5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and, at the time of the last communication from him to the Court, was detained in Torez Correctional Colony. 6.  The applicant, represented by a lawyer, stood trial before the Kerch Court on charges of engaging in sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, A. (born in 1999), over the period between March 2006 and April 2007. The applicant denied the charges, asserting that he may have broken A.’s hymen by accident while bathing her. 7.  On 27 July 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. 8.  The judgment was based, in particular, on
(i) the victim’s statements made at the pre-trial stage;
(ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant;
(iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim’s hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant’s genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness.
According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his “internal sexual organs”, he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time. 9.  On 11 September 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. He argued that there had been insufficient evidence of his guilt. The appeal contained the following statement:
“The court’s conclusion as to my guilt is based only on indirect evidence and on the statement of a minor [A.], made in the course of the pre-trial investigation and who, according to a psychiatric expert’s analysis, was suffering from mental retardation” (Вывод суда о моей виновности сделан судом только на основании косвенных доказательств, а так же [sic] на показаниях малолетней [A.], которые она дала на досудебном следствии, и которая, согласно заключению судебно-психиатрической экспертизы, страдает умственной отсталостью). 11.  The applicant submitted that the breaking of A.’s hymen was explained by the fact that he had accidentally penetrated her with his finger while bathing her. However, even if such a penetration had been intentional, it would not have constituted the offence of rape. 12.  The applicant further complained of the trial court’s refusal to order an additional expert examination to determine whether he had any diseases of his “internal sexual organs” which would have prevented him from sustaining an erection and engaging in sexual intercourse. 13.  The applicant asked the Supreme Court to reclassify his actions as “abuse of a minor” (розбещення неповнолітніх), a lesser offence than rape, and to impose a non-custodial sentence. 14.  On 9 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to consider the case in cassation and upheld the lower courts’ findings. 15.  On 27 November 2008 the Court’s Registry asked the applicant to provide copies of his appeal, his appeal in cassation and the decision of the Supreme Court in his case, to supplement his application. 16.  He accordingly requested those documents from the trial court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 17.  On 19 January 2009 the Court of Appeal advised the applicant that he needed to address his request for the copies to the trial court. 18.  On 26 January 2009 the trial court informed the applicant that it was not empowered to send him the requested copies. 19.  On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that it was not the court’s practice to issue copies of appeals in cassation or of its decisions.