Three essays in innovation economics
Creators: name: Klapper, Felix Benedikt
Publisher: name: Hannover : Institutionelles Repositorium der Leibniz Universität Hannover
Year: 2024
Subjects: subject: Patents
subject: Licensing
subject: R&amp;D
subject: Patent privateering
subject: Patent assertion entity
subject: Privacy
subject: Online addiction
subject: Service quality
subject: Network effects
subject: Advertisement quality
subject: Industrial organization
subject: Patente
subject: Lizenzierung
subject: F&amp;E
subject: Patentfreibeuterei
subject: Patentverwertungsgesellschaft
subject: Privatsphäre
subject: Online-Sucht
subject: Servicequalität
subject: Netzwerkeffekte
subject: Werbequalität
subject: Industrieökonomik
subject: Dewey Decimal Classification::300 | Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie::330 | Wirtschaft

description: This cumulative dissertation examines the implications of contemporary business models and comprises three articles. The first chapter provides a brief overview about the topics of the thesis and summaries of the three main chapters. Chapter 2, which is co-authored with Christian Siemering, investigates patent litigation, settlements, and R&amp;D incentives in a market where two firms develop technologies to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell intellectual property rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as an intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the positive effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distorting R&amp;D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE. Our results contribute to the recent debate about privateering, suggesting that it is even less desirable than previously assumed. Chapter 3 introduces a theoretical model examining the interplay between a two-sided host platform, a monopoly online service platform, and a homogeneous group of users. The service provider strategically determines its admission price and level of service addictiveness based on the host platform’s privacy policy. The addictiveness choice is associated with a trade-off between admission prices and user attention. Profits arise from user attention monetization via targeted advertisements and admission fees, contingent on the privacy policy allowing attention monetization. I demonstrate that the host platform, which receives a share of admission fees, favors a restrictive privacy policy. Under this policy, the service provider opts for a less addictive platform design with a higher admission price compared to a permissive policy, coinciding with higher service quality and reduced attention spending. The findings provide an explanation for recent corporate privacy policy shifts and suggest that these policies are service quality enhancing. Chapter 4 extends the framework proposed in the previous chapter by considering advertisement quality, which is influenced by the host’s data disclosure policy. I show that the host encounters a trade-off in this setting. On one hand, increasing the level of data disclosure improves advertisement quality, resulting in a higher admission price and, consequently, increased revenues for the host. On the other hand, a higher level of data disclosure may prompt the service provider to make its services more addictive, boosting user attention and thus revenues from targeted advertisements, but at the cost of lowering the admission price. I demonstrate that the host opts for a positive level of data disclosure in equilibrium, which may explain why complete privacy is not prevalent in online environments.