Document: 480 U.S. 228 107 S.Ct. 1098 94 L.Ed.2d 267 Earline MARTIN, Petitioner,v.OHIO. No. 85-6461. Argued Dec. 2, 1986. Decided Feb. 25, 1987. Rehearing Denied April 20, See 481 1024, 1913. Syllabus Under the Ohio Revised Code (Code), burden of proving elements a criminal offense is upon prosecution, but, for an affirmative defense, proof by preponderance evidence placed on accused. Self-defense defense under law and therefore must be proved defendant. Petitioner was charged with aggravated murder, which defined as "purposely, prior calculation design, causing death another." She pleaded self-defense, testified that she had shot killed her husband when he came at following argument during struck her. As to crime itself, jury instructed (1) that, convict, it find, in light all evidence, each murder State beyond reasonable doubt, respect those did not shift; (2) find guilt, convinced none whether offered or petitioner connection self-defense plea, raised doubt husband, specific purpose intent cause his death, done so design. However, could acquit if found precipitated confrontation husband; honestly believed imminent danger great bodily harm only means escape use force; (3) satisfied any duty retreat avoid danger. The guilty, both Court Appeals Supreme affirmed conviction, rejecting petitioner's Due Process Clause challenge based charge's placing proof. In reaching its decision, relied Patterson v. New York, 432 197, 97 2319, 53 281 (1977). Held: 1. Neither nor above instructions violate Fourteenth Amendment shifting State's crime. instructions, read whole, do improperly suggest considered determining there about sufficiency crime's elements. Furthermore, simply because support might negate purposeful killing design does mean impermissibly overlap, since creating fact necessary finding guilt easily fall far short other hand, will excused satisfactorily established even no jury's mind defendant guilty. Pp. 233-234. 2. It violation place committing murder. There merit disprove unlawfulness are serious offenses, while renders lawful would otherwise negates showing intent. follow courts have rejected this argument, holding such cases conduct satisfying mental state take life pursuant mere but two States abandoned common-law rule defenses, including render unconstitutional. decisions allowed fashion their own affirmative-defense, burden-of-proof rules. 235-236. 21 St.3d 91, 488 N.E.2d 166 (1986), affirmed. WHITE, J., delivered opinion Court, REHNQUIST, C.J., STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, JJ., joined. POWELL, filed dissenting opinion, BRENNAN MARSHALL, joined, Parts I III BLACKMUN, post, p. ---. James R. Willis, Cleveland, Ohio, petitioner. George J. Sadd, respondent. Justice WHITE Court. 1 provides "[e]very person accused presumed innocent until proven guilty prosecution. going forward accused." Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (1982). An one involving "an excuse justification peculiarly within knowledge accused, can fairly required adduce supporting evidence." 2901.05(C)(2) "long determined defense," 93, 166, 168 has 2901.05(A). 2 trial court case, prove fault situation giving rise argument; honest belief harm, from App. 19. question before us forbids which, relevant caus[ing] 2903.01 3 facts taken opinions below, may succinctly stated. On July 21, 1983, Martin Walter Martin, argued over grocery money. claimed head argument. Petitioner's version what then transpired went upstairs, put robe, later back down husband's gun intended dispose of. Her saw something hand questioned it. He her, lost fired him. Five six shots were fired, three them striking Mr. Martin. tried defense. judge charge self-defense. 4 Both conviction. constitutional instruction requiring latter court, relying our (1977), concluded require separate issue Mrs. element charged. said, "the appellant purposely, caused husband. Appellant dispute existence these elements, rather sought justify actions grounds acted self defense." St.3d, 94, N.E.2d, 168. thus infirmity We granted certiorari, 475 1119, 106 1634, 90 180 affirm decision Ohio. 5 re Winship, 397 358, 364, 1068, 1072, 25 368 (1970), declared "protects against conviction except every constitute charged." A few years later, we held Winship mandate fully where York extreme emotional disturbance, proved, reduced manslaughter. supra. emphasized preeminent role preventing dealing reluctance disturb definition procedures laws enforced courts, producing allocating persuasion. U.S., 201-202, S.Ct., 2322. authority define intentional another person. chosen, however, reduce manslaughter influence distress. To convict related defendant's time crime, also conclude convicted Patterson, construed Winship. Referring Leland Oregon, 343 790, 72 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), Rivera Delaware, 429 877, 226, 50 160 (1976), added "did more than permitted without violating Clause" declined reconsider cases. 206, 207, 2324, 2325. observed majority now assumed disproving defenses—for whatever reasons—[does not] strike different balance Constitution." Id., 211, 2327. 6 here been shift. plea told, confrontation, 7 agree Clause. exceed defining purposely seek shift verdict reflects purposefully nevertheless opportunity given show herself blameless thought failed so, entitled punish Patterson. 8 quite i.e., aside purposes unless standard. Such relieve plainly run afoul mandate. 1072. case clearer respect, think they adequate convey deciding 9 moved assertions overlap sense often tend former. most encounters arise suddenly involve plan life. cases, state's case. When prosecution made out prima facie survives motion acquit, raises guilt. Evidence evidence. Of course, juror took life, still established. note here, need rely on, observation "[a]ppellant [the murder], self-defense." 168.* 10 submits unlawful, This founders law, Sixth Circuit. White Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 346-347 (1986); Morris, App.3d 12, 18-19, 455 1352, 1359-1360 true essential hold like murder—an interpretation position dispute. same claim "criminal" crimes, cannot occur shown: supra, 346. 11 noted matters prove. "This Fifth adopted, American ratified." 202, Indeed, well into century, number followed shoulder Fletcher, Two Kinds Legal Rules: Comparative Study Burden-of-Persuasion Practices Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.J. 880, 882, n. (1968). aware States, South Carolina, absence properly But remains Constitution; and, answered cataloging practices States. practice unconstitutional Constitution requires sanity who pleads reason insanity. depart refused so. (1976). These important they, along today. 12 judgment accordingly 13 Affirmed. 14 whom MARSHALL join, BLACKMUN joins III, dissenting. 15 Today holds though Because inconsistent precedent fundamental fairness, dissent. 16 * "prior design." admitted classified "affirmative" apparently carry burden, 17 upheld part Court's today relies reasoning affirming decision. If accepts proper method analysis believe ignores central meaning. 18 statute shifted prosecutor statutorily suffering "extreme disturbance." N.Y.Penal Law §§ 125.25, 125.20 (McKinney 1975 Supp.1987). due process, largely "not serve negative order murder." clear implication ruling burden. 344-345 (CA6 1986). nonexistence doubt. 19 treating differently defenses plain. told dis jurors resolve inconsistency way lessens presumption innocence. For example, reasonably raising ultimate particular element. Or, reconcile balancing supports prosecutor's prosecution's persuasive. either unmistakable erroneous impression shares risk nonpersuasion conviction.1 20 Given principles, reliance puzzling. design" engaged "definite process advance killing," least some "studied consideration." (jury instructions) (emphasis added). contrast, "had harm."2 many finds himself immediate reacts deadly force formed kill. recognizes states: "It . ." Ante, 234. 22 conclusion should precluded concludes "Ohio case." Ibid. 23 gives explanation apparent rejection advanced used free consider Martin's goes, necessarily unpersuaded 233. seems long between immaterial. 24 flawed respects. First, problem arises implicitly assumes understands times, despite conflicting places pointed above, distinction legitimate concern mistakenly lower short, rationale fails explain why create suggested unacceptable.3 Second, significantly, explanation, extends deference legislatures area. Today's say virtually attempts upheld, regardless relationship understand it, disturbance mens rea underlying offense. After today's offense, verdict. 26 agree, substantial leeway administering justice systems. precedents suggests give complete consistent past circumstances look text burden-shifting satisfy ourselves requirements satisfied. Mullaney Wilbur, 421 684, 698-699, 95 1881, 1889, 44 508 (1975) explicitly granting unchecked discretion case.4 discuss cite Mullaney, unanimous agreement judicial intervention Even dissented, recognized "there obviously limits go [in labeling defense]."5 210, Today, asserts allocates burdens, indication lie. 27 establishes conflict, reverse II 28 Although wrongly decided principles set forth my differences approach fundamental. continue better outlined obligation certain restricted legislative distinctions offenses defenses. boundaries elaborated dissent, proposed two-part inquiry: 29 "The bear persuasion factor makes difference punishment stigma. requirement course applies fortiori shown Anglo-American legal tradition historically level importance. branch test met, legislature retains traditional proof." 226-227, 2335 (footnotes omitted). 30 Cf. McMillan Pennsylvania, 477 79, 103, 2411, 2425, 91 67 (1986) (STEVENS, dissenting) ("[I]f component prohibited transaction shall special stigma punishment, treated 'fact crime' meaning Winship"). 31 benefits approach. ensures critical sustain state. willing statute, incentive redefine make thereby manner Mullaney. leave states respects recognize new factors mitigate degree criminality 229-230, 2336-2337 (POWELL, ("New ameliorative generally remain undisturbed holdings " (footnote omitted)). 32 analysis, impermissible carried result decisively punishment. primary justifications unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Beard United 158 550, 562, 962, 966, 39 1086 (1895). Thus, acknowledge difficult apply hard imagine clear-cut application presented here. 33 willingness defer definitions crimes practical effect alleged law. Nolton, St.2d 133, 249 797 (1969). issue, just likely justified, yet voted convict. words, committed review choices limited justifies increasing convicting blameworthy. 2322 (state yield 'offends principle rooted traditions conscience people ranked fundamental' (quoting Speiser Randall, 357 513, 523, 78 1332, 1340, 1460 (1958))). complexity inquiry lead simple rules unjust results. dissent believes led enough mislead jury. evident text, disagree. harbor dissent's mistrust jury; sufficiently discharged. other. type inherently illogical aspect. contrary met occasion And disproved surplusage. attempt ascribe significance court's likelihood increased. away uncertain. "settled exists possibility understanding verdict, aside." Francis Franklin, 471 307, 323, 8, 105 1965, 1976, 85 344 (1985). avoided possible, threatening situation. Robbins, 58 74, 79-80, 388 755, 758 (1979). reduced—although view, eliminated—if gave little guidance respect. how evaluate affected 322, ("Nothing sentences [jury] whole contradictory carries weight other"). noted, example: "[I]f undermine interests protect effecting substantive change characterizing solely extent punishment." 698, 1889. 86, 2416, ("[I]n reasonable-doubt formally identified charged").

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