DOI: 10.5061/dryad.1jwstqk4c
title: Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights from U.S. institutions

description: Overview: This study gathered empirical data on the knowledge and
 expertise of biosafety and biosecurity personnel, and researchers
 overseeing research with enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (ePPPs) and
 Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) across various U.S. sectors. The data
 aims to improve public health measures and oversight for DURC and ePPP,
 offering insights for future policies. A relationship was found between
 the size of biosafety/biosecurity teams and the likelihood of conducting
 ePPP research, with larger teams being more likely to engage in such
 research. Methods: A survey of 541 biosafety and biosecurity professionals
 was conducted between March 8 and April 10, 2024, with results analyzed
 using SAS at a significance level of 0.05. The study received approval
 from the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at Arizona State University
 and the University of Nevada, Reno. Results: Government institutions were
 found to be more likely to conduct DURC experiments compared to other
 Organizational Categories (i.e., Academic, Commercial, Consulting,
 Government, Other). Public institutions reviewed a higher number of
 experiments beyond the U.S. DURC Policy compared to Private for-Profit
 institutions. Institutions with larger biosafety/biosecurity teams were
 associated with increased research activities and more effective
 non-compliance reporting mechanisms (e.g., anonymous hotlines, anonymous
 reporting forms). Financial support and implementation challenges varied
 significantly across organizational categories. Discussion: The findings
 highlight the need for adequate staffing and resources for high-risk
 biosafety and biosecurity research activities. The survey results call for
 a tailored regulatory approach and equitable resource distribution for
 managing such research. Additionally, establishing effective
 non-compliance reporting mechanisms is essential for mitigating risks.
description: Data were collected through surveys administered to individuals
 affiliated with the American Biological Safety Association International
 (ABSA International) and those listed as Institutional Biosafety Committee
 contacts with the National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy
 in 2024 in alignment with prior research of this profession (Fletcher et
 al., 2021; Gillum et al., 2013, 2014, 2016). 1096 individuals received the
 survey, and 541 respondents completed the survey in full or partial
 response, representing approximately 49.4% of the total recipients. Of
 these respondents, 21 were from countries outside of the United States and
 were eliminated from the study, as our grant was specific to only those
 located inside the United States. Participation in the survey was optional
 and voluntary. Because respondents were not required to complete every
 question, and respondents could skip or select “Prefer not to say” for
 certain questions, the total number of responses for each question
 varied.
description: # Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights
 from U.S. institutions
 [https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.1jwstqk4c](https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.1jwstqk4c) ## Description of the data and file structure **Overview** The dataset consists of 46 variables and 520 rows capturing various aspects of biosafety professionals' demographics, job characteristics, training, and research activities. Each row corresponds to an individual respondent, and each column captures a specific piece of information about the respondent or their professional experience. \**Dataset Format: .**csv \**Note: **the cell with “null” value represents that there is no answer recorded from respondent for that question Demographic data were removed to protect respondent identities. Individual who are interested in obtaining the complete data set can contact the authors. **Columns and Descriptions** 1. **PROGRESS**: The progress or completion percentage of the survey by the respondent. 2. **DURATION**: The total time taken by the respondent to complete the survey (in seconds). 3. **CHANNEL**: The channel through which the respondent accessed the survey (e.g., email, anonymous). 4. **BIOSAFETY_JOB** (Categorical): Position with biosafety responsibilities (Yes/No) 5. **NOTWORK** (Categorical): Indicator if the respondent is currently a student, retiree or unemployed (Yes/No) 6. **BIOSAFETY_CONS** (Categorical): Indicator if the respondent is a biosafety consultant (Yes/No) 7. **BSO** (Categorical): Indicator if the respondent is a Biosafety Officer (BSO) (Yes/No) 8. **IBC** (Categorical): Indicator if the respondent is a member of an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) (Yes/No) 9. **IBC_OUTS** (Categorical): Indicator if the IBC at their workplace is outsourced (Yes/No) 10. **EFFECTIVE** (Categorical): Respondent's perception of their effectiveness to implement biosafety/biosecurity oversight at workplace (Yes/No) 11. **BIOSEC_JOB** (Categorical): Job title or primary role of the respondent in biosecurity (Yes/No) 12. **TIME** (Categorical): The percentage of time spent on biosafety and biosecurity 13. **USG_FUND** (Categorical): Indicator if the respondent's work is funded by the US government (Yes/No) 14. **INSTITUTE_CAT** (Categorical): Category of the respondent's institution (Academic, Government, Consulting…). 15. **INSTITUTE_CHA** (Categorical): Characteristics of the respondent's institution (Public, Private For-Profit, Private Non-Profit) 16. **WORKFORCE** (Categorical): Information about the biosafety professional’s team at workplace (1,2,…) 17. **DURC_EPPP_EFF** (Categorical): Effectiveness of non-compliance reporting mechanisms to identify possible issues with Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and/or Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogen (ePPP) (Extremely Effective – Not at all) 18. **REPORT_PATHWAY** (Categorical): Pathways for reporting DURC and ePPP activities (Yes/No) 19. **DURC_RESEARCH** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace conducts research that is subject to DURC (Yes/No) 20. **DURC_RESEARCH_OUTC** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace outsources research that is subject to DURC (Yes/No) 21. **DURC_RESEARCH_NOT** (Categorical): Instances where DURC research was not conducted (Yes/No) 22. **IRE** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace has Institutional Review Entity information (Yes/No) 23. **DURC_TRAIN** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace trains researchers about risks associated with DURC (Yes/No) 24. **DURC_QUALITY** (Categorical): Indicator of the quality of DURC training (Excellent to Poor) 25. **DURC_TRAIN_UPDATE** (Categorical): Indicator of how well training is updated for DURC (Extremely well to Not well at all). 26. **DURC_FINSUP** (Categorical): Indicator of the amount of financial support for DURC activities (Excellent to Poor) 27. **DURC_DIFF** (Categorical): Indicator of the perceived difficulties of managing DURC at the workplace (Extremely difficult to Extremely easy). 28. **DURC_IMPACT** (Categorical): Impact of DURC on the respondent's work (Extremely Positive to Extremely Negative) 29. **ePPP_RESEARCH** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace conducts research that is subject to ePPP (Yes/No) 30. **ePPP_RESEARCH_OUTC** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace conducts research that may generate ePPP (Yes/No). 31. **ePPP_REVIEW_YN** (Categorical): Indicator if research at the workplace has undergone a review under ePPP (Yes/No). 32. **ePPP_PREPARE** (Categorical): Indicator of how prepared respondents are in understanding the risks associated with ePPP (Extremely Prepared to Not at all) 33. **ePPP_TRAIN** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace trains researchers about risks associated with ePPP (Yes/No) 34. **ePPP_TRAIN_QUALITY** (Categorical): Indicator of the quality of ePPP training (Extremely Good to Extremely Bad) 35. **ePPP_TRAIN_UPDATE** (Categorical): Indicator of how well training is updated for ePPP (Extremely well to Not well at all). 36. **ePPP_FINSUP** (Categorical): Indicator of the amount of financial support for ePPP activities (Excellent to Poor) 37. **ePPP_DIFF** (Categorical): Indicator of the perceived difficulties of managing ePPP at the workplace (Extremely difficult to Extremely easy). 38. **ePPP_IMPACT** (Categorical): Impact of ePPP on the respondent's work (Extremely Positive to Extremely Negative). 39. **DURC_ePPP_SUBC** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace uses subcontractors or subawardees to conduct DURC/ePPP (Yes/No). 40. **FSAT** (Categorical): Indicator if the workplace conducts research governed by the Federal Select Agent and Toxin (FSAT) regulations (Yes/No) 41. **RO_ARO** (Categorical): Indicator if the respondent is the responsible official or alternate responsible official of FSAT (Yes/No) 42. **FSAT_FINSUP** (Categorical): Indicator of the amount of financial support for FSAT activities (Excellent to Poor) 43. **FSAT_DIFF** (Categorical): Indicator of the perceived difficulties of managing FSAT at the workplace (Extremely difficult to Extremely easy). 44. **FSAT_IMPACT** (Categorical): Impact of FSAT on the respondent's work (Extremely Positive to Extremely Negative). 45. **DURC_RISKREDUCE** (Categorical): Indicators of how effective DURC is at reducing risks (Extremely effective to Not effective at all). 46. **ePPP_RISKREDUCE** (Categorical): Indicators of how effective ePPP is at reducing risks (Extremely effective to Not effective at all). \** ** **Potential Use:** The dataset provides a rich source of information that can be leveraged by researchers, policymakers, public health officials, and organizational leaders to gain insights into biosafety practices, evaluate program effectiveness, and ensure compliance with safety regulations. By using this data, potential consumers can make informed decisions that enhance biosafety and public health outcomes. ## Access information Data was derived from the following sources: * Data were collected through surveys administered to individuals affiliated with the American Biological Safety Association International (ABSA International) and those listed as Institutional Biosafety Committee contacts with the National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy in 2024.