cometadata/datacite-rtg-text-other-reclassification-records huggingface dataset:
Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design
Creators: name: El-Gamal, Mahmoud
name: Palfrey, Thomas R.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994

description: We propose and implement a Bayesian optimal design procedure. Our procedure takes as its primitives a class of models, a class of experimental designs, and priors on the nuisance parameters of those models. We select the experimental design that maximizes the information (in the sense of Kullback-Liebler) from the experiment. We sequentially sample with the given design and models until all but one of the models has viable posterior odds. A model which has low posterior odds in a small collection of models will have an even lower posterior odds when compared to a larger class, and hence we can dismiss it. The procedure can be used sequentially by introducing new models and comparing them to the models that survived earlier rounds of experiments. The emphasis is not on running as many experiments as possible, but rather on choosing experimental designs to distinguish between models in the shortest possible time period. The first stage of optimal design is illustrated with a simple experimental game with one-sided incomplete information.
description: We acknowledge the financial support from NSF grant #SES-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology. We also acknowledge the research assistance of Eugene Grayver who wrote the software for the experiments. This paper was presented at the Stony Brook workshop of Experimental Game Theory, summer 1993.

Published as El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Economical experiments: Bayesian efficient experimental design." International Journal of Game Theory 25, no. 4 (1996): 495-517.
description: Submitted - sswp884.pdf
Equilibria with Unrestricted Entry in Multi Member District Plurality (SNTV) Elections
Creators: name: Shvetsova, Olga V.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994

description: The hypothesis that the Duverger's Law can be extended to plurality multi member district elections received some empirical support in Steven Reed's (1990) study of the Japanese elections. Here we return to electoral data of Japan and Taiwan in order to find evidence consistent with the theoretical result offered in Part I of this essay, namely, that cohesive electorates should witness either the competition among as many "serious" candidates as there are seats, or, at most, one "extra" candidate. per race. We also compare the consistency of the data with two alternative sets of predictions, one—derived from our candidate-based model (strategic candidates; sincere voters), another—proposed by Gary Cox (1993) where strategic voter behavior is analyzed. The indications are that the strategic role of the candidates should be viewed as leading.
description: I would like to thank Peter Ordeshook, Rod Kiewiet and Elizabeth Gerber for their help and suggestions. I have also benefited from discussions with John Campbell, Matthew Shugart, and Skip Lupia. I also wish to thank Gary Cox and Emerson Niou for access to their data. Remaining errors are my own.
description: Submitted - sswp881.pdf
Perognathus fallax Merriam 1889
Creators: name: James H. Honacki
name: Kenneth E. Kinman
name: James W. Koeppl
Publisher: name: Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections
Year: 1982
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Heteromyidae
Perognathus
Perognathus fallax

description: Perognathus fallax Merriam, 1889. N. Am. Fauna, 1:19.
TYPE LOCALITY: U.S.A., California, San Bernardino Co., Reche Canyon (3 mi. (5 km) S. E. Colton), 1,250 ft. (381 m).
DISTRIBUTION: S.W. California (U.S.A.) to W.C. Baja California (Mexico).
COMMENT: Reviewed by Huey, 1964, Trans. San Diego Soc. Nat. Hist., 13(7):85— 168.
ISIS NUMBER: 5301410004005009001.
description: Published as part of James H. Honacki, Kenneth E. Kinman & James W. Koeppl, 1982, Order Rodentia (Part 2), pp. 382-392 in Mammal Species of the World (1 st Edition), Lawrence, Kansas, USA :Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections on page 388, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7353025
Equilibria with Unrestricted Entry in Multi Member District Plurality (SNTV) Elections
Creators: name: Shvetsova, Olga V.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994

description: Extending Duverger's Law to electoral districts of arbitrary district magnitude would imply just one "extra" candidate running in each race. In this paper we analyze equilibrium properties (possible equilibrium configuration and then existence) of a plurality electoral system returning more than one legislator per district. We look at sincere Downsian voters and strategically behaving candidates (who can change their policy platforms at no cost, while new candidates can enter the race). In Part II we find empirical evidence in favor of the implications of this analysis in the performance of actual SNTV electoral systems, such as the one in Japan and Taiwan.
description: I would like to thank Peter Ordeshook, Rod Kiewiet and Elizabeth Gerber for their help and suggestions. I have also benefited from discussions with John Campbell, Matthew Shugart, and Skip Lupia. I also wish to thank Gary Cox and Emerson Niou for access to their data. Remaining errors are my own.
description: Submitted - sswp880.pdf
In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote
Creators: name: Crémer, Jacques
name: Palfrey, Thomas R.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994
Subjects: voting, unification, decentralization

description: We present a positive theory of centralization of political decisions. Voters choose centralization or decentralization depending on their forecast of the political organization that will favor the policies they prefer. We study the induced preferences for centralization as well results of different forms of referenda.
description: Published as Crémer, Jacques, and Thomas R. Palfrey. "In or out?: Centralization by majority vote." European Economic Review 40, no. 1 (1996): 43-60.
description: Published - sswp879.pdf
Manifold nº 17 (Chine nº 3) (p. 38)
Creators: name: Péraire, Lucien
name: CNRS
Publisher: name: NAKALA - https://nakala.fr (Huma-Num - CNRS)
publisherIdentifier: https://ror.org/04ces3204
publisherIdentifierScheme: ROR
Year: 2023

description: Départ vers le Hou-Nan
description: created: 3-12-1930
An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games
Creators: name: Fey, Mark
name: McKelvey, Richard D.
name: Palfrey, Thomas R.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994
Subjects: Game Theory, Experiments, Bounded Rationality

description: In this paper, we report the results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant. Standard backward-induction arguments lead to a unique Nash equilibrium outcome prediction, which is the same as the prediction made by theories of "fair" or "focal" outcomes.
We find that subjects frequently fail to select the unique Nash outcome prediction. While this behavior was also observed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in the "growing pie" version of the game they studied, the Nash outcome was not "fair", and there was the possibility of Pareto improvement by deviating from Nash play. Their findings could therefore be explained by small amounts of altruistic behavior. There are no Pareto improvements available in the constant-sum games we examine, hence explanations based on altruism cannot account for these new data.
We examine and compare two classes of models to explain this data. The first class consists of non-equilibrium modifications of the standard "Always Take" model. The other class we investigate, the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model, describes an equilibrium in which subjects make mistakes in implementing their best replies and assume other players do so as well. One specification of this model fits the experimental data best, among the models we test, and is able to account for all the main features we observe in the data.
description: This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant #SES-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology. We thank Bob Forsythe and Ray Riezman for help in facilitating the use of the experimental laboratory at University of Iowa. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from participants at the 1993 ESA Fall Meetings, an editor, and an anonymous referee.

Published as Fey, Mark, Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey. "An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games." International Journal of Game Theory 25, no. 3 (1996): 269-287.
description: Submitted - sswp877.pdf
Perognathus fasciatus Wied 1839
Creators: name: James H. Honacki
name: Kenneth E. Kinman
name: James W. Koeppl
Publisher: name: Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections
Year: 1982
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Heteromyidae
Perognathus
Perognathus fasciatus

description: Perognathus fasciatus Wied, 1839. Nova Acta Phys.-Med. Acad. Caes. Leop.-Carol., 19(1):369.
TYPE LOCALITY: U.S.A., North Dakota, Williams Co., Buford.
DISTRIBUTION: Great Plains from S. E. Alberta, Saskatchewan, and S.W. Manitoba (Canada) to N. E. Utah, S. Colorado and E. South Dakota (U.S.A.).
COMMENT: Includes infraluteus, litus, and olivaceogriseus; revised by Williams and Genoways, 1979, Ann. Carnegie Mus., 48:73-102.
ISIS NUMBER: 5301410004005010001.
description: Published as part of James H. Honacki, Kenneth E. Kinman & James W. Koeppl, 1982, Order Rodentia (Part 2), pp. 382-392 in Mammal Species of the World (1 st Edition), Lawrence, Kansas, USA :Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections on page 388, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7353025
title: Lettre n°215 de Paul d'Estournelles de Constant à Nicholas Murray Butler (1 fevrier 1917)
title: Letter number 215 from Paul d'Estournelles de Constant to Nicholas Murray Butler (February 1, 1917)
Creators: name: d'Estournelles de Constant, Paul
Publisher: name: NAKALA - https://nakala.fr (Huma-Num - CNRS)
publisherIdentifier: https://ror.org/04ces3204
publisherIdentifierScheme: ROR
Year: 2022
Subjects: Pacifisme
Guerre mondiale (1914-1918)

description: Source: Archives de la Sarthe – France
Bullimus luzonicus
Creators: name: Don E. Wilson
name: Russell A. Mittermeier
name: Thomas E. Lacher, Jr
Publisher: name: Lynx Edicions
Year: 2017
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Muridae
Bullimus
Bullimus luzonicus

description: 803.
Luzon Forest Rat
Bullimus luzonicus
French: Bullimus de Lugon / German: Luzon-Waldratte / Spanish: Rata de bosque de Luzén
Other common names: Large Luzon Forest Rat, Luzon Bullimus
Taxonomy. Mus luzonicus Thomas, 1895,
Mt. Data, Luzon Island, Philippines.
A review of Bullimus by E. A. Rickart and
colleagues in 2002, including B. luzonicus,
provided new diagnostic and morphomet-
ric characteristics. In their molecular study
of the entire Luzon endemics, S. A. Jansa and colleagues in 2006 provided a molecular tree in which B. luzonicus was sister to B. bagobus and B. gamay. A genetic study by C. C.Kyriazis and colleagues in 2017 found significant genetic variation between populations of this species. Monotypic.
Distribution. Luzon I, N Philippines.
Descriptive notes. Head-body 234-267 mm, tail 190-233 mm, ear 28-5-36 mm, hindfoot 49-56 mm; weight 351-520 g. The Luzon Forest Rat is large, with dark brown dorsum and silvery venter. Tail is hairless and shorter (77-92%) than head-body length, ending with white part. Females bear 3—4 pairs of mammae.
Habitat. Primary lowland, montane, and mossy forest and degraded forests with partially open canopy, most abundant at elevations of 1000-1450 m.
Food and Feeding. [Luzon Forest Rats eat green plant material but might be omnivorous.
Breeding. Females have an average of two embryos (range 1-3).
Activity patterns. Luzon Forest Rats are active day and night, foraging for plants on the ground.
Movements, Home range and Social organization. Luzon Forest Rats make runways through tall grasses or dense undercover vegetation and leave pieces of cut grass (c.10-20 cm long) along these paths.
Status and Conservation. Classified as Least Concern on The IUCN Red List.
Bibliography. Balete et al. (2009), Heaney, Balete & Rickart (2016), Jansa et al. (2006), Kyriazis et al. (2017), Rickart, Heaney, Balete & Tabaranza (2011), Rickart, Heaney & Tabaranza (2002).
description: Published as part of Don E. Wilson, Russell A. Mittermeier & Thomas E. Lacher, Jr, 2017, Muridae, pp. 536-884 in Handbook of the Mammals of the World – Volume 7 Rodents II, Barcelona :Lynx Edicions on page 880, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.6887260
Subjective Games and Equilibria
Creators: name: Kalai, Ehud
name: Lehrer, Ehud
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available.
The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Na.sh and correlated equilibria, replace unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing such a game repeatedly, subjective optimizers will converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including a single multi-arm bandit player, multi-person multi-arm bandit games, and repeated Cournot oligopoly games.
description: The authors wish to acknowledge valuable conversations with Eddie Dekel-Tabak and other seminar participants of the 1993 Summer in Tel Aviv Workshop, the University of California, San Diego, the California Institute of Technology, and the University of Chicago. This research was supported by NSF Economics, Grant Nos. SES-9022305 and SBR-9223156, and by the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences of the California Institute of Technology. This is an extended version of the paper entitled "Bounded Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibrium" (see Kalai and Lehrer (1991)).

Published as Kalai, Ehud, and Ehud Lehrer. "Subjective games and equilibria." Games and Economic Behavior 8, no. 1 (1995): 123-163.
description: Submitted - sswp875.pdf
Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game
Creators: name: McKelvey, Richard D.
name: Palfrey, Thomas R.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous offer bargaining game of incomplete information with discounted playoffs. In each period, each player chooses to give in or hold out. The game continues until at least one of the players chooses to give in, at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates, with an agreement benefit accruing to each player, and a cost to the player (or players) that give in. Players have privately known agreement benefits. 'Low benefit players have a weakly dominant strategy to hold out forever; high benefit players would be better off giving in if they knew their opponent was planning to hold out forever.
For any discount factor there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which the two players alternate in their willingness to give in, if the players' priors about each others type are sufficiently asymmetric. Second, for almost all priors, this is the unique equilibrium if the discount factor is close enough to one.
description: This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant #SES-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology.

Published as McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game." Journal of Economic Theory 73, no. 2 (1997): 425-437.
description: Submitted - sswp876.pdf
Covers
Creators: name: Page, Scott E.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: This paper introduces the theory of covers for functions defined over binary variables. Covers formalize the notion of decomposability. Large complex problems are decomposed into subproblems each containing fewer variables, which can then be solved in parallel. Practical applications of the benefits from decomposition include the parallel architecture of supercomputers, the divisionalization of firms, and the decentralization of economic activity. In this introductory paper, we show how covers also shed light on the choice among public projects with complementarities. Further, covers provide a measure of complexity/decomposability with respect to contour sets, allowing for nonlinear effects which occur near the optimum to receive more weight than nonlinear effects arbitrarily located in the domain. Finally, as we demonstrate, covers can be used to analyze and to calibrate search algorithms.
description: The author would like to thank Stan Reiter, David Richardson, and Jim Jordan for their insights.
description: Submitted - sswp872.pdf
E-gouvernance et transformation numérique au Maroc : défis et perspectives pour des institutions et des services publics innovants
Creators: name: BOUNAHR Imane
name: EL KHATTAB Younes
Publisher: name: Zenodo
Year: 2024

description: dans un contexte de transformation numérique accélérée par les technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC), l’innovation et l’amélioration des performances sont devenues des priorités stratégiques pour les gouvernements. La transition vers le numérique est désormais une nécessité pour relever les défis contemporains liés à la transparence, à la rapidité et à la satisfaction des attentes des citoyens. Conscient de ces enjeux, le Maroc s’est engagé pleinement dans cette dynamique en mettant en œuvre des mesures ambitieuses visant à moderniser son administration publique et à soutenir une croissance économique durable et inclusive. La transformation digitale, ou e-gouvernance, se révèle ainsi être un levier majeur pour améliorer l’efficacité de l’administration publique marocaine et renforcer sa collaboration avec les acteurs économiques. Cette recherche, d’approche descriptive et critique, dresse un état des lieux de la gouvernance numérique au Maroc tout en analysant les défis et opportunités liés à cette transition. Les résultats soulignent les enjeux et les perspectives de cette transformation pour les institutions publiques marocaines, incitant les décideurs et les acteurs économiques à définir des politiques appropriées pour accélérer la mise en place de l’e-gouvernement. Ces politiques doivent également promouvoir une culture numérique partagée au sein des organisations publiques, facilitant ainsi l’adoption et l’optimisation des outils digitaux.
Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes
Creators: name: Kollman, Ken
name: Miller, John H.
name: Page, Scott E.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: We study the relationship between voters' preferences and the emergence of party platforms in two-party democratic elections with adaptive parties. In the model, preferences of voters and the opposition party's platform determine an electoral landscape on which the challenging party must adaptively search for votes. We show that changes in the underlying distribution of voters' preferences result in different electoral landscapes which can be characterized by a measure of ruggedness. We find that locally adapting parties converge to moderate platforms regardless of the landscape's ruggedness. Greater ruggedness, however, tempers a party's ability to find such platforms. Thus, we are able to establish a link between the distribution of voters' preferences and the responsiveness of adaptive parties.
description: Published as Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page. "Political parties and electoral landscapes." British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1998): 139-158.
description: Submitted - sswp871.pdf
The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four Decades of Research
Creators: name: Ordeshook, Peter C.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: It has been more than thirty five years since the publication of Downs's (1957) seminal volume on elections and spatial theory and more than forty since Black and Newing (1951) offered their analysis of majority rule and committees. Thus, in response to the question "What have we accomplished since then?" it is not unreasonable to suppose that the appropriate answer would be "a great deal." Unfortunately, reality admits of only a more ambiguous response.
description: Published as Ordeshook, Peter C. "The spatial analysis of elections and committees: Four Decades of research," in Perspectives on Public Choice, ed. Dennis C. Miller. Cambridge University Press, 1997. 247-270.
description: Submitted - sswp870.pdf
Notes on Constitutional Change in the ROC: Presidential versus Parliamentary Government
Creators: name: Niou, Emerson M. S.
name: Ordeshook, Peter C.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: The debate over constitutional reform has moved to center stage in Taiwan, with a focus on two issues: the choice of presidential versus parliamentary government and a determination of the ultimate role of the National Assembly. These two issues, in turn, are linked by a third -- whether the president ought to be elected indirectly by the National Assembly or directly in a mass popular vote. Of these issues, though, the choice between a presidential and a parliamentary system is central, because it requires that we consider the methods whereby chief executives and legislators are elected and, correspondingly, the role of the National Assembly. Beginning, then, with the issue of presidential versus parliamentary government, this essay argues that the most commonly cited arguments over the advisability of choosing one or the other of these two forms are, for the most part, theoretically meaningless and are largely rhetorical devices for rationalizing prejudices about preferred governmental structures and the state's role. Consequently, we attempt here to provide a more useful set of criteria with which to evaluate reform in general and the choice between presidential and parliamentary government in particular. We conclude that although the choice between presidential and parliamentary forms is important, equal attention should be given to the methods whereby a president and the legislature are elected. It is these institutional parameters that determine the character of political parties in Taiwan, their ability to accommodate any mainlander-native Taiwanese conflict, and the likelihood that executive and legislative branches will formulate coherent domestic and international policy.
description: The research represented by this essay, written for the "Conference on Democratic Institutions in East Asia," Duke University, Durham, NC (April 2-4, 1993), was supported by a grant from the Pacific Culture Foundation.

Forthcoming: Chinese Political Science Review
description: Submitted - sswp869.pdf
Perognathus flavescens Merriam 1889
Creators: name: James H. Honacki
name: Kenneth E. Kinman
name: James W. Koeppl
Publisher: name: Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections
Year: 1982
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Heteromyidae
Perognathus
Perognathus flavescens

description: Perognathus flavescens Merriam, 1889. N. Am. Fauna, 1: 11.
TYPE LOCALITY: U.S.A., Nebraska, Cherry Co., Kennedy.
DISTRIBUTION: Great Plains and intermountain basins from Minnesota and N. Utah (U.S.A.) to N. Chihuahua (Mexico).
COMMENT: Includes apache (see Williams, 1978, Bull. Carnegie Mus. Nat. Hist., 10:1 -57) and melanotis (see Hall, 1981:531).
ISIS NUMBER: 5301410004005011001 as P. flavescens.
5301410004005004001 as P. apache.
description: Published as part of James H. Honacki, Kenneth E. Kinman & James W. Koeppl, 1982, Order Rodentia (Part 2), pp. 382-392 in Mammal Species of the World (1 st Edition), Lawrence, Kansas, USA :Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections on page 388, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7353025
Competitive Solutions and Uniform Competitive Solutions for Cooperative Games
Creators: name: Stefanescu, Anton
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: The competitive solution and the uniform competitive solution are different solution concepts for cooperative games. The first was introduced by McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978), the second is proposed in the present paper, however, it is deriving from the same original ideas.
A (uniform) competitive solution is a finite configuration of effective payoff vectors, each of them being associate to a coalition. This configuration satisfies two fundamental requirements: the internal stability and the external stability. Despite the existing differences the competitive solutions and the uniform competitive solutions have some common properties and are also related to some other classical solution-concepts.
The uniform competitive solution is a modified version of the competitive solution. Some disadvantages of the earlier concept are removed and the existence theorems for very large classes of both transferable utility and non-transferable utility games are provided.
description: This research was supported by the Fulbright Grant No. 16220 to the California Institute of Technology. The author wishes to thank Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook for many fruitful discussions and helpful suggestions.
description: Submitted - sswp868.pdf
The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design
Creators: name: Chen, Yan
name: Plott, Charles R.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993
Subjects: Public goods, Mechanisms, Design

description: The Groves-Ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the 'free-rider' problem in public good provision in certain environments. Two questions are of overriding importance in implementing the mechanism. The first is related to the actual performance of the mechanism in general. The second is the choice of a 'punishment parameter', γ, which is the only parameter that is available for those who may want to actually use the mechanism. Thus the determination of the role of this variable on mechanism performance is fundamental for any advances along the lines of actual implementation. In studying the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, we show that the punishment parameter, γ, plays a crucial role in the performance of the mechanism. By using γ = 1 and 100, we show that under the higher punishment parameter, the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium is chosen much more frequently; a higher level of the public good is provided and efficiency is higher. By examining two behavioral models, we show that a higher γ leads to an increase in the probability of an individual choosing a best response predicted by the model. The parameter γ alone explains nearly 70% of the data in both the Cournot and the Carlson-Auster behavioral model. We also found that convergence to Cournot behavior is faster and more stable under a high γ than under a low γ.
description: We would like to thank John Ledyard for his many insightful discussions and suggestions, Dave Grether, Scott Page, Arthur "Skip" Lupia for their comments, and Hsing-Yang Lee for computer programming. Any remaining errors are our own.

Published as Chen, Yan, and Charles R. Plott. "The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design." Journal of Public Economics 59, no. 3 (1996): 335-364.
description: Submitted - sswp867.pdf
The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria
Creators: name: McKelvey, Richard D.
name: McLennan, Andrew
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994

description: Let S=∏^n_(i=1) Si be the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let (S10,…, Sn0) ϵ S be any strategy n-tuple, and let Ti = Si - {si0}, i = 1, ..., n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria to a game with strategy sets Si is the number of partitions P = {P1,…, Pn} of UiTi such that, for each i, #Pi = #Ti and Pi ∩ Ti = ∅. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the maximum number of equilibria.
description: This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grants SBR-9308862 to the University of Minnesota and SBR-9308637 to the California Institute of Technology. We benefited from stimulating discussions with Victor Reiner and Michel leBreton.

Published as McKelvey, Richard D., and Andrew McLennan. "The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria." Journal of Economic Theory 72, no. 2 (1997): 411-425.
description: Submitted - sswp865.pdf
Crunomys celebensis Musser 1982
Creators: name: Don E. Wilson
name: Russell A. Mittermeier
name: Thomas E. Lacher, Jr
Publisher: name: Lynx Edicions
Year: 2017
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Muridae
Crunomys
Crunomys celebensis

description: 804.
Sulawesi Shrew Mouse
Crunomys celebensis
French: Crunomys des Célébes / German: Sulawesi-Spitzmausratte / Spanish: Raton musarana de Célebes
Other common names: Celebes Shrew Rat, Small Shrew Rat, Sulawesi Small-bodied Shrew Rat
Taxonomy. Crunomys celebensis Musser, 1982,
“near the village of Tomado (lat.
1°19’ S, long. 120°5’ E) in the mountain valley of Danau (which means Lake) Lindu, Province Sulawesi Tenagh, Central Sulawezi, Indonesia.”
Crunomys is sister to Maxomys. The most recent molecular phylogeny by S. J. Steppan and J. J. Schenk in 2017 confirmed C. melanius as sister to C. suncoides, both belonging to a clade close to Maxomys in Rattini. Monotypic.
Distribution. Known only from type locality and adjacent areas in NC Sulawesi and Mt Gandangdewata, WC Sulawesi.
Descriptive notes. Head-body 115-127 mm,tail 80-84 mm, hindfoot 25-27 mm, ear 14 mm; weight 35-55 g. The Sulawesi Shrew Mouse is small, characterized by dark chestnut dorsal pelage and slightly paler brown venter, without demarcation between back and belly. Fur is not spiny. Finely scaled tail is 66-75% of head-body length and has stiff hairs. Head is short and broad, ears are small, and eyes have two concentric white rings. Skull is compact, with short wide rostrum. Tympanic bullae are not inflated, representing 15% of greatest skull length. Females have eight pairs of mammae.
Habitat. Tropical lowland evergreen rainforests with dense canopies and forested terraces next to wet ravines or small streams, wet and humid streamside forests, and mountain forests at elevations of 800-1600 m.
Food and Feeding. Stomach contents of Sulawesi Shrew Mice contained either vegetative matter or insects and other arthropods or a mix of all three.
Breeding. No information.
Activity patterns. Sulawesi Shrew Mice are terrestrial and probably diurnal.
Movements, Home range and Social organization. No information.
Status and Conservation. Classified as Data Deficient on The IUCN Red List. The Sulawesi Shrew Mouse is known from only ten specimens;its type locality area is not protected and suffers from human perturbations.
Bibliography. Achmadi, Esselstyn et al. (2013), Achmadi, Rowe & Esselstyn (2014), Corbet & Hill (1992), Musser (1982a), Musser & Durden (2002), Rickart et al. (1998), Steppan & Schenk (2017).
description: Published as part of Don E. Wilson, Russell A. Mittermeier & Thomas E. Lacher, Jr, 2017, Muridae, pp. 536-884 in Handbook of the Mammals of the World – Volume 7 Rodents II, Barcelona :Lynx Edicions on pages 880-881, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.6887260
RE-JUS CASEBOOK IL DIRITTO EUROPEO E LA TUTELA EFFETTIVA DEL CONSUMATORE NEL DIALOGO TRA CORTI E AUTORIT� AMMINISTRATIVE
Creators: name: Angiolini, Chiara Silvia Armida
name: Casarosa, Federica
name: Pel�, Giulia
name: Patera, Maria Chiara
name: Sabatino, Gianmatteo
Publisher: name: Universit� di Trento
Year: 2018

description: :unkn
The Automated System's Diverse Uses and Effects on Restaurant Services
Creators: name: Abubakar S. I.
name: Sarafadeen L. L.
name: Livingston S. A.
name: Muhammad A. B
Publisher: name: gjrpublication
Year: 2024

description: The use of equipment and technology to improve overall efficiency in restaurant management, decrease human labor, and streamline procedures is known as restaurant automation. It entails combining hardware, software, and additional tools to automate a number of formerly manual activities. Automating restaurants is not a brand-new idea; it has been in use for a number of years. However, restaurant operators are now more than ever using automation techniques due to technological improvements and the growing customer desire for quicker service and convenience.
Crunomys fallax Thomas 1898
Creators: name: Don E. Wilson
name: Russell A. Mittermeier
name: Thomas E. Lacher, Jr
Publisher: name: Lynx Edicions
Year: 2017
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Muridae
Crunomys
Crunomys fallax

description: 805.
Luzon Shrew Mouse
Crunomys fallax
French: Crunomys de Lucon / German: Luzon-Spitzmausratte / Spanish: Raton musarana de Luzon
Other common names: Northern Luzon Shrew Mouse, Northern Luzon Shrew Rat
Taxonomy. Crunomys fallax Thomas, 1898,
Sierra Madre Range, Isabella Province,
Luzon island, Philippines.
Crunomys 1s represented by one poorly
known species on Luzon Island, and it has
not been incorporated into any molecular phylogeny. The species was revised by G. G. Musser in 1982 and by E. A. Rickart and colleagues in 1998. Monotypic.
Distribution. Known only from type locality on NE Luzon I, N Philippines.
Descriptive notes. Head—body 105 mm, tail 79 mm, hindfoot 23 mm, ear 10 mm. No specific data are available for body weight. The Luzon Shrew Mouse is small and characterized by small eyes, grayish brown relatively spiny dorsal pelage, and gray venter. Tail is shorter than head-body length.
Habitat. Secondary lowland forest at an elevation of 300 m (single specimen).
Food and Feeding. No information.
Breeding. No information.
Activity patterns. The Luzon Shrew Mouse is probably nocturnal.
Movements, Home range and Social organization. No information.
Status and Conservation. Classified as Data Deficient on The IUCN Red List. The Luzon Shrew Mouse is known from a single specimen collected more than a century ago.
Bibliography. Heaney, Balete & Rickart (2016), Musser (1982a), Rickart et al. (1998).
description: Published as part of Don E. Wilson, Russell A. Mittermeier & Thomas E. Lacher, Jr, 2017, Muridae, pp. 536-884 in Handbook of the Mammals of the World – Volume 7 Rodents II, Barcelona :Lynx Edicions on page 881, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.6887260
Perognathus flavus Baird 1855
Creators: name: James H. Honacki
name: Kenneth E. Kinman
name: James W. Koeppl
Publisher: name: Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections
Year: 1982
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Heteromyidae
Perognathus
Perognathus flavus

description: Perognathus flavus Baird, 1855. Proc. Acad. Nat. Sei. Phila., 7:332.
TYPE LOCALITY: U.S.A., Texas, El Paso Co., El Paso.
DISTRIBUTION: S. W. Great Plains and intermountain plateaus from S. Dakota, E. Wyoming, and S. Utah (U.S.A.) to Sonora and Puebla (Mexico).
COMMENT: Includes merriami; see Wilson, 1973, Proc. Biol. Soc. Wash., 86: 191. Revised by Baker, 1954, Univ. Kans. Publ. Mus. Nat. Hist., 7:341 -347.
ISIS NUMBER: 5301410004005012001 as P. flavus.
5301410004005020001 as P. merriami.
description: Published as part of James H. Honacki, Kenneth E. Kinman & James W. Koeppl, 1982, Order Rodentia (Part 2), pp. 382-392 in Mammal Species of the World (1 st Edition), Lawrence, Kansas, USA :Alien Press, Inc. & The Association of Systematics Collections on page 388, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7353025
Crunomys melanius Thomas 1907
Creators: name: Don E. Wilson
name: Russell A. Mittermeier
name: Thomas E. Lacher, Jr
Publisher: name: Lynx Edicions
Year: 2017
Subjects: Biodiversity
Taxonomy
Animalia
Chordata
Mammalia
Rodentia
Muridae
Crunomys
Crunomys melanius

description: 806.
Mindanao Shrew Mouse
Crunomys melanius
French: Crunomys de Mindanao / German: Mindanao-Spitzmausratte / Spanish: Raton musarana de Mindanao
Other common names: Mindanao Shrew Rat, Southern Philippine Shrew Mouse
Taxonomy. Crunomys melanius Thomas, 1907,
“North Central Mindanao [Island,
Philippines]. 3000’ [= 914 m].”
A. S. Achmadi and colleagues in 2013 found C. melanius to be sister to C. suncodes, which was confirmed by the most recent molecular phylogeny of S. J. Steppan and J. J. Schenk in 2017; both species belong to a cladeclose to Maxomys. Monotypic.
Distribution. Leyte, Camiguin, and Mindanao Is, Philippines.
Descriptive notes. Head-body 98-133 mm, tail 68-95 mm, hindfoot 25-29 mm, ear 13-16 mm; weight 58-71 g. The Mindanao Shrew Mouse is small and characterized by dark chestnut, relatively spiny dorsum (few fine and soft spines) and blackish gray venter, with no clear demarcation between back and belly. Blackish brown tail is 65-77% of head-body length, paler below, but not bicolored. Skull is small, short, and narrow, and dental rows are short. Tympanic bullae is not inflated and represents 14-15% of greatest length of the skull. Females have eight pairs of mammae.
Habitat. Lowland, montane, and secondary forests from sea level to elevations of c.1500 m.
Food and Feeding. Stomach contents of Mindanao Shrew Mice contained vegetative material and arthropods.
Breeding. No information.
Activity patterns. Mindanao Shrew Mice are terrestrial and probably diurnal.
Movements, Home range and Social organization. No information.
Status and Conservation. Classified as Vulnerable on The IUCN Red List. The Mindanao Shrew Mouse is difficult to catch, and its population status is unknown. Deforestation and other human activities might be serious threats.
Bibliography. Achmadi et al. (2013), Corbet & Hill (1992), Heaney & Tabaranza (2006a), Heaney, Tabaranza, Rickart et al. (2006), Rickart et al. (1998), Steppan & Schenk (2017).
description: Published as part of Don E. Wilson, Russell A. Mittermeier & Thomas E. Lacher, Jr, 2017, Muridae, pp. 536-884 in Handbook of the Mammals of the World – Volume 7 Rodents II, Barcelona :Lynx Edicions on page 881, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.6887260
Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments
Creators: name: Palfrey, Thomas R.
name: Prisbrey, Jeffrey E.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993
Subjects: Voluntary contributions, public goods, experiments, reputation, learning, errors.

description: We report the results of a public goods experiment using a design that enables us to directly measure individual response functions in voluntary contributions games and estimate error rates. In addition, following Andreoni (1988), we employ two treatments in order to measure the extent to which voluntary contribution is due to reputation effects. The partners treatment involves a fixed group of subjects playing a repeated game. The strangers treatment approximates a one-shot game by randomly changing group assignments after each play. Our data shows that essentially the only difference between the two treatments is the amount of noise in the data, with the strangers treatment being the noisier of the two. This noise manifests itself in two distinct ways. First, there is more variation of decision rules across subjects in the strangers treatment. Second, individual behavior is, on average, less consistent with a cutpoint decision rule in the strangers treatment, which produces higher estimates of individual error rates. The differences between the strangers and partners data are virtually the same as differences between data from experienced and inexperienced subjects. This suggests an explanation for the finding in Andreoni (1988) that there was greater contribution under the strangers treatment in the standard homogeneous environment in which one direction of errors (under-contribution) are censored. Our results also support his conclusion that reputation effects do not appear to play a prominent role in repeated linear public goods voluntary contribution games. Many findings from past public goods experiments are consistent with our model of random variation in a population of subjects who are, on average, neither altruistic nor spiteful.
description: We acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SBR-9223701) and the Ministerio de Education y Ciencia (DGICYT PB91-0810). We thank Estela Hopenhayn for assistance in preparing and conducting the experiments. Antonio Rangel helped with the translation of instructions from English. We are grateful to our colleagues at both Caltech and Pompeu Fabra for their advice, with special thanks to Antoni Bosch.

Published as Palfrey, Thomas R., and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey. "Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments." Journal of Public Economics 61, no. 3 (1996): 409-427.
description: Published - sswp864.pdf
Rational Individual Behavior in Markets and Social Choice Processes
Creators: name: Plott, Charles R.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: This paper reviews a series of paradoxes that exist in the experimental economics literature. These paradoxes are instances in which otherwise accurate models of markets and social choice processes fail to capture the data of experiments. A loosely developed theory called The Discovered Preference Hypothesis is advanced in the paper as an explanation. Behavior seems to go through stages of rationality that begin with a type of myopia when faced with unfamiliar tasks. With incentives and practice, which might take the form of repeated decisions in the experimental work, (but might include play, banter, discussions with others, stages of commitment, etc.) the myopia gives way to what appears to be a. stage of more considered choices that reflect stable attitudes or preferences (as opposed to the labile attitudes identified by psychologists). Social institutions are seen as playing a role in the attainment of a third stage of rationality in which individual decisions incorporate the rationality of others, or the lack of it, in their own decisions.
description: Prepared for a conference on rational choice, Turin, Italy, October 1993. The support for this project provided by the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Published as Plott, Charles R. (1996) Rational Individual Behavior in Markets and Social Choice Processes: the Discovered Preference Hypothesis. In: The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour. McMillian , London, pp. 225-250.
description: Submitted - sswp862.pdf
Latin Majuscule Writing in Herculaneum Papyri
Creators: name: Marichal, Robert
Publisher: name: NAKALA - https://nakala.fr (Huma-Num - CNRS)
publisherIdentifier: https://ror.org/04ces3204
publisherIdentifierScheme: ROR
Year: 2015

description: vue 68
description: "Study of the following Latin papyri: P.Herc. 76, 153, 513, 766, 1031, 1208, 1463, 1491, 1620, 1624, 1665. All the papyri are listed on the cover page of the main folder, and sometimes they are accompanied by brief bibliographical notes. Some papyri are marked by a sign (in different red ink) meaning 'recopié'; some papyri are accompanied by the indication 'micro' (in different pink ink). In addition to some bibliographical notes, the indication 'Vu 54 - fini - Revue 58' is writtenat the end of the list. The upper right corner of the cover page contains the title 'Mayuscule' (the previous title was 'Mayuscule baroque semicursive', but the words 'baroque semicursive'have been deleted. The study related to each papyrus is enclosed in one folder with the number of the papyrus written on the upper right corner; in some cases the sheets concerning two papyri are inserted in one single folder, and one of the two numbers is written in a different ink. The list mentions also to P.Herc. 766 and P.Herc. 1031 (the number of which is added with a different ink on the left part of the page and not in the main list): their study has been inserted into the folder concerning P.Herc. 153 and P.Herc 513, but P.Herc. 766 and 1031 are not mentioned on the cover page of the folder."
description: Source: 4MAR_10_2_5-17
description: Relation: 4MAR_42_4-3
description: created: n.d., 1957
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Creators: name: Ledyard, John O.
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1994

description: Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. A review is made of various public goods experiments. It is found that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.
description: Revised version. Original dated to August 1993.

I thank the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA for their financial support. For their intellectual help and advice, I thank Peter Bohm, Don Coursey, Robyn Dawes, Roy Gardner, Mark Johnson, John Kagel, Jamie Brown-Kruse, Susan Laury, Gerald Marwell, Rosemarie Nagel, John Orbell, Elinor Ostrom, Tom Palfrey, Charles Plott, Amnon Rapoport, Al Roth, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Steve Slutsky, Richard Thaler, James Walker, most of the participants in the Conference on Experimental Research on the Provision of Public Goods and Common-Property Resources at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, and especially Mark Isaac without whom I would not have gotten even this far. Some of these strongly disagree with parts of my commentary. They may be justified.

Published as Ledyard, John O., "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research" in Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton University Press 1995. 111-194
description: Submitted - sswp861_-_revised.pdf
When Core Beliefs Collide: Conflict, Complexity, or Just Plain Confusion?
Creators: name: Alvarez, R. Michael
name: Brehm, John
Publisher: name: California Institute of Technology
Year: 1993

description: In this paper, we argue that on many important public policy questions, people may be unsure of their preferences because their underlying principles or values are in conflict. We build a simple model of conflicting core beliefs, building on the work of Heider (1958). Using abortion policies as our test case, we develop a test for our theory using heteroskedastic probit, using data taken from the 1988 General Social Survey. The heteroskedastic probit results confirm our model, and in the last section of the paper, we trace the implications of this model for some of the larger questions in public opinion research.
description: Paper prepared for presentation at the 1993 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
description: Submitted - sswp860.pdf