coastalcph/lex_glue huggingface dataset:
5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow.
6.  On 29 December 2007 N., the owner of two rooms in flat 10 located at 3‑3, ulitsa Anny Severyanovoy, Moscow, signed a deed of gift in respect of the rooms for Ya. The Moscow City Department of the Federal Registration Service (the “Registration Service”) registered the deed and Ya.’s title to the rooms.
7.  On an unspecified date the investigative committee opened criminal investigation into M.’s actions who was suspected of having tricked N. into signing the deed of gift for Ya.’s benefit.
8.  On 2 June 2008 Ya. sold the rooms to the applicant. According to the sale contract, the applicant paid 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the rooms.
9.  On 11 July 2008 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow issued a seizure order in respect of the rooms within the framework of the criminal investigation on the charges of fraud against M.
10.  On 16 July 2008 the Registration Service registered the sale agreement between Ya. and the applicant and the applicant’s title to the rooms.
11.  On 28 September 2009 the District Court found M. guilty of multiple offences, including a fraud in respect of the room later purchased by the applicant, and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. The Court established that M. had tricked N. into signing the deed of gift in respect of the two rooms whilst M. had actually sold the rooms to Ya.
12.  On 16 March 2010 N. died.
13.  On 7 February 2014 the Department of Housing of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department”) brought a civil action seeking restitution of the title to the two rooms to the City of Moscow and the applicant’s eviction.
14.  On 29 December 2014 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims. The court found the deed of gift null and void. It further established that N., the lawful owner of the rooms, had died intestate and without heirs. Accordingly the rooms should be considered a bona vacantia and should be transferred to the City of Moscow, even though the applicant had bought the rooms in good faith. The court transferred the title to the rooms to the City of Moscow and ordered the applicant’s eviction.
15.  On 18 June 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 29 December 2014 on appeal.
16.  On 26 October 2015 the City Court refused to grant the applicant leave to a cassation appeal against the judgments of 29 December 2014 and 18 June 2015.
17.  On 9 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision.
18.  The parties did not provide any information as regards the enforcement of the judgments in the City’s favour.
5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Nicoreni.
6.  In January 2012 the applicant had an agreement with a person (“X”) according to which he promised to help him apply for a Spanish visa at the Spanish consulate in Moscow. They were to travel to Moscow by train, however, X did not show up at the train station at the time of leaving and the applicant left for Moscow alone with the money he had previously obtained from X in the amount of 520 euros. He did not return to Moldova until October 2015.
7.  In the meantime X lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of fraud. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in March 2012 on the basis of that complaint.
8.  Since the prosecutor in charge of the case could not locate the applicant, he applied to an investigating judge for a detention warrant in respect of the applicant for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor argued in support of the remand that the applicant had been hiding from the investigating authorities.
9.  On 8 February 2013 the Râșcani District Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. In support of its decision, the court argued that the applicant had been absconding from the investigating authorities and that he could hinder the investigation and influence witnesses.
10.  On 9 October 2015 the applicant returned to Moldova from the Russian Federation. At the border he was informed that he was being wanted by the police and that he had to present himself at the Râșcani Police Station. The applicant telephoned the police station and agreed to come on 13 October 2015.
11.  On 13 October 2015 the applicant went to the Râșcani Police Station where he was immediately arrested and placed in detention.
12.  On 15 October 2015 the applicant appealed against the order of 8 February 2013. He argued, inter alia, that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against himself and that he had learned about it upon his return to Moldova. Moreover, after learning about the investigation he had immediately contacted the Police Station and presented himself there. He also submitted that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or interfere with the investigation.
13.  On 2 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It did not give an answer to the applicant’s argument that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against him.
14.  The applicant’s detention was prolonged on several other occasions until 16 March 2016 on identical grounds and all his appeals were dismissed.
15.  In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week.
16.  By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 July 2017 the applicant was convicted of fraud and given a suspended sentence of four years imprisonment.
4.  The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011).
5.  The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Slobozia, Târgoviște and Reșița, which led to the fall of the communist regime.
6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor’s offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators. The applicants’ injury and their close relatives’ deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014).
7.  The most important procedural steps were mentioned in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant developments of the criminal investigation are as follows.
8.  On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor’s office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the taking of evidence from military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television.
9.  From March 2017 the military prosecutor examined military and civilian archives, including the vast archives of the Romanian Senate. They also viewed and transcribed more than 400 hours of audio/video recordings. They proceeded with the re-examination of several witnesses. They questioned military personnel involved in the December 1989 military operations and fifty-one members of the political party which ruled at the time and of other authorities. They verified the documents indicating the military units’ actions from that period.
10.  At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.
4.  The applicants were born in 1977 and 1964, respectively, and live in Voronezh.
5.  The applicants are lawyers practicing in Russia.
6.  Between 2008 and 2010 the applicants, within the group of lawyers, consulted several municipal organisations about various legal issues and provided other legal service. However municipal organisations did not pay for the service and the applicants instituted proceedings seeking to recover the debt.
7.  On 22 June 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh granted the applicants claim against the municipal transport company and awarded them 40,020,000 Russian roubles. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. It appears that the judgment was executed at the expense of the municipal budget.
8.  On 9 January 2013 the prosecutor of the Voronezh Region applied to the district court for the extension of the time-limits for an ordinary appeal against the judgment of 22 June 2010.
9.  On 13 June 2013 the district court refused to extend the time-limits. The prosecutor appealed.
10.  On 8 August 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court quashed the decision of the district court and extended the time limit for an ordinary appeal. The court found that the public interest had been concerned as far as the judgment had been executed by means of the municipal budget. Thus the prosecutor had the right to lodge an appeal.
11.  On 12 November 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court granted the appeal lodged by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 22 June 2010 and ordered the reversal of execution. The judgment became final and was partially executed.
5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Muğla.
6.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought an enforcement order through a bailiff’s office against her former husband, G.F., to collect alimony in arrears and accrued interest.
7.  On 9 March 2006 G.F. objected to that order by bringing a case against the applicant before the Datça Enforcement Court. He requested that the court declare the enforcement order null and void on the grounds that he had made the payments in question in full.
8.  In the first hearing G.F.’s representative requested the court to take out an expert report to determine whether the payments he had made corresponded to the alleged debt. The court adjourned its examination on the question whether an expert report would be sought to a hearing to be held on 10 May 2006.
9.  In that hearing, the applicant’s representative left it to the court’s discretion for an expert to be appointed concerning the determination of the amounts that were already paid. The court therefore ruled for an expert to be appointed and scheduled another hearing for 7 June 2006.
10.  In the meantime, but before the hearing of 7 June 2006, the applicant’s representative requested that he be excused from that hearing since he had another scheduled court hearing elsewhere.
11.  The court held the hearing as scheduled but noted that the applicant’s representative was excused. In that hearing, the court noted that the expert report had been submitted in the case-file and read its contents out in the presence of G.F.’s legal representative. The latter asked the court to rule in accordance with the findings in the expert report, which had concluded that all the relevant alimony payments had been made. The court scheduled a hearing for 21 June 2006 holding that the absent party be notified.
12.  On 21 June 2006, in its final hearing, the court ruled against the applicant on the basis of the expert report in question. Neither the applicant nor her representative was present at that hearing. There is no indication in the transcript of the hearing that suggests that the court examined whether the applicant’s representative had been notified in due time.
13.  On 31 July 2006 the applicant’s representative lodged an appeal before the Court of Cassation, arguing that the notice for the court hearing of 21 June 2006 had been served on him only on 26 June 2006, resulting in him and her client missing the opportunity to participate in the hearing and submit their observations on the findings of the expert report. He explained in that connection that the expert’s calculations had been erroneous and did not correspond to the bank transfer receipts in the case-file.
14.  On 5 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 21 June 2006 without responding to the applicant’s arguments.
15.  The applicant’s rectification request against that decision was rejected on 13 March 2007.
4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Labytnangi, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region.
5.  On 22 May 2008 the applicant arrived at the IK-8 correctional colony, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region.
6.  On 31 March 2008 the applicant’s wife instituted divorce proceedings.
7.  On 9 April 2008 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 2 of the Krasnosulinskiy District of the Rostov Region (“Justice of the Peace”) sent a letter rogatory to the courts of Tyumen Region, asking them to interview the applicant and to establish whether he wished to attend the hearing in person.
8.  On 22 April 2008 the Tyumen Regional Division of the Judicial Department received the letter.
9.  On 4 July 2008 a Justice of the Peace in Labytnangi fixed an interview with the applicant for 18 July 2008 and sent two summonses to his home address, which his wife had listed in her statement of claim. Both summonses were returned undelivered.
10.  On 10 September 2009 the Tyumen courts informed the Justice of the Peace that it had been impossible to reach the applicant. On the same day the Justice of the Peace decided to hold a hearing in the applicant’s absence, noting that although the applicant had his registered residence at the address mentioned by the plaintiff, he had not appeared for an interview before the Justice of the Peace.
11.  On 18 September 2008 the Justice of the Peace granted the divorce. On the same day a copy of the decision was sent to the applicant’s home address.
12.  On 20 November 2013, the applicant learnt of the judgment of 18 September 2008. He asked for an extension of the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it. He argued that he had never received the judgment of 18 September 2008 and that he had been previously unaware of the divorce proceedings.
13.  On 26 December 2013 the Justice of the Peace heard evidence from the applicant’s former wife who claimed that the applicant should have been aware of the divorce proceedings in 2008 because his mother had received the final judgment of 18 September 2008. The Justice of the Peace held that an excerpt of the judgment had been served on the applicant in person on 31 October 2008 and refused the applicant’s application to extend the time limit for lodging an appeal. The hearing was held in the applicant’s absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision.
14.  On 15 May 2014 the Krasnosulinskiy District Court of Rostov Region upheld the decision of 26 December 2013, again in his absence.
6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Istanbul.
7.  On 11 December 1995 the applicant, a traffic control officer, was hit by a car while on duty. He suffered bodily injuries as a result of the accident. An official disability report indicated that he had a reduced working capacity of 60%.
8.  On the basis of this report the applicant, while reserving the right to increase his claims in due course, made an initial request for compensation to the Ministry of Interior, claiming 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in pecuniary damages and TRY 5,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
9.  Following tacit dismissal of the claim by the Ministry, the applicant brought a case for compensation before the Istanbul Administrative Court for the amounts he had specified in his request to the Ministry.
10.  During the course of the proceedings, the court decided of its own motion to order an expert report to determine the exact amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. The report, which was submitted to the court on 26 September 2005, indicated the applicant’s pecuniary damages as 157,077 TRY. The applicant did not submit a request to the court to increase his initial claims in the light of that report. The Istanbul Administrative Court in its decision delivered on 15 February 2006 only awarded him the amounts initially requested by him.
4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Malyn, Zhytomyr Region.
5.  On 17 November 1993 M. gave birth to a baby girl, K. Given that the applicant had had relations with M. at the relevant time, on 2 December 1993 he accepted paternity of K. by submitting the relevant declaration to the authorities.
6.  On 23 March 2000 the applicant married M. They divorced in 2006.
7.  In July 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Malyn District Court against M., challenging the paternity of K. The applicant claimed that, even though he had been married to another woman at the relevant time, he had had relations with M. and he had been sure that he was the father of the child and so accepted the paternity. However, in 2005 he had reason to doubt his paternity.
8.  On 24 March 2008 the District Court found for the applicant, relying on a genetic expert’s opinion which excluded the possibility of the applicant being K.’s biological father. The court noted that the applicant had a right to challenge his paternity given that there was no evidence in the file to suggest that he had known that he was not the father of the child when accepting paternity of K.
9.  M. appealed, stating that from January 1993 she and the applicant had lived together without being married and that she had never had any doubts about the applicant’s paternity of K. She argued, inter alia, that the genetic expert’s opinion was not reliable.
10.  On 29 May 2008 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s decision and held that, under Article 56 of the Family and Marriage Code, the applicant had not had a right to challenge his paternity because at the time that he accepted paternity of K., he was aware that he was not K.’s father. In support of that finding the Court of Appeal noted that before K.’s birth, the applicant and M. had not been married, they had not lived together (noting, in particular, that between February and April 1993 the applicant lived in another town), and the applicant had been married to another woman at the relevant time.
11.  The applicant appealed on a point of law, contending that there were no grounds for the Court of Appeal to find that at the material time he was aware that he was not the biological father of the child. No such evidence was available in the file and the Regional Court of Appeal had exceeded its powers in drawing such a conclusion.
12.  On 9 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal by the applicant as unfounded.
4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Timişoara.
5.  On 20 February 2003 the applicant, a bank manager at that time, was placed in pre-trial detention by the Bucharest Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor’s Office, on a charge of taking a bribe in order to favourably influence the acceptance of a loan requested by M.G.
6.  By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”) convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002.
7.  The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security (“Law no. 51/1991”) for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002.
8.  The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.
4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Blagoevgrad.
5.  He had been employed by the National Security Service, at the Regional Office of Blagoevgrad, as an agent since 1998. On account of the nature of his duties, he had held a security clearance permitting him access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant’s job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to him holding his post.
6.  On 20 November 2013, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision to revoke the applicant’s security clearance allowing access to classified information. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of that revocation, apart from a reference to section 59, in relation with section 40 § 1 f) and h); section 41 c) and d), and section 42 a) and b) of the Classified Information Protection Act (see paragraphs 12 and 13 below).
7.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the revocation with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 9 January 2014, upheld the revocation. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review.
8.  On 6 March 2014, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of his employment was the revocation of his security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable precondition for him to be able to perform his duties.
9.  The applicant challenged his dismissal at two levels of jurisdiction. He contested the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that he was not able to challenge, in the course of the procedure before the State Commission for Information Security, the facts on which the revocation of the security clearance permit was based. The Director of the National Security Service abused his powers in dismissing the applicant, who was not allowed an opportunity to defend himself.
10.  By its judgment of 19 March 2015, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s claims, reasoning that the decision of the Director of the National Security Service to revoke the applicant’s security clearance was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant’s dismissal inevitable because he was no longer able to perform his duties. The court added that the applicant had exhausted the remedy provided by law by challenging the revocation decision, and that the latter had become final; in addition, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any questions related to its lawfulness.
11.  On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant’s security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.
3.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.
4.  The applicants sued different State and municipal unitary companies (the debtor companies) in several unrelated sets of court proceedings.
5.  On the dates set out in the appended table domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in favour of the applicants to be paid by the debtor companies. In application no. 34145/11 the courts also ordered the debtor company to take certain action in favour of the applicant, as specified in the appended table.
6.  The companies were incorporated as State or municipal unitary enterprises. They provided services specified in the appended table.
7.  On various dates insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of some of the debtor companies. The companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency proceedings started and ended are tabulated below.