10.  The applicants live in Stobreč (application no. 37685/10) and Split (application no. 22768/12). Their names and dates of birth are set out in the Appendix. 11.  The legislation of the former Yugoslavia, in particular section 29 of the 1980 Basic Property Act (see paragraph 53 below), prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property[1] by adverse possession (dosjelost). 12.  When incorporating the 1980 Basic Property Act into the Croatian legal system on 8 October 1991, Parliament repealed the above-mentioned provision (see paragraph 54 below). 13.  Subsequently, the new Property Act of 1996, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, provided in section 388(4) that the period prior to 8 October 1991 was to be included in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of socially owned immovable property (see paragraph 56 below). 14.  Following several petitions for an abstract constitutional review (prijedlog za ocjenu ustavnosti) submitted by former owners of properties that had been appropriated under the socialist regime, on 8 July 1999 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) accepted the initiative and decided to institute proceedings to review the constitutionality of section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act. 15.  In a decision of 17 November 1999 the Constitutional Court invalidated with ex nunc effect section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act. It held that the impugned provision had retroactive effect resulting in adverse consequences for the rights of third parties (primarily those who, under the restitution legislation, were entitled to the restitution of property appropriated during the Communist regime) and was therefore unconstitutional (for the relevant part of the Constitutional Court’s decision see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, § 17, 11 June 2009). The Constitutional Court’s decision came into effect on 14 December 1999 when it was published in the Official Gazette. 16.  On 19 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) against Split Township (Grad Split – hereinafter “the respondent authority”) seeking a declaration of their ownership of five plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in their possession and the possession of their predecessors for more than seventy years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed, the applicants claimed to have acquired ownership of the land. Their statement of claim (tužba) read as follows:
“Plots of land nos. 866/91 (...), 866/117 (...), 866/136 (...) and 866/175 ... are registered in the name of the Stobreč Municipality.
EVIDENCE: Extract from the land register.
However, the plaintiffs and their legal predecessors have been holding the above-mentioned immovable property in their possession for more than 70 years, and thereby acquired the ownership of that immovable property.
EVIDENCE: Extract from the cadastre, testimony of the witness N.P., parties’ testimonies and other evidence, if needed.
(a)  [...]
(b)  Plot no. 866/136 belongs to the plaintiffs Mladen Radomilja and Frane Radomilja in two equal parts;
(c)  Plot no. 866/175 belongs to the plaintiff Ivan Brčić in its entirety.
EVIDENCE: See above
For these reasons it is proposed that the court, after having conducted the proceedings, adopt the following
Judgment 1.  It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs are the owners and co-owners, respectively, of the [following] immovable property ... and therefore:
(a)  [...]
(b)  Plot no. 866/136 Mladen Radomilja and Frane Radomilja in two equal parts;
(c)  Plot no. 866/175 Ivan Brčić in its entirety 2.  The plaintiffs are, on the basis of this judgment, entitled to seek and obtain registration in their name of the right of ownership and co-ownership, respectively, of the immovable property listed in point 1 of this judgment in the land register, as well as concurrent deletion of that right as registered to date in the name of the respondent authority’s legal predecessor, the Stobreč Municipality. 17.  By a judgment of 20 September 2004 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. It held that they had proved that they and their predecessors had had continuous and exclusive possession of the land in question since at least 1912 and in good faith. Furthermore, it held that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession at the relevant time had been twenty years. Consequently, in the applicants’ case that period had elapsed in 1932. The relevant part of that judgment reads:
“In the statement of claim it is submitted ... that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had been in possession of the immovable property [in question] for more than 70 years and that they had thereby acquired ownership of that property by adverse possession.
...
The plaintiffs base their claim on ... adverse possession. [E]ven if they do not expressly state it, the facts alleged in their statement of claim suggest that they maintain that the requirements for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had been met before 6 April 1941. This means that it was necessary to establish whether the requirements prescribed by the ... laws and other regulations in force at the time were met.
...
In the opinion of this court, because of changed economic and social circumstances, the time-limits for acquiring title to property by adverse possession prescribed by ... laws and other regulations in force on 6 April 1941 do not correspond to the principle of protection of legitimate interests of individuals, long-term possessors in good faith, or to the principle of legal certainty. [The court] therefore considers that the period of 20 years is required and sufficient to acquire ownership of immovable property by adverse possession.” 18.  In its appeal the respondent authority emphasised that the applicants could not have become the owners of the property in question because prior to 8 October 1991 it had been prohibited to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession, and that the lifting of that prohibition had not had retroactive effect (see paragraphs 11-15 above). In their reply the applicants responded that it was undisputed that they had been in exclusive possession of the property since the beginning of the twentieth century and thus for more than thirty years even before 6 April 1941. 19.   In a judgment of 17 May 2007 the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) reversed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicants’ action. It held that the Municipal Court had established the facts correctly (continuous and exclusive possession of the land in good faith since 1912) but had erred in its application of the substantive law. It established, firstly, that the land in question had been in social ownership on 8 October 1991 and that under the relevant legislation it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession before that date unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6 April 1941 (see paragraphs 48, 53-54, 57 and 59-60 below). However, those requirements had not been met in the applicants’ case. That was so because under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (which was applicable in Croatia from 1852 until 1980, see paragraphs 47-49 and 51 below) immovable property owned by municipal authorities could be acquired by adverse possession only after forty years. However, having regard to the factual findings of the first-instance court, according to which the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land at issue since 1912 (see paragraph 17 above), that time-limit had not expired before 6 April 1941. The relevant part of that judgment reads:
“In calculating the time-limit for acquiring by adverse possession immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, the period ... before 8 October 1991 is not to be taken into account because before that date section 29 of the Act on Basic Ownership Relations Act expressly prohibited acquiring ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession. Even though [that] provision was repealed by section 3 of the Act on the Incorporation of the Basic Ownership Relations Act, it is because of that prior express statutory prohibition that the time elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, unless [that] time-limit had elapsed before 6 April 1941 under the regulations in force at the time.” 20.  The applicants then, on 23 July 2007, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment alleging infringements of their constitutional rights to equality before the law, equality before the courts and fair procedure. In their constitutional complaint they stated, inter alia:
“... according to the findings in the contested judgment the plaintiffs ... have been in continuous exclusive possession from 1912 until the present day in good faith. ... The case therefore concerns [such] possession in the period of 90 years before the bringing of the civil action.
... In the instant case the court did not apply the cited provisions even though the plaintiffs’ predecessors had possessed [the property in question] since at least the beginning of the twentieth century and their possession had been continuous until the bringing of the civil action and lasts until the present day.
...
If the view that the property in question was socially owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.” 21.  In a decision of 30 September 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaint and on 19 November 2009 it served its decision on their representative. The relevant part of that decision reads:
“Only those facts on the existence of which depends the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right are relevant for the Constitutional Court.
In the civil proceedings ... it was established that ... the complainants ... had been in continuous exclusive possession of the disputed property since at least 1912 and in good faith.
...
In the reasoning of its judgment the second-instance court notes that the case concerns immovable property which was socially owned on 8 October 1991 and that, in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of [such] property, the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account.
In the examination of the constitutional complaint ... one has to take note of the fact that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act was invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of [17 November 1999] ... [I]n that decision the Constitutional Court held that possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. Given that the time-limit for acquiring ownership of property socially owned on 8 October 1991, did not run in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 (which view the Constitutional Court expressed in the decision U‑III‑1595/2006 of 5 February 2009), the court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested judgment of the County Court are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.” 22.  On 25 May 1993, 21 February 1996 and 20 July 1999 respectively, the applicants bought three plots of land from various individuals. However, the plots were recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township. 23.  On 4 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court against Split Township, seeking a declaration of their ownership of the three plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in the possession of their legal predecessors for more than 100 years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed in respect of their legal predecessors, the applicants claimed that by buying the land from them they had validly acquired ownership. Their statement of claim read as follows:
“The plaintiffs together, each in one half, bought from R.K. and M.K. ... the plots of land no. 866/34 (...) ... from T.F. ... the plot of land no. 866/59 (...), ... and from M.S. ... the plot of land no. 866/35 (...) ...
EVIDENCE: [The three sale and purchase agreements between the plaintiffs and the above mentioned individuals]
The plaintiffs immediately, upon the conclusion of the above sale and purchase agreements entered into possession of all the immovable property listed above. They remained in possession of it until the present day. After the [relevant tax authority ordered them to pay tax] they paid it.
EVIDENCE: Tax payment receipt
 Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S. ...
All the above-mentioned immovable property is registered in the land register in the name of the Stobreč Municipality even though the vendors in the enclosed [sale purchase] agreements and their legal predecessors have been in possession of that immovable property for more than 100 years, which means that they acquired ownership of that immovable property by adverse possession.
EVIDENCE: Extract from the land register;
 Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S., ... ; and
 other evidence, if needed.
Given that the vendors were non-registered owners of the above-mentioned immovable property, they have by the sale purchase agreements transferred their right of ownership to the plaintiffs as buyers. [In this way] the plaintiffs, through their legal predecessors, acquired ownership of the plots nos. 866/34 (...), 866/59 (...) and 866/35 (...)  ...
EVIDENCE: See above.
For these reasons it is proposed that the court adopt the following
Judgment 1.  It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs Jakov Jakeljić and Ivica Jakeljić are the co-owners, each in one half, of the plots nos. 866/34, 866/59 and 866/35 ... 2.  The respondent authority shall within 15 days, on pain of enforcement, provide the plaintiffs with the document containing clausula intabulandi necessary to record the right of ownership in the land register and delete that right as registered to date in the name of the respondent authority’s legal predecessor, the Stobreč Municipality. Otherwise, this judgment shall replace [such document]. 3.  The respondent authority shall, within 15 days, on pain of enforcement, reimburse the plaintiffs for the costs of these proceedings.” 24.  In the response to the applicants’ action the respondent authority submitted that the property in question had been in social ownership and that, having regard to the Constitutional Court’s decision invalidating section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraph 15 above), the fact of possessing socially owned property before 8 October 1991 could not be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for adverse possession. The applicants replied that the Constitutional Court’s decision to which the respondent authority had referred was of no relevance for the resolution of the dispute. 25.  In a judgment of 19 December 2002 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. However, following an appeal lodged by the respondent authority, that judgment was quashed on 2 March 2006 by the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) on procedural grounds. 26.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 1 June 2007, the Split Municipal Court again ruled in favour of the applicants. It established, firstly, that the land in question had been in social ownership on 8 October 1991 and that under the relevant legislation it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession before that date unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6 April 1941 (see paragraphs 48, 52 and 59-60 below). It found, however, that the applicants had proved that their predecessors had had continuous and exclusive possession of the three plots of land in good faith for more than forty years before 6 April 1941, and had continued to do so until they had sold them to the applicants (see paragraph 22 above). The applicants’ predecessors had therefore, under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (applicable in Croatia from 1852 until 1980, see paragraphs 47-49 and 51 below), acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession even before that date. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:
“In the response to the action the respondent denied the claim because the property in question had been [in] social ownership and because, pursuant to the Constitutional Court’s decision invalidating section 388(4) of the [1996 Property Act], possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring title to property by adverse possession.
...
Given that the action was brought in 2002, that in the land register the right of ownership is registered in the name of the Stobreč Municipality, that section 388(4) of the [1996 Property Act] was invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of 17 November 1999 – which means that the fact of possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time necessary for adverse possession – ... the plaintiffs and their predecessors could not have acquired ownership before 1991 unless they manage to prove that they had acquired [it] by adverse possession before 6 April 1941. The plaintiffs’ action evidently relies precisely on that. Therefore, since [for the court] it is beyond dispute that the plot in question had been socially owned on 8 October 1991 ... in order to determine whether it had been acquired by adverse possession it had to be established whether the plaintiffs’ legal predecessors had been in possession of certain quality of the disputed property before 6 April 1941 and thus for the period prescribed for adverse possession by the rules applicable at the time.” 27.  In their appeal the respondent authority emphasised that the applicants could not have become the owners of the property in question because prior to 8 October 1991 it had been prohibited to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession unless the ownership had been acquired in that manner before 6 April 1941. The respondent authority claimed that the lifting of that prohibition had not had retroactive effect (see paragraphs 11-15 above). In their reply the applicants retorted that it was undisputed that they had been in exclusive and continuous possession of the property in good faith for more than a hundred years and that they had in any event acquired ownership thereof by adverse possession, having possessed it for more than forty years before 6 April 1941. 28.  In a judgment of 29 May 2008 the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) reversed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicants’ action. It found that the applicants’ predecessors had only been in possession of the land in question (continuously and in good faith) since 1912. The forty-year time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession set out in Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code had not therefore expired by 6 April 1941 (see paragraph 51 below). In the subsequent period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 the relevant legislation had prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession (see paragraph 11 above and paragraphs 52-53 below). This had discontinued the running of the statutory time-limits. The time which had elapsed before 6 April 1941 had therefore not continued to run after 8 October 1991 – it had actually started to run again. The relevant part of that judgment reads:
 “In calculating the time-limit for acquiring by adverse possession immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, the period ... before 8 October 1991 is not to be taken into account because before that date section 29 of the Basic Ownership Relations Act expressly prohibited acquiring ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession. Even though [that] provision was repealed by section 3 of the Incorporation of the Basic Ownership Relations Act, it is because of that prior express statutory prohibition that the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, unless [that] time-limit had elapsed before 6 April 1941 under the regulations in force at the time.” 29.  The applicants then, on 1 August 2008, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment, alleging violations of their constitutional rights to equality before the law, equality before the courts and fair procedure. In their constitutional complaint they, inter alia, stated:
“Therefore, from the legal and factual situation where, as in the instant case, the plaintiffs have, themselves and through their predecessors, indisputably been in possession in good faith of the property in question for more than 100 years, and viewing such situation in the light of Croatian law in force, ... it follows that it is necessary to ... quash the contested judgment and remit the case ...
If the view that the property in question was socially owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.
... by not taking into account the entire period of possession of the property at issue before the bringing of the civil action the court misapplied the substantive law and thereby violated constitutional rights relied on by the plaintiffs.” 30.  In a decision of 15 September 2011, the Constitutional Court dismissed their constitutional complaint and on 4 October 2011 it served its decision on their representative. The relevant part of that decision reads:
“Only those facts on the existence of which depends the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right are relevant for the Constitutional Court.
In the civil proceedings ... it was established that ... the complainants ... had been in continuous exclusive possession of the disputed property since at least 1912 and in good faith.
...
In the reasoning of its judgment the second-instance court notes that the case concerns immovable property which was socially owned on 8 October 1991 and that in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of [such] property the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account.
In the examination of the constitutional complaint ... the Constitutional Court notes that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act was invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of [17 November 1999] ... [I]n that decision the Constitutional Court held that possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 could not be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. Given that the time-limit for acquiring ownership of property socially owned on 8 October 1991 did not run in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 (which view the Constitutional Court expressed in decision U‑III‑1595/2006 of 5 February 2009), the court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested judgment of the County Court are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.” 31.  In the proceedings before the Chamber the applicants complained that the Split County Court judgments in their cases were in breach of their rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention. 32.  The relevant part of the application forms in both cases reads as follows:
“III.  STATEMENT OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION(S) OF THE CONVENTION AND/OR PROTOCOLS AND OF RELEVANT ARGUMENTS
The applicants consider that ... the Split County Court by dismissing the applicants’ action, and the Constitutional Court by dismissing the applicants’ constitutional complaint violated, i.e. breached their rights provided by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ‘the Convention’), in particular those included in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which guarantees the protection of the right of property, and the rights provided by Article 14 of the Convention because the applicants’ are being discriminated and thereby placed in a disadvantageous position compared to other Croatian nationals because in almost the same, i.e. in terms of substantive law and factual background compatible, cases the same court, the Split County Court, has been adopting judgments allowing registration of the right of ownership [in respect of the land] in the immediate vicinity of that of the applicants, to those who make such requests on the basis of undisturbed possession of hundred years.
... 33.  In the application form in the Jakeljić case (no. 22768/12) the applicants also added:
“Before that court the applicants’ representative had lodged the application in the ... [case of Radomilja and Others], which the Court has registered under no. 37685/10. It is therefore suggested to consult that case-file and its enclosures.
Before the Croatian courts in substantially similar cases final judgments were adopted from which it follows that the courts have been granting the claims of those in possession of the land adjacent to that of the applicants, and have been declaring those possessors the owners of that immovable property on the basis of adverse possession that is, undisturbed possession of 20 years , which [period] elapsed by 6 April 1941, and so in accordance with the opinion [expressed at] extended plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia of 4 April 1960.
Therefore, [such] different treatment by the courts placed the applicants in an unequal position, which caused them enormous damage.” 34.  On 23 May 2014 and 25 June 2015 respectively, notice of the complaints concerning the alleged violation of their property rights was given to the Government and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above). The question communicated to the parties in both cases referred to the Court’s judgment in the Trgo case (see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, 11 June 2009) and read as follows:
 “Was the refusal of the domestic courts to acknowledge the applicants’ ownership of five/three plots of land they claim to have acquired by adverse possession, in violation of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, 11 June 2009)?” 35.  In their observations of 6 October 2014 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and 20 October 2015 (in the Jakeljić case) the Government argued, inter alia, that the cases had to be distinguished from the Trgo case. In particular, they submitted that, unlike the situation in Trgo, in the instant cases the applicants had instituted civil proceedings after the Constitutional Court had invalidated the 1996 version of section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 15-16 and 23 above and paragraph 56 below). Accordingly, the applicants could not have had legitimate expectations that the said provision would be applied in their case and that their claim to be declared the owners of the property in question would be granted (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 43, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 37). The relevant part of their observations in both cases reads:
“... at the time of bringing the civil action, and pursuant to domestic law, the applicants could not have had a legitimate expectation that they would see their claim upheld on the basis of the repealed section 388(4) of the Property Act. That is to say, at the time when the applicants brought their civil action in the Split Municipal Court, neither the provisions of the then valid Property Act, nor the case law of the highest courts of justice in the Republic of Croatia, had provided for the possibility of including the period in question in the time-limit for adverse possession.
...
... in the Trgo case, the applicant brought a civil action in 1997 to determine the right of ownership due to the expiry of the time-limit for adverse possession. Then (at the time the civil action was brought), the provision of the Property Act that dictated the inclusion of the period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 in the time-limit for adverse possession was still in force. During these civil proceedings, the Constitutional Court adopted the decision repealing the stated provision of the Property Act, and the applicant lost his case in the end for this reason. Furthermore, the Court noted in that case that repealing a particular legal provision had an ex nunc effect, but that this rule was not applied in the ongoing proceedings. Therefore, the Court concluded that the applicant should not have to suffer the negative consequences of correcting the legislator’s mistake, since the applicant had reasonably relied on legislation that was valid at the time when he initiated the proceedings. Therefore, the Court acknowledged that the applicant in that case had legitimate expectations, and consequently the right of ownership, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
 However, the situation in the present case is completely different. This is because of the described legislative activity after the decision of the Constitutional Court, but also because of the previously described consistent case-law. Therefore, the applicants in this case, at the time of bringing their civil action in the Split Municipal Court, could not have had any legitimate expectations that the court would acknowledge the time period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 as being included in the time-limit for adverse possession, and that they would gain recognition of the right of ownership on that basis.
Furthermore, the Government deem that the attitude of the applicants themselves before the domestic bodies, as well as the applicants’ constitutional complaint, clearly show that they did not even have such expectations.
The Government primarily point out that it was disputed before the ordinary courts (i) whether the applicants and their predecessors had been possessors in good faith and fair possessors, (ii) how long the applicants and their legal predecessors had been in possession of the disputed real property before 6 April 1941, and (iii) whether the legal time-limit for adverse possession had expired before 6 April 1941.
At no time was it disputed between the parties in the proceedings whether the possession of the real property in the time period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 should be included in the time-limit for adverse possession. Furthermore, the applicants expressly claimed before the domestic court that their civil action was based on the fact that the time-limit for adverse possession had expired before 6 April 1941 ...
The fact that the applicants themselves did not dispute this is also shown by their constitutional complaint.
... this constitutional complaint shows that the applicants did not believe that this time period should be included in the time-limit for adverse possession in their case, but that it was necessary to include in that time-limit the period during which their legal predecessors had owned the disputed real property before 6 April 1941, and to add the length of possession after 8 October 1991 to that time period.
Finally, the Government observe that, even in their application to the Court, the applicants did not refer to the fact that the domestic courts had miscalculated the time-limit for adverse possession, with regard to the period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991.
The Government additionally observe that the time required for adverse possession of socially-owned real property according to the provisions of the General Civil Code was indisputably 40 years. The applicants did not claim at any time before the domestic courts or the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia that the time required for adverse possession had been shorter. Precisely to the contrary, the applicants argued their constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court by claiming that the requirement of expiry of the time-limit of 40 years was met, because the time before 6 April 1941 should be added to the time after 8 October 1991, which according to their claims amounted to 41 years (see ... the applicants’ constitutional complaint).
In conclusion, it is entirely obvious in this case that the applicants did not ‘rely reasonably on a legislative provision that was later repealed’, but they tried to argue and prove that they met the requirements for adverse possession, in accordance with the legal provisions that were in force at the time the civil action was brought and in accordance with the case-law related to that legislation.
Therefore, this case was about hope in the acknowledgement of the right of ownership, which cannot be considered ‘possessions’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Kopecky v. Slovakia, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 September 2004, § 35).
Following the above, the Government deem that the applicants’ application is manifestly ill-founded and should be dismissed under Article 35, paragraph 3 of the Convention.”
(b)  The applicants’ observations in reply 36.  The applicants, in their observations in reply of 3 November 2014 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and 30 November 2015 (in the Jakeljić case), submitted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was applicable because their claims to be declared the owners of the land in question had a sufficient basis in national law, specifically (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 45, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 39):
- in both cases, in the interpretation adopted at the extended plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia of 4 April 1960, which was still being applied by the Croatian Supreme Court in cases similar to theirs (see paragraphs 58-60 below), and
- in the Jakeljić case, also in Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (see paragraph 51 below).
According to that interpretation by the Supreme Court a person would have acquired ownership of immovable property by adverse possession after being in possession thereof in good faith for twenty years (see paragraphs 58-60 below). 37.  For the applicants in the case of Radomilja and Others, the issue was whether the period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had in their case expired before 6 April 1941 or not. The above-mentioned interpretation requiring twenty years of possession in good faith (see the preceding paragraph and paragraphs 58-60 below), coupled with the factual findings of the domestic courts that they and their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912 (see paragraphs 17 and 19 and 26-28 above), suggested that it had. They could have therefore legitimately expected that their claim to be declared the owners of that land would be granted. Yet, the Split County Court and the Constitutional Court had misapplied domestic law and dismissed their claim by holding that a period of forty years had been necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 46). 38.  The applicants in Radomilja and Others also contested the factual findings of the domestic courts by arguing that those courts had misinterpreted the witness statement from which they had arrived at the conclusion that the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912 (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above). In fact, the evidence suggested that they had been in possession of that land since 1900 (ibid., § 47). 39.  In Jakeljić the applicants submitted that the Split Municipal Court had established that their predecessors had been in continuous and exclusive possession of the land in question in good faith for more than forty years before 6 April 1941 (see paragraph 26 above). Yet, the Split County Court, while stating that the Municipal Court had established the facts correctly, had somehow distorted those factual findings by holding that the applicants’ predecessors had actually only been in possession since 1912 (see paragraph 28 above). Had it correctly understood those factual findings, the County Court would have reached the same conclusion as to the law as the Municipal Court, namely that the applicants’ predecessors had, under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (see paragraph 51 below), acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 (see Jakeljić, § 40). 40.  In the alternative, the applicants in Jakeljić argued that even if their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912, they should have acquired it by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 based on the above-mentioned interpretation requiring twenty years of possession in good faith (see paragraph 36 above and paragraph 58 below). The applicants, who had bought the land in question from their predecessors, could therefore have legitimately expected that their claim to be declared owners of that land would be granted. However, the Split County Court and the Constitutional Court had misapplied domestic law and dismissed their claim, holding that a period of forty years had been necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession (ibid., § 41). Those courts had also wrongly applied the relevant domestic law by refusing to add up the period before 6 April 1941 and that after 8 October 1991 when holding that in between these two periods the running of the statutory time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had been discontinued (see paragraph 28 above). 41.  In view of those arguments (see paragraphs 36-40 above), the applicants in both cases submitted that the Court’s findings in the Trgo case were not relevant in their cases (see Radomilja and Others, § 48). In particular, in their reply to the Government’s observations they stated as follows (ibid.):
“... the Court has specified that the case of Trgo v. Croatia is relevant case-law [; this] case does not have the same factual and legal background as the present [one]. In particular, the Trgo case was about acknowledging ownership acquired by adverse possession in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991, whereas the applicants herein do not claim that said period should, nor do they have any expectations that the said period would, be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession given that they acquired the ownership [of the land in question by adverse possession] regardless [of that period]
The Trgo case therefore cannot be regarded as relevant case-law in the present case.” 42.  The applicants in their observations in both cases cited section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act, as amended by the 2001 Amendment (hereinafter referred to as “the 2001 version of section 388(4)”). They also made the following statements in relation to the issue whether they had legitimate expectations:
“During the domestic proceedings it was established beyond dispute that the applicants had been in possession of [the land in question] since the early 20th century until the present day, and that all this time they had been in peaceful and uninterrupted possession. Furthermore, the applicants believe that on the basis of more than a hundred years of peaceful possession they have a property interest, for which there is a sufficient basis in national law to be regarded as a ‘possession’ protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, the legitimate expectation of the applicants is based on a reasonable [and] justified reliance on the relevant statutory provisions, on the basis of which they have ex lege acquired ownership by the lapse of time necessary for [acquiring ownership by] adverse possession.
...
... the Government argued that the applicants at the time they brought their civil action could not have had legitimate expectation that their claim would be granted on the basis of invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act – which provision allowed the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 to be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession – because that provision had been invalidated at the time of bringing of the civil action.
It is submitted, first of all, that the applicants’ complaints primarily concern the fact that the second-instance court, in contrast to the first-instance court, did not acknowledge the legal consequences [produced], that is [the right of] ownership which the applicants had acquired, before 6 April 1941.
...
Besides, from the Government submissions on the merits it follows that they do not comment on the fact ..., ... which is one of the grounds of this application, that in accordance with the [case-law of the] domestic courts the time-period necessary for acquiring ownership of immovable property in social ownership by adverse possession is 20 years, which has to elapse by 6 April 1941.
...
However, if the view that the [land in question] was socially-owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.
...
... even if one accepts the factual findings of the domestic courts ... that is, that the applicants and their predecessors have been in possession of the [land] in question since 1912 ... they possessed [it] for 29 years before 6 April 1941 and for 11 years [in the period] from 8 October 1991 until the bringing of their civil action. This period of [altogether] 40 years is under the relevant provisions of the [1811 Civil Code, 1980 Basic Property Act and the 1996 Property Act] sufficient for acquiring ownership of the [land] in question.
...
... in the present case the applicant’s predecessors ... have possessed [the land in question] as [if they have been the] owners since before 1900 ... [T]hey have possessed [the land] in that way before 6 April 1941, between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 and after 8 October 1991 until the present day. They have therefore maintained uninterrupted possession on which grounds they should have, on the basis of the relevant legislation, acquired ownership by adverse possession.
What is important to emphasise is ... that no one has ever acquired any rights in respect of the [land in question] nor has anyone except the applicants themselves claimed any rights in respect of [that land]. ...
The Government’s argument that the applicants’ could not have had legitimate expectations that their claim would be granted on the basis of invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act is entirely misplaced because the applicants do not ask the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 to be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. It is submitted, first of all, that the applicants have never relied on section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act nor do they in their application rely on it. [That is so] because that they have, regardless of that time-period, acquired the right of ownership on several grounds and so before 6 April 1941 as well as after 8 October 1991, or until the time they brought the[ir] civil action.
...
The applicants have therefore at the time they brought the[ir] civil action, in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions which were in force at the time of brining the civil action and in accordance with the relevant case-law, acquired the ownership by adverse possession and so without taking into account the time period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991. If that view is not to be accepted, they have definitely acquired ownership by taking into account the period after 8 October 1991 in which period they have retained uninterrupted peaceful possession of [the land in question] until the present day.
...
... in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions, case-law and above stated facts it is beyond any doubt that the applicants acquired ownership by adverse possession ...
In line with the above it is suggested that the Court refuse the Government’s objections regarding applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ... and deliver a judgment finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and enable the applicants to enjoy their right of ownership.”
(c)  The Government’s comments on the applicants’ observations 43.  The Government in their comments of 15 January 2015 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and of 4 January 2016 (in the Jakeljić case) first reiterated their arguments as to why the applicants had not had legitimate expectations to become the owners of the land in question. In support of their arguments the Government emphasised that in their reply the applicants admitted that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 56-57 below) as well as the Constitutional Court’s decision of 17 November 1999 (see paragraph 15 above) had no significance in their cases and expressly argued that the cases had a factual and legal background different from the Trgo case (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 44, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 38). 44.  In their comments in the Jakeljić case the Government also replied to the applicants’ arguments that the time necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession had been twenty rather than forty years (see paragraphs 36 and 40 above). In particular, the Government submitted that the applicants had:
“... introduced the complaint on the allegedly inconsistent domestic practice [concerning the time required for adverse possession] only in these proceedings before the Court, in contravention of the principle of subsidiarity. If the applicants considered that their rights were violated by different legal views of domestic courts that were applied in their case, as opposed to other similar cases, they should have brought these complaints to the attention of the Constitutional Court. However, the applicants failed to do so.” 45.  As regards the applicants’ arguments as to why Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was nevertheless applicable (see paragraphs 36-40 and 42 above), the Government submitted that they concerned questions of fact and the application of domestic law, which under the Convention were not the Court’s task to examine (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 44, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 38).