6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Batman. 7.  The applicant is the owner of a property in the Toptancılar Sitesi area of Batman, which has mainly been used as an industrial park since 2002. Toptancılar Sitesi is located in close proximity to the Tüpraş Batman Oil Refinery (“Tüpraş Refinery” or “Tüpraş”), which was a State-owned enterprise until its privatisation in 2005, and to an oil storage and supply facility run by the Ministry of Defence (Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Akaryakıt İkmal ve NATO POL Tesisleri – hereinafter “ANT”). It appears that there are also a number of private petrol stations in the vicinity. 8.  On 3 May 2004 a large underground explosion took place in Toptancılar Sitesi, which resulted in three deaths and many injuries. The explosion and ensuing fire also damaged many properties in the vicinity, including that of the applicant. 9.  A number of administrative commissions were established in the aftermath of the incident in order to determine the cause of the explosion and the damage caused by it, as well as to secure the area of the explosion. Further information regarding the work undertaken by those commissions, and other entities, is outlined below. 10.  The fact-finding commission established by the Batman governor’s office consisted of, among others, the governor, deputy governor and mayor of Batman, the director of the Batman Security Directorate, the director of the local office of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the directors of the Tüpraş Refinery and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı – hereinafter “TPAO”) and the presidents of the local chambers of architects, mechanical engineers and geological engineers. It appears that the preliminary investigations led by the fact‑finding commission, with the assistance of experts, established that the explosion had been caused by an underground oil leak, although the source of the leak could not be identified. 11.  On 27 May 2004 the fact-finding commission decided that some of the businesses in Toptancılar Sitesi should be evacuated in view of the risk of further explosions. It is not clear from the information in the case file whether the applicant’s property was amongst those evacuated at the relevant time. 12.  There is no further information in the case file as to any other action taken by the fact-finding commission. 13.  The Batman governor’s office established a damage assessment commission, with a view to ascertaining the damage sustained in the area as a result of the explosion. Following the inspections performed, the commission established six heavily damaged, ten moderately damaged and thirty-one slightly damaged businesses, and two slightly damaged residences in the area. The owners of those properties were declared “disaster victims”. The applicant’s property was not amongst those identified as damaged by the commission. The owners of the damaged properties were provided with some rent allowance and other assistance. 14.  The Commission for the Discharge of Chemicals of an Unknown Origin measured the levels of underground gas in the area and, where high levels of gas were detected, arranged for it to be discharged through pipes. 15.  A technical commission was set up on an unspecified date to determine the source and extent of the oil leak, and to make proposals for cleaning up the area affected. The commission consisted of representatives from the Batman municipality, the Tüpraş Refinery and academia, as well as from the local chambers of architects and engineers of various disciplines. In its report dated 14 June 2004 the commission stated that the explosion had occurred as a result of the compression of petroleum products that had leaked into the underground water. 16.  Under the supervision of the commission, a number of shafts were drilled to extract the leaked oil. However, the commission stated in the aforementioned report that despite its continuous efforts, it had not made any progress in cleaning up the leak, given the magnitude of the problem, and its lack of sufficient means and expertise. It had however discovered that the contamination was concentrated outside the walls surrounding the Tüpraş Refinery and that no leakage had been observed around the ANT pipeline. 17.  The members of the technical commission, with the exception of the Tüpraş representative, also stated in the same report that while they had not been able to establish the source of the leak conclusively, their investigation suggested that the leak may have originated from the Tüpraş Refinery. It is not clear whether and when this report was made public. 18.  Upon the instruction of the Prime Minister’s Office, which had deemed the aforementioned report of the technical commission to be insufficient, another commission was established under the coordination of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources for the purposes of ascertaining the cause of the explosion. The commission was made up of, among others, academics, engineers and representatives from various ministries, the Tüpraş Refinery and TPAO. 19.  According to its interim report dated 11 October 2004, the studies it had carried out in Toptancılar Sitesi showed that the explosion of 3 May 2004 had been the result of an environmental pollution phenomenon that was much more complex than initially estimated. The management of this unprecedented environmental crisis required the utmost care, expertise, information and interpretational skills. The pollutant at issue was a mixture of crude oil and various petroleum products and, according to its estimations, there were between 500 and 2,000 tonnes of such material above groundwater. Technical limitations prevented the determination of the source of the leak with absolute certainty. However, the interpretation of the available data suggested that pollution of such great magnitude could only have been caused over a long period by a facility with a high capacity of petroleum refining and storage in the vicinity, which pointed to the Tüpraş Refinery (a conclusion which was challenged by Tüpraş and TPAO representatives). The report also stressed, however, the absence of conclusive evidence to back up this assumption. It added that once responsibility for the leak was determined with certainty by the national courts, all claims for damages could be directed against the party responsible. 20.  In the same report, the commission recommended the involvement of the State Water Board (Devlet Su İşleri – “DSİ”) in the operation carried out in the area to establish the source of the leak. It also recommended the closure of the Toptancılar Sitesi area to housing and commercial activity until the underground oil leak was cleaned by professional experts, given the risk of further explosions and fire posed by the leak. It is not clear whether and when this report was made public. 21.  In accordance with the proposal in the above interim report, on 17 August 2005 the Local Environment Board of the Batman governor’s office decided that no business or occupation permits should be granted in the area designated as the “red zone”, which consisted of an area of 200 x 300 metres where the contamination was at its highest, until the underground clean-up operation in the area was completed. 22.  Following receipt of the interim report mentioned above, the Prime Minister’s Office instructed the establishment of a high-level commission to take, or recommend, more concrete steps to tackle the environmental disaster at issue and determine its causes. There is no information in the case file as regards its composition. 23.  In January 2005 the commission invited the Tüpraş Refinery and ANT to carry out tests on their pipelines to determine whether the oil leak at issue had originated from them and, if so, to take the necessary precautions. It appears from the information in the case file that neither Tüpraş nor ANT assumed responsibility for the leak. 24.  In January 2005 the high-level commission also took some decisions regarding the underground clean-up operation that had to be undertaken in the contaminated area. Accordingly, it invited the Batman governor’s office, which was tasked with coordinating the decontamination operation, to issue a call for tenders for the clean-up operation. There is, however, no further information in the case file as to whether the Batman governor’s office initiated the tender process or took any other steps to get the clean-up operation underway. 25.  According to a report dated 12 May 2004 prepared by experts from Tüpraş, pressure tests conducted on the ANT pipeline suggested the possibility of a leak in that pipeline. They referred in this connection to some reports which indicated that the ANT pipeline had been damaged during excavation work carried out in September 2002. The experts further noted that water wells drilled along the ANT pipeline in previous years had revealed the presence of petrol in the underground water. Wells drilled in the vicinity of Tüpraş petrol tanks after the explosion to disclose any leaks originating from those tanks on the other hand had not yielded any results. 26.  It was also noted in the same report that before its reconstruction as an industrial park, the Toptancılar Sitesi area had been used for the trade and storage of petroleum products, as well as for the repair of tankers, which may have played a role in the contamination of the area. 27.  On 17 May 2004 Tüpraş issued a press release mainly recapitulating the claims made in the above report. It was indicated in the press release that although no leaks had been detected around its petrol tanks, a couple of wells drilled elsewhere on the refinery grounds had revealed the existence of a mixture of water and oil flowing towards the refinery from an outside source. It was also stressed that the levels of oil in the tanks were monitored electronically and that, therefore, any leaks of such substantial amounts would not have gone unnoticed. 28.  In February 2005 DSİ submitted to the Batman governor’s office a report which found that the oil leak had heavily contaminated an area of 1 sq. km around the Toptancılar Sitesi area. It was estimated that the leak had been ongoing for a very long time and that it involved some four to six thousand tonnes of phenol. 29.  According to a report prepared by the petrol analysis laboratory of the Middle East Technical University (Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi – hereinafter “ODTÜ”) on 15 October 2004, the product that had caused the explosion was a refined petroleum product that did not exist in nature as such and, therefore, it must have originated from another source. It was not, however, possible to speculate that the petroleum had leaked from the Tüpraş Refinery. 30.  In a report issued on 16 June 2005, experts from the Dokuz Eylül University in İzmir stated, inter alia, that the oil leak at issue had, in all likelihood, emanated from Tüpraş. They added that the difficulties faced in identifying the source or sources of the leak probably resulted from technical limitations. 31.  According to information obtained from the Municipality of Batman on 13 September 2017, the restrictions on business and occupation permits imposed by the Local Environment Board of the Batman governor’s office on 17 August 2005 in the so-called “red zone” (see paragraph 21 above) were still in force, as no progress had been made in cleaning up the underground oil leak. 32.  Soon after the explosion, the Batman public prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation into the incident. 33.  On 31 December 2004 it filed a bill of indictment with the Batman Assize Court against a number of serving Tüpraş executives in connection with the explosion, accusing them under Article 383 § 2 of the former Turkish Criminal Code (Law no. 765) of causing unintentionally (by carelessness, negligence or inexperience) an explosion that resulted in death, injury and damage. The public prosecutor relied as evidence on the commission reports mentioned in paragraphs 10 to 24 above. 34.  Sixty-four people, including the relatives of the victims who had lost their lives as a result of the explosion, as well as others who had sustained bodily or financial harm, joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties (müdahil). The applicant was not amongst them. 35.  At the first hearing held on 28 January 2005, a representative of the victims claimed that even if the oil leak which had caused the explosion had originated from the ANT pipeline, Tüpraş, as the supplier of the oil into that pipeline, remained responsible for the explosion. They nevertheless requested the judicial authorities also to prosecute the relevant officials from the ANT who were in charge of the oil pipeline. The Batman Assize Court decided that the lawyer’s request concerning the ANT officials would be taken into consideration on receipt of expert reports on the source of the leak. 36.  The Tüpraş executives mainly made the following arguments in their defence statements.
(i)  There were several oil pipelines, oil storage facilities and petrol stations in the area apart from the Tüpraş Refinery, the largest being the ANT facilities. The oil pipeline between ANT and Tüpraş, which had been used since 1972 to transfer F-46 military oil, had been inoperative since 1992, and a report prepared in 2002 attested that the pipeline had been empty at the time. However, the studies conducted on the pipeline after the explosion showed not only that there had been F-57 military oil in the pipeline, which had not been supplied by Tüpraş, but also that the pipeline had been damaged.
(ii)  According to its modus operandi, the ownership of both oil pipelines and the product supplied by Tüpraş belonged to the purchaser, and Tüpraş was not accountable for any damage or loss arising from a damaged pipeline.
(iii)  The wells drilled around the Tüpraş storage tanks had not revealed any oil leaks, which ruled out the possibility that the leak had originated from the refinery.
(iv)  The petroleum extracted from the various wells drilled in Toptancılar Sitesi had been analysed in the ODTÜ laboratory, and the results of the analysis showed that the sample product was not amongst those produced at the Tüpraş Batman Refinery.
(v)  Petroleum production consisted of only 5.95 % of the total production of the Tüpraş Refinery, and the remaining capacity was mainly devoted to the production of diesel fuel, asphalt, fuel-oil, solvents, residual oil and naphtha. In these circumstances, it was illogical to claim that the leak allegedly originating from the Tüpraş Refinery consisted only of the 5.95 % of its production, and that none of the remaining products, which made up the bulk of its production, had leaked.
(vi)  All product lines at the Tüpraş Refinery were above ground and consistently monitored. 37.  The victims contested the defendants’ claim that the 2002 report concerning the ANT pipeline indicated that the pipeline had been empty. They also claimed that the analysis conducted at the ODTÜ laboratory was not decisive, as the laboratory had checked the samples obtained from the wells only against the current products of the Tüpraş Refinery. That analysis did not necessarily take into account the changes over time in the refinery’s production or the changes sustained by the products underground, considering that the leak had been ongoing for a long time. 38.  On 31 July 2006, at the request of the Batman Assize Court, three professors from ODTÜ submitted an expert report on the source of the leak. Relying on all the information in the case file, including the commission reports noted in paragraphs 10 to 24 above, the experts made the following findings.
(i)  The studies carried out so far were inadequate to determine the source of the leak. For instance, although wells had been drilled outside the surrounding walls of the Tüpraş Refinery, which had revealed a significant amount of petroleum above groundwater, no drilling had been carried out on the other side of the walls. Without drilling wells in the appropriate key locations, it would not be possible to determine whether the leak had originated from a damaged pipeline or from the refinery.
(ii)  Various construction works and excavations carried out in the Toptancılar Sitesi area over the years had revealed the presence of petroleum under the ground long before the explosion. Therefore, the fact that there was an oil leak had been known for many years, including, most probably, by the State authorities, although it was not possible to pinpoint when the leak had started.
(iii)  The suspected corporations should normally have the technical means and manpower to detect any leaks originating from their facilities and take the necessary precautions. However, where leaks arose from breaches of pipelines or other equipment by malicious individuals for the purposes of theft, then these institutions could not be expected to uncover such incidents by their own efforts alone. Since the leak in question involved a highly valuable economic commodity, it seemed highly improbable that the institutions would not take any action to stop such a leak after taking notice of it. 39.  On 7 November 2006 three other experts, all of whom were engineers who worked as work safety inspectors, issued a second report. They noted in the report that the studies undertaken thus far had not been able to reveal the source or sources of the leak. The view that the Tüpraş Refinery was responsible for the incident had not been based on sufficient evidence. Hard evidence would be required to impute responsibility to persons or corporations and no conclusions could be reached on the basis of mere presumptions. 40.  On 1 May 2008 the Batman Assize Court delivered its judgment on the case. It held that while its proximity to the site of the explosion suggested that Tüpraş was responsible for the explosion, it was not possible to determine whether any of the individual suspects should bear liability for it, particularly given that the leak had been ongoing for a considerable amount of time and that the suspects would surely have taken action had they been aware of the leak. The Assize Court accordingly acquitted the Tüpraş executives. 41.  On 17 January 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court and discontinued the proceedings as prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 42.  On different dates in 2004 a number of property owners in Toptancılar Sitesi brought compensation proceedings against both the Tüpraş Refinery and ANT before the Batman Civil Court of First Instance (“the Batman Civil Court”) in respect of the damage they had sustained as a result of the explosion in question. In the course of one of those sets of proceedings (case no. 2004/963 E.), the Batman Civil Court ordered an expert report from three university professors to determine the source of the leak. 43.  On 3 March 2006 the experts submitted their report to the Batman Civil Court. The following findings were made in the report:
(i)  the product that had leaked underground was gasoline;
(ii)  it was highly likely that the contamination had been caused by an underground accumulation of gasoline that had leaked from one or more sources over a long period;
(iii)  given the location and movement of the underground contamination slick and the ground water flow direction, the source of the leak must have been in the south, where the Tüpraş facilities were located; they stated that any leak originating from the ANT pipeline would have generated a contamination slick in a northwesterly/northerly direction alongside the pipeline, which had not been the case; this left the Tüpraş Refinery as the only plausible source of the leak.
(iv) In addition to their legal responsibility arising from the failure to detect and prevent the leak in a timely manner, the State authorities were responsible on account of their negligence in authorising the establishment of residences and businesses in such close proximity to the refinery despite the apparent dangers it posed. 44.  The Batman Civil Court admitted that report into another case file concerning the same incident (case no. 2004/966 E.) and, relying on the findings in that report, on 21 July 2006 it decided that the Tüpraş Refinery was solely responsible for the leak. It dismissed the claims against ANT. 45.  The judgment of the Batman Civil Court, which was the first occasion on which the Tüpraş Refinery was publicly confirmed as the source of the leak by a court of law, was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 30 January 2007. A request made by Tüpraş for rectification of that decision was rejected on 18 June 2007. 46.  On 16 November 2006 the applicant brought an action for compensation against Tüpraş before the Batman Civil Court. He requested a total of 10,000 Turkish liras (TRY) for the depreciation of the value of his property after the explosion and for his loss of rental income for the following eighteen months, reserving his right to increase those claims. The applicant argued in his petition that following the explosion, Toptancılar Sitesi had been declared a hazardous area by the Batman governor’s office and had accordingly been evacuated, which had significantly reduced the value of his property. He had also been deprived of his rental income for the next year and a half. Moreover, since the necessary steps had not been taken to clean the oil leak, the area was still at risk of further explosions. The applicant also stated that the responsibility of Tüpraş for the explosion had been established by the expert reports submitted to the Batman Civil Court in another case (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). 47.  In its response dated 19 December 2006, Tüpraş claimed firstly that the applicant’s claims had become time-barred, as he had failed to lodge his action within one year of the date of the explosion. It also claimed, inter alia, that:
(i)  given the proximity of the site of the explosion to the Tüpraş facilities, many wells had been dug around the Tüpraş oil tanks to locate the source of the leak; however, none of those wells had revealed any oil leaks; on the other hand, wells dug around the perimeter of the Refinery had revealed the presence of oil that had leaked from elsewhere towards the Refinery;
(ii)  the scientific analysis of the samples obtained from the site of the explosion showed that the leaked material had not been produced by Tüpraş;
(iii)  the expert reports submitted to the criminal case file found that Tüpraş could not be held liable for the explosion;
(iv)  although the pipeline between Tüpraş and ANT had officially been out of use since 1992, it had been noted after the explosion that the pipeline in question had actually been full of oil; moreover, the pressure tests carried out subsequently showed that the pipeline had been punctured and was leaking oil;
(v)  the complaints arising from the security measures taken in Toptancılar Sitesi after the explosion, such as the ceasing of commercial activity and the denial of occupation licences, were outside the competence of Tüpraş. 48.  On 28 February 2007 the applicant brought another action against Tüpraş in respect of the structural damage that his property had sustained as a result of the explosion, and requested TRY 6,000 as compensation. He reserved his right to subsequently increase his claim. The applicant stressed in his petition that the sole responsibility of Tüpraş for the explosion had now been definitively established, as the judgment delivered by the Batman Civil Court against Tüpraş in case no. 2004/966 E. had been upheld by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). The Batman Civil Court joined the case to the one that the applicant had previously brought in November 2006. 49.  The Batman Civil Court ordered an expert report to determine the extent of the applicant’s damage. The experts carried out an on-site inspection at the applicant’s property on 7 March 2007, and reported their findings on 12 March 2007. They mainly noted the following:
(i)  the impact of the explosion had been equivalent to that of an earthquake with a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale;
(ii)  the applicant’s property, which was used as business premises, had been mostly repaired by the time of the on-site inspection and commercial activity had resumed; some cracks were nevertheless visible on the walls;
(iii)  the infrastructure of the building, including water, electricity and telephone connections and the sewer system, had had to be repaired as a result of the damage sustained in the basement;
(iv)  leaving aside the estimated wear and tear of the property since its construction, the structural damage was noted to be TRY 13,278.36;
(v)  given the magnitude of the explosion, it was inevitable that the walls and structural joists of the property would sustain cracks; moreover, the explosion had considerably slowed down real estate sales in the area; having regard to these factors, it was estimated that the applicant’s property had lost 50 % of its value, corresponding to TRY 66,483.25;
(vi)  a drop of 60 to 70 % had been noted in the rental income of property owners in Toptancılar Sitesi subsequent to the explosion; in these circumstances, the applicant’s loss of rental income for the eighteen months following the explosion was calculated to be TRY 5,400. 50.  In the light of the findings in the expert report, on 22 March 2007 the applicant applied to the Batman Civil Court to increase his original claims in line with the amounts calculated by the experts. 51.  On 18 April 2007 the Batman Civil Court allowed the applicant’s compensation claim in so far as it concerned the depreciation of the value of his property and the structural damage it had sustained as a result of the explosion, but rejected the claims concerning a loss of rental income for lack of sufficient evidence. The Civil Court held in its decision that both the original claims and the subsequent request to increase those original claims had been brought within the one-year time-limit set out in Article 60 § 1 of the former Code of Obligations, bearing in mind that the relevant time-limit would only start running when both the damage and the tortfeasor responsible for that damage became known to the victim. It stressed in this regard that the identity of the tortfeasor at issue had only been “known” once the judgment in case no. 2004/966 E., which had established Tüpraş as solely responsible for the explosion, had been upheld by the Court of Cassation, and the request for rectification of that Court of Cassation decision was still pending. 52.  On 26 October 2007 Tüpraş appealed against that judgment. In its appeal, it mainly repeated its time-limit objections and contested the findings in the expert report of 12 March 2007 that had formed the basis of the first-instance court’s judgment. The company also stressed that it had been held responsible for the explosion without any objective and tangible proof. Bearing in mind that 132 similar civil actions had been brought against its refinery in connection with the explosion of May 2004, it now risked paying damages of over TRY 10 to 12 million, plus interest and court fees. 53.  On 18 February 2008 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court, holding that the time-limit for bringing an action under Article 60 § 1 of the former Code of Obligations, which had started running on the date of the explosion, had expired by the time that the applicant had brought his claims. The Court of Cassation held in this connection that the explosion at issue had taken place on 3 May 2004 and that, soon after that date, some of the property owners in Toptancılar Sitesi had brought compensation claims against Tüpraş. Since the applicant was also a property owner in Toptancılar Sitesi, he should have formed an opinion regarding the responsibility of Tüpraş for the explosion on the date of its occurrence. The Court of Cassation stated that venturing a guess as to the identity of the tortfeasor, within the bounds of possibility, was sufficient to bring an action; it was not necessary to have the tortfeasor established with certainty. The applicant’s claim that he had brought the action subsequent to the establishment of the tortfeasor as Tüpraş in a case brought earlier by other property owners could not stop the running of the time-limit from the date of the explosion. The Court of Cassation further stated that although criminal proceedings had also been brought against Tüpraş executives in connection with the explosion in question, the longer prescription period applicable to the criminal offence at issue could not apply to the civil compensation claim brought against Tüpraş within the meaning of Article 60 § 2 of the former Code of Obligations. That was because, where a civil claim brought against a company for offences committed by its employees was concerned, the longer time-limit provided in the Criminal Code applied in the civil proceedings only for offences under Article 465 of the Criminal Code. Since the charges brought against the Tüpraş executives did not concern one of the offences under Article 465, the civil claim against Tüpraş should have been brought within the aforementioned one-year time-limit. 54.  On 12 May 2008 the applicant’s representative requested rectification of the decision of the Court of Cassation. He mainly made the following arguments:
(i)  the Court of Cassation’s ruling that merely guessing, or being in a position to guess, the tortfeasor was sufficient to trigger the Article 60 § 1 time‑limit ran counter to the doctrine and settled practice of the Court of Cassation on the issue, which unambiguously required certain and exact knowledge of the tortfeasor before the time-limit could start running; the applicant relied in this connection on a judgment of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation dated 22 November 1974, as well as to some articles drafted by legal scholars and practitioners dating as far back as 1992;
(ii)  the studies conducted in the aftermath of the explosion showed that the explosion had not been a simple accident, but had involved very complex elements; bearing in mind that it had taken even the experts in the field almost one year of scientific studies to establish the exact cause of the explosion, and another year after that to identify its source, a simple layman such as him could not be expected to have known the tortfeasor on the very day that the explosion took place;
(iii)  in these circumstances, he had only acquired the requisite knowledge of the tortfeasor upon the finalisation of case no. 2004/966 E;
(iv)  it was well established in the legal doctrine, as well as in the Court of Cassation judgments, that where “continuing damage” was concerned, the time-limit would only start running when the damage at issue came to an end; bearing in mind the risk of further explosions at Toptancılar Sitesi on account of the leak, his damage had not come to an end. 55.  On 25 September 2008 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed that request without providing any reasoning. 56.  On 19 December 2008 the Batman Civil Court delivered a judgment in line with the quashing decision of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant’s claims for having become time‑barred. 57.  On 10 March 2009 the applicant appealed against that judgment. In his appeal, he mainly reiterated the arguments noted in paragraph 54 above. He also stated that the 7th Chamber of the Court of Cassation had ruled in many cases concerning the same explosion that for the purposes of the time‑limit rule set out in Article 60 § 1, the requisite knowledge of the tortfeasor could not be considered to have been acquired before the respective actions had been brought (see the cases noted in paragraph 68 below). The 7th and 4th Chambers of the Court of Cassation had, therefore, delivered contradictory judgments on the same legal issue concerning identical facts. 58.  On 28 May 2009 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court without responding to any of the applicant’s claims. 59.  On an unspecified date the applicant requested rectification of the Court of Cassation’s decision. He highlighted, inter alia, the absence of any evidence in the case file to suggest that he had learned the identity of the tortfeasor prior to its establishment by the Batman Civil Court in case no. 2004/966 E. 60.  On 22 October 2009 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s rectification request.