cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.3886/e116102
title: Replication data for: The Impact of Shrouded Fees: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Indian Mutual Funds Market

description: We study a natural experiment in the Indian mutual funds sector that created a 22-month period in which closed-end funds were allowed to charge an arguably shrouded fee, whereas open-end funds were forced to charge entry loads. Forty-five new closed-end funds were started during this period, collecting $7.6 billion US, whereas only two closed-end funds were started in the 66 months prior to this period, collecting $42 billion US, and no closed-end funds were started in the 20 months after this period. We estimate that investors lost and fund firms gained approximately $350 million US due to this shrouding. (JEL D14, G23, G28, O16)
DOI: 10.3886/e116102v1
title: Replication data for: The Impact of Shrouded Fees: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Indian Mutual Funds Market

description: We study a natural experiment in the Indian mutual funds sector that created a 22-month period in which closed-end funds were allowed to charge an arguably shrouded fee, whereas open-end funds were forced to charge entry loads. Forty-five new closed-end funds were started during this period, collecting $7.6 billion US, whereas only two closed-end funds were started in the 66 months prior to this period, collecting $42 billion US, and no closed-end funds were started in the 20 months after this period. We estimate that investors lost and fund firms gained approximately $350 million US due to this shrouding. (JEL D14, G23, G28, O16)
DOI: 10.3886/e116049
title: Replication data for: Sunspots in the Laboratory

description: We show that extrinsic or nonfundamental uncertainty influences markets in a controlled environment. This work provides the first direct evidence of sunspot equilibria. These equilibria require a common understanding of the semantics of the sunspot variable, and they appear to be sensitive to the flow of information. Sunspots always occur in a closed-book call market, but they happen only occasionally in a double auction, where inframarginal bids and offers are observable.
DOI: 10.3886/e116050
title: Replication data for: The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations

description: We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the "endowment effect," account for reported gaps between willingness to pay ("WTP") and willingness to accept ("WTA"). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject misconceptions, there is no consensus about the fundamental properties of misconceptions or how to avoid them. Instead, by implementing different types of experimental controls, experimenters have revealed notions of how misconceptions arise. Experimenters have applied these controls separately or in different combinations. Such controls include ensuring subject anonymity, using incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms, and providing subjects with practice and training on the elicitation mechanism before employing it to measure valuations. The pattern of results reported in the literature suggests that the widely differing reports of WTP-WTA gaps could be due to an incomplete science regarding subject misconceptions. We implement a "revealed theory" methodology to compensate for the lack of a theory of misconceptions. Theories implicit in experimental procedures found in the literature are at the heart of our experimental design. Thus, our approach to addressing subject misconceptions reflects an attempt to control simultaneously for all dimensions of concern over possible subject misconceptions found in the literature. To this end, our procedures modify the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism used in previous studies to elicit values. In addition, our procedures supplement commonly used procedures by providing extensive training on the elicitation mechanism before subjects provide WTP and WTA responses. Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and mugs, goods frequently used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified procedures, we observe no gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, our results call into question the interpretation of observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion or prospect theory. Further evidence is required before convincing interpretations of observed gaps can be advanced.
DOI: 10.3886/e116050v1
title: Replication data for: The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations

description: We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the "endowment effect," account for reported gaps between willingness to pay ("WTP") and willingness to accept ("WTA"). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject misconceptions, there is no consensus about the fundamental properties of misconceptions or how to avoid them. Instead, by implementing different types of experimental controls, experimenters have revealed notions of how misconceptions arise. Experimenters have applied these controls separately or in different combinations. Such controls include ensuring subject anonymity, using incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms, and providing subjects with practice and training on the elicitation mechanism before employing it to measure valuations. The pattern of results reported in the literature suggests that the widely differing reports of WTP-WTA gaps could be due to an incomplete science regarding subject misconceptions. We implement a "revealed theory" methodology to compensate for the lack of a theory of misconceptions. Theories implicit in experimental procedures found in the literature are at the heart of our experimental design. Thus, our approach to addressing subject misconceptions reflects an attempt to control simultaneously for all dimensions of concern over possible subject misconceptions found in the literature. To this end, our procedures modify the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism used in previous studies to elicit values. In addition, our procedures supplement commonly used procedures by providing extensive training on the elicitation mechanism before subjects provide WTP and WTA responses. Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and mugs, goods frequently used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified procedures, we observe no gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, our results call into question the interpretation of observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion or prospect theory. Further evidence is required before convincing interpretations of observed gaps can be advanced.
DOI: 10.3886/e116051
title: Replication data for: The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Exports

description: Large economies export more in absolute terms than do small economies. We use data on shipments by 126 exporting countries to 59 importing countries in 5,000 product categories to answer the question: How? Do big economies export larger quantities of each good (the intensive margin), a wider set of goods (the extensive margin), or higher-quality goods? We find that the extensive margin accounts for around 60 percent of the greater exports of larger economies. Within categories, richer countries export higher quantities at modestly higher prices. We compare these findings to some workhorse trade models. Models with Armington national product differentiation have no extensive margin, and incorrectly predict lower prices for the exports of larger economies. Models with Krugman firm-level product differentiation do feature a prominent extensive margin, but overpredict the rate at which variety responds to exporter size. Models with quality differentiation, meanwhile, can match the price facts. Finally, models with fixed costs of exporting to a given market might explain the tendency of larger economies to export a given product to more countries.
DOI: 10.3886/e116051v1
title: Replication data for: The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Exports

description: Large economies export more in absolute terms than do small economies. We use data on shipments by 126 exporting countries to 59 importing countries in 5,000 product categories to answer the question: How? Do big economies export larger quantities of each good (the intensive margin), a wider set of goods (the extensive margin), or higher-quality goods? We find that the extensive margin accounts for around 60 percent of the greater exports of larger economies. Within categories, richer countries export higher quantities at modestly higher prices. We compare these findings to some workhorse trade models. Models with Armington national product differentiation have no extensive margin, and incorrectly predict lower prices for the exports of larger economies. Models with Krugman firm-level product differentiation do feature a prominent extensive margin, but overpredict the rate at which variety responds to exporter size. Models with quality differentiation, meanwhile, can match the price facts. Finally, models with fixed costs of exporting to a given market might explain the tendency of larger economies to export a given product to more countries.
DOI: 10.3886/e116052v1
title: Replication data for: Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games

description: We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.
DOI: 10.3886/e116103v1
title: Replication data for: Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles

description: To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash-to-asset value ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A ratio. A questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant. Running the experiment with a different context ("stocks of a depletable gold mine" instead of "stocks") significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion. (JEL C91, D14, G11, G12)
DOI: 10.3886/e116052
title: Replication data for: Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games

description: We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.
DOI: 10.3886/e116053
title: Replication data for: House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle

description: I develop and estimate a monetary business cycle model with nominal loans and collateral constraints tied to housing values. Demand shocks move housing and nominal prices in the same direction, and are amplified and propagated over time. The financial accelerator is not uniform: nominal debt dampens supply shocks, stabilizing the economy under interest rate control. Structural estimation supports two key model features: collateral effects dramatically improve the response of aggregate demand to housing price shocks; and nominal debt improves the sluggish response of output to inflation surprises. Finally, policy evaluation considers the role of house prices and debt indexation in affecting monetary policy trade-offs.
DOI: 10.3886/e116053v1
title: Replication data for: House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle

description: I develop and estimate a monetary business cycle model with nominal loans and collateral constraints tied to housing values. Demand shocks move housing and nominal prices in the same direction, and are amplified and propagated over time. The financial accelerator is not uniform: nominal debt dampens supply shocks, stabilizing the economy under interest rate control. Structural estimation supports two key model features: collateral effects dramatically improve the response of aggregate demand to housing price shocks; and nominal debt improves the sluggish response of output to inflation surprises. Finally, policy evaluation considers the role of house prices and debt indexation in affecting monetary policy trade-offs.
DOI: 10.3886/e116054
title: Replication data for: Optimal Expectations

description: Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility flows, and hence have higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this benefit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example, investors overestimate their return and exhibit a preference for skewness; in general equilibrium, investors' prior beliefs are endogenously heterogeneous. In a consumption-saving example, consumers are both overconfident and overoptimistic.
DOI: 10.3886/e116054v1
title: Replication data for: Optimal Expectations

description: Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility flows, and hence have higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this benefit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example, investors overestimate their return and exhibit a preference for skewness; in general equilibrium, investors' prior beliefs are endogenously heterogeneous. In a consumption-saving example, consumers are both overconfident and overoptimistic.
DOI: 10.3886/e116055
title: Replication data for: How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs

description: Studies of innovation have focused on the effects of patent laws on the number of innovations, but have ignored effects on the direction of technological change. This paper introduces a new dataset of close to fifteen thousand innovations at the Crystal Palace World's Fair in 1851 and at the Centennial Exhibition in 1876 to examine the effects of patent laws on the direction of innovation. The paper tests the following argument: if innovative activity is motivated by expected profits, and if the effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries, then innovation in countries without patent laws should focus on industries where alternative mechanisms to protect intellectual property are effective. Analyses of exhibition data for 12 countries in 1851 and 10 countries in 1876 indicate that inventors in countries without patent laws focused on a small set of industries where patents were less important, while innovation in countries with patent laws appears to be much more diversified. These findings suggest that patents help to determine the direction of technical change and that the adoption of patent laws in countries without such laws may alter existing patterns of comparative advantage across countries.
DOI: 10.3886/e116055v1
title: Replication data for: How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs

description: Studies of innovation have focused on the effects of patent laws on the number of innovations, but have ignored effects on the direction of technological change. This paper introduces a new dataset of close to fifteen thousand innovations at the Crystal Palace World's Fair in 1851 and at the Centennial Exhibition in 1876 to examine the effects of patent laws on the direction of innovation. The paper tests the following argument: if innovative activity is motivated by expected profits, and if the effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries, then innovation in countries without patent laws should focus on industries where alternative mechanisms to protect intellectual property are effective. Analyses of exhibition data for 12 countries in 1851 and 10 countries in 1876 indicate that inventors in countries without patent laws focused on a small set of industries where patents were less important, while innovation in countries with patent laws appears to be much more diversified. These findings suggest that patents help to determine the direction of technical change and that the adoption of patent laws in countries without such laws may alter existing patterns of comparative advantage across countries.
DOI: 10.3886/e116056
title: Replication data for: Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

description: Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
DOI: 10.3886/e116056v1
title: Replication data for: Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

description: Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
DOI: 10.3886/e116103
title: Replication data for: Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles

description: To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash-to-asset value ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A ratio. A questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant. Running the experiment with a different context ("stocks of a depletable gold mine" instead of "stocks") significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion. (JEL C91, D14, G11, G12)
DOI: 10.3886/e116104v1
title: Replication data for: What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?

description: Would people choose what they think would maximize their subjective well-being (SWB)? We present survey respondents with hypothetical scenarios and elicit both choice and predicted SWB rankings of two alternatives. While choice and predicted SWB rankings usually coincide in our data, we find systematic reversals. We identify factors—such as predicted sense of purpose, control over one's life, family happiness, and social status—that help explain hypothetical choice controlling for predicted SWB. We explore how our findings vary by SWB measure and by scenario. Our results have implications regarding the use of SWB survey questions as a proxy for utility. (JEL D03, I31)
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3565832
title: Sediment Properties Drive Spatial Variability of Potential Methane Production and Oxidation in Small Streams

description: This dataset contains 20 data tables (Fig.2.csv, Fig.3.csv, data_PLS_stream-main-stem.csv, Fig.4_a.csv, data_PLS_subcatch.-stream-sect.csv, Fig.4_b.csv, Fig.5.csv, Fig.S1.csv, Fig.S2.csv, Fig.S3.csv, Fig.S4.csv, Fig.S5_a.csv, Fig.S5_b.csv, Fig.S6_a.csv, Fig.S6_b.csv, Fig.S6_c.csv, Fig.S6_d.csv, TableS1_data-adjustment.csv, TableS1_lit-data.csv, PMO_surface-water.csv), we separated our data tables in the respective figures/analyses presented in our paper We added the units to each column title of each respective data table Please see "Metadata.pdf" and our paper (same title as the dataset) for more information
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3565833
title: Sediment Properties Drive Spatial Variability of Potential Methane Production and Oxidation in Small Streams

description: This dataset contains 20 data tables (Fig.2.csv, Fig.3.csv, data_PLS_stream-main-stem.csv, Fig.4_a.csv, data_PLS_subcatch.-stream-sect.csv, Fig.4_b.csv, Fig.5.csv, Fig.S1.csv, Fig.S2.csv, Fig.S3.csv, Fig.S4.csv, Fig.S5_a.csv, Fig.S5_b.csv, Fig.S6_a.csv, Fig.S6_b.csv, Fig.S6_c.csv, Fig.S6_d.csv, TableS1_data-adjustment.csv, TableS1_lit-data.csv, PMO_surface-water.csv), we separated our data tables in the respective figures/analyses presented in our paper We added the units to each column title of each respective data table Please see "Metadata.pdf" and our paper (same title as the dataset) for more information
DOI: 10.7910/dvn/vow9ob/rhmd12
title: Figure 1 - SL Media Maps Script.R

description: R file for creating maps in Figure 1.
DOI: 10.3886/e116057
title: Replication data for: Precautionary Saving and Consumption Fluctuations

description: This paper uses the consumption Euler equation to derive a decomposition of consumption growth into four sources. These four sources are new information, and three sources of predictable consumption growth: intertemporal substitution, changes in the preferences for consumption, and incomplete markets for consumption insurance. Using household-level data, we implement this decomposition for the average growth rate of consumption expenditures on nondurable goods in the United States from 1982 to 1997. The economic importance of precautionary saving rivals that of the real interest rate, but the relative importance of each source of movement in the volatility of consumption is not precisely measured.