The impact of the order of credibility information on reinterpretation
Creators: name: Gerstmayer, Sara
name: Krishna, Anand
Publisher: name: Open Science Framework
Year: 2023
Subjects: subject: Social and Behavioral Sciences
subject: Social Psychology
subject: Psychology
subject: FOS: Psychology
subject: Cognitive Psychology
subject: social cognition
subject: inferential processing
subject: implicit attitudes
subject: credibility
subject: attitude revision
subject: reinterpretation
subject: spontaneous evaluations
subject: propositional processing
subject: affect misattribution procedure

description: Recent research has shown that patterns of spontaneous evaluation (as measured by indirect procedures such as the AMP, Payne et al., 2005, or IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998) can be revised quickly by new reinterpretation information that changes the evaluative meaning of the existing information underlying an attitude (Mann &amp; Ferguson, 2015), in defiance of theories postulating slow associative learning as the formative processes behind such attitudes (e.g., Gawronski &amp; Bodenhausen, 2006). The postulated process of recontextualizing existing information and changing its meaning implies an application of inferential reasoning, a specific form of propositional processing. For example, the initial proposition of “Francis broke into the house and took out the children” may be evaluated negatively spontaneously even without an inference if breaking in and kidnapping has a strong, automatic association with negative evaluation. However, if the additional proposition of “The house was on fire and the children were in danger” is added, the evaluation of Francis can only change if these two statements are connected and the positive inference that Francis was saving the children is drawn. The resulting change in the pattern of spontaneous evaluations towards Francis would thus depend on this inference, which in turn depends on propositional processing. In line with this role of propositional processing in reinterpretation, previous research has demonstrated that the credibility of the reinterpretation information determines whether the spontaneous evaluation pattern shifts (Krishna, 2021). However, the kind of relational information included in propositions does not always affect spontaneous evaluations, especially if it is presented with a delay (Peters &amp; Gawronski, 2011) or after the initial pairing of the elements involved (Zanon et al., 2014). We propose that this is due to the difference between propositional and inferential processes (e.g., Boddez et al., 2017). To elaborate, given the propositions “A caused B”, A will be evaluated in line with B’s valence (in this example negative). While this is effectively the inference “A is negative” based on the additional proposition “B is negative”, given a sufficiently accessible evaluation, the inference is likely to be drawn spontaneously. A reinterpretation effect might then be induced by adding the proposition “B served positive outcome C [and not the typical negative outcome of B]”. The required inference for evaluative change would be “A caused B in service of C, therefore A is positive”. Given that attention is devoted to the new proposition and that the positivity of C is also sufficiently accessible, this reinterpretation inference is also likely to be drawn spontaneously. Thus far, we have described the assumed underlying inferential processes for typical reinterpretation effects (Mann &amp; Ferguson, 2015), which are presumed to sufficient to shift spontaneous evaluations. If we now consider additional propositions about credibility, the proposition “It is not credible that B served positive outcome C” should interfere with the reinterpretation inference, leading to weaker or no shift in spontaneous evaluations, if the proposition is available at the time the reinterpretation inference is drawn. However, if the proposition is supplied only after the reinterpretation information and the assumed subsequent spontaneous inference, it may not lead to a re-evaluation. Therefore, spontaneous evaluations may remain shifted in line with the reinterpretation information, even though it is known to be non-credible. Put simply, the credibility proposition may affect the truth value of the reinterpretation information, but that does not mean the new truth value will be applied to the evaluation. A corollary of this argument is that actively inducing an individual to draw the reinterpretation inference anew should lead to the shift in spontaneous evaluations reverting even in cases where the credibility information was supplied after the initial inference. If this argument holds, it would imply that dissociations between spontaneous and deliberative evaluations (which are generally assumed to be based on inferential reasoning in cases where there is no well-learned accessible evaluation, as with relatively novel targets) may be due to incomplete inferences. This would contradict accounts suggesting that evaluations are stored in memory in a different ‘format’ than they are learned, such as the ‘summary’ format proposed by Kurdi and Dunham (2020). Instead, we would argue that the outcome of an inference is stored in memory as a proposition and is retrieved directly as a spontaneous response to its subject. Thus, spontaneous evaluations may reflect an invalid inference because the initial inference has not been corrected in accordance with new information. Note that this storing-of-inferences process is unlikely to operate as a necessary consequence of every inference. It is implausible that every possible inference an individual draws is given equal space in memory; there are likely to be further requirements, such as motivation or a strong accompanying feeling of rightness, which we do not specifically enumerate here. The current research seeks to support this account by manipulating the applicability of the reinterpretation information via source credibility either before or after receiving the reinterpretation information itself. If the information is defined as non-credible prior to receiving it, the reinterpretation effect on evaluations should be weaker than if the information is defined as non-credible post-hoc.