DOI: 10.7910/dvn/igmj7e
title: Replication Data for: A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power

description: The documents here are a PDF Data Guide plus 17 Excel Files (numbered 1 to 17) containing the actual data and calculations. The PDF Data Guide is a PDF of the Article with the text of each calculation-based assertion highlighted in yellow. For each piece of highlighted text, there is an appurtenant comment, which gives a reference to a numbered Excel File and to one or more cells (or columns or rows) within that Excel File that provide the support for the assertion. (Note that sometimes a sheet within the specified Excel File is also referenced.) &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;

Abstract: The Supreme Court is poised to toughen the nondelegation doctrine to strike
down acts of Congress that give broad discretion to administrators, signaling a potential revolution in the separation of powers. A majority of the Justices have suggested in recent opinions that they are open to the far-reaching theory that all agency rulemaking is unconstitutional insofar as it coerces private parties and is not about foreign affairs. If adopted, this theory would invalidate most of the federal regulatory state. Jurists and scholars critical of rulemaking’s constitutionality base their claims on the original meaning of the Constitution. But these critics face a serious obstacle: early Congresses enacted several broad delegations of administrative rulemaking authority. The critics’ main response has been that these early statutes do not count, because they fall into two areas in which (say the critics) the original nondelegation doctrine did not apply, or applied only weakly: noncoercive legislation (e.g., giving benefits) or foreign-affairs legislation. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;

This Article finds that the originalist critics of rulemaking are mistaken to say that no early congressional grant of rulemaking power was coercive and domestic. There is a major counterexample missed by the literature on nondelegation, indeed by all of legal scholarship, and not discussed more than briefly even by historians: the rulemaking power under the “direct tax” of 1798. In that legislation, Congress apportioned a federal tax quota to the people of each state, to be paid predominantly by owners of real estate in proportion to their properties’ respective values. Thousands of federal assessors assigned taxable values to literally every house and farm in every state of the Union, deciding what each was “worth in money”—a standard that the legislation
did not define. Because assessors in different parts of a state could differ greatly in how they did valuation, Congress established within each state a federal board of tax commissioners with the power to divide the state into districts and to raise or lower the assessors’ valuations of all real estate in any district by any proportion “as shall appear to be just and equitable”—a phrase undefined in the statute and not a term of art. The federal boards’ power to revise valuations en masse in each intrastate tax district is identical to the fact pattern in the leading Supreme Court precedent
defining rulemaking. Thus, each federal board in 1798 controlled, by rule, the distribution of the federal real-estate tax burden within the state it covered.