Protecting the Right to Organized, Transparent Elections through a Constitutionally Trustworthy Electoral College Act (PROTECT Electoral College Act)

To review the use of election security grants in the 2020 Presidential election and to prohibit future election security grants to States with unconstitutional election procedures. 1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Protecting the Right to Organized, Transparent Elections through a Constitutionally Trustworthy Electoral College Act (PROTECT Electoral College Act) 2. Report on 2020 general election (a) Definitions For purposes of this section: (1) 2016 Presidential election The term 2016 Presidential election (2) 2020 Presidential election The term 2020 Presidential election (3) Applicable election security funds The term applicable election security funds (A) from amounts appropriated under the heading Election Assistance Commission, Election Security Grants Public Law 116–93 (B) from amounts appropriated under the heading Election Assistance Commission, Election Security Grants Public Law 116–136 (4) State The term State 52 U.S.C. 21141 (5) Unsolicited mail-in ballot The term unsolicited mail-in ballot (A) such ballot was not specifically requested by the voter; or (B) the ballot request by the voter was initiated by the mailing of a ballot application not specifically requested by the voter. (6) Unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage The term unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage (b) Report (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress and make publicly available a report on the 2020 Presidential election. (2) Matters included The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the following with respect to each State: that received applicable election security funds: (A) Unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage (i) In general An analysis of whether the unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage for State for the 2020 Presidential election was greater than the unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage for the State for the 2016 Presidential election. (ii) Relevant authority for any increase If the Comptroller General determines that the unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage for the State for the 2020 Presidential election was greater than the unsolicited mail-in ballot percentage for the State for the 2016 Presidential election, the Comptroller General shall provide a description of any change in authority (including any statutory change relating to the distribution of unsolicited mail-in ballots), action, or directive concerning unsolicited mail-in ballots occurring between the 2016 Presidential election and 2020 Presidential election that may have led to such result. (B) Mail-in voter verification procedures (i) In general An analysis of whether there were changes in the State’s methods and processes used to verify the identification of voters who vote using mail-in ballots, including signature verification requirements, that applied with respect to the 2020 Presidential election but did not apply to the 2016 Presidential election. (ii) Relevant authority for changes If the Comptroller General determines that there were changes in the State’s mail-in voter verification procedures described in clause (i), the Comptroller General shall provide a description of any authority (including any statutory authority), action, or directive that led to such change. (C) Other election procedures (i) In general An analysis of whether the State materially altered or changed its election procedures for the 2020 Presidential election (other than procedures described in subparagraph (B)) from the procedures in effect for the 2016 Presidential election. (ii) Relevant authority for changes If the Comptroller General determines that there were changes in the election procedures described in clause (i), the Comptroller General shall provide a description of any authority (including any statutory authority), action, or directive that led to such change. (D) Mail-in ballot collection (i) In general An analysis of whether there were specific, documented allegations of a person other than a voter or a voter’s family member or caregiver collecting or returning the voter's completed ballot in the 2020 Presidential election. (ii) Relevant authority for collection If the Comptroller General determines that there were specific, documented allegations described in clause (i), the Comptroller General shall provide a description of any authority (including any statutory authority), action, or directive permitting such collection or return. (E) Observation of ballot counting An analysis of whether the State has a statute providing for third-party observation of ballot counting, and if so, whether there were specific, documented instances in connection with the 2020 Presidential election in which the State is alleged to have failed to comply with such statute. (F) Failure to enforce An analysis of whether there were specific, documented instances in connection with the 2020 Presidential election in which the State allegedly failed to enforce one or more of its election statutes (other than a statute described in subparagraph (E)). (G) Use of applicable election security funds In the case of a State that received applicable election security funds, an analysis of— (i) whether such funds were used to make expenditures with respect to the 2020 Presidential election; (ii) whether such funds were used in connection with any activity carried out pursuant to an authority, action, or directive described in subparagraph (A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), or (D)(ii); and (iii) whether the State complied with all statutory and other conditions imposed in connection with the receipt of such funds. (H) Subsequent State actions A description of any of the following actions taken by the State legislature: (i) The passage of a resolution expressing an opinion on, or the submission to Congress or the Comptroller General of a communication relating to, the items described in subparagraphs (A) through (G). (ii) The enactment, after the completion of the 2020 Presidential election, of legislation regarding any authority, action, or directive described in subparagraph (A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), or (D)(ii) or any failure described in subparagraph (E) or (F). 3. Temporary suspension of, and requirements for, future election assistance grants (a) In general Subtitle D of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20901 et seq. 7 Requirements for election assistance 297. Suspension of election assistance (a) In general Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant may be awarded under this Act before July 1, 2022. (b) Suspension of previous grants No State may expend Federal funds provided under this Act before the date of the enactment of this section before July 1, 2022. 298. Requirements for future election assistance (a) In general Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no State may receive any grant awarded under this Act after the date of the enactment of this section unless the State has certified by resolution adopted by the State legislature, as a condition of receiving the grant, that it is in compliance with the requirements of subsection (b). (b) Requirements (1) In general A State satisfies the requirements of this section if, in connection with any election for Federal office— (A) the methods and processes used by the State to verify the identification of voters who vote using mail-in ballots are specifically set forth in statute; (B) except as specifically provided by statute— (i) the State does not use unsolicited mail-in balloting; and (ii) the State does not permit persons other than the voter or the voter’s family members or caregivers to return a voter’s completed ballot; (C) for any election after the last day that the public health emergency declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 247d (D) in the case of State that has a law providing for third-party observation of ballot counting, such ballot observation law is strictly followed in all instances; (E) the State complies with all requirements under title III; and (F) the State has taken documented, affirmative measures to address— (i) any prior failure to satisfy the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (E) that is identified by the State legislature in a resolution (or other similar communication submitted to Congress and the Comptroller General); or (ii) any prior specific, documented instance in which the State— (I) failed to enforce one or more of its election statutes; or (II) materially altered or changed its election procedures without a corresponding state statutory enactment. (2) Unsolicited mail-in balloting For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), the term unsolicited mail-in balloting (A) such ballot was not specifically requested by the voter; or (B) the ballot request by the voter was initiated by the mailing of a ballot application not specifically requested by the voter. 8 Prohibition on use of funds 299. Prohibition on use of funds Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any amounts provided under this Act shall not be used in furtherance of any election procedure that is not expressly set forth in a statute enacted by the State legislature. . (b) Conforming amendment The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 296 the following: Part 7—Requirements for election assistance Sec. 297. Suspension of election assistance. Sec. 298. Requirements for future election assistance. Part 8—Prohibition on use of funds Sec. 299. Prohibition on use of funds. .

Summary: Protecting the Right to Organized, Transparent Elections through a Constitutionally Trustworthy Electoral College Act (PROTECT Electoral College Act) This bill temporarily suspends federal election security grants and conditions receipt of future grants on certain state certifications. The bill also requires a study on the 2020 presidential election. Specifically, the bill suspends through July 1, 2022, election security grants. During this time period, new grants may not be awarded and previous grant funds may not be expended. Further, the bill conditions receipt of future election security grants on a state legislature certifying certain matters, including that the state's mail-in voter verification procedures are specifically established in statute. The state legislature must also certify that unless there is a statute that specifically authorizes the practice, the state (1) does not provide mail-in ballots to voters unless a voter specifically requests a ballot; and (2) does not permit third parties, except for a voter's family member or caregiver, to return a voter's completed ballot. The bill prohibits election assistance funds from being used to further an election procedure that is not expressly set forth in state statute. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office must study and report on the administration of the 2020 presidential election. The report must analyze specific matters for each state that received election security grants, including an analysis of a state's use of these grants and any subsequent actions taken by its state legislature.