cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.3886/e114771
title: Replication data for: The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and the Demand for Labor: Evidence from Hawaii

description: We examine the effects of the most durable employer health insurance mandate in the United States, Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, using Current Population Survey data covering the years 1979 to 2005. Relying on a variation of the classical Fisher permutation test applied across states, we find that Hawaii's law increased insurance coverage over time for worker groups with low rates of coverage in the voluntary market. We find no statistically significant support for the hypothesis that the mandate reduced wages and employment probabilities. Instead, its primary detectable effect was an increased reliance on exempt part-time workers. (JEL G22, I18, J23, J32)
DOI: 10.3886/e114771v1
title: Replication data for: The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and the Demand for Labor: Evidence from Hawaii

description: We examine the effects of the most durable employer health insurance mandate in the United States, Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, using Current Population Survey data covering the years 1979 to 2005. Relying on a variation of the classical Fisher permutation test applied across states, we find that Hawaii's law increased insurance coverage over time for worker groups with low rates of coverage in the voluntary market. We find no statistically significant support for the hypothesis that the mandate reduced wages and employment probabilities. Instead, its primary detectable effect was an increased reliance on exempt part-time workers. (JEL G22, I18, J23, J32)
DOI: 10.3886/e114090v1
title: Replication data for: Bank Leverage Cycles

description: We propose a general equilibrium framework with financial intermediaries subject to endogenous leverage constraints, and assess its ability to explain the observed fluctuations in intermediary leverage and real economic activity. In the model, intermediaries ("banks") borrow in the form of short-term risky debt. The presence of risk-shifting moral hazard gives rise to a leverage constraint, and creates a link between the volatility in bank asset returns and leverage. Unlike TFP or capital quality shocks, volatility shocks produce empirically plausible fluctuations in bank leverage. The model replicates well the fall in leverage, assets, and GDP during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
DOI: 10.3886/e114136v1
title: Replication data for: A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow Banking System

description: I develop a macroeconomic model in which banks can affect loan quality by exerting costly screening effort. Informational frictions limit the amount of external funds that banks can raise. In this framework I consider two types of financial intermediation, traditional banking and shadow banking. By pooling different loans, shadow banks achieve a higher endogenous leverage compared to traditional banks, increasing credit availability. However, shadow banks also make the financial sector more fragile, because of the lower quality of the loans they finance and because of their exposure to bank runs. In this setting unconventional monetary policy can reduce macroeconomic instability.
DOI: 10.3886/e114311
title: Replication data for: Consumption, Income Changes, and Heterogeneity: Evidence from Two Fiscal Stimulus Programs

description: Almost half of American families did not adjust their consumption following receipt of the 2001 or 2008 tax rebates. Another 20 percent, with low income and more likely to rent, spent a small but significant amount. Households with large spending propensity held high levels of mortgage debt. The heterogeneity is concentrated in a few nondurable categories and a handful of "new vehicle" purchases. The cumulated predictions of the heterogeneous response model tend to be smaller and more accurate than their homogeneous response model counterparts, offering new insights on the evaluation of the two fiscal stimulus programs.
DOI: 10.3886/e114311v1
title: Replication data for: Consumption, Income Changes, and Heterogeneity: Evidence from Two Fiscal Stimulus Programs

description: Almost half of American families did not adjust their consumption following receipt of the 2001 or 2008 tax rebates. Another 20 percent, with low income and more likely to rent, spent a small but significant amount. Households with large spending propensity held high levels of mortgage debt. The heterogeneity is concentrated in a few nondurable categories and a handful of "new vehicle" purchases. The cumulated predictions of the heterogeneous response model tend to be smaller and more accurate than their homogeneous response model counterparts, offering new insights on the evaluation of the two fiscal stimulus programs.
DOI: 10.3886/e114312
title: Replication data for: The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

description: We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known "strengths" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise payoff and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand these anomalous findings. (JEL C91, D82)
DOI: 10.3886/e114312v1
title: Replication data for: The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

description: We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known "strengths" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise payoff and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand these anomalous findings. (JEL C91, D82)
DOI: 10.3886/e114313
title: Replication data for: The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study

description: The Winner's Curse (WC) is a robust and persistent deviation from theoretical predictions established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in field environments. Recent attempts to reconcile such deviation include "cursed equilibrium" and level-k reasoning. We design and implement a simplified version of the Acquiring-a-Company game that transformed the game to an individual-choice problem that still retains the adverse-selection problem. We further simplified the problem so that simple ordinal reasoning could replace both Bayesian updating and contingent thinking. Our results suggest that the WC reflects bounded rationality in that people have difficulties performing contingent reasoning on future events. (JEL D81, D82)
DOI: 10.3886/e114313v1
title: Replication data for: The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study

description: The Winner's Curse (WC) is a robust and persistent deviation from theoretical predictions established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in field environments. Recent attempts to reconcile such deviation include "cursed equilibrium" and level-k reasoning. We design and implement a simplified version of the Acquiring-a-Company game that transformed the game to an individual-choice problem that still retains the adverse-selection problem. We further simplified the problem so that simple ordinal reasoning could replace both Bayesian updating and contingent thinking. Our results suggest that the WC reflects bounded rationality in that people have difficulties performing contingent reasoning on future events. (JEL D81, D82)
DOI: 10.3886/e114314
title: Replication data for: Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene

description: How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restaurants to maintain good hygiene quality. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for good hygiene at both chain and nonchain restaurants. Despite these incentives, a policy intervention in the form of posted hygiene grade cards causes significant improvements in restaurant hygiene. (JEL I18, I19, L14, L83).
DOI: 10.3886/e114314v1
title: Replication data for: Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene

description: How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restaurants to maintain good hygiene quality. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for good hygiene at both chain and nonchain restaurants. Despite these incentives, a policy intervention in the form of posted hygiene grade cards causes significant improvements in restaurant hygiene. (JEL I18, I19, L14, L83).
DOI: 10.3886/e114772
title: Replication data for: Medicare Part D and the Financial Protection of the Elderly

description: We examine the impact of the expansion of public prescription-drug insurance coverage from Medicare Part D and find evidence of substantial crowd-out. Using the 2002-2007 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we estimate the extension of Part D benefits resulted in 75 percent crowd-out of both prescription-drug insurance coverage and expenditures of those 65 and older. Part D is associated with sizeable reductions in out-of-pocket spending, much of which has accrued to a small proportion of the elderly. On average, we estimate a welfare gain from Part D comparable to the deadweight cost of program financing. (JEL H51, I18, J14)
DOI: 10.3886/e114772v1
title: Replication data for: Medicare Part D and the Financial Protection of the Elderly

description: We examine the impact of the expansion of public prescription-drug insurance coverage from Medicare Part D and find evidence of substantial crowd-out. Using the 2002-2007 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we estimate the extension of Part D benefits resulted in 75 percent crowd-out of both prescription-drug insurance coverage and expenditures of those 65 and older. Part D is associated with sizeable reductions in out-of-pocket spending, much of which has accrued to a small proportion of the elderly. On average, we estimate a welfare gain from Part D comparable to the deadweight cost of program financing. (JEL H51, I18, J14)
DOI: 10.3886/e114773v1
title: Replication data for: Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State

description: Hospitals now represent one of the largest union sectors of the US economy, and there is particular concern about the impact of strikes on patient welfare. We analyze the effects of nurses' strikes in hospitals on patient outcomes in New York State. Controlling for hospital specific heterogeneity, the results show that nurses' strikes increase in-hospital mortality by 18.3 percent and 30-day readmission by 5.7 percent for patients admitted during a strike, with little change in patient demographics, disease severity or treatment intensity. The results suggest that hospitals functioning during nurses' strikes do so at a lower quality of patient care. (JEL H75, I11, I12, J52)
DOI: 10.3886/e114136
title: Replication data for: A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow Banking System

description: I develop a macroeconomic model in which banks can affect loan quality by exerting costly screening effort. Informational frictions limit the amount of external funds that banks can raise. In this framework I consider two types of financial intermediation, traditional banking and shadow banking. By pooling different loans, shadow banks achieve a higher endogenous leverage compared to traditional banks, increasing credit availability. However, shadow banks also make the financial sector more fragile, because of the lower quality of the loans they finance and because of their exposure to bank runs. In this setting unconventional monetary policy can reduce macroeconomic instability.
DOI: 10.3886/e114137
title: Replication data for: Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective

description: This paper studies the consequences of predation when firms deploy guard labor as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys, which ask about firm-level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across firms and from production to protection. The loss due to protection effort is substantial and patterns of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output losses. Various extensions are discussed.
DOI: 10.3886/e114137v1
title: Replication data for: Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective

description: This paper studies the consequences of predation when firms deploy guard labor as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys, which ask about firm-level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across firms and from production to protection. The loss due to protection effort is substantial and patterns of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output losses. Various extensions are discussed.
DOI: 10.3886/e114315
title: Replication data for: The Geography of Trade in Online Transactions: Evidence from eBay and MercadoLibre

description: We analyze geographic patterns of trade between individuals using transactions data from eBay and MercadoLibre, two large online auction sites. We find that distance continues to be an important deterrent to trade between geographically separated buyers and sellers, though to a lesser extent than has been observed in studies of non-Internet commerce between business counterparties. We also find a strong "home bias" for trading with counterparties located in the same city. Further analyses suggest that location-specific goods such as opera tickets, cultural factors, and the possibility of direct contract enforcement in case of breach may be the main reasons behind the same-city bias. (JEL D44, F11, R12)
DOI: 10.3886/e114315v1
title: Replication data for: The Geography of Trade in Online Transactions: Evidence from eBay and MercadoLibre

description: We analyze geographic patterns of trade between individuals using transactions data from eBay and MercadoLibre, two large online auction sites. We find that distance continues to be an important deterrent to trade between geographically separated buyers and sellers, though to a lesser extent than has been observed in studies of non-Internet commerce between business counterparties. We also find a strong "home bias" for trading with counterparties located in the same city. Further analyses suggest that location-specific goods such as opera tickets, cultural factors, and the possibility of direct contract enforcement in case of breach may be the main reasons behind the same-city bias. (JEL D44, F11, R12)
DOI: 10.3886/e114316
title: Replication data for: Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment

description: This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to transfer the assets between initial and final owners. The uncertainty of trade in networks constitutes a potentially important market friction. Nevertheless, we find the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory converges to competitive equilibrium behavior in a variety of treatments. However, the rate of convergence varies depending on the network, pricing rule, and payoff function. (JEL C91, C92, G10, G19)
DOI: 10.3886/e114316v1
title: Replication data for: Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment

description: This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to transfer the assets between initial and final owners. The uncertainty of trade in networks constitutes a potentially important market friction. Nevertheless, we find the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory converges to competitive equilibrium behavior in a variety of treatments. However, the rate of convergence varies depending on the network, pricing rule, and payoff function. (JEL C91, C92, G10, G19)
DOI: 10.3886/e114317
title: Replication data for: Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

description: Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple experiment, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. (JEL C91, D40, D81)
DOI: 10.3886/e114317v1
title: Replication data for: Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

description: Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple experiment, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. (JEL C91, D40, D81)
DOI: 10.3886/e114555
title: Replication data for: Did the Americanization Movement Succeed? An Evaluation of the Effect of English-Only and Compulsory Schooling Laws on Immigrants

description: We provide the first estimates of the effect of statutes requiring English as the language of instruction and compulsory schooling laws on the school enrollment, work, literacy, and English fluency of immigrant children during the Americanization period (1910-1930). English-only statutes moderately increased the literacy of certain foreign-born children, particularly those living in cities or whose parents were not fluent in English. However, these laws had no impact on immigrants' eventual labor market outcomes or measures of social integration (from 1940 census and WWII enlistment records). Only laws regulating the age when children could work significantly affected immigrant outcomes. (JEL I21, I26, I28, J13, J15, N31, N32)
DOI: 10.3886/e114555v1
title: Replication data for: Did the Americanization Movement Succeed? An Evaluation of the Effect of English-Only and Compulsory Schooling Laws on Immigrants

description: We provide the first estimates of the effect of statutes requiring English as the language of instruction and compulsory schooling laws on the school enrollment, work, literacy, and English fluency of immigrant children during the Americanization period (1910-1930). English-only statutes moderately increased the literacy of certain foreign-born children, particularly those living in cities or whose parents were not fluent in English. However, these laws had no impact on immigrants' eventual labor market outcomes or measures of social integration (from 1940 census and WWII enlistment records). Only laws regulating the age when children could work significantly affected immigrant outcomes. (JEL I21, I26, I28, J13, J15, N31, N32)
DOI: 10.3886/e114556
title: Replication data for: Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948

description: I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)
DOI: 10.3886/e114556v1
title: Replication data for: Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948

description: I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)
DOI: 10.3886/e114557
title: Replication data for: Using Taxes to Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions Rates of New Passenger Vehicles: Evidence from France, Germany, and Sweden

description: France, Germany, and Sweden link taxes to passenger vehicles' carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rates. Based on new vehicle registration data from 2005 to 2010, we find that CO2 taxes reduce registrations. The effect is larger in France than in either Germany or Sweden, and the French results are robust to alternative estimation models. Compared with those of France, the German results vary somewhat more, and the Swedish estimates are the least robust. We find some evidence that the French tax affected the mix of new vehicles that vehicle manufacturers offered in the French market. (JEL H23, L62, Q54, Q58)