Forging Peace Through Strength in Ukraine and the Transatlantic Alliance Act

To provide military assistance to Ukraine, to enhance the presence and capabilities of the United States military in Europe, and for other purposes. 1. Short title; table of contents; definitions (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the Forging Peace Through Strength in Ukraine and the Transatlantic Alliance Act (b) Table of contents The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents; definitions. Sec. 2. Sense of Congress. Sec. 3. Strategic framework for United States security force assistance and cooperation in the European and Eurasian regions. Sec. 4. Requirement for plan to increase intelligence and cyber cooperation with Ukraine. Sec. 5. Enhancing presence and capabilities of United States military in Europe. Sec. 6. Enhancing readiness posture of United States military in Europe. Sec. 7. Posturing United States strategic capabilities. Sec. 8. Limitation on military contact and cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Sec. 9. Limitation on non-proliferation activities between the United States and the Russian Federation. Sec. 10. Annual report on military and security developments involving the Russian Federation. (c) Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees Except as otherwise provided, the term appropriate congressional committees (A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (2) Congressional defense committees The term congressional defense committees section 101(a)(16) (3) NATO The term NATO (4) Treaties defined (A) CFE Treaty The term CFE Treaty (B) INF Treaty The term INF Treaty (C) North Atlantic Treaty The term North Atlantic Treaty 2. Sense of Congress (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) On March 1, 2014, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin sought and received from the upper house of the Russian parliament the standing authorization of the use of military force to send Russian forces into Ukrainian territory. (2) On March 2, 2014, Russian troops invaded the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, seizing control of the peninsula, border crossings, government and administrative buildings, key infrastructure, and surrounding Ukrainian military bases. (3) From February 26 to March 3, 2014, President Putin directed exercises of 150,000 troops, including air and naval forces, and live fire demonstrations in western Russia, near the border with Ukraine. (4) On March 3, 2014, the Department of Defense announced it was suspending United States military engagement with Russia. (5) On March 12, 2014, in response to Russian aggression and provocations, the United States deployed additional F–15 aircraft to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission and F–16 aircraft to an aviation detachment in Poland. (6) On March 16, 2014, Crimea held a referendum on seceding from Ukraine and accede to the Russian Federation, which violated the Ukrainian constitution, occurred under duress of Russian military intervention, and was not recognized by the international community. (7) On March 20, 2014, the Russian parliament voted to annex Crimea and Russian President Putin signed the treaty of accession annexing Crimea to the Russian Federation. (8) On March 23, 2014, NATO Supreme Allied Command and Commander of U.S. European Command, General Philip Breedlove stated that the Russian force that is at the Ukrainian border now to the east is very, very sizeable and very, very ready (9) The Government of the Federation of Russian continues to provoke demonstrations and violence in Ukraine in order to create a false narrative of separatism and illegal justification for Russian intervention. (10) On April 3, 2014, NATO Supreme Allied Commander and Commander of U.S. European Command, General Philip Breedlove, stated that Russia has 40,000 troops capable of moving within 12 hours with elements of a Combined Arms Army, supported by fixed-wing aircraft, rotary aircraft, and the logistics required in order to successfully make an incursion. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of the Congress that— (1) the continuing and long-standing pattern and practice by the Government of the Russian Federation of physical, diplomatic, and economic aggression toward neighboring countries is clearly intended to undermine regional security and stability; (2) the Russian military build-up and aggressive posture on the eastern border of Ukraine represents a deliberate intent to intimidate Ukraine and its citizens to submit to Russian control; (3) the Russian Federation should immediately cease all improper and illegal activities in Ukraine, including the seizures of airfields and other locations, and President Putin should direct an immediate return of Russian forces to their barracks; (4) the United States reaffirms its strong commitment to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances which was executed jointly with the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom to explicitly secure the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and borders of Ukraine; (5) the United States supports the continued professionalization of the Ukrainian military and should enhance United States direct security cooperation with the Ukrainian military; (6) the United States reaffirms its defense commitments to its treaty allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; (7) the United States supports the expansion of security cooperation with states in Central and Eastern Europe, including NATO member states, NATO aspirants, and appropriate Eastern Partnership countries; (8) the United States should seek immediate membership in NATO for Montenegro, a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia, a diplomatic solution to disputes between Macedonia and Greece, and seek resolution to the constitutional issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (9) the United States reaffirms its support for the Supreme Allied Commander of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe to support NATO efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully and diplomatically; (10) the United States encourages the North Atlantic Council to act in a timely manner to direct the Supreme Allied Commander of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe to begin the NATO Defense Planning Process to NATO contingency plans in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine, including in Crimea, and establish political guidance and determine military capability requirements to effectively posture NATO military forces; and (11) the United States should take immediate steps to enhance its military presence and readiness posture in Europe to deter aggression and assure allies and partners through forward presence and engagement. 3. Strategic framework for United States security force assistance and cooperation in the European and Eurasian regions (a) Strategic framework (1) In general The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop a strategic framework for United States security force assistance and cooperation in the European and Eurasian regions. (2) Elements The strategic framework required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) An evaluation of the extent to which the threat to security and stability in the European and Eurasian regions is a threat to the national security of the United States and the security interests of the NATO alliance. (B) An identification of the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states of United States security force assistance and cooperation programs in such regions and of the resources required to achieve such objectives, priorities, and end states. (C) A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of United States security force assistance and cooperation programs in such regions in making progress towards such objectives, priorities, and end-states, including an identification of key benchmarks for such progress. (D) Criteria for bilateral and multilateral partnerships in such regions. (b) Report (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the strategic framework required by subsection (a). (2) Form The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 4. Requirement for plan to increase intelligence and cyber cooperation with Ukraine (a) Plan required Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to— (1) increase United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities devoted to monitoring the situation in Ukraine; (2) increase United States intelligence information sharing and situational awareness to the maximum extent practicable with Ukraine utilizing appropriate bilateral channels and the NATO–Ukraine Commission; (3) provide military advice and technical assistance to the Ukrainian military to enhance their defensive preparations and posture; (4) convene NATO member states and Ukraine to review options and implement prudent steps to increase the defense of United States, NATO and Ukraine cyber networks; (5) work with NATO member states and the Ukrainian military to counter Russian propaganda; and (6) provide any other types of intelligence and cyber cooperation with Ukraine and NATO members that the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. (b) Form The plan required in subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Appropriate congressional committees In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 5. Enhancing presence and capabilities of United States military in Europe (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the President should immediately augment the Armed Forces of the United States in the area of responsibility of the United States European Command to ensure that the Commander of the United States European Command has the capabilities and capacity needed to meet operational plan requirements for response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in support of a NATO ally. (b) Notification Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees— (1) notification that the Secretary has commenced the augmentation described in subsection (a), including— (A) the means through which the United States European Command has been provided the capabilities and capacity described in such subsection, including with respect to cyber, special operations, and intelligence capabilities to counter or mitigate conventional, unconventional, and subversive activities of the Russian Federation within the area of responsibility of such command; and (B) how such capabilities and capacity meet operational plan requirements; or (2) a detailed justification of the Secretary for failing to— (A) commence such augmentation; and (B) ensure that the Commander of the United States European Command has such capabilities and capacity. 6. Enhancing readiness posture of United States military in Europe (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the President should— (1) immediately correct deficiencies in the readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States in the area of responsibility of the United States European Command to meet the operational plan requirements for a response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in support of a NATO ally; and (2) provide appropriate additional resources to NATO as needed to enhance the readiness of the forces of NATO member states if a response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is required. (b) Notification Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees— (1) notification that— (A) the Secretary has commenced the actions described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a); and (B) the current, as of the date of the notification, and the six-month projected readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States meet the augmentation described in section (4)(a); or (2) a detailed justification of the Secretary for failing to commence the actions described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a). 7. Posturing United States strategic capabilities (a) Aegis Ashore system (1) In general Not later than December 31, 2016, and pursuant to an agreement between the United States and the Government of Poland, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure the operational availability of the Aegis Ashore system site in Poland. (2) Relocation of assets The Secretary may relocate the necessary assets of the Aegis weapon system between and within the DDG–51 Class Destroyer program and the Aegis Ashore program to meet mission requirements. (3) Briefings The Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense committees quarterly briefings to update the status of the progress in carrying out paragraph (1). (b) Theater air and missile defense (1) Findings Congress finds the following: (A) A Patriot battery of the United States providing a short-range air and missile defense capability has previously been rotationally deployed to Poland, pursuant to an agreement between the United States and the Government of Poland, during a period occurring between 2010 to 2012. (B) The deployment of the Patriot battery did not include operational missiles and was not replaced with another short-range air and missile defense system upon completion of the deployment rotation in 2012. (2) Policy It is the policy of the United States that available short-range air and missile defense systems and terminal missile defense systems of the United States with operational missiles be rotationally deployed to central and eastern European allies, pursuant to agreements between the United States and such allies, to strength the air and missile defense capabilities of such allies. (3) Missile defense capability of Poland (A) Not later than December 31, 2014, and pursuant to an agreement between the United States and the Government of Poland, the Secretary of Defense shall deploy to Poland a system providing a short-range air and missile defense capability or terminal missile defense capability, or both, and the personnel required to operate and maintain such system. (B) No action may be taken to effect or implement the removal of the system or the personnel described in subparagraph (A) unless— (i) at least 30 days before the removal, the Secretary of Defense notifies the congressional defense committees that such removal is temporary and in the national security interests of the United States; or (ii) the removal is requested by the Government of Poland in the manner provided in the agreement between the United States and the Government of Poland regarding the system and personnel. (4) Notification The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate congressional committees by not later than 60 days after the date on which a NATO member state makes a request that communicates to the Secretary the interest of the member state in hosting missile defense capabilities described in paragraph (2) and the plan of the Secretary for addressing such request. (c) Forward Deployed Nuclear Weapons The Secretary of Defense shall immediately— (1) stop plans for the relocation and consolidation of dual-capable aircraft (as defined in section 497a of title 10, United States Code) of the United States that are based in Europe; (2) develop plans to temporarily base dual-capable aircraft of the United States in NATO member states that make requests to host such aircraft; (3) conduct siting studies for the construction of weapon storage and security systems and protective aircraft shelters in NATO members states that notify the Secretary of an interest in hosting such systems and shelters and to provide for reasonable burden sharing of associated non-recurring and recurring costs; and (4) coordinate with NATO member states on the policy considerations of a decision by the United States and its allies to alter the posture of forward deployed nuclear weapons and related capabilities of the United States. 8. Limitation on military contact and cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation (a) Limitation None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the Department of Defense may be used for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation between the Governments of the United States and the Russian Federation until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that— (1) the armed forces of the Russian Federation are no longer illegally occupying Ukrainian territory; (2) the Russian Federation is respecting the sovereignty of all Ukrainian territory; (3) the Russian Federation is no longer violating the INF Treaty; and (4) the Russian Federation is in compliance with the CFE Treaty and has lifted its suspension of Russian observance of its treaty obligations. (b) Waiver The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if— (1) the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, submits to the appropriate congressional committees— (A) a notification that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States and a description of the national security interest covered by the waiver; and (B) a report, in unclassified form, explaining why the Secretary of Defense cannot make the certification under subsection (a); and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the information in the report under subparagraph (B). (c) Exception for certain military bases The certification requirement specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall not apply to military bases of the Russian Federation in Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula operating in accordance with its 1997 agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet Stationing on the Territory of Ukraine. (d) Definition In this section, the term bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation (1) means— (A) reciprocal visits and meetings by high-ranking delegations; (B) information sharing, policy consultations, security dialogues or other forms of consultative discussions; (C) exchanges of military instructors, training personnel, and students; (D) exchanges of information; (E) defense planning; and (F) military training or exercises; but (2) does not include any contact or cooperation that is in support of United States stability operations. (e) Effective date This section takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to funds described in subsection (a) that are unobligated as of such date of enactment. 9. Limitation on non-proliferation activities between the United States and the Russian Federation (a) Limitation None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy may be used for any contact, cooperation, or transfer of technology between the United States and the Russian Federation until the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that— (1) the armed forces of the Russian Federation are no longer illegally occupying Ukrainian territory; (2) the Russian Federation is respecting the sovereignty of all Ukrainian territory; (3) the Russian Federation is no longer violating the INF Treaty; and (4) the Russian Federation is in compliance with the CFE Treaty and has lifted its suspension of Russian observance of its treaty obligations. (b) Waiver The Secretary of Energy may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if— (1) the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, submits to the appropriate congressional committees— (A) a notification that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States and a description of the national security interest covered by the waiver; and (B) a report, in an unclassified form, explaining why the Secretary of Energy cannot make a certification for such under subsection (a); and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of Energy submits the information in the report under subparagraph (B). (c) Exception for certain military bases The certification requirement specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall not apply to military bases of the Russian Federation in Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula operating in accordance with its 1997 agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet Stationing on the Territory of Ukraine. (d) Effective date This section takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to funds described in subsection (a) that are unobligated as of such date of enactment. 10. Annual report on military and security developments involving the Russian Federation (a) Report Not later than June 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Russian Federation (in this section referred to as Russia (b) Matters To be included A report required under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the security situation in regions neighboring Russia. (2) The goals and factors shaping Russian security strategy and military strategy. (3) Trends in Russian security and military behavior that would be designed to achieve, or that are consistent with, the goals described in paragraph (2). (4) An assessment of Russia’s global and regional security objectives, including objectives that would affect NATO, the Middle East, and the People’s Republic of China. (5) A detailed assessment of the sizes, locations, and capabilities of Russian nuclear, special operations, land, sea, and air forces. (6) Developments in Russian military doctrine and training. (7) An assessment of the proliferation activities of Russia and Russian entities, as a supplier of materials, technologies, or expertise relating to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or missile systems. (8) Developments in Russia’s asymmetric capabilities, including its strategy and efforts to develop and deploy cyberwarfare and electronic warfare capabilities, details on the number of malicious cyber incidents originating from Russia against Department of Defense infrastructure, and associated activities originating or suspected of originating from Russia. (9) The strategy and capabilities of Russian space and counterspace programs, including trends, global and regional activities, the involvement of military and civilian organizations, including state-owned enterprises, academic institutions, and commercial entities, and efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to advanced technologies that would enhance Russian military capabilities. (10) Developments in Russia’s nuclear program, including the size and state of Russia’s stockpile, its nuclear strategy and associated doctrines, its civil and military production capacities, and projections of its future arsenals. (11) A description of Russia’s anti-access and area denial capabilities. (12) A description of Russia’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance modernization program and its applications for Russia’s precision guided weapons. (13) In consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, developments regarding United States-Russian engagement and cooperation on security matters. (14) The current state of United States military-to-military contacts with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which shall include the following: (A) A comprehensive and coordinated strategy for such military-to-military contacts and updates to the strategy. (B) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the one-year period preceding the report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the Russian participants in those contacts. (C) A description of such military-to-military contacts scheduled for the 12-month period following such report and the plan for future contacts. (D) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Russians expect to gain from such military-to-military contacts. (E) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects to gain from such military-to-military contacts, and any concerns regarding such contacts. (F) The Secretary’s assessment of how such military-to-military contacts fit into the larger security relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. (15) A description of Russian military-to-military relationships with other countries, including the size and activity of military attaché offices around the world and military education programs conducted in Russia for other countries or in other countries for the Russians. (16) Other military and security developments involving Russia that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.

Summary: Forging Peace Through Strength in Ukraine and the Transatlantic Alliance Act - Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the continuing practice by the Russian Federation of physical, diplomatic, and economic aggression toward neighboring countries is clearly intended to undermine regional security and stability; (2) the Russian military build-up and aggressive posture on the eastern border of Ukraine represents an intent to intimidate Ukraine and its citizens to submit to Russian control; (3) the Russian Federation should immediately cease all improper and illegal activities in Ukraine and President Putin should direct an immediate return of Russian forces; (4) the United States reaffirms its commitment to explicitly secure the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and borders of Ukraine; (5) the United States supports the expansion of security cooperation with states in Central and Eastern Europe, including NATO member states, NATO aspirants, and appropriate Eastern Partnership countries; (6) the United States reaffirms support of NATO efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully and diplomatically; and (7) the United States should take immediate steps to enhance its military presence and readiness posture in Europe to deter aggression and assure its allies and partners through forward presence and engagement. Directs the Secretary of Defense (DOD) (Secretary) to develop and report on a strategic framework for U.S. security force assistance and cooperation in the European and Eurasian regions. Directs the President to submit a plan to: (1) increase U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities devoted to monitoring the situation in Ukraine; (2) increase U.S. intelligence information sharing and situational awareness to the maximum extent practicable with Ukraine utilizing appropriate bilateral channels and the NATO-Ukraine Commission; (3) provide military advice and technical assistance to the Ukrainian military to enhance their defensive preparations and posture; (4) convene NATO member states and Ukraine to review options and implement prudent steps to increase the defense of U.S., NATO, and Ukraine cyber networks; and (5) work with NATO member states and the Ukrainian military to counter Russian propaganda. Expresses the sense of Congress in support of the immediate augmentation of U.S. Armed Forces in the area of responsibility of the U.S. European Command in order to meet operational plan requirements for response in support of a NATO ally. Directs the Secretary to provide notification of such augmentation, as well as related information. Calls for the President to immediately correct deficiencies in the readiness of U.S. Armed Forces in such area and to provide appropriate additional resources to NATO as needed. Requires the Secretary to ensure the operational availability of the Aegis Ashore system site in Poland. Authorizes the Secretary to relocate the necessary assets of the Aegis weapon system between and within the DDG-51 Class Destroyer program and the Aegis Ashore program to meet mission requirements. States that it is the policy of the United States that available short-range air and missile defense systems and terminal missile defense systems of the United States with operational missiles be rotationally deployed to central and eastern European allies to strengthen their air and missile defense capabilities. Requires the Secretary: (1) by December 31, 2014, and pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Poland, to deploy to Poland a system providing a short-range air and missile defense capability and/or terminal missile defense capability and the personnel required to operate and maintain such system; (2) to stop plans for the relocation and consolidation of U.S. dual-capable aircraft that are based in Europe and develop plans to temporarily base such aircraft in NATO member states that request to host such aircraft; (3) to conduct siting studies for the construction of weapon storage and security systems and protective aircraft shelters in NATO member states that notify the Secretary of an interest in hosting such systems and shelters and to provide for reasonable burden sharing of associated costs; and (4) to coordinate with NATO member states on the policy considerations of a decision to alter the posture of forward deployed nuclear weapons and related capabilities of the United States. Prohibits FY2015 DOD funds from being used for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation until the Secretary makes certain certifications with respect to Russian recognition of the sovereignty of all Ukrainian territory and related matters. Allows a waiver in the U.S. national security interest. Prohibits FY2015 Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration funds from being used for any contract, cooperation, or transfer of technology between the United States and the Russian Federation until the Secretary of Energy makes certain certifications with respect to Russia's respect of Ukrainian territory and compliance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Allows a waiver in the national security interest. Directs the Secretary to report annually on the current and future military power of the Russian Federation.