8.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Viana do Castelo (Portugal). 9.  The applicant is a lawyer by training and an auditor by profession. From 1993 onwards, he was no longer authorised to practise as a lawyer. By a decision of the Bar Council of 24 September 1993, the applicant was suspended from the roll, as the exercise of the profession of lawyer was considered to be incompatible with his practising as an auditor. This decision was published in the Official Gazette in June 2000. When the applicant ceased his activity as an auditor in April 2016, he continued to be suspended from the Bar Council’s roll until at least the end of 2016 as the result of a disciplinary sanction imposed on him for having practised as a lawyer while not being authorised to do so. 10.  On 28 February 2008, in the context of a set of civil proceedings in which he was nevertheless acting as a lawyer, the applicant criticised the decisions taken by the judge hearing the case, saying that they were not worthy of a judge and that a judge could not lie or omit the truth in the exercise of his functions. The judge in question filed a complaint for insult with the public prosecutor’s office. It is not clear from the material before the Court on what basis the applicant was acting as a lawyer in the context of those proceedings given the suspension from the roll referred to above. 11.  On 10 February 2010 the public prosecutor’s office at the Baixo‑Vouga District Court filed the prosecution’s submissions against the applicant on a charge of insulting a judge. As the applicant had not instructed a lawyer, the public prosecutor’s office appointed counsel on the basis of Article 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) to conduct the applicant’s defence. 12.  On 12 March 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Baixo‑Vouga Criminal Investigation Court for the opening of adversarial investigation proceedings (abertura de instrução; see paragraph 39 below). He also sought leave to replace his officially appointed defence counsel and represent himself. 13.  In an order of 7 September 2010 the court agreed to open the investigation but dismissed the request for officially appointed defence counsel to be replaced and for the applicant to conduct his own defence. It held that the applicant was not entitled to act in the proceedings without the assistance of defence counsel. The court held that under the provisions of Portuguese law, in particular Article 32 of the Constitution and Articles 64 § 3 and 287 § 4 of the CCP (see paragraphs 28, 33 and 40 below), the defendant had the right to be represented by independent counsel, a right which would not be made effective if self-representation were to be allowed. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s case-law on the subject, the court found that a defendant who was a lawyer could therefore not act in proceedings as his own counsel. 14.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Coimbra Court of Appeal against the order of 7 September 2010, challenging the decision not to allow him to represent himself in the criminal proceedings. 15.  On 21 December 2010 the Coimbra Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It considered the appeal to be admissible despite the fact that it had been lodged by the applicant in person, as it concerned the very issue whether the applicant, as the defendant, was entitled to conduct his own defence. The Court of Appeal stressed that Portuguese law on criminal procedure did not allow the procedural status of defendant to be combined with that of defence counsel in the same proceedings. It required that the defendant be assisted by defence counsel at the hearing before the investigating judge and at the trial in all cases where the proceedings concerned could give rise to a custodial sentence or a public-safety detention order. This reflected the premise that the accused would be better defended when the defence was conducted by a legal professional trained in advocacy. The latter, unencumbered by the emotional burden weighing on a defendant, could provide a lucid, dispassionate and effective defence. The law on criminal procedure was thus intended not to place limits on the defence’s action, but to support the proper defence of the accused. 16.  On 11 May 2012 the Constitutional Court decided that it was not necessary to adjudicate on the constitutional appeal lodged by the applicant in person, in which he had complained about the lower courts’ refusal to grant him leave to represent himself. The Constitutional Court found that the appeal had been neither signed nor endorsed by court-appointed defence counsel. The latter had not replied to the Constitutional Court’s query of 11 April 2012 as to whether she endorsed the constitutional appeal signed by the applicant himself. 17.  On 20 September 2012 the Baixo-Vouga investigating judge held a hearing (debate instrutório), of which the applicant had been notified in person. The judge had previously refused to adjourn the hearing at the applicant’s request, finding that the Court of Appeal had already given a final ruling on the applicant’s application to represent himself. The applicant failed to attend the hearing, at which his court-appointed counsel was present. The investigating judge confirmed the charge against the applicant and referred the case for trial (despacho de pronúncia) before the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court. 18.  On 12 December 2013 the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court, following a hearing which the applicant again did not attend but at which his court‑ appointed defence lawyer was present, found the applicant guilty of aggravated insult (see paragraph 50 below) and ordered him to pay 140 day‑fines of nine euros (EUR) each as well as the costs of the proceedings. 19.  The applicant, who at no point requested legal aid to cover the cost of his trial, court-appointed counsel or counsel of his own choosing, was ordered, in particular, to pay costs amounting to EUR 150 for his representation by court-appointed counsel. He did not pay these costs and the execution of the cost order was later discontinued for lack of assets which could be seized. 20.  In an order dated 1 May 2014 the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the judgment as inadmissible, on the ground that the appeal had not been signed by court-appointed defence counsel or by a lawyer instructed by the applicant. It confirmed that, as had previously been decided in a final decision, the applicant, as the defendant, did not have the right to represent himself in the proceedings. 21.  By an order dated 18 November 2014 the Porto Court of Appeal, acting through its President, dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant in person against the order of the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court. 22.  The Court of Appeal reiterated that, according to Portuguese law and well-established case-law, defendants in criminal proceedings, even if they were themselves lawyers, could not represent themselves but had to be assisted by defence counsel. It stressed that, as had also been argued by the General Council of the Bar Association in Opinion No. E-21/97 (see paragraphs 59-60 below), the provision of a criminal defence constituted a public-order interest. Therefore, the right to a defence could not be waived, even if this meant imposing a defence lawyer on the accused. Moreover, in adversarial proceedings the powers vested by law in the defence were incompatible in many situations with the position of the defendant. This was also clearly the case at the trial, taking into account, for example, the places to be occupied in the courtroom, the wearing of a gown and the cross-examination of witnesses. 23.  The Court of Appeal noted that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly confirmed, in particular in judgments nos. 578/2001 and 196/2007 (see paragraphs 52-55 below), that this interpretation and the corresponding legislation – including Article 64 § 1 (d) of the CCP, which stipulates that only defence counsel can lodge appeals (see paragraph 33 below) – was in keeping with the Constitution. Likewise, this approach was not in breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or of the Convention. In Portugal, the accused had an array of procedural rights which went beyond the minimum standards guaranteed by these international instruments. 24.  The Court of Appeal explained that Portuguese law on criminal procedure granted accused persons ample opportunity to defend themselves in person. The defendant had a very comprehensive right to intervene in person at any time in the proceedings in order to make requests, offer points of clarification, reply, explain or submit statements (see, in particular, Articles 61 § 1 (b), 98 § 1, 272 § 1, 292 § 2, 332, 341(a) and 343 §§ 1 and 2 of the CCP; paragraphs 30, 42 and 44 below). He also had the right to be the last person to address the court, immediately following the pleadings and before delivery of the judgment (see Article 361 § 1 of the CCP, paragraph 45 below). There was a distinction between, and a dual safeguard emanating from, the mandatory instruction of a lawyer to ensure the accused’s “technical” defence and the possibility for the accused to be present and to intervene in the proceedings. 25.  Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that, having no valid reasons to depart from an interpretation rooted in case-law and legal literature, Portugal had not amended its law in this regard either before or after the Views adopted in 2006 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (see paragraphs 63 et seq. below). 26.  As the applicant had not appointed counsel following his application to have the order of 18 November 2014 quashed, the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court’s judgment of 12 December 2013 became final on 6 January 2015. 27.  According to the material before the Court, the applicant did not call into question the qualifications or quality of the court-appointed lawyer at any stage in the proceedings before the domestic courts.