Domains

Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.

Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)

Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)

Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)

Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Platforms: PRE
Tactics:
phase_name: resource-development

Detection:
Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)

Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.

References:
source_name: mitre-attack
description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
source_name: URI Unique
description: Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.
source_name: PaypalScam
description: CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
source_name: CISA IDN ST05-016
description: CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.
source_name: CISA MSS Sep 2020
description: Fehrman, B. (2017, April 13). How to Bypass Web-Proxy Filtering. Retrieved September 20, 2019.
source_name: bypass_webproxy_filtering
description: FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
source_name: FireEye APT28
description: Krebs, B. (2018, November 13). That Domain You Forgot to Renew? Yeah, it’s Now Stealing Credit Cards. Retrieved September 20, 2019.
source_name: Domain_Steal_CC
description: Malhotra, A., McKay, K. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal . Retrieved July 29, 2022.
source_name: tt_obliqueRAT
description: Malhotra, A., Thattil, J. et al. (2022, March 29). Transparent Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware to target Indian government officials . Retrieved September 6, 2022.
source_name: tt_httrack_fake_domains
description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
source_name: Mandiant APT1
description: MDSec Research. (2017, July). Categorisation is not a Security Boundary. Retrieved September 20, 2019.
source_name: Categorisation_not_boundary
description: Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
source_name: URI
description: Mudge, R. (2017, February 6). High-reputation Redirectors and Domain Fronting. Retrieved July 11, 2022.
source_name: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting
description: Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
source_name: URI Use
description: Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
source_name: iOS URL Scheme
description: RISKIQ. (2017, December 20). Mining Insights: Infrastructure Analysis of Lazarus Group Cyber Attacks on the Cryptocurrency Industry. Retrieved July 29, 2022.
source_name: lazgroup_idn_phishing
description: RISKIQ. (2022, March 15). RiskIQ Threat Intelligence Roundup: Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Global Malware Infrastructure. Retrieved July 29, 2022.
source_name: httrack_unhcr
description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020