I think we took a wrong turn! A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Ontologies in Gambling Fallacies and Generally Fallacious Beliefs.
Creators: name: Williams, Brenton
Publisher: name: CQUniversity
Year: 2025
Subjects: classificationCode: 520402
subject: Decision making
classificationCode: 520503
subject: Personality and individual differences
classificationCode: 520504
subject: Psychology of religion

description: This thesis begins by establishing that Gambling Fallacies, a set of fallacious beliefs about gambling, can be interpreted as expressions of ontological confusion. To test this theory, the relationship between religious belief (previously associated with ontological confusion) and gambling fallacies was explored. Using an archived data set, the subscales of the Rohrbaugh Jessor Religiosity Scale (RJRS), a multidimensional measure of religious belief, were assessed for relationships to gambling fallacies as measured by the Gambling Fallacies Measure (GFM). The hypothesised relationships were supported: mundane aspects of religious belief were protective of gambling fallacies, whereas the set of superstitious religious beliefs was associated with an increased risk of believing in gambling fallacies. As superstition, or magical-thinking-related beliefs, have previously been predicted by a measure of ontological error using the Core Knowledge Confusion scale (CKC), it was suggested that this would also predict gambling fallacies. As previous use of the CKC in North America had resulted in statistical models deviating from the original Finnish scale, it was necessary to revise and validate the CKC for use in Australia. Revision of the CKC was performed by cross-sectional survey (n = 1010) using Qualtrics to host and source participants. Measures of cognitive performance (verbal knowledge), personality (absorption), analytical thinking, and anthropomorphism were used to evaluate scale characteristics and performance while predicting paranormal beliefs, gambling fallacies, and an ad hoc measure of commonly held fallacious beliefs. Results were evaluated using structural equation modelling and multivariate regression, finding an acceptable model structure, and the revised CKC (CKC-R) significantly predicted the outcome variable: paranormal beliefs. Furthermore, the CKC-R was related to, but differentiated from, both measures of verbal knowledge and absorption. However, the subscales of the CKC-R were significantly correlated, suggesting that ontological boundaries are irrelevant. Furthermore, significant overlap with anthropomorphism was indicated, suggesting previous claims that CKC-R subscales differ ontologically are tenuous and should be revised. Multivariate regression was used to test the relationship between the CKC-R and both the GFM and a general measure of commonly held fallacious beliefs. As the CKC-R predicted both the GFM and the ad hoc measure of fallacious beliefs to a degree similar to paranormal beliefs, the CKC-R failed the test of discriminant validity. Furthermore, as there was minimal unique contribution to the regression models made by the CKC-R, the relationship between the CKC-R and these fallacious beliefs is interpreted as being more likely related to the cognitive and personality measures tested. The CKC-R appears to be a measure related more to literal interpretation and engrossment in the focus of attention than the result of cognitive processes related to ontological categorisations. Hence, the possible relationship between gambling fallacies and ontological error was ultimately abandoned. Turning attention towards the CKC-R and its relationship to language, the final study evaluated the relationship between the CKC-R, metaphor frames, and responses to a dilemma presented in a crime vignette using an online experimental design. The CKC-R was expected to moderate the influence of metaphor frames on responses to the vignette. However, findings did not replicate North American studies, and no significant main effect of metaphor frame, nor interaction was found. Evaluation of the results suggests that the topic was treated differently between regions, and this difference is likely to have resulted in the null findings. As a result, the argument is made that the influence of the metaphor frame is dependent on an emotive response to the topic presented. Overall, this thesis provides a link between literal interpretation of metaphors and generally fallacious beliefs. Previous works have equated modelled fallacious beliefs with pseudoscientific understanding, enabling non-scientific solutions to answer questions left by gaps in science or understanding. These types of unanswered questions may cover big existential questions such as ‘what happens after death?’ but can also cover more mundane topics such as ‘how much water should I be drinking?’. This thesis offers evidence that false beliefs, regardless of their underlying ontological content, are reflected in a preference for literal interpretation of metaphors. This literal approach appears to be associated with a necessity to close off other possible, valid alternatives resulting in various forms of fallacious beliefs.