Document: 467 U.S. 203 104 S.Ct. 2305 81 L.Ed.2d 164 ARIZONA, Petitionerv.Dennis Wayne RUMSEY. No. 83-226. Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 23, 1984. Decided May 29, Syllabus Arizona's statutory capital sentencing scheme provides that, after a murder conviction, trial judge, with no jury, must conduct separate hearing to determine whether death is appropriate sentence. The judge choose between two options: or life imprisonment without possibility parole for 25 years. sentence may not be imposed unless at least one aggravating circumstance present, but if there and mitigating sufficiently substantial call leniency. make findings respect each circumstances, involves submission evidence presentation argument, State having burden proving existence circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. After jury convicted respondent armed robbery first-degree murder, conducted required ultimately found that were present. He ruled, contrary State's contention, relating killing pecuniary gain applied only murders hire did apply all committed in order obtain money, such as during robbery. Accordingly, was sentenced on his conviction years, he also 21 years' robbery, sentences run consecutively. Respondent appealed Arizona Court, challenging imposition consecutive sentences, filed cross-appeal, contending court had an error law interpreting "pecuniary gain" contract killings. Rejecting respondent's challenge ruling its set aside remanded redetermination resentencing conviction. On remand, held new hearing; rejected argument imposing penalty would violate Bullington v. Missouri, 451 430, 101 1852, 68 270; present sufficient leniency; death. mandatory appeal, under Bullington, violated Double Jeopardy Clause Fifth Amendment ordered reduced Held: prohibits from This case controlled by which Missouri's proceeding—barring upon reconviction initial resulted rejection because proceeding comparable issue guilt effect acquitted defendant penalty. shares characteristics Missouri made it resemble purposes Clause. Thus, constitutes acquittal penalty, cannot now murder. Although initially relied misconstruction statute defining circumstance, reliance does change double jeopardy effects judgment amounts merits proceeding—whether punishment offense. Wilson, 420 332, 95 1013, 43 232, distinguished. Pp. 209-212. 136 Ariz. 166, 665 P.2d 48, affirmed. William J. Schafer, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., petitioner. James R. Rummage, Deputy Public Defender, respondent. Justice O'CONNOR delivered opinion Court. 1 question presented received appeal. We agree 270 (1981), squarely controls disposition this case. Under interpretation adopted decision, unconstitutional. 2 * An first degree then determine, according considering Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (Supp.1983-1984), Petitioner, relying entirely trial, argued three Respondent, presenting witness, countered several were. One principal points contention concerned scope 13-703(F)(5) defines murder's commission "as consideration receipt, expectation anything value." provision applies hire, whereas petitioner money. 3 Several days hearing, who imposes assistance scheme, returned "special verdict" setting forth circumstances. App. 53-58. In particular, defined 13-703(F)(5), found: 4 "5. commit offense receipt value. 5 "In regard, A.R.S. Madsen March 26, 1980. believes when 13-703(F)(4) (5) are read together they intended contract-type situation burglary, etc." 54-55. 6 Having statutorily barred 13-703(E) (Supp.1983-1984); Pet. Cert. A-3. accordingly mandated imposed. 13-703(A) (Supp.1983-1984). With "dangerous offense" involving use deadly weapon outweighed any circumstance—respondent "planned . what [he] knew few hundred dollars. ." 66. As authorized law, §§ 13-604 13-702 (1978 Supp.1983-1984), prison terms convictions 7 Arizona, arguing both federal state law. 13-4032(4) (1978), appeal permitted file cross-appeal sentence; contended It agreed petitioner, however, misinterpreted 13-703(F)(5): "theft course murder" could constitute section. 130 427, 431, 636 1209, 1213 (1981). Because court's misinterpretation, concluded, "the previously will have matter resentencing." Id., 432, P.2d, 1214. left undisturbed. 8 remand hearing. Neither nor evidence, although opportunity do so. heard lawfulness presence 9 Petitioner neither urged find identified sentencing, largely repeating arguments proceeding. 78-94. North Carolina Pearce, 395 711, 89 2072, 23 656 (1969), Rule Criminal Procedure 26.14, implements principles Pearce effectively conceded thinking foreclosed statement See 104; ("In instant case, hope financial cause ."). But among five enumerated statute: testimony foreperson, based felony-murder instruction, premeditation instruction; thus, contended, regard theft using elevate second into form counting. 94-108. 10 special verdict reciting nonstatutory seven namely, concerning gain. none fact felony all, 118-124. 11 resentencing, been "acquitted" Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment. Benton Maryland, 784, 2056, 707 (1969). Due Process interpreted supra. addressed argument. concluded Court's decision supra, constitutional prohibition jeopardy. 48 (1983). therefore 12 petition writ certiorari. granted certiorari, 464 1038, 697, 79 163 (1983), affirm. II 13 thus bars has purposes. discretion sentencer—the Missouri—is restricted precisely death, release 50 addition, sentencer guided substantive standards introduced formally resembles trial. Finally, prosecution prove certain facts doubt support U.S., 438, S.Ct., 1857. For these reasons, proceeding, determined failed believed anxiety ordeal suffered equal those guilt, 14 Arizona—is detailed circumstances; found, usual rules govern admission 171-172, 53-54. held, indistinguishable Missouri. 171-174, 53-56. 15 That rather than render less like Morrison, 429 1, 3, 97 24, 25, (1976) (Double treats bench trials alike). Nor availability appellate review, including reweighing process part single continuing noted role strictly court, court. Indeed, need taken imposed, can work defendant's advantage. 173-174, 55-56. short, completed triggers protections 16 principle relevant same invoked Bullington: sole decisionmaker final retrial charge. Application renders violation undoubtedly central entered denying favor judgment, establish legal entitlement sentence, and, such, appropriateness 17 making findings, circumstance. Reliance merits. "[T]he 'the result erroneous evidentiary rulings interpretations governing principles' affects accuracy determination, alter essential character." Scott, 437 82, 98, 98 2187, 2197, 57 65 (1978) (quoting id., 106, 2201 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting)). cases hold even error. 18 232 (1975), guilty. holding application No problem Wilson reviewing asserted errors simply jury's guilty reinstated; factfinding necessary, twice placed By contrast, fact, favorable "guilty" reinstate. "remanded resentencing," 1214—that is, similar first. Whereas subjected first, happened III 19 attach therefore, 20 invited overrule decided years ago. decline invitation. adherence precedent rigidly cases, departure doctrine stare decisis demands justification. See, e.g., Swift & Co. Wickham, 382 111, 116, 86 258, 261, 194 (1965); Smith Allwright, 321 649, 665, 64 757, 765, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). suggested reason warrant our taking exceptional action overruling Bullington. 22 Affirmed. REHNQUIST, whom WHITE joins, dissenting. 24 Today affirms vacating Applying given bare majority concludes amounted implied eligibility I continue believe wrongly reasons expressed POWELL's dissent apart views, reasoning underlying correct dissent. premise today finding—that imposed—amounted "implied acquittal" thereby barring enhanced virtue continued rationale inapt. Unlike where broad decide appropriate, judge's carefully confined directed determining specified factors existed. Compare Mo.Rev.Stat. 565.008 (1979) obvious record established murdered victim undisputed sentencing. sense meaningfully "prove" case—the hard see how explicitly establishes factual basis construction impose 26 If, corrected itself remanding, prevent much clear (1975). stating well-settled rule reversing subject further review subjecting jeopardy, we wrote: 27 "It difficult why should different gotten postverdict District Judge Appeals, some ruling. discharging obviously enhances likelihood subjects him expense anxiety, legitimate claim benefit before trier fact." 345, 1023. 28 mean sought marshal additional against proved insufficient "case" time. There logical here purpose correcting error, particularly kind "retrial" condemned. reverse

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