IMF Reform and Integrity Act of 2020

To hold China, Russia, and other major shareholders of the International Monetary Fund accountable to the principles of the Fund, and for other purposes. 1. Short title This Act may be cited as the IMF Reform and Integrity Act of 2020 2. Opposition to quota increase for countries that undermine IMF principles The Bretton Woods Agreements Act ( 22 U.S.C. 286–286zz (1) by redesignating the 2nd section 73 (as added by section 1901 of division P of Public Law 116–94 (2) by adding at the end the following: 75. Opposition to quota increase for countries that undermine Fund principles (a) In general Not less than 7 days before consideration of any proposal to increase the quota of a foreign member of the Fund that is one of the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that determines whether the foreign member meets the following criteria: (1) The member is in compliance with all obligations set forth in Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. (2) The member, in the preceding 12 months, was not found to have manipulated its currency, as determined in a report required by section 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 or section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. (3) In the case of a member whose currency is included in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the Fund, the currency of the member is freely usable (within the meaning of Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund) and the Secretary concurs with the determinations of the Fund described in that Article, and, in the preceding 12 months, the member has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that its currency is widely used and traded internationally. (4) The member is committed to the rules and principles of the Paris Club. (b) Effect of determination On determining that a member of the Fund has failed to meet any of the criteria set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall instruct the Governor of the Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the proposal to increase the quota of the member in the Fund. (c) Waiver The President may waive subsection (b) with respect to a member of the Fund on reporting to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that— (1) the waiver is important to the national interest of the United States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor; or (2) the member is attempting to rectify the failure, with a description of the actions the member is taking to fulfill any unmet criteria. (d) Prohibition Notwithstanding subsection (c), the Governor of the Fund may not use the voice or vote of the United States to support a proposal to increase the quota of a member in the Fund if the President of the United States determines that the government of the member interfered in a United States election for Federal office (as defined in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971) in the 4 years preceding consideration of the proposal. (e) Proposal consideration For the purposes of this section, consideration of a proposal to increase the quota of a foreign member of the Fund does not include consent to an amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund that has been authorized by law. (f) Sunset This section shall cease to have force or effect 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. . 3. Opposition of the United States to International Monetary Fund loan to a country whose public debt is not likely to be sustainable in the medium term (a) In general Section 68(a) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act ( 22 U.S.C. 286tt(a) (1) in paragraph (2), by inserting after the comma the following: or a staff analytical report of the Fund states that there is not a high probability that the public debt of the country is sustainable in the medium term, (2) by adding at the end the following: (3) Waiver authority The Secretary of the Treasury may waive paragraph (2) on a case-by-case basis if the Secretary provides a written certification to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the waiver is important to the national interest of the United States, and includes with the certification a written statement of the reasons therefor. . (b) Sunset This section shall cease to have force or effect 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 4. Congressional notification with respect to exceptional access lending (a) In general The Bretton Woods Agreements Act ( 22 U.S.C. 286–286zz 76. Congressional notification with respect to exceptional access lending (a) In general The United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund may not support any proposal that would alter the criteria used by the Fund for exceptional access lending if the proposal would permit a country that is ineligible, before the proposed alteration, to receive exceptional access lending, unless, not later than 15 days before consideration of the proposal by the Board of Executive Directors of the Fund, the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the justification for the proposal and the effects of the proposed alteration on moral hazard and repayment risk at the Fund. (b) Waiver The President may reduce the applicable notice period required under subsection (a) to not less than 7 days on reporting to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the reduction is important to the national interest of the United States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor. . (b) Sunset This section shall cease to have force or effect 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Summary: IMF Reform and Integrity Act of 2020 This bill requires U.S. representatives to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to take certain actions, such as opposing quota increases for certain countries. (A country's quota generally reflects its economic strength and affects factors such as that country's voting power within the IMF.) Before the IMF considers a proposal to increase the quota of any of the ten largest IMF shareholder countries, the Department of the Treasury shall report to Congress as to whether the country meets certain criteria, such as (1) fulfilling its general IMF obligations, and (2) not engaging in currency manipulation in the last 12 months. If the country does not meet all such criteria, U.S. representatives to the IMF shall oppose the proposed quota increase. U.S. representatives shall also oppose the proposed quota increase if the President determines that the country's government has interfered with a U.S. federal election in the last four years. U.S. representatives to the IMF shall oppose a proposed loan to a country if there is not a high probability that the country's public debt is sustainable in the medium term. The U.S. Executive Director at the IMF shall not support any proposal to change IMF criteria on providing exceptional access lending if the change would allow a previously ineligible country to receive such funding unless Treasury reports to Congress a justification for supporting the change before it is considered at the IMF. This bill shall expire ten years after enactment.