Document: 128 S. Ct. 2007 (2008) RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Michael CHERTOFF, Secretary of Homeland Security. No. 06-1717. Supreme Court United States. Argued March 19, 2008. Decided June 2, *2009 Brian Wolfman, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. *2010 Anthony Yang, respondent. Counsel Record, Scott L. Nelson, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Petitioner. Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney Gregory G. Garre, Deputy A. to the Jeanne E. Davidson, Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Jay Singer, Robinson, Attorneys, Department Justice, Respondent. Justice ALITO delivered opinion Court.[*] The question presented in this case is whether Equal Access Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(l) (2006 ed.) and 28 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000 ed.), allows a prevailing party brought by or against Government recover fees paralegal services at market rate such only their cost party's attorney. States Appeals Federal Circuit limited recovery attorney's cost. 472 F.3d 1370 (2006). We reverse. I Petitioner Richlin Security Service Co. (Richlin) small California proprietorship. In early 1990's, it was engaged former Immigration Naturalization (INS) provide guard detainees Los Angeles International Airport. Through mutual mistake, parties' two contracts misclassified Richlin's employees under Contract 1965, 41 351 et seq. Labor discovered misclassification ordered pay its back wages. responded filing claim with Transportation's Board (Board). sought reformation order force make additional payments necessary cover liability Act. prevailed after extensive litigation, entered an award favor. then filed application reimbursement fees, expenses, costs pursuant EAJA. Under EAJA, "[a]n agency that conducts adversary adjudication shall award, other than States, expenses incurred connection proceeding, unless adjudicative officer finds position substantially justified special circumstances unjust." 504(a)(1). addition $45,141.10 523.8 hours work on contract $6,760 68.2 EAJA itself. granted part. Nos. WRO-06-90, WRO-03-91, 2005 WL 1635099 (June 30, 2005), App. Pet. Cert. 25a. It found met 504(b)(1)(B)'s eligibility requirements, see id., 30a, Government's had not been "substantially *2011 justified" within meaning 504(a)(1), 32a. concluded, however, entitled rates (ranging from $50 per hour $95 hour) which billed law firm.[1] See 39a. held "the firm rather ... rate." Ibid. submitted any evidence regarding firm, ibid., but "$35 reasonable firm[,] having taken judicial notice salaries Washington D.C. area as reflected internet." Id., 42a-43a. A divided panel affirmed. 1370. court construed term "fees," authorizes "prevailing rates," 504(b)(1)(A), embracing attorneys, experts, agents.[2] 1374. declined follow contrary decision Eleventh Jean 863 F.2d 759 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 2316, Ed. 2d 134 (1990). also distinguished Court's decisions Missouri Jenkins, 491 274, 109 2463, 105 229 (1989), West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. Casey, 499 83, 111 1138, 113 68 (1991), reasoning those cases involved different fee-shifting statute "`goals objectives.'" F.3d, 1375-1377, 1379 (discussing Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 1976, 42 1988). instead support interpretation EAJA's legislative history, 1381 (citing S.Rep. 98-586 (1984) (hereinafter Rep.)), considerations public policy, 1380-1381. Judge Plager dissented. He believed authorities majority (particularly Jenkins Casey) were indistinguishable. identified "sound policy reasons adopting take case, even if we thought choice." 1383. petitioned rehearing, pointing out approach followed several Circuits. 482 1358, 1359 (C.A.Fed.2007) Role Models Am., Brownlee, 353 962, 974 (C.A.D.C.2004); Hyatt Barnhart, 315 239, 255 (C.A.4 2002); Miller Alamo, 983 856, 862 (C.A.8 1993)). denied rehearing over Plager's dissent, full en banc. 57a. certiorari. 551 ___, 613, 169 392 (2007). II permits eligible "fees with" proceeding before administrative agency. *2012 defines expenses" follows: "`[F]ees expenses' includes expert witnesses, study, analysis, engineering report, test, project be preparation attorney agent (The amount awarded section based upon kind quality furnished, except (i) no witness compensated excess highest compensation witnesses paid involved, (ii) $125 determines regulation increase living factor, availability qualified attorneys agents proceedings justifies higher fee.)" 504(b)(1)(A).[3] "incurred" "fees" action Board. Since 504(b)(1)(A) awards straightforward reading leads conclusion purchased services. resists distinguishing "other expenses." concedes are reimbursable insists (including "any project") "reasonable cost." And view, outlays better characterized "fees." observes second sentence explains how calculate refers agents, without mentioning paralegals. From omission, infers Congress intended treat expenditures expenses," recoverable find fractured unpersuasive. Contrary contention, does clearly distinguish between reimbursed. Although refer cost" project," may reasonably have would exist product kind. At one point, appears use terms "expenses" interchangeably: first clause witnesses," while parenthetical characterizes There indication Congress, using place other, referring components remuneration. *2013 Even dichotomy draws supported statutory text, hardly amounts should classified concludes omission 504(b)(1)(A)'s (which generally rates") implies But could just easily conclude litany project" (all cost") rates. Surely paralegals more analogous studies, analyses, reports, tests, projects. brief, incants "paralegal e.g., Brief Respondent 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, slips up once them 35 ("As appeals explained, treating `distort normal allocation result less efficient performance legal services' EAJA..."). agreed cost," certainly measured perspective attorney.[4] To contrary, anomalous measure client. do understand contend, example, "engineering report" "analysis" calculated employs engineer analyst. Such tough square language. Section 504(a)(1) provides party." (emphasis added). That language leaves doubt specified items litigant. being hard believe paralegals, exception calculating employer seems plausible all litigant's subject proviso deemed rates" when determined.[5] *2014 B extent some ambiguity subsists need look far resolve it, already addressed similar respect another statute. considered litigants 1988. 1988 court, discretion, allow party, fee part costs." concluded "attorney's fee" "cannot meant compensate performed personally members bar." U.S., 285, 2463. separate billing become "increasingly widespread," 286, 2463 (internal quotation marks omitted), traditionally subsumed both personal labor individuals who contributed product, so confident given fees" traditional gloss declared "self-evident" embraced well attorneys. think answers us. like 1988, entitles certain parties fees." 504(b)(1)(A). makes mention "secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, others whose contributes bills her client." supra, must interpreted "attorney reach labor. contend changed much 1988's enactment 1976 1980 term's other. instructed agencies Government, embrace well. 504 follows contends our driven arising context used time decided, provided reference "expenses." guise fee[s]" because otherwise all. expressly (albeit "cost") attorney, agent, sees reason give broad construction gave *2015 rationale either there subsequent decisions. Our expressed apprehension possibility leave claimant emptyhanded. This unsurprising, since did rest conviction nothing. rested propositiona proposition took "self-evident"that historically included Indeed, rejected years handed down. 68, petitioner Commonwealth Pennsylvania looked "broad remedial purposes" allowed authorized Jenkins: "The issue [in Jenkins] not, [petitioner] contends, permit perception `policy' overcome `plain language.' remotely plain phrase `attorney's fee' include charges clerk services, `secretaries, product,' calculation lawyers' hourly Only recently arisen `the increasingly widespread custom separately [such] services.' By contrast, has never been, knowledge, practice including attorneys' record Jenkinsas lengthy hereof usage recognizes distinction 99, 1138 (quoting 285-286, 2463) (some internal citations omitted).[6] analysis Casey refutes stretch fit facts. As shows, turned extratextual goals III parries textual doctrinal history policy. persuaded either. cited address presented, actually counsel favor interpretation. 1984 Senate Report accompanying bill reenacted EAJA[7] unequivocally *2016 congressional intent recovered "`at cost.'" 29 Rep., 15; emphasis original). next tacitly endorsed same approving model rules Administrative Conference pre-EAJA Sixth decision, adopted schemes 29. persuaded. answer favor.[8] remarked "[e]xamples type ordinarily compensable [under EAJA] (billed cost)." 15. stray remark limit observed earlier, word "cost" (and sensibly) client's interpretation, simply indicates satisfies requirements able "bil[l]" out-of-pocket normally equal rat[e]" Moreover, correct, inconsistent today. "Nothing [EAJA] requires invariably separately. If relevant so, cost, requires." 288, (construing thus recognize possibility, will supply metric recovery. Whether appropriate depends practice. Report, contestable conclusion. On courts setting awards. 15 ("The read office overhead, nor amount, conduct customarily chargeable clients" added)). Beyond vague guidance, *2017 critical case: limits regardless such, persuade us soundness reliance Circuit's Northcross Memphis City Schools, 611 624 (1979), founders reason. approved endorsing Northcross, 30 639). problem again decide his where rates." aware clients rates, suggests assumed services.[9] endorsement means little. Finally, position. implementing release describes Conference's "Commenters varying positions expenses. discourage can important cost-saving measure. hand, practices charging time, duplicating, telephone like, vary according locality, field practice, individual custom. decided designate specific Instead, adopt suggestion Treasury revise rule charged item they clients." Act: Agency Implementation, 46 Fed. Reg. 32905 (1981). passage addresses all, today: market." fairest calculated. anterior *2018 See, Fed.Reg. (responding comments urging "identify particular compensable"). Like fail presented. likewise argues market-based distort litigant incentives cap rate. ("[A]ttorney fee"). lower operating market. reimbursed clip off top paralegal's According scheme encourage shift inefficient greater percentage value. argument, points out, proves too much. imply rates.[10] resulted excessive agents. junior (who senior attorneys) Cf. 287, ("If consistent practices, `windfall' argument regard associates"). Yet despite incentives, unambiguously [at] offers persuasive why treated differently. text statute, shows untroubled very distortion seeks prevent. practical feasibility relied Internet data District Columbia, fails explain firm's salary. benefits perks compensates staff come bottom line offered solution accounting problem, *2019 solutions readily found. Market transparent basis strains credulity abandoned predictable, workable framework uncertain complex cost-based inflict litigants, agencies, courts. IV Confronted flaws shelter canon construction. right narrowly light requiring strict waivers sovereign immunity. disagree. immunity thata tool interpreting law, displaces tools relies tandem canon. Ardestani INS, 502 129, 137, 112 515, 116 (1991) (relying "reinforce[ment]" independent "conclusion ambiguities insufficient undercut ordinary understanding language"); Ruckelshaus Sierra Club, 463 680, 682, 685-686, 103 3274, 77 938 (1983) "historic principles countries" define scope statute); Energy Ohio, 503 607, 626-627, 1627, 118 (1992) (resorting close provision left "with unanswered unresolved tension closely related provisions"); Smith 507 197, 201-203, 1178, 122 548 (1993) (invoking observing claimant's "undermine[d]" "commonsense meaning" language). stare decisis compel resort construe. V For these reasons, hold Board's error, erred affirming decision. judgment reversed, remanded further opinion. ordered. NOTES [*] SCALIA joins Part III-A, THOMAS Parts II-B III. [1] high $135 hour, amended hour. 39a; 9; n. 2. [2] Some nonattorney representatives, known "agents," assist presentation cases. infra. claimed qualify "agent" [3] Virtually identical provisions apply actions federal court. §§ 2412(a)(1), (d)(2)(A). 2412, resolved petitioner's application, avers (without challenge Richlin) 2412 "is case." 1. assume deciding extend equally 2412. confine discussion 504. [4] fairly petition certiorari "a [may] [or at] only." i. limiting "cost only" beg measured. cannot genuinely answered addressing subsidiary question, difficulty concluding latter "fairly included" former. Rule 14.1(a). [5] worth recalling survey Columbia. Presumably represented compensation. wants affirmed based, ironically enough, fact respond forces determining get (the client's) (at market). "incurred [the] party," plain. [6] Following "expert 1991, 113(a), Stat. 1079 (codified 1988(c)). [7] version enacted sunset effective October 1, 1984. 203(c), 204(c), 94 2327, 2329. revived (but amendments) 1985. Aug. 1985, 1-2, 99 183-186; infra; Scarborough Principi, 541 401, 406-407, 124 1856, 158 674 (2004) (summarizing history). [8] threshold legitimacy accompanied vetoed President Congress. 27 ("To serves legitimate intent, presumed ratified legislation enacted" Siegel, Use Legislative History System Separated Powers, 53 Vand. L.Rev. 1457, 1522 (2000); Sullivan Finkelstein, 617, 631-632, 2658, 563 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring part))). Melkonyan Sullivan, 501 89, 96, 2157, 115 78 interpret 1985 amendments). Because wash precisely weight deserves analysis. [9] Compare F.2d, 638 ("[A] scale most firms making categories, differentiating in-office experienced trial service, fair equitable fee") 639 authority fee-paying client, course providing Reasonable photocopying, travel 1988" omitted)). [10] "`An "agent non-attorney represent it.'" 4 H.R.Rep. 96-1418, p. 14 (1980)); supra. nonattorneys them, portion governing litigation fees. 2412(d)(2)(A)

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