DOI: 10.3886/e208442v1
title: Data and Code for "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency"

description: This entry is data and or code accompanying the article "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency." The summary of the study presented in the paper is as follows. This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa's traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency's revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness.
description: Branch 1: n/a<br>Branch 2: n/a<br>Branch 3: aggregation of events observed from sample of two agents at each intersection accounts for sampling procedure of agents among the pool of (typically) four agents per intersection. A full description of those weights, when they are used, is provided in Supplemental Appendix I of "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency"<br><br>
description: Response Rates: We designed five data collection branches inside the eight stations and 15 intersections (with 63 unique agents) of the target experiment sample to cover the 30 days of the target experiment sample and Day Zero. As described in the next paragraph, the target experiment sample was afflicted by festivities, attrition, and replacements; those affected the data collection activities in this sample, too. Furthermore, on Day Zero, some branches could only cover 14 teams. Thus, the branches were implemented in the 337 team-days of the experiment sample and the 14 teams on Day Zero. This produced an imbalanced panel of 337+14=351 team-days (henceforth, data collection sample), composed of eight stations and their eight managers, 16 JPOs, 16 FCAs, and 63 agents (and 12 replacements) in 15 intersections (and three replacements), shown in Table A2, Column 1 in the article.<br><br>In the target experiment sample, closure due to festivities and the removal of two teams for precaution led to the loss of 90 and 38 team-days, respectively (44 and 17 of which were assigned to the encouragement, respectively), resulting in a sample of 337 team-days (the \textit{experiment sample}). First, there were five Sundays and one festivity, leading to the loss of 6 days for each of the 15 non-dropped teams---i.e., 90 team-days. Second, in each of days 3, 5 and 6, we replaced one team, leading to no loss; the teams had been reshuffled; on day 8, we dropped two teams, leading to the loss of 38 (non-festivity) team-days; we had learned that the agents were tense.
description: Presence of Common Scales: n/a
description: The experiment was designed in 2015 in one of the two battalions of Kinshasa's commissariat, covering 7 of its 14 stations as well as Kinshasa's central station. This thus covered the staff of 8 police stations. Such staff was composed of 8 managers, 16 JPOs, 16 FCAs, and 15 teams of agents permanently posted to 15 distinct intersections, totaling 63 agents (13 teams had 4 agents, one of 5, and one of 6). <br><br>In the stations, we sampled the universe of interactions between the JPO and the driver (in Branch 1 and Branch 2) as well as between the FCA and the driver (Branch 2). In the street, in each of the 15 intersections, we sampled the universe of interactions between two randomly selected agents and the drivers; in this case, the agents were independently randomly selected each day from the pool of assigned agents for that intersection (which, for each intersection is typically 4).<br>
description: Interactions between traffic police agents and drivers in the street<br>Interactions between drivers and judicial police officers in the stations<br>Interactions between drivers and fine collection agents in the stations<br>. Smallest Geographic Unit: intersection
description: coded on-site observation; self-enumerated questionnaire;