Document: 523 U.S. 57118 S.Ct. 974140 L.Ed.2d 90 Margaret KAWAAUHAU, et vir., Petitioners,v.Paul W. GEIGER. No. 97-115. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Jan. 21, 1998. Decided March 3, Syllabus * When petitioner Kawaauhau sought treatment for her injured foot, respondent Dr. Geiger examined and hospitalized to attend risk infection. Although knew that intravenous penicillin would have been more effective, he prescribed oral penicillin, explaining in his testimony understood patient wished minimize costs. then departed on a business trip, leaving care other physicians, who decided she should be transferred an infectious disease specialist. returned, canceled transfer discontinued all antibiotics because believed infection had subsided. Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated, requiring amputation leg below knee. After trial malpractice suit brought by husband, jury found liable awarded Kawaauhaus approximately $355,000 damages. Geiger, carried no insurance, moved Missouri, where wages were garnished Kawaauhaus. petitioned bankruptcy. The requested Bankruptcy hold judgment nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6), which provides "discharge [in bankruptcy] . does not discharge individual debtor from any debt willful malicious injury another.'' Concluding Geiger's fell far appropriate standard therefore ranked as "willful malicious,'' court held nondischargeable. District affirmed, but Eighth Circuit reversed, holding §523(a)(6)'s exemption is confined debts intentional tort, so remains dischargeable it based negligent or reckless conduct. Held: Because arising medical attributable conduct fall within §523(a)(6) exception, Section 523(a)(6)'s words strongly support Circuit's reading only acts done with actual intent cause exception's scope. section's word "willful'' modifies "injury,'' indicating nondischargeability takes deliberate injury, merely, urge, act leads injury. Had Congress meant exempt resulting unintentionally inflicted injuries, might described instead injury'' selected additional words, i.e., "reckless'' "negligent,'' modify "injury.'' Moreover, formulation triggers lawyer's mind category "intentional torts,'' generally require actor intend consequences act, simply itself. Kawaauhaus' encompassing interpretation could place excepted wide range situations intentional, unintended, neither desired nor fact anticipated debtor. A construction broad incompatible well-known guide exceptions those plainly expressed, render superfluous exemptions set forth §§523(a)(9) 523(a)(12). rely Tinker v. Colwell, 193 473, 24 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, damages award tort "criminal conversation'' survived bankruptcy 1898 Act's exception judgments civil actions ""willful injuries.''' opinion repeatedly recognized at common law question trespass vi armis, akin master's ""action assault battery servant.''' placed criminal conversation solidly traditional category, this confines its holding; decision warrant departure current statutory instruction that, nondischargeable, must "for '' See, e.g., Davis Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 328, 332, 55 151, 153, 79 393. argument policy matter, discharge, least when acted recklessly addressed Congress. Debts negligently injuries do compass. Pp. ___-___. 113 F.3d 848 (C.A.8 1997), affirmed. GINSBURG, J., delivered unanimous Court. Norman Pressman, St. Louis, MO, petitioners. Laura K. Grandy, Belleville, IL, respondent. Justice GINSBURG 1 523(a)(6) Code another'' dischargeable. §523(a)(6). before us whether judgment, conduct, falls exception. We 2 In January 1983, Paul foot admitted hospital cost treatment. 3 deteriorated over next few days, right 4 Kawaauhau, joined husband Solomon, sued malpractice. trial, damages.1 insurance,2 ground was concluded malicious.'' Accordingly, re 172 B.R. 916, 922-923 (Bkrtcy.Ct.E.D.Mo.1994). unpublished order, App. Pet. Cert. A-18 A-22. 5 three-judge panel Appeals 93 443 (1996), divided en banc adhered panel's position, (1997) (en banc). held, "based what has generations called tort.'' Id., 852. On view, malpractice, reckless, rather than 6 acknowledged diverged previous holdings Sixth Tenth Circuits. See id., 853 (citing Perkins Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 394(CA6), cert. denied, 484 853, 108 156, 98 112 (1987), Franklin, 726 606, 610 (C.A.10 1984)). granted certiorari resolve conflict, 521 ----, 118 31, 138 1061 (1997), now affirm judgment. II 7 provides: 8 " (a) 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), 1328(b) title debt- 9 ..... 10 (6) another entity property entity.'' urge fits intentionally rendered inadequate necessarily led According Kawaauhaus, deliberately chose less effective wanted cut costs, while knowing providing substandard care. Such assert, meets malicious'' specification 12 confront pivotal concerning scope exception: Does compass cover acts, intentionally,3 (as urge), ruled)? statute reading. 13 (a)(6) merely injury.'' Or, observed, distinguished torts. Intentional torts "the act,'' itself.'' Restatement (Second) Torts §8A, comment a, p. 15 (1964) (emphasis added). 14 Every traffic accident stemming initial act-for example, rotating wheel automobile make left-hand turn without first checking oncoming traffic-could fit description. F.3d, "knowing breach contract'' also qualify. ibid. "well-known'' "should expressed.'' Gleason Thaw, 236 558, 562, 35 287, 289, 59 717 (1915). Furthermore, "we are hesitant adopt congressional enactment renders portion same law.'' Mackey Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 825, 837, 2182, 2189, 100 836 (1988). Reading obviate need §523(a)(9), specifically exempts death personal caused debtor's operation motor vehicle if such unlawful intoxicated using alcohol, drug, substance.'' §523(a)(9); see §523(a)(12) (exempting "malicious failure'' fulfill certain commitments owed federal depository institutions regulatory agency).4 16 heavily 754 (1904), presented question: survive person another'''? 481, S.Ct., 506. debt. feature statements opinion, particular: [An] sense voluntary'' even performed "without particular malice,'' 485, 508; "necessarily causes intentionally, may said willfully maliciously, come [bankruptcy discharge] exception,'' 487, 509. 509 (the liability "a wrongful just excuse' '') (quoting definition malice Bromage Prosser, Barn. Cress. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B.1825)). 17 exposition crystalline. Counterbalancing portions emphasize, observed qualified trespassory. Indeed, "trespass armis. U.S., 482, 483, 507. Criminal conversation, noted, action "action servant,'' thus we confine holding. That decision, clarify, 18 Subsequent decisions accord our construction. McIntyre Kavanaugh, 242 138, 37 38, 61 205 (1916), broker "deprive[d] forever disposing semblance authority.'' 141, 39. constituted another, bringing But 393 (1934), explained every conversion discharge. Negligent suffice establish "wilful 153. 19 Finally, maintain insurance. Congress, course, decide. unless until makes follow direction provides. 20 *** 21 For reasons stated, 22 Affirmed. syllabus constitutes part prepared Reporter Decisions convenience reader. Detroit Timber Lumber 200 321, 337, 26 282, 50 499. $203,040 special $99,000 general 919 (Bkrtcy.Ct.E.D. Mo.1994). addition, Solomon $18,000 loss consortium $35,000 emotional distress. Ibid. record clear point, appears required state carry Tr. Oral Arg. 19. defined Black's Law Dictionary "voluntary'' "intentional.'' 1434 (5th ed.1979). Consistently, legislative reports note means "deliberate intentional.'' S.Rep. 95-989, (1978) U.S.Code Cong. Admin.News pp. 5787, 5864; H.R.Rep. 95-595, 365 (1977) 5963, 6320. Sections 523(a)(9) (12) added 1984 1990 respectively. Pub.L. 98-353, Stat. 364 (1984) 101-647, 104 4865 (1990).

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