cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.3886/e113049v1
title: Replication data for: Clicking on Heaven's Door: The Effect of Immigrant Legalization on Crime

description: We estimate the effect of immigrant legalization on the crime rate of immigrants in Italy by exploiting an ideal regression discontinuity design: fixed quotas of residence permits are available each year, applications must be submitted electronically on specific "click days," and are processed on a first come, first served basis until the available quotas are exhausted. Matching data on applications with individual-level criminal records, we show that legalization reduces the crime rate of legalized immigrants by 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent.
DOI: 10.17632/xxgbhxwd9z.1
title: Data for: Transfersomal nanoparticles for nose-to-brain delivery of ofloxacin for better management of bacterial meningitis: formulation, optimization by Box-Behnken design, characterization and in vivo pharmacokinetic study.

description: This data that are obtained from formulatation of a nanosystem of ofloxacin (OFLOX) for nose-to-brain delivery to enhance brain accumulation and improve management of bacterial meningitis.
DOI: 10.3886/e112594
title: Replication data for: Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

description: We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)
DOI: 10.3886/e112594v1
title: Replication data for: Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

description: We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)
DOI: 10.3886/e112595
title: Replication data for: Children's Resources in Collective Households: Identification, Estimation, and an Application to Child Poverty in Malawi

description: The share of household resources devoted to children is hard to identify because consumption is measured at the household level and goods can be shared. Using semiparametric restrictions on individual preferences within a collective model, we identify how total household resources are divided up among household members by observing how each family member's expenditures on a single private good like clothing vary with income and family size. Using data from Malawi we show how resources devoted to wives and children vary by family size and structure, and we find that standard poverty indices understate the incidence of child poverty. (JEL I31, I32, J12, J13, O12, O15)
DOI: 10.3886/e112595v1
title: Replication data for: Children's Resources in Collective Households: Identification, Estimation, and an Application to Child Poverty in Malawi

description: The share of household resources devoted to children is hard to identify because consumption is measured at the household level and goods can be shared. Using semiparametric restrictions on individual preferences within a collective model, we identify how total household resources are divided up among household members by observing how each family member's expenditures on a single private good like clothing vary with income and family size. Using data from Malawi we show how resources devoted to wives and children vary by family size and structure, and we find that standard poverty indices understate the incidence of child poverty. (JEL I31, I32, J12, J13, O12, O15)
DOI: 10.3886/e112596
title: Replication data for: Cultural Change as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century

description: This paper develops a learning model of cultural change to investigate why women's labor force participation (LFP) and attitudes toward womenâ€™s work both changed dramatically. In the model, women's beliefs about the long-run payoff from working evolve endogenously via an intergenerational learning process. This process generically generates the data's S-shaped LFP curve and introduces a novel role for wage changes via their effect on the speed of intergenerational learning. The calibrated model does a good job of replicating the evolution of female LFP in the United States over the last 120 years and finds that the new role for wages was quantitatively significant.
DOI: 10.3886/e112596v1
title: Replication data for: Cultural Change as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century

description: This paper develops a learning model of cultural change to investigate why women's labor force participation (LFP) and attitudes toward womenâ€™s work both changed dramatically. In the model, women's beliefs about the long-run payoff from working evolve endogenously via an intergenerational learning process. This process generically generates the data's S-shaped LFP curve and introduces a novel role for wage changes via their effect on the speed of intergenerational learning. The calibrated model does a good job of replicating the evolution of female LFP in the United States over the last 120 years and finds that the new role for wages was quantitatively significant.
DOI: 10.3886/e112597v1
title: Replication data for: Preferences for Truthfulness: Heterogeneity among and within Individuals

description: We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying. The results allow us to reject a type-based model. People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either "economic types" (who care only about consequences) or "ethical types" (who care only about process). Instead, we find that preferences for truthfulness are heterogeneous among individuals. Moreover, when examining possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying and their interplay with economic costs of truthfulness, we find that preferences for truthfulness are also heterogeneous within individuals.
DOI: 10.3886/e112917
title: Replication data for: Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics

description: Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving voters information about candidate competence counters ethnic loyalty and strengthens accountability. I extend a canonical electoral model to show how information provision flows through voter behavior and ultimately impacts the distribution of political spending. I test the theory on data from Sierra Leone using decentralization and differential radio coverage to identify information's effects. Estimates suggest that information increases voting across ethnic-party lines and induces a more equitable allocation of campaign spending. (JEL D72, D83, J15, O17, Z13)
DOI: 10.3886/e112917v1
title: Replication data for: Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics

description: Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving voters information about candidate competence counters ethnic loyalty and strengthens accountability. I extend a canonical electoral model to show how information provision flows through voter behavior and ultimately impacts the distribution of political spending. I test the theory on data from Sierra Leone using decentralization and differential radio coverage to identify information's effects. Estimates suggest that information increases voting across ethnic-party lines and induces a more equitable allocation of campaign spending. (JEL D72, D83, J15, O17, Z13)
DOI: 10.3886/e112918
title: Replication data for: Financial Intermediation, International Risk Sharing, and Reserve Currencies

description: I model the equilibrium risk sharing between countries with varying financial development. The most financially developed country takes greater risks because its financial intermediaries deal with funding problems better. In good times, the more financially developed country consumes more and runs a trade deficit financed by the higher financial income that it earns as compensation for taking greater risk. During global crises, it suffers heavier losses. Its currency emerges as the reserve currency because it appreciates during crises, thus providing a good hedge. I provide evidence that financial net worth plays a crucial role in understanding this asymmetric risk sharing.
DOI: 10.3886/e112918v1
title: Replication data for: Financial Intermediation, International Risk Sharing, and Reserve Currencies

description: I model the equilibrium risk sharing between countries with varying financial development. The most financially developed country takes greater risks because its financial intermediaries deal with funding problems better. In good times, the more financially developed country consumes more and runs a trade deficit financed by the higher financial income that it earns as compensation for taking greater risk. During global crises, it suffers heavier losses. Its currency emerges as the reserve currency because it appreciates during crises, thus providing a good hedge. I provide evidence that financial net worth plays a crucial role in understanding this asymmetric risk sharing.
DOI: 10.3886/e112919
title: Replication data for: Credit Constraints and Growth in a Global Economy

description: We show that in an open-economy OLG model, the interaction between growth differentials and household credit constraintsâ€”more severe in fast-growing countriesâ€”can explain three prominent global trends: a divergence in private saving rates between advanced and emerging economies, large net capital outflows from the latter, and a sustained decline in the world interest rate. Micro-level evidence on the evolution of age-saving profiles in the US and China corroborates our mechanism. Quantitatively, our model explains about a third of the divergence in aggregate saving rates, and a significant portion of the variations in age-saving profiles across countries and over time. (JEL E21, E22, F21, F32, F41, O16, P24)
DOI: 10.3886/e112919v1
title: Replication data for: Credit Constraints and Growth in a Global Economy

description: We show that in an open-economy OLG model, the interaction between growth differentials and household credit constraintsâ€”more severe in fast-growing countriesâ€”can explain three prominent global trends: a divergence in private saving rates between advanced and emerging economies, large net capital outflows from the latter, and a sustained decline in the world interest rate. Micro-level evidence on the evolution of age-saving profiles in the US and China corroborates our mechanism. Quantitatively, our model explains about a third of the divergence in aggregate saving rates, and a significant portion of the variations in age-saving profiles across countries and over time. (JEL E21, E22, F21, F32, F41, O16, P24)
DOI: 10.3886/e113050
title: Replication data for: Firm Sorting and Agglomeration

description: To account for the uneven distribution of economic activity in space, I propose a theory of the location choices of heterogeneous firms in a variety of sectors across cities. In equilibrium, the distribution of city sizes and the sorting patterns of firms are uniquely determined and affect aggregate TFP and welfare. I estimate the model using French firm-level data and find that nearly half of the productivity advantage of large cities is due to firm sorting, the rest coming from agglomeration economies. I quantify the general equilibrium effects of place-based policies: policies that subsidize smaller cities have negative aggregate effects.
DOI: 10.3886/e113050v1
title: Replication data for: Firm Sorting and Agglomeration

description: To account for the uneven distribution of economic activity in space, I propose a theory of the location choices of heterogeneous firms in a variety of sectors across cities. In equilibrium, the distribution of city sizes and the sorting patterns of firms are uniquely determined and affect aggregate TFP and welfare. I estimate the model using French firm-level data and find that nearly half of the productivity advantage of large cities is due to firm sorting, the rest coming from agglomeration economies. I quantify the general equilibrium effects of place-based policies: policies that subsidize smaller cities have negative aggregate effects.
DOI: 10.3886/e113051v1
title: Replication data for: Technological Innovations, Downside Risk, and the Modernization of Agriculture

description: We use a randomized experiment in India to show that improved technology enhances agricultural productivity by crowding in modern inputs and cultivation practices. Specifically, we show that a new rice variety that reduces downside risk by providing flood tolerance has positive effects on adoption of a more labor-intensive planting method, area cultivated, fertilizer usage, and credit utilization. We find that a large share of the expected gains from the technology comes from crowding in of other investments. Therefore, improved technologies that reduce risk by protecting production in bad years have the potential to increase agricultural productivity in normal years.
DOI: 10.3886/e112597
title: Replication data for: Preferences for Truthfulness: Heterogeneity among and within Individuals

description: We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying. The results allow us to reject a type-based model. People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either "economic types" (who care only about consequences) or "ethical types" (who care only about process). Instead, we find that preferences for truthfulness are heterogeneous among individuals. Moreover, when examining possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying and their interplay with economic costs of truthfulness, we find that preferences for truthfulness are also heterogeneous within individuals.
DOI: 10.3886/e112598
title: Replication data for: Misclassification Errors and the Underestimation of the US Unemployment Rate

description: Using recent results in the measurement error literature, we show that the official US unemployment rate substantially underestimates the true level of unemployment, due to misclassification errors in the labor force status in the Current Population Survey. During the period from January 1996 to August 2011, the corrected monthly unemployment rates are between 1 and 4.4 percentage points (2.1 percentage points on average) higher than the official rates, and are more sensitive to changes in business cycles. The labor force participation rates, however, are not affected by this correction.
DOI: 10.3886/e112598v1
title: Replication data for: Misclassification Errors and the Underestimation of the US Unemployment Rate

description: Using recent results in the measurement error literature, we show that the official US unemployment rate substantially underestimates the true level of unemployment, due to misclassification errors in the labor force status in the Current Population Survey. During the period from January 1996 to August 2011, the corrected monthly unemployment rates are between 1 and 4.4 percentage points (2.1 percentage points on average) higher than the official rates, and are more sensitive to changes in business cycles. The labor force participation rates, however, are not affected by this correction.
DOI: 10.3886/e112599
title: Replication data for: Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy

description: The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs (i) increase with imports, (ii) increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities, and (iii) decrease with the variance of imports. We find US import policy during 1997-2006 to be consistent with this theory. A one standard deviation increase in import growth, the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity, and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the US imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent, by 88 percent, and by -76 percent, respectively.
DOI: 10.3886/e112599v1
title: Replication data for: Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy

description: The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs (i) increase with imports, (ii) increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities, and (iii) decrease with the variance of imports. We find US import policy during 1997-2006 to be consistent with this theory. A one standard deviation increase in import growth, the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity, and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the US imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent, by 88 percent, and by -76 percent, respectively.
DOI: 10.3886/e112600
title: Replication data for: Paper Money

description: Drastic changes in central bank operations and monetary institutions in recent years have made previously standard approaches to explaining the determination of the price level obsolete. Recent expansions of central bank balance sheets and of the levels of rich-country sovereign debt, as well as the evolving political economy of the European Monetary Union, have made it clear that fiscal policy and monetary policy are intertwined. Our thinking and teaching about inflation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy should be based on models that recognize fiscal-monetary policy interactions. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)
DOI: 10.3886/e112600v1
title: Replication data for: Paper Money

description: Drastic changes in central bank operations and monetary institutions in recent years have made previously standard approaches to explaining the determination of the price level obsolete. Recent expansions of central bank balance sheets and of the levels of rich-country sovereign debt, as well as the evolving political economy of the European Monetary Union, have made it clear that fiscal policy and monetary policy are intertwined. Our thinking and teaching about inflation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy should be based on models that recognize fiscal-monetary policy interactions. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)
DOI: 10.3886/e112601v1
title: Replication data for: Inferring Strategic Voting

description: We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies. (JEL D72)
DOI: 10.3886/e112920v1
title: Replication data for: Do Higher Corporate Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany

description: This paper estimates the incidence of corporate taxes on wages using a 20-year panel of German municipalities exploiting 6,800 tax changes for identification. Using event study designs and difference-in-differences models, we find that workers bear about one-half of the total tax burden. Administrative linked employer-employee data allow us to estimate heterogeneous firm and worker effects. Our findings highlight the importance of labor market institutions and profit-shifting opportunities for the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. Moreover, we show that low-skilled, young, and female employees bear a larger share of the tax burden. This has important distributive implications.
DOI: 10.3886/e112921
title: Replication data for: The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development

description: The TseTse fly is unique to Africa and transmits a parasite harmful to humans and lethal to livestock. This paper tests the hypothesis that the TseTse reduced the ability of Africans to generate an agricultural surplus historically. Ethnic groups inhabiting TseTse-suitable areas were less likely to use domesticated animals and the plow, less likely to be politically centralized, and had a lower population density. These correlations are not found in the tropics outside of Africa, where the fly does not exist. The evidence suggests current economic performance is affected by the TseTse through the channel of precolonial political centralization. (JEL I12, N57, O13, O17, Q12, Q16, Q18)
DOI: 10.3886/e112922
title: Replication data for: Clientelism in Indian Villages

description: We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)
DOI: 10.3886/e112922v1
title: Replication data for: Clientelism in Indian Villages

description: We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)