Expeditionary Diplomacy Act of 2021

To provide for the appropriate balance of empowering diplomats to pursue vital diplomatic goals and mitigating security risks at United States diplomatic posts, and for other purposes. 1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Expeditionary Diplomacy Act of 2021 2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) A robust overseas diplomatic presence is the sine qua non of an effective foreign policy, particularly in unstable environments where a flexible and timely diplomatic response can be decisive in preventing and addressing violent conflict. (2) Diplomats routinely put themselves and their families at great personal risk to serve their country overseas where they increasingly face threats related to international terrorism, violent conflict, and public health, among others. (3) The Department of State has a remarkable record of protecting personnel while enabling an enormous amount of global diplomatic activity, often in insecure and remote places and facing a variety of evolving risks and threats, from terrorism to sonic attacks. With support from Congress, the Department of State has revised policy, improved physical security through retrofitting and replacing old facilities, deployed additional security personnel and armored vehicles, and greatly enhanced training requirements and facilities, including the new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center in Blackstone, Virginia. (4) However, there is broad consensus that the pendulum has swung too far toward eliminating risk, excessively inhibiting diplomatic activity; instead of protecting diplomats that authorize calculated risks, human psychology combined with Department of State policy incentivize extending embassy closures, reducing footprints, and postponing or denying travel requests. (5) Congress must accept responsibility for its part in perpetuating a risk-averse culture, as its oversight too often promotes the myth that all security incidents are avoidable and appears more focused on finding scapegoats than improving policy; the Accountability Review Board requirement in the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4801 (6) The impact of reduced diplomatic engagement is both difficult to distill and undeniable; while the cost of an embassy closure or cancelled meeting is hard to measure, diplomatic missions rely on robust staffing and ambitious external engagement to advance United States interests as diverse as fighting terrorism and transnational organized crime, preventing and addressing violent conflict and humanitarian disasters, promoting United States businesses and trade, protecting the rights of marginalized groups, addressing climate change, and preventing pandemic disease. (7) Despite the fact that Congress currently provides annual appropriations in excess of $1,900,000,000 for embassy security, construction, and maintenance, the Department of State is unable to fully transform this considerable investment into true overseas presence given excessive restrictions that inhibit the ability of diplomats to— (A) meet with foreign leaders to explain, defend, and advance United States priorities; (B) understand and report on foreign political, social, and economic conditions; (C) provide United States citizen services that are often a matter of life and death in insecure places; and (D) collaborate and, at times, compete with other diplomatic missions. (8) Such restrictions present a clear and present danger to the core interests of the United States and contribute to the larger militarization of our national security, as military and intelligence agencies benefit from fewer security restrictions, greater risk tolerance, and less congressional scrutiny in the wake of security incidents. (9) Given these stakes, Congress has a responsibility to empower, support, and hold the Department of State accountable for implementing an aggressive presence strategy that mitigates potential risks and adequately considers the myriad direct and indirect consequences of a lack of presence. 3. Encouraging expeditionary diplomacy (a) Purpose Subsection (b) of section 102 of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4801(b) (1) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows: (3) to promote strengthened security measures, institutionalize a culture of learning, and, in the case of apparent gross negligence or breach of duty, recommend the Director General of the Foreign Service investigate accountability for United States Government personnel with security-related responsibilities; ; (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph: (4) to support a culture of risk management, instead of risk avoidance, that enables to Department of State to pursue its vital goals with full knowledge that it is not desirable nor possible for the Department to avoid all risks; . (b) Briefings on embassy security Section 105(a) of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4804(a) (1) by striking monthly briefings quarterly briefings (2) in paragraph (1)— (A) by striking any plans to open or reopen a high risk, high threat post progress towards opening or reopening high risk, high threat posts, the risk to national security of the continued closure and remaining barriers to doing so (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking the type and level of security threats such post could encounter the risk to national security of the post’s continued closure (C) in subparagraph (C), by inserting the type and level of security threats such post could encounter, and security tripwires 4. Replacement of Accountability Review Board with Security Review Committee (a) In general Section 301 of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4831 (1) in the section heading, by striking Accountability Review Boards Security Review Committees (2) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (1), by striking shall convene an Accountability Review Board (in this title referred to as the Board shall convene the Security Review Committee (in this title referred to as the SRC (B) in paragraph (2), by striking Board SRC (C) in paragraph (3)(A)— (i) in the subparagraph heading, by striking Board SRCs (ii) by striking Board SRC (3) in subsection (b)— (A) in the subsection heading, by striking Boards S RC (B) by striking Board SRC (4) in subsection (c), by striking Board SRC (b) Membership Section 302 of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4832 (1) in the section heading, by striking Accountability Review Board Security Review Committee (2) in subsection (a)— (A) by striking Membership Chairperson of the Board. Members of the Board Membership (1) In general The Secretary shall determine the composition of the SRC and designate a Chairperson. Members of the SRC ; (B) by striking vested in the Board. Members of the Board vested in the SRC. Members of the SRC (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: (2) Regulations The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations defining the membership and operating procedures for the SRC and provide to the Chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, in writing, a description of how the SRC will be structured with respect to any other standing committees. ; and (3) in subsection (b), by striking Board SRC (c) Technical and conforming amendments Section 303 of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4833 (1) by striking Board SRC (2) in the subsection heading for subsection (d), by striking boards SRCs 5. Findings and recommendations of Security Review Committee Section 304 of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4834 (1) in the section heading, by striking a Board the Security Review Committee (2) by striking A Board The Security Review Committee (3) by striking Board Security Review Committee (4) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (2), by inserting after were adequate (A) if the attack was against a diplomatic compound, motorcade, residence, or other mission facility, whether the security systems, security countermeasures, and security procedures operated as intended, and whether such systems worked to materially mitigate the attack or were found to be inadequate to mitigate the threat and attack; (B) if the attack was on any personnel conducting an approved operation outside the mission, if a valid process was followed in evaluating the requested operation and weighing the risk and diplomatic value of the operation; and (C) if gross negligence or serious breach of duty by an individual described in section 303(a)(1)(B) may have been a factor. ; (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ; and (C) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and (D) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph: (5) the diplomatic value of operations or physical presence relating to the incident in question, including a counterfactual for the impact of not undertaking the type of operation or physical presence related to the incident; and ; (5) in subsection (b), by inserting and to promote a culture of risk management, rather than risk avoidance for valuable diplomatic activity has reviewed (6) by amending subsection (c) to read as follows: (c) Personnel recommendations If the SRC suspects that an individual described in section 303(a)(1)(B) has engaged in gross negligence or serious breach of duty, and such misconduct has significantly contributed to the serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property, or the serious breach of security that is the subject of the SRC’s examination as described in subsection (a), the SRC shall report to the Director General of the Foreign Service for any appropriate action. ; and (7) in subsection (d)— (A) by striking Reports (1) Program recommendations Reports (B) by striking Congress Chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (C) by striking paragraph (2). 6. Reporting requirement Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and oral briefing to the Chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the regulations promulgated under paragraph (2) of section 302(a) of the Diplomatic Security Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4832(a)

Summary: Expeditionary Diplomacy Act of 2021 This bill modifies oversight and accountability procedures for diplomatic personnel and actions by revising the structure and scope of review for certain diplomatic activities. Specifically, the bill requires the Department of State to provide quarterly briefings (currently held monthly) on progress towards opening or reopening high-risk, high-threat posts, as well as risks to national security from their continued closure and any barriers to opening those posts. The bill also recasts and revises the responsibilities of Accountability Review Boards (i.e., the mechanism through which the State Department currently investigates any event that causes serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at, or related to, a U.S. government mission abroad). The bill renames these boards Security Review Committees, and it requires these committees to take into account specified contextual and mitigating factors when evaluating diplomatic actions that led to such outcomes, as well as the diplomatic value of operations relating to the incident in question.