cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.3886/e116131
title: Replication data for: Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off

description: We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability benefits. The risks that individuals face and the parameters of the Disability Insurance (DI) program are estimated from consumption, health, disability insurance, and wage data. We characterize the effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and welfare. DI features high rejection rates of disabled applicants and some acceptance of healthy applicants. Despite worse incentives, welfare increases as programs become less strict or generosity increases. Disability insurance interacts with welfare programs: making unconditional means-tested programs more generous improves disability insurance targeting and increases welfare. (JEL D14, J24, J65)
DOI: 10.3886/e116131v1
title: Replication data for: Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off

description: We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability benefits. The risks that individuals face and the parameters of the Disability Insurance (DI) program are estimated from consumption, health, disability insurance, and wage data. We characterize the effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and welfare. DI features high rejection rates of disabled applicants and some acceptance of healthy applicants. Despite worse incentives, welfare increases as programs become less strict or generosity increases. Disability insurance interacts with welfare programs: making unconditional means-tested programs more generous improves disability insurance targeting and increases welfare. (JEL D14, J24, J65)
DOI: 10.3886/e116146
title: Replication data for: The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans

description: Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While results are theory-specific, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or—contrary to common wisdom—at zero. (JEL D14, D91, J26, J32)
DOI: 10.3886/e116146v1
title: Replication data for: The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans

description: Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While results are theory-specific, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or—contrary to common wisdom—at zero. (JEL D14, D91, J26, J32)
DOI: 10.3886/e116147v1
title: Replication data for: Overconfidence in Political Behavior

description: This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the role of overconfidence in political behavior. Our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness, increased voter turnout, and stronger partisan identification. The model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society. These predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3,000 adults. Our numerous predictions find strong support in these data. In particular, we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness, voter turnout, and partisan identification. (JEL C83, D03, D72, D83)
DOI: 10.3886/e116132v1
title: Replication data for: Estimating a War of Attrition: The Case of the US Movie Theater Industry

description: This paper empirically studies firm's strategic exit decisions in an environment where demand is declining. Specifically, I quantify the extent to which the exit process generated by firms' strategic interactions deviates from the outcome that maximizes industry profits. I develop and estimate a dynamic exit game using data from the US movie theater industry in the 1950s, when the industry faced demand declines. Using the estimated model, I quantify the magnitude of strategic delays and find that strategic interactions cause an average delay of exit of 2.7 years. I calculate the relative importance of several components of these strategic delays. (JEL D92, L11, L82, N72)
DOI: 10.3886/e116147
title: Replication data for: Overconfidence in Political Behavior

description: This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the role of overconfidence in political behavior. Our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness, increased voter turnout, and stronger partisan identification. The model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society. These predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3,000 adults. Our numerous predictions find strong support in these data. In particular, we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness, voter turnout, and partisan identification. (JEL C83, D03, D72, D83)
DOI: 10.3886/e116134
title: Replication data for: Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy

description: We use microdata to show that young households with children are underinsured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. This empirical finding can be explained by a macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to limited contract enforcement. When calibrated, the model quantitatively accounts for the observed life-cycle variation in life insurance holdings, financial wealth, earnings, and consumption inequality. The model also predicts that reforms making consumer bankruptcy more costly will substantially increase the volume of both credit and insurance. (JEL D14, D91, G22, J13, J24)
DOI: 10.3886/e116134v1
title: Replication data for: Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy

description: We use microdata to show that young households with children are underinsured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. This empirical finding can be explained by a macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to limited contract enforcement. When calibrated, the model quantitatively accounts for the observed life-cycle variation in life insurance holdings, financial wealth, earnings, and consumption inequality. The model also predicts that reforms making consumer bankruptcy more costly will substantially increase the volume of both credit and insurance. (JEL D14, D91, G22, J13, J24)
DOI: 10.3886/e116133v1
title: Replication data for: The Housing Market(s) of San Diego

description: This paper uses an assignment model to understand the cross section of house prices within a metro area. Movers' demand for housing is derived from a life-cycle problem with credit market frictions. Equilibrium house prices adjust to assign houses that differ by quality to movers who differ by age, income, and wealth. To quantify the model, we measure distributions of house prices, house qualities, and mover characteristics from micro-data on San Diego County during the 2000s boom. The main result is that cheaper credit for poor households was a major driver of prices, especially at the low end of the market. (JEL D14, D91, R21, R31)
DOI: 10.3886/e116148
title: Replication data for: Modeling the Revolving Revolution: The Debt Collection Channel

description: We investigate the role of information technology (IT) in the collection of delinquent consumer debt. We argue that the widespread adoption of IT by the debt collection industry in the 1990s contributed to the observed expansion of unsecured risky lending such as credit cards. Our model stresses the importance of delinquency and private information about borrower solvency. The prevalence of delinquency implies that the costs of debt collection must be borne by lenders to sustain incentives to repay debt. IT mitigates informational asymmetries, allowing lenders to concentrate collection efforts on delinquent borrowers who are more likely to repay.
DOI: 10.3886/e116148v1
title: Replication data for: Modeling the Revolving Revolution: The Debt Collection Channel

description: We investigate the role of information technology (IT) in the collection of delinquent consumer debt. We argue that the widespread adoption of IT by the debt collection industry in the 1990s contributed to the observed expansion of unsecured risky lending such as credit cards. Our model stresses the importance of delinquency and private information about borrower solvency. The prevalence of delinquency implies that the costs of debt collection must be borne by lenders to sustain incentives to repay debt. IT mitigates informational asymmetries, allowing lenders to concentrate collection efforts on delinquent borrowers who are more likely to repay.
DOI: 10.3886/e116133
title: Replication data for: The Housing Market(s) of San Diego

description: This paper uses an assignment model to understand the cross section of house prices within a metro area. Movers' demand for housing is derived from a life-cycle problem with credit market frictions. Equilibrium house prices adjust to assign houses that differ by quality to movers who differ by age, income, and wealth. To quantify the model, we measure distributions of house prices, house qualities, and mover characteristics from micro-data on San Diego County during the 2000s boom. The main result is that cheaper credit for poor households was a major driver of prices, especially at the low end of the market. (JEL D14, D91, R21, R31)
DOI: 10.3886/e116149v1
title: Replication data for: Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials

description: We investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. Our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion: short-termism and the fixed patent term. Our empirical context is cancer research, where clinical trials -- and hence, project durations -- are shorter for late-stage cancer treatments relative to early-stage treatments or cancer prevention. Using newly constructed data, we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. The value of life-years at stake appears large. We analyze three potential policy responses: surrogate (non-mortality) clinical-trial endpoints, targeted R&D subsidies, and patent design. (JEL D92, G31, I11, L65, O31, O34)
DOI: 10.3886/e116150v1
title: Replication data for: Taxpayer Confusion: Evidence from the Child Tax Credit

description: We develop an empirical test for whether households understand or misperceive their marginal tax rate. Our identifying variation comes from the loss of the Child Tax Credit when a child turns 17. Using this age discontinuity, we find that despite this tax liability increase being lump-sum and predictable, households reduce their reported wage income upon discovering they have lost the credit. This finding suggests that households misinterpret at least part of this tax liability change as an increase in their marginal tax rate. This evidence supports the hypothesis that tax complexity can cause confusion and leads to unintended behavioral responses. (JEL D12, D14, H24, H31)
DOI: 10.3886/e116150
title: Replication data for: Taxpayer Confusion: Evidence from the Child Tax Credit

description: We develop an empirical test for whether households understand or misperceive their marginal tax rate. Our identifying variation comes from the loss of the Child Tax Credit when a child turns 17. Using this age discontinuity, we find that despite this tax liability increase being lump-sum and predictable, households reduce their reported wage income upon discovering they have lost the credit. This finding suggests that households misinterpret at least part of this tax liability change as an increase in their marginal tax rate. This evidence supports the hypothesis that tax complexity can cause confusion and leads to unintended behavioral responses. (JEL D12, D14, H24, H31)
DOI: 10.3886/e116151v1
title: Replication data for: Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance

description: This paper examines the implicit health insurance that households receive from the ability to declare bankruptcy. Exploiting multiple sources of variation in asset exemption law, I show that uninsured households with a greater financial cost of bankruptcy make higher out-of-pocket medical payments, conditional on the amount of care received. In turn, I find that households with greater wealth at risk are more likely to hold health insurance. The implicit insurance from bankruptcy distorts the insurance coverage decision. Using a microsimulation model, I calculate that the optimal Pigovian penalties are three-quarters as large as the average penalties under the Affordable Care Act. (JEL D14, H51, I13, K35)
DOI: 10.3886/e116151
title: Replication data for: Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance

description: This paper examines the implicit health insurance that households receive from the ability to declare bankruptcy. Exploiting multiple sources of variation in asset exemption law, I show that uninsured households with a greater financial cost of bankruptcy make higher out-of-pocket medical payments, conditional on the amount of care received. In turn, I find that households with greater wealth at risk are more likely to hold health insurance. The implicit insurance from bankruptcy distorts the insurance coverage decision. Using a microsimulation model, I calculate that the optimal Pigovian penalties are three-quarters as large as the average penalties under the Affordable Care Act. (JEL D14, H51, I13, K35)
DOI: 10.17632/zbbgvgzj42.1
title: Data for: Laboratory-scale investigation of the 3-D geometry of landslide dams in a U-shaped valley

description: The data includes the point cloud data of 7 sets of the three-dimensional geometry of landslide dams measured in this paper. These are the raw data for figures 3 and 4 in the manuscript. The data in excel format are 42 historical cases of landslide dams, including the occurrence site of landslide dam and detailed geometry parameters.
DOI: 10.3886/e116152
title: Replication data for: Optimal Annuitization with Stochastic Mortality and Correlated Medical Costs

description: The conventional wisdom since Yaari (1965) is that households without a bequest motive should fully annuitize their investments. Numerous frictions do not break this sharp result. We modify the Yaari framework by allowing a household's mortality risk itself to be stochastic due to health shocks. A lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk. But the annuity's remaining present value is correlated with medical costs, such as those for nursing home care, thereby reducing annuity demand, even without ad-hoc liquidity constraints. We find that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities, and many should hold negative amounts. (JEL D14, D82, G23, I12, J14, J26)
DOI: 10.3886/e116152v1
title: Replication data for: Optimal Annuitization with Stochastic Mortality and Correlated Medical Costs

description: The conventional wisdom since Yaari (1965) is that households without a bequest motive should fully annuitize their investments. Numerous frictions do not break this sharp result. We modify the Yaari framework by allowing a household's mortality risk itself to be stochastic due to health shocks. A lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk. But the annuity's remaining present value is correlated with medical costs, such as those for nursing home care, thereby reducing annuity demand, even without ad-hoc liquidity constraints. We find that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities, and many should hold negative amounts. (JEL D14, D82, G23, I12, J14, J26)
DOI: 10.3886/e116153v1
title: Replication data for: Interest Rates and Equity Extraction during the Housing Boom

description: Credit record panel data from 1999-2010 indicates that the likelihood of home equity extraction (borrowing, on average, about $40,000 against one's home) peaked in 2003 when mortgage rates reached historic lows. We estimate a 27 percent rise in extraction in response to a 100 basis point rate decline, and that house price growth amplifies this relationship. Differential responses to interest rates and home price appreciation by borrower age and credit score provide new evidence of financial frictions. Finally, equity extractions are associated with higher default risk, consistent with the use of borrowed funds for consumption or illiquid investment.
DOI: 10.3886/e116153
title: Replication data for: Interest Rates and Equity Extraction during the Housing Boom

description: Credit record panel data from 1999-2010 indicates that the likelihood of home equity extraction (borrowing, on average, about $40,000 against one's home) peaked in 2003 when mortgage rates reached historic lows. We estimate a 27 percent rise in extraction in response to a 100 basis point rate decline, and that house price growth amplifies this relationship. Differential responses to interest rates and home price appreciation by borrower age and credit score provide new evidence of financial frictions. Finally, equity extractions are associated with higher default risk, consistent with the use of borrowed funds for consumption or illiquid investment.
DOI: 10.3886/e116154
title: Replication data for: Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage

description: We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps. When constrained households engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained households to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In this environment, households' ex ante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. Welfare can be improved with macroprudential policies targeted toward reducing leverage. Interest rate policy is inferior to macroprudential policies in dealing with excessive leverage. (JEL D14, E23, E32, E43, E52, E61, E62)
DOI: 10.3886/e116154v1
title: Replication data for: Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage

description: We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps. When constrained households engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained households to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In this environment, households' ex ante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. Welfare can be improved with macroprudential policies targeted toward reducing leverage. Interest rate policy is inferior to macroprudential policies in dealing with excessive leverage. (JEL D14, E23, E32, E43, E52, E61, E62)
DOI: 10.3886/e116155
title: Replication data for: The Realization Effect: Risk-Taking after Realized versus Paper Losses

description: Understanding how prior outcomes affect risk attitudes is critical for the study of choice under uncertainty. A large literature documents the significant influence of prior losses on risk attitudes. The findings appear contradictory: some studies find greater risk-taking after a loss, whereas others show the opposite—that people take on less risk. I reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings by distinguishing between realized versus paper losses. Using new and existing data, I replicate prior findings and demonstrate that following a realized loss, individuals avoid risk; if the same loss is not realized, a paper loss, individuals take on greater risk.
DOI: 10.3886/e116155v1
title: Replication data for: The Realization Effect: Risk-Taking after Realized versus Paper Losses

description: Understanding how prior outcomes affect risk attitudes is critical for the study of choice under uncertainty. A large literature documents the significant influence of prior losses on risk attitudes. The findings appear contradictory: some studies find greater risk-taking after a loss, whereas others show the opposite—that people take on less risk. I reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings by distinguishing between realized versus paper losses. Using new and existing data, I replicate prior findings and demonstrate that following a realized loss, individuals avoid risk; if the same loss is not realized, a paper loss, individuals take on greater risk.
DOI: 10.3886/e116135
title: Replication data for: Financial Intermediation, Investment Dynamics, and Business Cycle Fluctuations

description: I use micro data to quantify key features of US firm financing. In particular, I establish that a substantial 35 percent of firms' investment is funded using financial markets. I then construct a dynamic equilibrium model that matches these features and fit the model to business cycle data using Bayesian methods. In the model, financial intermediaries enable trades of financial assets, directing funds toward investment opportunities, and charge an intermediation spread to cover their costs. According to the model estimation, exogenous shocks to the intermediation spread explain 25 percent of GDP and 30 percent of investment volatility.
DOI: 10.3886/e116135v1
title: Replication data for: Financial Intermediation, Investment Dynamics, and Business Cycle Fluctuations

description: I use micro data to quantify key features of US firm financing. In particular, I establish that a substantial 35 percent of firms' investment is funded using financial markets. I then construct a dynamic equilibrium model that matches these features and fit the model to business cycle data using Bayesian methods. In the model, financial intermediaries enable trades of financial assets, directing funds toward investment opportunities, and charge an intermediation spread to cover their costs. According to the model estimation, exogenous shocks to the intermediation spread explain 25 percent of GDP and 30 percent of investment volatility.
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3566025
title: CO2_Tem_Data

description: Datasets downloaded from the CT2017 research project of NOAA.
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3566026
title: CO2_Tem_Data

description: Datasets downloaded from the CT2017 research project of NOAA.