5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Krasnodar. 6.  The applicant had a press card issued to him as a photographer, stating that he was a “correspondent at Agency.Photographer.ru”. According to the applicant’s submissions, he also prepared various texts for publication in print and Internet media outlets on an occasional basis. 7.  In August 2009 the applicant and Ms D. travelled to Abkhazia to prepare a report with photographs on, as he described it, “the life of this unrecognised republic”. 8.  On 27 August 2009 they returned to Russia, arriving on foot at the Adler customs checkpoint. The applicant presented his Russian passport, press card and a customs declaration, stating that he had electronic information devices (a laptop and flash memory cards) in his luggage. The laptop was his own property, however, he also used it for professional purposes. 9.  The applicant and D. were examined by Officer K. In his report to his superior, drawn up at 10.40 a.m. on 27 August 2009, he stated that in view of the applicant’s answers to questions and because of his behaviour, neither of which have been specified to the Court, there was a need to verify the information contained in the applicant’s customs declaration by way of an “inspection procedure” (see paragraph 31 below) in respect of the items in his bag and backpack and to “apply the measure for minimising risk as per profile no. 55/1000000/11062008/00228 ...”. 10.  The Government have submitted to the Court a written statement from K., which reads as follows:
“Following the customs control measure of an interview and given [D.’s and the applicant’s] behaviour and the nature of their professional activities, a supposition/assumption (предположение) arose that they might have banned printed and/or audio- and video-material with extremist content in their bags ... Since [the applicant] noted in his declaration that he had electronic storage devices, I made a written report to the acting chief officer of the customs checkpoint concerning the need for carrying out an inspection of [the applicant’s] bags in the framework of the risk management system and for involving Officer B., an IT specialist. The inspection was approved by the chief officer by way of his handwritten approval on my report ... The chief officer issued an order for an inspection and authorised B. and myself to use the sampling procedure ... The above-mentioned supposition/assumption was based on the presence of a folder labelled “Extremist” in the laptop ... Data from it was copied on the same day [on the spot] ... to DVD RW disks, which were then sealed in a plastic bag ... [The applicant], B. and two attesting witnesses were present ... The sampling report contained a detailed description of the data that was copied, including the names of the folders that had been copied, their number and the number of files in each folder ... The copying was carried out by Officer B. I did not open or copy any electronic folders or files ... I did not read any ‘correspondence’ (personal correspondence or other text material) ... An order to carry out a forensic examination was issued on 8 September 2009 ... because on 27 August 2009 we had no information about the relevant expert organisations for that type of forensic examination ...” 11.  The Government have also submitted a written statement from Officer B., which reads as follows:
“In accordance with the order for an inspection [no. ...], which required sampling and which also indicated ‘other’, I copied data from [the applicant’s] laptop to six DVD RW disks ... because we had no other type of disks or electronic storage devices ... Since the laptop’s hard drive was some 160 Gb and at the time we had no means for fast copying, I decided only to copy folders with strange names. I did not read any ‘correspondence’ (personal correspondence or other text material) from the laptop.” 12.  According to the Government, after finding in the directory of the laptop an electronic folder entitled “Extremism (for RR[1])”, which contained a number of photographs, the customs officer decided to copy it and some other folders from the laptop for further examination by an expert, who could determine whether they contained any information of an extremist nature. 13.  The folder contained seven subfolders and 180 files. The applicant made a note in the record, stating that the material had been copied onto rewritable DVD disks (thus technically allowing the data to be modified, including by way of adding data). According to the applicant, the folder had some photographs and a PDF copy of an article entitled “How to incite hatred?” on anti-extremism legislation. The article, written by Ms V., was published in the Russian Reporter magazine in June 2009 and was accompanied by photographs taken by the applicant. The author of the article discussed the controversies and difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Russian anti-extremism legislation, with reference to four criminal cases under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, the material that was copied included documents and text concerning two ethnic groups (the Yazidis and the Meskhetian Turks), who were allegedly under pressure from the Krasnodar regional administration. For instance, a folder named “Isolation” contained texts describing the social problems facing thirty-seven Yazidi families (with references to their personal details), who had been discriminated against by the regional administration. 14.  It can be seen from the record of the sampling that thirty-four folders (containing some 480 subfolders with over 16,300 electronic files) were copied. The folders had the following names (mostly in Russian): In motion, Miscellaneous, Desktop, Foto_projects, On the road, Isolation, Drawings, 1 May, 9 May, 14 February, Law, Extremism (for RR). 15.  It appears that the data from the laptop was first copied to a mobile or external hard drive and then recopied to six DVDs. According to the Government, the information was then deleted from the external hard drive. The original data in the laptop was not deleted and remained intact. 16.  According to the applicant, his laptop remained with Officer B. for several hours. Allegedly, the officer read through the applicant’s correspondence in the ICQ messaging program and copied some 26 gigabytes of data, including the applicant’s personal correspondence, personal photographs and FTP[2]-type passwords. 17.  The applicant submitted the following written statement by Ms D. to the Court:
“At 10 a.m. we presented ourselves at the border control and presented our passports ... We were then taken to the customs control area ... There the customs officers asked [the applicant] to hand over his press card; so they were aware that he had one ... Officer K. interviewed us about the purpose of our visit to Abkhazia and our professional and civic activities ... I heard an FSB border officer tell the customs officers about the need for a ‘special check’ of our electronic storage devices ... Seeing a laptop in [the applicant’s] bag, the customs officers expressed their intention to copy all the available information ... I was interviewed (again) about my civic activities, my political views and about [the applicant’s] professional activities ... the type of work done and the publications ...” 18.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant was informed that a report had been commissioned from a criminal forensics expert to determine whether the data copied from his laptop had any prohibited “extremist” content. 19.  In November 2009 the expert organisation returned the DVDs to the customs office, stating that it was not possible to carry out the examination, although it gave no reasons. In December 2009 a report was sought from another expert organisation. Apparently, it concluded that the data contained no extremist material. According to the applicant, the DVDs with his data were handed over to him in November 2011. 20.  In the meantime, the applicant brought judicial review proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), challenging the adverse acts and actions of the customs officials. 21.  By a judgment of 25 January 2010 the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed his claims. The court held as follows:
“Laptops, storage devices, photo- and video-cameras should be considered as ‘goods’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the Customs Code. All goods should be presented for checking by customs, as required under Article 14 of the Code ... The customs authorities are authorised to take samples of goods for examination ... and to use technical devices to speed up the checks ... The data from the applicant’s laptop was copied for the purposes of examination in compliance with Presidential Decree no. 310 on combating fascism and political extremism ... In the circumstances, the fact that the samples taken for examination constituted all the relevant data was justified ...” 22.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the first-instance court’s assessment had not taken into account the requirements relating to Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention, in particular, the requirement that any interference by a public authority had to be shown to be “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. He mentioned the Court’s case-law relating to the seizure of printed material and electronic devices, an action which adversely affects the maintenance of professional secrecy. The applicant also argued as follows:
(a)  Compliance with Decree no. 310 was not possible without actually reading someone’s correspondence and other personal information, thereby interfering with the constitutional right to the protection of the secrecy of correspondence and other communications. Article 55 of the Constitution only permitted restrictions on people’s rights on the basis of a federal statute; the decree in question was secondary legislation (подзаконный акт) and could not lawfully introduce additional limitations on constitutional rights;
(b)  The trial court had mentioned that laptops, flash memory cards and the like were “goods” for the purposes of customs legislation. However, the sampling had been carried out in respect of the information they contained rather than the carriers or containers of the information (“the goods”). Access to that information, however, was only allowed on the basis of a court order, as stated in Article 23 of the Constitution;
(c)  In his “written explanations” to the appeal court, the applicant insisted that in Chapter 25 proceedings a public authority had the burden of proving that its acts were lawful and justified. However, the first-instance court had not required the customs authority to cite a specific legal provision authorising its officials to examine electronic data. According to the applicant, the customs authority representative had refused at the hearing to explain the specific content of the risk profile concerning the applicant, referring to the fact that the information in question was classified and was for internal use only. However, a 2004 Instruction by the Federal Customs Authority only authorised a customs inspection where the risk profile in question provided for that type of measure (see also paragraph 37 below). 23.  On 22 April 2010 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment, essentially reproducing the lower court’s reasoning as follows:
“Under Articles 403 and 408 of the Customs Code, customs authorities fulfill the tasks and functions assigned to them by federal and other legislation ... and have the authority to apply measures prescribed by the Customs Code for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ...
Article 11 of the Customs Code defines goods (for the purposes of customs legislation) as movable property which is being transferred across the customs border. This includes laptops, memory flash cards, photo-cameras, video-cameras, printed material and the like. Article 14 of the Code provides that all such goods should be subject to customs clearance and customs control. Article 123 of the Code provides that goods should be declared when being transferred across the customs border. Article 124 of the Code provides that the declaration is made by way of presenting a written declaration or otherwise ... The transfer of goods by individuals for personal use is prescribed by Chapter 23 of the Customs Code, and Government decree no. 715 of 27 November 2003 and no. 718 of 29 November 2003. Article 13 of the Code provides that goods which are prohibited from being transferred to Russia must be removed from Russia.
By a letter of 16 July 2008 the Federal Customs Authority listed the goods which are banned from Russian territory ... By a letter of 3 May 2006 the Authority listed the goods that must be declared to customs.
The procedure for and the types of customs checks are described in Chapters 34-37 of the Code. Article 358 of the Code provides that customs checks are based on the principle of selectiveness and, as a rule, should be limited to such forms of control as are sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ... When selecting the form of control, the risk management approach is applied, which is based on the effective use of resources for preventing violations of the legislation ... Risk is defined as a probability of non-compliance with customs legislation.
When carrying out a customs check, the customs authority is allowed to take samples of goods which are needed for further assessment. The relevant procedure is defined in Article 383 of the Code and Customs Authority order no. 1519 of 23 December 2003. When carrying out a customs check, the authority is allowed to use technical means to limit the time of such checks; the list and procedures for their use are defined in Article 388 of the Code and in Customs Authority order no. 1220 of 29 October 2003 ...
Order no. 677 of 10 November 1995 by the Customs Authority (‘On preventing the transfer of prohibited printed, audio- and video-material across the customs border’) does not contradict the current customs legislation and has not been revoked because the current Customs Code contains Article 13 concerning bans and limitations on the transfer of goods across the customs border ...
In view of the above, the court agrees with the first-instance court that the customs inspection was authorised and carried out within customs control procedures and that the data was copied in line with Russian Presidential Decree no. 310 of 23 March 1995 ... Article 2 of the decree clearly requires the customs authority to ‘arrest and bring to liability persons who disseminate printed, cinematographic, audio-, photo- or video-materials which are aimed at being propaganda in favour of fascism, at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity; and to take measures for seizing printed material of that kind’ ...
Article 383 of the Code concerning the minimal amount of samples was complied with because the information taken for sampling was not homogenous. Thus when the samples were taken, it was necessary to take the full amount of information from the device ...
In addition, it is noted that under Article 10 of the Customs Code, information received by customs officials may be used exclusively for the purposes of customs legislation ...
Customs officials are not authorised to disclose that information or transfer it to third persons, except as set down in the Code or other legislation ...” 24.  The applicant does not appear to have been prosecuted subsequently in criminal, administrative or other proceedings in connection with the data obtained from his laptop by the customs authorities.