8.  The applicant was born in 1982 in Venezuela and is currently detained in Valdemoro Prison.
9.  The applicant has been living in Spain with his family since 2003.
10.  In an indictment filed on 15 November 2005 in the United States (hereinafter, “the US”) District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the applicant was charged with one count of conspiracy to import one or more kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, into the United States in violation of Title 21, United States Code, sections 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(A), and 963, and Title 18, United States Code, sections 3551 et seq. (Count Four); and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one or more kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(I), and 846, and Title 18, United States Code, sections 3551 et seq. (Count Five). Each of those offences carried a possible maximum term of life imprisonment.
11.  By diplomatic note of 6 December 2013, the US authorities transmitted a request to the Spanish authorities for the applicant’s provisional arrest with a view to his extradition.
12.  On 13 December 2013 the applicant was arrested in Lugo by the Spanish police. The Central Court of Investigation No. 4 (Juzgado Central de Instrucción) initiated extradition proceedings on the same day and ordered his provisional release. The extradition request was then allocated to the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional.
13.  On 31 March 2014 the Public Prosecutor’s Office agreed to the applicant’s extradition.
14.  On 1 October 2014 the Audiencia Nacional granted the extradition request on condition that the US authorities provided a guarantee that any life sentence that was handed down would not be irreducible. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision.
15.  On 3 November 2014 the ruling was upheld by the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional. The applicant subsequently lodged a plea of nullity (incidente de nulidad de actuaciones) against that decision. On 19 December 2014 the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional ruled against the applicant, arguing that the object and purpose of annulment proceedings was not to serve as a second appeal instance against an extradition decision, but to correct possible violations of a fundamental right committed in a decision which was not subject to appeal.
16.  On 3 December 2014 the U.S. Embassy issued a note verbale, which provided the following answer:
“The United States notes that the bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Spain does not provide a basis for conditioning extraditions on assurances relating to life sentences. While the United States is not, therefore, obligated to provide the assurance requested, in consideration of the request of the Spanish Court and given the intentions of the U.S. prosecutor, the United States is prepared in this particular case to inform the Government of Spain as follows: Should LOPEZ ELORZA be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on 15 November 2005 for which extradition is sought, he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment because, if a life sentence is imposed, he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence ...”
17.  On 19 January 2015 the note verbale was communicated to the interested parties. On 23 January 2015 the Public Prosecutor submitted a report stating that the guarantees provided by the United States were adequate and that consequently extradition should be granted.
18.  On 24 February 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision (providencia) assessing the US guarantees, deeming them to be “sufficient”.
19.  The applicant brought two súplica appeals against that decision, the first of which was lodged on 28 February 2015. The applicant argued that the decision of 24 February 2015 should be declared null and void since the matter should have been addressed through an auto, instead of a providencia[1]. Secondly, the applicant contested the argument that the US Government had provided sufficient guarantees, stating that they were identical to the ones that had already been analysed by the Court in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium (no. 140/10, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) and found to be in violation of Article 3 (inter alia). The second súplica appeal was lodged on 2 March 2015 and included three different requests. First, he requested that the decision on whether the US guarantees were sufficient be addressed and dealt with by the Plenary of the Audiencia Nacional. He also sought the recusal of three judges who were members of the bench which had initially issued the decision of 24 February 2015. Lastly, he lodged an application for the general recusal of all the judges of the Audiencia Nacional who “had been invited by the United States of America on holiday trips” which had been paid for by that country.
20.  On 25 March 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision stating the following:
“FIRST - We will examine in the first place the plea for a referral to the Plenary formation of this Court of the decision about the sufficiency of the assurances given by the U.S. Government concerning the possibility for two life sentences to be imposed on the extradited person. This Chamber, given that the President of this Court has duly empowered it to decide about this matter, considers that the referral is not necessary as the assurances given are correct and sufficient, and furthermore show compliance with the ECtHR case-law in the Trabelsi vs Belgium case referred to by the appellant ....
Therefore, if the assurances given by the U.S. Government are the following:
“Should LOPEZ ELORZA be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on 15 November 2005, he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment, he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence;”
we can conclude that the warranty expresses the actual existing legal means for the revision of a sentence of life imprisonment in a way that shows that this punishment is not irreducible during the whole life-span of the person, complying with what the ECtHR has requested in order to consider that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
That is why there is no need to refer a decision on this matter to the Plenary formation of this Court.”
21.  Additionally, the Audiencia Nacional agreed on opening a procedure aimed at addressing the issue of the recusals requested by the applicant through a full report, at the same time ordering the suspension of the extradition proceedings until the recusal proceedings had been terminated.
22.  On 12 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision (acuerdo gubernativo) dismissing the applicant’s request.
23.  On 25 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional ordered the applicant’s provisional detention (auto). The applicant lodged another súplica appeal against that decision and requested that the extradition proceedings be suspended on the grounds that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first súplica appeal of 28 February 2015.
24.  In a decision of 28 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional rejected the applicant’s request to stay the extradition proceedings, finding that the complaints contained in the first súplica appeal had already been dealt with in the decision of 25 March 2015.
25.  On 1 June 2015 the applicant lodged another súplica appeal against the decisions of 25 May 2015 and 28 May 2015, contesting the reasoning as regards his request to stay the extradition proceedings and emphasising that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first súplica appeal of 28 February 2015.
26.  On 3 June 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a new decision dismissing the súplica appeals lodged by the applicant and confirming the decision on the applicant’s imprisonment pending extradition to the United States. In particular, the decision stated the following:
“The applicant considers that his súplica appeal lodged against the decision of 24 February 2015 has not been answered ... .
This Court refers at this point to what was already established in its decision of 25 March 2015 ... .
Nevertheless, in order to clarify any doubts that the applicant might have concerning whether or not he has received an answer to his súplica appeal, we [the Court] will resolve here the issued raised in that appeal.
...
The guarantees provided have been considered sufficient for the Court. Consequently, regardless of the judgment mentioned by the applicant, we consider that they comply with the requirements established in the ECtHR’s judgment Hutchinson v. United Kingdom [(no. 57592/08, 3 February 2015)], as well as the judgment of 13 November 2014 [Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, 13 November 2014)], lodged by a French citizen...
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned reasoning, the Court
Decides
to dismiss the súplica appeals referred to in the present ruling, maintaining the order of imprisonment for Andrés López Elorza, in view of his extradition to the United States of America”.
27.  On 19 June 2015 the applicant was detained for the purposes of being extradited to the United States.
28.  On 22 June 2015 the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court against the extradition decision. He asked for interim measures, requesting the Constitutional Court to order a stay of the extradition while the case was still pending. He contended, inter alia, that the assurances provided by the US authorities did not fulfil the criteria for assessing the reducibility of a life sentence and that the extradition would amount to a violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
29.  On 1 July 2015 the Constitutional Court issued a decision declaring the amparo appeal and the request for interim measures inadmissible. In particular, it found that the part of the amparo appeal concerning the validity of the assurances given by the US authorities and about a possible violation of the applicant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment had been lodged too late as the alleged violations stemmed from the decision of 25 March 2015, thus the 30-day time‑limit established in section 44(2) of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court No. 2/1919 had already passed when he had lodged his amparo appeal.
30.  On 2 July 2015 the applicant lodged a request for interim measures with the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He requested the Court to indicate to the Spanish Government that his extradition should be stayed pending the outcome of proceedings before the Court. The request was granted on the same day on a temporary basis until 1 August 2015, and the Government were asked the following questions:
“a.- Does the applicant risk under US criminal law, in respect of the charges, a maximum penalty that precludes early release and/or release on parole?
b.- What are the concrete mechanisms and under what US legal basis is the applicant entitled to review his possible final life sentence? In this sense, are the appeal, pardon and other review mechanisms referred to in the note verbale of 3 December 2014 the ones described in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium (application no. 140/10, 4 September 2014, § 27)?”
31.  On 23 July 2015 the Government submitted their response and attached a document issued by the Office of International Affairs of the US Department of Justice called “supplemental information to Spain on Sentencing Issues in Relation to Andres Lopez Elorza, a/k/a ‘Andres Lopez Flores’ (hereinafter, “the US report”). The report stated the following:
“By way of introduction, Lopez Elorza’s extradition is sought in order for him to stand trial on federal narcotics offenses in the Eastern District of New York. In essence, Lopez Elorza, a veterinarian, is charged with having been a member of a conspiracy between September 2004 and January 2005, the goal of which was to import heroin into the United States for subsequent distribution, in which Lopez Elorza’s role was to surgically implant packages of liquid heroin into the bodies of dogs that later were transported to the United States. The charges followed the search, in January 2005, of a farm Lopez Elorza operated in Medellin, Colombia, in which law enforcement authorities seized six puppies into which three kilograms of liquid heroin had been surgically implanted. The six puppies were bound for the United States, and the heroin they carried was surgically removed. After the search of his farm, Lopez Elorza fled Colombia.”
32.  As regards the first question put to the Government, the US report argued that there were pretrial factors that could affect the applicant’s sentencing. In particular, the report noted the following:
“Before any trial, Lopez Elorza could, with the advice of his lawyer, decide to give up the right to a trial and plead guilty to the charges in the indictment, with or without the agreement of the prosecution. See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a). A timely admission of guilt is a factor which could reduce the sentence the judge decides to impose following a conviction. In the United States, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Lopez Elorza may seek to reach an agreement with the prosecution wherein he would plead guilty in exchange for certain favorable actions, such as an agreement to allow him to plead guilty to fewer than all the charges in the indictment (with the remainder of the charges to be dismissed at sentencing), or even to lesser charges, or in exchange for the government’s promise to affirmatively recommend to the court that a particular lesser sentence be imposed. The agreement may also include the parties’ recommendation as to the appropriate sentence that - depending upon the type of plea agreement that is negotiated - may or may not bind the judge regarding the sentence that will be imposed. Such agreements are within the discretion of the government to enter into, and the judge may also decline to approve an agreement she or he does not believe to be in the interests of justice. The agreement may include, inter alia, an agreement to cooperate with U.S. authorities. Thus, if Lopez Elorza were willing and able to provide substantial assistance to the United States in the investigation or prosecution of another person who had committed a crime, a plea agreement might include a promise by the government attorneys, in exchange for his guilty plea, to file a motion with the court asking that Lopez Elorza’s cooperation be taken into account and permitting the Court to impose a lower sentence that it might otherwise impose. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(e); United States Sentencing Guidelines, Section 5K1.1. In such cases, it is not atypical for a judge to impose a sentence that is significantly less than the Guidelines recommendation.”
33.  It also observed that “[i]f, however, Lopez Elorza decides not to plead guilty and instead exercise his right to a trial, and if he is found guilty of one or more charges, his sentencing exposure will vary, depending on the nature of the charges on which he is found guilty. Moreover, the judge will have broad discretion to determine the appropriate sentence [...]”.
34.  As regards the estimated sentence that the applicant could face, the US report stated firstly that, “In imposing a sentence in a federal criminal case, the judge must consult the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines”. It added that the Guidelines were advisory since the judge had “the discretion to impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range so long as the court states ‘with specificity,’ both at sentencing and in the written judgment and commitment order, its reason for doing so”. It additionally stated that, “[b]oth the defendant and the government have the statutory right to appeal any sentence imposed on the grounds that it is substantively or procedurally unreasonable under the circumstances of the case”. Moreover, the decision whether to sentence a person convicted of multiple counts concurrently or consecutively was at the discretion of the court. Section 3584 of Title 18 of the US Code, states, in part, that “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively”. The report further stressed the following:
“Prior to sentencing, a probation officer will prepare a presentence report that contains information about the defendant’s offense, his criminal history, other background information, and a calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant has the right to object to the information and conclusion in the present report. Later, during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, defense counsel will be able to present to the judge various mitigating factors to consider that may result in the reduction of his sentence. Specifically, under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), in determining the particular sentence imposed on a defendant, the court shall consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, punishment for the offense, deter the defendant or others from committing similar criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the applicable guideline range; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to the victims of the offense(s). In assisting the court in considering the above seven factors, defense counsel will be able to present to the court in detail any mitigating factors relating to these criteria. This would enable the defense to provide to the sentencing court information regarding Lopez Elorza’s background and circumstances, including: his family environment and relationships, the environment in which he was raised, his work history,... socioeconomic factors including educational opportunities or lack thereof, his physical and psychological well-being and any past or current treatment, prior criminal conduct, if any, and any resultant rehabilitative programs and periods of probation, incarceration, and parole, as well as Lopez Elorza’s longterm educational, vocational, and sociological goals”.
35.  The report noted that there were many factors that contributed to the imposition of a sentence and that it was “impossible to address every conceivable permutation that could occur or every possible scenario that might arise”. However, the report indicated that according to the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the advisory sentencing range was “188 to 235 months incarceration, far less than the possible life sentence provided for under the statutes with which he was charged”.
36.  Furthermore, the report stated that under section 3553(a) of Title 18 of the US Code, there was a “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”. In that regard, the report stated that several of the applicant’s co-conspirators had already been sentenced in a related case before the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant’s case. One of the co-conspirators “faced a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months and received a sentence of 72 months incarceration”, another “faced a Guidelines range of 78 to 87 months and received a sentence of 14 months incarceration” and a third had “faced a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months and received a sentence of Time Served (approximately 12 months incarceration)”. The US report also noted that none of those defendants had entered into cooperation agreements with the government. Consequently, the sentences imposed on the applicant’s co-conspirators by the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant’s case “[could] be of value in assessing the sentence that will be imposed on him”.
37.  The report concluded that while it was possible that any available maximum sentence could be imposed for an offence, under the circumstances present in this case, “the risk of López Elorza receiving such a sentence is low”.
38.  As regards the second question, the US report stated that if the applicant was sentenced to a life term, he could benefit from a variety of mechanisms to seek to have the sentence invalidated or reduced or to obtain early release.
39.  Concerning the applicant’s right to invalidate or reduce his sentence, the Government stated that the applicant would have the right under US law to lodge an appeal with the Court of Appeals, asking for a reversal of his conviction “based on an error in the proceedings”. The applicant would also be able to “ask the Court of Appeals to review the appropriateness of his sentence”. He could argue that a life sentence was “unreasonable” in the circumstances of his case. The report also stated that even after the applicant had exhausted his rights at trial and on appeal, he could under US law file “a motion in the trial court claiming that his life sentence was imposed ‘in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States’, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack”.
40.  Concerning the applicant’s right to obtain early release, the report specifically stated that “since 1987, there has been no federal parole system in the United States”. The applicant, however, could ask for early release if he provided substantial assistance after his conviction and the imposition of his sentence. In addition, US law also allowed for compassionate release under section 3582 of Title 18 of the US Code. The report specifically stressed that the Bureau of Prisons could reduce the applicant’s sentence if it found that there was “an extraordinary and compelling reason to do so; for example, if a medical condition arose with López Elorza that would warrant such a modification”. Finally, the applicant could also seek executive clemency in the form of commutation (reduction) of his sentence. The report noted that in cases similar to the applicant’s, commutation of life sentences was not “a rare occurrence”. It gave as an example that of 13 July 2015, when President Obama had commuted the life sentences of “fourteen persons who had been convicted of drug related offenses”.
41.  On 31 July 2015 the interim measures under Rule 39 were extended and the Court requested that the Government stay the applicant’s extradition to the United States while the proceedings were pending before the Court.