mode of TVS diodes used 
on PDCU cards or GCU cards in the PPDB, which in combination with other 
system failures could lead to loss of controllability of the airplane. 
This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe 
condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: This AD becomes effective September 8, 2010.

[[Page 51932]]

    We must receive comments on this AD by October 8, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2010-0073, dated April 15, 2010 (referred to 
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:

    Several in service events related to various electrical systems, 
have led to the discovery of a common root cause: A leakage failure 
mode of Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) diodes used on Power 
Distribution Control Units (PDCU) cards or Generator Control Unit 
(GCU) cards in the Primary Power Distribution Boxes (PPDB). Due to 
such TVS diode failure mode, operation of some electrical circuits 
is degraded and some control signals are set at unexpected levels. 
Further analysis indicated that combination of a TVS diode failure 
with other systems failures could significantly reduce flight 
safety.
    To prevent and correct this condition, some Airplane Flight 
Manual (AFM) procedures have been modified to reduce the time of 
exposure to further failures whenever a TVS diode failure occurs. 
Additionally, a field tester has been developed to test all TVS 
diodes installed on the PDCU and GCU cards for the detection of 
components beyond acceptable tolerances. The criteria for PDCU or 
GCU card replacement in case of detection of faulty components have 
been identified.
    This AD requires the accomplishment of the revised AFM 
procedures, the testing and, as necessary, the replacement of the 
affected PDCU and GCU cards.
    Meanwhile, Dassault Aviation is developing a modification 
(M724), to improve PDCU and GCU cards, with TVS diodes having 
reduced susceptibility to the leakage failure mode.

    The unsafe condition is a leakage failure mode of TVS diodes used 
on PDCU cards or GCU cards in the PPDB, which in combination with other 
system failures could lead to loss of controllability of the airplane. 
You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD 
docket.

Interim Action

    This AD does not require the inspection of and on-condition 
replacement of the PDCU and GCU cards in paragraph (3) of EASA AD 2010-
0073, dated April 15, 2010, and this AD does not provide credit for 
accomplishment of certain service bulletins in paragraph (4) of EASA AD 
2010-0073, dated April 15, 2010. The planned compliance time for the 
inspection of and on-condition replacement of the PDCU and GCU cards in 
paragraph (3) of EASA AD 2010-0073, dated April 15, 2010, would allow 
enough time to provide notice and opportunity for prior public comment 
on the merits of those actions. Therefore, we are considering further 
rulemaking to address this issue.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

Differences Between the AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

FAA's Determination of the Effective Date

    An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of 
this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies 
waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because a 
leakage failure mode of TVS diodes used on PDCU cards or GCU cards in 
the PPDB, combined with other possible systems failures, could lead to 
loss of control of the airplane. Therefore, we determined that notice 
and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are 
impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment 
effective in fewer than 30 days.

Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight 
safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public 
comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under 
the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2010-0800; Directorate 
Identifier 2010-NM-162-AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We 
specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, 
environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all 
comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of 
those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more

[[Page 51933]]

detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2010-18-03 Dassault-Aviation: Amendment 39-16416. Docket No. FAA-
2010-0800; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-162-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective 
September 8, 2010.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Dassault-Aviation Model FALCON 7X 
airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial numbers except 
those on which Dassault-Aviation Modification M724 is embodied.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24: 
Electrical Power.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:

    ``Several in service events related to various electrical 
systems, have led to the discovery of a common root cause: a leakage 
failure mode of Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) diodes used on 
Power Distribution Control Units (PDCU) cards or Generator Control 
Unit (GCU) cards in the Primary Power Distribution Boxes (PPDB). Due 
to such TVS diode failure mode, operation of some electrical 
circuits is degraded and some control signals are set at unexpected 
levels. Further analysis indicated that combination of a TVS diode 
failure with other systems failures could significantly reduce 
flight safety.''
* * * * *
The unsafe condition is a leakage failure mode of TVS diodes used on 
PDCU cards or GCU cards in the PPDB, which in combination with other 
system failures could lead to loss of controllability of the 
airplane.

Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Actions

    (g) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise 
the Abnormal Procedures and Limitations sections of the Dassault F7X 
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following statement. 
This may be done by inserting copies of this AD into the AFM 
Limitations section and Abnormal Procedures section.

    ``Upon display of ELEC:BUS MISCONFIG TIED in Crew Alerting 
System (Abnormal procedure 3-190-20), land at nearest suitable 
airport
    Upon display of ELEC:LH ESS PWR LO or ELEC:LH ESS NO PWR 
(Abnormal procedure 3-190-40), land at nearest suitable airport
    Upon display of ELEC:RH ESS PWR LO and ELEC:RH ESS NO PWR 
(Abnormal procedure 3-190-45), land at nearest suitable airport
    Upon display of HYD:BACKUP PUMP HI TEMP (Abnormal procedure 3-
250-15), set off the pump and if the backup pump is still rotating 
(green) in hydraulic synoptic, descend to a safe altitude or below 
15,000 ft
    Caution: These temporary amendments take precedence over the 
same procedures displayed through the Electronic Check List (ECL) in 
the aeroplane.''

    Note 1: When a statement identical to that in paragraph (g) of 
this AD has been included in the Limitations section and Abnormal 
Procedures section in the general revisions of the AFM, the general 
revisions may be inserted into the AFM, and the copy of this AD may 
be removed.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows:
    (1) While the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2010-
0073, dated April 15, 2010, has a compliance time of ``after the 
effective date of this AD,'' this AD requires that the actions be 
done within 30 days after the effective date of this AD.
    (2) This AD does not require the inspection of and on-condition 
replacement of the PDCU and GCU cards in paragraph (3) of EASA AD 
2010-0073, dated April 15, 2010, and this AD does not provide credit 
for accomplishment of certain service bulletins in paragraph (4) of 
EASA AD 2010-0073, dated April 15, 2010.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom 
Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a 
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. 
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned 
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

    (i) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness 
Directive 2010-0073, dated April 15, 2010, for related information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) None.

[[Page 51934]]

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 11, 2010.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-20839 Filed 8-23-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P