5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Vantaa, Finland. 6.  The applicant has been living and working in Finland since 1999 on the basis of a permanent residence permit. 7.  In 2009 the applicant married a Russian national, Ms I.K., in Helsinki. After the marriage the couple settled in Vantaa, Finland, living in a flat owned by the applicant. I.K. had a temporary residence permit (expired in summer 2015). 8.  On 24 December 2012 I.K. gave birth to a daughter, V. The parents exercised joint custody in respect of the child, in accordance with Finnish law. The applicant also has two children from a previous marriage, both residing in Vantaa. V. had a temporary residence permit in Finland (expired in December 2014). On an unspecified date she acquired Russian nationality. 9.  In January 2013 I.K. suffered two strokes and was partially paralysed. She was admitted to hospital. 10.  The applicant took parental leave to take care of V. I.K.’s parents (most often her father) often visited from Russia to help care for V. while I.K. was undergoing medical treatment. 11.  In April 2013 I.K. was discharged from hospital. She had not, however, fully recovered mobility in one hand and one leg. 12.  Relations between the applicant and I.K. apparently deteriorated, and in June 2013 I.K. travelled to Russia, accompanied by her father, for further medical treatment and physiotherapy. V. remained with the applicant. 13.  Since the applicant had to return to work, in July 2013 he took V. to his parents in Norway, where V. was taken care of by her paternal grandmother and aunt. 14.  Following her return to Finland in August 2013, I.K. instituted proceedings with a view to having the child returned to Finland under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). 15.  In October 2013 the applicant brought V. back to Finland, and the proceedings for the return of the child were discontinued. 16.  Meanwhile, in August 2013 I.K. initiated divorce proceedings, asking the court to grant her sole custody of V. and to determine V.’s place of residence as being with her. 17.  Between November 2013 and March 2014 five interim decisions were issued by the Vantaa District Court (“the District Court”) determining that, pending resolution of the proceedings, the applicant and I.K. should have joint custody of V. and that the latter should reside with the applicant. 18.  On 14 November 2013 the District Court addressed the applicant’s concern that there was a risk of I.K.’s taking V. to Russia without his consent and ordered that V.’s passport be handed in to the police. 19.  On 23 December 2013 the District Court noted that there was no risk of the child’s being taken outside Finland as her passport had been handed in to the police. 20.  On 11 April 2014 the District Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and I.K. 21.  On 23 December 2014 the District Court held that the applicant and I.K. should have joint custody of V. and that V. was to reside with the applicant. The court also established a detailed schedule setting out I.K.’s contact with V. up until 2019. In taking that decision the District Court took into account I.K.’s state of health, in particular the fact that she had not completely recovered mobility in one hand and one leg after her stroke and was still undergoing rehabilitation procedures, which made it difficult for her to react quickly to the toddler’s active behaviour and to prevent potentially dangerous situations. The judgment was enforceable pending a decision in appeal proceedings. 22.  I.K. appealed against the above judgment. 23.  On 20 November 2015 the Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed I.K.’s appeal and upheld the judgment of 23 December 2014. The Court of Appeal confirmed that, since the applicant and I.K. had joint custody of their daughter, I.K. had no right to remove V. from Finland without the applicant’s consent. 24.  I.K. lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court of Finland. 25.  On 26 February 2016 the Supreme Court refused I.K. leave to appeal. 26.  In the meantime, while the appeal proceedings were pending, on 5 February 2015 I.K. took V. to Russia without the applicant’s consent. She informed him by email that she did not intend to come back to Finland. 27.  On 20 February 2015 the applicant applied to the Finnish Ministry of Justice to have the child returned to Finland under the Hague Convention. 28.  The Finnish Ministry of Justice sent an enquiry to the Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation, which confirmed that the child was residing with I.K. in St Petersburg. 29.  On 6 August 2015, after failed attempts to come to an agreement with I.K. as regards V.’s return to Finland, the applicant lodged an application with the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg seeking the child’s return to Finland on the basis of the Hague Convention. 30.  I.K. objected to V.’s return to Finland. Relying on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, she claimed that V. was already settled in her new environment in Russia, that she did not speak the Finnish language, that V.’s return to Finland would separate them and that it would thus be psychologically traumatic for her. She further indicated that V. had been removed to Russia so that she could be provided with the medical assistance she needed and, finally, that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder. 31.  The childcare authority involved in the proceedings considered that the child’s interests would best be met if she continued to reside with her mother, I.K. 32.  The Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg considered that V.’s removal from Finland to Russia had not been unlawful since the applicant and I.K. had joint custody of the child and the child’s removal to Russia did not diminish the applicant’s rights on the territory of the Russian Federation; moreover, V. had a number of medical conditions which could expose her to a risk of physical harm in the event of her return to Finland. 33.  By a judgment of 2 December 2015, the Dzerzhinskiy District Court granted the applicant’s request and ordered that the child be returned to Finland immediately. The court found, and it was common ground between the parties, that V.’s place of habitual residence was Finland and that her removal from Finland had taken place without the applicant’s consent. It concluded, therefore, that the child’s removal had been in breach of the applicant’s custody rights. It also found that there were no grounds for granting an exception to the child’s immediate return under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention: the argument concerning the risk of V. suffering psychological harm in the event of her return to Finland and the allegation that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder were found unsubstantiated; I.K. had provided no evidence to the effect that the medical assistance necessitated by V.’s state of health could not been provided to the latter in Finland; V.’s return to Finland would not entail her separation from I.K. since the Finnish Court had determined that the parties should have joint custody of the child and had set out a detailed schedule of I.K.’s contact with V. 34.  However, on 3 February 2016 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) quashed the above judgment on appeal and rejected the applicant’s request for V.’s return to Finland. The City Court held that since the judgment of the Vantaa District Court of 23 December 2014 ‒ which had determined V.’s residence as being with the applicant in Finland ‒ had not yet entered into force, I.K.’s actions in bringing V. to Russia had not been unlawful. The circumstances of the removal of the child, a national of the Russian Federation, to Russia had not violated the applicant’s parental rights. The City Court noted that at the time of the child’s removal, as well as the time of the examination of the appeal, she had not had a valid Finnish residence permit. The City Court also took into account the following facts: that since February 2015 V. had been permanently resident in St Petersburg ‒ at the address where I.K. was registered ‒ where suitable conditions had been created for her life and development; that both parties had registered places of residence in Russia; that at the time of her removal V. had been aged two years and one month, of which she had spent several months (from July to October 2013) in Norway, where she had been taken by the applicant without I.K.’s consent; and finally that V. did not speak Finnish and since February 2015 had been attending various medical facilities and nursery school in Russia. In view of the foregoing, the City Court came to the conclusion that Finland was not the State in which V. was habitually resident. Since February 2015 V. had integrated well into the Russian social and family environment and her retention in Russia was therefore not unlawful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. V.’s attendance at a kindergarten in Finland for a short period of time between November 2014 and January 2015 did not constitute sufficient proof of integration into the social environment in Finland such that Finland could be considered as the child’s habitual place of residence. Lastly, the City Court noted that the report of the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg stated that both parents had parental authority in respect of V., that the applicant’s rights were not diminished on the territory of the Russian Federation, and that the removal of the child from her mother in Russia to her father in Finland for the purposes of permanent residence in Finland could, on account of her numerous medical conditions, cause her physical harm. The court further noted that medical documents contained in the case file confirmed that the child had a number of medical conditions. It concluded that this circumstance ‒ which under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention constituted an exception to immediate return ‒ also led to the conclusion that there were no grounds for granting the applicant’s request. 35.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Presidium of the City Court. 36.  On 12 May 2016 a judge of the St Petersburg City Court refused to refer the case for consideration by the Presidium of that Court. 37.  On 4 August 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia refused to refer the case for consideration by the Civil Chamber of that Court. 38.  On 7 September 2016 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg ruled that V. should reside with her mother, I.K., in St Petersburg and ordered the applicant to pay child maintenance starting from 8 June 2015. 39.  Referring to temporary financial difficulties and insisting on V.’s return in Finland, the applicant has not been complying with the above‑mentioned judgment. 40.  On 5 October 2016 enforcement proceedings were instituted against the applicant. Restrictive measures were applied against him by the bailiffs service in the form of a prohibition on exiting the Russian territory. That decision currently prevents the applicant from travelling to Russia. 41.  As of 13 February 2018 the applicant’s child maintenance arrears amounted to 494,644 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 42.  The applicant has not seen his daughter since she left Finland. 43.  The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) entered into force between Russia and Finland on 1 January 2013. It provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 1
“The objects of the present Convention are –
a)  to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
b)  to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.
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Article 3
“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –
a)  it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b)  at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.”
Article 4
“The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.”
Article 11
“The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.
If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.”
Article 12
“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.
...”
Article 13
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that –
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.”
Article 14
“In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.”
Article 19
“A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” 44.  The Explanatory Report to the Hague Convention, prepared by Elisa Pérez-Vera and published by The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in 1982 ( “the Explanatory Report”), provides as follows: 1.  The notion of ‘the best interests of the child’
“21.  ... the legal standard ‘the best interests of the child’ is at first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical standard. 24.  ... [the philosophy of the Hague Convention] can be defined as follows: the struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must always be inspired by the desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their true interests. ... the right not to be removed or retained in the name of more or less arguable rights concerning its person is one of the most objective examples of what constitutes the interests of the child.
... the true victim of the ‘childnapping’ is the child himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in charge of his upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teachers and relatives. 25.  It is thus legitimate to assert that the two objects of the Convention – the one preventive, the other designed to secure the immediate reintegration of the child into its habitual environment – both correspond to a specific idea of what constitutes the ‘best interests of the child’. However ... it has to be admitted that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective reasons which have to do either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most closely connected. Therefore the Convention recognizes the need for certain exceptions to the general obligations assumed by States to secure the prompt return of children who have been unlawfully removed or retained.” 2.  The notion of the child’s ‘habitual residence’ and the ‘wrongfulness of his or her removal or retention’
“64.  Article 3 [of the Hague Convention] as a whole constitutes one of the key provisions of the Convention, since the setting in motion of the Convention’s machinery for the return of the child depends upon its application. In fact, the duty to return a child arises only if its removal or retention is considered wrongful in terms of the Convention. 66.  ... the notion of habitual residence [is] a well-established concept in the Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile. 68.  The first source referred to in Article 3 is law, where it is stated that custody ‘may arise ... by operation of law’. That leads us to stress one of the characteristics of this Convention, namely its application to the protection of custody rights which were exercised prior to any decision thereon. This is important, since one cannot forget that, in terms of statistics, the number of cases in which a child is removed prior to a decision on its custody are quite frequent. Moreover, the possibility of the dispossessed parent being able to recover the child in such circumstances, except within the Convention’s framework, is practically non-existent, unless he in his turn resorts to force, a course of action which is always harmful to the child. 71.  ... from the Convention’s standpoint, the removal of a child by one of the joint holders without the consent of the other, is equally wrongful, and this wrongfulness derives in this particular case, not from some action in breach of a particular law, but from the fact that such action has disregarded the rights of the other parent which are also protected by law, and has interfered with their normal exercise. The Convention’s true nature is revealed most clearly in these situations: it is not concerned with establishing the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future, nor with the situations in which it may prove necessary to modify a decision awarding joint custody on the basis of facts which have subsequently changed. It seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter being influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through unilateral action by one of the parties.” 3.  The exceptions to the principle of the child’s prompt return under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention
“34.  ... [the exceptions] to the rule concerning the return of the child must be applied only as far as they go and no further. This implies above all that they are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter ... The practical application of this principle requires that the signatory States be convinced that they belong, despite their differences, to the same legal community within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them – those of the child’s habitual residence – are in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access. As a result, a systematic invocation of the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the child’s residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration. 113.  ... the exceptions [in Articles 13 and 20] do not apply automatically, in that they do not invariably result in the child’s retention; nevertheless, the very nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion – and does not impose upon them a duty – to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances. 114.  With regard to Article 13, the introductory part of the first paragraph highlights the fact that the burden of proving the facts stated in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) is imposed on the person who opposes the return of the child ... 116.  The exceptions contained in [Article 13] (b) deal with situations where international child abduction has indeed occurred, but where the return of the child would be contrary to its interests ... Each of the terms used in this provision, is the result of a fragile compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission and has been kept unaltered. Thus it cannot be inferred, a contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth Session of proposals favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or educational prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide interpretation ...” 4.  The use of expeditious procedures by judicial or administrative authorities
“104.  The importance throughout the Convention of the time factor appears again in [Article 11 of the Hague Convention]. Whereas Article 2 of the Convention imposes upon Contracting States the duty to use expeditious procedures, the first paragraph of this Article restates the obligation, this time with regard to the authorities of the State to which the child has been taken and which are to decide upon its return. There is a double aspect to this duty: firstly, the use of the most speedy procedures known to their legal system; secondly, that applications are, so far as possible, to be granted priority treatment. 105.  The second paragraph [of Article 11 of the Hague Convention], so as to prompt internal authorities to accord maximum priority to dealing with the problems arising out of the international removal of children, lays down a non-obligatory time‑limit of six weeks, after which the applicant or Central Authority of the requested State may request a statement of reasons for the delay. Moreover, after the Central Authority of the requested State receives the reply, it is once more under a duty to inform, a duty owed either to the Central Authority of the requesting State or to the applicant who has applied to it directly. In short, the provision’s importance cannot be measured in terms of the requirements of the obligations imposed by it, but by the very fact that it draws the attention of the competent authorities to the decisive nature of the time factor in such situations and that it determines the maximum period of time within which a decision on this matter should be taken.” 45.  The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was signed in New York on 20 November 1989 and entered into force in respect of Russia on 15 September 1990, read as follows:
Preamble
“The States Parties to the present Convention,
...
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ...
Have agreed as follows:
...”
Article 3
“1.  In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
...”
Article 7
“1.  The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth ... to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
...”
Article 9
“1.  States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will.
...”
Article 18
“1.  States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.
...”