Indochina as a security concern of the Asean states
Creators: name: Huxley, Timothy John
Publisher: name: The Australian National University
Year: 1986
Subjects: subject: ASEAN
subject: regional
subject: strategic
subject: environment
subject: 1975 to 1981
subject: communist regimes
subject: South Vietnam
subject: Cambodia
subject: Laos
subject: Indochina
subject: non-communist
subject: Southeast Asia
subject: National security Southeast Asia
subject: Southeast Asia Foreign relations Indochina
subject: Indochina Foreign relations Southeast Asia

description: From 1975 to 1981 the governments of the ASEAN states claimed that changes in their regional strategic environment, resulting from thee seizure of power by communist regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and from Vietnam's subsequent invasion and occupation of Cambodia, seriously threatened the security of their countries. Objectively, the most serious threat that the ASEAN states faced as a result of the 1975 communist victories in Indochina was the implicit challenge posed to the somewhat fragile political, social, and economic status quo in non-communist Southeast Asia by the emergence of this radical new political order and, potentially an alternative developmental model, in Indochina. But the ASEAN governments did not wish to highlight their own countries' political, social and economic weaknesses, and for this reason did not emphasize this type of threat. They did, however, claim that Vietnam presented a direct military threat to the region, especially after the 1978 invasion of Cambodia. After 1978, the ASEAN governments also expressed concern about the implications for their countries' security of Hanoi's increasingly close military relationship with the Soviet Union. Successive administrations in Bangkok accused the Indochinese communist regimes of supporting revolutionary movements in Thailand, particularly in the northeast. All ASEAN governments claimed that the flow of refugees from Indochina after the 1975 communist victories, and particularly in 1978-79, threatened security, especially in terms off the possible impact on socioeconomic stability in countries granting 'first asylum'. The ASEAN governments' declarations regarding their security concerns did not always reflect objective threat assessments, often exaggerating and misrepresenting the dangers posed by developments in Indochina. To some extent this may be explained by the distorting influence on policy-makers' perceptions of an array of 'background factors', including the region's internal and external historical international relationships, the foreign policies of the Indochinese States after 1975, the policies of major extra-regional powers, and domestic political and socioeconomic problems in the ASEAN states. But there is also substantial evidence that some of the ASEAN governments - - or at least factions within them - - purposely manipulated various security threats related to Indochina, to fulfil their own domestic and international political objectives. From 1975 to 1978, the ASEAN governments were broadly successful in containing and managing their security concerns with Indochina, although this success was not due only to their skilful diplomacy. Despite frequently declared hostility towards ASEAN and its members, the communist Indochinese regimes displayed willingness to cooperate with non-communist Southeast Asia in order to facilitate post-war reconstruction. The ASEAN states' 'success' in managing their security concerns with Indochina was reinforced by the willingness of all parties to the intra-communist dispute, which broke out in Indochina in 1977-78, to seek more harmonious relationships with non-communist Southeast Asia. Moreover, it became increasingly clear that Indochinese communism would not, in the foreseeable future, present citizens of the ASEAN states with an attractive alternative political and developmental model.However, the higher profile which the ASEAN governments adopted in managing their security concerns with Indochina after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia may have been, on balance, counter-productive in terms of their countries' security, both in relaxation to Indochina and more generally. In particular, the Cambodian stalemate, to which ASEAN's policy contributed, was detrimental to the security of the Association's members in a number of ways, as the involvement of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia intensified, the division between communist and non-communist Southeast Asia hardened, ASEAN's cohesion was strained, and the ASEAN governments' increased their defence expenditures in contrast with their earlier emphasis on achieving security through economic and social development.