cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005289.v1
title: Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions

description: Abstract: Martha Nussbaum tells us that emotions are cognitive value judgments. She claims that her theory, the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, can handle traditional objections to cognitive theories of emotions. However, in this paper I hold that she improperly takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term "cognition": she faces the problems that arise when the term "cognition" is used in a very narrow sense (which claims that emotions are beliefs), resorting to a very wide sense under which any mental process is cognitive. I argue that this move does not solve the problems of the traditional cognitive theories of emotions. In order to show this, I distinguish four senses in which the term "cognitive" is used in theories of emotions, I analyze the ways Nussbaum uses them and why this move does not solve the traditional objections.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005281.v1
title: Maximal Specific Arguments in Defeasible Argumentation

description: Abstract DeLP (Defeasible Logic Programming) es un sistema de argumentación rebatible que captura razonamientos de sentido común. Algunos ejemplos propuestos en la literatura muestran que el sistema obtiene resultados contraintuitivos. Una posible causa de tales resultados es propuesta y se sugiere una manera de neutralizarla. Esto se hace mediante una preselección de los argumentos en base a un criterio denominado máxima especificidad. El criterio consiste básicamente en lo siguiente, un argumento será considerado como máximamente específicos solo si, para cualquier argumento basado en evidencia más específica que no explique la misma conclusión, este no explica lo contrario ni algo más general.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005296
title: Neopythagoreanism in the work of Johannes Kepler

description: ABSTRACT In this article I argue that the methodology in the Johannes Kepler´s work is guided by two principles of Pythagorean nature, they are: (i) sameness is made known by sameness, and (ii) harmony arises from establishing a limit to what is unlimited. By way of hypothesis, I present a general outline, which includes those principles, and I indicate how they are present in Kepler's investigations. I examine two particular cases in the light of that schema.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005296.v1
title: Neopythagoreanism in the work of Johannes Kepler

description: ABSTRACT In this article I argue that the methodology in the Johannes Kepler´s work is guided by two principles of Pythagorean nature, they are: (i) sameness is made known by sameness, and (ii) harmony arises from establishing a limit to what is unlimited. By way of hypothesis, I present a general outline, which includes those principles, and I indicate how they are present in Kepler's investigations. I examine two particular cases in the light of that schema.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7451687
title: BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON

description: Abstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7451687.v1
title: BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON

description: Abstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7453016
title: DOING AWAY WITH THE “SHMAGENCY” OBJECTION TO CONSTITUTIVISM

description: Abstract Constitutivists attempt to ground reasons for action in the constitutive features of agency. Central to Enoch's famous “shmagency” objection to constitutivism is the idea that constitutivists should worry about the question whether there is reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”-where a shmagent is a non-agent being who lacks the constitutive features of agency, but is otherwise as similar to agents as can be. I explain why constitutivism isn’t in trouble even if there’s no reason to be an agent. The nature of agency can in principle ground authoritative reasons for agents to act, even if there isn’t, in addition, a reason to be an agent. Relatedly, I explain why a prominent strand in previous responses to Enoch is misleading in focusing on whether the request for reasons to be an agent, as posed by the shmagent, is even possible or intelligible. Even if the shmagent’s request for reasons is possible and intelligible-as I argue it is-this doesn’t matter for constitutivists, for the request is misguided: constitutivists need no reasons to be an agent.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7453016.v1
title: DOING AWAY WITH THE “SHMAGENCY” OBJECTION TO CONSTITUTIVISM

description: Abstract Constitutivists attempt to ground reasons for action in the constitutive features of agency. Central to Enoch's famous “shmagency” objection to constitutivism is the idea that constitutivists should worry about the question whether there is reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”-where a shmagent is a non-agent being who lacks the constitutive features of agency, but is otherwise as similar to agents as can be. I explain why constitutivism isn’t in trouble even if there’s no reason to be an agent. The nature of agency can in principle ground authoritative reasons for agents to act, even if there isn’t, in addition, a reason to be an agent. Relatedly, I explain why a prominent strand in previous responses to Enoch is misleading in focusing on whether the request for reasons to be an agent, as posed by the shmagent, is even possible or intelligible. Even if the shmagent’s request for reasons is possible and intelligible-as I argue it is-this doesn’t matter for constitutivists, for the request is misguided: constitutivists need no reasons to be an agent.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.8091656
title: TWO-VALUED WEAK KLEENE LOGICS

description: Abstract In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming that every logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we provide two-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valued subsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of the Weak Kleene logics with unary operators that allow looking at them as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Formal Underterminedness (LFUs). Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko’s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specifically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems of Weak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.8091656.v1
title: TWO-VALUED WEAK KLEENE LOGICS

description: Abstract In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming that every logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we provide two-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valued subsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of the Weak Kleene logics with unary operators that allow looking at them as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Formal Underterminedness (LFUs). Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko’s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specifically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems of Weak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.8091527
title: ESTRUCTURAS FUNDAMENTALES CONCRETAS

description: Abstract Several problems in philosophy of physics have led to ‘ontic structural realism’, i. e., the supposition that, at the fundamental physical level, there are no ‘objects’, but ‘structures’. There are various requirements that a ‘structure’ should satisfy for ‘ontic structural realism’. Structures must be concrete entities, there must be something that fulfills the role of ‘node’, and the relations of the structure must not be dependent on the objects that are being related. Most of the traditional ontologies, both of substrata and properties, and of bundles of properties, seem to be inadequate to satisfy those requirements. It is argued here that there are several ways in which those requirements can be met: by nodal relations, by primitive ‘nodal facts’, and by symmetric dependencies between objects and relations.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.8091527.v1
title: ESTRUCTURAS FUNDAMENTALES CONCRETAS

description: Abstract Several problems in philosophy of physics have led to ‘ontic structural realism’, i. e., the supposition that, at the fundamental physical level, there are no ‘objects’, but ‘structures’. There are various requirements that a ‘structure’ should satisfy for ‘ontic structural realism’. Structures must be concrete entities, there must be something that fulfills the role of ‘node’, and the relations of the structure must not be dependent on the objects that are being related. Most of the traditional ontologies, both of substrata and properties, and of bundles of properties, seem to be inadequate to satisfy those requirements. It is argued here that there are several ways in which those requirements can be met: by nodal relations, by primitive ‘nodal facts’, and by symmetric dependencies between objects and relations.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.10026152
title: THOMAS KUHN’S THEORY OF RATIONALITY

description: Abstract According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.10026152.v1
title: THOMAS KUHN’S THEORY OF RATIONALITY

description: Abstract According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.10026056
title: THE SYSTEMATIC USE OF THE FIVE MODES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT

description: Abstract The five modes are a list of tools used by ancient sceptics to guide dogmatic people towards suspending their judgement. Attributed to Agrippa (of uncertain date) and used extensively by Sextus Empiricus (2nd or 3rd century CE), these modes are still widely discussed today by epistemologists and specialists in ancient philosophy. Scholars disagree, however, on how to understand the way the five modes are used together and what the logical form of the sceptical strategy behind their deployment is. This paper offers a reconstruction of the system of the five modes that avoids these problems. In specific, unlike previous reconstructions, (a) it includes a non-trivial version of the mode of relativity, (b) avoids committing the sceptic to a normative principle and (c) follows the textual evidence more closely. Moreover, I argue that the system can be better understood as a list of steps in a process, whose underlying logic can be expressed by a single algorithm.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.10026056.v1
title: THE SYSTEMATIC USE OF THE FIVE MODES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT

description: Abstract The five modes are a list of tools used by ancient sceptics to guide dogmatic people towards suspending their judgement. Attributed to Agrippa (of uncertain date) and used extensively by Sextus Empiricus (2nd or 3rd century CE), these modes are still widely discussed today by epistemologists and specialists in ancient philosophy. Scholars disagree, however, on how to understand the way the five modes are used together and what the logical form of the sceptical strategy behind their deployment is. This paper offers a reconstruction of the system of the five modes that avoids these problems. In specific, unlike previous reconstructions, (a) it includes a non-trivial version of the mode of relativity, (b) avoids committing the sceptic to a normative principle and (c) follows the textual evidence more closely. Moreover, I argue that the system can be better understood as a list of steps in a process, whose underlying logic can be expressed by a single algorithm.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.11266898
title: The aporia of ἢ ἐϰ παντὸς in Posterior Analytics II.19

description: Abstract This article sketches, and works to motivate, a controversial approach to Posterior Analytics II.19. But its primary goal is to recommend a novel solution to one particular interpretive aporia that’s especially vexed recent scholars working on Post. An. II.19. The aporia concerns how to understand the enigmatic ē ek pantos... (≈ “or from all...”) in the genealogical account of foundational knowledge at II.19 100a3-9. Our proposed solution to the aporia is discussed in connection with a number of larger philosophical issues concerning Aristotle’s theory of epistē mē.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.11266898.v1
title: The aporia of ἢ ἐϰ παντὸς in Posterior Analytics II.19

description: Abstract This article sketches, and works to motivate, a controversial approach to Posterior Analytics II.19. But its primary goal is to recommend a novel solution to one particular interpretive aporia that’s especially vexed recent scholars working on Post. An. II.19. The aporia concerns how to understand the enigmatic ē ek pantos... (≈ “or from all...”) in the genealogical account of foundational knowledge at II.19 100a3-9. Our proposed solution to the aporia is discussed in connection with a number of larger philosophical issues concerning Aristotle’s theory of epistē mē.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005332
title: S5-denying Approach to Relativized Metaphysical Modality

description: Abstract This paper is organised as follows: first, I present Salmon’s theory of modality (which I call ‘S5-denying approach to relativized metaphysical modality’) and compare it with the standard interpretation of modality: ‘the nonrelativized S5-friendly interpretation of metaphysical modality’. Second, I explain Murray and Wilson’s ‘two-dimensional S5-friendly interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality’. In the third and last part, I put forward a few arguments against Murray and Wilson’s attempt to provide an essentialist S5-friendly theory for modality. In general, this paper argues that if one wants to hold an essentialist theory for relativized (metaphysical) modality, then his best option in the market right now is to stick with Salmon’s proposal, which better represents a genuine essentialist interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005332.v1
title: S5-denying Approach to Relativized Metaphysical Modality

description: Abstract This paper is organised as follows: first, I present Salmon’s theory of modality (which I call ‘S5-denying approach to relativized metaphysical modality’) and compare it with the standard interpretation of modality: ‘the nonrelativized S5-friendly interpretation of metaphysical modality’. Second, I explain Murray and Wilson’s ‘two-dimensional S5-friendly interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality’. In the third and last part, I put forward a few arguments against Murray and Wilson’s attempt to provide an essentialist S5-friendly theory for modality. In general, this paper argues that if one wants to hold an essentialist theory for relativized (metaphysical) modality, then his best option in the market right now is to stick with Salmon’s proposal, which better represents a genuine essentialist interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005335.v1
title: Similarity as an extension of symmetry and its application to superrationality

description: Abstract In this paper we present a concept of similarity in games, on which to ground alternative solution concepts, some of which differ from the classical notions in the field. In order to do this we impose a constraint on players’ beliefs that amounts to a variant of the well-known symmetry principle in classical bargaining theory. We show how this similarity relation helps to identify different Nash equilibria in games, and how these “similar Nash equilibria” can be extended to non-symmetric games. While the notion is normative, it is nonetheless inspired by phenomena in which similarities between players lead to outcomes detected in behavioral studies. We study the strategic properties of the concept of similarity and discuss its relationships with Hofstadter’ notion of superrationality.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005335
title: Similarity as an extension of symmetry and its application to superrationality

description: Abstract In this paper we present a concept of similarity in games, on which to ground alternative solution concepts, some of which differ from the classical notions in the field. In order to do this we impose a constraint on players’ beliefs that amounts to a variant of the well-known symmetry principle in classical bargaining theory. We show how this similarity relation helps to identify different Nash equilibria in games, and how these “similar Nash equilibria” can be extended to non-symmetric games. While the notion is normative, it is nonetheless inspired by phenomena in which similarities between players lead to outcomes detected in behavioral studies. We study the strategic properties of the concept of similarity and discuss its relationships with Hofstadter’ notion of superrationality.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005345
title: VAGUENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A NEW REPLY TO VAN INWAGEN

description: Abstract One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005345.v1
title: VAGUENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A NEW REPLY TO VAN INWAGEN

description: Abstract One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005347.v1
title: FUNDAMENTALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

description: Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20005347
title: FUNDAMENTALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

description: Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.