COVINFORM - Synthesis and lessons learnt on communication, information and misinformation
Creators: name: Adler, Viktoria
name: Bertel, Diotima
name: Anson, Su
Publisher: name: Zenodo
Year: 2022

description: This deliverable provides a synthesis and interpretation of the findings of previous tasks of work package (WP) 7, based on the theoretical framework established in WPs 2 and 3, i.e., Complex Systems Theory (Ostrom 2007). This is aligned with a theoretical reflection on risk and crisis communication, particularly the Risk Governance Framework (IRGC, 2017), which outlines questions to address when developing communication, and the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell &amp; Perry 2012). Relating these theoretical models/frameworks to the Ostrom (2007) Systems Model, we visualise how Ostrom’s 2007 model is a relevant theoretical framework to compare the communication approaches of the ten COVINFORM countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. We propose an approach that analyses COVID-19 risk communication through the lens of complex adaptive system theory. This approach helps us to understand the relationships between various components influencing risk communication. Further, we could identify similarities and differences amongst the ten countries under research. In the next iteration of this deliverable, this will be extended by (a) further timespans, and (b) insights from the empirical research conducted in WP7, particularly research with vulnerable groups. Through our comparative analysis, we could identify that most countries used a centralised top-down communication approach. The main actors were government officials such as Prime Ministers and Presidents as well as Health and Interior Ministers. In some countries, National Crisis Centres and Public Health Institutes took on an important role in the coordination and delivery of COVID-19 risk communication. In all countries under research, risk communication followed a multi-channel strategy, including social media and press conferences. Looking at the means of communication, we can see that COVID-19 risk communication was predominantly conducted in a one-way and top-down approach. Awareness-raising campaigns were often used to communicate behaviour change to the public. Two-way channels we could identify were, for example, hotlines some countries set up. In some countries, NGOs played a crucial role in risk communication, particularly in relation to vulnerable groups. Most governments adopted their general risk communication campaigns, to some degree, so that they would speak to vulnerable groups. In many instances, this was done by translations or the adaption of certain texts into easy language. In general, communication barriers were similar across all countries under research. Language and cultural barriers were often mentioned, contributing to dis-and misinformation. Lack of trust, particularly in those countries where low trust in the government already existed prior to the pandemic, also played a negative role in risk communication. This deliverable concludes with some lessons learned in relation to five key points: 1.) accessible and inclusive communication, 2.) actionable communication, 3.) trusted and credible communication, 4.) relevant and timely communication and finally, 5.) understandable communication.