Document: 457 U.S. 368 102 S.Ct. 2485 73 L.Ed.2d 74 UNITED STATES, Petitionerv.Learley Reed GOODWIN. No. 80-2195. Argued April 21, 1982. Decided June 18, Syllabus After initially expressing an interest in plea bargaining on misdemeanor charges, respondent decided not to plead guilty and requested a trial by jury. While the charges were still pending, he was indicted convicted Federal District Court felony charge arising out of same incident as charges. Respondent moved set aside verdict ground prosecutorial vindictiveness, contending that indictment gave rise impermissible appearance retaliation. The denied motion. Appeals reversed, holding that, although prosecutor did act with actual vindictiveness seeking indictment, Due Process Clause prohibits Government from bringing more serious against defendant after has invoked his right jury trial, unless comes forward objective evidence increased could have been brought before exercised right. Believing circumstances surrounding genuine risk retaliation, court adopted legal presumption vindictiveness. Held : A warranted this case, absent such no due process violation established. Pp. 372-384. (a) In cases which action detrimental taken exercise right, improper vindictive motive applied only where reasonable likelihood existed. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 711, 89 2072, 23 656; Blackledge Perry, 417 94 2098, 40 628. Cf. Bordenkircher Hayes, 434 357, 98 663, 54 604. 372-380. (b) change prosecutor's charging decision made initial is completed much likely be improperly motivated than pretrial decision. It unrealistic assume probable response motions tried seek penalize deter. Here, timing suggests warranted. should remain free discretion determine extent societal prosecution. filed may reflect individual legitimately subject Bordenkircher, supra. 380-382. (c) nature asserted confirms case. mere fact refuses forces government prove its case insufficient warrant subsequent changes are unwarranted. 382-383. (d) respondent, opposed having bench does compel special whenever additional thereafter brought. there opportunity for here, justify imposition prophylactic rule. possibility would respond defendant's demand public explained penalty imposed sounlikely certainly Pp.383-384 4th Cir., 637 F.2d 250, reversed remanded. Andrew L. Frey, Washington, D.C., petitioner. Paul W. Spence, Baltimore, Md., respondent. Justice STEVENS delivered opinion Court. 1 This involves presumptions. question presented whether used evaluate judicial or criminal retried also trial. 2 pending charge. sequence events retaliation jury, United States Fourth Circuit conviction. 250. Because presents important concerning scope our holdings 656, 628, we granted Government's petition certiorari. 454 1079, 632, 70 613. 3 * Goodwin stopped speeding Park Policeman Baltimore-Washington Parkway. emerged car talk policeman. brief discussion, officer noticed clear plastic bag underneath armrest next driver's seat Goodwin's car. asked return raise armrest. so, but raised placed into gear accelerated rapidly. struck officer, knocking him first onto back then highway. policeman returned car, eluded high-speed chase. 4 following day, complaint several petty offenses, including assault. arrested arraigned Magistrate. Magistrate date fled jurisdiction. Three years later found custody Virginia Maryland. 5 Upon return, respondent's assigned attorney Department Justice, who detailed temporarily try crime authority indictments grand initiated negotiations prosecutor, advised wish desired Court.1 6 transferred responsibility prosecution assumed Assistant Attorney. Approximately six weeks later, reviewing discussing it parties, obtained four-count one count forcibly assaulting federal three related counts incident.2 count. 7 motion, finding "the adequately dispelled any retaliatory intent."3 8 Although readily concluded indictment," F.2d, at 252, nevertheless reversed. Relying decisions supra, held Fifth Amendment show rights. believed designed spare courts "unseemly task" probing motives prosecutor. 255. II 9 To punish person because done what law plainly allows do "of most basic sort." 363, 668, series beginning Pearce culminating recognized basic—and itself uncontroversial principle. For while penalized violating law, just punished exercising protected statutory constitutional right.4 10 punishment very purpose virtually all proceedings. presence punitive motivation, therefore, provide adequate basis distinguishing governmental fully justified legitimate perceived conduct noncriminal, activity. Motives complex difficult prove. As result, certain necessary "presume" motive. Given severity presumption, however—which operate absence proof thus block conduct—the so exists. 11 neither Double Jeopardy nor Equal Protection judge imposing harsher sentence retrial successfully attacks conviction appeal. stated, however, "[i]t can hardly doubted flagrant [of Clause] Fourteenth state follow announced practice heavier upon every reconvicted explicit punishing succeeded getting original aside." U.S., 723-724, S.Ct., 2080. continued: 12 "Due then, requires attacked must play part receives new And since fear unconstitutionally deter appeal collaterally attack conviction, freed apprehension motivation sentencing judge." Id., 725, 13 order assure concluded: 14 "[W]henever imposes severe reasons doing affirmatively appear. Those based information identifiable occurring time proceeding. factual data record, legitimacy reviewed appeal." 726, 2081. 15 sum, overcome record justifying sentence.5 16 confronted problem setting different considered Pearce. Perry assault inferior exclusive jurisdiction misdemeanors. 6-month sentence. Under had absolute de novo Superior Court, possessed notice appeal, deadly weapon. pleaded sentenced term five seven prison. 17 Perry's sentence,6 stated essence followed it: 18 "The lesson emerges Colten, Chaffin offended possibilities those pose realistic 'vindictiveness.' " 27, 2102. 19 opportunities situation "as impel conclusion rule analogous case." Ibid. explained: "A clearly considerable stake discouraging misdemeanants appealing obtaining will require expenditures resources becomes final, even result formerly going free. And, if means hand discourage appeals—by 'upping ante' through misdemeanant pursues appellate remedy—the State insure hardy defendants brave hazards trial." 27-28, 20 emphasized matter present acted bad faith malice indictment.7 prosecutor.8 21 Both involved procedural caused complete once convicted. these recognition institutional bias inherent system issues already decided. doctrines stare decisis, res judicata, double jeopardy based, least part, deep-seated bias. none barred retrials Blackledge, pressure supports them might subconsciously motivate obtain question. 22 604, allegation arose setting. prohibit carrying threat, during negotiations, bring accused refused offense originally charged. explicitly told "save inconvenience necessity trial" significantly increase potential punishment.9 indictment. disputed evidence, possession obtained, sought accused's refusal violation, stated: 24 "In dealing State's unilateral chosen conviction—a 'very give-andtake negotiation common between defense, arguably possess relatively equal power.' Parker Carolina, 397 790, 809 [90 1458, 1479-1480, 25 785] (opinion BRENNAN, J.)." 362, 667. "lay deterred . rather danger retaliating lawfully attacking conviction." 667-668. 26 held, element "give-and-take" negotiation, long "is accept reject prosecution's offer." noted tolerating encouraging pleas, accepted constitutionally simple reality table persuade forgo stand 27 "We hold course engaged openly unpleasant alternatives forgoing facing prosecution, violate Amendment." 365, 669. 28 outcome mandated Court's acceptance process.10 declining apply "additional" necessarily characterized "penalty." Since abandoned negotiation—in often "benefit" defendant—changes occur context inaccurate measure "vindictiveness."11 An indictment—from embarks negotiation—does define effort save expense file expectation lesser proves unfounded.12 III 29 like arises modify defendant. Unlike give claim vindictiveness; never suggested influence conduct.13 vindictiveness—applicable cases—is 30 There good reason cautious adopting inflexible preparing uncover further simply come realize broader significance. At stage proceedings, assessment proper crystallized. contrast, begins—and obtained—it discovered assessed determination, information, prosecuted. Thus, 31 addition, expected invoke rights inevitably impose some "burden" Defense counsel routinely suppress evidence; challenge sufficiency form indictment; affirmative defense; request psychiatric services; access files; invocation integral adversary justice operates. 32 broad entrusted freeze future conduct.14 prosecution.15 33 forced bear burdens uncertainty unjustified. argues trial—he 34 We cannot agree. distinction demanded. sure, burdensome selection venire; impaneled; witnesses arguments prepared carefully avoid mistrial. These matters less significant, facts either full entitled offer defense. compared issue trial—as trial—does duplicative final judgment obtained. Moreover, unlike party "to over thought correctly."16 "personal stake" engage "self-vindication" trial.17 Perhaps importantly, supported inPearce counterpart case.18 35 Colten Chaffin. demonstrate, makes clear, unlikely IV 36 foreclose appropriate objectively desire something allowed do.19 "On conclude indictment." 252. finding. Absent 37 remanded proceedings consistent opinion. 38 ordered. 39 BLACKMUN, concurring judgment. Like I believe precedents mandate "a 'vindictiveness' context. 2102, 628 (1974). Attorney responsible increasing aware decision; available electing Court; substantial dissuading option; familiar with, sensitive to, interests favored 41 find support prior post-trial said before: "Prosecutorial protect it, however asserts itself." 368, 670, 604 (1978) (dissenting opinion). BRENNAN points out, dictate here. fact, expressly distinguished left unresolved one, "where without relating [charges] ended insistence pleading guilty." 360, 666. 42 ruling depend settings: rather, declined opinions 656 (1969), penalty," 'the give-and-take bargaining.' 667, quoting 809, 90 1479, 785 (1970) J.). unilaterally 43 Adopting not, insist, undercut [the prosecutor] prosecution." Ante, 382. "[T]he 'makes discretionary determination served charges.' 367, 670 opinion), Hayes Cowan, 547 42, 44 (CA6 1976). deprive flexibility add elected Court—so adjustment "objective original" explains pointing reasonably filed. ante, 381. Attorney's explanation satisfies standards, see 371, n.2, and, Accordingly, concur 45 whom MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 46 (1974), responding arise conduct. us, responded raising offenses Yet holds, teeth here denial process. my view, affirmance Appeals, attempt distinguish completely unpersuasive. 47 salient quite simple. charged misdemeanors—speeding, reckless driving, failing aid scene accident, fleeing police striking officer—arising Assuming complaint, maximum conceivably exposed fines $3,500 months prison.1 misdemeanors, they scheduled magistrate, U.S.C. § 636(a)(3); 3401(a), authorized trials, n.1. who, owing inexperience, cases. Thus alleged crimes minor, attempted dispose expedited manner. But frustrated summary demanding course, under applicable statute, 3401(b), Constitution.2 48 Respondent's required Magistrate's Hyattsville reassigned Attorney, prosecute second, petty-offense now two felonies: assaulting, resisting, impeding weapon, dangerous If (as before) exposure become $11,500 prison.3 below elevation felonies, reflected law. 49 attempts denigrate asserting "involves presumptions," 369, arguing "there vindictiveness," 380 (emphasis original). By casting terms "mere" hopes make appear unreal technical. approach contrary letter spirit Blackledge. focused "apprehension motivation," 28, violated when situations involving "pose 'vindictiveness,' id., situations, amount technical On contrary, 2080, exercise" 50 contend inapplicable instances well examining us indications concludes, 382, With respect, disagree both reasoning. "presumptions." Rather, analyze employed precedents. Did 'vindictiveness?' See Is possible deter" position trial? answer questions "Yes." 51 suggests, 383, unimportant Such suggestion demonstrably fallacious. Experienced practitioners, know entails far work challenges potential-juror array, voir dire examination jurors, suppression hearings take up adding scheduling difficulties caseload. More care preparation instructions, witnesses, own remarks mistrial reversible error. always specter "irrational" acquittal unreviewable inconceivable election indifference almost prefer waive "troublesome" manifestly poses 52 truth conclusion, patent fallacy Court's, particularly evident us. practical effect transfer Judge substitute another. suffered administrative inconvenience: lost value services commit second prepare scratch. "clearly requir[ing] conviction" finally achieved. paraphrase 53 "if [elections]—by —the [jury] easily inference vindictiveness." 55 discusses (1978), 377-380, analogy 380. inapt. dealt narrow "openly [increased] charges." remotely suggest put added burden Indeed, —a .' (1970). fit within pattern Bordenkircher. ongoing "give-and-take negotiation" Government, "unilateral penalty" choice right." 56 seems me affirm Appeals. time, provision allowing magistrate. affidavit, forth action: (1) (2) lengthy history violent crime, (3) major narcotics transactions, (4) committed perjury preliminary hearing, (5) failed scheduled. way App. Pet. Cert. 22a; cf. merits motion though timely accordance Rule 12(b)(1) Rules Criminal Procedure. sufficient "cause" default pursuant Procedure 12(f). consider propriety regard we. "[F]or agent pursue whose person's reliance 'patently unconstitutional.' (quoting Stynchcombe, 412 17, 32-33, n. 20, 93 1977, 1986, 714). Two developed principles Kentucky, 407 104, 92 1953, 584, Kentucky's two-tier adjudicating system, general received "[t]he exist Kentucky system." 116, 1960. conducted, imposed, correctly." 117, noted: "It superior court. follows lenient penalty." Ultimately, described tribunal "in settlement." 119, 1961. 714, "was premised apparent need guard resentencing process." 25, 1982 minimis properly controlled retrial. typically sentence, personal self-vindication, occasion higher sentences desirous regards meritless appeals. 26-27, 1982-1983. waived "not haled charge." 30, 2104. is, maliciously Perry." again action. "This shown impossible proceed outset, Diaz States, 223 442 [32 L.Ed. 500]." 29, n.7, 2103, n.7. Habitual Act, mandatory life imprisonment convictions. 364-365, 669 ("To induce decision, contradict premises underlie concept itself"). threaten failed, equally compelling argument influenced hoped gain negotiation. Whether dismissed, merely threatened using use presumptively invalid, institution survive. preserve process, correspondent advantages State, guilty. Once accepted, broke down. former situation, "anticipated" refuse "threat" 360-361, 666 ("As matter, short, recidivist offered drop bargain"). dimension dismissal addition aggressive prompted greater bargain." (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). consequences prejudicial defendants, "would bargain charge, face bail, run inclined bargained plea." offer, reputation spared unnecessary damage placement record. validity measured select accused. "Within limits legislature's valid definition chargeable conscious selectivity enforcement violation' [not] deliberately unjustifiable standard race, religion, other arbitrary classification.' 364, 668-69 Oyler Boles, 448, 456, 82 501, 506, 446). levy "penalty" results solely normal Westen & Westin, Constitutional Law Remedies Broken Plea Bargains, 66 Calif.L.Rev. 471, 486 (1978). rejecting permissible; establish "penalize" discretion. 12, recognize prosecutors trained outset. Certainly, until investigated presume filed, infallible—an assumption ignore restraints limited resources. avoiding place conceivable 10, controlling over. strengthened, outside "warning" principal unjustified predicate; able marshal point 1983. strong tradition country favor despite entail parties. many cases—and reasons—both See, e.g., Vines Muncy, 553 342 (CA4 1977); Morlang, 531 183 1975); Ceja, 451 399 (CA1 1971); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 23(a). Singer 24, 85 783, 630, alone. "Trial established Constitution 'normal preferable mode disposing cases.' Patton 281 276, 312 [50 253, 263, 854]." 35, 790. states brief: "Accordingly, lawful, sustain justification tender enhanced direct Of rare presumptive actions demonstration." Brief 9. "speeding" "reckless driving," CFR §§ 50.31, 50.32 (1981), each punishable $500, months, both, 50.5(a) (1981). One "failing accident," 7, 13, Md.Transp.Code Ann. 20-102, 20-104 (1977), fine $1,000, four 27-101(c)(12), (14). "fleeing officer," 21-904 27-101(b). "assault striking" 113(d), both. Columbia Colts, 282 63, 73-74, 52, 53, 75 177 (1930); Hamdan, 552 278-280 (CA9 Sanchez-Meza, 461, 464-465 1976); Potvin, 481 380, 381-383 (CA10 1973). "Assaulting, impeding" 111, $10,000, years, "Assault weapon," 113(c), third fourth "failure appear," 3150.

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