CVE-2023-53198 (published 2025-09-15 14:15:42.223000+00:00)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

raw: Fix NULL deref in raw_get_next().

Dae R. Jeong reported a NULL deref in raw_get_next() [0].

It seems that the repro was running these sequences in parallel so
that one thread was iterating on a socket that was being freed in
another netns.

  unshare(0x40060200)
  r0 = syz_open_procfs(0x0, &(0x7f0000002080)='net/raw\x00')
  socket$inet_icmp_raw(0x2, 0x3, 0x1)
  pread64(r0, &(0x7f0000000000)=""/10, 0xa, 0x10000000007f)

After commit 0daf07e52709 ("raw: convert raw sockets to RCU"), we
use RCU and hlist_nulls_for_each_entry() to iterate over SOCK_RAW
sockets.  However, we should use spinlock for slow paths to avoid
the NULL deref.

Also, SOCK_RAW does not use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, and the slab object
is not reused during iteration in the grace period.  In fact, the
lockless readers do not check the nulls marker with get_nulls_value().
So, SOCK_RAW should use hlist instead of hlist_nulls.

Instead of adding an unnecessary barrier by sk_nulls_for_each_rcu(),
let's convert hlist_nulls to hlist and use sk_for_each_rcu() for
fast paths and sk_for_each() and spinlock for /proc/net/raw.

[0]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 2 PID: 20952 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-g048ec869bafd-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:383 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:649 [inline]
RIP: 0010:raw_get_next net/ipv4/raw.c:974 [inline]
RIP: 0010:raw_get_idx net/ipv4/raw.c:986 [inline]
RIP: 0010:raw_seq_start+0x431/0x800 net/ipv4/raw.c:995
Code: ef e8 33 3d 94 f7 49 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ef e8 b7 65 5f f7 49 89 ed 49 83 c5 98 0f 84 9a 00 00 00 48 83 c5 c8 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 00 3d 94 f7 4c 8b 7d 00 48 89 ef
RSP: 0018:ffffc9001154f9b0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 1ffff1100302c8fd RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: ffffc9001154f988 RDI: ffffc9000f77a338
RBP: 0000000000000029 R08: ffffffff8a50ffb4 R09: fffffbfff24b6bd9
R10: fffffbfff24b6bd9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801db73b78
R13: fffffffffffffff9 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000030
FS:  00007f843ae8e700(0000) GS:ffff888063700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055bb9614b35f CR3: 000000003c672000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 seq_read_iter+0x4c6/0x10f0 fs/seq_file.c:225
 seq_read+0x224/0x320 fs/seq_file.c:162
 pde_read fs/proc/inode.c:316 [inline]
 proc_reg_read+0x23f/0x330 fs/proc/inode.c:328
 vfs_read+0x31e/0xd30 fs/read_write.c:468
 ksys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:665 [inline]
 __do_sys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:675 [inline]
 __se_sys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:672 [inline]
 __x64_sys_pread64+0x1e9/0x280 fs/read_write.c:672
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4e/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x478d29
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f843ae8dbe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000791408 RCX: 0000000000478d29
RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000f477909a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000010000000007f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000791740
R13: 0000000000791414 R14: 0000000000791408 R15: 00007ffc2eb48a50
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010
---truncated---