cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.17632/wdns6h9vmt.1
title: Data for: Vote suppression and insecure property rights

description: Abstract of associated article: While it is commonly understood that land is a political tool, there is surprisingly little empirical research on how insecure property rights affect political outcomes. In this paper, we show how a dominant political party can use insecure property rights to ensure politically compliant voter behavior and how this power is frustrated after the introduction of a land certification program. We test this hypothesis on data covering 10,000 Mexican municipal elections during the country's democratic transition. Exploiting the gradual rollout of a large-scale land certification program, we find that land titles significantly raised the number of votes for the main opposition parties. Importantly, this effect disappears once the dominant party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has already lost at least one election in the municipality. These results provide an additional explanation of the PRI's downfall and, more generally, illuminate the relationship between political power, institutions and resource allocation.
DOI: 10.17632/zf4zbgjxrd.1
title: Data for: Wage effects of non-wage labour costs

description: Abstract of associated article: We study wage effects of two important elements of non-wage labour costs: firing costs and payroll taxes. We exploit a reform that introduced substantial reduction in these two provisions for unemployed workers aged less than 30 and over 45years who got a permanent job. A matching model with heterogeneous workers predicts positive wage effects of reducing firing costs but ambiguous wage effects of reducing payroll taxes, for both new entrant and incumbent workers. Difference-in-differences estimates and simulation of the model show positive wage effects for both new entrant and incumbent workers. The reduction in firing costs accounts for up to half of the overall wage increase for new entrants but only 10% for incumbents.
DOI: 10.17632/5rs4gbg58h.1
title: Data for: The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality

description: Abstract of associated article: Unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies. Introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies. This paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality. We build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction, on-the-job search, and intersectoral flows, where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs. We calibrate the model for Mexico, and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system, where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs, even if they obtain informal jobs, can lead to an increase in formality in the economy, while also producing small increases in unemployment. The exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects: the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits. We also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market. In particular, combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality, such as lower employment taxes and firing costs, can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation.
DOI: 10.17632/5tns66n5f6.1
title: Data for: Do parties matter? Estimating the effect of political power in multi-party systems

description: Abstract of associated article: When there are more than two parties, policy outcomes are typically the result of a bargaining process. We investigate whether changes in political power for various parties have an effect on tax policies. We use an instrumental variable approach where close elections provide the exogenous variation in our variable of interest: voting power. In order to isolate close elections in a proportional election system, we develop a new simulation algorithm. Using data from German municipalities in the state of Bavaria, our estimation results suggest that political power does matter for policies. Somewhat surprisingly, the center-left party SPD is found to lower all three locally controlled taxes, whereas The Greens increase both property taxes considerably. These results remain robust across a range of specifications. Our partisan effect for the SPD is also confirmed by a simple regression discontinuity estimation using mayoral elections.
DOI: 10.17632/9h2px2j7mr.1
title: Data for: Keep up with the winners: Experimental evidence on risk taking, asset integration, and peer effects

description: Abstract of associated article: The paper reports the result of an experimental game on asset integration and risk taking. We find some evidence that winnings in earlier rounds affect risk taking in subsequent rounds, but no evidence that real life wealth outside the experiment affects risk taking. Controlling for past winnings, participants receiving a low endowment in a round engage in more risk taking. We test a ‘keeping-up-with-the-Joneses’ hypothesis and find that subjects seek to keep up with winners, though not necessarily with average earnings. Overall, the evidence suggests that risk taking tracks a reference point affected by social comparisons.
DOI: 10.17632/bgpv5ynsxz.1
title: Data for: Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies

description: Abstract of associated article: We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors’ actions on cartel stability and firms’ incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse: markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe that the extra profits that firms obtain thanks to the possibility to communicate are higher when individualized information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation.
DOI: 10.17632/h69v43k22m.1
title: Data for: A shaky business: Natural gas extraction, earthquakes and house prices

description: Abstract of associated article: The production of natural gas is strongly increasing around the world. Long-run negative external effects of extraction are understudied and often ignored in (social) cost-benefit analyses. One important example is that natural gas extraction leads to soil subsidence and subsequent induced earthquakes that may occur only after a couple of decades. We show that induced earthquakes that are noticeable to residents generate substantial non-monetary economic effects, as measured by their effects on house prices, also when house owners are fully compensated for damage to their houses. To address the issue that earthquakes do not occur randomly over space, we use temporal variation in the occurrence of noticeable earthquakes while controlling for the occurrence of earthquakes that cannot be felt by house owners. We find that earthquakes that are noticeable with peak ground velocities of above half a cm/s lead to price decreases of 1.9 percent. The total non-monetary costs of induced earthquakes for Groningen are about €170 million (about €600 per household). These results indicate that the non-monetary costs are in the same order of magnitude as the monetary damage costs.
DOI: 10.17632/hfgvj4r7bt.1
title: Data for: Entry and markup dynamics in an estimated business cycle model

description: Abstract of associated article: How do changes in market structure affect the US business cycle? We estimate a monetary DSGE model with endogenous firm/product entry and a translog expenditure function by Bayesian methods. The dynamics of net business formation allow us to identify the extent to which desired price markups and inflation decrease when entry rises. We find that a 1% increase in the number of competitors lowers desired markups by 0.17%. While markup fluctuations due to sticky prices or exogenous shocks account for a large proportion of US inflation variability, endogenous changes in desired markups also play a non-negligible role.
DOI: 10.17632/nmsxzyjfkk.1
title: Data for: Returns to skills around the world: Evidence from PIAAC

description: Abstract of associated article: Existing estimates of the labor-market returns to human capital give a distorted picture of the role of skills across different economies. International comparisons of earnings analyses rely almost exclusively on school attainment measures of human capital, and evidence incorporating direct measures of cognitive skills is mostly restricted to early-career workers in the United States. Analysis of the new PIAAC survey of adult skills over the full lifecycle in 23 countries shows that the focus on early-career earnings leads to underestimating the lifetime returns to skills by about one quarter. On average, a one-standard-deviation increase in numeracy skills is associated with an 18 percent wage increase among prime-age workers. But this masks considerable heterogeneity across countries. Eight countries, including all Nordic countries, have returns between 12 and 15 percent, while six are above 21 percent with the largest return being 28 percent in the United States. Estimates are remarkably robust to different earnings and skill measures, additional controls, and various subgroups. Instrumental-variable models that use skill variation stemming from school attainment, parental education, or compulsory-schooling laws provide even higher estimates. Intriguingly, returns to skills are systematically lower in countries with higher union density, stricter employment protection, and larger public-sector shares.
DOI: 10.17632/v83j2sgzt9.1
title: Data for: The impact of financial regulation on current account balances

description: Abstract of associated article: Both global imbalances and financial market deregulation feature prominently among the potential causes of the global financial crisis, but they have been largely discussed separately. In this paper, we take a different angle and investigate the relationship between financial market regulation and current account balances, an area for which limited empirical evidence exists. We use a panel of countries over the period 1980–2010 and employ a novel empirical approach which allows us to simultaneously account for model uncertainty, current account persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. We find robust evidence that financial market regulations affect current account balances and that different aspects of these regulations can have opposing effects on the current account. In particular we find that easing bank entry barriers is negatively associated with the current account balance. In contrast, bank privatization and securities market deregulation tend to raise current account balances. Our results also highlight the importance to control for persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Once we control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a wide range of current account theories in contrast to previous studies accounting for model uncertainty.
DOI: 10.17632/v9x2n5wv3g.1
title: Data for: Regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability

description: Abstract of associated article: This paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance. Our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance. In the Random Audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection. In the Tournament Audit mechanism the probability of inspection increases with the degree of estimated underreporting. To study the effects of social information, the experiment varies the observability of identity, output, and compliance decisions. Optimal output is theoretically independent of the auditing scheme, but equilibrium reporting is higher under the Tournament mechanism than Random auditing. Experimental findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions for reporting, but deviate modestly for output. In particular, we find that average output is lower and reporting is higher in the Tournament treatment compared to the Random Audit treatment. At the individual level, a majority of participants misreported in most periods. Social observability does not affect output or reporting significantly in either of the audit treatments.
DOI: 10.14457/cu.the.2012.159
title: พฤติกรรมการอัพตัวคายน้ำด้วยวิธีสูญญากาศสำหรับการปรับปรุงคุณภาพดินอ่อน
DOI: 10.17632/4hmhd4bckx.1
title: Data for: A test of the household income process using consumption and wealth data

description: Abstract of associated article: The evolution of household income can be explained almost equally well by rival models. However, rival models have very different implications for other household behaviours, such as consumption. I therefore test between two prominent models in the UK using panel data on consumption and wealth, as well as income, over 1991–2006. To operate the test, I show that long-lived income shocks transmit far less than one-for-one through to consumption, and particularly so for younger households. I then compare these estimates of transmission with estimates of households’ ability to smooth shocks, captured by the data on wealth. Conditional on the suitability of the consumption model, my estimates provide evidence against the restricted income process (RIP) and in favour of an alternative heterogeneous income process (HIP). This finding also explains why cross-sectional consumption inequality grew slowly over the period even though the variance of long-lived shocks was high. Finally, I conclude that it is important to consider mean reversion of shocks when constructing life-cycle consumption models.
DOI: 10.17632/8b5y8m22vf.1
title: Data for: The own-wage elasticity of labor demand: A meta-regression analysis

description: Abstract of associated article: The own-wage elasticity of labor demand is a key parameter in empirical research and policy analysis. However, despite extensive research, estimates of labor demand elasticities are subject to considerable heterogeneity. In this paper, we explore various dimensions of this heterogeneity by means of a comprehensive meta-regression analysis, building on information from 151 different studies containing 1334 estimates in total. Our results show that heterogeneity in the estimates of the elasticity is natural to a considerable extent: the magnitude of the elasticity depends on the theoretical model applied and features of the workforce. Moreover, we find that labor demand has become more elastic over time, and is particularly elastic in countries with low levels of employment protection legislation. Furthermore, we find heterogeneity due to the empirical specification of the labor demand model, characteristics of the dataset and publication bias.
DOI: 10.17632/9gg9vjrfxx.1
title: Data for: The distribution of the gains from spillovers through worker mobility between workers and firms

description: Abstract of associated article: Knowledge spillovers through worker mobility between firms, found in previous research, imply that knowledge production within firms creates a positive externality to the hiring firms and their workers. We calculate the shares in the gains from spillovers retained by these parties using matched employer–employee data from Danish manufacturing. We find that around two-thirds of the total output gain (0.1% per year) is netted by the firms as extra profit, about a quarter goes to the incumbent workers as extra wages, while the workers who bring spillovers receive no more than 8% of it. This gains distribution, which favors the hiring firms, is similar for different types of moving workers, and is stable over time.
DOI: 10.17632/gh5d3jbmhr.1
title: Data for: Racial prejudice and labour market penalties during economic downturns

description: Abstract of associated article: Do economic downturns encourage racist attitudes? Does this in-turn lead to worse labour market outcome for minorities? We assess these important questions using British attitude and labour force data. The attitude data show that racial prejudice is countercyclical, with the effect driven by large increases for high-skilled middle-aged working men – a 1%-point increase in unemployment is estimated to increase self-reported racial prejudice by 4%-points. Correspondingly, the labour force data show that racial employment and wage gaps are counter-cyclical, with the largest effects also observed for high-skilled men, especially in the manufacturing and construction industries – a 1%-point increase in unemployment is estimated to increase the wage gap by 3%. These results are entirely consistent with the theoretical literature, which proposes that racial prejudice and discrimination are the result of labour market competition among individuals with similar traits, and that the effects of this competition are exacerbated during periods of economic downturn.
DOI: 10.17632/hh8gpxy8y9.1
title: Data for: Irreversible investment, uncertainty, and ambiguity: The case of bioenergy sector

description: Abstract of associated article: We analyze production and investment decisions of an agent in industrial activities that are characterized by two forms of uncertainty: demand uncertainty (in terms of number of buyers) and competitive effect uncertainty (in terms of other energy resource). We apply our model on the bioenergy industries. We compare the case of an ambiguity neutral agent with that of an ambiguity averse agent. We show that the investment decision of an agent depends on the effects of both the capital investment and the level of production on the cost and the uncertainty the agent is confronted with. Moreover, we find that ambiguity aversion tends to decrease the agent's optimal levels of production and investment. Our numerical analysis of the French case illustrates the different effects associated with demand uncertainty and competitive effect uncertainty.
DOI: 10.17632/tjrwytjgff.1
title: Data for: Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment

description: Abstract of associated article: We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker׳s payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can be observed frequently in our data although less often than predicted. Equilibrium play is more likely when subjects are predicted to conceal their productivity than when they should reveal. This tendency of under-revelation, especially of low-productivity workers, is consistent with the level-k model. A loaded frame where the private information concerns the workers׳ health status leads to less revelation than a neutral frame.
DOI: 10.17632/v82hn3k825.1
title: Data for: Price equalization, trade flows, and barriers to trade

description: Abstract of associated article: In this paper we show that price equalization does not imply zero barriers to trade. There are many barrier combinations that deliver price equalization, but each combination implies a different volume of trade. We demonstrate this first theoretically in a simple two-country model and then quantitatively for the case of capital goods trade in a multi-country model. To be quantitatively consistent with the observed capital goods trade flows across countries, our model implies that trade barriers must be large, yet our model delivers capital goods prices that are similar across countries. The absence of barriers to trade in capital goods delivers price equalization in capital goods but cannot reproduce the observed trade flows.
DOI: 10.17632/xcc99td5wm.1
title: Data for: Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: A model-based fiscal analysis

description: Abstract of associated article: We present a model-based measure of sovereign credit ratings derived solely from the fiscal position of a country: a forecast of its future debt liabilities, and its potential to use fiscal policy to repay these. We use this measure to calculate credit ratings for 14 European countries over the period 1995–2012. This measure identifies a European sovereign debt crisis almost two years before the official ratings of the credit rating agencies.
DOI: 10.17632/2fbf8mcjbw.1
title: Data for: Adaptive versus eductive learning: Theory and evidence

description: Abstract of associated article: Adaptive and eductive learning are two widely used ways of modeling the process by which agents learn a rational expectation equilibrium (REE). In this paper we report an experiment where we exploit differences in the conditions under which adaptive and eductive learning converge to REE so as to investigate which approach provides the better description of the learning behavior of human subjects. Our results suggest that the path by which the system converges appears to be a mixture of both adaptive and eductive learning model predictions.
DOI: 10.17632/sr7fpgptcd.1
title: Data for: Promises in contract design

description: Abstract of associated article: In this paper, we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency. If deviating from one's own words induces a self-imposed moral burden, the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for installing the nonbinding promise in the contract to whoever has the residual right to break such promise, in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). To study whether a worker's own promise of effort level governs his real choice of effort in a gift exchange game, we implement four treatments in our experiments by varying two factors: (1) who (the firm or the worker) takes the position of the proposer to propose the contract and (2) whether the proposed contract includes a nonbinding specification of the worker's effort level. Our key finding is that when it is the worker who proposes the contract and the contract includes the worker's promised effort level, both the worker's actual effort choice and the aggregate profits are significantly higher than in each of the other three treatments (and there is little difference in worker effort otherwise).
DOI: 10.17632/yv8s8wf9sz.1
title: Data for: How to subsidize contributions to public goods: Does the frog jump out of the boiling water?

description: Abstract of associated article: According to popular belief, frogs are boiled to death when the water is heated gradually. In this paper, we investigate how humans respond to a very slow versus a very steep increase of a subsidy on contributions to a public good. In an experiment, we vary the mode of the increase (gradual versus quick). When the subsidy is raised to an intermediate level, we see a modest effect in either treatment. When the subsidy is raised to a substantial level, there is a strong effect of a quick increase and a modest effect of a gradual increase in the subsidy.