Document: 500 U.S. 391 111 S.Ct. 1884 114 L.Ed.2d 432 Dale Robert YATESv.Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. No. 89-7691. Argued Jan. 8, 1991. Decided May 28, Syllabus Petitioner Yates and Henry Davis robbed a grocery store owned by Willie Wood. After wounded Wood, he fled the store, but remained, struggling with When Wood's mother entered grabbed Davis, stabbed her once, killing her. Wood then killed Davis. Subsequently, was arrested charged, inter alia, accomplice murder. At his trial, State argued that had planned to rob kill any witnesses, thus making as guilty murder under law because it probable or natural consequence robbery. As element malice, judge instructed jury, among other things, "malice is implied presumed" from either "willful, deliberate, intentional doing an unlawful act" "use deadly weapon." convicted, conviction upheld Supreme Court. He sought writ habeas corpus court, asserting presumption on use weapon unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction under, this Court's decisions in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 510, 99 2450, 61 39, Francis Franklin, 471 307, 105 1965, 85 344, which found similar jury instructions violated Due Process Clause. Twice court denied relief, twice Court remanded case for further consideration light Francis. On second remand, state again holding that, although unconstitutional, both allowing presume malice were harmless error. It its enquiry determine "whether beyond reasonable doubt would have unnecessary rely erroneous mandatory regarding malice." Concluding relied Davis' prove murder, did not presumptions facts showed acted when "lunged" at Mrs. multiple times. Held: 1. The failed apply proper harmless-error standard, stated Chapman California, 386 18, 24, 87 824, 828, 17 705 held error if appears "beyond complained contribute verdict obtained." Pp. 400-407. (a) An does "not verdict" only unimportant relation everything else considered issue question, revealed record. In applying Chapman, must first ask what evidence actually reaching verdict, weigh probative force against standing alone. enough could reached without reliance presumption. whether rested establishing presumed fact doubt, independently Before looking entire trial record assess significance presumption, however, crucial ascertain jurors, persons, 402-406. (b) employed deficient standard review. Its can been same presumptions, there sufficient support presumptions' effect. However, satisfy 's concerns fails jury's rest well such compelling show made no difference verdict. 406-407. 2. may be excused 407-411. Judicial economy best served makes own assessment errors' harmlessness instance has already twice, once analysis. See Rose Clark, 478 570, 584, 106 3101, 3109, 92 460. P. 1895. equivalent intent kill. While inferred all kill, cannot finding necessary intended since evidentiary simply clear issue. examination reveals transferred theory and, thus, barred treating underlying specific circumstances death do indicate so convincingly said jurors exclusive presumptions. court's description having she joined struggle died single stab wound, inflicted inadvertently. --- S.C. ---, S.E.2d 530, reversed remanded. SOUTER, J., delivered opinion Court, REHNQUIST, C.J., WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, JJ., joined, Part III BLACKMUN, footnote 6 SCALIA, joined. filed concurring part judgment, B David I. Bruck, Columbia, S.C., petitioner. Miller W. Shealy, Jr., respondents. Justice SOUTER 1 This comes before us third time, review determination We hold review, find errors harmless, reverse. 2 * A. 3 Petitioner, Yates, accomplice, country Greenville County, Carolina. shooting wounding proprietor, petitioner fled. woman shot proprietor. soon after robbery charged felonies.1 Although one, prosecuted him accomplice.2 4 shows some time commit selected T.P. Store easy target. parking car outside, they armed handgun knife. They one inside except who behind counter. brandished their weapons, ordered give them money cash register. hesitated, repeated demand. gave approximately $3,000 cash. handed lie across pistol beneath jacket, refused stepped back counter hands down side. meanwhile backing away toward entrance gun pointed told shoot. raised protect himself, whereupon fired twice. One bullet pierced left hand tore flesh wound chest, missed. screamed, "Let's go," ran out money. App. 57. jumped into passenger side waited. emerge, moved seat drove off. 5 Inside though wounded, around pursued back. two struggled, mother, Helen emerged adjacent office. She screamed saw scuffle men help son. testified "reached arm [Davis]. So, three stumbled counter, aisle." Id., 19. During struggle, chest scene within minutes.3 managed remove jacket fire five shots instantly. police short while later Under law, "where persons combine act, execution criminal homicide committed actors those acts [sic], present participating act are fatal act." Johnson, 291 127, 129, 352 480, 482 (1987). Petitioner's primary defense charge brought induce owner empty register, neither nor anyone during robbery.4 37, 42-44, 49, 77-78. 7 prosecution's petitioner's agreement From witnesses scene, thereby rendered result robbery, satisfaction requirement liability. closing argument prosecutor asserted leaving "any store." "with idea stabbing proprietor death; quiet killing, [petitioner's] backup." agreement, concluded, "[i]t struck blow, all." 89. also addressed required malice. "Mr. Yates," argued, "is equally guilty. heart," even victim. 83. 8 human being aforethought express implied." 95. continued: 9 "In order convict deceased Defendant, done aforethought, proof doubt. Malice defined technical term, imports wickedness excludes just cause excuse your action. something springs wickedness, depravity, depraved spirit, heart devoid social duty, fatally bent creating mischief. words 'express' 'implied' mean different kinds ways kind known shown. 10 "Malice expressed where previous threats vengeance someone lies wait come might attack them, directly really entertained. 11 where, intention proved direct evidence, indirectly necessarily are, themselves, proved. willful, excuse. general signification, means wrongful intentionally, justification 12 "I tell you, proven raise rebuttable, is, conclusive rebuttable evidence. I also, weapon. you surrounding put to, removed. And ultimately remains responsibility ladies gentlemen, make existed mind killer blow struck." 96-97. 13 went instruct returned verdicts counts indictment.5 affirmed conviction, we certiorari. 280 29, 310 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 1124, 103 3098, 77 1356 (1983). 14 thereafter "that weapon" precedent, Elmore, 279 417, 308 781 (1983), our decision 39 (1979). petition pending, another instructions, 344 (1985). attention relief opinion, certiorari here. granted writ, vacated judgment Aiken, 474 896, 218, 88 218 15 ground supra, applied retroactively. here, certiorari, 480 945, 107 1601, 94 788 (1987), concern complied mandate reconsider earlier supra. 484 211, 214, 108 534, 536, 98 546 unanimously erred failing consider retroactive application question merely principle settled prior should, reason, retroactively proceeding. accordingly proceedings inconsistent opinion. U.S., S.Ct., 538. 16 "[a]cquiescing conclusion judge's constituted improper presumption." 531 (1989). reviewing record, "two charges First, 'willful, excuse' [implied malice]. Second, charged: 'malice weapon'. . ." S.E.2d, 532. Despite majority justices described Ibid. "the case, judge, killer, Davis." Reviewing facts, "Davis lunged knife [and] fell floor wounds moments." - 531-532 (emphasis supplied). crime "Henry Davis's brutal Wood," [that] concluding Wood." 532 citation resulting wounds. 18 remaining dissented. expressing authorized error, id., dissenters disagreed harmless. "failed articulate malicious intent." Following mistakenly confusing carried gun. allowed eclipsed Yates' withdrawal, prejudiced right fair trial." 534-535. 19 Because appeared wrong determining challenged misread applied, time. 498 ----, 41, 112 (1990). II 20 513, 524, 2453, 2459, stating " 'the presumes person intends ordinary consequences voluntary acts' Clause prosecution each re Winship, 397 358, 90 1068, 25 368 (1970). (1985), 'acts sound discretion product person's will' 'is intend acts.' 316-318, 1972-73. omitted). these pernicious context shifted burden defendant. 21 charging With respect "presumption evidence." 96. "under killer."6 22 think juror understood upon introduction tending rebut should bearing together still retain significance. A along disprove ways, remained,7 tendency shift Respondents challenge Francis, constitutionality 23 Having concluded constitutionally erroneous, correctly treated subject consistently 582, 3108, 460 (1986), taint citing (1967).8 test 828; see ibid. (requirement federal constitutional embodies requiring reversal 'there possibility contributed conviction' ") (quoting Fahy Connecticut, 375 85, 86-87, 84 229, 230, 171 (1963)); Arizona Fulminante, 499 1246, 1257, 113 302 (1991) (confession "did [the defendant's] conviction"); Delaware Van Arsdall, 475 673, 681, 1431, 1436, 89 674 (1986) (Chapman excuses 'harmless' terms effect factfinding process trial"). 24 To say "contribute" ensuing not, course, totally unaware feature erroneous. When, example, hardly infer it, factually untenable most cases, run appellate practice, generally follow given. Richardson Marsh, 481 200, 1702, 1709, 95 176 (1987) ("rule juries pragmatic rooted less absolute certitude true than belief represents practical accommodation interests defendant"). rather, Thus, about measured 26 take quite distinct steps. If, fact.9 Did look predicate presumption? answering conduct subjective jurors' minds. answer come, instead, analysis given customary specifically, relevant point so. 27 Once Chapman's will Rather, Since minds, approach asking presumably accordance overwhelming leave resting absence comparatively minimal degree said, words, rendered. 28 requires identification evaluation addition itself, need word assumption many opinions rule, judged See, e.g., 1436 ("[A]n otherwise valid set aside confidently say, whole doubt"); United States Hasting, 461 499, 509, n. 7, 1974, 1981, 76 96 (1983) ("Chapman mandates reversing harmless"). That findings rested. contrary, incorrect, permit drawn always kept narrow focus questionable anything presumed.10 therefore, C 29 case. threshold matter, undertake explicit view scope Chapman. more significant, formulated. Instead, language taken "would rely" presumptions.11 30 Enquiry necessity reliance, concerns. But obtained. apparently latter issues consideration, required. 31 usual practice cases like reverse remand new correct authority instance. 3109. analysis, serve judicial proceeding now 32 begin turning State's domestic elements entails. decided "correctly precisely" common rule murder," malice.12 38, 810. alleged determined 33 approved accept statement subject. "intention kill," legal excuse.13 There clearly used weapon, knife, commit, justification, itself. 34 step intent, themselves. rebutting including testimony anyone. free reasonably expected Likewise, construed confidence post-Chapman reviewed assessing errors. 35 kill: instead have, attacked jumping enhanced least reasons thought avoid himself injured identified police. 36 nothing mother. Application would, equate accosting C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 144 (14th ed. 1979) ("Under common-law doctrine defendant, kills bystander, deemed author whatever victim"); American Institute, Model Penal Code 2.03(2) therefore 37 far clear. inside, inference undoubtedly permissible, compelled rational necessity. anyone, knowing had, fact, heard scream yet effort return 57, 61. Hence, behavior confirming claim originally whom store. 38 Nor reveal Carolina, sure, viewed showing directed specifically repetitiveness ruling inadvertence. "lunged knife" "wounds" "brutal stabbing." 531-532. supported eyewitness homicide, grabbed" [them] how encountered pathologist performed autopsy "[t]here noted external surface body." 32. physical suffered chest. assertion "multiple summation conceded "it [Mrs. Wood] tried grab Mr. 88. certainty between course it. inadvertently 40 sum, Without more, guilt accomplice. IV 41 42 ordered. 43 BLACKMUN joins B, judgment. 44 agree carefully constructed methodolgy disagree concerning Unlike "deadly harmless; "unlawful assigns. concur reversal, join 45 my simple reason disappeared ("burst") 'when [the] [were] to.' Ante, 96). 46 removed" portion seriously. believes, "a [reasonable] felt obliged application" qualifying "inherently contradictory." If literally, reasons, very vanish. 401, 6. contradiction. seems me possible proving use. victim, dead gunshot defendant shown access possession shot. Or (and here), sides concede used. often confront difficulty (as opposed theoretical understanding "inherent contradiction"), frequently nice particular factual establish "circumstances" well. problem Any "circumstances use" placed details introduced, engaged son, 'all aisle.' 395 19) added). seriously, conclude 47 matter. utterly disappear certain merely, instruction, conclusive" "rebuttable concludes "simply victim," ante, 411. followed matter contained. 48 feels empowered decide basis "free 408. Indeed, believe (Surely "rebuttable" conveys rebutted.) problem—what impossible basis—is examining mind. Not established overcome (rebut) Or, differently, properly assume ultimate determination, using appropriate proof. Carella 491 263, 273, 109 2419, 2424, (1989) (SCALIA, judgment). 49 Given nature then, "entire record" "harmless" purely hypothetical viz., whether, correctly, existence Such inquiry announced (1967) reiterated today. "[T]he 404 Bollenbach States, 326 607, 614, 66 402, 406, L.Ed. 350 (1946) ("the spelt according procedure standards trials"). ensures has, ensure jury. 50 51 For foregoing indicted assault battery conspiracy. liability felony-murder statute. penetrating penetrated full thickness probe examination. withdrawn shouted allegedly scheme, contended liable subsequent former challenges conviction. Brief 10, 5. qualified "when removed." 97. confuses clarifies. included melee occured. Yet vanished. inherently contradictory. "bursting bubble" clause insufficient presuming 322, 1975, (1985) ("Language contradicts explain infirm suffice absolve infirmity"). permissive "does require trier elemental basic places defendant." Ulster County Allen, 140, 157, 2213, 2224, 60 777 allows long irrational. 314-315, 1971. 267, 2421, (1989), SCALIA entirely consistent articulation contain context, suggests restrictive Compare 580-581, 3107 ("In conclusively injury") original) 579, 3106 (rebuttable "[w]here developed establishes doubt"). statement, terms, reflect every case; second, isolation, correct, today explains. itself variety element, identify alternative element. proposed "are closely related fact." 271, 2423 situation urged, tend deter considering evidence; indeed, waste contrary instructions. 526, 13, 2460, 13. rendering operation. 583, quotes dissent Connecticut 73, 97, 5, 969, 983, 74 823 (Powell, dissenting), way suggest presumption," rigorous imposed "We precisely applicable it." 805, 810 (1982). entertained." Where exist, kill" "from proved." summing up definition "must combination evil produces result." Our reading reflected prosecutor's witnesses. 85-86. 535 (Toal, dissenting) ("[T]he intent").

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