SAFE Act

To protect elections for public office by providing financial support and enhanced security for the infrastructure used to carry out such elections, and for other purposes. 1. Short title; table of contents (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act SAFE Act (b) Table of contents The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Title I—Financial Support for Election Infrastructure Subtitle A—Voting System Security Improvement Grants Part 1—Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-Verified Permanent Paper Ballot Sec. 101. Short title. Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements. Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with disabilities. Sec. 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots. Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements. Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design. Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements. Part 2—Grants to Carry Out Improvements Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements. Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use of requirements payments and election administration requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002. Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions. Subtitle B—Risk-Limiting Audits Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits. Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits. Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits. Title II—Promoting Cybersecurity Through Improvements in Election Administration Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements. Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance with election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines. Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer. Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting systems. Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage. Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election information. Title III—Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States. Title IV—Severability Sec. 401. Severability. I Financial Support for Election Infrastructure A Voting System Security Improvement Grants 1 Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-Verified Permanent Paper Ballot 101. Short title This subtitle may be cited as the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements (a) In general Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2) (2) Paper ballot requirement (A) Voter-verified paper ballots (i) Paper ballot requirement (I) The voting system shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voter’s vote that shall be marked and made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted, and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other counting device. For purposes of this subclause, the term individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot (II) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with clause (ii). (III) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter’s vote without the voter’s consent. (ii) Preservation as official record The individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot used in accordance with clause (i) shall constitute the official ballot and shall be preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used. (iii) Manual counting requirements for recounts and audits (I) Each paper ballot used pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable for a manual audit, and shall be counted by hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office. (II) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast. (iv) Application to all ballots The requirements of this subparagraph shall apply to all ballots cast in elections for Federal office, including ballots cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and other absentee voters. (B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when paper ballots have been shown to be compromised (i) In general In the event that— (I) there is any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any election for Federal office; and (II) it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence (as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in the jurisdiction involved) in any recount, audit, or contest of the result of the election that the paper ballots have been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election could be changed, the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to the election shall be made in accordance with applicable State law, except that the electronic tally shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified result. (ii) Rule for consideration of ballots associated with each voting machine For purposes of clause (i), only the paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered in the calculation of whether or not the result of the election could be changed due to the compromised paper ballots. . (b) Conforming amendment clarifying applicability of alternative language accessibility Section 301(a)(4) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(4) (including the paper ballots required to be used under paragraph (2)) voting system (c) Other conforming amendments Section 301(a)(1) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(1) (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking counted counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) (2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking counted counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) (3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking counted counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) (4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking counted counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with disabilities (a) Ballot cybersecurity, confidentiality, and access for individuals with disabilities (1) In general Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)(B) (B) (i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least 1 voting system at each polling place that— (I) is equipped for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual and enhanced visual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, and contains features to support enhanced manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity impaired; (II) in the case of any election for Federal office occurring after the date that is 6 years after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act— (aa) marks ballots that are identical in size, ink, and paper stock to those ballots that would be marked by hand or a ballot marking device used by voters who do not have accessibility needs; (bb) marks the ballot in such a way that someone examining the ballot will not be able to readily determine whether the ballot was marked by hand or machine; and (cc) combines ballots produced by the voting system with ballots marked by voters using other types of voting systems used by the State or jurisdiction in a way that prevents identification of which ballots were cast using each voting system; and (III) is made available for use by any voter who requests to use it; and (ii) in the case of any election for Federal office occurring after the date that is 6 years after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act, meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that allows the voter to privately and independently verify the accuracy of the permanent paper ballot through the presentation, in accessible form, of the printed or marked vote selections from the same printed or marked information that would be used for any vote tabulation or auditing; and . (2) Clarification with respect to application of requirement to ballots marked at home Section 301(a)(3) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3) Nothing in subparagraph (B) shall be construed to prohibit the use of an accessible ballot that may be printed or marked by the voter at home. . (b) Specific requirement of study, testing, and development of accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms (1) Study and reporting Subtitle C of title II of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081 (A) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and (B) by inserting after section 246 the following new section: 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms (a) Study and report The Director of the National Science Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification, and casting mechanisms and devices and best practices to enhance the accessibility of paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are used. (b) Eligibility An entity is eligible to receive a grant under this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form as the Director may require) an application containing— (1) certifications that the entity shall specifically investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such ballots; (2) a certification that the entity shall complete the activities carried out with the grant not later than December 31, 2020; and (3) such other information and certifications as the Director may require. (c) Availability of technology Any technology developed with the grants made under this section shall be treated as non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public, including to manufacturers of voting systems. (d) Coordination with grants for technology improvements The Director shall carry out this section so that the activities carried out with the grants made under subsection (a) are coordinated with the research conducted under the grant program carried out by the Commission under section 271, to the extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology. (e) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to remain available until expended. . (2) Clerical amendment The table of contents of such Act is amended— (A) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as relating to section 248; and (B) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the following new item: Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms. . (c) Clarification of accessibility standards under voluntary voting system guidance In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the paper ballot verification requirements for individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such subtitle. (d) Permitting use of funds for protection and advocacy systems to support actions to enforce election-related disability access Section 292(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21062(a) ; except that 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (7) Durability and readability requirements for ballots (A) Durability requirements for paper ballots (i) In general All voter-verified paper ballots required to be used under this Act shall be marked or printed on durable paper. (ii) Definition For purposes of this Act, paper is durable (B) Readability requirements for paper ballots marked by ballot marking device All voter-verified paper ballots completed by the voter through the use of a ballot marking device shall be clearly readable by the voter without assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal vision enhancing devices) and by an optical character recognition device or other device equipped for individuals with disabilities. . 105. Paper ballot printing requirements (a) Requiring paper ballots to be printed on recycled paper manufactured in United States Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (8) Printing requirements for ballots All paper ballots used in an election for Federal office shall be printed in the United States on recycled paper manufactured in the United States. . (b) Effective date The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to elections occurring on or after January 1, 2021. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design (a) Study The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct a study of the best ways to design ballots used in elections for public office, including paper ballots and electronic or digital ballots, to minimize confusion and user errors. (b) Report Not later than January 1, 2020, the Election Assistance Commission shall submit to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection (a). 107. Effective date for new requirements Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(d) (d) Effective Date (1) In general Except as provided in paragraph (2), each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section on and after January 1, 2006. (2) Special rule for certain requirements (A) In general Except as provided in section 105(b) of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the requirements of this section which are first imposed on a State and jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 shall apply with respect to voting systems used for any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year. (B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper record printers or certain systems using or producing voter-verified paper records in 2018 (i) Delay In the case of a jurisdiction described in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system in the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to 2020 2022 (I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of subsection (a) (relating to the use of voter-verified paper ballots). (II) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and (II) of subsection (a) (relating to access to verification from and casting of the durable paper ballot). (III) Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) (relating to durability and readability requirements for ballots). (ii) Jurisdictions described A jurisdiction described in this clause is a jurisdiction— (I) which used voter-verified paper record printers attached to direct recording electronic voting machines, or which used other voting systems that used or produced paper records of the vote verifiable by voters but that are not in compliance with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II), and (7) of subsection (a) (as amended or added by the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019), for the administration of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2018; and (II) which will continue to use such printers or systems for the administration of elections for Federal office held in years before 2022. (iii) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at polling places using grandfathered printers and systems (I) Requiring ballots to be offered and provided The appropriate election official at each polling place that uses a printer or system described in clause (ii)(I) for the administration of elections for Federal office shall offer each individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the election at the polling place the opportunity to cast the vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot which the individual may mark by hand and which is not produced by the direct recording electronic voting machine or other such system. The official shall provide the individual with the ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the waiting period for the individual to cast a vote is the lesser of 30 minutes or the average waiting period for an individual who does not agree to cast the vote using such a paper ballot under this clause. (II) Treatment of ballot Any paper ballot which is cast by an individual under this clause shall be counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot for all purposes (including by incorporating it into the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) for the precinct) and not as a provisional ballot, unless the individual casting the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot. (III) Posting of notice The appropriate election official shall ensure there is prominently displayed at each polling place a notice that describes the obligation of the official to offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes using a pre-printed blank paper ballot. (IV) Training of election officials The chief State election official shall ensure that election officials at polling places in the State are aware of the requirements of this clause, including the requirement to display a notice under subclause (III), and are aware that it is a violation of the requirements of this title for an election official to fail to offer an individual the opportunity to cast a vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot. (V) Period of applicability The requirements of this clause apply only during the period in which the delay is in effect under clause (i). (C) Special rule for jurisdictions using certain nontabulating ballot marking devices In the case of a jurisdiction which uses a nontabulating ballot marking device which automatically deposits the ballot into a privacy sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system in the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year elections for Federal office occurring held in 2022 or each succeeding year . 2 Grants to Carry Out Improvements 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements (a) Availability of grants Subtitle D of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21001 7 Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements (a) Availability and use of grant The Commission shall make a grant to each eligible State— (1) to replace a voting system— (A) which does not meet the requirements which are first imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with a voting system which does meet such requirements, for use in the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November 2020, or (B) which does meet such requirements but which is not in compliance with the most recent voluntary voting system guidelines issued by the Commission prior to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2020 with another system which does meet such requirements and is in compliance with such guidelines; (2) to carry out voting system security improvements described in section 297A with respect to the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding election for Federal office; and (3) to implement and model best practices for ballot design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots. (b) Amount of grant The amount of a grant made to a State under this section shall be such amount as the Commission determines to be appropriate, except that such amount may not be less than the product of $1 and the average of the number of individuals who cast votes in any of the two most recent regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in the State. (c) Pro rata reductions If the amount of funds appropriated for grants under this part is insufficient to ensure that each State receives the amount of the grant calculated under subsection (b), the Commission shall make such pro rata reductions in such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that the entire amount appropriated under this part is distributed to the States. (d) Surplus appropriations If the amount of funds appropriated for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2) exceed the amount necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the following in making a determination to award remaining funds to a State: (1) The record of the State in carrying out the following with respect to the administration of elections for Federal office: (A) Providing voting machines that are less than 10 years old. (B) Implementing strong chain of custody procedures for the physical security of voting equipment and paper records at all stages of the process. (C) Conducting pre-election testing on every voting machine and ensuring that paper ballots are available wherever electronic machines are used. (D) Maintaining offline backups of voter registration lists. (E) Providing a secure voter registration database that logs requests submitted to the database. (F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detailing use limitations and security safeguards to protect the personal information of voters in the voter registration process. (G) Providing secure processes and procedures for reporting vote tallies. (H) Providing a secure platform for disseminating vote totals. (2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation and reform in providing voting system security and the proposed plan of the State for implementing additional conditions. (3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant stakeholders, including local election officials, in developing the grant implementation plan described in section 297B. (4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities carried out with the grant. (e) Ability of replacement systems to administer ranked choice elections To the greatest extent practicable, an eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting system under this section shall ensure that the replacement system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice voting under which each voter shall rank the candidates for the office in the order of the voter’s preference. 297A. Voting system security improvements described (a) Permitted uses A voting system security improvement described in this section is any of the following: (1) The acquisition of goods and services from qualified election infrastructure vendors by purchase, lease, or such other arrangements as may be appropriate. (2) Cyber and risk mitigation training. (3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of the State’s election infrastructure which is carried out by a provider of cybersecurity services under a contract entered into between the chief State election official and the provider. (4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, including addressing risks and vulnerabilities which are identified under either of the security risk and vulnerability assessments described in paragraph (3), except that none of the funds provided under this part may be used to renovate or replace a building or facility which is used primarily for purposes other than the administration of elections for public office. (5) Providing increased technical support for any information technology infrastructure that the chief State election official deems to be part of the State’s election infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of the State’s election infrastructure. (6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the information technology infrastructure described in paragraph (4). (7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration systems. (b) Qualified election infrastructure vendors described (1) In general For purposes of this part, a qualified election infrastructure vendor (2) Criteria The criteria described in this paragraph are such criteria as the Chairman, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and publish, and shall include each of the following requirements: (A) The vendor must be owned and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. (B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman and the Secretary, and to the chief State election official of any State to which the vendor provides any goods and services with funds provided under this part, of any sourcing outside the United States for parts of the election infrastructure. (C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the election infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices issued by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. (D) The vendor agrees to maintain its information technology infrastructure in a manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices issued by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. (E) The vendor agrees to meet the requirements of paragraph (3) with respect to any known or suspected cybersecurity incidents involving any of the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part. (F) The vendor agrees to permit independent security testing by the Commission (in accordance with section 231(a)) and by the Secretary of the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part. (3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements (A) In general A vendor meets the requirements of this paragraph if, upon becoming aware of the possibility that an election cybersecurity incident has occurred involving any of the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part— (i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or not such an incident occurred, and submits a notification meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and the Chairman of the assessment as soon as practicable (but in no case later than 3 days after the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility that the incident occurred); (ii) if the incident involves goods or services provided to an election agency, the vendor submits a notification meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B) to the agency as soon as practicable (but in no case later than 3 days after the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility that the incident occurred), and cooperates with the agency in providing any other necessary notifications relating to the incident; and (iii) the vendor provides all necessary updates to any notification submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii). (B) Contents of notifications Each notification submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall contain the following information with respect to any election cybersecurity incident covered by the notification: (i) The date, time, and time zone when the election cybersecurity incident began, if known. (ii) The date, time, and time zone when the election cybersecurity incident was detected. (iii) The date, time, and duration of the election cybersecurity incident. (iv) The circumstances of the election cybersecurity incident, including the specific election infrastructure systems believed to have been accessed and information acquired, if any. (v) Any planned and implemented technical measures to respond to and recover from the incident. (vi) In the case of any notification which is an update to a prior notification, any additional material information relating to the incident, including technical data, as it becomes available. 297B. Eligibility of States A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the State submits to the Commission, at such time and in such form as the Commission may require, an application containing— (1) a description of how the State will use the grant to carry out the activities authorized under this part; (2) a certification and assurance that, not later than 5 years after receiving the grant, the State will carry out voting system security improvements, as described in section 297A; and (3) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require. 297C. Reports to Congress Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees, including the Committees on Homeland Security, House Administration, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules and Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried out with the funds provided under this part. 297D. Authorization of appropriations (a) Authorization There are authorized to be appropriated for grants under this part— (1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and (2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026. (b) Continuing availability of amounts Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section shall remain available until expended. . (b) Clerical amendment The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following: Part 7—Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements. Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described. Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States. Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress. Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations. . 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use of requirements payments and election administration requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002 (a) Duties of Election Assistance Commission Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20922 by and the security of election infrastructure by (b) Membership of Secretary of Homeland Security on Board of Advisors of Election Assistance Commission Section 214(a) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 20944(a) (1) by striking 37 members 38 members (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: (17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary’s designee. . (c) Representative of Department of Homeland Security on Technical Guidelines Development Committee Section 221(c)(1) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 20961(c)(1) (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraph: (E) A representative of the Department of Homeland Security. . (d) Goals of periodic studies of election administration issues; consultation with Secretary of Homeland Security Section 241(a) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 20981(a) (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking the Commission shall the Commission, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as appropriate), shall (2) by striking and (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph: (4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the integrity of election systems by cyber or other means; and . (e) Requirements payments (1) Use of payments for voting system security improvements Section 251(b) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21001(b) (4) Permitting use of payments for voting system security improvements A State may use a requirements payment to carry out any of the following activities: (A) Cyber and risk mitigation training. (B) Providing increased technical support for any information technology infrastructure that the chief State election official deems to be part of the State’s election infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of the State’s election infrastructure. (C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the information technology infrastructure described in subparagraph (B). (D) Enhancing the security of voter registration databases. . (2) Incorporation of election infrastructure protection in State plans for use of payments Section 254(a)(1) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21004(a)(1) , including the protection of election infrastructure. (3) Composition of committee responsible for developing State plan for use of payments Section 255 of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21005 (A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection: (b) Geographic representation The members of the committee shall be a representative group of individuals from the State’s counties, cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and shall represent the needs of rural as well as urban areas of the State, as the case may be. . (f) Ensuring protection of computerized Statewide voter registration list Section 303(a)(3) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21083(a)(3) , as well as other measures to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents, as identified by the Commission, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. 113. Incorporation of definitions (a) In general Section 901 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21141 901. Definitions In this Act, the following definitions apply: (1) The term cybersecurity incident incident 6 U.S.C. 148 (2) The term election agency (3) The term election infrastructure (4) The term State . (b) Clerical amendment The table of contents of such Act is amended by amending the item relating to section 901 to read as follows: Sec. 901. Definitions. . B Risk-Limiting Audits 121. Risk-limiting audits (a) In general Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081 303A. Risk-limiting audits (a) Definitions In this section: (1) Risk-limiting audit The term risk-limiting audit (A) has a probability of at least 95 percent of correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome is not the correct outcome; (B) will not change the outcome if the reported outcome is the correct outcome; and (C) involves a manual adjudication of voter intent from some or all of the ballots validly cast in the election contest. (2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome (A) Reported outcome The term reported outcome (B) Correct outcome The term correct outcome (C) Outcome The term outcome (3) Manual adjudication of voter intent The term manual adjudication of voter intent (4) Ballot manifest The term ballot manifest (A) is created without reliance on any part of the voting system used to tabulate votes; (B) functions as a sampling frame for conducting a risk-limiting audit; and (C) accounts for all ballots validly cast regardless of how or whether they were tabulated and includes a precise description of the manner in which the ballots are physically stored, including the total number of physical groups of ballots, the numbering system for each group, a unique label for each group, and the number of ballots in each such group. (b) Requirements (1) In general (A) Audits (i) In general Each State and jurisdiction shall administer risk-limiting audits of the results of all election contests for Federal office held in the State in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2). (ii) Exception Clause (i) shall not apply to any election contest for which the State or jurisdiction conducts a full recount through a manual adjudication of voter intent. (B) Full manual tabulation If a risk-limiting audit conducted under subparagraph (A) corrects the reported outcome of an election contest, the State or jurisdiction shall use the results of the manual adjudication of voter intent conducted as part of the risk-limiting audit as the official results of the election contest. (2) Audit requirements (A) Rules and procedures (i) In general Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the chief State election official of the State shall establish rules and procedures for conducting risk-limiting audits. (ii) Matters included The rules and procedures established under clause (i) shall include the following: (I) Rules and procedures for ensuring the security of ballots and documenting that prescribed procedures were followed. (II) Rules and procedures for ensuring the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by jurisdictions. (III) Rules and procedures for governing the format of ballot manifests and other data involved in risk-limiting audits. (IV) Methods to ensure that any cast vote records used in a risk-limiting audit are those used by the voting system to tally the results of the election contest sent to the chief State election official of the State and made public. (V) Rules and procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit. (VI) Rules and procedures for the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit and to determine whether and when the audit of each election contest is complete. (VII) Rules and procedures for testing any software used to conduct risk-limiting audits. (B) Public report (i) In general After the completion of the risk-limiting audit and at least 5 days before the election contest is certified, the State shall publish a report on the results of the audit, together with such information as necessary to confirm that the audit was conducted properly. (ii) Format of data All data published with the report under clause (i) shall be published in machine-readable, open data formats. (iii) Protection of anonymity of votes Information and data published by the State under this subparagraph shall not compromise the anonymity of votes. (c) Effective date Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section for the first regularly scheduled election for Federal office held more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act and for each subsequent election for Federal office. . (b) Conforming amendments related to enforcement Section 401 of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21111 and 303 303, and 303A (c) Clerical Amendment The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the following new item: Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits. . 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits (a) Payments to States Subtitle D of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21001 8 Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits (a) In general The Commission shall pay to States the amount of eligible post-election audit costs. (b) Eligible post-election audit costs For purposes of this section, the term eligible post-election audit costs (1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as defined in section 303A) with respect to an election for Federal office occurring after the date of the enactment of this part; and (2) any equipment, software, or services necessary for the conduct of any such risk-limiting audit. (c) Special rules (1) Rules and procedures The Commission shall establish rules and procedures for submission of eligible post-election audit costs for payments under this section. (2) Insufficient funds In any case in which the amounts appropriated under subsection (d) are insufficient to pay all eligible post-election audit costs submitted by States with respect to any Federal election, the amount of such costs paid under subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the amount that bears the same ratio to the amount which would be paid to such State (determined without regard to this paragraph) as— (A) the number of individuals who voted in such Federal election in such State; bears to (B) the total number of individuals who voted in such Federal election in all States submitting a claim for eligible post-election audit costs. (d) Authorization of appropriations (1) In general There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to carry out this part. (2) Availability Any amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal year limitation until expended. . (b) Clerical amendment The table of contents of such Act, as amended by section 111(b), is further amended by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following: Part 8—Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits. . 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits (a) Analysis Not later than 6 months after the first elections for Federal office is held for which States must conduct risk-limiting audits under section 303A of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by section 121), the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an analysis of the extent to which such audits have improved the administration of such elections and the security of election infrastructure in the States receiving such grants. (b) Report The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a report on the analysis conducted under subsection (a) to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate. II Promoting Cybersecurity Through Improvements in Election Administration 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements (a) Ballot tabulating devices Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (9) Ballot tabulating methods (A) In general The voting system tabulates ballots by hand or through the use of an optical scanning device that meets the requirements of subparagraph (B). (B) Requirements for optical scanning devices Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the requirements of this subparagraph are as follows: (i) The device is designed and built in a manner in which it is mechanically impossible for the device to add or change the vote selections on a printed or marked ballot. (ii) The device is capable of exporting its data (including vote tally data sets and cast vote records) in a machine-readable, open data standard format required by the Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. (iii) The device consists of hardware that— (I) is certified under section 2216 of the Homeland Security Act; and (II) demonstrably conforms to a hardware component manifest describing point-of-origin information (including upstream hardware supply chain information for each component) that— (aa) has been provided to the Commission, the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security under section 2215 of the Homeland Security Act, and the chief State election official for each State in which the device is used; and (bb) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been provided under item (aa) with independent experts for cybersecurity analysis. (iv) The device utilizes technology that prevents the operation of the device if any hardware components do not meet the requirements of clause (iii). (v) The device operates using software— (I) for which the source code, system build tools, and compilation parameters— (aa) have been provided to the Commission, the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security under section 2215 of the Homeland Security Act, and the chief State election official for each State in which the device is used; and (bb) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been provided under item (aa) with independent experts for cybersecurity analysis; and (II) that is certified under section 2216 of the Homeland Security Act. (vi) The device utilizes technology that prevents the running of software on the device that does not meet the requirements of clause (v). (vii) The device utilizes technology that enables election officials, cybersecurity researchers, and voters to verify that the software running on the device— (I) was built from a specific, untampered version of the code that is described in clause (v); and (II) uses the system build tools and compilation parameters that are described in clause (v). (viii) The device contains such other security requirements as the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security requires. (C) Waiver (i) In general The Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, may waive one or more of the requirements of subparagraph (B) (other than the requirement of clause (i) thereof) with respect to any device for a period of not to exceed 2 years. (ii) Publication Information relating to any waiver granted under clause (i) shall be made publicly available on the Internet. (D) Effective date Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2024, and for each subsequent election for Federal office. . (b) Other cybersecurity requirements Section 301(a) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications devices in systems or devices (A) In general No system or device upon which ballot marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters (except as necessary for individuals with disabilities to use ballot marking devices that meet the accessibility requirements of paragraph (3)), or upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, or concealed communication device. (B) Effective date Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal office. (11) Prohibiting connection of system to the internet (A) In general No system or device upon which ballot marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters, or upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall be connected to the Internet or any non-local computer system via telephone or other communication network at any time. (B) Effective date Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal office. . (c) Special cybersecurity rules for certain ballot marking devices (1) In general Section 301(a) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (13) Ballot marking devices (A) In general In the case of a voting system that uses a ballot marking device, the ballot marking device shall be a device that— (i) is not capable of tabulating votes; (ii) except in the case of a ballot marking device used exclusively to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3), is certified in accordance with section 232 as meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B); and (iii) is certified under section 2216 of the Homeland Security Act as meeting the requirements of clauses (iii) through (viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B). (B) Requirements (i) In general A ballot marking device meets the requirements of this subparagraph if, during a double-masked test conducted by a qualified independent user experience research laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of a simulated election scenario which meets the requirements of clause (ii), there is less than a 5 percent chance that an ordinary voter using the device would not detect and report any difference between the vote selection printed on the ballot by the ballot marking device and the vote selection indicated by the voter. (ii) Simulated election scenario A simulated election scenario meets the requirements of this clause if it is conducted with— (I) a pool of subjects that are— (aa) diverse in age, gender, education, and physical limitations; and (bb) representative of the communities in which the voting system will be used; and (II) ballots that are representative of ballots ordinarily used in the communities in which the voting system will be used. (C) Effective date Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2022, and for each subsequent election for Federal office. . (2) Procedure for testing (A) In general Subtitle B of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20971 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices (a) In general Any State or jurisdiction which intends to use a ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking device used exclusively to comply with the requirements of section 301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may submit an application to the Commission for testing and certification under this section. (b) Application, assignment, and testing (1) In general An application under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 18 months before the date of the election for Federal office in which the ballot marking device is intended to be used and shall contain such information as the Commission requires. (2) Assignment Upon receipt of an application for testing under this section, the Commission shall contract with a qualified independent user experience research laboratory for the testing of whether the ballot marking device intended to be used by the State or jurisdiction meets the requirements of section 301(a)(10)(B). (3) Requirements for testing Any contract described in paragraph (2) shall require the qualified independent user experience research laboratory to— (A) not later than 30 days before testing begins, submit to the Commission for approval the protocol for the simulated election scenario used for testing the ballot marking device; (B) use only protocols approved by the Commission in conducting such testing; and (C) submit to the Commission a report on the results of the testing. (4) Qualified independent user experience research laboratory For purposes of this section: (A) In general The term qualified independent user experience research laboratory (B) Criteria A laboratory shall not be accredited under this subsection unless such laboratory demonstrates that— (i) no employee of, or individual with an ownership in, such laboratory has, or has had during the 5 preceding years, any financial relationship with a manufacturer of voting systems; and (ii) any group of individuals conducting tests under this section collectively meet the following qualifications: (I) Experience designing and running user research studies and experiments using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. (II) Experience with voting systems. (c) Review by independent board (1) In general The Commission shall submit for approval to an independent review board established under paragraph (3) the following: (A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission under subsection (b)(3)(A). (B) Any report submitted to the Commission under subsection (b)(3)(C). (2) Final approval Not later than the date that is 12 months before the date of the election for Federal office in which a State or jurisdiction intends to use the ballot marking device, the independent review board shall report to the Commission on whether it has approved a report submitted under paragraph (1)(B). (3) Independent review board (A) In general An independent review board established under this paragraph shall be composed of 5 independent scientists appointed by the Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. (B) Qualifications The members of the independent review board— (i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-reviewed publications in the following fields: cognitive psychology, experimental design, statistics, and user experience research and testing; and (ii) may not have, or have had during the 5 preceding years, any financial relationship with a manufacturer of voting systems. (4) Publication The Commission shall make public— (A) any protocol approved under this subsection; (B) any report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C); and (C) any determination made by an independent review board under paragraph (2). (d) Certification If— (1) a ballot marking device is determined by the qualified independent user experience research laboratory to meet the requirements of section 301(a)(7); and (2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) is approved by a majority of the members of the independent review board under subsection (d)(2), then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device. (e) Prohibition on fees The Commission may not charge any fee to a State or jurisdiction, a developer or manufacturer of a ballot marking device, or any other person in connection with testing and certification under this section. . (B) Conforming amendments (i) Section 202(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20922(2) and ballot marking devices hardware and software (ii) The heading for subtitle B of title II of such Act is amended by inserting at the end ; ballot marking devices (iii) The table of contents of such Act is amended— (I) by inserting ; Ballot Marking Devices (II) by inserting after the item related to section 231 the following: Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices. . 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance with election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines (a) Requiring testing of existing voting systems (1) In general Section 231(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20971(a) (3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines (A) Testing Not later than 9 months before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the Commission shall provide for the testing by accredited laboratories under this section of the voting system hardware and software which was certified for use in the most recent such election, on the basis of the most recent voting system guidelines applicable to such hardware or software (including election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this Act. (B) Decertification of hardware or software failing to meet guidelines If, on the basis of the testing described in subparagraph (A), the Commission determines that any voting system hardware or software does not meet the most recent guidelines applicable to such hardware or software issued under this Act, the Commission shall decertify such hardware or software. . (2) Effective date The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal office. (b) Issuance of cybersecurity guidelines by Technical Guidelines Development Committee Section 221(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20961(b) (3) Election cybersecurity guidelines Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act, the Development Committee shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, operating, and updating election systems to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents. . 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer (a) Requirement Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer (A) Requiring use of software for which source code is disclosed by manufacturer (i) In general In the operation of voting systems in an election for Federal office, a State may only use software for which the manufacturer makes the source code (in the form in which will be used at the time of the election) publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in such source code, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who obtains the software from using the software in a manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity activity. (ii) Exceptions Clause (i) does not apply with respect to— (I) widely-used operating system software which is not specific to voting systems and for which the source code or baseline functionality is not altered; or (II) widely-used cybersecurity software which is not specific to voting systems and for which the source code or baseline functionality is not altered. (B) Requiring use of hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer (i) Requiring disclosure of hardware A State may not use a voting system in an election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the identification of the hardware used to operate the system. (ii) Additional disclosure requirements for custom or altered hardware To the extent that the hardware used to operate a voting system or any component thereof is not widely-used, or is widely-used but is altered, the State may not use the system in an election for Federal office unless— (I) the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the components of the hardware, the design of such components, and how such components are connected in the operation of the system; and (II) the manufacturer makes the design (in the form which will be used at the time of the election) publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in the design of the hardware or the component, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who obtains the design from using the design in a manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity activity. . (b) Effective date The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting systems (a) Inclusion in definition of voting system Section 301(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(b) (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking this section this Act (2) by striking and (3) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and (4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: (2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the election; and . (b) Definition Section 301 of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081 (1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection: (c) Electronic poll book defined In this Act, the term electronic poll book (1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling location, or vote center, or other location at which voters cast votes in an election for Federal office; and (2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to vote in an election. . (c) Effective date Section 301(e) of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(e) , or, with respect to any requirements relating to electronic poll books, on and after January 1, 2020. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage (a) Requiring States to submit reports Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage (a) Requiring States to submit reports Not later than 120 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the chief State election official of a State shall submit a report to the Commission containing a detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction in the State which will administer the election, including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll books and other equipment and components of such system. (b) Effective date Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal office. . (b) Conforming amendment relating to enforcement Section 401 of such Act ( 52 U.S.C. 21111 sections 301, 302, and 303 subtitle A of title III (c) Clerical amendment The table of contents of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 301 the following new item: Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage. . 206. Streamlining collection of election information Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 20922 (1) by striking The Commission (a) In general (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: (b) Waiver of certain requirements Subchapter I of chapter 35 . III Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( 52 U.S.C. 21081(a) (10) Voting machine requirements By not later than the date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in any subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in the United States. . IV Severability 401. Severability If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding. June 26, 2019 Reported from the Committee on House Administration June 26, 2019 Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Summary: Securing America's Federal Elections Act or the SAFE Act This bill addresses election security through grant programs and requirements for voting systems and paper ballots. The bill establishes requirements for voting systems, including that systems (1) use individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots; (2) make a voter's marked ballot available for inspection and verification by the voter before the vote is cast; (3) ensure that individuals with disabilities are given an equivalent opportunity to vote, including with privacy and independence, in a manner that produces a voter-verified paper ballot; (4) be manufactured in the United States; and (5) meet specified cybersecurity requirements, including the prohibition of the connection of a voting system to the internet. The National Science Foundation must award grants to study, test, and develop accessible voter-verified paper ballot voting and best practices to enhance the accessibility of such voting for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) must award grants to states to replace certain voting systems, carry out voting system security improvements, and implement and model best practices for ballot design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots. States must carry out postelection risk-limiting audits for all federal elections, funded by the EAC. States may use elections requirements payments from the EAC to carry out activities related to election security. The EAC must provide for the testing of voting system hardware and software and decertify such technology that does not meet guidelines.