Russian Invasion of Georgia
Russian Cyberwar on Georgia
10 November, 2008
Regular updates can be found on the Georgia Update website:
www.georgiaupdate.gov.ge
INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................2
BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE.......................................................2
RUSSIA
S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE ..............................3
CYBER BLOCKADE.........................................................................................5
SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS .................................................5
PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR .............................................................7
RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK......................................................................8
THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK...............................................................................9
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................10
APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia .........................................11
1. INTRODUCTION
The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by an intensive build up
of cyberattacks attempting to disrupt, deface and bring down critical
Georgian governmental and civilian online infrastructure. These attacks
became a massive assault on the eve of the invasion which resulted in
the blocking, re-routing of traffic and control being seized of various
sections of Georgian cyberspace. The attack marks a new phase in the
history of warfare, being the first case in which a land invasion was coordinated with an orchestrated online cyber-offensive. This offers
crucial lessons for strategists and planners whilst providing vital
information about how the Russian Federation is developing its
offensive capacities on the internet.
The campaign has been reported in the media, with wide coverage
suggesting the campaign was a spontaneous outburst of popular
feeling in Russia lead by independent hackers. However, as this report
suggests, the offensive was too large, coordinated, and sophisticated
to be the work of independent hackers; the evidence leads by-andlarge to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Whilst only a criminal investigation can directly prove the involvement
of the Kremlin, both experts and commentators have accused
Moscow of sponsoring the attacks as their magnitude requires the
involvement of the kind of resources only a state-sponsor can provide.
2. BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE
Cyberattacks are becoming an increasingly established and virulent
form of warfare in the early Twenty-First Century. High technology and
online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers,
including private individuals and terrorist organizations, and can
potentially destabilize a country
s whole economy and crucial security
infrastructure. Cyberwarfare has found its primary state-sponsor in the
Russian Federation, which is widely suspected of having played a
leading role in the first large scale cyberattack on a NATO member
state last year.
In the spring of 2007 government computers in Estonia came under
sustained attack from cyberterrorists following the decision taken by
Estonian officials to move a statue placed commemorating a Red
Army soldier that died fighting the Nazis, to the military cemetery in the
capital Tallinn. The event roused emotions and led to large scale
protests by the Russian minority. It was then that the Estonian
Government
s online networks came under massive assault using
Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) assaults on its infrastructure. The
attacks, which flooded computers and servers, blocking legitimate
users were described as 
crippling
 by experts, owing to Estonia
s high
dependence on information technology. Commentators have pointed
out that the assault had very serious consequences for Estonia`s banks
and airports. Consequences similar in effect to a full scale missile strike.
This provided vital lessons for Estonia and NATO and has led to the
development of a cutting edge cyberwarfare institute in Tallinn.
3. RUSSIA
S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE
In August 2008, cyberwar associated with the Russian Federation struck
once more, this time against Georgia. The DDoS attacks began in the
weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russian invasion and
continued after the Kremlin announced that it had ceased hostilities on
12 August. Georgian claims have been confirmed by Tom Burling, an
executive of Tulip Systems, a U.S. Internet firm, which took over hosting
of the web sites for Georgia's government agencies during the conflict.
In a recent interview Burling said its experts had worked frantically to
curtail the damage from the hackers, remarking that "They have been
attacking Georgia from a cyber standpoint since July." Some of the
Western sources confirm this claim.
On 20 July the Shadowserver Foundation published news about the
serious attack against the website of the President of Georgia: 
over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia
(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a
multi-pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
Computerworld, 21 July: 
The Web site for the president of Georgia was
knocked offline by a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack over
the weekend, yet another in a series of cyberattacks against countries
experiencing political friction with Russia.
New York Times, 12 August: 
Weeks before bombs started falling on
Georgia, a security researcher in suburban Massachusetts was watching an
attack against the country in cyberspace.
The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by a cyber attack on
Georgia
s Internet facilities. A large number of Georgia
s Internet
servers were seized and placed under external control from late
Thursday, 7 August, whereas Russia
s invasion of Georgia officially
commenced on Friday, 8 August. Also, much of Georgia
s traffic and
access was taken under unauthorized external control at the same
time that this first large scale attack occurred.
The defacement of President Mikheil Saakashvili web site
president.gov.ge with the screen-shot provided below which operated
as a moving slideshow was part of the initial phase of the attack. What
followed were large numbers of DDoS against the site designed to
prevent the Georgian government from getting its message across to
the general population and international media during this critical
time.
Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber
threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence
gathering, malware and E-crime incident response. As an expert in the
field, he views the defacement attacks as clearly being Kremlin linked
and not undertaken by independent or un-coordinated attackers.
What am I trying to imply? It smells like a three letter intelligence
agency
s propaganda arm has managed to somehow supply
the creative for the defacement of Georgia President
s official
web site, thereby forgetting a simple rule of engagement in such
a conflict - risk forwarding the responsibility of the attack to each
and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked
Georgian sites using publicly obtainable DDoS attack tools in a
coordinated fashion.
An example of Russian efforts to shut the mouse of Georgian media is
the story of the Georgian news agency GHN. The first attack against
the agency
s website occurred in August 2008. Another wave of cyber
attacks started on 8 September. As a result, the GHN news agency
website had been paralyzed for 2 weeks. Another Georgian media
website that came under consistent cyber attacks after the end of the
armed conflict is www.apsny.ge 
 website of the Georgia-Online news
agency. It is interesting to note that Russian efforts to prevent Georgian
Internet media resources from disseminating information continued
even after the war.
4. CYBER BLOCKADE
The Russian assault on Georgian cyberspace was intensely coordinated and directed out of St. Petersburg, inside the territory of the
Russian Federation. The primary orchestrator was the Russian Business
Network (RBN) which conducted the cyber-blockade so that all
Georgian Internet traffic was going through Russia, denying Georgia its
internet independence. Computers in Georgia showed that an assault
was clearly taking place, which is presented here as evidence of
Russian sponsored cyber-terrorism:
Two trace routes for the web site mfa.gov.ge, that of the Georgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were showing:
(a) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
(b) From Ukraine - Ge = available & slow; not accessible, cached
(forged page) now only via redirect through Bryansk.ru
Other Georgia government websites such as mod.gov.ge, the
website of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the web site
president.gov.ge, the web site of the Georgian Presidency showed
(c) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
(d) From Ukraine - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
By examining Internet routes before and after the beginning of the war,
it is clear that they were altered either legally or illegally, blocking
traffic in and out of Georgia. Some of those routers are known to be
under control of the Russian Business Network (RBN). This can be
demonstrated via a comparison of route configuration before and
after the war.
5. SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS
Here we can provide clear evidence of co-ordination and a full list of
targets the cyber-terrorists had selected taken from the Russian hosted
web site stopgeorgia.ru (which also appears as stopgeorgia.info a
redirected page). This site provided the necessary attack tools for the
cyber assault against Georgia for hackers. As we can see the screenshot shows that mostly .ge web sites are listed for priority attacks.
However - also targeted for assault is the US embassy in Tbilisi. This web
site, as seen before, is an open site to attract future FSB cyber warriors.
The following evidence below shows how these sites can be traced
back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in ST. Petersburg and other
cybercriminal locations.
The information site Stopgeorgia.ru which provided information and
tools for independent hackers to attack Georgian sites was hosted
by AS36351 Softlayer of Plano Texas. This is a well known location
that is associated with Atrivo and Intercage malware hosting
connectivity, which is highly disruptive to online service.
The information site Stopgeorgia.info was hosted by AS28753
NETDIRECT in Frankfurt, Germany as well as in AS12578 APOLLO
LATTELEKOM APOLLO in Latvia.
The link back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) was provided by
the clues left in the registration, which reads as:
Sponsoring
Registrar:
EstDomains,
Inc.
Registrant: Domain Manager, Protect Details, Inc, Street1: 29
Kompozitorov St., Saint Petersburg, RU, Phone:+7.8129342271
In summary, 36 important web sites were identified as targets for
hackers, including the US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi, Georgian
Parliament, Georgian Supreme Court, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various
news agencies and other media resources, the Central Election
Commission, and many others.
Due to efforts of many IT specialists in Internet hosting routing
companies, normal traffic was mostly resumed after the initial strikes.
Most critical websites were hosted outside of Georgia.
6. PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR
To help to make a final judgment regarding the cyberwar against
Georgia these two declarations from Russian officials can help us to
evaluate how Moscow thinks in regard to online warfare. The Russian
State Duma deputy and member of the Security Committee Deputy
Nikolai Kuryanovich stated in 2006 within a formal Russian
parliamentary letter of appreciation to hackers who had taken down
several Israeli web sites:
"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the
open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with
the aid of information soldiers, that is hackers. This means that a
small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of
the current armed forces."
Should we interpret this declaration as a statement of intent, or merely
a prediction? A few days ago, the Editor of the Russian Online journal
cybersecurity.ru, made a similar statement that provides insight into the
Russian war aims:
Cyber-attacks are part of the information war, making your enemy
shut up is a potent weapon of modern warfare.
Clear examples that such thinking is being applied as guiding principles
of Russian strategy as part of the intense information-war taking place
can be drawn from the second wave of attacks that showed up from
Russian Business Network (RBN) server range. This time the weapon was
a new campaign purporting to come from the BBC that mocked
Georgia's President and spread as a new virus.
The malware from various locations caused the virus to be delivered
from
single
site,
address:
79.135.167.49).
The name of the malware is "name.avi.exe", and as of September 2008,
only FOUR out of 36 anti-virus products could detect it. The Russian
Business Network (RBN) had created a highly virulent strain designed to
act as a propaganda weapon against Georgia.
7. RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK
The individual, with direct responsibility for carrying out the cyber "first
strike" on Georgia, is a RBN operative named Alexandr A. Boykov of
Saint Petersburg, Russia. Also involved in the attack was a programmer
and spammer from Saint Petersburg named Andrey Smirnov. These
men are leaders of RBN sections and are not "script-kiddies" or
"hacktivists," as some have maintained of the cyber attacks on Georgia
 but senior operatives in positions of responsibility with vast
background knowledge.
Intelligence can suggest further information about these individual
cyber-terrorists. According to Spamhaus SBL64881, Mr. Boykov operates
a hosting service in Class C Network 79.135.167.0/24. It should be noted
that the pre-invasion attacks emanated from 79.135.167.22, clearly
showing professional planning and not merely 
hacktivism.
 Due to the
degree of professionalism and the required massive costs to run such
operations, a state-sponsor is suspected. Further information gathered
also links the RBN to known disruptive websites.
The IP addresses of the range, 79.135.160.0/19 are assigned to
Sistemnet Telecom to provide services to companies who are
classified as engaging in illicit activities such as credit card fraud,
malware and so on.
79.135.160.0/19 Sistemnet Telecom and AS9121 TTNet (Turkey) are
associated with AbdAllah_Internet which is linked with cybercrime
hosting such as thecanadianmeds.com. These are known Russian
Business Network routes.
8. THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK
The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there
have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is
meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are
indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to
regular civilians.
On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against
the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the
Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second,
and up to 200
250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached
graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were
higher.
The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge
website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly
generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload
the web server in a way where every single request would need
significant
time.
The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian
websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to
load
servers
these
requests.
As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down
after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack
may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the
Russian cyber attacks.
CONCLUSION
The information presented in here catalogues and explains the historic
first major use of cyberattacks as a weapon of war during the Russian
aggression against Georgia. Considering that this is the second Russiansponsored cyber-attack in just over a year, as well as the alarming fact
that the US Embassy in Tbilisi was listed for assault by cyberterrorists,
NATO member states as well as NATO aspirant countries need to be on
full alert for future Russian aggression against critical online
infrastructure.
APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia
Contents
SHADOWSERVER............................................................................................................. 11
COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 13
COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 14
SOFT SECURITY ................................................................................................................ 15
THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 15
NEW YORK TIMES ........................................................................................................... 17
AFP....................................................................................................................................... 19
INTERNATIONAL DATA GROUP................................................................................ 20
THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 22
WASHINGTON POST ...................................................................................................... 23
NEWSWEEK....................................................................................................................... 26
AFP....................................................................................................................................... 28
WASHINGTON POST (blog)............................................................................................29
SHADOWSERVER
20 July 2008; Updated on 10 August 2008
The Website for the President of Georgia Under Attack - Politically Motivated?
For over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia
(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a multi-
pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The site began coming
under attack very early Saturday morning (Georgian time). Shadowserver has
observed at least one web-based command and control (C&C) server taking
aim at the website hitting it with a variety of simultaneous attacks. The C&C
server has instructed its bots to attack the website with TCP, ICMP, and HTTP
floods.
Commands seen so far are:
flood http www.president.gov.ge/
flood tcp www.president.gov.ge
flood icmp www.president.gov.ge
The server [62.168.168.9] which houses the website has been largely offline
since the attack started. Passive DNS records show the system houses several
other websites which are mostly unrelated to the Georgian government.
However, the server does also host the Social Assistance and Employment
State Agency website (www.saesa.gov.ge). This website along with the others
on the host have been rendered inaccessible.
Is the attack political or perhaps nationalistic in nature? Your guess is as good
as ours but it doesn't take much to come to this possible conclusion. Recent
DDoS attacks against various other neighbors of Russia to include Estonia
have been quite popular in the last few years. We do not have any solid
proof that the people behind this C&C server are Russian. However, the HTTPbased botnet C&C server is a MachBot controller, which is a tool that is
frequently used by Russian bot herders. On top of that the domain involved
with this C&C server has seemingly bogus registration information but does tie
back to Russia.
Who else have these guys been attacking with this MachBot C&C server? The
answer is no one. This server recently came online in the past few weeks and
has not issued any other attacks that we have observed until recently. All
attacks we have observed have been directed right at
www.president.gov.ge.
The C&C server involved in these attacks is on the IP address 207.10.234.244,
which is subsequently located in the United States. Beaconing traffic from
your network to this host may indicate that you have infected machines on
your network and are most likely participating in this DDoS attack. We would
recommend blocking and/or monitoring for traffic to this address.
Update (7/20/2008: 1:36 PM EST): It appears the host site for 207.10.234.244 has
taken action against this system and appears to now be blocking access to it.
However, the server being targeted by the C&C is still unreachable.
Update (8/10/2008: 10:34 AM EDT): With the recent events in Georgia, we are
now seeing new attacks against .ge sites. www.parliament.ge &
president.gov.ge are currently being hit with http floods. In this case, the C&C
server involved is at IP address 79.135.167.22 which is located in Turkey. We
are also observing this C&C as directing attacks against www.skandaly.ru.
Traffic from your network to this IP or domain name of
googlecomaolcomyahoocomaboutcom.net may indicate compromise and
participation in these attacks.
COMPUTERWORLD
21 July 2008
By Jeremy Kirk
Georgia president's Web site falls under DDOS attack
Botnet took down site for one day
The Web site for the president of Georgia was knocked offline by a distributed
denial-of-service (DDOS) attack over the weekend, yet another in a series of
cyberattacks against countries experiencing political friction with Russia.
Georgia's presidential Web site was down for about a day, starting early
Saturday until Sunday, according to the Shadowserver Foundation, which
tracks malicious Internet activity.
Network experts said the attack was executed by a botnet, or a network of
computers that can be commanded to overwhelm a Web site with too much
traffic.
The command-and-control server for the attack is based in the U.S.,
Shadowserver said. The botnet appears to be based on the "MachBot" code,
which communicates to other compromised PCs over HTTP, the same
protocol used for transmitting Web pages.
The tool used to control this kind of botnet "is frequently used by Russian bot
herders," according to Shadowserver. "On top of that, the domain involved
with this [command-and-control] server has seemingly bogus registration
information but does tie back to Russia."
One of the commands contained in the traffic directed at the Web site
contained the phrase "win+love+in+Rusia," wrote Jose Nazario, a senior
security engineer at Arbor Networks, on a company blog.
On Sunday, it appeared that the host for the command-and-control server
had been taken offline, Shadowserver said.
The motivation for the attacks is not entirely clear. But Georgia is just one of
several former Soviet satellites, including Estonia and Lithuania, that are
seeking to downplay their historical legacy with Russia.
Georgia has angered Russia by pushing for entry to NATO, a pro-Western
security alliance. It has also tangled with Russia over the handling of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, two rebellious regions pushing for independence.
In Lithuania, 300 Web sites were defaced around July 1 following a new law
prohibiting the public display of symbols dating from the Soviet era and the
playing of the Soviet national anthem. The hacking was blamed on an
unpatched vulnerability in a Web server at a hosting company.
Estonian Web sites were pounded by a massive DDOS attack in April and May
2007. The attacks are believed to have been connected to a decision to
move a monument honoring Soviet World War II soldiers to a less prominent
place, which ignited protests from ethnic Russians.
COMPUTERWORLD
11 August 2008
By Gregg Keizer
Cyberattacks knock out Georgia's Internet presence
Large-scale attacks, traffic rerouting traced to Russian hacker hosting network
August 11, 2008 (Computerworld) Hackers, perhaps affiliated with a wellknown Russian criminal network, have attacked and hijacked Web sites
belonging to Georgia, the former Soviet republic now in the fourth day of war
with Russia, a security researcher claimed on Sunday.
Some Georgian government and commercial sites are unavailable, while
others may have been hijacked, said Jart Armin, a researcher who tracks the
notorious Russian Business Network (RBN), a malware and criminal hosting
network.
"Many of Georgia's Internet servers were under external control from late
Thursday," Armin said early Saturday in an entry on his Web site. According to
his research, the government's sites dedicated to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the country's president, Mikhail
Saakashvili, have been blocked completely, or traffic to and from those sites'
servers have been redirected to servers actually located in Russia and Turkey.
As of midnight Eastern time on Sunday, Georgia's presidential and defense
ministry sites were unavailable from the U.S. Although the foreign ministry's site
remained online, the most recent news item was dated Aug. 8, the day
Georgian and Russian forces first clashed.
Armin warned that Georgian sites that appeared online may actually be
bogus. "Use caution with any Web sites that appear of a Georgia official
source but are without any recent news [such as those dated Saturday, Aug.
9, or Sunday, Aug. 10], as these may be fraudulent," he said in another entry
posted midafternoon on Sunday.
Statements from Georgia's foreign ministry have appeared in a blog hosted
on Google, perhaps in an attempt to circumvent attacks.
Researchers at the Shadowserver Foundation, which tracks malicious Internet
activity, confirmed some of Armin's claims. "We are now seeing new attacks
against .ge sites [Editor's note: .ge is the top-level domain for Georgia.] ...
www.parliament.ge and president.gov.ge are currently being hit with HTTP
floods," the researchers said in a Sunday update to a July post.
On Saturday, Armin reported that key sections of Georgia's Internet traffic
had been rerouted through servers based in Russia and Turkey, where the
traffic was either blocked or diverted. The Russian and Turkish servers Armin
identified, he said, "are well known to be under the control of RBN and
influenced by the Russian government."
RBN, which pulled up stakes last year and shifted network operations to China
in an attempt to avoid scrutiny, has been fingered for a wide range of
criminal activities, including a massive subversion of Web sites last March.
Later on Saturday, Armin added that network administrators in Germany had
been able to temporarily reroute some Georgian Internet traffic directly to
servers run by Deutsche Telekom AG. Within hours, however, the traffic had
been again diverted to Russian servers, this time to ones based in Moscow.
The attacks are reminiscent of other coordinated campaigns against Estonian
government Web sites in April and May 2007 and against about 300
Lithuanian sites on July 1. Like Georgia, both countries are former republics in
the Soviet Union.
Three weeks ago, a distributed denial-of-service attack knocked Georgia's
presidential site offline for about a day.
Late Sunday, Russian ground forces were reported advancing toward Gori,
an important transportation hub in central Georgia.
SOFT SECURITY
11 August 2008
This day highlights
Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress (extract)
In the wake of Russian-Georgian conflict, a week worth of speculations
around Russian Internet forums have finally materialized into a coordinated
cyber attack against Georgia
s Internet infrastructure, whose tactics have
already managed to compromise several government web sites and is
continuing to launch DDoS attacks against numerous other Georgian
government sites
THE TELEGRAPH
August 11 2008
By Jon Swaine
Georgia: Russia 'conducting cyber war'
Several Georgian state computer servers have been under external control
since shortly before Russia's armed intervention into the state commenced on
Friday, leaving its online presence in disarray.
While the official website of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian President, has
become available again, the central government site, as well as the
homepages for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence,
remained down. Some commercial websites have also been hijacked.
The Georgian Government said that the disruption was caused by attacks
carried out by Russia as part of the ongoing conflict between the two states
over the Georgian province of South Ossetia.
In a statement released via a replacement website built on Google's bloghosting service, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "A cyber warfare
campaign by Russia is seriously disrupting many Georgian websites, including
that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."
Barack Obama, the Democratic US Presidential candidate, has demanded
Moscow halt the internet attacks as well as observing a ceasefire on the
ground.
Last April the computer systems of the Estonian Government came under
attack in a coordinated three-week assault widely credited to statesponsored Russian hackers. The wave of attacks came after a row erupted
over the removal of the Bronze Soldier Soviet war memorial in Tallinn, the
Estonian capital. The websites of government departments, political parties,
banks and newspapers were all targeted.
Analysts have immediately accused the Russian Business Network (RBN), a
network of criminal hackers with close links to the Russian mafia and
government, of the Georgian attacks.
Jart Armin, a researcher who runs a website tracking the activity of the RBN,
has released data claiming to show that visits to Georgian sites had been rerouted through servers in Russia and Turkey, where the traffic was blocked.
Armin said the servers "are well known to be under the control of RBN and
influenced by the Russian Government."
Mr Armin said that administrators in Germany had intervened at the
weekend, temporarily making the Georgian sites available by re-routing their
traffic through German servers run by Deutsche Telekom. Within hours,
however, control over the traffic had been wrested back, this time to servers
based in Moscow.
As in the barrage against Estonian websites last year, the Georgian sites are
being bombarded by a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, in which
hackers direct their computers to simultaneously flood a site with thousands of
visits in order to overload it and bring it offline.
The Shadowserver Foundation, which tracks serious hacking, confirmed: "We
are now seeing new attacks against .ge sites - www.parliament.ge and
president.gov.ge are currently being hit with http floods."
Mr Armin warned that official Georgian sites that did appear online may have
been hijacked and be displaying bogus content. He said in a post on his site:
"Use caution with any web sites that appear of a Georgia official source but
are without any recent news ... as these may be fraudulent."
The Baltic Business News website reported that Estonia has offered to
send a specialist online security team to Georgia
However a spokesman from Estonia's Development Centre of State
Information Systems said Georgia had not made a formal request. "This
will be decided by the government," he said
NEW YORK TIMES
12 August 2008
By John Markoff
Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks
Weeks before bombs started falling on Georgia, a security researcher in
suburban Massachusetts was watching an attack against the country in
cyberspace.
Jose Nazario of Arbor Networks in Lexington noticed a stream of data
directed at Georgian government sites containing the message:
win+love+in+Rusia.
Other Internet experts in the United States said the attacks against Georgia
Internet infrastructure began as early as July 20, with coordinated barrages of
millions of requests 
 known as distributed denial of service, or D.D.O.S.,
attacks 
 that overloaded and effectively shut down Georgian servers.
Researchers at Shadowserver, a volunteer group that tracks malicious
network activity, reported that the Web site of the Georgian president, Mikheil
Saakashvili, had been rendered inoperable for 24 hours by multiple D.D.O.S.
attacks. They said the command and control server that directed the attack
was based in the United States and had come online several weeks before it
began the assault.
As it turns out, the July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out
cyberwar once the shooting started between Georgia and Russia. According
to Internet technical experts, it was the first time a known cyberattack had
coincided with a shooting war.
But it will likely not be the last, said Bill Woodcock, the research director of the
Packet Clearing House, a nonprofit organization that tracks Internet traffic. He
said cyberattacks are so inexpensive and easy to mount, with few fingerprints,
they will almost certainly remain a feature of modern warfare.
It costs about 4 cents per machine,
 Mr. Woodcock said. 
You could fund
an entire cyberwarfare campaign for the cost of replacing a tank tread, so
you would be foolish not to.
Exactly who was behind the cyberattack is not known. The Georgian
government blamed Russia for the attacks, but the Russian government said it
was not involved. In the end, Georgia, with a population of just 4.6 million and
a relative latecomer to the Internet, saw little effect beyond inaccessibility to
many of its government Web sites, which limited the government
s ability to
spread its message online and to connect with sympathizers around the world
during the fighting with Russia.
It ranks 74th out of 234 nations in terms of Internet addresses, behind Nigeria,
Bangladesh, Bolivia and El Salvador, according to Renesys, a Manchester,
N.H., firm that provides performance data on the state of Internet.
Cyberattacks have far less impact on such a country than they might on a
more Internet-dependent nation, like Israel, Estonia or the United States,
where vital services like transportation, power and banking are tied to the
Internet.
In Georgia, media, communications and transportation companies were also
attacked, according to security researchers. Shadowserver saw the attack
against Georgia spread to computers throughout the government after
Russian troops entered the Georgian province of South Ossetia. The National
Bank of Georgia
s Web site was defaced at one point. Images of 20thcentury dictators as well as an image of Georgia
s president, Mr. Saakashvili,
were placed on the site. 
Could this somehow be indirect Russian action?
Yes, but considering Russia is past playing nice and uses real bombs, they
could have attacked more strategic targets or eliminated the infrastructure
kinetically,
 said Gadi Evron, an Israeli network security expert. 
The nature of
what
s going on isn
t clear,
 he said.
The phrase 
a wilderness of mirrors
 usually describes the murky world
surrounding opposing intelligence agencies. It also neatly summarizes the
array of conflicting facts and accusations encompassing the cyberwar now
taking place in tandem with the Russian fighting in Georgia.
In addition to D.D.O.S. attacks that crippled Georgia
s limited Internet
infrastructure, researchers said there was evidence of redirection of Internet
traffic through Russian telecommunications firms beginning last weekend. The
attacks continued on Tuesday, controlled by software programs that were
located in hosting centers controlled by a Russian telecommunications firms.
A Russian-language Web site, stopgeorgia.ru, also continued to operate and
offer software for download used for D.D.O.S. attacks.
Over the weekend a number of American computer security researchers
tracking malicious programs known as botnets, which were blasting streams
of useless data at Georgian computers, said they saw clear evidence of a
shadowy St. Petersburg-based criminal gang known as the Russian Business
Network, or R.B.N.
The attackers are using the same tools and the same attack commands that
have been used by the R.B.N. and in some cases the attacks are being
launched from computers they are known to control,
 said Don Jackson,
director of threat intelligence for SecureWorks, a computer security firm
based in Atlanta.
He noted that in the run-up to the start of the war over the weekend,
computer researchers had watched as botnets were 
staged
 in preparation
for the attack, and then activated shortly before Russian air strikes began on
Saturday.
The evidence on R.B.N. and whether it is controlled by, or coordinating with
the Russian government remains unclear. The group has been linked to online
criminal activities including child pornography, malware, identity theft,
phishing and spam. Other computer researchers said that R.B.N.
s role is
ambiguous at best. 
We are simply seeing the attacks coming from known
hosting services,
 said Paul Ferguson, an advanced threat researcher at
Trend Micro, an Internet security company based in Cupertino, Calif. A
Russian government spokesman said that it was possible that individuals in
Russia or elsewhere had taken it upon themselves to start the attacks.
I cannot exclude this possibility,
 Yevgeniy Khorishko, a spokesman for the
Russian Embassy in Washington, said. 
There are people who don
t agree with
something and they try to express themselves. You have people like this in
your country.
Jumping to conclusions is premature,
 said Mr. Evron, who founded the
Israeli Computer Emergency Response Team.
13 August 2008
By Glenn Chapman
Georgia targeted in cyber attack
Georgian government websites have been under intense cyber attack on
top of the Russian military strikes launched against the country late last week,
a US Internet firm said Tuesday.
Tulip Systems Inc said they took over hosting of the websites for Georgia's
presidency and a major television network on Saturday, a day after Russian
forces poured into Georgia in response to Tbilisi's attacks on a Moscowbacked rebel province.
Tulip executive Tom Burling said the distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks began in the weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia
conflict and continued Tuesday after the Kremlin announced it had ceased
hostilities in the former Soviet state.
"They have been attacking Georgia from a cyber standpoint since July,"
Burling told AFP. "They are still doing it now."
"Our poor technician here has gotten three hours sleep in the past four days,"
he said.
Burling suggested that Russia was behind the attacks, which are similar to a
cyber offensive waged against Estonia last year that coincided with a
diplomatic spat between the Baltic state and Moscow.
DDoS attacks consist of overloading websites with so many online requests
that systems crash.
Burling said Georgian government websites were being slammed with
hundreds of millions of simultaneous requests for documents when Tulip gave
them refuge, Burling said.
"The cyber attack was taking down every Georgian government website," he
said.
On Tuesday, the Georgian sites hosted on Tulip were still reportedly getting hit
with 68,000 requests at a time.
Russia has denied involvement in cyber assaults on Georgia and experts say it
is difficult to determine exactly who is behind such attacks.
"The Georgian government's websites have obviously been under attack,"
said Gadi Evron, an Israeli computer security specialist that investigated the
cyber assault on Estonia.
"It is simply too early and we lack enough information to reach any
conclusion as to the motive and identity of the attackers," he said.
Evron said that such cyber warfare has become commonplace in the past
decade.
"These types of attack are only natural and happen immediately following
any conflict or political tension," Evron told AFP in an email.
DDoS attacks are simple, economical and hard to trace.
The assaults are typically done by using networks of computers that have
been turned into "zombies" or "bots" with malicious software planted by
hackers without the owners of machines being aware.
"Botnets" can grow to thousands or millions of machines and be commanded
to simultaneously make requests at targeted websites.
Andre DiMino, director of Shadowserver, a nonprofit Internet security
watchdog with team members around the world, warned against jumping to
the conclusion that Russia's government is the culprit in the Georgia cyber
attacks.
"This actually looks more like grass roots hacktivist types -- people that jumped
on the bandwagon," DiMino said, using Internet jargon referring to political
activists that resort to online evil-doing.
Tulip's Burling said the trend of such cyber maliciousness was a cause for
concern.
"It's like the Olympics. We are supposed to be above politics in the Internet
community."
Georgian forces attacked the Moscow-backed rebel province of South
Ossetia to regain control of the region which broke away from Tbilisi in the
early 1990s.
Russian troops and tanks poured into Georgia on Friday after the Georgian
offensive.
INTERNATIONAL DATA GROUP
13 August 2008
By Jeremy Kirk
Estonia, Poland help Georgia fight cyber attacks
In an intriguing cyber alliance, two Estonian computer experts are scheduled
to arrive in Georgia by evening to keep the country's networks running amid
an intense military confrontation with Russia.
And Poland has lent space on its president's Web page for Georgia to post
updates on its ongoing conflict with Russia, which launched a military
campaign on Friday to eject Georgian troops from South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, two renegade areas with strong ties to Russia.
The cooperation between the former Iron Curtain allies is aimed at blunting
pro-Russian computer hackers, who have been blamed over the last few
years for cyber attacks against Estonia, Lithuania and Georgia in incidents
linked to political friction between those nations and Russia.
Two of the four experts that staff Estonia's Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) were waiting Tuesday morning in Yerevan, the capital of
Armenia, seeking permission to drive into Georgia, said Katrin P
communication manager for the Estonian Informatics Center. The two officials
are also bringing humanitarian aid, she said.
Estonia is also now hosting Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, which
has been under sustained attack over the last few days.
"Let's just say we moved it," P
e said. "I know that there are interested
parties who read media so it's not good to say exactly where the hosting is."
The Web site for Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, remained up on
Tuesday morning. That site was knocked offline around mid-July after a DDOS
attack from a botnet, network experts said.
The botnet was based on the "MachBot" code, which communicates to other
compromised PCs over the HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol), the same
protocol used for transmitting Web pages. MachBot code has been known to
be used by Russian bot herders, according to the Shadowserver Foundation,
which tracks malicious Internet activity.
Shadowserver said Monday that hackers had at one point defaced the Web
site for Georgia's parliament. "The attackers have inserted a large image
made up of several smaller side-by-side images of pictures of both the
Georgian President and Adolf Hitler," the group wrote.
Georgia is now also hosting some sites in the U.S., a logical move to better
defend the sites against attacks, P
e said. Shadowserver wrote that the
presidential site appeared to have been moved to an IP (Internet protocol)
address belonging to Tulip Systems, an ISP in Atlanta, Georgia.
The country is also looking to other ways to keep information flowing. A
Georgian news site was also up, but the site warned it was under "permanent
DDOS attack" That Web site has set up a group in Google's Groups service,
where subscribers can get the news stories it regularly posts.
Georgia's banking sites also suffered attacks that caused them to shut down
their online systems, said David Tabatadze, a security officer with the Georgia
Research and Educational Networking Association and Georgia's CERT. Some
of those systems are still down, he said.
Tabatadze said that the majority of Georgia's Internet traffic is routed through
Turkey, with some of it going through Russia. Although some news reports
indicated Georgia's Internet traffic may have been shifted through Russia,
Tabatadze said that's not the case.
"We have checked the traffic route on Ripe.net...and we did not see any
traffic re-routing via Russia," Tabatadze said.
It appears that large groups of hackers are working together to take down
the Web sites, but the attacks have been so intense that it will take a while to
analyze, Tabatadze said.
Other CERTs around the world have been helping to provide information on
the attacks, Tabatadze said.
The last few days have been a nerve-racking time for Georgians, said
Tabatadze, who said he heard explosions on Sunday when Russian planes
bombed air-traffic control stations near Tbilisi, Georgia's capital.
"You can't even imagine the situation," Tabatadze said. "This is a terrible end
for Georgia."
On Tuesday morning, Russia announced it would stop military operations in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, saying the safety of its peacekeepers in the
region had been secured.
THE TELEGRAPH
13 August 2008
By John Swaine
Russia continues cyber war on Georgia
Their assault, which began before the commencement of the five-day
Russian military offensive, has again crashed the official website of the central
government and has been widened to include a US company which
stepped in to rescue the website of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian
President.
Tom Burling, from Tulip Systems, which began hosting the President's site on its
servers in Atlanta after it was brought down by the hackers, said his company
had become the latest target of a flood of bogus traffic sent from Russia to
crash the sites. He said the malicious visits were outnumbering legitimate ones
5000 to 1.
Mr Burling, who has reported the attacks to the FBI, said his company was
working around the clock to combat the hackers. "Our people aren't getting
any sleep," he said.
The President's website is currently accessible, as are the sites of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, which were also brought down in the
initial wave of attacks. At one stage, photographs comparing Mr Saaskashvili
with Adolf Hitler were posted on the Foreign Ministry's site. The website of the
National Bank of Georgia has also been compromised.
The Russian hackers are launching waves of distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks on the websites. This means their computers, and the
computers of unsuspecting people whose home systems they have hacked
and enlisted for their "botnet", or swarm of zombie computers, are directed to
simultaneously flood a chosen site with thousands of visits in order to overload
it and bring it offline.
Last April the computer systems of the Estonian Government came under
attack in a co-ordinated three-week assault that was widely credited to
state-sponsored Russian hackers.
The Georgian Government said that the present disruption was being caused
by attacks carried out by Russia as part of the conflict between the two
states, which was triggered last week over Georgia's attempt to reassert
authority over its northern rebel province of South Ossetia.
In a statement, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "A cyber warfare
campaign by Russia is seriously disrupting many Georgian websites, including
that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."
Analysts immediately laid the blame for the attacks on Georgian sites with the
Russian Business Network (RBN), a gang of criminal hackers which has close
links to the Russian mafia and government.
Jart Armin, a researcher who tracks RBN activity, said visitors to the Georgian
sites had been re-routed through servers in Russia and Turkey, which were
"well known to be under the control of RBN and influenced by the Russian
Government."
Greg Day, a security analyst at McAfee, said increasingly hacking will be a
matter of national security.
"We can expect to see cyber attacks being increasingly used as a weapon.
The benefits of using such methods are that no one is directly physically hurt
or killed and it is much harder to pinpoint the source and who is involved," he
told Sky News.
The hackers have also been targeting the website of Garry Kasparov, the
Russian opposition figure and former chess champion.
WASHINGTON POST
27 August 2008
By Kim Hart
A New Breed Of Hackers Tracks Online Acts of War
'Hacktivists' Update Their Mission
TORONTO -- Here in the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, a new breed
of hackers is conducting digital espionage.
They are among a growing number of investigators who monitor how traffic is
routed through countries, where Web sites are blocked and why it's all
happening. Now they are turning their scrutiny to a new weapon of
international warfare: cyber attacks.
Tracking wars isn't what many of the researchers, who call themselves
"hacktivists," set out to do. Many began intending to help residents in
countries that censor online content. But as the Internet has evolved, so has
their mission.
Ronald J. Deibert, director of the Citizen Lab, calls the organization a "global
civil society counterintelligence agency" and refers to the lab as the "NSA of
operations."
Their efforts have ramped up in the past year as researchers gather evidence
that Internet assaults are playing a larger role in military strategy and political
struggles. Even before Georgia and Russia entered a ground war earlier this
month, Citizen Lab's researchers noticed sporadic attacks aimed at several
Georgian Web sites. Such attacks are especially threatening to countries that
increasingly link critical activities such as banking and transportation to the
Internet.
Once the fighting began, massive raids on Georgia's Internet infrastructure
were deployed using techniques similar to those used by Russian criminal
organizations. Then, attacks seemed to come from individuals who found
online instructions for launching their own assaults, shutting down much of
Georgia's communication system.
Two weeks later, researchers are still trying to trace the origins of the attacks.
"These attacks in effect had the same effect that a military attack would
have," said Rafal Rohozinski, who co-founded the Information Warfare
Monitor, which tracks cyber attacks, with Citizen Lab in 2003. "That suddenly
means that in cyberspace anyone can build an A-bomb."
The cyber attacks that disabled many Georgian and Russian Web sites earlier
this month marked the first time such an assault coincided with physical
fighting. And the digital battlefield will likely become a permanent front in
modern warfare, Deibert said.
Seven years ago, Deibert opened the Citizen Lab using grant money from the
Ford Foundation. Soon after, he and Rohozinski helped begin the OpenNet
Initiative, a collaboration with Harvard's Law School, Cambridge and Oxford
universities that tracks patterns of Internet censorship in countries that use
filters, such as China. The project received an additional $3 million from the
MacArthur Foundation. Deibert and Rohozinski also launched the Information
Warfare Monitor to investigate how the Internet is used by state military and
political operations. And Citizen Lab researchers have created a software
tool called Psiphon that helps users bypass Internet filters.
The combined projects have about 100 researchers in more than 70 countries
mapping Web traffic and testing access to thousands of sites.
A number of companies specialize in cyber security, and several nonprofit
organizations have formed cyber-surveillance projects to keep international
vigil over the Web. Shadowserver.org, for example, is a group of 10 volunteer
researchers who post their findings about cyber attacks online.
The small Toronto office of Citizen Lab, tucked in a basement of the
university's Munk Centre for International Studies, serves as the technological
backbone for the operations. World maps and newspaper clips cover the
walls. Researchers move between multiple computer screens, studying lists of
codes with results from field tests in Uzbekistan, Cambodia, Iran and
Venezuela, to name a few.
"We rely on local experts to help us find out why a particular site is being
blocked," Deibert said. It could be a problem with the Internet service
provider, a temporary connection glitch or a downed server. "But what's more
effective is blasting a site into oblivion when it is strategically important. It's
becoming a real arms race."
He's referring to "denial of service" attacks, in which hundreds of computers in
a network, or "botnets," simultaneously bombard a Web site with millions of
requests, overwhelming and crashing the server. In Georgia, such attacks
were strong enough to knock key sources of news and information offline for
days.
Georgian Internet service providers also limited access to Russian news media
outlets, cutting off the only remaining updates about the war. On the night of
Aug. 12 -- the height of the fighting -- "there was panic in Tbilisi brought about
by a vacuum of information," Rohozinski said.
Shadowserver saw the first denial of service attack against Georgia's
presidential Web site July 20. When the fighting began, Andre M. Di Mino,
Shadowserver's founder, counted at least six botnets launching attacks, but it
was "difficult to tell if it was a grass-roots effort or one commissioned by the
government."
The organization detects between 30 and 50 denial of service attacks every
day around the world, and Di Mino said they have become more
sophisticated over the past two years.
"It really went from almost a kiddie type of thing to where it's an organized
enterprise," he said. But he's hesitant to label this month's attacks as a form of
cyberwar, although he expects networks to play an expanded role in political
clashes.
Jose Nazario, a security researcher with Arbor Networks, said cyber attacks
used to target a computer's operating system. But he's seen a "tremendous
rise" in attacks on Web browsers, allowing attackers access to much more
personal information, such as which sites a person visits frequently. An
attacker then could learn which servers to target in order to disrupt
communication.
It's unclear who is behind the attacks, however. In some cases, the locations
of botnet controllers can be traced, but it's impossible to know whether an
attacker is working on the behalf of another organization or government. "It's
going to take a year to figure this out," Nazario said.
The data trail often goes cold when it crosses borders because there is little
legal framework for such investigations. And many countries, along with the
United Nations and other international bodies, are still weighing whether a
cyber attack is an act of war.
"If a state brings down the Internet intentionally, another state could very well
consider that a hostile act," said Jonathan Zittrain, co-founder of Harvard's
Berkman Center for Internet Society, and a principal investigator for the
OpenNet Initiative.
There are also strategic reasons not to disrupt networks in order to monitor the
enemy's conversations or to spread misinformation.
"That's an amazing intelligence opportunity," he said.
Using the Internet to control information can be more important than
disrupting the networks when it comes to military strategy, Rohozinski said. In
Georgia, for example, the lack of access to both Georgian and Russian
sources of information kept citizens in the dark while the fighting continued.
"Sometimes the objective is not to knock out the infrastructure but to
undermine the will of the people you're fighting against," he said. "It's about
the nuts and bolts, but it's also about how perceptions can be shaped
through what's available and what's not."
NEWSWEEK
1 September 2008
By Trevis Wentworth
ve Got Malice
Russian nationalists waged a cyber war against Georgia. Fighting back is
virtually impossible.
On July 20, weeks before Russia stunned Georgia with a rapid invasion, the
cyber attack was already under way. While Moscow baited Georgia with
troop movements on the borders of the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, the "zombie" computers were already on the attack.
Russian viruses had seized hundreds of thousands of computers around the
world, directing them to barrage Georgian Web sites, including the pages of
the president, the parliament, the foreign ministry, news agencies and banks,
which shut down their servers at the first sign of attack to pre-empt identity
theft. At one point the parliament's Web site was replaced by images
comparing Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to Adolf Hitler. This was not
the first Russian cyber assault
that came against Estonia, in April of 2007
it was the first time an Internet attack paralleled one on land.
The labyrinthine ways of the Web and the complicated interfaces between
the Russian government's clandestine services and organized crime make it
impossible, at this point, to say with certainty who was responsible, or how far
up the chain of command it went. The Russian military certainly had the
means to attack Georgia's Internet infrastructure, says Jonathan Zittrain,
cofounder of Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society. Moreover,
the attacks were too successful to have materialized independent of one
another. Bill Woodcock, the research director at Packet Clearing House, a
California-based nonprofit group that tracks Internet security trends, says the
attacks bear the markings of a "trained and centrally coordinated cadre of
professionals."
But who? Jart Armin, who has tracked Russian cybercrime, points to the
possibility that a role was played by the notorious Russian Business Network, a
cybermafia that specializes in identity theft, child pornography, extortion and
other dark and lucrative Internet crimes. The RBN's political agenda is vague
or nonexistent, but it often contracts out its services, and Armin says there is
increasing evidence that it is connected to, or at least tolerated by, the
Kremlin.
Indeed the timing is such that it's hard to discount some sort of Kremlin
coordination, even if it's impossible to prove, and Woodcock argues that such
cyber assaults have become a tool of Russian political leadership. As the
attacks' political intentions became more specific, he notes, the operations
have grown more complex. In addition to targeting Georgian government
and media Web sites, Russian hackers brought down the Russian newspaper
Skandaly.ru, apparently for expressing some pro-Georgian sentiment. "This
was the first time that they ever attacked an internal and an external target
as part of the same attack," he says.
Fighting back is tough. When Russian hackers made a name for themselves
last year by bringing down the Web site of the Estonian parliament along with
the sites of banks, ministries and newspapers, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas
Paet immediately accused the Kremlin of backing the attacks. But he was
unable to produce evidence supporting his claims. Putin eventually named a
suspect, or scapegoat, within his government. As Russian hackers waged a
similar assault on Georgian sites over the past few weeks, Estonia
one of
Europe's most wired countries
offered its better-defended servers to host
many Georgian government Web sites. Lithuania and Poland have stepped
up as well, prompting some excited bloggers to suggest that this is a digital
Sarajevo, akin to the events of August 1914, the start of the first Internet world
war. Certainly that's exaggerated, but the mutual defense going on in
cyberspace shows that these nations take the Russian threat to their online
infrastructure seriously.
Still, the nature of the Internet is such that it is almost impossible to respond
quickly enough. The government doesn't maintain its own botnets
large
networks of zombified computers standing ready to attack
but can rent one
from a crime network, like the Russian Business Network. Then, through statecontrolled media, the government can inspire waves of nationalists to amplify
the destructive force. "Everybody with a laptop has the responsibility to attack
the enemy
and you find out who the enemy is by looking at what the
government is saying," Woodcock says.
While no one can say who wrote the malware that was used to cause
Georgian servers to crash, it certainly proliferated on Russian Web sites in a
user-friendly form. Gary Warner, a cybercrime expert at the University of
Alabama at Birmingham, says he found "copies of the attack script" posted in
the reader comments section at the bottom of virtually every story in the
Russian media that covered the Georgian conflict, complete with instructions
on how the script could be used to attack a specific list of Web sites. The
efficiency is enough to make Russia's tanks and planes and ships, however
deadly, appear downright anachronistic.
4 September 2008
Experts call for united global action against cyber attacks
The world has to unite against the growing menace of cyber terrorism, IT
experts said Thursday, evoking a recent "cyber war" against Georgia as the
latest example of the threat.
"The world has finally woken up and understood that cyber security needs a
global approach and is a very serious matter," Estonian politician Mart Laar
told a cyber security forum in the Estonian capital Tallinn.
Estonia had to deal with attacks on government websites blamed on Russian
hackers in the spring of 2007.
Official Georgian websites suffered a similar cyber offensive last month in the
wake of Russia's military offensive on Georgian soil. Estonia was among
several states that stepped in to host hacked Georgian websites.
"The cyber war against Georgia in August demonstrated how it has become
part of the real war on the ground and we must act," Laar added.
According to Laar, cyber attacks against the Georgian websites came a day
ahead of Russia's August 8 military action in the country, a move roundly
condemned in the West.
Robert Kramer, vice-president of public policy for CompTIA, the Computing
Technology Industry Association uniting the world's top IT firms, underscored
that global cyber security starts at home with the average Internet user.
"The weakest link in cyber space is the human being behind the computer
with not enough awareness and skills on IT security matters," Kramer told the
forum.
Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar, an IT expert with Estonia's defence ministry, repeated the
warning.
"People everywhere need to understand that your unprotected computer at
home can be used as a tool in cyber-war," she said.
Tim Boerner, an IT security expert with the US Secret Service, said experts
noted increased attacks on Georgian web sites weeks before the first bombs
fell on Georgia.
"Over one million computers worldwide were used during the cyber attacks
against Estonia in spring 2007," he added.
An ex-Soviet republic that broke free from Moscow in 1991, the tiny Baltic Sea
state of Estonia joined the European Union and NATO in 2004.
It has become a leader in global IT development and has focused heavily on
cyber security since suffering the wave of cyber attacks in early 2007.
WASHINGTON POST (blog)
16 October 2008
By Brian Krebs
Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks
An exhaustive inquiry into August's cyber attacks on the former Soviet bloc
nation of Georgia finds no smoking gun in the hands of the Russian
government. But experts say evidence suggests that Russian officials did little
to discourage the online assault, which was coordinated through a Russian
online forum that appeared to have been prepped with target lists and
details about Georgian Web site vulnerabilities well before the two countries
engaged in a brief but deadly ground, sea and air war.
The findings come from an open source investigation launched byProject
Grey Goose, a volunteer effort by more than 100 security experts from tech
giants like Microsoft and Oracle, as well as former members of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Lexis-Nexis, theDepartment of Homeland Security and
defense contractor SAIC, among others.
The group began its inquiry shortly after the cyber war disabled a large
number of Georgia government Web sites. Starting with the Russian hacker
forum Xaker.ru (hacker.ru), investigators found a posting encouraging wouldbe cyber militia members to enlist at a private, password-protected online
forum called StopGeorgia.ru. Grey Goose principal investigator Jeff Carr said
the administrators of the hacker forum were keenly aware that American
cyber sleuths were poking around: Within hours after discovering the link to
the StopGeorgia site, Xaker.ru administrators deleted the link and banned all
access from U.S.-based Internet addresses.
At StopGeorgia.ru, project members unearthed a top-down hierarchy of
expert hackers who doled out target lists of Georgian government Web sites
to relative novices, complete with instructions on how to exploit vulnerabilities
in the sites in order to render them inaccessible. Following a July defacement
of the Georgian president's Web site that was blamed on Russian hackers, the
Georgian government blocked Russian Internet users from visiting
government Web sites.
But Carr said StopGeorgia administrators also equipped recruits with
directions on evading those digital roadblocks, by routing their attacks
through Internet addresses in other Eastern European nations. The level of
advance preparation and reconnaissance strongly suggests that Russian
hackers were primed for the assault by officials within the Russian government
and or military, Carr said.
"The fact that the StopGeorgia.ru site was up and running within hours of the
ground assault -- with full target lists already vetted and with a large member
population -- was evidence that this effort did not just spring up out of
nowhere," said Carr, speaking at a forum in Tysons Corner, Va., sponsored
by Palantir Technologies, an In-Q-Tel funded company in Palo Alto, Calif.,
whose data analysis software helped Grey Goose investigators track the
origins and foot soldiers involved in the cyber attack. "If they were planning
ahead of the invasion, how did they know the invasion was going to occur?
The only way they could have known that is if they were told."
Initially, security experts assumed that the sites were felled via "distributed
denial of service" (DDoS) attacks, a well-known method of assault that uses
hundreds or thousands of compromised personal computers to flood a
targeted site with so much junk traffic that it can no longer accommodate
legitimate visitors. But investigators soon learned that attackers were
instructed in the ways of a far more simple but equally effective attack
strategy capable of throttling a targeted Web site using a single computer.
Security researcher and Grey Goose investigator Billy Rios said attackers
disabled the sites using a built-in feature of MySQL, a software suite widely
used by Web sites to manage back-end databases. The "benchmark" feature
in MySQL allows site administrators to test the efficiency of database queries,
but last year hackers posted online instructions for exploiting the benchmark
feature to inject millions of junk queries into a targeted database, such that
the Web servers behind the site become so tied up with bogus instructions
that they effectively cease to function.
"Not only can a small number of users bring down the back end databases, it
indicates that there was some form of planning, reconnaissance, and some
technical sophistication by some of the members," Rios said. "It also indicates
that all the information from the attacked systems was most likely already
compromised and pilfered before the injection point was posted."
While Grey Goose members could find no direct link between Russian
government officials and the StopGeorgia.ru forum administrators, they claim
it is unreasonable to conclude that no such connection exists.
"The historical record shows clear support by members of the Russian
government and implied consent in its refusal to intervene or stop the hacker
attacks," the report states, naming at least three Russian politicians and
military officials who have previously endorsed coordinated cyber attacks
against other nations as a show of nationalistic pride.
Oleg Gordievsky, a former colonel in the Russian KGB who defected to the
British intelligence wing MI6 in 1985, spoke in 1998 at an international
conference on crime and discussed how Russian hackers convicted of cyber
crime are sometimes offered an alternative to prison -- working for the FSB"
(the federal security service of the Russian Federation and a successor to the
KGB).
According to a cyber warfare analysis by researchers at Dartmouth College,
Moscow has a track record of offensive hacking into Chechen Web sites. The
researchers provide this account of incidents in 2002, when Russian hackers
used cyber warfare in to supplement the ongoing military conflict with
Chechnya.
"In 2002, Chechen rebels claimed that two of their Web sites, kavkaz.org and
chechenpress.com, crashed under hack attacks by the Russian FSB security
service. The website crashes were reportedly timed to occur concurrently or
shortly after Russian Special Forces troops stormed the Moscow Theater in
which the rebels had taken hostages. "On October 26 ... our Web Site
kavkaz.org was attacked by a group of hackers," said a spokesman for the
Chechen rebel site run by Movladi Udugov. Following the attack on the site,
which is based in the United States, Udugov said that he was "amazed Russia's
special services can operate so freely on U.S. territory." The attacks on one
site, chechenpress.com, fell under the category of brute-force denial of
service (DoS) attacks, while on the other site, kavkaz.org, the attacks
appeared much more sophisticated.
According to Chechen sources, the Web site was hijacked by hackers from
the FSB. The FSB hackers reportedly accomplished this by changing the
domain registration of the site and then eliminating the data for the site from
the hosting server. Upon learning of these attacks, the rebels moved the
information on the sites to kavkazcenter.com. However, that site was
attacked just a week later, also apparently the work of FSB hackers.
In July, Russian hackers were blamed for a similar assault on Lithuanian
government Web sites. In Security Fix's account of that attack, I posted a
copy of a congratulatory letter sent to nationalist Russian hackers by Nikolai
Kuryanovich, a former member of the Russian Duma. The missive is dated
March 2006, and addresses the hacker group Slavic Union after the group
had just completed a series of successful attacks against Israeli Web sites.
"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the open field of
battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with the aid of information
soldiers, that is hackers," Kuryanovich wrote. "This means that a small force of
hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of the current armed
forces."
The Grey Goose report concludes that the journeyman-apprentice
relationship observed in the StopGeorgia forum will continue to be the
training model used by nationalistic Russian hackers, and that those hackers
are actively engaged in finding more efficient ways to disable networks.
In the meantime, Carr said, the Russian government will continue to deny any
involvement in any nation-level cyber attacks.
"The Russian government has adopted this hands-off and satisfying position of
deniability while enjoying the rewards achieved by the Russian hacker
community," Carr said.
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
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 2008 Jason Fritz
HOW CHINA WILL USE CYBER WARFARE
TO LEAPFROG IN MILITARY COMPETITIVENESS
byJason Fritz BS (St. Cloud), MIR (Bond)
Introduction
The People
s Republic of China (PRC) may be a global power economically but its military lacks force projection
beyond the Asia Pacific region. Its traditional military hardware is one to three generations behind the US and
Russia. In light of these deficiencies it is probable that cyber warfare will provide China with an asymmetric
advantage to deter aggression from stronger military powers as they catch up in traditional military capabilities.
Cyber warfare would also allow China to leapfrog by means of technology transfer and exploiting adversary
weaknesses. This investigation will address three primaryquestions: What is China
s current militarycapability?
How would cyber warfare allow China to seriously advance its strategic abilities? And what is the evidence that
China is headed in a cyber warfare direction?
1. Traditional Military Power of the PLA
In order to see how the Chinese military will 
leapfrog
 in military competitiveness, it is
necessary to establish its current capabilities. The Chinese People
s Liberation Army (PLA)
is composed of five main service branches, the PLA Ground Force, PLA Navy, PLA Air
Force, Second Artillery Corps, and the PLA Reserved Force. China has one of the world
largest military forces, with 2.3 million active members, a reserve force of 800,000, and a
paramilitary force of 3.9 million, for a grand total of approximately 7 million members. The
PLA has tried to transform itself from a land based power, to a smaller, mobile, high tech
power that is capable of reaching beyond its borders (Annual Report to Congress 2007;
China's National Defense in 2006).
During the 1980
s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping pushed for quality over quantity, and the
military was reduced by one million members. In 1993, President Jiang Zemin officially
announced a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) a part of the national military strategy for
modernization. RMA is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to
technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military
and others. RMA is tied to modern information, communications, space technology, and
total systems integration. Careful observation of US involvement in the Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraqi wars, furthered China
s interest in network-centric warfare and
asymmetric warfare, the former successfully used by the US, and the latter successfully used
against the US. At the turn of the century, the bulk of China
s traditional military force
remained 1950s to 1970s era technology imported and reverse engineered from Russia.
China is seeking to modernize this force. The size of China
s traditional force will shrink, as
fewer numbers are needed when new technology is introduced (Cordesman and Kleiber 2006;
Corpus 2006; Moore 2000).
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China
s defence budget has increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The official
military budget of China was US$57 billion in 2008, making it the second largest military
budget in the world. By contrast, the largest is the US with $623 billion, and the third largest
is Russia with $50 billion. Japan, South Korea, and India are the next largest spenders in the
Asia Pacific region with $41 billion, $21 billion, and $19 billion, respectively (World Wide
Military Expenditures 2007). China
s annual defence budget increases at approximately the
same rate as its annual GDP, with an average increase of 9% per year since 1996 (Pike 2008;
China's National Defense in 2006). However, China
s total military spending may be far
greater than the official figures reported. Foreign acquisitions, research and development of
dual use science and technology, national security, construction, and emergency response and
disaster relief, are a few examples of expenditures which may fall under non-military
headings but directly relate to the advancement of the military. The US Department of
Defence estimates China
s total military-related spending for 2007 could be between $97
billion and $139 billion. Think tanks and academic institutions report a wide range of
estimates for China
s defence budget, using varying methodologies and sources, however
most arrive at the same conclusion: China significantly under-reports its defence expenditures
(Annual Report to Congress 2008; International Assessment and Strategy Center 2005).
Ground Force
The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the world
s largest, with 1.25 million personnel, or about
70% of the PLA
s total manpower (Annual Report to Congress 2008). Approximately
400,000 of these troops are based in the three military regions (MRs) opposite Taiwan.
According to the 2008 Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), the PLAGF comprises 18 group armies which include 9 armoured divisions, 3
mechanised infantry divisions, 24 motorised infantry divisions, 15 infantry divisions, two
amphibious assault divisions, one mechanised infantry brigade, 22 motorised infantry
brigades, 12 armoured brigades, 7 artillery divisions, 14 artillery brigades, and nine antiaircraft artillery missile brigades. China
s military doctrine places an emphasis on electronic
and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, surface-to-air missiles, special
operations forces, army aviation helicopters, and satellite communications. The PLAGF
continues to reduce its overall size, opting for a more high tech and mobile force (China's
National Defense in 2006).
While much of the equipment remains antiquated, China is continually upgrading. This
includes approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 main battle tanks now deployed to units in
the Beijing and Shenyang MRs. As many as 6,000 tanks were produced by China in the
1960
s. From the early 1970
s to 2000, China
s tank inventory remained around 10,000.
This was mostly composed of old Soviet tanks and Chinese versions of old Soviet designs.
China continually upgraded over the decades, but was always one step behind the current
Soviet models. The Chinese-produced versions of the Soviet T-54A (Type 59 and Type 69)
account for over two-thirds of the total PLA tank inventory. While retiring some of the older
Type 59/69 series and replacing them with the second generation Type 88 and Type 96, the
PLA is also upgrading the remaining Type 59/69 series tanks with new technologies
including improved communication and fire-control systems, night vision equipment,
explosive reactive armour, improved power plant, and gun-fired anti-tank missiles so that
they can remain in service as mobile fire-support platforms. China
s newest tank, the Type
99, entered PLA service in 2001. Maintenance of such a massive force becomes a problem,
and many of China
s tanks may have fallen into disrepair. This may also be a push for
modernizing to a smaller but more effective force (Armoured Fighting Vehicles 2008).
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The PLAGF
s hand guns further illustrate China
s attempts to modernize and catch up by
means of foreign acquisition and reverse engineering. Most of China
s weapons are derived
from Soviet models acquired before the Sino-Soviet split in late 1950s and early 1960s.
Examples include Soviet or Russian small arms like the Mosin-Nagant series rifles and
carbines, the SKS carbine, the AK-47 assault rifle, the RPD light-machine gun, the Tokarev
TT33 pistol, and the DShK heavy machine gun. The PLA
s main infantry rifle, the QBZ-95
is derived from the Russian AK-47, and the Chinese Type 56 Assault Rifle is a direct copy,
albeit locally produced and with a permanently attached bayonet with a more sword-like,
stiletto style. The Chinese Type 56 Assault Rifle, a locally produced version of the SKS, also
differs from its Russian counterpart by having a permanently attached bayonet. The Chinese
Type 56 was mass produced from the 1960
s to 1980
s and was exported to many states
around the world (Small Arms 2008).
Navy
The People
s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is composed of 250,000 personnel divided into
three major fleets, the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, each containing
surface ships, submarines, naval air force, coastal defence, and marine units. China
s naval
force includes 57 attack submarines, 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships, and 49 coastal
missile patrol craft. A priority has been placed on anti-air capabilities with improvements in
over-the-horizon targeting, range, and accuracy in surface-to-air missiles. 
Taking
informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives
high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation
weaponry and equipment
 (China's National Defense in 2006). As a part of PLAN
modernization program, PLAN has been developing blue water navy capabilities.
PLAN does not currently have an aircraft carrier. However, evidence suggests they are
pursing such technology and have the capability to construct one. Renovation to a former
Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier may be used for training purposes, and the Chinese
have expressed interest in acquiring Russian Su-33 carrier-borne fighters. The ex-Australian
carrier Melbourne also provided research for the PLAN as it was towed to China for scrap.
Russian assistance, coupled with an already capable ship building infrastructure, could allow
PLAN to rapidly develop an aircraft carrier. The PLAN's ambitions include operating out to
the first and second island chains, extending operations to the South Pacific near Australia,
north to the Aleutian Islands, and west to the Strait of Malacca towards the Indian Ocean
(Annual Report to Congress 2008).
China
s submarine fleet is derived from outdated Russian technology and is seeking to
become a more modern and smaller force. Early Chinese submarines were domestically
produced versions of the Soviet Romeo class submarine, which were only capable of coastal
patrols with deployment to sea limited to a few days per year. One Romeo was modified to
carry six YJ-1 (C-801) anti-ship missiles, but it had to surface to fire them. The Chinese
Ming class submarines produced in the 1970s were not much better, other than being of
newer construction. This was followed by the Song class submarine, which had a
streamlined hull and can be fitted with anti-ship missiles capable of being fired while
submerged. China returned to purchasing subs in the late 1990s with the Russian Kilo class
submarine. The Type 041 Yuan Class is the newest diesel-electric submarine in the PLAN.
Its design incorporates parts of the Song class and Russian Kilo class submarines. The Yuan
class has five torpedo tubes capable of launching indigenous torpedos as well as Russian
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designed torpedos, and it is believed to have anti-ship missiles. This ship was designed to
replace the aging Romeo and Ming class submarines which currently form the backbone of
the PLAN
s submarine fleet (Chinese Submarines 2008; see also China
s Navy 2007).
Chinese produced Han class nuclear submarines were plagued with problems. A follow-on
Type 093 nuclear submarine was developed with experience from the Han class and further
assistance from Russian submarine builders, such as advanced wielding and construction
techniques. Despite being armed with new Chinese wire-guided torpedoes; the Type 093
overall capability remains comparable to Russian technology of the late 1970s. Nevertheless,
China continues to make progress and the true level of Russian assistance lacks transparency
(Smith 2001). Further, the Type 093 may have benefited from German fuel cell technology
and French design, which could allow for two to three weeks of submerged operations
without having to surface to recharge batteries. Internet-source photos of Type 039s under
construction also show Chinese mastery of advanced multi-layer rubber/polymer hull
coatings that greatly reduce hull-radiated noise while limiting the effectiveness of activesonar detection (Chinese Submarines 2008).
China maintains a fleet of approximately 28 destroyers, 48 frigates, and 30 ocean-capable fast
attack craft. The frigates were designed for anti-surface warfare, and lacking significant selfdefence. Chinese-built destroyers include the Luhu class, the Luhai class, and the Luda
I/II/III, from oldest to newest, respectively. The Luhai and Luda class are armed with a
battery of guns, torpedos, mortars, optional helicopter pads, and domestically built Crotale
SAMs which were built from designs provided by France in the 1980s. Construction of the
Luhai class was delayed from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s due to construction of frigates
for the Thai Navy. The most powerful addition to the PLAN is the Russian-built
Sovremenny class destroyers. These include MOSKIT anti-ship missiles and KASHTAN
combined gun/missile ship defence systems. While these designs are non-stealth 1970s
Russian technology, outdated by current designs, they provided the PLAN with modern antiship, anti-air, and anti-submarine systems. The most recent Sovremenny acquisitions carry 8
Sunburn supersonic sea-skimming ASM and the SA-N-7 Gadfly, which will give PLAN
limited naval air-defence capability. Up to this point, China only possessed short-range
SAMs of French or domestic design (Surface Combatants 2008; IISS 2008).
Improvements in stealth design of the PLAN
s ships further the notion that China seeks to
modernize by purchasing or clandestinely obtaining technology from other states, reverse
engineering that technology, and then attempting to make upgraded domestically produced
versions. According to Frank Moore of the Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies:
The PLA developed new stealthy warships benefiting from Russian or Ukrainian design
advice, weapons, electronics and other systems, plus new computer aided design methods
which speeded their development. By 2002 it was possible to observe the construction of
three new classes of warships via Chinese internet sources ... the No. 168 class, which
armed with Russian SHTIL SAMs, Russian radar, Kamov Ka-28 ASW helicopters and
Chinese C-802/803 anti-ship missiles, and powered by Ukrainian gas turbine engines. Soon
after two No. 170 class destroyers were launched. These featured large phased array radar
similar in appearance to the U.S. AEGIS system... Most likely the new "AEGIS" radar comes
from the Ukrainian KVANT bureau and is a newly-developed active phased array radar with a
broad search range of about 150km ... In 2003 [PLAN] launched two Type 054 stealthy
frigates. Some sources indicate production was halted at two ships pending the completion of
a new Russian SAM... In early 2004 internet-source pictures of a model of this new variant,
apparently from a Chinese shipbuilding exhibition, confirmed that it will feature a new verticallaunched SAM and be outfitted with Russian radar and missile guidance systems. The Type
054 is also powered by co-produced French-designed SEMT Pielstick marine diesel engines.
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A fourth stealthy warship emerged in April 2004: a new fast-attack craft (FAC). Now being
produced at two or three shipyards, this new FAC utilizes a wave-piercing catamaran (twin)
hull design, which improves stability at high speeds even in rough seas. It is based on a
design obtained from the Australian fast-ferry firm AMD... [with] radar-absorbing materials
applied to the hull. (Moore 2000).
Not only does this illustrate China
s use of foreign technology, it also demonstrates the
complexity of modern warfare. These are highly sophisticated weapons, weapons pieced
together from multiple sources, the existence of which was leaked onto the internet.
Air Force
The People
s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the third largest air force in the world
behind the United States and Russia. The PLAAF employs 250,000 personnel and 1,762
combat aircraft (IISS 2008). The Soviet Union helped found the PLAAF in 1949, providing
aircraft in 1951, and production technology and pilot training in 1953. China gained limited
air combat experience during the Korean War. In 1956 China began assembling its own
aircraft based on Soviet design, such as the J-2, J-5, and J-6, copies of the MiG-15, Mig-17,
and Mig-19 respectively. The Sino-Soviet split was a significant setback to the PLAAF as
was resource competition with the missile and nuclear divisions of the military. China
aircraft industry received a boost during the Vietnam War by providing aircraft for North
Vietnam.
During the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant restructuring, opting for a more
streamlined force and increased training. Due to the Sino-Soviet Split, the PLAAF turned to
Western states for military expertise. Western states saw China as a counterbalance to the
Soviet Union; however support dissolved following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.
Reverse engineering of Soviet weaponry continued with the Chinese aircraft F-7 being an
illegitimate copy of the MiG-21, and the F-8 incorporating various Soviet designs.
Gorbachev
s 1989 visit to China marked an end to the Sino-Soviet split. The newborn and
economically struggling state of Russia used the transfer of military technology and expertise
to China as a way to sustain its own aerospace industry (Moore 2000).
The collapse of The Soviet Union, and concerns over a Taiwan conflict that could draw in the
United States, reinvigorated the PLAAF
s modernization program. In the 1990s, China
began development of fourth generation fighters, including the J-10 and a collaboration with
Pakistan on the JF-17. China continued focusing on improved pilot training and retiring
obsolete aircraft, preferring quality over quantity. The PLAAF is currently developing its
own fifth generation stealth craft and increasing Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for all its
fighters.
In addition to jet fighter aircraft, 
China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted
from the Russian Tu-16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be armed with a
new long-range cruise missile
 (Annual Report to Congress 2008). China is also developing
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft utilizing Russian and possibly Israeli
technology; and is making progress in tanker aircraft used for in-flight refuelling and airlift
planes. These are important steps in obtaining the capability to conduct operations beyond
China
s borders (China's National Defense in 2006; Allen 2005).
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Production of indigenous Chinese aircraft has been lacklustre. Most of the designs require
foreign expertise which is then reverse engineered. The technology obtained is often one
generation old at the time of acquisition, as states do not want to give up their advantage.
Further, to reverse engineer they not only need the aircraft itself, but also high-precision and
technologically advanced machine tools, electronics and components, skilled personnel, and
facilities. By the time the technology is fully understood, and indigenous versions produced,
the aircraft may be two or three generations behind the latest models of the world
s advanced
military forces. China is not alone in this difficulty. Except for the five largest industrial
arms producers (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US), other countries that have
attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft, such as Israel, South Africa,
India, Taiwan, and South Korea, have abandoned their efforts and returned to importing
systems from one of the five main producers. One reason is the economy of scale involved
with financing research, development, and production of all of the systems and sub-systems
that compose modern combat aircraft (Moore 2000; see also Allen, Krumel and Pollack
1995). Despite these difficulties, China remains committed to producing indigenous aircraft.
Continued purchase of foreign technology demonstrates that the Chinese believe reverse
engineering and then upgrading is the best approach to establish themselves as a selfsufficient producer in the future. In other words, the PRC aspires to become one of the elite
weapons producers, but it does not want to wait for the infrastructure to evolve; it wants to
leapfrog these capabilities.
Space
The PLA is responsible for the Chinese space program. China was the fifth nation in the
world to place a satellite in orbit, the third nation to put a human into space, and the third
nation to successfully test an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) capable of destroying an enemy
satellite in low earth orbit. China
s manned space activities have received substantial support
from Russia. This can be seen in the design of the Shenzhou spacecraft, which closely
resembles the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. Although China
s commercial space program has
utility for non-military research, it also demonstrates space launch and control capabilities
that have direct military application. All taikonauts have been selected from members of the
PLAAF, and the PLA has deployed space-based systems for military purposes. These
include imagery intelligence satellite systems such as the ZiYan series and JianBing series,
synthetic aperture satellites (SAR) such as JianBing-5, the BeiDou satellite navigation
network, and secured communication satellites such as FengHuo-1. China launched its 100th
Long March series rocket in 2007, and continues to put more sophisticated and diverse
satellites into orbit. The PRC is developing the Long March 5, an improved heavy-lift rocket
that will be able to lift larger reconnaissance satellites into low-earth orbit or communications
satellites into geosynchronous orbits by 2012. It expects to replace all foreign-produced
satellites in its inventory with indigenously produced sun-synchronous and geo-stationary
models by 2010 (Annual Report to Congress 2008; Center for Strategic and International
Studies 2003).
Many of China
s space assets are dual use, having financial and prestige benefits in addition
to military applications. The Ziyuan-2 series, the Yaogan-1 and -2, the Haiyang-1B, the
CBERS-1 and -2 satellites, and the Huanjing satellites, offer ocean surveillance, disaster and
environmental monitoring, and high resolution imaging in the visible, infrared, and radar
spectrums. New electro-optical satellites are capable of penetrating night and weather with a
1/10 meter resolution, providing near continuous targeting data for the PLA forces. In the
arena of navigation and timing, China has five BeiDou satellites with 20 meter accuracy over
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the region. The PRC also uses the Russian GLONASS navigation system and is a primary
investor in the European Union
s Galileo navigation system. China has developed small
satellite design and production facilities, and is developing microsatellites, satellites which
weigh less than 100 kilograms. These satellites offer remote sensing, imagery, and radar, and
could allow China to rapidly replace or expand its satellite force in the event of war or a
disruption to the network. The country is also improving its ability to track and identify
foreign satellites, which is an essential component in the event of counter-space operations.
China
s successful test of an ASAT weapon demonstrates an ability to strike enemy assets in
low earth orbit. This acts as a deterrent to conflict and demonstrates the PRC
s commitment
to relatively low-cost asymmetric warfare (International Assessment and Strategy Center
2005).
Second Artillery Corps
The Second Artillery Corps (SAC) controls the PLA
s nuclear and conventional missile
forces. Weapons from the SAC are subsequently filtered to other branches of the PLA.
Items such as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) may be used by the PLAAF on H-6
bombers, or by the PLAN on Type 093 nuclear submarines. China's total nuclear arsenal is
estimated to be between 120 and 250. China maintains a 
no first use
 policy; however, the
ambiguous nature of declaratory policies leave open the option for first strike if China
leaders believe their national security or the CPC are under threat.
China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with the help of Soviet assistance.
After the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, China continued its development on its own and
made significant progress. The People
s Republic detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964,
making it the fifth state to do so, following the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and France. With the addition of India and Pakistan, and possibly Israel and North Korea,
China remains only one of nine states with a nuclear capability. China launched its first
nuclear missile in 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen bomb in 1967. Short-range ballistic
missile (SRBM) capability was obtained with the development of the Dongfeng-1, mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM) capability with the Dongfeng-2, intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) capability with the Dongfeng-3, and limited intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) capability with the Dongfeng-5 (Missile and Space Programme 2008; Second
Artillery Corps 2000).
It is estimated that China has 24-36 liquid fuelled ICBMs capable of striking the US and
approximately 100-150 IRBMs capable of striking Russia and Eastern Europe. China also
possesses approximately 1,000 SRBMs with ranges between 300 and 600 km. Beijing is
continually upgrading the range, accuracy, and payload capability of its SRBMs at a rate of
100 new missiles per year. Its most current missile, the Dongfeng-31A is a solid fuel ICBM
with a range of 11,200km. It is road mobile, and has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). As noted above, China possesses submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) on its SSBN submarines. The PLAAF also has bombers capable of
delivering nuclear bombs. However, they would be unlikely to break through the modern air
defence systems of advanced military powers. The SAC has sought to improve its retaliatory
strike capability by hardening missile silos, developing mobile launchers, and increasing
range, accuracy, and response time of its missile system (Annual Report to Congress 2008;
see also Wortzel 2007).
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China
s non-nuclear missile arsenal continues to develop anti-access/area denial capabilities.
These include the land attack cruise missile (LACM) DH-10, the Russian SUNBURN antiship cruise missile (ASCM), the Russian SIZZLER supersonic ASCM, and indigenous
versions of anti-ship missiles based on their own MRBMs. The acquisition of Russian arms
demonstrates China
s continued commitment to technology transfer and reverse engineering.
Thus, 
The DH-10 will be similar in size and capability to the U.S. TOMOHAWK, in part
because the PLA has been collecting parts of this U.S. cruise missile from Iraq and
Afghanistan. The PLA has obtained at least six Russian Kh-55 cruise missiles from the
Ukraine, and reportedly, has benefited from Israeli cruise missile technology associated with
the DELILAH anti-radar missile
 (Moore 2000). Asymmetric warfare, another tendency of
the PLA, is shown by its research into manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MaRV), decoys, chaff,
jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons that will strengthen deterrence and strike
capabilities. Many of these technologies can also be used to defeat, deter, or stymie US
attempts at a National Missile Defence shield. By examining the weapons and deployment of
the SAC, China
s perceived primary threats can be identified. The majority of the SAC
SRBMs are opposite Taiwan. DF-11 Mod 1s are capable of carrying thermobaric and cluster
munitions as well as high-explosives. In addition, they may carry radiofrequency/electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads which, if used in sufficient numbers, could
disable electronic communications and electric power networks (Annual Report to Congress
2008).
People
s Armed Police
The People
s Armed Police (PAP) is no longer the official fifth service branch of the PLA;
however it remains an integral part of Chinese defence. The line between military operations
against foreign elements and operations of internal security are often blurred. This can be
seen all the way down to the PAP uniforms which differ only slightly from PLAGF, often
leading foreigners to mistake them as soldiers. In contrast, public security officers wear dark
gray or blue uniforms more common among Western police forces. Much of the PAP force
was absorbed directly from the PLA. They use a similar rank structure, and they obey the
s general regulations. PAP guards are also recruited at the same time and through the
same procedures as PLA soldiers. The PAP has a dual command structure including the
Central Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council through the Ministry of Public
Security. By law the PAP is not part of the PLA; however, their interconnection is
unavoidable, and the PAP will play an important role as domestic or non-military issues
become intertwined with traditional military issues (People's Armed Police Force
Organisation 2007; Tkacik 2007).
The PAP is a paramilitary force primarily responsible for law enforcement. China
s National
Defence White Paper, published in 2006, lists the total strength of the PAP at 660,000. The
IISS Military Balance of 2008 lists an estimated 1.5 million (IISS 2008). The PAP has its
origins in the PLA, which was originally tasked with both defending China from foreign
threats and providing internal security. While the two share much in common, China
eventually decided the differences were greater than the similarities. The PAP's primary
mission is internal security. They are responsible for guarding government buildings at all
levels, including party and state organisations, foreign embassies, consulates, and airports.
The PAP provides personal protection to senior government officials, and performs security
functions for major corporations and public events 
 including its much-publicized role in the
2008 Beijing Olympics (see Paramilitary Olympics 2008). Additionally, the PAP maintains
multiple counter-terrorism units, sea and land border security forces, fire fighting units, and
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has a role in the protection of forests, gold mines, hydroelectric facilities, and highway
infrastructure. The secondary mission of the PAP is external defence, and in times of war
PAP internal security units can act as light infantry supporting the PLA in local defence
missions. Similarly, the PLA can fill in for the PAP and has done so during the Cultural
Revolution, the Tiananmen Square incident, and flooding of the Yellow River (People's
Armed Police Force Organisation 2007; China's National Defense in 2006; People
s Armed
Police 2005).
Military Intelligence
The General Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and is
responsible for implementing military modernization plans. It serves as the headquarters for
the PLAGF and contains directorates for the PLAN, PLAAF, and SAC, as well as a
department for electronic warfare. The General Staff Department also includes subdepartments for artillery, armoured units, communications, engineering, mobilization,
operations, politics, training, and surveying. Direct control over the four military branches is
sub-divided among the General Staff Department and regional commanders; however the
General Staff Department can assume direct operation control at any time. The General Staff
Department is under the control of the Central Military Commission (General Staff
Department 1997).
The Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting
military intelligence. This includes military attach
s at Chinese embassies abroad,
clandestine agents to conduct espionage, and the analysis of publicly available data published
by foreign countries. The Second Department oversees military human intelligence
(HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and satellite and aerial imagery intelligence
(IMINT) which it disseminates to the Central Military Commission and various branches.
The Second Department has increased its focus on scientific and technological military
intelligence gathering. The Third Department of the General Staff Headquarters is
responsible for monitoring the telecommunications of foreign militaries and producing
reports based on the military information gathered. China operates the most extensive signals
intelligence (SIGINT) network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the
1950s, the Second and Third Departments have maintained a number of secondary and higher
learning institutions for producing recruits, particularly in foreign languages. The Third
Department not only intercepts communication of foreign militaries, but also those of the
PLA, thereby maintaining control and supervision over the different branches and
commanders within all of the military regions (Second Intelligence Department 2005,
General Staff Department 1997).
Other branches of the General Staff Department include the Fourth Department and the
General Political Department (GPD). The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) is
responsible for electronic intelligence (ELINT) including electronic countermeasures and
maintaining databases on electronic signals. The GPD is responsible for overseeing the
political education required for advancement within the PLA and controls the PLA
s internal
prison system. The International Liaison Department, a branch within the GPD, conducts
propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and counter-espionage against foreign
intelligence. As with the PAP, many of the departments within the General Staff Department
appear to have significant overlap. The structural details are beyond the scope of this study;
however, they are worth noting, as they pertain to the discussion below of cyber warfare.
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Technology Transfer
China continues to pursue the acquisition of foreign military technology. Beijing is in
ongoing negotiations with Moscow to obtain multiple weapons systems, and in 2007 signed
arms agreements worth $150 million. Israel has previously supplied advanced military
technology to China. However, under pressure from the US, Israel began to implement strict
military export regulations. China is attempting to remove an embargo placed on lethal
military export from the EU. This embargo was a response to the Tiananmen Square
incident. Opinion on removing the embargo remains divided among EU member states.
According to the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on China
s Military:
China continues a systematic effort to obtain dual-use and military technologies from abroad
through legal and illegal commercial transactions. Many dual-use technologies, such as
software, integrated circuits, computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications,
and information security systems, are vital for the PLA
s transformation into an informationbased, network-enabled force.
Between 1995 and 2008, several high profile cases of Chinese espionage against the US
surfaced. These attempts targeted aerospace programs, space shuttle design, F-16 design,
submarine propulsion, C4ISR data, high-performance computers, nuclear weapons design,
cruise missile data, semiconductors, integrated circuit design, and details of US arms sales to
Taiwan.
Targeted organisations include Northrop Grumman, NASA, Los Alamos
Laboratories, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sun Microsystems, and various defence installations.
The Chinese do not limit themselves to high value targets or an elite group of agents. They
obtain any data which may be of value, including legally obtained documents or OSINT,
which may help them piece together the larger picture. China utilizes a decentralized
network of students, business people, scientists, diplomats, and engineers from within the
Chinese Diaspora. The majority of these individuals have legitimate purposes within the host
state; however they are recruited at a later date, or asked for small pieces of information or
favours which can seem harmless in scope to the individual. Attempts are also made to
purchase interests within high technology companies, as well as win political favour with
government officials. For example, there have been repeated allegations that President Bill
Clinton
s decision to sell sophisticated computer and satellite technology to China was
influenced by campaign contributions (Appel 2004; Cooper 2006; Grier 2005; Jordan 2008;
Warrick and Johnson 2008; Lynch 2007; Cox Report 1999; McLaughlin 1999; PRC
Acquisitions of US Technology 1998).
China
s use of espionage to obtain foreign military technology is not restricted to the US. In
2007, the head of a Russian rocket and space technology company was sentenced to 11 years
for passing sensitive information to China. An alleged agent who defected in Belgium
claimed hundreds of Chinese spies were working within Europe
s industries. These
allegations coincided with an arrest in France for illegal database intrusion of the automotive
components manufacturer Valeo, and a guest researcher in Sweden arrested for stealing
unpublished and unpatented research. Further, Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin defected to
Australia in 2005, claiming there were over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants
within Australia (Luard 2005; Isachenkov 2007). Espionage and technology transfer prosper
in cyber warfare, where being physically present is not required, and attribution becomes
increasingly difficult. It also falls in line with China
s strategy of leapfrogging. By acquiring
foreign military knowledge, China can quickly catch up and begin working at a comparable
level, rather than investing the large amounts of time and effort it would take to acquire this
knowledge independently.
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Doctrine/Strategy
Chinese military doctrine and strategy remain focused on modernization. Beijing has not
explicitly laid out an official grand strategy. This may be due to disagreement within the
government, or done intentionally to hide true motives and avoid being bound by them.
Much of the writings published by the PRC are contradictory or ambiguous, using modern
and ancient foundations, while being disseminated by varied sources. However, several
points which are continually emphasized may point to a general consensus. These include
modernization of weapons, equipment and training; accelerating the RMA; improving
education and training of the PLA and the CPC; 
informationized
 (xinxihua) warfare; and
scientific development. China seeks to maintain domestic and regional stability while
developing its economic, military, technologic, scientific, and soft power. It also seeks a
balance between military and economic development, believing they are mutually dependant.
Beijing maintains its One China Policy in relation to Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over the
Parcel and Spratly islands and adjacent waterways (China's National Defense 2006).
Deng Xiaoping, representing second generation leadership after Mao, sought to avoid
international responsibilities and limitations, as they could slow down development of the
military and economy. The third generation leadership of Jiang Zemin did look outward,
promoting a multipolar world in the face of the post-Cold War unipolarity under the US, just
as fourth generation leader Hu Jintao promoted the ideology of a Harmonious World (hexie
shijie) which places more emphasis on international relations (Lam 2004; Zheng and Tok
2007). However the PRC continues to avoid concrete stances through concepts of noninterference, diversity, and equality. It compares itself to other states through Comprehensive
National Power (CNP - zonghe guoli), using qualitative and quantitative values, and not
accepting traditional Western categorizations (see Pillsbury 2000). For example, China
includes the economy, soft power, and domestic stability as factors of CNP. This is
important, because it shows a correlativity which holds relevance for cyber warfare. Under
CNP the economy, soft power, and domestic stability can be seen as military matters.
Further, maintaining the status quo in regards to Taiwan and the Spratly islands may not be
China
s long-term intention, but rather a way to stall efforts while it builds up military
strength, strength which can include economic and international influence.
Despite not wanting to become embroiled in concrete commitments to military strategy,
Chinese leaders cannot ignore the interconnectedness of the modern world, and they have
realized the necessity of international cooperation. For example, the need for resources has
fuelled China
s global presence. The PRC is the world
s second largest importer of
petroleum. As the country
s economy grows and the middle class expands, the demand for
fossil fuel resources will continue to grow. This creates a need for sound international
relations with exporting nations and the need for securing transportation routes, such as the
Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. These are intertwined with the politics and
military affairs of the states involved. Competition with the US for these resources has often
led to China making agreements with nations the US opposes on several points, such as
Angola, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Venezuela, and Yemen (Hanson 2008; Brookes 2006).
Beijing may be using these countries simply because there is less competition for resource
access in the case of these suppliers. However, the result is often international criticism of
China as these states may be violating human rights or supporting terrorism. Moreover,
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Beijing
s methods of befriending these exporters comes into question, especially in regards to
arms being traded or availability of finance which may be supporting controversial policies.
China currently lacks the power projection to protect critical sea lanes from disruption or to
deter international criticism. Crucial to extended power projection is the blue water navy
which would benefit from online technology transfer and the further development of C4ISR.
Online PSYOPS and media warfare would enhance China
s soft power. Beijing believes that
economic growth is critical to military development; economic growth creates a greater
energy demand, which in turns creates a greater military demand, thus the two form a
positive feedback loop (Ikenberry 2008; China's National Defense in 2006).
While Beijing recognizes the need for international cooperation, it remains cautious. The
country suffered greatly from foreign incursions within the last century. Colonialism by
Western powers, Japanese occupation in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War,
and border conflicts with India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are all kept fresh through
China
s historical discourse. Despite China
s long history, these events are of special note as
they are within living memory, and these events were present during the founding and
duration of the CPC
s rule.
Ensuring the survival of the CPC shapes China
s strategic outlook. In order to bolster
domestic support for policies, nationalism has been emphasized over communist ideology.
This can be seen with government organised protests against Japan over visits by Japanese
leaders to WWII war shrines and protests against the publishing of Japanese school text
books which downplay Japan
s atrocities against the Chinese. These protests often coincide
with other strategic interests, such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, which are
often unbeknownst to the casual observer or participant. The mobilization of nationalism can
also be seen during the holding of a US reconnaissance plane in 2001, and the mistaken
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The 2008 Olympics further
demonstrated how China could garner national support in the face of a widening wealth gap,
forced relocation, corruption, and environmental degradation. These events demonstrate a
strategic value in public manipulation through nationalism; one that is interconnected with
military affairs, and one which is increasingly turning to online assets (see Faiola 2005).
Several conclusions can be drawn from the status of the PLA. China is committed to
modernizing its military, primarily through the purchase or illicit acquisition of foreign
technology and subsequently reverse engineering that technology so it can be produced
domestically. The PLA has placed an importance on trimming down its size, favouring
quality over quantity. The PLA
s weaponry often lags one or two generations behind that of
Western military powers. However, the total force base still poses a significant deterrent, and
establishes China as a dominant power within the Asia-Pacific Region. China lacks force
projection beyond its region, primarily do to the lack of a blue water navy and aircraft carrier
fleet, but also due to limits in missile technology and air-defence penetration, and opposition
by foreign powers such as the United States. China seeks to become self-sufficient in many
of these key capabilities. Once they have leapfrogged and are no longer trying to catch up,
the Chinese will no longer need such widescale technology transfer, and they will possess the
might to shape the international system, rather than be bound by one that was created by
foreign powers.
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2. A New Era
History has demonstrated that the advantage often goes to those who develop a technology
first. The great naval voyages of Ming admiral Zhang He were unprecedented for their time
and helped establish China as a suzerain of the wider Asian region. However, the mid-15th
century saw China retreat to xenophobic and isolationist policies that paved the way towards
China
s decline and opened the door for colonialism (see Dick 2006). This lesson has not
been lost among Chinese officials, and it is often used to spur initiatives such as their stated
desire to be the first to mine the moon for helium-3 (China
s Space Program 2005). The
information revolution has given more power to individuals and increased globalization
through the interconnectedness of economies, rapid dissemination of news, and improved
access to communication and information of all types. Any attempt to compete on a global
level without the use of these technologies would place the PRC at a significant military and
financial disadvantage. For this reason, the benefits of electronic reliance outweigh the risks
involved. Further, it is impossible for a state to develop a defence against cyber warfare
without simultaneously learning how to execute attacks themselves.
The US is the sole superpower, making it a benchmark for military competitiveness. Beijing
also views the US as a potential adversary, in particular due to perceptions of the US military
attempting to encircle China with bases in nearby states and opposition to China
modernization goals, to concerns over any forceful application of the One China Policy, and
to concerns over a range of internal affairs issues. China seeks to learn from US mistakes and
successes, using American expertise and field-tested military experience to accelerate
China
s development. The People
s Republic also focuses on weaknesses in the US military
in order to improve upon the American example and to expose asymmetric advantages. For
these reasons it is important to examine where the US is headed in military thinking and
development, as China is likely to follow (Derene 2008; Lasker 2005; Liang Xiangsui 1999).
Network-Centric Warfare
The US has viewed the internet as a potential tool of warfare since its inception. Arpanet, a
precursor of modern internet, was heavily funded by the US military, with a particular
emphasis on its research collaboration benefits. Despite fears of cyber terrorism post 9/11,
the US continues to place increasing reliance on the internet as a security tool. This can be
seen in the restructuring of US intelligence agencies and the creation of new online exchange
such as Intellipedia and A-Space (Shaughnessy 2008; Magnuson 2006). Militarily, the
information revolution has given rise to an increasing reliance on situational awareness,
weather monitoring, surveillance, communication, and precision strikes. Chinese military
strategists have made special note of the US reliance on, and dominance with, electronic
means in the Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi conflicts (Tellis 2007; Center for Strategic and
International Studies 2003; Liang and Xiangsui 1999).
Since the 1990s the US has put emphasis on developing network-centric warfare (NCW).
NCW seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology,
into a military advantage through the networking of well informed, geographically-dispersed
forces. Originally described as a system of systems, it includes intelligence sensors,
command and control systems, and precision weapons that enable enhanced situational
awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment. In essence, NCW
translates to information superiority, which requires the reduction of hard categorization,
because compartmentalizing military branches can stem the flow of information. In 2001, the
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Pentagon began investing in peer-to-peer software as a means to spread information while
supplying redundancy and robustness. The US Department of Defense has sought the
creation of the Global Information Grid (GIG) as a backbone of NCW. All advanced
weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centres are eventually to be
linked via the GIG. Collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing classified
security information on demand will be made globally available to soldiers, policymakers,
and support personnel to achieve information superiority (Alberts 2002; Alberts, Garstka, and
Stein 2000).
Vice President Richard Cheney stated in 2004:
With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years
ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective . . . . In Desert Storm, it
usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its
coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time
imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in
flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps,
grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our
commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen
(Raduege 2004).
Information Operations
In 2003, under the direction of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the US
expanded on NCW in a document titled the Information Operations Roadmap. Now
declassified, it was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by George Washington
University
s National Security Archive. Information Operations (IO) calls for NCW to
become a core military branch along with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Intelligence, and
Space. To accomplish this it requires the development of a comprehensive education
program to enlist new recruits, and an overhaul of the organizational structure of current
military branches in an attempt to break down barriers that hinder information exchange and
progress. IO activities include PSYOPS troops who try to manipulate the adversary
thoughts and beliefs, military deception and disinformation, media warfare, electronic
warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). Thus Information Operations
Roadmap stands as an another example of the US commitment to transform military
capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by
innovation and rapidly developing information technologies.
IO seeks to 
dominate the electromagnetic spectrum
, in an attempt to 
deny, degrade,
disrupt, or destroy a broad range of adversary threats, sensors, command and control and
critical support infrastructures
 (Information Operations Roadmap 2003). The document
notes that PSYOPS and manipulating the thoughts of populations through media and internet
require constant observation during peacetime, otherwise in the event of conflict, a state
would not be sufficiently engrained into the information culture to utilize them fully. This
can be seen with the emergence of patriotic hackers, the advancement of social media, and
the rapid evolution of memetics, slang, and subcultures, all of which will be discussed further
below (List of Internet Phenomenon 2008; Pang 2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008; Slashdot
Trolling Phenomenon 2008). IO includes defence, attack, and reconnaissance as vital
components (Information Operations Roadmap 2003).
IO seeks to put out a political message in coordination with any traditional military assault. It
places an emphasis on finding, and clandestinely promoting, favourable media from third
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parties, so as to appear more credible. IO also seeks to establish a legal framework to defend
against cyber attacks and cyber reconnaissance, as well as establish rules of engagement for
conducting cyber attack. For example, how much certainty is required in identifying the
source of an attack before responding? If an attack is being routed through multiple
computers, is it acceptable to attack the intermediary computer? This would halt the attack
but it would harm or destroy a computer which may have been infected without the owner
knowledge or consent. Additionally, an intangible computer attack can result in significant
tangible loss, but does this warrant the use of traditional military weapons as a response?
Future Combat Systems
Another US project that is gaining attention and closely resembles NCW and IO is Future
Combat Systems (FCS). FCS places a particular emphasis on advanced robotics, including
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs), NonLine of Sight Launch Systems, and Unattended Systems. This system of systems seeks to
make warfare as networked as the internet, as mobile as a mobile phone, and as intuitive as a
video game. The highly interconnected nature of FCS can even be seen in its development,
utilizing 550 contractors in 41 US states. While the US has yet to determine a definitive
name for this new type of information based, highly networked, and highly technological
warfare, it is clear that the US government has spent a significant amount of time and money
seeking to make it a reality. US Army officials have already stated that they intent to change
s name, because they believe the name is inappropriate, stating 
the future is now
 (FCS
Watch 2008; Future Combat Systems 2008; Baard 2007; Klein 2007; Gannon 2001).
Some of the complex logistical problems inherent in such an undertaking include: finance
allocation, giving the approval for use to commanders, inter-agency cooperation, a common
vernacular, rules of engagement, and adhering to the program
s stated goals. The US is
continually modernizing its cyber force, creating new hacker units, conducting cyber war
exercises, and diversifying and limiting the number of access points that could be used for an
attack (Waterman 2008; Greenberg 2007). And the US is not alone, 
more than 120 countries
already have or are developing such computer attack capabilities
 (GOA 1996). Information
warfare is being adopted by all modern nations and competition is mounting.
Informationization
China
s 2006 white paper on national defence places an emphasis on the informationization
of the military. 
Informationization
 (xinxihua) means improving the PLA
s ability to use
the latest technologies in command, intelligence, training, and weapon systems. New
automatic command systems linked by fibre-optic internet, satellite and new high-frequency
digital radio systems, allow for more efficient joint-service planning and command, while
also enabling a reduction in layers of command. The PLA
s move towards information
technology can be seen with the use of new space-based surveillance and intelligence
gathering systems, ASATs, anti-radar, infrared decoys, and false target generators. PLA
soldiers are using decision simulators, a low-light automatic tracking system for helicopters,
and a battlefield artillery/mortar fuse jamming system derived from Russian technology.
OSINT on China
s military continually makes note of informationization and the related, if
not identical, fields of cyber warfare, information warfare, CNO, and EW. 
Priority is given
to R&D of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, and endeavours to achieve
breakthroughs in a number of key technologies and leapfrogging technological progress, thus
speeding up weaponry and equipment modernization
 (China's National Defense 2006).
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Informationization includes increased education of soldiers in cyber warfare and NCW, a
reorganization of military branches and command system, and integrating joint operations.
The PLA is improving the information network for military training, and has built more
virtual laboratories, digital libraries and digital campuses to provide distance learning and
online teaching and training. University courses have emerged for cyber attack and defence,
a study of hacker methods, computer virus design and application, and network security
protocols (Annual Report to Congress 2008). Following the Russian example, China is
engaging in the debate of defining cyber warfare, in part through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, in order to have a hand in the shaping of a legal framework and rules of
engagement related to this new warfare. The PLA is pursuing a comprehensive
transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to
one capable of fighting and winning short duration, high intensity conflicts along its
periphery against high-tech adversaries (Annual Report to Congress 2008) 
 an approach that
China refers to as preparing for 
local wars under conditions of informationization
 (China's
National Defense 2006).
Exponential Growth and Unrestricted Warfare
One view on twentieth century patterns of unrestricted warfare has noted:
The names Watt and Edison are nearly synonymous with great technical inventions, and
using these great technological masters to name their age may be said to be reasonable.
However, from then on, the situation changed, and the countless and varied technological
discoveries of the past 100 years or so makes it difficult for the appearance of any new
technology to take on any self importance in the realm of human life. While it may be said that
the formulations of "the age of the steam engine" and "the age of electrification" can be said
to be names which reflect the realities of the time, today, with all kinds of new technology
continuously beating against the banks of the age so that people scarcely have the time to
accord them brief acclaim while being overwhelmed by an even higher and newer wave of
technology, the age in which an era could be named for a single new technology or a single
inventor has become a thing of the past. This is the reason why, if one calls the current era
the "nuclear age" or the "information age," it will still give people the impression that you are
using one aspect to typify the whole situation. (Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui 1999).
It is important to stop for a moment and ponder the rapid advancement in military weaponry.
New weaponry and concepts are easily dismissed as science fiction, yet the integration of
mobile phones and the internet in 2008 would resemble science fiction to someone in the
1980s. Reports of research and development may be noted momentarily before being
subsumed in a busy, informationally-competitive world. For the purpose of this study, it is
useful to acknowledge them in passing as they show the rapid advancement in science and
technology, where military weapons are headed, and the increasing complexity and
cooperation involved in their development and use. Current militarily-applicable science and
technology, under development or already in use, include: augmented reality (Bonsor 2008);
biotechnology; genetics; giving soldiers internal/biologic infrared, night vision, radar, and
sonar capability (Block 2006); GPS; force fields (Hershkovitch 1998); invisibility cloaks
(Mark 2008; Winkler 2003); microwave guns (Beam It Right There Scotty 2005);
nanotechnology; neuroscience; positron bombs (Davidson 2004); robotic exoskeletons
(Berkeley Bionics Human Exoskeleton 2007; Yeates 2007); space-based weapons such as
ANGELS (Lewis 2005) and Rods from God (Adams 2004); telepathy (Braukus 2004; Put
Your Mobile Where Your Mouth Is 2002); thought control of internet surfing and electronic
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devices (New Technology Operated by Thought 2007); unmanned ground combat vehicles
(Bloom 2008); and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (Pike 2008).
Adding further to this complexity, Unrestricted Warfare, a book by two PLA senior colonels,
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, claims that warfare is no longer strictly a military operation,
and that the battlefield no longer has boundaries. Unrestricted Warfare was published by the
PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House in Beijing in February 1999. According to the
FBIS translation editor, the book 
was endorsed by at least some elements of the PLA
leadership
 and an interview with one of the authors was published in the CPC Youth
League
s official daily newspaper on June 28, 1999. Thus while the book is not entirely
backed by the PLA, especially the older generation, like the 
half empty, half full
 glass
analogy, it does have some official backing and hence a degree of legitimacy as a document
assisting analysis as to where the PLA is headed and how asymmetric tactics against a
superior hi-tech military might be employed.
Environmental concerns, human rights in regard to weapons of mass destruction, and the
increasingly intertwined economies and political structures of globalization all have an
impact on modern warfare. Sheer might of weaponry can no longer guarantee victory under
these conditions. US extravagance in weaponry has been shown to stymie in the face of
guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and Iraq. Under limited warfare, asymmetric warfare has seen a
resurgence in use and value. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda employ guerrilla tactics and
make use of the internet and financial institutions to subvert traditional warfare (Levinson
2008; Yassin 2008). No single weapon can deliver a decisive victory, and weapons have
been replaced by weapons systems. For example, the patriot missile relies on multiple
technologies working in concert, from satellites to the missile itself, with data being relayed
around the world. Modern militaries have become reliant on electronic sophistication. The
authors of Unrestricted Warfare assert that war has not disappeared, but its appearance has
changed and its complexity has increased (Qiao and Wang 1999).
Non-Traditional Threats
Increasing interdependence among states has increased the danger of non-traditional security
threats, including the spread of disease, environmental damage, international terrorist groups,
international crime, acquisition and transportation of energy and resources, natural disasters,
and intertwined economies that can have an impact on social and political issues. For
example, modern transportation has made it possible for criminals to traverse the globe with
relative ease. The internet allows them to transfer or hide money across the globe and to
covertly communicate beyond the jurisdiction of their enemies. Natural disasters or
communicable diseases are no longer something which can be kept quiet as information
radiates out through global media, causing damage to soft power factors, tourism, business,
and international scrutiny (China's National Defense in 2006).
The line between military and non-military, soldier and civilian, is being blurred. Terrorism
is the most common example: the 2001 plane hijackings in the US, the Madrid train
bombings in 2004, and the London bombings in 2005 to name just a few key examples.
These lack an easily identifiable enemy to target, they cross territorial boundaries and use
asymmetric attacks. Further blurring the line are the Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway
by disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, the actions of currency speculators in relation to the East
Asian financial crisis, drug cartels, the mafia, media moguls who can influence the opinion of
a mass audience, or industrial polluters who affect the economy and health of their
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neighbours. These events can cause damage and disruption equal to war, but there is no
foreign military or state against which to go to war. The individuals involved may be from
multiple states and acting without government sponsorship.
Another form of non-traditional threat comes from hackers. Hackers tend not to have
military training, they may or may not have a political agenda, and they are capable of
causing massive damage with nothing more than an off-the-shelf computer and an internet
connection. For example, two British teenagers were able to access files on ballistic weapons
research of the US. They then took control of US air force computers and proceeded to
intrude into other military and government installations, making it appear as though the US
military was hacking other states (Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas
2001). The rapid advancements in technology and globalization are opening new and
complex ways to subvert security. In 2008, a group of 11 people managed to steal 45 million
users
 bank and credit card details, resulting in a loss of more than $256 million. The group
members were from diverse, yet cyber-advanced, geographical locations, including: Belarus,
Estonia, China, Ukraine, and the US. Their unprecedented feat was accomplished by sitting
outside of TJX retail stores and hacking into the store
s wireless network. This illustrates
asymmetry, emerging technology security risks, globalization, and the enhanced vulnerability
of commercial targets as opposed to direct military targets (Malone 2008; Almeida 2006).
Combination
To be militarily successful in this new era will require the ability to combine operations.
Combining weapons has been used throughout military history. Horses, armour, stirrups, and
swords are not as effective when used individually. Their combination can create synergy,
where the combined strength is greater than the individual parts. During the Gulf War, the
US combined the old A-10 ground attack aircraft with the new Apache helicopter to create a
lethal union
 (Qiao and Wang 1999). By dropping leaflets and publicizing video of
precision strike weaponry, the US combined PSYOPS and media warfare as well. The US
has pursued additional combinations of traditional and non-traditional attack methods.
During the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis, the US initially tried traditional military force, but when
this attempt failed they froze Iran
s foreign assets, imposed an arms embargo, supported Iraq
with weaponry and training, and began diplomatic negotiations. When all these channels
were used together, the crisis finally came to an end. The Americans have also employed
non-traditional attacks against non-traditional enemies. For example, they used hacking
methods to search for and cut off the bank accounts of Osama Bin Laden in various states
(Musharbash 2008; Vallence 2008).
China has demonstrated its commitment to such combinations. It seeks to develop military
modernization and economic growth in tandem, with an emphasis on science and technology.
China
s 2006 defence white paper puts forth a goal to 
work for close coordination between
military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and legal endeavours
, using
strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way. . .
 Also noted is the importance of taking
part in international organizations, such as ASEAN+Three, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, WTO, IMF, and the International Olympic Committee. These open up
diplomacy, aid in soft power, and give China a voice in determining the legal framework of a
globalized world (Ikenberry 2008; China's National Defense in 2006).
To learn how to conduct cyber security, the Chinese must have a full understanding of how
attacks are conducted; therefore they will learn offence along with the defence - the two are
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inseparable. China has repeatedly stated its goal of military modernization, and cyber
warfare is where modern militaries are headed. However, cyber warfare would unlikely be
used alone. It could be used simultaneously with a traditional attack, perhaps as a first blow
to take an opponent off guard, or in tandem with multiple non-traditional attacks, such as
PSYOPS and economic operations, or variants of each. Additional combined tactics that will
be discussed in the following sections include cyber attack, cyber reconnaissance, and market
dominance.
Internal Security
As seen with the lack of division between the PLA and PAP, the Chinese defence white
paper
s stated goal of developing the military and economy in tandem, and with the blurring
of lines in Unrestricted Warfare, China cannot ignore the full spectrum of impact that
Information Communication Technologies (ICT) will have, including that within its borders.
China
s internet population has risen to 210 million people (Anick 2008; Bridis 2008). And,
as of 2007, China possessed over 500 million mobile phones. China has become a world
leader in the communications industry, and 3G and 4G technology are increasing the ability
for mobile phones to supplant a personal computer for online activities. On the one hand ICT
supports economic, scientific, and technology development; on the other it creates a nontraditional security threat.
Social networking services can be used as a tool to further nationalistic goals. These goals
may include the spread of political ideology, propaganda, and disinformation. As seen with
the US Information Operations Roadmap, PSYOPS are an integral component of cyber
warfare. Operatives can sway audiences by presenting well thought out arguments or by
altering opposing views; they may also manipulate democratized news by artificially inflating
votes using scripts (Cuban 2008). Recent informationization military courses offered at
Wuhan University include 
An introduction to US and Taiwanese social information
systems
 suggesting that China has already recognized the benefits of utilizing social
networking externally (China
s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and
Space Warfare Capabilities 2008).
Additionally, online users are increasingly volunteering to enter large amounts of personal
data, which can, and has been, used for prosecutions (Use of Social Network Websites in
Investigations 2008; WFTV 2008; Layer 8 2007). Users do so to enjoy the social service it
provides, either not realizing, or unconcerned, that the government is simultaneously gaining
access to a self-imposed Big Brother. Not only can China use this information to its benefit,
but also it must secure it from being used by an adversary, such as its use for identifying
potential espionage and subversive assets. In terms of stemming anti-government agendas,
state agencies censor blogs, bulletin boards, email, and forums. Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) often take it upon themselves to censor users, because they are held legally responsible
for any customer who violates the law. Internet caf
s are required to keep detailed records of
their customers. In addition, 
every Chinese person who signs up for internet service must
register with his or her local police department within 30 days
 (China and Internet
Censorship 2006).
As China
s economy continues to grow, personal electronic devices are becoming more
accessible to Chinese citizens. Products such as personal computers, high speed internet
connections, mp3 players, large hard drives for storage, gaming systems, and advanced
mobile phones fuel a desire for more software and entertainment. This will enhance
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international criticism of Chinese copyright infringements and it will make it difficult for
China to prevent the spread of Western culture (French 2006; People
s Daily Online 2006;
Pirates of the Orient 2006). Increased connectivity also increases the capability of people to
conduct subversive activities that endanger state security. This may include, 
Signing online
petitions, calling for reform and an end to corruption, planning to set up a pro-democracy
party, publishing rumours about SARS, communicating with groups abroad, opposing the
persecution of the Falun Gong and calling for a review of the 1989 crackdown on the
democracy protests . . .
 (Kumar 2006). Other emerging non-traditional threats include mob
mentality, consumer price manipulation, domestic hacker groups who can damage and
interfere with the Chinese government or drag it into conflict with other states, and the
security of the identity and financial details of a growing online consumer market (Delio
2001).
In addition to China
s economy being directly linked to military issues, so too are domestic
threats, soft power, and the control of information. Readily available free web sources, such
as blogs, photo uploading, video uploading, Podcasts, torrents, and RSS feeds, have given
powers to individuals that were once restricted to large media outlets. Social networking
sites allow for the spread of this information across the globe at speeds exceeding traditional
mass media, and they are capable of reaching larger markets. These social networking
services, often referred to as Web 2.0, are noted for their ability for people to collaborate and
share information online, particularly emphasizing real-time dynamic displays,
interconnectedness, and being a part of a larger community. China maintains strict
government control over television, newspapers, and radio; therefore these new forms of
distribution pose a threat to China
s control. Censorship of the internet by China, known as
the Great Firewall, can be seen in the banning of foreign sites, such as Blogger and Voice of
America, as well as a wide range of search terms and images the government deems a threat
to national security or counter-productive to the political party. During the 2007 uprising in
Tibet, China blocked access to the video website YouTube (Richards 2008), and on multiple
occasions it has been accused of using Photoshop to digitally alter photos in its favour
(Pasternack 2008; Yue 2008). With the increasing popularity and economic success of Web
2.0, coupled with China
s global presence (prestige and international scrutiny) it is unlikely
that the Chinese government will ban these new forms of news distribution on a permanent
basis. However, it will seek to understand and entrench itself within the emerging system.
China has struggled to cope with internal and external cyber dissidents. This includes prodemocracy movements and the dissemination of sensitive information such as the spread of
SARS and human rights abuses. Pro-democracy activists Li Yibing and Jiang Lijun of Hong
Kong used virtual dead drops to secretly pass messages, such as a plot to 
disrupt the 16th
Communist Party Congress by phoning the police with a false bomb alert
 (Reporters
Without Borders 2006). Each member knew the user name and password to a single email
account. They would save messages as drafts, allowing the other member to log in and read
it at a later point. This avoided detection, because no message was ever sent. This represents
an asymmetric advantage provided by new technology; however China demonstrated its
prowess in using the same technology to combat the cyber-dissidents by using international
cooperation, internet laws, and online eavesdropping. Activists can use the internet to build
coalitions, create e-petitions, and organize protests, using elements such as maps, lookouts,
and live broadcasts. Foreign bloggers using commercially available satellite imagery have
compromised Chinese military secrets on numerous occasions. These non-governmental
bloggers have uncovered a Chinese site used for developing submarine technology, a training
facility used to prepare for a potential conflict with India, and the construction of a fourth
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satellite and missile launch facility in Hainan (Reporters Without Borders 2006; Yahoo
implicated in third cyberdissident trial 2006).
Determined Chinese internet users are finding ways around The Great Firewall. One popular
way is to use proxy relays. A proxy server acts as an intermediate; it allows them to access
banned sites through servers that are based abroad. Other techniques include using
specifically designed software, circumventors, tunnelling, encryption, and cached pages.
Several foreign organizations have voluntarily taken on the task of circumventing China
censorship and making this information public. Among the groups that may have breached
The Great Firewall are the University of Cambridge, the University of Toronto, M.I.T.,
underground hackers (presumably doing it just for the challenge), and groups formed by
Chinese defectors. Software such as Dynapass, Ultrasurf, Freegate and Garden Networks are
used by approximately 100,000 people in China to gain access to news and information that
is blocked by the firewall. With the increasing interconnectivity of modern times, China
must actively defend against these internal threats or risk having collateral damage to the
military, soft power, economy, and political integrity (China Tightens Vice on Internet 2006).
Despite some drawbacks, it is in China
s best interest to promote the growth of the internet as
it will boost the economy, improve education, and keep the nation competitive in the 21st
century. New freedoms for expressing political opinion will be counterbalanced by new
means of censorship and means to reduce a widening digital and social divide. The Chinese
government must be moderate in its approach to censorship and the digital divide or it runs
the risk of widespread dissent resulting from increasing socio-economic/rural-urban
disparities. The impact of the internet on China
s near future will be one of expanded
growth, a complex interaction of balances, and a constant adaptation to evolving technologies
from within pre-established ideologies. The following sections will further demonstrate how
the average internet user is becoming intertwined with military activity.
3. Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack
NCW, IO, FCS, and Informationization are not identical to cyber attack and cyber
reconnaissance; however they significantly overlap. The first four, discussed above, tend to
deal with the hi-tech advancement of traditional military assets, PSYOPS, and media warfare
 all of which rely on the internet in some form. The lexicon is continuing to develop, having
at times included the terms: total dimensional warfare, expeditionary forces, command and
control warfare, information warfare, full spectrum dominance, and electronic warfare.
Cyber attack may be thought of as hacking with the intent to destroy or disrupt. This could
include the physical destruction of a computer, deleting/re-writing of files, or knocking a
network or service offline. Cyber reconnaissance is the collection of data, also known as
cyber espionage or network intrusion. This may include technology transfer or intelligence,
such as troop locations or weaknesses that could be used in an attack. In many cases a hacker
goes from reconnaissance to attack at will. Here all six will be addressed 
 NCW, IO, FCS,
Informationization, Cyber Attack, and Cyber Reconnaissance - as components of cyber
warfare (China
s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space
Warfare Capabilities 2008).
This section will examine cyber reconnaissance with an emphasis on Chinese examples and
military applications. In addition to China
s stated goal of informationization and the quasiofficially endorsed book, Unrestricted Warfare, this section will show that foreign allegations
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and widespread network intrusions suggest China is developing a cyber warfare capability.
Cyber warfare fits with China
s established patterns of asymmetry and technology transfer.
In order to grasp why Beijing would pursue cyber warfare as a means of leapfrogging, it is
essential to acknowledge the skills of hacking. Hackers utilize a wide range of tools with
highly sophisticated techniques, the scope of which is beyond this article; however some
basic understanding is necessary. Hacking is capable of causing massive damage with little
funding, it is difficult to detect and defend against, it provides a high level of deniability, and
it eliminates the problem of geographical distance.
Security Hacking
A common method used in cyber reconnaissance and attack is the security exploit. A
security exploit is a prepared application that takes advantage of a known weakness. It is a
piece of software, data, or commands that utilize a bug, glitch, or vulnerability to cause an
unintended or unanticipated behaviour to occur on computer software, hardware, or
electronic devices. This can allow the attacker to take control of the computer, permitting its
use for other tactics, such as DDoS discussed below. An exploit may be used to gain lowlevel entrance to a computer, after which a hacker can search for further exploits to attain
high-level access such as system administrator (root). This tactic is known as privilege
escalation. Once exploit vulnerability has been identified by security experts, a patch will be
issued. For this reason hackers try to keep known exploits secret. These are known as zero
day exploits, and hackers may catalogue large numbers of them for their own use or to be
sold on the black market (Hines 2008). In 2006, Taiwan was hit with 
13 PLA zero-day
attacks
, for which it took Microsoft 178 days to develop patches (Tkacik 2007).
Vulnerability scanners may be used to identify exploits. One such scanner known as a port
scanner automates the process of finding weaknesses of computers on a network. These
check to see which ports on a specified computer are 
open
, available to access, and
sometimes will detect what program or service is listening on that port. Turning from
reconnaissance to attack, once an open port is found, large quantities of data can be sent in an
attempt to cause a buffer overflow. This can cause exposure of data, memory loss, and/or a
crash within the compromised system.
The primary means to identify computers used in cyber warfare is the IP address. An IP
address is a numerical identification that network management assigns to devices
participating in a computer network utilizing the Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) for
communication between nodes. In essence, each computer has its own unique IP address.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for
global IP address allocation. ICANN, a non-profit organisation operating in the US, is under
contract with US Department of Commerce and previously with US Department of Defense.
Despite this identification tool, hackers can mask their identity by using proxy servers.
Information is routed through multiple computers, only showing each computer
s identity to
the next in line. For example, a Chinese hacker could route his or her activity through a
computer in Brazil, which routes its activity through Russia. The computer in Russia could
be used to attack a computer in the US, and the US would see it as an attack from Russia.
Perhaps through painstaking effort the American investigators can identify that the Russian
computer was a proxy, but then they are led to Brazil. If they manage to go from Brazil to
China, they are still unsure whether China was the originator or simply another link in the
chain. Proxy servers can be rented or obtained through compromised systems. Additionally,
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free software such as Tor (The Onion Router), encryption, tunnelling protocol, and wireless
access points (hotspots) add additional anonymity.
A spoofing attack is when a person or program fools another into thinking it is someone or
something else. One example is the man-in-the-middle attack, in which person C gets person
A to believe they are person B, and they get person B to believe they are person A, thus
gaining access to information sent in both directions. This is accomplished by monitoring
packets sent from A to B (often involving a packet sniffer), guessing their sequence and
number, knocking them out with a SYN attack, and injecting packets from C. Firewalls may
defend against these attacks, if they have been configured to only accept IP addresses from
the intended correspondent.
Webpage spoofing, known as phishing, imitates a webpage such as a bank
s website. When
the user enters their data, such as passwords and usernames, the fake website catalogues their
information. Webpage spoofing is often used in conjunction with URL spoofing, using an
exploit to display a false URL, and DNS cache poisoning to direct the user away from their
intended site and then back again when the data has been collected. As a precaution some
websites require a user to arrive at their login page from a specified referrer page, but these
referrer pages may also be spoofed. During the 2008 Olympics net users in China received a
high volume of email spam offering video highlights of the games. Clicking on the links
brought users to spoofed CNN pages which asked them to download a codec to watch the
videos; once installed the computer was compromised and become a part of the Rustock
botnet, i.e. an automated 
robot
 running on the web to generate false headlines that entice
people to load harmful code (Miller 2008; Hi-tech Thieves Target Olympics 2008).
Spoofing may also be used defensively. For example, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) has practised spoofing on peer to peer networks. The RIAA floods these
communities with fake files of sought-after material. This deters down loaders by means of
fear and by wasting their time and bandwidth. This could be employed in the same manner
by militaries, or as a source of disinformation. A similar defensive tactic, known as a honey
pot, lures criminals in by offering sought-after data or what appears to be a compromised
network. The honey pot is designed to collect data on the intruder, while giving away
nothing, or giving away something that is perceived as an acceptable loss to gain something
greater in return.
Attackers may also compromise a computer or network by using a Trojan horse, often known
simply as a Trojan. A Trojan appears to perform a desirable function, while secretly
performing malicious functions. Trojans can be used to gain remote access, destroy data,
download data, serve as a proxy, falsify records, or shut down the target computer at will.
The Pentagon, defence-related think tanks, and defence-related contractors were the target of
a combined spoofing and Trojan attack in 2008. Trojans were hidden in email attachments
designed to look as if they were sent from a reliable source. The Trojan was designed to bury
itself into the system, covertly gather data, and send it to an internet address in China. Due to
the ability of hackers to route their activity through foreign computers, security experts were
unable to determine if China was the final destination, if it was an attempt at framing China,
or if it was a state-sponsored activity (Waterman 2008).
This was not the first time US research facilities received spoofed emails with Trojans
purportedly from China. In 2005 the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Los Alamos
National Laboratory became infected. No classified information was believed to have been
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obtained; however personal information of visitors from the years 1990 to 2004 was
compromised. This included names, date of birth, and social security numbers. These two
research facilities were originally constructed for sensitive nuclear weapons research during
WWII. Today they are used 
for research in numerous areas including national security,
nanotechnology, advanced materials, and energy
 (Lasker 2005). In general, Cyber
reconnaissance may be an attempt to attain victory conditions before battle. These intrusions,
if undetected, allow intruders to identify vulnerabilities for future cyber attack. The cost of
probing computer networks is low, given the lack of attribution, requiring as few as one
hacker, and the ability to work from remote locations using off-the-shelf hardware.
A rootkit is a toolkit hidden on a compromised computer. The rootkit can be a diverse set of
programs, but invariably is designed to hide the fact that the computer has been compromised
and defending itself once detected. These rootkits often hide themselves as seemingly
innocuous drivers or kernel modules, depending on the details of the operating system and its
mechanisms. In addition to covering the tracks of an intruder, they can allow easier access in
the future by opening backdoors. They may also include an arsenal of sniffers, key loggers,
and tools that relay email chat conversations. Rootkits may also serve as a staging ground for
email spam distribution and DDoS attacks as a part of a larger botnet. In 2005, it was
revealed that Sony BMG included rootkit software on their CDs. This software altered the
Windows OS to allow access to the computer by anyone aware of the rootkits existence,
presumably to enforce copyright protection. This example shows that corporations, too, can
be a part of cyber attack or reconnaissance, furthering China
s desire to create its own
software and establish market dominance as opposed to being subjected to the US
Numerous source codes for ready-made rootkits can be found on the internet. In 2006,
alleged Chinese hackers infiltrated 
the Department of Commerce
s Bureau of Industry and
Security, which manages export licensing of military-use products and information
 using
rootkits to allow privilege escalation. The agency spent millions of dollars on new, clean,
hardware and software, because they could not restore the integrity of the compromised
network (Tkacik 2007).
A virus is a self-replicating program that spreads by inserting copies of itself into other
executable code or documents. The original virus may modify the copies, known as a
metamorphic virus, making its destruction more difficult (similar to genetic diversity). A
virus can spread from one computer to another through the internet, email, the network file
system, or removable medium such as a USB drive. Damage caused by viruses include
deleting files, damaging programs, reformatting the hard drive, and disrupting or debilitating
the system completely. Viruses may also be used as PSYOPs or demoralizers by presenting
text, video, or audio messages to the computer user. In order to replicate, a virus must be
allowed to execute code and write to memory. For this reason, many viruses attach
themselves to executable files, such as Word and pdf documents, or html links. Some viruses
try to avoid detection by killing the tasks associated with antivirus software before it can
detect them. The Panda Burning Incense Virus is an example of cyber warfare posing an
internal security threat to China, and it set a legal precedent for pursuing and prosecuting
hackers (Lemon 2007).
Like a virus, a worm is also a self-replicating program. A worm is a program or suite of
programs that attempts to scan a network for vulnerable systems and automatically exploit
those vulnerabilities. Some worms work passively, sniffing for usernames and passwords and
using those to compromise accounts, installing copies of themselves into each such account,
and typically relaying the compromised account information back to the intruder through a
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covert channel. Many worms have been designed only to spread, and do not attempt to alter
the systems through which they pass. However, the Morris worm and Mydoom showed that
network traffic and other unintended effects can cause major disruption. A 
payload
 is code
designed to do more than spread the worm - it might delete files on a host system, encrypt
files for extortion, send documents via email, or destroy the target computer by rendering it
unusable.
The Code Red and Code Red II worms were the most successful worms in internet history,
causing nearly $2 billion in damages and infecting over 600,000 computers. The worms,
which may have originated from a university in Guangdong, China (United States General
Accounting Office 2001), attacked computers running Microsoft
s IIS web server and
exploited a buffer overflow. Home computers were largely unaffected; however any attempt
at infection caused them to crash. The worms created slow downs in internet speed, knocked
websites and networks offline, and defaced websites with the phrase 
Hacked by Chinese!
 although Chinese involvement was never confirmed. The attacks may have been statesponsored, they may have been underground hackers and script kiddies, or they may have
been a combination of the two. A script kiddie is not an expert in computer security. They
use pre-packaged automated tools written by others and found online, such as WinNuke
applications, Back Orifice, NetBus, Sub7, Metasploit, and ProRat. Even though script
kiddies lack sophistication, and they are looked down on by the hacker culture, they still pose
a significant security risk. When media attention is drawn to internet incidents, it is often
followed by individuals seeking to participate without any coordinated effort or instructions
to do so. Code Red II had a slightly different payload that could open a backdoor, leaving the
computers vulnerable to further exploitation (Schwartz 2007; Cost of 'Code Red' Rising
2001).
The Code Red worms coincided with the collision of a US reconnaissance plane and a
Chinese fighter jet, in which the Chinese pilot died, and known as the Hainan or EP-3
Incident. Patriotic Chinese hackers defaced dozens of US military and computer industry
websites. Patriotic US hackers responded with inflammatory web page defacements,
comment spamming, posting of photoshopped derogatory pictures, and probably were the
source of the Code Blue Worm (Delio 2001). Code Blue sought out systems infected by
Code Red and reprogrammed them to launch attacks against targets based in mainland China.
In particular, it launched DDoS attacks against the Chinese security firm NS Focus. These
type of attacks could be used clandestinely against one
s own country to spur nationalism. Or
cyber attacks could be used by a third party state, or organization, to create conflict between
external states to further some masked goal. For example, Iran could benefit by creating
tension between the US and China through an attack prior to a US proposed UN resolution, in
which China has veto power (Onley and Wait 2006; Delio 2001).
In 2004, the Myfip worm probably originated from IP addresses in the Chinese municipality
of Tianjin (Brenner 2005). This worm stole pdf files, with later variants targeting Microsoft
Word documents, schematics, and circuit board layouts. Among the victims were Bank of
America, BJ
s Wholesale Club, and Lexis-Nexis. The worm not only stole intellectual
property, such as product designs, but also took customer lists and databases. Identifying the
number of companies affected poses difficulties as they do not wish to further damage their
business by coming forward. To do so can damage consumer confidence and require the
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implementation of costly security measures. Businesses may also be oblivious to the number
of previous infections and potential data loss as they simply update their patches and move on
(Brenner 2005).
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt
to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. This is accomplished by
flooding the target with data requests, so that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or so that
it responds so slowly that it is rendered useless. DDoS attacks may be conducted by a
collective of individuals, often co-ordinating their efforts, or by a network of computers
under the control of a single attacker. Such networks are called botnets, with each computer
in the botnet being known as a bot, or a zombie. These computers have been taken control of
by malicious users without the knowledge of the owner, usually through a rootkit, Trojan, or
virus. Sobig and Mydoom are examples of worms which created zombies. A botnet's
originator, known as a bot herder, can control the group remotely, usually through a means
such as IRC, and usually for nefarious purposes. Infected zombie computers are used to send
email spam, to host contraband data such as child pornography, or to engage in distributed
denial-of-service attacks as a form of extortion. The services of a bot herder can be rented on
the black market. One estimate suggested that Chinese hackers have 750,000 zombie
computers in the US alone (Waterman 2007). A similar, but non-malicious, phenomenon
involving the banding together of excess computer power can be seen in the Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (SETI@home), or Stanford University
s protein folding simulations
(Folding@home).
DoS and DDoS attacks can prevent an internet site or service from functioning temporarily or
indefinitely. DOS attacks can also lead to problems in the network branches around the
actual computer being attacked. For example, the bandwidth of a router between the internet
and a local area network may be consumed by an attack, compromising not only the intended
computer, but also the entire network. If the attack is conducted on a sufficiently large scale,
entire geographical regions of internet connectivity can be compromised without the
attacker's knowledge or intent by incorrectly configured or flimsy network infrastructure
equipment. Scripts can be set up to automate the process, and subtle variations of these
attacks, such as smurf attacks, fraggle attacks, teardrop attack, ping flood, SYN flood, IRC
floods, banana attack, Fork bomb, pulsing zombie, and nuke exemplify their sophistication.
Various DoS-causing exploits such as buffer overflow can confuse server-running software
and fill the disk space or consume all available memory or CPU time. A permanent denialof-service (PDoS), also known loosely as phlashing, is an attack that damages a system so
badly that it requires replacement or reinstallation of hardware. Unlike the DDoS, a PDoS
attack exploits security flaws in the remote management interfaces of the victim's hardware,
be it routers, printers, or other networking hardware. These flaws leave the door open for an
attacker to remotely 
update
 the hardware firmware to a modified, corrupt or defective
firmware image, therefore bricking the device and making it permanently unusable for its
original purpose. The PDoS is a hardware-targeted attack which can be much faster and
requires fewer resources than using a botnet in a DDoS attack.
It is important to note the difference between a DDoS and DoS attack. If an attacker mounts
a smurf attack from a single host it would be classified as a DoS attack. In fact, any attack
directed against computer availability would be classified as a DoS attack. On the other
hand, if an attacker uses a thousand zombie systems to simultaneously launch smurf attacks
against a remote host, this would be classified as a DDoS attack. Several botnets have been
found and removed from the internet. Dutch police located and disbanded a 1.5 million node
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botnet, and the Norwegian ISP Telenor disbanded a 10,000 node botnet (Keizer 2005;
Leyden 2004). Large, coordinated international efforts to shut down botnets have also been
initiated, such as Operation Spam Zombies, which included agencies from 25 different states
(Operation Spam Zombies 2005). It has been estimated that up to one quarter of all personal
computers connected to the internet may become part of a botnet. And an estimated 50% of
all pirated Windows programs contain pre-installed Trojans. China is renowned for its use of
pirated Windows programs. This is a cause for concern for China as it bogs down internet
and computer efficiency. It also could make Chinese computers susceptible to international
condemnation, if their computers are used via proxy. Further, it demonstrates to China the
value of developing its own operating systems for domestic and world markets, either to
avoid such problems, or to create them for others (Weber 2007).
There are also hybrids. A worm can install a rootkit, and a rootkit might include copies of one
or more worms, packet sniffers, or port scanners. A rootkit or virus may be used to conduct a
DoS attack, and compromising the system may include some traditional social engineering
(HUMINT). So all of these terms have somewhat overlapping usage and they are often
misused by mainstream media. The depth of security hacking goes far beyond the examples
given here. These examples serve as an introduction to the level of sophistication with which
computers can be compromised, illustrating the difficulty in providing defence. They also
demonstrate the high level of damage that can be caused by a small group of individuals who
work with little funding. This adds to the lack of attribution as it does not require the funding
and support of a military, making state-sponsored hacking easy to deny. In combination with
anonymity tools and the ability to hide intrusions, security hacking provides a high level of
stealth and asymmetry.
Military Applications of Hacking
The USA
s paramount position and its heavy reliance on computers have made it a prime
target. For this reason it has some of the most extensive information on cyber attacks. The
United States has had millions of computers infected at a cost in the billions of dollars.
Hackers may be lone teenagers searching for fun or curiosity or state-sponsored intelligence
gathering and technology transfer, the determination of which is highly problematic.
Frequently hit targets include the US Department of Defense, the Pentagon, NASA, Los
Alamos Laboratories, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Harvard
University, California Institute of Technology, and a wide range of think tanks, defence
contractors, military installations, and high profile commercial corporations. The attacks
have come from across the globe and identifying and prosecting those responsible has proven
difficult (Greenberg 2007; Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas 2001).
These hackers have been able to steal classified data, such as naval codes, information on
missile guidance systems, personnel performance reports, weapons development, and
descriptions of the movement of equipment and personnel. Jonathan (
c0mrade
) James
downloaded $1.7 million worth of software used to control the International Space Station
life support. Dutch teenagers stole information on the Patriot rocket launching system, and
the Navy
s Tomahawk cruise missile, and tried to sell it to Iraqi officials during the Gulf War
 Iraq thought it was a hoax and declined (Miklaszewski 1999). Hackers have
commandeered US commercial, educational, and military computers and used them in attacks
against other nations, including Taiwan. Hackers can cause an immense amount of damage
to a state, stealing information, deleting and changing files, transferring capital, and
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destroying programs or entire networks (Hacking U.S. Government Computers from
Overseas 2001; Christensen 1999; Qian and Wang 1999).
In 2001 and 2002 Gary (
Solo
) McKinnon probed US Army, Navy, Air Force, Department
of Defence, and NASA computers causing $700,000 worth of damage, taking down a
network of 2,000 computers, accessing classified data, deleting and re-writing files. He
accomplished this on his own from his home in London using commercially available
software and a dial up connection. McKinnon claims he was searching for proof that the US
is hiding information about UFOs and an anti-gravity propulsion system. This illustrates the
relative ease with which intrusions can take place, the difficulty of determining whether or
not it is a state-sponsored action, and a lack of legal framework for timely response. With
such attacks occurring so frequently to vital industries, the US, with the largest military
budget in the world, has inevitably developed a means to defend against them, which by
association means they have also developed the means to conduct cyber reconnaissance and
cyber attacks itself. China, too, is the subject of frequent attacks, albeit less publicized, and it
will want to remain competitive with US military capabilities (Boyd 2008; Bruno 2008).
Titan Rain
A coordinated series of attacks against US installations are strong indicators that China is
developing a cyber warfare capability. The attacks which ran from 2003 to 2006 were
designated 
Titan Rain
. They targeted US defence and aerospace installations, Sandia
National Laboratories, Lockheed Martin, Redstone Arsenal, the Department of Defense, and
NASA, gathering sensitive military data. The United Kingdom also reported being attacked
by the Titan Rain hackers. Much of the data stolen was not classified; however it was not
meant for public or foreign consumption, nor was it meant for unlicensed use. For example,
the US military
s classified data is typically not connected to the broader internet, but
sensitive information such as logistics support for the armed forces is. This can provide
valuable insight into field tested experience, as well as expose possible weaknesses to an
adversary (Brenner 2007; Espiner 2005).
In addition to the unauthorized gathering, the US is concerned that enough of this data could
be used to piece together a larger picture, one that would be considered classified. Among
the information gathered were 
a stockpile of aerospace documents with hundreds of detailed
schematics about propulsion systems, solar panelling and fuel tanks for the Mars
Reconnaissance Orbiter . . . specs for the aviation-mission-planning system for Army
helicopters, as well as Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air
Force
 (Thornburgh 2005). Although the majority of data appears to have been benign, its
massive quantity may one day prove to include items that the US deems classified at a later
date. These attacks could be a staging ground, testing US defences, for future operations of a
more serious nature.
Titan Rain demonstrated how China could use cyber warfare as an asymmetric tactic (Norton
Taylor 2007). Apparently, a team of hackers, estimated to number between 6 to 30, would
take control of US defence computers, copy everything on the hard drive within 30 minutes,
and send that data to zombie computers in South Korea, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, where it was
subsequently routed to computers in the Chinese province of Guangdong. The ability to
route the data makes it difficult to prove the attacker
s identity. While it is believed China
was responsible, there is no certainty that the data was not further routed to another location.
Additionally, those computers may have been under remote control by a separate
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government, or the hackers may not have been state-sponsored. The attacks themselves were
not particularly sophisticated, requiring only minimal training with commercially available
products. The instructions on how to conduct such attacks are widely available on the
internet itself (Delio 2001). But attempts to identify the attackers would require the
burdensome task of sending covert agents to physically identify the source.
By using the virtual world, hackers are able to traverse great distances without leaving their
station. On the night of November 1, 2004, Titan Rain members scanned, broke into, and
retrieved data from defence installations in Arizona, Virginia, California, and Alabama (in
that order) all within a period of six hours. Once attackers gain control of US computers,
through methods such as Trojans, they can not only shut down the system, they can also
conduct attacks using those computers. This could be used to raise condemnation of the US,
as it would appear the US is attacking other states (Graham 2005; Thornburgh 2005). While
proof is non-existent, some US officials believe that the PLA was responsible (Norton-Taylor
2007). Chinese military doctrine repeatedly discusses 
the importance of penetrating an
adversary's military logistics and personnel networks. Furthermore, the multiple intrusions
into what nuisance and criminal hackers would regard as boring, mundane networks-networks that do not offer the treasure trove of credit card numbers, bank accounts, and
identity data that criminal hackers typically seek-- suggest a military purpose
 (Tkacik 2007).
Further Evidence of Build-up
Attacks under the code name Titan Rain have ceased. However, OSINT suggests that cyber
attacks from China persist. From 2005 to 2007, the US State Department, Bureau of Industry
and Security, DoD, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Homeland
Security, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and defence-related think
tanks had intrusions from Chinese ISPs (China
s Proliferation Practices and the Development
of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Leyden 2007, Tkacik 2007, Almeida
2006). Sensitive but non-classified data continues to be harvested; items such as emails and
the 
names and other personal information on more than 1,500 employees
 (Onley and Wait
2006). Attacks from Chinese ISPs have forced entire networks to be taken offline or
replaced. In 2005 alone, 
the Pentagon logged more than 79,000 attempted intrusions
 (Reid
2007). Cyber reconnaissance and attacks from Chinese IP addresses had become so frequent
and aggressive that US President George W. Bush raised the subject to Chinese President Hu
Jintao at the APEC summit in 2007.
The difficulty of attribution in cyber attacks, such as proxies, botnets, non-state-sponsored
hackers, and a lack of legal framework to pursue them, means these attacks may not have
come from China; however the accusations alone are evidence that China will want to
develop a cyber warfare capability. China now has the world
s largest internet population, so
in terms of volume, China has the most targets to defend. Chinese officials have stated that
they are the victim of 
massive and shocking losses of state and military secrets via the
Internet
 (Leyden 2007). Foreign states wishing to use cyber warfare against the US may
recognise the focus being placed on China and use Chinese computers to conduct their own
reconnaissance and attacks by using botnets or proxies based there. Further, denouncements
by the US may indicate that retaliatory responses are in the works and that the US will use
allegations of Chinese incursions to bolster support for increasing US cyber warfare
capability, thereby putting China further behind in military competitiveness. Damage to
China
s soft power, particular in relation to ICT, may affect China
s economy by making
investors cautious and export controls/legal bureaucracy more stringent. PSYOPS campaigns
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and media warfare, of the type outlined by the US Information Operations Roadmap
(discussed above), may help China regain its lost credibility. These are elements of cyber
warfare, but viewed as less offensive than reconnaissance and direct cyber3 attack.
Non-US Foreign Allegations
The US is not alone in accusing China of using cyber warfare. In 2007 and 2008, China was
publicly accused of hacking into government facilities by officials in Australia, France,
Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the UK (Basu 2008; Goodin 2008;
Ha 2008; Leyden 2007; Marquand 2007). The number of countries under Chinese attack
could be far greater as some may not know that they are under attack, may not wish to reveal
their weakness due to a loss of soft power and consumer confidence, or they do not wish to
upset China as a valuable trading partner. Hans Elmar Remberg, Vice President of the
German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany
s domestic intelligence
agency) stated that 
across the world the PRC is intensively gathering political, military,
corporate-strategic and scientific information in order to bridge their technological gaps as
quickly as possible
 (Tkacik 2007).
Unlike HUMINT, cyber warfare provides a lack of definitive attribution, makes distance
nearly irrelevant, allows for the mass accumulation of data in a short span of time, and at a
small cost in comparison to traditional espionage or military activities. Cyber attacks, such as
an incident that shut down the UK House of Commons, may only be small scale test runs,
probing, or reconnaissance blunders, meaning that the true scope of cyber attack has yet to be
seen (Norton-Taylor 2007). Cyber reconnaissance appears to be the most beneficial tool of
cyber warfare. Beyond finding exploitation points in the military for future attack, the
commercial sector allows China the opportunity to skip generations of research and
development efforts, levelling the playing field in science and technology, and by association
boosting economic and military might. Chinese hackers have even gone after British
parliamentiary files on human rights issues, showing a potential interest in relation to soft
power, globalization, international condemnation, and the legal apparatus. As Unrestricted
Warfare has shown, there are no boundaries in relation to such military operations.
4. Case Studies: Estonia, Georgia and Chanology
The 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia and Project Chanology are examples of
large-scale cyber attacks. The Estonian attacks were the first to show how cyber attack
against a state provides a debilitating effect at a low cost, a lack of attribution, a lack of legal
framework in defence, world-wide attention, and may point to a new arm of traditional
attack. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was even more sophisticated and intense
than the Estonian case, showing the maturation of the process. Project Chanology reveals
how the collective masses can use online tools to emerge as a powerful force without a
central leadership. This can be harnessed by military power through the tactics described in
IO (Information Operations, see above). And as a matter of internal security, Chanologystyle movements must be carefully observed as they pose a non-traditional threat. Estonia
and Chanology are an emerging expression of warfare that is fuelled by new powers afforded
by the internet, but spills over into the real world, not only through financial loss and media
coverage (soft power), but also in the form of volatile protests, disruption, mob mentality, and
the capability of drawing governments and militaries into unwanted actions.
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Estonia
In 2007, the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era war memorial and bronze statue in
Tallinn, stating that the memorial symbolised Soviet occupation. The Russian government
condemned the relocation, claiming it was a tribute to those who fought in World War II.
The relocation sparked protests which resulted in 150 injuries, one death, and a month-long
cyber war campaign. Estonian websites including parliament, banks, ministries, schools, and
newspaper outlets were attacked with DDoS attacks and web page defacements. Some
websites also redirected users to images of Soviet soldiers and quotations from Martin Luther
King about resisting evil. Hackers who hit the ruling Reform Party's website left a fake
message that the Estonian prime minister and his government were asking for Russian
forgiveness and promising to return the statue to its original site (The Cyber Raiders Hitting
Estonia 2007).
These attacks garnered world-wide attention. The Russian government was directly accused
by media outlets and the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Russia had the motive and
the means for such an attack. However, there was no direct evidence to suggest that the
attacks were state-sponsored. There was evidence that some of the IP addresses used in the
attacks belonged to Russian government officials, and instructions on how to carry out cyber
warfare did circulate on Russian websites. However, the source of DDoS attacks could have
been masked by using proxies or botnets that are located across the globe. Neither NATO
nor European Commission experts were able to find any proof of official Russian
government participation. Further, the Russian government denounced Estonia
s claims and
refused to participate in any type of investigation (Bright 2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber
War' 2008; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007).
Debilitating Effect at a Low Cost
The effects of the cyber attacks were magnified as Estonia is one of the most internet-savvy
states in the European Union (The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007). The Estonian
government has pursued a paperless society, or e-government, and web-based banking.
Slowing down, or halting, banking services and newspaper outlets that rely on advertising
revenue strains the economy. This happens not only through a direct loss in revenue, but also
with a reduction in productivity, lost efficiency, diverting resources, escalating frustration,
and lost consumer and investor confidence. Estonia also uses the internet to elect
parliamentary officials, file their taxes and, via mobile phone, shop or pay for parking. In
some cases, website administrators simply blocked access from foreign states. While this
was effective in curbing the attacks, it completely cut off banking services to Estonians
outside of the country, vital to Estonian business people abroad. Spam emails inundated
government officials
 inboxes, halting online communication from the Parliament
s email
server. Officials closed off large portions of their network to keep more vital areas online. A
government briefing site was given high priority while the president
s website was sacrificed.
The 10 largest swarms of data requests by the hackers absorbed 90 megabits per second for
up to 10 hours each, straining Estonia
s networks. It was 
equivalent to downloading the
entire Windows XP operating system every six seconds for 10 hours
 (Landler and Markoff
2007). The cyber attacks on Estonia came close to shutting down the country
s digital
infrastructure. While these may seem more of a disruption than a collapse, the effects radiate
out into society (Bright 2007; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007).
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The month-long campaign caused companies to put resources into alternative infrastructure,
such as going back to traditional mail, relying on telephones, fax, and libraries, and reenforcing alternative methods of payment. As well as the cost of material infrastructure,
these type of cyber attacks cause a loss in productivity. This includes paying more people to
staff bank tellers, increased traffic on the streets, and long lines at retail outlets. Newspaper
outlets, telephone companies, and product distributors, have grown accustomed to using
online tools, and now rely heavily on them. While this might be a boon for some industries,
the whole restructuring process weakens the nation in the short term. The cyber attacks are
comparable to the damage caused to industry (beyond tangible infrastructure) by flooding or
blizzards. It places a nation in a state of flux, and leaves it more vulnerable to a traditional
attack.
DDoS attacks offer an enemy country an effective low cost assault with high deniability. The
majority of attacks on Estonia were DDoS, clogging its servers, switches, and routers.
Analysis from Arbor Networks revealed thousands of bots were used against Estonia from
locations as diverse as the US, Vietnam, Peru, and China. The cost to a state wanting to
establish botnets is minimal, requiring only one person, an internet connection, and a basic
computer. While the information for conducting such attacks can be found online, it is more
likely someone with expertise, such as non-government hacker groups, would be involved in
securing the rental of a botnet. This still keeps the number at a minimum, and hackers can
find alternative ways to fund the rental of servers with high bandwidth, such as credit card
theft (Waterman 2007; The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007).
Deniability
Determining the source of DDoS attacks is a difficult task, as they can be conducted with
proxies or botnets. Even if an IP address is obtained, there is no certainty that that was the
true source of the attack and not one link in a chain of computers or simply a compromised
computer being used unbeknownst to the owner. Message boards and chat rooms located on
Russian websites served as a meeting place for attackers, a place to coordinate their time of
attack, discuss targets, and recruit others. Because these individuals can be scattered across
the globe, it is difficult to assign a group identity to them. The web host may not be aware
that plans are being laid on their website, or they may not realise the scope of such plans.
These discussions can appear as a childish prank, overshadowing the serious repercussions of
the actions taking place, with no individual feeling responsible to put a stop to it.
The Estonia cyber attacks raised debate as to whether they were sponsored by the Russian
government. Some believed the attacks were too sophisticated to be the work of individuals
or even organised crime. Others believed the attacks were endorsed and guided by the
Russian government, but thought they were not directly involved 
 using online operatives
and media warfare as mentioned in IO. Russia has been accused in the past of sponsoring
web brigades
 - cyber attack teams - that conduct PSYOPS, disinformation, spamming, and
cyber bullying, such as revealing an enemy
s personal details (Polyanskaya 2006). From the
perspective of officials from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team and the
Pentagon
s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the attacks were not conducted by
sophisticated means, nor were they state-sponsored. The attackers used commercially
available off-the-shelf computers and scripts that are readily available on the internet
(Waterman 2007). Data from the Arbor Networks Active Threat Level Analysis System
(ATLAS) indicated that the attacks were conducted by multiple distributed botnets which
appeared to have been acting independently (Kerner 2007). Even if the attacks were traced to
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Russian government computers there was no certainty that those computers had not been
taken over by remote hackers. It would also seem foolish for the Russian government to use
its own computers for such an attack, especially when it has the expertise to mask its identity,
unless doing so was masking its identity (knowing that you know I know). Johannes Ullrich,
chief research officer of the Bethesda, stated: 
Attributing a distributed denial-of-service
attack like this to a government is hard. It may as well be a group of bot herders showing
patriotism, kind of like what we had with Web defacements during the US-China spy-plane
crisis [in 2001]
 (Brenner 2007).
As evidence of the Estonia case continued to be examined, the consensus was that the
Russian government was not directly involved. It appeared to have been 
hacktavists
simply a mass number of individuals upset over the relocation of the statue. Plans for the
attacks were posted on internet forums, message boards, and chat groups prior to the attacks,
including detailed instructions on how to send disruptive messages and which Estonian
websites to use as targets. The discussion of proposed attacks had become so popular that it
was indexed by Google, causing a Google search for the topic to return these incendiary
websites at the top of its search results, bringing them to the attention of even more people.
Despite being aware of these discussions prior to the attacks, Estonia could do little to stop
them. Estonian officials could not identify the individuals discussing attacks, as online (not
real) names were used, and obtaining IP addresses would involve going after the website
administrator and foreign ISP 
 a task with which mega-corporations such as the MPAA and
RIAA have difficulty, despite their massive funding and even when going after domestic IP
addresses. Further, there is no certainty that an individual participating in the discussion will
act on his or her comments, there were mass numbers of people involved (each with a
different IP address, ISP, and host state to deal with), and there is no solid legal apparatus in
place to deal with such an undertaking. Nonetheless, there was a growing and visible threat.
Estonian officials may have been better off devoting their resources to plant online
operatives. These operatives could have placed well thought out comments to try and sway
the crowd. Rather than spending all resources on physical prevention, some resources could
be used to train operatives in PSYOPS, mob mentality, propaganda, and logical deterrents
such as subtly mentioning flaws in their arguments, or the consequences of participating in
such an attack. In order to be effective this would also require an in-depth understanding of
internet subcultures (List of Internet Phenomena 2008; Pang 2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008;
Slashdot Trolling Phenomenon 2008). Subtle techniques, such as self-deprecating humour,
can sway the crowd
s emotions and train of thought (Landler and Markoff 2007). Russian
government involvement may have been as an instigator, knowingly or not, as 
there [were]
anti-Estonian sentiments, fuelled by Russian state propaganda, and the sentiments were
voiced in articles, blogs, forums and the press
 (The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007).
This could be a type of outsourcing of activity that provides a low cost attack with high
deniability. Once in the hands of an unwitting mob, the tools necessary are readily available
and the means are simple, thereby coordinating a massive data request simultaneously. On an
individual level it takes very little effort, yet as a combined whole it has devastating effect
with emergent sophistication. This small individual role, may also cause participants to feel
less responsible (Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008).
Legality
In addition to the difficulty of identifying the source of a cyber attack, a lack of legal
framework to deal with such an attack makes it exceedingly problematic. Only one person
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has been charged and convicted in connection with the Estonian attacks. Dmitri
Galushkevich was fined 17,500 kroons for attacking the Reform Party website. Galushkevich
admitted to his assault on the site, and he is believed to have acted alone. Several leads in
identifying other potential participants in the Estonian attacks relied on Russian cooperation.
Estonia made a formal investigation assistance request under a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT) between the states. Moscow appeared as though it would help, but after a
delay in action, it ultimately refused to cooperate, stating that the proposed investigation was
not covered by the MLAT. Further, the Head of the Russian Military Forecasting Centre
stated that the attacks against Estonia had not violated any international agreements because
no such agreements exist (Alo 2007; Sobrale 2007). A pro-Kremlin youth movement called
The Commissar of the Nashi, claimed responsibility for some of the attacks 
 however, the
group is located within Moldova and Transnistria which are beyond the jurisdiction of
Interpol and no MLAT applies. This severely hampers the investigation as pursuing all-EU
arrest warrants for these suspects would be largely a symbolic gesture (Commissar of Nashi
2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008; Ministry of Internal Affairs 2007).
International Publicity
Regardless of whether the attacks were state-sponsored, the Estonian incident brought cyber
warfare to the attention of the global community. The case was studied intensively by many
countries and military planners, since it was believed to have been state-sponsored and a
modern example of a large-scale attack. Experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the European Commission, and organisations from the US and Israel were
dispatched to offer assistance and collect first hand analysis of the event. The implications
are far reaching: 
For NATO, the attack may lead to a discussion of whether it needs to
modify its commitment to collective defense, enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty
 (Landler and Markoff 2007). There is no precedence for an attack of this type. If a
state
s communications centre is attacked by a missile, it is considered an act of war. But
what is the response to a cyber attack on that same installation, with the same debilitating
effect? The Estonian attacks have encouraged the development of a NATO Cybernetic
Defence Centre in Estonia. This is an extension of Estonia
s 1996 push for the expansion of
computer and network infrastructure in Estonia, nicknamed the Tiger
s Leap (Bright 2007; A
Cyber-Riot 2007; Estonia Has No Evidence of Kremlin Involvement 2007).
Georgia
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia appeared to mirror the
Estonian attacks, hinting that cyber warfare may become a standard addition to traditional
warfare, whether that be state-sponsored or not. Hours after fighting broke out, 
Russian
hackers had established a site, StopGeorgia.ru, where visitors could view a list of Georgian
websites being targeted, showing which sites had been successfully brought down, and
download a simple program that enabled their own computer to join the attack
 (Waterman
2008). The attacks included DDoS attacks from six different botnets against government and
news websites, webpage defacements, spamming, the distribution of Georgian officials
email addresses, and distribution of a list of Georgian websites with known security flaws.
The level of sophistication and intensity of the Georgian attacks surpassed that of the
Estonian attacks, showing that capability is increasing. Russian-based hackers tried to halt
the Georgian hacker community from responding, by taking down the two highest-profile
Georgian hacker sites, hacker.ge and warez.ge, in their initial assault (Waterman 2008).
However, Georgian hackers did respond, going after Russian news sites, and in some cases,
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spoofing those sites to redirect traffic to pro-Georgian news sources (Coleman 2008; Griggs
2008). Georgian officials asserted that the Russian military was behind the attacks, but they
could not provide concrete evidence. Regardless, it represents a new aspect to warfare that
must be taken into account. Patriotic cyber attacks may now accompany all traditional wars.
If this is not shaped according to government objectives, it runs the risk of undermining
operations. For example, patriotic cyber attacks could damage soft power, they could incite
damaging retaliatory attacks, and they could drag state powers into conflict.
Chanology
China may wish to tap into the power of a broader range of internet users, those who are not
government sponsored, nor skilled hackers, yet have wide-ranging knowledge of the internet
through frequent use. In one view:
I've always argued that I do not believe the patriotic hackers are dedicated government
agents, but I do believe that they are treated as useful idiots by the Chinese regime, and that
the Chinese regime has figured out a rough method, using the propaganda apparatus, to
shape the behavior of these patriotic hacker groups, many of whom are getting older and
going from black hat to gray hat to white hat, and they want wives and jobs and houses, and
the only way to get certified as an information security professional in China is to be certified
by the ministries of public and state security. (China
s Proliferation Practices, and the
Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008)
A powerful array of tools is openly available to anyone with an internet connection, and they
require little effort to learn. Free web-space, image and video uploading sites, such as blogs,
Flickr and YouTube, give anyone with an internet connection multimedia sharing tools that
rival traditional media. Social networking sites, such as Facebook and Digg, provide
additional means to spread this information to a massive audience which, given enough
popularity, draws in the traditional media as well. China can use propaganda and PSYOPs to
influence this crowd, using it as a political tool. For example, it can be used to organise
protest and cyber attacks denouncing Japan
s lack of remorse for WWII atrocities, to criticize
Falun Gong followers, or to rally support for the One China Policy (Faiola 2005). Project
Chanology gives insight into how these non-hacker internet users can come together towards
a common goal of disruption using the rapid growth of available internet capabilities. It also
illustrates a growing need to understand these emergent communities as they pose a nontraditional security threat.
Project Chanology was a series of cyber attacks and real life protests organised over the
internet against the Church of Scientology (CoS). The CoS is the largest organization
devoted to the practice and promotion of the Scientology belief system. They are often
criticized as being a cult which tries to exploit people for financial gain. A loose group of
internet users named Anonymous orchestrated attacks against the CoS using multiple image
boards, such as 4chan, 7chan, 12chan, 420chan, and 711chan, as well as supplementary
wikis, IRC channels, YouTube, Facebook, Slashdot, Digg, and Encyclopaedia Dramatica.
Users of the channels are collectively known as Anonymous, or anon, due to the website
use of anonymous posting; however their internet networks extend beyond the image boards.
A large and diverse population of internet users identify with the name Anonymous, many
having differing viewpoints and objectives. This point is often lost on the media, who
mistakenly believe Anonymous represents a cohesive group. Anonymous is connected, but
the nodes which connect each member are not the same, and therefore they do not all rally to
the same cause.
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Project Chanology was officially launched in the form of a video posted on YouTube on
January 21, 2008. The video stated that the attacks where in response to Scientology
internet censorship, dubious recruitment tactics, saturating of disaster areas to 
help
 victims,
and overall belief system. Of particular contention was Scientology
s forced removal of a
leaked Tom Cruise video interview, in which he expounded his love for Scientology.
Additional complaints against the CoS include the removal of leaked Scientology belief
documents (part of a 10-year legal battle against Karin Spaink and several ISPs), and the
attempted removal of the newsgroup alt.religion.scientology from Usenet, which led the
hacker group Cult of the Dead Cow to declare war on the Church of Scientology as early as
1995. Anonymous
s stated intent was to 
expel the church from the internet
 and to 
save
people from Scientology by reversing the brainwashing
. This was followed by DDoS
attacks, black faxes, prank calls, false deliveries to CoS buildings, the dissemination of
Church leaders personal information (telephone numbers, social security numbers, and
addresses), and the publishing of the contended leaked material on a wide range of websites.
Project Chanology members grew to approximately 9,000 people. They successfully took
down the Scientology website on January 18, 2008 with a mid-range DDoS attack. By
comparison a botnet can launch a simultaneous attack from 50,000 computers. Nonetheless,
Anonymous managed to cripple the Scientology website for a period of two weeks. In
response to the attacks, the CoS moved its internet domain to a more secure provider. The
original declaration of war video, which utilized a synthesized voice, was viewed over two
million times within 18 days of its release. Project Chanology garnered mainstream media
coverage on an international scale. Mainstream media
s attention created an unintended
DDoS attack by drawing more attention to the CoS website. Anonymous further raised
questions about Scientology
s actions, including the death of Lisa McPherson, a scientologist
who died in 1995, for which the CoS was previously under federal investigation.
Anonymous used a Google bomb technique to make the Scientology.org website the first
result in a Google search for 
dangerous cult
 (McMillan 2008; O
Connell 2008; Vamosi
2008; Cook 2008; Single 2008; Ramadge 2008; The Passion of Anonymous 2008).
Utilizing a wide range of online communication tools, and a new YouTube video titled 
Call
to Action
, Anonymous coordinated a series of protests. In the video anon states: 
We have
no leaders, no single entity directing us.
 On February 10, 2008, approximately 7,000 people
protested throughout 100 cities in 14 countries. Protesters wore Guy Fawkes masks from the
V for Vendetta film, and made Rick Astley's pop single "Never Gonna Give You Up", a
theme song for the protests against Scientology. The seemingly bizarre and childish
behaviour of Anonymous is a part of their cohesion, a subculture of memes, slang, and
humour. A second series of protests began on March 15, 2008, with approximately 7,000 to
8,000 protestors throughout 100 cities in 10 countries. CoS has not released an official
estimate of the financial damage caused by Project Chanology. However, they have publicly
stated that they were forced to increase online security, hired off-duty police officers to
provide physical security at their churches, and have suffered increasing negative press and
scrutiny from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. CoS has denounced Anonymous as
cyber terrorists and Anonymous has since switched its campaign to go after Scientology
tax-exempt status.
China could use online operatives to incite this type of internet based 
. It could be used
constructively within China, such as undermining the Falun Gong, or destructively against an
enemy country, such as inciting protests against pro-democracy Taiwanese leadership.
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Copyright 
 2008 Jason Fritz
Additionally, these online communities pose a security threat, and should therefore be
examined if only as a means of deterrence. As mentioned in IO, this sort of emergent mob is
not one that can be quickly understood. To be used as a military tool, China would need a
deep understanding of the asset
s culture. In the case of Anonymous, this equates to a heavy
reliance on inside jokes, slang, internet and pop culture. Anonymous uses humour to unite
and to obfuscate logic and responsibility. Credence within the group may come from inside
jokes and creativity, rather than sound information 
 they even revel in their own failure.
Internet communities can lack a centre of command, and be composed of serious, moderate,
and casual participants, all of whom may change their level of participation on a whim.
Assassin
s Mace
Assassin
s Mace, or shashoujian, is used in Chinese military writings to describe a weapon or
tactic 
which can deliver decisive blows in carefully calculated surprise moves and change
the balance of power
 (Johnston 2002). Similar concepts can be seen throughout China
history, from Sun Zi
s (tr. 1963) The Art of War to Mao Zedong
s (tr. 2000) On Guerrilla
Warfare. An assassin
s mace gains strength by ignoring pre-established rules of conduct. It
has many similarities to asymmetric warfare, such as being a novel way to level the playing
field, but it differs in that it is a decisive weapon, aimed at incapacitating an enemy,
suddenly and totally
 (Navrozov 2005). China possesses several asymmetric, highly
devastating weapons, such as a limited but modernising nuclear weapons capacity, China
ASAT capability, and its electromagnetic pulse (EMP) capability. However each of these has
considerable drawbacks. For example, human rights and environmental concerns have
relegated nuclear weapons to the role of deterrent and introduced limited warfare. By using
cyber warfare, China could achieve the same asymmetric destructive power while bypassing
the drawbacks.
It is unlikely that China would use kinetic kill weaponry, such as its direct ascent ASAT, in
an attempt to disrupt US space based assets. To disrupt US satellite dominance would require
a massive sky clearing operation, because the US has constellations of satellites with multiple
redundancy. The US GPS provides tactical communication and precision navigation, making
it a desirable target 
 however, the GPS uses at least five space satellite constellations. When
one is destroyed, others can be manoeuvred to fill holes in the net. Not all of these satellites
are within striking range at any given time. This means a sky clearing operation would take a
significant amount of time, thereby revealing Beijing
s intentions. This would cause
international dispute due to space debris, and allow the US to manoeuvre its other satellites
out of harm
s way. It would risk retaliation in which China would be at a disadvantage.
Additionally, there is no guarantee an attempt would be successful, as each launch requires
precise targeting, and China
s ASAT has only been tested once. It is more likely China
would attempt to knock out the corresponding relay stations on Earth by using a cyber attack.
Chinese tacticians have focused on neutralising the uplinks and downlinks of the space-based
systems through diverse forms of cyber attack including simple DoS attack. This gives the
advantages of deniability and low cost. It would remove distance from the equation, allowing
multiple targets to be taken out simultaneously regardless of location, and it would remove
international condemnation and/or involvement (Waterman 2008; Tellis 2007; International
Assessment and Strategy Center 2005).
China could destroy a vast majority of US electronics, including computers, cars, phones, and
the power grid, using EMP weaponry. This is something of which all nuclear armed states
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are capable by means of high altitude nuclear explosions, taking as few as three to blanket the
continental US (Electromagnetic Pulse 2005). Open source materials have shown the US,
China, France, and Russia all using an EMP burst as a surprise first strike in war games
(China
s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare
Capabilities 2008; Winn 2008; Nock and Lizun 2007; Qian and Wang 1999). However, it is
unlikely China would use such brute-force tactics. Using a high altitude atomic burst would
cause international outrage as it violates an international treaty, it damages the environment,
and it indiscriminately disrupts everything in its blast radius. Alternatively, shutting down
the US power grid, production lines, water utilities, chemical plants, telecommunications, and
transportation routes is possible through cyber attack, and it would provide the benefit of
deniability. Details on how such an attack would be conducted are scarce in OSINT as
governments do not wish to publicize their weaknesses or give away their assets. It is
important however that they do acknowledge them, since any computer system which is
connected to the internet is vulnerable to attack. In 2008, the CIA reported that multiple
cities outside the US had their electrical power shut off by hackers. The reports were vague,
supposedly due to security concerns; however it was reported that the attacks came from
online, through the internet, not by physical means (Bridis 2008; McMillan 2008).
Weapons of Mass Disruption
OSINT continually points to cyber warfare being capable of crippling a state
s electric power
transmission, transportation systems, and communications systems (Phone Phreaking 2008;
Weber 2008; Trahan 2008; McMillan 2007; Tkacik 2007; Reid 2007; Robson 2004;
Miklaszewski 1999). If the Russian government was behind the cyber attacks on Estonia, it
did not use such a dramatic assault. The Russians may simply have been testing their cyber
warfare capabilities, saving their most devastating capability for when it is needed most, as it
may only work once. Such an attack would cripple the flow of goods, effectively starving the
population and shutting down business. Evidence that such a possibility exists can be seen
across the globe. In 1997, a teenager shut down air and ground communication at a US
airport in Massachusetts, and in 2000, the Russian government announced that hackers had
succeeded in taking control of the world
s largest natural gas pipeline network, Gazprom, by
using a type of Trojan. In 2000, Vitek Boden took control of a sewage pumping station in
Australia. He remotely triggered the release of a million litres of sewage into public
waterways (Barker 2002). Computers and manuals seized in Al Qaeda training camps
contained large amounts of SCADA information related to dams and critical infrastructure.
In 2003, the Slammer Worm took a US nuclear power plant
s safety monitoring system
offline, and the Blaster Worm was connected with a massive blackout in the Eastern US
(Maynor and Graham 2006).
The United States is particularly vulnerable as much of the communication, manufacturing,
water, transportation, and energy infrastructure is owned by the private sector, as opposed to
China and Russia where infrastructure is predominantly in the hands of the government
(Greenemeier 2007). The relative ease with which the Titan Rain attacks were conducted
make private sector computer networks look like an easy target (Almeida 2006). The
government and defence installations are heavily funded for security, whereas the private
sector is not. Initially the US power grid control systems were on closed networks (not
connected to the internet). However, over time companies began deciding it was too costly to
maintain separate networks. The internet became essential for operations, meaning they
would need two separate systems for operation, one connected and one not. Through the
decision-making process companies decided it was cheaper to have only the one that was
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connected, but focus on keeping it secure. Over time security became lax, and no network
that is connected can be entirely secure. Many of these systems do not support
authentication, encryption, or basic validation protocols; of those that do support them, most
run with security features disabled (Maynor and Graham 2006). In addition to the internet,
SCADA systems may be compromised through outdated modems used for maintenance
purposes, wireless access points, or roaming notebooks. Further, power companies may buy
and trade power amongst themselves, so loopholes designed to check available capacity have
provided another entry point (Winkler 2007). The vulnerability of the private sector
computer network, due to a lack of understanding or a lack of incentive, provides China (or
other cyber-capable groups) with the opportunity to cripple US infrastructure.
Point of Sale
Using a modern fuel service station as a parallel for a cyber attack on commercial
infrastructure, one can see the debilitating effects of a cyber attack. Magnetic stripe cards
have replaced tangible notes as the primary method of payment. By overwhelming a bank
through something as simple as a DDoS attack, an adversary could knock the point of sale
banking system offline. Few service stations are equipped to handle this for duration longer
than one day, and the Estonian attacks demonstrated a month-long capability. Lines in the
store would grow as the speed of transactions dramatically slowed. Nearby ATMs would be
taxed as people begin withdrawing more notes. As the ATM runs out of its supply of money,
an internal alert is sent to notify the ATM provider to send an armoured car to restock the
machine. This would require additional workflow, disrupting a fine tuned system of
allocated staff hours and drivers. The long lines at the register would disrupt the productivity
and efficiency of working customers who are unaccustomed to the long wait, and it would
radiate frustration and anger throughout the community.
As the service line grows and employees struggle to keep up, the amount of store theft (fuel
and merchandise) increases. More hours would be allocated to review surveillance footage,
and the local police would be inundated with cases of theft. Panic may ensue, as seen with
small disruptions at service stations, comparable to the temporary collapse of Optus
telecommunications or the temporary collapse of Westpac banking (Streem 2008). A
sustained disruption could lead to mob mentality. The fragility of social order was
demonstrated in 2008 when fuel price increases led to widespread violent protests across the
globe, including Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Portugal, South
Korea, Spain, Thailand, and the UK (Arrests Following Jakarta Fuel Price Increases 2008;
Banerjee and Zappei 2008; Cowell 2008; Fuel Demo Adds To Road Taxes Row 2008;
Indonesia: Growing Fuel Price Protests Meet Repression 2008; Thai Truckers Join Global
Fuel Price Protest 2008).
Alternatively, the registers themselves are operated by using the internet and could be
targeted. China could bypass banking systems, energy providers, transportation systems, or
communications systems and go after the less guarded, and less funded, point-of-sale
software. Few service stations remain in the western world that use unconnected registers, as
it would be difficult to remain competitive. Similarly, there are few competitors in the
service station industry due to strong competition. This means there are only a small group
of service station vendors within a large city, and all of the computers within those companies
are running off of the same network. The six largest non-state owned energy companies,
known as super majors, are: Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron Corporation,
ConocoPhillips, and Total SA. These six companies control the vast majority of service
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stations (SBDCNET 2001). This is sometimes obscured by the use of alternative store
names, despite being contracted to a supermajor, or the continued use of an old company
name despite having been bought out by a supermajor. This illustrates a lack of diversity in
the retail industry. By attacking only a few targets, an entire city
s service stations could be
knocked offline. There are a limited number of independent operators within a typical city;
however their numbers are too few to facilitate the influx of customers from the larger
competitors.
Without the online register, PLUs (price look-up codes) cannot scan and prices would have to
be manually added. Any extended duration of this process could shutdown a store, and
depending on the system, fuel may not be able to be dispensed without the computer. Service
stations are not known for their sophistication in computer defence as they routinely tighten
budgets to their limits and they have not seen a need to harden this infrastructure. As
community hostility rises, employees may resign due to stress. It would be difficult training
new employees during this time with extended lines and the employees themselves suffering
an inability to access fuel. New staff would also cause lost time and money for training. All
delivery trucks create online invoices sent and received by the service station. Assuming
they are able to maintain the fuel for their trucks, they would be forced to adapt to old
methods of interaction and record keeping. A store
s stock might also suffer shortages from
hoarding of products due to panic in the community.
These systems could be attacked solely online, or operatives could be placed into the store to
learn the system
s weaknesses and install malware directly. Operations could be expanded
beyond a service station to attack grocery and a wide range of retail outlets. Rather than
going after the transport of goods, it may be easier to disrupt them online at their point of
sale. The effects would radiate outward, knocking down additional infrastructure unable to
handle the increased stress. A service station is only one example of weak commercial
infrastructure that relies on computers to operate. If China could gain market dominance in
the point of sale software industry, or in the registers used for sales, it would gain an even
greater access to disruption. This disruption could be used as a deterrent, as blackmail, or as
a force multiplier in traditional warfare.
Market Dominance
China may seek to establish market dominance in the production of ICT software and
hardware as a means of increasing its cyber warfare capability. On an infrastructure level,
China could seek to control ownership of submarine cable infrastructure allowing it further
access to cyber reconnaissance or the option of shutting down portions of internet
connectivity during times of war (Whitney 2008; Of Cables and Conspiracies 2008). Further,
if China could unseat Microsoft as the industry standard in software, it could install
backdoors, latent viruses, or remotely triggered ex-filtration devices. This type of tactic was
examined in section 3, above (Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack), with Sony BMG
s use of
rootkits. China used legal and financial prowess to convince Microsoft to teach its software
engineers how to insert their own software into Window
s applications. As a part of the
Chinese argument for doing so, was an insistence that Microsoft Windows was a secret tool
of the US government. By providing China with 
skeleton keys
 to the Windows Operating
System, inadvertently China was given advanced knowledge on how to infiltrate foreign
computers and craft advanced exploits (Marsal 2008; Tkacik 2007).
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US concerns over Chinese market dominance have begun to surface. In 2006, the State
Department banned the purchase of computers from the Lenovo Group, the Chinese firm that
acquired the IBM personal computing division, following penetrations using a zero-day flaw
in Microsoft software. China is also growing in the field of microchips, something other
states need for defence related electronics. Not only could China embed exploits, but also
dominance in this field gives it access to critical individuals and information through
partnership, such as a chance to liaise with industry insiders, come close to sensitive
information and hardware, and conduct social engineering or HUMINT. In 2003, the Huawei
Shenzhen Technology Company was charged with stealing secrets and wholesale pirating of
Cisco software, a US company. In 2007, Huawei then attempted to buy 3Com, a US
company which supplies the US government with security software, routers, and servers.
India turned down a $60 million Huawei investment deal in 2005 after concerns over cyber
reconnaissance, noting that Huawei is the same company that conducts sweeping and
debugging of the Chinese embassy. India
s Defence Ministry stated 
the choice was between
cheap Chinese equipment and national security
 (Tkacik 2007).
China consistently reverse engineers ICT hardware and software in an attempt to maintain a
stronghold on its own markets. This can be seen with the reverse engineering of Skype
Protocol and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and 
knock offs
 of the iPhone (VoIP
WkiBlog 2006). The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project, which has the potential to
rapidly spread internet connectivity to China
s remaining population, uses an open source
operating system and software, helping to free China from US owned Microsoft. Yet China
has denounced the sale of OLPC, promoting instead various domestic versions that were
reversed engineered from the OLPC model.
Further, the Chinese have secured
manufacturing rights to produce OLPC within China even though they do not intend to
promote OLPC sales domestically (O
Brien 2008). China also has a history of reverse
engineering websites that become popular and profitable in the Western world; examples
include clones of YouTube, Google, MySpace, Facebook, Wikipedia, and eBay being
YoQoo, Baidu, Baidu Space, Xiaonei/Zhanzuo, Baidu Baike/Hoodong, and Taobao
respectively (Marshall 2008; Wei 2008; Burns 2006).
Peacetime Operations
During peacetime, China is likely to rely on cyber reconnaissance to gather information and
catalogue exploits/weaknesses in the US military and infrastructure. Automobile companies,
food services, oil companies, financial institutions, and telecommunications all play a vital
role in supporting military operations, as well as housing technological advances, expertise,
and inside information which could prove useful for leapfrogging (Winkler 2005).
Technology transfer allows China to skip years of costly research and development, and it
removes the competitive edge of foreign militaries and companies (Tkacik 2007). In
unrestricted fashion, China may also seek advantage during peacetime to battle military
export restrictions of the EU, purchase vital capital in the US financial system, and help
shape the international legal structure being developed for cyber warfare. Cyber
reconnaissance against US military logistics networks could reveal force deployment
information, such as the names of ships deployed, readiness status of various units, timing
and destination of deployments, and rendezvous schedules. It could also reveal the details of
weaponry sold to Taiwan.
China has repeatedly shown interest in the US Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNet) (China
s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its
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Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008). NIPRNet is used to exchange unclassified but
sensitive information between internal users. The network is connected to the broader
internet to improve collaboration between scientists and officers located in different
organizations and in remote locations. This means it can provide intruders with data such as
ballistic weapons research, aircraft and ship design, military payroll, personnel records,
procurement, modelling of battlefield environments, and computer security research
 (Lewis
1994). The US places classified military information on the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNet) and secret information on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS). While these networks are not connected to the internet,
examining NIPRNet may give insight into the contents through cross talk, or it may provide a
means of escalating privileges, providing information on how to access SIPRNet and JWICS
either directly or indirectly via an asset.
Taiwan
China can use the internet to manipulate the Taiwanese populace, either to set up for an
attack, or to undermine Taiwan independence peacefully and avoid conflict altogether. This
may include PSYOPS/propaganda, recruitment and identification of sympathizers, or
cataloguing of cyber and defence weaknesses. For example, an internet rumour in 1999 that
a Chinese Su-27 had shot down a Taiwan aircraft caused the Taipei stock market to drop
more than two percent in less than four hours. An earthquake in 1999 and a typhoon in 2001
revealed weaknesses in Taiwan
s telecommunications, electric power, and transportation
infrastructure; weaknesses which could be targeted in physical sabotage. Further, a landslide
revealed that the loss of a single power grid tower is capable of knocking out 90 percent of
the power grid in the central mountainous region. Building information, including the
location of the President
s office, and daily activities, are openly available on the internet.
This is even more significant given the lack of security present during the 2004 assassination
attempt on President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu (China
s Proliferation
Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Taiwan
Assassin 2004).
In the event of a Taiwan conflict, China could use cyber attacks to delay US involvement
long enough for Taiwan to capitulate. For example, China could go after the US logistical
apparatus, using information gained via NIPRNet, in order to delay the force deployment
phase. This would include the organization of forces, food supplies, uniforms, and/or
communication which are often organised through networks that are connected to the
internet. Cyber attack could also delay re-supply to the region by misdirecting stores, fuel,
and munitions, corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission
capability. If the Chinese lack the capability to find exploits in NIPRNet, they could simply
conduct DDoS attacks to bring it down long enough for a Taiwanese surrender. While
delaying the US, China could use traditional military forces in concert with cyber warfare
against Taiwan. The cyber warfare component could include online PSYOPS, media
warfare, special forces aided by cyber reconnaissance information, and cyber attacks against
Taiwan
s point of sale and banking infrastructure.
6. Conclusion
This research has shown that China seeks to leapfrog in military competitiveness by utilizing
cyber warfare. Chinese military doctrine places an emphasis on asymmetric attack. Cyber
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warfare epitomizes this a low cost means of levelling the playing field. Cyber attack strikes
at a superior adversary
s weakness 
 in the case of the US, a heavy reliance on hi-tech
computerized weaponry and a civilian population reliant on an unsecured computer
infrastructure. Cyber reconnaissance follows China
s tradition of technology transfer and
reverse engineering for domestic production as a means of leapfrogging.
Cyber
reconnaissance gives the added benefit of providing deniability, low cost, a lack of legal
framework against it, and the removal of geographical distance. Foreign allegations, such as
the Titan Rain incursions, suggest China is making rapid progress in cyber reconnaissance
and attack capabilities. The PRC openly states in its National Defense White Paper that it is
seeking informationization and modernization of the PLA. This follows the US, China
perceived greatest threat, in its pursuit of NCW, IO, and FCS. Cataloguing adversary
weaknesses not only provides an asymmetric advantage in the event of a conflict, it also acts
as a deterrent while China catches up in traditional military might. By utilizing cyber
reconnaissance, China can accelerate its advancement in hi-tech weaponry. Unrestricted
warfare has shown a blurring of the lines between military and non-military spheres. China
can tap into the power of its online population for military purposes, such as seen in the
Estonian, Georgian and Chanology case studies. Following the US example of IO, China can
leverage the internet as a means of boosting soft power. Using cyber reconnaissance, the
Chinese can gain market dominance in the fields of ICT. This will provide increased cyber
security, by removing foreign influence, and it will provide improved cyber offence, such as
pre-installed exploits or ownership of internet infrastructure. Market dominance also relates
to financial gain, which China has stated is intrinsically related to military capabilities and
strategic interests.
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