DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.30017164
title: <b>THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANA ARENDT - ALEXIS KARPOUZOS</b>

description: Hannah Arendt’s conception of thinking stands in stark contrast to that of René Descartes. Descartes, writing in the early modern period, sought a foundation for knowledge that could not be doubted. In the statement <i>“Cogito, ergo sum”</i> — <i>“I think, therefore I am”</i> — Descartes asserts that the very act of thinking confirms the existence of the self. For him, thinking is a solitary, internal act, grounded in rational certainty. The thinking subject is isolated, abstracted from the world, and turned inward in search of indubitable truth.Arendt, by contrast, reorients the act of thinking away from the search for epistemic certainty and toward the existential and ethical conditions of human life. For her, thinking is not a method for grounding knowledge but a means of confronting the meaning of one’s actions and of engaging responsibly with the world. Rather than affirming the self through self-referential logic, Arendt views thinking as a form of inner dialogue — a silent conversation with oneself that has implications for one’s relationships, one’s judgments, and one’s participation in a shared reality.This contrast reveals a deeper philosophical divergence. Descartes’s model of thought affirms the primacy of the isolated subject. Arendt, however, situates thinking within the plurality of human existence. Thought becomes an activity that sustains ethical awareness — a safeguard against the dangers of unreflective conformity. Where Descartes sought to <i>prove</i> existence through thinking, Arendt challenges us to <i>preserve</i> our humanity through the practice of thoughtfulness.Thus, for Descartes, thought secures the self. For Arendt, it secures the conditions for living <i>with</i> others in a world that demands judgment, responsibility, and moral awareness.<b>Judgment as the Ethical Extension of Thought</b>For Arendt, judgment is not a derivative of knowledge nor a purely rational computation. It is the faculty through which the human being engages the world reflectively and evaluates meaning. Judgment is grounded not in the application of universal laws but in the capacity to <i>think with others</i> — to see the world from perspectives not one’s own. This capacity, which Arendt calls an “enlarged mentality, ” allows us to form judgments that are neither purely subjective nor merely conformist.Judgment, then, is a bridge between the solitary activity of thinking and the shared world of human plurality. It requires imagination, not for fantasy, but for ethical perspective — for entering into the reality of others without dissolving the distinctiveness of the self. In judgment, the thinker steps into the common world and assumes responsibility not merely for personal beliefs but for public consequences.The Eichmann trial provides a profound example. In Eichmann’s inability to judge, Arendt observed not the presence of hatred, but the absence of thinking. He did not reflect, did not question, did not imagine the human consequences of his actions. His failure was not intellectual, but existential — a refusal to engage in the inner dialogue that sustains conscience. Here, Arendt shows that the root of moral collapse lies not in ideology alone, but in the abdication of thought and judgment.Judgment, for Arendt, is the human capacity to discern meaning in the absence of certainty, and to act in the world with responsibility. It does not guarantee moral correctness, but it makes ethical life possible.