cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.3886/e113869v1
title: Replication data for: Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin

description: This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We find that treatment reduces the prevalence of clientelism and does not affect turnout. Treatment also lowers the vote shares for the candidate with a political stronghold in the village and is more effective in garnering votes in regions where a candidate does not have a political stronghold.
DOI: 10.3886/e113336
title: Replication data for: Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

description: This paper reports the results of an experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our findings are as follows. First, when the buyers can communicate, discrimination raises the likelihood of exclusion. Second, when the incumbent seller is unable to discriminate and must make the same offers to the buyers, communication reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces more generous offers when the seller cannot discriminate, and divide-and-conquer offers when the seller can discriminate. Third, when communication is allowed, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. (JEL C72, C91, D62, D86, K12, K21, L12, L42)
DOI: 10.3886/e113336v1
title: Replication data for: Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

description: This paper reports the results of an experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our findings are as follows. First, when the buyers can communicate, discrimination raises the likelihood of exclusion. Second, when the incumbent seller is unable to discriminate and must make the same offers to the buyers, communication reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces more generous offers when the seller cannot discriminate, and divide-and-conquer offers when the seller can discriminate. Third, when communication is allowed, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. (JEL C72, C91, D62, D86, K12, K21, L12, L42)
DOI: 10.3886/e113337
title: Replication data for: The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com

description: We compare house sales on a For-Sale-By-Owner (FSBO) platform to Multiple Listing Service (MLS) sales and find that FSBO precommission prices are no lower, but that FSBO is less effective in terms of time to sell and probability of a sale. We do not find direct evidence of the importance of network size as a reason for the lower effectiveness of FSBO. We do find evidence of endogenous platform differentiation: patient sellers use FSBO while patient buyers transact more often on the MLS (where they avoid patient sellers). We discuss the implications for platform competition, two-sided markets, and welfare. (JEL L85, M31, R31)
DOI: 10.3886/e113337v1
title: Replication data for: The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com

description: We compare house sales on a For-Sale-By-Owner (FSBO) platform to Multiple Listing Service (MLS) sales and find that FSBO precommission prices are no lower, but that FSBO is less effective in terms of time to sell and probability of a sale. We do not find direct evidence of the importance of network size as a reason for the lower effectiveness of FSBO. We do find evidence of endogenous platform differentiation: patient sellers use FSBO while patient buyers transact more often on the MLS (where they avoid patient sellers). We discuss the implications for platform competition, two-sided markets, and welfare. (JEL L85, M31, R31)
DOI: 10.3886/e113338
title: Replication data for: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning

description: New ideas, products, and practices take time to diffuse, a fact that is often attributed to some form of heterogeneity among potential adopters. This paper examines three broad classes of diffusion models -- contagion, social influence, and social learning -- and shows how to incorporate heterogeneity into each at a high level of generality without losing analytical tractability. Each type of model leaves a characteristic "footprint" on the shape of the adoption curve which provides a basis for discriminating empirically between them. The approach is illustrated using the classic study of Ryan and Gross (1943) on the diffusion of hybrid corn. (JEL D83, O33, Q16, Z13)
DOI: 10.3886/e113338v1
title: Replication data for: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning

description: New ideas, products, and practices take time to diffuse, a fact that is often attributed to some form of heterogeneity among potential adopters. This paper examines three broad classes of diffusion models -- contagion, social influence, and social learning -- and shows how to incorporate heterogeneity into each at a high level of generality without losing analytical tractability. Each type of model leaves a characteristic "footprint" on the shape of the adoption curve which provides a basis for discriminating empirically between them. The approach is illustrated using the classic study of Ryan and Gross (1943) on the diffusion of hybrid corn. (JEL D83, O33, Q16, Z13)
DOI: 10.3886/e113593
title: Replication data for: Social Networks and the Decision to Insure

description: Using data from a randomized experiment in rural China, we study the influence of social networks on weather insurance adoption and the mechanisms through which they operate. To quantify network effects, the experiment provides intensive information sessions about the product to a random subset of farmers. For untreated farmers, the effect of having an additional treated friend on take-up is equivalent to granting a 13 percent reduction in the insurance premium. By varying the information available about peers' decisions and randomizing default options, we show that the network effect is driven by the diffusion of insurance knowledge rather than purchase decisions. (JEL G22, O12, O16, P36, Q12, Q54, Z13)
DOI: 10.3886/e113594
title: Replication data for: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

description: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
DOI: 10.3886/e113594v1
title: Replication data for: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

description: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
DOI: 10.3886/e113595
title: Replication data for: Together We Will: Experimental Evidence on Female Voting Behavior in Pakistan

description: In many emerging democracies women are less likely to vote than men and, when they do vote, are likely to follow the wishes of male household and clan heads. We assess the impact of a voter awareness campaign on female turnout, candidate choice and party vote shares. Geographic clusters within villages were randomly assigned to treatment or control, and within treated clusters, some households were not targeted. Compared to women in control clusters, both targeted and untargeted women in treated clusters are 11 percentage points more likely to vote, and are also more likely to exercise independence in candidate choice, indicating large spillovers. Data from polling stations suggests that treating 10 women increased female turnout by about seven votes, resulting in a cost per vote of US$3.1. Finally, a 10 percent increase in the share of treated women at the polling station led to a 7 percent decrease in the share of votes of the winning party.
DOI: 10.3886/e113595v1
title: Replication data for: Together We Will: Experimental Evidence on Female Voting Behavior in Pakistan

description: In many emerging democracies women are less likely to vote than men and, when they do vote, are likely to follow the wishes of male household and clan heads. We assess the impact of a voter awareness campaign on female turnout, candidate choice and party vote shares. Geographic clusters within villages were randomly assigned to treatment or control, and within treated clusters, some households were not targeted. Compared to women in control clusters, both targeted and untargeted women in treated clusters are 11 percentage points more likely to vote, and are also more likely to exercise independence in candidate choice, indicating large spillovers. Data from polling stations suggests that treating 10 women increased female turnout by about seven votes, resulting in a cost per vote of US$3.1. Finally, a 10 percent increase in the share of treated women at the polling station led to a 7 percent decrease in the share of votes of the winning party.
DOI: 10.3886/e113870
title: Replication data for: Getting beneath the Veil of Effective Schools: Evidence from New York City

description: In this paper, we collect data on the inner-workings of 39 charter schools and correlate these data with school effectiveness. We find that traditionally collected input measures -- class size, per-pupil expenditure, teacher certification, and teacher training -- are not correlated with school effectiveness. In stark contrast, we show that an index of five policies suggested by qualitative research -- frequent teacher feedback, the use of data to guide instruction, high-dosage tutoring, increased instructional time, and high expectations -- explains approximately 45 percent of the variation in school effectiveness. The same index provides similar results in a separate sample of charter schools.
DOI: 10.3886/e113870v1
title: Replication data for: Getting beneath the Veil of Effective Schools: Evidence from New York City

description: In this paper, we collect data on the inner-workings of 39 charter schools and correlate these data with school effectiveness. We find that traditionally collected input measures -- class size, per-pupil expenditure, teacher certification, and teacher training -- are not correlated with school effectiveness. In stark contrast, we show that an index of five policies suggested by qualitative research -- frequent teacher feedback, the use of data to guide instruction, high-dosage tutoring, increased instructional time, and high expectations -- explains approximately 45 percent of the variation in school effectiveness. The same index provides similar results in a separate sample of charter schools.
DOI: 10.3886/e113871v1
title: Replication data for: Risk Protection, Service Use, and Health Outcomes under Colombia's Health Insurance Program for the Poor

description: Unexpected medical care spending imposes considerable financial risk on developing country households. Based on managed care models of health insurance in wealthy countries, Colombia's Régimen Subsidiado is a publicly financed insurance program targeted to the poor, aiming both to provide risk protection and to promote allocative efficiency in the use of medical care. Using a "fuzzy" regression discontinuity design, we find that the program has shielded the poor from some financial risk while increasing the use of traditionally underutilized preventive services—with measurable health gains.
DOI: 10.3886/e113872
title: Replication data for: Deterrence and Geographical Externalities in Auto Theft

description: Understanding the degree of geographical crime displacement is crucial for the design of crime prevention policies. This paper documents changes in automobile theft risk that were generated by the plausibly exogenous introduction of Lojack, a highly effective stolen vehicle recovery device, into a number of new Ford car models in some Mexican states, but not others. Lojack-equipped vehicles in Lojack-coverage states experienced a 48 percent reduction in theft risk due to deterrence effects. However, 18 percent of the reduction in thefts was displaced toward unprotected Lojack models in non-Lojack states, providing new evidence of geographical crime displacement in auto theft.
DOI: 10.3886/e113872v1
title: Replication data for: Deterrence and Geographical Externalities in Auto Theft

description: Understanding the degree of geographical crime displacement is crucial for the design of crime prevention policies. This paper documents changes in automobile theft risk that were generated by the plausibly exogenous introduction of Lojack, a highly effective stolen vehicle recovery device, into a number of new Ford car models in some Mexican states, but not others. Lojack-equipped vehicles in Lojack-coverage states experienced a 48 percent reduction in theft risk due to deterrence effects. However, 18 percent of the reduction in thefts was displaced toward unprotected Lojack models in non-Lojack states, providing new evidence of geographical crime displacement in auto theft.
DOI: 10.3886/e113873v1
title: Replication data for: Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions

description: This paper presents evidence on the perverse trade-off that first price auctions induce between low prices at the awarding stage and poor ex post performance when bids are not binding commitments. By exploiting the different timing with which first price auctions were introduced in Italy to procure public works, this study finds that at least half of the cost savings from lower winning prices are lost because of ex post renegotiation. Screening the lowest price bid for its responsiveness prevents performance worsening but also reduces the initial cost savings by a third and induces delays in awarding the contract.
DOI: 10.3886/e113103
title: Replication data for: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

description: We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.
DOI: 10.3886/e113103v1
title: Replication data for: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

description: We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.
DOI: 10.3886/e113339
title: Replication data for: Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

description: The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)
DOI: 10.3886/e113339v1
title: Replication data for: Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

description: The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)
DOI: 10.3886/e113340
title: Replication data for: Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics

description: This paper presents evidence about the effect of individual monetary incentives on English and math teachers in Israel. Teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for improving their students' performance in high-school matriculation exams. The main identification strategy is based on measurement error in the assignment to treatment variable that produced a randomized treatment sample. The incentives led to significant improvements in test taking rates, conditional pass rates, and mean test scores. Improvements were mediated through changes in teaching methods, enhanced after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs. No evidence was found of manipulation of test scores by teachers. (JEL I21, J31, J45)
DOI: 10.3886/e113340v1
title: Replication data for: Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics

description: This paper presents evidence about the effect of individual monetary incentives on English and math teachers in Israel. Teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for improving their students' performance in high-school matriculation exams. The main identification strategy is based on measurement error in the assignment to treatment variable that produced a randomized treatment sample. The incentives led to significant improvements in test taking rates, conditional pass rates, and mean test scores. Improvements were mediated through changes in teaching methods, enhanced after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs. No evidence was found of manipulation of test scores by teachers. (JEL I21, J31, J45)
DOI: 10.3886/e113341
title: Replication data for: On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model

description: Contrary to what is usually assumed, the expected revenue for lenders as a function of the loan rate cannot be globally hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model with a continuum of types. This has important implications. First, if there is credit rationing, there must be at least two equilibrium loan rates. Second, while at the low rate loans are rationed, all those applicants willing to pay the high rate are then served. Numerical analysis shows that unless the joint distribution of risk class and output is rather special, the two loan rate outcome with rationing is unlikely. (JEL D82, G21)
DOI: 10.3886/e113341v1
title: Replication data for: On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model

description: Contrary to what is usually assumed, the expected revenue for lenders as a function of the loan rate cannot be globally hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model with a continuum of types. This has important implications. First, if there is credit rationing, there must be at least two equilibrium loan rates. Second, while at the low rate loans are rationed, all those applicants willing to pay the high rate are then served. Numerical analysis shows that unless the joint distribution of risk class and output is rather special, the two loan rate outcome with rationing is unlikely. (JEL D82, G21)
DOI: 10.3886/e113342
title: Replication data for: Peer-Induced Fairness in Games

description: People exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as a reference to evaluate their endowments. We analyze two independent ultimatum games played sequentially by a leader and two followers. With peer-induced fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first follower. Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower. Allowing for heterogeneity, we find that 50 percent of subjects are fairness-minded. We discuss how peer-induced fairness might limit price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation, and explain pattern bargaining. (JEL C72, D63 )
DOI: 10.3886/e113342v1
title: Replication data for: Peer-Induced Fairness in Games

description: People exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as a reference to evaluate their endowments. We analyze two independent ultimatum games played sequentially by a leader and two followers. With peer-induced fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first follower. Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower. Allowing for heterogeneity, we find that 50 percent of subjects are fairness-minded. We discuss how peer-induced fairness might limit price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation, and explain pattern bargaining. (JEL C72, D63 )