cometadata/datacite-titles-descriptions-related-identifiers huggingface dataset:
DOI: 10.11588/data/10030
title: Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence [Dataset]

description: The determinants of individual, voluntary climate action (VCA) in combating climate change and its potential scale are frequently debated in public but largely underresearched. We provide estimates of the willingness to individually reduce EU greenhouse gas emissions by one ton, using the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Estimates are derived from an online ﬁeld experiment with a large, highly heterogenous, and Internet-representative sample of voting-aged Germans. Jointly estimating willingness to pay (WTP), non-indifference to VCA, and prior knowledge, we uncover important determinants of preferences for VCA, such as education, the information structure among the population, and exogenous environmental conditions.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10030/5nm2xy
title: 2013-03_Data-DC-Fld_konvertiert.zip

description: for internal use only
DOI: 10.11588/data/10030/khgcd2
title: Diederich-Goeschl_2014_WTP-for-VCA_ERE-57_405-29.dta

description: Data
DOI: 10.11588/data/10030/yizhgr
title: Diederich-Goeschl_2014_WTP-for-VCA_ERE-57_405-29.do

description: do-File
DOI: 10.11588/data/10011
title: Ambiguity attitudes [Supplemental material]

description: The handbook chapter reviews experimental methods to measure ambiguity attitudes, as well as the recent experimental evidence regarding these attitudes. The data file contains background data that form the basis of Table 1 in the chapter.
description: see details in book chapter
DOI: 10.11588/data/10011/lme1ti
title: TablePremiaOnline_ambrev_FINAL.xlsx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10011/z57nip
title: LZA_description.tar_1.gz

description: This file is only for internal use.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10015
title: Hierarchy, Coercion, and Exploitation: An Experimental Analysis [Dataset]

description: The power to coerce workers is important for the efficient operation of hierarchically structured organizations. However, this power can also be used by managers to exploit their subordinates for their own benefit. We examine the relationship between the power to coerce and exploitation in a laboratory experiment where a senior and a junior player interact repeatedly for a finite number of periods. We find that senior players try repeatedly to use their power to exploit junior workers. These attempts are successful only when junior workers have incomplete information about how their effort impacts on the earnings of senior players, but not when they have complete information. Evidence from an incentive-compatible questionnaire indicates that the social acceptabil
ity of exploitation depends on whether the junior worker can detect she is being exploited. We also show how a history of exploitation affects future interactions.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10015/bzo17m
title: master data.tab

description: Original SPSS file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10015/omy9ec
title: LZA.tar.gz

description: This file is only for internal use.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10015/uxkipc
title: All_4 treatments stata correct format.xlsx

description: OpenXML - Spreadsheet
DOI: 10.11588/data/10006
title: Tempus Fugit: Time Pressure in Risky Decisions [Dataset]

description: We study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects, pure loss prospects, and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. In two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains, but increases risk aversion for losses. For mixed prospects, subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The results suggest the importance of aspiration levels, and thus the overall probability to break even, under time pressure. We discuss the implications of our findings for decision-making situations that involve time pressure.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10006/78klne
title: ReadmeData.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10006/f48qdm
title: do_experiment2.do
DOI: 10.11588/data/10006/iv6sts
title: do_experiment1.do
DOI: 10.11588/data/10006/ivadv4
title: onlinematerial_MS-FINAL.pdf

description: experimental instructions
DOI: 10.11588/data/10006/ix0ajh
title: timepressMSdata.xlsx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10023
title: How do subjects view multiple sources of ambiguity? [Dataset]

description: As illustrated by the famous Ellsberg paradox, many subjects prefer to bet on events with known rather than with unknown probabilities, i.e., they are ambiguity averse. In an experiment, we examine subjects’ choices when there is an additional source of ambiguity, namely, when they do not know how much money they can win. Using a standard assumption on the joint set of priors, we show that ambiguity-averse subjects should continue to strictly prefer the urn with known probabilities. In contrast, our results show that many subjects no longer exhibit such a strict preference.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10023/btdsqu
title: LZA.tar.gz

description: This file is for internal use only.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10023/dru177
title: ambiguity4.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10023/go7sns
title: ambiguity4.xlsx

description: OpenXML Spreadsheet format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10018
title: On the Ingredients for Bubble Formation: Informed Traders and Communication [Dataset]

description: Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experiments. Most experiments in which bubbles occur feature a declining fundamental value. This feature has been criticized for being atypical of real financial markets. Here, we experimentally study other ingredients for bubble formation that are common in such markets, namely the existence of inside information and communication among traders. We find that bubbles and mirages can occur if these additional ingredients are present. In particular, the mere possibility that some traders are better informed than others can create bubbles. Surprisingly, communication turns out to be counterproductive for bubble formation.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10018/6jhkul
title: oss bubbles per day.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10018/x0jltm
title: LZA.tar.gz

description: This file is only for internal use.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/6d6nfi
title: Screen7B.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/7m1yqi
title: Screen6A.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/8if5k6
title: Screen5B.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/a623eq
title: Screen4Aswitch.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/b3zdfe
title: Screen7B.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/bphs0v
title: Screen3Anoswitch.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/bskj84
title: promises_v19.0.txt

description: Z-Tree Text export
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/cihc7w
title: Screen5A.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/d9wpqr
title: Screen6A.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/dtidhq
title: messages_baseline.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/eoxdjc
title: messages_switch.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/flrenv
title: Screen3Aswitch.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/hflnju
title: readme_data.txt
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/hibffq
title: promises.do
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/hjjf79
title: readme.txt
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/i0hktd
title: Screen1.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/krktqe
title: Screen7A.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/ku0zz7
title: Screen3B.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/lggchd
title: Screen2.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/ls7nek
title: baseline.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/oap8de
title: Screen5A.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/ogqkvo
title: Screen4B.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/qkn0xe
title: Screen2.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/r4ubot
title: Screen3Anoswitch.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/rzcej8
title: Screen1.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/rzpgah
title: Screen4B.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/twcj2k
title: promises v19.0.ztt

description: Z-Tree
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/uc1kio
title: Screen5B.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/uqutxs
title: switch.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/whnebt
title: Screen3Aswitch.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/xnzsjk
title: Screen4Aswitch.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/yaevzu
title: Screen7A.tiff
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/zymylr
title: translation of screens.pdf

description: english translation of the screens
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066
title: Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability [Dataset]

description: We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion. Differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision ("ex-ante") and where they are accountable for the outcome ("ex-post").
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066/3xmm5b
title: PPT_Codebook.xlsx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066/pfen21
title: PPTdata.tab

description: data in stata format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066/rc50t3
title: PPT_datamerged.xlsx

description: contains the raw data merged from the excel files created by zetree
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066/suknmt
title: PPT_fig1.xlsx

description: creates figure 1 (article)
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066/t6glx3
title: readme.txt
DOI: 10.11588/data/10066/xqailn
title: PPT_do_replication.do

description: contains code to replicate the results reported in the article
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032
title: Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations

description: Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games. This paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect. The first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word. The second assumes that people dislike letting down others' payoff expectations. According to the latter account, promises affect behavior only indirectly, because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others. I conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations. The results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations. This suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se.
description: 2.3.1, 2.3.1
description: promisesv19.0.ztt: zTree program (zTree version 2.3.1) Screen*.eps: screen shots (in german) Translation of screens.pdf english translation of the screens Translation of instructions.pdf english translation of instructions (German available upon request) readme_data.txt information on the other files *.dat, *.tab, promises.do: see readme_data.txt LIST OF FILES: baseline.dat - Stata data file for "communication" and "no communication" treatments discussed in Appendix A switch.dat - Stata data file for "switching" treatments discussed in Section 4 promises.do - Stata code for tables, non-parametric tests, and regressions messages_baseline.tab - Tab delimited file containing text messages send in the baseline communication treatment, as well as the coded dummy "promise" messages_switch.tab - Analogous to previous file for the "partner switching" treatment NOTE: In order to run the .do file, you will need to adjust the paths to point to the appropriate directory.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/czi0dd
title: Screen3B.eps
DOI: 10.11588/data/10032/xod7be
title: translation of instructions.pdf

description: english translation of the instructions
DOI: 10.11588/data/10096
title: Catastrophic Risk: Social Influences on Insurance Decisions [Dataset]

description: We study behavioral patterns of insurance demand for low-probability large-loss events (catastrophic losses). Individual patterns of belief formation and risk attitude that were suggested in the behavioral decisions literature emerge robustly in the current set of insurance choices. However, social comparison effects are less robust. We do not find any evidence for peer effects (through social loss aversion or imitation) on insurance take-up. In contrast, we find support for the prediction that people underweight others’ relevant information in their own decision making.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10096/ootu0u
title: dofile_krawczyketal.do
DOI: 10.11588/data/10096/sa6y1h
title: dataset.dta
DOI: 10.11588/data/10096/v6yctw
title: dataset_stat12_with_Bayesian_probs_2.dta
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069
title: Group Size and the (In)Efficiency of Pure Public Good Provision [Dataset]

description: Are larger groups better at cooperation than smaller groups? This paper investigates, under controlled conditions, the presence and direction of a possible group size effect in pure public good provision by large heterogeneous groups. Employing subjects drawn from the general population and introducing Internet-based procedures to study this question, we collected experimental evidence from 1,110 subjects playing a linear public goods game in groups of 10, 40, and 100 members. We find a positive and significant group size effect: Increasing group size by a factor of 10 (4) increased efficiency by 10 (6) percent. The effect arose at the intensive margin and with repetition. Those who contributed contributed more in larger groups. Larger and smaller groups had similar initial contribution levels, but cooperation rates declined more slowly in the larger groups. Free-riding was invariant to group size, despite subjects' persistent beliefs of a negative group size effect at the extensive margin. Further econometric examination of the data supports these findings and provides starting points for future theoretical an
d experimental research on the group size effect.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/01brcr
title: data.dta

description: main data file, stata 13 format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/8hocoi
title: experimental_screens.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/cf4wch
title: defaults_stata12.tab

description: contains data on default rates (percdefault), stata 12 format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/de9fxt
title: data.xlsx

description: main data file exported from Stata to Excel
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/m3bpgi
title: recruitment.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/moq2az
title: readme_Instructions, screens, recruitment.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/mzujjs
title: instructions.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/nwpfj4
title: email_templates.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/nxjvzh
title: data_labeled.xlsx

description: main data file exported from Stata to Excel using variable and value labels
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/obtxfr
title: readme_Data.pdf

description: documentation
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/qiiow2
title: data_stata12.tab

description: main data file, stata 12 format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10069/wjxrwq
title: defaults.dta

description: contains data on default rates (percdefault), stata 13 format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10052
title: Women can´t jump?—An experiment on competitive attitudes and stereotype threat [Dataset]
title: An experiment on competitive attitudes and stereotype threat

description: Gneezy et al. (2003) offer a partial explanation for the wage gap between men and women. In an experiment they found that women react less to competitive incentives. The task they used in their experiment can however be considered a male task. We replicate the experiment and extend it by treatments with a gender-neutral task and a female task. For the male task we replicate their results, but for the neutral task women react as strongly to incentives than men and for the female task women react stronger than men. Our findings suggest a stereotype threat explanation. Women tend not to compete with men in areas where they (rightly or wrongly) think that they will lose anyway – and the same holds for men, although to a lower extent.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10052/2zdr2z
title: WomenCantJumpExampleInstructionsNeutralTaskCompetitive.docx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10052/8vtkya
title: WomenCantJumpExampleInstructionsMaleTaskRandomPay.docx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10052/fn7zl8
title: WomenCantJumpExampleInstructionsNeutralTaskCompetitive.pdf

description: PDF-A version
DOI: 10.11588/data/10052/ft6m0h
title: data_WomenCantJump.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10052/ktytjp
title: WomenCantJumpExampleInstructionsMaleTaskRandomPay.pdf

description: PDF-A version
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040
title: Prospect theory or construal level theory? Diminishing sensitivity vs. psychological distance in risky decisions [Dataset]

description: Attitudes toward risks are central to organizational decisions. These attitudes are commonly modeled by prospect theory. Construal level theory has been proposed as an alternative theory of risky choice, accounting for psychological distance deriving from temporal, spatial and social aspects of risk that are typical of agency situations. Unnoticed in the literature, the two theories make contradicting predictions. The current study investigates which theory provides a better description of risky decisions in the presence of temporal, spatial, and social factors. We find that the psychophysical effects modeled by prospect theory dominate the psychological distance effects of construal level theory.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/0dkkhg
title: instructions_experiment4.pdf

description: (dutch)
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/2byq8u
title: instructions_experiment3.docx

description: (dutch) docx format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/8cwbnf
title: instructions_experiment4.docx

description: (dutch) docx format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/ivm945
title: instructions_experiment3.pdf

description: (dutch)
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/ji3jwp
title: instructions_experiment1.pdf

description: (dutch)
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/vpshns
title: dataset_TrautmannvdKuilen_2012actapsychologica.xlsx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/wryfd4
title: instructions_experiment2.docx

description: (dutch) docx format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/xamzzp
title: instructions_experiment1.docx

description: (dutch) docx format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10040/yf7lgt
title: instructions_experiment2.pdf

description: (dutch)
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/0ihbma
title: Questionnaire.ztq

description: Original z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/0w6p4x
title: LZA_format_description_stata115.tar.gz

description: This file is only for internal use
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/79yfnq
title: data_control.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/7sxdo2
title: Tvdk2015_Tables and Tests.do

description: :unav
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/9zvcaf
title: Tables.do

description: STATA do file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/csz0qa
title: OutcomeMatching_ztt_export.txt

description: Text export of z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/e3hquh
title: QuadraticScoringRuleProbability.ztt

description: Original z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/ecchip
title: Introspection_ztt_export.txt

description: Text export of z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/etuxv1
title: TvdK2015_Analyses in Excel.xlsx

description: :unav
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/ipjitk
title: ProbabilityMatching.ztt

description: Original z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/ixgfc6
title: readme.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/k1c5eu
title: QuadraticScoringRule_ztt_export.txt

description: Text export of z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/ks0ize
title: OutcomeMatching.ztt

description: Original z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/mkawuf
title: Questionnaire_ztq_export.txt

description: Text export of z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/r4goax
title: data_orign.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/tzhokv
title: ProbabilityMatching_ztt_export.txt

description: Text export of z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/ufokcz
title: QuadraticScoringRuleProbability_ztt_export.txt

description: Text export of z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/vmivk0
title: QuadraticScoringRule.ztt

description: Original z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10004/vu9r4n
title: Introspection.ztt

description: Original z-Tree file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10021
title: Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally [Dataset]

description: A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) [18] implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopolies, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome. We show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in costs, since every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical predictio
n, the Walrasian outcome is a good predictor of market outcomes. Finally, we suggest a new theory based on a mix of imitation and other learning processes that explains subjects' behavior fairly well.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10021/ceqqtp
title: data JET 2010 AHOW.xlsx

description: OpenXML - Spreadsheet format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10021/fwyokc
title: data JET 2010 AHOW.tab

description: Original STATA file
DOI: 10.11588/data/10021/potjby
title: LZA.tar.gz

description: This file is for internal use only.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10017
title: Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopoly [Dataset]

description: In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three-firm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level. Markets with four or five firms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome. Some of those markets are actually quite competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10017/mcl49d
title: data two are few.xlsx

description: OpenXML - Spreadsheet format
DOI: 10.11588/data/10017/plgwit
title: LZA.tar.gz

description: This file is for internal use only.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10017/ruhkz2
title: data two are few.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10094
title: Payment Procedure in a Public Good Game Experiment: The Effects of Endowment Timing, Tangibility, and Source [Dataset]

description: We study whether and how payment procedure affects behavior in a repeated public good game. To this end, we conducted five treatments, varying the times of paying the initial endowment (week before, before, or after the decisions) and the source of the initial endowment (windfall vs. earned money in a real-effort task). We find little evidence for effects of tangible endowment, windfall endowment, or prepaid endowment. However, we observe that payment procedures do influence decisions in a repeated public good game experiment.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10094/hm1jfd
title: Key_to-Data_Waichman&Voss.pdf
DOI: 10.11588/data/10094/lflymv
title: Dataset_Waichman&Voss.xlsx
DOI: 10.15468/dl.f75t4k
title: Occurrence Download

description: A dataset containing 882 species occurrences available in GBIF matching the query:
{
 "and" : [
 "Country is Colombia",
 "OccurrenceStatus is Present",
 "TaxonKey is Aedes aegypti (Linnaeus, 1762)"
 ]
}

 The dataset includes 882 records from 9 constituent datasets; see https://api.gbif.org/v1/occurrence/download/0001890-250127130748423/datasets/export for details.
 
Data from some individual datasets included in this download may be licensed under less restrictive terms.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10019
title: Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence [Dataset]

description: We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are mainly explained by different informational assumptions, and to a lesser extent by different behavioral rules. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. Furthermore, individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10019/5itut1
title: LZA.tar.gz

description: This file is for internal use only.
DOI: 10.11588/data/10019/dhvtr0
title: imit-vergleich simulation data.xlsx
DOI: 10.11588/data/10019/dzy9k6
title: imit-master.tab
DOI: 10.11588/data/10019/hlmfyj
title: imit-simul.frequencies.xlsx