Australia and nuclear strategy
Creators: name: Leah, Christine Martine
Publisher: name: The Australian National University
Year: 2012
Subjects: subject: Nuclear weapons HistoryAustralia
subject: Nuclear weapons Public opinion Australia
subject: Deterrence (Strategy) HistoryAustralia
subject: Australia Military policy History

description: This thesis consists of an historical and strategic analysis of Australia's relationship with nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. It covers the period from when Britain and the United States both began research into harnessing the power of atomic energy for military purposes, to the present day. It concludes with a forward-looking chapter that assesses the possible and probable interactions of Australia's various experiences with nuclear weapons and a strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific undergoing long-term, transformational geopolitical change. For many decades it has been assumed that Australia's ratification of the NPT was due to specific American security assurances regarding the use of nuclear weapons. This nuclear umbrella is often cited as one significant factor constraining the spread of nuclear weapons by obviating the need for U.S. allies to possess their own nuclear deterrent. However, Australia has always had a complex and conflicted relationship with the bomb. Recently declassified documents reveal that until about 1974, most senior officials, including Prime Ministers, were not persuaded that extended nuclear deterrence - whether something explicit or as a more generalized phenomenon - applied to Australia. Understanding the history of Australian thinking about nuclear weapons and its relationship with U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is important for several reasons. First, it shows how certain geopolitical circumstances can shape attitudes towards the possession and use of nuclear weapons in different geostrategic contexts. Second: it shows how different geopolitical contexts shape allied understandings of concepts of nuclear strategy. Third: it shows how different strategic circumstances can be more or less conducive to the perceived credibility of security assurances. Fourth: a proper understanding of Australia's relationship with U.S. END has implications for policy today. It helps us think about how that relationship might endure and evolve in different contexts. This is especially important given that the Asia-Pacific has just embarked on a long period of transformational geopolitical change. To think that Australia "relies" on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence per se is misleading. Australia's relationship with nuclear weapons is complex, ambiguous, distant, and multi-layered. Why did Australia pursue a nuclear weapons capability from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s? Why did Australia decide to co-operate with Great Britain on nuclear and missile research? Why did policymakers then try to develop a nuclear weapon capability independently? Why did Canberra eventually renounce that option and instead choose to sign the NPT and "rely" on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in 1973? And under what circumstances might Australia, again, love the bomb directly rather than vicariously? The wider intent of the study is to shed light on the different ways Australia has thought about the role of nuclear weapons in international, regional, and national security, and how that thinking might evolve in the future. There is an assumption held by many political advocates that nuclear disarmament is a desirable goal in itself. This is not a view I agree with. My love and passion for this topic and broader questions of nuclear strategy and weapons proliferation lead me to believe that the role of nuclear weapons in international security must be understood within a broader context. It is not enough to say that the nuclear weapons states must reduce their nuclear arsenals and work towards the eventual goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. Any ambition for the United States to reduce the size of its nuclear stockpile must be informed by a far stronger understanding of how different levels onuclear capabilities could shape perceptions of strategic stability between the major players in Asia, including U.S. allies who rely on American extended nuclear deterrence. Indeed, nuclear weapons are only one component of strategic stability, and their role must be understood in the context of the overall military balance. This analysis of Australia's experience with nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence, it is hoped, will contribute to our understanding of all the direct and indirect ways that nuclear weapons contribute positively to international security.