5.  The applicants are eight Russian nationals whose particulars are listed in the appendix. 6.  The applicants were living together at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr‑Kort, Nazran, Ingushetia, Russia. They are related (three adult siblings: two brothers and a sister; and the wife and three minor children of one brother). 7.  The three applicants-siblings have another brother, Mr Ali T., known as “Magas”. Since the 1990s Mr Ali T. has been suspected of participating in, and then leading, illegal armed groups operating in Ingushetia and masterminding a number of crimes and terrorist attacks. In July 2001 he was pronounced dead by the Nazran District Court; however, that information was later refuted and attributed to his use of false identity documents. On 26 November 2004 the Nazran District Court revoked the pronouncement in view of new information. 8.  Mr Ali T. was arrested in Ingushetia in June 2010. The criminal investigation into his activities continued until December 2012. In February 2014 the Russian Supreme Court, in a final judgment, found him guilty of a number of terrorism-related crimes, entailing dozens of victims among civilians and security personnel. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 9.  The applicants submitted that they had had no direct contact with Mr Ali T. since 1998. The Government explained, in additional observations of 18 April 2012, that there were a number of pieces of evidence indicating that between 2004 and June 2010 Mr Ali T. had been in regular contact with his relatives in Nasyr-Kort. That evidence included witness statements collected by the criminal investigation between the end of 2010 and early 2011, including those of Mr Ali T. himself, his wife and other persons. According to the evidence, his wife had resided at the said address since 2004, a fact which the relatives must have been aware of. No copies of the documents in question have been provided by the Government. 10.  The Government provided a copy of a certificate issued by the Nasyr-Kort administration on 6 July 2010 to the effect that Mr Ali T. had at the material time been registered as resident at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr‑Kort, together with the applicants and other members of the extended family. The document did not list the third applicant among the residents at that address. The Government explained that in March 2011 the third applicant’s place of residence was recorded as 4, Zapadnaya Street, Nasyr-Kort. 11.  On 18 July 2013 the Court rendered a judgment in case no. 50757/06, Taziyeva and Others v. Russia. It was lodged by nine applicants, including two of the applicants in the present case, Mr Askhab Taziyev (the fourth applicant in the present case) and Ms Zareta Taziyeva (the third applicant). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the fact that a search had been carried out without a warrant at the applicants’ house in Nasyr-Kort. The search had been carried out in December 2005 as part of a counter-terrorist operation aimed at apprehending Mr Ali T., and the authorities had relied on the Suppression of Terrorism Act as the only legal basis. In respect of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court found that the applicants had failed to substantiate their complaint in this respect and dismissed it as manifestly ill-founded. 12.  On 21 February 2011 a senior investigator requested authorisation to search the house at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr‑Kort. He substantiated his request by reference to the ongoing investigation in case no. 171822 against the leaders and members of “Imarat Kavkaz” (declared a terrorist organisation by the Supreme Court in February 2008), and the possibility that documents and items relevant for the investigation, including weapons, ammunition and explosives, might be stored there. 13.  On 22 February 2011 the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow granted the request, pursuant to Articles 165 and 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”). The reasoning and operative part of the decision read as follows:
“It follows from the documents submitted [number and dates] that ... [T.] Ali M., who stands accused of committing crimes under Articles 208 § 1, 279, and 222 § 3 of the Criminal Code [leadership of an armed gang, organisation of an armed revolt and unlawful handling of arms and ammunition], is one of the leaders of illegal armed group “Imarat Kavkaz” ... At his address of registration there may be objects and documents relevant for the ongoing investigation (including firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices), as well as other objects and substances which are banned from free circulation ...
The investigation of this criminal case is particularly complex. It is an exceptional case because it involves criminal activity of a large number of accused who have not yet been arrested, it continues to be carried out in conditions of strict secrecy on the territory of several regions of the Russian Federation and foreign states, and it relates to involvement in criminal activity organised by Umarov D.H. It involves a large number of people. Therefore, there are sufficient grounds to believe that at the address where A.M.[T.] is registered there may be objects and documents relevant for the ongoing investigation. ...
The court, having examined the submitted documents and heard the opinions of the senior prosecutor and the senior investigator, authorises the search of the registered address of A.M.[T.], being satisfied that for the purposes of the investigation there is enough information to believe that there may be objects and documents relevant to the ongoing investigation (including firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices), as well as other objects and substances which are banned from free circulation on the territory of the Russian Federation.
...
DECIDES:
To grant the request of the senior special-case investigator [name] to carry out the search on the premises in relation to case no. 171872 and to allow the search at the place of registration of [T.] Ali M at [the address].
The decision may be appealed against to the Moscow City Court within ten days.” 14.  On 3 March 2011 servicemen arrived at Nasyr-Kort and surrounded the area around the applicants’ home. They used an armoured personnel carrier, several minibuses and a car. They entered the courtyard and searched the house and surrounding premises. 15. At 2 p.m. on 3 March 2011 the third applicant signed the search warrant. 16.  The second and third applicants were ordered into a minibus, where they were questioned about their brother, Mr Ali T. Other applicants, their neighbours and vehicles were moved a safe distance from the house. Soon afterwards, there was an explosion. 17.  The applicants’ home consisted of two dwellings: a newly finished house with a basement and garage, which was destroyed by the explosion, along with two cars parked in the courtyard; and a second house, which was damaged and rendered unfit for habitation. There were also two “technical” buildings – a garage and an old house used for storage; the latter remained intact but the applicants alleged that all valuables had gone. 18.  At 3.35 p.m. a senior investigator from the Federal Security Service of Russia (“the FSB”) drew up a search report. It stated that during the search, in the basement of the dwelling situated to the right of the entrance, an improvised explosive device (“IED”) had been discovered consisting of a 125 mm artillery shell and a detonator wrapped in black cellophane tape, connected with wires. For security reasons, all persons present at the site and neighbours had been taken a safe distance from the house. The explosives experts had attempted to deactivate the device using a hydro detonator (water cannon). The deactivation had failed and the IED had exploded, causing destruction of the dwelling. Several identity documents and photographs had been collected among the debris. The report was signed by two attesting witnesses, and each page contained an indication that the third applicant had refused to sign it. 19.  Later on 3 March 2011, the site and the debris were inspected by an investigator from the Nazran Interior Department and a report was drawn up. The report ran to six pages and was complete with a plan of the premises; photographs were also taken. The report stated that both dwellings located in the courtyard had been damaged: the window panes and doors were broken, the roofs and the walls were damaged. The third building, a technical shed, had been completely destroyed. Two cars located in the courtyard had also been destroyed and covered with broken bricks. The investigators had collected swabs from the site. The report was co-signed by the investigator, an explosives expert and two attesting witnesses. 20.  The following day the local police reported the explosion at the applicants’ house to the media. The press release stated that FSB servicemen had located two IEDs in the basement and had called in experts. The experts had been unable to deactivate the devices and had had to destroy them with controlled blasts; as a result, the dwellings had been damaged but there were no casualties. 21.  The applicants submitted that the search of 3 March 2011 had been conducted without any authorising documents or attesting witnesses, and that they had been subjected to threats and intimidation by the servicemen. 22.  After the search, the superior officer had said on the radio that no explosives had been found in the yard. The second and third applicants had been ordered to proceed to one of the minibuses parked about 300 metres from the house and interrogated. They had been intimidated and forced to admit that they had been in contact with their brother and had received money from him. They had also been forced to sign several documents. 23.  During the interrogation of the second and third applicants, the armed men had ordered the inhabitants of the neighbouring houses to move as far away as possible because the servicemen had been planning to blow up the house. The military vehicles had also been moved to a safe distance. Later, the applicants had witnessed an explosion. When they had returned to the house, they had seen only debris and realised that all their belongings had been destroyed (washing machine, gold items, tea sets and so on). In addition, two cars that had been parked in the courtyard had been damaged and their radios had been missing. The applicants submitted a video clip showing the state of their house and the courtyard after the explosion. 24.  According to the Government, prior to the search, the third applicant had been presented with a warrant, as attested by her signature. The search had been conducted in the presence of an investigator, two attesting witnesses and the second and third applicants. The security forces had discovered improvised explosive devices in the basement of the applicants’ house and had therefore moved the applicants, as well as their neighbours, to a safe distance. A bomb-disposal expert had used a water cannon, but had failed to deactivate the device and it had exploded, causing the detonation of other explosives, which had not been found during the search. Those explosions had destroyed the dwellings. The second IED had not been recorded in the search record because the security forces had found only one explosive device; they had presumed that the first explosion had detonated the second device. 25.  On 3 March 2011 the third applicant was questioned by an investigator from Nazran police station, and a report was drawn up. She stated that earlier that day armed people had come to their house in several cars and an armed personnel carrier (“APC”). She and her relatives had been escorted to a vehicle, where she had been questioned. Later she had been shown a site inspection report and had been asked to sign it. She had noted something about an explosion. She had been stressed and under pressure to sign the papers. After the armed persons had left, the applicant and her family had discovered that their residence had been destroyed, the buildings having been blown up. She categorically denied that any IEDs had been stored in the house and suggested that the explosions had been set up by the servicemen. 26.  The second applicant and three neighbours were also questioned by the Nazran police on 3 March 2011. The second applicant stated that the persons who had carried out the search had asked him to show them around. Together with him, they had first entered the house to the left of the entrance to the courtyard, then the two technical buildings, and finally the dwelling that was located to the right. Once the examination of the dwellings had been completed, the second and third applicants and Mr K., a neighbour who had been at their place, had been escorted to a minibus parked nearby. One of the officers had reported to someone over the radio that “everything was ok”. Inside the vehicle, the two applicants had been questioned about their brother, Ali T., who at the time had been under arrest. Then the second applicant had heard over the radio that an explosive device had been found in the basement and an explosives expert had been called in. In the afternoon he had seen that everyone had left the premises and an explosion had followed; about ten minutes later another explosion had occurred. Both dwellings had been destroyed. After the military had left, the applicants had returned to their home and found the two dwellings destroyed, while the “technical” building had been looted – many of their belongings had gone. The applicant suggested that the explosions had been set up by the military. 27.  The applicants’ neighbours confirmed that the armed men who had carried out the search at the applicants’ house had asked them to leave their houses sometime after 2 p.m. The men had explained that a bomb had been found and there was a risk of explosion. The neighbours had complied; two explosions had occurred within about ten minutes. Later in the day the servicemen had left and the neighbours had been allowed to return to their houses. 28.  On 4 March 2011 the third applicant lodged several complaints with different authorities, including the State prosecutor’s office and the head of the Nazran Interior Department. She complained of the unlawful search, of intimidation during the interrogation, and the theft and destruction of their property. Throughout the following month, she sent several letters to the authorities. 29.  On 12 March 2012 Mr K., the applicants’ neighbour, issued an affidavit. He explained that on 3 March 2011 he had been at the applicants’ home. At about 11 a.m. a large group of armed people and an APC had arrived at the place and a search had been conducted. The witness had not seen any documents or attesting witnesses. He had been taken to a minibus parked nearby, but when the officers had found out that he was not a member of the family, he had been asked to leave. Several hours later all the neighbours had been evacuated from their houses and then two explosions had followed, within a space of ten minutes. 30.  All the complaints were forwarded to and dealt with by the military investigation division, military unit no. 68799, located in the Republic of Ingushetia. 31.  On 8 April 2011 a military investigator refused to open a criminal investigation. The third applicant was informed of that decision by letters of 8 and 18 April, and 5 May 2011, indicating a possibility to appeal. 32.  The decision of 8 April 2011 was revoked by a military investigator’s decision on 27 October 2011. The third applicant was informed by a letter dated 27 October 2011 that the investigation had resumed. On 14 November 2011 the third applicant was informed that the investigation had been stayed on 2 November, indicating a possibility to appeal.
(b)  The decision of 22 November 2011 33.  On 22 November 2011 the military investigator refused to open an investigation into crimes committed under Articles 286 (exceeding official powers) and 158 (theft) of the Criminal Code. A five-page summary of the decision, forwarded to the third applicant on the same day, indicated that the following procedural measures had been taken: on 14 November 2011 a military investigator had questioned the bomb-disposal expert and the FSB investigator who had conducted the search of the premises. On 16 and 18 November 2011 he had questioned four other FSB officers who had taken part in the search, and on 17 November 2011 he had questioned two attesting witnesses. The third applicant had also been questioned. 34.  The investigator noted that the third applicant had been presented with the search warrant prior to the search, and had counter-signed it. No pressure had been put on her or any other members of her family. At the beginning of the search, in the cellar of one of the buildings, the officers had discovered an IED made out of a 125 mm artillery shell. The third applicant had denied having any information about the IED. All those present had been taken to a safe distance and the bomb-disposal expert had tried to dismantle it; he had been unsuccessful and the device had exploded. It had caused the detonation of a second device, of which the officers had been unaware. Only one IED had been found and recorded in the site inspection report. 35.  The bomb-disposal expert stated that he had taken part in the search and found an IED made out of a 125 mm artillery shell and a detonating device, wrapped up in black cellophane and connected to the IED with wire. The persons present had been evacuated, following which the IED had been detonated with the help of a hydro detonator. That had resulted in an explosion, the destruction of the building and a fire. About two minutes later another undiscovered IED had detonated, probably because of the fire. 36.  The FSB officers confirmed their presence at the site on the day in question, the fact they had been informed about the discovery of the IED and the need to evacuate everyone to a safe distance. 37.  Finally, the investigator referred to the search report and the site inspection report drawn up on the day in question. 38.  The decision concluded as follows:
“Drawing on the above, the [third applicant’s] allegations about the unlawful search, use of violence, explosions, damage, destruction and theft of property have not been confirmed by the results of the inquiry.
It has been established that the search at the third applicant’s house was carried out by investigator F. on the basis of the decision of 22 February 2011 issued by the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow ... on lawful grounds, with attesting witnesses, and without any breaches of the law. During the search the investigator and the explosives expert did not issue any threats, use violence, force [people] to give statements, or otherwise cause any harm to the third applicant.
Contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the circumstances did not reveal any fault in the actions of the investigator and the explosives expert. They acted lawfully, with the aim of eliminating danger to the life and health of all those present during the search and the residents of the nearby houses. ... Noting well-established facts pointing at the commission by Mr Ali [T.] (“Magas”) of a number of terrorist acts with the use of explosive devices, the investigator took a well-grounded decision to carry out the search with the participation of an explosives expert, who had been instructed to examine the dwellings in order to find potential explosive devices and deactivate them, in order to ensure the safety of all those present.
The search report of 3 March 2011 indicated that the explosives expert had found an IED in the cellar of one of the dwellings. Having carefully examined the situation, and taking into account that the IED could have detonated at any moment, the investigator took a grounded decision to evacuate everyone to a safe distance. Under such circumstances, there was no time or possibility to take personal belongings out of the house. Once the evacuation was completed, the explosives expert attempted to deactivate the IED by special means. The attempt led to the IED’s detonation; the ensuing explosions destroyed the dwellings. No one was hurt, due to the security measures taken. ...
Under such circumstances, the consequences of the detonation of the explosive device that had occurred while it was being deactivated, and the destruction of the dwellings and other possible damage to property, do not attest to unlawful actions on the part of the law-enforcement personnel, contrary to the applicant’s assertion. The applicant’s allegations have not been confirmed. ...the applicant’s request to open a criminal investigation for abuse of official functions by the investigator and the explosives experts should be dismissed.” 39.  The decision of 22 November 2011 was communicated to the third applicant on the same day. The applicants never appealed against it. 40.  On 12 March 2012 the third applicant asked military investigation unit no. 68799 to send her copies of the decisions of the military investigator of 8 April, 27 October, 2 November and 11 November 2011. On 21 March 2012 the military investigator again forwarded the copies of the requested decisions to the third applicant. It does not appear that the applicants maintained any further contact with the investigation. 41.  In the meantime, on 20 June 2011 the third applicant lodged a court action under Article 125 of the CCrP with the Magas District Court. She complained of a lack of investigation into her complaints of 4 March 2011 and that no decision had yet been made on that matter. She requested the court to assess the authorities’ failure to investigate the incident. 42.  On 27 June 2011 the Magas District Court held a hearing. A representative of the State prosecutor’s office informed the court and the third applicant that her complaints had been forwarded to the military investigation division and that an investigation was still ongoing. The District Court dismissed the action in view of the ongoing investigation. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 43.  In their additional observations of 18 April 2012 the Government explained, without providing copies of the relevant documents, that the criminal investigation against Mr Ali T. and other leaders of the terrorist organisation (file no. 171822) included the incident concerning storage of IEDs at the applicants’ address. At the time of submission of the observations, the criminal investigation was still ongoing, and the documents and witness statements collected within it could not be disclosed, in the interests of justice.