5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zgornja Korena. 6.  On 3 June 2010 the Maribor Local Court found the applicant guilty, pursuant to the (old) Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below), of two counts of violent behaviour, which had been committed in the periods between 1 May and 29 June 2003, and between 1 July 2003 and 22 November 2004, respectively. The applicant was given a suspended prison sentence. The judgment became final on 17 June 2011. 7.  On 9 April 2004 the applicant was granted a licence to work as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings under the Compulsory Composition, Bankruptcy and Liquidation Act (hereinafter “the Bankruptcy Act”) then in force. His name was entered in the Register of Liquidators maintained by the Ministry of Justice. At the time of his appointment the Bankruptcy Act regulated the conditions under which such a licence could be granted and revoked (see paragraph 28 below). 8.  On 1 October 2008 a new Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act (hereinafter “the Financial Operations Act”) came into force, replacing the Bankruptcy Act (see paragraph 29 below). 9.  On 21 June 2011 the Maribor Local Court informed the Ministry of Justice that the applicant’s conviction for the criminal offences committed in 2003 and 2004 had become final (see paragraph 6 above). Accordingly, on 27 June 2011 the Ministry of Justice revoked the applicant’s licence, based on section 109 of the Financial Operations Act. It stated that pursuant to that provision, the applicant, having been convicted of an offence prosecuted ex officio (hereinafter “publicly prosecutable”) committed with intent, had to be divested of his licence. Three days following the decision the applicant’s name was removed from the registry of liquidators. 10.  On 25 July 2011 the applicant lodged an administrative action against the decision revoking his licence. He argued that at the time he had committed the criminal offence he could not have foreseen that it would have entailed such a sanction and that section 109 of the Financial Operations Act should not have been applied retrospectively – an issue which in his view had been entirely disregarded by the Ministry of Justice. The applicant also emphasised that at the time he had acquired the licence the law had not provided for the measure of revocation in a case of conviction for a criminal offence. In this connection, he referred to Article 28 of the Slovenian Constitution, which sets out the principle of legality in criminal law prohibiting, inter alia, any retroactive application of criminal law. Accordingly, he could not have been expected to anticipate that such legal consequences would have arisen from his actions which, furthermore, had no bearing on the performance of his duties as a liquidator. He argued that over the years in this profession, he had gained extensive experience and had built up his reputation. His job as a liquidator had constituted his only source of income and he and his family had thus suffered a grave and unexpected loss of earnings following the revocation of his licence. 11.  On 7 November 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that the revocation of his licence had been entirely lawful. As regards the applicant’s assertion that the measure should not have been applied retroactively, it found that the time when the offence had been committed was not to be considered relevant since the measure in question pertained to the final conviction, thereby respecting the presumption of innocence. 12.  On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating the argument that his licence had been unlawfully revoked. He further alleged that the Administrative Court had failed to address that key argument and to provide a reasoned response to his complaints. Moreover, the applicant was of the view that, assuming that the Administrative Court had correctly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Financial Operations Act, those provisions were inconsistent with the Constitution. 13.  On 13 February 2013 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law as inadmissible, holding that the question he had raised did not meet the standard of “an important legal question” which should be resolved by the Supreme Court. The relevant provision of section 109 of the Financial Operations Act was unambiguous and did not require any particular interpretation; it was clear from its wording that it applied equally to those liquidators who had acquired their licence prior to the enactment of the Financial Operations Act as well as to those who had acquired it after the new Act had come into force. Moreover, the Act did not specifically provide that the measure in question applied only to convictions for criminal offences committed after it had entered into force. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had failed to substantiate that the revocation of his licence had had particularly harmful consequences for him. 14.  On 19 April 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on several constitutional provisions, including those enshrining equal protection of rights, the right to judicial protection and to enjoy the freedom of work. He complained that the lower courts’ decisions had been very brief and had not answered his arguments and that no evidence concerning, inter alia, his financial situation had been assessed. He continued to aver that when given the licence, he had complied with all the pertinent criteria and that the relevant provisions of the Financial Operations Act were unconstitutional. He also argued that the courts had not applied the more lenient law, which had been the old Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, the courts had disregarded the fact that only a suspended prison sentence had been imposed on him and that the legal distinction to include all criminal offences committed with intent was arbitrary and not relevant to the aim of maintaining public confidence in the profession at issue. 15.  On 6 November 2013 the Constitutional Court decided not to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint, relying on the second paragraph of section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 36 below). 16.  In the meantime, as it transpires from a decision granting him unemployment allowance, on 15 April 2012 the applicant was dismissed from the Institute for Insolvency Management. He was subsequently unemployed. From November 2014 to November 2015, he was employed through a programme for older workers. 17.  On 28 February 2013 the applicant’s conviction was expunged from his criminal record. 18.  On 8 April 2013 the applicant applied for a new liquidator’s licence. 19.  On 29 May 2013 the Ministry of Justice rejected his application, citing the Financial Operations Act’s provision, pursuant to which a licence could not be granted once it had been revoked (point 2, paragraph 4 of section 108 of the Financial Operations Act – see paragraph 30 below) and noting that the applicant’s licence had been revoked on 27 June 2011. 20.  On 27 June 2013 the applicant lodged an administrative action against the above decision. He argued that the sanction of permanent revocation was absolutely disproportionate and that neither judges nor lawyers were subject to such strict conditions as both were able to reapply for office after they had been dismissed. The applicant further submitted that he had lost his job virtually overnight and that the companies which had provided support services to him, such as accounting, had also been seriously affected by the measure. He also explained that he was unemployed and found it difficult to provide for his children who were in his sole custody. 21.  On 5 January 2014 the applicant lodged pleadings referring to a judgment issued in criminal proceedings unconnected with the present case. He argued that a convicted person could successfully apply for a liquidator’s licence after his conviction had been expunged from his criminal record. 22.  On 12 March 2014 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It found that the refusal to grant a licence was based on a valid law, which prohibited granting of a licence to an applicant whose previous licence had been revoked. It did not address the applicant’s argument that further to the expungement of his conviction from his criminal record he should have been able to reapply. 23.  Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 24.  On 10 March 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law on the grounds that he had failed to demonstrate that there was an important legal question, he had not pointed to any inconsistencies in the case-law and he had not shown that he had suffered very severe consequences as a result of the impugned measure, which the court pointed out had been a refusal to grant him a licence and not the earlier revocation. 25.  On 27 May 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, relying on several provisions of the Constitution including equal protection of rights, the right to judicial protection, freedom of work, as well as Articles 6, 7 and 14 of the Convention. He argued that his case was an important one and that if the current position of the courts remained in effect, he would never be able to work as a liquidator again. The applicant disputed the Supreme Court’s decision, which had required him to show that there had been inconsistencies in the case-law. The Supreme Court ignored his argument to the effect that the relevant provisions were unconstitutional and instead took a position that only a departure from case‑law would merit the examination of his appeal. The applicant furthermore argued that the interpretation of the relevant legislation had not yet been settled. 26.  On 14 December 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint as inadmissible, citing the second paragraph of section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 36 below). The decision was served on the applicant on 4 January 2016.