5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Liski, Voronezh Region. 6.  In 2009 the applicant started to run a business as an “individual entrepreneur” (индивидуальный предприниматель). 7.  In February 2013 he lodged a notification with the Liski unit of the south-eastern branch of the Consumer Protection Agency (“the Liski Unit”) about his intention to extend his business to the sale of foods. In this notification he specified, inter alia, three different addresses as follows: the address at which he was actually residing (that he called “адрес места жительства”), his “registration address” (адрес места регистрации) which corresponded to his registered residence address and the address of the place of this new business (адрес фактического осуществления заявленного вида деятельности) for stands selling food. 8.  The applicant’s business was subject to an inspection in July 2014. It appears that the applicant was aware that this inspection took place. The inspection was recorded in an inspection document dated 23 July 2014. 9.  On 28 July 2014 an official of the Liski Unit contacted the applicant on his mobile number and, it appears, informed the applicant of the intention to institute administrative offence proceedings against him and that a hearing in this regard would be held on 6 August 2014 (see, however, paragraph 10 below). On the basis of the inspection document the Liski Unit compiled on 6 August 2014 a record of the alleged administrative offence, accusing the applicant of non‑compliance with the technical regulations (Article 14.43 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences – “the CAO”). Specifically, the applicant was accused of several counts relating to (i) the absence of equipment and/or proper storage arrangements respecting temperature requirements for food products, in particular for perishable foods; (ii) the fact that certain stored goods had not been accompanied by documents certifying their origin, quality and safety. The offence record contained the applicant’s mobile telephone number; his registered residence address and the business address (the location of the stalls); his actual residence address was not specified in the offence record. 10.  The offence record states that the applicant came to the Liski Unit on 6 August 2014 but then left the building before any offence record could be compiled, having stated that he had not been properly informed of the actual purpose of the meeting. Thus, the applicant was not present during the compiling of the record. 11.  It is unclear whether the applicant received a copy of it at the time. 12.  The Liski Unit instituted proceedings before the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Region (see paragraph 36 below). 13.  On 12 August 2014 the court adopted a decision to initiate a case and to examine it by way of a summary procedure. According to the Government, on 13 August 2014 this decision was dispatched, by registered mail, “to the applicant’s two addresses”; both letters were subsequently returned following expiry of the retention period. Unlike for subsequent proceedings (see paragraphs 15 and 21 below), the Court has not been provided with any relevant evidence such as postal slips or dispatch cards. However, it appears that one letter was dispatched to the applicant’s registered residence address and was then returned to the court for lack/absence of the addressee at that address (see paragraph 31 below). 14.  On 10 October 2014 the court decided to examine the case by way of an ordinary procedure because it was necessary to hear the defendant (that is to say the applicant). A preliminary hearing was scheduled for 11 November 2014 and the applicant’s or his representative’s presence was required. It was indicated in the relevant court order that information on the progress of the case (including the time and place of hearings) was available on the court’s Internet site and at the information stand at the entrance to the court. 15.  According to the Government, the notification was dispatched on 13 October 2014 but then was returned to the court following expiry of the retention period. The Government has provided the Court with a dispatch card showing that the notification was dispatched on 14 October 2014 to the applicant’s registered residence address and then returned to the court on 24 October 2014 with a note listing reasons for return with “expiry of the retention period” being checked. 16.  On 11 November 2014 the court adjourned to 9 December 2014 and it required the parties to be present. On 12 November 2014 letters were sent by registered mail to the applicant’s registered residence address and the location of the business (the stalls). Those letters were subsequently returned to the court as undelivered. The dispatch card listed reasons for re‑dispatch, with “expiry of the retention period” being checked. 17.  The Government has also submitted a dispatch card showing that the notification was delivered to the Liski Unit on 19 November 2014. 18.  On 10 December 2014 the court heard the case and acquitted the applicant. Neither the applicant nor his representative was present, and they lodged no submissions. It was indicated in the judgment that the applicant had been “duly informed” of the hearing. 19.  The Government has submitted no specific information or documents relating to the dispatch of the trial judgment. 20.  The Liski Unit appealed to the 19th Commercial Court of Appeal. According to the Government, on 19 December 2014 a copy of their statement of appeal was dispatched to the applicant. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch card or postal slip. 21.  By a decision of 26 December 2014 the appeal court scheduled a hearing for 28 January 2015. According to the Government, this decision was dispatched to the applicant but was then returned to the court as not claimed within the retention period. 22.  The Government has also submitted a dispatch card showing that the notification was dispatched to the Liski Unit on 30 December 2014 and was handed over to it on 12 January 2015 as confirmed by a signature (of its official). 23.  On 4 February 2015 the appeal court adjourned the hearing to 4 March 2015. According to the Government, the correspondence enclosing this decision was dispatched to the applicant by registered mail but was then returned to the court as not claimed within the retention period. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch cards or postal slips. 24.  On 12 March 2015 the 19th Commercial Court of Appeal held an appeal hearing and heard the Liski Unit’s representative. The appellate court admitted as evidence new documents submitted by the Unit, one of which was meant to demonstrate that the applicant had indeed been aware of the administrative hearing on 6 August 2014 (see paragraph 9 above). 25.  By a decision of the same date the appeal court then quashed that judgment, found the applicant guilty, and imposed a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB – equivalent to 298 euros (EUR) at the time). This decision became final and enforceable on the same date. The appeal decision reads as follows:
“[The applicant] is absent from the appeal hearing; he has been duly informed about the time and place of the hearing. Pursuant to Articles 123, 156 and 266 of the CComP [Code of Commercial Procedure] the case is being examined in his absence ...
This decision ... may be challenged by way of a cassation appeal before the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit within two months ...” 26.  According to the Government, the correspondence enclosing the appeal decision was dispatched to the applicant but was then returned to the court undelivered. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch card or postal slip. 27.  According to the applicant, he first learnt about the trial and appeal decisions on 3 June 2015 during a conversation with an official of the Liski transport prosecutor’s office. The applicant then accessed the website of the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Regional Court. At his request, on 29 June 2015 he was given access to the case file at the registry of that court and was provided with the court decisions of 10 December 2014 and 12 March 2015. The applicant then lodged an application for a cassation‑appeal review in respect of the appeal decision of 12 March 2015 and requested the restoration of the time-limit for a valid reason. 28.  In his statement of appeal the applicant argued, as to the matter of notification in the appeal proceedings, that he had not been provided with the Liski Unit’s statement of appeal and had not been informed of the start of the appeal proceedings. It should have been clear to the appeal court from the case file that the notifications to the registered residence address had been returned. However, the appeal court persisted in sending notifications to that address while failing to use alternative means such as a telephone communication on his mobile number that was mentioned in the case file. Moreover, the appeal court could have asked the Liski Unit’s representative whether she had the applicant’s actual residence address or his telephone contacts. The appeal court could have required the representative to hand over a notification to the applicant in person. The appeal court had been aware of a business notification and, specifically, could have sought submission of the 2013 notification document (see paragraph 7 above) indicating the applicant’s actual residence address while the Liski Unit’s representative had omitted to disclose it. The applicant insisted that he had not received any notifications; no correspondence, including by registered mail, had been handed over to him by any official of the postal service; he had never refused any such correspondence. In particular, despite the requirements of the law, when returning correspondence, the postal service had not specified that the addressee had not been present/residing at the address and had not indicated the source of their information about that. 29.  On 22 July 2015 the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit examined the applicant’s application for the restoration of the time-limit for cassation review. The court held as follows:
“Under Article 276 of the CComP an application for cassation review may be lodged within two months of the date on which an impugned judicial decision acquired legal force, unless otherwise provided by the CComP.
It is noted, however, that the statement of cassation appeal in respect of the appeal decision of 12 March 2015 was dispatched to the first-instance court on 8 July 2015 – that is to say after the expiry of the relevant period ...
The case file contains no indisputable proof that the impugned court decision was in a timely manner dispatched to and received by [the applicant]. It is also noted that he was actually served with the court decisions in respect of the present case on 29 June 2015 in the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Region. Thus, the court finds it acceptable to grant the application for restoration of the time-limit ...” 30.  On 6 October 2015 the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit held a public hearing while noting the absence of the parties and that they had been duly notified of the cassation hearing but had chosen not to attend. The cassation court then proceeded with the examination of the case on the basis of the case file and the parties’ arguments concerning the charge and procedural matters. The cassation court then upheld the appeal decision. In particular as regards the matter of notification, it considered that the decision to start proceedings had been dispatched to the applicant but that he had avoided being served with judicial notifications; however, he had been able to continue to keep himself informed, via the court’s website, of the appeal proceedings after the first-instance judgment against him (see the “Relevant domestic law and practice” section below). The decision of 6 October 2015 reads, in the relevant parts, as follows:
“In his cassation appeal [the applicant] asks this court to set aside the appeal decision of 12 March 2015, referring to the wrong application of the substantive and procedural laws. In their observations in reply the administrative authority objects ... The parties were duly notified of the time and place of the [cassation] hearing but their representatives have not appeared before this court. Thus, the cassation appeal has been examined in their absence ... Having examined the case file and having examined the arguments raised in the cassation appeal and observations in reply, the cassation court finds no grounds for granting the cassation appeal ...
This court dismissed the cassation appeal in the part concerning the alleged non‑notification of the appeal hearing.
Pursuant to Article 121 § 1 of the CComP, a commercial court informs parties to a case of the initiation of that case, the time and place of a hearing, or a procedural act, by way of dispatching a court decision. When applying the above provision it is relevant that it follows from Article 121 § 6 and Article 123 § 1 that before a hearing or before taking a procedural act a court must have information that the participants have received a copy of the first judicial act in a given case or must have information relating to Article 123 § 4.
A first judicial act means a decision to initiate a case. ...
Where a case file contains a document concerning the handing over (о вручении) of the first judicial act to the person or information relating to Article 123 § 4, this person is deemed to have been duly notified of appeal, cassation or supervisory review proceedings ... , provided that the relevant court fulfils its obligations relating to the posting of information regarding dates and places of hearings on the official Internet site ...
Pursuant to Article 9 § 1 and Article 41 §§ 2 and 3 of the CComP, participants in commercial-court proceedings bear the risk of adverse consequences that may arise from their taking a certain procedural action or from omitting to take it; they use their procedural rights in good faith and fulfil their procedural obligations ... failure to comply with such obligations entail the consequences prescribed by the CComP ...
The decisions to initiate a case and to start the examination of the case were dispatched to [the applicant], as required by the law, but he evaded (уклонился) receipt of the court notifications.
Given the above-mentioned legal provisions and the presumption of good-faith conduct on the part of the participants in a commercial case, this court concludes that [the applicant] should have been aware of the time and place of the appeal hearing and could have accessed the relevant information on the processing of the case via accessible official sources ...
This decision may be challenged before the Supreme Court of Russia within two months of the adoption of this decision, as prescribed by Article 291.1 of the CComP.” 31.  In his cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Russia the applicant mentioned, inter alia, the following information:
“As can be seen from a certificate on registered mail postal dispatches (I have received this certificate on 25 July 2015; see its original enclosed herewith) the decision of 12 August 2014 ... was dispatched on 13 August to the following address [the applicant’s registered residence address]. It was then sent back to the court on 21 August 2014, as indicated “because there was no addressee”, and was handed over to the court on 1 September 2014. This confirms that I did not evade the receipt of this notification or any subsequent notification ...” 32.  Referring to Article 30.12 of the CAO, on 30 December 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the appeal decision and the first cassation-appeal decision.