RCW 10.73.010
Appeal by defendant.
Appeal by defendant, see Rules of Court.
RCW 10.73.040
Bail pending appeal.
In all criminal actions, except capital cases in which the proof of guilt is clear or the presumption great, upon an appeal being taken from a judgment of conviction, the court in which the judgment was rendered, or a judge thereof, must, by an order entered in the journal or filed with the clerk, fix and determine the amount of bail to be required of the appellant; and the appellant shall be committed until a bond to the state of Washington in the sum so fixed be executed on his or her behalf by at least two sureties possessing the qualifications required for sureties on appeal bonds, such bond to be conditioned that the appellant shall appear whenever required, and stand to and abide by the judgment or orders of the appellate court, and any judgment and order of the superior court that may be rendered or made in pursuance thereof. If the appellant be already at large on bail, his or her sureties shall be liable to the amount of their bond, in the same manner and upon the same conditions as if they had executed the bond prescribed by this section; but the court may by order require a new bond in a larger amount or with new sureties, and may commit the appellant until the order be complied with.
[
2010 c 8 s 1060
;
1999 c 143 s 48
;
1893 c 61 s 31
; RRS s 1747.]
RCW 10.73.090
Collateral attack
—
One year time limit.
(1) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) For the purposes of this section, "collateral attack" means any form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal. "Collateral attack" includes, but is not limited to, a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition, a motion to vacate judgment, a motion to withdraw guilty plea, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to arrest judgment.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a judgment becomes final on the last of the following dates:
(a) The date it is filed with the clerk of the trial court;
(b) The date that an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction; or
(c) The date that the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition for certiorari to review a decision affirming the conviction on direct appeal. The filing of a motion to reconsider denial of certiorari does not prevent a judgment from becoming final.
[
1989 c 395 s 1
.]
RCW 10.73.100
Collateral attack
—
When one year limit not applicable.
The time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090
does not apply to a petition or motion that is based solely on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) Newly discovered evidence, if the defendant acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion;
(2) The statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct;
(3) The conviction was barred by double jeopardy under Amendment V of the United States Constitution or Article I, section 9 of the state Constitution;
(4) The defendant pleaded not guilty and the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the conviction;
(5) The sentence imposed was in excess of the court's jurisdiction;
(6) A motion for a modification of conditions of community custody pursuant to RCW 9.94A.703
and
9.94A.709
; or
(7) There has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.
[
2024 c 118 s 8
;
1989 c 395 s 2
.]
NOTES:
Application
—
Effective date
—
2024 c 118:
See notes following RCW 9.94A.704
.
RCW 10.73.110
Collateral attack
—
One year time limit
—
Duty of court to advise defendant.
At the time judgment and sentence is pronounced in a criminal case, the court shall advise the defendant of the time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090
and
10.73.100
.
[
1989 c 395 s 4
.]
RCW 10.73.120
Collateral attack
—
One year time limit
—
Duty of department of corrections to advise.
As soon as practicable after July 23, 1989, the department of corrections shall attempt to advise the following persons of the time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090
and
10.73.100
: Every person who, on July 23, 1989,  is serving a term of incarceration, probation, parole, or community supervision pursuant to conviction of a felony.
[
1989 c 395 s 5
.]
RCW 10.73.130
Collateral attack
—
One year time limit
—
Applicability.
RCW 10.73.090
and
10.73.100
apply only to petitions and motions filed more than one year after July 23, 1989.
[
1989 c 395 s 6
.]
RCW 10.73.140
Collateral attack
—
Subsequent petitions.
If a person has previously filed a petition for personal restraint, the court of appeals will not consider the petition unless the person certifies that he or she has not filed a previous petition on similar grounds, and shows good cause why the petitioner did not raise the new grounds in the previous petition. Upon receipt of a personal restraint petition, the court of appeals shall review the petition and determine whether the person has previously filed a petition or petitions and if so, compare them. If upon review, the court of appeals finds that the petitioner has previously raised the same grounds for review, or that the petitioner has failed to show good cause why the ground was not raised earlier, the court of appeals shall dismiss the petition on its own motion without requiring the state to respond to the petition. Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition, the court of appeals shall, whenever possible, review the petition and determine if the petition is based on frivolous grounds. If frivolous, the court of appeals shall dismiss the petition on its own motion without first requiring the state to respond to the petition.
[
1989 c 395 s 9
.]
RCW 10.73.150
Right to counsel.
Counsel shall be provided at state expense to an adult offender convicted of a crime and to a juvenile offender convicted of an offense when the offender is indigent or indigent and able to contribute as those terms are defined in RCW 10.101.010
and the offender:
(1) Files an appeal as a matter of right;
(2) Responds to an appeal filed as a matter of right or responds to a motion for discretionary review or petition for review filed by the state;
(3) Is under a sentence of death and requests counsel be appointed to file and prosecute a motion or petition for collateral attack as defined in RCW 10.73.090
. Counsel may be provided at public expense to file or prosecute a second or subsequent collateral attack on the same judgment and sentence, if the court determines that the collateral attack is not barred by RCW 10.73.090
or
10.73.140
;
(4) Is not under a sentence of death and requests counsel to prosecute a collateral attack after the chief judge has determined that the issues raised by the petition are not frivolous, in accordance with the procedure contained in rules of appellate procedure 16.11. Counsel shall not be provided at public expense to file or prosecute a second or subsequent collateral attack on the same judgment and sentence;
(5) Responds to a collateral attack filed by the state or responds to or prosecutes an appeal from a collateral attack that was filed by the state;
(6) Prosecutes a motion or petition for review after the supreme court or court of appeals has accepted discretionary review of a decision of a court of limited jurisdiction; or
(7) Prosecutes a motion or petition for review after the supreme court has accepted discretionary review of a court of appeals decision.
[
1995 c 275 s 2
.]
NOTES:
Finding
—
1995 c 275:
"The legislature is aware that the constitutional requirements of equal protection and due process require that counsel be provided for indigent persons and persons who are indigent and able to contribute for the first appeal as a matter of right from a judgment and sentence in a criminal case or a juvenile offender proceeding, and no further. There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel at public expense to collaterally attack a judgment and sentence in a criminal case or juvenile offender proceeding or to seek discretionary review of a lower appellate court decision.
The legislature finds that it is appropriate to extend the right to counsel at state expense beyond constitutional requirements in certain limited circumstances to persons who are indigent and persons who are indigent and able to contribute as those terms are defined in RCW 10.101.010
." [
1995 c 275 s 1
.]
Severability
—
1995 c 275:
"If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [
1995 c 275 s 5
.]
RCW 10.73.160
Court fees and costs.
(1) The court of appeals, supreme court, and superior courts may require an adult offender convicted of an offense to pay appellate costs.
(2) Appellate costs are limited to expenses specifically incurred by the state in prosecuting or defending an appeal or collateral attack from a criminal conviction. Appellate costs shall not include expenditures to maintain and operate government agencies that must be made irrespective of specific violations of the law. Expenses incurred for producing a verbatim report of proceedings and clerk's papers may be included in costs the court may require a convicted defendant to pay.
(3) Costs, including recoupment of fees for court-appointed counsel, shall be requested in accordance with the procedures contained in Title 14 of the rules of appellate procedure and in Title 9 of the rules for appeal of decisions of courts of limited jurisdiction. An award of costs shall become part of the trial court judgment and sentence.
(4) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who has not willfully failed to pay the obligation, as described in RCW 9.94A.6333, 9.94B.040, and
10.01.180, may at any time petition the court that sentenced the defendant or juvenile offender for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion. If it appears to the satisfaction of the sentencing court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or the defendant's immediate family, the sentencing court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs, modify the method of payment under RCW 10.01.170, or convert the unpaid costs to community restitution hours, if the jurisdiction operates a community restitution program, at the rate of no less than the state minimum wage established in RCW 49.46.020
for each hour of community restitution. Manifest hardship exists where the defendant or juvenile offender is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160
(3).
(5) The parents or another person legally obligated to support a juvenile offender who has been ordered to pay appellate costs and who is not in contumacious default in the payment may at any time petition the court that sentenced the juvenile offender for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion. If it appears to the satisfaction of the sentencing court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the parents or another person legally obligated to support a juvenile offender or on their immediate families, the sentencing court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs, or may modify the method of payment.
[
2022 c 260 s 10
;
2018 c 269 s 12
;
2015 c 265 s 22
;
1995 c 275 s 3
.]
NOTES:
Construction
—
Effective date
—
2022 c 260:
See notes following RCW 3.66.120
.
Construction
—
2018 c 269:
See note following RCW 10.82.090
.
Finding
—
Intent
—
2015 c 265:
See note following RCW 13.50.010
.
Finding
—
Severability
—
1995 c 275:
See notes following RCW 10.73.150
.
RCW 10.73.170
DNA testing requests.
(1) A person convicted of a felony in a Washington state court who currently is serving a term of imprisonment may submit to the court that entered the judgment of conviction a verified written motion requesting DNA testing, with a copy of the motion provided to the state office of public defense.
(2) The motion shall:
(a) State that:
(i) The court ruled that DNA testing did not meet acceptable scientific standards; or
(ii) DNA testing technology was not sufficiently developed to test the DNA evidence in the case; or
(iii) The DNA testing now requested would be significantly more accurate than prior DNA testing or would provide significant new information;
(b) Explain why DNA evidence is material to the identity of the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to sentence enhancement; and
(c) Comply with all other procedural requirements established by court rule.
(3) The court shall grant a motion requesting DNA testing under this section if such motion is in the form required by subsection (2) of this section, and the convicted person has shown the likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis.
(4) Upon written request to the court that entered a judgment of conviction, a convicted person who demonstrates that he or she is indigent under RCW 10.101.010
may request appointment of counsel solely to prepare and present a motion under this section, and the court, in its discretion, may grant the request. Such motion for appointment of counsel shall comply with all procedural requirements established by court rule.
(5) DNA testing ordered under this section shall be performed by the Washington state patrol crime laboratory. Contact with victims shall be handled through victim/witness divisions.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon motion of defense counsel or the court's own motion, a sentencing court in a felony case may order the preservation of any biological material that has been secured in connection with a criminal case, or evidence samples sufficient for testing, in accordance with any court rule adopted for the preservation of evidence. The court must specify the samples to be maintained and the length of time the samples must be preserved.
[
2005 c 5 s 1
;
2003 c 100 s 1
;
2001 c 301 s 1
;
2000 c 92 s 1
.]
NOTES:
Effective date
—
2005 c 5:
"This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [March 9, 2005]." [
2005 c 5 s 2
.]
Construction
—
2001 c 301:
"Nothing in this act may be construed to create a new or additional cause of action in any court. Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit any rights offenders might otherwise have to court access under any other statutory or constitutional provision." [
2001 c 301 s 2
.]
Report on DNA testing
—
2000 c 92:
"By December 1, 2001, the office of public defense shall prepare a report detailing the following: (1) The number of postconviction DNA test requests approved by the respective prosecutor; (2) the number of postconviction DNA test requests denied by the respective prosecutor and a summary of the basis for the denials; (3) the number of appeals for postconviction DNA testing approved by the attorney general's office; (4) the number of appeals for postconviction DNA testing denied by the attorney general's office and a summary of the basis for the denials; and (5) a summary of the results of the postconviction DNA tests conducted pursuant to RCW 10.73.170
(2) and (3). The report shall also provide an estimate of the number of persons convicted of crimes where DNA evidence was not admitted because the court ruled DNA testing did not meet acceptable scientific standards or where DNA testing technology was not sufficiently developed to test the DNA evidence in the case." [
2000 c 92 s 2
.]
Intent
—
2000 c 92:
"Nothing in chapter 92, Laws of 2000 is intended to create a legal right or cause of action. Nothing in chapter 92, Laws of 2000 is intended to deny or alter any existing legal right or cause of action. Nothing in chapter 92, Laws of 2000 should be interpreted to deny postconviction DNA testing requests under existing law by convicted and incarcerated persons who were sentenced to confinement for a term less than life or the death penalty." [
2000 c 92 s 4
.]