The realiser-realiser identity theory of mind
Creators: name: Llamas, Erick
Publisher: name: The Australian National University
Year: 2021

description: In this thesis, I present and defend the view I call the realiser-realiser identity theory of mind. I will argue that this view can solve the main issues surrounding the mind-body problem, namely, the problems posed by conceivability arguments, the problem of mental causation, the problem of multiple realisation of the mental and the correlation between the mental and the physical properties. Chapter I is an introductory chapter where I present my view and compare it with all the standard answers to the mind-body problem. In Chapter II, I will show how the realiser-realiser identity theory fares with respect to the conceivability argument against the necessitation between the mental and the physical properties. First, I will argue that there is a general strategy with which the conceivability argument has been defended. Then, I will present what I call the realisers' response to conceivability arguments. In a nutshell, the way to escape conceivability arguments comes down to the distinction between the realiser and the realised properties presented in Chapter I. I will argue that we can accept conceivability arguments when they are run at the level of the role properties, however, we will be able to show that when they are run at the level of the realiser properties the arguments cannot get of the ground. In the appendix to Chapter II, I discuss the details of Kripke and Chalmers' conceivability arguments. In Chapter III, I will deal with three problems that are core parts of the mind-body problem: the problem of mental causation, the problem of multiple realisation and the problem of explaining the correlation between the mental and the physical. I discuss these issues in the same order. At the end of this Chapter, I will discuss how the realiser-realiser identity theory can be developed with respect to the nature of the realiser. I will argue that the theory can be developed in many versions than range from kinds of physicalism to kinds of idealism, but that these different versions do not change the way in which the realiser-realiser identity theory handles the problems mentioned above. In Chapter IV, I will compare the realiser-realiser identity theory with less standard answers to the mind-body problem that focus their attention on the notion of the physical. Analogously to the phenomenal concept strategy, these less standard answers to the mind-body problem hold that our concepts of the physical are peculiar, and if we were to pay attention to how peculiar the concept of the physical is we would be able to circumvent the problems in the philosophy of mind. Broadly speaking, this strategy has been implemented in three ways: (i) the Chomskyan line, which involves a sort of sceptical stance on the notion of the physical; (ii) the non-mental line, which accepts the sceptical stance on the physical and tries to save the problems with the notion of the non-mental and (iii) the Russellian line, which involves a sceptical stance towards the non-structural features of the physical. Although different, the Chomskyan, the non-mental and the Russellian line hold that there is something special about the physical concepts: they involve some sort of opacity with respect to the nature of the physical. I will refer to this strategy as the physical concepts strategy. Then I compare the physical concepts strategy with the realiser's response to conceivability arguments. In the final Chapter, I will discuss in detail the notion of realisation presented in Chapter I. Here I will present more detail to the notion and distinguish a couple of properties of the relation of realisation that I presented in Chapter I. Here I will compare my notion of realisation with other notions in the vicinity in order to have greater clarity on what the relation amounts to. At the end, I will present a couple of ways on which the notion of realisation can prove useful for different purposes.