title: Corporate governance in the private and public sector
title: Empirical studies on the determination of managerial incentives in the private sector and efficiency and quality in the public sector
titleType: AlternativeTitle
Creators: name: Dyballa, Katharina
Publisher: name: Technische Universität Dortmund
Year: 2017
Subjects: subject: Corporate governance
subject: Executive compensation
subject: Managerial incentives
subject: Disclosure obligations
subject: Foreign competition
subject: Codetermination
subject: Efficiency in employment offices
subject: Quality in employment offices
subject: 330
subject: Management
subject: Gehalt
subject: Lohn
subject: Vergütung
subject: Anreiz
subject: Publizitätspflicht
subject: Wettbewerb
subject: Mitbestimmung
subject: Effizienz
subject: Qualität
subject: Öffentlicher Sektor
subject: Privatwirtschaft

description: Corporate governance in Germany experienced a growing relevance in both the private and public sectors. Therefore, the focus of this dissertation lies on the evaluation of the effectiveness of corporate governance instruments in both sectors. However, whereas in the private sector the general goal of corporate governance is to motivate managers in order to increase the wealth of the corporation, in the public sector the goal is rather to meet performance objectives in an efficient and effective manner. Accordingly, analyzing effectiveness of corporate governance instruments in private respectively public sectors will differ from each other: Regarding the private sector, the main focus lies on the question whether corporate governance instruments indeed lead to a successful alignment of shareholder’s and manager’s interests. As the alignment of interests is predominantly provided by monetary incentives, this dissertation (chapter 2 to 4) empirically focuses on the impact of three corporate governance mechanisms (foreign competition, the implementation of mandatory disclosure obligations, and German codetermination) on level and design of executive compensation. By showing that (1) a high degree of foreign competition increases managerial pay incentives (U.S. and Germany), (2) stronger disclosure obligations have a leveling effect in particular on inappropriate high remuneration levels and (3) labor’s interest is similar to shareholder’s and thus increases managerial pay incentives in cases of codetermination, one might conclude that the considered private sector instruments succeed in improving corporate governance. According to the new public management approach the general goal of corporate governance in the public sector is rather focusing on efficiency and effectivity. Thus, the corresponding empirical analysis in chapter 5 focuses on the evaluation of efficiency and quality in local public services using the example of German employment offices. Additionally in this context, chapter 5 provides insights on the impact of several new public management characteristics on efficiency and quality in German employment offices. It turns out that the effectiveness of some new public management indicators did not reveal the expected impact: They neither lead to an increase in job agency’s efficiency nor quality. Furthermore a job agency’s efficiency deviates between 3 to 35% from cost minimum and there is no general trade-off between efficiency and quality.