Inhibit System Recovery

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)

A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:

* <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code>
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>
* <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>
* <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>
* <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system
* <code>diskshadow.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)

On network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.

Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)

Platforms: Windows
macOS
Linux
Network
IaaS
Containers
Tactics:
phase_name: impact

Detection:
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.

Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage</code>).

For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession.

References:
source_name: mitre-attack
description:  Brian Prince. (2014, June 20). Code Hosting Service Shuts Down After Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 21, 2023.
source_name: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack
description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
description: Microsoft Windows Server. (2023, February 3). Diskshadow. Retrieved November 21, 2023.
source_name: Diskshadow
description: Romain Dumont . (2022, September 21). Technical Analysis of Crytox Ransomware. Retrieved November 22, 2023.
source_name: Crytox Ransomware
description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS Simple Storage Service S3 Ransomware Part 2: Prevention and Defense. Retrieved March 21, 2023.
source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware
description: Steve Ranger. (2020, February 27). Ransomware victims thought their backups were safe. They were wrong. Retrieved March 21, 2023.
source_name: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020
description: TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved October 19, 2022.
source_name: disable_notif_synology_ransom