cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.3886/e114385
title: Replication data for: Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games

description: Game theory is usually difficult to test in the field because predictions typically depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such test using both laboratory and field data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In this game, players pick positive integers and whoever chooses the lowest unique number wins. Equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson distributed population uncertainty. The field and lab data show similar patterns. Despite various deviations from equilibrium, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium. Some deviations can be rationalized by a cognitive hierarchy model. (JEL C70, C93, D44, H27)
DOI: 10.3886/e114385v1
title: Replication data for: Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games

description: Game theory is usually difficult to test in the field because predictions typically depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such test using both laboratory and field data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In this game, players pick positive integers and whoever chooses the lowest unique number wins. Equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson distributed population uncertainty. The field and lab data show similar patterns. Despite various deviations from equilibrium, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium. Some deviations can be rationalized by a cognitive hierarchy model. (JEL C70, C93, D44, H27)
DOI: 10.3886/e114386
title: Replication data for: Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?

description: In markets where product quality is imperfectly observed or delivery is uncertain, seller reputations and product guarantees or warranties can impact equilibrium prices and quantities. Using data from a decentralized online market, this paper empirically investigates the substitutability of product guarantees for seller reputation. I find that a "guaranteed or your money back" promise from the market maker does not substitute for reputation, either in determining price or the probability of sale. The most likely causes of the policy's ineffectiveness are delays in buyer response to the guarantee and skepticism about reimbursement in the event of fraud. (JEL D82, L14, L15, L81, M31)
DOI: 10.3886/e114386v1
title: Replication data for: Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?

description: In markets where product quality is imperfectly observed or delivery is uncertain, seller reputations and product guarantees or warranties can impact equilibrium prices and quantities. Using data from a decentralized online market, this paper empirically investigates the substitutability of product guarantees for seller reputation. I find that a "guaranteed or your money back" promise from the market maker does not substitute for reputation, either in determining price or the probability of sale. The most likely causes of the policy's ineffectiveness are delays in buyer response to the guarantee and skepticism about reimbursement in the event of fraud. (JEL D82, L14, L15, L81, M31)
DOI: 10.3886/e114591
title: Replication data for: Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Residential Real Estate Market

description: Using discontinuities in housing transaction taxes in New York and New Jersey we find robust price bunching. Incidence for transactions local to the notch falls on sellers, with no evidence of evasion. The volume of missing transactions above the notch exceeds those bunching (beyond the usual extensive-margin response), indicating incentives for buyers and sellers not to transact (market unravels). The possibility of unraveling affects interpretation and estimation of bunching. Away from the threshold, we find increased discounts and weaker relationship between listing and sale prices. Equilibrium bargaining framework highlights that taxation affects the ultimate allocation in this search market. (JEL H71, R21, R31)
DOI: 10.3886/e114591v1
title: Replication data for: Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Residential Real Estate Market

description: Using discontinuities in housing transaction taxes in New York and New Jersey we find robust price bunching. Incidence for transactions local to the notch falls on sellers, with no evidence of evasion. The volume of missing transactions above the notch exceeds those bunching (beyond the usual extensive-margin response), indicating incentives for buyers and sellers not to transact (market unravels). The possibility of unraveling affects interpretation and estimation of bunching. Away from the threshold, we find increased discounts and weaker relationship between listing and sale prices. Equilibrium bargaining framework highlights that taxation affects the ultimate allocation in this search market. (JEL H71, R21, R31)
DOI: 10.3886/e114592
title: Replication data for: Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives

description: At political boundaries, local leaders have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and thus incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. We document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at province boundaries. Heavy metal pollutants, not targeted by the central government, have not decreased in concentration after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms. (JEL D72, O13, O18, P25, P28, Q25, Q53)
DOI: 10.3886/e114592v1
title: Replication data for: Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives

description: At political boundaries, local leaders have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and thus incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. We document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at province boundaries. Heavy metal pollutants, not targeted by the central government, have not decreased in concentration after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms. (JEL D72, O13, O18, P25, P28, Q25, Q53)
DOI: 10.3886/e114844
title: Replication data for: The Economic and Policy Consequences of Catastrophes

description: How likely is a catastrophic event that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP, and wealth? How much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe? We answer these questions and provide a framework for policy analysis using a general equilibrium model of production, capital accumulation, and household preferences. Calibrating the model to economic and financial data, we estimate the mean arrival rate of shocks and their size distribution, the tax on consumption society would accept to limit the maximum size of a catastrophic shock, and the cost to insure against its impact.
DOI: 10.3886/e114844v1
title: Replication data for: The Economic and Policy Consequences of Catastrophes

description: How likely is a catastrophic event that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP, and wealth? How much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe? We answer these questions and provide a framework for policy analysis using a general equilibrium model of production, capital accumulation, and household preferences. Calibrating the model to economic and financial data, we estimate the mean arrival rate of shocks and their size distribution, the tax on consumption society would accept to limit the maximum size of a catastrophic shock, and the cost to insure against its impact.
DOI: 10.3886/e114845
title: Replication data for: Profiting from Regulation: Evidence from the European Carbon Market

description: We investigate how cap-and-trade regulation affects profits. In late April 2006, the EU CO2 allowance price dropped 50 percent, equating to a €28 billion reduction in the value of aggregate annual allowances. We examine daily returns for 552 stocks from the EUROSTOXX index. Despite reductions in environmental costs, we find that stock prices fell for firms in both carbon- and electricity-intensive industries, particularly for firms selling primarily within the EU. Our results imply that investors focus on product price impacts, rather than just compliance costs and the nominal value of pollution permits.
DOI: 10.3886/e114845v1
title: Replication data for: Profiting from Regulation: Evidence from the European Carbon Market

description: We investigate how cap-and-trade regulation affects profits. In late April 2006, the EU CO2 allowance price dropped 50 percent, equating to a €28 billion reduction in the value of aggregate annual allowances. We examine daily returns for 552 stocks from the EUROSTOXX index. Despite reductions in environmental costs, we find that stock prices fell for firms in both carbon- and electricity-intensive industries, particularly for firms selling primarily within the EU. Our results imply that investors focus on product price impacts, rather than just compliance costs and the nominal value of pollution permits.
DOI: 10.21227/057c-wr47
title: CURE-TSR: Challenging Unreal and Real Environments for Traffic Sign Recognition

description: As one of the research directions at OLIVES Lab @ Georgia Tech, we focus on the robustness of data-driven algorithms under diverse challenging conditions where trained models can possibly be depolyed. To achieve this goal, we introduced a large-sacle (&gt;2M images) traffic sign recognition dataset (CURE-TSR) which is among the most comprehensive datasets with controlled synthetic challenging conditions. Traffic sign images in the CURE-TSR dataset were cropped from the CURE-TSD dataset, which includes around 1.7 million real-world and simulator images with more than 2 million traffic sign instances. Real-world images were obtained from the BelgiumTS video sequences and simulated images were generated with the Unreal Engine 4 game development tool. Sign types include speed limit, goods vehicles, no overtaking, no stopping, no parking, stop, bicycle, hump, no left, no right, priority to, no entry, yield, and parking. Unreal and real sequences were processed with state-of-the-art visual effect software Adobe(c) After Effects to simulate challenging conditions, which include rain, snow, haze, shadow, darkness, brightness, blurriness, dirtiness, colorlessness, sensor and codec errors. Please refer to our GitHub page for code, papers, and more information.
DOI: 10.3886/e114387
title: Replication data for: Getting More Work for Nothing? Symbolic Awards and Worker Performance

description: We study the impact of status and social recognition on worker performance in a field experiment. In collaboration with an international non-governmental organization, we hired students to work on a database project. Students in the award treatment were offered a congratulatory card honoring the best performance. The award was purely symbolic to ensure that any behavioral effect is driven by non-material benefits. Our results show that the award increases performance by about 12 percent on average. The results provide strong evidence for the motivating power of status and social recognition in labor relations. (JEL C93, J33, M12, M52)
DOI: 10.3886/e114387v1
title: Replication data for: Getting More Work for Nothing? Symbolic Awards and Worker Performance

description: We study the impact of status and social recognition on worker performance in a field experiment. In collaboration with an international non-governmental organization, we hired students to work on a database project. Students in the award treatment were offered a congratulatory card honoring the best performance. The award was purely symbolic to ensure that any behavioral effect is driven by non-material benefits. Our results show that the award increases performance by about 12 percent on average. The results provide strong evidence for the motivating power of status and social recognition in labor relations. (JEL C93, J33, M12, M52)
DOI: 10.3886/e114388
title: Replication data for: Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge

description: We offer a theory of the sunk cost fallacy as an optimal response to limited memory. As new information arrives, a decision-maker may not remember all the reasons he began a project. The sunk cost gives additional information about future profits and informs subsequent decisions. The Concorde effect makes the investor more eager to complete projects when sunk costs are high and the pro-rata effect makes the investor less eager. In a controlled experiment we had subjects play a simple version of the model. In a baseline treatment subjects exhibit the pro-rata bias. When we induce memory constraints the effect reverses and the subjects exhibit the Concorde bias. (JEL D24, D83, G31)
DOI: 10.3886/e114388v1
title: Replication data for: Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge

description: We offer a theory of the sunk cost fallacy as an optimal response to limited memory. As new information arrives, a decision-maker may not remember all the reasons he began a project. The sunk cost gives additional information about future profits and informs subsequent decisions. The Concorde effect makes the investor more eager to complete projects when sunk costs are high and the pro-rata effect makes the investor less eager. In a controlled experiment we had subjects play a simple version of the model. In a baseline treatment subjects exhibit the pro-rata bias. When we induce memory constraints the effect reverses and the subjects exhibit the Concorde bias. (JEL D24, D83, G31)
DOI: 10.3886/e114389
title: Replication data for: Tracking Decision Makers under Uncertainty

description: Eye tracking is used to investigate the procedures that participants employ in choosing between two lotteries. Eye movement patterns in problems where the deliberation process is clearly identified are used to substantiate an interpretation of the results. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers rely exclusively upon an expected utility type of calculation. Instead eye patterns indicate that decision makers often compare prizes and probabilities separately. This is particularly true when the multiplication of sums and probabilities is laborious to compute. (JEL D81, D87)
DOI: 10.3886/e114389v1
title: Replication data for: Tracking Decision Makers under Uncertainty

description: Eye tracking is used to investigate the procedures that participants employ in choosing between two lotteries. Eye movement patterns in problems where the deliberation process is clearly identified are used to substantiate an interpretation of the results. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers rely exclusively upon an expected utility type of calculation. Instead eye patterns indicate that decision makers often compare prizes and probabilities separately. This is particularly true when the multiplication of sums and probabilities is laborious to compute. (JEL D81, D87)
DOI: 10.3886/e114390
title: Replication data for: Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

description: This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)
DOI: 10.3886/e114390v1
title: Replication data for: Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

description: This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)
DOI: 10.3886/e114391v1
title: Replication data for: The Impact of Social Ties on Group Interactions: Evidence from Minimal Groups and Randomly Assigned Real Groups

description: Economists are increasingly interested in how group membership affects individual behavior. The standard method assigns individuals to "minimal" groups, i.e. arbitrary labels, in a lab. But real group often involve social interactions leading to social ties between group members. Our experiments compare randomly assigned minimal groups to randomly assigned groups involving real social interactions. While adding social ties leads to qualitatively similar, although stronger, in-group favoritism in cooperation, altruistic norm enforcement patterns are qualitatively different between treatments. Our findings contribute to the micro-foundation of theories of group preferences, and caution against generalizations from "minimal" groups to groups with social context. (JEL C92, D64, D71, Z13)
DOI: 10.3886/e114593
title: Replication data for: Does It Matter if Your Health Insurer Is For Profit? Effects of Ownership on Premiums, Insurance Coverage, and Medical Spending

description: There is limited empirical evidence about the impact of for-profit health insurers on various outcomes. I study the effects of conversions to for-profit status by Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) affiliates in 11 states, spanning 28 geographic markets. I find both the BCBS affiliate and its rivals increased premiums following conversions in markets where the converting affiliate had substantial market share. Medicaid enrollment rates also increased in these markets, a pattern consistent with "crowd in" of families who were formerly privately insured. The results suggest for-profit insurers are likelier than not-for-profit insurers to exercise market power when they possess it.
DOI: 10.3886/e114593v1
title: Replication data for: Does It Matter if Your Health Insurer Is For Profit? Effects of Ownership on Premiums, Insurance Coverage, and Medical Spending

description: There is limited empirical evidence about the impact of for-profit health insurers on various outcomes. I study the effects of conversions to for-profit status by Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) affiliates in 11 states, spanning 28 geographic markets. I find both the BCBS affiliate and its rivals increased premiums following conversions in markets where the converting affiliate had substantial market share. Medicaid enrollment rates also increased in these markets, a pattern consistent with "crowd in" of families who were formerly privately insured. The results suggest for-profit insurers are likelier than not-for-profit insurers to exercise market power when they possess it.
DOI: 10.3886/e114594v1
title: Replication data for: Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program

description: Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. Such policy designs create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. I investigate the implications of such policies by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program. Using household-level panel data, I find that the incentive produced precisely estimated zero treatment effects on energy conservation in coastal areas. In contrast, the rebate induced short-run and long-run consumption reductions in inland areas. Income, climate, and air conditioner saturation significantly drive the heterogeneity. Finally, I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis and investigate how to improve the policy design. (JEL D12, D62, H76, L94, L98, Q48)
DOI: 10.3886/e114846
title: Replication data for: Watch Your Step: Optimal Policy in a Tipping Climate

description: We investigate the optimal policy response to the possibility of abrupt, irreversible shifts in system dynamics. The welfare cost of a tipping point emerges from the policymaker's response to altered system dynamics. Our policymaker also learns about a threshold's location by observing the system's response in each period. Simulations with a recursive, numerical climate-economy model show that tipping possibilities raise the optimal carbon tax more strongly over time. The resulting policy paths ultimately lower optimal peak warming by up to 0.5°C. Different types of posttipping shifts in dynamics generate qualitatively different optimal pretipping policy paths.
DOI: 10.3886/e114846v1
title: Replication data for: Watch Your Step: Optimal Policy in a Tipping Climate

description: We investigate the optimal policy response to the possibility of abrupt, irreversible shifts in system dynamics. The welfare cost of a tipping point emerges from the policymaker's response to altered system dynamics. Our policymaker also learns about a threshold's location by observing the system's response in each period. Simulations with a recursive, numerical climate-economy model show that tipping possibilities raise the optimal carbon tax more strongly over time. The resulting policy paths ultimately lower optimal peak warming by up to 0.5°C. Different types of posttipping shifts in dynamics generate qualitatively different optimal pretipping policy paths.
DOI: 10.3886/e114847v1
title: Replication data for: Stimulating Local Public Employment: Do General Grants Work?

description: We apply the regression kink design to the Swedish grant system and estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on local public employment. Our robust conclusion is that grants do not stimulate local public employment. We find no statistically significant effects on total local public employment, and we can exclude even moderate effects. When disaggregating the total effect by sector, we find that personnel in the traditional welfare sectors are unaffected, a conclusion which applies to both publicly and privately employed in these sectors. The only positive and statistically significant effect of grants is that on administrative personnel.
DOI: 10.3886/e114848
title: Replication data for: The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises

description: We calculate increases in contributions required to achieve full funding of state and local pension systems in the United States over 30 years. Without policy changes, contributions would have to increase by 2.5 times, reaching 14.1 percent of the total own revenue generated by state and local governments. This represents a tax increase of $1,385 per household per year, around half of which would go to pay down legacy liabilities while half would fund the cost of new promises. We examine sensitivity to asset return assumptions, wage correlations, the treatment of workers not currently in Social Security, and endogenous geographical shifts in the tax base.