Document: 467 U.S. 461 104 S.Ct. 2518 81 L.Ed.2d 399 MICHIGAN CANNERS AND FREEZERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.v.AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BARGAINING BOARD al. No. 82-1577. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 19, 1984. Decided June 11, Syllabus The federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act 1967 (AFPA) was enacted to enable individual farmers and other producers agricultural commodities join together voluntarily in cooperative associations order protect their marketing bargaining position as against large powerful processors. AFPA makes it unlawful for "handlers"—defined include both processors producers' associations—to coerce any producer "in exercise his right . or refrain from joining" a association, 7 U.S.C. § 2303(a), enter into terminate contract with association handler, 2303(c). Michigan Marketing Bargaining (Michigan Act) includes same prohibitions AFPA, but goes beyond by establishing state-administered system which are organized certified exclusive agents all particular commodity. Under this system, if an association's membership constitutes more than 50% commodity its members' production accounts commodity's total production, may be accredited agent that Upon accreditation commodity, regardless whether they have chosen become members must pay service fee abide contracts negotiates Cooperative Association (MACMA), under Act, is sole sales representative asparagus State. After MACMA had negotiated on behalf growers sell crop certain year, appellant processors, sued state court seeking declaratory judgment provisions requiring fees mandatory adherence association-negotiated pre-empted AFPA. rejected appellants' claim, holding prohibited only processor misconduct, whereas challenged regulated activities. Held: Pp. 469-478. (a) This case where basis pre-emption Congress, while not displacing regulation entirely, has preempted law extent conflicts "stands obstacle accomplishment execution full purposes objectives Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 52, 67, 61 399, 85 L.Ed. 581. 469-470. (b) AFPA's theme voluntariness carried through defining practices. By term "handler" well prohibits interference former latter. Just forbids interfere producer's decision remain affiliated also coercing belong to, participate with, association. 470-471. (c) Congress' intent shield coercion confirmed legislative history, reveals question free choice central focus congressional attention during passage Act. Despite fact share goal augmenting power, "accredited" wield power products according terms established force privilege. 471-477. (d) empowers do precisely what them do. In effect, association—a clear violation addition, although does compel binds him contracts, forces precludes goods himself, thus, practical imposes incidents Congress concerned enacting 2303(a). 477-478. 416 Mich. 706, 332 N.W.2d 134, reversed. Joseph G. Scoville, Grand Rapids, Mich., appellants. John H. Garvey, Lexington, Ky., amicus curiae, special leave Court. James A. White, Lansing, appellees. Justice BRENNAN delivered opinion 1 A perceived need help American farmer economic relations moved various enact laws designed bolster farmer's when bringing market. involves two such laws: State Michigan's Act). presented accord authority sale products, held pre-empted. 134 (1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, 464 912, 271, 78 252 (1983), now reverse. 2 * 3 (AFPA), 82 Stat. 93, 2301 seq., protects producers1 market products.2 Responding "the growing concentration hands fewer larger buyers [of products]," S.Rep. 474, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1967), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, pp. 1867, 1869, rectify imbalance between products. Although Act's principal purpose deciding producers. thus provides either engage practices freedom choose bring himself 2303. Specifically, 2303(a) associations3 "coerce joining belonging producers." Similarly, 2303(c) handlers intimidate into, maintain, breach, cancel, agreement handler."4 4 Mich.Comp.Laws 290.701 seq. (1984), facilitate collective action among producers, It statute, however, extensively regulating activities associations. Most importantly, establishes §§ 290.703, 290.707. apply Board 290.707(c).5 When accredits 290.710(1), 290.713(1).6 Thus, creates "agency shop" arrangement whenever there majority support B 5 Association, Inc. State.7 1974, permitted 1974 crop. response, appellants Dukesherer Farms Ferris Pierson, would bound contract, along Canners Freezers Inc., processors,8 those operated area did regulate. (1976). portions disagree. II 6 Federal pre-empt three ways. First, law, explicitly define intends law. E.g., Shaw Delta Air Lines, 463 85, 95-96, 103 2890, 2898-2899, 77 490 (1983). Second, even absence express pre-emptive language, indicate occupy entire field regulation, regulatory activity Government. Fidelity Savings Loan Assn. De la Cuesta, 458 141, 153, 102 3014, 3022, 73 664 (1982); Rice Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 218, 230, 67 1146, 1152, 91 1447 (1947). Finally, displaced nonetheless actually Such conflict arises compliance impossible, Florida Lime Avocado Growers, Paul, 373 132, 142-143, 83 1210, 1217, 10 248 (1963), 404, 581 (1941). See Assn., supra, U.S., at S.Ct., 3022. last applies case. contains no language; nor reflect agricultural-product marketing. Indeed, states "shall construed change modify existing law." 2305(d).9 And, recognized, supervision readying foodstuffs always been deemed matter peculiarly local concern." 144, 1218. 8 Appellants contend service-fee mandatory-representation frustrate objective imposing unwilling view, chief interest growth associations, equally important preserve independent. contend, deprives allows affiliation.10 9 turn first wording begins finding will adversely affected unless organizations authorized (emphasis added). More significantly, prohibited. addition forbidding could discourage producers," "enter [or] maintain Moreover, see 464-465, short, just history began bill aimed solely threat coercion, orientation shifted progressed one sheltering direction. 11 originally introduced Senate, S.109, 89th Sess. (1965), independent reason provoked considerable criticism hearings followed. Critics offered several reasons prohibiting coercion. some stated preferred because believed earn money marketed themselves.11 testified were pressuring serious risk attain monopoly proportion, detriment processor, consumer well.12 Third, witnesses prohibition promote competition merits membership.13 Fourth, many disadvantaged quality product buy price substantially diminish ranks producer.14 simply "a basic right" deserving protection.15 12 response these concerns, Senate passed amended thereby protecting new opened 113 Cong.Rec. 21410 (1967) went provide: 13 "It shall handler knowingly following practices: 14 "(a) To .; 15 16 "(c) person handler. ." Ibid. added).16 17 Report explaining stated: 18 "The choice. Many suggested fully accomplish purpose, protected improper pressure he should direction, is, committee before testimony being subjected convinced logic situation afford choice, direction." p. 1871. 19 Senator Aiken floor "is decide, pressures, wishes association." 21411 (1967). 20 next referred House Committee Agriculture, ibid., heard opposed inclusion prohibited-practices section bill.17 plea, declined adopt proposed amendment limited application H.R.Rep. 824, 4-5 Ultimately, deleted explicit reference bill, 114 7449 (1968), findings declaration policy read: Id., 7469 added).18 so doing, indicated intend alter substance bill. Representative Sisk explained: 21 "Since already excluded 'handler,' phrase ['association section] redundant misconstrued unfairly pointing finger accusation intent; my amendments meaning make misinterpretation difficult." 7464. 22 amendment, Latta "I want record clearly show our present language choose." 7449. Latta, Poage, Chairman 23 intention desire give anybody discriminate else failure 24 25 cannot anything read little differently satisfactorily, groups, without changing iota, far I can see, legal effect legislation. 26 27 think taking out words numerous places 'associations producers'—will anywise effect." Id, 7449-7450. 28 highlighting prohibit coerced affiliation definition "contracting negotiating arrangements, written oral, 7465-7469 added).19 29 agreed debate. 8419. Hence, passing S. 109, unequivocally expressed agree agency relationship impinge independence. appear, therefore, despite C 30 "[w]hile 2303 'join to' forbid representation sees fit." 719, N.W.2d, 139. Once reaches size receives accreditation, bind nonmembers, consent, enters operating handler"—a 2303(c).20 himself. n. 6, supra. 31 conclusion, authorizes conduct forbids, the—accomplishment 404.21 extent, 32 ordered. Title 2302(b) defines "producer" mean engaged farmer, planter, rancher, dairyman, fruit, vegetable, nut grower." Capper-Volstead 291, Clayton 17, most cooperatives exempt antitrust laws. further prior Acts "association herein "producers' associations," defined "any marketing, bargaining, shipping, processing 1141(j) title 12, 291 title." 2302(c). generally refers As evolved process, decided handlers, expanded Thus 2302(a) provides: 'handler' means business practice (1) acquiring sale; (2) grading, packaging, handling, storing, received producers; (3) contracting respect product; (4) acting broker performance function act specified clause (1), (2), paragraph" 2302(d) 'person' individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations" "processor" used refer "handlers" except capacity representatives Section full: permit employee refuse deal association; "(b) price, quantity, quality, purchase, acquisition, handling within handler; "(d) loan money, thing value, offer inducement reward refusing ceasing "(e) false reports about finances, management, handlers; "(f) conspire, combine, agree, arrange do, aid abet doing of, made chapter." 290.707 pertinent part: "An upon determination board meets following: current period who unit cover quantity produced unit. determine using information periods, information, projections periods. exclude contracted owned controlled handlers. An whose main processes surplus form subject cooperative. specify appointed negotiations prices trade obligate dispose holdings direction mechanism whereby divided "bargaining units" that, once accredited, represents essentially 100% members. 290.706 "(1) appropriate. petition representing less 10% eligible overlapping may, presentation unit, contest "(2) making determination, appropriate largest produced, geographic covered number included consistent criteria: community included; potential interests unit; exclusions effectively bargain defined; kinds, types subtypes classed proposed; Whether meet involved; "(g) pattern past commodity." represented directly producer. 290.-704(1)(h). eliminates direct dealing processor. minimum period. fruit vegetable process asparagus. Farms, corporation farming. And Pierson Appellee argues provision might otherwise after enactment Brief 8-14. contends time California's Prorate upheld Parker Brown, 317 341, 63 307, 87 315 (1943), contained "similar" Even we accept MACMA's interpretation 2305(d), argument unpersuasive. California bears relevant similarity orderly plans restrict produce, regulate flow market, establish grade requirements. identified minimize adverse effects surplus. 355, 315. argue accords individually right. conflict, additional decide light disposition primary address question. See, e.g., Producers Act: Hearings 109 Subcommittee Agriculture Forestry, 144 (statement Earl W. Kintner, National Tax Equality Association), 173-183 Paul L. Phillips) (hereinafter cited Hearings). Discrimination Against Members Farmer Cooperatives: 2d 135 (1966) Starke Taylor Jr., Independent Cotton Industries Association) 1966 Hearings); Hearings, 110, 113-114 W.W. Holding III, Shippers 151 196 Irving Isaacson, Maine Poultry Associates). 187 Harry Graham, Grange). 69 Edward Brown Williams, Frozen Food Packers), 91-92 Ted Cameron, Broiler Council). 10-11 Sen. Williams). 146 Donald Smith, Texas Ginners 196-197 Dunkelberger, Association). much focused vertically integrated explained, compete one-sided provided unfair competitive advantage over feared would, reason, drive entirely business. id., Taylor, 138-140 Courtney, Wholesalers); 122-123 Herman Eubank, excludes process. calculating representational strength "[t]he [the produced] handlers." 290.707(c). 5, 4. 4(d), addresses "inducements rewards" cease approach ultimately adopted 2303(d). explained offering inducements since quite proper pursue vigorously voluntary organization attempt secure better farmers." 1872. Trade Practices: 66-67 Grange), 79 Tony T. Dechant, Farmers Union), 89-90 Robert N. Hampton, Council Cooperatives), 109-110 Ralph B. Bunje, Canning Peach throughout debate frequently expressed. For example, "In felt offensive discrimination lack membership. basically wanted directions—to two-way street—to protector cared care member ". original legislation proposal assure cooperative." 7451 (1968). May "There committee, discussion, way confuse anyone wish so. Actually spelled say: 7450. Nation still say 'I your you me it' " Appellees draw analogy cases "state-action exemption" 26-36; 22-31. state-action exemption, based therefore here. 307. provide type active involvement exemption require applicable. Because cast permissive rather terms—an not, representative—this impossible comply (1963).

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