cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.12040758.v1
title: Subnational disparities in EU law use: exploring the GEOCOURT dataset

description: We present a new dataset compiling the geographic coordinates of the entire universe of courts that have passed on cases to the European Court of Justice over the lifetime of the European Union. The GEOCOURT Dataset allows the exploration of spatial disparities and clustering effects across time, member states and tiers of courts. Exploration of our new dataset reveals that involvement in the preliminary ruling procedure tends to be concentrated in a relatively small subset of regions within member states, often the region hosting the country's capital. We also consider several regional attributes associated with Article 267 use, which point out avenues for future research. Controlling for country and region fixed effects, we show that peak courts, GDP, population and capital along with with indicators of economic well-being and integration in cross-border trade are positively associated with referral propensity.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.12111051.v1
title: Trade-offs between redistribution and environmental protection: the role of information, ideology, and self-interest

description: Reducing economic inequality and combatting climate change are two strongly supported policy goals, but they will require significant public investments. In times of limited fiscal resources, governments struggle to raise additional revenues needed to finance both, making trade-offs between generally supported policy goals likely. But how do citizens decide if they have to choose between goals they support in principle, such as spending on efforts to reduce inequality and channeling resources toward initiatives to protect the environment? We discuss three major factors that help explain this choice – information, self-interest, and ideological orientation. Our experimental study shows that information is not a significant determinant of such choices, and that ideology is only important as long as there are no conflicting goals. Once citizens have to decide between redistribution and environmental protection, myopic self-interest trumps all other theoretically relevant variables mentioned in the literature.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7746701
title: The EU as a savior and a saint? Corruption and public support for redistribution

description: While the European Union is plagued by considerable social and economic inequality, not least in the wake of both the enlargement of the Union and the financial crises, we know surprisingly little about the sources of public support for redistribution and the EU:s most significant tool for reducing inequalities: Cohesion Policy. We suggest that, while identity, ideology and utilitarian concerns may motivate support for international redistribution, such support is highly contingent on perceptions of domestic corruption. Using unique and newly collected survey data, we show that perceptions of domestic corruption increase support for within-EU redistribution but only in contexts where the quality of government is low and public service delivery deficient. Perceptions of corruption have no such effect in contexts where the quality of government is high. We conclude that perceptions of domestic corruption will drive support for Cohesion Policy in contexts where the EU can be seen as both a potential savior and – relative to domestic government – a saint. We discuss implications for further EU integration.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.11961228.v1
title: Internal network structures as opportunity structures: control and effectiveness in the European competition network

description: European Administrative Networks (EANs) are well-studied platforms of collaboration between national authorities. To understand EANs, the literature typically relies on few explanatory variables: network origins, objectives, and outputs. This external view of EANs leaves important questions unanswered, notably concerning power redistribution and regulators’ perception of EANs. This article highlights the importance of network internal structures as an explanatory variable for understanding EANs. We contend that internal structures are ‘opportunity structures’ for regulators to set agendas and share resources. We investigate the case of the European Competition Network (ECN) – a highly structured, hierarchical and formalized enforcement network – drawing on structured interviews with 15 National Competition Agencies (NCAs) carried out in 2014. We find that the ECN’s formal internal structures afford all NCAs access to the agenda, foster perceptions of effectiveness, and promote informal sharing of expertise outside the network. Future research should incorporate internal structures into analyses of administrative networks.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.12111051
title: Trade-offs between redistribution and environmental protection: the role of information, ideology, and self-interest

description: Reducing economic inequality and combatting climate change are two strongly supported policy goals, but they will require significant public investments. In times of limited fiscal resources, governments struggle to raise additional revenues needed to finance both, making trade-offs between generally supported policy goals likely. But how do citizens decide if they have to choose between goals they support in principle, such as spending on efforts to reduce inequality and channeling resources toward initiatives to protect the environment? We discuss three major factors that help explain this choice – information, self-interest, and ideological orientation. Our experimental study shows that information is not a significant determinant of such choices, and that ideology is only important as long as there are no conflicting goals. Once citizens have to decide between redistribution and environmental protection, myopic self-interest trumps all other theoretically relevant variables mentioned in the literature.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.11961228
title: Internal network structures as opportunity structures: control and effectiveness in the European competition network

description: European Administrative Networks (EANs) are well-studied platforms of collaboration between national authorities. To understand EANs, the literature typically relies on few explanatory variables: network origins, objectives, and outputs. This external view of EANs leaves important questions unanswered, notably concerning power redistribution and regulators’ perception of EANs. This article highlights the importance of network internal structures as an explanatory variable for understanding EANs. We contend that internal structures are ‘opportunity structures’ for regulators to set agendas and share resources. We investigate the case of the European Competition Network (ECN) – a highly structured, hierarchical and formalized enforcement network – drawing on structured interviews with 15 National Competition Agencies (NCAs) carried out in 2014. We find that the ECN’s formal internal structures afford all NCAs access to the agenda, foster perceptions of effectiveness, and promote informal sharing of expertise outside the network. Future research should incorporate internal structures into analyses of administrative networks.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.12093711
title: Countering bias? The EU Commission’s consultation with interest groups

description: The EU Commission regularly consults with external actors when preparing policy proposals. This paper investigates possible bias in the voices the Commission listens to across all policy areas and consultation instruments. We map the full range of consultation instruments used by the Commission and analyse variation in group representation across types of consultations and policy areas. Our analysis draws on a dataset of more than 350 major Commission proposals between 2011 and 2016. We find that the Commission has established a consultation regime with the widespread use of standard consultation instruments, including open online consultations, stakeholder conferences and consultation in closed fora. The range of consulted actors depends on both consultation instruments and policy types. Open online-consultations are most inclusive. Our findings indicate that the Commission may be able to counteract the influence of business by selecting the most appropriate format for consultation.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7913954.v1
title: Representation through information? When and why interest groups inform policymakers about public preferences

description: While interest groups are often seen as transmission belts of public preferences, little is known as to how they might transmit such preferences. This paper argues that the provision of information is one mechanism through which advocates represent their constituents’ interests and analyses who informs policymakers about these preferences and when actors are more likely to do so. The study relies on a new dataset containing information on the arguments advocates made in public hearings that were held on 34 specific policy issues in Germany. The results reveal that the amount of information on public preferences an actor provides is determined by actor type, its public support and position on the issue. Interestingly, information on public preferences is predominantly used by status-quo defenders. This paper contributes to our understanding of interest groups as transmission belts and their potential to enhance governments’ ability to respond to public preferences.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.12093711.v1
title: Countering bias? The EU Commission’s consultation with interest groups

description: The EU Commission regularly consults with external actors when preparing policy proposals. This paper investigates possible bias in the voices the Commission listens to across all policy areas and consultation instruments. We map the full range of consultation instruments used by the Commission and analyse variation in group representation across types of consultations and policy areas. Our analysis draws on a dataset of more than 350 major Commission proposals between 2011 and 2016. We find that the Commission has established a consultation regime with the widespread use of standard consultation instruments, including open online consultations, stakeholder conferences and consultation in closed fora. The range of consulted actors depends on both consultation instruments and policy types. Open online-consultations are most inclusive. Our findings indicate that the Commission may be able to counteract the influence of business by selecting the most appropriate format for consultation.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.11960823.v1
title: Austerity and the path of least resistance: how fiscal consolidations crowd out long-term investments

description: What policies do government prioritize when they implement austerity? I argue that governments choose the path of least resistance when they engage in fiscal consolidations. Positive policy feedback protects programmes from retrenchment when they cover large segments of the population. In contrast, policies involving discounting short-term benefits for long-term gains are more exposed to austerity as they are subject to an intertemporal trade-off. Using a compositional dependent variable analysis in 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 2014, I show that austerity, measured with the narrative approach to fiscal consolidations, is associated with a decrease in the proportion of public investment in research and development and gross fixed capital formation and an increase in health care and pensions’ proportion of budgets. The budget shares of human capital investments in education, childcare and active labour market policies and of compensatory transfer-based labour market insurance are resilient to austerity.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7981787
title: Inter-institutional cooperation and intergroup unity in the shadow of veto: the construction of the EP’s institutional role in the Brexit negotiations

description: From its initially limited role under Article 50 in the withdrawal negotiations, the EP has constructed a central role for itself in the process. How was the EP able to shape the rules to its advantage? As instruments to enhance its own role, the EP combined the unconcealed brandishing of its veto threat with the promotion of strong internal unity and supporting the Commission’s role as central negotiator. The EP was able to exploit interpretative ambiguities in the incomplete contract which is the EU Lisbon Treaty to reinforce its institutional position.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.11960823
title: Austerity and the path of least resistance: how fiscal consolidations crowd out long-term investments

description: What policies do government prioritize when they implement austerity? I argue that governments choose the path of least resistance when they engage in fiscal consolidations. Positive policy feedback protects programmes from retrenchment when they cover large segments of the population. In contrast, policies involving discounting short-term benefits for long-term gains are more exposed to austerity as they are subject to an intertemporal trade-off. Using a compositional dependent variable analysis in 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 2014, I show that austerity, measured with the narrative approach to fiscal consolidations, is associated with a decrease in the proportion of public investment in research and development and gross fixed capital formation and an increase in health care and pensions’ proportion of budgets. The budget shares of human capital investments in education, childcare and active labour market policies and of compensatory transfer-based labour market insurance are resilient to austerity.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7746701.v1
title: The EU as a savior and a saint? Corruption and public support for redistribution

description: While the European Union is plagued by considerable social and economic inequality, not least in the wake of both the enlargement of the Union and the financial crises, we know surprisingly little about the sources of public support for redistribution and the EU:s most significant tool for reducing inequalities: Cohesion Policy. We suggest that, while identity, ideology and utilitarian concerns may motivate support for international redistribution, such support is highly contingent on perceptions of domestic corruption. Using unique and newly collected survey data, we show that perceptions of domestic corruption increase support for within-EU redistribution but only in contexts where the quality of government is low and public service delivery deficient. Perceptions of corruption have no such effect in contexts where the quality of government is high. We conclude that perceptions of domestic corruption will drive support for Cohesion Policy in contexts where the EU can be seen as both a potential savior and – relative to domestic government – a saint. We discuss implications for further EU integration.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7704206
title: Analysing the trade-off between transparency and efficiency in the Council of the European Union

description: This article analyses the oft-invoked tension between transparency and efficiency in the context of the Council of the European Union. It asks to what extent these two sources of legitimacy are incompatible, by exploring the premises and the coherence of the trade-off argument. It argues that the argument is unclear because of the multiple meanings of efficiency. Furthermore, while the trade-off is in some instances more plausible than in others, transparency does not necessarily threaten efficiency and can sometimes even increase it. The presumed correlation between secrecy and efficiency, on which the trade-off is implicitly based, can also be questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. For these reasons, the trade-off argument forms a generally contingent and often questionable basis for limiting transparency.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7110266.v1
title: The politics of (de-)politicization and venue choice: A scoping review and research agenda on EU financial regulation and economic governance

description: Scholarly interest in EU financial regulation and economic governance has increased sharply over the last decade, but the literature on their politics remains fragmented. We present a scoping literature review which systematically locates and aggregates academic articles on their politics in ISI-ranked journals between 1999 and 2016. We identify lacunas in this literature by mapping its strands onto the EU political system. We then present a system-level research agenda that focuses on the cycles of depoliticization and politicization that strongly characterize the politics in these areas. Future research must pay careful attention to the conditions, mechanisms and, especially the venues that (dis)allow the linkage of societal politicization to EU-level politics. This approach is deeply rooted in the specifics of the politics of these policy areas, but also draws on the strengths of research in these areas to increase its relevance for broader debates on the future of the EU itself.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7683695
title: Political and instrumental leadership in major EU reforms. The role and influence of the EU institutions in setting-up the Fiscal Compact

description: This paper analyses the role and influence of the EU institutions in major reform negotiations. We argue that one of the paradoxes of European Council dominated decision-making has been the enhanced dependence on EU institutions to translate broad priorities into actual reforms. We substantiate this claim by means of an in-depth process-tracing analysis of the Fiscal Compact. The conventional wisdom is that the Fiscal Compact was a German dictate. Instead, we show that it resulted from a division of labour: political leadership by member states in the control room, and instrumental leadership by the institutions in the machine room. Such instrumental leadership is unjustly depicted as mere facilitation, with little impact on process and outcome. We juxtapose the Fiscal Compact to two similar cases of Germany-led EU reforms (the Euro-Plus-Pact and Contractual Arrangements) to reveal the leadership activities by the institutions and the fingerprints these left in the final outcome.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7981787.v2
title: Inter-institutional cooperation and intergroup unity in the shadow of veto: the construction of the EP’s institutional role in the Brexit negotiations

description: From its initially limited role under Article 50 in the withdrawal negotiations, the EP has constructed a central role for itself in the process. How was the EP able to shape the rules to its advantage? As instruments to enhance its own role, the EP combined the unconcealed brandishing of its veto threat with the promotion of strong internal unity and supporting the Commission’s role as central negotiator. The EP was able to exploit interpretative ambiguities in the incomplete contract which is the EU Lisbon Treaty to reinforce its institutional position.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7704206.v3
title: Analysing the trade-off between transparency and efficiency in the Council of the European Union

description: This article analyses the oft-invoked tension between transparency and efficiency in the context of the Council of the European Union. It asks to what extent these two sources of legitimacy are incompatible, by exploring the premises and the coherence of the trade-off argument. It argues that the argument is unclear because of the multiple meanings of efficiency. Furthermore, while the trade-off is in some instances more plausible than in others, transparency does not necessarily threaten efficiency and can sometimes even increase it. The presumed correlation between secrecy and efficiency, on which the trade-off is implicitly based, can also be questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. For these reasons, the trade-off argument forms a generally contingent and often questionable basis for limiting transparency.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7981787.v1
title: Inter-institutional cooperation and intergroup unity in the shadow of veto: the construction of the EP’s institutional role in the Brexit negotiations

description: From its initially limited role under Article 50 in the withdrawal negotiations, the EP has constructed a central role for itself in the process. How was the EP able to shape the rules to its advantage? As instruments to enhance its own role, the EP combined the unconcealed brandishing of its veto threat with the promotion of strong internal unity and supporting the Commission’s role as central negotiator. The EP was able to exploit interpretative ambiguities in the incomplete contract which is the EU Lisbon Treaty to reinforce its institutional position.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7704206.v2
title: Analysing the trade-off between transparency and efficiency in the Council of the European Union

description: This article analyses the oft-invoked tension between transparency and efficiency in the context of the Council of the European Union. It asks to what extent these two sources of legitimacy are incompatible, by exploring the premises and the coherence of the trade-off argument. It argues that the argument is unclear because of the multiple meanings of efficiency. Furthermore, while the trade-off is in some instances more plausible than in others, transparency does not necessarily threaten efficiency and can sometimes even increase it. The presumed correlation between secrecy and efficiency, on which the trade-off is implicitly based, can also be questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. For these reasons, the trade-off argument forms a generally contingent and often questionable basis for limiting transparency.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7683695.v2
title: Political and instrumental leadership in major EU reforms. The role and influence of the EU institutions in setting-up the Fiscal Compact

description: This paper analyses the role and influence of the EU institutions in major reform negotiations. We argue that one of the paradoxes of European Council dominated decision-making has been the enhanced dependence on EU institutions to translate broad priorities into actual reforms. We substantiate this claim by means of an in-depth process-tracing analysis of the Fiscal Compact. The conventional wisdom is that the Fiscal Compact was a German dictate. Instead, we show that it resulted from a division of labour: political leadership by member states in the control room, and instrumental leadership by the institutions in the machine room. Such instrumental leadership is unjustly depicted as mere facilitation, with little impact on process and outcome. We juxtapose the Fiscal Compact to two similar cases of Germany-led EU reforms (the Euro-Plus-Pact and Contractual Arrangements) to reveal the leadership activities by the institutions and the fingerprints these left in the final outcome.
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.7683695.v1
title: Political and instrumental leadership in major EU reforms. The role and influence of the EU institutions in setting-up the Fiscal Compact

description: This paper analyses the role and influence of the EU institutions in major reform negotiations. We argue that one of the paradoxes of European Council dominated decision-making has been the enhanced dependence on EU institutions to translate broad priorities into actual reforms. We substantiate this claim by means of an in-depth process-tracing analysis of the Fiscal Compact. The conventional wisdom is that the Fiscal Compact was a German dictate. Instead, we show that it resulted from a division of labour: political leadership by member states in the control room, and instrumental leadership by the institutions in the machine room. Such instrumental leadership is unjustly depicted as mere facilitation, with little impact on process and outcome. We juxtapose the Fiscal Compact to two similar cases of Germany-led EU reforms (the Euro-Plus-Pact and Contractual Arrangements) to reveal the leadership activities by the institutions and the fingerprints these left in the final outcome.