Document: 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007) Gary DAVENPORT, et al., Petitioners, v. WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Washington, Petitioner, Washington Education Association. Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 10, 2007. Decided June 14, *2376 Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for petitioners. Paul D. Clement, Solicitor Atlanta, GA, States as Amicus curiae, by special leave the Court, supporting John West, DC, respondent. Judith A. Lonnquist, Seattle, Harriet Strasberg, Counsel Record, Jeremiah Collins, Laurence Gold, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Respondent. Milton L. Chappell, Petitioners Glenn Taubman c/o National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, VA, Steven T. O'Ban Ellis, Li, McKinstry PLLC, Petitioners. Maureen Hart, Linda Dalton, Sr. Assistant Thomas Wendel, William Berggren Deputy Petitioner. Justice SCALIA delivered opinion Court. The State prohibits labor unions from using agency-shop fees a nonmember election-related purposes unless affirmatively consents. We decide whether this restriction, applied public-sector unions, violates First Amendment. I Labor Relations Act leaves free regulate their relationships with public employees. See 49 Stat. 450, amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). laws many authorize union and government employer enter into what is commonly known an agreement. This arrangement entitles levy fee on employees who are not members but nevertheless represented in collective bargaining. See, e.g., Lehnert Ferris Faculty *2377 Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 511, 111 1950, 114 Ed. 2d 572 (1991). primary purpose such arrangements prevent nonmembers free-riding union's efforts, sharing employment benefits obtained bargaining without costs incurred. Machinists Street, 367 740, 760-764, 81 1784, 6 1141 (1961). However, sector raise Amendment concerns because they force individuals contribute money condition employment. Thus, Abood Detroit Bd. Ed., 431 209, 235-236, 97 1782, 52 261 (1977), we held that constitutionally prohibited objecting ideological germane collective-bargaining duties. And Teachers Hudson, 475 292, 302, 304-310, 106 1066, 89 232 (1986), set forth various procedural requirements collecting agency must observe order ensure can use his impermissible purposes. Neither Hudson nor any our other cases, however, has mandates obtain affirmative consent before spending nonmember's chargeable under Abood. authorized negotiate agreements. Where agreements effect, law allows charge equivalent full membership dues have collected through payroll deductions. Wash. Rev.Code §§ 41.56.122(1), 41.59.060(2), 41.59.100 (2006). 42.17.760 (hereinafter 760), which provision Fair Campaign Practices (a state initiative approved voters 1992), restricts ability spend it collects. Section 760, stood when decision review was rendered, provided: "A organization may shop paid individual member make contributions or expenditures influence election operate political committee, individual."[1] Respondent, exclusive agent approximately 70,000 educational employees, Consistent its responsibilities (or so assume these cases), respondent sent "Hudson packet" all twice year, notifying them right object paying nonchargeable expenditures, giving three options: (1) pay within 30 days; (2) expenses *2378 receive rebate calculated respondent; (3) determined arbitrator. Respondent escrow were reasonably dispute until process complete. In 2001, found itself courts defending, two separate lawsuits, nonmembers' fees. first lawsuit brought petitioner No. 05-1657, second putative class action several union, petitioners 05-1589. Both suits claimed respondent's violation 760. alleged had failed authorization specified after trial merits, court violated 760 awarded both monetary injunctive relief. different judge provided private action, certified class, stayed further proceedings pending interlocutory appeal. After intermediate appellate proceedings, divided that, although failure receiving did satisfy 760's affirmative-authorization requirement matter law, statute's imposition Federal Constitution. ex rel. Public Disclosure Comm'n 156 Wash.2d 543, 553-571, 130 P.3d 352, 356-365 (2006) (en banc). reasoned Court's agency-fee jurisprudence established balance between rights nonmembers, triggered heightened scrutiny deviated imposing burden confirming does expenditure electoral also interfered expressive associational Boy Scouts America Dale, 530 640, 120 2446, 147 554 (2000). granted certiorari. 548 ___, 35, 165 1014 II authorizes do wish join union. Regardless one's views desirability agreements, see Abood, U.S., at 225, n. 20, undeniably unusual give entity power, essence, tax As like respondent, simply exercise extraordinary prohibiting notion modest limitation upon benefit-violates is, say least, counterintuitive. concedes could gone much further, restricting portion devoted Brief 46-47. Indeed, uncontested would be constitutional eliminate entirely. id., 46 (citing Lincoln Fed. Union Northwestern Iron Metal Co., 335 525, 69 251, 93 212 (1949)). For reasons follow, *2379 conclude far less restrictive placed exact no greater concern. A principal reason concluded unconstitutional believed having balanced dictated shoulder barred Wash.2d, 557-563, P.3d, 358-360. reached conclusion primarily cases repeatedly invoked following proposition: "`[D]issent presumedit made dissenting employee.'" 306, 16, 1066 (quoting 774, 1784); supra, 238, 1782. perceived requiring consent. interpretation extends well beyond proper ambit. Those balancing manner suggests, simple entitlement nonmember-employees. Union, 529-531, 251. never suggested implicated whenever governments place limitations above require. To contrary, described "outlin[ing] minimum procedures [public-sector] relationship meet Abood." Keller Bar Cal., 496 1, 17, 110 2228, 1 (1990) (emphasis added). mere fact required more than trigger scrutiny. floor unions' collection ceiling state-imposed restrictions. read too admonition "dissent presumed." meant only improper enjoin including those objected, statutory satisfied narrower remedy. 768-770, 772-775, 1784 (discussing possible judicial remedies federal statute forbade employees' purposes); 237-242, 1782 unconstitutionally bargaining); (setting necessary violating Abood). But, justices below correctly recognized, repeated affirmation obligation interfere vindicate imply legislatures voters) themselves cannot limit scope entitlement. *2380 B defends judgment ground quite mistaken rationale adopted Washington. Its argument begins premise how "its" money, citing proposition description encumbering funds lawfully possession. 21; 568-569, 363-364. Relying premise, invokes Nat. Bank Boston Bellotti, 435 765, 98 1407, 55 707 (1978), Austin Michigan Chamber Commerce, 494 652, 1391, 108 652 (1990), related campaign-finance cases. It argues rigorous applies ballot propositions corporations. Washington's notwithstanding, point. Amendment, entirely immaterial already lawful possession law. What matters union-contracting agencies compelled relies deal governmental restrictions regulated come assistance coercion 767-768, 1407; Austin, 654-656, 1391. fairly restriction money; acquire people's money.[2] question asked, therefore, enjoy essentially answers draws distinctions based content speech, while permitting rest objects. contention *2381 amounts content-based discrimination off mark. true enough regulations speech presumptively invalid. R.A.V. St. Paul, 505 377, 382, 112 2538, 305 (1992) cases). "[t]he general prohibition ... `raises specter Government effectively drive certain ideas viewpoints marketplace.'" Id., 387, 2538 Simon Schuster, Inc. Members N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 105, 116, 501, 116 476 (1991)). identified numerous situations risk inconsequential, strict unwarranted. example, obscene defamatory proscribed social interest morality outweighs negligible contribution categories marketplace ideas. R.A.V., 382-384, 2538. Similarly, among instances proscribable pose threat selected subclass chosen very entire proscribed. 388, (confirming choose ban most prurient obscenity). Of particular relevance here, recognize will impermissibly sometimes attenuated acting capacity regulator. Accordingly, subsidizes speech. Regan Taxation With Representation Wash., 461 540, 548-550, 103 1997, 76 129 (1983). black-letter permits property nonpublic forum, exclude speakers basis subject matter, long drawn viewpoint neutral reasonable light served forum. Cornelius NAACP Fund, 473 788, 799-800, 806, 105 3439, 87 567 (1985). principle underlying treatment equally applicable narrow circumstances believe distorted reasonable, viewpoint-neutral State's allowing sought protect integrity process, 563, 361, evidently thought being impaired infusion extracted state-bestowed thus limited state-created harm enact across-the-board concern process. said totally issue, regulation permissible "there realistic possibility official suppression afoot." 390, think same when, repealable *2382 coerce payment issue. Even if neutral, cf. Cornelius, satisfies requirement. Quite obviously, afoot, since remains participate available state-coerced lacking permission. Cf. Regan, 549-550, 1997 (First require enhance person's speak). sum, given unique context arrangements, nature violate emphasize important holding: uphold face public- private-sector Washington.[3] Since collect contractually taken employers rather agencies, presents somewhat question.[4] need answer today, stage litigation overbreadth challenge. generally Schaumburg Citizens Better Environment, 444 620, 633-634, 100 826, 63 73 (1980) (applying doctrine).[5] Instead, consistently argued itself. noted applicability establish just agencies' compulsory 24, 48. That contention, unconvincing immaterial. undoubtedly one protecting elections limiting ways. But though means depending type involved: *2383 conditioned time constitutionality respect bearing unions. * hold therefore vacate remand inconsistent opinion. ordered. BREYER, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring part judgment. agree rested flawed interpretations concur judgment, Parts II-A paragraph 2 Part II-B, addresses arguments Association raised briefs 565, 6, 362, banc) (noting neither addressed below). address lower been opportunity them. Collegiate Athletic Assn. Smith, 525 459, 469-470, 119 924, 142 929 (1999). NOTES [1] amended codify "use" passed question. Supp. 2-3. concedes, 3, moot. Because damages prior version still correct Our analysis affected amendment, merely causes frequently thought. [2] might point if, suggests times, burdened own members. solely "use [of] member." members' chose commingle App. Pet. Cert. pp. 99a, 105a-107a. Respondent's improvident accounting practices render unconstitutional. note current technology, likely burdensome wishes provide expenditures. similar reasons, invocation (2000), misplaced, basically relying case. compel acceptance unwanted otherwise attractive. Rumsfeld Forum Academic Institutional Rights, 547 47, 68-69, 126 1297, 164 [3] Under Act, unfair practice 158(a)(3), retain power execution application 164(b). [4] suggest different. previously construed arguably based. Communications Workers Beck, 487 735, 738, 762-763, 2641, 101 634 (1988) (§ 158(a)(3) over objection furtherance obligations representative); Ellis Railway Clerks, 466 435, 450-451, 104 1883, 80 428 (1984) (expenditures publications report about activities representative charged objection). [5] Nor clear "strong medicine" doctrine even challenge Virginia Hicks, 539 113, 118-120, 123 2191, 148 (2003) (recognizing doctrine's benefitseliminating chilling effect overbroad nonpartiesmust weighed against costsblocking perfectly applications law). targets prohibition, sufficiently capable defending interests significantly "chilled."

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