Run Virtual Instance

Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)

Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

Platforms: Linux
macOS
Windows
Tactics:
phase_name: defense-evasion

Detection:
Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.

Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. <code>-silent</code>, <code>-ignore-reboot</code>), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. <code>VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless</code>).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. <code>VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all"</code>).

Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V.  If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. 

Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.

References:
source_name: mitre-attack
description: Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
source_name: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019
description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
description: Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
source_name: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion