5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Köthel. 6.  In 2004 the applicant began a relationship with X, a married woman who continued to live with her husband, with whom she had six children. In early 2006, X became pregnant and disclosed this to the applicant. In October 2006, she gave birth to a girl. Shortly after, the relationship with the applicant ended. 7.  X and her husband, the girl’s legal father, refused the applicant’s subsequent initiatives to have contact with the child. They disputed that the applicant was the biological father but refused to consent to paternity testing. 8.  The applicant initiated various proceedings to establish his legal paternity, to have biological paternity testing conducted and to obtain joint custody. His requests were to no avail. 9.  On 21 December 2010 the applicant applied to Obernburg Family Court to obtain regular contact with the child, referring to the Court’s judgment in the case of Anayo v. Germany (no. 20578/07, 21 December 2010) delivered on the same day. He claimed to be the child’s biological father and offered to prove this claim by means of an expert’s report. In addition, he made a sworn declaration that he had had sexual intercourse with X around the time of conception. 10.  On 9 May 2011 the Family Court dismissed the applicant’s request. It held that the applicant’s paternity had not been established and that, consequently, he could not be granted contact. 11.  On 14 June 2011 the applicant appealed. On 16 November 2011 he supplemented his appeal, mainly relying on the Court’s judgment in the case Schneider v. Germany (no. 17080/07, 15 September 2011) and requested contact with the child at least once a month, initially under supervision. 12.  On 1 December 2011, the Court of Appeal orally heard the applicant and the child’s legal father. The latter declared that he knew about the relationship between his wife and the applicant and also assumed that there had been sexual contact. In October 2005 the mother had told him and the children that her relationship with the applicant was terminated although he could not rule out, and indeed considered it likely, that she had continued the relationship without his knowledge. He had learned of his wife’s pregnancy in February 2006 and concluded that he was the father. In December 2006 the applicant had told him on the telephone that he was the child’s father. At that moment, the mother had felt relieved that the time of secrets was over. This moment had been a breakthrough for them as a couple and their relationship had improved subsequently. The child had been desired by both. Even assuming that the applicant were the child’s father, he would not agree to any contact because the applicant had caused them much suffering and had to bear the consequences of his behaviour. The proceedings the applicant had instituted were a burden for the couple but did not have a negative impact on the relationship with his wife, but had rather consolidated it. Everyone in the family but the child knew that the applicant believed that he was the child’s father. 13.  On 9 February 2012 the Court of Appeal orally heard the child’s mother. At the end of the hearing it informed the parties that it considered contact with the applicant not to be in the child’s best interest for the time being and suggested that the applicant withdraw his appeal. 14.  On 21 June 2012 the child’s appointed guardian ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger), a psychologist, furnished a detailed written statement concluding that contact with the applicant would be detrimental to the child’s well‑being at this age. 15.  On 17 August 2012 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to mandate an expert opinion on the question of whether contact would be detrimental to the child or would at least serve her best interest; to hold an oral hearing where the guardian ad litem should explain her written statement; to conduct a paternity test and to hear the child. 16.  On 28 September 2012, the Court of Appeal informed the parties that it considered it necessary to hear the child. The child’s guardian ad litem opposed this. She submitted, inter alia, that the child had no knowledge of the applicant’s claims, that the latter could not prove his fatherhood in the absence of a legal basis and that the child’s legal parents had not submitted any proof of their allegations that the mother’s husband was also the child’s biological father. 17.  On 29 October 2012 the Court of Appeal heard the six‑year‑old child in the presence of her guardian ad litem only. According to the minutes, the child was aware - without knowing the real reasons - that her parents were in dispute with the applicant, who wanted to visit her or wanted her to visit him, but that neither her parents nor herself agreed to this. 18.  On 19 November 2012 the guardian ad litem submitted that the child’s hearing confirmed her written statement of June 2012. 19.  On 21 November 2012 the applicant commented on the child’s hearing, submitted a private expert opinion and requested the Court of Appeal to mandate an expert opinion regarding contact rights and to appoint a new guardian ad litem. He further asked the Court of Appeal to inform the child about his application during a new hearing. He added that in the event that his appeal were to be denied, he should receive a written report on the child’s development and two recent photographs every six months.
(b)  The decision of the Court of Appeal 20.  On 13 December 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s requests. It observed, at the outset, that the applicant could not rely on Article 1684 § 1 of the Civil Code as he was not the child’s legal father. He could not rely on Article 1685 § 2 of the Civil Code either, because he had never borne any actual responsibility for the child. The Court of Appeal then addressed the question of whether Article 1685 § 2 of the Civil Code could be interpreted, in the light of the Court’s judgments Anayo and Schneider (cited above), as assuming that a father who was able to prove that he had seriously tried to bear actual responsibility but failed to do so because of the mother’s or legal parent’s resistance, could be considered as having borne actual responsibility within the meaning of this Article. 21.  This question could, however, be left open because contact had in any event to serve the child’s best interest. In this respect the Court of Appeal held that it was already contrary to the child’s best interest to address the preliminary question of whether the applicant was the child’s biological father. The child was living in a well-organised and emotionally stable family unit consisting of a father, a mother and other children. The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was convinced that this family union would be destroyed if the applicant’s paternity were established and contact rights ordered. The hearing of the child and the legal parents had shown that in the child’s perception of the world, there was only one father, the mother’s husband. There were no indications that the latter did not assume his role as a father towards the child or assumed it differently than towards his other children. The child was well-integrated in the family, where she felt protected and secure. This assessment was also consistent with the conclusions of the child’s curator ad litem. 22.  The Court of Appeal feared that clarifying the question of paternity bore the risk that the family unit would break up, which would have considerable negative consequences on the child because she would lose her essential attachment figures. As it had indicated after the hearing, it held it to be more likely that the applicant was the child’s biological father. This question could, however, ultimately only be determined by a paternity test, to which the child’s legal parents were opposed. The mother affirmed that her husband was the biological father of her daughter and both stood firm against the applicant. According to the Court of Appeal it resulted from the hearing that the legal father trusted, in principle, his wife’s assertions but at the same time had doubts as to his paternity, although he had not explicitly expressed them. In spite of these doubts, and the long-lasting court proceedings, he did not put in question his wife’s statements. The Court of Appeal received the impression that the spouses had barricaded themselves against the applicant as if they were in a corral, as had shown the legal father’s declaration that the legal proceedings did not have a negative impact on the relationship with his wife but had rather consolidated it. The Court of Appeal concluded that the legal father could live with this uncertainty, and that his attitude had no consequences for the child. If, however, the applicant’s biological paternity were to be established, the legal father would realise that his long-standing trust in his wife was not justified. It was not possible to predict the legal father’s reaction, but the manifest risk that the spouses’ marriage would break up could not be dismissed in view of the couple’s past difficulties. The couple’s separation would amount to the breaking-up of the child’s family unit and the loss of her relationships, which would endanger her well-being. 23.  The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was aware that, in view of the importance of the child’s well-being, it could be a long time before the preliminary question of paternity could be clarified and years before contact rights could be granted. This might evolve once the child started to ask questions, but for now it was not in her best interest to be confronted with the paternity issue. It was therefore not advisable to tell her about the applicant’s allegations or to substitute the child’s guardian ad litem. 24.  The Court of Appeal went on to say that, even assuming that the applicant was the child’s biological father, contact with the applicant was not in the child’s best interest. Due to the highly emotional conflicts between the legal parents and the applicant, and the fact that the applicant had not ruled out that he might tell the child that he was her biological father if he saw her, contact would jeopardise the child’s well-being. Therefore it was not advisable to order an expert opinion regarding the question of whether and how the child would deal with two fathers or whether it was in general advisable to grant children contact with their biological fathers at an early stage. These issues had to be assessed in the light of the extremely tense relations between the applicant and the child’s legal parents, and in view of the predictable consequences for the child if contact were granted. The Court of Appeal added that it could decide on these questions on its own after having orally heard the persons involved, and based on the written statements of the guardian ad litem, an experienced psychologist well-known from other proceedings. 25.  As regards the applicant’s request for information the Court of Appeal held as follows:
“The applicant’s request for information, claimed in the alternative in his lawyer’s submissions of 21 November 2012, does not exist. Such claim cannot be based on Article 1686, 1st sentence, of the Civil Code because the applicant is not, as required by this provision, the child’s legal father. Whether the provision can be interpreted in the light of the above mentioned decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as assuming that a biological father can also claim a right for information, can be left open: that would require addressing the preliminary issue of whether the applicant was the child’s biological father. It has already been shown that clarifying this question by ordering a paternity test would be contrary to the child’s well-being.” 26.  On 11 February 2013, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s objection alleging a violation of the right to be heard. 27.  Previously, on 28 January 2013, the applicant had lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (no. 1 BvR 844/13). 28.  On 18 July 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that on 13 July 2013, the Law for the strengthening of the rights of biological but not legal fathers had entered into force which, pursuant to Article 1686a of the Civil Code, provided a new possibility for biological fathers to be granted contact and information rights even if they had no social and family relationship with the child (see paragraph 32 below). It added that in court proceedings concerning the enforcement of such rights, the determination of the preliminary question of paternity could be necessary, pursuant to Article 167a § 2 of the Family Matters Act (see paragraph 33 below). It enquired of the applicant whether, under these circumstances, he would withdraw his constitutional complaint. 29. On 13 August 2013 the applicant replied that he would maintain his complaint because, even under the new law, he would not have obtained a more favourable decision. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal had rejected his request for contact rights, even assuming that he was the child’s biological father, since contact did not serve the child’s well-being. The Court of Appeal had thus already decided in the light of the new Article 1686a of the Civil Code. The applicant added that the same reasoning applied to his request for information. Given that, in its view, the determination of paternity would endanger the family unit, the Court of Appeal would refrain from ordering a measure of examination because the legal parents could not reasonably be expected to undergo any examination, under Section 167a § 2 of the Family Matters Act. 30.  On 21 September 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons.