5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Sestaci.
6.  The applicant is a journalist who, at the time of the events, was employed as Head of the Press Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office. In January 2003 he sent to a newspaper two letters containing information about pressure put on the Prosecutor General’s Office by a high-ranking politician. In one of the letters, the Vice-President of Parliament expressed discontent that several police officers were being criminally prosecuted for allegedly ill-treating and unlawfully detaining suspects. In another letter it was stated that one of those police officers had previously been convicted of similar offences, but had been exempted from serving a sentence and had soon been re-employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Subsequently, the newspaper published an article on the basis of the letters. The applicant was then dismissed by the Prosecutor General for having violated the internal regulations of the Press Department. In proceedings for his reinstatement brought against the Prosecutor General’s Office, he argued before the domestic courts that the disclosure of the letters had been in good faith and had pursued the aim of “fighting corruption and trading in influence”. He argued that, in any event, the letters could not be classified as secret under domestic law. The domestic courts found in favour of the applicant’s employer, on the grounds that the applicant had breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing the letters, and that he had failed to consult other heads of departments before disclosing the letters to the newspaper.
7.  On 30 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the Court.
8.  In a judgment of 12 February 2008 the Grand Chamber of the Court held that the applicant’s dismissal from his employment had infringed his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (see Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, ECHR 2008).
9.  The Court found that, for the purposes of Article 10 § 2, the measure taken against the applicant had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression, had been “prescribed by law”, and had pursued a legitimate aim.
10.  As to whether the measure had been “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of that provision, the Court noted firstly that the applicant had not had alternative channels for disclosing the letters, and that, in the circumstances of the case, external reporting, even to a newspaper, could be justified. Against that background, it also found that the information disclosed by the applicant was of major public interest, because it concerned such issues as the separation of powers, improper conduct by a high-ranking politician, and the government’s attitude towards police brutality. Balancing the different issues involved, the Court also took into consideration the detriment caused to the Prosecutor General’s Office by the disclosure. In doing so, the Court came to the conclusion that the public interest in having information about undue pressure and wrongdoing within the Prosecutor General’s Office revealed was so important in a democratic society that it outweighed the interest in maintaining public confidence in the Prosecutor General’s Office. Lastly, the Court noted that the applicant had acted in good faith and that the most severe sanction possible had been imposed on him. In view of all the considerations, the Court came to the conclusion that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, in particular his right to impart information, had not been “necessary in a democratic society”, and that there had been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention.
11.  As to the application of Article 41, the Court ordered Moldova to pay the sum of 10,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 8,413 for costs and expenses.
12.  After the Court had delivered the above judgment, the applicant applied to the domestic courts to have the domestic judgments confirming his dismissal set aside. He was successful, and on 28 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice ordered his reinstatement. On the same day the applicant lodged an application for reinstatement with the Prosecutor General’s Office.
13.  According to the applicant, on 29 May 2008 he had a meeting with the Prosecutor General, who asked him to resign from his position. As the applicant refused, the Prosecutor General told him that “he had enough wits to force him to do that”. He was told to go home and wait for his employment order. The Government disputed the above submissions.
14.  On 5 June 2008 the Prosecutor General issued an order reinstating the applicant as Head of the Press Department and ordering that his salary arrears be paid. On the same date the Prosecutor General wrote to the head of the trade unions of the Prosecutor General’s Office, seeking the trade unions’ approval of the applicant’s dismissal from his employment on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act (see paragraph 23 below). In accordance with the labour legislation in force, the trade unions’ approval was a necessary step in dismissing the applicant, and it was obtained the next day.
15.  On 6 June 2008 the applicant was invited to the Prosecutor General’s Office and presented with the employment order. According to the applicant, he was, however, not allocated an office and not given a badge to access the building. Each morning he had to wait outside the building until one of his superiors allowed him to enter. Since he had no office, he stayed in the library or in the press office. However, when other employees from the press office had to leave the office, he was locked outside it with the explanation that his superiors had not allowed him access to sensitive information. The applicant was not given any tasks. The Government also disputed the above submissions.
16.  On 16 June 2008 the applicant was presented with a dismissal order, effective as of 10 June 2008. The dismissal was based on section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The reason for the applicant’s dismissal was the appointment of a new Prosecutor General in 2007. According to the order, the trade unions had consented to his dismissal on 6 June 2008.
17.  On 10 July 2008 the applicant contested the order of 16 June 2008 before the Chisinau Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) and sought reinstatement. He presented details about his meeting with the Prosecutor General of 29 May 2008 and about his discussion with him (see paragraph 13 above). He also stated that since his re-employment on 6 June 2008 he had not received a badge to access the building, had not been given an office, and had not been given any tasks. Moreover, on the very day of his reinstatement, the Prosecutor General had obtained the trade unions’ approval of his dismissal. He argued, inter alia, that since 2003 the Prosecutor General had changed twice, and that he was the first person to be dismissed on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The applicant also argued that that section was not applicable in the circumstances of the case, since the position of Head of the Press Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office was not part of the cabinet of the Prosecutor General. He expressed the view that his dismissal constituted a failure on the part of the State to abide by the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008.
18.  The Prosecutor General’s Office did not contest the applicant’s allegations about the Prosecutor General’s discussion with him and about the treatment to which he had been subjected during his employment. It only submitted that labour-law provisions had been respected at the time the applicant had been dismissed.
19.  On 17 December 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s action and ruled that his dismissal had been in accordance with the law. In particular, the court found that since the new Prosecutor General had been appointed in 2007, he had the power to terminate the applicant’s employment on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The Court of Appeal considered that the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008 had been implemented once the domestic courts had revised the judgments confirming his dismissal in 2003. The Court of Appeal did not give any consideration to the applicant’s arguments concerning his discussion with the Prosecutor General and/or his experience during the time of his employment.
20.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice in which he submitted, inter alia, that the Prosecutor General’s Office had failed to prove wrong his contentions about its failure to issue him with a badge or an office and to give him tasks. After making reference to the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008, the applicant claimed that his reinstatement had been simulated, referring to it as “the so‑called reinstatement”. He also contended that his dismissal had not been the result of an ordinary labour dispute, and that in fact the Prosecutor General’s Office had acted in bad faith with a view to getting rid of an inconvenient employee (salariat incomod). However, the appeal on points of law was dismissed on 29 April 2009. Like the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court did not make any assessment of the applicant’s allegations about his discussion with the Prosecutor General and the treatment to which he had been subjected during his ten days of employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s argument about the State’s failure to execute the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008 by finding that that judgment had been enforced once the domestic judgments had been reviewed and the applicant had been reinstated in his previous position.
21.  The applicant informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights about the developments described above, and alleged that his being dismissed once again and the outcome of the new reinstatement proceedings amounted to a failure by the State to comply with the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008. In an action report of 2 December 2016 (see DH-DD(2016)1446) the Government informed the Committee of Ministers about the general and individual measures taken in the course of implementing the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008, and expressed the view that that judgment had been enforced once the Supreme Court had reviewed and quashed its own judgment of 26 November 2003. They asked the Committee of Ministers to terminate the execution procedure in respect of that case.
22.  At the time of issuing the present judgment, the procedure for supervising the execution of the judgment of 12 February 2008 is still ongoing before the Committee of Ministers.