DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.15867791
title: Subsovereign Finance as Discipline: A Critical Macro-Finance Perspective on U.S. Territorial Markets

description: Subsovereign Finance as Discipline: A Critical Macro-Finance Perspective on U.S. Territorial Markets

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.15566317Resource Type: DatasetPublication Date: 2025-05-31Author: AnonLicense: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)Copyright: © 2025 The AuthorsProgramming Language: PythonRepository Status: Active, replicablePublisher: ZenodoVersion: 1.0

Description

This dataset and code repository support the macro-financial empirical study: Illiquidity Without Democracy, which analyzes the UBS Puerto Rico bond fund crisis through a critical macro-finance lens. By compiling liquidity and return data from the full Dow 30 alongside Puerto Rican financial equities, the project investigates how symbolic liquidity withdrawal operates as an instrument of financial subjugation in colonially governed markets.

The uploaded materials include:





35 Excel files containing firm-level trading data (Dow 30 and PR equities)




A Python script (cmf_analysis.py) implementing Amihud illiquidity and Fama–MacBeth regressions




A README.md file with detailed reproducibility instructions



Grounded in Bonizzi et al. (2022), this work contributes to the theory of financialized colonialism, where credit ratings, liquidity signals, and bond pricing are not merely technical indicators—but expressions of asymmetrical power. Our analysis empirically substantiates that liquidity constraints for Puerto Rican firms intensified during key institutional moments, revealing systemic exclusion embedded in neoliberal financial governance.

This study is grounded in Critical Macro-Finance (CMF), which we conceptualize as an extension of Jensen and Meckling’s Agency Theory. In its original formulation, Agency Theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts—a legal and economic structure shaped by negotiated relationships among stakeholders, each with divergent incentives. CMF builds on this foundation by embedding those contractual relationships within broader institutional and political-economic contexts.

Whereas traditional agency models emphasize micro-level incentive alignment, CMF expands the analytic frame to include systemic asymmetries in power, information, and legal infrastructure—especially in fragile or postcolonial states. From this perspective, contracts are not formed in a vacuum but are shaped by historical legal origins, regulatory capture, financial hierarchy, and global capital flows. Thus, CMF repositions the firm not only as a nexus of contracts but also as a node in a stratified macro-financial system where access to capital, enforceability of rights, and institutional trust are unequally distributed.

This theoretical orientation allows us to interrogate how formal governance structures conceal deeper distortions in financial inclusion, enforcement asymmetries, and systemic risk transmission, particularly in contexts where legal institutions fail to uphold equitable contracting environments.

Keywords





Financialized colonialism




Critical macro-finance




Market microstructure




Illiquidity




Fama–MacBeth regression




Puerto Rico debt crisis




UBS bond fund




Neoliberalism




Event study




Dow 30




Amihud illiquidity