ACTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR REVEALING AND ANALYZING THE SECURITY OF HIDDEN SERVERS
Creators: name: MATIC, SRDJAN
Publisher: name: Universit� degli Studi di Milano
Year: 2017

description: In the last years we have witnessed a boom in the use of techniques and tools that provide anonymity. Such techniques and tools are used by clients that want their communication to stay anonymous or to access censored content, as well as by administrators to hide the location of their servers. All those activities can be easily performed with the support of an anonymity network. An important component of an anonymity network is the hidden server, a machine whose IP address is kept secret. Such hidden servers are the target of research in this thesis. More specifically, we focus on different types of hidden servers used in the Tor anonymity network. Tor hidden services (HSes) are anonymous services hosted in the Tor Network. The HS itself is a hidden server because users that connect to it are not aware of its IP address, and thus its location. Another equally important kind of hidden servers are Tor bridges. Bridges are entry nodes of the Tor Network, whose IP address is not publicly disclosed to avoid blocking traffic towards them. Bridges are meant to be used by clients that connect from countries where governments perform selective filtering over the contents that users can access, and for this reason governments try to block connections to those nodes. In this thesis we develop novel approaches and we implement them into techniques to analyze the security and reveal the location of hidden servers. This thesis comprises two parts, one dealing with HSes and the other one with bridges. In the first part of the thesis, we develop a novel active approach for recovering the IP address of hidden servers that are used for hosting HSes. To this end, we design, implement, and evaluate a tool called Caronte that explores the content and configuration of a hidden service to automatically identify location leaks. Later those leaks are leveraged for trying to unveil the IP address of the hidden service. Our approach differs from previous ones, because Caronte does not rely on flaws in the Tor protocol and assumes an open-world model, i.e., it does not require a list of candidate servers known in advance. A final validation iistep guarantees that all the candidates that are false positives (i.e., they are not hosting the hidden service) are discarded. We demonstrate Caronte by running it on real HSes and successfully deanonymizing over 100 of them. In the second part of the thesis we perform the first systematic study of the Tor bridge infrastructure. Our study covers both the public bridge infrastructure available to all Tor users, and the previously unreported private bridge infrastructure, comprising private nodes for the exclusive use of those who know about their existence. Our analysis of the public infrastructure is twofold. First, we examine the security implications of the public data accessible from the CollecTor service. This service collects and publishes detailed information and statistics about core elements of the Tor Network. Despite the fact that CollecTor anonymizes sensitive data (e.g., IP or emails of bridge owners) prior to its publication, we identify several pieces of information that may be detrimental for the security of public bridges. Then, we measure security relevant properties of public bridges, including their lifetime and how often they change IP and port. Our results show how the public bridge ecosystem with clients is stable and those bridges rarely change their IP address. This has consequences for the current blocking policies that governments are using to restrict access to the anonymity network, because more aggressive strategies could be adopted. We also show how the presence of multiple transport protocols could harm bridge anonymity (since the adversary becomes able to identify the bridge through the weakest protocol). To study the private bridge infrastructure, we use an approach to discover 694 private bridges on the Internet and a novel technique, that leverages additional services running on bridges, to track bridges across IP changes. During this process, we identify the existence of infrastructures that use private proxies to forward traffic to backend bridges or relays. Finally, we discuss the security implications of our findings.