Moral thinking across the world:Exploring the influence of personal force and intention in moral dilemma judgements [ Registered Report Stage 1 Protocol]
Creators: name: Bago, Bence
name: Balazs Aczel
name: Zoltan Kekecs
name: Protzko, John
name: Marton Kovacs
name: Nagy, Tamas
name: Hoekstra, Rink
name: Palfi, Bence
name: Quiamzade, Alain
name: Mattiassi, Alan
name: Gordon-Finlayson, Alasdair
name: Mirisola, Alberto
name: Fleischmann, Alexandra
name: Arvanitis, Alexios
name: Belaus, Anabel
name: Hartanto, Andree
name: Findor, Andrej
name: Thomas, Andrew
name: Wlodarczyk, Anna
name: Sternisko, Anni
name: Lantian, Anthony
name: Kuhberger, Anton
name: Graton, Aurélien
name: Bashour, Bana
name: Dixson, Barnaby
name: B.T. Rutjens
name: Jaeger, Bastian
name: Trémolière, Bastien
name: Becker, Benjamin
name: Brown, Benjamin
name: Gjoneska, Biljana
name: Jokić, Biljana
name: Shi, Bill
name: Batres, Carlota
name: Levitan, Carmel
name: Reyna, Cecilia
name: Celine-Justine Matibag
name: Hudson, Charlotte
name: Shane-Simpson, Christina
name: Schild, Christoph
name: Castille, Christopher
name: Cubillas, Carmelo
name: Storage, Daniel
name: Ochoa, Danielle
name: Purić, Danka
name: Darius-Aurel Frank
name: Moreau, David
name: Reinero, Diego
name: Zhang, Don
name: Calvillo, Dustin
name: Burak, Elif
name: Puvia, Elisa
name: Harris, Elizabeth
name: Lange, Elke
name: Bilancini, Ennio
name: Musser, Erica
name: Buchanan, Erin
name: Baskin, Ernest
name: Hristova, Evgeniya
name: Lalot, Fanny
name: Farzan Karimi-Malekabadi
name: Bayrak, Fatih
name: Xin, Fei
name: Ruiz-Dodobara, Fernando
name: Dumančić, Francesca
name: Marcu, Gabriela
name: Feldman, Gilad
name: Kocalar, Halil Emre
name: Stephen, Ian
name: Žeželj, Iris
name: Lau, Ivy
name: Lu, Jackson
name: Röer, Jan
name: Celniker, Jared
name: Hidding, Jasper
name: Lenz, Jennifer
name: Olsen, Jerome
name: Goh, Jin
name: Wagge, Jordan
name: Boudesseul, Jordane
name: Lammers, Joris
name: Kaminski, Gwenaël
name: Ścigała, Karolina
name: Rybus, Katarzyna
name: Schmidt, Kathleen
name: Kendrick, Keith
name: Tiede, Kevin
name: Peters, Kim
name: Hill, Kimberley
name: Barzykowski, Krystian
name: Susa, Kyle
name: Stevens-Wilson, Laura
name: Tunstead, Lauren Victoria
name: Vaughn, Leigh Ann
name: Wilton, Leigh
name: Lazarević, Ljiljana
name: Eudave, Luis
name: Batalha, Luisa
name: Macyjane Iones
name: Becker, Maja
name: Maliki Ghossainy
name: Manyu Li
name: Papadatou-Pastou, Marietta
name: Leliveld, Marijke
name: Gollwitzer, Mario
name: Paruzel-Czachura, Mariola
name: Voracek, Martin
name: Twardawski, Mathias
name: Matúš Adamkovič
name: Grinberg, Maurice
name: Mehrad Moeini-Jazani
name: Mensink, Michael
name: Michał Białek
name: Parzuchowski, Michal
name: Vadillo, Miguel
name: Tonković, Mirjana
name: Sirota, Miroslav
name: Pop-Jordanova, Nada
name: Carnes, Nate
name: McLatchie, Neil
name: Owsley, Nicholas
name: Steffens, Niklas
name: Yilmaz, Onurcan
name: Mitkidis, Panagiotis
name: Kačmár, Pavol
name: Pärnamets, Philip
name: Szekely-Copîndean, Raluca
name: Ribeiro M. F., F.
name: Huskey, Richard
name: Zein, Rizqy Amelia
name: Rockwell Clancy
name: Lins, Samuel
name: Sangsuk Yoon
name: Solas, Sara Álvarez
name: Wood, Sarah
name: Mackinnon, Sean
name: Gao, Shan
name: Alper, Sinan
name: Skye-Loren West
name: Czoschke, Stefan
name: Stieger, Stefan
name: Janssen, Steve
name: Albalooshi, Sumaya
name: Fiedler, Susann
name: Adamus, Sylwia
name: Taciano Milfont
name: Evans, Thomas Rhys
name: Lima, Tiago Jessé Souza De
name: Lynds, Trent
name: Tripat Gill
name: Ulf-Dietrich Reips
name: Chopik, William
name: Xiaoxiao Zheng
name: Liu, Xin
name: Yansong Li
name: Vally, Zahir
name: Magraw-Mickelson, Zoe
name: Chartier, Christopher
Publisher: name: figshare
Year: 2020
Subjects: Personality, Social and Criminal Psychology

description: <b>ABSTRACT: </b>The study of moral judgements is often centered on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (i.e., emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (i.e., following the greater good defined through consequences). In a seminal study of this field, Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (e.g., the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements. As their study was conducted with US samples, our knowledge is limited concerning the universality of this effect, in general, and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors of moral judgements, in particular. Here, we empirically test the universality of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by testing the replicability of the experiments of Greene et al. on a large (N = X,XXX) and diverse sample across the world. We hypothesize that intent and personal force universally increase the unacceptability of outcome-maximizing harm in these dilemmas, and that the effect is stronger in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures due to cultural differences in emotional processing (guilt, shame, anxiety). The relevance of this exploration to a broad range of policy-making problems is discussed.<br><b>ITEMS: </b>Registered Report Stage 1 Protocol