5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Charlotte, North Carolina (the United States of America).
6.  The case concerns “non-contentious” proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant’s son to the United States after the child’s mother (a Croatian national and the applicant’s former wife) had in August 2011 “wrongfully retained” him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”).
7.  Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant’s request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court’s decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court’s decision reads as follows:
“... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner’s appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ...
In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case.”
8.  In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant’s request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way:
“... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision.”
9.  Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant.
10.  In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert’s assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court’s refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life.
11.  By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant’s right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above).
12.  The other relevant facts of the case are set out in detail in the Court’s judgment in the first Adžić case (see Adžić, cited above, §§ 6-57).