Document: Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JEREMY CARROLL v. ANDREW CARMAN, ET UX. ON PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI TO APPEALS THIRD CIRCUIT No. 14–212. Decided November 10, 2014 PER CURIAM. On July 3, 2009, the Pennsylvania State Police Depart- ment received a report that man named Michael Zita had stolen car and two loaded handguns. The also said might have fled to home of Andrew Karen Carman. department sent Officers Jeremy Carroll Brian Roberts Carmans’ inves- tigate. Neither officer been before. 749 F.3d 192, 195 (CA3 2014). officers arrived in separate patrol cars around 2:30 p.m. house sat on corner lot—the front faced main street while left (as viewed from front) side street. initially drove house, but after discovering parking was not available there, turned right onto As they did so, saw several parked side- by-side gravel area property. “first avail- able spot,” at “the far rear property.” Ibid. (quoting Tr. 70 (Apr. 8, 2013)). exited their cars. looked toward small structure (ei- ther carport or shed) with its door open light on. Id., 71. Thinking someone be inside, Officer walked over, “poked [his] head” in, “Pennsylvania Police.” F.3d, 71 2013); alteration original). No one however, so continued walking house. approached, sliding glass 2 CARMAN opened ground-level deck. thought “looked like customary entryway,” he decided knock it. 83 stepped deck, came out “belligerent[ly] aggressively ap- proached” them. 195. identified themselves, explained were looking for Zita, asked his name. refused answer. Instead, away appeared reach waist. 195–196. grabbed man’s arm make sure reaching weapon. twisted Car- roll, lost balance, fell into yard. 196. At point, woman what happening. again Zita. then herself as Carman, her hus- band, told there. In response, permission search Carman consented, everyone went inside. searched find They left. Carmans charged any crimes. later sued Federal District Court under 42 U.S. C. §1983. Among other things, alleged unlawfully entered property violation Fourth Amendment when backyard deck without warrant. trial, argued entry lawful “knock talk” exception warrant require- ment. That exception, contended, allows someone’s door, long stay “on those portions [the] general public is al- 3 lowed go on.” 7 2013). re- sponded normal visitor would gone rather than Thus, argued, apply. close Carroll’s case chief, parties each moved judgment matter law. denied both motions, jury. rele- vant here, instructed jury “allows resident’s otherwise proach residence seeking speak inhabitants, just private citizen might.” 24 further “officers should restrict movements walkways, driveways, porches places where visitors could expected go.” returned verdict Carroll. appealed, Appeals Third Circuit reversed relevant part. court held violated law because “requires police begin encounter an implied invitation 199. entitled qualified immunity actions clearly established therefore versed petitioned certiorari. We grant petition reverse Circuit’s determination immunity. A government official §1983 unless statutory constitutional time challenged conduct. See Ashcroft al-Kidd, 563 ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., 3). 4 only if contours are sufficiently clear “a reasonable understand doing violates right.” Anderson Creighton, 483 635, 640 (1987). words, “existing precedent must placed question beyond debate.” S., 9). This doctrine “gives officials breathing room mistaken judgments,” “pro- tects ‘all plainly incompetent who know- ingly violate law.’ ” 12) Malley Briggs, 475 335, 341 (1986)). Here cited single sup- port decision immunity—Estate Smith Marasco, 318 497 2003). Assuming sake argument controlling circuit constitute estab- lished federal these circumstances, see Reichle Howards, 566 (2012) 7), Marasco does establish mans’ rights. Robert Smith’s knocked door. When respond, backyard, least garage. 519. acknowledged officers’ “entry curtilage receiving answer reasonable.” 520. It held, Dis- trict made factual findings needed decide issue. 521. For example, noted record “did discuss layout position prop- erty,” “there [was] no indication whether followed path apparently route suggestive reasonableness.” remanded proceedings. concluding 5 this case, relied exclusively Marasco’s statement reason- able.” 520; 199 supra, 520). court’s view, But conclusion follow. unsuccessful automatically allow parts hold, knocking required before visitors. simply may back Indeed, issue seems even let alone use. Moreover, expressly stated ableness.” makes wholly different necessarily “restrict[ed] drive- ways, To extent says anything about it arguably supports view. “[o]fficers allowed residence’s approach inhabitants may.” that, “ ‘when come . ex- pected (e.g., porches), observa- tions such vantage points covered by Amendment.’ W. LaFave, 6 Search Seizure §2.3(f ) (3d ed. 1996 Supp. 2003) (footnotes omitted)). Had read statements going concluded— quite reasonably—that visitors.* more perplexing comparison decisions state courts, which rejected rule adopted here. United States Titemore, 437 251 (CA2 2006), approached doors. first traditional driveway; second porch. chose latter. 253–254. appeal, defendant Amendment. 255–256. Second argument. explained, primary entrance visible used public.” 259. “[b]ecause [the officer] principal using take,” 252. Seventh James, 40 850 (1994), vacated grounds, 516 1022 (1995), provides another example. There, —————— * footnote, “recognize[d] there some instances visitors,” “this instance.” 198, n. (emphasis added). footnote still reflects view dwelling, “which most circumstances door.” 198. Cf. Perea-Rey, 680 1179, 1188 (CA9 2012) (“Officers conducting talk need specific multiple doors accessible public.”). duplex entrances. Bypassing “used paved walk- way along leading 862. rights argument, explaining “accessible public” “was commonly entering nearby alley.” situations “where readily public,” implicated belief means access dwelling.” also, e.g., Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279–1280 1993) (“If read- ily place, driveway reasonably believing dwelling”); Domicz, 188 N. J. 285, 302, 907 A.2d 395, 405 (2006) (“when enforcement walks purpose making contact resident believes visitors, unconstitutionally trespassing property”). do today cases cor- rectly conduct “But applied below correct, ‘beyond debate.’ Stanton Sims, 571 (2013) (per curiam) 8) Kidd, 9)). erred certiorari granted. 8 reversed, proceedings consistent opinion. ordered.

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