coastalcph/lex_glue huggingface dataset:
5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The first applicant is serving a life sentence in Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89. The second applicant lives in Obukhiv.
6.  On 24 March 2000 the applicants got married.
7.  On 16 February 2001 the first applicant was found guilty of a number of criminal offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
8.  The applicants requested that the prison administration allow them a long-term family visit on many occasions, in particular, in 2006. Their requests were rejected on the grounds that Article 151 of the Code of Execution of Sentences did not provide for long-term visits to life prisoners.
9.  In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009.
10.  According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone.
11.  The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened “shortly after the introduction of the application”. According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014.
12.  As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison’s logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.
5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently detained in St Petersburg.
6.  He was suspected of involvement in large-scale drug dealing.
7.  On 2 February 2011 he was arrested. He remained in custody pending the investigation and trial.
8.  On 6 October 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Kazan (“the District Court”) received the case file and set the trial date for 19 October 2011.
9.  On 19 March 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years’ imprisonment.
10.  During the trial, which consisted of sixteen hearings, the applicant was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom. There was no desk inside the cage, only a wooden bench, which made it impossible for him to take notes during the hearings. Armed security guards remained beside the cage dock. The applicant’s lawyer could only approach him with the court’s permission. Any conversations between them had to take place in the presence of the guards.
11.  On 10 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in the hearing by videoconference. He was placed behind a floor-to-ceiling metal partition on the premises of the remand prison SIZO-3 of the Tatarstan Republic where he was detained and communicated with the judges via a video link.
4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Belgrade.
5.  On 9 May 2005 the applicant lodged a claim seeking ownership of 265 shares of the company Tri Grozda a.d. Beograd
6.  On 14 September 2007 the Belgrade Court of First Instance delivered a judgment in favour of the applicant.
7.  On 13 December 2011 the Belgrade Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of 14 September 2007, and rejected the applicant’s claim.
8.  On 3 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time and requesting compensation in that regard.
9.  On 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time. It held that the finding of a violation had constituted sufficient just satisfaction in the particular circumstances of the present case for the following reasons. First, the nominal value of the impugned shares was only slightly higher than 200 euros. The case was thus of minor importance for the applicant. Secondly, it considered that the applicant had contributed to the length of the civil proceedings by failing to lodge a constitutional appeal earlier.
5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Moldovan Law.
6.  On 24 December 2012 and 21 June 2013 respectively the applicant company initiated two sets of civil proceedings challenging two decisions issued by the State Tax Inspectorate of Străşeni (Inspectoratul Fiscal de Stat Străşeni – “the Inspectorate”) under which it had been fined for non‑compliance with the VAT reporting regulations. On 5 September 2013 these two sets of proceedings were joined.
7.  On 26 December 2013 the Străşeni District Court upheld the applicant company’s claims and overturned the impugned decisions. The representative of the Inspectorate was not present when the judgment was delivered, despite having been duly informed of the date and the time of the hearing.
8.  On 5 February 2014 the Inspectorate lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Străşeni District Court. No request for an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging an appeal was made. The applicant company objected to the appeal and argued that it had been lodged outside the thirty‑day time-limit and that the Inspectorate had not requested an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging it.
9.  In a decision of 3 September 2014 the Chişinău Court of Appeal calculated the applicable time-limit and found that it had expired on 27 January 2014 and, accordingly, that the Inspectorate had been late in lodging its appeal. It therefore decided to strike the appeal out of its list of cases as time-barred. The Inspectorate lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. It argued that the Chişinău Court of Appeal could not strike out the appeal after having commenced its examination of the merits of the case.
10.  On 8 October 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the Chişinău Court of Appeal’s strike-out decision of 3 September 2014. Without contesting the Court of Appeal’s calculation of the time-limit for lodging the appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the argument put forward by the Inspectorate and found that the Court of Appeal had breached the rules of procedure by adopting a strike-out decision after having started an examination of the merits of the case. Ultimately, the case was referred back to the Chişinău Court of Appeal for re-examination.
11.  On 28 January 2015, after rehearing the case, the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the Inspectorate’s appeal, quashed the judgment of the Străşeni District Court of 26 December 2013 and rendered a new judgment whereby the applicant company’s action was rejected as ill-founded.
12.  On 10 June 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice declared an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company inadmissible.
5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bor.
6.  The proceedings began on 30 March 1992 when the applicant brought a lawsuit against third persons concerning the execution of a contract.
7.  On 19 June 1997 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s claim.
8.  On 30 October 1997 the appeal court quashed the decision on legal costs, remitted that issue to the first-instance court for a retrial and upheld the remainder of the first-instance judgment.
9.  The first-instance court subsequently rendered three decisions on the costs of the proceedings on 23 July 1998, 19 February 1999 and 3 March 2000. All of these decisions were quashed on appeal.
10.  On 5 February 2013 the first-instance court rendered a fourth decision on the issue of legal costs awarding the applicant approximately 2,000 euros (EUR).
11.  According to the information on the file, the proceedings are currently pending before the second-instance court.
12.  On 13 March 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him EUR 300 for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in this regard. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant’s proceedings to be expedited.
4.  On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract (“the contract”) with the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”) for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (во денарска противвредност пресметана во евра). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (затезна камата по стапка yтврдена со закон) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros.
5.  On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company’s protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (Основен суд Охрид) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Битола), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013.
6.  On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency’s domestic rate (домицилна камата) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (Рев1. бр. 74/2012).
7.  The applicant company’s claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court’s case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company’s representative on 31 March 2014.
8.  On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company.
9.  In judgments Рев.1 бр. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, Рев.1 бр.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and Рев. бр. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency’s domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (ТСЖ бр. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and ТСЖ 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).
6.  The applicants, who were born in 1980 and 1977, respectively, live in Slobozia and Parcani, in the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”). In view of the fact that, in the applicants’ submission, it was impossible for them to apply to the Court directly, the application was lodged by their mothers.
7.  On 2 March 2005 the applicants were arrested by the “MRT” authorities and placed in detention on remand on suspicion of murder. On 1 June 2009 they were convicted by an “MRT” court and sentenced to terms of fourteen years and a half, and fourteen years’ imprisonment, respectively. On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court of the “MRT” upheld the above judgment, but reduced the sentence of the first applicant to fourteen years’ imprisonment.
8.  It does not appear from the material in the case file and from the parties’ submissions that the applicants informed the authorities of the Republic of Moldova about the proceedings against them and the conviction and detention in the “MRT”.
9.  In December 2014 the applicants challenged their conviction by way of an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova which, on 14 February 2015, upheld their appeal and quashed the judgments of the “MRT” courts on the ground that they had been issued by unconstitutional tribunals.
10.  The applicants were released from detention on 20 July and 20 August 2015, respectively, for reasons which were not related to the Supreme Court of Moldova’s decision of 14 February 2015.
6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Corjova.
7.  He had his car registered with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and had Moldovan registration plates installed on it.
8.  On 16 December 2006 a customs officer of the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”) stopped the applicant at a check‑point and seized his car on the ground that upon entry on the territory of Transdniestria he had failed to stop at the border. He was later obliged to pay a fine of 58 United States dollars in order to recover the car.
9.  On 19 December 2006 the applicant’s driving licence was seized on the ground that he had failed to comply with traffic rules. His car was also seized, on the ground of his failure to comply with customs regulations, but the seizure report was destroyed and he was able to recover his car five hours later after the intervention of a group of Russian peacekeepers. His driving licence was not returned and he was issued a temporary driving licence.
10.  According to the applicant, he complained to the authorities of Moldova, but they informed him that there was nothing they could help him with. The Moldovan Government disputed the fact that the applicant had informed them about the circumstances of the present case.
11.  Reports by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, the relevant domestic law and practice of the Republic of Moldova, and other pertinent documents were summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 11138/10, §§ 61-77, 23 February 2016).
5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Chişinău.
6.  The applicant had a dispute with H. over ownership of a house. He brought a claim against H. seeking acknowledgement of his property rights, as his father’s heir, and H.’s eviction from the house. H. lodged a counterclaim, seeking acknowledgement of her property rights to the house as she had built it.
7.  On 20 December 2007 the Buiucani District Court dismissed H.’s counterclaim and allowed the applicant’s claim in full. H. lodged an appeal. On 20 May 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the earlier judgment and dismissed H.’s appeal. H. did not attend the appellate hearing, even though the summons had been repeatedly sent to the address she had provided in her appeal. A registered letter was returned with a note stating that H. did not live at the address indicated by her. The judgment became final after the expiry of the two-month time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law.
8.  On 11 May 2009 H. lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice, stating that she had only learned of the judgment of 20 May 2008 on 23 April 2009. In her application, she indicated the same address as in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The applicant asked the Supreme Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal as being lodged outside the legal time-limit. He submitted that since it had been H. who had lodged the appeal with the Chişinău Court of Appeal, it had been her duty to enquire about the progress of the proceedings and not to wait for a year before doing so.
9.  On 16 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed H.’s appeal on points of law, quashed the previous judgments and delivered a new judgment on the merits of the case dividing the disputed house into equal shares between the applicant and H. The court argued that the appeal had not been lodged outside the time-limit because H. had not attended the hearing before the Court of Appeal and there was nothing in the file to suggest that that court had informed her of the availability of the full judgment. The court concluded that without any evidence of the date when H. had learned of the judgment, her appeal was considered to have been submitted on time. The judgment was final.
5.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1982 and live in Khust and Kharkiv respectively.
6.  The first applicant lodged a claim against a social security authority, seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance she was receiving. A first-instance court allowed her claim in part. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the social security authority lodged a further appeal on points of law.
7.  On 6 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”), having examined the appeal, quashed the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed the applicant’s claim.
8.  The second applicant moved from the territory of the Republic of Moldova controlled by the so‑called “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”) (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII) to Ukraine to take up permanent residence. Under domestic law, repatriating Ukrainians were entitled to the tax-free and duty-free import of their foreign-registered vehicles. However, the customs office refused to apply this tax exemption in the applicant’s case on the grounds that the car had not been registered by the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Moldova. She challenged this refusal before the administrative courts. A first-instance court allowed her claim and ordered the customs office to clear her car through customs. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the customs office lodged a further appeal on points of law.
9.  On 4 April 2013 the HAC allowed the appeal, quashed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the applicant’s claim.
10.  Both applicants alleged that the HAC, contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 11 below), had not sent them copies of the appeals lodged in their cases or informed them of the pending appeals by any other means, thus depriving them of an opportunity to respond. They alleged that they had only learned of the appeal proceedings when they had been served with the HAC’s final decisions quashing the lower courts’ decisions in their favour.
11.  As worded at the relevant time, Articles 214 and 215 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice provided that a HAC judge-rapporteur would decide, having considered an appeal, whether to initiate proceedings to review the lower courts’ decisions on points of law. If the judge decided to initiate such proceedings, he or she was required to inform the parties of that decision and serve a copy of the appeal on the opposing party with a time-limit for responding.
12.  The relevant provisions of the Code concerning the procedure for serving court documents are summarised in Lazarenko and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 70329/12 and 5 others, § 15, 27 June 2017).
5.  Following judicial proceedings which ended with a final judgment of the Bălţi Court of Appeal of 8 December 2009, the applicant company obtained a final ruling obliging the Cadastral Authority to register immovable property privatised by it in 1999 and in 2004 in its name.
6.  On an unspecified date the defendant in the proceedings lodged a request for a review of the judgment of 8 December 2009, seeking its annulment on the grounds that in a technical report dated 25 May 2009 it had been stated that the immovable property in question did not qualify as immovable property (“the review request”).
7.  On 24 August 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal dismissed the review request on the grounds that the information contained in the technical report of 25 May 2009 did not qualify as new and relevant information which could not have been obtained before the delivery of the final judgment in the case.
8.  On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgment and ordered a re-examination of the review request.
9.  On 16 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant’s control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case.
10.  On 16 August 2012, after examining the merits of the case, the Edineţ District Court again found in favour of the applicant company and required the Cadastral Authority to register some of the immovable property privatised by the applicant company in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. The Cadastral Authority challenged that judgment by lodging an appeal and the proceedings are still pending.