Ten Principles of Soviet Operational Art: Red Army Operations in Theory and Practice, 1936-1942
Creators: name: Brisson, Kevin
Publisher: name: Graduate Studies
Year: 2014
Subjects: subject: History--Military
subject: History--Russian and Soviet
subject: Military Studies
subject: Soviet
subject: Military
subject: Operations

description: Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, fought from 22 June, 1941 to 9 May, 1945, there was a dramatic transformation in the way the Red Army conducted battle. From an army on the cusp of annihilation to one that quickly recovered to vanquish the invading forces of Nazi Germany, this resurgence can be traced in part to its mastery of operational art. Moreover, the ever-increasing series of strategic victories which eventually led to Nazi Germany’s final defeat, beginning in late 1942, revealed the importance that offensive doctrine held for the Red Army leaders. The guiding principles which formed the basis of operational art were proscribed within many of the Red Army’s prewar and wartime theoretical writings, many of which coalesced unto the pages of several Red Army field manuals. However, for the purposes of this thesis, focus shall be assigned to the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations as the primary source for what the author shall later identify as the ten principles of Soviet operational art. The first chapter will be devoted to explaining how the author utilized various sources in the examination of this subject. In addition to English-language sources, Russian and German primary and secondary materials were extensively consulted. As part of this literature review, comments regarding both the value and shortcomings of these works will be made to show why they were used and to what degree they proved helpful. The second chapter will seek to discuss all ten principles of Soviet operational art. This will begin by identifying where in the manual these principles are located and how they were supposed to be applied in the context of tactical and operational offensives. This will be followed by a brief look at how each was conceptually developed. A broader understanding of the nature of these principles will require an examination of their respective roles in the planning and conduct of tactical deep battle and operations in depth. The third major section of this thesis will assess the importance of the aforementioned principles by examining their roles in two major operations. These are: (1) the Smolensk Counter Offensive Operation, 21 July to 7 August, 1941 and (2) Operation Uranus, 19-23 November, 1942. The Smolensk Counterstroke was chosen to demonstrate operational failure when most of the ten principles of operational art were absent. Conversely, Uranus will be to show success when all are present. Following this shall be the fourth chapter, which will offer a comparative discussion on the differences and similarities in German and Russian military doctrines as expressed by their respective field manuals, namely the 1933 Truppenführung and the 1936 Soviet Polevyye Ustav. Lastly, the fifth and final chapter will offer a summary conclusion that will address the question of why the German army failed to win the war, even when abiding by a military doctrine similar to that practiced by the Red Army. This will involve a comparative assessment of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin’s abilities as military leaders and their understanding of operational art.