DOI: 10.3886/icpsr09619
title: CBS News/New York Times Persian Gulf War Polls, January-February 1991
title: Archival Version

description: This series of interviews tracks public opinion regarding
the Persian Gulf War from the period immediately prior to the
initiation of bombing in January 1991 to the ensuing ground combat in
February. In addition to monitoring the evolving war, these data also
provide an ongoing evaluation of the Bush presidency during that time
period. Part 1 (January 5-7) examines sending troops to Saudi Arabia
vs. staying out, the likelihood of war, Bush's efforts to find
diplomatic solutions, negotiating with Saddam Hussein vs. forcing Iraq
to leave Kuwait, the possibility of terrorist attacks in the United
States, how closely the respondent followed the news of the Persian
Gulf situation, military action against Iraq vs. waiting for sanctions
to work, requiring a congressional declaration of war, Congress voting
on a declaration of war before or after the January 15 deadline for
Iraq's withdrawal, the January 9 meeting between Secretary of State
James Baker and Iraq's foreign minister, attempting to meet with
Hussein before January 15, and what might happen in the Persian Gulf in
the event of war or otherwise. Part 2 (January 11-13) poses questions
identical to Part 1 and addresses new issues, including whether Bush
had already decided prior to the January 15 deadline to send troops
into battle, whether a Kuwaiti offer to trade part of its territory in
exchange for Iraq's withdrawal would be an acceptable resolution to the
crisis, whether congressional authorization of the use of force would
increase the likelihood of war, how congressmen should vote concerning
the authorization of force, what Bush should do if only one house of
Congress votes in favor of the use of force, whether the failure of the
meeting between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister on January
9 made war more likely, and more questions related to what might happen
in the Persian Gulf in the event of war or otherwise. Part 3 (January
5-7, 17 Panel) replicates both Part 1, the January 5-7 survey, and Part
5, the January 17 survey. It also examines new issues, including
whether the United States did the right thing in initiating military
action against Iraq, whether the war would last weeks or months, the
number of expected American casualties in the war, whether the United
States should remove Saddam Hussein from power in addition to driving
Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, bombing military targets in heavily
populated civilian areas vs. targets not in heavily populated areas,
impressions of how the war was proceeding for the United States, how
the respondent first heard about the war, perceptions of the main
reason why United States forces were fighting in the Persian Gulf, and
the reliability of Israel as an ally of the United States. Part 4
(January 17-20 Combined) replicates questions from Part 3, the January
17 survey, and probes new areas, including whether the war to defeat
Iraq would be worth the cost in human life and financial resources,
whether news that the war had begun made the respondent feel more
worried or relieved, whether members of Congress who voted against the
use of military force were viewed more/less favorably, FBI interviews
of Arab-American business/community leaders, Arab-American sympathy for
Iraq, Israeli retaliation for future Iraqi missile attacks, opposition
to the war via protest marches/rallies and their effect on the war
effort, military/economic aid to Israel, whether the United States
military was holding back information about the war, if following the
war news had affected the respondent's schedule, and whether the United
States was correct to enter the Vietnam War. Questions unique to Part 5
(January 17) include whether the respondent felt proud about the United
States' actions in the Persian Gulf, and whether getting Saddam Hussein
out of Kuwait or the outcome of the struggle for freedom in the Soviet
Union was of more importance to the United States. Questions unique to
Part 6 (January 18) include whether Israel should retaliate for future
Iraqi missile attacks. Part 7 (January 19) repeats questions from Part
6. Questions asked in Part 8 (January 20) include whether
military/economic aid to Israel should be increased. Questions unique
to Part 9 (February 12-13) consider whether Iraqi troops could be
forced out of Kuwait by continued bombing or if a ground war would be
necessary, the timing of the start of a ground war, whether a ground
war would be worth the loss of thousands of American troops, the
targeting of civilian as well as military locations for bombing,
Israel's involvement in the war, continuing to fight until Hussein was
removed from power vs. ending the war when Iraqi troops left Kuwait,
whether removing Hussein from power would be worth the cost of
thousands of American troops, effects of the war on the respondent, the
timing of negotiations to end the war, the United States' inflicting
excessive damage on Iraq, paying the cost of rebuilding Iraq after the
war, the effect of the war on government's ability to function in other
areas, and satisfaction with the accuracy and quantity of war-related
information. Questions unique to Part 10 (February 24) involve whether
the United States was correct to begin the ground war, the anticipated
length of the ground war, whether Bush tried hard enough to reach a
diplomatic solution before beginning the ground war, whether the United
States and Iraq were close to a negotiated settlement before the ground
war began, and opinions of Mikhail Gorbachev and his motives in trying
to negotiate an end to the war. Questions unique to Part 11 (February
25) examine whether the United States should set up a new government in
Iraq if Saddam Hussein was removed from power, whether United States
troops should remain in the Gulf after the war to insure stability in
the region, the extent to which the people of Iraq were to blame for
allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power, and whether the United
States should allow the Kuwaiti royal family to return to its position
leading Kuwait after the war.
description: Stratified random digit dialing. Within households, 
 
 respondents were selected using a method developed by Leslie Kish and 
 
 modified by Charles Backstrom and Gerald Hursh (see Backstrom and 
 
 Hursh, SURVEY RESEARCH [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
 
1963]).
description: Datasets: 
DS0: Study-Level Files
DS1: January 5-7
DS2: January 11-13
DS3: January 5-7, 17 Panel
DS4: January 17-20 Combined
DS5: January 17
DS6: January 18
DS7: January 19
DS8: January 20
DS9: February 12-13
DS10: February 24
DS11: February 25
DS12: Codebook for All Parts
description: Adult population of the United States aged 18 and over.
description: A weight variable is included that must be used in any
analysis. Telephone exchanges, telephone numbers, and names of
respondents have been recoded to "999" for reasons of
confidentiality.