Document: Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MARK A. CHRISTESON v. DON ROPER, WARDEN ON PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI TO APPEALS EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 14–6873. Decided January 20, 2015 PER CURIAM. Petitioner Mark Christeson’s first federal habeas peti- tion was dismissed as untimely. Because his appointed attorneys—who had missed the filing deadline—could not be expected to argue that Christeson entitled equitable tolling of statute limitations, requested substitute counsel who would laboring under a conflict interest. The District Court denied motion, and Appeals for Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed. In so doing, these courts contra- vened our decision in Martel Clair, 565 ___ (2012). petition certiorari is therefore granted, judgment reversed, case remanded further proceedings. I 1999, jury convicted three counts capital murder. It returned verdicts death on all counts. Missouri Supreme affirmed conviction sentence 2001, see State Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251 (en banc), denial postconviction motion relief 2004, State, 131 796 banc). Under strict 1-year limitations imposed by Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S. C. §2244(d)(1), due April 10, 2005. Nine months before this critical deadline, attorneys Phil Horwitz Eric Butts represent 2 ROPER See 18 §3599(a)(2) (providing appointment state row inmates). Butts, they have subsequently acknowl- edged, failed meet with until more than six weeks after due. App. Pet. Cert. 93a. There no evidence communicated their client at during time. They finally filed August 5, 2005—117 days too late. since claimed failure timely file resulted from simple miscalculation AEDPA period (and defending themselves, may disclosed privileged communications). id., 90a–92a, 135a. But legal ethics expert, reviewing counsel’s handling petition, stated report submitted Court: “[I]f abandonment, am sure what be.” Id., 132a. untimely, application certificate appealability. appears severe cognitive disabilities lead him rely entirely attorneys, been aware dismissal. 229a, 231a, 237a. Nearly seven years later, contacted Jennifer Merrigan Joseph Perkovich discuss how proceed case. immediately noticed glaring problem. only hope securing review merits claims Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking reopen final ground AEDPA’s should equitably tolled. could such be- half, any argument prem- ised own malfeasance failing 3 petition. While initially receptive Perkovich’s assistance, soon refused allow outside access files. 345a. On May 23, 2014, mo- substitution counsel. explaining it “not [Christeson’s] best interest represented located New York Pennsylvania,” are. 169a. did address offer forgo fees expenses associated travel Missouri, nor possibility appointing other Christeson. appealed. lack jurisdiction, apparently reasoning were authorized an appeal behalf.1 September 19, while still pending Circuit, issued warrant execution setting October 29, date. After proceedings relevant here, again behalf. motion. Explaining “federally-appointed warranted when serve interests justice,” offered four reasons its decision. Order 04–CV–08004 (WD Mo., Oct. 22, 2014), p. 1, 375a (quoting Lambrix Secretary, Florida Dept. Corrections, 756 F.3d 1246, 1259 (CA11 2014); internal quotation marks omitted). First, deemed untimely because “was shortly —————— has signed retainer agreement removes doubt score. 4 date.” 375a. Second, observed “abandoned” recently appeared behalf class-action lawsuit challenging Missouri’s lethal injec- protocol. 376a. Third, noted although court Ibid. Fourth finally, expressed belief granting set “an untenable precedent” allowing seek “ ‘abusive’ ” delays cases. This time, Cir- cuit Court’s order. We stayed execution, post, ____, now reverse. II Title §3599 “entitles indigent defendants cases, including corpus proceedings.” S., (slip op., 1). “By providing defend- ants mandatory right qualified proceedings, Congress recognized particularly important role play promoting fundamental fairness imposition penalty.” McFarland Scott, 512 849, 859 (1994). not, however, conferred petitioners choice. Instead, leaves select properly attorney. §§3599(a)–(d). contemplates “replace” “similarly . upon motion” petitioner. §3599(e). addressed standard apply considering Clair. rejected ar- gument lawyer war- 5 ranted situations: “when lacks qualifications necessary ; he disabling interest; or completely abandoned client.” 7) (internal we adopted broader standard, holding granted ‘interests justice.’ 13). explained factors appeals consider determining whether district abused discretion denying “include: timeliness motion; adequacy court’s inquiry into ant’s complaint; asserted cause complaint, extent breakdown com- munication between client’s responsibility, if any, conflict).” here consideration governed Clair’s “interests justice” standard. adequately account forth principal error acknowledge Butts’ Toll- ing based satisfy available “serious instances attorney misconduct.” Holland Florida, 560 631, 651–652 (2010). Advancing claim required denigrate per- formance. Counsel cannot reasonably make argument, which threatens professional reputation livelihood. Restatement (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §125 (1998). Thus, ob- served similar context Maples Thomas, ___, n. 8 (2012) 17, 8), “significant interest” arises attorney’s “interest avoiding damage [his] reputation” odds 6 “strongest argument—i.e., him.” Indeed, credit, acknowledged nature conflict. Shortly filed, provided update status collateral it, stated: “Because herein essential witnesses factual questions indispensable in- quiry, there ethical conflicts arise prohibit litigat- issues support claim. Un- waivable under- litigating way. Holloway Arkansas, 435 475, 485–486 (1978). Conflict free must present question dis- trict court.” 48a–49a. Yet, response order char- acterized potential arguments favor “ludicrous,” “a basis rationale [erroneous] calculation 86a, 90a. every counseled petitioner will necessarily involve interest, contentions directly concededly contrary manifestly reputational interests. Clair makes clear sort grounds substitution. Even narrower allowed where ‘disabling interest.’ 7). And concluded, 7 “gu[t]” specific substitution-of-counsel clause contained §3559(e), contemplate grant- motions circumstances beyond those effectively “has all”—as conflicted. 10). went far say given de- fendant’s “statutory counsel,” even “in ab- sence” §3599(e) compelled “to appoint new developed con- flict.” Given obvious consider- ations relied justify deny second third Court—that continued litigation means previously substituted counsel— are substantial. Whether currently beside point: actively representing some mat- ters, prevented them particular matter. Likewise, irrelevant sua sponte directed course request appealabilty adjudicating challenge protocol, evident. fourth cited Court— delay abuse—might valid considerations many 12) (“Protecting against abusive justice”). alone undoubtedly delayed, abusive. approximately month became plight well date, 90 investigate Nor plain subsequent substi- tute might futile. – 15–16) (affirming made futile). To sure, faces host procedural obstacles having Al- though raise pursuant 60(b), Gonzalez Crosby, 545 524, 535–536 (2005), obtain demon- strate both motion’s and, significant ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justif[y] reopening judgment.” 535 Ackermann United States, 340 193, 199 (1950)). That, turn, require show limitations. He opportunity, assistance doing so. * forma pauperis granted. consistent opinion. ordered. ALITO, J., dissenting JUSTICE whom THOMAS joins, dissenting. reverse without briefing argument. As acknowledges, showing applicable tolled, ante, 2, availability equit- able cases (AEDPA) great importance. sought ameliorate lengthy often characterized past.* Woodford Garceau, 538 202, 206 (2003) (“Congress enacted reduce execu- criminal sentences, cases”). thus time limit §2244(d). If tolled whenever petitioner’s dead- line rendered ineffective little value, seemingly interminable return. Members lamented occurs Johnson Bredesen, 558 1067, 1067–1070 (2009) (Stevens, statement respecting certiorari), Elledge 525 944, 944–946 (1998) (BREYER, certiorari). Holland, held limita- tions tolled—but quite ex- traordinary circumstances. Any expansion delinea- undertaken careful possible normal procedure full believes case, my understanding expresses view whatsoever ultimately tolling. understand hold conflict-free purposes investigating facts re- lated issue presenting what- ever can mounted relief. Based record, involves anything error, albeit serious one, part filed. According miscalculated date result run. met prior thought but actually These nothing attor- ney fall short establishing kind abandonment needed precedent. 651–652. do opinion otherwise. close relationship decides (the propriety refusal counsel) entitlement tolling, think plenary appro- priate write separately emphasize summary disposition does issue.

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